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Betterness of permissibility

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Ferguson, Benjamin and Köhler, Sebastian (2020) Betterness of permissibility. Philosophical Studies, 177 . pp. 2451-2469. doi:10.1007/s11098-019-01319-8 ISSN 0031-8116.

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01319-8

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Abstract

It is often assumed that morally permissible acts are morally better than impermissible acts. We call this claim Betterness of Permissibility. Yet, we show that some striking counterexamples show that the claim’s truth cannot be taken for granted. Furthermore, even if Betterness of Permissibility is true, it is unclear why. Apart from appeals to its intuitive plausibility, no arguments in favour of the condition exist. We fill this lacuna by identifying two fundamental conditions that jointly entail betterness of permissibility: ‘reasons monotonicity of permissibility’ and the ‘weak classical view’. We then argue that there are good reasons for accepting both of the fundamental conditions. We note that there exist plausible moral theories that reject one of the fundamental conditions. However, the way in which those theories reject the fundamental conditions does not allow them to endorse the counterexamples that motivate the belief that Betterness of Permissibility might be false.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Intention, Ethics, Values, Responsibility
Journal or Publication Title: Philosophical Studies
Publisher: Springer
ISSN: 0031-8116
Official Date: September 2020
Dates:
DateEvent
September 2020Published
18 June 2019Available
Volume: 177
Page Range: pp. 2451-2469
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-019-01319-8
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Open Access (Creative Commons)
Date of first compliant deposit: 21 October 2019
Date of first compliant Open Access: 21 October 2019
RIOXX Funder/Project Grant:
Project/Grant IDRIOXX Funder NameFunder ID
275-20-063[NWO] Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoekhttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100003246
Is Part Of: 1

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