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SEAL : sealed-bid auction without auctioneers
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Bag, Samiran, Hao, Feng, Shahandashti, Siamak F. and Ray, Indranil G. (2019) SEAL : sealed-bid auction without auctioneers. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 15 . pp. 2042-2052. doi:10.1109/TIFS.2019.2955793 ISSN 1556-6013.
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WRAP-SEAL-sealed-bid-auction-without-auctioneers-Bag-2019.pdf - Accepted Version - Requires a PDF viewer. Download (969Kb) | Preview |
Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2019.2955793
Abstract
We propose the first auctioneer-free sealed-bid auction protocol with a linear computation and communication complexity O(c), c being the bit length of the bid price. Our protocol, called Self-Enforcing Auction Lot (SEAL), operates in a decentralized setting, where bidders jointly compute the maximum bid while preserving the privacy of losing bids. In our protocol, we do not require any secret channels between participants. All operations are publicly verifiable; everyone including third-party observers is able to verify the integrity of the auction outcome. Upon learning the highest bid, the winner comes forward with a proof to prove that she is the real winner. Based on the proof, everyone is able to check if there is only one winner or there is a tie. While our main protocol works with the first-price sealed-bid, it can be easily extended to support the second-price sealed-bid (also known as the Vickrey auction), revealing only the winner and the second highest bid, while keeping the highest bid and all other bids secret. To the best of our knowledge, this work establishes to date the best computation and communication complexity for sealed-bid auction schemes without involving any auctioneer.
| Item Type: | Journal Article | |||||||||
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| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HF Commerce Q Science > QA Mathematics Q Science > QA Mathematics > QA76 Electronic computers. Computer science. Computer software |
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| Divisions: | Faculty of Science, Engineering and Medicine > Science > Computer Science | |||||||||
| Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | Auctions, Auctions -- Computer simulation, Auctions -- Decision making -- Data processing, Auctions -- Mathematical models, Data encryption (Computer science) , Auction theory | |||||||||
| Journal or Publication Title: | IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security | |||||||||
| Publisher: | IEEE | |||||||||
| ISSN: | 1556-6013 | |||||||||
| Official Date: | 25 November 2019 | |||||||||
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| Volume: | 15 | |||||||||
| Page Range: | pp. 2042-2052 | |||||||||
| DOI: | 10.1109/TIFS.2019.2955793 | |||||||||
| Status: | Peer Reviewed | |||||||||
| Publication Status: | Published | |||||||||
| Reuse Statement (publisher, data, author rights): | © 2019 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works. | |||||||||
| Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access | |||||||||
| Date of first compliant deposit: | 27 November 2019 | |||||||||
| Date of first compliant Open Access: | 27 November 2019 | |||||||||
| RIOXX Funder/Project Grant: |
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