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PREVENTING RADICALIZATION IN EUROPEAN CITIES: AN URBAN GEOPOLITICAL QUESTION

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ABSTRACT

With the intensification of attacks in European cities since 2014, preventing radicalization has become the main security strategy for fighting ‘terrorism’ in Europe and beyond. While the concern with radicalization in security policy was due to a realization that European cities are not just the target of but also increasingly the ‘breeding ground’ of terrorism, less attention has been paid to how radicalization prevention has changed the relations between European cities and war. Debates in critical security studies have remained a-spatial for the most part, focused on either the national or international scales, while the question of radicalization has not yet become a topic of scrutiny in the literature on urban geopolitics. Addressing this lacuna, I engage with the policy debates at the EU, urban, and regional levels as well as the role of the European Forum for Urban Security that eventually led to the first EU Mayors’ conference on terrorism and radicalization in Brussels in March 2018. The core observation here is that, rather than another form of national security, radicalization prevention is an extension of counterinsurgency in European cities. This extension of the liberal way of war inside Europe is also accompanied by an increasing focus on urban geopolitics of danger, one that is the relational outcome of the assumed ungovernability of the Other at the urban and international scales and which blurs spaces of liberal peace and war. These developments point to the gradual incorporation of radicalization prevention into the processes of urban governance.

INTRODUCTION

On March 8, 2018, the European Commission (EC) and the Committee of Regions (CR) jointly held the first European Union (EU) Mayors’ conference on terrorism behind closed doors in Brussels.¹ The conference, Building Urban Defences Against Terrorism, marked the first convergence of multi-scalar networks of European politicians, policymakers, and urban experts discussing radicalization prevention at the EU level. European mayors² and the EU parliamentary members³ came together with members of two major EU think tanks, the Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN) and the European Forum for Urban Security (Efus), to examine four topics: “the role of cities in the fight against terrorism”, “lessons learned from recent attacks”, “security by design”, and “cities against radicalization” (EC & CR, 2018). The Brussels conference marked the European Commission’s (2018b, p. 2) official commitment to

¹ Only the opening and closing remarks were broadcasted for journalists.
² These included the mayors of Nice, Manchester, Berlin, London, Hamburg, Chambon-Feugerolles, Stockholm, Mechelen, Sintra, Barcelona, Brussels, and Marseille.
³ These included members of the European Parliament, the Committee of the Regions, the Security Union department, and the Migration and Home Affairs department, along with the commissioners for the Regional Policy.
recognize urban authorities as major actors in fighting radicalization, to facilitate building policy networks, and to provide funding, with an immediate targeted funding of €220 million for research on transnational projects, support for cities, and innovative security projects. What does the Brussels conference reveal about relations between cities and war in continental Europe?

With the recent intensification of attacks in European cities since 2014, radicalization – albeit vaguely defined – has become the top security issue in Europe and beyond, to the point of becoming a pillar of counterterrorism worldwide (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018). For the European Commission (2018a), radicalization is “a complex phenomenon of people embracing radical ideology that could lead to the commitment of terrorist attack”. Prevention, in turn, has become the best solution to combat this “complex phenomenon”. Scholars have criticized this preventive turn in national security policies for racializing Arab and Muslim populations as the internal enemy in Europe (Kundnani, 2012; Fadil et al., 2019) and, particularly in the UK, they have condemned the resultant securitization of social policy (Ragazzi, 2017; Miah, 2017; Heath-Kelly, 2016). For the most part, however, these studies have remained a-spatial, focusing on either the national or international levels. Less attention has been paid to the urban dimensions of radicalization prevention, how these have changed relations between European cities and war, and what this means for security politics in the heartland of liberal democracy. Curiously, radicalization (prevention) has not yet become a topic of scrutiny in the sub-field of urban geopolitics, which has as one of its concerns the spatial dimensions of war in cities.

Taking the first EU Mayors’ conference on radicalization as an entry point, the core observation of this article is that urban geopolitical imaginaries of danger are integral to threat perceptions in radicalization prevention, and thus a radical critique of radicalization prevention requires paying attention to the urban geopolitics of the liberal way of war in European cities. Theoretically, I am influenced by the insights of Henri Lefebvre on the politics of space, Michel Foucault on war, and Himani Bannerji on ideology. Empirically, I engage with developments that eventually led to the 2018 EU Mayors’ conference, including main policy debates among the EU institutions and regional and urban authorities as well as the important role of Efus in making these debates sensible. While critics have paid attention to knowledge-production networks such as RAN (Kundnani & Hayes, 2018, pp. 20–7) and Community Policing and the Prevention of Radicalization (CoPPRa) (de Goede & Simon, 2013), Efus has not come under any scrutiny to date.

My main argument is that the shift from counterterrorism to radicalization prevention in Europe has changed relations between European cities and warfare. Radicalization prevention re-articulates and re-territorializes counterinsurgency in European cities. This extension of the liberal way of war inside
Europe is also accompanied by an increasing focus on the urban geopolitics of danger, a focus that is the relational outcome of the assumed ungovernability of the Other at the urban and international scales and which blurs the spaces of liberal peace and war. European cities are no longer perceived as solely the victims of terrorism organized from outside and so in need of being secured through urban design and maximized security operations (see Coaffee et al., 2008); “[t]he majority of terrorist suspects involved in recent attacks in Europe,” reads the opening lines of the EU Mayors’ conference communiqué, “were born and raised in EU Member States, but were radicalised and turned against their fellow citizens” (EC & CR, 2018, p. 2). The focus on ‘home-grown radicalization’ has shifted attention to the ‘breeding grounds’ of terrorism, that is, as the spaces and agents of war in European cities. The metaphor of a ‘breeding ground,’ which was hitherto deployed by military strategists to describe ‘failed’ states in the Global South, has become a reference code for ‘immigrant neighbourhoods’ such as Molenbeek and Schaerbeek in Brussels.

In its emphasis on understanding radicalization prevention as the extension of liberal way of war in European cities, the paper contributes to debates on warfare and cities in urban geopolitics. I take up the recent calls in urban geopolitical debates to go beyond the binary differentiation between peaceful cities and cities in recognized war zones (see Rokem et al., 2017) and highlight the importance of engaging with the productive dimension of war in spaces of liberal peace. The paper also contributes to debates on radicalization prevention in Critical Security Studies by going beyond a sole focus on biopolitics and securitization. I argue that radicalization prevention strategies increasingly mediate and are mediated by the re-territorialization and re-articulation of the urban and geopolitical imaginaries of danger in the unevenly developed and racially segregated European cities.

In what follows, I begin by addressing why it is important to take seriously the naming of ‘immigrant neighbourhoods’ as the ‘breeding grounds’ of radicalization. A critical engagement with the politics of such naming requires us to go beyond the liberal ideology of civil peace. I then situate radicalization prevention in relation to the liberal way of war, showing its ideological and strategic debt to counterinsurgency practices, particularly focusing on the concept of ‘holistic approach’. Having its roots in liberal warfare, the policy focus on ‘holistic approach’ has brought a development-oriented focus in prevention and has facilitated the entry of a whole array of experts, including urban experts and authorities in radicalization prevention. The third section focuses on the role of Efûs as the major urban expert think tank in current urban-focused debates on radicalization prevention and in the EU Mayors’ conference. I map the Forum’s policy activism and its link to urban policy for the French banlieues, designed to combat the latter’s assumed ungovernability. I also take the recent urban policy developments in Brussels as an example of the extension of these debates beyond the corridors of the
EU. In the last section, I situate the current attention to the ‘breeding grounds’ in relation to the ideological parallels in the representations of ‘immigrant neighbourhoods’ and ‘failed’ state as the ‘safe heavens’ of terrorism. Taken together, these developments, I suggest, alert us to the ways that radicalization prevention is strengthening the convergence of security politics and urban governance and how in doing so there lies the danger of severely limiting democratic rights and accountability in today’s increasingly demographically diverse European cities.

**RADICALIZATION AND ITS ‘BREEDING GROUNDS’**

In tandem with the sequence of attacks in European cities since 2014, preventing radicalization and safeguarding ‘European values’ have become top security issues in Europe. Both are major priorities in *The European Agenda on Security: 2015–2020* (EC, 2015, pp. 12–6) and the latest EU foreign and security policy, *A Stronger Europe* (EU, 2016, p. 4). The EU has revised its radicalization prevention strategy (Council of the European Union [Council], 2017) and released its first action plan on urban security, the *Action Plan to Support the Protection of Public Spaces* (EC, 2017). At the national scale, by early 2018 22 EU member states had implemented radicalization prevention policies (Migration and Home Affairs, 2018). At the regional and local scales, urban authorities and experts have become vocal forces in security politics around radicalization. A growing number of European mayors have gathered and signed declarations on preventing radicalization in four major summits in Aarhus (2015), Rotterdam (2016), Nice (2017), and Barcelona (2017). In addition, there is an ever-growing web of think tanks and networks producing knowledge on radicalization (prevention), many of which were founded by and almost all of which are financially supported by the EU.4

As a security concept, radicalization was first coined by the Dutch security services in 2001. Besides its link to ‘violent extremism’, the concept from the beginning was used in relation to the racialized urban conditions in Europe, particularly the questions of segregation and integration of post-colonial5 migrants (Fadil et al., 2019). With the 2003–2004 insurgencies against Western occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan and their consequences in Europe – the Madrid bombing in March 2004, the murder of Theo Van Gogh in Amsterdam in November 2004, and then the London bombing in July 2005 – security officials gradually shifted their counterterrorism strategies towards preventing radicalization

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5 My use of post-colonial is a temporal reference to the period after the shattering of European colonialism.
inside Europe. State security forces have justified the preventative targeting of those assumed to be ‘at-risk’ of becoming ‘terrorists’ in the name of safeguarding ‘European values’, social cohesion, and peace.

A growing scholarship in Critical Security Studies has since questioned this appeal to safeguarding values. Scholars have underlined how, in echoing the Islam-versus-the-West narrative of the War on Terror (Mamdani, 2004), preventive strategies systematically racialize Muslim populations as the internal enemy in Europe. Despite different histories of nation-building and non-European migration as well as the different demographics of those assumed to be Muslim or who identify as Muslim, one can see a similar racializing of the internal enemy as ‘the Muslim’ from the UK (Kundnani, 2009) and France (Mondon & Winter, 2017) to Belgium and the Netherlands (Fadil et al., 2019) and on to Denmark (Anderson & Moe, 2015) and Sweden (Hörnqvist & Flyghed, 2012). Scholars have also criticized, particularly in the UK, how the appeal to safeguarding has resulted in state co-optation of social policy for targeting the ‘at-risk’ through the increasing securitization of education (Miah, 2017), public health (Heath-Kelly, 2016), and social services (Ragazzi, 2017). More recently, others have pointed out to some aspects of the geographical focus and the global spread of radicalization prevention (Heath-Kelly, 2017; Kundnani & Hayes, 2018).

Less attention has been paid to how radicalization prevention has changed relations between European cities and war and what this means for security politics and governance in the heartland of liberal democracy. This is important not least because since the 2015 Paris attacks, alongside the racialized figure of ‘the Muslim’ as the internal enemy, there has been an undeniable attention to ‘immigrant neighbourhoods’ – areas of deprivation populated by majority low-income, non-White residents. Parisian banlieues such as Gennevilliers and Saint-Denis and Brussels’ deprived quartiers such as Schaerbeek and Molenbeek, neighbourhoods where the attackers had resided and been captured or from where they left for Syria, were quickly represented as the ‘breeding grounds’ of radicalization in the media. Molenbeek, for example, suddenly was given the nicknames of “The Islamic State of Molenbeek”, “Europe’s jihadi capital”, and “Europe’s jihadi heaven.” These forms of naming are not simply a fleeting matter of sensational journalism. After all, names and naming in politics, as Himani Bannerji (2000) explains,

are more than just words, they are ideological concepts. They imply intentions and political and organizational practices … To say this is to say explicitly that discourse is more than a linguistic manoeuvre. It is a matter of putting in words, mediating and organizing social relations of ruling, of meanings organized through power. (p. 41)

Ideology, for Bannerji, is “the process of creating a dehistoricized and dehistoricizing body of content – of representations of reality” that simultaneously also erases and distorts reality (2011, p. 236). This
process of creating, erasing, and distorting reality is essential to relations of ruling. The concept of ‘breeding ground’ has colonial and geopolitical connotations. It carries in itself imaginaries of animality, contagion, and danger, historically associated with the assumed ‘uncivilized’ nature of colonies.

‘Breeding ground’ is also a spatial and geopolitical metaphor of war. Military strategists and geopoliticians had hitherto deployed the concept to describe the ‘failed’ states and ‘ungoverned spaces’ of the War on Terror as so-called ‘safe heavens’ for producing and recruiting terrorists to attack the West (see Hehir, 2007; Call, 2008). The current transplantation of the concept so as to apply to ‘immigrant neighbourhoods’ of European cities should alert us to the urban, geopolitical, and neocolonial\(^6\) dimensions of the latest geographical imaginaries of war in Europe. While since 9/11 counterterrorism measures have been part of urban security policies, the concepts of ‘home-grown radicalization’ and ‘breeding ground’ have changed the relations between Western cities and war. In the media and policy discourses, Western cities are no longer solely the victims of terrorism organized from outside. Rather, we are told, particular geographies of European cities – ‘immigrant neighbourhoods’ – are now ‘safe havens’ for harbouring and recruiting those ‘at-risk’ of terrorism. In his opening remarks to the 2018 EU Mayors’ conference, Dimitris Avramopoulos (2018), the EU Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, highlighted the need to “neutralize the breeding grounds in our cities”.

Cities have never been a neutral canvas for making war and politics. As Henri Lefebvre (1991) argued a half century ago, space is not a tabula rasa. Space is a social product; it is in fact the ultimate locus and medium of struggle. “There is a politics of space,” Lefebvre (2009, pp. 167–85) emphasized, “because space is political”, because the production and destruction of urban space have historically been key political stakes for domination and the survival of imperialist capitalism. Since the 1990s, the politics of space in warfare have directed scholars in the sub-field of urban geopolitics to examine the complex ways that the diverse and multi-scalar political geographies of war play out in and through urban spaces. The upshot of this literature is that the spatial dimension of war and the political dimension of space have been integral to warfare. From the geographical imaginaries of danger to make war (Gregory 2004, 2016) and the deliberate destruction of cities to win war (Coward, 2008) to the increasing urbanization of warfare (Graham, 2004, 2010) and the use of urban design as a security apparatus (Coaffee et al., 2008) and on to the territorial dimension of the War on Terror and the vertical geometrics of urban asymmetric conflicts (Elden, 2009, 2013), scholars have directed us to the integral relations between space, war, and ideology.

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\(^6\) By neocolonial, I refer to the re-composed continuation of colonial and imperial relations of domination and exploitation after official decolonization in the early second half of the twentieth century.
Surprisingly, radicalization prevention has not yet become a topic of scrutiny in urban geopolitics. This is partly due to the conception of war and the temporal and geographical emphasis in this relatively young literature. The dominant focus on spectacular geographies of war (in the former Yugoslavia, Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan) has resulted in a representation of war as solely being about the project of kinetic force into non-Western political geographies. When war ‘comes home’ to the West, cities in turn are perceived solely as the victims and not the agents of war (as in Coaffee et al., 2008; Graham, 2010). In their recent intervention, Jonathan Rokem and Sara Fregonese (Rokem et al., 2017, p. 254) have called for pushing the boundaries of debate in urban geopolitics by “challenging the canonical differentiation between urban phenomena of socio-economic spatial segregation, socio-political division, and of militarized urban conflict, and – ultimately – the very distinction between conflict cities and more peaceful ones”. Recent developments in the EU radicalization prevention debates, I suggest, push us to challenge such differentiation as they direct us to take into consideration the spatiality of the kinetic dimension of war and the geopolitical struggles and international affairs (see, Elden, 2009; Agnew & Corbridge, 1995), as well as that of urban politics. This is also the point that has not yet gained due attention in the current critical literature on radicalization prevention; that is, the need to go beyond the liberal ideology of civil peace, which represents liberal society (Europe/the West) as the space of peace produced through cessation of war and war as ‘the state of nature’ that is always already located outside of the territoriality of liberal society. A radical critique of radicalization prevention requires situating its ideology and practice in relation to what Dillion and Reid (2009) have called the liberal way of war.

THE LIBERAL WAY OF WAR AND RADICALIZATION PREVENTION

“If we look beneath peace, order, wealth, and authority … will we hear and discover a sort of primitive and permanent war?” asked Michel Foucault in his 1975–76 lectures under the title Society Must Be Defended (2003). In proposing an inversion of Clausewitz’s dictum that ‘war is the continuation of politics by other means’, Foucault attempted to approach war as a social relation and in doing so suggested how we might consider war as the matrix for techniques of domination in liberal society. “The role of political power,” he wrote, “is perpetually to use a sort of silent war to reinscribe that relationship of force” in order to neutralize the disequilibrium revealed by war (Foucault, 2003, p. 15). The dualist separation of peace and war owes its commonsense status to liberal law, which in sanctioning such a separation (at the international and national scales) aimed to legitimatize the violence of capitalism and modern colonialism (Neocleous, 2014, pp. 17–36). Foucault’s unfinished project has inspired scholars to examine the ways that strategies of war may function in specific ways on the terrain of peace, entailing both destructive and productive dimensions. Counterinsurgency, for example, is one “war strategy that harness[es] technologies of liberal peace as a way of war” (Bell, 2011, p. 311).
Ideologically and strategically, radicalization prevention re-articulates counterinsurgency in the ‘breeding grounds’ of European cities. As Rizwan Sabir (2017) has shown, the UK Prevent surveillance strategy of and propaganda against ‘the Muslim’ are extensions of the British counterinsurgency strategies used in Northern Ireland and Afghanistan. This link transcends particular components of radicalization prevention and the case of the UK Prevent. It was not accidental that radicalization prevention emerged in the conjuncture in which counterinsurgency also made a comeback in warfare strategies. In order to win war, the re-emergence of counterinsurgency aimed to moderate violence by bringing a strategic shift towards an increasing ‘civilianization’ of warfare (Bell, 2011), anchored in the intertwined ways of liberal rule and war where the liberal governing of life is itself part of the war effort (Dillon & Reid, 2009). The return of counterinsurgency reaffirmed the increasing dependence of the liberal way of war on strengthening the historical nexus of development and security, a deepening that capitalizes on the moderation of violence in order to sustain domination by merging the social reconstruction and reform of the enemy societies in order to nullify threats and crush resistance (Duffield, 2001, 2007; Bell, 2011; Wiezman, 2011).

In a manner similar to counterinsurgency doctrine, the central logic of radicalization prevention is that coercive power and its kinetic force cannot win the war against terrorism on its own. Rather, so we are told, in the ‘battle of ideas’ between Islamist extremism and Western liberal democracy there is also a need to ‘win hearts and minds’ so as to moderate violence. As such, the policy focus on radicalization prevention signalled a move away from security politics with a sole focus on fighting formal organizations designated as ‘terrorist’ towards an emphasis on preventing ‘extremist’ mind-sets in ‘at-risk’ subjects (see Kundnani & Hayes, 2018; EC, 2018a). Anchored on the nexus of security and development, this preventive turn in security and war politics in Europe emphasizes the promotion of good governance, democracy, education, and economic prosperity through assistance programmes – not in opposition to coercive strategies of counterterrorism, but rather as complementary components to them (see Barzegar et al., 2016). The inclusion of social policy and the attention to the urban question in radicalization prevention strategies are in relation to this deepening nexus of security and development in European cities. The logic here is legitimized by appealing to a ‘holistic approach’ in policy discourses.

“The prevention of radicalization in our cities,” reads the 2018 EU Mayors’ communiqué (EC & CR, 2018), “is an issue of outmost urgency, and requires a holistic approach based on all relevant policies”. References to a conceptual label such as “holistic approach”, “comprehensive approach”, “integrated approach”, “whole of society”, “whole of city”, and “multi-agency approach” have formed one major pillar
of preventive debates since 2015. One encounters them in the EU debates (EC, 2015, pp. 4, 15; EU, 2016, pp. 4, 9–10; Council, 2017, p. 4; The Congress, 2016a, p. 9), the European mayors’ declarations (The Congress, 2015, 2016b, 2017; Efus & EUROMED, 2017), and in policy proposals made by think tanks (RAN, 2018; EUKN, 2016). What these terms mean is that the fight against radicalization, as the Guidelines for the EU Strategy for Combating Radicalization (Council, 2017) states, needs “to make use of all relevant policy areas and instruments, including criminal justice, education, social inclusion, citizenship and European values, etc.” (p. 4). As a policy concept, the history of the ‘holistic approach’ goes back to the late twentieth century. The concept had already been put into practice under (at times similar) names such as “comprehensive approach”, “whole of government”, “unity of effort”, “joint-up government”, and “integrated mission” in a whole array of state warfare and imperialist interventions in ‘ungoverned spaces’ and ‘failed’ states of the Global South – from peace operations to international development and humanitarian interventions and on to counterinsurgency and urban warfare (see Patrick & Brown, 2007; Friis, 2010; Bell, 2011). In international relations, the ideological premise of the ‘comprehensive approach’ is rooted in the geographical imaginaries of underdevelopment, poverty, and inadequate governance in ‘fragile’ states posited as threats to global peace and security (Bell, 2011, p. 325).

A parallel ideology is at play in radicalization prevention today, and as we will see in the last section, this ideology is central to the rendering of ‘immigrant neighbourhoods’ as the ‘breeding grounds’ of radicalization. Proponents of prevention argue that a ‘holistic approach’ is essential for addressing the “root causes” of radicalization in Europe. Under the banner of the “root causes”, in turn, they point to poverty, socio-economic exclusion, excessive (Islamic) religiosity, and cultural segregation as threats to ‘European values’ and peace in European cities (EC, 2015, pp. 12–6; EU, 2016, p. 21; Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe [PACE], 2015, p. 3, 5, 2016a, pp. 1, 3–4, 2016b, pp. 1, 3; The Congress, 2016a, p. 9; Council, 2017, pp. 2, 4). Echoing the debates on ‘new wars’ (Kaldor, 1999), the ideological appeal of ‘holistic approach’ is that it conveniently turns symptoms of urban uneven development, racialization, segregation, and exploitation into causes of radicalization. In the meantime, the emphasis on a ‘holistic approach’ has opened up space for a diversity of experts (psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, etc.) to participate in the knowledge production industry around radicalization (see RAN, 2018) and in the process has facilitated the mobilization of development-oriented programmes as part of radicalization prevention (see Briscoe & van Ginkel, 2013). Seen from this perspective, more than co-opting social policy by securitizing it, radicalization prevention re-articulates and re-territorializes the forms of social intervention that have long been part of the liberal way of war in ‘ungoverned spaces’ of the Global South in the ‘breeding grounds’ of European cities.
The ‘holistic approach’ has also paved the way for the current emphasis on the specifically urban conditions (such as racial segregation, concentration of non-White poverty, unemployment, etc.) in prevention debates (EC, 2017, pp. 7–8; Council, 2017, p. 4; PACE, 2016b, p. 3; The Congress, 2016a, p. 9). The EU’s first urban security policy in 2017, the series of four European mayors’ summits on radicalization between 2015 and 2017, the formation of urban knowledge networks such as the Strong Cities Network (2015), Nordic Safe Cities (2016), and the Alliance of European Cities Against Violent Extremism (2017), along with the first EU mayors’ conference in March 2018, all capture the current heightened attention to the specifically urban dimensions of radicalization prevention. In the Action Plan, for example, the European Commission (2017, pp. 3–4), underlines the need to link radicalization prevention to the 2016 Urban Agenda for the EU and the use of urban planning and design. In her closing remarks to the EU Mayors’ conference, Corina Cretu, the EU Commissioner for Regional Policy, encouraged mayors to make use of the European Development Fund and the Urban Innovative Actions Fund for preventing radicalization. Herein, the urban politics of ungovernability has played a crucial role.

THE URBAN POLITICS OF RADICALIZATION PREVENTION: THE EUROPEAN FORUM FOR URBAN SECURITY

The production of ungovernability, its spaces and figures, is integral to relations of ruling and forms of state intervention (Marei et al., 2018). The historical production of ‘immigrant neighbourhoods’ as supposedly ungovernable spaces of European cities is a key ideological force in the recent prominence of the urban question in radicalization prevention. Since 2014, the media has played an important role in normalizing a representation of ‘immigrant neighbourhoods’ as the ‘no-go zones’ and ‘breeding grounds’ of radicalization (see Yildiz, 2014; Ladevèze, 2015; Destexhe, 2016; Kroet, 2017). As we will see in the next section, this sudden fixated hysteria around ‘breeding grounds’ is the relational outcome of the convergence of the representations of ‘failed’ states in European cities and the already existing state and media discourses on ‘immigrant neighbourhoods’ as ‘ungovernable’ urban spaces. The reaction of the former French Prime Minister Manuel Valls to the January 2015 attacks in Paris is yet another example of how politicians have reaffirmed this systematic production and normalization of urban ungovernability. “A territorial, social, ethnic apartheid has spread across our country”, Valls explained in reference to the French banlieues (de la Baume, 2015). I will come back to the geopolitics of the production of this form of urban ungovernability. First, I want to focus on the role of experts in urban crime prevention and urban policy in rationalizing such ideological links in the current policy debates.

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7 See https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/1-151803
The production of expert knowledge has been integral to dehistoricizing the ideological representations of space (Lefebvre, 1991). Urban policy does not simply act on space as a thing. Expert knowledge on urban issues, as Mustafa Dikeç (2007) has argued, is “guided by particular ways of imagining space, and different ways of imagining space have different implications for the constitution of perceived problems and proposed solutions” (p. 171). In the current EU debates, the Paris-based European Forum for Urban Security (Efus) has played an influential role in rationalizing the focus on cities through knowledge production and its lobbying powers at the European Council and the European Congress of Local and Regional Authorities (The Congress). The case of Efus is important for three reasons: First, the Forum was a major player in shaping the debates on the role of cities in radicalization prevention policy discourse and in the 2018 EU Mayors’ conference. Second, the history of the Forum’s emergence directs us to the long history of making sensible the ‘ungovernability’ of deprived, majority non-White neighbourhoods, while its current activities highlight the increasing role of urban experts in the liberal way of war in such neighbourhoods. Third, the gradually growing expert authority of Efus and the increasing level of secrecy in its activities should warn us about the undemocratic aspects and pitfalls of the privatization of policymaking.

Founded in 1987 as a private non-profit research organization under the auspices of the Council of Europe, Efus was formerly known as the European Forum for Urban Safety and has since had consultative status to the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, and the European Commission in the area of urban crime prevention (delinquency, riots, youth violence, gangs, and drugs) (Calfa, 2007, p. 2). In the aftermath of the 2005 London bombings, Efus undertook its first project, Cities Against Terrorism (2006–2007). The project, funded by the European Commission, looked into the then newly formed UK Prevent for training local representatives in confronting terrorism (Efus, 2007). With the name change in 2011, the Forum’s activity around urban security beyond crime prevention follows the EU’s focus on radicalization and terrorism in European cities. The next round of the Forum’s activities, this time with an explicit focus on radicalization, followed the attack on the Jewish Museum of Brussels executed by a non-White French citizen in May 2014. In the aftermath of the 2015 Paris attacks, Giulherme Pinto (2015), then the president of Efus, was quick to declare that “The police and juridical reply of the States will only be effective if it is reinforced by that of the cities in the fields of prevention and integration” – a mission that the Forum has since taken seriously.

Focusing on prevention, advocating for the role of urban authorities at the national and EU levels, and committing to area-based intervention in ‘problem’ localities are among the major themes of the Forum’s activities around crime and radicalization prevention (see Efus, 2014, 2017). Along these lines,
Efus has taken up an increasing number of EU-funded initiatives such as Local Institutions Against Violent Extremism (LIAISE) I and II (2014–2016 and 2016–2018 respectively); BOUNCE, which seeks to strengthen the resilience of ‘at-risk’ youth to extremism (since 2016); PRACTICES, which advocates partnership against violent radicalization in and among cities (2017–2020); PREPARE, which looks at the prevention of radicalization in prisons (2017–2019); Local Voices, which helps local authorities train credible local voices embedded in communities (2017–2019); PRoTECT, which focuses on public resilience to terrorism through new technologies (2018–2020); LOUD, which mobilizes local young leaders for inclusion initiatives (2019–2020); and BRIDGE, which is about building resilience to reduce polarization and growing extremism (2019–2020) (see Efus, 2019). Since 2015, Efus has also acted as an expert in the EU’s main think tank on radicalization, RAN.

Efus has been the major force in organizing the series of summits of Euro-Mediterranean mayors on radicalization prevention and played an important role in crafting the four declarations that came out of these summits: The Aarhus Declaration (The Congress, 2015), The Rotterdam Declaration (The Congress, 2016b), The Nice Declaration (Efus & EUROMED, 2017), and the Barcelona Declaration (The Congress, 2017). Emphasizing prevention alongside repression and the role of cities and urban authorities as well as the use of integrated approaches are among the common themes of the four declarations. The first summit, The Aarhus Summit in November 2015, which coincidently took place in the aftermath of the second Paris attack, was a gathering of only the city members of Efus. In his opening speech, Jean-Claude Frécon (2015), president of The Congress, strongly portrayed the attacks as a war on the so-called ‘European way of life’, on the assumedly authentic neighbourhoods of European cities:

This time, the people targeted by the terrorists were the younger generation. The generation who one can find sitting on café terraces in the evenings, who eat at restaurants, who go to concert halls, and who do this in mixed neighbourhoods, where cultures mix, intermingle and intermarry. It is this way of life that the terrorists have targeted.

The Forum’s summits have been important political and expert spaces for rationalizing the need for Euro-Mediterranean and international urban knowledge networks. The idea of the Alliance of European Cities Against Violent Extremism was first put forward at the Aarhus Summit. With the help of the Congress and given the recurrent attacks in European cities since 2015, Efus has expanded its membership and mobilized for bigger summits. The 2017 Nice Summit turned into a gathering of Euro-Mediterranean mayors, and the Alliance of European Cities Against Violent Extremism was finally formalized at the Barcelona Summit in November 2017. The first EU Mayors’ conference on

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8 Currently Efus has 250 city members from 16 EU member states.
terrorism in 2018 took place as a follow-up to the 2017 Nice Declaration and the EU Action Plan (EC, 2018c). Not surprisingly, some of the main themes of the Forum’s activities, such as increased power to urban authorities, spatially targeted intervention, security by design, and a focus on the ‘breeding grounds’ of radicalization, were central to the EU Mayors’ conference (EC & CR, 2018).

With its political commitment to “de-centralizing” policymaking (Efus, 2017, pp. 23–7), the Forum’s policy activism around radicalization prevention strategies has brought new dimensions to the neoliberal re-scaling of state security in Europe and in the process has severely decreased possibilities of democratic participation. In tune with the broader neoliberal politics of the NGOs, Efus prides itself as an “independent network”, “a private, not-for-profit association operating a public service function” (Efus, 2017, p. 18). Yet, according to its own experts, “it has largely been a public-sector grouping led by mayors and local authorities,” with most of its meetings taking place behind closed doors. This politics of secrecy extends to the Forum’s publications and events on its EU-funded projects, the majority of which are only available to its members, essentially municipalities and other expert organizations working on crime and radicalization. Rather than democratizing policymaking, the Forum’s celebration of “decentralizing” policymaking has provided momentum for more exclusive and private urban and security knowledge-production networks, without any public accountability. In September 2017, the European Urban Knowledge Network and the European exchange learning programme, URBACT, which works on sustainable integrated development also joined policy forces to identify good practices for radicalization prevention (EUKN, 2017). One of the major common themes of both the Nice Summit (2017) and the EU Mayors’ conference was the importance of the private sector in prevention policymaking. In his opening remarks to the EU Mayors’ conference, Sir Julian King, Commissioner for the EU Security Union, highlighted the role of the private sector in helping cities to “fundamentally rethink our public spaces” and “to squeeze the space in which terrorists can operate”.

A closer look at the formation of Efus directs us to an interesting lineage: French urban policy. The Forum originated in the 1980s in the context of heightened urban unrest in the French banlieues and the gradual hegemony of urban neoliberalization with its focus on urban regeneration, gentrification, and the ‘war on crime’. Its founder and longest-serving president, Gilbert Bonnemaison (1930–2008), is a familiar name to the students of urban policy, politics, and policing in France. A former mayor of Epinay-sur-Seine (1967–1995) and socialist deputy for Seine-Saint-Denis (1981–1993), Bonnemaison was appointed chair of the Mayors’ Commission on Security, which was set up in 1982 by then-Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy to find a solution to the unrest in French banlieues. This was in the aftermath of

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a series of intense uprising of the banlieues from Lyon to Paris, which came to be known as the ‘hot summer of 1981’. The events not only intensified the rising political fear of the ‘ungovernability’ of banlieues, but also changed the colour of such fear by giving it a neocolonial shade in associating such assumed ungovernability with migration from former French colonies (Rey, 1999; Dikeç, 2007). Since then the French state’s (failed) solution to the unrest of the excluded residents of banlieues has been urban policy – a mixture of spatially targeted urban renovation and policing projects in poor areas of banlieues (see Dikeç, 2007).

Bonnemaison’s 1982 report, Confronting Delinquency: Prevention, Repression and Solidarity, became one of the three founding texts of French urban policy targeting the banlieues (Bonnemaison, 1982; Dikeç, 2007, pp. 48–56). Anchored in the nexus of security and development, Bonnesmaison advocated for a ‘comprehensive approach’ to the causes of insecurity based on prevention (alongside repressive policing) and area-based development in those neighbourhoods (also see de Maillard, 2004). His report became an influential part of a hegemonic environmentally deterministic discourse – with roots in the nineteenth-century French reform movement (Rabinow, 1989) and the Chicago School of Urban Sociology (Thrasher, 1927), one that conceives of urbanism both as the cause of and the solution to insecurity in cities. The ‘Bonnemaison principles’ of social prevention through reforming ‘problem’ populations and neighbourhoods also have roots in the use of urbanism in French colonial pacification in North Africa (Çelik, 1997; Saberi, 2017) and are central to the Forum’s approach to preventing crime, building peace and now preventing radicalization (see Efus, 2017, pp. 14–6).

By 1986, Bonnemaison’s principles of social prevention had made their way to the in-formation corridors of the European institutions through collaboration between the French National Council for the Prevention of Delinquency (at which time Bonnemaison acted as chair), the Council of Europe, and the Standing Conference of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe (now The Congress). Tellingly, Efus was officially constituted in 1987 with Bonnemaison as its president (1987–1996) at the Council of Europe’s conference on the European Campaign for Urban Renaissance in Barcelona (Efus, 2017, pp. 16–7), which itself was part of the emerging discursive legitimation of gentrification and neoliberalization. From the early 1990s onwards, Efus also facilitated the establishment of national forums, with the French and Belgium Forums being established in 1992 and 1995 respectively in the aftermath of urban unrest in the French banlieues and Brussels’s poor quartiers. Later in the 2000s, Efus also extended its activities to the war on gangs and peacebuilding in Central America (Efus, 2012) and Africa (Efus, 2013).
The Forum’s attempt to bring the urban question to the forefront of radicalization prevention debates has already made its way into urban policy formation. The latest urban policymaking in the Communes of Schaerbeek and Molenbeek-Saint-Jean in Brussels are telling examples. Schaerbeek and Molenbeek, respectively situated in the northwest and west of Brussels’s centre, have long been part of “the poor crescent” of the EU capital, the products of decades of urban neoliberalization, poor urban governance, gentrification of Brussels centre and its European quartiers, and systemic racism (Van Hamme et al., 2016). Both Communes are known for their Otherized, ‘Muslim’ populations; Molenbeek is known for its high concentration of residents of Moroccan descent, while Schaerbeek is known for residents of Turkish and Moroccan descent. Schaerbeek and Molenbeek came into the spotlight of radicalization hysteria as ‘breeding grounds’ of radicalization on account of their association with Belgians leaving for Syria and the alleged ‘safe houses’ for the Paris and Brussels attacks. Since early 2017, both Communes have been partners in the Efus EU-funded projects: Schaerbeek is part of PRACTICES and participated in the Nice Summit in September 2017; Molenbeek is part of Local Voices project and also participated in PRACTICES conferences.

Since 2015, the Molenbeek municipality and the Police Bruxelles-Ouest have implemented Service de Prévention. In its policy orientation for 2016 to 2018, the municipality situates “fighting against radicalism”, “urbanism”, and “revitalisation of our neighbourhoods” in relation to each other so as to make a “secure city” (Molenbeek-Saint-Jean, 2016, p. 1). Referring to “the tragic events of November 2015 in Paris”, the municipality promises “to convey an image of Molenbeek-Saint-Jean” that corresponds to “a dynamic and attractive town where security, conviviality and a rich diversity dominate” (Molenbeek-Saint-Jean, 2016, p. 12). To achieve this promise, the municipality has installed new networks of surveillance cameras and Local Prevent Partnerships (PLP) in targeted areas as part of its preventive strategies for crime and radicalization (Molenbeek-Saint-Jean). There is a considerable geographical overlap between the PLP areas and the priority zones of urban renewal (zone de revitalisation urbaine – ZUR) in Molenbeek’s latest urban policy for 2017-2020 (Molenbeek-Saint-Jean, 2017, pp.12-4). ZURs are characterized by concentrated non-White poverty, over-crowded, (relatively) cheap or social housing, high youth unemployment and foreign residents. In Molenbeek, these areas mostly include in and around quartier Maritime, la zone du canal, quartier Heyvaert, and Gare de l’Ouest.

The Schaerbeek municipality and the Police Bruxelles-Nord have also implemented their strategy, Programme de Prévention Urbaine (PPU) since 2015. The PPU is based on “a repressive but also socio-preventive approach” (Schaerbeek, 2017a, p. 1) as well as on an “integrated” and “holistic” one.

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11 The Communes of Schaerbeek and Molenbeek are among the 19 municipalities that have come together under the Brussel Capital Region, what is commonly referred to as Brussels.
A new governmental entity, the Local Integrated Security Cell (La Cellule de Sécurité Intégrée Locale) (CSIL), which is specifically tasked with bringing the police and municipal forces together, administers the PPU. The PPU has been involved with any project that directly or indirectly relates to radicalization prevention in Schaerbeek and has facilitated the collaboration between the municipality and Efus since 2016. Schaerbeek’s latest area-based urban policy for 2017-2020 is crafted with the direct participation of the PPU, in particular in designating ZURs (Schaerbeek, 2017b, p. 4). Here too there is a high overlap between the targeted geographies of the PPU intervention and the designated ZURs in Schaerbeek mostly situated in and around la place de Colignon, quartier Brabant, quartier Halmet, and Rue Royale Sainte-Marie.

The convergences of radicalization prevention and urban policy in Schaerbeek and Molenbeek deserve their own detailed examination that is beyond the scope of this paper. However, taken together, these developments direct us to the gradual incorporation of radicalization prevention into processes of urban governance. This incorporation is neither innocent nor neutral. As mentioned earlier, the ideological appeal here is that symptoms of urban uneven development, racialization, segregation, and marginalization are turned into causes of radicalization. Thus the focus on the urban question has also included a legitimizing of the targeting of poverty, the ‘immigrant’/’Muslim’ and their everyday spaces as threats to peace and security. In all its EU-funded work on terrorism and radicalization, Efus has explicitly focused on the threat of the ‘immigrant’/’Muslim’, living in ‘ghettos’, from its first project on cities and terrorism which focused on the Pakistani community in the UK (Efus, 2007, pp. 56–8; 74–85) to its recent initiatives such as PRACTICES or LIAISE II. Mangus Ranstorp, a major figure of LIAISE II and the Quality Manager of RAN, has been one of the counterterrorism experts forcefully rationalizing the targeting of ‘immigrant neighbourhoods’ with their “garage mosques” as the “pressure cookers of discontent” and radicalization (see Ranstorp, 2015, 2010). It was not accidental that the first Efus-led European mayors’ summit took place in Aarhus in 2015; Aarhus, a city with a population of less than 250,000, had already been applauded for its radicalization prevention strategies explicitly targeting ‘the Muslim’ problem (see Anderson & Moe, 2015).

The targeting of ‘the Muslim’, as mentioned above, is a core ideology of radicalization prevention. What is specific to the Efus discourse is a seemingly scientific narrative that brings together the targeting of ‘the immigrant’/’Muslim’, area-based urban intervention, and development-oriented strategies. Its ideological tenets are the outcome of a linking of the geopolitics of the War on Terror, an environmentally deterministic, neocolonial urbanist ideology that perceives the urban form of the geographical concentration of non-White poverty as a bastion of threat and danger, and a liberal humanitarian ideology which advocates for civilizing the Other as the most sustainable way of
constructing liberal subjects. This ideological ensemble needs to be understood in relation to the historical production of ‘ungovernability’ in European cities, one that mediates and is mediated by urban and geopolitical imaginaries of danger and war.

**THE URBAN GEOPOLITICS OF TARGETING THE ‘BREEDING GROUNDS’**

In his introductory remarks to a series of policy recommendations to the EU, Herman van Rompuy (2017, p. 7), the president of the European Policy Centre, declared “Member States need to invest in education, housing, job opportunities and the like to foster the integration of Muslim communities in urban banlieues” (p. 7). The name “urban banlieues” is a tautology in terms, given banlieue (literally, suburb) is essentially a product of urbanization. Its redundancy, however, directs us to the “mediating and organizing relations of ruling” (Bannerji, 2000), including the ideologies and representations of space, that make the term sensible to policymakers. Since the 1980s, the term banlieue, as with quartier or inner-city, denote more than suburb, district or neighbourhood; they denote a social space characterized by urban deprivation, non-White immigration, marginality, and disorder. Banlieue, in particular, has become the social space associated with the formerly colonized and the excluded in the Metropole (Dikeç, 2007; Silverstein, 2018). For the likes of van Rompuy, the term “urban banlieue” makes sense precisely because they understand banlieue as not urban, at best less urban, where urban itself denotes the ‘civilized way of life’, the ‘European way of life’, as Jean-Claud Frécon (2015), the president of The Congress, reminded the attendees of the Aarhus Summit. “Urban banlieues” evokes an urban geopolitical imaginary of danger, that of the neocolonial Other so far and yet too close to the Metropole.

Cartographies of political fear within and without the domestic space are central to rendering Others as threatening (Dalby, 1990, 2007). By turning geographical specificities of insecurity into common sense, geopolitical ideologies play a major role in making such mapping of fear sensible. While feeding on a ravaging anti-Muslim racism as the current literature has highlighted, the current targeting of ‘the Muslim’ is also in relation to the cartographies of geopolitical fear arising particularly since the mid-twentieth century, building upon the earlier processes of racializing the internal enemy as ‘the immigrant’ in European cities (see Yilmaz, 2016; Lucassen, 2005). While this history goes back to at least the mid-nineteenth century (Lucassen, 2005), the contemporary recasting of ‘the immigrant’ as a security threat owes much of its legitimacy to the urban and geopolitical contexts in the aftermath of the collapse of modern European colonialism and the production of Europe’s domestic neocolonies – the ‘immigrant neighbourhoods’. The loosening of direct colonial domination also accompanied the deliberate reconstitution of former imperial and colonial subjects as foreigners, while exploiting their devalued labour and confining their living spaces within urban peripheries of the Metropole. In the post-
colonial era, European states have not only constantly changed citizenship and immigration laws, but have also taken on the task of rewriting their national histories by eliminating the fundamental role of migrant labour in building those imperial nations (Dixon, 1981; Lucassen, 2005; Thomas, 2006; Bhambra, 2017). During the same period, state urban and regional policies played an influential role in giving materiality to the neocolonies and new cartographies of danger in European cities. In linking urban politics to geopolitics in this conjuncture, Lefebvre (2009, p. 181) pointed to the ways that the state mobilized urban policy in order to sustain domination over the post-colonial ‘migrant’ by confining their lives to what he called the “internal colonies” of European cities, a process that has been central to the production of today’s ‘immigrant neighbourhoods’.

The recasting of ‘the immigrant’ as ‘the Muslim’ is traceable to the geopolitical struggles and ideologies in the late twentieth century. With the collapse of the Communist bloc and in the context of imperialist interventions and geopolitical struggles in the Middle East in the 1980s and 1990s, liberal and conservative forces in Europe (and the West) targeted political Islam as a threat to Western liberal democracy and its new imperialism (Mamdani, 2004). It is this historical production of neocolonies as peripheralized urban spaces in European cities that makes sensible the phrase “Muslims communities in urban banlieues” and the recasting of ‘immigrant neighbourhoods’ as the ‘breeding grounds’ of radicalization. And it is this relational historical production of ‘breeding grounds’, ‘immigrant neighbourhoods’, and state intervention that has yet to be scrutinized in the critical debates on radicalization prevention. Urban geopolitics (as an ideological ensemble) has played an important role in dehistoricizing this historical production.

On the global level, the shattering of modern European colonialism brought shifts in imperialist and colonial relations of ruling. Globalization, neoliberalization, re-territorialization, and the multiplication of regional proxy wars in the Global South became imperialist strategies of neocolonial domination. The consequences of these interventions, including extreme uneven development, deepening poverty, forced migration, and capitalist dependence on migrant labour for expansion have, in turn, been increasingly occluded by new concerns for security. Already by the 1990s, the discourse of human security in international relations explicitly identified migration – particularly migration from the Global South to the Global North – as a security issue for/in the West (Duffield, 2001, 2007). The concept of the ‘failed state’ as the ‘breeding ground’ for harbouring terrorism first came into the lexicon of international politics at this conjuncture (Call, 2008), when the nexus of security and development became an integral part of the liberal way of war. From Robert Kaplan (1994) and Gerald Helman and Steven Ranter (1999)

12 This is the period after the 1979 Iranian revolution, during which we were witnessed to the first Palestinian Intifada in 1987, the Rushdie Affair in 1989, and the first Gulf War in 1991.
to Thomas Barnett (2004), imperialist geopoliticians were quick to re-imagine underdevelopment and the ravages of neocolonial imperialism in former colonies as danger. These geopolitical imaginaries provided political and intellectual backdrops for well-rehearsed neocolonial cartographies of ‘failed’ states, ‘ungoverned spaces’ of violence, ‘gaps’ in global economy, and ‘hotbeds’ of anarchy, thus paving the way for humanitarian wars and later the War on Terror (see Duffield, 2001; Dalby, 2007; Elden, 2009). By 2006, the concept of ‘failed’ states significantly “shaped the way development, diplomatic and defence agencies viewed the nature of their enterprise and indeed how they viewed the world” (Call, 2008, p. 4).

We can detect parallel cartographies of danger and geopolitical fear, anchored in the nexus of security and development on the urban level during the same period. European cities have also been hit hard by uneven development, increasing socio-economic polarization, racial and spatial segregation, migratory movements, and the geographical concentration of poverty and wealth in and across cities (Porter & Craig, 2004; Brenner, 2004). This is the immediate context of the consolidation of ‘immigrant neighbourhoods’ and their territorial stigmatization (Wacquant, 2008) as ‘no-go zones’ of deviance and disorder. What has been dehistoricized in such ideological cartographies of danger is the fact that ‘immigrant neighbourhoods’ are the products of neoliberal state restructuring, urban uneven development, structural racism, colonial and imperial legacies of Othering, and area-based urban policies of social mixity and policing (Bridge, 1981; Diğeç, 2007, 2017; Kundnani, 2007; Flint & Robinson, 2008). Since the mid-2000s, the situation in ‘immigrant neighbourhoods’, whether inner city or suburban, had already become a theme in the mainstream academic debates on radicalization “in connection with the riots, torching of cars and incidents of stone-throwing against emergency services vehicles that have been witnessed around Europe” (Hörnvist & Flyghed, 2012, p. 328; see Fukuyama, 2006; Fraïhi, 2008; Marret, 2010; Anderson & Moe, 2015; Varvelli, 2016).

The assumedly scientific indicators that these academics use to redraw urban cartographies of the ‘breeding grounds’ of radicalization in European cities explicitly echoes the Failed States Index (now called the Fragile States index) proposed by the Fund for Peace in Foreign Policy magazine in 2005 (see Call, 2008, p. 1495), including high population density, poverty, political exclusion, crime, gangs, and racial/ethnic tensions. To this frenzy of expert knowledge, one also needs to add the gurus of Western counterinsurgency doctrine in the War on Terror. For David Kilcullen (2013) and John Nagl (2014), the consequences of rapid worldwide urbanization necessitates conducting counterinsurgency in the peripheralized urban spaces of metropolitan centres. For these military strategists of the War on Terror, future insurgencies will more and more spring from the slums of the Global South and the banlieues of the Global North rather than the mountains of Afghanistan. The military, they tell us,
should move to urban counterinsurgency and appropriate lessons from the fields of community policing through to community development and urban planning.

This territorialized and racialized representation of the ‘breeding grounds’ of radicalization in European cities also has echoes in the latest policy debates at the EU level. In his opening remarks to the 2018 EU Mayors’ conference, Karl-Heinz Lambertz, president of the Committee of the Regions, underlined the urgency of “multi-agency responses” to “the potential threats … which emerge from neighbourhoods in our cities … defined by social exclusion, unemployment, and low level of school attendance”. One comes across explicit namings such as “closed communities”, “no-go zones”, “ghettos”, and “disadvantaged neighbourhoods” in the EU parliamentary policy debates (PACE, 2015, pp. 3–5, 2016a, pp. 1–4; 2016b, pp. 1–3) and those of The Congress (2016a, p. 9). PACE has directly called for the use of urban policy to “invest in improving disadvantaged neighbourhoods and their social infrastructure” (2016b, p. 3). Importantly, the latter forms of naming and policy recommendations come from the closest EU allies of Efus. In her closing remarks to the 2018 EU Mayors’ conference, Corina Cretu, the EU Commissioner for Regional Policy, underlined “the importance of education, health care and urban regeneration” in the “ghettos” of European cities as the best way for preventing radicalization.

CONCLUSION

On February 26, 2019, the European Commission (EC) and the Committee of Regions (CR) held the second EU Mayors’ conference, EU Cities Against Radicalization, behind closed doors in Brussels. “Urban security”, the conference communiqué reads, “goes beyond measures to protect citizens against terrorist attacks, requiring a holistic approach addressing radicalization at the earliest possible stage” (EU, 2019, p. 2). In their opening remarks, Lambertz, Avramopoulos, and King all emphasized the success of the 2018 conference and the need for such gatherings to design and share preventive responses and establish partnerships. Besides representative from RAN and Efus, who were also present at the 2018 conference, this time representatives from Nordic Safe Cities, Strong Cities Network, and EU-funded Efus initiatives such as PRACTICES, PREPARE, and BRIDGE were also among the 150 attendees. The EU Commission allocated another immediate €115 million from the Internal Security Fund – Police for projects on radicalization prevention in 2019–2020 and another €25 million for the period of 2020–2024.


There are always complex chasms between such expert gatherings, policymaking, and policy implementations on the ground. As Jaminé and Fadil (2019) have shown in relation to youth social workers involved with deradicalization of returnees in Antwerp, Belgium, policy implementation “occurs through the constant interrogation of its objects, methods, and aims” (p. 170). Yet, the ideological dimension of a crisis, as the late Stuart Hall (1978) emphasized in Policing the Crisis (p. 219), is crucial in producing consent to “the interpretations and representations of social reality generated by those who control the mental, as well as the material, means of social reproduction” and “to the measures of control and containment which this version of social reality entails” (1978, p. 221). One of the aims of this paper was to direct attention to the increasingly organized multi-scalar political and expert forces behind making particular visions of reality by policymaking and some of the less scrutinized ways of their practices of articulation – categorizations, spatial designations, naming, and problematization.

Engaging with the politics of naming and problematizing in recent policy discourses and the political forces behind them, I argued that the ideology of radicalization prevention is not simply another façade of national security policy gone too far in its practices of securitization. Rather, it is a continuation of the liberal way of war in European cities, one that has been long practiced in the ‘ungoverned spaces’ of the Global South. This extension of liberal war into European cities is also accompanied by an increasing focus on the urban geopolitics of danger, a danger that is the relational outcome of the ungovernability of the Other at the urban and international scales and that blurs the spaces of liberal peace and war. In particular, I engaged with the ideologies of ‘holistic approach’ and ‘breeding grounds’, showing, on the one hand, their lineage in the strategies and geographical imaginaries of warfare such as counterinsurgency and the concept of ‘failed’ states. On the other hand, I showed how they have mediated and are mediated by the entry of urban experts and authorities into radicalization prevention debates, in the process legitimizing the targeting of poverty, ‘the immigrant’/‘Muslim’, and their living spaces as threats to peace and security.

I also engaged with the European Forum for Urban Security (Efus) as a major player in shaping the debates on the role cities in radicalization prevention and the 2018 EU Mayors’ conference. I showed the political work of urban experts in making sensible the ungovernability of deprived, majority non-White neighbourhoods and in governing the liberal way of war in such neighbourhoods. The gradual expert authority of Efus and the increasing level of secrecy in its activities, I argued, should warn us about the undemocratic aspects and pitfalls of the privatization of policymaking in the name of peace. It is not accidental that Efus, with its history in French urban policy for banlieues, has become an important expert and political force in the current debates on radicalization prevention. The transplantation of ‘ungovernability’ from the peripheralized geographies of the imperialist world order to ‘immigrant
neighbourhoods’ of European cities has not occurred in a void. Naming ‘immigrant neighbourhoods’ as ‘breeding grounds’ was made sensible because urban policy, policing, and media discourses had already made these marginalized, racialized, and segregated neighbourhoods ‘ungovernable’ in relation to poverty, deviance, and disorder.

What is erased and distorted in this ideological fixation with ‘immigrant neighbourhoods’ as ‘breeding grounds’ is that the visible social, racial, and morphological differences of these neighbourhoods with, indeed their segregation from, the ‘European’ city has been neither voluntary nor natural. Imperialist wars, uneven development, neoliberalization, and systemic racism along with economic crisis and the failed postwar urban visions have brought a real crisis of democracy, diversity, territorialisation, and security in European cities. If policymakers and politicians celebrate development-oriented approaches to radicalization prevention as a progressive step, neither in policy debates nor in policy solutions do they actually address, even mention, the real causes of the current crisis that is deepening in European cities. In fact, the real crisis has yet to be named.

The discussion here points to the gradual incorporation of radicalization prevention into the processes of urban governance. This is troubling because the very same urban practices that resulted in the production of ‘immigrant neighbourhoods’ as ‘ungovernable’ are now being advocated for breaking up the physical and social fabric of these neighbourhoods in the name of ‘neutralizing the breeding grounds’. There is an urgent need for conducting in-depth and on-the-ground research on the ways urban policy and radicalization prevention converge in the specific context of different cities. The specificities of such convergence – including the force of the colonial, imperial and national legacies; the role of various social and political forces; and the effects of such convergences on the everyday lives of those who are targeted and those who live in targeted neighbourhoods – need to be examined in specific contexts. In the time of unending wars, economic crisis, the electoral return of the hard-Right, and the recurrent urban uprisings of the excluded, what will be the consequences of the convergence of urban and war strategies in the name of safeguarding peace for democracy, social justice, and the right to urban life in European cities of the twenty-first century?

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