Introduction

In this article, I examine the concept of global governance. Both global and governance are contested and important concepts. The first indicates the scope and scale of today’s world of production, consumption and exchange and the other encapsulates the shift from ‘state/government’ to ‘multi-layered’ governance not only of states and markets but also of interstate relations and security. I argue that the shift from government to governance is a response to the needs of a gendered global capitalist economy and is shaped by struggles, both discursive and material, against the unfolding consequences of globalisation. In making my case I begin by reviewing three key areas in the global governance debate. These are the place of globalised markets and new regulatory regimes, the place of the state within the global political economy and the challenges it faces, and the processes of democratisation that can be seen as a bridge between shifts in state/market relations and the emerging governance framework. I argue that mainstream global governance debates would gain much from the insights that feminists have developed on key issues of knowledge, reasoning and epistemic communities, on the economic and social consequences of disciplinary neoliberalism and on the politics of engagement with institutions of power. I also suggest that this shift from government poses challenges for feminist political practice. These challenges are both of scholarship and of activism as feminists struggle to address the possibilities and politics of alternatives to the current regimes of governance.

Ideologies of Global Governance

Governance emerges as a concept in the post-Cold War and some would call it a ‘post-statist’ period of the 1980s. We can easily pick up the threads of liberal triumphalism in the discourse of convergence that was articulated at this time (see for example, Fukayama, 1991; Huntington, 1995 and Barber, 1996). In post-cold war sketches of the world system in late twentieth century, liberal values triumph over others; aspects of western civilisation over other cultures; and modernity’s concerns are resolved through these triumphs. Struggles within the parameters of other cultures, religions, and ideologies, upon this envisioning, are doomed to failure unless they...
recognise the impossibility of reform from within. The logical conclusion then is that a liberal world is the only future that we can ‘rationally’ look forward to if we wish to live civilised, non-violent and democratic lives. The ‘clash of civilisations’ scenario takes on tremendous force in the context of the September 11 attacks upon the World Trade Centre, and the idea of governance faces its first major challenge. The ‘war on terror’ has become a part of the governance discourse – Afghanistan and Iraq both become examples of an active engagement with the politics of convergence. Non-liberal regimes, especially those that defy rather than work with western ‘civilisation’ become legitimate targets of attack and reconfiguration. This western civilisation is also a ‘market civilisation’ (Gill, 1995:399) where the individual competes for resources in the market and where the market civilisation “tends to generate a perspective on the world that is ahistorical, economistic, materialistic, ‘me-oriented’ short-termist, and ecologically myopic.” (ibid.)

Four different strands thus become visible when we examine the context in which ‘governance’ emerged as a discourse. First, was the collapse of the Soviet Union and the beginning of the post-Cold War period in the international system. Second, and building on this, was the convergence of economic policies under globalisation within the neo-liberal framework which, arguably, are being embedded through mechanisms of global governance. Third, as a consequence of the collapse of ‘communism’ and the rise and dominance of the neo-liberal framework in the global economy, was a re-examination of the role of the state in the context of the post-Cold War globalisation. And finally, was the emergence of the discourse of democratisation as the most appropriate framework within which both political and economic transitions could be accomplished – democracy became the bulwark against both forms of totalitarianism as well as the return to state managed economies. The concept, indeed ideology, of global governance has come to take account of all these strands. In the following sections I will reflect upon three of the four strands noted above: neo-liberalism and global governance, the ‘failing’ state and democratisation.

*Neo-liberalism and Global Governance*

Neo-liberal economic theory is the ascendant framework for global governance. The discourse of neo-liberalism, then emphasises, and indeed normalises, the “efficiency, welfare and the freedom of the market, and self-actualisation through the process of consumption” (Gill, 1995:401) even though the outcomes of these policies are contradictory, hierarchical and inefficient to protect human life and the world in which we live. This discourse of the market also has another message – if market based competition is the most efficient way of allocating resources in society, then any attempts to interfere in its functioning would be per se inimical to the ‘greater good’. The dominant actors, in the context of globalisation, are those that control trans-national capital that is the motor behind much of economic activity –

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4 Asked about the place of the US in the international system Secretary of State for Defence Donald Rumsfeld replied “I honestly believe that every country ought to do what it wants to do…It is either proud of it afterwards or it is less proud of itself” (The Guardian, 11.02.04: 25). Can global governance institutions constrain and contain the might of the US?

5 A liberal reformulation of this position would be that global governance regime is needed for the provision of global public goods, such as a sustainable environment, as well as regulation of global public bads, such as international crime (Nayar and Court, 2002: vii). Neither a sustainable environment nor international crime, however, can be understood without reflecting upon the social contradictions that give rise to unsustainable environments and to the growth of international crime.
through the circulation of money, through speculation on money markets, and capital movements as well as through tax evasion and money laundering. The market then, though far from a level playing field, is given the primary political space in the discourse of globalisation.

The market is institutionalised not only in the functioning of global capitalism but also through the institutions of global governance. This, to quote Gill, is done through the process of ‘new constitutionalism’ - in contrast to traditional constitutionalism that is associated with the state - which “can be defined as the political project of attempting to make transnational liberalism, and if possible liberal democratic capitalism the sole model for future development” (ibid.:412). It is in this project that institutions of global governance – the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO - become stronger vis as vis the state, that are presented as neutral players seeking maximum economic efficiency for all through attempting to ensure ‘fair dealing’ in the markets. These institutions also symbolise the separation of the economic from the political, thus taking the heat out of macro-economic policy making. Indeed, the very term governance emerges because the increasingly important Bretton Woods agencies are not mandated to challenge the primary position of state actors. Governance or indeed, ‘good governance’ then becomes a measure “to refer to the capacity of governments to formulate and implement policies and processes by which authority is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources.” (Faundez, 1997:6) Law is an important part of institutionalising neoliberalism: (World Bank, 1992) through providing the following: “(a) … a set of rules known in advance; (b) [ensuring that] the rules are actually in force; (c) [that] there are mechanisms ensuring application of the rules; (d) [that] conflicts are decided through binding decisions of an independent body; and (e) there are procedures for amending the rules when they no longer serve their purpose” (p. 30). Rules, then, are critical to ‘good governance’ – rules that stabilise neoliberalism through state law, but which are disciplinary in the global sense.

Finally, market dominated, state sceptical governance also takes a privatising turn. Through internal regulatory mechanisms such as voluntary codes of conduct, transnational capital seeks to limit external scrutiny of its production regimes and the impact of these on labour and the environment in particular. The stabilisation of these privatised forms of governance takes place through recognition by international organisations of these initiatives. However, NGOs and social movements also play a part in challenging internal regulation by scrutinising both the parameters of the codes and mechanisms for the implementations.

Gendered Markets
If markets are crucial to the understanding of the current phase of globalisation - through the mechanisms of global production (labour) and exchange (goods and services), of regulation that spans not one country but regions and (with the increased

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6 One could argue that this disciplinary neo-liberalism is clearly evident in the increasing convergence between the economic policy frameworks of the World Bank and the UNDP, especially in addressing the anti-poverty agenda as well as in initiatives for the management of capital-labour relations through the Global Social Compact, which builds on the idea of ‘corporate social responsibility’ – one way of privatising social governance.

7 See for example the Global Social Compact negotiated by the UN under the leadership of Kofi Anan (www.globalsocialcompact.org)
role of international economic institutions, and the WTO) the globe, through the use of technologies that so enhance the flows of monies and make instantaneous financial transactions across the globe possible, through breaking down the political resistance of nation-states to liberalisation and opening up of their internal markets to global competition - then we need to analyse the gendered nature of markets as well as impact of the gendered roles for women. Feminists have argued that markets are socially embedded institutions and roles ‘within market systems are structured by non-market criteria’ and then institutionalised through indicators of ‘market rationality’ (Harriss-White, 1998:201; Elson and Pearson, 1998). These non-market, though clearly not non-economic, criteria lead to specific gender based distortions in the markets (see Palmer, 1991; van Staveren, 2000; Rai, 2002). The participants in the market include the state, market organisations such as formal associations such as trade unions, consumer groups, business associations, market networks, firms and individuals. The functioning of the market depends upon the politics of state involvement, the politics of market structures and the politics of social embeddedness - of the state and the market (White, 1993: 6-10). In such a patterned market system, participants come to specific markets with ‘unequal’ capabilities and bargaining capacities and resources as a result of and which inhere in unequal market structures, regulated and stabilised by gendered state formations, and characterised by more or less unequal power - class and gender are two bases for unequal power relations operating in the market. The consequence of this is that gendered market hierarchies distribute rewards and privileges (Palmer, 1991 ) and construct and consolidate identities (Ling, 1997) which then further embed markets in gendered socio-economic ‘scapes’.

The neo-liberal ideology thus fails to take into account the embedded nature of the markets and its consequences. It does not query that individuals can pursue their economic self-interests in ways that has nothing to do with the ‘best price’. Neither do they question the “degree to which self-interest places economic goals ahead of friendship, family ties, spiritual considerations, or morality.” (Block, 1990:54) Nor, indeed how reproductive roles might change in the playing out of market roles (Harriss-White, 1998). Finally, there is an assumption that instrumentality in decision making goes hand in hand with obedience to rules, and with maximising interests, rather than a set of signals that can lead to conflictual economic and social behaviour in different groups of populations. Together this brings into question the assumed neutrality of markets in terms of access, competitiveness and efficiency.

In the current phase of globalisation, markets are not seen only as central to resource competition and allocation in the sphere of private capital, but also as central to state and governance institutions more generally. This has led critical theorists to speak of marketised institutions. As Hewson and Sinclair have put it, marketised institutions “may not be market institutions in the narrow sense. However, even within public institutions the tendency is increasingly towards adopting market principles of organization and social intervention” (1999:17). Philip McMichael suggests the same when he speaks of the ‘new managerialism’ that promotes a problem solving approach to difficult issues of redistribution of resources (2000). In terms of the central concerns of regulatory regimes of global capitalism, and the role of global governance institutions in securing these regimes through TRIPS for

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8 For a discussion of gendered market sectors and production processes see Elson, 1999; Elson and Pearson, 1998; Mies, 1982.
example, feminist arguments about the gendered nature of markets would make us re-examine the whole basis of the TRIPS regime and not just the governance of the trade regimes in the context of the unequal power relations between the North and the South. Under TRIPS patents cover “any inventions, whether products or processes (our italics), in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application” (our italics). Two things stand out here. First, that both product and processes have now been brought under the patenting regime. As a result, for example, farmers will not be able to keep seeds from their crops. As women form an increasing number of small and poor farmers, this provision is affecting them particularly. Second, patents privilege particular forms of knowledge – ‘stabilising’ historically developed processes of production would entitle modern industrial companies to patent products and processes and deny nature’s and people’s creativity. “By discounting time and historically evolving nature of innovation, patenting institutionalises privilege – those who are left out of the loop (very often poor women are the majority of those excluded) fall progressively behind in the race for ring-fencing products for monopoly exploitation” (Barwa and Rai, 2003:). Vandana Shiva has been arguing that perhaps these insights should lead us towards exploring the merits of ‘social patents’, thus broadening the acknowledgement of knowledge creation and to gain accessed to gendered markets. However, she also worries whether this would allow the principle of ‘knowledge as property’ to be further entrenched in discourses of governance (Shiva and Holla-Bhar, 1996; Shiva, 2000). If these insights of feminist and critical scholars and activists are taken into account, it becomes possible to assess the nature of global institutions as based on market principles, promoting market based solutions to social and political problems, and stabilising these solutions with the support of dominant epistemic elites (Taylor, 2000).

**The Failing State?**

Because of the centring of the market that takes place through ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’, there is a great deal of interest in the changing nature of the state in the literature on global governance. Indeed one could argue that the whole edifice of global governance is built on assumptions about the shifting boundaries of the state in the international political economy on the one hand, and international relations on the other (Rosenau and Czempiel, 2000). The shifts in the nature and position of the state then beg the question about what replaces the state/government and the inter-state world system. Writers point to various concepts such as ‘transworld’ ‘supraterritoriality’ and more narrowly, ‘multilateralism’ to describe the system of ‘post-state’ political economy and international relations (Scholte, 2000). The global spread of capitalism demands attention to the relations between the nation-state and global markets on the one hand and the nation-state and the international system on the other (World Bank, 1992; 2002). In the 1980s, when neoliberalism was making its challenge to state-mediated social democracy, it was suggested that the state is no longer capable of addressing the issues arising from the global reach of capitalism, whether these are relating to competition in the market, regulation of the market or to maintaining rules within its borders in order to resolve the collective problems of its citizens (Strange, 1995). As such, the nature of competition between states in the international system, Strange argued, also changed - from competing over territory to competing over markets. And that as the form of competition between states has changed, so has their nature, with trade and finance policies becoming more important than defence and foreign policies.
This analysis of the ‘leaking sovereignty’ of the state is reflected in the discourse of the dysfunctional state that held sway in the 1980s and early 1990s in another context. The World Bank in its report on Governance and Development (1992) suggested that third world states were unable or unwilling to develop the capacity to formulate and implement policies for the development of the economy of the country. Economic conditionalities (generally known as structural adjustment policies) set by the Bank and the IMF were not working because of the failure of the state. A plethora of ‘good governance’ literature then flooded the development scene articulating, reflecting and assessing donors’ demands upon the recipient nation-states “for democratic pluralism, for the rule of law, for a less regulated economy and for a clean and non-corrupt administration...for greater decentralization...” (UNDP, 1994:76). The globalisation of policy frameworks indicated the relative weakness of the state in the newly emerging international system. The state was, in line with the rhetoric of resurgent liberalism, the problem not the solution; the state hindered the expansion and functioning of markets that was a key to the stabilisation of the world economy. Too much government was stifling the energies of entrepreneurs waiting to take advantage of expanding markets. “Weak institutions – tangled laws, corrupt courts, deeply biased credit systems, and elaborate business registration requirements – hurt poor people and hinder development…” according to the World Development Report on Building Institutions for Markets (2002: http://econ.worldbank.org/wdr/WDR2002). This does not seem like a weak state, but a dysfunctional one. The question then was whether the state could respond to the new pressures of global political economy and if so, what should be the parameters of its functioning?

While many proclaimed the weaknesses of the state are leading to a post-statist era, others reflected upon how the state is repositioning itself in order to secure its continued role in mediating between capital and labour in the period of globalisation. The argument was that capital needs the regulatory power of the state in order to do business, but that the state needs to be committed to economic liberalisation in order to fulfil the potential of globalising markets (Cox, 1996). What we are witnessing, argues Cox, is not the demise of the nation-state but its ‘internationalisation’; not its destruction but its transformation. In brief, Cox argues that from being bulwarks against the global intrusions into national economies, today’s states are becoming mediators, adapters and negotiators with the global political economy. To perform this changed role they have to reconfigure the power structures of government, giving far more emphasis to the role of finance and trade in economic regulation rather than industry and labour, for example. The state’s role, therefore, becomes one of helping to adjust the domestic economy to the requirements of the world economy (1996). In this context the nostalgia for a benign, or at the very least powerless, nation-state is clearly misplaced: “[n]ational states exist as political ‘nodes’ or ‘moments’ in the global flow of capital” and that their development is part of the crisis-ridden development of capitalist society (Burnham 1998:8). And furthermore, that this aspect of the internationalisation of the state points to the current contradictions in globalisation as to extract surplus globally, capital depends on national and global public goods provision while at the same time reducing the capacity of states to generate tax revenue, and by putting them under the discipline of neoliberalism through structural adjustment policies, to provide those ‘public goods’.
**Feminist Engagement with the State**

If a critique of markets have focused feminist attention to the contexts within which global governance institutions are regulating social relations, feminist approaches to global governance institutions have developed largely through analyses of political engagements at the level of the state (local as well as national). Feminists have addressed the fundamental question whether the state is constitutive of gender relations by stabilizing patriarchy through discursive, legal and economic power. State economic policies in particular have been addressed in the context of production and primitive accumulation – the states’ ‘race to the bottom’ to attract private capital and foreign direct investment (FDI), and under pressure from the international financial institutions (IFIs) such as IMF and the World Bank. As global capital’s presence is felt directly, less mediated through the state, and as local spaces are opened up to the forces of market the challenges to global economic forces and organisations are also posing issues of political discourse and mobilisation for women. Women’s labour, labour rights and the increasing burden of women in the context of privatisation and marketisation of social reproduction (Bakker and Gill, 2003) is analysed in feminist development literature (Kabeer, 1994; Elson, 1995; Rai, 2002; Beneria, 2003). Finally the discrepancy between the state’s role in regulating flows of capital and of labour (human beings) through a combination of nationalist, and even xenophobic, discourse around ‘illegal’ immigration as well through laws and policing have been studied by feminist sociologists and geographers (Kofman, this volume; Sassen; 1998 Truong, 2003).

These analyses have led women’s groups and feminist activists to ask whether any engagement with the state, and building on this, with institutions of global governance is potentially fraught with dangers of co-option, or whether it is through critical engagements that feminists can change state policy. Through the nineteen nineties, there was a decisive shift from scepticism and caution towards the state to an engagement with and embrace of state institutions. They did so in three broad arenas. The first is that of participation in political institutions. They have insisted upon the importance on representation of women in these institutions from different standpoints – that women do politics differently/better, or that it is just that historically excluded groups be allowed a say in the ‘governing’ that affects their lives. Strategizing for this, feminists have argued for quotas for women in political institutions in order to make women more visible and audible in political processes. They have also engaged with political institutions by participating in bureaucracies, policy making bodies and representative organisations under the broad principles of gender mainstreaming (Miller and Razavi, 1998; McBride Stetson and Mazur, 1995; Rai, 2003). The second arena, which links the state debate with that on democratisation, is that of women organising in the informal and formal sectors and

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*The state is broadly defined within the feminist literature to encompass formal politico-juridical institutions, regulatory frameworks such as constitutions and regulators as well as elements of discursive power such as educational and cultural bodies that privilege and consolidate, among others, gendered identities. Feminists from a poststructuralist position have emphasised the fractured nature of the state and hence the need to engage in the political interstices of the political system, while Marxist feminists have seen the gendered state as an important node in the maintenance of the global circuits of capital. State interests, thus, are cast in different light by different feminist scholars within a broad framework that gives credence to the specific gendered nature of the state.*

*See Young 2003 for an analysis of the regulation of the movement of natural persons at the under Mode 4 of GATS.*
spaces of politics – women’s movements, human rights groups, functional lobbying
groups such as the Self-employed Women’s Association (SEWA) and WIEGO. These
groups have lobbied governance institutions at all levels from the outside. The focus
has been both, the protection of their members as well as lobbying for shifts in state
policy. Women’s movements have been grappling with the issue of the changing role
of the state. As the sites of production and reproduction shift within states, as new
regimes of production make for different forms of work - part-time, flexible,
concentrated in EPZs, migratory - women are having to organise differently. While
the state continues to be a central focus of women’s mobilisation on various issues,
supra-territorial strategies are being increasingly employed in order to either counter
the state, to delegitimise its position, or to mobilise global discursive regimes in their
interests. So, women’s groups have participated in ethical trading initiatives (Hale,
this volume), as well as challenged the erosion of welfare provision and pressed for
gender sensitising economic policies at the global as well as the local level (O’Bien
et.al., 2000). The third area of feminist intervention is that of developing political and
epistemic networks that feed into policy institutions as well as debates. Feminist
scholarship in the fields of Economics as well as Development Studies have unpacked
key economic concepts, particularly the crucial concept of work - what constitutes
work, how is it reflected in economic documents that form the basis of policy making
and how, alternatively, might work be assessed, analysed and reflected in public
debates (Rubery, 1988; Bakker, 1994; Bakker and Gill, 2003)? Gender budget groups
in many countries have done useful work in dis-covering the male bias in economic
accounting for the work of women and the impact of this bias on economic policy
making and its impact on the lives of both men and women (Elson, in this volume).
These groups have engaged in discussions with Treasury Departments with
intellectual expertise and political commitment to attempt to make transparent the
contribution of women to the economy.

If the state is a participant in the reconstitution of its own relations with the
global political economy, then it continues to be a focus for the struggles against this
changing relation - whether it is from (dis-)organised labour in the urban or the rural
context, or whether it is from other social movements. The nation-state as the focus of
developmental struggles allows historical knowledges of traditions, cultures, and
political contexts to be mobilised with greater facility than the amorphous
‘international economic institutions’ peopled by shadowy figures not visible to the
local oppositional struggles. Thus, state accountability and the space for political
participation for both men and women forms an important part of the understanding
of governance for many women’s groups at both the national and the global levels
(Tambiah, 2002).

Democratisation the State

An analysis of the state gave impetus to the discourse of democratisation in
the debates on the shift from government to governance. While popular struggles had
formed a critical part of the process of democratisation, the emphasis within the
discourse remained on the link between liberalisation of economies and the
democratisation of the state. This allowed democratisation to seen as a rather
ahistorical unfolding of established western ‘models’ of democracy. Economic
conditionalities of the nineteen eighties were in the nineties supplemented by the
political conditionalities of ‘good governance’. However, a critical literature on
democratisation did challenge these assumptions (Luckham and White, 1996; Whitehead, 2002). This literature paid attention to the multilevel analysis of the international system on the one hand and the state and civil society relations on the other, which was to become a hallmark of the governance debate. Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) pointed to three factors that affect the actual working of democracies - 1) the international factors - such as inter-state relations; 2) the individual state itself and its political institutions and leadership - the role of the military as opposed to civilian leadership for example and 3) 'civil society' which reflects the social and interests groups with a stake in society. It was argued that it is the constellation of these three factors that make for the possibilities, or otherwise, of a successful democratisation process.

The rise of global institutions led to a liberal institutionalist analysis of the consequences of global governance for democratisation. On the one hand, the various interventions focus on the need for conceptualising alternatives to state institutions of government in the context of the global political economy. On the other hand, the literature focuses on addressing the democratic deficit of the global institutions themselves. How can these institutions be made more accountable in a context where they seem to be usurping the power of the state (Woods, 2002)? The effectiveness of global institutions, especially the UN system and the Bretton Woods institutions, are evaluated and found wanting leading to prescriptions of reform. New governance institutions are recommended to regulate actors and issues emerging as key in a globalised world, such as mechanisms of consultation, surveillance and co-ordination of macroeconomic policies, an 'international financial architecture' stabilised through global institutions, and the regulation of capital (TNCs) and labour (migration) (Nayar and Court, 2002: vii-xi). The democratic deficit in old international institutions is identified as a reason for attempting to reform the global governance regime. A juxtaposition of this liberal institutionalist agenda for global governance and of the social democratic framework might allow us to develop some key themes of democratic governance such as the link between political democracy and social justice, the relation between representative and participatory politics and the importance of global democratic space for mobilisation in challenging the hegemony of neoliberalism. Such a juxtaposition would also allow us to explore the concerns of feminist scholarship - about democratising the private as well as public spheres, the unbundling of citizenship in the context of neoliberal policy agendas and the struggles to defend the welfare state provisions and the mainstreaming of gender perspectives in policy making - which are sidelined in the liberal institutionalist framework. Feminist studies of transitional and democratising states emphasise these points. While some of the studies have focused on the impact of liberalising economies and the marketisation of the state on women’s lives (Einhorn, 2000) others have considered how women can engage the state in a globalising context where the state is coming under multiple pressures and is repositioning itself in different ways in different contexts (Rai, 2000 and 2002; Jaquette and Wolchik, 1998; Eschle, 2000, and Blacklock and Macdonald, 2000).

**Gendered global governance**

Feminist engagements with global governance have built upon the insights derived from the debates on the market and the state as well as on processes of democratisation. Meyer and Prugl have defined three different feminist approaches to
global governance. First, gender in global governance is seen as “involving institutional structures in which women have found or carved out niches for themselves and their interests as women” and therefore “introduce into global governance women-centred ways of framing issues…” (1999:4-5; Stienstra, 2000; Liebowitz, 2002). Gender mainstreaming processes have seen feminist bureaucrats and gender policy advocates make home in state and global governance structures. (Sawer, 2003; Staudt, 2003; Miller and Razavi, 1998). The outcomes of these engagements from within have varied greatly depending upon the level of bureaucratic hierarchy at which feminists are able to operate, the political culture of the site of governance, the dominant framework of analyses used by organisations to fashion policy, the resources that gender work has been able to attract – both financial and political capital – as well as the support that feminists within organisations have been able to depend upon from social movements engaged in advancing women’s strategic interests.

Second, gender in global governance is approached through critical politics “exploring the purposive, goal-oriented…social-movement strategies to influence the United Nations…” and Bretton Woods institutions (p. 5; also see O’Brien et.al., 2000). UN conferences have been catalysts for women’s organisations to mobilise in the interests of their constituents, as well as to develop conceptual tools to critically engage with the discourses of growth-led development emanating from Bretton Woods institutions. NGOs have mounted campaigns, such as Women’s Eyes on the Bank, and ‘Women Take on the World Trade Organisation’ campaign by Women’s Environment and Development Organization (WEDO). In the context of the regional free trade agreements, such as NAFTA, “Transnational NGO activism can actually be seen as contributing to or expanding the resources an national political movement has at its disposal” (Liebowitz, 2002: 175) thus linking the various levels of organisations and sites of resistance. Feminist and women’s groups have engaged with institutions at all these levels through conventional and virtual forms of political engagement and developed insights from these engagements (Eisenstein, 1998, also Youngs, 2001).

Finally, feminists have approached gender politics in the context of global governance as “contestations of rules and discursive practices in different issue areas” (Meyer and Prugl, 1999:5). They have done so by not only focusing on the consequences of the dominant global neo-liberal economic policy frameworks espoused by the Bretton Woods institutions, but also the constitutive gendered nature of the concepts used to formulate these policies (Elson, 1995, Bakker, 1994; Rai, 2003). Some have argued, for instance, that the intensification of globalisation through the extension of marketised economies and state institutions, feminist would suggest, has been accompanied by changes in the governance of production and social reproduction. This is resulting in the transformation of “gender orders and regimes associated with intensified globalization” and the institutionalisation of these transformations in gendered governance frameworks (Young, 2003: 109).

While such a multi-level analysis of governance is useful, it is also important not see these levels are discrete, but as overlaid and overlapping. So, for example, local NGOs are often dependent upon state funding and/or external finance raising issues of accountability and transparency in agenda setting. Similarly, discourses of governance generated at the global levels, in part through women’s movements at local and national levels - through UN conferences for example - create a framework
for institutional initiatives at the state level. While state interests – generated through nationalist and/or democratic elites and articulated at international fora to convey particular political positions within the world system – also create discursive and policy frameworks on gender equity which women’s groups and movements can take advantage of. And finally, social movements continue to be imbricated at all levels. Women’s movements and environment and human rights movements working together would be some of the example here. Pulling these three strands together we find an alternative understanding of global governance, which focus on macro-level changes taking place in the international system and political economy, but grounds these in the local and global struggles on issues of political rights, language, and regimes of accumulation and exchange.

Because of this grounding of theorising in political practice, feminists have been aware of issues of difference not only between men and women, but also among women. The differences that have emerged among women have been many - between NGOs of the North and those of the South, between activists and femocrats, between those who decide to engage with multilateral and state institutions and those who don’t, between those who are funded by multilateral agencies and those that are less well funded or not at all. These divisions are also about the implicated nature of engagement, which normalises critiques through mainstreaming them. As I have argued elsewhere (2002), NGOs and women’s movements working with institutions of power at any level are constrained by the dominant paradigms of power. Most of the initiatives taken by these institutions under pressure from women’s groups are ‘integrating’ rather than ‘agenda-setting’ (Jahan1995). The limitations of ‘cultural’ and ‘socio-economic’ structures that embed the political institutions are significant constraints upon women activists. This emphasis on difference has also led to the worry that the terms of women’s engagements with multilateral bodies or state institutions do not generally favour women. The shifts in the paradigms within which various institutions of power function are minimal and hence, for example, institutions such as the national machineries for the advancement of women work within very narrow boundaries, reluctant or unable to challenge the dominant socio-political power. Finally, feminists have considered the question of the legitimacy of not only global institutions, but also of women’s NGO’s speaking for women at international and national fora. Who can speak of the pain and confusion of activists on the ground who feel betrayed by the system that they thought was going to be their ally for change? (Rai, 2002) Thus, feminist insights gained through political practice allow us to ask different questions about the parameters and paradigms of governance (Peterson, 2003). Who is being governed, in whose interests and how – traditional issues of political science are disturbed through the introduction of the categories of gender.

The Politics of Global Governance

I have suggested above that as a concept, global governance becomes prominent in the context of disciplinary neo-liberalism and can be seen to be institutionalising the neo-liberal framework at the level of macro-economic policy. In

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11 I am grateful to one anonymous referee for bringing this point to my notice. The way in which ‘western’ commitment to gender equality was raised as an issue by the US state in the context of the invasion of Afghanistan, but disregarded in the case of Iraq poses interesting questions for feminist scholarship and activism.
his critique of the work of the Commission on Global Governance, Baxi comments on the discrepancy between the assumptions of globality by the Commission and the “central facts of contemporary world disorder” (1996: 530). Violence and poverty in particular are growing apace, and both affect women in particular ways. The feminisation of poverty, and violence against women in creating and policing new and old inter-state borders has made this co-operative development a fraught discourse for women. In this context Baxi rightly comments that “If governance is to be conceived as a process, it is well to recall that process is permeated by structures-in-dominance, both in states and civil societies.” (p. 532) The contradictions that arise out of capitalism’s march across the globe are embedded in social relations of inequalities based on class, gender, ethnicities and religions among others. The assessment of the processes and institutions of governance need to be aware of these contradictions and the power relations that frame them.

**Democratising Global Governance**

If the growing salience of global institutions is an important characteristic of the world we live in, then the question also arises about the nature of these institutions (Woods, 2002). This question can be addressed in two different ways. The first approach would be to address the ways in which these institutions are participating in a process of embedding ‘structures-in-dominance’ (Baxi, 1996) such that capitalist regimes of production and exchange are taken to be the only way forward for the global economy. Global convergence, in this sense, can be seen to be the stretching out the borders of capitalism to encompass the world. In this sense, global institutions become the target of opposition movements and civil society groups. The anti-capitalist movements broadly defined thus are not interested in necessarily holding these institutions accountable. Rather their purpose is to challenge the policy agendas of these institutions and also to ‘reveal’ these institutions as embedded in the dominant capitalist order and therefore participating in establishing a ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’ (Gill, 1995) which increasingly binds states and non-state actors into the global capitalist system. This analysis of global institutions then leads us to consider political strategies that are focused on increasing the space for peoples’ movements, challenge the erosion of the provision of public goods and to envision alternative modes of governance for a different globalisation.

Alternatively, and developing the liberal institutionalist analysis, there is a growing concern with the democratic deficit that is attached to global governance. As Held argues, under globalisation, “where transnational actors and forces cut across the boundaries of national communities in diverse ways, where powerful international organizations and agencies make decisions for vast groups of people across diverse borders, and where the capacities of large companies can dwarf many a state, the questions of who should be accountable to whom, and on what basis, do not easily resolve themselves” (2002:308). The focus of analysis then becomes the issue of democratic accountability, transparency and legitimacy of global institutions. Liberal cosmopolitanism is one response to these issues. Upon this reading, laws and constitutions must reflect egalitarian individualism. Impartial reasoning and the avoidance of serious harm are the two underlying principles of that are reflected in cosmopolitan responses to the challenges of democratising global governance. Archibugi defines cosmopolitical democracy in the following way: “Cosmopolitical democracy is based on the assumption that important objectives – control of the use of force, respect for human rights, self-determination – will be obtained only through the
extension and development of democracy” (Archibugi, 2000:143). It builds on the assumption that issues such as the environment, migration and use of natural resources are no longer contained within national boundaries, that technology allows communicative networks to be globalised and therefore democratic politics to become possible including the re-envisioning of non-coercive international institutions without disappearing the national states. A world parliament is suggested as is the extension of world assemblies, which are representatives not of the states but of the people. Critics have, however, pointed out the naivete and indeed the danger of such cosmopolitan envisionings: socially structured spaces of world politics do not, Chandler argues, allow for sovereign equality among states. The hegemonic power of some (particularly the US) states is evidence of the embeddedness of dominant discursive agency of some in the face of diminishing autonomy of others (Chandler, 2000). This cautionary stance provokes me to suggest that if feminist engagements with global governance institutions do not take into account the disciplinary power of the dominant social relations within which these institutions are embedded, these engagements could succumb to the danger of supporting “systems that create themselves” (Riles, 2000:173). While I see the expanded confidence of feminist movements and networks, I also worry that the spaces for negotiations and deliberations leading to radical redistributive outcomes decreasing. The seduction of engagement with governance institutions and influencing policy outcomes which provides a sense of agency against all odds, at times through emphasising the process over outcome, at others through emphasising ‘empowerment’ without the transfer of resources that denotes changes in power relations also provide cautionary tales.

**Challenges for Feminist Politics**

The challenges that feminist politics faces are both in the arenas of scholarship and activism. While feminists have posited a powerful critique to mainstream global governance literature, they also need to present an alternative articulation of what governance means (Pearson in this volume). If they do not like marketised institutions, they need to be able to sketch the outline of governance institutions that they would like to see. Catherine Hoskyns and I (1998) have argued that “[f]or both strategic as well as practical reasons women have had to organize separately as women. ..[However, the] feminist challenge is limited by a current lack of focus on the importance of redistributive policies that are rooted in the structural inequalities of capitalist production and exchange“ (p. 362). We posed the question: can gender recover class? Following Spivak, I would argue that a recognition of the importance of redistribution allows us “[b]oth in the economic area (capitalist) and in the political (world-historical agent) ... to construct models of a divided and dislocated subject whose parts are not continuous or coherent with each other” (ibid. 276) And these dislocations, and discontinuities are where women seeking transformation within political economy as well as the discursive circuits of power can find agency. This is particularly relevant now when marketisation and the retrenchment of welfare provision under globalisation is creating tremendous pressures and inequalities across different social and spatial boundaries. We see, however, that feminists are engaging with institutions within the convergent ideological framework of neo-liberal governance because the space for alternatives has scaled down even as the recognition of gender based inequalities has increased. This is not to suggest that these engagements are not important. Indeed the solid ground of embedded liberalism has fractured so much under the neo-liberal onslaught that the protection of the welfare
state seems a radical project well worth participating in. However, a recognition of the
limits of the strategies of engagement with ‘constitutional neoliberalism’ also need to
be taken seriously if we are to be effective in developing political strategies of
empowerment for both poor women and men.

Conclusion

One could argue that global governance is a concept that hides as much as it reveals.
On the one hand the shift from government to governance is presented as an
explanatory framework seeking to account for global change, and on the other it is
seen as addressing the problem of states’ inability to respond to that change.
However, the power of hegemonic intellectual and policy elites are behind it and as
such it has also become central to the alternative discourses of counter-hegemonic
movements. Feminists too are engaged in this debate as they see a “general
broadening of the field of international reorganisation from a preoccupation with
describing the output of intergovernmental organisations, their formal attributes and
processes of decision-making to a concern with structures of governance” (Meyer and
Prugi, 1999: 4). These structures include organisations such as the UN, and NGOs as
well as social and political movements in a ‘global civil society’. A concern with
issues of governance also helps explode the myth of consent that is a feature of the
earlier globalisation literature – a consent that is often juxtaposed with the
inevitability of globalisation and therefore conceals the power relations within which
the process is developing. One could argue as Palan does, that “the language of global
governance, with its attendant rather unflattering insinuations about the functions,
legitimacy, and aptitude of the state (and society)...makes sense only once an
agreement is reached about some prior, if normally undeclared, common human
goals, political functions and so on.” (1999:67) These a priori notions are themselves
markers of closures - not the same as operated under nationalist regimes, but new
closures which make for new winners and losers - in both the public and the private
spheres, and take both national and local/global forms.

I have argued in this article that issues of gender have particular salience in the
debates on governance and unless we use the insights that have emerged from
feminist theory and practice we will not be able to encompass the needs of the future
in the conversations about the global present. To reiterate, feminist contributions to
these conversations lie in ways in which political activism and theoretical insights
have been methodologically imbricated to develop insights on governance. These
insights have examined the discursive as well as the material power wielded in
embedding certain dominant explanations of governance in the mainstream literature
which have then shaped the agendas for ‘governing’ (Kooiman, 2003) and paradigms
of governance. Specifically, feminist interventions in the areas of knowledge creation,
recognition and institutionalisation have particular salience for the processes of
embedding neo-liberal marketised discourses of globalisation and governance.
Feminist debates on the state and democracy have relevance for the way in which
political activism as well as the relational understanding between the state and global
institutions of governance might be viewed. Gendered critiques of markets as not only
uneven spaces of exchange, but as inefficient and distorted mechanisms that build
upon unequal gendered social relations subject the normalisation of rationality of the
market to rigorous scrutiny. The global governance debate needs to make a
conceptual shift to embed these insights, developed through everyday struggle at
local, state and global levels, as well as through engagements with and critiques of
mainstream literature if theories of critical governance are to fundamentally challenge the structures-in-dominance within this field.

Specifically, I would suggest three areas where feminist deconstruction of the concept provide radical insights into the concept. First, such an analysis becomes an exercise in the recognition of the multiple bases of inequalities that are being stabilised through systems of global governance: class, North/South relations and gender as the unequal social relations constitutive of global capitalism which find reflection in marketised institutions. Second, it allows us to reflect upon gendered arguments and political strategies that challenge these inequalities. From gender mainstreaming to gender budgets, from gendered Codes of Conduct to gendering workers’ unions, from enhancing the scope of micro-credit to the extension of Tobin Tax to Maria Tax (Pearson, this volume). Finally, While these multiple strategies are critical to addressing gendered inequalities, the focus on the study of how global capitalism is embedded in socially unequal regimes of production and social reproduction also allows us to view the limits of these strategies. However important to the lives of individual men and women shifts in specific policies cannot offset the disciplinary dominance of global capitalist relations. To challenge that a broader alliance of feminist form part, would be needed. As Hoskyns and I have argued, “the next phase of women’s struggles needs to take on board more centrally the issue of redistribution of resources if power relations in society are to be refashioned“ (Hoskyns and Rai, 1998:363)\(^{12}\). Perhaps the next phase of women’s struggles might be stronger for building bridges with other movements arising from the continuing marginalisation of people living under intensification of globalisation.

\(^{12}\) As Upen Baxi pointed out in his reading of this paper, the society we speak of is already globalised and therefore the epistemic and social struggles that feminists have to engage in are also necessarily globalised not only in the targets of the struggle – a transnationalist capitalist class that dominates through both state and suprastate institutions – but also the networks of struggle that they create.
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