The Library
Multiple equilibria in the citizen-candidate model of representative democracy : a comment
Tools
Tools
Tools
Dhillon, Amrita and Lockwood, Ben. (2002) Multiple equilibria in the citizen-candidate model of representative democracy : a comment. Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol.4 (No.2). pp. 171-184. ISSN 1097-3923
![[img]](http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png)
|
PDF
WRAP_Dhillon_jpet4.pdf - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader Download (266Kb) |
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9779.00094
Abstract
The Besley-Coate model of representative democracy has the problem of multiple equilibria (Besley-Coate, 1997). We show that requiring the Besley-Coate political equilibria to be iteratively undominated at the voting stage refines the set of (pure strategy) political equilibrium outcomes only for those cases where at least four candidates stand for election. This note complements the results of De Sinopoli and Turrini (1999).
| Item Type: | Journal Article |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics |
| Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | Noncooperative games (Mathematics), Elections -- Mathematical models |
| Journal or Publication Title: | Journal of Public Economic Theory |
| Publisher: | Blackwell |
| ISSN: | 1097-3923 |
| Date: | 17 December 2002 |
| Volume: | Vol.4 |
| Number: | No.2 |
| Page Range: | pp. 171-184 |
| Identification Number: | 10.1111/1467-9779.00094 |
| Status: | Peer Reviewed |
| Access rights to Published version: | Open Access |
| Related URLs: | |
| References: | Besley, T. and Coate, S. (1997). An Economic model of representative democracy. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, pp.85-114. De Sinopoli, F. and Turrini, A. (1999). A Remark on the Besley-Coate model of representative democracy. Belgium: Universite Catholique de Louvain. (CORE DP 9927). De Sinopoli, F. (2000). Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule. Social Choice and Welfare, 17, pp.655-672. Dhillon, A. and Lockwood, B. (2000). When are plurality rule voting games dominance solvable? University of Warwick Research Papers No.549. Harsanyi, J. and Selten, R. (1988). A General theory of equilibrium selection in games. [s.l.]: MIT Press. Marx, L.M and Swinkels, J.M. (1997). Order independence for iterated weak dominance. Games and Economic Behaviour, 18, pp.219-245. Osborne, M. and Slivinski, A. (1996). A model of political competition with citizen candidates. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111, pp.65-96. |
| URI: | http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/13 |
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
