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Multiple equilibria in the citizen-candidate model of representative democracy : a comment
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Dhillon, Amrita and Lockwood, Ben (2002) Multiple equilibria in the citizen-candidate model of representative democracy : a comment. Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol.4 (No.2). pp. 171-184. doi:10.1111/1467-9779.00094 ISSN 1097-3923.
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9779.00094
Abstract
The Besley-Coate model of representative democracy has the problem of multiple equilibria (Besley-Coate, 1997). We show that requiring the Besley-Coate political equilibria to be iteratively undominated at the voting stage refines the set of (pure strategy) political equilibrium outcomes only for those cases where at least four candidates stand for election. This note complements the results of De Sinopoli and Turrini (1999).
| Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory | ||||
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | ||||
| Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | Noncooperative games (Mathematics), Elections -- Mathematical models | ||||
| Journal or Publication Title: | Journal of Public Economic Theory | ||||
| Publisher: | Blackwell | ||||
| ISSN: | 1097-3923 | ||||
| Official Date: | 17 December 2002 | ||||
| Dates: |
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| Volume: | Vol.4 | ||||
| Number: | No.2 | ||||
| Page Range: | pp. 171-184 | ||||
| DOI: | 10.1111/1467-9779.00094 | ||||
| Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||
| Access rights to Published version: | Open Access (Creative Commons) | ||||
| Related URLs: |
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