Intimate Occupation:
Sexual Biopolitics in Colonized Palestine

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the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Women’s and Gender
Studies

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Declaration

This thesis is submitted to the University of Warwick in support of my application for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Women’s and Gender Studies. It has been composed by myself and has not been submitted in any previous application for any degree.

Word Count

The word count of this thesis is 70,055, not including the acknowledgements, abstract or bibliography.
Abstract

This thesis examines how Israel’s colonial occupation of Palestine is manifest and maintained through sexuality and sexual violence. Beginning with a review of existing literature, the thesis assesses the relevance of an analytical framework of biopolitics to examine contemporary sexual and reproductive politics in Palestine/Israel. In particular, it builds on existing scholarship that has emphasised the infrastructural nature of sexuality to occupation by demonstrating that sexuality is integral to, and part of the militarised and technological infrastructure of, biopolitical colonial occupation. This analysis of sexual infrastructure is then developed through three empirical case studies. First, I examine the structures and practices of militarized sexual violence that are shown to be central to Israeli military warfare, and in so doing challenge the assumptions of certain feminist human rights discourses. Second, I examine cases of contemporary Israeli anti-miscegenation politics, demonstrating the biopolitical targeting of love and intimacy in Palestine/Israel and drawing attention to its imbrication with older colonial politics of racial science. Third, I analyse reproductive medicine and technology, drawing attention to the ways in which access to such provisions are differentiated along racial and religious divisions. I further explore how, in the context of Palestine/Israel, reproductive technologies can function as both sites of unbearable racist colonial violence and scenes of life, hope and anti-colonial resistance. Each case study displays a different dimension of the sexual infrastructure of occupation and draws out the various ways that Israel’s biopolitics of sexuality works with and is productive of discourses of whiteness, imperialism, anti-Black racism, Orientalism and heteronormativity. Through each case study, this thesis also examines the various moments in which the assumptions of certain liberal feminist theory and activism and notions of humanitarianism come to be complicit with colonial occupation, making a contribution to existing scholarship on feminist biopolitics and femo and homo nationalism. Finally this thesis concludes by arguing for an understanding of the sexual infrastructures of colonial occupation as a means to both empirically analyse sexuality and sexual violence and to enable the situated cultivation of specific forms of creative resistance to such infrastructures.
Chapter 1 Introduction

On 3 August 2017, over 20,000 people attended the Jerusalem March for Pride and Tolerance, an event which forms part of Jerusalem’s annual LGBT Pride Week festivities. Each year’s march is organized around a different theme, and the 2017 event sought to highlight the intersection of religious observation and LGBT identity in the Holy City of Jerusalem (al-Quds). As attendees marched carrying the iconic rainbow flag with a Star of David placed in its centre, they were placed under the protection of over 1,000 Israeli police and military officials, a heightened securitization following the 2015 homophobic stabbing of six marchers by an ultra-Orthodox Jew from an illegal Israeli settlement in the Palestinian West Bank. The march ended with a large event in Jerusalem’s Independence Park, an Israeli park built over an ancient Palestinian Muslim cemetery and named in celebration of the Zionist ‘victory’ in 1948, now famous for its Israeli gay cruising scene. Among the thousands of attendees was Micha Yehudi, a transgender Israeli soldier who had recently spoken to the international press about the solace he had found in the Israeli military whilst coming out as a transgender man: ‘The protection I felt being in the army at the time. I don’t think I could have been in a safer environment… I was lucky enough as well because I had so much protection and support from my commanders, my friends and the soldiers under me’ (cited in Lee, 2017).

Israel ranks ninth out of the 103 countries in the LGBT Military Index\(^1\) (Hague Center for Strategic Studies, 2014), and the Israeli Defence Forces (hereafter Israeli Occupation Forces or IOF) have officially allowed lesbian, gay and bisexual Israelis to openly serve since 1993. Service is compulsory for all Israeli citizens, except for Palestinian citizens of Israel and ultra-Orthodox Jewish Israelis, who are exempt from conscription. More recently, transgender soldiers have been allowed to openly serve in all ranks in the IOF, with the Israeli military’s health insurance often covering the cost of medical transition.

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\(^1\) The LGBT Military Index is a global ranking of countries by inclusion of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender service members in the armed forces. According to the index’s creators, integrating LGBT individuals into the ‘armed forces is a matter of dignity and human rights for those willing to risk their lives for their country. But it is more than that: it is a matter of military effectiveness’ (Hague Center for Strategic Studies, 2014).
These inclusive policies, alongside the IOF’s self-promoted military feminism, have led to Israel being routinely heralded as hosting one of the most liberal militaries globally, understood as reflective of Israeli society more broadly, as noted by Golan (1997), Klein (2002), Sasson-Levy (2003), Sasson-Levy and Amram-Katz (2007), and Segal (1995). Indeed, in the wake of US President Donald Trump’s July 2017 Twitter announcement that he intended to ban transgender individuals from serving in the US military, scores of articles appeared online comparing the US military, now characterized as transphobic, with that of trans-inclusive Israel, calling on Trump to revoke the transgender military ban and follow in the footsteps of his inclusive Israeli military ally, see for example Cohen (2017), Garfield (2017), and Lopez (2017). In response to being asked about Trump’s announcement, retired Israeli General Elazar Stern, former commander of the IOF’s Manpower Command, stated that Israel’s position on transgender military inclusion was ‘something to be proud of’, going on to suggest that ‘it makes us strong that we don’t waste time on questions like this’ (cited in Tarnopolsky, 2017). The Israeli military’s chief gender officer also made clear that the IOF’s ‘goal was that everyone should be in the army, and everyone should be safe and comfortable in the army’ (cited in Rosenberg, 2017).

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In June 2017, a few weeks prior to the Jerusalem March for Pride and Tolerance, the Israeli government suspended plans to create a space where Jewish women and men could pray together at east Jerusalem’s Western Wall (Kotel), the holiest site in Judaism, which

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2 The IOF routinely publicly celebrate gender equality. For example, for International Women’s Day in 2012 the IOF released an infographic detailing how they manufacture weapon system joysticks to suit female hands, and combat vests to fit the female torso. On International Women’s Day in 2017, Israeli security minister Gilad Erdan tweeted from his official account, stating that women ‘serving in the Israeli police on the frontline against terrorism are doing an amazing job in fighting crime. A salute to the women now and throughout the year’ (cited in Cusack, 2017). On the same day, Erdan signed an order to allow the Israeli police to shut down an International Women’s Day event in al-Quds (Jerusalem) organized by a Palestinian women’s group (ibid.).

3 This comparison between the US and Israeli militaries has important significance given that both states exist as settler colonies and have a long history of sharing intel, military techniques and resources (see Lloyd and Pulido, 2010).
has been under Israeli occupation since June 1967.\(^4\) The decision, which marked a reversal of the government’s 2016 approval of a plan to create a mixed-gender prayer section, was critiqued as a clear example of the Israeli government being ‘in the pocket’ of the ultra-Orthodox Jewish community. Indeed, the Western Wall Heritage Foundation, the independent religious body that governs the Western Wall and is dominated by ultra-Orthodox male rabbis, has long forbidden Jewish women and men from praying alongside each other, leading to the creation of a small women’s prayer section where women are prohibited from praying out loud or in groups, denied access to Torah scrolls, and banned from wearing tallitot (prayer shawls). As a result, the Israeli campaign group Women of the Wall was set up in 1988 in order to fight for equal access, naming the Western Wall ‘the greatest symbol for the exclusion of women in the public sphere in Israel’.\(^5\) The government’s backtracking on the decision to open a mixed prayer space was met with fierce condemnation, with hundreds of Israelis protesting outside Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s residence in Jerusalem (al-Quds), labelling the decision an assault on women’s rights and religious freedoms. The former Israeli Ambassador to the United States, Michael Oren, situated the decision within the context of Zionist notions of equality, heralding the decision as ‘the abandonment of Zionism. The Western Wall belongs to all Jews’ (cited in Sherwood, 2017). The head of Women of the Wall suggested that the decision marked ‘a terrible day for women in Israel, when the prime minister sacrifices their rights while kowtowing to a handful of religious extremists, who want to enforce their religious customs while intentionally violating the rights of the majority of the Jewish world’ (Wildman, 2017).

* * *

\(^4\) East Jerusalem, which contains the Old City (al-Balda al-Qadimah) housing the Western Wall and al-Ḥaram al-Šarīf, came under formal Israeli occupation in June 1967, following the Six Day War. Within three days of capture, the ancient Moroccan Quarter was bulldozed by Israeli forces, rendering its 650 residents homeless, and was swiftly replaced by what is today known as the Western Wall Plaza. See Abwod (2000) for a historical analysis of the Moroccan Quarter of Jerusalem.

Amidst these two events—the state regulation and reinforcement of the gender binary at the Western Wall, and the securitized state celebration of Jewish Israeli LGBT populations—Jerusalem also marked the scene of intensified Palestinian anti-colonial resistance. On 14 July 2017, three Palestinians opened fire at Israeli border officers stationed at al-Ḥaram al-Šarīf, the third holiest site in Islam, which has been under Israeli colonial occupation since 1967 and shares a border with the gender-segregated Western Wall. Following the shooting, which resulted in the deaths of three Palestinians and two Israeli border officers, the Israeli authorities quickly shut down the al-Aqṣa complex, cancelling Friday prayers, closing the Old City of Jerusalem to all traffic, and raiding and occupying the mosque. Two days later, the Israeli authorities reopened the Islamic compound, having installed metal detectors and security cameras at all entrances. Israel’s closure of the mosque compound and the introduction of heightened security was labelled ‘collective punishment’ by Sheik Ikrima Sabri, former Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and the Palestinian Territories (cited in Husseini, 2017). Adnan Husseini, the Palestinian Authority’s Jerusalem governor, said that Israel was ‘inflating this situation’, situating it in a context whereby ‘Palestinians are killed in cold blood almost daily at checkpoints’ (ibid.). Palestinian Christian leaders similarly condemned the measures, with Archbishop Atallah Hanna stating that ‘it is our duty as Palestinian Christians and Muslims to remain united against Israel’s greed, which targets all of us… the Palestinian people are united against the occupation and racism’ (cited in Ahmed, 2017).

The installation of cameras and metal detectors was widely viewed as part of Israel’s ongoing settler colonial desire to ‘Judaize’ east Jerusalem, further curtailing, regulating and surveying Palestinian access to the city. Palestinians who were able to access al-Ḥaram al-Šarīf began to boycott the compound until the surveillance measures were

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6 Palestinians who reside in the West Bank and Gaza Strip have highly restricted access to Jerusalem (al-Quds). In the case of Palestinians from the West Bank seeking to enter Jerusalem, men over the age of fifty-five and women over the age of fifty are allowed to travel freely, while all other Palestinians have to apply for permits, which are often denied. Palestinians residing in the Gaza Strip are currently unable to access Jerusalem, except for a small number of ‘humanitarian’ transfers and Ramadan prayer permits. Palestinian refugees existing outside of the territories occupied by Israel are denied wholesale access to the territory. For a detailing of Israel’s various permit and ID politics, see Tawil-Souri (2011, 2012) and Hass (2002).

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removed, praying in the surrounding streets en masse, while protests spread across the city. A week later, on 21 July, thousands of Palestinians carried out their Friday prayers in the streets of east Jerusalem, where subsequent demonstrations were violently supressed by the Israeli Occupation Forces with stun grenades, tear gas and rubber bullets, and all Palestinian men under the age of fifty were barred from entering the Old City of Jerusalem (al-Balda al-Qadimah). The clashes, which spread to the occupied West Bank, resulted in four Palestinians being shot dead and over 120 injured, along with the fatal stabbing of three Israeli settlers in the illegal Jewish settlement of Neve Tsuf. Simultaneously, pro-Palestinian solidarity protests were held in Istanbul, New York, Geneva, Berlin, Cape Town, Tunis, Kuala Lumpur, Tehran, London, Ankara, Manchester, Sanaa and Beirut. In neighbouring Amman, protests were coupled with the shooting dead of two Jordanians by an Israeli security guard stationed at Amman’s Israeli embassy, sparking a diplomatic crisis between the two nations. Yara Jalajel, a Palestinian human rights lawyer, made clear:

the issue of al-Ḥaram al-Šarīf stands as a symbolic, but very strong catalyser of the routine of injustice and oppression that Palestinians in Jerusalem are facing… No one can rationally expect that the more than six million Palestinians who currently live in the occupied Palestinian territories will eternally endure dispossession, injustice, denial and humiliation without reacting to the violence they face. (Cited in Tahhan, 2017)

On Tuesday 25 July, a week prior to Jerusalem’s March for Pride and Tolerance, the Israeli authorities caved in to the mounting national and international resistance, removing the security measures that had been placed at the entrance of al-Ḥaram al-Šarīf.

* * *

I open this thesis by narrating these three events that took place across the city of Jerusalem (al-Quds) during the summer of 2017 in order to outline the various ways in which the securitized state celebration of Jewish Israeli sexual minorities functions to obscure yet bolster not only colonial occupation, but other forms of sexual regulation and segregation. Tens of thousands of Israelis could march in celebration of the intersection of religious tolerance and sexuality under the protection of the state, but Palestinians were met with deadly state violence outside a mosque just days before; Jewish women’s
religious freedoms are regulated and restricted in ways that reinforce a religionized gender binary, segregating and silencing Jewish Israeli women, yet at the same time justifying their existence within Palestine. Indeed, the condemnation of gender restrictions at the Western Wall itself relies upon the naturalization of settler colonial occupation, insofar as it calls upon the Israeli government to regulate and legislate over the Western Wall, naturalizing Israel’s sovereign right over a Palestinian site which has been subject to occupation since 1967. Furthermore, at the same time as Jewish Israeli women have their religious freedoms restricted, they are required to enlist in Israel’s LGBTQ-friendly military, assisting the military occupation Palestine.

Within this context, a growing number of scholars have critically analysed the ways that women’s and LBGTQ rights are being exploited or co-opted in the service of border controls, occupation and war, exemplified in the works of Dhawan (2013), Farris (2017), Mohanty, Riley, and Pratt (2008), Puar (2007, 2017), and Seth (2013). In the specific context of Israel’s occupation of Palestine, Maikey (2017), Mikdashi and Puar (2016), Puar (2017), among others, have argued that through the production of Israel as a site of gendered and sexual modernity, Palestinian society is produced as sexually violent, homophobic and repressed. A set of discourses – often referred to as ‘pinkwashing’ – that Maikey (2017) argues function to ‘divert from the image of Israel as a place of war, occupation and colonization.’ Furthermore, and in so doing, scholars have noted that the discourses and practices that construct Israeli modernity also function to distract from the broader patriarchal hetero-normative violences of colonial occupation, as argued in the works of Griffiths and Repo (2018), Hasso (2000), Ihmoud (2015), Puar (2017), and Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2015, 2016).

Staged through three empirical case studies and drawing upon and building on this literature, this thesis uses biopolitical theory and feminist ideas concerning the intersections of colonialism, biopolitics, race and sexuality to empirically examine how Israel’s colonial occupation of Palestine manifests and is maintained through sexuality and sexual violence. In contributing to these existing debates, I examine three case studies – reproductive medicine and technology, the regulation of intimacy and miscegenation, the use of sexual violence as a tactic of warfare – in order to investigate the sexual politics of Israel’s colonial occupation. Furthermore, in analysing three sites of sexual politics in Palestine/Israel, I have sought to build on existing literature that has situated the emergence of the state of Israel in a framework of colonialism and imperialism,
exemplified in the works of Bhandar (2018), Hasso (2000), Said (1979a), Weizman (2007), and Wolfe (2006). As such, each case study has drawn out the differing ways in which Israel’s biopolitics of sexuality works with and is productive of discourses of whiteness, imperialism, anti-Black racism, and Orientalism. In so doing, this thesis aims to establish that Israel’s practices of reproductive control and sexual violence, while situated and specific, are not exceptional to Israel, but rather form part of a much broader historical and global apparatus in which reproductive technology and medicine, population control policies, and sexual violence are used to attend to biopolitical anxieties concerning population and reproduction, as argued by Davis (2003), Holloway (2011), and Roberts (1997).

In examining how Israel’s colonial occupation of Palestine manifests and is maintained through sexuality and sexual violence, this thesis also builds on Puar’s (2017) recent work, by examining how the regulation of sexuality in Palestine/Israel doesn’t solely take place through the sexual identities and homosexual/heterosexual distinction that structures claims to gendered and sexual rights but rather, as Puar has argued in the context of occupied Palestine, ‘sexuality is not only contained within bodies but also dispersed across spaces’ (2017: 119). As such, in Chapter Three I analyse the Israeli built wall as an important political technology of occupation that brings into being various forms of sexual and intimate regulation and governance; the controlling of the Palestinian and Israeli labour force through the maintenance of sexual divisions of labour, the interrupting of Palestinian family structures, and delimiting the Palestinian populations access to vital material resources needed to sustain and reproduce life. In Chapter Five I investigate anti-miscegenation activism in Israel, examining how such activisms work to construct ideas of national heteronormativity which centre on a biologized understating of Jewish identity, placing heterosexual Palestinian-Israeli relations outside of ideas of the natural national family. While in the examination of reproductive technologies and medicine in Chapter Six, I demonstrate that sex cells are racialized in a way that reiterates the centrality of Jewishness as a biological racial category to the state of Israel. Yet, through my analysis of Israel’s use of Depo Provera amongst Israel’s Black Jewish population, I argue that Blackness exists in excess of Israel’s understanding of Jewishness, resulting in the coercive control and curtailment of Black women’s reproductive and intimate lives. Together, then, the empirical sites of analysis that form this thesis attend to the various ways in which sexuality manifests not only through categories of sexual identity, but also in discourses of race, nation and religion, and is
produced through reproduce medicine and technology, understandings of the family, and is embedded within the spatial infrastructures of colonial occupation.

At the same time, this thesis also extends existing arguments concerning the complicity of feminist and queer theorising and activism with biopolitical racism, through attending to moments in which ethical assumptions and positions of certain feminist scholarship are rendered complicit with the colonial occupation of Palestine. There now exists a growing body of scholarship that examines the ways that queer and feminist discourses, scholarship and activism and regimes of humanitarianism are supportive of and come to be entwined within biopowers racist logics, exemplified in the works of Blencowe (2011, 2012), Farris (2017), Puar (2007, 2013, 2017), and Repo (2016). Here scholars have importantly underscored the various ways that biopower operates through logics of transformation and liberation such that biopolitical power is not something that can be opted out of. In the context of Palestine, Puar has traced the ways in which queer anti-pinkwashing activism can unwittingly help to secure the reproduction or salience of pinkwashing insofar as such critiques often take place at the expense of a broader analysis of the sexual politics of colonial occupation, which can become masked behind Israel’s liberal LGBTQ rights agenda (2017: 118-119, 124-125). While in the context of international aid and humanitarianism in Palestine, Bhungalia has examined the relationship between racializing discourses of terrorism and aid, arguing that ‘the tethering of counterterrorism laws and security infrastructures, including most notably the use of the “foreign terrorist” classification, to civilian aid programmes to the Palestinians has produced increasingly expansive modes of policing, fragmentation, and pacification across the West Bank and Gaza Strip… the aid recipient in Palestine is foremost a potential threat’ (Bhungalia et al., 2018: 180). Building on these works, in Chapter Four I examine how certain feminist and international organisations’ claims that sexual violence is absent from Israel’s occupation functions to support and obscure the material practices and structures of sexual violent against the Palestinian population. In Chapter Six, my examination of reproductive technologies and medicine argues that certain feminist literature focusing on the effects of such technologies on the female body neglect the ways in which, in the context of Palestine/Israel, such technologies do not solely target gendered and sexual identities, given that both heterosexual and LGBTQ Jewish populations in Israel are able to access a range of reproductive technologies.
Together, then, this thesis examines how various colonial technologies of occupation intersect with and are productive of sexuality, and how certain feminist scholarly knowledge functions, however unwittingly, as a system that serves to mask the colonial violation of Black and Palestinian subjects, concomitantly strengthening the image of Israel as a site of exceptional reproductive rights, freedoms and technological advancement. In so doing, this thesis empirically contributes to existing scholarship concerning Israel’s occupation of Palestine and to feminist biopolitical theory. It offers a series of new empirical examinations of various sites and scenes of the sexual politics of occupation, new analyses of feminist complicity with these politics, and demonstrates that together these examinations contribute to understandings of how sexuality and sexual violence are structural to the technologies that support and maintain Israel’s infrastructural colonial occupation of Palestine.

The research questions that guide and structure this research project are the following: In what ways are intimacy, reproduction and sexuality regulated within the state of Israel? How do these modes of regulation, co-produced within liberal discourses of modernity, civility, rights and freedom, function to uphold and propagate Israel’s colonial occupation? What are the connections and mutations between Israel’s present regulation of intimacy and much older colonial and imperial racializing figurations of gender and sexuality? How and in what ways is certain contemporary feminist theorising complicit in colonial occupation?

1.1 Methodology
In order to answer these questions, this thesis employs a sociological case study approach, examining three empirical cases. In so doing, I aim to demonstrate the material ways in which Israel’s occupation of Palestine manifests and is maintained through the everyday lived experiences of sexuality and practises of sexual violence. Given that my research questions are explorative, asking how disciplinary populations come into being, how modes of subjection are enacted and maintained, and what the effects of these are, a case study approach is most appropriate for this study. As Feagin, Orum and Sjoberg (1991: 2) note, a case study approach is:

defined as an in-depth, multifaceted investigation, using qualitative research methods, of a single social phenomenon. The study is conducted in great detail and often relies on the use of several data
sources… The case study is usually seen as an instance of a broader phenomenon, as a set of a larger parallel instances.

As Gerring and Cojocaru (2016: 4) have noted, ‘case study research begins with a selection of cases to be subjected to intensive analysis.’ In selecting the three sites or scenes of analysis for this thesis, I have been attentive to the availability of data, and to the representativeness or (a)typical nature of the cases at hand. Gerring and Cojocaru further note that ‘the availability of evidence for the chosen cases(s)—and the researcher’s access to that evidence—must be a key criteria of case selection’ (ibid.). As detailed below, each case that I have chosen has been selected alongside an array of data—media sources, court rulings, government policy, NGO reports, theoretical analyses—which has allowed me to sufficiently examine the case at hand. Mesec (1998) has argued that when selecting cases for research we should select ‘interesting’ cases, that is, cases that form extreme or exceptional instances, instead of typical or average examples. The case should not be chosen on the basis of a representative sample, but rather because its unusual or striking nature may transform our understandings of a given phenomenon. On the other hand, Yin (2009) recommends that when selecting cases we should choose representative or typical examples, because in so doing we might uncover further nuances or dynamics in relations previously thought to be understood. In selecting my three cases, I have sought to synthesize these two approaches, selecting cases that attend to seemingly mundane or typical spheres, while also juxtaposing or coupling these knowledges against or with seemingly more ‘extreme’ or ‘exceptional’ phenomena. For example, in Chapter Five, I examine representative public health policy concerning access to reproductive technologies through and alongside exceptional testimonies of Black Jewish women who have been sterilized by the state. Thus my approach to case study selection and the resulting case study analyses have sought to provide a nuanced analysis of the sexual biopolitics of Israeli society in a way that muddles the distinction between the mundane or ordinary and the seemingly exceptional, drawing attention to their co-dependency and co-production within a scene of settler colonial occupation.

Furthermore, I have sought to select cases that are representative of differing spheres of life and Israeli society—legal, biomedical, media, social and popular discourses—in order to reveal the far-reaching and structural nature of sexuality’s deployment. In focusing on these cases, I do not claim that they are the only sites through which an analysis of the deployment of sexuality by the settler colonial Israeli state can be
interrogated and disrupted. Rather, as particularly dense and pressing sites through which the contemporary sexual life of Israeli settler colonialism can be illuminated and examined, they are prioritized here because they also speak to ongoing and foundational debates within anti-colonial, anti-racist, queer and feminist projects—about sexual consent, anti-Black state violence, gendered militarism, Orientalism, and reproductive futurity. As such, my analysis of these cases has implications for these political and theoretical projects more broadly.

While it has been noted that the selection of case studies can be subjective, resulting in so-called selection bias (George and Bennett, 2005), Starman (2013: 36) has argued that ‘the selection of cases based on prior knowledge leads to a better research plan… crucial for enabling the development of a strong theoretical base for the research, which makes the procedure of theory testing more rigorous.’ This line of argumentation is important, not only in terms of the rigour of case study selection, but also in terms of recognizing our situatedness and experience in relation to our research. The objectivity of the contours of our research has long been questioned and re-envisioned by feminist theorists who, in differing ways, have sought to draw attention to the ways in which knowledge is socially situated and contingent, exemplified in the works of Collins (1997), Haraway (1988), and Harding (1992). For example, The Combahee River Collective Statement professed: ‘it is our experience and disillusionment with these liberation movements, as well as experience on the periphery of the white male left, that led to the need to develop a politics that was anti-racist, unlike those of white women, and anti-sexist, unlike those of Black and white men’ (1977); Fanon used his lived experience as a Black man in order to elaborate upon European imperialism’s structural and psychic materialities, arguing that ‘the feeling of inferiority of the colonized is correlative to the European’s feeling of superiority’ (Fanon, 2008: 93). This focus on positionality and experience has been critiqued for its apparent implicit suggestion that there exists a foundational authentic, truthful self or experience awaiting discovery (Scott, 1991). Yet what perhaps get missed here are the ways in which situated experiences are used not to uncover a true or authentic identity, but rather as a gateway through which to elaborate on historical and present processes of subjectification as they operate through and along deployments of racialization, gender, sexuality and geopolitical location. Indeed, The Combahee River Collective used their location as Black women to argue that ‘the liberation of all oppressed peoples necessitates the destruction of the political-economic systems of capitalism and imperialism as well as patriarchy’ (1977), while Fanon (2008) used his
experiences as a Black man to articulate a ‘historico-racial schema’ which sought to bring to light the historical contingencies and supremacist mythologies imposed upon the Black subject.

Thus, alongside taking into account the availability of data and the representative and/or exceptional nature of the cases, my selection of case studies has also been guided by the five activist trips that I have made to Palestine over the past ten years, and my analysis cites the many pamphlets, leaflets, educational materials and photographs that I took and collected during these visits. My first trip, in October 2009, took me on a tour of the occupied West Bank. I then returned twice in 2010, spending two months in al-A’aroub refugee camp, a camp nestled between Bethlehem and al-Khalil (Hebron) and surrounded by several illegal settlements, and Aida refugee camp on the outskirts of the city of Bethlehem. It was also during this trip that I first ventured into what is often understood to be ‘Israel 1948’: land that has been under colonial occupation since 1948. My experiences of anti-Arab and anti-Muslim racism in Haifa and Eilat led me to seek haven in east Jerusalem (al-Quds), where I learnt of the ongoing court case of Saber Kushour, who was being tried for ‘rape by deception’. This case, which continued to haunt and follow me for years to come, structures Chapter Four, and led to my subsequent interest in the regulation of miscegenation and intimacy. I then returned to Palestine in June–July 2014. While staying in al-Eizariya (Bethany), a former suburb of Jerusalem now separated from the city by the wall, I witnessed first-hand Operation Brother’s Keeper and Operation Protective Edge. This painful, wounding snapshot in time is partially captured in Chapter Three. Finally, my most recent trip to Palestine took place in July and August 2015, during which time I stayed in al-Fawwar refugee camp, just south of al-Khalil (Hebron). Importantly, these visits to Palestine were not planned or undertaken as ethnographic research trips, but rather formed part of the activism and work that I undertake outside of the academy. However, I nonetheless recognize that they have been indispensable to my knowledge of Israeli occupation and the scenes of life that I examine in this thesis.

The case studies of this thesis bring together a number of differing sources and data. The first of the three case studies, “‘Cultures of Death”: Settler Colonialism and/as Sexual Violence’, brings together NGO reports, academic studies, public statements made by Israeli officials, and media reports, which were collected between January and June 2017. The second case study, ‘Racial Purity, Sexual Threat: The Politics of Anti-Miscegenation
in Palestine/Israel’, is structured around an Israeli legal trial and the reports produced concerning the activities of an Israeli anti-miscegenation organisation, Hands for Brothers (Yad L’Achim). I collected media reports concerning the case in February–April 2015, and the Hands for Brothers reports throughout the years of 2015-2017. The final case study, “‘Be Fruitful and Multiply’: Fertility Economies, White Futurities’, examines Jewish Israeli pronatalism, specifically through the state of Israel’s IVF policy and Egg Donation Law, as well as Israel’s use of Depo Provera, a birth control injection, among Jewish Ethiopian women. Literature and policy reports concerning assistive reproductive technologies in Israel were collected in June–July 2016. While in the second half of this chapter I examine testimonies of Ethiopian women collected by the Israeli feminist organization Isha L’Isha, data from the World Health Organization, and Israeli media stories concerning the use of Depo-Provera in Israel, collected between June and December 2016. The penultimate section of this thesis takes the shape of ‘Freedom Dreams: An Interlude of Reproductive Resistance’, which tells the stories of Palestinian women who have successfully smuggled their husbands’ sperm out of Israeli prisons. As I note in the interlude, this practice has been highly criminalized by the state of Israel. Therefore, while my knowledge of this practice came about through conversations in the West Bank, here I narrate these stories using media sources alone, and do not allude to how sperm-smuggling takes place, only using material already in the public domain. During August–October 2015, I collected fifteen media articles on sperm-smuggling, a Palestinian Legislative Council Report, and a statement made by the Ahrar Centre for Prisoners’ Studies and Human Rights.

When selecting and analysing these materials and assembling my case studies, I have drawn upon Foucault’s (1977) mode of genealogical analysis in order to create what he named a ‘history of the present’. Outlining his genealogical method, Foucault (2003: 10) remarked: ‘genealogy is, then, a sort of attempt to desubjugate historical knowledges, to set them free, or in other words to enable them to oppose and struggle against the coercion of a unitary, formal, and scientific theoretical discourse.’ In the spirit of this method, as
outlined above, in each case study I bring together a range of sources and genres of materials in order to produce an empirical study into a dimension of the sexual politics of occupation. Bringing together these varying genres of material, while guided by available data, has also been strategic, insofar as it has allowed me to trouble a series of sedimented truths or stories about sexual politics, Palestine and the state of Israel. Indeed, in many ways I think of the bringing together of these various sources as genealogies of insurrection, to the extent to which they produce new histories of the Palestinian present that rebel against the common orthodoxies told. In so doing, I follow Foucault’s assertion that genealogy is always an insurrection: a militant rebellion or insurgency against the colonizing logics of regimes of truth. Writing about insurgent genealogy, Foucault states:

genealogies are therefore not positivistic returns to a form of science that is more attentive or more accurate. Genealogies are, quite specifically, antisciences. It is not that they demand the lyrical right to be ignorant, and not that they reject knowledge, or invoke or celebrate some immediate experience that has yet to be captured by knowledge. That is not what they are about. They are about the insurrection of knowledges. Not so much against the contents, methods, or concepts of a science; this is above all, primarily, an insurrection against the centralizing power-effects that are bound up with the institutionalization and workings of any scientific discourse organized in a society such as ours… Genealogy has to fight the power-effects characteristic of any discourse that is regarded as scientific. (Foucault, 2003: 9, emphasis added)

As Foucault suggests, insurrection knowledges are not predicated upon the romanticization of native or yet-to-be-discovered truths. Rather, a genealogy of insurrection is a call to arms, a refusal to submit to institutionalizing operations of power that produce ‘what remains’. In so doing, a genealogy evokes a method of writing a critical history of the present, using historical and present-day material to re-evaluate sedimented knowledges and structures, and to trace the tactics through which modern paradigms, practices and institutions emerged out of specific exercises of power, many of which may now be forgotten, elided or buried. In tracing a historically attentive genealogy of sexuality in the present, I hold what Foucault names ‘subjugated
knowledges along with dominant state and international discourses in order to examine the lived experiences of sexual regulation and violence in Israel’s settler colonial present. Luciano (2007: 9) articulates this as chronobiopolitics, an approach that focuses on ‘the sexual arrangement of life over time’ such that a counter-network of force relations is produced, one that works in the service of the abolition of our violent racial, sexual and gendered structures of subjection. Such a methodical abolitionism that does not map out in advance what the future can and should look like, but instead follows Hartman to ‘imagine a free state… as the anticipated future of this writing’ (2008: 4, emphasis author’s own).

Finally, my analysis has benefited substantially from the many Palestinians who hosted me, showed me around and shared their stories with me, and the Palestinian organizations with which I volunteered or visited. I do not name any Palestinians, not wanting to further compromise their already precarious security or safety; but their stories, tears, laughter, hope, frustrations, trauma, rage, longing and dreams of freedom fill the pages of this thesis. Intimate Occupation is thus not an attempt to give voice to the Palestinian people: I do not presume to hold such capacity. Rather my intention is to think through the tactics and strategies that produce realms and zones of experience, life and death, and to begin to reckon with the precarious lives that are only visible through the optic of their subjugation. I thus write in the service of a freedom yet to come. I labour towards the production of new forms of life unable to yet be fully grasped or imagined within Israel’s colonial social order, whose condition of emergence hinges upon what Fanon (1967: 36) names an insurgent anti-colonial ‘program of complete disorder’.

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8 Foucault defined ‘subjugated knowledges’ as:

a whole series of knowledges that have been disqualified as non-conceptual knowledges, as insufficiently elaborated knowledges: naive knowledges, hierarchically inferior knowledges, knowledges that are below the required level of erudition or scientificity… it is the reappearance of what people know at a local level, of these disqualified knowledges, that made the critique possible. (Foucault, 2003: 7)
1.2 Ethics

Alongside an attentiveness to the safety of Palestinians, I have also had to continually negotiate my own safety and position in relation to the governance of ‘extremism’ and ‘terrorism’ in UK universities, and in relation to the characterization of anti-Zionism as anti-Semitism. In 2015, the UK’s Counter-Terrorism and Security Act created a statutory duty, known as Prevent Duty, for UK higher- and further-education institutions, schools and childcare providers. The duty’s main aim is to ‘reduce the threat to the UK from all forms of terrorism by stopping people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism’ (HEFCE, 2017). In universities, Prevent Duty is monitored by the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE), and specifically targets what is commonly understood as ‘Islamic extremism’. Indeed, the opening paragraph of the UK government’s Prevent Duty Guidance for Higher Education Institutions in England and Wales names ‘young people… travelling to join terrorist organisations in Syria and Iraq’ as a key issue that universities must tackle. In the service of stopping ‘radicalization’ on university campuses, higher-education institutions are now required to assess ‘where and how their students might be at risk of being drawn into terrorism. This includes not just violent extremism but also non-violent extremism, which can create an atmosphere conducive to terrorism and can popularise views which terrorists exploit’ (Prevent Duty Guidance, 2015: point 19).

Prevent Duty, which offers no concrete definitions of ‘extremism’ or ‘terror’, is resulting in the surveillance and regulation of student behaviour, research programmes, campus events and student societies across UK university campuses. In the context of this thesis, there is mounting evidence to suggest that the Prevent Duty directly connects support for Palestine and condemnation of the state of Israel with radicalism and the potential for terrorism. In 2016, a seventeen-year-old Muslim schoolboy from Luton was questioned under Prevent Duty for wearing a ‘Free Palestine’ badge to school (see Hothman, 2016; Norton, 2016b). Official HEFCE guidance on Prevent includes ‘vocal support for Palestine’, ‘opposition to Israeli settlements’, ‘criticism of wars in the Middle East’ and ‘opposition to Prevent’ on a list of ‘contentious topics’ that universities must monitor and

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9 See JUST Yorkshire’s (2017) report, Rethinking Prevent: A Case for an Alternative Approach, which examines the impact of Prevent and argues that it is instilling ‘fear, suspicion and censorship’ on university campuses.
survey (Hooper, 2017). As a result, CAGE, a British organization that works with communities impacted by the War on Terror, has suggested that ‘Prevent implementation goes well beyond preventing political violence, and into the realm of pre-crime and the criminalisation of dissent and political and/or religious activism’ (CAGE, 2017).

Alongside the widespread roll-out of Prevent Duty, since I began my PhD the UK government has made a number of other moves to further couple anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism, and to intervene in and regulate public support for Palestine and the boycott of Israeli goods. In 2016, the UK government issued guidance attempting to ban local authorities and public-sector organizations from boycotting Israeli suppliers, suggesting that the boycott was ‘polarising debate, weakening integration and fuelling anti-Semitism’ (Cabinet Office, 2016). While this guidance, after being legally challenged by pro-Palestinian activists, was ruled to be unlawful, it points to the UK government’s investment in protecting and furthering the state of Israel, concomitantly coding pro-Palestinian activism as racist. During the same year, 2016, the UK government made moves to adopt a new definition of anti-Semitism in a bid to combat hate crimes against Jews in the UK. I will not reproduce the multifaceted and lengthy definition here, but want to draw attention to one example of anti-Semitic hatred cited: ‘Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavour’ (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2016). This example, and the new definition more broadly, draws upon the definition of anti-Semitism provided by the College of Policing, the professional body serving British police forces.  

While this guidance was published in 2016, the UK government has a longer history of attempting to delegitimise pro-Palestinian activism in the UK by labelling it anti-Semitic. For example, Government Action on Anti-Semitism, a report released by the Department for Communities and Local Government in 2014, cited the banning of Israeli-manufactured products by Leicester City Council, and Tower Hamlets flying the Palestinian flag, in the context of anti-Semitic actions (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2014).

The UK government’s definition of anti-Semitism can be viewed in full online here: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/a-definition-of-antisemitism (last accessed 19 October 2017).

In addition, this definition draws heavily on the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition of anti-Semitism adopted in May 2016. The
In their 2014 *Hate Crime Operation Guidance*, the College of Policing further elaborate on the connection between anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism:

> the ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestine has led to a new anti-Semitism, sometimes referred to as anti-Zionism. This is expressed in a system of beliefs, convictions, and political activities focused around the conflict in the Middle East. This form of hostility often blames Jews and/or Israelis for all of the tension in the region. (College of Policing, 2014: 36)

Given that dissent from Prevent—with all of its assumptions concerning pro-Palestinian activism and Muslim communities—is taken as an indicator of extremism and radicalization, here I refrain from deconstructing or critiquing the policies and laws outlined above in any way. Yet, importantly, these policies and laws have shaped the development of my thesis, and have also dictated when and how I have presented my research at conferences, and the scholarly networks and connections that I have been able to forge and benefit from. In noting the existence of these regulatory frameworks, my aim is to draw attention to the context within which I have written this thesis, and to now point to some of the ethical strategies that I have had to adopt in order to preserve my own safety and security whilst also remaining dedicated to an approach that seeks to critically analyse the colonization of Palestine.

It is important to note that this PhD thesis in no way incites hatred towards any group. In exploring the sexual biopolitics of Israeli settler colonial occupation, my thesis offers an exploration and critique of the ways in which sexuality is deployed as a technology of settler colonial occupation, which at times is justified and/or legitimated through claims about Jewish theology. One example is my exploration of Israeli pronatalism in Chapter Six. Here, in noting the ways in which the naturalization of settler colonialism is often staged through claims about Jewish theology, I am not critiquing Jewish people or the Jewish faith. Rather, my critique of the state of Israel is interested in how theological

claims, which are tied to racialized population formations, are instrumentalized in the service of nation-state formation and settler colonial occupation.

Chapter Three of this thesis serves to situate Israel and its regime of colonial biopolitics historically and in the present. In order to do this, I survey a wide body of existing literature that has examined the origins of Zionist thought as rooted in European imperialism and tied this to sexual politics. In so doing, I present the established history that elaborates upon how the anti-Jewish racism that was prevalent in Europe was inverted in order for Zionists to lay claim to a sovereign and racially exclusive homeland for global Jewry. This argument—that processes of racialization are fundamental to the state of Israel—could be misread as contravening the UK government’s definition of anti-Semitism outlined above. I want to make clear that rather than singling out the state of Israel as a racist project, my aim here is to de-exceptionalize Israel, and to situate it within our modern global order. This aim necessitates a consideration of broader and older European histories of imperialism, colonialism and racism, and an attentiveness to the linkages between these histories and the present-day existence of the state of Israel.

Furthermore, while writing this thesis I have taken care over the language used to describe, articulate and critique the scene from which I am writing. An uncountable number of events have been no-platformed, cancelled and subjected to investigation across UK universities because they have taken place under a banner of ‘Israeli apartheid’, and the speakers and performers who were scheduled to appear have often been accused of inciting hatred and encouraging extremism. As a result of this context, throughout this thesis I refrain from using the term ‘apartheid’ to characterize the state of Israel’s infrastructure of occupation, a characterization that compares Israel’s treatment of Palestinians to South Africa’s treatment of non-white citizens during the apartheid era. Despite this, throughout this thesis I nonetheless offer in-depth analyses of the ways in

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13 During the 2017 Israel Apartheid Week, the University of Exeter, University College London and University of Central Lancashire all cancelled events that were planned to take place (Weale and Morris, 2017). In March 2017, Middlesex University and the University of East London cancelled planned public lectures featuring Professor Richard Falk, citing his labelling of Israel as an ‘apartheid state’ among the reasons (Farand, 2017). Events critical of Israel which do go ahead at UK universities are now increasingly subjected to intense scrutiny, security checks and infiltration.
which the state of Israel creates regimes of control that racially separate out populations, resulting in a cartographic fracturing and the production of materially uneven conditions and experiences of life.

While there are some terms that I have hesitated to use for reasons pertaining to my own security, I do strategically rename or reclassify places and institutions so that their haunting Palestinian past and present, and the violences that erased it, become once again visible. This renaming is important, I suggest, because the erasure and renaming of Palestine—its villages, towns, cities, olive groves, ports, airports, railway lines, highways, resorts—has been an important strategy for justifying Israeli settler colonization and the attendant dispossession and displacement of the Palestinian people.  

Indeed, as Said writes:

To call this place ‘Palestine’ and not ‘Israel’ or ‘Zion’ is already an act of fairly consequential political interruption… it serves to show how epistemologically the name of, and of course, the very presence of bodies in, Palestine are—because Palestine carries so heaving an imaginative and doctrinal fright—transmuted from a reality into a non-reality, from a presence into an absence. (Said, 1979: 10).

Supporting Palestinian land claims and refusing to reinscribe the colonial logics of a Palestinian non-reality, throughout this thesis I use the Palestinian Arabic names in the main text or in brackets when referring to locations in Palestine (e.g. Hebron (al-Khalil)). In addition, throughout this thesis I refer to the Israeli Defence Forces (their official name) as the Israeli Occupation Forces or IOF. This strategic renaming is in solidarity with the people of Palestine, and marks my refusal to recognize the Israeli state as ‘defending’ itself against the indigenous inhabitants of Palestine rather than being an occupying force. My use of ‘IOF’ follows in the tradition of numerous Palestinian and pro-Palestinian

14 These struggles are, of course, still ongoing. For example, in 1998 the Palestinian-led legal rights organization Adalah took the Israeli government to court because over eighty per cent of road signs were in Hebrew and English only (Adalah, 1998); in 2009 the Israeli government announced that all major road signs would be ‘standardized’, converting English and Arabic place names into straight transliterations of the Hebrew names, erasing the Arabic names of Palestine (Cook, 2009).
media outlets and human rights groups, including Middle East Monitor, Electronic Intifada and al-Haq.

Lastly, as of September 2017, there are three Palestinian organizations listed on the UK Home Office’s ‘Proscribed Terrorist Organisation’ list.¹⁵ Throughout this thesis, I have been careful not to cite any documents, materials or statements made by these groups, and have also, to the best of my knowledge at the time of writing, not cited any Palestinians who are directly affiliated with these groups.

1.3 Chapter Outlines

Chapter Two, ‘Biopolitics, Colonialism and Feminist Scholarship’, establishes the key concepts and frameworks that will inform my analyses throughout the thesis through a literature review that outlines Foucault’s analytic of biopower, and analyses subsequent feminist, anti-racist and anti-colonial engagements with it. I begin by outlining Foucault’s analytic of biopower, pointing to the centrality and importance of sexuality. The chapter then turns to review important feminist engagements with biopower, focusing on those that draw attention to the importance of gendered and sexual regulation to empire, nationalist projects, and reproductive medicine and technology. The second section examines existing debates that look at the relationship between race, colonialism and biopower. In so doing, I draw attention to the works of Mbembe, Puar, Fanon, among others, in order to stress the importance of using an analytic of biopower to study the infrastructures of colonial occupation. The final section, ‘The Politics of Biopolitical Complicity’, outlines scholarship that has examined the ways in which feminist, queer and anti-racist theory and activism, as well as paradigms of liberal humanitarianism, converge with or become complicit in biopolitical racism. By the end of this chapter, I hope to have justified the importance of a framing of biopolitics to the study of the sexual politics of Israeli colonial occupation. Furthermore, bringing together the various works reviewed, I argue, allows us to focus on how sexuality is dispersed across the geographies of colonial occupation, resulting in an analytic that examines sexual infrastructure.

¹⁵ The list of the UK government’s ‘Proscribed Terrorist Organisations’ can be found online:
Chapter Three, ‘Zionist Biopolitics’, aims to both review literature that historicizes the Zionist state building project in a framework of European imperialism and colonization, and to outline some of the central tactics and technologies of Israel’s current colonial occupation of Palestine. Building on the important works outlined in the previous chapter that stressed the importance of examining how sexuality is dispersed and embedded across the geographies and infrastructures of contemporary life, in this chapter I seek to establish the ways in which the biopolitical targeting of Palestinian health, reproduction and the family is embedded in the contemporary technologies of colonial occupation. I begin by offering a historical overview of Zionism as an ideology that developed in Europe and how this came to materialise itself in Palestine, focusing on literature that has stressed Zionism’s imperial and colonial politics. I then turn to examine literature that has sought to analyse more recent trends in Israel’s colonial occupation, specifically pertaining to the technologies of control being developed and deployed by state of Israel. The final section of this chapter seeks to materialise the analyses that have come thus far, by offering an examination of the Israeli built wall, looking at its effects on Palestinian life, love, and reproduction. By the end of this chapter, I hope to have demonstrated that biopolitical demographic concerns have been of central importance to the development of the colonial occupation of Palestine, proliferating an array of high and low-tech technologies of occupation that operate through practices of separation, fragmentation, and through the slowing down of Palestinian life. And, furthermore, that these demographic concerns and attendant technologies of occupation specifically target the intimate family and reproductive lives of Palestinians.

Chapter Four, “‘Cultures of Death’; Settler Colonialism and/as Sexual Violence’, forms the first of the three case study chapters. This case study brings together the central themes of this thesis – sexuality and sexual violence, biopolitical complicity, and colonial occupation – in order to examine Israel’s practices of sexual violence and the sexual nature of settler colonial occupation. Situated in the context of the summer of 2014, which saw Israel launch Operation Brother’s Keeper and Operation Protective Edge, this chapter begins by tracing how Israel’s life-destroying and injuring operations were figured and justified as an exercise of ‘humanitarian warfare’. The chapter then turns to examine international organisation and feminist international relations theory claims that sexual violence is absent from Palestine/Israel, which have until now been met with little critical discussion. In so doing, I argue that these literatures participate in liberal discourses of humanitarian warfare, thus justifying colonial occupation and masking its sexual politics.
This chapter then turns to empirically document both Israel’s use of sexual violence as a method of torture and the sexualized nature of colonial occupation and warfare. In so doing, this chapter highlights a new and novel instance of the biopolitical complicity of certain feminist scholarship with colonial occupation, while also contributing to existing analyses of sexual violence and occupation.

The second case study, ‘Racial Purity, Sexual Threat: The Politics of Anti-Miscegenation in Palestine/Israel’, examines the biopolitical regulation of sexual intimacy and love in Palestine/Israel. Structured around an Israeli legal trial that took place in Jerusalem in July 2010, in which a Muslim Palestinian man from Jerusalem was imprisoned for ‘rape by deception’, this chapter then goes on to situate this ruling within a wider context of the regulation of miscegenation in Palestine/Israel. In order to do this, I analyse the activities of one vigilante Israeli group - Hands for Brothers (Yad L’Achim) - that seeks to regulate and intervene in mixed relationships, carrying out rescue missions to ‘rescue’ Jewish Israeli women from the Palestinian men that they form intimate relationships with. In so doing, this chapter examines the ways in which the regulation of miscegenation operates as an intimate biopolitical technology of social control, and argues that it works to affirms the centrality of Jewishness to the state of Israel and ideas of national Jewish heteronormativity. As such, this chapter analyses a new and novel instance of anti-miscegenation politics, contributing to existing analyses of sexuality, miscegenation and colonialism.

The final case study chapter, ““Be Fruitful and Multiply”: Fertility Economies, White Futurities’, critically examines Israel’s official policy of Jewish pronatalism and attendant uses of reproductive technology and medicine. Tracing the historical contours of Israel’s fertility economy, I demonstrate that access to IVF and egg donation in Israel sheds light on the state of Israel’s regime of citizenship and its investments in occupation, Jewishness and the delimitation of Palestinian reproduction. Against official state narratives of pro-Jewish reproduction, this chapter then turns to document the sterilization of Ethiopian Jewish women through the use of Depo-Provera, a birth control injection. In so doing, I highlight the limits of certain feminist theorizations of reproductive freedom, and argue that the state of Israel’s covert regulation of family planning and access to reproductive technologies functions as a technology of occupation which creates a cartography of racially desirable and undesirable, reproductive and non-reproductive life. My examination of the treatment of Black-Israeli women’s reproduction builds on existing
scholarship regarding pronatalism and reproduction in Palestine/Israel, by demonstrating the ways in which the reproduction of all subjects deemed racially incompatible with the Israeli body politic is targeted for intervention, and also reveals the structural relationship between Zionism and anti-Black racism.

Before concluding my thesis, I offer an interlude, ‘Freedom Dreams: An Interlude of Reproductive Resistance’, where I examine the contemporary phenomenon of Palestinian sperm-smuggling: the smuggling of male Palestinian prisoners’ sperm out of Israeli jails by their wives, and the latter’s subsequent IVF insemination. Up until this point, through a series of case studies, this thesis has examined how Israeli colonial occupation manifests itself and is maintained through sexuality and sexual violence. This ‘Interlude of Reproductive Resistance’ thus functions to interrupt this narrative flow, and serves as a reminder that despite the far-reaching violences of Zionist biopower, power concomitantly produces capacities and genres of resistance, and fields of hope, alterity and freedom, against and through its subjectifying forces. The case of Palestinian sperm smuggling, I argue, challenges common portrayals of Palestinian women as oppressed and abject, whilst also highlighting the importance of reproduction to Palestinian anti-colonial resistance.

I will conclude by arguing that sexuality is structural to colonial occupation and that it operates not solely through identarian forms of regulation and control. Rather, I will assert that in the context of Palestine/Israel, sexuality is embedded within the various technologies and infrastructures of occupation. And, furthermore, that populations are targeted in accordance with Israel’s white, Jewish and heteronormative conceptions of the family. I will also reassert the need for certain feminist theory to take seriously the infrastructural ways that sexuality operates in the context of colonial occupation. I will then finish by exploring what the implications of an understanding of the intimate infrastructures of occupation are, suggesting that such an approach may enable the situated cultivation of specific forms of creative resistance to such infrastructures.
Chapter 2 Biopolitics, Colonialism and Feminist Scholarship

This chapter takes the shape of a literature review that seeks to establish the main theoretical concepts and ideas that form the underpinnings of this thesis. In order to do this, this chapter surveys three key areas of established scholarly knowledge concerning Foucault’s analytic of biopower; 1) its relationship to feminist though; 2) the study of colonialism and occupation; and 3) scholarship that examines how feminist theory and paradigms of liberal humanitarianism converge with or become complicit in biopolitical racism and imperialism.

The first section of this chapter, ‘The Politics of Life’, proceeds by outlining Foucault’s mapping of biopower in the History of Sexuality Volume One and elsewhere, and then turns to outline feminist scholarship elaborating on why sexuality is especially important to the workings of biopower. In so doing, I draw attention existing feminist literature that examines the relationship between reproduction and supremacist, racist and colonial politics in order to demonstrate what I believe to be the relevance of biopolitical theory for this thesis, including the works of Feder (2007), Stoler (1995), Puar (2007), and Repo (2016). Here I also draw attention to how such scholarship has lent itself to Black feminist and anti-racist debates concerning reproductive justice, such as the works of Hannabach (2013), Roberts (2015) and Whatcott (2018), which begins to give shape to the analysis of Israel’s use of reproductive technology and medicine in Chapter Six. The second section of this literature review forms an examination of existing debates that examine the relationship between race, colonialism and biopower, specifically focusing on how such debates extend, challenge or re-map Foucault’s work, including the works of Hanafi (2013), Fanon (1967), Mbembe (2001, 2003), Puar (2015, 2017), and Weheliye (2014). Outlining this literature, which focuses not only on the occupation Palestine but also on the broader and global politics of racialization and colonial occupation, also gives further shape to the need to de-exceptionalize the state of Israel in global politics in so far as Palestine here serves as a specific example and manifestation of broader racist and imperial power dynamics. The final section of this chapter, ‘The Politics of Biopolitical Complicity’, reviews existing scholarship that has examined the ways in which feminist theory and activism and discourses of humanitarianism converge with or become complicit in biopolitical racism, including the works of Blencowe (2011), Farris (2017), Fassin (2007), Puar (2017), and Reid (2010). In so doing, I bring together the two previous literatures by looking at selected texts that have sought to analyse and unpick the ways in which feminist and queer activism and discourses of rights becomes embroiled with
Together, the sections of this literature review aim to establish the importance of a framework of biopolitics to this thesis. In bringing together and reviewing these important existing literatures, this chapter seeks to demonstrate the merits of Foucault’s articulation of biopower, as well as how it has been utilised, extended and reformulated by scholars seeking to chart and analyse the specific politics of, and struggles against, colonial, settler colonial and racist modes of governance, and its relationship to sexual politics and struggles for reproductive justice. Furthermore, bringing these literatures together, this chapter suggests, allows us to map how mechanisms of reproductive population management become entwined within the spatial infrastructures of colonial occupation.

2.1 The Politics of Life

Foucault’s theorization of the technology and workings of biopower is attributed to *The History of Sexuality Volume One: The Will to Knowledge* (1978) and to his more recently published lectures, *Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1974-75* (2003a), *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76* (2003), *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-78* (2009) and *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-79* (2008). In *The History of Sexuality Volume One*, Foucault tasked himself with exploring how sex and sexuality became objects of knowledge, unpicking and elaborating upon the ways that sex and desire became figured as sites of authentic discovery of the true self and targets for national population intervention and regulation. In so doing, Foucault critiqued accounts of sexuality that figured it as taboo, offering a far-reaching critique of what he terms the ‘repressive hypothesis’—the understanding that power relations bearing on sexuality take the form of prohibition or censorship. Foucault argued that, in contrast, Western culture, far from repressing sexuality, has actually produced and multiplied it as a means of producing, regulating and accessing the modern individual (Foucault, 1978).

Central to Foucault’s account of the proliferation and deployment of sexuality was the emergence of ‘biopower’, a technology of power that ‘brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge/power an agent in the transformation of human life’ (Foucault, 1978: 143). Sex was central to biopower, providing a link between an individual’s sexuality and reproduction, and the national reproduction and vitality of the race/species as a whole (Foucault, 1978). Thus, for
Foucault, sexuality was not simply a truth of the self, but rather a specific discourse produced by biopower to ensure the health, vitality and reproduction of certain human species, ‘motivated by one basic concern: to ensure population, to reproduce labour capacity, to perpetuate the form of social relations’ (ibid.: 36-37).

In outlining his analytic of biopower, Foucault argued that this form of power emerged and consolidated itself through two key tactics or ‘poles’: the first concerns ‘an anatomo-politics of the human body’ that seeks to discipline the individual body into a social system of labour productivity (ibid.: 139). Here, in targeting sexuality, biopower ‘required the social body as a whole, and virtually all of its individuals to place themselves under surveillance’ in the service of a ‘normalizing society’ (ibid.: 116). The second pole centres on a set of ‘regulatory controls’ that govern the social body of the species or race within a ‘biopolitics of population’ (ibid.: 139). As a result of this second pole, a whole host of national population surveillance and regulation mechanisms arose concerning the management of sexuality: ‘the birth rate, the mortality rate, longevity, and so on—together with a whole series of related economic and political problems which, in the second half of the eighteenth century, became biopolitics’ first objects of knowledge and the targets it seeks to control’ (Foucault, 2003: 243).

Both in the lectures and in The Will to Knowledge, race, racism, and nationalism emerge as central to workings of biopower, albeit in differing ways (Stoler, 1995). Indeed, as Repo has noted (2013: 2), ‘in the lectures, Foucault’s analysis of racism is primarily linked to biopower and the emergence of nationalism, whereas in The Will to Knowledge, it is bound to sexuality and bourgeois order.’ In The Will to Knowledge, Foucault crucially observes that race is entangled with the apparatus of sexuality, deployed as central to the operations of biopower. As Stoler notes, ‘racism is first mentioned in a discussion of the earliest technologies of sex that arose in the eighteenth century around the political economy of population’ (1995: 26). This centrality of race is due, in part, to the shift from national sovereign judicial power to biopower. Foucault writes, ‘for a long time, one of the characteristic privileges of sovereign power was the right to decide life and death’ (1978: 135). However,

there has been a parallel shift in the right of death, or at least a tendency to align itself with the exigencies of a life-administering power… this death that was based on the right of the sovereign is now
manifested as simply the reverse of the right of the social body or ensure, maintain, or develop its life (ibid.: 136)

It is within this shift from the sovereign state power over life to the desire to administer and foster life that biopower incorporates racism as one of its central logics. Indeed, while Foucault notes that racism had existed long before the emergence of biopower (see Foucault, 2003: 254), it is through racism becoming entangled with sexuality that biopower is able to consolidate and differentiate between species and populations and to determine which lives should be promoted, regulated and maximised, secured for reproduction. Or, as Repo (2013: 4) has put it, ‘race is not just a new means of carrying out the death function of sovereign power, but it is a central part of determining whose lives to defend, preserve and regulate’. Thus, rather than life-administrating desires of biopower seeking to maximise the lives of all, racism creates biopowers paradoxical under-belly whereby the human species is divided in racialized and hierarchized groups and accordingly regulated in national and international contexts. This, as Foucault notes, drives and inspires modern political violence:

Wars are no longer waged in the name of the sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars… If genocide is the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomenon of population. (1978: 137)

For Foucault, sexual biopolitics operate through a racist logic, with racism ‘separating out groups that exist within a population’ (2003: 255) in the service of the ‘cleanliness of the social body’ (1978: 54). In Foucault’s account of biopower, sexuality is thus indispensable to its workings, which on the scale of the State functions through race in order distinguish and differently target populations. Foucault’s account of biopolitical racism has met with criticism, with scholars pointing to how his figuring of race in regimes of biopower was premised on an inward focus on Europe, resulting in a lack of
attention to the connected politics of enslavement, imperialism and colonialism. I will return to this point in more detail in the next section, however in the rest of this section I focus on how Foucault’s analytic of biopower has been taken up in queer and feminist scholarship.

Subsequent scholarship utilising Foucault’s conception of biopower has articulated this formation of modern power differently depending on which of Foucault’s texts are taken as the basis for theorisation. For example, scholars studying the relation between biopower, sovereignty and racialized violence have commonly drawn upon Foucault’s lectures at the Collège de France, while feminist scholars interested in sexuality and reproduction have focused on The Will to Knowledge. Without wanting to oversimply a vast and complex field of theorization and analysis, the result of this division has broadly led to two differing types of biopolitical theorization, with the former primarily concerned with what is articulated as the ‘death function’ of bio/necro-politics, exemplified in the works of Agamben (1998), Boano and Marten (2013), Jabri (2007), and Macey (2009). While the latter concerned with what Repo has termed sexuality’s relationship to the ‘life function’ (2013), exemplified in works of Blencowe (2012), Feder (2007), and Repo (2013, 2016). As Puar (2007: 35) has put it, ‘many accounts of contemporary biopolitics thus foreground either race and state racism or, as Judith Butler does, the ramification of the emergence of the category of “sex”, but rarely the two together.’ Consequently, biopolitical scholarship concerned with race has increasingly focused its analysis on how life is made to die in order for other life to live (Repo, 2013; McWhorter, 2009).

In this context, it is important to note the work of Agamben, whose 1998 Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, sought to respond to and critically engage with Foucault’s theorisation of biopower in order to foreground the relationship between sovereign power and biopolitics which, he argued, was forged in the exceptional exercise of state sovereignty (1998). Examining the long history of the death camp as a site of sovereign state exception, Agamben argues that sovereign power establishes itself through the production of bare human life, which exists at the limits of and through the suspension of law. For Agamben, rather than a break in history of state power, biopower moves bare life from the periphery into the centre, incorporating the threat of death as central to the concerns of the state: ‘Placing biological life at the center of its calculations, the modern State… does nothing other than bring to light the secret tie uniting power and bare life’ (ibid.: 6). Agamben’s scholarship has been subject to large and critical
reception, seen in the works of Blencowe (2010), Doty (2011), Lemke (2005), Repo (2015), and Repo and Griffiths (2018). In the specific context of the colonial occupation Palestine, Agamben’s framework of bare life has been utilised by numerous scholars seeking to articulate Palestinian life under colonial occupation, where an analogy has been drawn between Palestinians and Agamben’s figure of *Homo Sacer*, see for example, Ball (2014), Boano and Marten (2013), and Bowman (2007). As a result, Repo and Griffiths have argued that ‘this politics of death and a turn to Giorgio Agamben's (1995) reading of Foucault… has, for the most part, framed discussion of Palestinian subject-making in the spaces of security apparatuses in the West Bank and Gaza’ (2018: 18). While Agamben’s work has its clear and demonstrated uses for analysing the colonial occupation of Palestine, in this body of scholarship sexuality and sexual subject making practises are often decentred from the frame of analysis. Indeed, as Repo and Griffiths further note, a focus on the intimate and sexual politics of occupation are ‘foreclosed by an Agambenian framework’ (ibid.). Thus, given this thesis’ aim of using biopolitical theory to examine the ways in which Israeli occupation manifests and is maintained through racialized sexuality and sexual violence, I am primarily concerned with examining biopolitical feminist scholarship that has focused on sexuality’s biopolitical will to life and its relationship to racism.

In her seminal work on Foucault’s mapping of biopower, Stoler notes that ‘crucial elements of gender and empire are missing from Foucault’s account’ (1995: 35). Indeed, while Stoler recognises the benefits of Foucault’s analytic (1995: 47), she suggests that any account of biopower that doesn’t take seriously the ways in which biopolitical discourses of racial survival and sexual regulation in Europe were influenced by the figuring of colonized subjects as posing a sexual and racial threat, misses a large part of the history and emergence of biopower. Through an examination of the colonial society of the Dutch East Indies, Stoler argues that,

> it is imperial-wide discourses that linked children’s health programs to racial survival, tied increasing campaigns for domestic hygiene to colonial expansion, made childrearing an imperial and class duty, and cast white women as the bearers of a more racist imperial order and the custodians of their desire-driven immoral men (1995: 35)

By linking imperial expansion to gender and the rise of sexual technologies of biopower,
Stoler convincingly demonstrates the ways in which the political economy of population that Foucault identified was tied to and influenced by sexual practices in the colonies and associated fears of the demise of the white race. As a result, she argues that ‘the myth of blood that pervades nineteenth-century racism may be traced, as Foucault does, from an aristocratic preoccupation with legitimacy, pure blood and decent, but not through it alone. It was equally dependent on an imperial politics of exclusion’ (1995: 51). In Stoler’s account, then, a biopolitics of sexuality is central to colonial rule, producing attendant European demographic concerns that impelled the European nation’s biopolitical will to life.

Building on Stoler’s important analysis and responding to recent scholarship that has focused heavily on the biopolitics of race, Repo has argued that the ‘exclusive focus on race elides the sexual politics that transforms bodies into productive and reproductive machines through processes of regulation, discipline and subjectification’ (2016: 112). Through an analysis of the racist and sexist politics of Europe’s far-right movements, Repo explores how the ‘declining fertility of European women’ is figured as a central concern by far-right groups, which is then tied to their anti-immigrant and Islamophobic politics (ibid.: 113). In taking seriously the gendered and sexual dimensions of European racism and xenophobia, Repo demonstrates how concerns regarding the reproduction of white European life, figured as duty of white women, are central to contemporary manifestations of racism and anti-immigrant politics. Throughout Foucault’s scholarship, he maintains that with the emergence of biopower, the family becomes a privileged site through which biopower is exercised such the individual is produced a member of the population, nation and social body (see Foucault 1978, 2003, 2003a; also see Blencowe, 2011: 84-87). Building on Foucault’s analysis, Feder (2007) argues that the family acts as a privileged category of racial exclusion in the contemporary US. Drawing on Spillers (1987) important historization of the category ‘gender’ as an exclusive classification that, through enslavement, has ‘ungendered’ or denied gender to Black women, Feder asserts that gender primarily functions as a mode of biopolitical disciplinary power that operates within family structures to reproduce normativity, while race predominantly acts upon the family as way of regulating who can access ‘normal’ family life. In a differing vein, Cooper (2017) examines how neoliberalism relies on a neoconservative agenda of family values in order to re-inscribe a biopolitics of racial and class in the contemporary US. Arguing that the maintenance of capitalism ‘entails the periodic reinvention of the family as an instrument for distributing wealth and income’ (2017: 17), Cooper traces how 1960s
activist movements fighting for gendered and sexual rights challenged the ‘sexual normativity of the family wage’ (ibid.: 21), leading to the development of an oppositional neoconservative agenda. This fear of racial mixing and concerns surrounding the fertility of white women that Stoler, Repo, and Feder articulate, along with the exclusion of Black and colonized subjects from reproductive family structures, provides an important background to Chapter 5 where I analyse the regulation of mixed Palestinian-Israeli relationships. Indeed, while specific Zionist settler colonial demographic concerns (outlined in Chapter Three) are important here, these feminist works provide a vital backdrop against which to demonstrate how those logics build upon a broader Western project of biopolitical colonialism.

Taking biopolitical analysis in a differing direction, Puar’s formative work on ‘homonationalism’ examines how the contemporary granting and configurations of (certain subjects’) gay rights, inclusion and citizenship are intricately connected to the war on terror and US empire and its associated regimes of torture, detention, incarceration, occupation and war (2007). Puar defines homonationalism as,

an analytic to apprehend state formation and a structure of modernity: as an assemblage of geopolitical and historical forces, neoliberal interests in capitalist accumulation both cultural and material, biopolitical state practices of population control, and affective investments in discourses of freedom, liberation, and rights (Puar, 2013: 337).

Reading across and bringing together Foucault’s various accounts of biopower, and putting them into conversation with scholars who have extended Foucault’s account (e.g. Mbembe and Agamben) along with queer and feminist scholarship, Puar demonstrates how gay rights have come to be figured as marker of liberal modernity ‘at the expense of sexually and racially perverse death in relation to the contemporary politics of securitization, Orientalism, terrorism, torture, and the articulation of Muslim, Arab, Sikh, and South Asian sexualities’ (2007: xiii). In so doing, Puar importantly demonstrates how the onset of what she terms ‘sexual exceptionalism’ (ibid.: 2-11) has led to the incorporation of (certain) homosexuals into the terrain of biopolitics ‘life function’, a move predicated on the production of homophobia and sexual monstrosity as antithetical to liberal modernity, and thus fittingly attributed to those populations and individuals
figured as ‘terrorist’. Thus, attention to homonationalist power structures asks for a focus on how the according and celebration of gay rights for some populations comes ‘at the expense of the delimitation and expulsion of other populations’ (Puar, 2013: 337).

Along with Puar’s seminal work, there is a growing body of academic scholarship that seeks to un-pack and analyse the state of Israel’s international practises of pinkwashing, exemplified in the works of Elia (2012), Darwich and Maikey (2014), Hartal and Sasson-Levy (2017), Hochberg (2010, 2015), Morgensen (2012), Puar (2011, 2013), Puar and Mikdashi (2016), Ritchie (2015, 2010), and Spade (2013). Israeli pinkwashing refers to Israel’s international public relations campaigns, such as ‘Brand Israel’16, which seek to internationally promote Israel as progressive Western site of gay modernity against the backdrop of a homophobic, violent and backwards Palestinian society. As Puar has noted,

 Israeli pinkwashing is a potent method through which the terms of Israeli occupation of Palestine are reiterated—Israel is civilised, Palestinians are barbaric, homophobic, and uncivilised. This discourse has manifold effects: it denies Israeli homophobic oppression of its own gays and lesbians (see Gross 2010 and Kuntsman 2009), and it recruits, often unwittingly, gays and lesbians of other countries into collusion with Israeli violence towards Palestine. In reproducing Orientalist tropes of Palestinian sexual backwardness, it also denies the impact of colonial occupation on the degradation and containment of Palestinian cultural norms and values. Pinkwashing harnesses global gays as a new source of affiliation by recruiting liberal gays into a dirty bargaining of their own safety against the continued oppression of Palestinians, who are now perforce re-branded as ‘gay un-friendly’. (Puar, 2011: 139)

16 ‘Brand Israel’ was an international public relations campaign funded by the Israeli Foreign Ministry. As Puar notes (2011: 137-138), the ‘‘Brand Israel’ campaign, produced by the Israeli Foreign Ministry, to counter its growing reputation as a colonial power… Targeting global cities such as New York, Toronto, and London, the ‘Brand Israel’ campaign has used events such as film festivals to promote its image as cultured and modern. One of the most prominent features of the ‘Brand Israel’ campaign is the marketing of a modern Israel as a gay-friendly Israel.’
Importantly, as Puar notes, pinkwashing functions as one tactic or facet of homonationalism, rather than as synonymous\(^\text{17}\). Working as one among many sexual tactics of occupation, pinkwashing functions to internationally produce Israel as a liberal rights upholding nation, which was alluded to in this thesis’ introduction where I pointed to the IOF military inclusion of LGBTQ Israelis. I will return to Israeli homonationalism and pinkwashing later in this chapter.

While Puar’s work has importantly drawn attention to a facet of biopolitical modernity, whereby homosexual subjects enter the liberal life protecting apparatus of the state, frameworks of biopolitics have been differently put to use in debates concerning ‘reproductive justice’. Here scholars have utilised frameworks of biopolitics, often coupled with Black feminism, in order to foreground the ways that reproductive medicine, sterilization, assistive reproductive technologies, and geographies of reproductive capacity intersect with gender, racism, political economy and nation state formation, seen in the works of Darling (1999, 2006, 2008), Roberts (1993, 1997, 2015), Ross (2005), and Stern (2005). As a term coined by the US-based SisterSong Collective, a group of Black feminist activists and scholars, reproductive justice combines and extends discourses of social justice and reproductive rights. In so doing, the framing of reproductive justice draws out the intersecting and overlapping links between racism, incarceration, poverty, geo-politics, and patriarchy, and figures population control policies as reproductive issues. As Roberts puts it (2015: 81-82):

\begin{quote}
True reproductive freedom requires a living wage, universal health care,
\end{quote}

\(^{17}\) As Puar elaborates, homonationalism is not synonymous with pinkwashing:

Homonationalism, thus, is not simply a synonym for gay racism, or another way to mark how gay and lesbian identities became available to conservative political imaginaries; it is not another identity politics, not another way of distinguishing good queers from bad queers, not an accusation, and not a position. It is rather a facet of modernity and a historical shift marked by the entrance of (some) homosexual bodies as worthy of protection by nation-states, a constitutive and fundamental reorientation of the relationship between the state, capitalism, and sexuality. (Puar, 2013: 337)
and the abolition of prisons. Black women see the police slaughter of unarmed people in their communities as a reproductive justice issue. They recognize that women are frequent victims of racist police violence and that cutting short the lives of black youth violates the right of mothers to raise their children in healthy, humane environments. The reproductive justice movement and Black Lives Matter are likely allies because, at their core, both insist that American society must begin to value Black humanity… Reproductive justice activists treat abortion and other reproductive health services as akin to the resources all human beings are entitled to—such as health care, education, housing, and food—in an equitable, democratic society.

Scholars taking up a framework of reproductive justice in order to study the curtailment of reproductive life and access to reproductive technologies and medicine increasingly borrow from theories of biopolitics in order to do so. This is not surprising, given that Foucault (2003: 243) named ‘the ratio of births to deaths, the rate of reproduction… natalist policy’ as central to the racialized biopolitics of population. Roberts, for example, has critically explored the role that race and racism play in the emergence of reproductive technologies, and in so doing draws attention to the ways in which such technologies serve as biopolitical technologies of population management in ways that sediment racialized material inequalities, preventing women of colour from exercising their reproductive rights (1997). In a differing vein, in their work on sterilizations performed on women incarcerated in Californian jails between 2006-2010, Whatcott has examined how the introduction of informed consent procedures, purported to serve as a form of female protection, ‘operates as one of the mechanisms through which biopolitical sterilization persists’ (2018: 133). In so doing, Whatcott argues that the procedure of informed consent becomes a regulatory function of biopower and consolidates carceral regimes, confirming ‘the claim of reproductive justice theory that biopolitical power persists beyond the legal termination of the eugenics era’ (ibid.: 137). Bringing together Puar’s focus on the sexual politics of US empire with reproductive justice theory, Hannabach examines the 1990s sterilization of female Haitian refugees ‘contaminated’ with HIV during their detention at the US naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba – a location the US considered exempt from immigration, asylum and constitutional law. Bringing together Foucault’s notion of biopower and Mbembe’s re-articulation of colonial sovereignty and biopower, Hannabach ‘examines the various legal, medical, and
cultural technologies that produced these Haitian refugees’ blood—and specifically Haitian women’s blood—as a site of international anxiety over legal sovereignty, biopolitics, and reproductive rights’ (2013: 23). Together, the focus of these works on reproductive rights and justice as existing at the intersection of global racial power hierarchies, regimes of detention and incarnation, citizenship, income, and gender provide a vital background to Chapter Six, where I examine the use of reproductive technologies and medicine as biopolitical practises that function to preserve those targeted by Zionism’s life function, concomitantly denying reproductive futurity to those deemed in excess of Israel’s desired body politic.

In this section, I have attempted to demonstrate the importance of Foucault’s theory of ‘biopolitics’ for studying sexual and reproductive politics and violence, as well as to the study of the sexual politics of colonialism. Although this theory emerged out of Foucault’s specific engagement with eighteenth and nineteenth century shifts in power, the framework has demonstrable uses for the contemporary study of occupation, colonialism, sexuality, and reproductive medicine and technologies, helping us elaborate upon the ways in which power operates at the level of the individual and population in order to demarcate and secure chosen body politics. The feminist engagements with biopower outlined above insist, in differing ways, that the governance of sexuality and the reproduction of life places race as central sorting mechanism through which life is ordered and intervened in. It is this insistence that structures this thesis’ central claim, that Israel’s occupation of Palestine is maintained through sexuality and sexual violence.

2.2 Biopolitics and Colonialism

Both in the lectures and The Will to Knowledge Foucault names race as indispensable to the working of biopower, indeed biopower gains its force via the targeting of sexuality through a racist logic. However, while as noted in the previous section Foucault acknowledged that racism has a history that predated biopower, he does not discuss colonialism and imperialism and their relationship to biopower in a sustained way. In discussions of biopower, colonialism and imperialism are mentioned on a small number of occasions, predominantly in the lectures he gave at the Collège de France. For example, in Society Must Be Defended, Foucault argues biopower is made possible, in part, through the ‘blowback’ of colonial modes of governance:
At the end of the sixteenth century we have, then, if not the first, at least an early example of the sort of boomerang effect colonial practice can have on the judicial-political structures of the West. It should never be forgotten that while colonization, with its techniques and its political and juridical weapons, obviously transported European models to other continents, it also had a considerable boomerang effect on the mechanisms of power in the West, and on the apparatuses, institutions, and techniques of power. A whole series of colonial models was brought back to the West, and the result was that the West could practice something resembling colonization, or an internal colonialism, on itself. (Foucault, 2003: 103)

Arguing that modern power in European societies took the form of internal colonization, through its fracturing of populations and its modes of quarantining, monitoring, governance and surveillance, Foucault went on to argue that a primary effect of this ‘internal colonialism’ was a biopolitics of racism: ‘Racism first develops with colonization, or in other words, with colonizing genocide. If you are functioning in the biopower mode, how can you justify the need to kill people, to kill populations, and to kill civilizations? By using the themes of evolutionism, by appealing to a racism’ (ibid.: 257). Thus, Foucault recognises that colonization was fundamental to the emergence of biopolitical racism, but provides little substantive detail on the former. As a result, a number of scholars have critically thought through Foucault’s analytic, asking how equipped the analytic of biopower is to comprehend the intricacies of colonial rule. Weheliye (2014: 57), for example, argues that ‘even though the originating leap of racism can be found in the colonized “rest,” only its biopolitical rearticulation in the west imbues it with the magical aura of conceptual value.’ For Weheliye, Foucault’s focus on racism as it enters Europe leads him to ‘distinguish European state racism and biopolitics from those primeval forms of racism that linger in the aforementioned philosophical, geographical, and political quicksands of an unspecified else-where’ (ibid.: 58). For Weheliye (ibid.: 59), it through such a figuring that, in both The Will to Knowledge and the lectures, that the epitome and harshest form of biopolitics is given in the example of the Third Reich, rather than colonialism, enslavement or indigenous genocide. As

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18 Foucault mentions colonization on a number of other occasion in Society Must be Defended but not in direct relation to biopower (see Foucault, 2003: 38-39, 60, 256-257).
Foucault writes, ‘of course, no state could have more disciplinary power than the Nazi regime. Nor was there any other State in which the biological was so tightly, so insistently, regulated’ (Foucault, 2003: 259).

In a differing vein, in *The Birth of Biopolitics*, Foucault outlines what he terms the ‘liberal art of government’, a socio-political and economic mode of government that arose in the eighteenth-century attendant to biopower as a means of securing Europe. Arguing that the ‘idea of progress, of a European progress, is a fundamental theme in liberalism’ (2008: 54), Foucault traces the emergence of liberalism as a set of market practices through which ‘Europe appeared as an economic unit’ (ibid.: 55). For Foucault, the production and management of ideas of freedom were central to liberalism. As he writes;

> I employ the world “liberal,” it is first of all because this governmental-practice in the process of establishing itself is not satisfied with respecting this or that freedom, with guaranteeing this or that freedom. More profoundly, it is a consumer of freedom. It is a consumer of freedom inasmuch as it can only function insofar as a number of freedoms actually exist: freedom of the market, freedom to buy and sell, the free exercise of property rights, freedom of discussion, possible freedom of expression, and so on… The new art of government therefore appears as the management of freedom, not in the sense of the imperative: “be free,” with the immediate contradiction that this imperative may contain. (ibid.: 63)

As Foucault argues, liberalism emerges as means to secure the progress and development of Europe in the world, attendantly creating ideas and experiences of economic freedom - to own, to consume, to speak, to sell – that drive, secure, and reproduce the market. Central to liberalism’s production of freedom was the attendant securitization of life, or as Foucault puts it, ‘there is no liberalism without a culture of danger’ (ibid.: 67). Tying the emergence of danger to the biopolitical management of race and sexuality, Foucault writes,

> The horsemen of the Apocalypse disappear and in their place everyday dangers appear, emerge, and spread everywhere, perpetually being brought to life, reactualized, and circulated by what could be called the political culture of danger in the nineteenth
century. This political culture of danger has a number of aspects. For example, there is the campaign for savings banks at the start of the nineteenth century; you see the appearance of detective fiction and journalistic interest in crime around the middle of the nineteenth century; there are the campaigns around disease and hygiene; and then think too of what took place with regard to sexuality and the fear of degeneration: degeneration of the individual, the family, the race, and the human species. (ibid.: 66)

Here biopolitics emerges not only as a discourse of life management that seeks to monitor and secure the reproduction of the nation, the chosen race, and to induce longevity, but also as a means to secure the European liberal market which, as Foucault argues, protects and furthers Europe internationally and its attendant ideals of progress. Here, importantly, Foucault links the ‘liberal art of government’ and the ‘culture of danger’ to processes of colonization and imperialism. As he writes,

Obviously, this organization, or at any rate this reflection on the reciprocal positions of Europe and the world, is not the start of colonization. Colonization had long been underway. Nor do I think this is the start of imperialism in the modern or contemporary sense of the term, for we probably see the formation of this new imperialism later in the nineteenth century. But let's say that we have the start of a new type of global calculation in European governmental practice. I think there are many signs of this appearance of a new form of global rationality, of a new calculation on the scale of the world. (ibid.: 56)

Thus, while not equating liberalism with colonialism and imperialism, Foucault argues that liberal economic theory, with its desires for perpetual European freedom and enrichment at the expense of the impoverishment of other parts of the world, implies the logics of imperialism. Here the ‘liberal art of government’ emerges attendant to colonization and imperialism to produce a form of market rationality whereby the management of risk serves ‘the enrichment of Europe’ now considered as a single unit (ibid.: 54), on the ‘condition that the entire world becomes its market’ (ibid.: 55).

While Foucault did clearly recognize the importance of processes of colonization and
imperialism to biopower and to the globalized liberal market, then, it is also certainly true that such processes did not always take centre stage across his various analyses of biopower. In the rest of this section, I aim to outline subsequent interventions into the study of biopower that have theorised colonialism as their central object of study. In so doing, I draw attention to select important works that account for the biopolitics of colonial occupation. Such works not only strengthen the analytic of biopower as applied to study of sexual biopolitics in Palestine/Israel, but also point to the need to de-exceptionalize the state of Israel insofar as its regime of colonial occupation, while situated and specific in many ways, sits in relation to other colonial occupations, acts of warfare, and the modern treatment of racialized life.

In his important works On The Post-Colony (2001) and ‘Necropolitics’ (2003), Mbembe is less concerned with critiquing the place of colonialism, or lack thereof, in Foucault’s accounts\(^\text{19}\). Rather, Mbembe centrally asks whether the life function of biopower, articulated through a focus on European population management, is able to account for the forms of racialized sovereign power and the subjugation of life deployed through enslavement and contemporary colonial occupations, where he importantly uses occupied Palestine as a site of analysis. As Mbembe asks, ‘Is the notion of biopower sufficient to account for the contemporary ways in which the political, under the guise of war, of resistance, or of the fight against terror, makes the murder of the enemy its primary and absolute objective?’ (ibid.: 12).

\(^{19}\) Mbembe makes this explicit when he suggests, that the technologies which ended up producing Nazism should have originated in the plantation or in the colony or that, on the contrary—Foucault’s thesis—Nazism and Stalinism did no more than amplify a series of mechanisms that already existed in Western European social and political formations (subjugation of the body, health regulations, social Darwinism, eugenics, medico-legal theories on heredity, degeneration, and race) is, in the end, irrelevant. A fact remains, though: in modern philosophical thought and European political practice and imaginary, the colony represents the site where sovereignty consists fundamentally in the exercise of a power outside the law (\textit{ab legibus solutus}) and where “peace” is more likely to take on the face of a “war without end”. (2003: 23)
While Mbembe does note that sexuality is important to the forms of disciplinary, necro and biopower deployed in the colony, sexuality takes a backseat to his analysis of colonial violence. For Mbembe, it is precisely through the racialized articulation of colonized peoples as not fully human that the life-function of biopower becomes suspended in sovereign colonial rule. Existing as the paradoxical under-belly of Western sovereignty and rule of law, Mbembe charts how Europe has long produced terror as its Other, as that which has to be biopolitically exterminated from the social body in the service of civilizing necessity. Yet, importantly, Mbembe demonstrates that colonial rule is the absolute exercise of racialized terror. As Mbembe writes:

the colonies are the location par excellence where the controls and guarantees of judicial order can be suspended—the zone where the violence of the state of exception is deemed to operate in the service of “civilization.” That colonies might be ruled over in absolute lawlessness stems from the racial denial of any common bond between the conqueror and the native. In the eyes of the conqueror, *savage life* is just another form of *animal life*, a horrifying experience, something alien beyond imagination or comprehension… the sovereign right to kill is not subject to any rule in the colonies. In the colonies, the sovereign might kill at any time or in any manner. Colonial warfare is not subject to legal and institutional rules. It is not a legally codified activity. Instead, colonial terror constantly intertwines with colonially generated fantasies of wilderness and death and fictions to create the effect of the real. Peace is not necessarily the natural outcome of a colonial war. In fact, the distinction between war and peace does not avail. Colonial wars are conceived of as the expression of an absolute hostility that sets the conqueror against an absolute enemy. (ibid.: 24-25)

Mbembe importantly notes that ‘sexuality is inextricably linked to violence and to the dissolution of the boundaries of the body and self by way of orgiastic and excremental impulses’ (2003: 15), and later argues out that ‘the prohibition of mixed marriages, forced sterilization, even the extermination of vanquished peoples are to find their first testing ground in the colonial world’ (ibid.: 23).
In outlining the limits of European biopower, Mbembe uses the works of Fanon to suggest that contemporary colonial occupation – ‘a matter of seizing, delimiting, and asserting control over a physical geographical area—of writing on the ground a new set of social and spatial relations’ (ibid.: 25) – combines ‘the disciplinary, the biopolitical, and the necropolitical. The most accomplished form of necropower is the contemporary colonial occupation of Palestine’ (ibid.: 27). For Mbembe, the two populations – occupied and occupier – are incompatible, yet ‘inextricably intertwined’ (ibid.: 27), and it is through the colonial exercise of sovereignty that the colonized Palestinian people are relegated ‘into a third zone between subjecthood and objecthood’ (ibid.: 26). Here, rather than biopower operating in the service of life maximisation and the vitality of the population, ‘weapons are deployed in the interest of maximum destruction of persons and the creation of death-worlds, new and unique forms of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to conditions of life conferring upon them the status of living dead’ (ibid.: 40, emphasis authors own). It is through this reign of sovereign violence that, for Mbembe, necropower emerges through three key sites: territorial fragmentation, vertical sovereignty, and a splintering occupation (ibid.: 27-30). The result of these three mechanisms is a form of ‘infrastructural warfare’ that procures a Palestinian ‘death-world’ as the ultimate exercise in Zionist sovereignty. This notion of ‘infrastructural warfare’ is one that I will return to when I examine humanitarian warfare (Chapter Four).

Despite Mbembe’s theorisation of the deathly and all-encompassing sovereign violence of colonial occupation, his theorisation of necropolitics also creates spaces within which to understand practices of freedom and resistance. Indeed, along with supplementing the life-function of biopolitics with its colonial necro counterpart, Mbembe builds on the works of Gilroy and Fanon in order to argue that, ‘whether read from the perspective of slavery or of colonial occupation, death and freedom are irrevocably interwoven’ (ibid.: 38). Examining the practices of individual and mass slave suicide and contemporary suicide bombing, Mbembe suggests that they provide ‘that space where freedom and negation operates’ (ibid.: 39). Indeed, given the totalising nature of colonial necropolitics, for Mbembe the exercise of death becomes the ultimate expression of freedom from subjugation in the colony – ‘the body duplicates itself and, in death, literally and metaphorically escapes the state of siege and occupation’ (ibid.: 37).
On this point, the works of Fanon are especially important. While Fanon is rarely read as a bio or necro political philosopher, as I have argued elsewhere (Medien, forthcoming), his work has salience for understanding how colonized life is experienced and managed and, furthermore, how the settler’s existence and wealth remain contingent on this. Similar to Mbembe, Fanon argues that life under colonialism lives in decay, produced and managed so that living becomes a ‘permanent struggle against omnipresent death’ (1965: 128). Elaborating on this, Fanon argues:

the colonized person, who in this respect is like the men in underdeveloped countries or the disinheritied in all parts of the world, perceives life not as a flowering or a development of an essential productiveness, but as a permanent struggle against an omnipresent death. This ever-menacing death is experienced as endemic famine, unemployment, a high death rate, an inferiority complex and the absence of any hope for the future. All this gnawing at the existence of the colonized tends to make of life something resembling an incomplete death. (ibid.)

Fanon recognizes the ways in which the calculated production of life under colonialism through unemployment, high mortality rates and lack of food—in other words, the absence or curtailing of what sustains life—is a central condition and experience of colonization. Indeed, it is to this that the ‘settler owes the fact of his very existence’ (Fanon, 1967: 27–28). In the face of the totalizing structures of colonization, Fanon, like Mbembe, recognises the potentially of death as a practise of freedom. In ‘Maghreb Blood Shall Not Flow in Vain’, one of the many articles that Franz Fanon wrote for al Moujahadin, the FLN newspaper, he details the French massacre of the Tunisian town Sakiet Sidi Youssef on 8 February 1958. At the height of the Algerian War of Independence, in revenge for Tunisia’s hosting of Algeria’s FLN, twenty-five French planes bombed the Tunisian town of Sidi Youssef, massacring over 100 Tunisians, injuring more than 200, and destroying the entire town. In his article, Fanon writes:

no man’s death is indispensable for the triumph of freedom. It happens that one must accept the risk of death in order to bring freedom to birth, but it is not lightly that one witnesses so many massacres… we say to the Tunisian people that we are together for
better and for worse, that the Maghreb blood is sufficiently generous and it offers itself in great streams to the end that from Algeria to Tunisia there shall be no more French soldiers to threaten, torture, and massacre the Maghreb peoples. (Fanon, 1967a: 95)

Fanon’s letter to the Tunisian people, who were experiencing social and biological death as a necessary condition of Algeria’s will to life, importantly reminds us that death is always a risk when attempting to live in resistance to the modes of governance imposed by the violent colonial order of things. This understanding of death as a practise of resistance or freedom within regimes of biopolitics is an important contribution to the field of study, reminding us that within colonial occupation the death-function of biopower is not always the negative effect of the will to life, but can also work in the service of freedom. Indeed, as Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2009: 63) has argued in her work on Palestine:

the daily struggle just to survive coupled with a political ideology that believes in the crucial need to stop the constant displacements and to liberate the land, and the prevailing despair, has led some to believe in death and martyrdom as the best way of living, or if you will, the only feasible expression of life under occupation.

Following Mbembe and Foucault’s theorisations of bio and necro politics, and inspired by Fanon’s earlier writings, a large and growing body of scholarship has similarly sought to analyse aspects of Israel’s colonial occupation through framings of bio and necro politics, exemplified in the works of Abu-Rabia-Queder (2017), Abujidi (2014), Abujidi and Verschure (2006), Busse (2015), Daher-Nashif (2018), Ghanim (2008), Gregory (2004), Hanafi (2013), Leshem (2013), Pugliese (2015), and Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2015, 2016). In her work on the ‘right to maim’ (2015, 2017), Puar has examined the relationship between biopower and Israel’s settler colonial occupation, questioning the utility of frameworks of biopolitics that ‘presume death to be the ultimate assault, transgression or goal, and the biopolitical end point or opposition of life’ (Puar, 2017: xviii). Whereas Mbembe focuses on the sovereign death-world that haunts and subjects those living under colonial occupation, Puar asks us to consider how letting the colonised live can function as a biopolitical coordinate in the settler colony. Examining Israel’s maiming and debilitating of Palestinian populations, whereby the ‘infrastructural
warfare’ that Mbembe outlines above is coupled with a shoot to cripple policy, rather than shoot to kill, Puar argues that ‘withholding death—will not let or make die—becomes an act of dehumanization: the Palestinians are not even human enough for death’ (2015: 9). In recalibrating the life and death coordinates of contemporary biopower, Puar makes clear that through its targeting of Palestinian infrastructure – the bombing of buildings, bulldozing of homes, closure of vital services – Israel’s technologies of colonial occupation do not necessarily seek to outright eliminate the Palestinian population, but rather disable and debilitate them and, in so doing, produce a façade of a liberal and humane occupation. As Puar writes:

The IOF policy of shooting to maim, not to kill, is often misperceived as a preservation of life. In this version of attenuated life, neither living nor dying is the aim. Instead, ‘will not let die’ and ‘will not make die’ replaced altogether the coordinate ‘make live’ or ‘let die’. It is not only the right to kill but the right to main being exercised as the domain of sovereignty… what I am explicitly arguing is that from the discursive and empirical evidence offered by Palestinians, this foundational biopolitical frame is a liberal fantasy that produces ‘let live’ as an alibi for colonial rule and thus indeed facilitates the covert destruction of ‘will not let die’ (2015: 8)

Through the production of the ‘let live’, Puar not only demonstrates an additional biopolitical coordinate of colonial occupation but also a facet of Israeli political economy. Here the destruction of Palestinian infrastructure and the letting live of Palestinian life functions to produce a profitable economy of reconstruction and humanitarian rehabilitation, at the same time as it functions as a ‘biopolitical tactic that seeks to render impotent any future resistance, future capacity to sustain Palestinian life on its own terms, thereby generating debilitating generational time’ (ibid.: 17). Yet, as Puar (2015: 17) notes, ‘this is a biopolitical fantasy, that resistance can be located, stripped, and emptied. “Resistance itself” becomes a target of computational metrics.’ While Puar does not connect her theorisation of ‘let live’ to Foucault’s writings on liberalism, her theorisation of the debilitation of Palestinian life and the intricate management of it, could be drawn in connection to Foucault’s suggestion that liberal politics necessitates a ‘culture of danger’ (2008: 67). Indeed, through the production of a façade of humanitarian occupation, Palestinian life is figured as a securitized ‘danger’,
one that must be intervened in through the liberal logics and metrics of risk management, which at the same time support the progress of Israeli liberal market economics.

In a similar vein to Puar’s theorisation of ‘let live’, Hanafi (2013) has argued that Israel’s colonial project is a ‘spacio-cidal’ one. Examining Israel’s policies of ‘creeping apartheid’ (ibid.:192), Hanafi argues that rather than operating through a logic of erasure and genocide, Israel’s actions seek to target ‘land for the purpose of rendering inevitable the ‘voluntary’ transfer of the Palestinian population primarily by targeting the space upon which Palestinian people live’ (ibid.: 191). Coining the term ‘spacio-cide’ to articulate these policies and practices, Hanafi notes,

spacio-cide connotes a peculiar kind of bio-politics, not one that is concerned with maximizing the health and wealth of the population, but quite the opposite, and one intended to establish a delicate balance in which the health and wealth of the population, and especially the physical terrain on which it exists, are minimized, without effecting a total elimination. (ibid.:196)

Similarly analysing the spatial politics of Israel’s colonial occupation, Jabary-Salamanca has focused on Israel’s disengagement from Gaza in 2005, arguing that Israel’s subsequent categorization of Gaza’s infrastructure as a ‘terrorist infrastructure’ has justified a reign of ‘infrastructural violence’ and a ‘regime of control and containment’ which leads to the ‘criminalization of everyday life and its sustaining fabric’ (Jabary-Salamanca, 2011: 23. Cited in Puar, 2017: 134). This criminalization of the everyday produces ‘a new colonial reality whereby infrastructural networks gain force as geopolitical sites to assert spatial control and as biopolitical tools to regulate and suppress life’ (2011: 23). Through the intricate and calculated ‘remote control

21 In 2005, the state of Israel officially withdrew the IOF from the Gaza Strip and dismantled all twenty-one illegal settlements there, which had housed over 8,000 Jewish settlers. Following the IOF-led evacuation of settlers, Israel demolished 2,800 houses and twenty-six synagogues. Following this ‘disengagement’, which marked the end of a thirty-eight-year presence of Jewish settlers, the Gaza Strip was blockaded and Israelis were barred from accessing it. See Li (2006), Efrat (2006) and Roy (2005) for further analyses of this.
occupation’ in Gaza, Jabary-Salamanca argues that Israel is able not only to kill Palestinian life in spectacular outbursts, but also to control water, electricity, building materials and food, in a way that ‘allows Israel to repress political and violent resistance—to colonial occupation—through symbolic and actual spatial enactments of violence’ (2011: 28).

In the previous section I demonstrated how sexual biopolitics places race as the central sorting mechanism through which life is secured, fostered or disallowed. The interventions into the study of biopower outlined above, which take colonial occupation as their central focus, provide an important recalibration of the goals and tactics of colonial biopower. As these works demonstrate, to focus solely on biopower’s will to life is to miss the intricate modes of colonial governance and territorial orderings – ‘infrastructural warfare’, ‘infrastructural violence’, ‘splintering’, ‘will not let die’, ‘spacio-cide’, ‘terrorist infrastructure’ – that arise as attendant to the vitalities of life maximization within regimes of colonial occupation and control. At the same time, such a focus also asks that we don’t presume death to be the sole underside of colonial biopolitics. And, furthermore, that we leave space for death as resistance or as a practise of freedom. If, as Mbembe argues, the laws and regulations of Western liberal governance are suspended in the colony, producing territories of racialized exception, then an examination of colonial occupation mustn’t focus solely on Palestinian life as the negative effect of Zionist vitality. Rather, as this scholarship demonstrates, focusing on the tactics of infrastructural governance and colonial warfare can help us understand the complex ways in which life is produced and managed, and the accompanying liberal justification for this. This, coupled with the examinations of reproductive justice and homonationalist practises outlined in the first section, calls for a focus on the sexual infrastructures of occupation. Indeed, building on this literature, I seek to demonstrate in the empirical case studies analysed in this thesis that the management of sexuality within the Israeli settler colony does not solely result in direct racialized death, but also in the intricate management of reproductive capacity and intimacy, resulting in ‘splintering’ regimes of differentially capacititated reproductive life.

2.3 The Politics of Biopolitical Complicity

Thus far, I have reviewed literature concerning bio and necro politics that highlight how power operates at the level of the individual and population in order to secure the reproduction of chosen populations, and to produce colonial infrastructures and
differently ruled zones of living. Together, we can see how colonial occupation functions to quarantine, displace, and segregate populations, targeting specific groups through reproductive policy, and justifying itself through frameworks of sexual rights, practices of ‘letting live’, and through the incorporation of ‘spacio-cidal’ logics. This understanding is indispensable to the thesis’ inquiry into the sexual biopolitics of colonial occupation that is staged through the three case studies. However, in carrying out this inquiry, this project is also interested in how feminist scholarship and activism and regimes of humanitarianism become complicit or entangled within the infrastructures of colonial occupation. In this final section, I will outline literature that has foregrounded the ways in which feminist scholarship, paradigms of humanitarianism and sexual and gendered rights come to be incorporated into or entwined within biopowers’ racist logics.

Importantly, in this section I do not use the term biopolitical complicity to name particular feminists and struggles for rights and justice as necessarily good or bad. Indeed, if biopower operates through a processual, structural and institutional logic, one that inscribes sexual and racial sensibilities into the everyday mechanisms of population and territorial governance, then one cannot simply opt out of becoming complicit in the racialized sexual politics of life. Rather, as this section hopes to outline, attention to the politics of biopolitical complicity necessitates an acute attention to moments in which our paradigms, fights for justice and rights, and discourses converge, intersect, or become folded into the mechanisms of life management and subjugation, and how racism becomes normalized into fields of inquiry.

In the case studies that comprise this thesis, I specifically examine the ways in which feminist theorising becomes complicit and converges with biopolitical racism. While not focusing on feminist discourse, Foucault himself recognised the relationship between racism and discourses of social transformation in his discussions of socialism and biopower, where he noted that ‘socialism was racism from the outset’ (2003: 216). Indeed, while foregrounding socialisms transformative and positive character, in Society Must be Defended Foucault (2003: 216–217) pointed to the racist biopolitical nature of socialism, arguing that a function of state socialism ‘is to take control of life, to manage it, to compensate for its aleatory nature, to explore and reduce biological accidents and possibilities’, which leads to ‘biological racism… in the way socialist States deal with the mentally ill, criminals, political adversaries, and so on.’ Thus, while socialism as a political movement is invested in a transformative and emancipatory politics of equality,
Foucault importantly reminds us that this itself is not enough to place socialism outside of the logics of biopower. In a differing vein, in the previous section I drew attention to Foucault’s account of liberalism, which underscored the ways in which liberalism’s production of freedom and security attendantly necessitates a ‘culture of danger’ in which risk is managed to preserve and reproduce European populations and markets at the expense of others deemed a ‘danger’. I examine one site of progressive liberal politics in this section, namely the liberal politics of humanitarianism. Thus, following Foucault’s assertions, and in line with the important scholarship outlined above that draws attention to how biopower’s racist logics utilise gay rights and reproductive medicine and technologies to consolidate occupation, border regimes, incarceration and war, in this section I review literature that has paid acute attention to the biopolitics complicity or convergence.

Extending Foucault’s account of the relationship between socialism and racism, Blencowe has importantly considered the relationship between feminist discourse and biopolitical racism, examining the ways in which ‘second-wave’ feminist anti-biologism participated in ‘the revitalization of biopolitical racism’ (2011: 23). Focusing on the conception of biopolitics outlined in the first section of the chapter, which pointed to its positive and life proliferating desires, Blencowe questions ‘the (often assumed) association between the assertion of contingency and the promotion of minority empowerment’, noting that ‘biopolitical racism… is very much a politics of contingency, transformation and process’ (2011a: 153). Examining the works of Wittiq as exemplary of a tradition that continues to inspire feminist thinking today, Blencowe argues that the feminist turn away from ideas of naturalised biological sexual difference was not coupled with a critique of the biopolitical eugenicist racism that was intrinsic to earlier feminist discourse. Thus, in dismissing earlier feminist biologist thinking as outdated and conservative, rather than examining it as actively engaged in struggles for social change that were premised on eugenicist racism, Blencowe argues that ‘second wave’ feminist discourse ‘might have, to an extent, masked the ontological assumptions and affective technologies of the biological and naturalizing knowledges to which they were ostensibly (and genealogically) opposed’ (ibid.: 6). What Blencowe importantly underscores, is that it is the failure to get to grips with how biopolitical racism operates and the desires and motivations of social transformation that inspire it, that secures and naturalises the reproduction of its imperial and racist biopolitical logics today.
In a differing vein, Puar has similarly analysed how queer activism can wittingly and unwittingly work in the service of homonationalist and pinkwashing logics, asking that rather positing ourselves as outside of or non-complicit in homonationalist power structures we consider how we are positioned in relation to them. In her article *Rethinking Homonationalism*, Puar (2013: 336) re-states that her aim in developing the analytic of homonationalism was to ‘historicize how and why a nation’s status as “gay-friendly” has become desirable in the first place. Like modernity, homonationalism can be resisted and re-signified, but not opted out of: we are conditioned by it and through it’. Further developing this point in relation to Palestine, Puar more recently argued that, 'the point is not to merely to position Israel as a homonationalist state against which anti-pinkwashers must resist, but to further demonstrate the complex global and historical apparatus that creates the appearance of the activities of the Israeli state as legitimate and progressive' (2017: 118). Thus, for Puar, resistance to Israeli pinkwashing practises should not result in a simple queer negation of these politics, but rather an acute attention to how particular identifies and politics are incorporated into the logics and in the service of colonial occupation. Of particular importance for this thesis, Puar incorporates the spatial theorising of colonial occupation outlined above to argue that,

this understanding of sexuality entails theorizing not only specific disciplinary sites but also broader techniques of social control, given that “feminism” and “queer” and the death or lively potential of their subjects have already been made to be productive for governance. In this oscillation between disciplinary societies and control societies, sexuality is not only contained within bodies but also dispersed across spaces (ibid.: 119).

For Puar, then, the specific scholarly and activist disavowal of pinkwashing, or the fantasy that one can place oneself outside of homonationalist power structures, helps secure the reproduction or salience of pinkwashing insofar as such disavowals often take place at the expense of a broader critique of the sexual politics of colonial occupation, which can become masked behind Israel’s liberal LGBTQ rights agenda (ibid). This point has been taken up by numerous scholars examining the relationship between queerness and imperial and racist politics, including Dhawan (2013), Haritaworn, Kuntsman, and Posocco (2014), Sircar and Jain (2013), and Spade (2013). Such a point is indispensable to this thesis and the case studies that follow, insofar as the cases focus on the sexual and
reproductive politics of occupation as they intersect with discourses of humanitarianism and reproductive rights, and become coded into the infrastructure of occupation, or what Mbembe names as a ‘splintering occupation’ (2003: 28). For Puar, it is through the anti-pinkwashing discourses’ tunnel-vision focus on homosexuality-as-identity that the other sexual politics of occupation are able to proliferate and sediment themselves into the everyday infrastructures of colonial occupation. As Puar writes,

Pinkwashing is not a queer issue per se, or even one that instrumentalizes queers for specific biopolitical ends. It is not about sexual identity in this regard but rather a powerful manifestation of the regulation of identity in an increasingly homonationalist world – a world that evaluates nationhood on the basis of its treatment of homosexuals. Pinkwashing, then, works not only to obfuscate the occupation, to marginalize and pathologize and temporally quarantine Palestinian queers beholden to a reification of Palestinian homophobia. More trenchantly, I would argue, it actually works as a foil to the pronatalist, eugenically orientated practises of sexual reproduction - both homo and hetero - mapping certain ableist prototypes of homosexuality as a form of capacity that can potentiate, on the side of life... given these interconnected and multiple rubrics, enacted in the name of sex, sexual freedom, and stellar technological achievement (as with ART), any anti-pinkwashing stance that does not address the biopolitics of reproduction and regeneration may come dangerously close to reiterating the ableism not only of the Israeli state but also of (secular) queerness itself. (2017: 124-125)

As Puar makes clear, anti-Israeli activism that focuses solely on how particular identities are put to use in the service of a colonial occupation reproduces the logics of the occupation itself, insofar as it reifies the categories of sexual identification upon which the logics of colonial occupation depend.

In differing ways, both Puar’s and Blencowe’s scholarship demonstrates how feminist and queer scholarship and activism can wittingly and unwittingly operate to normalize biopolitical racism through a lack of attention to the dynamic workings of biopower. This focus on feminist and queer politics can be extended to emancipatory paradigms of gendered and sexual rights and their relationship to imperial and far-right politics. As feminist scholars have long noted, women’s rights were central to colonial and post-
colonial modes of governance, with women’s reproductive rights, suffrage, property rights, legal rights, and others being held as markers of national modernity and sovereignty, exemplified in the works of Chatterjee (1989), Puar (2017), and Seth (2013). Indeed, as Seth (2013) has argued, the ‘woman question’ was taken up as central in Indian and Chinese anti-colonial struggles and newly independent nation building precisely because it was a way of negotiating modernity.

More recently, feminist scholars have critiqued the ‘co-optation’ of women’s rights agendas in the service of the war on terror and invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan whereby the notion of Muslim women as oppressed was deployed to justify occupation and war, see for example, Heathcote (2010), Mohanty, Riley, and Pratt (2008), and Von der Lippe and Väyrynen (2011). However, this notion of ‘co-optation’ can be critiqued for its assumption that there may exist a ‘good’ feminist discourse outside of modern power structures. Or as Hemmings (2010: 11) has argued, ‘co-optation’ is ‘usually lamented as direct co-optations, as a series of moves away from a feminism necessarily critical of such discursive duplicity’, rather than an examination of feminist discourse in biopolitical relation to imperialism and racism. In this vein, Farris has coined the term ‘femonationalism’ to draw out the links between ‘the exploitation of feminist themes by nationalists and neoliberals in anti-Islam campaigns and to the participation of certain feminists and democrats in the stigmatization of Muslim men under the banner of gender equality’ (2017: 4). In so doing, Farris builds of Puar’s concept of ‘homonationalism’ in order to examine how, on the one hand, supremacist politics are propagated through a reification of Muslim populations as Europe’s Other and, on the other hand, that ‘by suggesting that gender inequality is an issue affecting mostly non-western women, the anti-Islam feminists and femocrats have contributed to diverting attention away from the many forms of in equality that still affect western European women’ (ibid.: 9). Here, rather than using the term co-optation, Farris productively employs the term ‘convergence’ to acknowledge ‘the constitutive frictions and differences, gains and losses, that inhabit the femonationalist camp’. In so doing, she argues that ‘a deeper understanding of these contradictions can help us to advance a radical critique of the negative effects of this convergence on gender justice in general’ (ibid.: 10). Extending this line of feminist critique, Puar has argued that the ‘homosexual question’ – the measuring of a nation states modernity and sovereignty through their granting of homosexual rights – has come to supplement the ‘woman question’ (2017: 98, 124). In the context of Israel and Palestine, Puar notes that ‘in the context of the increasingly right-
wing conservatism of the Israeli state, the nationalist resolution of the homosexual question is mediated through the differing spatial registers of the secular “gay haven” (ibid.: 124).

Alongside these feminist works, there also exists a growing body of scholarship that examines the biopolitics of humanitarianism, exploring the differing ways in which liberal humanitarian efforts, often understood as charitable and lifesaving, participate in biopolitical economies of imperialism and racism, exemplified in the works of Bryan (2015), Donovan (2015), Duffield (2012), Fassin (2007), Gregory (2010), McCormack and Gilbert (2018), Lopez, Bhungalia, and Newhouse (2015), Piotukh (2015), Reid (2010), Rozakou (2012), Skinner and Lester (2012), and Vaughan-Williams (2015). For example, in his examination in post-Cold War shifts in humanitarianism, Reid (2010: 395) argues that the notion of ‘humanitarian emergency’,

is today conceived as the primary locale for the transformation of ungovernable populations. Emergencies represent sites of global danger and disorder vested with renewed political significance because they occur where human life is said not only to have failed to perform its adaptive functions in securing itself as biohuman life, but where the very failure of humans to adapt is construed as a threat to the security of world order.

For Reid, rather than ‘humanitarian emergencies’ being understood as crises in capitalism or empire, they are figured as problems located in the local population, with humanitarian efforts ‘conceptualized in positive terms as constitutive of the possibility for the extension of liberal governance to places and peoples hitherto considered ungovernable’ (ibid.: 409).

Similarly for Fassin (2007: 501), humanitarian intervention are practices of biopolitical population management, ‘insofar as it sets up and manages refugee camps, establishes protected corridors in order to gain access to war causalities, develops statistical tools to measure malnutrition, and makes use of communication media to bear witness to injustice in the world.’ Given that humanitarian interventions operate through biopolitical power, they also participate in ‘making a selection of which existences it is possible or legitimate to save (e.g., by selecting AIDS patients to be given antiretroviral drugs for lack of resources, or deciding whether to provide assistance to people who have participated in
massacres’) (ibid.), thus participating in global moral economies that differentially value life.

In their recent work into the militarization of humanitarianism and the humanitarian practices of militaries, McCormack and Gilbert (2018: 97) note that wars are increasingly ‘justified in humanitarian terms… humanitarianism and the related idea of human security have emerged in the international community as causes that can legitimate military interventions and war, particularly through the emergence of the mandate of Responsibility to Protect’. For McCormack and Gilbert (ibid.: 99), humanitarian ‘is grounded in the colonial and imperial history of liberalism’, which becomes obscured behind the language of saving humanity. Or, as Zehfuss (2012: 868) notes, humanitarianism re-enacts ‘rather than overcoming the colonial relation.’ In the context of Palestine, Weizman (2010) has argued that international humanitarian law is implicated in the biopolitics of destruction, whereby law determines the appropriate and normative number of lives that can be lost in military occupation. For Weizman, the biopolitical technology of humanitarian laws ‘have become a means for exercising contemporary violence and for governing the displaced, the enemy and the unwanted’ (ibid.: 4). Khalili illustrates the consequences of this point well when she argues that, ‘if policy makers think that war can be waged more humanely, they may choose to wage war more often’ (2013: 7).

In this section, I have reviewed literature that focuses on how feminist and humanitarian discourses have a specific complicity with biopolitical racism and imperialism. In so doing, I have sought to draw attention to the ways in which biopolitical power is not something that can be opted out of, and have pointed to how feminist and humanitarian projects for transformation and justice participate in liberal economies of biopower that reify, sediment and actively create global inequalities and imperial and racist power structures. This background provides an important context for some of the analysis that follows in this thesis. For example, in Chapter Four I analyse how feminist and humanitarian claims that sexual violence is absent from the Palestine/Israel conflict come to be incorporated into and supportive of Israel’s logics of ‘humanitarian warfare’, which not only masks specific practises of Israeli sexual violence and torture but also work to obscure the ways in which colonial occupation is always sexually violent in its logics. While in the next chapter I examine Zionism as a biopolitical discourse, one that was rooted in a radical politics of transformation at the same time as it brings a colonial
occupation to bear against the Palestinian people.

2.4 Conclusion

It has been the aim of this chapter to review scholarship that informs the theoretical framework for this thesis. Through a particular reading of Foucault’s analytic of biopower, we can observe how biopower emerges as a positive set of technologies that work at the level of the individual and population in order to maximise life. Yet, rather than a universal technology of life maximisation, racialized sexuality cuts through populations, operating as a sorting mechanism in determining the experience, conditions and longevity of modern life. While Foucault’s analytic derived from a specific historical context and set of concerns, of which empire and colonisation have been notably absent, it remains useful in that it shares similar concerns that I intend to raise in my analysis of Israel’s colonial occupation, including questions of pro-natalism and reproduction, questions of population management and warfare, and questions around racism and life and death.

Yet, rather than relying on Foucault’s theorisation alone, I have reviewed important selected works that Foucault’s mapping of biopower has inspired, particularly those concerning colonial occupation, reproductive justice, and biopolitical complicity. The feminist focus on race, gender and reproduction highlights the importance of sexual and reproductive politics to biopower. While the literature on bio and necro-power and colonial occupation underscores the various spatial tactics of control through colonial occupation is secured, as well as spaces and genres of resistance. The literature concerning the biopolitics of complicity importantly underscored the need to remain critically vigilant when participating in emancipatory critique and humanitarian politics. Taking up Puar’s suggestion that, in the context of occupied Palestine, ‘sexuality is not only contained within bodies but also dispersed across spaces’ (2017: 119) can bring the focus of these differing works together. Indeed, it allows us to map how the mechanisms of reproductive population management become entwined within the spatial infrastructures of colonial occupation, resulting in the uneven dispersal of intimacy, reproductive capacity, and vitality. At the same time, the focus on the dispersal of sexuality across the geographies of occupation can allow for an understanding of how paradigms of gendered or sexual identity and rights can come to work in the service of occupation, precisely because they fail to attend to the sexual infrastructures of occupation. This, as this thesis helps to demonstrate, is fundamental to understanding
Israel’s occupation of Palestine, as well as the entanglement of feminist critique with colonial occupation.
Chapter 3 Zionist Biopolitics

The aim of this chapter is to outline some of the central tactics and technologies of Israel’s current colonial occupation of Palestine through a review of literature that historicizes the Zionist state building project in a framework of European imperialism and colonization and scholarship that has examined more recent trends in Israeli occupation. Furthermore, the final section of this chapter offers a short case study analysis of the Israeli built wall, drawing out its effects on Palestinian family life. Building on the important works outlined in the previous chapter that stressed the importance of examining how sexuality is dispersed and embedded across the geographies and infrastructures of contemporary life, in this chapter I seek to establish the ways in which the biopolitical targeting of Palestinian health, reproduction and the family is embedded in the contemporary technologies of colonial occupation.

To this end, this chapter is divided into two parts. Part One is comprised of two sections, ‘Zionist Biopolitics’ and ‘Tactics of Colonial Occupation’. ‘Zionist Biopolitics’ takes the form of a literature review, where I examine existing literature that has sought to examine the historical imperial and colonial politics of Zionism. In so doing, my aim is to outline existing literature that draws out the ways in which Zionism operates as a colonial biopolitical discourse, one that seeks to transform, foster and maximise the lives of the Jewish population against and at the expense of the native Palestinian population. The second section, ‘Tactics of Colonial Occupation’, aims to briefly outline existing literature that has examined more recent trends in Israel’s colonial occupation, specifically pertaining to the technologies of control and population management being developed and deployed by state of Israel.

Part Two, ‘The Sexual Infrastructure of Occupation’, takes on a different form, seeking to materialise the analyses that I have outlined in the literature reviews. In so doing, this section takes the form of a small case study, where I examine the Israeli built wall specifically looking at its effects on Palestinian life, love, and reproduction. Analysing a differing genre of materials, this section brings together NGO and international organisation reports and photographs that I have taken during my trips to Palestine. In bringing together and analysing these materials, my aim to begin to demonstrate the ways in which sexuality, reproductive politics, and sexual violence are embedded within the infrastructures of Israel’s militarized occupation.
Together, the aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that biopolitical demographic concerns have been of central importance to the development of the occupation of Palestine, proliferating an array of high and low-tech techniques and tactics of occupation which operates though practices of separation, fragmentation, and through the slowing down of Palestinian life. And, furthermore, that these demographic concerns and attendant technologies of occupation specifically target the intimate family and reproductive lives of Palestinians.

3.1 Part One: Zionism and Imperialism

Emerging in Europe in the late nineteenth century, Zionism as a nationalist cultural, political, and theological ideology and movement has always contained numerous and diverse schools of thought, some of which rejected Jewish settlement in Palestine. The aim of this section is not to reduce or obscure this. Rather, in this section my aim is to outline existing scholarship that has examined key tenants of Zionism as ideology and its materialisation in Palestine. In order to do this, in this section I explore three key themes: (1) Zionism’s reliance on, and inspiration taken from, European colonialism and imperialism and its associated production of European whiteness as morally and hygienically superior; (2) how this reliance necessitated and produced the native Palestinian population and the settler Jewish population as necessarily incompatible yet, as Mbembe articulated in the previous chapter, ‘inextricably intertwined’ (2003: 27); (3) and together, how these previous two tenants warranted the instrumentalization of a biopolitical discourse that sought to transform the Jewish body politic. Outlining the links between European colonialism, Zionism and the transformation of the Jewish body politic also gives further context to the ethics section in this thesis’ introduction where I outlined the growing links drawn between anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism. Indeed, as will be shown, Zionism’s articulation of the Jewish subject as the Israeli subject through the creation of the state of Israel as the homeland for the global Jewry attempts to create the two as synonymous, and in so doing, as Raz-Krakotzkin has argued, draws heavily on Christian and European enlightenment traditions of modernity in order to construct a universal subject, thus attempting to dissolve boundaries between Jew and Israel (Raz-Krakotzkin, 2013. Also see Bhandar, 2018).

In highlighting the links between Zionism and European colonialism and imperialism, I draw on the works of numerous scholars who have drawn out the connections between
the two, including Abu El-Haj (2012), Bhandar (2018), de Jong (2018), Hasso (2000), Rodinson (1975), Said (1979, 1979a), Sayegh (1965), Shafir (1996), Weizman (2007), and Wolfe (2006, 1999). In The Question of Palestine, Said argues that, ‘for too many people who read the press, who watch television and listen to the radio, who pretend to more than a smattering of political knowledge, who confess to expert opinions on international controversy, the Middle East is essentially the Arab-Israeli conflict (dispute, problem, struggle, etc.) and little more’ (1979a: 5). As Said (1979a) explains, this current framing of Palestine/Israel as a conflict or dispute functions to mask the role that colonialism and imperialism played in both the development of Zionism as an ideology and its materialisation in Palestine, and the wider European influence and support that Zionism was able to garner. Thus, for Said, Zionism ‘can only be studied genealogically in the framework provided by imperialism, even during the nineteenth century when Zionism was still an idea and not a state called Israel’ (ibid.: 72-73).

As numerous scholars have noted, understanding Zionism through a framework of imperialism necessitates attention to European anti-Semitism and Jewish responses to it, exemplified in the works of Abu El-Haj (2012), Masalha (2007), Massad (1996), Said (1979a), and Sayegh (1965). For example, Herzl, often described as the founding father of political Zionism (Masalha, 2007), declared a month before his death in 1904 that ‘we shall find the solution of our problem only in Palestine’ (Beller, 2012: 123). The problem that Herzl sought to find a solution to was European racism, which had long segregated Europe’s Jewish population, coupling them with disease, madness and degeneration, relegating them to ghettos (see Boyarin, 1997; Gilman, 2013; Yosef, 2004). Herzl’s entry into Zionist thinking is often credited to his reading of Dühring’s 1881 book The Jewish Problem as a Problem of Race (Mayorek, 1994). Dühring argued that Jews formed a distinct race, one that would always be harmful to general society, and that Jewish peoples must be separated from the general population and their influence on society diminished. Indeed, Herzl later testified that ‘his real occupation with the Jewish problem dated from the moment he read Duhring’s book’ (ibid.: 84). Thus, Herzl came to understand that the ‘basis for anti-Semitism was not religious, economic or social, but rather racial, which meant, of course, that it would never disappear. Whatever the Jew does, whatever he looks like, whatever he feels, he will always be regarded as a Jew, hated and rejected’ (ibid.: 86). Rejecting the liberal discourses of reform or integration as the solution to minoritizing biopolitical discourses of anti-Jewish racism, in 1896 Herzl published The Jewish State. The pamphlet, a blueprint for the Zionist movement, argued that the best
way to escape anti-Semitism was to create an independent Jewish state, calling on Jews across Europe to begin this process by purchasing land in Palestine, then under Ottoman control (Herzl, 1886).

Yet, as Said has noted, while Zionism, coincided with an era of the most virulent Western anti-Semitism, Zionism also coincided with the period of unparalleled European territorial acquisition in Africa and Asia, and it was part of this general movement of acquisition and occupation that Zionism was launched initially by Theodor Herzl… it is important to remember that in joining the general Western enthusiasm for overseas territorial acquisition, Zionism never spoke of itself unambiguously as a Jewish liberation movement, but rather as a Jewish movement for colonial settlement in the Orient. (1979a: 69)

Thus, while Zionism arose in direct response to ‘virulent’ European anti-Semitism, its remedy to this was sought in the form of national Jewish sovereignty that took inspiration from the European state form, which at the time took the form of imperialism and colonisation. As result, as Sayegh has noted, Herzl and his contemporaries sought to settle Jews in Palestine and in so doing imitate ‘the colonial ventures of the “Gentile nations” among whom Jews lived’ (1965: 1). As has been established in the literature, Zionism arose as a movement seeking to ‘free Jews and solve the problem of anti-Semitism in the West’ (Said, 1979a: 23), and in so doing the movement took inspiration from European colonialism and sought to establish a Jewish nation-colony in Palestine. As a result of Zionism’s clear colonial ambitions, Bhandar has importantly noted that ‘it is difficult to understand how anyone can object to contemporary characterizations of Israel as a settler colony; the early founder and advocates of the Jewish colonization of Palestine had absolutely no difficulty in using the term “colonization” to describe their intentions in Palestine’ (2018: 120).

When writing about imperialism in relation to Zionism, Said has argued that ‘imperialism was and still is a political philosophy whose aim and purpose for being is territorial

22 The pamphlet also suggests that if Palestine is unachievable, European Jews could look to form a colony in Argentina.
expansion and its legitimization. A serious underestimation of imperialism, however, would be to consider territory in too literal a way’ (1979a: 73). Said’s point has salience for understanding the role that imperial discourses of racial supremacy and whiteness played in the Jewish desire to settle in and colonize Palestine, as well as the role of the health, sexuality and longevity of both Jewish and Palestinian populations. In her work on gender and the Palestinian Nakba, Hasso has importantly argued that,

twentieth-century Zionist and British representations of Palestine relied strongly on modernizing and “civilizing” narratives to legitimate Palestine's colonization. Similar to the usually racist and always ethnocentric discourses justifying such projects, the colonization of Palestine has often been portrayed as the introduction of social, political, and scientific “progress” and economic development to “backward” peoples and places. (2000: 491)

Thus, in taking inspiration from and inhabiting the logics of imperialism and colonization, Zionism also took on the generally accepted Orientalist assumptions about the so-called Orient as a racialized backwards geography inhabited by nomadic and uncivilized Arabs, a racial discourse that justified the Zionist need to develop and settle in Palestine. Or, as Said has put it, Zionism ‘not only accepted the generic racial concepts of European culture, it alsobanked on the fact that Palestine was actually peopled not by an advanced but by a backwards people, over which it ought to be dominant’ (1980: 82).

Understanding the role that already existing supremacist racial discourses played in justifying the Zionist desire to settle in and colonize Palestine requires us to examine how this concomitantly necessitated the re-positing and re-articulation of Europe’s Jewish population. As has already been noted, the Jewish population in Europe had long been figured as a degenerated race, one that was subjected to an array of racist policies. Thus, one of Zionism’s goals was to transform the Jewish population into a regenerated and civilized polity, a goal that was believed to be only realisable through the creation of a nation state in Palestine. In so doing, Zionism sought to naturalise Jewish identity in the land of Palestine by drawing out and making concrete the historical links between the Jewish people and their exile from Palestine, thus figuring settlement in Palestine as a ‘return’ to a previous state of affairs. In The Genealogical Science, Abu El-Haj examines the relationship between Zionism, Jewish identity and ancestry genetics, arguing that for
Zionist scientists, rather than figuring degeneration as biologically innate to Jewish peoples, ‘Jewish degeneration would be stopped’, and that the land of Palestine would become the site of ‘Jewish regeneration’ (2012: 78, emphasis authors own). This reticulation of degeneration a symptom of exile, rather than an intrinsic biological racial quality, allowed the Zionist to ‘fuse with the White European against the coloured Oriental,’ recasting the Jew as European and facilitating the ‘total identification of Zionism with the most reprehensible aspects of European white cultural and racial hegemony’ (Said, 1979a: 28). Thus, in aligning with and taking up the values of white European imperialism, Zionism created a discourse and society in which the ‘uncivilized’ Arab and their undeveloped land was antithetical to white Zionist modernity, concurrently naturalising the Zionist civilizing mission to the land of Palestine. This provides an important context to Mbembe’s suggestion in the previous chapter, that two groups were incompatible yet ‘inextricably intertwined’ (2003: 27). Indeed, as Said notes, ‘the Arab expressed whatever by definition stood outside, beyond Zionism’ (1979a: 88), and in so doing, Zionism drew ‘a sharp line between Jew and non-Jew… to which the Arab never belonged’ (ibid.: 107). This figuring of Jews as white, or as encompassed into the shifting terrains of whiteness through the pitting of them against the Arab, provides an important background for understanding Israel’s treatment of Ethiopian Jewish women in Chapter Six, whose Blackness cannot be assimilated into the state of Israel’s white European-facing ideology and identity. It also provides an important backdrop against which to understand the current colonial occupation of Palestine which, as I explore in the following section, deploys an array of technologies and practices in order to keep the Jewish Israeli and Palestinian populations separate. Such an analysis is further explored in my examination of the regulation of mixed Palestinian-Israeli relationships in Chapter Five.

As scholars including Boyarin (1997), Presner (2007), Yosef (2004) have argued, in order to achieve Zionist modernity, sexuality was central to Jewish regeneration. Surveying the role that gender and sexuality played in Zionist narratives of nationalist regeneration, Yosef has argued that early Zionist advocates longed ‘for a new kind of strong, healthy, proud, and heterosexual Jewish masculinity that would contradict the image of the diaspora Jew as weak, queer, and “feminine”… Not only bodies needed to be reinvented, but also minds that had degenerated in the ghetto. Zionism demanded that the new muscular Jew have a healthy body and a healthy mind’ (2004: 18-19). In order to realise themselves as tethered to white European identity, Zionist thinkers thus argued that the
gender and sexuality of the Jewish subject had to be ‘reinvented’, and understood that this reinvention could take place through land cultivation, scientific knowledge production and militarisation, which would provide the cornerstones of Israel’s modern economy. In her analysis of the role that land cultivation played in Zionist thought and its territorial materialization, Bhandar has noted that ‘it is through agricultural labor and the act of cultivation that the European Jew – as an exilic figure with a higher intellectual aptitude than the Arabs, and also a European subject who had been rejected and cast out of Europe – would redeem himself in Palestine’ (2018: 124), precisely because ‘it was through the mixing of his sweat with the soil of Palestine that the exiled Jew would redeem himself, re-forming his attachment to the land of Zion, while at the same time creating a viable and sustainable Jewish economy in Palestine’ (ibid.: 118). While this notion of Hebrew labor has been associated with state socialism and equality, Abu El Haj argues that, ‘Hebrew labor… had nothing to do with an a priori dedication to socialism,’ rather it was tied to ‘the assessment by Jewish physicians and social scientists of “the Jews” as a degenerated race and their eugenic framework for imagining a “solution” to that problem, that is, a revived and reborn Hebrew nation in Palestine’ (2012: 81). Thus, in figuring the establishment of a modern Jewish colony in Palestine as the solution to Jewish degeneration in Europe, and in tying the Jewish settler subject to Palestinian land through modern cultivation and development, Zionism sought to intervene in and transform the health and gendered identity of the European Jew such that they would be ‘re-born’ as strong, muscular and healthy. As a result, Abu El-Haj has argued that Israeli science, health and population policies were ‘a biopolitical project’, serving in ‘the interest of a newly founded state and the struggle of its various elites (political, military, scientific) to produce a Jewish nation that it presumed already to exist’ (ibid.: 108).

Not only did the newly founded state of Israel have to negotiate the complex regeneration and reinvention of the European Jewish population through land cultivation and colonization, but it also had to negotiate the encompassing of incoming Jews from the Middle East and North Africa. Writing about this significant proportion of Israel’s Jewish population, Shohat argues that Jewish migrants from ‘countries such as Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Iran and India, countries generally regarded as forming part of the Third World, constitute fifty percent of the population… European hegemony in Israel, in this sense, is the product of a distinct numerical minority, a minority in whose interest it is to downplay Israel’s “Easternness” as well as its “Third Worldness”’ (1988: 2). Exploring the links between medicalization, nation building and race, Weiss traces the migration
history of North African and Yemeni Jews to Israel in the late 1940s and 1950s, arguing that ‘the attitude of the new Zionist state toward the Yemenite immigrants was very similar to that of the colonial missionaries and medical troops that had set out to ‘civilize’ the ‘primitives’ (2001: 98). Held in transit camps on their arrival to Israel, North African and Middle Eastern Jewish immigrants were subjected to array of immunizations and fitness examinations developed through ‘a complex system of welfare workers, nurses, and doctors… striving not only to heal immigrants, but also to educate them in a host of areas, from infant care to matters of personal hygiene’ (Davidovitch and Shvarts, 2004: 153). And while it has been noted that these public hygiene programs took their inspiration from European and North American racial science and social eugenics (Davidovitch, Goldberg, Seidelman and Shvarts, 2005), they ‘also arose – at least in part – from the Zionist establishment’s conception of creating a “new man”’ (Davidovitch and Shvarts, 2004: 15). In the context of ‘Hebrew labor’ and colonial nation building, Shohat has importantly noted that Oriental Jews were figured as ““natural workers” with “minimal needs”’ (1997: 11), which justified their position as manual workers against European Jews who ‘came to occupy high administrative positions’ (ibid.: 12). Thus, Zionist policies seeking to regenerate the global Jewry in Palestine ‘presented the white/European body as the “right” model’ (Davidovitch and Shvarts, 2004: 154), a model that necessitated the cleansing of the Oriental Jew who was viewed as a biopolitical contaminant, and the attendant relegating of the native non-Jewish Palestinian population to the outside of Zionist modernity.

In this section, I have reviewed literature that has established the relationship between imperialism and Zionism, and highlighted the importance of Zionist discourses of Jewish regeneration and cultivation to the onset of the colonization of Palestine. Furthermore, the literature highlights how together, these two strands function to partially fold the European Jewish subject into the shifting terrains of European whiteness, a Jewish whiteness that was understood as only realizable in the land of Palestine. This background provides an important context for the analysis that follows in this thesis. Indeed, understanding the foundational framing of colonialism and imperialism as central to Israeli modernity and its attendant schemas of racial hierarchy, helps us understand and situate the persistence of these framings and their materialisation today. Furthermore, it also gives context to the need to de-exceptionalize the state of Israel, given that its ideological basis forms part of a much broader Western imperial project. Finally, in pointing to the importance of sexual and gendered transformation to Zionist modernity,
which was staged through the relationship between land cultivation, militarization and health, we can begin to observe the centrality of a biopolitics of sexuality to the state of Israel.

### 3.2 Tactics of Colonial Occupation

Above I outlined literature that draws out the concrete links between Zionism and European imperialism, resulting in a racially ordered Israeli society. While in the previous chapter, in exploring literature that has focused on the bio and necro politics of colonial occupation, as well as feminist engagements with biopolitics, I began to argue for a focus on the sexual infrastructures of colonial occupation. That is, the ways in which the technologies and practices of Israeli occupation manifest and are maintained through sexuality and sexual violence. In this section I briefly survey literature that has examined Israel’s current phase of occupation, specifically looking at the various tactics and technologies of occupation currently being deployed by the state of Israel.

Zionism’s ambitions—after decades of Jewish land-buying, migration and lobbying, as well as forced Palestinian displacement, village and town destruction, and death—would come to be realized on 14 May 1948, the date on which David Ben-Gurion, then head of the Jewish Agency, proclaimed the establishment of the state of Israel. This event, named al-Nakba (the Disaster) by Palestinians, saw over 700,000 of them forcibly expelled from their homes, and up to 600 villages and towns emptied, many of them destroyed and cartographically erased. Swiftly passing a series of Absentees’ Property Laws, enacting and normalizing settler colonial Jewish domination through land law, Israel deemed the land of forcibly expelled Palestinians ‘abandoned land’, naming Palestinians who were not present during the 1948 colonization as ‘present absentees’ and transferring their land to the ownership of the Israeli administration (Adalah, 2010; Shakhoub-Kevorkian, 2012). In the decades since the formal establishment of the state of Israel, the colonization

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23 See Shafir (1996) for a thorough analysis of Jewish migration and land-purchasing in Palestine prior to the formal creation of the state of Israel. Importantly, Shafir argues that the early import of Zionist ideas as outlined in this section created the conditions for division between European settlers and Palestinians.

24 See Davis (2011), Slyomovics (1998) and Khalidi (2006) for important and rich detailing and memorializations of the hundreds of Palestinian villages destroyed during the Nakba.
of Palestine has taken place through several phases, enabled through that fact that ‘Israel’s Declaration of Independence did not define the state’s borders so as to keep the option for future expansion possible’ (Tawil-Souri, 2012: 154). Indeed, as Tawil-Souri further elaborates,

Already by the time statehood was declared in May 1948, Israel had expanded beyond the boundaries of the Jewish state delineated in the 1947 UN partition plan; it expanded even more in the months leading up to the Armistice Agreements in 1949; and has been expanding ever since (with the one occasion of ‘shrinking’ when it returned the Sinai to Egypt between 1973 and 1982 which it had held since the 1967 war). Although the Green Line was considered the de jure border since 1967 according to UN Resolution 242, Israel has long since trespassed it in (mis)appropriating Palestinian land well beyond it. Since 1967 and despite the 1991–1993 Oslo Accords, that ‘rupture’ has expanded into a wider-reaching network of Israeli control over Palestinian space in the territorial expansion of settlements and burgeoning settler population, the shifting and growing matrix of bypass roads and checkpoints, military zones and ‘green areas’ deep in the West Bank, the widening buffer zone around the Gaza Strip, the enlarging of Jerusalem’s boundaries, and so on. But the boundaries of the Israeli regime are much more fuzzy, wide-reaching, and dynamic, in that the breadth and width of control over Palestinians exists throughout the territory of Palestine/Israel, seeping through multiple spaces of Palestinian individual and collective life. (ibid.)

In Israel’s mode of colonial occupation, ‘the ‘need’ for a Jewish majority’ (Yuval-Davis, 1989) has thus perpetuated an intricate system of colonial rule that privileges ‘the lives of Zionist settlers at the expense of the Palestinians and their homes and livelihoods’ (Repo and Griffiths, 2018: 18), producing the territory as ‘fragmented, shattered by colonisation and closure’ (Tawil-Souri, 2012: 155). In his analysis of the post-1967 occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Weizman has argued that the ‘borderlessness’ nature of the state of Israel has facilitated the imposition of a multitude of micro-borders aimed at colonizing and controlling Palestine and the Palestinian people,
producing what he names as an ‘elastic geography’ of occupation (2007: 6). As Weizman writes,

the frontiers of the Occupied Territories are not rigid and fixed at all; rather, they are elastic and in constant transformation. The linear border, a cartographic imaginary inherited from the military and political spatiality of the nation state has splintered to a multitude of temporary, transportable, deployable and removable border-synonyms – ‘separation walls’, ‘barriers’, ‘blockades’, ‘closures’, ‘road blocks’, ‘checkpoints’, ‘sterile areas’, ‘special security zones’, ‘closed military areas’ and ‘killing zones’ – that shrink and expand territory at will. (ibid.)

In the most recent post-Olso Accords (1993) phase of occupation – a set of agreements that were purported to serve as a ‘peace treaty’ – scholars have noted that ‘Israel’s unique colonial project is focused on incorporating as much (Palestinian) territory but with as few Palestinians as possible’ (Tawil-Souri, 2012: 155), exemplified in the works of Alatout (2009), Gordon (2008), Mbembe (2003), and Weizman (2007). In order to realise this, Gordon has argued that there has been an increased Israeli focus on attempts to ‘separate’ the Palestinian and Israeli populations. As he writes,

The Oslo Accords… signified the reorganization of power rather than its withdrawal, and should be understood as the continuation of the occupation by other means. The difference then between the colonization and separation principles is that while the first is interested in both the people and their resources, even though it treats them as separate entities, the second is only interested in the resources and does not in any way assume responsibility for the people. (2008: 200)

As Ritchie argues, through its deployment of these various technologies and tactics of occupation, the state of Israel thus aims to survey, monitor and manage the Palestinian population and territory, ‘penetrating the most seemingly imitate spaces of everyday life’ (2014: 623). Much attention has been given to what are often described as ‘high-tech’ modes of occupation and warfare – ‘unmanned aerial drones, x-ray machines, remote-controlled cameras, radars, and surveillance techniques that instill fear and awe’ (Tawil-
Souri, 2012: 170). Yet, as Tawil-Souri argues in her examination of Israel’s ID card system,

even in the hi-tech age of ‘societies of control’ – to evoke Gilles Deleuze’s term – of free-floating controls, dispersed and ubiquitous systems of people-tracking, roaming surveillance, fixing identities through bio-metric means and computer databases – low-tech forms of control are still important. In fact, they’re quite effective. In examining ‘technologies of control’ it is important not to simply consider these as hi-tech, electronic, digital, or indeed entirely ‘new’ mechanisms, but to recognise that a much older and more ubiquitous ‘low techno-politics’ continues to function powerfully. (ibid.: 171)

Analysing ID cards as one such low-tech modality of control, Tawil-Souri argues that they function to differentiate and border individual Palestinians, regulating where and how Palestinians can live, study, marry, and work. Functioning along with checkpoints, walls and other ‘elastic’ technologies, they create a fractured geography that, as Repo and Griffiths argue, ‘biopolitically orders and manages the lives of Palestinian men, women and children, and the relations between them in the Occupied Territories’ (2018: 24). At the same time, as Tawil-Souri argues, such technologies often leave the Jewish-Israeli population unaffected; ‘Jewish-Israeli mobility is largely un-bounded either in Israeli or Palestinian spaces, whereas Palestinians are often forbidden from moving within their own spaces, let alone in/out of Israel’ (2012: 164).

The aim of this section has been to review literature that has articulated and analysed the more recent trends in Israel’s colonial occupation. In so doing, I have sought to point to some of the ways that Zionism has materialised itself which gives shape to the analyses of colonial necro/bio-political occupation that were outlined in the previous chapter. In the previous section I outlined scholarship that has importantly stressed the imperial and colonial dimensions of Zionism, drawing attention to the ways in which Zionism materialised into a racially ordered society in which the non-Jewish Palestinian population were deemed incompatible with Zionist modernity. In its current phase, as the literature in this section demonstrates, these Zionist demographic concerns materialize themselves through practices of land appropriation and territorial expansion, ‘separation’, ‘fragmentation’, and ‘enclosure’, producing what Weizman names as an ‘elastic
geography’ that is ever-changing, and that deploys checkpoints, road blocks, and zoning in order to consolidate colonial rule and discipline the Palestinian population within a regime of occupation.

3.3 Part Two: The Sexual Infrastructures of Occupation

Thus far in this chapter and thesis overall, I have sought to outline literature that has focused on the structural and racialized nature of colonial occupation and its production of intertwined, yet juxtaposed, zones of living. In the previous chapter, in reviewing existing feminist biopolitical theory, I highlighted the ways in which a biopolitics of sexuality and reproduction places race as a central sorting mechanism through which life is ordered, fostered and disallowed. While in my engagement with literature concerning colonial bio and necro-power, I drew attention to the ways in which theorists have analysed the various spatial aspects of control and governance through which colonial occupation is secured. In this chapter, I have sought to demonstrate how the history and present of Zionist colonization draws upon and operates through racializing sexual biopower, both in its ideological formation and its materialisation in Palestine. In other words, I have sort to begin to sketch out how Zionism has operated as a biopolitical discourse through racialized concerns for population, health and reproduction, and by drawing on older discourses of European colonialism and imperialism. In this final section, I once again take up Puar’s suggestion that in the context of occupied Palestine, ‘sexuality is not only contained within bodies but also dispersed across spaces’ (2017: 119). Before presenting the three case studies around which this thesis is centred, I now turn to more closely examine the wall, offering an examination of how a biopolitics of sexuality is entwined within the infrastructures of occupation.

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In 2002, the Israeli government approved the construction of what Israel terms a ‘separation barrier’ - what I here refer to as ‘the wall’ - which would separate and

25 The Israeli government and some organizations use the term ‘separation barrier’ to refer to the wall, while others use ‘annexation wall’, ‘segregation wall’ or ‘apartheid wall’. Throughout my discussion here, I solely use the term ‘wall’ to refer to the structure that divides and slices Jerusalem (al-Quds) and the West Bank, but I hope that my pointing to its myriad affects and effects reveals its annexing, bifurcating and segregating functions.
redefine the Palestinian West Bank, cutting it off from the Jerusalem and Israel. The stated purpose of the wall, largely in response to the Second Palestinian Intifada (uprising), ‘is to prevent suicide attacks against Israeli citizens’ (Baskin, 2002: 7). As Brigadier General Israel Yitzchak, head of the Border Police unit responsible for patrolling the wall stated, ‘With this fence, we'll be able to stop 100 percent of terrorist infiltrations’ (ibid.). In June 2002, then Israeli Defence Minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer cut the ribbon opening the first phase of wall construction in the Palestinian village of Salem (Usher, 2006). The wall:

consists of fences, ditches, razor wire, groomed sand paths, an electronic monitoring system, patrol roads, and a buffer zone… Around 70 Km of the Barrier both constructed and under construction consists of 8–9-metre-high concrete slab segments which are connected to form a wall, particularly in urban areas such as Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Qalqiliya and Tulkarm. (UNOCHA, 2014: 2)

As Baskin has noted, these different material and technologies used to build the wall correspond to differing ‘terrorist threats’: ‘It should be stressed that “fence” is a generic term for a physical barrier that will assume different forms in different locations. In places where Jewish and Palestinian population centres are close to each other, it might be a high concrete wall that will not only prevent terrorist infiltration but also give protection against light arms fire’ (2002: 7). In deploying what were earlier described as both high-tech (sensors, electronic monitoring) and low-tech (concrete slaps, fences, ditches, razor wire) technologies, and legitimated through a racializing framing of the Palestinian population as ‘terrorist’, the wall is presented as a pre-emptive technology of Israeli security, and materially operates in the service of Post-Oslo separation. While the International Court of Justice stated that the wall was illegal in 2004, calling for it to be dismantled and reparative compensation given to those affected (see ICJ, 2004), construction of the wall persists. It is now estimated to be twice as long as the Green Line,26 with eighty-five per cent of its construction taking place on occupied Palestinian land (Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, 2017). The Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (2017) reports that, with hundreds of miles of zigzagging curves and loops,

26 The Green Line refers to the pre-1967 border, or 1949 Armistice Border, that was drawn between Israel and the West Bank following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.
[the] annexation wall is used by Israel to further occupy Palestinian land, particularly in East Jerusalem and Area C\textsuperscript{27} of the West Bank, thereby cutting families apart, isolating people from their work and land and lastly creating unilateral facts on the ground, making the creation of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders impossible.

![Image of the wall from Aida Refugee Camp, Bethlehem, Palestine.](Medien, July 2010)

Figure One. The view of the wall from Aida Refugee Camp, Bethlehem, Palestine.

As the photograph above demonstrates, the wall operates as a primary and highly visible technology of occupation in Palestine. Against its stated purpose as an anti-terror technology, it serves key demographic biopolitical functions. Strategically winding around Israel’s illegal West Bank settlements, it directly connects them to Jerusalem, functioning to serve the ‘policy of bolstering the Jewish majority by adding Jewish

\textsuperscript{27} The Oslo II Accord divided the West Bank into three administrative divisions: Area A, Area B and Area C. Area A is exclusively administered by the Palestinian Authority, Area B is administered by the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli authorities, and Area C is administered solely by the state of Israel. See Hass (2002) for a detailing and analysis of this Oslo zoning.
population to the Jerusalem area’ (Ir Amim, 2008). The wall thus materializes demographic facts on the ground by ‘Judaizing Jerusalem’ (Dolphin, 2006). As such, the wall can be seen as part of the ‘security apparatuses that function to manage the population in accordance with Israel's demographic anxieties around Palestinian population size and mobility that are seen to threaten the survival of the Israeli population’ (Repo and Griffiths: 2018: 18). Analysing the ways in which the wall operates as a technology of biopolitical governance for both Palestinian and Israeli populations, Alatout pertinently notes, ‘the goal of the Israeli state and the wall are not exclusively repressive’ (Alatout, 2009: 965, emphasis author’s own). Divided into three short acts—movement, sustenance, home—and drawing on photographs taken during my visits to Palestine and on NGO and international organization reports, this chapter now turns to examine how the wall functions to productively disrupt family life and as an agent in Israel’s unjust economy of sexuality and intimacy.

3.3.1 Act One: Movement

![Figure Two. Queuing at an armed checkpoint on the entry road to Nablus, Palestine (Medien, July 2014).](image)

28 For a detailed breakdown of the settlements and settler populations encompassed in Israel by the wall, see Weizman and Lein (2002), Council for Arab-British Understanding (2015) and Ir Amim (2008).
The United Nations state that ‘the wall is a key obstacle to freedom of movement in the West Bank’ (UN, 2016: 5). Checkpoints, like the one pictured above, play a key function in this restriction of movement. As of January 2017, there were ninety-eight fixed checkpoints in the West Bank, including fifty-nine internal checkpoints and thirty-two along the wall. Diverse in their material formation,

they can take the shape of a moving tank whose soldiers stop to check identification cards, known as the ‘flying checkpoint’; or a dug-up road with one-meter-square cement blocks placed to stop or divert the flow of vehicular traffic; or a 12-meter high control tower from which soldiers communicate with passers-by through peep-holes; or remote-control operated metal turnstiles that literally squeeze people through them. (Tawil-Souri, 2011: 28–29)

Checkpoints have become a central mechanism of Israeli colonial control, operating as ‘extensions of Judaization, militarization, and fragmentation of Palestinian land, a physical manifestation of the territorial project of Zionist expansion’ (ibid.: 32). Of the thirty-two checkpoints existing along the wall, marking entry points between the West Bank and newly defined Jerusalem (al-Quds), Qalandia Checkpoint is the largest. Built on the site of a one-time Palestinian airport, Qalandia operates as a ‘terminal’ which 15,000–26,000 Palestinians pass through every day to study, work, seek medical treatment, and visit friends, family and holy sites. In order to cross the checkpoint, Palestinians need to hold the correct ID card, issued by the Israeli Civil Administration. Yet, although its heaviest users are made up of the 140,000 Palestinian residents of the city of Jerusalem currently separated from the city by the wall, a correct ID often does not guarantee entry. As one Palestinian notes, ‘all it takes is the changing of the Israeli

See B’Tselem for a full list of all permanent checkpoints in the West Bank as of 31 January 2017:
http://www.btselem.org/freedom_of_movement/checkpoints_and_forbidden_roads#list (last accessed 23 November 2017). But importantly, as Tawil-Souri (2011: 29) notes, ‘mapping checkpoints is an absurd exercise of documenting the shifting temporal landscape of occupation—a map created today does not necessarily reflect what was yesterday and could likely be obsolete tomorrow.’
soldiers and the arrival of a soldier with a bad attitude and within minutes, what was reported as an acceptable line of cars in Qalandia could become like a busy parking lot, with cars waiting for a long time’ (Kuttab, 2015). Indeed, while the naming of Qalandia as a ‘terminal’ may conjure an image of a modern airport, which Qalandia once was, the colonial reality is vastly different. As Kotef and Amir explain:

unlike other checkpoints, terminals are built through and through. Surrounded by concrete walls, roofed, and containing clearly marked designated areas (such as a ‘waiting area’ or gates for people with wheelchairs), they are erected as architectural monstrosities. These constructions are equipped with an array of monitoring and control apparatuses—from electric iron turnstiles to security cameras and biometric identification devices—that enable soldiers to control the checkpoints from an isolated edifice. Despite their title, most of them are located, like most checkpoints, inside Palestinian territory. They are built like border crossings, reinforcing the illusion that they are normal sites marking the border between two sovereign entities and concealing the fact that Israeli rule applies on both sides of the terminal. With seemingly friendly welcome signs, vast parking lots (in which no one parks—the Palestinians have no access by car to the checkpoint area), benches (on which no one sits), toilets (which are often out of order), the terminals present a façade of legitimacy. (Kotef and Amir, 2007: 982)

Constituted of five cage-like lanes, and littered with teasing ‘Visit Israel’ postcards depicting beaches along the Mediterranean coast, the carceral structure of Qalandia works in the service of the Zionist biopolitics of separation: to control, discipline and survey, to segregate Palestinians from Israelis, to separate and fragment Palestinians from one another, and to further confine a population already imprisoned within a geography of occupation. As Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem (2016) notes, of Qalandia’s five lanes,

only one is operational at the busiest times… these conditions mean

30 I witnessed these posters while passing through Qalandia on my trips to Palestine.
workers are forced to leave for work in the dead of the night, wait in long lines, and often sleep where they work, seeing their families only on weekends. This is not a necessary evil but a deliberate choice by the Israeli authorities.

Qalandia, and the wall that it fortifies, deliberately slows down Palestinian life, creating conditions in which ‘residents live only several kilometres away from their destinations, but every day they have to wait for hours in the long lines at the checkpoint’ (B’Tselem, 2014). Through the material structure of the wall, occupation time and temporalities are produced and proliferated, ones that have particular intimate gendered affects. With long ques building up from 3.30am every morning, if not earlier, thousands of Palestinian men leave their homes every morning in order to reach work in Jerusalem. As Repo and Griffiths note, the system of terminal checkpoint crossings is designed to ensure a particular type of Palestinian is able to endure the daily crossing, one whose cheap labour serves the exigencies of the Israeli economy. This economic function is quite apparent: approximately 92,000 men have permits to work in Israel and they remain a primary source of low-paid labour for the Israeli economy; 36,000 of the men work in settlements, mostly in construction – building the houses that are the first line of the occupation. (2018: 20)

In order gain a work permit to cross the terminal, Israeli regulations state that Palestinian men must be ‘over the age of thirty, married and have at least one child. The Checkpoint and its permit system is therefore based around the norm of the able-bodied family-supporting male labourer. Given the long hours that Palestinian men must give up for the commute, it means that as husbands and fathers they are left with little time to spend with their wives and children, or see friends and neighbours’ (ibid.: 24). Through the prerequisite that Palestinian workers are married, the wall and its terminal checkpoints serve to normalize hetero-normative family structures at the same time as they work to break down and disrupt family life. In so doing, the wall sediments unequal hetero-normative divisions of reproductive labour and working patterns as the necessary conditions for Palestinian employment, using these divisions to support the Israeli settler-state building project.
Against this geography of terminal checkpoints, Jewish settlers living in illegal settlements in the West Bank enjoy unrestricted access between their homes and Israel’s 1967 boundaries via Jewish-only highways,\(^{31}\) a system of modern, high-speed roads that cut through the Palestinian West Bank. Creating a fast, high-tech temporality of modernity, the roads directly connect illegal Jewish-only settlements with Israel.\(^{32}\)

### 3.3.2 Act Two: Sustenance

![Figure Three. Palestinian farmland confiscated behind the wall, Jenin, Palestine. (Medien, 2014)](image)

Figuratively, materially and productively folding the Jewish settler populations into the Israeli state, the wall simultaneously curtails the lives of the thousands of Palestinians who live under its shadow, restricting their access to friends, family, schools, universities, livelihood, daily services, water resources and infrastructure, and in many cases leading

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31 One such highway is Route 443, the main road linking Jerusalem to West Bank Jewish settlements, from which Palestinians are banned. Built in 1980, the route was built ‘by expropriating thousands of dunams of public and private land belonging to Palestinian residents of villages in the area’ (B’Tselem, 2011).

32 See Visualizing Palestine (2012) for an infographic on the segregated road system.
to their homes being demolished. The wall is being constructed over the West Bank’s most fertile land and water resources, with serious implication for long-term water use (Human Rights Watch, 2004). As Human Rights Watch report, for Palestinians the ‘construction of the barrier to date has destroyed thousands of dunums of agricultural lands and assets such as olive and other fruit trees, made other lands and irrigation waters inaccessible, and increased transportation costs’ (ibid.). For example, in the Palestinian village of Umm al-Rihan, the wall seals the village’s entrance roads, leaving it with no health facilities and one overcrowded school (ibid.). In relation to twenty-two villages within the Salfit district of the West Bank, the United Nations has expressed concern that the wall’s path will plunge the region into food poverty, in an area that already has the highest levels of food insecurity in the West Bank (UNOCHA, 2003: 3). As the World Health Organization (2016: 34) reports, along the ‘racist expansion wall… which runs from north to south for about 200 km, the Israeli authorities have isolated and seized control of the Jordan Valley, the breadbasket of Palestine and the main source of food for the Palestinian population’.

Palestinians over the age of twelve whose farmland or homes exist in what Israel has now termed a ‘closed military zone’—the land existing between the wall and the Green Line—now have to apply for a residency or farming permit from the Israeli authorities to continue farming their land or living in their homes. The wall thus recodes populations, legalizing illegal settlers while illegalizing native Palestinians. Within this new ‘closed military zone’—which might be thought of as a simultaneous zoning of displacement and containment—‘the entry of dairy products, meat and eggs is also restricted’ (UNOCHA, 2014). In November 2006, OCHA reported that roughly sixty per cent of families owning land in this military zone were denied permits to access it, and twenty-two per cent of the land became accessible only by foot, meaning that no vehicles could be used to transport produce grown there (UNOCHA, 2006). As a result, according to Physicians for Human

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33 There is no data available on the overall number of Palestinian houses demolished specifically for the purposes of constructing the wall, but specific cases have been publicized. For example, the whole Palestinian village of Arab al-Ramadin al-Janubi was demolished in 2008 to make way for the wall (see B’Tselem, 2008). In addition, in 2006 a Norwegian Refugee Council-funded project stated that the overall figure of those displaced by the wall’s construction would likely be in the tens of thousands (Badil Resource Centre, 2006).
Rights (2015), the life expectancy of a Palestinian stands at ten years lower than that of a Jewish Israeli.

In her analysis of the impacts of this agricultural control on gender, the family and sexuality, Abu Awwad notes that,

agriculture remains the backbone of the Palestinian economy, whether it is the main potential sector for the advancement of the Palestinian economy, or a refuge and source of income in light of the limitations of other alternative opportunities. It is also crucial for the promotion of Palestinian steadfastness and resistance against Zionist colonialism and the protection of the land and national identity. (2016: 545)

Central to new controls, confiscations and restrictions placed on the Palestinian agricultural sector, Abu Awwad argues, is a ‘colonialist exploitative gender ideology’ whereby the Israeli authorities issue ‘permits only for women… they exploit the common notion that women are weak and unable to take on all these tasks, and assume that if women cannot complete the work, Palestinian agricultural fields behind the separation wall will be destroyed’ (ibid.: 557). Once again harnessing gendered stereotypes and patriarchal hetero-normative divisions of labour, the Israeli authorities deploy the wall and its associated permit regime in order to aid the settler colonial program of land confiscation, concomitantly restricting Palestinian access to the various vital resources needed to sustain and reproduce life. Furthermore, delimiting Palestinian men’s access to farmland consequently leads many of them to seek employment in Jerusalem (al-Quds), necessitating their use of the terminal checkpoints outlined above, making family life, work, and land retention even more impossible.

In the previous chapter when outlining Foucault’s analytic of biopower, I noted that it is organised around two axes that work concurrently, an anatomo-politics of the human body and a governmentality biopolitics of population. Through its seizing of fertile farm land, gendered restrictions on access, and the controlling of produce, we can see how the wall functions to produce a system of bifurcating gendered regularity controls that serve the purposes of the latter axis. As a site of disciplinary biopower, the walls targeting of Palestinian sustenance – food, livelihoods, land – facilities what Foucault names as ‘an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies
and the control of populations’ (1978: 184). Through this explosion of techniques enabled by the wall, Palestinian vitality, health and mortality is tied to Israeli colonial control, attendantly producing new gendered subjectivities, economies and geographies.

3.3.3 Act Three: Home

Figure Four. The wall wrapped around a Palestinian home, Bethlehem, Palestine. (Medien, July 2010)

Earlier in this chapter I drew attention to literature that has aptly described the ways in which Israeli occupation functions to splinter, segregate, and fragment Palestinians and their territory. While this literature often focused on seemingly un-gendered technologies of occupation, the splintering of home life, of family relations, celebrations and love, is a tactical effect of the wall. As a concrete structure that fragments Palestinian life, the wall produces a West Bank population and an east Jerusalem population subject to differing residency and visa processes, separating families and rendering near impossible the future mixing of these now-different Palestinian populations. In July 2003, the Knesset passed the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law, a temporary law which has subsequently been extended annually. The law freezes the family unification rights of Palestinian families where one spouse is a Palestinian Jerusalem resident or Palestinian citizen of Israel, and the other a West Bank resident. As one human rights organization notes:
the law aims clearly at limiting the demographic presence of Palestinians within Israeli territory, in particular within the illegally annexed East Jerusalem. It is directly oriented towards the Palestinian population and infringes discriminatorily and disproportionally family rights that are not only recognized by international conventions, but also by Israeli domestic law. (Society of St. Yves, 2013: 3).³⁴

This law produces arbitrary age restrictions. So, if a Palestinian couple consisting of a West Bank resident and Jerusalem resident seek to cohabit in Jerusalem (al-Quds),

if the couple asks for a permit for the wife, she has to be 25 years old or above, if the permit is for the husband he has to be 35 years old or above in order to apply for family unification. This means that if they have been married before the aforementioned ages, there is a lapse of time where one of the spouses has to reside illegally in Jerusalem or the family has to be separated. (Ibid.: 14)

Furthermore, in order to obtain the permit to reside as a family in Jerusalem, West Bank residents are subjected to strict a security check,

which does not include them only, but also relates to ‘family members’. The law defines the term ‘family members’ as spouses, parents, children, siblings, and their spouses. Such a check is extremely wide, it may concern people who the applicant hardly knows or is connected to, such as half-brothers, in-laws, and previous wives and husbands of parents and siblings. (Ibid.)

³⁴ When Israel illegally occupied east Jerusalem in 1967, it extended domestic law into the newly occupied territory. Since then, it has been a key goal of Israeli lawmakers to permanently alter the demographic composition of the city, which is expressed in the official policy of ‘demographic balance’, where a population ratio of twenty-eight per cent Palestinian to seventy-two per cent Jewish Israeli is set as a policy objective (Shragai, 2010). See Cheshin et al. (1999) for an overview and analysis of the various policies that have sought to achieve this.
Here, a permit can be denied if any application or family member has been interrogated by the Israeli police or suspected of any ‘wrongdoing’. Yet, as Human Rights Watch report (2016), ‘Israeli military authorities detain Palestinian protesters, including those who advocated nonviolent protest against Israeli settlements and the route of the separation barrier… As of April 2016, Israel held 692 Palestinian administrative detainees (including 2 women and 13 children) without charge or trial, based on secret evidence.’ Thus, protesting against the wall, the structure that secures the separation of families, is used by the state of Israel to ensure and enforce that very separation.

Children born in Jerusalem (al-Quds) of relationships now classified as ‘mixed’ can only be registered as residents of east Jerusalem—which grants them access to health, education and social services—if they were born in an Israel-based hospital to two permanent residents of Jerusalem. Such children receive an identity number at the hospital and are registered with the Israeli Population Registry. This process differs greatly for Palestinian children born in Jerusalem to mixed West Bank-Jerusalem relationships. As the Badil Resource Centre for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights (2014) explains:

A child born to parents only one of whom is a permanent resident of Jerusalem does not receive an identity number at the hospital. Instead, the parents receive a form titled ‘notification of live birth.’ In order to receive an identity number, the parents apply for a ‘request to register a birth’ with the Ministry of the Interior. Included in this application must be proof that the parents’ ‘center of life’ is in Jerusalem. The ‘Center of Life’ policy was introduced in 1995 by Israel’s Ministry of the Interior, whereby Palestinian residency in Jerusalem depends upon being able to supply evidence of daily activity in Jerusalem. Evidence that one’s ‘center of life’ remains in Jerusalem include, but are not limited to, home ownership papers, leasing contracts, bills for utility services, payment of taxes, pay slips, school registration of children, etc. Any Palestinian Jerusalemite that cannot satisfy the high bar of evidence will have their residency revoked, will no longer be allowed to remain in Jerusalem, and will
be forced to leave immediately so as to not reside in the city illegally.\textsuperscript{35}

Thus, through impossibly strict and complex identification and residency processes, and through the normalization of hetero-marriage as the only acceptable and legible family structure, the state of Israel fractures and bifurcates Palestinian domestic life, with the wall here serving to regulate and fortify new Palestinian population classifications (Parsons and Salter, 2008). Functioning in the service of Zionist demography, the Civic Coalition for Palestinian Rights in Jerusalem estimates that there are as many as 10,000 unregistered Palestinian children living in east Jerusalem, who lack access to education and health services (Civic Coalition for Palestinian Rights, n.d.). Describing the impact of the wall on separated family life, human rights group B’Tselem (2016) states:

Families living under these regulations had no fixed framework for their lives. Their family life was characterized by the constant and repeated separation of husband from wife, and of the children from one of the parents. This way of life also entailed tiring and difficult journeys and delays at border crossings, which were especially hard on the elderly, pregnant women, small children, and infants. Because of these difficulties, and since there was no other way to prevent separation from their families for prolonged periods, in many cases family members remained in the Occupied Territories after their visitor’s permits had expired. The military authorities considered these persons to be ‘lawbreakers,’ and since 1989 have used various means—from threatening them financially to deporting them from their homes in the middle of the night—to make them leave.

Thus, for the Jewish Israeli state, the wall folds hundreds of thousands of settler-citizens into newly defined Israel, a biopolitical folding that brings with it the proliferation of modern road systems, creating what would appear to be a naturalized connection between Israel’s high-tech gated illegal settlements and the services, land and life found in Israel

\textsuperscript{35} Since 1967, Israel has revoked the Jerusalem residency status of at least 14,416 Palestinians, removing them from the population register and abolishing their Right to Return under Israeli law (Association for Civil Rights in Israel, 2015).
1948. Marking and materializing illegal settlers as legal citizens, the wall functions as a productive technology, creating an experience of freedom—freedom of movement, travel, economy—for Israelis living on both sides of the wall, creating a new and expansive definition of the Jewish state and citizen, one that Zionist discourse names Eretz Israel (Greater Israel). Yet for Palestinian society, the wall functions to differentiate and govern Palestinians and separate and fragment their land in ways that are tied to the broader biopolitical demographic aims of Israeli colonial occupation. As this brief sketch of the wall makes clear, it operates as an important political technology regulating the Palestinian and Israeli labour force through a regulation and maintenance of sexual divisions of labour, it interrupts and fragments family structures, and delimits the Palestinian populations access to the vital resources needed to sustain life. In this sense, then, the wall produces a biopolitical infrastructure of occupation that directly targets and operates through heteronormative sexual structures and social reproduction.

Construction of the wall continues, with over eighty per cent of it already built. Every Friday afternoon, after mosque prayers, the residents of the villages of Iraq Burin, Bil’in, Nabi Saleh and al-Ma’sara, Ni’ilin, among others, gather at the wall to protest at its persisting existence. Every Friday afternoon they are met with Israeli military violence. For Palestinians, the resistive struggle against the assault on their lives persists.

3.4 Conclusion

It has been the aim of this chapter to outline some of the central tactics and technologies of Israel’s current colonial occupation of Palestine through a review of literature that historicizes the Zionist state building project in a framework of European imperialism and colonization, and by an examination of one important technology of occupation: the wall. In the previous chapter I reviewed literature that has importantly stressed the need to take seriously the biopolitical nature of discourses of social justice and emancipation, precisely because biopower operates through the social body and targets all individuals and populations. As I have noted in this chapter, Zionism arose as a transformative political project that sought to solve the problem of European anti-Semitism through the regeneration of the Jewish subject in Palestine. Yet, in taking on the formative shape of other European colonial and imperial projects, and through the articulation of Israel as a sovereign exclusively Jewish nation state, Zionism philosophically and materially developed as a settler colonial project. In so doing, central to the production of a white European-facing Zionist modernity was the racialized figuring of the Palestinian
population as exterior and inferior. As a result, biopolitical demographic concerns have been of central importance to the development of the state of Israel and its colonial occupation of Palestine, proliferating an array of high and low-tech techniques and tactics of occupation which, as scholars have argued, operate though practices of separation, fragmentation, and the slowing down of Palestinian life.

Building on the important works outlined in the previous chapter that stressed the importance of examining how sexuality is dispersed and embedded across the geographies and infrastructures of contemporary life, I have sought to demonstrate that the biopolitical targeting of Palestinian health, reproduction and the family is embedded in the contemporary technologies of Israeli colonial occupation. For example, as we saw above, in line with the state of Israel’s vested interest in reducing the Palestinian population of Jerusalem (al-Quds), concomitant with a desire to enlarge the Jewish population, the intimate family and reproductive lives of Palestinians are fractured and broken down, producing a system of social control that renders family life and intimacy between Jerusalem and West Bank Palestinian populations near impossible. In the context of post-Olso goals to separate the Israeli and Palestinian populations, Puar has argued that ‘the fracturing of populations moves from self/other subject/object construction to microstates of differentiation and modulation of capacities and debilities’ (2017: 121). This point is important for understating how sexuality operates across the infrastructures of occupation because, as Puar notes, ‘it is not about sexual identity in this regard’ (ibid.: 124). Indeed, rather than sexual identity being the sole site through which populations are regulated and controlled, we can see how sexuality is embedded in racialized colonial demographic goals and the resulting technologies of occupation. Puar’s move away from a focus on the paradigms of sexual identity on which claims to gendered and sexual rights rest, to one that examines the sexual and racializing fracturing of life under colonial occupation, provides an important context within which to situate the case studies that follow. For example, as I argue in Chapter Six, the reproductive lives of Black Jewish women have been covertly controlled and intervened in, even though these Jewish women exist as heterosexual within an exclusively Jewish state.
Chapter 4 ‘Cultures of Death’ – Settler Colonialism and/as Sexual Violence

The only deterrent for those who kidnapped the [Israeli] children and killed them, the only way to deter them is the knowledge that their sister or their mother will be raped… It sounds very bad, but that’s the Middle East… I’m not talking about what we should or shouldn’t do. I’m talking about the facts. The only thing that deters a suicide bomber is the knowledge that if he pulls the trigger or blows himself up, his sister will be raped. That’s all. That’s the only thing that will bring him back home, in order to preserve his sister’s honour. (Kedar cited in Mezzofiore, 2014)

The above remarks were made by Dr Mordechai Kedar, lecturer in Arabic literature at Israel’s Bar-Ilan University, during a radio interview on 1 July 2014. Kedar was being interviewed on a popular current affairs programme broadcast on Kol Yisrael Reshet Bet (Voice of Israel Network B), Israel’s public radio service, following the discovery of the dead bodies of three Jewish Israelis close to the Palestinian city of al-Khalil (Hebron). The three Israelis, two of whom were aged sixteen and the other aged nineteen, had been reported missing on 12 June, and were last seen at the bus stop outside of Alon Shvut, an illegal Jewish settlement in the occupied West Bank. In response to the kidnapping, the state of Israel launched a military search-and-rescue operation formally named Operation Brother’s Keeper.

Under the pretext of Operation Brother’s Keeper, the Palestinian West Bank and east Jerusalem were collectively punished over a two-and-a-half-week period: over 500 Palestinians were detained and/or imprisoned, over 1,000 Palestinian premises were raided, nine Palestinians were killed, new checkpoints and roadblocks were erected, curfews were imposed across the West Bank and east Jerusalem, and numerous

36 It was reported that only thirty of these arrested Palestinians were ever questioned in relation to the disappearance of the three settler youths (Norman, 2014). Rather, Israel used the pretext of the kidnapping to rearrest scores of Palestinian men who had been freed in the Shalit prisoner exchange in 2011, among many other politically active Palestinians (al Gharbi, 2014).
Palestinian properties were demolished (UNICEF, 2014; United Nations, 2014). Indeed, in a letter to members of the US Congress, Amnesty International (2014b) argued:

> these abductions cannot justify the Israeli Defence Forces’ unlawful collective punishment of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories… the unlawful collective punishment measures referenced above include the imposition of a complete closure on the Hebron district of the occupied West Bank, which prevents some 750,000 Palestinians from moving between villages and the city of Hebron.

Concomitant with the collective punishment of Palestinians, the collective anger of Jewish Israeli citizens culminated in protests being held across Israel, with attendees calling on the state of Israel to urgently find the three missing persons, calls that were coupled with the chanting of ‘death to Arabs’ (Abunimah, 2014; Roy 2014).

It would later emerge that the Israeli police, intelligence officials and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had known within hours of the kidnapping that the three Israelis had been killed (al Gharbi, 2014; Blumenthal, 2014; Goldberg, 2014). Yet, rather than revealing the deaths to the Israeli public, Israel’s intelligence agency imposed a gag order on Israel’s national media, barring all media from reporting the deaths. Simultaneously, Netanyahu staged an aggressive and widespread national and international public relations campaign, giving national and global publics the impression that Hamas were holding the three Israelis hostage, and suggesting that there was still hope of finding them alive. It subsequently became abundantly clear that Operation Brother’s Keeper, launched under the pretence of a search-and-rescue mission, served as a mask for an intensified wave of violent colonial dispossession, mobility restriction and control, justified through globally salient racializing narratives of Islamic terror.

Dr Kedar’s radio interview took place the day following the discovery of the bodies. The statement that opens this chapter was made following the interviewer asking Kader to elaborate on the current political situation, and more specifically what could be done to eliminate the possibility of any future such kidnappings and killings. Kedar’s remarks were widely reported in the Israeli press, causing an outcry among certain groups. A collective of Israeli feminist activists wrote to the president of Bar-Ilan University, Rabbi
Professor Hershkowitz, calling for Kedar to be dismissed and suggesting that his ‘words of incitement grant legitimacy to the Israel Defence Forces soldiers and Israeli civilians to commit rape, and endanger both Israeli and Palestinian women… Kedar’s words echo expressions that treat rape as a remedial practice, although it is a war crime’ (cited in Kashti, 2014). A group of Palestinian feminists and academics wrote a response that appeared in the e-zine Jadaliyya, where they importantly noted that they ‘were not surprised to hear Kedar advocating rape as an antidote to anti-colonial resistance’, situating his remarks within a context where ‘colonial relationships are themselves gendered and sexualised’ (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, Ihmoud and Dahir-Nashif, 2014). In response to this outcry, Bar Ilan University, Kedar’s employer, issued a statement responding to his remarks. The statement read as follows:

[Kedar] did not call and is not calling to fight terror except by legal and moral means… he wanted to illustrate that there is no means of deterring suicide bombers, and using hyperbole, he gave the rape of women as an example. In order to remove all doubt: Dr. Kedar’s words do not, God forbid, contain a recommendation to commit such despicable acts. The intention was to describe the culture of death of the terror organizations. Dr. Kedar was describing the bitter reality of the Middle East and the inability of a modern and liberal law-abiding country [Israel] to fight against the terror of suicide bombers. (cited in Mezzofiore, 2014; Kashti, 2014; Khalek, 2014. Emphasis added)

Bar-Ilan University’s response ultimately defends Kedar’s sexually violent remarks, affirming that they are merely an ‘illustration’ of a Middle Eastern ‘bitter reality’—a reality from which Israel’s modern, liberal and law-abiding ways mark it as distinct. Here, rather than condemning Kader as an advocate of the mass rape of Palestinian women, Bar-Ilan University depicts him as a moral law abider, one who only evoked sexual violence as means of depicting the ways in which the Arab and Muslim peoples of the Middle East are marked by an illiberal terrorist ‘culture of death’.

Framed in the context of the summer of 2014, this chapter empirically examines how the threat, material practice, and structures of sexual violence are central to the state of Israel’s deployment of colonial violence and warfare. At the same time, this chapter also builds on the literature concerning biopolitical complicity outlined in Chapter Two, by
examining how a certain strand of contemporary feminist theorising has come to be complicit in masking these very forms of sexual violence. To begin, this chapter proceeds by offering a partial outlining of Israel’s military operations during the summer of 2014. Directly following Operation Brother’s Keeper, the state of Israel launched a deathly and destructive air and ground invasion of the already besieged Gaza Strip, which was formally named Operation Protective Edge. In revisiting this operation, I examine claims that the state of Israel’s invasion of Gaza, and its military practices more broadly, are guided by human rights frames that produce a morally coded practice of ‘humanitarian warfare’.

The second section then turns to examine the sexual dimensions of these practises of ‘humanitarian warfare’, looking specifically at how international organisations and certain feminist theory has come to be biopolitically complicit in the masking of sexual violence. Over the past two decades, following the mass use of sexual violence during the Rwandan genocide (1994) and Bosnian war (1992–1995), international organizations alongside feminist security studies and feminist international relations have sought to comprehend, analyse and map the ways sexual violence is used as a weapon of war, exemplified in the works of Buss (2009), Card (1996), Enloe (2000), Hansen (2000), Kirby (2013), Sjoberg and Via (2010), and Stiglmayer (1994). Alongside importantly documenting sexual violence in conflict zones, a certain strand of this body of scholarship has sought to examine why sexual violence is used in some conflicts and not in others, seen in the works of Meger (2010, 2011), Skjelsbæ (2012), and Wood (2006, 2009). Here, importantly, the state of Israel is often held up as a primary example of a conflict from which sexual violence is absent. Examining this literature, I suggest that this assertion functions to racially distribute sexual violence globally in ways that bolster the project of Western imperialism, while also serving to enhance Israel’s frames of liberal and humanitarian warfare. Despite some feminist literature claiming otherwise, I then turn to examine the ways in which sexual violence is in fact employed by the state of Israel, suggesting that frames of liberal feminism and humanitarian warfare have masked the sexual violation and invasion of Palestinian bodies.

In the final section of this chapter, ‘Israeli Settler Colonialism and/as Sexual Violence’, I return to Kedar’s remarks and his employer’s response. Situating these sexually violent and Orientalizing remarks within an array of hypersexualized, violent statements made during the summer of 2014, I argue that the state of Israel and its Jewish populace
continually deployed overtly sexually violent depictions of, and calls for violence against, Palestinian women in order to both celebrate and further the destruction of Palestinian land and life. In so doing, I suggest that the kidnapping of three Israeli youths and the invasion and bombing of Gaza in 2014 momentarily ruptured the taboo surrounding public evocations of sexual violence against the Palestinian population, leading to a perverse bubbling-over that reveals the ways in which colonial occupation is always a sexually violent phenomenon.

4.1 A Façade of Morality: ‘Humanitarian Warfare’ in Gaza

On 8 July 2014, following weeks of sporadic bombing, Israel launched an air and ground invasion of the already besieged Gaza Strip, with the stated aim of stopping rocket fire from Gaza into Israel and destroying ‘terrorist’ tunnel networks. Formally named Operation Protective Edge, the invasion produced countless and enduring tragedies. The United Nations have reported that at least 2,131 Palestinians were killed (UNOCHA, 2014a; Puar, 2015: 1) and 11,231 Palestinians were injured (UNRWA, 2014). At least 18,000 Gazan homes were rendered uninhabitable (United Nations, 2014) and a further 37,650 housing units partially damaged (Amnesty International, 2014a). As a result, over 100,000 Palestinian residents of Gaza were made homeless, and roughly half a million were internally displaced within Gaza’s blockaded total area of 365 square kilometres (UNWRA, 2014).

In the previous chapters, when reviewing scholarship that analyses Israel’s colonial occupation, I examined literature that has argued that Israel’s occupation does not always seek to directly kill the Palestinian population. Rather, I highlighted important works that have analysed the various tactics through which the Palestinian population are quarantined and disciplined within a regime of colonial occupation, ones which targets Palestinian family life, sustenance and mobility (Hanafi, 2013; Mbembe, 2003; Puar, 2017). While the Gaza Strip is subject to a differing modality of colonial governance from the West Bank, Israel’s methods of attacking and depleting Palestinian infrastructure through what Jabary-Salamanca (2011. Cited in Puar, 2017: 134) has named ‘infrastructural violence’ are manifest, albeit in differing forms. Operation Protective Edge specifically targeted infrastructure in order to further decimate the
already fragile conditions in the Gaza Strip. Israeli missiles shelled 244 schools, one of which, the Jabaliya Elementary School, was providing refuge to over 3,000 displaced Palestinians, documented by Amnesty International (2014), Kasrils (2014), and OCHA (2014). An Amnesty International report published during the operation pointed to the specific targeting of large multiple-storey housing complexes, shopping areas and commercial buildings. Noting that ‘the Israeli military took measures to ensure that residents left the targeted buildings before their destruction,’ the report details the specific targeting and destruction of ‘civilian buildings and property on a large scale, carried out without military necessity… with long-term impact on the already perilous economic situation of Palestinian civilians in Gaza’ (Amnesty International, 2014a: 5–6). Indeed, throughout Operation Protective Edge, Gazan civilians often received automated phone calls and text messages alerting them to impending airstrikes, giving them a short amount of time, sometimes sixty seconds, to vacate buildings before bombing (Amnesty International, 2014a; Puar, 2015: 3). One such building was the Municipal Commercial Centre in the city of Rafah, which was bombed and destroyed in its entirety on Saturday 23 August 2014. The commercial centre had contained a prayer room, a shopping mall with forty-seven shops, a legal firm, an estate agent, a medical clinic and a café (Amnesty International, 2014a: 9–11). On 29 July 2014 Gaza’s only power plant was bombed, leaving it in partial operation. Still today, on a ‘good day’, the residents of Gaza have daily access to five hours of electricity, which Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in June 2017 described as an ‘internal Palestinian matter’ (cited in Ravid and Khoury, 2017). The bombing of the power plant led Gaza’s largest sewage treatment plant to go out of service, leaving roughly ninety per cent of Gaza’s water undrinkable (Marlowe, 2015) and between twenty and thirty per cent of households without access to municipal water (Amnesty International, 2014a). In addition, eight hospitals were bombed, six of which were subsequently taken out of service; seventy-three mosques

37 The Gaza Strip has been under blockade by Israel and Egypt since 2007. The blockade followed the 2006 Palestinian elections, which were won by the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas. Following these elections, the Israeli state closed all crossings to the territory and began severely restricting who and what could enter the territory. The state of Israel created lists of food items banned from entry into Gaza (for example, coriander was banned), and also controls the precise volume and calorific value of food required to stop those living in Gaza from starving. See Gross and Feldman (2015) for an in-depth analysis of this.
were destroyed and 130 others damaged; and forty-five ambulances were damaged or destroyed (Finkelstien, 2016).

Above I provide this at best partial account of the widespread infrastructural destruction in order to point to another site of violent Israeli colonial control. I also do so to build on the biopolitical literature and framework developed in the previous chapter. When articulating his analytic of necropower, Mbembe (2003: 29) argued that this ‘orchestrated and systematic sabotage of the enemy’s societal and urban infrastructure network complements the appropriation of land, water, and airspace resources.’ For Mbembe, this form of sabotage leads to a network of ‘infrastructural warfare’ which produces ‘invisible killings’ (ibid.: 30) through the destruction and curtailment of all the vital services needed to sustain life, resulting in what he earlier named as ‘death-worlds’. However, as Bhungalia importantly argues, ‘this particular strategy of warfare does not necessarily entail elimination of the body as the primary goal, but the strategic management of it’ (2010: 354). Suggesting that ‘whereas Foucault produces a totalizing narrative about life, Mbembe constructs a totalizing discourse of death,’ Bhungalia brings together both Foucault and Mbembe’s theorisations of the bio/necro-political to argue that, ‘while Gaza certainly resembles Mbembe’s ‘death world’, the Israeli state has expressed, as well, vested interest in regulating Palestinian life at a biological minimum’ (ibid.: 355). Indeed, as Bhungalia demonstrates, to understand the continuation and persistence of life in the Gaza Strip requires an understating of both the production of direct and indirect death, and the continued regulation and maintenance of life that functions, as Tawil-Souri argues, to ‘keep Palestinians on the verge of a catastrophe but [that] do not let them slide into all-out starvation’ (Tawil-Souri, 2017). The latter of which, as I now outline, is often coded as a practise of humanitarianism.

Following Operation Protective Edge, in October 2015 the High-Level Military Group (HLMG), a group comprised of former military personnel and UN workers from several countries, published their report, *An Assessment of the 2014 Gaza Conflict*. The report, which was subsequently presented to the United Nations, found that the state of Israel had engaged in explicitly humanitarian efforts to minimize infrastructural destruction and loss of life during Operation Protective Edge. As the report argues:

> throughout the hostilities of the 2014 Gaza Conflict, Israel engaged in extensive humanitarian efforts to aid the civilian population of
Gaza, drawing on its standing special unit of military and civilian personnel tasked with identifying, monitoring and facilitating the humanitarian needs of the civilian population of Gaza. Additionally, the IDF set up a sophisticated coordinating structure incorporating military, NGO and civilian representatives during the conflict in order to facilitate humanitarian access and movements. In the course of the conflict, Israel facilitated the movement of over 100,000 tons of supplies into Gaza from Israel. Many of Israel’s humanitarian efforts went well beyond its obligations, for example, providing electricity and fuel to Gaza, in spite of their military use by Hamas, operating the crossing points for humanitarian aid convoys while under fire from inside Gaza and setting up a field hospital for Gaza residents. (HLMG, 2015: 9)

Following the recent trends of ‘humanitarian warfare’ outlined in Chapter Two, the report’s suggestions that Operation Protective Edge was a humanitarian operation are delivered against the backdrop of Gaza figured as a ‘terrorist infrastructure’ (Salamanca, 2011. Cited in Puar, 2017: 134) under the control of incomprehensibly violent Muslim militants.38 Here the state of Israel emerges as having a liberal and democratic investment in humanitarian militarism even as it engages in a war against Islamic terrorism. As Abu El Haj (2014, cited in Puar, 2017: 142) notes:

> Israeli leaders and their US allies insist on describing the carnage as a war of self-defence. They also say that the Israeli army wages war with moral integrity. It doesn’t target civilians. It never intends to kill them. It even warns Gazans when an attack is coming so they can get out of harm’s way.

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38 The report states that aim of Operation Protective Edge ‘was the cessation of rocket fire from Gaza and the neutralisation of the threat from Hamas’s extensive network of cross-border infiltration tunnels’ (HLMG, 2015: 8), and suggests that ‘Hamas’s charter explicitly obligates the organisation to destroy Israel through Jihad in order to establish Islamic rule’ (ibid.: 7).
Here, through the discursive figuring of the IOF as humanitarian, the dehumanizing colonial biopolitics of what Puar (2015, 2017) names as ‘let live’ are recoded to produce any Palestinian death toll and injury as unintentional: after all, they did warn them!

Claims that Israel engages in humanitarian warfare—that is, a practice of military conflict that seeks to aid and assist the very population that it occupies—far exceed and pre-date this report. In his work on the IOF’s practices during the al-Aqsa Intifada (2000), Israeli anthropologist Ben-Ari has argued that this uprising marked a historic change in the tactics used by the IOF. Suggesting that global human rights discourses, along with the technological development of ‘precise warfare’ that aims to ‘minimise collateral damage’, have led the state of Israel to adopt a restrained approach to warfare (Ben Ari, 2009: 232), Ben-Ari attempts ‘to show how moral considerations are now part and parcel of military actions and not simply opposed to them’ (ibid.: 245).39 This notion of moral warfare precision as a means to ‘minimise collateral damage’ was further elaborated in a 2005 article, ‘Military Ethics of Fighting Terror’, co-written by an Israeli philosopher and an IOF general. The authors argued that the targeted killing of Palestinians at checkpoints, and assassinations from watchtowers and aircraft, represented a moral form of combat, given that civilian casualties are now minimized (Kasher and Yadlin, 2005). A further example of humanitarian warfare emerged in 2010, in the wake of Operation Cast Lead (2008–2009), when the Israeli military announced that it would assign a ‘humanitarian affairs officer’ to each of the IOF combat units in order to ensure that Palestinian civilians and their properties were protected during conflict, and to help with the planning and distribution of humanitarian assistance. When announcing these officers, the IOF stated that ‘the IDF has adopted new procedures designed to enhance the protection of civilians in urban warfare, for instance by further emphasising that the protection of civilians is an integral part of an IDF commander’s mission’ (cited in Sherwood, 2010).

39 I draw attention Ben Ari’s study to highlight the widespread salience that narratives of ‘humanitarian warfare’ have gathered, a set of narratives that I disagree with and seek to critique and complicate. In citing his work, I feel it important to note that a number of graduate students at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem came forward to detail Ben Ari’s sexual misconduct, which included numerous accounts of rape (see Lis and Illany, 2008). My citing of his study is not an attempt to normalize sexual violence within the academy, but rather an attempt to highlight the violences of his scholarship.
Here the notion that the state of Israel is engaging in forms of warfare that are humane in their precision not only obfuscates the demonstrated patterns of the society-wide destruction and direct and indirect killing of Palestinian land and life, but also obscures the nature of the ‘conflict’. Produced through frames of humanitarian warfare, the democratic state of Israel emerges as invested in liberal human rights-based approaches to violence against illiberal and irrational Muslim terrorists, naturalizing the foundational frame of Zionist colonialism and its attendant claims of modernity. In a similar vein to Bhungalia (2010), in her work on Operation Protective Edge Puar moves away from necro-political frames that assume death as the end goal of infrastructural warfare, arguing that through the subversion of ‘collateral damage’ via warning texts and phone calls, shooting to cripple rather than to kill, and infrastructural destruction, ‘Israel covertly enacts the right to maim through promoting itself as attempting to avoid civilian casualties’ (Puar, 2015: 9). Examining Israel’s widespread infliction of injury so as not to cause death, Puar examines maiming as a specific coordinate of settler colonial biopolitics, one that ‘functions as slow but simultaneously intensive death-making’ (ibid.: 9), resulting not in ‘incomplete death, or an accidental assault on life, [but] rather the end goal in the dual production of permanent disability via the infliction of harm and the attrition of the life support systems that might allow populations to heal from this harm’ (ibid.: 11).

Puar’s important highlighting of Israel’s simultaneous and contradictory intentional infliction of ‘permanent disability’ and control of the services and materials needed to rebuild life, also points to the profitable economy of humanitarian post-conflict reconstruction that is produced, one that the state of Israel, through its policies of blockade and occupation, is able to control (Puar, 2015: 17). In her short film The Food Chain (2004), Azoulay highlights the fallacies of the IOF’s supposed humanitarian approach to colonial occupation. Shot during the al-Aqsa Intifada, the film exposes and explores the paradoxical situation whereby the state of Israel both creates the conditions of hungry and destruction and controls and provides sustenance and humanitarian assistance. A female officer interviewed in the film proudly declares that Israel’s twin interests are humanitarian assistance and combatting terror, while her colleague notes without irony that the IOF are a ‘super humanitarian’ force. As Azoulay suggests in the film’s synopsis:

40 Azoulay’s film can be watched in full on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lwZQrpV1PBc (last accessed 18 December 2017).
one arm strikes the blow, while the other arm provides the assistance. This is the current phase of the Occupation—the Palestinians are constantly kept ‘on the verge of catastrophe’. Those who contend there is no hunger in Palestine are absolutely correct. There is no hunger in Palestine, nor will there be. The mechanisms of assistance, which provide food to the hurting Palestinian population, counter-balance the fatal blow to the sources of food and accessibility to it. (Azoulay, 2002)\(^41\)

Pointing to the profitable humanitarian economy produced by Israeli colonial occupation, Azoulay highlights the paradoxical scene in which any notion of Israeli humanitarianism emerges: we will bomb, occupy, and murder you with an air of humanitarian care, and then algorithmically control the humanitarian response such that repair or reparation becomes impossible. Indeed, as Feldman notes, Israel’s use of frameworks of ‘humanitarianism’ function as modalities of control, categorizing goods and materials in the service of a biopolitical desire to regulate, control and make dependent Palestinian life:

as international agencies have tried to step up assistance to Gaza in the aftermath of the war, they have run up against the limits of Israel’s definition of ‘humanitarian.’ Food and medicine have gone in, but supplies to rebuild destroyed homes remain restricted… It is in part the very power of the humanitarian claim that makes possible a political strategy of focusing international attention on concern rather than obligation, of identifying only the most basic goods as humanitarian necessities, and thereby restricting the political, economic, and social opportunities available to Palestinians in Gaza. (Feldman, 2009: 29)

\(^{41}\) This quote is taken from the synopsis provided on Azoulay’s personal website: http://cargocollective.com/AriellaAzoulay/filter/Films/The-Food-Chain (last accessed 18 December 2017).
Here, importantly, Israeli profit is not just generated from the control of humanitarian aid, goods and services but, as numerous scholars have argued, through the technologies of destruction and killing themselves, exemplified in the works of Abood (2016), Puar (2017), Pugliese (2015), and Weizman (2010). As Abood has argued, ‘Gaza has long been a testing ground for Israeli weapons and tactics for controlling a large civilian population’ (2016). And, as Pugliese has argued, this generates a profitable international technology market. Noting that during the ‘catastrophic 2014 assault on Gaza unleashed by Operation Protective Edge, Israel deployed operationally for the first time the new Elbit Hermes 900 drone’, Pugliese highlights that ‘during the peak of the assault on the Gaza Strip, Elbit’s profits increased by 6.1%’ (ibid.: 3. Also see Puar, 2017: 145). As a result, Weizman argues that a key international dimension of the intensive assault on Palestinian life in Gaza to both test new military technologies and to serve as the threshold for the geographically broader War on Terror:

Gaza is a laboratory in more than one sense. It is a hermetically sealed zone, with all access controlled by Israel… Within this enclosed space, all sorts of new control technologies, mutations, legal and humanitarian tools, and warfare techniques are tried out on its million and a half inhabitants. The ability to remote control large populations is also tested, before these technologies are marketed internationally. Most significantly of all, it is the thresholds that are tested and pushed: the limits of the law, and the limits of violence that can be inflicted by the state and be internationally tolerated. This limit, newly defined with every attack, will become the new threshold of what can be done to people in the name of ‘war on terror’. (Weizman, 2010: 96)

In this section, I have outlined empirical information regarding Operation Protective Edge and literature that both critically and uncritically elaborates on the politics of humanitarian warfare. My aim has been to underscore that the ways in which, even when colonial violences are being brought to bear against Palestinians and their land in the most evident ways, the state of Israel codes them within discourses of liberal humanitarianism, civilian protectionism and Islamic terrorism, in a way that obscures a profitable and controlling coordinate of colonial biopolitics: destructive infrastructural warfare as a
mode of regulation and cruelly ‘letting live’ (Puar, 2017), enmeshed within a profitable humanitarian economy of ongoing and impossible reconstruction.

### 4.2 ‘Nothing to See Here’: Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War

![Violent Conflicts in Which at Least One Side Refrained from Using Sexualized Violence as a Weapon](image)

Figure Five. Sexual violence as a weapon of war. (Women’s Media Centre, 2014)

The above map was produced by the US-based Women’s Media Centre, a non-profit feminist organization set up to empower the voices of women in the mainstream US media. Citing two international academic studies on sexual violence as a weapon of war, the map’s sparse three dots—Israel-Palestine, El Salvador, Sri Lanka—attest that sexualized violence is a commonplace tactic and weapon of warfare. As this section attempts to demonstrate, the notion that sexual violence is absent from the ‘Israel-Palestine conflict’ is a common explicit and implicit understanding and framing, one which, I argue, points to another dimension of Israel’s obscuring ‘humanitarian regime of warfare’.

In April 2017, the United Nations Secretary-General published a report, *Conflict-Related Sexual Violence*, the aim of which was to document the use of sexual violence in conflict zones during the year 2016. Here the use of the term ‘conflict-related sexual violence’ related to the following commonly used definition: ‘rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, enforced sterilization, forced marriage,
and any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity perpetrated against women, men, girls, or boys that is directly or indirectly linked to a conflict’ (United Nations, 2017: 3). While the report notes that it is not exhaustive, it nonetheless suggests a pattern in the use of sexual violence in conflict zones: ‘the majority of the listed parties are non-State actors, with seven of these having been designated as terrorist groups pursuant to Security Council resolutions’ (ibid.). Listing a number of mostly Islamic designated terrorist organizations that are employing sexual violence as a tactic of war—ISIS (Da’esh), Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, Al Shabaab, Boko Haram and Hay’at Tahrir Al Sham (formerly Nusrah Front), among others—the report provides a series of country case studies examining the use and effects of sexual violence in conflict. Spanning Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Yemen, Nigeria, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the report ends with eight recommendations for the UN Security Council, a number of which couple the fight against sexual violence with the fight against terrorism.43

I note this report as one example among many such reports on sexual violence in conflict from which Israel is absent, in order to point to the contemporary tendency to exclude and distance Israel from frames of sexual violence, and to point to the attendant trend of coupling sexual violence with terrorist non-state actors.44 Highlighting this global

42 If one were to accept this definition—although I would argue that such a definition needs to be expanded or rethought—then the use of Depo-Provera amongst the Ethiopian-Israeli community, documented in Chapter Six, would constitute an example of ‘conflict-related sexual violence’ and a contravention of United Nations resolutions.

43 Recommendation A asks that the Security Council ‘ensure that efforts to prevent violent extremism and counter terrorism reinforce efforts to prevent sexual violence in conflict’, and recommendation C asks that the ‘nexus between trafficking in persons and conflict-related sexual violence, including by terrorist groups’ be addressed (United Nations, 2017: 45).

44 The coupling of sexual violence with Islamic terrorism may well lead to the suggestion that nation-states, especially Western ones, are not perpetrators of sexual violence. Such a coupling obscures, for example, the well-documented rapes and sexual assaults that occur in British immigrant detention prisons (see Black Women’s Rape Action Project, 2015), the use of sexual violence by the US military at Abu Ghraib (see Hasso, 2007;
distribution of sexual violence is not intended in any way to suggest that the actors and conflicts listed do not engage in sexual violence as a tactic of warfare. Rather, my aim is to raise questions concerning the mapping of sexual violence in conflict, which seems to plot all too easily onto imperial and colonial figurings of violence, the Global South and Islamic terror, whereby the perpetrator of sexual violence is a non-white man acting outside the confines of state structures and their attendant sovereign sanctioning of violence. I want to suggest that this plotting may also serve to produce a model of humane and liberal Western warfare where sexual violence is absent, such as Israel’s framing above.45

The exclusion of Israel from any investigations of sexual violence in conflict, despite Palestine/Israel forming one of the world’s most visible conflicts, is present within some of the feminist international relations and conflict studies literature. Indeed, while there now exists a large body of feminist work that seeks to figure sexual violence as central, rather than tangential or an add-on, to the practice of war, exemplified in the works of Buss (2009), Enloe (2000), Tickner (1997), and Wood (2006), within some of these studies Israel is often figured as the global exception. Wood, in her widely-cited studies on the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war, suggests that ‘in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, also an ethnic conflict characterized by the increasing separation of ethnically defined populations, sexual violence appears to be extremely limited’ (Wood, 2006: 314). Suggesting that ‘at present neither Israelis nor Palestinians carry out sexual assaults despite the killing of Israeli civilians by Palestinian groups and of Palestinian civilians by Israeli security forces’ (ibid.), Wood claims that any cover-up of sexual violence is unlikely: ‘it is unlikely that the apparent absence of sexual violence in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict reflects underreporting, given the scrutiny of violence there by Puar, 2004), and the widespread reports that French troops and UN peacekeepers have raped women and children in the Central African Republic, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali and elsewhere (Grady, 2010; Murphy, 2006).

45 Davis (2000) articulates well the difficulty of critiquing racism in understandings of sexual violence whilst also remaining in opposition to sexual violence when she notes that ‘we must also learn how to oppose the racist fixation on people of color as the primary perpetrators of violence, including domestic and sexual violence, and at the same time to fiercely challenge the real violence that men of color inflict on women.’
domestic human rights groups and international actors’ (Wood, 2009: 133). Indeed, this high level of human rights scrutiny, Wood concludes, may contribute to the absence of sexual violence: ‘it could be the case that the intensive international monitoring of the conflict deters the practice of sexual violence, but both sides do not appear much deterred in their other practices by their frequent condemnation by international actors’ (Wood et al., 2013: 4). In similarly attempting to answer the question as to why some soldiers and armed groups rape during conflict and others do not, Meger (2010: 123) concludes that it comes down to the ‘nature of the groups involved’—in other words, the ideological and moral discourses that underpin the actors involved, and the fact that ‘some militaries are not as “masculine” as others’ (ibid.: 124). Skjelsbæ supports this conclusion, arguing that ‘sexual violence can be a way of reaffirming masculinity’ in conflicts, and thus having a predominantly male military ‘makes it easier for men to commit sexual violence in war situations’ (2012: 62). Wood (2006, 2009) also notes that the absence of sexual violence in the ‘Israeli-Palestinian conflict’ may be due to the IOF’s reliance on female combatants.

In the introduction to this thesis, I opened by pointing to a scene of militarized sexual modernity produced through the IOF’s inclusive conscription, whereby a politics of LGBTQ and gender inclusion functions to promote the IOF as a queer-friendly and feminist army, obscuring not only the colonization of Palestine but also the strict policing of normative gendered and sexual relations and roles. The production and promotion of the IOF as a female-friendly army—they boast specially designed combat vests to fit the ‘female torso’ and smaller joysticks in weapons systems to ‘better accommodate women’s hands’—feeds into and bolsters the framing of humanitarian warfare outlined above, insofar as gender equality and ‘women’s empowerment’ functions as a marker of sovereign liberal democracy and its attendant regimes of human rights and the rule of law, literature on which was outlined in Chapter Two. Indeed, given Israel’s investment in humanitarian liberal democracy and the exclusion of sexual violence in conflict from this framing, I would argue that sexual violence as a tactic of warfare becomes publicly antithetical to Israel’s mission. Here we would do well to question why and how the mere

46 This information is taken from an infographic designed by the IOF and released on International Women’s Day in 2012. The infographic can be viewed on the IOF’s official blog: https://www.idfblog.com/2012/03/08/infographic-women-idf/ (last accessed 20 December 2017).
presence of women in the military comes to be understood as an antidote to sexual violence, and furthermore how sexual violence comes to be figured as a separate add-on to regimes of occupation, warfare and conflict, rather than being intrinsic to violence itself. Within this feminist literature, Israel can come to be understood as a ‘good’ example of conflict, insofar as sexual violence is seemingly absent; the end goal of such a critique would ostensibly be an elimination of sexual violence from conflict, rather than an abolitionist critique of the global and local colonial and racializing structures that produce such conflict in the first place. Such an understanding not only functions to reaffirm the IOF’s supposed humanitarian mission and Israel as a liberal democracy, but also to bolster broader supremacist global frames that map sexual violence onto ethnic conflicts in the Global South, perpetrated by non-state and non-white terrorist actors. In Chapter Two I outlined literature that importantly highlights the biopolitics of complicity and convergence - that is, the biopolitical relation between discourses of justice and social transformation and racist and imperial politics. Here my analysis builds on this literature, by drawing attention to the ways in which certain feminist literatures and international organisations participate in economies of biopower that reify imperial and racist power structures, and here work to naturalise and mask the sexually violent politics of Israeli colonial occupation.

Before turning to argue for a more expansive biopolitics of settler colonial sexual violence, I want to demonstrably reject claims that the state of Israel does and has not employed sexual violence as a tactic of warfare. As is pointed out throughout this thesis, and in most detail in ‘Freedom Dreams: An Interlude of Reproductive Resistance’, Israel’s settler colonial occupation of Palestine is often carceral, both in its logics of control and surveillance (e.g. the wall, checkpoints, watchtowers) and in its methods of confinement and separation insofar as the administrative detention and incarceration of Palestinians, including children, is widespread. Indeed, in 2014 alone, ‘Israeli authorities held some 500 Palestinians in administrative detention without trial; thousands of other Palestinians were serving prison terms’ (Amnesty International, 2015). The torture and ill treatment of Palestinians is well documented, even though Israel has ratified the UN declaration against torture. Israeli authorities openly admit that interrogators are allowed to employ ‘exceptional’ interrogation methods, which include what is described as ‘physical pressure’ in times of ‘necessity’ (Falah, 2008; Lein, 2007).

The state of Israel’s use of torture as a necessary, yet exceptional, method of interrogation
has global salience. Puar, in her deconstructive and de-exceptionalizing analysis of the sexual torture deployed by the US military at Abu Ghraib, argued that torture ‘constitutes apposite punishment for terrorists and the bodies that resemble them’ (Puar, 2005: 15). Citing Maran, Puar argues that ‘as the terrorist resorts to extremes of violence that cause grievous individual pain, so the state replies with extremes of violence that, in turn, cause grievous individual pain’ (ibid.). Connecting these practices of sexual torture to methods used by the French in the Algerian War, the domestic US carceral system, Israeli colonial violence and the torture of Sikh men in Punjab, Puar argues that sexual torture becomes the necessary and apt mode of treatment for bodies coded as Muslim and terrorist via the deployment of Orientalizing knowledges of modernity ‘that mark him (or her) both as sexually conservative, modest, and fearful of nudity… as well as queer, animalistic, barbarian, and unable to control his (or her) urges’ (ibid.: 18). Here hetero-patriarchal (homo)sexual torture as a method of violence is figured as the appropriate response to the perverse sexuality of bodies coded as Muslim and terrorist, whose actions, understood as perversely irrational and incompressible, can only be countered with similar extremes. This figuring is present in Kedar’s remarks and his university’s response, insofar as the rape of Palestinian women was articulated as the fitting, culturally specific response to the ‘culture of death’ that structures societies, geographies and bodies coded as Muslim and thus as terrorist.

In his examination of the testimonies given by Palestinian children and men to the Public Committee Against Torture in Israel (PCATI), Weishut found at least sixty reports of sexual torture at the hands of the Israeli authorities between the years 2005 and 2012. Weishut (2015: 72) notes:

the perpetrators involved in torture and ill-treatment are those concerned directly with keeping public order in Israel, but occasionally physicians are reported as complicit in torture. Torture is generally concealed behind prison walls, but every so often victims of torture are brought to Israeli emergency rooms, turn to a private lawyer and/or have their experiences documented by the Public Committee Against Torture in Israel.

Weishut’s work uncovers a persistent and widespread pattern of sexual violence as a method of torture against Palestinian children and men in Israeli prison and detention
facilities, ranging from verbal sexual abuse and threats to forced nudity, sexual assault and rape. Yet, despite these men having reported their testimonies to PCATI, they appear to remain unintelligible to researchers, international organizations and NGOs that assert that sexual violence is absent from the ‘Israeli-Palestinian conflict’ and its humane methods of warfare.

A selection of the testimonies given by Palestinian children and men reads as follows (all cited in Weishut, 2015: 75–78):

‘The interrogator [name] threatened that he will fuck me and put his hands in my ass if I won’t give him a full confession and if I won’t sign on all accusations that they directed toward me’ (age 28, perpetrator: secret service)

‘One of the interrogators said “if you don’t confess, I’ll put my foot into your ass.” ... One of the two interrogators had an electric lamp with cables and told me “if you don’t confess, I’ll put these electricity cables in your ass”. ... I confessed out of fear from the electricity and from putting the cables into my behind’ (age 17, perpetrator: secret service)

‘The two of them [names] took me to the toilet and then one said that I’m sweet and that I better confess, since otherwise he’ll ask the other to fuck me... Then they started hitting me on my face, belly and back’ (age 16, perpetrator: secret service)

‘And he said... if you will talk and sign on everything that we’ll tell you, we’ll treat you nice and well, and if not, we’ll fuck your sister’ (age 15, perpetrator: secret service)

‘When I got off the army jeep at [place name] I was nude like a baby is born, and the soldiers started to take pictures together with me’ (age 23, perpetrator: soldiers)

‘The interrogator [name] was sitting opposite to me [while my feet
were cuffed] and put his foot on my genitals and pressed and kicked my testicles’ (age 40, perpetrator: secret service)

‘They took off my trousers and underwear and shove a pole into my behind... They stopped when someone came in and asked what they were doing... A little later, the officer took me to the toilet, locked the door, sat me down and urinated on my face and body’ (age 23, perpetrator: police)

I reprint these Palestinian testimonies of sexual torture in order to both document these often-ignored practices and to point to what becomes obscured and masked through international organization and feminist mappings of sexual violence as a tactic of terrorist and/or illiberal violence, and the productive figuring of the IOF as engaged in humanitarian warfare. In the testimonies above, Palestinian men attest that the threat and practice of sodomy-rape, forced nudity, and the threat of raping female family members is systematically used as a torturous tactic for eliciting confessions from Palestinian men. What becomes clear across these testimonies is that Israeli interrogators

47 Here I have reprinted the testimonies of Palestinian men who were sexually tortured by the state of Israel, but it is important to note that Palestinian women are also subjected to carceral sexual violence. In her work on Palestinian women political prisoners, Bayour (2014) argues that Israel’s incarceration of women represents a form of ‘sexual terrorism’. Describing the treatment of pregnant incarcerated Palestinian women, Bayour writes:

another tactic used to humiliate women is to handcuff pregnant women prisoners when they go into labour, a graphic expression of occupation as the control of women’s fertility. Because pregnant women are perceived as carriers of their race and bearers of the nation, the torture and control of their bodies is partially symbolic.

(Bayour, 2014: 208)

Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2009) has detailed the ways in which women’s bodies are subjected to forced nudity and invasive searching when they visit their relatives in Israeli prisons, and Hasso (2000) has detailed the rape of Palestinian women by Zionist forces during the 1948 Nakba.
draw upon much older and globally salient discursive heteronormative knowledge formations of Orientalist family codes, sexuality and gender roles in order to elicit confessions and humiliate Palestinian men and children. Here, in many ways, while resulting in a differing tactic of colonial control, the deployment of heteronormative understandings of Middle Eastern gender and sexuality sits in direct relation to the knowledges that came to form the basis of sexual regulations surrounding the wall, as outlined in the previous chapter. Justified as an exceptional ‘necessity’ by the state of Israel, these methods come to be understood as the fitting response to the illiberal ‘culture of death’ that structures Palestinian life. Bringing together a series of much older and globally widespread knowledges about Arab and Muslim society and sexuality, these practices of torture do not contravene the Zionist desire to separate Jewish Israelis and Palestinians, insofar as homosexual torture is used here as a threat or method of punishment and humiliation rather than as a vehicle with which to reproduce national life. Indeed, as Puar (2005: 27) argues in her work on Abu Ghraib, the sexual torture of men coded as terrorist can function as a technology of patriarchal anti-reproduction, ‘castrating the reproductive capacities of men. It is precisely masculinity, the masculinity of the terrorist, that threatens to reproduce itself.’ Rather, for Puar, through this construction, ‘not only is the Muslim body constructed as pathologically sexually deviant and as potentially homosexual, and thus read as a particularized object for torture, but the torture itself is constituted on the body as such’ (2005: 19), resulting in a racist and heteronormative yet homosexual tactic of culturally specific humiliation and torture. Indeed, while Kader’s remarks regarding the mass rape of Palestinian women were argued to be a hyperbolically illustrative depiction of a ‘Middle Eastern bitter reality’, here we see these racist paradigms materialize into the appropriate, widespread and necessary method of eliciting Palestinian confession.

The line of feminist argumentation above, whereby the mere presence of women in the military can stop the use of sexual violence in conflict, fails to attend to the ways in which colonial occupation draws upon and produces racialized sexual violence not as an add-on or by-product of conflict, but rather as part of a biopolitics of population knowledge production that grounds ‘Palestinian terror’ as always sexually perverse, and thus deems sexual violence necessary in the attendant fight against it. Thus, here I want to argue that these hetero-normative, yet homosexual, modes of Israeli sexual humiliation and torture are produced, however unwittingly, through the same continuum of knowledge production that structures the feminist and international organization figuring of sexual
violence in conflict outlined above. Across this scene of knowledge production and documentation, we see the discursive production of non-white, Muslim (or understood as such) bodies as the dominant perpetrators of sexual violence that often takes place in the absence of modern state structures, the rule of law or feminized militarism. This discursive practice of the mapping and distribution of racialized sexual violence is thereby able to produce the state of Israel as a feminist, humanitarian and liberal state where sexual violence as a method of warfare is absent, at once feeding into the productive articulation of the IOF as a humanitarian force and masking the infrastructural destruction of Gaza. Returning now to the summer of 2014, I turn to examine how these obscured practices of colonial sexual violence perversely bubbled over into the Israeli public domain in ways that, I argue, reveal settler colonialism as always sexually violent in its modes of operation.

4.3 Israeli Settler Colonialism and/as Sexual Violence

Thus far, this chapter has sought to examine the ways in which liberal discourses of humanitarian warfare, feminized militarism and sexual violence in conflict function in covert and obfuscating ways both to mask the infrastructural destruction and control of Gaza, and as a façade for the state of Israel’s use of sexual violence as an appropriate and fitting mode of torture for Palestinian children and men. I have sought to argue that these obfuscating narratives function to produce sexual violence as taboo in liberal and democratic contexts such as Israel’s, and instead attach sexual violence and inhumane warfare to populations marked as terrorist. In this section I hope to demonstrate that the scale of violence and destruction brought to bear against Palestinians during the summer of 2014, framed around the killing of three Jewish citizens of Israel, led to a shifting or rupture of the figurine of sexual violence against Palestinians as taboo. Examining the ways in which evocations of racial-sexual violence bubbled over into the public domain, I argue, can reveal the sexual nature of settler colonial violence. This revealing importantly demonstrates that sexual violence, rather being than an ‘exceptional’ method of torture or something altogether absent from the ‘Israeli-Palestinian conflict’, is structural to Israeli colonial occupation itself.

Scholars examining settler colonialism, militarism and/or Palestine have long argued that settler colonialism is itself a racialized, sexualized and gendered phenomenon, including Burton (2005), Moreton-Robinson (2011, 2015), and Stoler (1995, 2010). In addition to rape and other forms of bodily sexual violence, colonial warfare, settlement and land
cultivation are figured through sexual tropes of penetration and conquest. As Shalhoub-Kevorkian, Ihmoud, and Dahir-Nashif (2014) have argued:

the racialized logic of sexual violence energizes the very imaginary and project of conquering and cultivating Palestinian land, in transforming it into the Jewish polis… sexual violence is embedded not only in the sexualized practices and politics of the Zionist state, but also in the nature of Israeli settler colonial violence itself.

Demonstrating the ways in which colonial violence operates through racialized logics of gender and sexuality, Shalhoub-Kevorkian cites Remnick:

‘the situation between us’, Dayan creepily informed the Palestinian poet Fadwa Tuqan, ‘is like the complex relationship between a Bedouin man and the young girl he has taken against her wishes. But when their children are born, they will see the man as their father and the woman as their mother. The initial act will mean nothing to them. You, the Palestinians, as a nation, do not want us today, but we will change your attitude by imposing our presence upon you.’ (Remnick, cited in Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2009: 48)

Demonstrating the ways in which settler colonialism is planned and scripted through an invasive racialized rape narrative whereby conquest is figured as an imposing non-consensual sexual encounter normalized over generational time, Remnick highlights the sexual logics of colonial settlement. Such an understanding exceeds the figuring of sexual violence in conflict as an additional tactic of violence, and instead asks that we figure the settler colonial acts of ongoing dispossession, separation and occupation as a set of practices that are embedded in and productive of sexuality. As Shalhoub-Kevorkian (ibid.) puts it, ‘theorising sexual violence against women in conflict zones should be incarcerated in the analyses of internal patriarchy and victimization of women, rather, one must look at abuse and victimisation as a product of the interlock between the various colonial hegemonic systems of Empire that are raced, classed, sexed, and gendered.’

In his work examining hegemonic masculinity and sexual identities in the IOF, Kaplan clearly demonstrates that sexual violence is inseparable from Zionist military force.
Rather, for Kaplan, sexual violence is central to the logics of Israeli warfare, occupation and conquest. As he notes:

the association between military conquest and sexual conquest inspires military action. The basic act of shooting at a target in a practice range is conceived in IDF military slang as ‘fucking the targets’. An accurate shot in the bull’s-eye, or knocking out the target altogether, is referred to as ‘threading a target’, another slang word for screwing a sexual object, while attacking an enemy position is often compared with the conquest of women. (Kaplan, 2003: 192)

For Kaplan, the eroticization of male and female Palestinian targets is central to the project of objectifying and dehumanizing them, such that military force is rendered both apt and fitting for Palestinian bodies on the one hand, and erotically satisfying for IOF forces on the other:

stripped of any cultural meaning, the enemy itself could not be appealing as a target. To become a target, it must be sexualized. This is why the pairing of targeting with sexuality is crucial for combat performance. To attract the shooter, it must carry a sexual meaning, one that connotes domination and penetration, one that can motivate soldiers to act. Hence, the military operation is not only a fighting machine, it is also a sexual endeavour. It is this very eroticization of the enemy targets that triggers the objectification process to begin with. (Ibid.: 193–194)

Contrary to suggestions that sexual violence is absent from Israeli settler colonialism, or is incidental or tangential to conflict, Kaplan’s work demonstrates the ways in which Zionist so-called humanitarian warfare is staged through the production of the Palestinian enemy as an erotic sexual target. This racially erotic warfare, alongside the sexual torture of Palestinian detainees and Kader’s sexually violent radio remarks, demonstrates the ways in which a settler colonial racial-sexual biopolitics doubly operates to produce Palestinian land and life as satisfyingly penetrable, and to produce such penetrative sexual violence as a fitting response to a Palestinian ‘culture of death’. As such, ‘the logic of sexual violence, embedded in the Zionist regime, energizes historical and continuous
attacks on Palestinian bodies and lives’ (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, Ihmoud and Dahir-Nashif, 2014).

This structural framing of sexuality in settler colonial violence produces a seemingly contradictory scene of Zionist colonial biopolitics. One the one hand, Israeli colonial occupation seeks to control, quarantine and discipline Palestinians where eroticized invasion and land appropriation is a central tactic and goal. On the other hand, the Jewish Israeli social body is concomitantly figured as a distinct Jewish racial population, whose purification and reproduction is held as a central Zionist goal, against the Palestinian population, who are framed as a biopolitical pollutant. This latter goal of Zionist biopolitics is further examined in Chapters Five and Six, where I differently examine how intimacy and reproduction are regulated and intervened in, in ways that not only seek to stop the Palestinian population from contaminating the Jewish Israeli population, but also create racial caesuras within Jewishness along and through whiteness. Here what unifies or weaves through these two contradictory, yet in-concert, poles is a biopolitics of racializing sexuality, one that draws upon and re-energizes older heteronormative Orientalist understandings of Muslim and Arab gender and sex in order to create a colonial logic of sexual violence, embedded within the very sensibilities of the Zionist regime. Yet here, despite the demonstrated widespread use of sexual violence and the sexualized nature of military force, the sexual logics of colonial occupation come to be figured as societally taboo, given the Zionist desire to biopolitically protect the purity of the Jewish Israeli body politic and the moral weight of liberal feminist humanitarianism. Yet, I argue, rather than this taboo functioning as repressive through what Foucault names the ‘repressive hypothesis’, it operates covertly to allow the widespread biopolitical dissemination and deployment of sexuality and sexual violence through and across the territories and bodies under Zionism’s control. This taboo, I now argue, was momentarily ruptured during the summer of 2014.

During the 2014 invasion and bombing of Gaza, and a few weeks following Kedar’s violent call for the mass rape of Palestinian women, an image began to circulate within Jewish Israeli WhatsApp groups and on social media. The illustration depicts a Muslim woman wearing a black niqab. Her abaya is torn from the waist down, with its ragged edges exposing her naked lower body, only interrupted by her pointed red stilettos. Lying down on silky sheets with her arms raised to her head in a sexually inviting pose, the woman has the sole word ‘Gaza’ written across her chest. Printed across the top and
bottom of the image are two sentences in the Hebrew language which, translated into English, read: ‘Bibi, 48 finish inside this time! Signed, citizens in favour of a ground assault.’

Figure Six. ‘Bibi, finish inside this time! Signed, citizens in favour of a ground assault.’

While current mass and global depictions of Muslim women commonly portray them as objects of gendered and sexual oppression in need of saving (Abu Lughod, 2002), this

48 ‘Bibi’ is the nickname given to Benjamin Netanyahu, the prime minister of Israel.
pornographic Israeli image tells quite a different story. The illustration of the woman, ‘Gaza’, is drawn in pin-up style, an artistic style that, while having a pre-World War II history, became the subject of ‘intense appropriation by the military industrial complex’ during World War II (Kakoudaki, 2004: 336). In her exploration of the relationship between the figure of the pin-up and militarization, Kakoudaki has argued:

the pin-up works as a patriotic image not because it is clean-cut and mainstream, but because it channels the excitement of an explicitly sexual scenario into non-pornographic media… it is not usually depicted in a sexual encounter with another body, and as a result, most pinups are soft-core. But the image nonetheless contains sexual content. (Ibid.: 339)

Through its incorporation into the military-industrial complex, the pin-up, a sexual and soft pornographic genre whose subject is almost always cis-female and whose audience is presumed as hetero-male, was mass produced and distributed with a ‘military function of boosting morale… the pinup helps the war effort because of what it depicts’ (ibid.: 340).

While previous analyses of the pin-up’s use in militarized culture examine images that depict a female who is on the ‘same side’ as the soldiers fighting, exemplified in the works of Buzek (2006), Kakoudaki (2004), Kronsell (2006) and Zeisler (2008), this violent depiction of ‘Gaza’ seductively awaiting and inviting Zionist penetration/invasion transforms the genre. Featuring a Palestinian woman rather than a Jewish Israeli, it conjures the ‘enemy’ as alluring, and her penetration produces orgasmic Zionist sexual pleasure. Calling on the Israeli prime minister to ‘finish inside this time!’, it synonymizes an IOF ground invasion with hetero-male ejaculation, simultaneously collapsing the Palestinian woman into her land. Here, in many ways, this image of ‘Gaza’, seductively inviting Zionist penetration, embodies the two contradictory figurings of Zionist settler colonialism outlined above. On the one hand, Zionism’s racist logics have equated Palestinian land with the Palestinian body, producing Palestine and its inhabitants as oppressed and backwards, yet in need of sexualized conquering, which is figured as key to settlement. On the other hand, Palestinian women are articulated as agents of national reproduction, a terrorist demographic threat against whom Jewish Israeli society must protect itself, such that the Zionist ‘machinery of violence explicitly targets native
women’s sexuality and bodily safety as biologized “internal enemies” since they are the producers of the next generation’ (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, Ihmoud and Dahir-Nashif, 2014). Bringing all these elements together to produce a niqab-wearing yet sexually inviting Palestinian woman, the image actively constructs racial-religious difference, depicting a pathologizing account of Arab gender and sexuality at a distance from that of the penetrating Jewish settler.

During the summer of 2014 this public figuring of Palestinian women as targets for colonial violence, like the public sexualization of violence itself, became quotidian. While Jewish Israelis gathered on hilltops to picnic, watch and cheer as bombs were dropped on Gaza (Mackey, 2014), a Jewish Israeli woman’s viral Facebook post articulated the sexualized pleasure of spectating at massacres: ‘what an orgasm to see the Israeli Defense Forces bomb buildings in Gaza with children and families at the same time. Boom boom’ (cited in Ihmoud, 2015: 9). During that same month, Israeli Knesset member Ayelet Shaked publicly declared that Palestinian mothers should be murdered to prevent them from reproducing (Daily Sabah, 2014). The municipal council of the coastal Jewish Israeli city Or Yehuda hung a large public banner which read, ‘Israeli soldiers, the residents of Or Yehuda are with you! Pound their mother and come back home safely to your other!’ (cited in Sheen, 2014).

What is significant here is not that settler colonial violence has been perversely articulated and understood through sexual tropes. Indeed, as I have already demonstrated, such a comprehension has a much older ingrained history, albeit one that is often concealed behind prison walls and within military ranks. Rather, the significance of these statements lies in their mass circulation, their bubbling over into the public domain in the form of social media posts, municipal banners, parliamentary speeches and public radio statements. Indeed, within so-called Western liberal democracies, such practices of sexual violence—sexual torture, calls for mass rape, the equating of bombing with sexual acts—are usually explained away as exceptional, as the actions of a few wayward officers; yet here these calls, images and banners circulated within the public sphere with an irrefutable public intentionality.

49 In Hebrew slang, the word ‘pound’ (kansu) denotes sexual penetration.
As a moment of intensified violence, destruction, dispossession and control, the summer of 2014 acted as a colonial flashpoint, one that harnessed much older Orientalist racisms in order to destroy the conditions needed for a generational Palestinian future. Here I would argue that multifarious intensified and persisting colonial violences brought to bear against Palestinian people living in occupied territories over the summer of 2014, while coded as humanitarian and non-sexually violent, were motivated by and laboured in the service of gendered and sexual violence, sparked by the loss of ‘pure’ Jewish life. As a flashpoint of colonial intensification, we see the racializing gendered and sexual logics of colonial occupation perversely bubble over into the public domain, revealing the ways in which Israel’s colonial occupation cannot be understood separately from the racializing gendered and sexual logics imbricated within it. This flashpoint at once reveals the perverse underside and fallacies of Israel’s sexual and gendered modernity, unmasking what lies beneath feminist militarism, humanitarian warfare, and Israel’s proliferation of sexual and gendered rights. Yet, at the same time as these public sexually violent moments unmask the sexual nature of settler colonial violence, and their shoring up of Orientalist paradigms of Arab sexuality actively and productively work in the service of Zionist modernity insofar as such treatment and evocations are globally understood as the only apt response to the Arab Muslim ‘culture of death’.

4.4 Conclusion
Framed in the context of the summer of 2014, it has been the aim of this case study chapter to empirically analyse the widespread material and structural practises of militarised heteronormative sexual violence that the state of Israel deploys against the Palestinian population as part of its ongoing colonial occupation. To this end, I have documented the state of Israel’s use of sexual torture in Israeli detention and prison facilities, the sexualized nature of the Israeli military and practises of warfare, and popular societal wide calls for sexual violence against Palestinian women. In so doing, I have argued that these practises are able to proliferate and circulate through becoming masked behind claims of humanitarian warfare and feminist and international organisations’ claims that sexual violence is absent from Israel’s colonial occupation. Furthermore, in analysing a site of liberal feminist complicity with colonial occupation, I have argued that practises of documenting of sexual violence in conflict map such instances onto the geographies and bodies of non-white non-European men in ways that strengthen the liberal international order that holds the nation state as the legitimate actor of violence. In the context of Palestine/Israel, such mappings work to naturalise the framing of the state of
Israel as a legitimate Western nation state engaged in a war against a terrorist population, obfuscating the historical present of settler colonialism, dispossession and occupation.

Building on the literature reviewed in previous chapters, I have demonstrated not only that sexual violence is intrinsic to Zionist conquest, but also that sexual violence is regularly called for and sanctioned against Palestinians. In so doing, I have sought to de-exceptionalize liberal frames of militarized Israeli excellence, not only drawing attention to widespread and institutionalized sexual biopolitical modes of control and governmentality being brought to bear against Palestine and its inhabitants, but also situating these within global frames of Orientalism, gendered freedom and economies of humanitarianism. As such, this case study contributes to existing literature on sexual biopolitics and colonial occupation by articulating a contradictory scene of Zionist biopolitics. Indeed, I have argued that the invasion of Palestinian land and bodies stands in intimate and contradictory relation to Zionist attempts to keep the state of Israel’s populace racially pure. This paradoxically produces Zionist settler colonial desires to penetrate Palestinian life and land, at the same time as it creates an impulse to clinically separate the contaminating Palestinian population, producing sexual violence against Palestinians as both taboo and perversely desirable.
Chapter 5 Racial Purity, Sexual Threat: The Politics of Anti-Miscegenation in Palestine/Israel

In July 2010, Saber Kushour, a Palestinian Muslim man from occupied east Jerusalem, was sentenced by an Israeli court to eighteen months imprisonment for the crime of ‘rape by deception’. As the story goes, two years previously, in 2008, Saber had been driving his moped around downtown Jerusalem, where he met a Jewish Israeli woman. Saber is alleged to have introduced himself as ‘Dudu’, a nickname his friends and family call him by, and a name that is also used in the Hebrew language as a nickname for David (McGregor-Wood, 2010). Shortly after meeting, Saber Kushour and the Jewish Israeli woman had sex. According to reports, two weeks later, when the Israeli woman discovered that Saber was not the Jewish bachelor she had thought, and that he was in fact an Arab, a Muslim and a Palestinian, she complained to the police (Newman, 2010). Her complaint resulted in Saber Kushour being charged with rape and indecent assault, after which he was placed under house arrest for two years (Kesavan, 2010).

Saber stood trial in July 2010, and as the result of a plea bargain, was convicted under the charge of ‘rape by deception’ (McGregor-Wood, 2010). As he sentenced Saber Kushour, Judge Zvi Segal said:

> if she had not thought that the accused was a Jewish bachelor interested in a serious relationship she would not have cooperated...
> the court is obliged to protect the public interest from sophisticated smooth tongued criminals who can deceive innocent victims... the court is required to stand firmly on the side of the victim. (Cited in BBC News, 2010).

Following the conviction, High Court Justice Elyakim Rubinstein, speaking about the conviction for ‘rape by deception’, suggested that such a ruling should be handed down whenever a ‘person does not tell the truth regarding critical matters to a reasonable woman, and as a result of misrepresentation she has sex with him’ (cited in Zarchin, 2010).

Saber Kushour’s case, narrated above through news reports, was circulated internationally and widely reported by *The Guardian*, ABC News, *The Irish Times*, *Haaretz*, Al Jazeera, *The Atlantic*, *The Huffington Post* and *The Telegraph of India*, 123
among others. In many ways, this international circulation led this one case to be posited as an extreme or exceptional one, an example of, as a Guardian article suggested, ‘racism against Arabs in Israel… if it had been a Jewish man passing himself off as Arab, a complaint would never have reached the court’ (Sherwood, 2010a). While other evidence regarding this case later came to public light,\(^{50}\) the ruling of ‘rape by deception’, whereby Saber Kushour’s identity as a Palestinian Muslim was figured by the judge as a ‘critical matter’, did not change. Thus, I am less interested in the ‘truth’ of the sexual encounter, and more interested in how, no matter the evidence at hand, the judicial system of the state of Israel saw it as fit and legitimate to incarcerate a Palestinian man under the charge of ‘rape by deception’ because of his sexual interactions with a Jewish Israeli woman.

This chapter situates Saber Kushour’s conviction of ‘rape by deception’ within the wider regulation of miscegenation in Palestine/Israel, and in so doing argues that the regulation of and intervention into mixed Palestinian-Israeli hetero-sexual relationships forms part of Israel’s biopolitical apparatus of population control and colonial occupation. In so doing, this analysis contributes to the literature outlined in Chapters’ Two and Three by complicating current configurations of sexuality within Israel. Indeed, as the literature reviewed argued, while Palestinian society is represented as sexually violent, homophobic and repressed, Israel is concomitantly generated within a frame of sexual modernity, whereby its LGBTQ rights record and modern ‘gay havens’ both obscure and legitimate the colonization and occupation of Palestine (Maikey, 2017; Puar, 2017). In response to this, Puar contended that Israeli pinkwashing ‘actually works as a foil to the pronatalist, eugenically orientated practises of sexual reproduction - both homo and hetero,’ and further argued that ‘any anti-pinkwashing stance that does not address the biopolitics of reproduction and regeneration may come dangerously close to reiterating the ableism not only of the Israeli state but also of (secular) queerness itself’ (2017: 124-125). Building on Puar’s argument, this chapter examines the regulation heterosexual intimacy and anti-miscegenation politics, situating it within Israel’s broader sexual infrastructure of occupation.

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\(^{50}\) In September 2010, new information was publicly circulated regarding Kushour’s case. It was later claimed that the woman involved ‘had been abused by her father from an early age and forced by him to become a sex worker’, and as a result, ‘the prosecution, it is claimed, agreed to the plea bargain that reduced the charge to rape by deception in order to prevent a long cross-examination of a traumatised victim’ (Shabi, 2010).
In so doing, this chapter argues that the case of Saber Kushour, and the regulation of miscegenation in Israel more broadly, should be situated within a much older colonial biopolitical history of miscegenation. As this chapter shall demonstrate, this older history of anti-miscegenation and associated discourses and practices of eugenic policy are often thought to be outdated, absent from our contemporary political landscape. However, through the analysis of anti-miscegenation activities in present-day Israel, this chapter argues that rather than being something characteristic of a race-science era of past, that such practises are passionately invested in in Israel, both in official state policy exemplified in Saber Kushour’s case, and through societal wide activism. Thus, in drawing attention to the case of Saber Kushour, the central aim of this chapter is to use this case to demonstrate the ongoing relevance of anti-miscegenation in the context of Israel’s occupation of Palestine. At the same time, and in so doing, this chapter also aims to highlight the complicity of certain forms of nationalist feminism with eugenics, racism, and heteronormative nationalism, through its failure to attend to the ways in which feminist concerns for the national female body are bound up with notions of racial purity and fears of degeneracy.

The first section of the chapter serves to outline older colonial discourses of miscegenation and racial purity. In so doing, I suggest that rather than symptomatic of the past, that such discourses continue to have salience in contemporary Israel. The second section then turns to both situate this case within the broader feminist literature on rape and to foreground the racialized nature of the ‘rapist threat’. Here I draw attention to the ways in which prominent Western feminist theory concerning rape often fails to take seriously racialization as central to understandings of gender and sexual violence, building on the arguments in this thesis and existing literature concerning the biopolitical complicity of feminist theorising and activism. Following this, I review important Black feminist works that have explored the historical construction of the Black man as rapist, as well as the historical and present coupling of Muslim masculinity with rape, deviance and violence. My aim in this section is to situate the case of Saber Kushour within much older racial histories of rape and to draw solidarities between Black feminist literature and the study of sexuality and sexual violence in Palestine. The final section, ‘Sexual Terrorism’, empirically examines the vigilante regulation of miscegenation in Palestine/Israel through an analysis of the activities of Yad L’Achim (Hands for Brothers), a vigilante ‘rescue’ group. In so doing, I argue that, despite being hetero-
sexual, mixed Palestinian-Israeli relationships exceed the hetero-normativity of the state of Israel, where hetero-normativity is constructed through the biologized category ‘Jewish’. As such, I further challenge Israel’s official narrative of sexual liberalism and demonstrate that an anti-miscegenation biopolitics of intimacy is an important part of Israel’s infrastructure of occupation that, as the literature reviewed in Chapter’s Two and Three argued, aims to separate Palestinians from Israelis and fragment Palestinian society. Together, in examining the specific manifestation of anti-miscegenation activism and policy in the state of Israel, my aim is to articulate how contemporary fears over racial mixing are seen to pose a threat to the maintenance of Israeli colonialism and the notion of a racially pure Jewish state. And, furthermore, to elaborate on how intimacy, love and family life become a biopolitical target in the context of Israel’s colonial occupation of Palestine.

5.1 The Biopolitics of Miscegenation & Racial Purity

Above I noted that the case of Saber Kushour, who was charged with ‘deceptive rape’, circulated internationally in ways that allowed the case to be sensationalised as an exceptional example of racism in Israeli society. In this section, my aim is to begin to deexceptionalize this case by situating it within a much older biopolitical colonial history of European miscegenation and eugenics. In Chapter Three I reviewed literature that analysed the emergence of Zionism and its materialisation in Palestine within frameworks of imperialism, whereby Zionism’s desires for a sovereign Jewish nation state were understood in the context of European whiteness and racial purity. These discourses, it was argued, have led to a contemporary politics of separation and fragmentation whereby the Israeli state attempts to keep the Jewish Israeli and Palestinian populations from mixing. Thus, in the Palestine/Israel context, anti-miscegenation politics have their own particular contours, specifically in relation to ideas around Israel as an exclusively Jewish state. However, in this section, I argue they are connected to much older biopolitical colonial discourses concerning racial purity and population. And, furthermore, in drawing out these connections, I challenge contemporary literature that has relegated these specific forms of anti-miscegenation to the past, highlighting their ongoing relevance in Palestine/Israel.

In Chapter Two when outlining Foucault’s analytic of biopower and feminist engagement with it, it was noted that central to emergence of biopower were ideas of racial purity as part of the discourse of modern biology. As Foucault (2003: 81) argues, ‘the State is no
longer an instrument that one race uses against another: the State is, and must be, the protector of the integrity, the superiority, and the purity of the race.’ This concern with the purity, cleanliness and health of social body and national population, leading to the deployment of mechanisms of exclusion against those deemed abnormal, degenerate, impure, and thus dangerous, is the moment at which Foucault identifies the emergence of modern racism in the context of Europe (see Foucault, 2003, 2003a, 1978). Building on Foucault’s analysis, McWhorter (2010) has analysed the ways that central to emergence of biopower and its intertwining of race and sex was the emergence of eugenics as a facet of modern biology. As McWhorter (ibid.: 53) writes,

Twentieth-century eugenics was a set of practices, discourses, and social movements whose twin goals were (1) to rid designated populations of unwanted traits—most notably “feeble-mindedness,” mental illness, physical handicaps such as deafness and blindness, addiction, diseases such as tuberculosis and cancer, and behaviours categorized collectively as “social inadequacy” or as expressions of “moral imbecility”—and (2) to increase the percentage of people bearing highly valued traits such as intelligence as measured by IQ tests, physical strength and stamina, diligence, and moral restraint. The only means available for this purpose before mid-century was, of course, selective breeding. Eugenics projects necessarily involved seizing control of the means of reproduction, which meant seizing control of human—and, in particular, of female—bodies.

Emerging at the biopolitical intersection of race and sexuality, eugenics sought to improve the ‘national stock’ through ensuring that biological reproduction was the privilege of nationally desirable subjects. Such understandings of biology were central to European colonial rule which, as Stoler’s work reviewed in Chapter Two argued, figured the colonized subjects as posing a sexual and racial threat to biological purity of Europe, resulting in an ‘imperial politics of exclusion’ (1995: 51). As such, Stoler has argued that eugenics functioned as a ‘national, gendered, racialized, and a class-specific project… for improved natality and selective sterilisation’ (ibid.: 31).

In the context of feminist discourse, scholars such as Blencowe (2011a), Farris (2017), Murphy (2012) and Nadkarni (2014) have differently explored the relationship between feminist theory and activism and eugenics. In her monograph *Eugenic Feminism,*
Nadkarni examines twentieth-century eugenic feminism in the United States and India, arguing that,

it is through feminist investments in nationalism (which, I propose, work according to a racialized reproductive mechanism) that feminism becomes dangerously tied to eugenicist thinking. I thus trace the strain of feminism that is mediated by nationalism to show its persistent reliance on a eugenic reproductive logic as the means of national and feminist improvement. (2014: 8)

Through her examination of birth control and reproductive rights movements, Nadkarni argues that feminisms biological investment in women’s reproductive health and rights as a vehicle for national improvement ‘always rests on anxieties about the “unfit” (however defined) undoing the nation, as the twin fears of “race suicide” and “overpopulation attest”’ (ibid.: 6). For Nadkarni, then, rather than ‘understanding eugenics as falling out of favour after the Nazis took it to its logical conclusion’ (ibid.: 5-6), she argues that nationalist feminist concerns over border controls, reproductive rights, and population produce a relationship between biology and the nation state that complicate the emancipatory nature of certain feminisms that draw their logics from eugenicist discourses of the past. Nadkarni’s historical research on post-colonial Indian nationalism and US empire offers an important analysis of the biopolitical nature of feminist discourse which, as Farris’ (2017) work outlined in Chapter Two argued, persists through what she terms ‘femonationalism’.

In a differing vein, certain feminist scholars have noted the persistence of eugenic discourses in biomedical technologies and repogenetics, often named ‘liberal eugenics’, exemplified in the works McWhorter (2010), Raz (2009), Roberts (2009), Schurr (2017), and Smith (2011). Indeed, as Roberts has argued, repogenetics – genetic selection technologies, human embryo cloning, pre-implantation genetic diagnosis - ‘incorporates a seemingly benign form of eugenic thinking in its reliance on reproductive strategies to eliminate genetic risk rather than social strategies to eliminate systemic inequities’ (2009: 795). While in her examination of Mexico’s contemporary surrogacy market, Schurr (2017: 244) argues that ‘liberal eugenics performed in the new bioeconomy does not displace state biopolitics but rather transforms it’ through ‘the (re-)production of a postcolonial politics of reproduction that values white(r) lives over non-white lives’
Thus, scholars have importantly traced the ways in which eugenicist notions of biological racial difference have transformed and persisted into the present. However, in the context of this chapter, I want to suggest that one manifestation of such discourse that is often left in past is miscegenation, which I argue persists in Palestine/Israel today.

Arising out of this historical context of racial purity, colonial nationalism and racism, miscegenation - the term used to describe the interbreeding of people assumed to be of different biological racial origin – emerged as a colonial technology that sought to prevent racial interbreeding and preserve white racial purity. Tracing the history of miscegenation discourse, Young notes that the word miscegenation was invented in 1864, before which ‘the word that was conventionally used for the fertile fusion and merging of races was ‘amalgamation’’ (1994: 9). Emerging in the context of the US civil war over fears of Black and white racial mixture, Gilman (1985: 256) has described how ‘miscegenation was a fear (and a word) from the late nineteenth-century vocabulary of sexuality. It was a fear not merely of inter-racial sexuality but of its results, the decline of the population.’ Thus, the discourse of miscegenation was directly linked to ideas of national biology and population, and associated fears of racial degeneracy. As a result, and in the context of Australia’s history of child removal policies, Robert (2001: 71) has argued that the term miscegenation itself operates as a biopolitical technology of population control:

Discourses of ‘miscegenation’ tended to commandeer Aboriginal women’s bodies for the purposes of white men’s sexual access, and yet to maintain a pretence of separation between colonisers and colonised—excluding these relationships (and their progeny) from the realm of ‘family’. Thus at the point where white men’s sexual conquest of Aboriginal women threatened the ‘logic of elimination’, (through the ‘half-caste menace’ and white men ‘going native’) the discourse of miscegenation intervened through institutions and knowledges to reassert the priorities of colonisation.

Based on the same discourses of modern biology that fuelled eugenics, discourses of miscegenation thus arose as a colonial biopolitical technology that sought to demarcate ideas of the nation family, heteronormativity and racial purity. According to many analyses of miscegenation, such discourses are now a thing of the past. Indeed, in her analysis of miscegenation discourse in the US, Pascoe argues that ‘with the invention of
the term “miscegenation” in the 1860s, the stage was set for the rise of a social, political and legal system of white supremacy that reigned through to the 1960s’ (2009: 1), which was the period that Young notes that ‘as many as forty of the fifty states prohibited interracial marriage… it was only in 1967 in the United States that such laws were declared unconstitutional’ (Young, 1994: 135). While in her analysis of British miscegenation discourse, Bland argues that specific anti-miscegenation efforts arose during the interwar period which mirrored similar efforts in British colonies and focused on the ‘innate biological/evolutionary tendencies as the moral arbiter’ (Bland, 2005: 33).

While the analyses of miscegenation and eugenics reviewed here point to a series of discourses, policies and laws that were prevalent in the twentieth-century, the case of Saber Kushour, I want to suggest, reveals a specific continuation of anti-miscegenation practice in twenty-first century Israel. Notions of Israel as an exclusive homeland for the global Jewry which, as the literature reviewed in Chapter Three established, biologize Jewishness to Israelis through discourses of European whiteness, becomes the site along which sexual relations and intimacy are regulated. Indeed, in the context of the ruling of ‘rape by deception’ sexual consent is formed through assumptions of race, with the court sentencing given by Judge Zvi Segal stating that if the woman has known that Saber Kushour was not ‘a Jewish bachelor interested in a serious relationship she would not have cooperated.’ Here the Palestinian population are marked in excess of national heteronormativity and ideas of the family. Thus, I am specifically suggesting that miscegenation as a biopolitical practice, and the eugenicist ideas of biology and racial purity on which it is based, are of continued relevance in the context of contemporary Palestine/Israel, albeit with their own specificities and histories. These discourses, I will now argue, are not engaged with or challenged within certain feminist discourses concerning rape.

5.2 The Non-White Rapist and Feminist Discourse
Saber Kushour’s ruling was generally celebrated by feminist organizations in Israel. For example, Merav Mor, a spokeswoman for the Association of Rape Crisis Centres in Israel, told Al-Jazeera International that she saw no trace of racism in the case: ‘this was purely a case of a man giving false information in order to fraudulently coerce a woman into a sexual relationship… This has absolutely nothing to do with the Arab situation in Israel’ (cited in Cheslow, 2010). Merav Mor was not alone in her celebration of the verdict. Nurit Tsur, executive director of the Israel Women’s Network, agreed that the incident was
rape, because it wasn’t informed consent… She has the right to decide with whom is she is having a one night stand’ (ibid.). While Tsur conceded that the case might have had ‘a touch of racism’ (ibid.), her celebration of the verdict was clear: Israeli women needed protection, in the words of Judge Zvi Segal, from ‘sophisticated smooth tongued criminals’ such as Palestinian men like Saber Kushour.

While these statements made by Israeli feminist organisations could be understood as specific to the context of Palestine/Israel, they also speak to older and on-going debates in Western feminist theory. Indeed, both the Israeli women’s organizations and the legal ruling draw explicitly upon discourses of sexual consent in order to justify, legitimate and reinforce the need to protect Jewish Israeli women from Palestinian men like Saber Kushour. The epidemic of men raping women has understandably been a topic of notable importance to feminist scholarship. In 1975 Brownmiller published her work Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape, in which she famously wrote that rape ‘is nothing more or less than a conscious process of intimidation by which all men keep all women in a state of fear’ (Brownmiller, 2013: 4). Following on from this work, numerous feminist scholars including Cahill (2001), Kelly (2013), MacKinnon (1989), Stanko (1985), Walker (1984), and Yodanis (2004), have analysed rape as ‘part and parcel of a larger system of sexual domination’, namely patriarchy (Cahill, 2001: 9). For MacKinnon, laws regarding rape have traditionally taken a male standpoint and served male interests. Rape has commonly been defined as ‘intercourse with force or coercion and without consent’ (MacKinnon, 1989: 172, emphasis author’s own). In rape jurisprudence, the accused man must have the appropriate mental state, defined as ‘what he actually understood at the time or what a reasonable man should have understood under the circumstances’ (ibid.: 180). As MacKinnon pertinently notes, the criminality and legitimacy of rape claims rest on how the act was understood by the male assailant, not the woman subjected to sexual violence.

These Western feminist histories and narratives of rape were undoubtedly present in Saber Kushour’s courtroom, as well as in the women’s organization statements that circulated in the trial’s aftermath. Yet, rather than serving the interests of male power, the judge draws upon narratives of a reasonable and ignorant woman in order to highlight her inability to give informed consent. This narrative of ignorance—that a subject involved in rape was ignorant of the situation or desires of another—is prevalent in discourses of rape and consent. The British criminal barrister Gerry, author of the Sexual Offences Handbook, argued that ‘if someone has reasonable and genuine belief their partner gave
consent then they shouldn’t be convicted’ (Gerry, 2014). As Sedgwick (1991) has argued, ignorance is often equated with innocence. For Sedgwick, rape is a key instance in which male ignorance is harnessed to reinforce gender inequality:

> the epistemological asymmetry of the laws that govern rape, for instance, privileges at the same time men and ignorance, inasmuch as it matters not at all what the raped woman perceives or wants just so long as the man raping her can claim not to have noticed… and the rape machinery that is organized by this epistemological privilege of unknowing in turn keeps disproportionately under discipline, of course, women’s larger ambitions to take more control over the terms of our own circulation. (Sedgwick, 1991: 5)

These feminist critiques of rape laws serve both to highlight the entrenched patriarchal nature of legality and to give insight into a global scene in which male rapists, in the instances when they are brought to trial, regularly walk free.\(^{51}\) But how then are we to understand the case of Saber Kushour, a Palestinian man imprisoned for ‘rape by deception’, guilty of not revealing his Arab Muslim status? In the context of these critiques of rape law, the tables appear to have been explicitly turned: the narratives of innocence regularly used to protect men and rename rape as ignorance are deployed in order to depict and protect a reasonable woman who did not understand the nature of the sexual relationship into which she was entering.

While this scholarship on rape offers a powerful explanation of the patriarchy inherent in the legal justice system, discourses of rape also shape and are shaped by dominant constructions of race which, as feminist scholars such as Crenshaw (1989, 1991, 1992), Davis (2011), Somerville (1994) and Wells-Barnett (1895, 1892, 1900) have argued, have historically produced Black masculinity as rapist. In her 1892 pamphlet *Southern Horrors: Lynch Law in All Its Phases*, 1895 *A Red Record*, and 1900 *Lynch Law in America*, Wells-Barnett empirically examined the lynching of Black men in the southern states of the US, noting that one of the most common rationales given for the lynching of a Black man was the raping of a white woman. Arguing that “nobody in this section of

\(^{51}\) Every year in the UK, for example, an average of 15,670 rapes are reported to the police, yet only 1,070 rapists are convicted of their crimes (Smith, 2014).
the country believes the old threadbare lie that Negro men rape white women” (1892), Wells-Barnett documented that over ten thousand lynchings had taken place between 1865 and 1895. Her research found that despite the common use of rape as a justification for lynching, Black people were lynched for almost any offence or non-offence. Furthermore, her research demonstrated that the term rape was deployed to describe almost any alliance between a white woman and a Black man, including voluntary or consensual relations. As Wells-Barnett argues, ‘the truth remains that Afro-American men do not always rape(?) white women without their consent’ (ibid.). As such, Wells-Barnett contended that lynching was a tactic used to terrorise the Black population and to uphold the honour of white women through anti-miscegenation politics. In a differing vein, Somerville has argued that during the Jim Crow era in the US, scientifically grounded racisms were routinely mobilized to ‘naturalize and legitimate the dominant cultural myth of the black rapist’, and in so doing to justify racial segregation (Somerville, 1994: 262). Similarly, in Women, Race, and Class (2011), Davis elaborated on how the myth of the Black rapist worked in concert with the US legal framework, leading to the mass incarceration and execution of Black men. As Davis puts it, ‘the myth of the Black rapist has been methodically conjured up whenever recurrent waves of violence and terror against the Black community have required convincing justifications.’ Tracing the history of rape laws in the US, Davis (2011: 172) notes that rape laws ‘were framed originally for the protection of men of the upper classes, whose daughters and wives might be assaulted,’ reminding her readers that ‘of the 455 men executed between 1930 and 1967 on the basis of rape convictions, 405 of them were black’ (ibid.).

In the context of the feminist engagements with rape outlined earlier in this section, Davis pertinently argues that ‘during the early stages of the contemporary anti-rape movement, few feminist theorists seriously analysed the special circumstances surrounding the Black woman as rape victim.’ For Davis, Black women have been neglected in white feminist anti-rape activism because sexual violence against Black women’s bodies has been foundational to the United States. As she (ibid.: 173) contends,

Slavery relied as much on routine sexual abuse as it relied in the whip and the lash… the pattern of institutionalised sexual abuse of Black women became so powerful that it managed to survive the abolition of slavery. Group rape, perpetrated by the Ku Klux Klan and other terrorist organizations of the post-Civil War period, became an uncamouflaged
political weapon in the drive to thwart the movement for Black equality.

Surveying the works of feminist theorists who have examined rape, including Brownmiller, MacKellar, Russel and Firestone, Davis (ibid.: 177) notes that ‘they all assert that Black men are motivated in especially powerful ways to commit sexual violence against women.’ Focusing specifically on Brownmiller’s *Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape*, Davis (ibid.: 175) contends that,

Brownmiller claims that Black men’s historical oppression has placed many of the ‘legitimate’ expressions of male supremacy beyond their reach. They must resort, as a result, to acts of open sexual violence… It cannot be denied that Brownmiller’s book is a pioneering scholarly contribution to the contemporary literature on rape. Yet many of her arguments are unfortunately pervaded with racist ideas.

For Davis, it is not enough for white feminist theorists to critique rape alone, rather ‘the struggle against racism must be an ongoing theme of the anti-rape movement, which must not only defend women of colour, but the many victims of the racist manipulation of the rape charge as well’ (ibid.: 187). Thus, as Davis, Wells-Barnett, and Somerville argue, the myth of the Black rapist has justified waves of racialized violence against the Black community in the US, while also operating as a site of anti-miscegenation politics whereby heterosexual relations between white women and Black men are figured as a biological threat to the white body politic. At the same time, as Davis demonstrates, feminist theorising has neglected the racialized nature of rapist threat, and in so doing has failed to grapple with the myriad forms of sexual violence that Black women have and do experience in the US.

While emerging out of a differing history of colonization and racialization, narratives of non-white men as biologically prone to rape have a protracted history in understandings of Arab Muslim masculinity and sexuality. In the previous chapter I outlined the ways in which heteronormative Orientalist productions of Arab Muslim sexuality are central to constructions of sexuality in Palestine/Israel, justifying and making legitimate practices of sexual torture. In so doing, I noted that these constructions draw on older sites of colonial knowledge production and, as the literature reviewed in Chapter Three demonstrated, such discourses of Orientalism have been historically fundamental to the
Zionist desire and justifications to colonize Palestine. In this context, and in the specific case of Saber Kushour, narratives of Arab and Muslim men as rapist have a protracted history. Fanon, in *Toward The African Revolution*, highlighted how the figure of the north African Muslim man was comprehended in terms of rape. Writing about the Arab man, Fanon sarcastically remarked, ‘*sexuality*. Yes, I know what you mean; it consists of rape’ (Fanon, 1967b: 11, emphasis author’s own). Quoting Dr Leon Mugniery’s doctoral thesis, presented in Lyon in 1951, Fanon (1967b: 11) reminds us of the ‘powerful sexual appetite that is characteristic of those hot-blooded southerners’. Mugniery’s thesis goes on to argue that the inherently violent sexuality of the Oriental Muslim was precisely why he must not be allowed to mix with (white) French women: ‘these are mostly young men (25 to 35) with great sexual needs, whom the bonds of a mixed marriage can only temporarily stabilize, and for whom homosexuality is a disastrous inclination’ (Mugniery, cited in Fanon, 1967b: 11). The problem of Arab Muslim sexuality was irresolvable, Mugniery argued, and as a result if the French state did not take measures to control Arab immigration, ‘we may well be exposed to increasing attempts at rape’ (ibid.). Similar to Davis’ argument that the myth of the Black rapist functions as mask for societal wide racism and sexual violence against Black women, for Fanon, the colonial fantasy of the Arab man as rapist at once masked and justified the atrocities of French colonial occupation, concomitantly masking the sexual nature of colonial violence: ‘tortures, the rape of little girls, collective murders. The history of the French occupation is studded with such crimes’ (ibid.: 71).

Rather than being symptomatic of a dark colonial past, these Orientalist discourses regarding Arab Muslim sexuality have been circulated, transmuted and deployed globally, feeding into immigration policy, justifying war and legitimizing occupation. For example, a study published in 2015 on the rise of sexual violence in Sweden, conducted by the Gatestone Institute, found a ‘strong connection between rapes in Sweden and the number of immigrants from MENA-countries’, a connection the report attributes to tendencies ‘deeply rooted in Islam’s culture to rape and brutalize women who refuse to comply with Islamic teachings’ (Gatestone Institute, 2015). Highlighting a previous study, the report concludes that ‘immigrants from North Africa (Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia) were 23 times as likely to commit rape as Swedish men’ (ibid.). Using colonial knowledges of Arab Muslim men as more prone to sexual violence within a sexually repressive Islamic culture, the report draws upon the Orientalist traditions outlined above in order to call forth a racist anti-immigrant agenda.
In a different location, 1980s France, a right-wing poster appeared across the nation. Depicting a sneering, hook-nosed, bearded caricature of an Arab man, the poster declared: ‘WANTED: MOHAMED BEN ZOBI, born in Algeria, residing in France. THIS MAN IS DANGEROUS! Susceptible of: MURDER! RAPE! THEFT! BURGLARY! To find him do not go far: all around you there are 700,000 JUST LIKE HIM!’

In the above examples, the myth of Arab rapist has been mobilized in the service of white nationalism, emerging as an explicit sexual threat to the civility and order of Europe and its white body politic. In the context of Palestine/Israel, the deployment of discourses of the hyper-sexual and rampant Muslim Arab have played a role in Israeli occupation. As the previous chapter analysed, notions of the violent, sodomous, rampant, yet conservative sexuality of Palestinian men have functioned to justify the use of sexual torture. While in Chapter Three, I demonstrated how Israeli fears concerning Palestinian family life and reproduction are regulated by and structural to the wall as a technology of occupation. The Israeli feminist organisations response to the incarceration of Saber Kushour for the crime of ‘deceptive rape’, while not explicitly articulating fears of nation population decline, participate in and support the economy of biopolitical discourses of miscegenation through their failure to interrogate this national racialized context in which such discourses arise. In arguing that the case of Saber Kushour ‘has absolutely nothing to do with the Arab situation in Israel’, the Israeli feminist response thus reveals what Nadkarni names as ‘feminist investments in nationalism’ (2014: 8), ones that dangerously work in the service of what Puar has argued were Israel’s ‘eugenically orientated practises of sexual reproduction’ (2017: 124-125).

Similarly, the feminist discussions of rape and sexual consent discussed earlier in this chapter foreground male hetero rape as a supreme threat to all women, supported, encouraged and institutionalized by heterosexist law. Yet as Somerville, Davis and Well-Barnett, and Fanon have argued, race is central to how gender and sexuality are understood and produced. In the US context, the myth of Black rapist has a violent history as technology of racialized violence. In the context of ‘rape by deception’, I want to suggest that Kushour’s identity becomes a ‘critical matter’, and his actions come to

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52 This poster can be viewed online: [https://mia.hypotheses.org/299](https://mia.hypotheses.org/299) (last accessed 2 January 2018). For a further discussion of this poster, see Mehammed Mack (2017: 106).
amount to rape, through the structures of colonial occupation, which gain their legitimacy and historical weight from these much older transnational racial-sexual colonial discourses. Within this history, the articulation of Kushour as a ‘deceptive rapist’, rather than appearing as exceptional or as an anomaly, reminds us that the construction of Arab Muslim men as such has taken place many times before, and that non-white men more broadly have routinely been figured as rapist in a variety of locations in order to justify racialized violence. Furthermore, as Wells-Barnett importantly demonstrated, the myth of Black rapist also supports the broader anti-miscegenation politics outlined the previous section, whereby all intimate relations between white women and Black men were figured as non-consensual. While Wells-Barnett was writing about the specific context of lynchings in the US, her analysis gives some insight into how, in the racially ordered Palestinian/Israeli society, Kushour was figured as a rapist for not revealing his status as an Arab Muslim Palestinian. Taking up the connection that Wells-Barnett drew between the myth of the Black rapist and miscegenation, I now turn to further empirically document anti-miscegenation practises in Israel.

5.3 Sexual Terrorism

A poll conducted in 2007 found that more than half of Israeli Jews believe intermarriage should be equated with ‘national treason’. (Cook, 2009)

A survey conducted by the Smith Institute on behalf of Yad L’Achim shows that more than 90 percent of the Jewish public in Israel staunchly opposes intermarriage between their son or daughter and a Muslim. (Yad L’Achim, 2016)

Through detailing the imprisonment of Saber Kushour for the crime of ‘rape by deception’, and in linking this to colonial anti-miscegenation practises more broadly, in this chapter I have aimed to demonstrate that intimate family life and love are a racialized biopolitical target in Palestine/Israel. In Chapter Three I reviewed recent literature examining Israel’s tactics and technologies of occupation, where it was argued that in its current phase the occupation of Palestine aims to separate the Jewish Israeli and Palestinian populations, exemplified in technologies such as the wall, checkpoints, and the permit regime. Bringing together these two literatures, in this section I examine the
societal regulation of mixed Palestinian-Israeli hetero-sexual relationships which, as the opening quotes of this section suggest, are actively opposed in Israeli society.

In the Israeli municipality of Petah Tikva, a city close to Tel Aviv, a special team of youth counsellors and psychologists has been set up to ‘rescue’ Jewish women from the Arab men they date (Cook, 2009).53 Hezi Hakak, a spokesperson for Petah Tikva municipality, has publicly advertised a hotline that has been set up for the friends and family of Jewish ‘victims’ to report cases: ‘We can’t tell the girls what to do but we can send a psychologist to their home to offer them and their parents advice’ (ibid.). Chief Rabbi Shmuel Eliyahu from the town of Safed, where a similar committee has been set up, recently told a local newspaper that ‘Arab’ men ‘seducing’ Jewish girls was ‘another form of war’ (ibid.). Similar to the figuring of Saber Kushour as a deceptive rapist, here Palestinian men engaged in sexual relations with a Jewish Israeli woman are articulated as violent and deceptive: they are not seeking love, they are seeking war. The Palestinian man is placed outside of the comprehension of modern love, with miscegenation being figured as a deceptive act of warfare. Similar to Robert’s (2001) earlier analysis of miscegenation discourse in the Australian context, here mixed Palestinian-Israeli relationships are deemed in excess of ideas of the national and natural ‘family’.

The threat of miscegenation is so feared by the Israeli state and public that vigilante ‘rescue’ groups have been set up in order to rescue Jewish Israeli women from the Palestinian men they date.54 The organisation that I examine in the rest of this section is Yad L’Achim (Hands for Brothers), which according to its webpage runs ‘military like

53 In addition to the rescue committees described here, Israeli court permission is often given for groups to protest outside mixed Palestinian-Israeli weddings. See for example this protest, which took place in August 2014: http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Police-to-be-out-in-force-as-extremists-plan-to-protest-Arab-Jewish-wedding-371338 (last accessed 4 January 2018).

54 Alongside Yad L’Achim, other organizations that monitor and intervene in mixed relationships include Lehava, Lev L’Achim and Derekh Hayim. Alongside these formal groups, it has been reported that Jewish citizens in many Israeli neighbourhoods have formed vigilante patrols to break up mixed relationships, often beating Palestinian men in the street when they are found with Jewish women (see Freedman, 2009; Lee, 2013).
rescues from hostile Arab villages’ in coordination with the Israeli military. Running a range of social services—a hotline to report mixed relationships; social reintegration programmes and ‘safe houses’ for the ‘survivors’ of mixed relationships; belated circumcision and bar mitzvah ceremonies for children raised in non-Jewish households; campaigns against missionaries working in Israel; rehabilitation programmes for Jewish women who go astray; support for relatives ‘coping’ with mixed Palestinian-Jewish relationships—Yad L’Achim report that they ‘handle more than 600 cases of intermarriage a year’ (Yad L’Achim, 2017). They publish detailed articles and reports on their ‘rescue missions’ on their website, and almost all Yad L’Achim’s cases emphasize domestic sexual violence on the part of the Palestinian partner (see for example Yad L’Achim, 2014, 2015a). Supporting and proliferating the Orientalist knowledges that posit Palestinians as violent and incapable of modern love, Yad L’Achim articulate themselves as the saviours of Jewish sanctity against the backdrop what the previous chapter articulated as a Palestinian ‘culture of death’.

The stories of ‘rescue missions’ that Yad L’Achim tell are diverse. In October 2012, they reported ‘rescuing’ a Jewish Israeli woman and her new-born child, born from a Palestinian father, from the birthing suite of a hospital. As the report details:

two days after the birth, when mother and baby were due to be released, a Yad L’Achim team arrived at the hospital to guide her through the rescue. As the paperwork on their release was being processed, the young mother told her husband to wait in her room while she went to the nursery to check on the baby. While the husband remained in the room to pack up, she and the baby were smuggled out of the hospital through a back door into a waiting Yad L’Achim car. By the time the husband suspected that something was wrong, it was too late. He approached the nursery, only to be told that his wife and baby had long since been released. (Yad L’Achim, 2012)

In a July 2012 report, Yad L’Achim detail how their team ‘rescued’ a woman born into a Jewish Israeli family, who for twenty years had been living with her Palestinian husband

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55 This quote is taken from the webpage: http://yadlachim.org/?CategoryID=188 (last accessed 2 January 2018).
in a Palestinian village close to the Palestinian city of Tulkarem. She had been estranged from her Jewish family for many years, and her case came to Yad L’Achim’s attention after she made contact with a Jewish relative. After this call, as the article detailing the rescue mission describes:

Yad L’Achim wasted no time in setting up a team to plan her rescue. The sense of urgency, and emotion, was particularly strong in light of this poor woman’s name: Dina bat Leah, whose biblical namesake had been held captive by Arabs in Shechem [Nablus], and who was ultimately rescued by her two brothers Shimon and Levi. Yad L’Achim completed its rescue plan for Dina and her two young children, an eight-year-old son and a 10-year-old daughter. Her older children would have to remain behind, for now. Contact was made with a senior official in the office of the IDF’s Coordinator of Government Activities in Yehudah and Shomron, who agreed to issue Dina and her children a special visa to enter Israel. Soldiers at the border crossing were given instructions to open the gates to the rescue car. After the car crossed into Israel and came to a stop, Dina emerged with her children. She burst into tears at the realization that her nightmare of 25 years was finally over. She and her children were home and could begin the journey back to their people… Dina related that during their drive in the rescue car, when she revealed to her children that they were on a one-way trip to Israel, the children, who had themselves suffered from their father’s abuse, shouted in excitement: ‘Promise us that we won’t ever go back there!’ At the checkpoint, while they sipped from glasses of cold water and calmed down from their stress of recent weeks, Dina removed her jalabiya and scarf and asked a Yad L’Achim staffer to ‘thrown it in the garbage.’ In that moment, she shed her Arab dress and took on the appearance of a Jewish woman taking her first steps back to her people and birthplace. There wasn’t a dry eye at the checkpoint; even hardened soldiers cried unashamedly. (Yad L’Achim, 2012a)
patriarchal Orientalist logics that secure Israel as site of modernity, security and freedom, also seen in the pinkwashing logics outlined in Chapter Three, and that justified the practises of sexual torture examined the previous chapter. Indeed, through the production of the Palestinian man as violent and abusive, the state of Israel is articulated as a site of modern rescue, one where women can shed their ‘Arab dress’ and be welcomed back into the security of a modern democratic state. In so doing, any intimate union between an Israeli women and Palestinian man is depicted as unnatural within Israel’s modern ideas of non-violent Jewish family life.

Another Yad L’Achim recue report describes a ‘rescue’ operation which took place in March 2015. The article, titled ‘Dramatic Rescue Nearly Nixed by Terrorist Freed in Shalit Deal’, opens: ‘a Purim miracle. That’s how a Yad L’Achim rescue team described last week’s dramatic evacuation of a Jewish woman and her three children from a hostile Arab village near Beit Lechem [Bethlehem]’ (Yad L’Achim, 2015). The ‘terrorist’ described in the article’s title is the Palestinian grandmother of the children being ‘rescued’, who had attempted to stop the mission and rescue her grandchildren from the Israeli ‘military style rescue’. ‘Fixing’ the problem of mixed relationships, which Yad L’Achim (2014) describes as ‘an existential threat of the highest order’, the organization regulates sexual intimacy and love between heterosexual Jewish Israelis and Palestinians. Producing the Palestinian as always already violently deceptive and terroristic, ‘rescue missions’ tear families apart. The ‘terrorist’ Palestinian grandmother, desperate to protect her grandchildren from Zionist ‘rescue’, embodies the asymmetrical distribution of love: always already a terrorist, she is biologically unequipped to offer the kinds of loving care and attachment offered by modern Israel. The sanctity and purity of the female Jewish body for Israel needs ‘rescue’ and protection, against the backdrop of the deceptive Palestinian terrorist.

Through the figuring of mixed Palestinian-Jewish Israeli relationships as a national emergency, vigilante groups such as Yad L’Achim—which naming them vigilantes may work to erase their clear coordinating support from the IOF—are able to invade Palestinian villages, towns and cities, ‘taking back’ children and women deemed part of the Zionist body politic. This practice not only reminds us of the fictitious nature of Palestine’s borders, their penetrability and the precarious nature of ‘being at home’ in Palestine, but also points to the centrality to the state of Israel of Jewishness as a biological ethno-racial category. For example, in May 2014, Yad L’Achim reported helping a
woman who had grown up ‘thinking she was a Muslim and condemned to life imprisonment in a violent marriage’ to become Jewish once again (Yad L’Achim, 2014a). It was reported that for this Palestinian woman, who had grown up without knowledge that her mother had been Jewish, ‘hearing that her mother was Jewish didn’t mean anything to her since according to Islam the child’s religion goes after the father’ (ibid.). But a rescue mission was nonetheless carried out, with Yad L’Achim transferring her to a safe house inside of Israel’s 1948 boundaries and integrating her into Judaism. Yad L’Achim’s activities, framed around their motto ‘we don’t give up on a single Jew,’ thus reinstate not only the centrality of Jewishness to the state of Israel, but also the biological inscription of Jewishness as an ethno-religious category, an unchangeable bloodline rather than a changeable religious status. I pick up this thread in the next chapter, where I examine how egg cells are inscribed with race.

In detailing these anti-miscegenation activities, my aim has been to highlight how intimacy, love and family life become a biopolitical target within the Israeli settler colony. In Chapter Two I reviewed recent literature that sought to examine how Israeli defines and produces itself as a site of sexual modernity through the proliferation and promotion of LGBTQ rights. Yet as Puar (2017) noted in the introduction to this chapter, a focus on pinkwashing alone fails to account for the biopolitics of heterosexual intimacy. Across the cases outlined above, we can see that the Israeli state, and societal organisations more broadly, delimit and intervene in sexual relations between Jewish Israeli women and Palestinian men, demonstrating a more complex scene of sexual rights and regulations than paradigms of Israeli pinkwashing. Rather, these anti-miscegenation activities reveal how heteronormativity in the state of Israel is structured around Jewishness as a racial category, and defined against or irreconcilable with Arabness (and Blackness, as I argue in the next chapter). Thus, while these relationships exist as hetero-sexual, they exceed the heteronormativity of the state of Israel. In her discussion of Chow’s ‘ascendancy of whiteness’, Puar (2007: 31) argues:

neither is the ascendancy of whiteness bound to heterosexuality, though it is bound to heteronormativity. That is to say, we can indeed mark a specific historical shift: the project of whiteness is assisted and benefited by homosexual populations that participate in the same identarian and economic hegemonies as those hetero subjects complicit with this ascendancy.
Following Puar, in the context of the regulation of hetero-sexual miscegenation in Palestine/Israel, we see how heteronormativity functions to place mixed Palestinian-Israeli intimate relations outside of the confines of the national and natural family. Here miscegenation marks the limit of hetero familial bonds, which in Israel are drawn through an embrace of imperial European whiteness and the biologized category ‘Jewish’. This context, I argue, provides a vital framework with which to understand how Saber Kushour came to be understood as a deceptive rapist as a result of sexual relations with a Jewish Israeli woman.

5.4 Conclusion

It has been the aim of this chapter to empirically examine Israeli anti-miscegenation regulation and activism as a biopolitical mode of population control and a sexual technology of colonial occupation. Taking the case of Saber Kushour, the Palestinian Muslim man who had sex with a Jewish Israeli woman, as my starting point, it has been the aim of this chapter to de-exceptionalize Saber’s case, reanimating this court ruling and situating it within Israel’s broader regulation of intimacy. You may recall from the beginning of this chapter that High Court Justice Elyakim Rubinstein, speaking about the conviction for ‘rape by deception’, suggested that such a ruling should be handed down whenever a ‘person does not tell the truth regarding critical matters to a reasonable woman, and as a result of misrepresentation she has sex with him’. Configured within this ruling, and aligned with racist Orientalist discourses, Saber Kushour’s sexual identity as a Muslim, a Palestinian, an Arab, is the critical matter, one which, as this chapter has sought to demonstrate, has been produced as posing a biological reproductive threat to the perseverance, life and futurity of the Jewish Israeli people and their nation.

Building on the important works reviewed in Chapters Two and Three, this chapter has sought to situate the charge of ‘rape by deception’ within the broader regulation of miscegenation within the state of Israel, which I argue forms a dimension of Israel’s sexual infrastructure of occupation. As we have seen, concerns over miscegenation have a protracted colonial history outside of Israel, demonstrating the imbrications of Israel’s contemporary policing of love and intimacy with an older colonial biopolitics of population science. Furthermore, in the context of feminist discourse, I have sought to unpick the ways that nationalist concern for women can work to support anti-miscegenation agendas through their failure to grapple with the ways in which such sites
operate as racializing biopolitical discourses. In so doing, I argued the fierce regulation of miscegenation between Palestinian men and Jewish Israeli women works to produce such intimate relations as unnatural in the context of the Israeli national family, and as such suggested that national heteronormativity in Israel is structured around categories of whiteness and Jewishness. In the next chapter I will further this analysis through an examination of how the reproductive lives of Black Jewish women have been covertly controlled and intervened in, even though these women exist as heterosexual and Jewish within a Jewish state.
Chapter 6 ‘Be Fruitful and Multiply’: Fertility Economies, White Futurities

I will say that Israel is well known in terms of policy, culture, and court decisions as one of the most pro-natalist countries in the world—think about the funding for IVF in Israel which is about as robust as any country I know of. The whole effect of the halachic [Jewish religious law] view of be fruitful and multiply no doubt has an impact here too, so it doesn’t surprise me if Israel authorizes posthumous reproduction in these cases where many other countries would not. (Cohen, cited in Ghert-Zand, 2016)

The above remarks were made by I. Glenn Cohen, professor of law at Harvard University, in response to Petah Tikvah Family Court’s global landmark ruling in September 2016. After a four-year legal battle, Irit and Asher Shahar won their fight to have the sperm of their son, a deceased IOF navy officer, fused with a donated egg and inseminated into a surrogate. This kind of posthumous reproduction, while outlawed in many countries, is nothing new in Israel. State guidance was first issued on the matter in 2003: drawing heavily on the biblical commandment to ‘be fruitful and multiply’, the rules made it clear that the right to retrieve sperm from dead bodies for in vitro fertilization should be reserved solely to the partner of the deceased (Landau, 2004). These rules have since been challenged on a number of occasions, and a new precedent was set in 2007 when an Israeli court allowed the parents of a soldier who had died in service in Gaza to gift their dead son’s sperm to a woman who wanted a baby (Sinclair, 2007). During the same year, following the 2006 Israeli invasion and war in Lebanon, 150 IOF soldiers decided to sign a ‘biological will’, according to which they would freeze their sperm for future use by their partners or parents in IVF procedures. Attorney Irit Rosenblum, head of the New Family Organization, who claim to be the masterminds behind and only company offering ‘biological wills’, suggested that ‘if the State jeopardizes the lives of its citizens it has no right to prevent them from preserving their right to procreate’ (cited in Regev, 2007). Since then, military support has grown for posthumous reproduction, with a February 2017 research study finding that an overwhelming majority of male solders (188 out of 212) agreed that they would preserve their reproductive cells for posthumous IVF at their parents’ request (Noy, 2017).

The Shahars’ fight differed in that they wanted to use both an egg donation and a surrogate, meaning that Irit and Asher Shahar, the future baby’s biological grandparents,
would be raising the child alone. Professor I. Glenn Cohen, a leading medical ethics expert, expressed no surprise at the court’s decision to allow the Shahars to use their dead son’s sperm to produce a child, tying the court’s decision to Israel’s wider pronatalist approach to reproduction, grounding this approach in the biblical commandment to ‘be fruitful and multiply’, and using Israel’s broader state provision of IVF as an exemplar of such an approach. Critics of this right to posthumous reproduction have argued that the guidance focuses solely on the right of the dead Jewish Israeli citizen, with little consideration for the child, producing what Landau (2004: 1952. Cited in Puar, 2017: 113) has called the ‘exploitation of the dead’.

Situated within Israel’s history of pronatalist reproductive policies, the family court’s decision does indeed present no anomaly. It is a widely accepted international fact that Israel is a world leader in pronatalist policy, and in the development and provision of the assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs), such as IVF, which allow medically assisted reproduction. These pronatalist tendencies are arguably traceable back to the very founding of the Israeli state. For example, in 1949, one year after the formal founding of the Israeli nation, the first prime minister of Israel, Ben-Gurion, announced the award of a symbolic monetary prize for ‘heroine mothers’ who delivered their tenth child (Birenbaum-Carmeli, 2004). This policy was subsequently supplemented with a range of other initiatives, including the 1962 setting up of the Natality Committee and the 1968 establishment of the Demographic Centre. These Israeli government-funded initiatives aimed to ‘carry out reproductive policy intended to create a favourable climate, such that natality will be encouraged and stimulated; an increase in natality in Israel being crucial for the future of the whole Jewish people’ (ibid.: 902). One such policy that arose from these government initiatives was the 1968 establishment of the Fund for Encouraging Birth, which offered low-interest loans to couples wishing to extend their families (Sperling, 2010: 365). However, an aspect of this fund often excluded from discussions of Israel’s pronatalism is that it was not open to ‘Israeli Arabs [Palestinians], as one of its eligibility requirements was military service’ (ibid.).

It is within this context of national Jewish survival, pronatalism and reproductive rights that Israel’s IVF policy is commonly situated. Routinely heralded as the world leaders in IVF, Israelis are the highest per capita users of IVF globally (Nahman, 2013). In Israel all citizens, including single women and lesbians, are entitled to eight state-funded IVF treatment cycles until the age of 42, after which they are limited to three cycles. This
current policy reflects controversial policy changes made in 2014, before which Israel provided unlimited IVF treatments for all women until the age of forty-five, or until two ‘take home’ babies had been born. While the recent curtailing of the policy was met with criticism—critics of the policy change suggested that the reproductive choices of women were being limited (Prusher, 2014)—the policy is nonetheless said to stand out as a global exemplar of inclusive reproductive public health policy.

This chapter examines Israel’s biomedical-industrial-reproductive complex, exploring how the distribution of and access to reproduction operates as a site of biopolitical racism. Here I argue that within Israel, bodies are marked out and targeted for reproduction along the coordinates of Jewishness and through their proximity to whiteness. The first section of this chapter surveys the historical importance of science and technology to the Israeli state-building project, and examines how this importance, produced through a rehabilitative Zionist demographic logic aiming to consolidate a Jewish majority in a settler Jewish state, gave rise to an array of pronatalist policies, military technologies and colonial sciences. In so doing, I point to how discourses of scientific discovery and pronatalism, similar to the sphere of posthumous IVF discussed above, are couched in languages of militarism, war and logics of racial survival. The second section of this article turns to examine the contours of Israel’s IVF policy, the various laws that govern it, and the academic discourses that have sought to explain it. In so doing, I argue that the distribution of IVF and egg donation operates in ways that affirm the centrality of Jewishness to the state of Israel, while also further limiting the possibility of miscegenation or population-mixing.

In 2008 it emerged that Israeli health officials were subjecting a disproportionate number of female Ethiopian immigrants to the controversial contraceptive injection Depo-Provera, often without these women’s knowledge. Depo-Provera is considered by many doctors the birth control method of last resort because of the many problems of treating its side effects, as noted by Gupta (1991), Nair (1989), and Neinstein and Katz (1986). Figures showed that fifty-seven per cent of Depo-Provera users in Israel were Ethiopian women (Isha L’Isha, 2009). The second half of this chapter turns to examine this differing scene of medically assisted (non-)reproduction in Israel, namely the distribution of Depo-Provera among Israel’s Ethiopian Jewish community. In so doing, I argue that against the backdrop of a supposedly pronatalist state, Israel controls the reproduction of Jewishness in ways that seek not only to separate and displace Palestinians, but also to produce
Israel’s populace as white. As such, I reveal how the workings of Zionism as a white European ideology, discussed in Chapter Two, play out through the contemporary governance of reproduction.

In examining these scenes of reproductive governmentality, my aim in this chapter is to uncover the various ways that sexual reproduction, biomedicine, racism and settler colonialism intersect and overlap within the state of Israel, creating a matrix of reproductive governance that seeks to celebrate and foster the reproduction of racially demarcated life at the expense of other life forms. Furthermore, I also seek to elaborate on how these spheres of reproduction come to be celebrated within frameworks of modernity, women’s and gay reproductive rights, and technological advancement, frameworks which provide a biopolitical mask for anti-Blackness and the propagation of colonial occupation. As such, this chapter does not seek to offer a critique of IVF or ARTs more generally in and of themselves. This is, of course, not to suggest that ARTs have been developed and produced in apolitical contexts. Indeed, as various scholars have noted, ARTs have often been developed in concert with the patriarchal figuring of infertility as a problem located in women’s bodies, and through imperial and racialized global demography problematics (Franklin, 2013). Here, however, I am specifically interested in how such technologies are deployed and instrumentalized in the service of colonial occupation.

Thus, in an attempt to offer a differing narrative of IVF and an account of Palestinian vitality and resistance, directly following this chapter is an interlude: ‘Freedom Dreams: An Interlude of Reproductive Resistance’. Narrating Palestinian women’s stories of smuggling sperm out of Israeli prisons, and of subsequent IVF treatment and conception, I tell an alternative story of Palestine, IVF and reproduction. Here, in bringing the endurance of Palestinian life out of the margins of discussions of IVF in Palestine/Israel and back into the centre, I highlight the radical contingency of reproductive technologies, and the potency of their potential to craft new cartographies of life/resistance as much as they may reify and produce terrains of colonial violence. Thought together, this chapter and its accompanying interlude function to narrate reproduction and non-reproduction as both sites of unbearable racist colonial violence and scenes of life, hope and anti-colonial resistance.
6.1 Rehabilitating the Jewish Subject: Zionism, Science and Technology

Science and technology have been a vital component of Zionism, central to the early development of Zionist philosophy in Europe, to the geographical materialization of the Zionist project in Palestine, and to Israel’s present-day economy. In what follows I briefly offer an alternative framework in which to understand Israel’s biomedical-reproductive-industrial complex. In this section I briefly trace the emergence of Israel’s reproductive-industrial complex not as an approach to childbirth rooted in biblical commandments, but rather as part of the Zionist settler colonial political project tied to the rehabilitation of the Jewish race.

In 1896 Herzl published *The Jewish State*, which, as I outlined in Chapter Three, is considered to be one of the most important books of early Zionist thought, creating a road map for the future of an independent Jewish state. In the book, Herzl claimed that the plan for Israel would be carried out by two agencies: the Society of Jews and the Jewish Company. Central to these agencies was the advancement of science: as Herzl explains, the ‘Society of Jews will do the preparatory work in the domains of science and politics, which the Jewish Company will afterwards apply practically’ (Herzl, 1988: 93). Later writing a fictional account of future Israel in his 1902 Zionist novel *Altneuland (Old New Land)*, Herzl depicted the future Jewish state as a social utopia, one which explicitly linked Western ideals of progress and modernization to the advancement of a technoscientific culture. As a result, as Corry and Golan (2010: 393) have rightly argued, ‘from the very start, the Zionist movement perceived the sciences, pure and applied, as central to its program of creating a new Jewish society in the Land of Israel.’ Indeed, as was argued earlier, the ideals of Western progress coupled with a technological settler colonial desire to ‘make the desert bloom’, inspired by other European colonial projects, was central to the rehabilitation or rebirth of the diasporic Jewish populace in the land of Palestine.

The deployment of technoscientific discourses was swiftly and systematically institutionalized in all areas of Israeli policy. As Corry and Golan (ibid.: 393–394) argue, ‘after the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, science and technology quickly turned central to its ideology, economy, security, and culture… Bereft of manpower and territorial depth, the pursuit of technological superiority became a cornerstone of its military doctrine, policies, and accompanying discourse.’ Universities and research
institutions, such as the Weizmann Institute of Science in Rehovot, the Hebrew University and Hadassah Medical Centre in Jerusalem, and the Technion in Haifa, served as the cornerstones of this scientific colonialism. The results ‘were admired throughout the world—a young nation that quickly reached the forefront of western science and technology’ (ibid.). By the 1970s, Israeli universities were producing the highest rate in the world of doctorates in the natural sciences (300 per million), and through its many different disciplines—agriculture and water, military technology, cartography—knowledge was produced which allowed the consolidation and naturalization of Israel, a state built on the land of Palestine. Cartographers explored the maps of Palestine, replacing the Arabic names of villages, rivers, mountains and valleys with Hebrew names (Long, 2008). New agricultural techniques were introduced, encouraging kibbutzniks to emerge in seemingly unpopulated barren deserts (Efron, 2011). By the 1970s, Israeli universities and private companies, often working together, were producing a growing percentage of the weapons systems and military equipment used by the IOF, including the Reshef missile boat, the Kfir fighter plane and the Merkava tank (Offenhauer, 2008).

Not only did Western scientism provide a modern framing for the ongoing colonization of Palestine, but it also held an important function for Zionist subject-making practices. As was outlined in Chapter Three, central to early Zionist philosophy was the reimagining of the European Jewish subject. The Jewish body had long been central to European medical discourse and Jews had long been associated with disease, madness, degeneration and sexual perversity, as analysed by Boyarin (1997) and Gilman (2013). To remedy centuries of racism, science and technology proved crucial to the creation of the so-called New Jew or Sabra, which referred to an imperial, healthy, masculine, strong, military, Israeli-born Jew who symbolized the collective rebirth of global Jewry after centuries of diasporic statelessness and degeneration, as demonstrated in the works of Almog (2000), Sufian (2007), and Weiss (2002a). Indeed, early Zionist writer and leader Nordau understood that the role of Zionism was to create what he called the ‘new muscular Jew’. Linking the body to national heroism and militarism, Nordau argued that Jewish men needed to exercise and develop their bodies in a muscular fashion in order to overcome ‘the horrible devastation that eighteen hundred years of exile caused us’ (cited in Yosef, 2004: 19). Unlike the degenerated Jews of the European ghetto, the new Israeli Jews were to be comprised of men who ‘rise early and are not weary before sunset, who have clear heads, solid stomachs, and hard muscles’ (ibid.). As such, Zionism’s remedy for the psychopathology of the diasporic Jew was a rehabilitative ‘return’ to Palestine.
Tying the rehabilitation of the Jewish body to the settlement and development of Palestinian land produced a paradoxical situation whereby ‘to become fully European, the Jew had to leave Europe’ (Ajl and Seikaly, 2016: 131. Cited in Puar, 2017: 103).

Consequently, File (2009) and Shvarts (2008) have noted that medicine and public health, in particular reproductive health and fertility, held immense importance in the realization of the state of Israel, a new yet ancient land to be populated by strong Jewish citizens. In the early twentieth century, Zionist health missions founded mother-and-child clinics to provide basic reproductive health services in newly established settlements, and reproductive health and medicine later emerged as a central field of Israeli science. Indeed, in their historical overview of Israeli researchers’ contribution to the field of reproductive medicine, Mashiach et al. (2010: 57–59) argue that fertility has emerged as an important field of research in Israel. Through the 1950s and 1960s Israeli researchers emerged as distinguished figures in national and international debates on reproductive medicine, contributing significantly to global fertility research (Lunenfeld et al., 2011; Mashiach et al., 2010). Thus, Zionism’s keen interests in scientific and military culture have led to Israel positioning itself as a leading international player in biomedical and technoscientific research and exports (Nahman, 2013).

Zionism’s history of scientific celebration, and its noted global success, has produced a Jewish society that celebrates science and technology, as well as a lucrative global economy. As Prainsack and Firestone (2006: 33) have observed, unlike in other nations, in Israel there is very little public controversy surrounding biomedical practices such as genetic engineering or cloning. Moreover, ARTs such as IVF, intracytoplasmic sperm injection, donor insemination, surrogacy, egg donation and prenatal genetic diagnosis are accepted and popular in Israel, and most of them are generously or completely state-sponsored, allowing all citizens, including single parents, same-sex couples and the families of deceased soldiers, access to medically assisted reproduction (Birenbaum-Carmeli, 2016).

As the above brief history of Zionism, science and technology suggests, Israel’s biotech economy is central to present-day global markets and to Israel’s national economy, as well as pivotal to the ideological and material colonization of Palestine, which together have allowed the ‘Jewish race’ to rehabilitate themselves. Indeed, what we see emerge is
an Israeli national culture of scientific discovery and medical advancement, formed in response to European anti-Semitism, and rooted in a desire to create a modern, militarized, European-facing homeland for the Jewish people, predicated on the often unnoted dispossession of Palestine and the Palestinian people. Through scientific discovery, heavily funded by government institutions, the Israeli state has sought to realize the creation of a new European Jewish subject, one whose reproduction will be secured through state-funded pronatalist policies. This chapter now turns to examine how this rehabilitative scientism plays out in reproductive policy, focusing on IVF. While the explanations for Israeli pronatalism and access to ARTs, further expanded below, root such policies in Jewish cultural traditions of family values, post-Holocaust rehabilitation and biblical commandments, I closely examine how the Zionist state’s provision of IVF is rooted in racial and religious exclusionary reproductive practices. Building on the work of Portuguese (1998), Kanaaneh (2002), Hashash (2010) and Nahman (2006, 2008a, 2013), I focus on the close entanglements of Zionist settler colonialism and reproductive medicine as a way to further understand the emergence of Israel’s reproductive-industrial complex.

### 6.2 IVF and Colonial Knowledge Production

As outlined in this chapter’s introduction, in Israel all women, including single women and lesbians, are entitled to eight state-funded IVF treatment cycles until the age of forty-two, after which they are limited to three cycles. The state’s comprehensive IVF policy, covered by the state’s universal national medical insurance plan, leads to Israeli women undergoing more IVF cycles than women in any other country globally. Almost all of Israel’s expenditures on fertility treatments relate to IVF procedures and their associated costs, and in 2010 it was estimated that Israeli Health Funds spent 407 million Israeli shekels (US$109 million) in this area (Library of Congress, 2012). A 2002 survey found that there were 1,657 IVF procedures per million people per year performed in Israel, compared with 899 in Iceland, the country with the second-highest rate (Collins, 2002). As a result, it has been noted that Israel’s IVF rate far outstrips the rest of the world: within Israel, four per cent of children are today the product of IVF, compared with roughly one per cent in the United States (ibid.). As Sperling (2010: 363) has suggested, ‘a comparison with the principles of IVF provision in other countries (UK, Canada, USA) shows Israel’s policy to be substantially more “liberal”.’ For Sperling, ‘the country’s attitude and policy towards childbirth mainly stems from its strong religious tradition, shaped most notably by the biblical commandment and collective duty to “be fruitful and
multiply”’ (Sperling, 2010: 364). Situated within this religious narrative that posits childbearing as a religious moral duty, Israel’s pronatalist attitude, assisted with biomedical technology, is said to produce a culture of family life that emphasizes ‘the centrality of the family for individual and collective well-being’ (Birenbaum-Carmeli et al., 2000: 20).

Despite the historical importance of fertility and public health to the Zionist settler colonial project, Western knowledge production and academic discourse about Israel’s IVF policy rarely takes a critical approach to the policy, and almost wholly fails to connect IVF policy to the occupation of Palestinian land and discriminatory treatment of Palestinians. Scholars have documented the ways in which colonialism and scholarly knowledge production go hand in hand, whether it be through imperialist representations of Muslim and Arab societies (Said, 1979b), the ‘sanctioned ignorance’ that excludes indigenous frameworks of knowing (Kuokkanen, 2003), or the obsessive desire to ‘save Muslim women’ from their supposedly oppressive culture (Abu-Lughod, 2002). I now turn to examine how Israel’s IVF policy is positioned and justified in academic literature in order to create an understanding of Israeli pronatalism, its reasoning and its salience. Furthermore, I point to the ways in which colonial knowledge production functions to mask and disseminate racist biopolitics.

Academic discourses on IVF in Israel fixate on a commonly held assumption that Israel is extreme in its pronatalism, that is, extremely pro-life and encouraging of reproduction, seen in the works of Landau (2003), Shalev and Gooldin (2006), and Sperling (2010). From media analysis and sociological studies to medical and public health research, studies consistently focus on Israel’s life-giving tendencies, rarely recognizing the historical and structural assault on all aspects of Palestinian life under Israeli colonial occupation. Here, scholars such as Birenbaum-Carmeli (2004), Gooldin (2011), Safir (1991), and Sperling (2010) have noted that Israel’s pronatalist attitude is underpinned by major biblical texts, coupled with frameworks that see Israel as liberal and modern, in order to elaborate upon specific IVF cases. Using the case of posthumous sperm retrieval discussed in this chapter’s introduction as one such exemplar of Israel’s liberal pronatalist approach to reproduction, Sperling (2010: 365) states that ‘there are even precedents approving the retrieval of sperm from a dead body (including a request from parents of a soldier killed in a terrorist attack).’ For Sperling, allowing a family to remove sperm from
a soldier killed by ‘terrorists’, and giving them subsequent access to state IVF treatment, points to:

[Israel’s] very progressive and advanced approach on many issues, such as extensive recognition of single-parent families, liberal policy on adoption by and registration of children to gays and lesbians, significant protection of minorities by the Supreme Court, and effective management of corruption and unethical behaviour of public figures, including its president, prime ministers and the like. (Ibid.)

This articulation of Palestinians as ‘terrorists’, coupled with narratives of Israel as a liberal, tolerant nation struggling to survive in a hostile region, is further conjoined with the need to rehabilitate and replenish the Jewish population in the wake of the Holocaust. For Birenbaum-Carmeli (2004: 901), the religious significance attached to childbearing in Israel is ‘made more relevant by recently acquired meanings, namely the Holocaust trauma and the Zionist quest to enlarge the Jewish population’. As the US Law Library of Congress (2012) reports:

the genocide perpetrated on Jews in the Holocaust and the ongoing loss of life in terrorist attacks and in wars since the establishment of the State are considered by some experts as having strengthened Israel’s resolve to survive as a Jewish homeland in an area that is often viewed as hostile.

This need to survive in hostile geographies has led Anson and Meir (1996: 12) to claim that the roots of Israel’s pronatalism and high fertility must be sought ‘in Israel’s position in the world system and in the specific conditions under which Israelis live their lives’. For Landau (2003: 73), the specific conditions Anson and Meir refer to are the ‘ongoing struggle over the establishment of the State [of Israel] and its form, including the periodic wars and salient threats of random violence’.

Throughout these studies, the authors simply conclude, without any reference to structural racial inequalities or settler colonialism, that ‘as a result of its liberal policy Israel has become a leading country for IVF services’ (Simonstein, 2010: 204). The result of the
state of Israel’s pronatalist stance has led to a popular discussion of Israel as having fertility rates that stand out against other industrialized and developed nations, seen in the works of Hashiloni-Dolev (2006) and Shalev and Gooldin (2006). Indeed, as Birenbaum-Carmeli has noted (2004: 901), ‘in terms of women’s education and labor market participation, Israel resembles Western European countries. Yet, the total fertility rate of Israeli women is about 50 per cent higher.’ Similarly, Sperling (2010: 236) has noted that a ‘distinctive characteristic of the Israeli society concerns its approach to reproduction and parenthood. Israel has one of the highest birth and fertility rates in the world, especially within developed countries. These are encouraged by its religion, culture, politics, public policy, and law.’ Through the presentation of Israel’s high birth rate, which stands out from population decline in Europe, as a marker of the sovereign modernity of the state, Israel’s frame of progressive technological modernity is enacted and maintained.

Yet, despite Israel’s supposed universal pronatalist IVF policy, the cartographic dispersal of IVF clinics reveals an uneven racial geography, one that undoubtedly highlights the state of Israel’s vested interest in maximizing Jewish Israeli reproduction at the same time as limiting Palestinian access to such services. While Palestinian citizens in Israel should, in theory, be able to access state-sponsored IVF, the uneven distribution of Israel’s IVF clinics means that this is rarely the case. Of the twenty-five IVF units in Israel, none is located in hospitals in Palestinian majority areas (Zu’bi, 2017). For example, Nazareth, the largest Palestinian city within Israel’s 1948 borders, has no IVF clinics. This, in combination with the systematic lack of public transport services between Palestinian-populated and Israeli towns, alongside the everyday racism that Palestinians face in heavily populated Jewish Israeli areas, has curtailed the access of Palestinian citizens of Israel to assisted reproductive services (ibid.).

Interestingly, the public health and policy accounts of IVF outlined above differ sharply from feminist engagements with IVF and ARTs more broadly. Rather than focusing on the justificatory national discourses that underpin reproductive policies, in their discussions of IVF feminist scholars have focused on the microbiology of women’s bodies, situating the technology within a much wider and more drawn-out history of the reproduction of heteropatriarchy, exemplified in Crowe (1990), Corea (1987), Sawicki (1991), Spallone (1989), and Wajcman (1991). Wajcman, for example, argues that ‘the development of reproductive technologies is a form of patriarchal exploitation of
women’s bodies… this technology is intrinsically an instrument of domination’ (1991: 1972). For scholars such as Corea (1987), Crowe (1990) and Denny (1994), the development and dissemination of IVF represents a continuation of the medicalization and pathologization of women’s bodies and invasively articulates infertility as a social problem attributable to women. As Spallone and Steinberg (1987: 1) suggest, ‘the use of in vitro fertilization methods to create babies and enable human embryo research relies on the social and medical control of women’s bodies, undermining their integrity, social autonomy and the struggle for women’s liberation.’

These feminist accounts of IVF are important, insofar as they pertinently remind us of the ways in which the bodies of women are targeted and problematized as sites of reproductive intervention, sites through which reproductive futurities can be secured in ways that may well do more to consolidate and reproduce structures of patriarchal violence than to challenge them. Yet, in focusing solely on the microbiology of the female body, such accounts fail to get to grips with the structural, cartographic and geopolitical futurities that are secured through IVF’s use, and which in the case of IVF in Israel may leave us focusing solely on the violences done to the Israeli woman’s body at the expense of accounting for a settler colonial state. Importantly, this is not to say that Jewish Israeli cis-women are not targeted by their state as subjects who must compulsorily reproduce; indeed, this has been documented (Simonstein, 2010). Rather, it is to examine how Israeli women’s bodies are imbricated within regimes of biopower, subjected to control and intervention such that they are disciplined within patriarchal regimes of reproduction. These are regimes from which Israeli women ultimately also benefit, given that they function to secure the future of the settler state.

In her important work on reproduction, Murphy (2011, 2013) uses the term ‘distributed reproduction’ to refocus debates on reproduction away from sole focuses on the microbiology of women’s bodies, looking at more extensive and expansive infrastructures—the state, military, colonial structures, resource distribution, economic infrastructures—which are unevenly distributed across space and time, and which

56 In addition to the accounts of IVF outlined here, there exists a body of feminist scholarship on reproductive technologies and biopolitics that does link these technologies to race and imperialism, see for example Cooper and Waldby (2014), Roberts (1997), Twine (2015), and Weinbaum (2004).
accordingly assist, structure and foreclose one’s capacities to reproduce. In so doing, Murphy uses the term infrastructure to ‘name the spatially and temporally extensive ways that practices are sedimented into and structure the world. Thus, a capacious sense of infrastructures includes social sedimentations such as colonial legacies, the repetition of gendered norms in material culture, or the persistence of racialization’ (Murphy, 2013).

Murphy’s work is important for thinking through the cartographic dispersal of assisted reproduction in Palestine/Israel. Indeed, in a context in which the reproduction of life is constantly denied to Palestinian women—for example, the United Nations reports that between 2000 and 2005 sixty-seven Palestinian women were forced to give birth at Israeli military checkpoints, where thirty-six newborn babies died (Erturk, 2005)—an emphasis on the biopolitical distribution of reproductive capacity pushes us beyond a sole focus on the bodies of the Israeli women who undergo IVF treatment. Taking inspiration from Murphy, in the following section I explore in more detail how Israel’s IVF policy and its attendant laws have been produced through a racist Zionist biopolitics which aims to consolidate a Jewish majority in a Jewish state by containing and delimiting Palestinian fertility, thereby also producing a lucrative site of capital accumulation.

6.3 Eggs and/as Citizens
Since the birth of the world’s first IVF baby in 1978, it is estimated that 3.75 million babies have been born worldwide with the assistance of medical reproductive technologies (Carmel and Werner-Felmayer, 2012). As result, egg cells have become an object in high demand for both infertility treatment and stem cell research, commanding a higher monetary value than sperm cells, which are infinitely more accessible and plentiful (ibid.; Franklin, 2013). Given the high numbers of Israeli women seeking IVF treatment, alongside Israel’s flourishing biomedical reproductive industry, egg cells have become a lucrative object within Israel. Prior to 2010, Israel’s IVF regulations allowed egg cell donations only by women who were undergoing IVF as infertility treatment. This national demand for egg cells was coupled with a new, competing demand by scientists for egg cells for the purpose of cloned stem cell research. Prior to 2010, while stem cell research using embryos cloned from human egg cells was not outlawed, Israel’s IVF regulation stipulated that egg cells taken from a cis-woman’s body could only be used for the purposes of reproduction, leaving Israeli scientists with an egg cell shortage for biomedical research (Carmel and Werner-Felmayer, 2012; Schuz and Blecher-Prigat, 2012). Indeed, as Israeli scientist Itzkovitz-Eldor suggested to a Knesset committee in
2004, legislation was holding back stem cell research\textsuperscript{57} and national development. Itzkovitz-Eldor noted: ‘we should not conceal that biotechnological developments are a nation-state goal, and not only a personal goal for the researcher who will take the stash and go home’ (cited in Hashash, 2010: 287). This policy was rationalized in terms of the health risks associated with egg donation, leading the discrepancy between the increasing demand for egg cells and their scarce donation to be characterized as a ‘national egg shortage’ (Rabinerson et al., 2002). By 2007, the number of cis-women waiting for egg donations was estimated at 6,000 (Carmel and Werner-Felmayer, 2012: 5).

As a result of these stringent legal restrictions, Israeli fertility doctors set up branches of their clinics in countries with lax ART legislation, such as Romania, Ukraine, Cyprus and the Czech Republic, where Israeli women in need of eggs were encouraged to travel in order to undergo fertility treatment (Nahman, 2013; Shalev, 2010). Alongside the onset of this transnational egg economy, private clinics inside Israel began offering economic inducements to IVF patients to donate eggs, and offered to waive certain treatment costs if women agreed to ‘share’ their eggs with others (Carmel and Werner-Felmayer, 2012). However, two events that took place in the 2000s—the 2000 ‘egg affair’ and the 2009 ‘Sabyc clinic affair’—arguably led to further reluctance for Israeli women to donate their eggs, prompting the Israeli government to address the national egg shortage. In 2000, the Israeli police opened a criminal investigation into the renowned fertility doctor Ben-Rafael, who was accused of harvesting large quantities of egg cells from women without their informed consent. According to journalist reports, the doctor confessed that in one case he had removed 232 ova from one patient alone, inseminating 155 of them across thirty-three recipients. In another case, he had taken 256 ova from one woman, subsequently dispersing them across thirty-four women (ibid.). The scandal resulted in a crisis of public trust, and the practice of egg donation in the country ceased almost completely. Later, in July 2009, Romanian police raided the Sabyc fertility clinic in Bucharest, Hungary, which had been set up by Israeli fertility doctors for the use of Israeli women in need of egg donation (Shalev, 2010). The Romanian authorities arrested the responsible Israeli doctors, who were accused of human egg-trafficking and endangering the lives of dozens of low-income Romanian women for the purpose of harvesting and selling their eggs (Lundin, 2012; Nahman, 2008a). After these dramatic national and

\textsuperscript{57} Since the onset of stem cell research in the 1990s, Israeli scientists, start-up companies and research centres have been at the forefront (Bichler and Nitzan, 2002).
international scandals, Israel’s Ministry of Health, which had begun deliberating an egg donation law in 2001, enacted the Egg Donation Law in 2010.

According to the 2010 Egg Donation Law, all single Israeli women aged between twenty-one and thirty-five who are deemed healthy and are not currently undergoing fertility treatment themselves are now allowed to donate their egg cells for reproductive or research purposes, for which they will receive financial compensation of 10,000 Israeli shekels (approximately £2,200). Under the new legislation, Israeli women aged between eighteen and fifty-four who are experiencing fertility problems can request egg cell donation for subsequent IVF infusion, which will be covered by Israeli health insurance (Nahman, 2013). Egg donors are permitted to donate oocytes three times on an anonymous basis, spaced by a minimum of 180 days, which can be donated to a maximum of three different recipients. The donors are required by law to be unmarried and unrelated to the recipient, which is said to ‘avoid harming the household’s dynamics and the status of the child to be born, derived from religious law’ (Avraham and Seidman, 2011: 105) and further ‘to prevent the possibility of the act to be considered a form of adultery’ (Gruenbaum et al., 2011: 41). The law also clarifies that the offspring is the legal child of the recipient, and that the donor has no parental rights or responsibilities. Similarly to Israel’s IVF policy, the Egg Donation Law has been explained and legitimized by theological discourses of ‘be fruitful and multiply’, and by the Israeli government’s supposed desire to make the reproductive dreams of Israeli women come true.

Indeed, in 2007, when the Egg Donation Bill passed an early reading, the Minister of Health addressed the Knesset, stating:

in the State of Israel, the value of parenthood, the right to bring children into the world and realization of the personal aspiration within the family unit are extremely central, both from the cultural and halakhic point of view... The opening of many IVF units all over the country, the freezing of fertilized eggs for many years, bringing children into the world by means of surrogacy, posthumous sperm insemination and more—all these are the fruits of technological progress that found legal redress in legislation... The current bill is one more step in this direction, since it addresses the issue of egg donation, a subject that touches considerable suffering of many
couples and women and has been a significant barrier to realizing the right to parenthood. (Cited in Shalev, 2010: 6)

The Minister of Health’s address chimes with the broader pronatalist accounts of Israel’s reproductive policies that this chapter has thus far outlined. Situating the law within the state’s interest in realizing the reproductive desires of (Jewish) Israeli citizens, attributing it to cultural and theological discourses, and stressing the ‘technological progress’ that such a law enacts and allows, the rationalizing statement further secures the state of Israel as a leader in humane reproductive health policy.

Yet, against this celebration of liberal reproductive rights, the 2010 Egg Donation Law bans cross-religious egg donation, although this law does not have jurisdiction over the transnational import of eggs, which more often than not are not ‘Jewish’ (Nahman, 2013). This clause came out of lengthy religious deliberation, and is characterized as ‘an attempt to balance the need to expand the reservoir of potential egg donors while serving the concerns of religious leaders about genealogy and inheritance’ (Avraham and Seidman, 2011: 104). Many Israeli Jewish authorities express concern over the unclear religious status of children born via IVF, especially from non-Jewish egg donors (Gruenbaum et al., 2010). Orthodox Jewish law states that only the offspring of a Jewish mother is considered to be born a Jew. However, in regard to oocyte donation, there is a debate as to whether the oocyte donor or the woman who physically gave birth to the child should be regarded as the mother (Gruenbaum et al., 2010). As a result of this confusion, many rabbis suggest that any child born from an ovum collected from a non-Jewish mother should undergo a formal religious conversion once born. Indeed, as Gruenbaum et al. (ibid.: 104) have noted, ‘donor gametes are largely unacceptable to orthodox rabbis since egg donation confuses the definition of mother and raises questions about a child’s genealogy and potential risk of consanguinity.’ In an attempt to settle this dispute, Deputy Health Minister Yaakov Litzman only agreed to support the Egg Donation Law after receiving the consent of the rabbinical authorities, who insisted on this religious amendment, arguing that it is in line with Judaism’s matrilineal standards, by which the religion of a newborn baby is determined by the mother’s religion. Thus, under the 2010 Egg Donation Law, while the identity of the donor is kept anonymous, the religion of the donor is made known to the future parents in order that a correct religious match can be made.
As this multilayered sketch of the Israeli regulation of egg cells and their use within IVF demonstrates, the regulation of reproduction takes place across and through a number of scales, norms and sites: cellular, international, national, religious, racial, gendered. After the public discovery that Israeli doctors were unethically exploiting the bodies and cells of Israeli women nationally and low-income women internationally, the government was pushed to enact legislation that sought to nationally regulate egg cells. Brought into being in such a way that normative monogamous family structures and Jewish lineage remain intact, the Egg Donation Law inscribes egg cells with a race and religion, insofar as Judaism is understood as both.

In many ways, this concern over the risk of consanguinity—a concern over the tainting of Jewish blood—specifically targets Muslim and Christian Palestinian populations, insofar as the law is unable to attend to the lucrative transnational economy of egg donation in which Israel participates. As such, the Egg Donation Law functions to limit Palestinian citizens of Israel’s capacity to donate or receive eggs, given that they struggle to access IVF clinics, at the same time as it offers Jewish Israelis and medical researchers greater scope to access ‘Jewish eggs’. Writing about the relationship between modern forms of racism and sexuality, Foucault (1978) argued that a focus on bloodlines or consanguinity is what binds these two domains together. Arguing that modernity required a shift from a thematic of bloodlines to one of sexuality, Foucault suggested that it was in their overlap—the space in which a concern for the purity of bloodlines was replaced or complemented by a desire to manage biological processes of sexual reproduction—that a facet of modern biopolitical racism was manifested. As Foucault (ibid.: 149) writes:

beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century, the thematic of blood was sometimes called on to lend its entire historical weight toward revitalizing the type of political power that was exercised through the devices of sexuality. Racism took shape at this point (racism in its modern, ‘biologizing’, statist form): it was then that a whole politics of settlement, family, marriage, education, social hierarchization, and property, accompanied by a long series of permanent interventions at the level of the body, conduct, and everyday life, received their colour and their justification from the mythical concern with protecting the purity of the blood and ensuring the triumph of the race.
Contrary to the pronatalist literature that argues that Israel’s IVF policy, and its attendant Egg Donation Law, have at their heart a pronatalist desire that aims at “‘liberalizing’ Israeli egg donation’ (Nahman, 2013: 13), if we think through Foucault’s analytic of sexuality and race, alongside Murphy’s notion of stratified reproduction, we can come to a different understanding. Through a concern with ‘protecting the purity’ of the Jewish race, Israel’s 2010 Egg Donation Law reinstates the centrality to Israel of Jewishness as a biological racialized category by inscribing egg cells with race so that they become an exclusive commodity, reserved for reproducing Jewish Israeli citizens only (Abu el Haj, 2007, 2012). The Egg Donation Law, together with the uneven geography of IVF clinics, functions, as Murphy (2013) argues, to sediment ‘colonial legacies, the repetition of gendered norms in material culture, [and] the persistence of racialization’.

In so doing, the 2010 Egg Donation Law produces a complex regime of citizenship: in egg donation, you must come from the egg of an unmarried Jewish citizen and be donated to a Jewish Israeli citizen in order to be counted as a Jewish Israeli by birth. In the case of eggs taken from non-Jewish women who reside outside of Israel’s national borders, any child born from such a foreign egg will have to undergo religious conversion in order to be counted as Jewish and thus access Israeli citizenship. Furthermore, you can only access state-sponsored IVF if you are an Israeli citizen, either through Jewish birthright, residence (as is the case for some Palestinian citizens of Israel) or migration; in the latter case, such access would be conditional on a pledge of allegiance to Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.58 Thus, throughout the complex site of egg cell regulation and IVF insemination, Israel as a racially defined Jewish state is affirmed. Against the uncritical claims that Israel’s pronatalism should be situated within frames of reproductive rights, technological and liberal progress, and religious teachings, an analysis of the racial-religious regulation and dispersal of ARTs points to their functioning as an exclusive sexual technology aiming to reproduce Jewish life and entrench the framing of the state of Israel as the democratic homeland of global Jewry.

58 In 2010, the same year that Israel’s Egg Donation Law was passed, the Israeli cabinet also approved a Loyalty Oath Bill requiring all new citizens to swear an oath of allegiance to Israel as a ‘Jewish and democratic state’. The loyalty oath has been shown to mainly affect Palestinians from the occupied territories who move into ‘Israel proper’ after marrying Palestinian citizens of Israel.
6.4 The Depo-Provera Affair

Until now, this chapter has been concerned with how, through narratives of Zionist pronatalism, the state of Israel offers exclusionary access to IVF and egg donation such that the Zionist aim of consolidating a rehabilitated Jewish majority is furthered at the expense of the reproduction of Palestinian life. Furthermore, it has argued that the Egg Donation Law functions so that the chances of Palestinians and Israelis mixing, even at a cellular level, is curtailed, thus operating in the service of the colonial biopolitics of separation outlined in Chapter Three. In this section I change the focus of my analysis. Turning to examine how reproductive capacity is distributed within and across the Jewish populations that comprise the state of Israel, I further complicate the justificatory discourses of pronatalism outlined above, examining the state of Israel’s sterilization of Ethiopian Jewish women. Contrary to suggestions that Israel seeks to secure the reproduction of the whole Jewish populace in the wake of the Holocaust, the examination that follows reveals how race cuts and folds across the category ‘Jew’ in ways that deny reproductive futurity to Black Israeli citizens. Such an analysis furthers my line of argumentation that the formative contours of the Zionist state of Israel are intimately shaped by and connected to global structures of racialization.

In 2008, an article published by the Israeli national newspaper *Yedioth Ahronoth (Latest News)* offered an investigative report into the significant decrease in birth rate among Ethiopian immigrants to Israel. It reported that, for example, in the Pardes Katz neighbourhood of the Israeli city of Bnei Brak—one of the poorest and most densely populated cities in Israel—among the fifty-seven Israeli families of Ethiopian origin residing in the neighbourhood, only one baby had been born over a three-year period (Association for Civil Rights in Israel, 2013). *Yedioth Ahronoth’s* article included the testimonies of numerous Ethiopian Jewish migrants to Israel, all of whom testified that since arriving in Israel they had been visiting national family health clinics, where they were administered with Depo-Provera contraceptive injections every three months (ibid.). Some women further claimed that they had begun receiving these injections prior to their arrival in Israel, during their stays in ‘transit camps’ in Ethiopia. The article also

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59 Ethiopian transit camps are holding facilities where Ethiopian Jews spend time, often years, ahead of their journey to Israel. The camps are funded by the Jewish Agency, the Israeli Ministry of Immigrant Absorption, and at times the American Jewish Joint
included the testimony of one medical doctor of Ethiopian origin who had spent years working in the immigrant absorption centres that Ethiopian Jews visit once they arrive in Israel. The doctor explained that Ethiopian immigrant women had not been given information regarding any other method of contraception, and that the numerous side effects of Depo-Provera were not explained to them (ibid.).

The reporting that Depo-Provera had continuously been given to Ethiopian Jews before and on their arrival in the state of Israel without full explanation is alarming. Medroxyprogesterone acetate, sold under the brand name Depo-Provera, is a hormonal medication that is used, among other things, as a method of birth control commonly administered via injections every three months. Containing progesterone, the injection works by preventing ovulation, turning cervical mucus into a state that is hostile to sperm, and affecting the endometrium so that it cannot hold fertilized eggs. The contraceptive is today declared safe by organizations such as Planned Parenthood and the World Health Organization, however as Hannabach has noted, ‘Depo-Provera had been denied approval by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for several decades prior to the 1990s due to hazardous side effects including breast and endometrial cancer, prolonged menstrual bleeding, severe depression, debilitating abdominal pain and headaches, and long-term sterility’ (2013: 33).

While declared safe today, Depo-Provera has historically raised questions about racism, settler colonization, medical experimentation and social justice. In his monograph, *Contraceptive Risk: The FDA, Depo-Provera and the Politics of Experimental Medicine*, Green notes:

after the FDA approved The Upjohn Company’s application to test Depo-Provera as a female contraceptive in 1963, the drug was administered to 11,400 women at the Grady Memorial Hospital’s Distribution Committee. In these camps, Ethiopians undergo medical examinations and Hebrew classes, among other activities which are supposedly geared towards helping Ethiopian Jews better integrate into Israeli society. See Massad (1996), Bernstein (1981) and Meir-Glitztein (2011) for further analyses of the use of transit camps by the state of Israel.
Family Planning Clinic in Atlanta, the drug’s major domestic clinical trial. The drug was also administered to convicted male sex offenders at the Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore, but without the FDA’s experimental authorization. Neither at Grady nor at Johns Hopkins did the men and women involved in these studies give their informed consent. (Green, 2017: 1)

Of the women who participated in the Grady Memorial trial, at least fifty per cent were African American, and almost all were low-income (ibid.; Roberts, 1997). Following the trial, the Black Women’s Health Project located some of the women who had taken part in the trial, finding that ‘some of them suffered severe illnesses including cancer, clinical depression, and suicidal tendencies’ (Isha L’Isha, 2009: 3). In 1992, the FDA approved the drug for use on US women, a decision that was met with mass protest by feminist-of-colour reproductive justice organisations including the National Latina Health Organization, the National Black Women’s Health Project, the Native American Women’s Health Educational Resource Centre, the National Women’s Health Network, and the National Asian Women’s Health Organization (Smith 2005: 91; Ordover 2003: 181). Indeed, as Hannabach notes in her examination of the forced use of Depo-Provera on Haitian refugees attempting the enter the US, Depo-Provera was ‘foregrounded in debates in the 1990s over new policies and technologies targeting the sexual and reproductive practices of women of color, setting the stage for policies still in effect today’ (2013: 34). Importantly connecting this racist trial to its counterparts across the world, Roberts (1997: 145) has noted that ‘the South African government under apartheid pressured Black women to use Depo Provera by distributing free injections at factories and farms, sometimes threatening women with the loss of their jobs if they did not consent.’ Scully (2015: 233) has similarly tracked the use of Depo-Provera among Black women in Zimbabwe, where, she argues, it was used as ‘a weapon of the White regime to control the majority Black population by effectively eliminating future generations’. Similarly, Holloway (2011: 53) has noted that non-consensual Depo-Provera trials funded by the US were ‘conducted on women who lived in third world countries like Nigeria, India, Costa Rica, and Kenya’. Thus, while Depo-Provera is often solely understood as one among many methods of contraception available to cis-gendered women, its existence as such has come into being through racialized medical experimentation, often on the bodies of Black women, and as a mode of population governance in settler colonies, intervening in and controlling the intimate lives of populations racialized as
nationally or internationally undesirable. Indeed, as Holloway (ibid.) notes, in all of these cases ‘the ordinary privacy expected to accompany sexual intimacy becomes a matter of government notice, regulation and control, which are attached to particular bodies. This loss of privacy seems unique to women and specifically attached to their reproductive potential.’

I foreground this longer history of Depo-Provera as a drug used to curtail the reproduction of Black and/or third-world life in order to offer an expanded frame within which to situate and understand the case of Israel’s treatment of Black Ethiopian women. Here I want to suggest that Israel’s treatment of its Black Jewish citizens, while situated and specific in many ways, should also be connected to global histories and presents of anti-Black racism. This suggestion should not be surprising given that, as the literature reviewed in Chapter Two argued, the state of Israel drew and draws upon imperial European frameworks of racism in order to secure its modern status. That being said, in the context of Zionist understandings of nationhood and prevalent constructions of Jewishness, there are some particularities of Ethiopian Jews’ relationship to Israel that are important to note. While Ethiopian Jews trace their history back thousands of years, believing themselves to be part of the lost tribe of Dan or descendants of Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, their recognition as Jews has been consistently brought into question by European empires and the state of Israel (Ojanuga, 1993: 147). After their ‘discovery’ by European Christian missionaries in the 1800s, the questionable nature of their Jewishness was attributed to their ‘lack of familiarity with rabbinical law (Halakha) and distinct religious practices, which diverge from mainstream Orthodox Judaism’ (Offer, 2007: 464), a practice of non-recognition which has arguably pivoted around constructions of European Judaism as the norm. Ethiopian Jews—Beta Israelis or Falashas, as they are more commonly known—were only officially recognized as Jews by the Israeli government in April 1975, after which they were allowed to appeal to the Law of Return and gain Israeli citizenship (Kessler, 1996: 162). As a result, ‘emigration from Ethiopia is a relatively new event in Israel’s history’ (Offer, 2007: 464), with most of Israel’s estimated 125,500 Black Jews arriving in the 1980s and 1990s after being airlifted out of Ethiopia and Sudan. Since their arrival they have been met with an array of racist policies—from being held in Ethiopian-Israeli absorption centres which, as Hertzog (1999: 94) argues, figure them as ‘persons with special needs’, to housing discrimination, police brutality and high unemployment (Ben Eliezer, 2008). For example, in 1996 a newspaper reported that the national blood bank had been discarding
blood donated by Ethiopian Jews because it was concerned that it would likely be contaminated with HIV (ibid.). Following the report, thousands of Ethiopian Israelis protested in Jerusalem, resulting in the Israeli police using tear gas, rubber bullets and water cannons against them. As Offer (2007: 462) notes, ‘the Ethiopian community in Israel is one of the poorest and most segregated segments of the Israeli population.’

Following Yedioth Ahronoth’s 2008 investigative article, the Haifa-based feminist organization Isha L’Isha compiled an extensive report concerning the state of Israel’s use of Depo-Provera among the Ethiopian community in Israel. The report found that, despite Ethiopians making up only 1.75% of the Israeli population, fifty-seven per cent of Depo-Provera users in Israel were Ethiopian women, with other high-use groups of Depo-Provera including women held in various forms of custody, in particular mental institutions. Through individual and group interviews and questionnaires with Ethiopian women who had received Depo-Provera injections, and interviews with gynaecologists and community workers, the report reveals the specific targeting of Ethiopian women for Depo-Provera use. The interviews attest that Ethiopian women were targeted: one clinic manager admitted that his ‘staff had received instructions to administer Depo Provera injections to these women, but refused to reveal from whom they had received these instructions’ (Isha L’Isha, 2009: 11). Furthermore, the women receiving Depo-Provera had not been provided with any information regarding alternative birth control methods or the side effects of the injection. One woman interviewed noted that she did not ‘get any information about the drug, including about its side effects in any language’ (ibid.: 60).

To date, Israel’s blood bank service prohibits the use of blood donations from all natives of the Caribbean, South-East Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, except South Africa.

Interestingly, many academic studies that examine Israel’s Ethiopian Jewish populace and their civil rights do so by way of comparison with the Palestinian minority population in Israel. This mode of coupling, however unwittingly, positions Ethiopian Jews as not belonging, or as a hostile population within Israel. See for example Mizrachi and Herzog (2012), Jaffe (1995) and Eisikovits (1997).

The compilation of this statistic is worthy of note. The statistics from which it was drawn state that fifty-seven per cent of women who received Depo-Provera were of ‘African origin’. This has been assumed to be Ethiopian because African asylum seekers are unable to use health services, since the National Health Insurance Law does not cover them.
Another interviewee attested that she ‘had no information about other methods. Now I know about the pill’ (ibid.: 10).

Supporting the earlier news story that the dissemination of Depo-Provera began in transit camps, one Ethiopian woman noted that she was first told about the injection by ‘the Jewish Agency in Ethiopia… they came to my house and recommended it to me’ (ibid.: 11). Another revealed that she was ‘told here in the immigration absorption centre that there is not enough money for raising children’ (ibid.). In order to investigate whether Israeli women of non-Ethiopian origin were recommended the injection, Isha L’Isha asked five such women to visit their gynaecologists and ask about Depo-Provera: ‘the answers all 5 women got were unanimous: Depo Provera is not recommended except in highly unusual cases’ (ibid.: 13).

While compiling the report, and in response to the emergence of these statistics and testimonies, Isha L’Isha submitted two queries to the Israeli Ministry of Health. The first asked about the ministry’s general policy towards Depo-Provera, to which it responded that ‘Depo-Provera is not a recommended contraceptive, but rather a means of birth-control to be used only when alternative means are not suitable (for example, when other contraceptives fail or when there is no possibility or will to place an intrauterine device)’ (Association for Civil Rights in Israel, 2013: 2). A parliamentary query was also submitted to the then Israeli minister of health, Yaacov Ben-Yezri. Ben-Yezri claimed that there was no special policy regarding women of Ethiopian origin. He suggested that the reason that Israeli women of Ethiopian origin were widespread users of Depo-Provera was because ‘the usage of Depo Provera is very popular in Ethiopia, [and] women prefer to continue using it or start using it in Israel’ (cited in Isha L’Isha, 2009: 6). The reason for Depo-Provera’s popularity, Ben-Yezri noted, was because ‘it is generally known that there is a cultural preference among the Ethiopian community for drugs taken by injection over those taken orally’ (ibid.). Yet, despite Ben-Yezri’s suggestion that the widespread use of Depo-Provera among Ethiopian Jewish women is a choice rooted in cultural traditions, the World Health Organization has painted a very different picture. In their earlier reports on global birth control patterns, the WHO found that the favoured birth control method in Ethiopia was variants of birth control pills taken orally, with over seventy per cent of Ethiopian women favouring this method (cited in Isha L’Isha, 2009).
Isha L’Isha’s report concerning the use of Depo-Provera among the Ethiopian community was published in 2009, after which they submitted a final parliamentary query to the then deputy health minister, Yaakov Litzman. Litzman was asked if there was, or ever had been, a directed birth control policy for Ethiopian Israelis; he responded that there was not, nor had there ever been, a policy which aimed to decrease the Ethiopian-Israeli birth rate (Association for Civil Rights in Israel, 2013). Despite the Israeli government’s continued stance that Depo-Provera was not being used as a means of sterilizing Ethiopian Israelis, Isha L’Isha concluded that Israel was attempting to control and manage the fertility of Ethiopian Jews, naming the practice ‘racist’ and concluding that:

the paternalistic attitude towards women of Ethiopian origin and the state’s concern over high rates of birth among poor and black populations drove official Israeli bodies, such as The Jewish Agency and the medical establishment, to act, allegedly for the benefit of women’s health, but in fact according to the concepts and wishes of the establishment regarding the desirable way to conduct family life.

(Isha L’Isha, 2009: 14)

Despite the publication of this hard-hitting research report, public discourse surrounding the Depo-Provera scandal quickly subsided, largely leaving the public eye. Then, on 8 December 2012, four years after the phenomenon had originally been highlighted by Yedioth Ahronoth, Israeli Educational Television, a state-owned TV channel, aired an episode of journalist Gal Gabbi’s documentary series Vacuum. The episode’s focus was on the forced sterilization of Ethiopian Jews, which the episode demonstrated was still taking place. Similarly to the newspaper article and research report, participants in the documentary reported that they had been given Depo-Provera injections in transit camps in Ethiopia, prior to their arrival in Israel. On camera, with their faces blurred and names changed or removed, the Ethiopian women testified that they had not been told that Depo-Provera was a birth control injection, but had rather been told that they were being administered with an immunization shot. As one woman in the programme noted, ‘they said, “come, there are vaccinations, gather everyone”… We said we wouldn’t receive it. They said, “you won’t move to Israel”’ (Sales, 2013). Another woman interviewed similarly asserted that she was told that she would be denied a plane ticket to Israel if she did not receive what she thought was a vaccination: ‘I didn’t want to take it. They wanted
me to take it. But I didn’t know it was a contraceptive… I thought it was an immunization’ (ibid.).

Reporting that, in the previous decade alone, births among Ethiopian women in Israel had fallen by nearly fifty per cent, the episode also recounted how, on the women’s arrival in immigrant absorption centres in Israel, doctors’ appointments were swiftly scheduled for the women to carry on being injected with Depo-Provera. Others, who had not been injected in Ethiopia, were encouraged to take up the method of birth control in a series of family-planning workshops. The episode also included an on-screen interview with Rachel Adato, an Israeli gynaecologist, who clearly explained that Depo-Provera was widely thought of as the contraceptive method of last resort.

Following its broadcast, this episode of Vacuum received widespread national attention, with articles appearing in almost every Israeli newspaper dubbing the revelations the ‘Depo-Provera Affair’. A few weeks later, six civil society organizations in Israel—the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, Isha L’Isha (the Haifa Feminist Centre), Tebeka (Advocacy for Equality and Justice for Ethiopian Israelis), the Israel Association for Ethiopian Jews, Physicians for Human Rights Israel, and Tmura (Legal Centre for the Prevention of Discrimination)—wrote a letter to the director general of the Ministry of Health, putting a series of demands on the government in an attempt to stop the practice (Association for Civil Rights in Israel, 2013). In response, in January 2013, the director general of the Ministry of Health issued an order to Israel’s health bodies to stop administering and renewing Depo-Provera injections without informed consent, but the instruction was issued ‘without taking a stand or determining facts about allegations that had been made’ (Nesher, 2013).

The Depo-Provera Affair reveals the fallacies regarding Israel’s universal Jewish pronatalism, and points to the racist regulations internal to the production of Jewishness within the state of Israel. While the earlier literature that seeks to explain Israeli pronatalism framed it as a ‘quest for Jewish survival’ rooted in the biblical commandment to ‘be fruitful and multiply’, which has led to an array of policies and initiatives that seek to liberalize and maximize reproduction, a centring of the experiences of these Black Ethiopian-Israeli women asks for a different conclusion. Contrary to accounts that Israel is a site of reproductive justice where single Jewish women, and lesbian and hetero couples, are afforded a bountiful array of options, access and control over their
reproductive lives, here we see how dehumanizing attempts are made to coercively control and curtail Black women’s reproductive and intimate lives.

As I noted earlier, the status of Ethiopian Jews as Jewish within Eurocentric conceptualizations of Jewishness has long been questioned. Here, even after the state of Israel’s formal recognition of them as in fact Jewish—and thus as allowed entry into and citizenship of the state of Israel as the homeland of global Jewry—their ability to reproduce life within the state of Israel has been subjected to insidious coercive delimitation. As the women themselves note, their passage into Israel became contingent on their accepting birth control injections, understood by many women as ‘vaccinations’. Positing these women as unable to be trusted with their own fertility, the institutional denial of reproduction to Ethiopian Israelis, and the state’s subsequent denial of that denial, point to another coordinate of the racialized biopolitical economy of reproduction within the Israeli settler colony. In the interests of Zionist whiteness, a new Jewish Israeli demography is coerced into being, one that not only seeks to exceed the Palestinian populace and regulate their reproduction, but also aims to control Jewish reproduction in such a way that the Israeli populace are not produced as Black. Here Blackness thus marks the limits of what can be encompassed in the Israeli category ‘Jewish’, denaturalizing the category itself.

In her examination of the denial of reproductive freedom to African-American women, Roberts (1997: 4) noted ‘government sponsored programs as late as the 1970s that coerced Black women by the thousands into being sterilized. Meanwhile, a fertility business devoted to helping white middle-class couples to have children is booming.’ While Roberts was writing in the specific context of the US, her analysis has salience beyond the US’s national boundaries. Indeed, while non-Black citizens of the state of Israel, regardless of sexuality, are allowed to reproduce even after their deaths, to import egg cells from abroad, and to have access to an array of heavily state-funded reproductive technologies, Ethiopian Jewish women, once framed as not even Jewish enough for citizenship, have been targeted for generational elimination. The feminist focus on reproductive technologies as a source of patriarchal oppression, which I discussed earlier, almost wholly overlooks the role that racism plays in shaping reproductive technology and freedom, and who has access to it. Here, the control of reproduction through the targeting of specific ethnic-racial populations reveals a racist social infrastructure of reproduction, exceeding the sole coordinate of patriarchy. Furthermore, the Depo-Provera
Affair points to the ways in which the distribution of sexuality, as a biopolitical site through which populations are mapped, exceeds the commonly drawn boundaries of ‘Israeli’ and ‘Palestinian’, as well as the production of women’s or LGBTQ reproductive rights as contained struggles for reproductive freedom. Here Black Jewish women are marked as outside the limits of the hetero- and homonormativity of the state of Israel, paradoxically queering the sphere of LGBTQ and women’s reproductive rights.

6.5 Conclusion

Puar (2017: 113) has recently argued that ‘the excelling of ART in Israel has a biopolitics of population racism intrinsic to its logic.’ As I have argued in this chapter, masked and justified behind official state narratives of pronatalism, the state of Israel has a vested interest in regulating the reproduction of Jewishness such that it is white, modern and uncontaminated with Arabness. Working in the service of rehabilitating the Jewish race in a liberal European form, science and technology, and the development and dispersal of ARTs, play a central role in regulating both reproduction and Jewish rehabilitation, whilst also proliferating Israel’s global technological economy and its attendant frames of modernity. Here the bodies of white (or understood as such) Israeli women are instrumentalized, not only to reproduce the rehabilitated Jewish race, but also to provide the cellular materials needed to generate research and economic value.

Yet, rather than portraying a universal pronatalist and reproductive discourse pertaining to all Jews, here I have sought to uncover the undersides of Israeli pronatalism. From the standpoint of the Ethiopian Jewish woman sterilized without her consent, and Palestinian residents of Israel unable to access IVF clinics or egg donation, I have attempted to unpick the ways in which reproductive politics are always racial politics. Building on the literature outlined in Chapter Two and Chapter Three, my analysis in this chapter reveals the ways in which Israel’s sexual infrastructure of occupation affects the reproductive lives of all subjects in Palestine/Israel. Furthermore, rather than understanding these as unfortunate instances within a liberal state, I have sought to point to the ways in which this delimitating of reproductive life is produced by Zionism’s very framing, which intimately consigns groups racialized as undesirable or incompatible with Zionism’s national imaginary to segregation, racism, discrimination and, at worst, a non-future within the state of Israel. In so doing, this chapter has also sought to highlight the intimacies and interconnectedness of differing projects of racialization, racism and Israeli nation-building, and to point to the deeply entwined relationship between anti-Blackness
and Zionist settler colonialism.

Indeed, as I redraft the conclusion to this chapter, over 40,000 asylum seekers and migrants from the African continent, predominantly Sudan and Eritrea, are facing a choice between deportation to a third country within a ninety-day time period or permanent incarceration within the state of Israel (Lior, 2018). This practice is legalized through an amendment made to the 1954 Prevention of Infiltration Law, a law originally passed to prevent Palestinian refugees from returning to their homelands, coding them as ‘infiltrators’ and allowing the state of Israel to legally expel fedayeen (Palestinian nationalist militants/liberators). Having been officially extended to grant Israeli authorities the power to detain undocumented migrants and asylum seekers for up to three years and to sanction their forced deportation, the law aims to stop non-Jewish infiltration into Israel, which is seen as a threat to Israel’s character as a Jewish state and homeland (Kritzman-Amir, 2009; Yaron, Hashimshony-Yaffe and Campbell, 2013). As a judicial site of border regulation, citizenship definition and nation-building, the law functions to demarcate and enforce the racial-religious boundaries of the Zionist state of Israel, enacting biopolitical population caesuras that define which humans are worthy of a future, both within the lands that Israel has colonized and occupied, and externally to them, given that in many cases the deportation of African asylum seekers will likely lead to their death or enslavement. The structural basis of state violence inflicted upon Black African asylum seekers, Ethiopian Jews and Palestinians is thus part of an intimate, overlapping matrix of settler colonial racial oppression, one that works to dispossess, quarantine, survey and colonize Palestinians, and to curtail the existence and reproduction of all those deemed racially incompatible with the state of Israel and its desired body politic.
Chapter 7 Freedom Dreams: An Interlude of Reproductive Resistance

The most serious threat that Israel faces is the wombs of Arab women in Israel. (Soffer, cited in Kanaaneh, 2002: 74)

Sometimes we/I envy the birds. We/I envy the animals that they can fly without a border, without somebody who will stop them somewhere, without somebody interfering in your life and even in one’s dreams. (Juma in Juma and Desai, 2017: 128)

Oppression can also have the opposite effect; it can empower and turn women into creators of survival strategies and of methods of resistance; as such women become more than passive recipients of oppression. All of my hope is vested in this belief. (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2009: 70)

On 31 July 2013, Lydia al-Rimawi gave birth to a healthy baby boy named Majd Abdul Kareem al-Rimawi at the Razan Medical Centre in Nablus, a Palestinian city in the north of the West Bank (Alsaafin, 2014; Zabaneh, 2014). Majd’s conception was intriguing, yet increasingly not unusual. The Israeli Occupation Forces had arrested his father, Abdel Kareem, in June 2001 for allegedly shooting at Israeli soldiers. Abdel Kareem was sentenced to twenty-five years’ imprisonment, a sentence that he has since been serving in an Israeli prison (Alsaafin, 2014; Dawber, 2013). At the time of his imprisonment, Abdel Kareem’s daughter, Rand, was nine months old.

As I have argued in this thesis, Israel’s occupation of Palestine is in part secured through a deployment of colonial narratives of deviant and deceptive Oriental sexuality, and through the strict regulation of miscegenation, in which the Israeli prison-industrial complex serves a crucial function. As of November 2018, 6,036 Palestinians are being held in Israeli prisons as either political prisoners or administrative detainees,\(^{63}\) an

\(^{63}\) The Palestinian prisoner support group Addameer (2017) defines administrative detention as:
incarceration practice that is illegal under international law and constitutes a war crime under the fourth Geneva Convention (Addameer, 2017). A 2012 study by the Palestinian prime minister’s office suggested that about 800,000 Palestinian men—nearly twenty percent of the population of the West Bank and Gaza—have spent a week or more in an Israeli jail since 1967 (Taha and Eglash, 2014). Prisoners are predominantly male—as of November 2018, fifty-one prisoners are women—and all prisoners have limited visitation rights. Visits from Palestinian prisoners’ immediate families are restricted to forty-five minutes, no physical contact is permitted between husbands and wives, and conjugal visits are banned. Male relatives aged between sixteen and thirty-five are typically prevented from visiting family members in prison for ‘security reasons’, and only receive entry permits once a year if they are the brother of a detainee, or biannually if they are the son of a detainee. Prisoners are separated from their visiting families by a glass panel, and are only able to communicate with them by using a telephone which connects the two sides of the glass screen (Alsaafin, 2014). Only children up to the age of eight are allowed physical contact with their imprisoned parents, and this contact is only allowed for a maximum of ten minutes (ibid.). As a carceral colonial practice of anti-reproductive governance, Palestinians are disappeared behind the walls of Israeli prisons, and their reproductive futurities halted.

Both in the context of the ongoing colonial occupation, and as tied to religious and cultural tradition, family and childbirth are important in Palestine (Kanaaneh, 2002). The Palestinian men being held in Israeli jails leave behind wives like Lydia al-Rimawi (Dawber, 2013). Fearing that she would not be biologically able to expand her family following her husband’s release, and after hearing that other wives of Palestinian prisoners had conceived via IVF using their husband’s sperm smuggled out of Israeli prisons, Lydia decided to give the procedure a go. As she said, ‘I thought of giving Rand a brother or sister, and to have someone to carry on his name. I also thought of it as a challenge to the occupation’ (Alsaafin, 2014).

[Note: This section contains a procedure that allows Israeli occupation forces to hold prisoners indefinitely on secret information without charging them or allowing them to stand trial. The secret information or evidence cannot be accessed by the detainee nor his lawyer, and according to Israeli military orders, an administrative detention order can be renewed for an unlimited time.]
There are currently fourteen IVF clinics in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the Razan Fertility Clinic, a fertility centre in the West Bank city of Nablus, offers free treatment to the wives of Palestinian prisoners who have managed to smuggle sperm out of Israeli prisons (ibid.). It is not known how the sperm is smuggled out of the Israeli prisons; revealing the methods would endanger the practice (Alsaafin, 2014; Dawber, 2013; Taha and Eglash, 2014). Dr Salim Abu Khaizaran, director of the Razan Fertility Clinic, said that as of July 2014, twenty-one Palestinian women had conceived using sperm smuggled from Israeli prisons (cited in Sherwood, 2013). Speaking of the free treatment given to prisoners’ wives, Mohammed Qabalan, the media director of the Razan Fertility Clinic, said: ‘we do it for free, because we see this as a social responsibility, an obligation’ (cited in Alsaafin, 2014).

The pronatalist literature examined in the previous chapter suggests that Palestinians, and Muslims in particular, are not widespread users of Israel’s liberal IVF policy, not because of the restrictions and discriminations brought about by Israeli colonial rule, but rather due to the conservatism of Islam and Arab society more broadly, as argued by Anson and Meir (1996) and Landau (2003). Yet, as Lydia’s IVF tale hints, this narrative is far from straightforward or accurate. Indeed, the notion that Arab populations are more socially conservative than their liberal, progressive Israeli counterparts, a trope highlighted throughout this thesis, is explicitly challenged by Lydia’s story. In 2013, the Palestinian Supreme Fatwa Council ruled in favour of IVF procedures using sperm smuggled from prisons (Alsaafin, 2014), and as Mohammed Qabalan explains, Islamic approval was granted before the procedures began taking place: ‘we needed a fatwa [Islamic religious legal ruling] that would legitimize the procedure. We received that from Sheikh Ikrama Sabri, a senior mufti, on the condition that there was previous sexual intercourse between the married couple before the husband was arrested’ (cited in Alsaafin, 2014).

These Islamic rulings have been met with widespread, yet at times ambivalent, Palestinian social approval. Samahar Masalmeh, who gave birth to Karim in 2014 following IVF insemination using sperm smuggled out of the Israeli prison where her husband is currently serving a fourteen-year sentence, said:

the idea of in vitro fertilization is not widely accepted… At the beginning my family didn’t support me, they were worried of what
people would say if they saw me pregnant while my husband is in jail. But then one family did it because they couldn’t have babies, and things became easier. Now even those who criticized us support us.

(Cited in Gostoli, 2014)

Similarly, Lydia al-Rimawi, who was at first sceptical about undergoing IVF, said that her decision to undergo the procedure came because ‘every time I’d go to a wedding or a funeral or to Ramallah, people would come up to me and ask me why I don’t give it a go... They are the ones who put the idea in my head and convinced me to go through with it!’ (cited in Alsaafin, 2014).

The Israeli literature on IVF does very little to address the fugitive Palestinian sperm smuggled out of Israel’s colonial jails, making its way across the infrastructure of military occupation in the hope of bringing life to families separated by colonial carceral segregation. Neither operating outside of human and social reproduction nor escaping the structures of heteropatriarchy, the practice of Palestinian sperm-smuggling operates within the Israeli colonial infrastructure of occupation as a practice that proliferates resistance to the normalizing tendencies of modern forms of settler colonial governmentality and biopower. While many of Foucault’s contemporary commentators offer a negative and totalizing reading of biopower, here I want to argue that the practice of Palestinian sperm-smuggling out of Israel’s colonial prisons, and the use of IVF as a community service to reproduce Palestinian life, points to an aesthetic practice of desubjugating resistance that lies at the very heart of biopolitical regimes of power (Foucault, 1978a).

This brief interlude, appearing towards the end of my thesis, offers itself as an attempt to disturb the narrative flow. Up until now, the biopolitical cases and scenes of Israeli colonial occupation that I have examined have highlighted the far-reaching creativity of Israel’s infrastructure of colonial subjugation—through the building of winding walls, the dissemination of reproductive technologies, vigilante anti-miscegenation groups, mass incarceration. Yet, as the works of Mbembe (2003) and Puar (2017) outlined in Chapter Two suggested, the idea that resistance could ever be wiped out is a fantasy, exemplified in the resilience of those undertaking the journey across the wall from home to work outlined in Chapter Three. In the spirit of Foucault’s genealogies of insurrection—a rebellion or insurgency against colonizing and institutionalizing regimes of truth—my
‘Interlude of Reproductive Resistance’ is written in the hope of highlighting the radical contingency of biopower, pointing to a desubjugating practice of Palestinian creativity, vitality and freedom.

Against the backdrop of forced disappearances, olive tree-uprooting, arson, bombing, mass incarceration, roadblocks, checkpoints, blockade, settlement-building, house demolition, revocations of residency, water shortages, school and university closures, electricity blackouts, mosque closures and the many other life-destroying, exhausting daily violences of settler colonial occupation, the practice of sperm-smuggling and IVF treatment as a community service embodies the Palestinian desire to live on. Rather than being a subversion of heteropatriarchy, the use of the biotechnology of IVF reproduces Palestinian life within the confines of hetero coupling, but against and through the backdrop of a proliferating colonial occupation. It is here, located within rather than outside of the matrix of contemporary biopower, that resistance becomes possible. As Foucault (1982: 220–222, 1984a: 283–284, 1984b) argued so well, power always correlates with the capacity for action and strategic movement within a social field of contestation. Indeed, when Foucault argues that ‘power is everywhere’ (1978: 93–94) and that ‘society without power is a simple abstraction’ (1982: 222), we must never understand him to be arguing the nihilistic case that there is no hope. It is precisely because power is everywhere that ‘actions upon actions’ are possible (ibid.).

Important and poetic works in the field of Black studies have sought to comprehend the fugitivity of the Black subject, the ‘enduring Black social life in the face of anti-blackness as a constant struggle against social death’ (Von Gleich, 2017: 204). Examining the ‘fugitive dreams’ of West Africans who fled slave raiders on the African continent, Hartman (2006: 222) argues that taking flight is ‘the language of freedom’. Against what Fanon has named the settler colonial ‘gnawing at life’, which produces the ‘absence of any hope for the future’ (1965: 128), here I want to suggest that fugitive Palestinian sperm, working against the carceral settler colonial order, and willed into life by Palestinian women, produces a dream of Palestinian freedom, or what Deleuze and Guattari, by way of Black Panther Jackson, might call a ‘line of flight’ (1988). As a ‘fugitive practice of survival and resistance in the face of social death’ (Von Gleich, 2017:

64 See Koerner (2011) for an analysis of the relationship between George Jackson and Gilles Deleuze.
Palestinian fugitive sperm and the women who carry it refuse the settler colonial logics of quarantine, separation and elimination, mapping an escape route from the social conditions of confinement and infrastructural occupation. As Lydia al-Rimawi (cited in Vick, 2013) elaborates: ‘the Israelis imprisoned him to eliminate him from Palestinian society. We wanted to show that even though you took him away from us for a very long time, we were able to do this. It’s a political achievement.’ Similarly, the Ahrar Centre for Prisoners’ Studies and Human Rights made a statement on the growing incidence of sperm-smuggling, saying that ‘the message we want to send is that for every man imprisoned for life, a new baby will come to life… if Israel intends to destroy the life of a Palestinian and prevents him to have children, their plan will fail’ (cited in Bajec, 2014). Suad Abu Fayed, an inhabitant of the West Bank’s Askar refugee camp and mother to a daughter named Hurriyah (Freedom) who was born from smuggled sperm, has said: ‘I know it won’t be easy raising a baby with a husband in jail, but this is our way of breaking Israel’s siege on us… We are challenging occupation and getting something beautiful in return’ (cited in Taha and Eglash, 2014). As a hopeful practice in the service of what Hartman (2008) calls ‘freedom communities’, Palestinian sperm-smuggling is ‘considered a national mission and national achievement… This is helping prisoners. The hope they get from the fact that they’ll have a family waiting for them,’ according to Zaid Nasser, a doctor at the Nablus IVF clinic (cited in Mitnick, 2016).

Importantly, to point to the practice of Palestinian sperm-smuggling is neither to romanticize Palestinian resistance nor to ignore the scenes of violence in which it is situated. Rather, I hope to demonstrate that it is precisely from within biopolitical sexism and racism that new life becomes possible. Yet the creativity of sperm-smuggling is not one that eludes the punishment and control of the Israeli state. Shortly after he was born, Lydia al-Rimawi attempted to bring Majd to visit his father in prison. The Israeli prison authorities denied them entry, stating that they could not prove that Majd was related to Abdel Kareem. Abdel Kareem, desperate to meet his newborn son, confessed to the prison

65 Reflecting on Lose Your Mother, Hartman argued that book is about the making of home, and the practices of hopeful survival that create the conditions for living with a sense of being at home. For Hartman (in Saunders, 2008: 13), ‘freedom communities, whether they be maroon communities or social movements… [are] about creating the conditions that make dwelling possible.’
guards that he had smuggled sperm out of prison. As a punishment, eight months were added to his original twenty-five-year sentence, and he was fined 5,000 Israeli shekels (approximately £850): ‘they called me a liar, saying it wasn’t my husband’s son because he’s been locked up for 12 years… It was like I had brought a bomb with me, not my baby. The prison was on high alert that day’ (Lydia al-Rimawi, cited in Taha and Eglash, 2014).

As Chapters Four and Five sought to demonstrate, the Palestinian is always already sexually pathological, deceptive, deviant and terroristic. In Lydia al-Rimawi’s analogy, not only is new Palestinian life treated as terrorist life, but the birth of life through practices of deviant sperm-smuggling explode open, like a bomb, the seemingly neat boundaries that seek to separate, manage and control Palestinian and Israeli populations. The Israeli subject of IVF is one of modernity and technological advancement, a lover of life, while the Palestinian woman’s body—no longer merely a figure of oppression, the victim of Muslim patriarchy—inhabits a space of escape and fugitivity; her ability to reproduce becomes an act of anti-colonial warfare. Temporally rupturing the landscape of totalizing occupation, the Palestinian phenomenon of sperm-smuggling reminds us of the ‘messiness’ of biopower, and of reproduction’s inherent entanglement within the racialized and colonial relations of contemporary life. Although IVF provision is free on both sides of the wall, rather than fitting into a narrative of technological modernity, advancement and democratic inclusivity, Palestinian women’s access to IVF is marked as a terrorist security threat: ‘this is a great injustice,’ said Meir Indor, head of Almagor, the Israeli association for terror victims, of the sperm-smuggled births. ‘Those who were murdered by these terrorists will never get to marry, they will never live their lives, while those who commit the murders are in a situation where they can always start a new life’ (cited in Taha and Eglash, 2014).

While being swiftly recoded into discourses of Islamic terrorism, Palestinian sperm-smuggling—as a practice of reproduction, as a challenge to the infrastructures of occupation, and as a dream of anti-colonial freedom—persists.
Figure Seven. Nothing Will Stop Us! (Mohammad Joha, Tamer Institute for Contemporary Education, 2004).
CONCLUSION

To the people of Israel who fear our freedom: Don’t be afraid, we will liberate you too
This is my rendition
Of an anthem to be sung
That day you and I
Will stand side by side
Shoulder to shoulder
Watching a new dawn
Wipe away
Decades of hate and savagery
The day I rise
From the ruins of your oppression
I promise you I will not rise alone
You too will rise with me
You will be liberated
From your tyranny
And my freedom
Will bring your salvation

This is my rendition
Of an anthem to be sung
I’ll craft new words of expression
Outside of this suffocating language
That has occupied me
Your words
Are like your walls
They encroach on my humanity
I am more than demography
I’m neither your collaborator
Nor your enemy
I am not your moderate
Not your terrorist
Not your fundamentalist
Islamist
Extremist
Militant
Radical
I am more than adjectives
Letters and syllables
I will construct my own language
And replace your words of power
With the power of my words

This is my rendition
Of an anthem to be sung
I don’t want to obliterate
Nor humiliate you
I refuse to hate you
Don’t care to demonize
Or proselytize
Or theorize
Your intentions
Every breath you draw
Reminds me you are human
The sound of your beating heart
Is a rhythm familiar to my ears
You and I are no different
We are made of blood and tears

This is my rendition
Of an anthem to be sung
I will resist and soar
Above your matrix of control
With the power of my will
Your wall will fall
And the concrete that once segregated us
Will be used to rebuild homes
Your bulldozers and your tanks
Will dissolve into the earth
The sap will return to the olive trees
The gates will open wide for the refugees
We will be free
I will be your equal
And only then
You will be mine
My other self
My fellow human being

(Sabwai, 2011)

This thesis has examined how the state of Israel’s colonial occupation manifests and is maintained through sexuality and sexual violence and, furthermore, how certain feminist theory functions to not only obscure the politics of colonial occupation, but are often complicit with them. Through the analysis of three empirical case studies, this thesis has argued that a biopolitics of sexuality is a structural to Israel’s colonial occupation, embedded in various legal, medical, and infrastructural technologies of population organization and management, reproduction and warfare. In so doing, this thesis has sought to build on existing feminist biopolitical theory and scholarship on colonial occupation, by offering analyses of new sites of sexual politics that highlight how the intimate regulation of reproduction and family life and practices of sexual violence are central to the governance and maintenance of colonial occupation in Palestine.

Furthermore, in analysing three sites of sexual politics in Palestine/Israel, I have sought to build on the existing literature reviewed in Chapter Three that has situated the emergence of the state of Israel in a framework of colonialism and imperialism. As such, each case study has drawn out differing ways in which Israel’s biopolitics of sexuality works with, and is productive of, discourses of whiteness, imperialism, anti-Black racism, and Orientalism. And, furthermore, how such discourses operate on different scales and through different registers. Together, then, this thesis has sought to build on existing feminist literature by demonstrating how the regulation of sexuality and intimacy in Palestine/Israel manifests through a number of trajectories – walls, torture, reproductive medicine and technology, warfare, anti-miscegenation activism - and to elaborate a nuanced account of the infrastructure of sexual biopolitics as technology of Israel’s colonial occupation of Palestine.
In Sabwai’s poem that opens this concluding chapter, she importantly reminds us that the lives of Palestinians and Israelis are intimately entwined. Sabwai’s Palestinian assertion – ‘you and I are no different’ – was similarly made by Mbembe (2003: 27) in Chapter Two, where he argued that the two populations are marked by a politics of separation yet are ‘inextricably intertwined’, and Said’s argument outlined in Chapter Three, that Israel defines itself against not being Palestinian - ‘the Arab expressed whatever by definition stood outside, beyond Zionism’ (1979a: 88). For Sabwai, this recognition can also serve as the basis of a politics of freedom. As Sabwai argues, Palestinian life exists in excess of the modes of sexual regulation brought to bear against it – ‘I am more than demography’. It is thus through the destruction of the sexual infrastructures of colonial occupation that Palestinian and Israeli liberation, a co-joined project, can be realised – ‘I will be your equal. And only then. You will be mine’. The rest of this concluding chapter will bring together the debates and arguments made across the previous chapters in order to emphasise the significance of a framework of the infrastructure of sexual biopolitics in the context of Palestine/Israel, and will end by thinking through and with Sabwai’s ‘liberation anthem’ as a means to consider the possibilities and imaginaries of Palestinian freedom.

**Sexual Infrastructures of Colonial Occupation**

In Chapter Two, this thesis began by reviewing literature in the fields of feminist biopolitical theory, necro and biopolitical theorisations of colonial occupation, and the biopolitics of complicity with racism and imperialism. The feminist focus on race, gender and reproduction highlighted the importance of sexual and reproductive politics to biopower. While the literature on bio and necro-power and colonial occupation examined the politics of violence and death in the context of colonial occupation. The literature concerning feminist complicity with biopolitics importantly underscored the need to remain critically vigilant when participating in emancipatory critique and humanitarian politics, given the often intentional and unintentional incorporation of such politics with imperial racist politics. Bringing these literatures together in the context of Palestine/Israel, it was argued, allows for an analysis of how the mechanisms of reproductive population management and associated struggles for reproductive justice become entwined within the spatial infrastructure of colonial occupation through the production of differently racialized populations, zones of containment or ‘splintering’ (Mbembe, 2003, Wiezman , 2007), and mechanisms of warfare and injury (Puar, 2017),
and through the deployment of differing technologies, such as reproductive technologies, torture, incarceration, and the regulation of intimacy.

In Chapter three I reviewed literature that has examined the colonial and imperial politics of Zionism. Here I sought to underscore the ways in which the project of Zionism was also a project of whiteness that was inspired by European imperialism, resulting in a nation state building project that ‘presented the white/European body as the “right” model’ (Davidovitch and Shvarts, 2004: 154), and attendantly relegated the native non-Jewish Palestinian population to the outside of Zionist modernity. Building on the discussion of the complicity of progressive movements with biopolitics in the previous chapter, this literature review set out an understating of how, in the context of Palestine/Israel, the category ‘Jewish’ has been racially biologized and tethered to whiteness, leading to the creation of a racially exclusive colonial state that has constructed national heteronormativity and understandings of the national family through Jewish whiteness. I then turned to examine existing literature on the current phase of occupation, where I outlined the different forms that the infrastructure of occupation takes – splintering, separation, quarantine, military zones, elastic geographies, checkpoints, buffer zones, and the use of high and low tech modes of control. Technologies of regulating sexuality contribute to each of these forms of occupation. As I demonstrated through a discussion of the wall, infrastructural military and industrial technologies of occupation intervene directly and deliberately in sexuality and economies of intimacy. Thus this thesis has demonstrated that sexuality is integral to, and part of the infrastructure of, biopolitical colonial occupation.

Following these literature reviews, the case study chapters that comprise the main original contributions of the thesis have sought to offer analyses of a number of different dimensions of an infrastructure of sexual biopolitics in the context of Israel’s colonial occupation of Palestine. Throughout my analysis, I have shown that this takes place through many discursive and regulatory mechanisms that are not centrally structured to sexual identity categories or necessarily through the homosexual/heterosexual distinction. In Chapter Four, my focus was on the structures and practices of militarized sexual violence that were shown to operate through Orientalist heteronormative conceptions of Arab family life, which led to calls for rape against Palestinian women and practices of homosexual torture against Palestinian men legible and deemed necessary. In Chapter Five I investigated the politics of anti-miscegenation and argued that mixed Palestinian-
Israeli relationships exceed Israel’s national conceptions of the family and heteronormativity, marking them as sites for fierce regulation and violent intervention. In Chapter Six I examined reproductive medicine and technology in Palestine/Israel through what Murphy (2011, 2013) has named as ‘distributed reproduction’, arguing that a geography of occupation and (non)reproduction was consolidated through the dispersal of IVF clinics and the banning of cross-religious sperm donation, delimiting Palestinian access to fertility treatment and eliminating the possibility of cellular miscegenation. Furthermore, through the coercive limiting of Black Jewish women’s access to fertility and reproduction through the use of Depo Provera, I sought to expose the ways in which national heteronormativity in Israel and understandings of Jewishness were constructed through whiteness, with Israel’s Black Jewish population marking the limit of which Jews could be encompassed into the state of Israel.

Importantly, however, my point has not been to argue that sexual identity, or other identities for that matter, have dissipated or are no longer categorisations through which individual experience is understood and political structures operate. Indeed, as the literature reviewed in this thesis demonstrates, gendered and sexual rights based on the categories of woman, lesbian, queer, and so on, continue to be salient ways that modernity is enacted and populations and states are understood. As Farris (2017) argued, gender inequality and women’s rights persist as salient ways through which racist anti-immigrant policies are justified. In the context of Palestine/Israel, Puar has argued that homosexual rights, or what she terms the ‘homosexual question’ (2017: 98, 124), has been a key site through which the state of Israel has branded and promoted itself as modern, tolerant, and progressive. Yet alongside these, my project has sought to explore non-identitarian deployments of sexuality, that work through (re)productions of race, gender, and nation, within the Israel’s infrastructural regime of colonial occupation. For example, in Chapter Three I analysed the Israeli built wall as an important infrastructural technology of occupation that brings into being various forms of sexual and intima regulation, such as its controlling of the Palestinian and Israeli labour force through the maintenance of sexual divisions of labour, its interruptions of family structures, and its delimiting of the Palestinian populations access to vital resources needed to sustain life. Such an analysis consequently challenges predefined identity categories as the only legible and legitimate basis for gendered and sexual theory and analysis.
In this regard, my analysis also has implications for feminist theorising and activism. Throughout this thesis, I have sought to examine how certain feminist discourses can work to support the politics and structures of colonial occupation. In Chapter Four, in my examination of certain feminist and international organisations’ claims that sexual violence is absent from Israel’s occupation, it was argued that such works function to support and obscure the material practices and structures of sexual violence against the Palestinian population. Furthermore, it was argued that the broader feminist project of documenting sexual violence in conflict map such instances onto the geographies and bodies of non-white non-European men in ways that strengthen the liberal international order that holds the nation state as the legitimate actor of violence. In the context of Palestine/Israel, such mappings work to naturalise the framing of the state of Israel as a legitimate Western nation state engaged in a war against a terrorist population, obfuscating the historical present of settler colonialism, dispossession and occupation. While in Chapter Six, my examination of reproductive technologies and medicine argued that certain feminist literature focusing on the effects of such technologies on the female body neglect the ways in which, in the context of Palestine/Israel, such technologies do not solely target gendered and sexual identities, given that both heterosexual and LGBTQ Jewish populations in Israel are able to access a range of reproductive technologies. Rather, in this context sexuality was targeted through the racializing structures of colonial occupation and its tactics of separation and containment, delimiting Palestinian and Black Jewish populations access to fertility and reproduction. Thus, while I have noted that identitarian based politics is still salient, my analyses of the sexual politics of colonial occupation calls for feminist analysis to better grapple with the biopolitical ways that sexuality operates in the context of colonial occupation. That is, the ways in which sexuality inscribes itself into the racialized mechanisms of population management and control, or what I here name as the *sexual infrastructures of colonial occupation*.

The need for feminist analysis to take seriously the infrastructural operations of sexuality and gender has implications beyond the analysis of the subjugating sexual structures of colonial occupation. It also has implications for how and if we can see, comprehend, and stand in solidarity with forms of resistance to such structures. In the Interlude that preceded this chapter I examined practices of Palestinian sperm smuggling out of Israeli prisons and subsequent IVF treatment, where it was argued that such practices operate as a site of resistance to the infrastructural sexual logics of Israeli colonial biopower.
Here the smuggling of sperm by Palestinian women as the subsequent use of IVF in order to conceive new life demonstrated the limits of certain feminist theorisations of reproductive technologies that understand them as a site of female oppression. Indeed, rather than a demand for gendered equality or women’s rights, understating this case as a practise of Palestinian reproductive resistance requires a comprehension of how such practises operate against and through the carceral and splintering infrastructures of occupation. While identarian based sexual and gendered politics often result in reactive analyses and responses to sexual and gendered violence, thinking in terms of infrastructures and technologies of sexual biopolitics enables a resistive approach to situated forms of infrastructural subjugation. Retroactive identarian based claims for sexual and gendered rights and the documentation of sexual violence of course remain important means of claiming redress and reparation for such harm, but here I am explicitly arguing that identifying and working against the sexual infrastructures of occupation may attendantly allow for the cultivation of other imaginaries of life that fundamentally challenge the structures that have produced such harms. Indeed, as the practices of sperm smuggling suggest, while the subjugating structures of colonial occupation and its various modes of population regulation and governance seek to prescribe a particular kind of Zionist present and future, other creative imaginaries of a Palestinian present and futures are already being built in the present.

**Palestinian Life as Human Life**

In Sabwai’s poem that opened this concluding chapter, she importantly articulated the intimacies that exist between the Palestinian and Israeli populations such that an understanding of freedom for both Palestinians living under occupation and Israelis emerged as a co-joined and mutually dependent condition. Sabwai’s articulation of the intimacies between Palestinian and Israeli life was similarly recognised in scholarship reviewed in Chapters Two and Three. Following these existing analyses, this thesis examined a series of case studies in order to study the various ways that sexuality manifests in order to maintain Israel’s occupation such that Palestinian and Israeli populations are separated, attendantly producing Israeli modernity against Palestinian subjugation. In the final section of this thesis I think through this idea of co-joined imaginaries of Palestinian freedom.

Scholars, activists and populations resisting and/or experiencing subjugation globally have long connected the struggle for Palestinian liberation to other global and local
conditions of segregation, colonization, imperialism, patriarchy and racism. Said, for example, noted that ‘figures like [James] Baldwin and Malcolm X define the kind of work that [had] most influenced’ his own (Marrouchi, 2004: 54). In 2014, as the US police force fired tear gas at Black Lives Matter protestors protesting against the state murder of Michael Brown, Palestinians tweeted advice on how deal to with tear gas, an experience they know all too well, under the banner ‘To Ferguson from Palestine’. In 2015 more than 1,000 Black scholars, activists and organizers signed a statement published in Arabic and English which suggested that ‘while we acknowledge that the apartheid configuration in Israel/Palestine is unique from the United States (and South Africa), we continue to see connections between the situation of Palestinians and Black people’ (Bailey and Petersen-Smith, 2015). In 2016, Palestinian students in Gaza released a letter and accompanying video standing in solidarity with Standing Rock Sioux Native Americans and their fight against the US government plans to install an oil pipeline on their land, stating that ‘When I read your history, I can see myself and my people reflected in yours. I feel in my core that your fight is my fight, and that I am not alone in the battle against injustice’ (Norton, 2016a). In the 1970s, exiled members of the US Black Panther Party were training alongside the Palestinian Liberation Organization in Algeria (Seidel, 2016).

I point to these instances of connected struggle and solidarity in order to highlight current and older internationalist traditions that have long connected the Palestinian liberation struggle to other struggles globally, rooted in a recognition that all of our conditions of oppression and freedom are deeply conjoined. This is a deterritorialization of the state of Israel that asks for an attunement to the specificities of occupation as much as it asks for generative connectivities. In her writing on W. E. B Du Bois and C. L. R. James, Lowe notes that both thinkers contributed to:

philosophies of history rethought in terms of Black struggles for emancipation. Both insisted not only that the Black worker was a crucial historical actor in world history, but that telling the history of Black labor would necessarily transform the historical form that had formerly centred European man, and would permit the singularly of Black history to become legible for other colonized peoples struggling for independence. (Lowe, 2015: 171)
For Lowe, a crucial function of Black scholarship has been to centre the Black subject at the same time as situating it in relations across national boundaries, class lines, racial groupings and global locations. Such a project asks us to think beyond this received liberal humanist tradition, and all the while, to imagine a much more complicated set of stories about the emergence of now, in which what is foreclosed as unknowable is forever saturating the ‘what-can-be-known’. We are left with the project of imagining, mourning and reckoning ‘other humanities’ within the received genealogy of the human. (Ibid.: 175)

If, as Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2016: 2257) recently suggested, ‘Palestinian bodies, both living and dead, are no-bodies that exist at “the limits of the human”’, then, following Lowe, a crucial function of writing about Palestine and resisting the normalization of Israeli colonial occupation is to imagine other genealogies of the human, ones that can both mourn the Palestine and Palestinians that have been lost at the same time as they reckon with the forms of Palestinian life that persist, and that could one day exist, at the limits of identitarian liberal formations of the human. As I have argued elsewhere (Medien, forthcoming 2019) in his little-discussed 1970s and 1980s writings on Palestine, French philosopher Deleuze arguably took on this task. With reference to an article that appeared in the French-Palestinian literary magazine Revue d’études palestiniennes (Journal of Palestine Studies),66 Deleuze (1983: 32) writes: ‘to Israel’s arrogant formula, “We are not a people like others,” the Palestinians have not stopped responding with the cry that was invoked in the first issue of the Revue d’études palestiniennes: “we are a people like others, we only want to be that”’. This simultaneous de-exceptionalization of Israeli Jewish life and affirmation of Palestinian humanness disrupts the denial of humanity that structures Palestinian existence. In harnessing the human as the central object in the affirmation of Palestinian life, Deleuze opposes the minoritizing tactics—refugee, exile, terrorist—that conscript Palestinians into the realm of specialist, minor or particular subjects, a realm that would only propagate the status of Palestinian life as beyond the grasp of the modern human. Rather, Deleuze’s writings on persisting Palestinian

66 Elias Sanbar, the founder of the Journal of Palestine Studies, has noted that it was Gilles Deleuze who provided him with the necessary connections to set up the journal (Halevi, 1994).
existence and/as resistance—which, he argues, ‘bears witness to a new consciousness’—concretely affirms Palestinian life as a condition that opposes itself to the colonizing assemblages that define the sociopolitical and economic modern world order (Deleuze and Sanbar, 1982).

Deleuze’s affirmation of the ‘ordinary’ human-ness of Palestinian life chimes with recent productive refigurings of the category of the human through the praxis of Blackness (see for example Hartman, 1997; McKittrick, 2006, 2014; Moten, 2013; Weheliye, 2014). Here, in differing ways, scholars have sought to dismember Man through Blackness, declining the invitation to enter the orderings of Western ‘Man’ and exploring other genres of being human (McKittrick, 2014). In so doing, they have drawn attention to the ways in which access to the category of the human has long been shaped by those who have been cast out, yet figuratively and materially enslaved, within its orderings. In her exploration of Wynter’s oeuvre, for example, McKittrick (2014: 3) asks about ‘the ways in which those currently inhabiting the underside of the category of Man-as-human—under our current epistemological regime, those cast out as impoverished and colonized and undesirable and lacking reason—can, and do, provide a way to think about being human anew’. In doing so, McKittrick asks that we disfigure the subject of Man-as-human via the incorporation of the colonial and racist histories that have birthed this figure, an invitation that necessarily brings ‘being human as praxis into our purview, which envisions the human as verb, as alterable, as relational, and necessarily dislodges the naturalization of dyselection’ (ibid.: 7).

In Deleuze’s (1978, 1983, 1988) writings on Palestine, which draw attention to the ways in which settler colonialism’s violences are implicit in structuring capitalist modernity and concomitantly produce populations beyond the grasp of modern world order, Palestinian-ness similarly emerges not as a cultural or biological descriptor, a noun to describe a marginal group, but as a verb, one that articulates Palestinian-ness as a state of being human, forcing us to think the contours of the category of the human anew. Writing in a 1988 edition of al Karmel, a Palestinian literary journal published in the Arabic language in Ramallah, Palestine, Deleuze harnesses the underside of Man on which Palestinians stand:

occupation, endless occupation: the hurled stones come from inside,
from the Palestinian people, as a reminder that somewhere in the

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world—no matter how small it is—the debt has become reversed. The Palestinians throw their stones, the living stones of their land. Men are born out of these stones. No one can pay his debt by murders, one, two, three, seven, ten daily, or by striking deals with anyone other than the people directly concerned. The others may choose to eschew their responsibility, but every dead person calls on the living. The Palestinians have struck deep into the soul of Israel. They are at work on it fathoming and traversing it every day. (Deleuze, 1988: 35)

In restoring Palestinians to their land through the criminal67 ‘living stones’ they hurl at the IOF, Deleuze reanimates a field of Palestinian land and life. Producing what he might elsewhere term a ‘line of flight’—a mode of acting against the dominant system, one that allows for the activation of minor life—Deleuze reanimates Palestinian stones, the rubble of their homeland, and marks these stones as coextensive with modalities of Palestinian life—‘men are born out of these stones.’ In so doing, Deleuze pertinently reminds us that Palestine and Palestinians live on in spite of, and against, the forces of Zionist settlement. This living on refuses death as the condition of Palestinian life—‘every dead person calls on the living’—and entails the production and proliferation of new modes of being. Indeed, Deleuze’s affirmation of Palestinian-ness, his desire to allow them ‘to become what they are, that is, a completely “normal” people’ (Deleuze and Sanbar, 1982), demands that we see the inadequacies of already given ontologies of life that are inextricably tied to settler colonial and racial capital, asking us to think the human anew. As Deleuze poetically suggests, a resistive Palestinian-ness produces a ‘multiplicity of the possible, the profusion of possibles at each moment’ (Deleuze and Sanbar, 1982).

I conclude by taking up Deleuze’s creative imagining of Palestinian life, not to suggest that rethinking all subjugated humanity from a perspective of Palestinian-ness would offer a ‘way out’ of our current violent order, nor to romanticize Palestinian resistance to colonial occupation, but rather as a call to think creatively against the categorizations and genres of life that structure Palestinian existence and its figuring as a terrorist ‘culture of

67 The Israeli penal code criminalizes Palestinian stone-throwing as a felony. The state of Israel is currently proposing to extend the current two-year sentence for stone throwing to twenty years (see Addameer, 2017a; Ma’an, 2016a).
death’. In presenting an examination of colonial occupation in terms of infrastructural sexual biopolitics, my aim has been to develop an approach that allows for both the empirical analysis of sexual politics and that enables the situated cultivation of specific forms of creative resistance to such infrastructures. Indeed, understanding the various infrastructural ways that sexuality operates in order to maintain and proliferate colonial occupation, I argue, also allows for the mapping of creative and resistive alterities to them. Such an infrastructural politics asks that we think within and beyond our received histories and our gendered and sexual subject constructions, across time and space, and between living and dead. To make visible the intimacies of Israel’s colonial occupation, then, is to recognize that liberal humanity is that which produces racialized inhumanity. Such a recognition should not call forth empty or flattening solidarities—‘we are all Palestinian,’ for example—but rather hopes to denaturalize the infrastructural processes by which Palestinians are ‘dysselected’ from the category of humanity (Wynter in Scott, 2000).

Thus, through its detailed examinations of sexual violence, reproduction and the regulation of intimacy, and in bringing together queer, feminist, anti-colonial and other literatures, Intimate Occupation is meant as a step towards a more radical and insurrectionary genealogical politics, one that creates relations across time and space so that it can be used to make visible the possibilities of our intimacies in the present. My hope has been that by writing an intimate story of Palestine, I have made perceptible not only the violent infrastructural sexual politics of occupation, but also the intimacy of our scenes of subjection, so that the attendant intimate conditions of our freedoms become an inescapable horizon.
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