

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick

Permanent WRAP URL:

<http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/130713>

Copyright and reuse:

This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.

Please scroll down to view the document itself.

Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to cite it.

Our policy information is available from the repository home page.

For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk

**THE EMOTIONS OF SOCIAL CONTROL: A STUDY
OF PARANOIA IN POLICE OCCUPATIONAL CULTURE**

Sean Mark Watson

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Sociology)

At the University of Warwick

Department of Sociology

July 1996

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Please note that the contents are arranged by a 'nested' numbering system. Each successive column to the right is a subsection of the adjacent column to its left. So 4.3.3.2 is the second subsection of 4.3.3.0, and that in turn is the third subsection of 4.3.0.0, which itself is the third subsection of 4.0.0.0. Chapter 4 has too many sub-divisions to present in the table of contents. I have therefore listed only up to the third column in this table, and provided a full listing of chapter 4 in Appendix 2.

P1	<u>CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF AFFECT</u>
P1	1.0.0 The Bacchae
P3	1.1.0 Affective facts
P4	1.2.0 Affect in Classical Social Theory
P6	1.3.0 Harold Garfinkel: Social Trouble and the Sublime: <i>1.3.1 Objectification: 1.3.2 Distrust, Hatred, and Enjoyment.</i>
P10	1.4.0 Conclusion
P14	<u>CHAPTER 2: THE POLICE SUBJECT: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE</u>
P14	2.1.0 Introduction
P15	2.2.0 The Forging of a Police Identity
P20	2.3.0 Occupational Socialisation
P23	2.4.0 The General Characteristics of Police Occupational Culture <i>2.4.1 Indispensability, Apocalypse, Cynicism: 2.4.2 Suspicion and Stereotyping: 2.4.3 Racial Prejudice: 2.4.4 The Cult of Masculinity: 2.4.5 Conservatism: or the Suspicion of Difference.</i>
P36	2.5.0 Typologies of Policing
P37	2.6.0 Conclusion
P42	<u>CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHODS AND METHODOLOGY</u>
P42	3.0.0.0 Introduction
P42	3.1.0.0 Grounded-theory in Qualitative Research <i>3.1.1.0 Ontology and Epistemology, in "Grounded-Theory": 3.1.2.0 Description and Explanation Theorising in Grounded-theory: 3.1.3.0 Grounded-Theory Style Data-Gathering in Interviews: 3.1.3.1 Interview guides and techniques: 3.1.3.2 Doing Ethnographic Fieldwork: 3.1.3.3 Analyzing Interview and Fieldwork Data: 3.1.3.4 Analyzing Discourse: 3.1.3.5 The Object of Discourse Analysis.</i>
P54	3.2.0.0 The Research Narrative Part 1 <i>3.2.1.0 The Observational Fieldwork: 3.2.2.0 The Pilot Interview Study: 3.2.3.0 The Main Interview Study: 3.2.3.1 The locations: 3.2.3.2 The Sample: 3.2.4.0 The Interview Experience: 3.2.5.0 The First Analysis: 3.2.5.1 Thematized Collections: Lateral Coding: 3.2.5.2 Marginal Notes: 3.2.5.3 Editing: 3.2.5.4 Writing-Up: 3.2.5.5 What Next?</i>
P68	3.3.0.0 The Problem of Affect <i>3.3.1.0 Methodology and Affect: Foucault and Nietzsche</i>
P72	3.4.0.0 The Research Narrative Part 2 <i>3.4.1.0 Re-Working the First Report: 3.4.1.1 Vertical Coding: 3.4.1.2 The Final Writing-Up.</i>

- P80 **CHAPTER 4: THE RESEARCH FINDINGS** (full list appendix 2)
- P80 **4.0.0.0 Introduction**
- P83 **4.1.0.0 Part 1 - Affect at the Most General Level**
4.1.1.0 Feeling for right and wrong: 4.1.2.0 The enjoyment of closure: 4.1.3.0 Sources of bad feelings: 4.1.4.0 The management of bad feelings: 4.1.5.0 Splitting: 4.1.6.0 Permanent crisis.
- P101 **4.2.0.0 Part 2 - The Major Threatening Object**
*4.2.1.0 (Major object 1) The dangerous individual:
 4.2.2.0 (Major object 2) The criminal fraternity - material of everyday policing:
 4.2.3.0 (Major object 3) Problem families:
 4.2.4.0 (Major object 4) "The black problem":
 4.2.5.0 (Major object 5) Youth:
 4.2.6.0 (Major object 6) Alternative lifestyles.*
- P123 **4.3.0.0 Part 3 - The Minor Threatening Object**
*4.3.1.0 (Minor object group 1) Other policemen and the criminal justice system:
 4.3.2.0 (Minor object group 2) Agitators, trouble makers, middle class extremists:
 4.3.3.0 (Minor object 3) The mass media.*
- P129 **4.4.0.0 Part 4 - The Threatening Mechanism**
*4.4.1.0 (Mechanism group 1) The Threat to Disciplinary Processes and institutions:
 4.4.2.0 (Mechanism group 2) The ineffectiveness of punishment:
 4.4.3.0 (Mechanism group 3) Loss of respect, the problem of territory, and the sense of impotence:
 4.4.4.0 (Mechanism 4) Alcohol:
 4.4.5.0 (Mechanism 5) The ambivalence of class:
 4.4.6.0 Policing the explanation of crime.*
- P148 **4.5.0.0 Part 5 - The Ideal Object**
*4.5.1.0 (Ideal object 1) The family and the "respectable way of life":
 4.5.2.0 (Ideal object 2) The victim:
 4.5.3.0 (Ideal object 3) Extra legal protecting of the "community":
 4.5.4.0 (Ideal object 4) Interpreting the "spirit of the law" to serve "society":
 4.5.5.0 (Ideal object 5) Important and unimportant laws:
 4.5.6.0 (Ideal object group 6) Mr average, the woman, the child.*
- P153 **4.6.0.0 Part 6 - Affective Policing Styles**
4.6.1.0 The ambiguities of policing: 4.6.2.0 A desire for order: 4.6.3.0 Towards a typology of affective orientations: 4.6.4.0 "Sensitive" versus "positive" policing.
- P165 **4.7.0.0 Conclusion**
- P170 **CHAPTER 5: LACAN AND ZIZEK; SYMBOLIC CRISIS AND PARANOIA**
- P170 **5.0.0 Introduction**
- P170 **5.1.0 "Imaginary", "Symbolic" and "Real"**
- P171 **5.2.0 Lacan on Paranoia and the "Imaginary"**
5.2.1 The Police as the Social "Imaginary"
- P175 **5.3.0 Slavoj Zizek on the "Imaginary" and the "Symbolic"**
5.3.1 Symbolic Antagonism and Shame: 5.3.2 Sovereignty and Governmentality: 5.3.3 The Police and Governmentality: 5.3.4 "Symbolic" and "Imaginary" Identity in the Police: 5.3.5 Policing and Positivism.
- P186 **5.4.0 Zizek on the "Symbolic" and the "Real": Idiosyncratic Antagonism**

- 5.4.1 *Che Vuoi and the Sinhome.*
- P191 **5.6.0 Conclusion**
- P195 **CHAPTER 6. ENLIGHTENMENT AND ALIENATION FROM NATURE:
ADORNO AND HORKHEIMER'S THEORY OF MASS PARANOIA**
- P195 **6.0.0 Introduction**
- P195 **6.1.0 Self-Consciousness and Instrumentality as Alienation**
6.1.1 Paranoid projection: Ressentiment and the Forbidden Body.
- P199 **6.2.0 Fascism**
- P200 **6.3.0 Projection, False Projection and Scientific Rationality**
- P202 **6.4.0 The Inner and the Outer: Paranoia and the Desire for Control**
6.4.1 The Economic and the Psychic.
- P204 **6.5.0 Cultural Authoritarianism**
- P207 **6.6.0 Conclusion**
- P211 **CHAPTER 7: DISCIPLINE, GOVERNMENTALITY, AND DESIRING-
PRODUCTION**
- P211 **7.0.0 Introduction**
- P211 **7.1.0 Power/Knowledge**
7.1.1 The Science of Policing.
- P217 **7.2.0 The Neo-Nietzschean Subject**
7.2.1 The Role of Affect in Foucault's Work
- P223 **7.3.0 Deleuze and Guattari's theory of Desire, its Relationship to Foucault's
Power/Knowledge, and to Psychoanalysis**
7.3.1 Deleuze and Guattari's theory of Capitalism the state and Desiring-Machines.
- P227 **7.4.0 The Police and Re-Territorialisation**
- P230 **7.5.0 Conclusion**
- P234 **CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION**
- P243 **APPENDIX 1** The interviewees
- P245 **APPENDIX 2** A full listing of chapter 4
- P249 **BIBLIOGRAPHY**

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would firstly like to acknowledge the contribution of the men and women of the British police. The constabulary, together with the individuals involved, must remain anonymous. But I thank them for their patience and hope this thesis may be of some value to them. I would like to thank my supervisors Robert Fine and Peter Ratcliffe for all of their work and support over a number of years, together with the Sociology Department of the University of Warwick. I would also like to thank the Faculty of Economics and Social Science at the University of the West of England for their continued support. In particular I would like to thank my colleagues Peter Jowers, Jem Thomas, Simon Thompson, and Colwyn Jones, both for invaluable discussions of the ideas contained in this thesis and for their help in proof reading and giving comments on drafts. Most of all I would like to thank Lidia who has given me support and put up with me throughout.

DECLARATION

Sections of Chapter 5 were published in an earlier form in the following article.

S. Watson, 'Symbolic Antagonism: Police Paranoia and the Possibility of Social Diversity', in J. Weeks The Lesser Evil and the Greater Good: The Theory and Politics of Social Diversity. Rivers Oram, London, 1994.

Small sections of Chapters 5, 6 and 7 appeared in an earlier form in the following article.

P. Jowers and S. Watson, 'Somatology: Towards a Sociology of the Visceral', in D. Owen, Sociology after Postmodernism. Sage, London, 1997.

All sections from the latter publication appearing in this thesis were written by myself alone.

SUMMARY

This thesis has several linked focuses:

1. I have argued for, and begun to develop, a theoretical and methodological framework too enable sociological research to encompass the affective dimension of human experience and action.
2. I have put forward a model of culture as an affective phenomenon inhabiting the space between two poles of affective orientation. One pole can be characterised as desiring change, fluidity, difference, and complexity. The other pole involves an enjoyment of order, and stasis, a strong tendency to split the world into 'good' and 'bad', together with a suspicion of complexity, change, and the 'other'. The latter of these two affective/cultural poles I have characterised as 'paranoid'.
3. I have explored, by means of non-participant observation and an interview study (37 interviews), the extent and nature of paranoid affective forms within police occupational culture. This is an examination of the affective cultural repertoires available to the police, and the subject positions they may therefore occupy within that cultural fabric (not an examination of psychopathology). I have gained evidence of a fragmentary, ambivalent and dynamic culture with distinct paranoid forms.
4. I have engaged with a number of theoretical sources in order to begin to develop a means for explaining my findings. In particular I have drawn on the work of Jaques Lacan, Slavoj Zizek, Theadore Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. This is complex material and a good deal of space has been devoted to explaining the relevant aspects of their theoretical systems. I have begun, however, to apply them to the question of police cultural paranoia with some success. The bipolar model of affect/culture is a common feature of all of these theorists and has enabled me to use their work to begin to link police cultural paranoia to our own paranoid visions, and to certain aspect of modernity as a whole.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF AFFECT

1.0.0 The Bacchae

In Euripides' play The Bacchae the god Dionysus appears in the hills near Thebes. He is the god of nature, of flux and transformation, he is also the god of intoxication, revelry, and religious ecstasy. In the concept of ecstasy we perhaps find the real key to Dionysus. Ecstasy comes from ek-stasis - "put out of place or kind, more generally, an overpowering emotion or state of sudden intense rapturous delight or religious frenzy".¹ It stands in contrast to stasis - fixity, persistence, order - life versus death perhaps. More on stasis later.

Dionysus has another more terrible side however. Under certain conditions the forces which he commands can flip from rapturous delight into murderous frenzy. This is the central theme of Euripides' tragedy. Dionysus is a shatterer of boundary and code, a dissolver of the ego, a source of fluidity, hybridity and desire - creativity and destructiveness. How can such a god be honoured without destroying the polis?

Dionysus demands to be honoured but is denied by Pentheus, the young king of Thebes. In anger he liberates the women of the city from their traditional bonds and leads them into the hills and into madness. The central tragic figure of the play is the young king. His wise advisors, who have already dressed themselves as Bacchantes and are ready to go into the hills to join the revels, suggest that he should indeed honour the god, by means of traditional ritual - they are true Durkheimians. The Dionysian forces cannot be denied they must be honoured and assimilated as a force for, not against, collective life. Pentheus however will have none of it. He rejects Dionysus's divinity and "resorts to threats of force expressed in the language of hunting, trapping, imprisoning, binding, encircling".² In short he is determined to control and crush the forces of Dionysus.

But of course the god is defined by his/her (for this is a an androgenous god) multiplicity of form, unrepresentability, refusal of categories and boundaries - refusal of 'closure' and 'self-presence', in the post-modern parlance. Dionysus cannot be mastered.

Pentheus's imagination runs out of control as his fantasy projections escalate. He perceives a world full of enemies with bad motives and threatening qualities. He on the other hand is beyond reproach. What he thirsts for most of all is power for the purpose of controlling and domesticating the wildness which threatens him, apparently from the outside, but in reality from himself, from his own foreclosed nature which he fears.

Projection, hatred, fear and the will to control combine with fascination and ultimately desire for the 'other'. That which Pentheus denies, becomes, inevitably it seems, the object of his desire. Finally Dionysus binds Pentheus in the chains of his denial and desire, dresses him as a woman and leads him up into the hills to be physically dismembered in a horrific frenzy led by his own mother, who parades around holding her sons head thinking it the head of a lion.

As J.P. Euben rightly argues, this is not simply the story of the dismemberment of Pentheus but of Thebes, Athens, of civilisation itself. The word for dismemberment, to tear to pieces, rent asunder, transgress, is 'diasparakton'. It is a story first of all of an

erosion of old myths and forms, *a wasting away of the feeling they once evoked*, an increasingly disjointed and inconsistent expression of ideas, *a nervous insistence upon the old forms* and references together with more and more arbitrary and extravagant manipulation of them.³ (my emphasis)

This is followed, of course, by paranoid and destructive denial of The Dionysian forces themselves with inevitable consequences. If a space is not found for these forces to be recognised and affirmed then they first energise (as in Pentheus) the will-to-control and ultimately, as this will is frustrated, return as frenzy, paranoia and destruction.

The Bacchae captures in the most fantastic form many of the themes I wish to touch on in this thesis.

At the Nietzschean end of the post-structuralist terrain lies the all pervading nature of the body and its affective forces, their role in group life, and the nature of and consequences of their denial. More particularly, a complex relationship exists between fluidity, 'becoming' and the blurring of boundaries, on the one hand, and the affective will to order, control and stasis, and 'being' on the other. The dangerous and unmasterable volatility of the 'Dionysian dialectic'.

At the Hegelian end of the same terrain lies the anxiety and potential destructiveness associated with the problems of representation, recognition and misrecognition, self presence and self mastery, identity, and 'lack' of closure.

1.1.0 Affective facts

As Slavoj Žižek argues, the purely textual, deconstructive moment of discourse analysis misses something crucial. This something he calls the "kernel of Enjoyment" which *affectively attaches* us to ideology or discourse. In his remarkable book, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, Slavoj Žižek makes a point which goes to the heart of the most serious weakness of most modern social theory:

At first it would seem that what is pertinent in an analysis of ideology is only the way it functions as discourse, the way the series of floating signifiers is totalised, transformed into a unified field through the intervention of certain 'nodal points'... But the case of so-called 'totalitarianism' demonstrates what applies to every ideology, to ideology as such: the last support of the ideological effect (of the way an ideological network of signifiers 'holds' us) is the non-sensical, pre-ideological kernel of enjoyment. In ideology 'all is not ideology (that is ideological meaning)', but it is this very surplus which is the last support of ideology. That is why we could say that there are also two complementary procedures of the 'criticism of ideology':

one is discursive, the 'symptomal reading' of the ideological text bringing about the 'deconstruction' of the spontaneous experience of its meaning - that is, demonstrating how a given ideological field is a result of a montage of heterogeneous 'floating signifiers', of their totalization through the intervention of certain 'nodal points':

the other aims at extracting the kernel of enjoyment, at articulating the way in which - beyond the field of meaning but at the same time internal to it - an ideology implies, manipulates, produces a pre-ideological enjoyment structured in fantasy.⁴

How do ideas, institutions and practices, regardless of their particular content, capture us affectively? Why do we feel pleasure at the utterance of certain discourse and deep displeasure, anxiety, horror, hatred etc at the utterance of others? Why are we willing to kill or be killed for a nation, race, political principle, utopian ideal, and so on? Why do we love, desire, worship, some objects in our ideological field and hate, loath, fear others? Why and how are we affectively bound to social practices in general, and in particular the urge to control, normalise and purify? How and why are men sometimes led out of their houses, into the hills, and into destructive frenzy?

It has been deemed imperative under the aegis of an Enlightenment which refused to honour Dionysus, to separate out reason from 'the passions' in order that rational political and scientific thought and action could march on their way, uninfected by the "dark forces". This has remained the case until the present day. Even for Jurgen Habermas, the most sophisticated of contemporary defenders of Enlightenment rationality, the ultimate objective is a communication free of power and passion - the "ideal speech situation".⁵ Just as Michel Foucault has asserted the omnipresence of power, so it is time to re-assert the affective nature of all thought and action.

Clearly this is not an entirely new theme. A whole tradition exists around Spinoza, Nietzsche and Freud. Attacked, despised, projected upon - it has received, and still receives the kind of loathing projected upon Dionysus in Euripides' tragedy.⁶ What is more important however is sociology's own denial of Dionysus.

1.2.0 Affect in Classical Social Theory

The affective forces appear in the classic works of Marx, Weber and Durkheim but in highly truncated form. For much of Marx's work they are abstracted from the body as the *forces* of production, or more specifically labour *power*. The only place where they appear as relatively embodied forces is in The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, as a kind of sensuality limited to the desire to objectify one's will through labour-power, in communion with others.⁷ This is conceived of as a purely constructive and cooperative force. There is no sense of the flip side - of destructiveness, hatred, psychotic paranoia. Nor is there any sense of the paranoid roots of the 'desire for mastery' which may underlie such a will to objectify. Affect re-appears in volume one of Capital as the "fetishism of commodities".⁸ Flows of energy (the relations of exchange of labour power) focused into an object - the commodity - causing it to appear to have miraculous qualities (what Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari call a "miraculated object"⁹). There Marx's own analysis ends.

In Weber we find the process of rationalisation and the whole of capitalist economic behaviour driven by an affective phenomenon, "salvation anxiety".¹⁰ This is a foreshadowing, albeit a limited one, of the post-structuralist analysis. This is an anxiety born of a crisis of representation (the impossible double bind of pre-destination and limited salvation) as such it is Hegelian in character rather than Nietzschean. It seems to pre-empt Jaques Lacan's and Slavoj Zizek's Hegelian metaphysics of 'lack', as I shall show in Chapter 5.

In Durkheim we find, of course, a real concern with the creative and destructive Dionysian forces

we have seen that if collective life awakens religious thought on reaching a certain degree of intensity, it is because it brings about a state of effervescence which changes the conditions of psychic activity. Vital energies are over excited, passions more active, sensations stronger; there are even some which are produced only at this moment. A man does not recognise himself; he feels himself transformed and consequently he transforms the environment which surrounds him. In order to account for the very particular impressions he receives, he attributes to the things with which he is in most direct contact properties which they have not, exceptional powers and virtues which the objects of the every-day experience do not possess.¹¹

As is well known Durkheim goes on to claim that the religious form can be found in many superficially secular phenomena. It is not always clear, however, whether a religious community uses the rite to 'find itself' in Dionysian ecstasy as suggested above or whether the rite is a means to ward off or contain Dionysian forces. It may be that there are in fact two different (but overlapping) kinds of community in Durkheim's work. One united by religious ecstasy and one united by paranoid exclusion and boundary keeping. The rite may play a different role in each. This recalls the opposition in *The Bacchae* between the Dionysian community of fluidity, becoming and religious ecstasy on the one hand and Pentheus's community of paranoia, order, control and stasis on the other. It is also clear that one could very easily tip over into the other - as we have already seen. What is certain is that for Durkheim the loss of convincing focuses for affective forces (sacred rites etc) is the road to anomie and the unleashing of Dionysian forces. The ambivalent qualities of such focusing of collective affect into particular social practices, rituals, beliefs, and so on, is a key theme for this thesis.

At a more general level Durkheim says of affect that

The differences and resemblances which determine the fashion in which they [things and people] are grouped are more affective than intellectual...it is this emotional value of notions which plays the preponderant part in the manner in which ideas are connected or separated. It is the dominant characteristic in classification.¹²

All of this is of course lost in the readings of Marx, Weber and Durkheim which have dominated the sociological tradition in the 20th century. Most recent versions of the Marxist class actor are cool rational pursuers of class-interest, or if they are not it is because they have been ideologically duped. The only alternative to this view is one where class actors are 'structural dopes' - empty, passionless, Althusserian

computers into which structural coordinates are fed. A similar fate awaited Durkheim at the hands of the structural-functionalists and social ecologists.¹³ The "conscience collective" is transformed from a transcendental force field binding humans into an affective unity, into a set of normative rules fed into "cultural dopes".¹⁴ Similarly the theme of anxiety virtually disappears in most contemporary readings of Weber. If the themes of asceticism and salvation anxiety appear at all they do so in a tagged on form. They seem to be a side issue, a diversion, rather than the core of the problem.

The structuralist tradition - structural anthropology and semiotics - similarly present human beings as affectless 'structural dopes', though this has been rescued through the recapturing of the spirit of Durkheim and Mauss by the post-structuralists, via the influence of George Bataille and the College of Sociology.¹⁵

In many ways it is the pervasive influence of positivism which is responsible for this corpse at the centre of our discipline. Positivism is the great denier of the affective forces. Here the passions are thoroughly off limits, particularly at the reflexive level. Positivism cannot conceive of itself as a social phenomenon, most of all it cannot conceive of itself as driven by passions. It is supposed to be pure, transparent, disinterested - a method, nothing more. Certainly it is not supposed to be a will to mastery, order and control. It is the dominance of this blindness in the 20th century sociological tradition which has driven the consideration of affect to the margins.

1.3.0 Harold Garfinkel: Social Trouble and the Sublime

Despite being pushed to the margins, affect constantly forces its way into the picture. It is often hoped that it can be contained within categories such as 'the irrational' or 'intuitive' - as though it were one type of thought and action amongst many - and a relatively minor one at that - an aberration even. It is possible to find endless examples of the affective forces subverting sociological texts which deny them a place. However I should like to confine myself to describing one particularly famous text in which affect exploded into view, was clearly acknowledged and affirmed as fundamental by the researcher concerned, and then was never commented on again either by himself or his commentators as far as I am aware. I refer to Harold Garfinkel's Studies in Ethnomethodology.¹⁶

Ethnomethodology is of course the one honourable exception to the mainstream tendency to view the individual as a cultural dope. It constantly reiterates the claim that we are active seekers of meaning. But what exactly does this 'activeness' consists of. Garfinkel in fact tells us quite clearly.

Much of Garfinkel's experimental work (if one can call it that given his critique of traditional 'scientific' epistemology and methodology) revolved around the *disturbance* of background expectancies, interpretive rules, tacit knowledge etc. He says "Procedurally it is my preference to start with familiar scenes and ask what can be done to make *trouble*." The result of such "trouble" making are dramatic but for him they are, in a sense, beside the point since they are simply devices for examining the "natural attitude" itself; for 'noticing' what usually goes 'unnoticed'. He tries to push the effects of ontological disturbance to the margins but they keep coming back to centre ground.

In one experiment Garfinkel suggests to his students that they describe the goings on in their own homes as though they were boarders with limited background knowledge. The initial result was that the lack of management of impression, politeness, table manner, the presence of hostile motivations, and all of the other everyday aspects of family life, all became "discomfortingly visible". Students expressed discomfort and a desire to return to the "real me". Also "Students were convinced that the view from the 'boarders' perspective was 'not their real home environment'"¹⁷. So far so good. The link between 'real events' and 'background knowledge' is clear. But something else began to manifest itself. This was the link between disturbance of background knowledge and *affect*. Soon this link became blindingly clear

When students used these background expectancies [those of a boarder] not only as ways of looking at familiar scenes but as grounds for acting in them, the scenes exploded with the *bewilderment and anger* of family members.¹⁸ (my emphasis)

What Garfinkel reports next is even more instructive.

They [the families] vigorously sought to make the strange actions intelligible and to restore the situation to normal appearances. Reports were filled with accounts of *astonishment, bewilderment, shock anxiety, embarrassment, and anger*, and with charges by various family members that the student was *mean, inconsiderate, selfish, nasty, or impolite*.¹⁹ (my emphasis)

Anxiety is raised by disturbing background expectancies, 'making strange', invoking the uncanny. It is then reduced through making actions intelligible by attributing moral badness to (in this case) the experimenter. The amorphous anxiety is turned into the intelligible emotion of anger only after the action has been made intelligible, and order re-established in this way.

While he draws attention to these responses to the breakdown of intelligibility he does not comment on the wider social implications of the projection of moral badness in response to such breakouts of the uncanny. Indeed he passes over it very quickly.²⁰

1.3.1 Objectification.

So "sublime" transgressions are dealt with retrospectively.²¹ Accounts are given, and we have 'knowledges', 'discourses', 'interpretive repertoires' which enable such accounts. These are the knowledges relating to madness, criminality and other behavioural pathologies. It is Michel Foucault's work which has been most concerned with this domestication of the "sublime" through the discourses of madness, delinquency and sexuality.²²

Garfinkel potentially provides a theory which begins to touch on the relationship between the fragility of the fabric of tacit knowledges/expectancies and the production of affect. In particular we can see the way that anxiety associated with this fragility is channelled into structured emotion through a cultural framework. We can see that this transformation involves objectifying/subsuming/assimilating disturbances of social 'reality' into commonsense discourses.

Finally we can see that this objectification, this bringing of 'chaos' under the control of tacit knowledges and expectancies, involves attributing moral badness, or some substitute for it (anti-social tendencies, lunacy, evil intentions, hatred and malevolence, etc.), to some party in the 'event'.

After having uncovered these links Garfinkel himself seems deeply puzzled.

Despite the interest in *social affects* that prevails in the social sciences, and despite the extensive concern that clinical psychiatry pays them, surprisingly little has been written on the socially constructed conditions for their production. The role that a background of common understandings plays in their production, control, and recognition is, however, almost terra incognita. This lack of attention from experimental investigators is all the more remarkable if one considers that it is precisely this relationship that persons are concerned with in their common sense portrayals of *how to conduct one's daily affairs so as to solicit enthusiasm and friendliness or avoid anxiety, guilt, shame, or boredom.*²³ (My emphasis)

In relation to sociological investigation he makes the same claim.

Under these circumstances it is more accurate to talk of investigators *acting in fulfilment of their hopes, or in avoidance of their fears*, than of acting in the deliberate and calculated realization of a plan.²⁴ (My emphasis)

Based on the results of experiments involving systematic rule transgression (invading body space, bargaining for fixed price items in shops, etc.) he makes it quite clear that *when sociologists (and others) talk about members of society 'operating according to the rules' what they really mean is that people avoid the anticipatory anxiety of breaking the rules*²⁵. Indeed "the more important the rule, the greater is the likelihood that knowledge is based on avoided tests."²⁶ This brings affect, as the motor of sociation, right into the centre of the analytical field.

Garfinkel made these observations almost 30 years ago yet the "terra incognita" he refers to remains relatively unexplored sociologically.

1.3.2 Distrust, Hatred, and Enjoyment.

In further investigating the relationship between tacit knowledge and affect Garfinkel embarked on what (especially in the context of a study of the police subject) is a fascinating strategy.

The existence of a definite and strong relationship between common understandings and social affects can be demonstrated and some of its features explored by the deliberate display of *distrust* [however]... With many students the assumption that the other person was not what he appeared to be and was to be distrusted was the same as the attribution that *the other person was angry with them and hated them*.²⁷ (My emphasis)

Systematic and universal incredulity cannot, then, easily serve as a basis for social interaction²⁸. It leads directly into paranoid fantasies. I say that this is fascinating because of course the police subject operates under a rule of universal incredulity.

Garfinkel records another, even stranger, phenomenon however. Quoting a student experimenter he says...

"once I started acting the role of a hated person I actually came to feel somewhat hated and by the time I left the table I was quite angry." Even more surprising to us, many reported that *they found the procedure enjoyable and this included the real anger not only of*

*others but their own.*²⁹ (My emphasis)

Garfinkel mentions this only in passing. This 'enjoyment' of hatred/anger - a willingness to believe that others hate you and threaten you and therefore deserve to be hated and struck down in turn - is I think a fascinating emotional orientation to the world and one which, as I will show, is at the heart of the police officer's experience of the world.

Notwithstanding all his ingenuity Garfinkel says nothing about the wider social and political implications of affect driven objectification of social scapegoats who serve as a symbolic focus for this underlying 'well' of what Anthony Giddens (following R. D. Laing) has called "ontological insecurity" or "existential anxiety".³⁰ Dealing with the "sublime" often seems to involve moralising and pathologising. Who gets moralised and pathologised, how, and why?

1.4.0 Conclusion

I have begun to sketch out, then, some general theoretical themes which form a backdrop to this thesis.

1. That social reality is an affective reality, driven by the interaction between cultural forms and bodily forces. This has been suppressed as an issue within the sociological tradition but we don't have to look far in order to unearth it.

2. By 'bodily forces' I mean precisely that. The body is a dynamic, energised system. It 'burns' fuel to generate thermal, kinetic, electrical, and chemical energy. It is this complex, energised system which is acculturated when the human organism becomes social. Friedrich Nietzsche and Sigmund Freud began to explore the question of how such an acculturation of the human organism could occur.³¹ The thinkers I have looked at in chapters 5, 6, and 7 of this thesis are some of those who have carried on this exploration.

3. When (using Zizek's vocabulary) I speak of "enjoyment" I am referring to the way in which the 'bodily forces' I have identified above are brought into coordination with one another at the collective level. We do not simply *have* beliefs, values, common practices and so on, we are somatically embedded in them, we are *attached* to them emotionally.

4. Individual bodies are not fixed within such "structures of enjoyment" they are dynamic and mobile. We will find that such "structures" are, in any case, fragmentary and full of ambivalence. They are the materials

out of which we make-sense of the world, and that making-sense is always an affective phenomenon. As individuals a variety of different possible ways of interpreting the world are available to us. These positions from which we may experience and interpret the world I shall refer to as 'affective subject positions'.

5. Such collective affective dynamics inhabit a bipolarity between *fluidity, ambivalence, change, dissolution, difference and 'becoming'*, on the one hand and *order, control, capture, stasis and 'being'*, on the other. Somewhere in the tension between these poles is a simultaneous capacity for both creativity and violent destructiveness. I shall refer to this bipolarity as the 'Dionysian dialectic'.

5. At a more mundane level people hate, do violence, moralise, exclude, include, belong, identify and so on because they 'enjoy' doing so. People also often fear the confusion and anxiety which comes with ambiguity, the breaking down of boundaries and rapid change. Some people of course may have the strength to tolerate and even celebrate the creative opportunities inherent in such conditions of change and hybridity but that perhaps only makes them more certain to become the objects of paranoid suspicion.

In order to begin to unravel some of the question which need to be addressed with regard to these themes this thesis undertakes a study of the affective dynamics of one particular cultural milieu, that of the police. In Chapter 2 I shall review to what extent police studies research in the area of police occupational culture has uncovered a proclivity towards paranoia, suspicion of difference, anxiety, fear of ambiguity, and a tendency to divide the world into fairly rigid categories. In other words many of the characteristics of the paranoid pole of the 'Dionysian dialectic'. After outlining my research methods in Chapter 3, I shall lay out some of my own research finding with regard to the affective forms of police occupational culture in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5 I set out the theoretical approaches to collective paranoia found in the work of Jaques Lacan and Slavoj Zizek, and analyze some of the major features of police paranoia using their schemas. In Chapter 6 I will look at Adorno and Horkheimers' work, which retains its power as the twentieth century's preeminent study of collective violence as mass paranoia. In Chapter 7 I set out a Foucauldian/Deleuzian framework as a means for understanding the affective dynamics of policing in the wider context of the affective dynamics of modernity. In Chapter 8 I shall summarise my thesis before setting out some brief thoughts about the possible future direction of affect research in the social sciences.

This thesis is then, in part, an exploration of the extent to which paranoid affect inhabits the modern idea and reality of policing. This not intended to be a static account of the fixed psychology of individual officers. Instead it is an examination of paranoia as a cultural phenomenon. This exploration is part of a wider concern with developing a social theory of paranoia, and collective affect in general.

Notes

1. J. Peter Euben. The Tragedy of Critical Theory: The Road Not Taken. Princeton University Press. Princeton New Jersey, 1990, Ch 5 'Membership and Dismembership in the Bacchae'.
2. Ibid. p140.
3. Ibid. p134
4. Slavoj Zizek. The Sublime Object of Ideology. Verso. London. 1989. p124
5. J. Habermas. Communication and the Evolution of Society. trans. Thomas McCarthy. Heinemann. London. 1979.
6. See for example F. Crews ongoing campaign in the New York Review of Books, in particular F. Crews, 'The Unknown Freud', in The New York Review of Books. Vol. XI, No 19, Nov. 18, 1993.
7. K. Marx. 'Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts', in Early Writings. Penguin. London. 1984, pp322-334. This is the section on 'Estranged Labour' where Marx is of course describing man's alienation from his own "active function, from his *vital activity*." (p328).
8. K. Marx. Capital vol. I. Penguin Edition. Harmondsworth, 1979, pp163-177.
9. This will be discussed fully in Chapter 7.
10. M. Weber. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. trans. T. Parsons. Unwin, London. Ch4 (particularly p 110 and fn40). Also H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds). From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Routledge, 1991. Part III section XIII.
11. E. Durkheim. The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. George Allen and Unwin. London. 1964. p422.
12. E. Durkheim. The Division of Labour in Society. Free Press, New York, 1964, pp 85-6.
13. A reassessment of Durkheim has been taking place in recent years however. In particular see P. Mestrovic. The Coming Fin de Siecle. Routledge. London. 1991.
14. The term "cultural dopes" is used by Garfinkel in his criticism of structural functionalist sociology. H. Garfinkel. Studies in Ethnomethodology. Prentice Hall, 1967.
15. For some fascinating insights into the vast, and reverberating, effects of this subterranean influence see D. Hollier (ed), The College of Sociology 1937-39. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1988.
16. H. Garfinkel. op cit.
17. Ibid p46.
18. Ibid p47.

19. Ibid p47

20. Another important analysis of the relationship between transgression of background structures and the attribution of moral badness and pollution is Mary Douglas's work. M. Douglas, Purity and Danger. Routledge, London, 1978.

21. By sublime I mean transgressions which are transgressions by virtue of their unintelligibility. For the definitive contemporary account of the concept of 'the sublime' see the work of J.F. Lyotard especially 'The Sublime and The Avant Garde' in A. Benjamin (ed). The Lyotard Reader. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1989, pp196-211. For an excellent overview of Lyotard's use of the concept see P. Jowers, 'Towards the Politics of a Lesser Evil', in J. Weeks, The Lesser Evil and the Greater Good: The Theory and Politics of Social Diversity. Rivers Oram, London, 1994, pp179-200. Jowers defines the sublime as "A lack of reality [which] is a form of 'ontological dislocation'. Associated with it is an *intensification of feeling*" (original italics). There can be no doubt that this is precisely what Garfinkel is producing with his "trouble".

22. M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish. Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1987. M. Foucault, Madness and civilisation. London, Routledge, 1989. M. Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction. Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1987.

23. H. Garfinkel. op cit, p49.

24. Ibid p98.

25. Ibid pp69-70.

26. Ibid p70.

27. H. Garfinkel. op cit, pp50-51.

28. This of course is the origin of Habermas's claim that 'truthful' self disclosure is one of the transcendental and therefore universal validity claims in the pragmatics of communication. J. Habermas, The Theory of communicative Action (vol 1). (translated by Thomas McCarthy). Heinemann, London, 1984. pp22-42 (the notion of 'universal validity claims' is used throughout Habermas's later work).

29. H. Garfinkel. op cit, p52.

30. A. Giddens, Modernity and Self Identity. Cambridge. Polity Press, 1991, pp35-69.

31. For a clear indication of the extent of the grounding of Freud's psychology in the body see S. Freud, 'Project for a Scientific Psychology', in The Standard Edition of The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, trans J Strachey, Vol. I. Hogarth Press, London, 1964. Frank Sulloway argues persuasively that this approach remained with Freud throughout his life. F. S. Sulloway, Freud: Biologist of the Mind. Burnett Books, London, 1979. For a stimulating discussion of Freud's neuro-science see C. Gilmour, 'Freud's Androids', in J. Neu (ed). The Cambridge Companion to Freud. Cambridge, Cambridge, 1991.

CHAPTER 2: THE POLICE SUBJECT: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

2.1.0 Introduction

Since the early 1960s the institution of policing has become a popular object of social scientific study. There are no doubt many reasons for this. Perhaps the sense amongst critical social scientists that the police, represent in some highly concentrated form, the combination of ideological and coercive state apparatus peculiar to political hegemony in Western democracies. Another source of interest have been the repeated corruption and brutality scandals both in Europe and the United States. There may also have been a growing sense of unease about whether the police really do what they are supposed to do, or what we always assumed they did: and if they don't then what *is* their function? Perhaps most importantly there is a sense in which the police are regarded as 'not like us', we seem to have a quite alien and separate culture right here amongst us. Anthropologists don't need to go to the Sudan or the Amazon to find strange and exotic 'forms of life', they are right here in our police stations. This is combined, however, with a powerful sense of "uncanny strangeness".¹ The police are not like us but at the same time they are absolutely like us - they are an embodiment of certain qualities we all recognise (often at an unconscious level) in ourselves.

This, I would argue, is at the heart of the fascination with police occupational culture, the sense that it can tell us something profound about ourselves that we 'know but do not know'. It is a phenomenon out on the limits, defining the boundary of who we are at a deep level. This, at least, has been my own experience in my contacts with the police. I have found their behaviour and beliefs sometimes puzzling, and objectionable, at one level, but at another I have had the uneasy sensation that I knew exactly where they were coming from. If put into their position I knew I would probably be just the same. But just the same in what sense? I don't share their major beliefs and prejudices, in terms of content (though of course I have my own prejudices). It seems to me that what I saw of them in me were the emotional undercurrents which form the foundation of the police officer's attachments and reactions to the world. These emotional undercurrents are revealed in the *form* of their beliefs, interactions, and practices.

What I mean by this is that the detailed *content* may change. For example we may find that the police are particularly disgusted by, and suspicious of Irish immigrants in one historical period, and New Age Travellers in another. The content varies but the *form* (the tendency to split the world into the 'respectable' and the alien, dirty, and inherently criminal, the feelings of threat and hostility, and so on) may change less. I do not mean to imply by this that the content is somehow unimportant. In my research findings I shall be

charting this content in close detail. And I have, where appropriate, made suggestions in chapters 5,6, and 7 regarding the specific historical origins of the police concern with the 'problem family', the 'delinquent', the 'dangerous individual', and other specific categories of threatening 'other'.² But having charted the detailed content my main focus will be on the patterns of affective form (splitting, projection, feelings of threat and hostility and so on).

I shall show in this chapter that certain forms of belief and interaction with the world have emerged in the literature on police occupational culture. The fact that this may reveal structures of emotional response to the world seems not to have been registered by police studies researchers however. It will be the purpose of this thesis to pursue that theme along with the notion that these affective currents can be understood in relation to the wider social structures and processes of modernity.

First, though, it often seems that the best time to see a social phenomenon most clearly is on its boundaries, when it is just 'becoming itself', or just 'ceasing to be'. There one can see, to some extent, the many forces which contribute to its existence. The rest of the time it is so taken for granted that it becomes almost invisible. For this reason I will begin by looking at the historical emergence of the police subject in section 2.2.0 and occupational socialisation in section 2.3.0.³

In section 2.4.0 I shall look at what past research has claimed to be the main characteristics of this police occupational culture. In section 2.5.0 I will look briefly at a typology of police officers.⁴

2.2.0 The Forging of a Police Identity

While there has been a good deal of historical work conducted on the establishment of professional publicly funded policing, as an organisation, in the nineteenth century, less has focused on the creation of an *occupational culture* and a *collective identity subject*, amongst Victorian British policemen. One study that does is the outstanding work of Carolyn Steedman.⁵

Steedman points out that most police history describes the developments which followed the County and Borough Police Act of 1856 in terms of an imposition of the patterns of policing of the city onto the town and countryside: in particular the adoption of the model of the Metropolitan Police.⁶ She argues that this is not a strictly accurate characterisation of events. There are a number of reasons for this, not least the fact that, rather than centralising authority with the Home Office, as the Metropolitan Police Act had, the new Act actually strengthened the power of the petty-sessional divisions run by the local magistracy. More

importantly from the point of view of the development of police occupational culture, was the fact that the vast majority of recruits to the lower ranks were working class men from the countryside, not from the cities. This was a deliberate policy which followed logically from principles voiced by Peel at the time of the Metropolitan Police Act. "In the novelty of the present establishment, particular care is to be taken that the constables of the police do not form false notions of their duties and powers".⁷ Consequently an effort was made to recruit men "who had not the rank, habits or station of gentlemen".⁸ Steedman argues that it went further than this, however. The manners and customs of rural class hierarchy, deference and obedience on the one side, and the ability to command and carry an aura of natural authority on the other, were to be reproduced as principles of police organisation. In the period examined by her, 1856-80, a strict separation existed between the lower ranks of constable and sergeant and the officer ranks of inspector and above.

Police officers were recruited as officers, drawn from the ranks of failed farmers, former land agents, bailiffs and clerks. The men under them, unimportant working-class men, were recruited and maintained as such by a local police hierarchy and local government. What was bought when a rural labourer signed a police recruitment form was not just his willingness to work for low wages, but his understanding and acceptance of a set of social relationships. This understanding was sought out, and paid for, by rural police authorities and urban watch committees alike.⁹

The police constable was perceived and treated as a paid *servant* of the propertied. It was made quite clear that the function of their discretionary powers was to enable them to make *distinctions in their application of law enforcement and social control activities depending on the respectability of the individual concerned*. The protection of the life and property of the ratepayer was primary. The functions of service to local property, and the potential for putting down local insurrections, in the style of the traditional rural militia, was far more important than any national intelligence gathering and detection functions. Steedman also echoes Allan Silver in her claim that the "neutral, passivity" of the police constable was to act as a *moral display*, a "mere symbol for the citizen's own self discipline".¹⁰ Most importantly, it was also formative in the development of the police identity in the following decades. "The development of a modern system of police demanded obeisance and conscious identification with their masters from some working-class men."¹¹

For many in the early years, working as a policeman was a temporary phase in one's life, a stop gap in between periods of quite different employment. For some, though, it began to become a permanent way of life, and indeed a vocation. They began to make themselves into policemen in the modern sense. Thus began the quest for a coherent identity, a sense of purpose, and a mission. Steedman notes that from the point of view of early working class recruits the main model for this kind of occupational strategy was recruitment

into the military. In a similar way, real, though limited, scope for individual self advancement existed in the police. Aspirations, in the police mind, centred not only around self transformation but also around the possibility of wider social transformation. Of course pseudo-scientific positivist discourses were not yet available to these men. "Images of Army of God and New Model Army" are more common than visions of social engineering, in the anonymous offerings to the Police Service Advertiser and the Police Guardian. Personal and social salvation through "faith" and "good works".¹²

The paradigmatic voice of secret police radicalism throughout Steedman's text is Inspector John Pearman. A rare case of a mid-Victorian policeman rising right through the ranks. Pearman, a sombre, but intelligent, man, spent a great deal of time reflecting on such matters as the fact that 710 people owned one quarter of the land in the country, whilst the poor toiled endlessly and were kept poor in order to amass the wealth of a small minority. The tensions at the heart of this police officer's world view are evident. Surely, he wrote, it was the rich who were more sinful than the poor. Surely the earthly law that he found himself enforcing was not God's law. Steedman claims to find regular evidence of policemen's guilt at having to engage in activities which they found to be at least distasteful and sometimes even unjust.¹³ This and the resulting fear and hatred expressed by the working classes whom they policed was a source of very real personal emotional pain. In a poem about an unhappy working class child one policeman says

Though the sight of my blue coat
A terror to some may be
Beneath this coat there beats a heart
That aches for such as thee.¹⁴

A policeman somehow at odds with himself as a policeman. We discover in Steedman's text, however, that this is the norm rather than the exception. More importantly it is a pattern which still persists, an issue I shall explore further in Chapters 4 and 5.

Steedman describes the development of an institutional ideology in which the policeman is a faithful servant of a paying master, in which his chief quality is passivity and obedience. Morally he must be above reproach, as must his family (a policeman had to present his intended wife to the Chief Constable for approval). Given the dominant social theory of 'moral contamination' of the period this moral perfection necessarily involved enforced isolation from the rest of the working classes. Add to this the fact that the policy was to employ men as far away from their original homes as possible, the fact that he worked seven days a week, at all times of the day and night, and one has a picture of extreme social isolation. The life of a mid-Victorian policeman

was a hard, poor and lonely one. One officer described himself and his like as "the spectre at the feast".¹⁵ This struggle with temptation, poverty and sheer physical exhaustion is often described in terms of a *spiritual journey, to become good, to do good works, to resist temptation.*

It was naturally felt that this faithful obedience and moral purity should be rewarded by another journey. That of ascent of the promotional ladder, a hope which was of course usually disappointed. This *disappointment and anger* found itself projected against the nearest possible target, the military man who had been appointed to high position within the service without having been promoted through the ranks. This served to develop a powerful identification with the idea of the virtue of working through the ranks. Resentment arises at the perception of short-cuts, or "fast tracks", to this day.

Another key self-conceptualisation experienced by the mid-Victorian policeman was as a secular missionary of some kind, a view which was often encouraged by the policeman's masters, in terms of the control of the 'sinful', but which sometimes found itself extended in radical directions. Pity, salvation, and transformation through collective betterment were ideas perfectly compatible with this protestant asceticism. As was the critique of wealthy corruption and sinfulness. Steedman claims to discover a sub-culture of political analysis, a culture in which policemen's letters to the Police Service Advertiser and Police Guardian were signed with pseudonyms such as 'Liberty' and 'Justice' and in which Pearman himself used the figure of Cromwell to represent earthly justice as he struggled to find a conceptual apparatus which could make sense of his experience. Such discourses of salvation and re-moralisation have survived to the present day.¹⁶

Two separate struggles helped to forge a collective police identity in the second half of the nineteenth century. The struggle for pension rights, was led by the officer class. Through national associations such as the Police Mutual Assurance Association and through lobbying it helped to form a sense of police identity, at this level, which transcended local differences. The other struggle was the struggle for better pay and leisure time (the mid-Victorian policeman worked a seven day week). This was the struggle of the lower ranks. And it was in part through this struggle and the ensuing strike action in the 1850s and 1870s that policemen first began to articulate the idea that they could not simply be replaced by an endless pool of cheap unskilled rural labour because they were not unskilled workers. They were *working men with a craft*.¹⁷ Steedman also argues that this conceptualisation of himself as a worker with a marketable skill, and the constant confrontations with watch-committees, at least in part, challenged the common conceptualisation of the policeman as a faithful servant of the ratepayer. This feeling can only have been strengthened in the 1860s with the campaigns to educate policemen, making them literate and numerate, and giving them a grounding in the law.

Steedman also emphasises the general administrative duties taken on by police officers and the effects this potentially had on his perception of the world.

A borough head constable was in a particularly good position to develop a conventional analysis of social life. *Mid-Victorian society came to enumerate itself, and the transmission of statistical information from the provinces to central government, and its return, in government report, re-published in local papers played an important role in this enumeration. But provincial police officers, acting as social statisticians, played a direct role in this process.* Reporting on the 'state' of a town to a watch committee involved taking account of a vast number of seemingly disparate factors: the number of gas lights in working order, the scavengers' wages, the incidence of street begging, the numbers in the local tramp ward, the proportion of those apprehended by the police who could neither read nor write. Life's drama, the theatre of the streets was thus enumerated, made concrete.¹⁸ (my emphasis)

The policeman found himself, his institution, his identity, his powers, constituted at the heart of a classic power/knowledge matrix in the Foucauldian sense. Steedman claims that this gave Pearman the statistical material he needed to elaborate his critique. Clearly such data can be interpreted in more than one way, however, and the dominant interpretation was the one to emerge in early positivist criminology (a theme I shall return to in Chapter 7). As we now know, these statistics came to be seen as measures of social pathology and dysfunction on the part of the delinquent classes rather than of injustice and exploitation on the part of a corrupt and sinful wealthy. However, it is clear that then, as now, the performance of general social administration, data collection, and population management did not fit well with the self-image of the policeman as law enforcer. Nor did the fact that he was increasingly being driven to engage in general moral regulation of the working classes.

By the 1870s a tangible sense of a fraternity, or community, of policemen was emerging, the collective struggles, the enforced isolation, the institutional ideology, the idea of a police-craft or even professional expertise, the fact that by now there was a real community of long serving policemen and officers, and, according to Steedman, a 'radical underside' to all of this. I would go further than this. Steedman demonstrates something which she never makes fully explicit, namely that the police identity and occupational culture of the mid-Victorian years was defined not so much by its coherence and homogeneity, as by the 'antagonistic' heterogeneity which traversed it. Law enforcer, general agent of government and administration, secular missionary amongst heathens, secular missionary trying to bring salvation to his

fellow men, servant, worker, enemy of the worker, professional expert, practical social scientist, by the 1880s he was, and I would argue still is, all of these and more. Not only that but he was an object of contempt from the point of view of his masters, and of suspicion, hatred and violence from the point of view of the working classes. He had to endure the music-hall hilarity at his expense, the mocking of his aspirations to better himself, the big feet and the funny hat, a travesty of this "spiritual journey".¹⁹ Somehow these antagonisms, at the heart of what the policeman had become, ignited strong feelings everywhere.

2.3.0 Occupational Socialisation

Another place where the police subject is 'becoming itself' of course, where one can see some of the forces impinging on its creation, is in the process of 'making' a new police officer. In the literature on police occupational culture there is a fairly strong consensus that a distinctive culture does indeed exist and that the major elements of that culture are in principle isolatable, measurable, and describable. Indeed researchers have gone a long way in performing such an analysis (as I shall discuss in section 2.4.0). Assuming, however, that such a culture exists how do individual officers come to assimilate the set of attitudes and beliefs which comprise the common culture of policing? Given the consistently conservative, authoritarian, and suspicious elements of the culture it has been suggested that perhaps certain personality types might be particularly drawn to the work. This has proved difficult to establish. Other researchers, such as John Van-Maanen have suggested that even if there is a tendency towards a certain personality type the overwhelming majority of the cultural orientation of the police officer is a product of a systematic process of occupational socialisation.²⁰

This socialisation can begin before the recruit even joins the police force since he is often drawn in through a network of friends and/or relatives who are already police officers. In addition there is a well established route from the armed forces into the police force. Ex-forces recruits will often know former colleagues who have joined the police but perhaps more importantly will be aware of a certain affinity in terms of the respective occupational cultures. A list of common elements would include many of the elements I have identified as comprising the paranoid pole of the 'Dionysian dialectic' - concern with hierarchy and obedience, conservatism, orderliness, cleanliness, machismo, suspicion of difference and of outsiders and so on

The importance of values such as neatness, punctuality, discipline, obedience, and deference are hammered home immediately the recruit enters the police training college or academy. These together with the value which encompasses all others in the occupational mind set of the police officer - the sense of "mission". Van-

Maanan argues that this is inculcated by placing a series of obstacles in the way of the recruit (examinations, physical tests etc) which give him a sense that he is entering an elite. The whole occupational socialisation process works to develop a powerful sense of collective mission and group commitment. Group solidarity is reinforced through the use of team tasks, collective punishments, team competitions and so on. These formal approaches to the forging of group *sentiment* are supplemented with informal processes. In between arduous physical tests, examinations, periods of instruction and so on the new recruits sit down, in groups, in informal settings and listen to the 'old-hands' telling "war stories". It is here that the recruits really begin to build up a police officer's way of looking at things, people, places and events.

After the police training college the recruit is placed with a tutor-constable ('field-training-officer' in the United States). It is here that the collection of 'police ways of looking at things' is further elaborated and the new officer begins to learn how to employ them in order to do police work. The main method of learning is mimicking. The recruit has to learn how to speak to members of the public like a policeman, how to have a policeman's demeanour and body language, when an event becomes police business, when it ceases being police business, how to treat the different categories of person in the world (the world as the police officer sees it) and so on. He learns all of this by copying his more experienced colleagues. The experience is of profound change. "God, those first couple of months are amazing. You need to learn everything.... Like how to walk and how to talk and how to think and what to say and see."²¹ This learning through mimicking does not lead to a situation where the individual becomes a "cultural dope", he doesn't become an automaton unable to think for himself. Policing demands a high level of initiative, intelligence, and innovation. But all of this is done within certain affective constraints. What exactly are they learning anew here? It is clear that they are not learning a systematic body of knowledge in the normal sense. They are somehow learning to retune their senses towards the world around them, learning a new body language, and a new sense of themselves. I would argue that they are learning how to *feel* like police officers - in both senses of the phrase.

Perhaps most importantly the new officer has to learn the importance of his colleagues and of loyalty and commitment to them. According to Van-Maanan this is established mainly by observing the behaviour of the officer in responding to so called "hot calls". These are law and order enforcement calls which may involve some degree of physical danger. Egon Bittner summarised most clearly what had been suspected for some time - namely that the vast majority of police-work is not law-enforcement related work. Indeed the average uniformed patrol officer can expect to count the number of arrests made per year on the fingers of one hand.²² Nevertheless the police collective sense of identity is substantially structured around the law-enforcement task and in particular around law-enforcement which may involve physical danger. It is this which imparts meaning and self esteem. It is also in relation to these tasks that the sense of mutual loyalty

and protectiveness becomes most intense. The new recruit will be observed to see how quickly he gets out of the car in a danger spot, how willing he is to provide support to his colleagues without regard for personal safety, how quick he is to respond to a colleagues rescue call over the radio, and so on. He must be seen to be willing to share the risks involved in policework. Smith and Gray, in their study of the Metropolitan Police, also document in detail the series of unpleasant initiation rituals "by which the new member is made aware of the obligations he is taking on".²³

This unquestioning commitment to protect ones colleagues, once established, pervades much of the occupational culture. Indeed Van-Maanan catalogues his own observations of officers engaging in "street justice" whilst systematically covering for one another by, for example, signing false statements (before his eyes) regarding events where they had not been present. This sense of mission, of absolute loyalty, commitment and mutual protectiveness is often combined with suspicion of superiors, of the criminal justice system, of "do-gooders", and with a generalised pessimism and disenchantment, a sense of disgust and pervasive threat in a corrupt world.

The group pressures to conform to this view of things are enormous. Importantly Van Maanan fails to notice the fact that the positive processes of cultural induction always operate in tandem with a much more sinister undercurrent of terror. My own observations suggest that new recruits are subjected to ample evidence of what happens to marginalised officers and it is a frightening prospect. Persistent verbal abuse, psychological attacks such as ignoring people for long periods, spiteful and humiliating humour, are all commonplace, and more serious physical attacks or threats to ignore emergency radio calls are a constant possibility.²⁴

This raises two questions with regard to both positive and negative methods of cultural induction. Firstly, to what extent does this socialisation involve learning of *structures and modes of feeling*? For example Van-Maanan points out that officers learn how to categorise people in the world in police relevant terms. Like many other researchers he also hints that police officers have distinct *feelings* about these different categories of people but the precise nature of these feelings and how they fit into the occupational socialisation process is rarely pursued in any detail. Secondly, what is the *affective context* of this occupational socialisation? Why do recruits find the attitudes and beliefs which compose the police occupational culture *attractive*? What role do *desire and fear* play in the process of cultural induction? Leading on from this obviously is the question of the role of desire and fear in the sustaining of police occupational culture in general.

2.4.0 The General Characteristics of Police Occupational Culture

So far I have been describing research concerning the dynamic development of the police subject. Much of the police studies literature takes a rather more static approach however. Rather than cataloguing the many fragmentary elements of the police subject or examining the many forces contributing to its formation much of this literature paints things in very broad brush strokes. This literature is nevertheless of interest. So what are the elements commonly accepted as constituting the "patterned set of understandings", as Robert Reiner calls it?²⁵ The first thing to remark on is the fact that virtually all of the major researchers in the field have commented on the extent to which policing is experienced by the police officer not as a job but as a way of life and a vocation. It is the pervasive principle of his identity. We see the emergence of this and of the tensions which traverse this identity in Steedman's work of course. What have researchers into modern policing discovered within the police identity however?

2.4.1 Indispensability, Apocalypse, Cynicism.

Firstly there is the "myth of police indispensability".²⁶ Society could not do without the police because they are all that stands between order and complete chaos. Between "us" and the forces of destruction lies only "the thin blue line". This is of course bound up with the police officer's attempt to divide the world very clearly into those who are good, decent and potentially vulnerable (the police are, as Reiner puts it, highly "victim centred") versus those who are evil, predatory, and threaten chaos. This is a construction of the world which not only dominates police culture but has taken on the role of popular moral mythology. As Malcolm Young puts it

In nightly theatrical TV rituals of social order and chaos, a stream of hero policemen stand at the symbolic crossroads between peace and mayhem, and the detective and chief officer now operate at the point where once the church and its priests declaimed on apocalyptic threat, and categories of good and evil.²⁷

This division of the world, and the belief in the police mission as all that stands in the way of total chaos is *emotionally powerful*, though it is rarely analyzed by police researchers as such. Here is just one example from the police studies literature.

I had a dream about all of us, about the Section going round in a car. We were in plain

clothes and we were indiscriminately murdering everybody in the daytime that was causing trouble in the night time. I've never enjoyed a dream so much in my life.²⁸

This quotation comes from an interview with a police officer who had recently experienced the stress of involvement in a major inner city riot. Nevertheless this powerful fantasy of violence against perceived evil gives some idea of the emotional undercurrents flowing beneath the police officer's apocalyptic vision of the world. The moral respectability of their "indiscriminate murdering" seems to be indicated by the fact that they operate in the "daytime", in the light, while the forces of evil, of course, cause their "trouble" undercover of darkness. This splitting of the world and moralising of the two sides is all pervasive. As Reiner and Manning point out, it can be deeply insidious as political functions of the police such as strike breaking, breaking up demonstrations, dealing with civil unrest, and ultimately defending the state and a particular social order, tend to be brought under the same "sacred canopy" of moral righteousness as more generally morally approved tasks such as catching murderers, rapists and child abusers.²⁹

This all leads on to another characteristic which has been regularly commented upon. This is the general attitude of cynicism associated with the police officers cultural identity. Given a belief in the immanent encroachment of the "forces of barbarism" together with an "over valuation of order and stability" it would be odd if police officers were not pessimistic and cynical. They believe in their mission, they believe they are defending civilisation, and they genuinely believe civilisation is under threat. Of course the immanence of the threat and the very fact that police officers construct themselves as the forces of good can tend to give perceived licence (as hinted at by the dream quoted above).

Reiner adds two observations. Firstly that the "myth of indispensability" is in part a necessary rationalisation of the police officer's forgoing of the right to strike. What would otherwise be experienced as a political humiliation can instead be rationalised away as an indication of their particularly important function. Secondly he argues that cynicism can be explained in part as a defence against failure. Indeed outright success in terms of solving crime (ie. what the police officer identifies as his real purpose) is a rare experience for the average officer. Setting aside the question of how convincing these arguments are for a moment, it is interesting that both of these explanations involve affective phenomena - potential *shame and humiliation* on the one hand and *frustration and feelings of failure* on the other. Yet the affective dimension is never made explicit. Perhaps most tellingly it is generally asserted that this cynicism is associated with a rather callous humour. The explanation given for this humour by both researchers and police officers themselves, is that it is a way of dealing with *stress and anxiety* associated with the job.

2.4.2 Suspicion and Stereotyping

Suspicion is seen as a practical necessity for doing the job. The police officer ensures that things are going on "as normal" and to this end he develops a highly detailed 'cognitive map' of his physical and human surroundings. Many months or years of observing the same area of a city, for example, will give the officer a deeply embedded sense of 'what is normal' at any particular time of the day or night in that part of town. The smallest deviations from the usual patterns and rhythms stand out in relief from this background of normality. This can be a baffling experience for the ethnographic researcher. The officer you are accompanying suddenly stops and asks over his radio for a check on a parked car. What has made him stop? The car he is checking has valid tax on it, it appears to be in good condition, it is parked legally. He points to the rest of the cars in the street. He notes that none of them are over five years old and that they are all expensive top of the range cars, this is a prosperous middle class suburb. So what is a twelve year old Ford Cortina parked here for?

Skolnick gives an example from an article on "Field Interrogation" of a list of 'signs of suspiciousness' - they include "automobiles which do not look right", "businesses open at odd hours, not according to routine or custom", "persons who attempt to avoid or evade the officer", "exaggerated unconcern over contact with the officer", "hitchhikers" and so on.

Skolnick argues that the key to understanding the high level of suspiciousness (amongst other things) of the police officer, is to appreciate the peculiar combination of authority, risk of physical danger, and the requirement to appear efficient. The second of these necessitates a constant attempt to identify potential assailants by visual clues. Skolnick refers to those who are regarded as providing such clues as "symbolic assailants".³⁰

Egon Bittner has a slightly different perspective on this. His work is the first to seriously question the assumption by the researchers, and the police themselves, that the central function of policing is law enforcement. He shows that actual arrest rates could not justify this view, and that the amount of non-law enforcement work undertaken is too large to be characterised as a deviation from the normal police function. So how can that function be characterised. "Something-that-ought-not-to-be-happening-and-about-which-someone-had-better-do-something-now" is his definition.³¹ He does not analyze what the repercussions might be of this conflict between what the police think they are and what they actually are. But of course one of the main consequences, of their actual function, is a deeply ingrained suspiciousness of anything out of the ordinary. In the work of Skolnick and Bittner we can begin to get a sense of the police officer's deep

aversion to the different, the strange, the unusual, and the marginal. This aversion is built into the practice of policing and is of course an *affective* phenomenon. Police officers have a *bad feeling when things are not "normal"*. Again, this affectivity is neglected in the analysis, remaining only implicit.

A striking consequence of this deep seated suspiciousness and aversion to the strange and unexpected is a very strong tendency to stereotype. Holdaway, Reiner, Smith and Gray, and others, have provided a number of useful accounts of the peculiar perception of the social structure which the police mandate to deal with social-trouble generates.³² Though as noted earlier these accounts tend to be rather static.

i. Good class villains. These are professional criminals. They are given a kind of grudging respect by the police officer. Pursuing and outwitting them is regarded as real police work. Indeed the 'better' they are at what they do the more fulfilling the police work is.³³ Importantly they 'play the game' by the same rules as the police themselves. They "know they have done wrong" as it were. There is a resounding utterance of "it's a fair cop gov". They reinforce the legitimacy of the police. They tend to have the same basic values as the police officer - a positive valuing of order, family, patriarchy, machismo, smartness, wit and hardness. Indeed Dick Hobbs, in his examination of the East London Working class and CID, discusses the existence of a "cultural symbiosis" constructed around these values together with key notions of "entrepreneurship". This is not surprising of course given that many of these officers were drawn from such working class backgrounds themselves. He gives detailed descriptions of a heavy drinking pub culture in which professional criminals and CID officers mix freely and

When uniformed officers invoke formal rules in a periodic attempt to standardize CID practice and performance, the detective can claim that 'you don't catch villains in church', 'thieves don't work 9 to 5.' Or most tellingly, 'it takes one to know one.'³⁴

Smith and Gray revealed the same kind of patterns, amongst the CID in particular. They claim that officers are "clearly pleased at being fully accepted in a place where important and violent criminals were in the habit of drinking" and that there is a clear nostalgia for the days when according to police officers themselves "the villains and the CID were almost the same thing, there was only one per cent difference between them".³⁵ They also argue that police and "good class villains" share a "cult of masculinity" in common.

Boundaries are blurred - to whom does the officer owe his allegiance, his fellow officer or his informant whom his fellow officer is investigating? In this environment of blurred boundaries and cynical entrepreneurial values Hobbs suggests that corruption is to be expected and indeed the mechanisms of

bribery are totally normalised so that the point at which they slide over into outright corruption is imperceptible. Smith and Gray too make it clear that ambiguity and ambivalence are endemic.

ii. **Police Property** So if police officers don't define themselves in contrast to the "good class villain" then what target of police activity does serve this function? The answer is the different, the strange, the 'socially inadequate', and marginalised minorities. Those whom the police and the good class villain jointly despise. These are what Reiner (following J.A.Lee) refers to as "police property".³⁶

It is believed, by the police at least, that 'society' expects the police to deal with, and segregate "problematic or distasteful" marginal social groups - "vagrants, skid-row alcoholics, the unemployed, or casually employed residuum, youth adopting a deviant cultural style, ethnic minorities, gays, prostitutes and radical political organisations". At a conservative estimate this probably constitutes around ten percent of the population. Again we can refer back to Bittner and Skolnick's seminal work. It is these groups who constitute the bulk of the "symbolic assailants" and source of "social trouble" in the view of the police officer. They disturb the police officer's highly tuned sense of the normal, ordered, and respectable. The overwhelming sentiment associated with these groups is revulsion and disgust. Commenting on deaths in police cells due to drunkenness and inhalation of vomit Young says

the executive has always allocated the control of such 'drunken dossers' to the police. As 'social dirt' they become an affront to purity and possess the danger of the contagious and impure requiring their removal from the public vision.³⁷

Young's analysis, rooted in the structural anthropology of Mary Douglas, focuses on the nature of society and culture as an ordered system of boundaries. In this model human beings are basically ordering creatures. They have an aversion to the transgression of even the most arbitrary boundaries of class, gender, sexuality, race, space and so on. Such transgressions are always experienced as forms of pollution. They produce reactions of revulsion, disgust and rage. In Young's view the police are delegated a responsibility for clearing up social "pollutants" and they therefore have the most highly developed sense of social boundary and order. They are, in the language of the early positivist criminologists, "social hygiene" experts.³⁸ Young's is certainly the most sophisticated elaboration of Bittner's thesis to date. Yet it still does not really get to grips with the question of why such "pollution" should arouse such powerful feelings. Indeed the question of affect is again sidestepped altogether.

Given the police officer's view that these groups are effectively "police property" the question of

accountability for the methods used in dealing with them is neatly sidestepped. Indeed it is not uncommon to hear police officer's accusing the middle classes of hypocrisy when they show signs of concern at police excesses. The view is that the middle classes want these people dealt with but they don't want to see it being done, they don't want to have to mentally register the reality of what is involved.

iii. **Challengers.** Both Holdaway and Malcolm discuss the police officer's symbolic division of space. One of the most significant of these divisions is that between the public world in front of the enquiry desk and the space of controlled access behind. The integrity of this sacred space is of immense importance for the police officer's sense of order, of being in control of things and therefore of his power within the overall scheme of things. Challenges to the legitimacy of this control and therefore to the power and self image of the police officer are not taken lightly. Such challenges can be, and often are, made by other professional groups. In particular lawyers, social workers, probation officers, journalists, doctors, and researchers, in their various ways are able to penetrate the police officer's sphere of control over their territory and 'property'.³⁹ There have been attempts to institutionalise police accountability on their 'territory' through the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) and various lay visitor schemes. Even with video-recording of interviews this has proved extremely difficult. In general the police are extremely resistant to attempts to seriously open up police practices to systematic scrutiny and are suspicious if not hostile towards those groups who have it within their power to penetrate the police domain.

iv. **Do-Gooders.** In some ways these individuals and groups can be regarded as a sub group of 'challengers'. But whereas most 'challengers' challenge only on a limited basis for instrumental purposes (eg for the purpose of providing medical treatment to an injured prisoner) 'do-gooders' attempt to limit police power as a matter of principle. They do so because they view police power as inherently dangerous. The main object of suspicion in this regard is the National Council for Civil Liberties (now Liberty), commonly known as the 'National Council for the Prevention of Policemen Doing their Duty'. Other large organisations such as Amnesty International, together with smaller temporary police monitoring organisations, such as those who observed and recorded police activities during the miner's strike in the early 80s, are regarded with equal contempt and suspicion.

v. **Disarmers.** Disarmers are essentially people who have committed crimes but who are commonly viewed as vulnerable and, if anything, potential victims. According to Holdaway, women, children and old people pose particular problems for the police in this regard. My own experience suggests, however, that the police have special categories which can be mobilised. This is particularly the case with women. Quite stark distinctions are often made between "respectable" women and "slags", "sluts", or "whores" (the latter

categories need not necessarily be applied to someone who is known to be a prostitute)

vi. **Politicians.** Reiner reserves a special category for politicians though it could be argued that, for the police, politicians are simply the worst case 'challenger'. They interfere in things they do not understand either because they are corrupt, self-seeking, weak, or stupid. The problem is that they have the power to interfere.

The above are *categories of person*, but there are also two clear *categories of police work*. These are:

i. **Good Result** This is work which involves a "good arrest" in which skill, determination, and physical strength and bravery may be displayed. Perhaps more importantly however a "good result" involves the building of a successful case by the use of police craft. It must, however, be a case against a "worthy antagonist" - a "good class villain", or at least someone who is in some way regarded as being extremely dangerous (drug and sex offenders for example). According to Smith and Gray the measuring of police performance by statistical quantification is despised by police officers precisely because such figures say nothing about the *quality* of the arrests recorded.

One of the things that seems to me to be most important about the "good result" is that there is a *result*, there is some completion, 'closure', the case goes somewhere definite.

ii. **Rubbish.** 'Rubbish' is work involving "people from 'police property' groups presenting themselves as victims or clients for service".⁴⁰ Smith and Gray's analysis of this is most graphic. The most detested of all 'rubbish' calls are domestic disputes. They are perceived as no win situations for the police officer even when they involve 'respectable' people. Summarising a police call to a domestic dispute Smith and Gray say

Of course, he did not respect the people, and that contributed to his view that the call was 'rubbish', but his more important reasons for thinking so were that there was nothing that he should or could do about the matter and that there could not possibly be any 'result'.⁴¹

Such calls rarely result in a prosecution, and the underlying problems tend to result in repeated calls none of which offers any obvious opportunity to resolve the situation. Officers often end up being attacked by both parties to the dispute. When "rubbish" calls do result in an arrest, or some other action taken, it is not regarded as an arrest which brings prestige. When combined with the belief that this is not really police work

at all, such unresolvable frustration only exacerbates the sense of disgust at 'police property'. As much as the "good result" depends on closure, "rubbish" is defined by its ambiguity, messiness, and apparent insolubility.

Robert Reiner concludes his analysis, of police relevant categories, with a fascinating paragraph.

Running through the perception of the social structure is a distinction between the powerless groups at the bottom of the social hierarchy who provide the 'rubbish' and the 'police property', and the respectable strata, with distinct segments which in different ways threaten police interests.⁴²

In other words we start out above with a police picture of the world which 'splits' it starkly into the good and the bad, but when we begin to examine the categorisation of the social world in detail we find that the threat seems to be all inclusive. The 'good' becomes harder and harder to track down. Ultimately one begins to suspect that in fact it is only the police themselves who are really 'good'. Indeed much of the evidence from Westley, Skolnick, Manning, Van-Maanen, Holdaway, Reiner, Young and others suggests that the most fundamental element of police occupational culture is solidarity, mutual commitment and protectiveness, secrecy and isolation. Yet this neglects the fact that the average police officer along with his suspicion of lawyers, judges, and politicians is also suspicious of his superiors and of other departments and forces. He may even be suspicious of other "reliefs" working the same division as himself. Smith and Gray describe the existence of 'in groups' and 'outsiders', various tests for admittance to inner circles, constant testing of loyalties in an environment of mistrust and fear of being made an outcast. We begin to see in Reiner's comments the seeds of paranoia within the police officers affective orientation to the world.

2.4.3 Racial Prejudice

The most regularly documented dimension of stereotyping is the existence of systematic racial bias amongst police officers. Again the patterns seem to occur across cultures. The American police studies tradition records a large amount of evidence of everyday racism, together with opposition to the civil rights movement, and support for far right racist political organisation. As Westley puts it

For the police the Negro epitomizes the slum dweller, and he is considered inherently criminal both culturally and biologically. Individual policemen sometimes deviate sharply from this general definition, but no white policeman with whom this author has had contact

failed to mock the Negro, to use some type of stereotyped categorization, and to refer to interaction with the Negro in exaggerated dialect when the subject arose.⁴³

Westley catalogues the usual range of racist assertions. Black people are 'morally degenerate', 'naturally lazy', 'biologically inferior', 'not fully developed mentally', 'born criminals', 'savages', 'like animals' and so on. Reiner points out that in this country such racism revealed itself to researchers years before police claims that black people are statistically more of a "crime problem". Maureen Cain's work published in the early seventys showed evidence of distinct patterns of prejudice amongst police officers who were convinced of the inherent violence of black people.⁴⁴ Fielding and Fielding also point to the belief amongst British police officers in the inherent criminality and degeneracy of black people. There appears to be a conviction, amongst the majority of police officers studied, that there is no problem of racism in the police force and that if a problem exists then it is, in fact, a crime problem amongst black people.⁴⁵ Fielding and Fielding argue that this is combined with a rhetoric of avoiding sectional interest. The result is that any sensitivity to ethnic minorities is viewed as special treatment.⁴⁶ Reiner, and Fielding and Fielding, argue that the combination of police prejudice together with social structures of inequality inevitably lead to ethnic minorities becoming "police property", and the major basis upon which many police officers define moral degeneracy. All such studies also show high levels of racist hostility directed towards police officers from ethnic minorities, by their white colleagues. They are required to tolerate constant racist taunts and jokes, and are often marginalised and pushed into desk jobs. The racist taunts begin at training college where instructors claim that it is a necessary means for getting them used to what they will have to face from their colleagues and the general public.⁴⁷

Quotations from sources such as Westley, Graef, or Smith and Gray can be quite disturbing.

In the Autumn of 1981 we saw the following inscriptions in a lavatory at a police station in an area of high ethnic concentration

"Fight racialism - smash a nigger in the gob today.

Q: What is the difference between a nigger and a bucket of shit?

A: The bucket.⁴⁸

Obviously not all of their material is as extreme as this. Nevertheless Smith and Gray quote this because it

is representative of extremes which are not uncommon in police culture and because it gives a clear sense of the prevalence and acceptability of racism within the police in general. Smith and Gray's report on police racism is a disturbing record of prejudice, occasionally verging on hatred. Such attitudes are often combined with the feeling of being hated, in turn, by black people, who also do not know their place.

You know why there aren't any more black coppers? They're too fucking lazy, that's why. I think they're scared of their people. And I don't think they've got the brain power for it either. I'm sorry, but that's how I feel. You can get a whole community who wouldn't get an O'level between them. They're so bloody arrogant, they really are, certainly the people I come across in the West Indian community. I do know a couple who are quite nice guys, but 90 per cent of them - they really are arrogant. And totally "anti".... They think there's a war between them and us.⁴⁹

Smith and Gray argue that the police reserve slightly different stereotypes for 'Asian' and 'Afro-Caribbean' communities. While 'Afro-Caribbeans' are perceived to be lazy, violent and inherently criminal, 'Asians' are often perceived to be liars, difficult to deal with, and difficult to communicate with.⁵⁰

2.4.4 The Cult of Masculinity

Smith and Gray provide an excellent account of a constellation of elements they refer to as the "cult of masculinity". Its key ingredients are heavy drinking, sexual boasting and horseplay, combined with extreme hostility towards perceived sexual deviants, constant talk about violence and exaggerated tales of bravado. It is Smith and Gray's view that this kind of "hard man" act is perceived, particularly by the CID, as being central to the criminal underworld of the "good class villain" and, given the strange symbiotic relationship between the two (as demonstrated so clearly by Hobbs), it is taken on board by police officers.

These were uniformed officers off duty, and they had no practical reason for going to the club at the time, but they were clearly pleased at being fully accepted in a place where important and violent criminals were in the habit of drinking.⁵¹

Respect is gained within the informal hierarchy of the police group through initiation rituals which establish reputations for strength, ability to drink alcohol to excess, and enjoying a fight. It is through hard drinking bouts that officers establish relations of trust and create 'in' and 'out-groups'. Drinking is a symbol of the blurring of boundaries between the police and the criminal. It is a central feature of the day to day lives of

both groups, often in the same pubs, and often while talking to one another. It can also involve police officers in breaking the law by drinking outside licensing hours, drinking excessively on duty, drunk-driving, and so on.

Violence is a key "symbol of authority and power". Ultimately, as Bittner points out, the final defining characteristic of police competence, in a pacified society, is a monopoly over the use of legitimate violence.⁵² Thus "the idea of violence is often central to the conceptions that police officers have of their work".⁵³ Elsewhere, however, Smith and Gray point out the high levels of anxiety associated with the police officer's fear of "losing face". They argue that the best officers develop methods of asserting dominance without having to resort to violence. However, the rest combine a "high value placed on dominance and a lack of the skills needed to achieve it legitimately". The consequence of this combined with the symbolic linking of violence, authority, and respect, is excessive talk about, and use of, violence. This becomes even further exaggerated in the context of protecting the group and backing up other officers who are thought to be "in trouble". A threat, either symbolic ("to the uniform") or physical, is a threat to all. What I would like to emphasise, yet again, is that this is a *constellation of emotions*. Feelings of threat, anxiety about possible shame and humiliation, and the desire to exert violent control.

Smith and Gray, understandably, seem somewhat at a loss to explain their findings regarding police attitudes to sexuality. They argue that policemen appear to be extremely insecure about their own sexual identity - this is, they argue, is the only way one can account for the persistent sexual boasting, and homophobic jokes. There is an even more worrying side to this however. The valuation of violence as a symbol of domination seems to combine with attitudes towards sexuality to create worrying obsessions with the details of violent rapes, claims that women really like such violations, and even that they themselves would have liked to have committed the offenses. The situation is even more bizarre than this however. They suggest that "It does seem that guilt at sharing the impulses of certain sexual offenders can easily turn into a vindictive attitude towards these offenders and an exaggerated attitude of condemnation."⁵⁴

There are recurrent images of violent castration. A police officer imagines what he would do to someone who raped his daughter. He makes clear that he would severely beat and castrate him.⁵⁵ But why on earth is he imagining such a thing as the rape of his daughter in the first place? It seems clear that the castration is not retribution for the rape itself but for the challenge to the authority of the fantasising police officer. Thus sex, dominance, violence and now punishment become deeply intertwined in a *complex constellation of emotions*.

Why do I refer only to police men and not women? The fact is that this is a fundamentally male culture. Women have to tolerate the kinds of discussions hinted at above, taking place while they are present.

Ideas about the limitations of women specifically as police officers merge imperceptibly into general views about the inferiority of women which again merge into sexual boasting and horseplay. Something of this mixture is caught in a single remark by an older PC, who said that 'a young girl will be no good in restraining a violent man as long as she has a hole in her arse'.⁵⁶

When I began writing the thesis I was careful to make everything gender neutral. But the very masculine nature of police culture made this seem somehow counter-productive. There is a real sense in which women have to become "one of the lads" in order to get on in the police service, and also a sense in which ethnic minority officers have to become honorary whites.

2.4.5 Conservatism, or the Suspicion of Difference

Reiner describes a constellation of elements in police culture which he refers to as conservatism. It encompasses two distinct but related elements. Political and moral conservatism. There is a good deal of evidence both here and in the United States of right wing sympathies - and in some cases involvement with extreme right wing politics. Reiner argues that this is in part a result of police deradicalisation in the 1920s following the police strikes, and more importantly a result of the fact that the police, have since their inception, been used against organised labour and left wing political movements. Perhaps most importantly of all, Reiner points out that the police force itself is hierarchical, with a high valuation of obedience, discipline, and deference, though he does not explore this idea. He argues that individuals with a conservative outlook are likely to be drawn to this sort of work. This is no doubt true, yet it is also the case that researchers such as Colman and Gorman have provided quantitative evidence of growing authoritarianism in police officers after they begin the job, and that researchers like Van-Maanen and Fielding and Fielding have been providing qualitative and quantitative evidence of the same thing for some time.⁵⁷ The Fieldings' work does appear, also, to show conservative attitudes amongst officers at the time of recruitment. Indeed the Fieldings go further than arguing that the police recruits are conservative in outlook. They point out that the liking for hierarchy combined with extreme suspiciousness bordering on conspiracy theory is reminiscent of Fascist political sentiment. They 'tested' this by asking recruits whether they agreed with statements which, unknown to them, were taken from a National Front publication. They overwhelmingly did agree.

Reiner's second dimension of conservatism is what he calls "moral conservatism". For example in their study of police recruits attitudes to punishment, Fielding and Fielding found them to be extremely harsh. There was general agreement that the purpose of prison was punishment, and that sentences are too short and the courts weak. It is believed that the aetiology of crime is either moral evil or individual pathology, and where the model of individual pathology is used then the causes of such pathology are believed to be biological or associated with poor parenting. There is a general belief that moral standards and attitudes to authority are declining dramatically. Capital and corporal punishment are popular. Also

While at induction 77 percent did not think criminals should be hated, this proportion dropped to 50 per cent at year one, returning to 69 per cent in year two. Thus about a third regarded crime as sinful and criminals as objects of hatred.⁵⁸

Most studies seem to show a long term hardening of cynicism as police officers progress through their career. Fielding and Fielding note also the prevalent idea that "'trouble' comes from 'a small element'". In particular race is a key factor in identifying this morally degenerate minority. But in addition to race all other marginal categories are suspect, from hippies to homosexuals. The only thing which all of these groups have in common is that they constitute social heterogeneity. This is what is really at the heart of what Reiner refers to as moral conservatism: a deep suspicion of difference. The Fieldings begin to touch on the psychological mechanisms at work here

From here it is a small step to the view that the danger posed by these elements is from those who are outside 'our' system and its conventions. Officers who contemplate the evils of the routine world and contrast this to their own human potential. The officer's decency is the pragmatic yardstick applied to the citizen behaviour in order to determine community standards: officers must believe in their own normality. A dispassionate attitude to a distressing world is more comfortably maintained if one sees evil as external.⁵⁹

Yet of course this division can never be successfully maintained. The level of ambiguity and blurring of boundaries is already apparent from my discussion of the "cult of masculinity". And indeed in most of the studies I have mentioned, from Westley, Skolnick, Van-Maanen, Malcolm, and Holdaway, to Reiner, and Smith and Gray, the role of systematic "justice without trial" is made apparent. In other words by pursuing the enforcement of their moral conservatism the police themselves routinely break the law and engage in acts of violence normally associated with criminals. The only way for them to make sense of this is for their own violence (and fantasy about violence) to be legitimated as morally good violence, and others as morally bad.

But this must clearly be a very delicate and volatile strategy as Smith and Gray seem to suggest in their comments on police officers feelings of guilt above.

It seems to me that these psychological splitting strategies, together with the associated emotional volatility constitute an important but as yet unexplored aspect of the social order described in these studies. It also seems likely that *some relationship exists between the police officer's suspicion of social difference and his own ambivalent identity*. Is there not some 'compensation' going on here? Is this a case of paranoid projection, an identity which fears, but which cannot eradicate, its own, built in, ambivalence? Does it instead project outwards onto symbolic representatives of that ambivalence ("symbolic assailants" as Skolnick calls them) and direct hostility towards them? *Perhaps the most potent threat to the police officer's sense of his authority, rightness, and dominance is the police officer himself.*

2.5.0 Typologies of Policing

It is clear that despite what police officers may desire, their culture is not actually coherent and homogenous at all. Fielding and Fielding for example point out that there are a multiplicity of contradictions and inconsistencies running through police culture in general. There are of course gender, age, ethnic, and many other differences, all of which tend to be suppressed. All that are permitted legitimately are differences within the institutionalised hierarchy, and differences within the unofficial pecking order which measure aggressiveness, masculinity and other police relevant qualities such as being a "good thief taker". Nevertheless other differences remain and Reiner points to the existence of a number of typologies, generated by police studies researchers, which attempt to capture the variations in orientation between officers. He synthesises them into the following types:

i. The 'bobby'. He is relatively "optimistic", oriented towards deterrence, community maintenance and integration. He particularly believes in the need for policing by consent, the involvement of the public and so on.

ii. The 'new centurion'. Where the 'bobby' is more likely to be a foot patrol officer, the classic 'new centurion' likes to drive fast cars, find excitement, and fight crime and criminals the hard way. He is "hard nosed" and cynical. He also tends to view the public as at best naive and at worst an awkward irrelevance.

iii. The 'uniform carrier'. This kind of officer has taken his cynicism to the point where actually doing the

job seems futile. He spends most of his time at "tea stops" or in other work avoidance.

iv. The 'professional'. Where (i) and (ii) may have no desire for career advancement through the ranks as their orientations are satisfied by the opportunities provided by being a PC, and where (iii) may have given up on such possibilities, the 'professional' is oriented to police work as a career.

These types could be elaborated upon but perhaps, as with much of the rest of the police culture literature, what this seems to tacitly reveal are affective phenomena - optimism, pessimism, desire for order, desire for excitement, desire for personal advancement. These are not ideas, or beliefs. They are the feelings about the world which the police officer's ideas and beliefs inhabit. Perhaps also individual police officers are more mobile within these types than Reiner suggests. It will be a secondary objective of the thesis to suggest a possible typology of police affective subject positions (section 4.6.3.0 of the research findings). These will be types of emotional orientation to the world which are available to the police officer, and between which he may move depending on a variety of biographical, occupational, and current pragmatic factors. Some of the available range of affective solutions to the policing mandate may be more paranoid in character than others. These are questions I shall explore further in the research findings.

2.6.0 Conclusion

This is by no means an exhaustive study of the detailed findings of the literature on police occupational culture. What I have done is to present the central themes which seem to appear regularly. What should by now be apparent is the fact that this literature appears to tacitly reveal structures of affective phenomena which it has generally failed to foreground and examine systematically. Researchers regularly mention hatred, shame, fear, anxiety, disgust, excitement, anger and so on, and they do so in a fairly consistent manner. Yet they rarely foreground these patterns of affect; certainly they do not attempt to apply any systematic theory of affective phenomena.

It will be an objective of my thesis to foreground some of these patterns of affect and suggest a possible theoretical basis for explanation. I shall not be focusing primarily on the extremes of emotional reaction however. It will contend that identifiable forms of affective cultural orientation underlie police officers' everyday, mundane perceptions of people and events. Often these forms tend towards the paranoid pole of the 'Dionysian dialectic'. An analysis of this may tell us something about modernity in general.

Notes

1. "Uncanny strangeness" is the sensation associated with objects and events which remind us of unconscious aspects of ourselves. See the excellent J. Kristeva, Strangers to Ourselves. Harvester, London, 1991, pp182-188.

2. I have not dealt in detail with the historical origins of the police concern with race and youth because they have been dealt with in detail elsewhere. See for example P. Gilroy, 'The Myth of Black Criminality' in P. Scraton (ed) Law, Order and the Authoritarian State. Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1987. Also G. Pearson, Hooligan: A History of Respectable Fears. Macmillan, London, 1983.

3. I have used the term 'subject' here for the reasons given at the end of chapter 1. What I am looking at are the cultural repertoires within which the police officer moves: the materials which make up the possible perspectives from which he can interpret the world. Thus individual police officers are not static collections of attitudes and beliefs. As individuals their subject position can vary within the field of cultural repertoires: they can take up different subject positions. But they cannot take up subject positions which do not exist. Thus the police cultural repertoires do not determine rigidly how an individual police officer will think and act, but they do provide certain constraints: they provide conditions of possibility.

4. This is not a review of police studies literature in general. There is not the scope here for such a review, and in any case it would serve no useful purpose. Instead I have reviewed some of the main contributions to the study of police occupational culture, since this is essentially what I am concerned with in this thesis.

5. C. Steedman, Policing the Victorian Community: The Formation of English Provincial Police Forces, 1856-80. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1984

6. The paradigmatic case is C. Reith's six volumes: The Police Idea. Oxford University Press, London, 1938; Police Principles and the Problem of War. Oxford University Press, London, 1940; The British Police and the Democratic Ideal. Oxford University Press, London, 1943; A Short History of the British Police. Oxford University Press, London, 1948; The Blind Eye of History. Faber and Faber, London, 1952; A New Study of Police History. Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1956.

7. Quoted in T. A. Critchley, A History of Police in England and Wales (second edition), Patterson Smith, New Jersey, 1972, p53

8. Quote from N. Gash, Mr Secretary Peel, 1961, in T. A. Critchley, op cit, p52.

9. C. Steedman, op cit, p2.

10. C. Steedman, op cit, p5. A. Silver, 'The Demand for Order in Civil Society: A Review of Some Themes in the History of Urban Crime, Police and Riot', in D.J. Bordua (ed), The Police: Six Sociological Essays. John Wiley, New York, 1967.

11. C. Steedman, op cit, p10.

12. C. Steedman, op cit, p4.

13. C. Steedman, op cit, pp 145-6

14. 'The City Arab: A Policeman's Passing Thought'. Police Guardian. 12 November, 1872. Quoted in C. Steedman, *Op Cit*, p146.
15. 'Lamentation from Helmet'. Police Guardian. 24 November, 1876.
16. C. Steedman, *op cit*, p142.
17. C. Steedman, *op cit*, pp 132-7.
18. C. Steedman, *op cit*, p139
19. C. Steedman, *op cit*, p162.
20. J. Van Maanan. 'Working the Street: A Developmental View of Police Behaviour'. in H. Jacobs (ed), The Potential for Reform of Criminal Justice. Sage, 1974.
21. *Ibid*, p93
22. E. Bittner. 'Florence Nightingale in Pursuit of Willie Sutton: A Theory of the Police'. in H. Jacobs (ed) The Potential for Reform of Criminal Justice. Sage, London, 1974. E. Bittner, The Functions of the Police in Modern Society. Jason Aronson, New York, 1975.
23. D.J. Smith and J. Gray, Police and People in London: The PSI Report. Gower, Aldershot, 1985, pp354-358.
24. Such dangers are not speculation on my part. As I shall detail in the research findings, I was informed during my field study, by the inspector, that he had moved one PC to desk duties because he (the inspector) feared that the PC's colleagues might not respond rapidly to an emergency call made by him.
25. R. Reiner, The Politics of the Police (second edition), Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1992, p109.
26. R. Reiner, *op cit*, p113.
27. M. Young, An Inside Job. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991, p14.
28. R. Graef, Talking Blues: the Police in their Own Words. Collins Harvill, 1989, p58.
29. R. Reiner *op cit*, p112. P. Manning, Police Work. MIT Press, Cambridge Mass., 1977, p5.
30. J. H. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement in a Democratic Society. John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1966, Ch3.
31. E. Bittner. "Florence Nightingale in Pursuit of Willie Sutton: A Theory of the Police". in The Potential for Reform of Criminal Justice. H. Jacob (ed), Sage, London, 1974, p30.
32. R. Reiner, *op cit*, pp 118-121. 32. S. Holdaway, Inside the British Police. Blackwell, Oxford, 1983. Also good on police categorisation is M. Young, *op cit*.
33. See D. J. Smith and J. Gray, *op cit*, p347.
34. D. Hobbs, Doing the Business: Entrepreneurship, the Working Class, and Detectives in the East End of London. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989, p213.

35. D.J. Smith and J. Gray, op cit, pp367 and 371. I am aware that there are differences between the working environments and cultural assumptions of uniformed and plain clothes departments. However these can easily be overplayed. Whilst there is often a strong sense of rivalry between them, a certain contempt on the part of the CID, and envy on the part of the uniformed departments, the similarities far outweigh the differences. There is a well developed system of sending uniformed officers on "attachment" to plain clothes departments and a constant movement of officers on a permanent basis between departments. In my own research I found that other typological distinctions such as those between what I have called "re-moralisers" and "despisers" are certainly more significant than any general cultural differences between plain clothes and uniformed departments.

36. J.A. Lee, 'Some Structural Aspects of Police Deviance in Relations With Minority Groups', in C. Shearing (ed) Organisational Police Deviance, Butterworth, Toronto, 1981. See also D.J. Smith and J. Gray, op cit, pp347-8.

37. M. Young, op cit, p13

38. See P. Pasquino, 'Criminology: the Birth of a Special Knowledge', in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, G. Burchell et al (eds), Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1991.

39. S. Holdaway, op cit, pp71-7.

40. R. Reiner, op cit, p119.

41. D.J. Smith and J. Gray, op cit, p350.

42. R. Reiner, op cit, p121.

43. William A. Westley, Violence and the Police: A Sociological Study of Law, Custom, and Morality, The MIT Press, Massachusetts, 1970, pp99-104.

44. M. Cain, Society and the Policeman's Role, Routledge, London, 1973, pp117-119.

45. The belief that no problem of racism exists is common but not universal. Some officers admit that there is a problem, but they generally argue that it does not effect the way people do the job and/or that it is confined only to a few "bad apples".

46. N.G. Fielding and J. Fielding, 'Police Attitudes to Crime and Punishment', British Journal of Criminology, Vol.31, No. 1, Winter 1991, p46.

47. See for example D.J. Smith and J. Gray, op cit, pp 423-427, R. Graef, op cit, pp 117-144, and most recently S. Holdaway, The Racialisation of British Policing, Macmillan, London, 1996, pp 138-177.

48. Smith and Gray, op cit, p392.

49. Detective Sergeant in a Home Counties force, age 38, sixteen years service. Quoted in R. Graef, op cit, pp130-131.

50. Smith and Gray, op cit, pp 407-409.

51. Smith and Gray, op cit, p367.

52. Bittner, op cit, p37.

53. Smith and Gray, op cit, p351.

54. ibid, p374.

55. Ibid, p360.

56. ibid p378.

57. J. Van Maanan, op cit. N.G. Fielding and J. Fielding, op cit.

58. Ibid, p45.

59. Ibid, p47.

CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHODS AND METHODOLOGY

3.0.0.0 Introduction

This thesis is a study of the role of affective processes in the sense-making activities of a particular community. It operates at two interconnected levels: on the one hand it seeks to *describe* the ideas, beliefs, styles of thought and, most importantly, feelings of police officers; on the other hand it seeks to begin to *explain* why police officers should have such beliefs and feelings. It is essential therefore that the research methodology employed encompasses these two tasks. Within the research methods literature the two approaches which most closely approximate to these requirements are commonly referred to as 'grounded-theory' and 'discourse-analysis'; the latter is actually a sub-type of the former. What I will be employing is a particular version of 'discourse analysis' which focuses on the role of affective processes. This chapter therefore proceeds in the following way: in section 3.1.0.0 I shall be looking at the main tenets of grounded-theory (at both philosophical and technical levels), this will include an examination of discourse analysis as a form of grounded-theory; in section 3.2.0.0 I shall begin to set out the research narrative itself; in section 3.3.0.0 I shall discuss, at an abstract level, the methodological problems associated with studying affective processes, and in section 3.4.0.0 I shall conclude the research narrative in the light of this discussion.

3.1.0.0 Grounded-theory in Qualitative Research

3.1.1.0 Ontology and Epistemology, in "Grounded-Theory"

Bryman and Burgess discuss three types of qualitative research analysis strategy in their recent account.¹ Two of these are relevant to this project (as will become clear), these are "grounded-theory" and the "pattern model".

Grounded-theory was developed as a research strategy and a label with the work of Glaser and Strauss in the 1960s, and has retained a prominent position in the vocabulary of qualitative research methodology ever since.² Bryman and Burgess describe grounded-theory as a particular set of research techniques or strategies. Such accounts often suggest or imply that it is simply the nature of the research problem which determines whether qualitative or quantitative techniques will be used. This also gives rise to the implication that 'measuring' and 'interpreting' strategies can usefully be combined. These claims may be problematic

however, the relationship between these two different objectives needs to be thought out carefully.

Cassell and Symon remark that grounded-theory as a term refers to an epistemological position as well as a set of research techniques;³ they note the following contrast between positivist and phenomenological "epistemologies". For the positivist researcher there are 'objectively true facts' in the world, these are composed of variables governed by general laws. In order to gain knowledge of these objective facts the researcher must formulate hypotheses. The research data are used are to test the hypothesis. It is most important that a specific procedure is followed. If the procedure (or scientific method) is followed then reliable, valid testing of the hypothesis is guaranteed, producing generalisable results. In other words the data are to be subject to a pre-determined set of categories and procedures and anything outside of this is deemed irrelevant. This is so to the extent that positivists at this end of the research spectrum will rarely tape interviews, they tend to use rigidly structured questionnaires providing easily quantifiable data of a pre-determined type and form. Ultimately the focus is on explaining 'facts' by reference to laws rather than understanding 'meanings' by reference to culturally specific rules of interaction.⁴

In contrast to this, Cassell and Symon suggest that grounded-theory is rooted in a phenomenological epistemology which is fundamentally constructivist, there is therefore no search for any objective reality outside the linguistic constructions of those studied. Instead, the researcher explores the way in which people construct meaning or interpret the world. There is a concern with "life-worlds" since it is assumed that individual, group and organisational behaviour is determined, not by sets of discrete and measurable variables governed by universal laws, but by systems of meaning and interpretation bound by interactional rules. A model case of research which focuses on such 'life-world' material would be the work of the anthropologist Clifford Geertz. "Thick description" is the term he uses for this kind of detailed account of a community's 'sense-making' practices.⁵ Grounded-theory therefore sets out to 'find' meanings in the data. It does not use the data to test pre-determined hypotheses, rather it develops a dialectical relationship between theory and data.

To summarise then, "positivists" (as defined by Cassell and Symon) tend to ask interview questions in order to 'find out about the things they ask questions about'. For example if they wanted to find out about patterns of usage of medical services in an inner city area they might interview GPs and residents, asking them questions in order to ascertain how much usage there is, what the major reasons for visits to the doctors are, and so on. "Phenomenologically" oriented researchers (as defined by Cassell and Symon), on the other hand, ask people questions in order to find out 'how the world seems to them'. They would perhaps be more interested in such questions as - what it means to be healthy, how people see the role of medicine in their

lives, how people view the medical profession and its expertise, and so on.

The key epistemological question is, what constitutes warrantable knowledge? "Positivists" answer that warrantable knowledge is knowledge which is reliable, valid and generalizable. Reliability refers to the reproducibility of results under similar conditions, validity refers to whether the research really is measuring what it claims to measure, and generalizability refers to the ability to move from the specific results of the research towards universal or probabilistic laws. Such knowledge is guaranteed by the use of specific procedures (sampling, control groups, and the strategies of hypothesis testing outlined earlier).

"Phenomenologists" have a somewhat different response to the question of warrantable knowledge however. While the positivist must conform strictly to a set of procedures, there is no rigid procedure for the 'finding' of structures of meaning in a research methodology like grounded-theory. So what is the basis of warrantability for this research strategy? Ultimately for many social scientists who adhere to broadly interpretivist epistemology the answer is that the interpretation of the data is warrantable if it is persuasive. As Reason and Rowan put it "the only criterion for the 'rightness' of an interpretation is inter-subjective - that is to say, that it is right for a group of people who share a world view."⁶ As such it is claimed that constant exposure of the interpretation to colleagues and others is crucial to its final formulation.

3.1.2.0 Description and Explanation/Theorising in Grounded-theory

It is perhaps important to point out at this stage that commentators like Cassell and Symon have simplified the issues, surrounding the distinctions set out above, enormously. In particular the distinctions are not just epistemological, they are ultimately ontological. There are arguments here about what level of 'things/objects' in the world are to be studied by sociologists.

The ontological and epistemological claims are often confused with one another. As Charles Taylor has pointed out, these levels are clearly linked. 'If one argues that members of society construct social order, reality and 'Being' with their various "interpretive repertoires" then one may have to go some way down the path towards acknowledging that one's own research findings are in fact also an interpretation, produced by drawing on yet another set of "interpretive repertoires".⁸ It is not clear however that all of those who subscribe to the former ontological claim regarding social reality also subscribe to the latter epistemological claim regarding the nature and status of their research findings. Surely even phenomenologically oriented researchers have some conception of their accounts of other people's 'sense-making' activities being more

or less accurate, even 'true'. If this is the case then of course not all interpretations are equal: some are better than others. The very fact that such sociologists have some conception of 'warrantable knowledge', as set out above, suggests that this must be the case.

A further ambiguity emerges in the literature however, regarding the relationship between interpretation and theory. Assuming that members of society construct interpretations of events by drawing on interpretive repertoires, then clearly part of the task of qualitative research techniques, such as grounded-theory, must be to reconstruct and map out those repertoires. However we rarely stop there, in general we go on to develop theories which can help us *explain* how and why and with what consequences such repertoires have been mobilised. That is why grounded-theory is not called 'grounded-describing'. Grounded-theory goes beyond the purely descriptive ethnography of Clifford Geertz's "thick description" for example.⁹

Grounded-theory engages in both interpretation (making sense of members' linguistic utterances and meaningful actions) and explanation. In order to arrive at explanation it will generally have recourse to processes, mechanisms, structures etc. which lie outside of the discourse or action to be explained, or, if they lie within the discourse, their presence is not immediately self-evident. So we first describe the way in which a certain individual or group of individuals interprets the world. We then explain why this person or persons interprets the world in this way, and explain what the consequences of such an interpretation of the world are. Grounded-theory actually combines elements of both epistemological/ontological perspectives outlined by Cassell and Symon.

This study certainly conforms to this pattern. It charts the elements of police officers' 'sense-making' activities whilst all the time seeking to answer two questions:

1. *What sort* of sense-making is going on here?
2. *Why is this sort* of sense-making going on here?

And it will, of course, do so by attending to a particular aspect of this sense-making: its affective content. Given the phenomenological questions being asked of the research data ("how does the world seem/feel to police officers?"), I did not consider quantitative techniques to be appropriate. Grounded-theory analytical techniques provide a framework for qualitative description in tandem with theory-building, though this will have to be supplemented when I come to look at affective processes in more detail in sections 3.4.0 and 3.5.0

3.1.3.0 Grounded-Theory Style Data-Gathering in Interviews

Despite the fact that there are no rigid procedures in grounded-theory, there is however a clear set of techniques used in this kind of qualitative research.

3.1.3.1 Interview guides and techniques

There seems to be some general agreement that a number of levels of categorisation and coding of data is necessary in order to draw out interpretive repertoires and link to theory.¹⁰ If one is working with interview data then the very first level of coding comes when the 'interview guide' is constructed. While the qualitative interview is obviously far more open than the quantitative interview there is still a need for the interviewer to go into the interview having some idea of the general topics which are of interest. This set of topics may be derived from the research literature, personal experience, or preliminary research work.¹¹

This *interview guide* is likely to be *modified through use*. Above all this kind of qualitative researcher must maintain flexibility in the face of incoming data.¹² Not only must the researcher be prepared to alter the interview guide in the light of previous interviews but it is also likely that the order of questioning will have to be flexible, as relatively open-ended questions often lead to the interviewee going on to comment on issues which the researcher had intended to raise at a later point. In such circumstances it is not desirable to stop the interviewee and make him/her conform to the order of the interview guide, since the research is intended to uncover the connections which the interviewee makes, not confirm or refute those which the researcher has made. This is a case in which the qualitative researcher's ontological standpoint does in fact dictate a procedure (if one can call flexibility a procedure). It may be that the researcher should in fact extend this flexibility to include revision of the actual content of the interview-guide during the interview itself. Given the ontological assumptions there is no good reason why not, other than that some level of commonality between interviews, in terms of the questions asked, forms a convenient starting point in the analysis. As Cassell and Symon correctly point out, with this type of research we are never entirely clear at the outset what we are interested in or how we can explore the issues, or even what the major issues are.¹³ These things have to be allowed to emerge and evolve. This ultimately is the key to grounding theory in the data.

It is, I would suggest, of central importance that one keeps in mind the key objective of the qualitative interview, that is to get the interviewee to 'talk' with the *minimum of inhibition*. Clearly one wants talk about specific things, though this can be as broad as 'talking about one's job' or 'talking about parenthood'. But

ultimately there is no point in asking questions about these issues if they fail to provoke relatively uninhibited 'talk' since, to reiterate the point, what we want is the interviewee's connections, constructions and interpretations, not ours (at least not at this stage). Some issues are much easier to talk about than others: it is likely that a police officer will feel more at ease talking about his educational background than about police corruption. It is therefore generally recommended that interviews should start with some basic demographic questions (age, socio-economic background, education, marital status, etc.).¹⁴ This first ten minutes are generally the most awkward so by the time these questions are over the atmosphere is usually a good deal more relaxed. King also suggests that it is important that the interview should not finish on a difficult or distressing issue. It should, if possible, finish with some upbeat general questions (in my case the last question was "What do you find most enjoyable about your work?" and it turned out to be one of the most revealing of all). In the middle, of course, will be found the main substance of the interview. It will contain main questions, often with sub-questions. These sub-questions may provide a series of alternatives depending on the response to the main question. The general order of the interview guide is therefore:

1. Simple, factual, specific questions (possibly for demographic data).
2. Increasingly difficult, perhaps distressing issues. Specific main questions with sub-questions.
3. Upbeat general questions.

It is interesting to note that in recommending that certain issues be not discussed until the interview is well underway, authors such as King are tacitly acknowledging the fact that interviews are affective phenomena. In their research technique they take into account affective phenomena which they do not acknowledge at any descriptive, theoretical or meta-theoretical level.

One must not simply get topics in the right order however, the questions also have to be phrased in a way which provokes uninhibited 'talk'. This, in my view, is really the main purpose of the pilot interview study. The researcher starts out with a mass of questions on topics which have suggested themselves in the ways outlined above. Some of these questions will provoke lots of 'talk' amongst all interviewees, some will provoke 'talk' varying from virtual silence to fairly detailed responses, some will actually cause not only silence but a frosty and uncomfortable atmosphere to descend over the rest of the interview. On the whole the researcher will retain only the first category, though some in the second category may be useful in picking out variations in orientation between individuals. The final group of questions could, in theory, be quite informative in that they tell one something about the ways in which the interviewees will *not* look at,

interpret, or construct the world. In practice however they are almost impossible to use since they often destroy the basis for any communicative activity and therefore make the research impossible. They therefore tend to get thrown out.¹⁵ This is clearly unfortunate in the case of research intended to map affective patterns since these nodal points of bad affective intensity are crucial to the analysis. I would suggest that this makes it all the more remarkable that such strong negative affective intensities still emerged in my own data.

Summarising the requirements of interviews providing data for grounded-theory type analysis:

1. They are generally semi-structured, with the loose structure provided by an interview guide.
2. The topics covered, in the interview guide, will initially be derived from the research literature, personal experience, and/or prior research.
3. The researcher must be as flexible as is practical (bearing in mind that the data has to be analyzed at some point). This will almost certainly involve revising the interview guide particularly at the pilot stage. It will also involve changing the order of questioning in each interview, and may even involve revision of the content of the interview guide mid-interview if this provokes, what is 'revealing' itself to be, relevant 'talk'.
4. The researcher must keep in mind the importance of provoking relatively uninhibited 'talk' without too much pre-structuring. This 'talk' will be in certain specified areas, though even that is open to revision. The objective of the research, in the initial stages anyway, is to map out the interviewees' interpretive repertoires, not the researcher's.

3.1.3.2 Doing Ethnographic Fieldwork

Fieldwork clearly stands as a major data-gathering activity in its own right. For those who rely heavily on interviews however, it can also function as an essential source of ideas for constructing an interview guide and as a major source of supplementary data for purposes of 'triangulation'.

Burgess identifies four basic modes of conducting fieldwork observation.

1. The complete participant. This is totally covert. Here relationships are formed between observer and

observed but the person or persons being observed are *unaware of the 'real' role* of the observer.

2. The participant-as-observer. Here relationships are formed and participation takes place but the intention to observe events is *open*.
3. The observer-as-participant. Here only *superficial contacts* are maintained with the people being studied - mainly by asking them occasional questions.
4. The complete observer. Here the basic strategy involves standing back and watching and listening *without any substantial involvement* in the proceedings.¹⁶

Strategies 1 and 4 clearly present major problems. In the case of 1 there are both ethical and practical obstacles. In this piece of research it simply was not possible to be a covert participant (as I am not a serving police officer), even if it had been felt to be desirable. Strategy 4 begs the question of how it is possible to spend long periods of time within a particular social milieu without interacting. At some point it would become so artificial a situation as to be counterproductive. The tendency in much research is therefore to adopt either 2 or 3 or, as *in this case*, a combination of the two. It is also important to note that strategies/roles can change over time. The observer may start out using strategy 3 but gradually be drawn into more and more participation. Alternatively the observer may wish to participate but find that this is not practicable, or that those being observed are unhappy with the situation. In my own case I wanted to approximate as closely as possible to 2 to the extent that this was practicable, however I felt, particularly at the beginning and end of the month, pushed further into strategy 3.

Conducting fieldwork can be extremely stressful for the researcher.¹⁷ It involves the careful management of impressions in an environment which is, generally, totally alien, filled with strangers, and often potentially or actually hostile. In this stressfully alien environment one has to carry out the extremely difficult task of comporting oneself in such a way as to gain trust and access.¹⁸ Accordingly Waddington (summarising Fetterman, Taylor and Brogdan) recommends the following self management strategies:

1. "A positive and non-threatening self-image."
2. "Avoiding unwarranted or uninvited displays of friendliness and familiarity."
3. "Emphasise whatever features they [you] may have in common with their [your] respondents."

4. "Show sufficient interest in people's views."
5. "Do favours or try to help people whenever possible."
6. "'Pay homage' to the routines of the persons with whom they [you] come into contact."¹⁹

In terms of recording data it is recommended that one should acclimatise for a short period before beginning to take notes. When note-taking does begin, notes should include descriptions of what the researcher has observed in the way of interactions, utterances and events. They should also contain memos regarding how the researcher feels at the time and what hunches are emerging in his/her mind during the course of the observation.²⁰ Waddington suggests that observational fieldwork is an inductive rather than a deductive research strategy.²¹ As such we can see that the data-gathering and analysis are not entirely separable from one another. In the same way that grounding theory in interview data may involve adjusting interview guides in the course of actually conducting interviews, so fieldwork observation may, and should, involve theorising on the hoof.

3.1.3.3 Analyzing Interview and Fieldwork Data

Nigel King lists four approaches to the analysis of interview data:

1. Quasi-statistical. Here the objective is to count the number of times certain words or phrases occur and perhaps correlate them with one another.
2. Template analysis. Here one has a pre-structured codebook containing lists of categories felt to be relevant to the analysis. This set of categories is applied to the data. Its contents are revisable however and the analytical technique is not generally a statistical one. The ideal of course would be to derive the template from a preparatory piece of research. In the case of this research initial fieldwork provided, in part, the basis for the template used to analyze the interview data.
3. Editing. Here categories are sought in the data through a continuous process of cutting and pasting, theory production, and summary.
4. Immersion. This is the least structured technique and involves a kind of spontaneous, intuitive

response to immersion in a range of qualitative data sources.²²

These are clearly ideal types. It is clear from accounts of grounded-theory that it, in fact, relies on varying combinations of approaches 2 and 3.

The analysis of qualitative data, from which a linkage between the data and a theoretical conceptualisation is gradually built up, is often referred to as "coding". A number of more or less systematic levels of coding take place.²³

An important distinction is made between "initial" or "open" coding and "axial" coding.²⁴ In the "open" stage a number of initial categories are allowed to 'emerge' out of the data if one is, predominantly, using analysis strategy (3), or *be applied* to the data, if one is, predominantly, using analysis strategy (2). Then a period of theoretical reflection takes place in which connections are generated between this initial set of categories. This results in a further re-arrangement of the data. The latter is "axial" coding, it is a further stage in which relationships within the data can be allowed to 'emerge'.²⁵ The codes themselves can cover a range of different sorts of things - kinds of activities, kinds of relationships, the ways in which people think about people and objects, psychological strategies, perspectives and so on. As far as one can gauge there seem to be no strict rules governing the category-formation process. Flexibility is the ultimate imperative.

The intention, it would appear - though I can find no explicit expression of this belief - is that the more levels of "axial" coding take place, the more the researcher distances him/herself from his/her initial preconceptions and allows the data to drive the coding and, therefore, the theory building. This quote from Jorgensen, referring to the analysis of field work data, I think sums up perfectly this whole analytical orientation:

The analysis of qualitative data is dialectical. Data are dissembled into elements and components; these materials are examined for patterns and relationships sometimes in connection to ideas derived from the literature, existing theories, or hunches that have emerged during fieldwork or perhaps simply commonsense suspicions. With an idea in hand, the data are reassembled, providing an interpretation or an explanation of a question or particular problem; this synthesis is then evaluated and critically examined; it may be accepted or rejected entirely with or without modifications; and not uncommonly, this process then is repeated to test further the emergent theoretical conception, expand its generality, or otherwise examine its usefulness.²⁶

Theory building is assisted in this process by constant memo writing.²⁷ Any new ideas, theoretical connections, categories, general feelings about the work, and so on, are noted down at the time and gradually incorporated into the work as a whole.

Much of the searching, cutting, pasting and sorting involved in axial coding has been made far easier in the last decade by the availability of word-processors, and more recently computer software designed specifically for qualitative data coding. This has made possible rapid and very radical resorting of data that would not have been possible without vast resources ten or fifteen years ago.

This study (as will become clear) did indeed employ a combination of template analysis and editing. The initial template was itself derived from prior field research and literature surveys. Simultaneously however new categories were being sought in the data and indeed some hunches emerged in the interview room itself before any formal analysis had begun. It also employed a number of layers of axial coding (what I have referred to in sections the research narrative as 'vertical' and 'horizontal' coding), going in its scope even beyond King's recommendations.

3.1.3.4 Analyzing Discourse.

I said at the beginning of this chapter that Bryman and Burgess identify two types of qualitative research-analysis strategy relevant to this thesis (precisely how they are relevant will become evident in the 'research narrative' section which follows). So far I have only discussed grounded-theory. They argue however that the deep interweaving of theory and data implied by the grounded-theory model rarely actually takes place. I would dispute this and I believe certain aspects of my own research narrative will support my position. However Bryman and Burgess argue that in fact most qualitative analysis does not have any theory-based explanation in it at all, for the simple reason that in many approaches description is equated with explanation. They call this the "pattern model". Here the focus is simply on *the way* in which language is employed. There is little or no examination of *why* language is employed in a particular way. An example of this would typically be the kind of anthropological "thick description" employed by Clifford Geertz referred to earlier, together with the whole spectrum of analyses in anthropology, sociology, and cultural studies that is informed by structural linguistics and semiotics.

It is often assumed that the discourse analyses conducted by Michel Foucault are an example of the "pattern model", indeed Bryman and Burgess imply this. This is a mistaken assumption however. It is true that many analyses which call themselves 'discourse analyses', and indeed many which purport to be of a Foucauldian

character, are in fact of the "pattern model" type in that they do not go beyond detailed *description* of the way in which language is employed. Foucault's own work however clearly interweaves *description and explanation*. He has a whole series of theoretical artifacts ranging from his theory of modernity as a series of disciplinary and governmental technologies, to his theory of the linkage between power and knowledge. These help him to explain the usages of language and meaningful action which he uncovers. Ironically it is this combination which has led crude positivists to accuse Foucault of relativism and subjectivism, whilst naive constructivists accuse him of positivism. I shall explore this further in due course. First however I shall outline the descriptions of discourse analysis which can be found in the methodological literature.

3.1.3.5 The Object of Discourse Analysis

According to much of the literature, the central purpose of discourse analysis is the examination of text and human utterances in order to find relatively stable patterns within that talk and text. The object of analysis is, therefore, language itself and the practices within which that language is embedded. How is language used, how do accounts of the world vary, and what are the consequences of such variations?²⁸

This means that when an interviewee's 'talk' is analyzed, the intention is not to establish the beliefs or views of the individual, "the concern is at the level of language or discursive practices, rather than the individual interviewee".²⁹ Discourse analysis is not therefore a kind of extreme subjectivism since, "repertoires are conceptualised not as originating from the individual but as culturally and historically embedded and socially communicated."³⁰ Not only does discourse analysis not begin from the subject but it assumes that discourses are implicated in the structuring of subjectivity. A further consequence of this is that the subject is not viewed as a coherent, centred originator of meaning but as a site of diversity and fragmentation.³¹

Discourse analysis, at the very least, brackets out the question of the relationship between language and 'objective' reality. Indeed most discourse analysts come from an epistemological standpoint much like the phenomenological one outlined above, which argues that language is fundamental to the construction of social reality. Reality is whatever it is established to be by, what ethnomethodologists call, "accounting" practices.³² Discourse between people is made up of a series of rhetorical strategies designed to produce "factuality". The discourse analyst looks for "procedures through which some part of reality is made to seem stable, neutral and objectively there".³³ Potter and Wetherall point out that there are two broad focuses in discourse analysis. Firstly, there are those analyses that attempt to map out the common *procedures* through which interpretations of the world are put together, made stable, and made to appear "factual". This focus is derived from the sociological tradition of ethnomethodology. Then there are those analyses which seek to

map out actual discourses. The common source of inspiration for this kind of analysis in contemporary sociology is the work of Michel Foucault.³⁴

The first task for the discourse analyst is to establish exactly what "versions" of reality are being mobilised and how.³⁵ Thus the first target for investigations is pattern and variability of pattern in discourse. These patterns have, in the methodological literature, been referred to as "interpretive repertoires".³⁶ These versions of reality may have purposes or passions behind them. It is also argued that not only do varying repertoires have varying consequences but that the discursive resources available to a speaker set certain limits upon their capacity for action.³⁷ It is important to make clear at this point that, as suggested above, investigation of the wider effects of particular interpretive repertoires, and forces lying behind their mobilisation, are analytically separable from the process of discourse analysis itself.

To put it simply:

1. The discourse analyst first seeks to demonstrate the existence of certain repertoires, map them out, show that they are available within a particular milieu and show the rhetorical play at work - the procedures for the 'construction of factuality'.
2. Then comes explanation for the coming into play of those repertoires, together with analysis of their wider effects, as a second level of analysis requiring a further coming together of theory and data.

As outlined above, any kind of grounded-theory technique may have these two distinct levels of conceptualisation. In other words discourse analysis - particularly Foucauldian discourse analysis - should be characterised as a variety of grounded-theory rather than as a variety of the pattern-model. This is important because Foucault will be figuring heavily at methodological, theoretical, and empirical levels in this thesis.

3.2.0.0 The Research Narrative Part 1

The long story of this research begins in August 1988 when I began work as a researcher on an investigation of police attitudes funded by the Home Office. A Chief Inspector in a large, mainland British Constabulary was working, at that time, on a piece of research on crime and social stress. In the course of conducting this investigation he had become interested in the question of cautioning policy; in particular he felt that

cautioning was vastly under-used. More importantly he suspected that it was more under used with some social groups than with others. His own experience and his reading of the police studies literature suggested to him that police stereotypes and prejudices might influence their use of cautioning. He therefore requested that the Home Office fund a one year investigation of police attitudes that might influence their use of cautioning, and the Home Office agreed to this. He felt however that the research itself should be supervised and carried out by professional academic researchers.

The, then, Department of Economics and Social Science at Bristol Polytechnic was asked to supervise the research, and I was employed to carry out the research and produce a report. The programme of research was designed, carried out and written up by me. It consisted of the following:

1. The whole of August 1988 was spent conducting overt observational fieldwork.
2. From September to Christmas 1988 I conducted and analyzed the results of a pilot interview study.
3. From mid January until April 1989 I conducted the main interview study.
4. Transcription took place in April and May 1989.
5. Analysis and writing-up took place in June and July 1989.

3.2.1.0 The Observational Fieldwork

This took place with one uniformed 'group' working on the central sub-division of the city. A police group works its way around a complete shift-cycle each month, so I worked my way around the shift-cycle with them. The central sub-divisional headquarters in Bristol is directly adjacent to the force headquarters and as such has a scale and level of activity not normally found in other divisional offices.

The intention of this work was twofold:

1. To familiarise myself with some of the formal technical aspects of police-work and the organisation of a police divisional office.

2. To collect data on police occupational culture and informal rules governing police-work. This was to feed into the initial interview guide.

I was coming to this work with no background in police-studies and little familiarity with the literature. I was thus literally having to learn, from my fieldwork, what questions were possible, what issues of interest and relevance existed. Far from being a hindrance I believe that this lack of experience really did ensure that I learned as directly and inductively from my own fieldwork data as is possible. I carried very few pre-conceptions, derived from police studies orthodoxy, into the field.

At the beginning of each shift the inspector would attach me to an officer or pair of officers. In this way I was able to observe virtually every aspect of uniformed police work in my time there. I spent time in cars, on foot patrol, in the control room, in the reception office, on point duty, in the canteen, in the interview room, in the station bar, and so on.

Right from the beginning my experience was one of extreme difficulty in managing appearances so as to minimise suspicion, hostility, and general discomfort (theirs and my own). I felt myself to be in an extremely alien environment. Emphasising points in common was very difficult as there appeared to be few, and managing my appearance to suggest otherwise was not at all easy. A good example of this was my attempt to find an appropriate mode of dress. I generally wear jeans and T-shirts, and I have a number of earrings in each ear. I felt that this appearance was bound to be alienating so I removed my earrings and wore a second-hand suit. Being so highly attuned to any idiosyncrasy whatsoever they, of course, immediately detected that this was not my normal mode of dress. At one point I found myself in a lift with several police officers. One of them pointed at the holes in my ears and laughed, making a joke about having a "punk" spying on them. The difficulties did not end there however. On one occasion I was in a police car with some officers who stopped a "Peace Convoy" bus. They emptied the bus and proceeded to search it (supposedly for drugs - though they had absolutely no grounds for doing so and, indeed, found none). A group of the "travellers" gathered on the pavement and turned their attention to me. I was still wearing my ill-fitting suit. I heard mutterings of "he's CID" and felt extremely hostile looks bearing down on me. The next thing I knew someone had spat at me. It appeared that I had become the object of everyone's paranoia. I quickly abandoned the suit and went back to jeans and T-shirt (though I never wore earrings).

The field study was intensely intellectually stimulating but I cannot say that it was a pleasant experience. Though things eased considerably after the first few days it never became really comfortable. Indeed it was interesting to note that a lull in these tensions occurred in the middle of the month. I suspect that this was

as a result of their own curiosity about me temporarily overcoming their hostility and suspicion. For a very short while I was a novelty, a break in the routine. Towards the end of the month however I sensed new hostility as this novelty value wore off.

Negative affective responses dominated my very first encounters with the police in a research context then. These negative affects were on both sides. I felt alienated and uncomfortable. On the whole they showed all the signs of not wanting me there, not trusting me, and not respecting what I was attempting to do. After one afternoon in a patrol car with two officers I made the following note.

They said that my presence was inhibiting them from behaving normally so that I wasn't getting the full picture anyway. I explained that I had expected this. They indicated that they were suspicious of me because they were used to being "kicked in the teeth by people in my position". They then went on to outline their general resentment of the media's representation of them, especially the BBC.³⁸

Affective processes were emerging as an issue in the research as early as this very first month then. At this stage, however, I perceived these processes as an obstacle to the research. It had not yet occurred to me that a phenomenon as central to the research experience as this must itself be included in any adequate sociological account. In retrospect it seems absurd that one should view whole dimensions of social experience as obstacles to doing sociological research. Trying to remove, or ignore, the influence of feelings from the research scenario has been for so long an unquestioned dogma, however, that it had become almost common-sense.

I wrote notes about events, conversations, relationships, technical issues (eg how the control-room works, when notebooks are used, the contents of briefings at the beginning of shifts etc.), and working hypotheses. This ran to 140 sides of hand written notes on a small notepad. From the field notes, together with a scanning of the literature, I produced a list of questions which I felt at this stage might be relevant to the study in one way or another. I had begun, then, to establish the themes relevant to my interview guide in precisely the way suggested by Nigel King above. From this I constructed a provisional set of interview questions. There were too many questions to use all in one interview, the intention, therefore, was that a pilot study would take place in which slightly different questions were used in each interview.

3.2.2.0 The Pilot Interview Study

This study was carried out at the same central sub-divisional station as the fieldwork, though on the whole it involved officers from different groups to those studied in the initial phase. Ten interviews ranging between 60 and 90 minutes were carried out. They were tape recorded but never transcribed (due to resource constraints). Some of the substantial results of these interviews clearly fed into the research findings. It was here that many of my working hypotheses started to clarify themselves. The overt purpose of these interviews, however, was to test questions and re-work the interview guide. Two distinct processes were involved in this:

1. As indicated above in the general account of data gathering techniques, some of the questions tended to provoke a lot of 'talk' with almost all officers, some provoked 'talk' with some but not with others, and some provoked a frosty silence, confusion, or boredom with almost all officers. For the reasons outlined above it was my objective to purge the interview guide of all except the first category of questions.³⁹
2. These interviews also enabled me to constantly reassess what it was I was looking for. This was a further means for grounding the theory in the data. I was by now finding myself becoming very deeply embedded in the life-world of the police officer. Their thoughts, pre-occupations, categories etc had begun to pervade my own life.

By the end of this stage of the research I had a set of questions which all tended to provoke fairly uninhibited talk and which related fairly closely to my growing sense of the 'spirit' of the police world-view.

3.2.3.0 The Main Interview Study

I carried out 40 interviews, in the main study, at six different police stations. The stations were chosen by the senior police officer who had initiated the research. He did so on the basis of discussions, with myself, in which we decided that it would be desirable to have interviews from officers working in a number of different 'types' of area.

3.2.3.1 The locations

Station 1. (Code T) This is a station covering a divided area. On one side is a ghettoised, but mainly privately

owned or rented, inner city area with a very high concentration of residents of a wide range of Afro-Caribbean and Asian origin, on the other side is a tough, predominantly white, working-class council estate. It is universally recognised as the toughest sub-division in the force.

Station 2. (Code V) This station also covers a divided area. On one side is the most notorious of the mainly white, working class council estates in the city. On the other side is a 'respectable' middle class suburb. It has a reputation for difficulty exceeded only by Station 1.

Station 3. (Code W) This station covers a mixture of middle-class private housing and some relatively 'respectable' areas of council housing, together with a considerable amount of light industry.

Station 4. (Code X) This station also covers an area divided between a tough council housing estate and an area of more 'respectable' private housing.

Stations 1 to 4 were all in the main large city covered by the force

Station 5. (Code Y) This is a sub-division covering a smaller city and as such has a quite different scale and level of activity to that of the other stations. Clearly the full range of area types are covered - from the central business, shopping and entertainments district, to the council estates, the ghettoised 'transitional zones', and the middle-class suburbs.

Station 6. (Code Z) This is a medium sized seaside town. Again a variety of areas are policed from here.

3.2.3.2 The Sample

The procedure for selecting the sample was far from ideal but, given the general difficulties of access to the police, this was inevitable. Appointments were made for me to arrive at particular stations in particular weeks by the Chief Inspector who had initiated the research. He gave instructions to the Inspector on duty to provide me with a variety of different officers to interview over the course of my time there (usually about a week to ten days at each station). Responsibility for providing interviewees was generally delegated to one of the sergeants on duty. In some cases these individuals were extremely helpful, in other cases they made it quite clear to me that they were only doing this because they had been ordered to do so. The nature of the sample varied from station to station, partly because of the differences between the divisions in terms of the

central emphases of their work but partly because the attitudes of those constructing my sample for me varied so considerably. Nevertheless whilst the sample is not perfect I did talk to officers, below the rank of inspector, who were engaged in, or had experience of, virtually every kind of policing. They also show a wide spread of age, experience, and background as shown below.

Out of 40 interviews in the main study 37 were fully transcribed.⁴⁰ Of these

Ages ranged from 21 to 52.

35 were male.

2 were female.

All were white.

2 had unskilled working-class parents (labourers, factory workers etc.).

13 had skilled working-class parents (mechanics, carpenters etc.).

6 had lower middle-class parents (clerical, sales etc.).

7 had middle-class professional/managerial parents (teachers, civil servants, managers etc.).

3 had middle-class parents with small businesses.

1 had a father who was a director of a fairly large company.

4 had fathers who were police officers.

32 were married (1 told me he was divorced, and 2 others told me they were on their second marriages. This was not a direct question so there may have been more divorcees).

25 had children.

32 owned their own home. 4 were in police accommodation, 1 was in lodgings.

13 had only basic secondary education with no qualifications (though a sizeable proportion of these had been to grammar schools).

6 had 'O'levels.

7 had 'A'levels.

4 had technical qualifications.

4 had served apprenticeships.

3 had degrees (one was studying part-time for a Masters degree).

7 had military backgrounds (3 more were former merchant-seamen).

19 had some other history of work before joining the police (though this was minimal for at least half of these)

Length of service in the police ranged from 1 year to 28 years.

22 were uniformed police constables.

1 was a uniformed woman police constable.

1 was a PC 'acting up' to sergeant.

5 were uniformed sergeants.

1 was a uniformed woman sergeant in a women's police unit.

2 were PCs on attachment to 'street offenses' (plain clothes 'vice'- work)

1 was a PC on attachment to the CID.

2 were detective constables.

2 were detective sergeants.

Most officers who were past their probationary period appeared to have worked in a number of different places and have been on 'attachment' to a number of different departments (street offenses, traffic, CID, control-room etc).

Although the sample was not randomly picked three things strike one immediately about this demographic material:

1. The extremely traditional pattern of family life that emerges: marriage, children, home ownership, are all astonishingly preponderant. Other patterns emerged such as the fact that over two thirds of the sample said that their mothers were full-time housewives and, of those who had worked, 8 were either nurses or in care-work of some kind (ie the supposedly feminine occupations): a picture of very traditional gender relationships and stereotypes perhaps. A number were also married to nurses.
2. The large number of ex-military personnel. When military and merchant-navy are added together they account for over one quarter of the sample.
3. The relatively large number with fathers in the police. 10% may not seem extraordinary but in comparison to police officers as a proportion of the general population it is large.

3.2.4.0 The Interview Experience

The interviews were not nearly as uncomfortable as the observational fieldwork. There is a definite sense in which the researcher has the upper hand in the interview situation. Even if the interview takes place on the interviewee's physical territory it is always the researcher's symbolic and affective home territory. It is the interviewee who is suddenly in an alien environment, not knowing quite what is expected of him/her. The researcher is calling the shots, and by now should know what he/she is doing. I was pretty clear about what I was doing at this stage. I had a reasonable working knowledge of what police officers do, what sorts of things preoccupy them, what I wanted to get them talking about, and what questions they would respond to. I was able, for the first time, really to take control of things.

The overall responses of the interviewees varied but a fairly common pattern was discernable. Of course a few individuals just refused to cooperate altogether either by sustaining a blank wall of monosyllabic answers throughout, or by chanting a kind of public relations mantra repetitively regardless of the question. I recall only one really serious case of each of these types of obstruction however. On the whole, all individuals would begin in a more or less guarded way but by the time they had got through the introductory questions they had warmed to the situation considerably.

I have no way of being certain of this but I developed a very strong impression that the more I gave the impression of being in control and knowing where I was going, the more they warmed to the task. As I got better at it so did they. It may be that the opposite was also true when I was conducting the fieldwork observations. My own uncertainty, anxiety, and discomfort was no doubt feeding their irritation and paranoia.

My hunch is that this was a result of their affective orientation towards respect for authority and authoritativeness. This is in the nature of the organisation and its mandate, as I shall show. The interview situation supplied a clear sense of hierarchy. They could feel at home with this, even if I was in charge. But the fieldwork observations created a situation of extreme ambiguity for everyone. On the one hand I had been given authority to observe them, but on the other hand I was on their territory: they were being policemen and I was not a policeman. This would normally give them an automatic authority over me. Our relationship was extremely blurred: my right to ask questions and observe their activities was not clear. Indeed on one occasion a station-sergeant ejected me from his charge-room on the grounds that I didn't have any right to be there and anyway he "didn't like the look of me". This kind of ambiguity in relationships of authority is precisely the kind of thing that police officers find most confusing, and annoying.

When it came to the interviews, apart from the very few exceptions I have indicated above, they appeared to have no difficulty in speaking extremely openly and at length on all of the issues I introduced. Some indeed appeared to find the experience a positively cathartic one. One detective constable whose marriage had recently broken down, due in part to the strains of the job, pointed out that there were no counselling services available in the force and furthermore that the whole culture of hard machismo militated strongly against it ever being recognised as a real need. Hard men and women don't talk about their feelings. Yet he was clearly taking this opportunity to do just that. A number of others took the same opportunity quite openly, and many others were clearly doing so in a more covert manner.

At the other end of the spectrum of feeling however was the evident pleasure that many of these men and women took in talking about their vocation. As many studies have indicated policing is not regarded simply as 'the work one happens to do'. Rather it is adopted as an entire identity, mission, vocation, and way of life.⁴¹ But the, also well documented, insularity of the profession means that officers rarely get a chance to articulate their beliefs and feeling about their vocation to anyone other than fellow police officers.⁴² The consequence is that once the initial barrier of awkwardness and suspicion has been overcome they are in general positively eager to give account of themselves.

The waning of suspicion is also, perhaps, a consequence of isolating the officer temporarily from the police milieu. To some extent he 'forgets himself' just enough to speak, but not enough for the paranoia inhabiting police occupational culture to be disguised.

This 'dropping of one's guard' was further facilitated by the sheer length of the interviews. They varied in length between sixty and ninety minutes. This was a deliberate strategy provoked by the experience in the pilot study that some of the best material emerged very late in interviews after even the most suspicious individuals had their powers of resistance loosened by sheer exhaustion. The consequence for myself was increasing mental exhaustion. In many ways maintaining concentration intensely for this length of time is even more difficult for the interviewer particularly given the semi-structured method used. One has to keep track of where one is whilst hopping around from one part of the interview guide to another. I found that I could only comfortably cope with two interviews per day with a good gap in between. But this was by no means always possible. Often I would go in and find myself sitting around for hours before getting one interview for the day. On other days I would have to make up for this by conducting three or four interviews in a row. After perhaps six hours of almost continuous concentration within this very synthetic interactional environment one feels tiredness, irritation, even boredom, and often symptoms such as headaches and a general physical numbness. This clearly feeds into the affective dimension of the interview in completely

unpredictable ways.

In retrospect it seems quite clear that it is essential in the context of qualitative research of this kind that the researcher closely monitors his/her own mood patterns in the research environment. Factors which may seem rather petty such as growing exhaustion, hunger, illness, might in fact have serious effects on research outcomes.

3.2.5.0 The First Analysis

As I have already indicated, analysis began almost on the first day I stepped out onto the streets with a police officer. I immediately began to formulate working hypotheses in relation to the data I was collecting. Also, as I have suggested above, the interview guide in many ways represents a transitional analysis of what has gone before it. The analysis proper did not begin until shortly before the main interviews had been completed. At this point a number of audio-typists were hired and a rapid transcription process began. As the transcripts became available I proceeded to analyze them.

3.2.5.1 Thematised Collections: Lateral Coding

The transcripts were analyzed using an unmodified Word Perfect 5.0 word-processing programme. The procedure of lateral coding was as follows:

1. I focused on five broad sets of issues which (on the basis of fieldwork and pilot interviews) I had begun to perceive as central to the police world-view. These were unemployment, recidivism, youth, race, and class.⁴³
2. I drew up of a list of key terms and phrases which I felt might enable me to locate relevant quotes relating to each of these broad categories. For example in relation to unemployment I would look for - 'unemployment', 'unemployed', 'unemployable', 'work', 'redundant', 'dole', 'social-security', 'benefits', and so on. These lists were, of course, constantly revised as the process of analysis itself suggested new key terms.
3. I then used the word-search command to find these key terms and phrases.
4. Once found, the relevant quote was copied into a separate file covering that particular theme. I thus

ended up with five new files containing fifty or sixty quotes in each. Some of these quotes would be duplicated in more than one file as they might be quotes relevant to, and perhaps linking, unemployment and recidivism, or race and unemployment, and so on.

The first major technical obstacle I encountered was the quality of the transcripts. The audio typists had no expertise in this area, for them the conversations might just as well have been in a foreign language. The result was that the transcripts were often not simply inaccurate but meaningless in places. This was exacerbated in cases where there was background noise on the tape (usually traffic in the road outside). The only solution to this was to go through the transcripts, together with the tapes, myself, making any necessary corrections. This proved to be extremely time-consuming. Consequently I often had to work with imperfect transcripts, only making the necessary corrections when I had reached the second level of analysis (ie the five thematised collections of quotations).

3.2.5.2 Marginal Notes

At this stage I adopted another classic analytical technique, the use of marginal notes. I printed out the complete thematised collections of quotations. I then went through them noting in the margins the connections being made, by police officers, in the text. After a while I was able to use shortened notation or a kind of loose code to label quotations as repeats of connections I had noted earlier.

3.2.5.3 Editing

I was then physically able to cut up the print-outs into sections and rearrange the quotes into sub-themes - for example, quotes linking recidivism to problem families; quotes linking recidivism to unemployment; quotes linking recidivism to moral degeneracy; quotes linking recidivism to inappropriate action by the courts; and so on. Such sorting was not always clear-cut as quotes may link more than two ideas, or they may be ambiguous or muddled to a degree where it is difficult to make out what is being said at all. Overall patterns began to emerge quite clearly however. These patterns I quickly summarised before proceeding to write up.

3.2.5.4 Writing-Up

The nature of the write-up was limited by the amount of space available for it in the final report (it was to

be only one chapter in a larger report, the rest of which was written by the Chief Inspector who had initiated the project). It therefore contained very few raw quotations and few references to the literature. It was a straightforward summary of the research findings, divided into five sections which had formed the basis for the analysis. My abiding memory of this stage of the process is of how easily my conclusions came to me; I was so saturated in the police world-view by this time.

3.2.5.5 What Next?

As I had proceeded with this analysis it had become apparent that the level of sophistication fell far short of what I felt should be expected.

1. It was essentially a discourse analysis at only a very superficial level in that it contained only the first of the two necessary dimensions I have described above. I had begun to describe some of the interpretive repertoires employed by police officers, but I had in no way provided any theory regarding possible mechanisms determining that their repertoires should take these forms, nor any theoretical account of their possible consequences.
2. I had the strong feeling that I had only begun to touch the tip of the iceberg. The lateral coding procedure had pulled out a few bits and pieces and analyzed them in isolation from the rest of the text. My initial choice of relevant categories and key search-terms had forced me to ignore whole swathes of material and also ignore the continuity of individual officer's narrative accounts of their world.

For the purpose of this thesis I proceeded with the objective of working with the very large amount of data I had accumulated, in order to develop an analysis which would overcome these two major weaknesses. The next year or so was spent reading from the police studies literature in order to familiarise myself with the kind of theories commonly put forward to account for some of the characteristics I had found to be common in police discourse. Some of the results of this are evident in my literature review section. But I was becoming aware of the fact that something very important was missing both from the police studies literature, and also from the more general sociological tool-kit with which I was familiar. There was no account of the affective dimension of police occupational culture.

3.3.0.0 The Problem of Affect

When I had to go back to the tapes in order to correct transcripts, one of the things that struck me was the gap that can exist between spoken and written word. What had initially looked like a minor moan on the page was suddenly saturated with emotion, a sinister tone, an angry shout, a sad note, and so on. And then once I had begun to think about it even the words on the page began to leap out at me as nodal points in swirling currents of *feeling*. I began to ask people whether there existed any theoretical framework which could help me with patterns of affect. I heard some vague mutterings about Lacan but little else. I effectively spent much of the next three years mapping out the current state of theory in this area and elaborating a set of theoretical tools for my own purposes.

As well as posing theoretical questions, this also raised a whole set of methodological questions:

1. In what sense can one collect *evidence* of affective phenomena?
2. How can one *analyze* such phenomena as they appear in the evidence?
3. How can one *present warrantable* claims and evidence for such phenomena?
4. How does the presentation of evidence of these affective phenomena relate to the presentation of mappings of *interpretive repertoires*?

I have to a great extent dealt with the issue of affective processes in chapters 5, 6, and 7. However, I will briefly reflect on these methodological questions here.

3.3.1.0 Methodology and Affect: Foucault and Nietzsche

The fact is that there are really no concrete models to work from in Anglo-American sociology. The only methodological models which do exist are those derived from experimental psychology. These are concerned with the measurement of bodily arousal under certain controlled conditions. This did not seem to me to be an appropriate model for my own purposes, however, at first this was simply an intuition. I felt strongly that I was collecting, recording, and able to comment on, evidence of affective phenomena without having to attach electrodes to my interviewees in order to measure their skin conductivity - but how? Surely all I had was words, discourse, talk and text. Indeed my Anglicised interpretation of Foucauldian discourse analysis

encouraged me to think about discourse in this way. But of course this was a total misapprehension of Foucault's own account of human discourse. Foucault's outlook is Nietzschean. To grasp it we need only look to his most explicitly methodological text, the essay 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History'.⁴⁴

Foucault is primarily concerned to distinguish in this essay between two different styles of historical method. One is the tradition which searches for origins, coherent narrative, logics of development, clear trajectories, totalities, closed systems and so on. He argues, following Nietzsche that this is "priestly" history. It is the history of a historian who denies the role of his own "will-to-knowledge" in the construction of his historical interpretation (or "perspective" to put it in proper Nietzschean vocabulary) and instead attributes that will to a great transcendental subject. The subject is no longer of course God but history itself. Foucault's target is clearly all derivatives of Hegelian teleological metaphysics. But this target can be interpreted extremely widely. Any account of history which sees in it some clear developmental progress, some increase in reason, or truth is liable to be put into this priestly camp: for 'reason' and 'truth' also count as the "will-to-power" disguised as transcendental will (ie. God-substitute). Indeed the "will-to-truth" appears as the most potent form of "ressentiment".

So Foucault argues for a second type of history. Here the historian acknowledges the perspectival character of his work, the fact that his own will runs through it. Methodologically this history must emphasise the discontinuities and fissures in the archive. History is not a single story but a massive multiplicity of fragments (a claim which he similarly makes regarding the individual subject and its history). *The historical account must therefore, by definition, be fragmentary, discontinuous and incomplete. There is no single system, no underlying logic, no telos. History is radically contingent. My own thesis is not a historical analysis but it is an analysis of a particular subjectivity, that of the police officer. As such I shall be following the methodological implications of Foucault's position as outlined here.*

But this still does not deal with the question of affect. As we proceed through this essay it becomes clear that historical contingency is not the only Nietzschean component in Foucault's approach. At the centre of the genealogical method is 'the body and its forces'.

Finally, descent [of discourse] attaches itself to the body. It inscribes itself in the nervous system, in temperament, in the digestive apparatus; it appears in faulty respiration, in improper diets, in the debilitated and prostrate body of those whose ancestors committed errors. Fathers have only to mistake effects for causes, believe in the reality of an "afterlife" or maintain the value of eternal truths, and the bodies of their children will suffer.... The

body is the inscribed surface of events (traced by language and dissolved by ideas)... Genealogy, as an analysis of descent, is thus situated within the articulation of the body and history. Its task is to expose a body totally imprinted by history and the process of history's destruction of the body.⁴⁵

History appears as a struggle between bodies and their forces. It is a history of never-ending violence. Social rules and rituals are simply the sedimented embodiment of the "domination of certain men over others". Memory, and the consequent ability to obey rules, honour obligations, duties and promises, is the product of a training of the body and its forces brought about by violence.⁴⁶ Once installed however, such rules have no permanence of meaning. Struggle is never-ending and the meaning of a thing, sign, utterance, or rule is never finally determined.

Interpretation is the violent or surreptitious appropriation of a system of rules, which in itself has no essential meaning...the development of humanity is a series of interpretations. The role of genealogy is to record its history.⁴⁷

Meaning is determined by relations-of-forces. These relations change constantly and occasionally very radically. The forces of desire and domination cannot easily be distinguished. It has been argued the Foucault is predominantly a theoretician of power and that he leaves the question of desire to such fellow travellers as Gilles Deleuze and Jean-Francois Lyotard.⁴⁸ But this is really to misunderstand his theory of power. Power is the subjection of one body to another's volition, will, or desire (the terms are effectively synonymous here). Signs, rules, discourses, and so on, are elements in regimes which make this possible. When a police officer orders a crowd to disperse and it does so because it understands his order and accepts his authority then those bodies have become an extension of his volition, will, or desire. Domination is simply another way of describing bodies distributed hierarchically in a field of desire.⁴⁹

Foucault's own genealogical method of discourse analysis is therefore explicitly concerned with the intersection of language, forces (or 'affective forces' as I have tended to call them) and meaning. When he describes a series of interpretive repertoires he is simultaneously describing fields of affect and the distribution of bodies in them. This is why he chooses madness, delinquency, and sexuality as his key points of reference. They are the clearest examples of the intersection of affect (fear, hatred, love etc.) with language, and the hierarchical distribution of bodies (ie. domination).

Importantly, from the point view of the methodological problems set out at the beginning of this section.

Foucault argues that signs, utterances, rules, and actions have no meaning outside of the fields of desire/domination which grasp them at any one time. Understanding or interpreting a series of signs, utterances or actions always involves affect. Understanding is an affective, bodily phenomenon. This is obvious when we think about it more carefully. Why do we read novels? Because they make us feel things - suspense, amazement, fear, horror, pleasure and so on. There is nothing in a novel but signs, yet it goes right into our body, into our nervous system and makes us feel things.⁵⁰ This is why in listening to a tape recording of a police officer's voice it is not difficult to detect that officer's feelings despite the fact that he not present in the room, despite the fact that those feelings took place some years ago, and despite the fact that all that apparently remains of them are some traces on a piece of magnetic tape. The trace is transformed back into a series of utterances, which quite easily re-situate themselves in our own nervous system. We understand by feeling something of what the police officer felt when he made those utterances. Understanding might be thought of as a kind of bodily empathy or alignment brought about by rules, signs, utterances and so on.

This does not mean that the 'field of interpretation' is wide open. On the contrary. If we are discussing an exchange in a fictional text, for example, in which the characters are expressing extreme hatred towards one another and I state that they are expressing feelings of love then it will be clear to both of us that I am wrong. We are quite used to the idea of 'feeling-with' characters in fictional texts.⁵¹ There is of course room for disagreement around the margins (is it a jealous anger or a frustrated anger etc?) but we know perfectly well that we are witnessing the character's feelings of anger. The 'anger' in question is not the same thing as the signifiers on the page, they are just marks on a piece of paper. But the signifiers somehow provoke our sense of 'feeling-with' a fictional character. The precise material mechanisms responsible for this still, so far as I know, remain a mystery to literary-theorists and neuro-scientist alike, (though I shall be touching on some possible avenues of exploration in the conclusion to this thesis). Now if the text itself places clear constraints on the interpretation of a fictional character's feelings then surely the same holds true for expressions of feeling by real persons in interview transcripts.

It is also important to note that we can obtain a measure of agreement about the feelings being expressed by a character (fictional or otherwise) in a text because we exist within a community of interpreters within which signifiers have some measure of common significance. Consequently there is nothing arbitrary and subjective whatsoever about these interpretations. They are perfectly verifiable (or otherwise) by other members of the community of interpretation and feeling for which the text is intended.⁵² It seems to me that the police interview transcripts examined here provoke a quite marked 'feeling-with' the individuals concerned, and that this experience of 'feeling-with' the police officers is verifiable by other members of the interpretation and feeling community within which these police officers and ourselves are located.

We are now in a position to answer the four methodological questions posed at the end of section 3.3.0.0:

1. *Whenever one collects qualitative data one is collecting evidence of affective phenomena.* These data may be field notes reporting meaningful actions, interactions and utterances, or they may be interview transcripts, or diaries. As long as they are meaningful they are affective.
2. Analyzing these phenomena involves *recording patterns of feeling* which reveal themselves to us as we understand the data systematically. We must attempt to provide explanation for these patterns. This will involve advancing possible theoretical *models to explain the pattern* of affective forces. There will be an interaction between these theoretical models and the data. Our understanding of the data will be elaborated by this interaction.
3. The claims one makes in relation to affective phenomena are warranted if the evidence one presents evokes in the reader something of the patterns of feeling which one claims exist in the evidence, *a feeling-with' the interviewee.* To put it another way the reader must understand it as you do, in the bodily sense to which I have been alluding.
4. The presentation of *interpretive repertoires is really always about affective phenomena.* We simply have to make it explicitly so. Our inability to see this is simply a manifestation of the Cartesian mind-body dualism which remains so deeply embedded in our thinking.

3.4.0.0 The Research Narrative Part 2

3.4.1.0 Re-Working the First Report

Having elaborated a set of theoretical tools to help think through and, hopefully, begin to explain the affective dimension, I now had to go back to the data. My intention was to bring about an encounter between the two and see what happened: but how? I went back to my original report and realised that it was constructed in terms of a set of categories which were not commensurate with the aspects of the data I now

wanted to bring to the foreground. I wanted to look at affective phenomena such as feelings of threat, idealising of certain things, feelings about ambivalence, stress, and so on. My original report was organised around more traditional sociological themes such as class, race, youth, and so on. I therefore had to go through it and extract any material relevant to my new framework, re-categorising as I proceeded. These were not yet my final set of categories however.

3.4.1.1 Vertical Coding

I had realised that if I was going to generate any real subtlety in the analysis by letting the data 'push' things as much as possible then I would have to go painstakingly through transcripts from beginning to end. The epistemological stance I take precludes the possibility of assuming that the data can in any crude way 'speak for itself'. One always encounters one's data from a particular theoretical standpoint. However it is possible to be more or less open to influence by the contours of the data itself. One important clue to whether the researcher is really doing this is the extent to which one finds oneself being surprised by 'new discoveries'. In going through complete transcripts, armed with my new theoretical toolkit, I found myself being genuinely surprised and excited as I found evidence of affective phenomena which I could never have guessed at previously. Simultaneously the re-encounter with the data forced me constantly to re-appraise my theory. This is the double movement of perception and imagination which Kant called "*reflective judgement*".

I could not of course go through all of the transcripts so I had to take a small sample. I could have taken some from each of the stations studied. I decided against this however. Analysis is always about focusing on a particular aspect of one's data. I could for example have focused on what the police said about local government, or what they said about homeless people, or any number of different themes. I had chosen to look at affect and developed a theoretical framework for that purpose. Given this focus I decided that I would look at transcripts from officers working in areas which seemed to intensify the feelings central to police-work most strongly. I therefore took twelve transcripts from stations one and two. I also took quotations from a number of others for the final presentation of the research findings.

I went through each of these transcripts from beginning to end making a set of parallel notes to go with each transcript. These notes contained summaries of the themes on each page of the transcript together with memos noting connections and new ideas about categories of phenomena. By the time I had finished this the "reflective" analytical process described above had begun to resolve itself into a set of main thematic categories around which the analysis would be structured:

1. General affective phenomena.
2. Major threatening objects.
3. Minor threatening objects.
4. Ideal objects.
5. Threatening mechanisms.
6. Splitting.
7. Affective policing styles.

At a later stage it became evident that 'splitting' was in fact the key strategy for managing ambivalence and bad feelings. It was therefore assimilated into part 1 on 'general affective phenomenon' - leaving six categories overall.

At this stage the contents of the new category files were limited to the re-coded material from the original lateral-coding analysis. The next stage was to go through the transcripts again using the vertical-notes as guides to enable me to enter quotations and notes under each theme. After this process I had seven files containing large collections of randomly arranged notes and quotations. I then printed out the files. I proceeded physically to cut up and edit these printouts into sub-themes within each of the six main categories listed above. The sub-themes were by now very much guided by the results coming out of the vertical coding process.

3.4.1.2 The Final Writing Up

After placing the material into sub-theme groupings I started writing up under each major category. I set out the patterns which had been emerging as clearly as possible, illustrating copiously with quotations.

This was the final stage of the now multi-dimensional process of disassembling and assembling described by Jorgensen above. *I had by now immersed myself in the data from many different directions over a number of years. I had done so in the context of developing a theoretical framework which the data seemed to*

demand and respond to. The two sides of my thinking were always feeding and driving one another forward. This was the case to the extent that, once I had edited the material into sub-themes as described above, the various narratives and sub-plots seemed almost to write themselves.

The only problem I found was that I had assembled too many quotations in the files themselves. Consequently I initially tried to make the data "speak for itself" in a way which perhaps assumed too much of the reader.⁵³ I therefore had to remove much of this material and fill it out further with my own commentary.

What I have presented in the research findings is a complex construction. It is what Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari call an "assemblage". An intricate articulation of data, theory, images, models, metaphors, and methods. All of this invested with my own desires, fears, anxieties, paranoias etc. It is by necessity incomplete (all such "machines" have their loose ends, their points of breakdown) and perspectival, it is self-consciously so however. I make quite clear what my concerns are, what I desire to know, and that my desire is itself a constitutive factor in the outcome.

Notes

1. A. Bryman and R. G. Burgess, 'Developments in Qualitative Data Analysis: An Introduction', in Analyzing Qualitative Data A. Bryman and R. G. Burgess (eds), Routledge, London, 1994.

2. B. G. Glaser and A. L. Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research. Chicago, Aldine, 1967. A. L. Strauss, Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists. Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press, 1987. A. L. Strauss and J. Corbin, Basics of Qualitative Research. Newbury Park, California, Sage 1990. B. A. Turner, 'Some Practical Aspects of Qualitative Data Analysis: One Way of Organising The Cognitive Processes Associated with the Generation of Grounded Theory', Quality and Quantity 15, 1981.

3. C. Cassell and G. Symon, 'Qualitative Research in Work Contexts', in C. Cassell and G. Symon (eds), Qualitative Methods in Organisational Research. Sage, London, 1994.

4. N. King, 'The Qualitative Research Interview', in C. Cassell and G. Symon (eds), Qualitative Methods in Organisational Research. Sage, London, 1994. pp14-37. For the definitive discussion of the distinctions between these two research orientations see C. Taylor, 'Interpretation and the Sciences of Man' in F. Dallmayr and T. McCarthy (eds), Understanding and Social Enquiry. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1977.

5. C. Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, Fontana, London, 1993.
6. P. Reason and J. Rowan, Human Enquiry: A Sourcebook of New Paradigm Research. Wiley, Chichester, 1981, p243. Also C. Taylor, op cit.
7. See C. Taylor, op cit.
8. Anthony Giddens once described this double process of interpretation as "the double hermeneutic". 1. Members of society make sense of the world (ie interpret it). 2. Sociologists then make sense of members' sense-making activities (ie interpret them). A. Giddens, Studies in Social and Political Theory. Hutchinson, London, 1979, p12. The concept of "interpretive repertoires" comes from the work of Potter and Wetherall amongst others. J. Potter and M. Wetherell, 'Analyzing Discourse', in Analyzing Qualitative Data. A. Bryman and R. G. Burgess (eds). pp 47-66.
9. C. Geertz, op cit.
10. A. Bryman and D. Burgess 1994. pp 4-5. H. Marshall, 'Discourse Analysis in an Occupational Context', in C. Cassell and G. Symon (eds), Qualitative Methods in Organisational Research. Sage, London, 1994., p97. N. King, op cit, p29.
11. N. King, 'The Qualitative Research Interview', in C. Cassell and G. Symon (eds), Qualitative Methods in Organisational Research. Sage, London, 1994. pp14-37
12. N. King, Ibid pp19-21.
13. C. Cassell and G. Symon. op cit, p4.
14. N. King. op cit, p21.
15. It is clearly important that future studies in the area of affect find methods which can tap into this detail in some way. Such large-scale methodological innovation was not central to the purpose of this thesis however. All I can hope to do in this area is suggest possible avenues for future exploration.
16. R. Burgess, In the Field: An Introduction to Field Research. George and Allen Unwin, London, 1984.
17. D. L. Jorgensen, Participant Observation: A Methodology for the Human Sciences. Sage, Newbury Park CA, 1989.
18. S. J. Taylor and R. Brogdan, Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods: The Search for Meanings. Wiley, New York, 1984 (second edition). p20
19. D. Waddington, 'Participant Observation', in C. Cassell and G. Symon (eds), Qualitative Methods in Organisational Research. Sage, London, 1994. p107-122. D. M. Fetterman, 'A Walk Through the Wilderness: Learning to Find Your Way', in W. B. Shaffir and R. A. Stebbins (eds), Experiencing Fieldwork: An Inside View of Qualitative Research. Sage, Newbury Park CA, 1991, p89. Taylor and Brogdan 1984, op cit.
20. Taylor and Brogdan, 1984, op cit.
21. Waddington, op cit.

- 22.N.King. 'The Qualitative Research Interview', in C.Cassell and G.Symon (eds). Qualitative Methods in Organisational Research. Sage. London. 1994. pp14-37
- 23.For example A.Bryman and R.Burgess, op cit, pp4-8. D.Waddington, op cit, p109. N.King, op cit, p29.
- 24.A.L.Strauss and J.Corbin, op cit, p96
- 25.Nigel King refers to this process as "clustering". N.King, op cit, p29.
- 26.D.L.Jorgensen, op cit, pp110-111
- 27.A.Bryman and R.Burgess, op cit, p5
- 28.H.Marshall. 'Discourse Analysis in An Occupational Context' in C.Cassell and G.Symon (eds). Qualitative Methods in Organisational Research. Sage. London. 1994. J.Potter et al, 'Discourse, Noun, Verb or social practice?', Philosophical Psychology 3: p205-17, 1990. G.N.Gilbert and M.Mulkay, Opening Pandora's Box: a Sociological Analysis of Scientists' Discourse. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984. J.Potter and M.Mulkay, 'Scientist interview talk: interviews as a technique for revealing participants' interpretative practices', in M.Brenner, J.Brown, and D.Canter (eds) The Research Interview: Uses and Approaches. Academic Press. London. 1985. J.Potter and M.Wetherall, Discourse and Social Psychology: Beyond Attitudes and Behaviour. Sage. London. 1987. J.Potter and M.Wetherell, 'Analyzing Discourse', in A.Bryman and R.G.Burgess (eds), Analyzing Qualitative Data. Routledge, London, 1994. pp 47-66. M.Wetherall and J.Potter, 'Discourse Analysis and Identification of Interpretative Repertoires', In C.Antaki (ed) Analyzing Lay Explanation: a Case Book. Sage, London, 1988. M.Wetherall and J.Potter, Mapping the Language of Racism: Discourse and the Legitimation of Exploitation. Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1992
- 29.H.Marshall, op cit, p95.
- 30.Ibid. p94.
- 31.Ibid. p94.
- 32.The notion that social reality is a product of story-telling practices which have the specific objective of making human conduct appear to conform to rules, and thereby produce a sense of a shared and stable reality is of course central to the work of Harold Garfinkel. H. Garfinkel. Studies in Ethnomethodology. Prentice Hall, 1967. J.Heritage. Garfinkel and Ethnomethodology. Polity Press, Cambridge. 1984. D.R.Watson and W.W.Sharrock, Something on Accounts'. The Discourse Analysis Research Group Newsletter 7, 1991, p3-12.
- 33.Potter and Wetherall, pp49-50
- 34.J.Potter and M.Wetherall, 1988. J.Potter and M.Wetherall, 1994.
- 35.The concept of "versions" comes from the work of Harriet Marshall. H. Marshall, in C.Cassell and G.Symon (eds). Qualitative Methods in Organisational Research. Sage. London. 1994.
- 36.J.Potter et al, 'Discourse, Noun, Verb or social practice?'. Philosophical Psychology 3: p205-17, 1990. G.N.Gilbert and M.Mulkay, Opening Pandora's Box: a Sociological Analysis of Scientists' Discourse. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984. J.Potter and M.Mulkay, 'Scientist interview talk: interviews as a technique for revealing participants' interpretative practices', in M.Brenner, J.Brown, and D.Canter (eds) The Research Interview: Uses and Approaches. Academic Press, London, 1985. J.Potter and M.Wetherall,

Discourse and Social Psychology: Beyond Attitudes and Behaviour. Sage, London, 1987. M. Wetherall and J. Potter, 'Discourse Analysis and Identification of Interpretative Repertoires', In C. Antaki (ed) Analyzing Lay Explanation: a Case Book. Sage, London, 1988.

37. H. Marshall/ Ibid p91

38. Fieldnotes. 12/8/88.

39. Though, as I have already noted, it would be desirable to find some way of using these extremely hostile and anxious responses as data in future.

40. Three tapes were so badly spoiled by background noise that they could not be transcribed.

41. See for example R. Reiner, The Blue Coated Worker. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978, p247.

42. On isolation see, for example, J. Skolnick, Justice Without Trial. John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1966, esp ch 3. Also see W.A. Westley, Violence and the Police. MIT press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1970. Also see R. Graef, Talking Blues. Collins Harvill, London, 1989.

43. I did not code under the category of 'gender'. This was a consequence of the results of the pilot study where questions directed towards eliciting responses relating to gender were not very successful. The questions I asked were intended to provoke them into talking about how they saw the problem of crime, how they saw the state of society in general, and how they perceived their own role. It seemed to interviewees obvious that problems of crime and disorder were male (black, male youth in particular). Attitudes to women in general were more evident in the fieldwork than in the interviews and since I have focused more heavily on the latter this has built in a lack of sensitivity to these issues. Only one interview produced any really useful material on gender issues, and that was an interview with a woman sergeant heading a 'Women's Police Unit', specialising in domestic violence, child abuse, and rape. Because this was such an atypical interview it was not possible to make any general claims based on it. All I would be confident in saying is that my observations confirmed many of the claims made by Smith and Gray regarding the prevalence of a "cult of masculinity" as outlined in chapter 2, though I would argue that attitudes are not as static as they describe them. The various ingredients of the "cult of masculinity" vary from situation to situation, it is a dynamic affective phenomenon.

44. M. Foucault, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', in Language, Counter Memory, Practice. Blackwell, Oxford, 1977.

45. Ibid, pp147-148

46. This, like much else here, is taken directly from Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals.

47. Ibid, p 151

48. This is the argument put most forcefully by Peter Dews in the excellent but flawed Logics of Disintegration. Verso, London, 1987.

49. In fact this definition of power is not that different to Weber's or, for that matter, Tonnies'.

50. This fact has become the central focus in the work of some novelists. Foremost among these is William Burroughs. His work is explicitly designed as a set of techniques for disrupting sedimented patterns of feeling. He sets out to attack our bodies through his text. At its most potent it is intended to have the effect

of a physical blow. See his accounts of the development of his technique in W. Burroughs, *Interzone*, Picador, London, 1989.

51. I do not mean to give the false impression by this use of the notion of a kind of empathy that I believe that understanding is in any sense about getting-inside-the-other's-head. Such Weberian notions of understanding are quite outmoded. If anything understanding is more about 'synchronising bodies' than 'getting inside heads'.

52. The responses given by the police officers to the questions asked were not responses intended for Kalahari Bushmen or Martians, they were intended for a modern Westernised consciousness with some minimal knowledge of policing. Though it has to be admitted that since a central tenet of this thesis is that communities are never really culturally homogenous there is always scope for 'misunderstanding'. But even the very idea of 'misunderstanding' carries with it the implicit assumption that unproblematic understanding within an interpretive community is the norm.

53. This approach did not in any case fit very neatly with my own epistemological standpoint, as I have discussed above.

CHAPTER 4: THE RESEARCH FINDINGS

4.0.0.0 Introduction

As explained in the methods chapter, the analysis of the interview data came in two stages. Firstly a 'lateral' scanning of the transcripts in order to build up a picture of the interpretive repertoires (which I later came to think of as constellations of concepts, associated with particular intensities of feeling). This was initially written up in the form of short summaries of what police officers think and feel about certain concrete issues, which I initially suspected (on the basis of field work and pilot interviews) might be of significance to them. These included issues such as 'habitual offending', 'unemployment', and 'youth', for example.

It quickly became clear this was not satisfactory for two reasons. Firstly I felt that my expectations were having a significant influence on the picture emerging, but perhaps more importantly, I also felt that this approach simply was not providing an adequate avenue into the subtleties of the police officer's affective experience. I have already said that I think that much of the past research on police occupational culture paints a very static picture in very broad brush strokes. This, I think, perhaps reveals both conceptual and methodological shortcomings. Human actors are conceived of as cultural dopes determined in their thoughts and behaviour by a fixed set of simple cultural coordinates rather than as *affectively active interpreters of the world* employing a wide array of, often quite disparate, interpretive repertoires. The result of this conceptualisation of the actor is that culture itself is understood in rather over simple terms as a single coherent system of beliefs.¹ Methodologically, I think this tends to lead to an imposition of themes too early on in the analysis. The researcher tends to be quick to assume that he/she knows what issues are relevant to the police officer. Much of the complexity, subtlety, and ambivalence of the police officer's affective/interpretive repertoires are lost in this way. I, therefore, decided that material from my own earlier analysis should be broken up into a new schema dictated by a much more detailed vertical analysis of a small number of whole transcripts. This second level of analysis provided the many themes, sub-themes and quotations for the current presentation of the findings. Added to this are occasional references to the supporting fieldwork carried out.

I should perhaps say something about the structure of presentation of the research findings. The first thing that will strike the reader is that there are no long sections of smooth narrative. Instead the findings are presented as a series of 'snapshots'. These snapshots are collected into sections reflecting the theoretical concerns of the thesis, and within those sections there is a logic to the ordering of the 'snapshots'.

Nevertheless this is not a story of a complete, 'full', and coherent world-view. I do not believe anyone, in the modern world, employs a coherent and consistent series of affective/interpretive repertoires. Police officers would like to be self consistent and free of contradiction and ambivalence, they would also like to be sure that their colleagues all have much the same view of the world as themselves. This is precisely one of their greatest problems. But no single, consistent, homogenous, picture of the world-view of the police officer ultimately emerges. Such views are riven with contradiction and ambivalence.

The snapshots presented here are a presentation of the fragmentary patterns that emerged directly from the second level of analysis. It is, therefore, an 'accurate' presentation of the research findings, but, more importantly, I believe that this kind of presentation also gives the most 'accurate' sense of the experience of 'real' people. People are made up of such fragmentary snapshots, which they assemble and disassemble in attempts to maintain an illusion of continuity and coherence. They are the materials out of which we 'make sense' of the world, but there is no good reason why those materials, when piled up together, should look like a single coherent 'system', or 'story'. They are just a pile of materials out of which we try to make stories. Nevertheless amongst these materials are little bits of stories, the elements out of which narratives may be constructed. I have taken 'snapshots' of these elements and presented them here. What we can detect in these snapshots is a pattern. The pattern is not a pattern of 'content', as I have already said, at the level of content there is much discontinuity. The patterns appear at the level of 'form'. This 'form' is dictated by a particular affective orientation to the world. This orientation involves a desire to remove complexity and ambivalence from the police subject's experience of the world. This impossible desire results in a paranoid splitting of the world into good and bad parts, together with hostile impulses directed towards the bad parts.

Beside the fact that the police subject is itself 'incomplete' it is also clearly the case that what I present is an incomplete picture. As one enters the fine grain of individual transcripts one almost has the sense that one is entering a 'fractal' world in which one could go on entering ever more finely grained levels of detail for ever. It is a theoretical premise of this thesis that the 'closure' implied by the idea of a 'complete picture', covering every conceivable detail, is a hopeless fantasy. I have restricted myself therefore to the more modest objectives of demonstrating in this account of my research findings:

- a) the fact that police thinking, language, and practice are saturated with emotion/affect; that they are 'emotional facts':

- b) that police occupational culture, and the affective subject positions therein, are dominated by a certain kind of negative emotional orientation which I shall later analyze as collective paranoia.

The main sections and sub-sections are shown below. There is another layer of sub-sub-sections within the sub-sections. A full list is given in Appendix 2.

4.1.0.0 PART 1 - AFFECT AT THE MOST GENERAL LEVEL

- 4.1.1.0 Feeling for right and wrong
- 4.1.2.0 The enjoyment of closure
- 4.1.3.0 Sources of bad feelings
- 4.1.4.0 The management of bad feelings
- 4.1.5.0 Splitting
- 4.1.6.0 Permanent Crisis

4.2.0.0 PART 2 - THE MAJOR THREATENING OBJECT

- 4.2.1.0 (Major object 1) The dangerous individual
- 4.2.2.0 (Major object 2) The "criminal fraternity" - material of everyday policing
- 4.2.3.0 (Major object 3) Problem families
- 4.2.4.0 (Major object 4) "The black problem"
- 4.2.5.0 (Major object 5) Youth
- 4.2.6.0 (Major object 6) Alternative lifestyles

4.3.0.0 PART 3 - THE MINOR THREATENING OBJECT

- 4.3.1.0 (Minor object group 1) Other policemen and the criminal justice system
- 4.3.2.0 (Minor object group 2) Agitators, trouble makers, middle class extremists
- 4.3.3.0 (Minor object 3) The mass media

4.4.0.0 PART 4 - THE THREATENING MECHANISM

- 4.4.1.0 (Mechanism group 1) The threat to disciplinary processes and institutions
- 4.4.2.0 (Mechanism group 2) The ineffectiveness of punishment
- 4.4.3.0 (Mechanism group 3) Loss of respect, the problem of territory, and the sense of impotence
- 4.4.4.0 (Mechanism 4) Alcohol
- 4.4.5.0 (Mechanism 5) The ambivalence of class
- 4.4.6.0 Policing the explanation of crime

4.5.0.0 PART 5 - THE IDEAL OBJECT

- 4.5.1.0 (Ideal object 1) The family and the "respectable way of life"
- 4.5.2.0 (Ideal object 2) The victim
- 4.5.3.0 (Ideal object 3) Extra legal protecting of the "community"
- 4.5.4.0 (Ideal object 4) Interpreting the "spirit of the law" to serve "society"
- 4.5.5.0 (Ideal object 5) Important and unimportant laws
- 4.5.6.0 (Ideal object group 6) Mr average, the woman, the child

4.6.0.0 PART 6 - AFFECTIVE POLICING STYLES

- 4.6.1.0 The ambiguities of policing
- 4.6.2.0 A desire for order
- 4.6.3.0 Towards a typology of affective orientations
- 4.6.4.0 "Sensitive" versus "positive" policing

4.7.0.0 CONCLUSION

The vocabulary used here ("splitting", good and bad "objects" etc.) is one loosely derived from the Kleinian account of "paranoid/schizoid" phenomena.² I have chosen this vocabulary because I have found it to be a user friendly shorthand. Within the main 'parts' of the chapter I have broken each of these concepts (the 'major threatening object' and so on) down into their myriad complexities as dictated by the second level of analysis. My use of this vocabulary at this point does not indicate any theoretical preferences on my part. Indeed I have made little use of Kleinian theory, as it tends to focus on fairly fixed personality characteristics, whereas I am looking at the affective currents of a particular organisational environment. But the basic understanding of paranoia as involving splitting, projecting, and destructiveness, in the face of unbearable complexity or ambivalence, is common to all of the theoretical perspectives I shall be examining in subsequent chapters.

I have divided 'threatening objects' into two categories of 'major' and 'minor objects'. This came about as a result of the analysis where it became clear that the various threatening objects were not all suspected with the same degree of intensity. While I have divided them into two categories for the sake of convenience, it is of course most likely that there is a sliding (and mobile) scale of intensity. This would apply to both 'threatening' and 'ideal' objects, and also to 'threatening mechanisms', a further level of analysis (and probably further research) would be required in order to ascertain such positions with more precision.

Quotations from police officers included in the text are followed by a code consisting of a letter and a number. The letter refers to the station at which the officer was working when the interview took place. Descriptions of these locations are given in section 3.2.3.1 of Chapter 3. Most of the quotations come from stations 'T' and 'V' as these were the transcripts used for the second level of analysis. The numbers in the codes refer to particular officers. Basic details of age, years of service, rank, and department are given in Appendix 1. I should emphasise that the quotations are included for illustrative purposes. They do not constitute the evidence.

4.1.0.0 PART 1 - AFFECT AT THE MOST GENERAL LEVEL

The whole of this thesis is about police affect and as my presentation of the data progresses I shall attempt to break down police feelings into convenient sub-divisions. In this section I wish to present some very general patterns.

4.1.1.0 Feeling for right and wrong

Firstly it is important to notice that police officers themselves are well aware of the fact that feelings are important determinants of their activity even if social scientists are not. Feeling concepts occur regularly in their own accounts of their experience. They also make it clear that they regard their work as deeply influenced by intuitive feelings about the world. This is what they mean when they talk of "police craft".

I mean I suppose you go around and you get a feeling of what is right and what is wrong.
What's a mistake and what isn't. It is something that the policeman himself sums up. (V1)

4.1.2.0 The enjoyment of closure

Not all of the police officer's register of feelings is negative (though as I shall show, much of it is). What police officers get most pleasure from however is deeply linked to their greatest fears and anxieties. When asked the question the answer is almost always that they enjoy a good, unambiguous, job, which is done, finished, and left with no untidy loose ends. What they like is what contemporary theorists call "closure".

Are there any particular things that you like doing, things that you find satisfying?

Oh yes. I suppose it's detecting a crime or something like that. Or just actually finding out something, stopping somebody, finding out that something is stolen, arresting and clearing it all up, bringing the job to a conclusion at the end of the day. It makes it all a nice and neat package. That always gives, I think it gives most people satisfaction. You've done a nice little job and its all worked out in the end. V2

But as they, and all police studies experts, point out, hardly any of their work is ever like this. Instead it is messy. Often it is not even clear whether it is actually police work at all, or if it is, why it is. Seldom are problems brought to a satisfactory conclusion with no loose ends. Only occasionally is a problem finished with once and for all. Often it is not clear what is the right thing to do in the circumstances. Rarely is one person an unambiguous victim and another an unambiguous victimiser. The world which police officers inhabit refuses to conform to black and white categories they want to see. It spills out of their common-sense, taken-for-granted understanding of what things, people, they, and their job, are. This refusal of the world to conform to what they are sure it must be is the source of great frustration. Just as the police officer values closure more than anything else so ambivalence creates strong, negative, destructive, feelings. This is a

pattern which will appear again and again.³

4.1.3.0 Sources of bad feelings

In the following section I shall try to suggest just a few of the sources of anxiety, frustration, and fear which plague the police officer.

4.1.3.1 Stress and trauma

At times the police officer's inability (for all kinds of reasons) to be the ideal, he identifies with, reaches positively traumatic proportions.

If you let it get to you it would drive you up the wall wouldn't it. So you can't allow things to get to you because in this job there are so many problems, you can go to a sudden death. If you allow yourself to involve yourself with the family and the problems you would be thinking about that for the next few days. I was on the radio and I used to get very frustrated and I had to get out of that place because I found that I couldn't give the service to the public that I wanted. The most outstanding thing that came to me was some woman ringing me up from ***** on a 999 system and telling me how she was being broken into at about 4 am in the morning and how this man was attacking her on the phone, and screaming down the phone, and the nearest car I could get to help her was at *****. I don't know if you know the geography of *****?

Not very well.

***** is right over there and ***** , it took about a quarter of an hour for that car to get to her, and I'm chatting to her on the phone, and she's screaming, and I'm trying to calm her down, and I didn't like that, and you do that quite often, and you do feel for those people.

T9

Police officers face very real horrors - dead bodies, terrible injuries, dreadful scenes of human degradation and abuse. The stress and anxiety this creates has to be managed somehow, both individually and collectively.

4.1.3.2 Resentment/anxiety about overwork, growing chaos, and lack of understanding

A common source of resentment is the, supposed, lack of appreciation the public have of the difficulties involved in policing. The public think it is easy, but it is not, the public think they don't do much, but in fact they are overworked. Behind the projected accusations of lack of understanding there is a clear anxiety amongst the police *themselves* that they are not keeping up with the growing chaos, as they perceive it. This is also apparent in the constant anxiety about the way that paperwork soaks up valuable policing time. With the endless series of perceived 'chaos threatening objects and mechanisms' I have catalogued, this 'too much chaos and too little time' anxiety is inevitable.

The Police Force has been dragged into more and more legislation. Our increase in manpower is quite small, relatively small, compared to increasing legislation and really the big problem there is that there is too much for the Police Force to do, and probably a fair amount of apathy in the Police Force because of it. Probably, at times, I hate to say this, we're getting swamped really I feel. I'm just being brutally honest. T1

It is interesting that the experience of being "swamped" has often been linked to paranoid orientations to the world.⁴

4.1.3.3 Police association with 'the bad' - alienation and fear

As I shall show, the police feel deeply alienated from certain groups in society, often from whole communities. But there is a certain sense in which they feel alienated from the whole of the rest of society. This is because it is felt that the police are somehow touched and tainted by the bad, frightening, disturbing areas of life with which they are traditionally associated.

I think there are in society a lot of people who still have a slight fear of the police because they only tend to come across the police when they are vulnerable or because they have done something wrong. T1

This feeling of alienation becomes particularly painful when police officers believe that they are being shunned by the "respectable" middle classes with whom they aspire to identify.

4.1.3.4 'Dirty work' and rejection by the middle classes

There is a feeling that many middle class people look on the police with distaste, that you are more likely to get invited in for a cup of tea on a council estate than in a middle class private housing estate, where people do not want their neighbours even to see them speaking to the police never mind inviting them into the house. The simplest of contacts with the police can create a stigma. Its unintended consequence however is that many supposedly "respectable" people look upon the police with the same sense of moral revulsion that police officers reserve for the "lower classes". Police officers come to be symbolically associated with the "dirty work" they do.⁵

Police officer's explanation for the high incidence of their involvement in working class "domestic disputes" is, not simply that working class people have more domestic disputes (though they believe this as well) but that working class people have "less pride", they do not mind "involving the police". This increases the police officer's own distaste for the "lower classes" but on some level forces him to recognise that they are loathed by the middle classes, who "don't want the police involved".

This creates, in some cases, a certain resentment towards the professional middle classes and obviously great ambiguity in the police officer's own mind about which section of society he should identify with. The income is relatively good, officers tend to live with their families, and own their homes, in middle class areas, they want to be viewed as "respectable" professionals yet never feel that they really fit in. Whilst many officers emphasise that they have friends outside the force they also recognise that they lost many friends by becoming police officers, and that one of the consequences of this general alienation from all strata of society is a turning inwards for mutual support, friendship and social relationships.

4.1.3.5 Anxiety and authority

An area of anxiety which emerges particularly for the young and inexperienced officer concerns the nature of his own authority. It is clear that the boundaries of this authority are, to say the least, 'fuzzy' both from the public's point of view and his own. This becomes most apparent however in the young officer's desperate concern to find, and conform to, the boundaries of that authority of office. But the authority of the officer is not a purely 'legal-rational' one. Indeed a great deal of it is (in Weberian terms) both 'traditional' and 'charismatic'. As such police-women, and young police-men, often have great difficulty in imposing themselves on situations. Older male officers seem to carry authoritative weight more easily both because

they are older men and also because they are therefore used to being taken seriously. they expect it rather than hope for it. Some officers however give the impression that they find it difficult to make people take them seriously regardless of their age and experience.

A permanent *performance* of authoritiveness has to be cultivated. This comes quite naturally to some but to others it is very difficult. Authority itself is infused with complex and fluid affective forces. This permanent ambiguity of authority, the need for performance, the constant need to prove oneself again and again, the need to create, in the 'other', a desire to obey, leads to stress, anxiety and tension in most officers. In some this clearly leads to fantasies of disrespect, challenge, and potential impotence. What does this do to the general demeanour of, particularly, the insecure officer?

This officer was a 23 year old probationer. This is just part of a long discussion of the nature of his authority, and how anxious he was about it.

As long as I use my power correctly and cover myself with pocket book entries or forms that are necessary for that power then I have got nothing to worry about. If that person does make a complaint saying that we couldn't do that at least at the end of the day it can be proven that I was acting within my power, and that I did nothing wrong, and then that chap can be spoken to by a senior officer, and it can be explained. Whereas he might not believe the power of the PC, most people listen to a sergeant, and if not a sergeant usually an inspector or above. Then they tend to appreciate that the PC was doing right in the first place. I think that sort of person looks at a PC as a minion, as a worker, as a puppet on the end of a string, in a way. He is only a young lad, I'll try and pull the wool over his eyes or something like that. That's what happens more often than not. They think you are young and inexperienced and pull the wool over your eyes, and ignorant to what powers you have got, and when you do propose to use them, or do something that may require use of powers, they disagree and don't like it. Then you might end up with a public order situation. Then they might assault you because they don't like what you are going to do. Perhaps in the case of a search and then they are going to get arrested then. They don't like it at all. V3

4.1.3.6 Laughing and being laughed at

One of the most regular consequences of anxieties about authority is the development of fantasies of being

laughed at.

You can only go so far without backing down. If you back down, especially in a crowd situation, it makes you look stupid and then you lose the trust and respect you are supposed to be trying to get. It's a mockery, they'll just ridicule you then.... Two or three warnings and then he has got to come. because if you back down on that it certainly makes you look stupid. it makes the uniform look stupid as well. T3⁶

Humour plays an extremely complex role in police culture. There are constant derogatory, and often very violent jokes, at the expense of women, ethnic minorities, people with special needs, homosexuals, and virtually any other minority group one can think of. Police officers, particularly the stronger personalities within a relief, constantly use humour as a means of humiliating even their own colleagues. It often seems to be a way of seeking out weaknesses and establishing dominance in an affective field made up of feelings of fear, humiliation, and destructive pleasure. There is something violent and hostile in this humour. They have a sarcastic remark for everyone - it is they who are constantly laughing at others. Yet in classic paranoid fashion they are convinced that others are always (potentially at least) laughing at them. They claim that their humour is a safety valve yet it seemed to me that their (related, in my view) suspicion of being laughed at was never very far from violence.

4.1.3.7 Boundary between work and non-work

Asked a question about drug use this, fairly liberal, officer stated that he had no personal objection to drug use but that since it was against the law he had to act when in his role as a law enforcement officer. However, he displays decidedly ambivalent feelings about what he would do when off duty. Despite the fact that a police officer is always officially bound to act in his capacity as a law enforcement officer, he nevertheless perceives some boundary in his life. What happens when the two sides of this boundary pull in different directions? Considerable tensions between law, organisational culture, and personal morality may develop.

Well, my perception is that if people really want to do it then it really is a matter for them, I mean they always will. I mean, the law says that it is illegal and if it comes to my attention and I'm on duty then I'm duty bound to do something about it. If I'm off duty I should do something about it equally as much. I mean whether I would have yet to be put to the test yet. T1

As I have already indicated, policing is not regarded by police officers simply as a job. A policeman is not just a man or woman who does police-work, he is a police-officer in everything he does. Policing is a vocation with which one identifies at a very deep level.

4.1.3.8 The permanence of suspicion, life as police-work, the instrumentality of human interaction.

The attitude of permanent suspicion which results from the lack of a clear boundary between work and non-work leads to another common area of ambivalence at the heart of the police officer's experience. This is the question of what exactly his relationships with other people are for. In the case of this officer there appears to be a sadness about his basic alienation from other human beings, a statement of loneliness almost. Suddenly however this is explained in terms of a threatening challenge to authority

I get on with most people, all across the board in the community. The problem these days is people don't, compared to when I joined, people don't seem to want to talk to you, especially the police. The people who like the police will always talk to you, but dealing with the people we actually come into contact or want to come in contact with as far as dealing with crime, people don't seem to want to talk to you as much as they used to. Certainly you get a lot more abuse than you used to from the general public.

Why do you think that is?

It is just the way people are being brought up now. More freedom. People don't like authority basically. V2

Later on we find the real crux of the ambivalence. Human relationships - the willingness of people to "talk" to the police officer are crucial to "police craft". Human relationships are of instrumental value.

It makes life difficult, to be able to prove a job without anybody ever speaking to us or giving us information. Even if they don't admit it, if they talk to us it gives us something to work on, what they've said. But I understand that might change, the right to silence may be taken away in the future. V2

From the point of view of the police officer's feelings, he experiences a mixture of personal insult, frustration, and confusion over the status of his relationships with fellow human beings. Where does

instrumentality end and communicativity begin? This is as a clash between "communicative action" and "strategic action", between "lifeworld" and "system" as Jurgen Habermas might put it.⁷ It is not difficult to imagine how these feelings could retrospectively be rationalised, at least in part, in terms of projected fantasies of moral degeneracy, threats to order and authority, and so on. It is important to recognise however that we find this ambiguity about the nature of human relationships running throughout police experience. The attitude of permanent suspicion makes this inevitable (recall Garfinkel's comment on the effects of an attitude of permanent suspicion). Policing is not a job; it is a "way of life" they will tell you. The uniform never really comes off. So the police officer never knows when he is talking to someone just for the sake of 'the pleasure of talking', and when he is talking for 'the pleasure of policing'. Or at least he never knows when one might turn into the other. The transition may go either way. Just as a chance conversation in the supermarket may turn into an important source of intelligence, so a conversation with a suspect or informant may turn into a pleasurable chat.

The permanence of suspicion is not of course limited to verbal interaction. A day out with one's family can quickly turn into an opportunity for the observation of thieves at work in a multi-story car park, or shoplifters at work in a department store. All of life is potential police-work. The strain this places on police officers, and their families, is very high. "I think the rule of the game is to be suspicious first because you can only be wrong and you've lost nothing" (V4).

4.1.4.0 The management of bad feelings

Institutional means for focusing these bad feelings into areas where they can be dealt with are necessary. The explanations given for some of the more unpleasant aspects of 'canteen culture', such as racist and sexist humour, often involve the notion that they are ways of dealing with stress. They remain expressions of hatred none-the-less. If hateful humour can be a form of stress management then presumably so can other forms of projection and hatred. In this sub-section I shall attempt to suggest a few of the ways in which these, and other, bad feelings are channelled and 'managed'.

4.1.4.1 Resentment and low moral - the impact on "police property."

This accumulation of anxiety and frustration is combined with further frustration at seeing certain faces and names over and over again. They lose patience and often become bitter about this "minority" of people

"ruining" things for everyone else. Police officers express a desire that society should in a sense wake up and realise what is really going on and deal with these people accordingly.

The overall effect is a difficulty in maintaining morale and an ever increasing resentment directed towards the "troublemakers", the "yob element", the persistent petty offender, the "pathetic", "nuisance" element (these, and other, objects of suspicion and contempt will be analyzed in detail in PART 2). The patterns of beliefs and feelings amongst police officers suggest that not only are certain sections of society placed at a potential disadvantage in terms of surveillance and treatment but that this tendency is reinforced by growing anxiety, frustration and a drop in morale in the job.

4.1.4.2 Disgust with Idleness

One example of feelings which seem to be totally disproportionate are those relating to work and unemployment.

Do you think that unemployment is a significant factor?

I think, actually, the majority of youngsters down there in *****, or ***** or *****: the majority who are unemployed don't seem to want to be employed. Now whether that's come about over a long period or not, I don't know. But they seem to have become unemployable

You aren't sure why?

No, I am not sure why. I feel that some of them are out-and-out idle.

Do you find that objectionable?

I do. And as much as I try to explain to myself that a lot of this is down to social circumstances, I still find it very annoying when people won't do anything for society and yet they expect an awful lot back. Holding out a grubby little hand saying, "give me more", when they won't actually do anything for anyone else. V4

The question of unemployment and idleness in general is a persistent theme. Indeed one could almost call

it an obsession. I shall be elaborating on it in some detail in PART 4, on 'threatening mechanisms'. For the moment I simply wish to suggest that perceived threatening 'objects' (such as repeat offenders) and 'mechanisms' (such as idleness) are operating as a affective 'lightening conductors' for other anxieties and frustrations. In psychoanalytic terms a process of 'displacement' or 'projection' is taking place leading to unjustifiably paranoid feelings about the unemployed.

4.1.4.3 When someone is nasty it makes you nasty

One very reflective and articulate officer makes the point that when people are threatening in some way it is very difficult not to respond in a threatening manner oneself. Indeed he is clearly suggesting that this is what often happens in everyday policing situations.

Once you actually get out there, and you are dealing with situations where tempers are high and people are getting violent then a lot of training tends to sort of fly out of the window. You simply react, your animal instincts take over. Someone is very unreasonable, very nasty to us we are going to be nasty to them and that's the human element of it which is very difficult to get over. V4

Suppose we replace his "someone is very unreasonabe, very nasty" with "*if we perceive* that someone is being very unreasonable, very nasty". Suppose then we assume that those "perceptions" can be affected by the kind of projection and displacement processes suggested above. If we then throw in all of the sources of anxiety, frustration, fear, and so on mentioned above (together with the others I shall be cataloguing in this project, and many I have not) we have a potentially very volatile mixture.

4.1.4.4 Perception of hatred and danger of violent attack

Many police officers work with a very real sense of danger. Working on a predominantly white working-class council estate they may feel a barrier of suspicion between them and the community, a feeling of being unwelcome and a sense of "them and us", even hatred. This becomes further exaggerated when working in areas with large ethnic minority groups, especially Afro-Caribbean. Here many officers believe that there is a real danger of being killed. This fear does not of course mean they are in any 'real' danger of being killed but then the relationship between perception and reality is ambiguous. How does a police officer's fear of being attacked and possibly killed, influence the creation of tension leading to real hostility?

4.1.4.5 Cynicism

Overall the police officer develops an extremely cynical view of the world. This of course is a fact repeated in much of the police studies literature, as I pointed out in Chapter 2. What has not been registered, however, is that this is a state of feeling.

Do you think that Policing, on the whole, gives you a more realistic view of the world than most people?

Far more cynical view of the world. I think it will probably come out with thinking society is far more dangerous than - I'm sure you do. I think you become more defensive, or you can do. You are more likely to be sceptical. T1

4.1.4.6 The badness of human nature

This bleak view of the world is mirrored by a very cynical view of human nature.

I've never believed that human beings are intrinsically good if you like I think there is a selfish aspect to all of us. There is a lot of bad in all of us. Not to say that there isn't some good as well, but I think we're all inherently selfish and some people seem to never do things for the good of others...I always thought that people were selfish but I didn't realise just how bad they could be, or not how bad, because there has always been violence and nastiness in society, but how unreasonable people could be, how totally unreasonable people can be. V4

How does this officer respond to someone who just *might* be having a joke at his expense, who just *might* not have the required respect for his authority?

4.1.4.7 Human stupidity

Not only are people fundamentally bad, but they are mostly stupid as well. A question about domestic disputes brought the following response

It's only the top 40% of people of the general public which understand basic morals and

know the difference between right and wrong and can understand if there is - I know it sounds basic, but can fill in forms without being puzzled by them or whatever. And there are that 10% that are illiterate and cannot cope with life at all. There is that bit in the middle where people live and get by and are confused by forms, can't really think for themselves. They are pointed in the right direction and they walk in that direction like clockwork toys or whatever and follow other people. V3

Around 60% of the population are defective according to this officer. What sort of effect does this feeling about these people have on his respect for their rights, on his expectations of deference from them. on the way he speaks to them?

4.1.4.8 General feelings of threat

This combined feeling that the world and human beings are thoroughly bad leads to a universal feeling of threat on the part of the police officer

I mean for a fact that when you came in the car with me, my attitude was guarded to say the least because it's not that I want to hide what's going on, I wanted to know why it was going on. You will obviously be wary that people, that some people are out to get you. T3

It is important to note the adjustment made in the final sentence. What he actually starts out to say is that "people are out to get you". This seems to be an affective premise central to police occupational culture.

4.1.5.0 Splitting

One of the consistent characteristics of the affective culture of policing is the tendency to 'split' the world rigidly into either good or bad objects and mechanisms. This is (as I shall show) the key strategy for managing bad feelings. Any ambiguity around the boundary, between 'good' and 'bad', is itself felt as a threat and generally produces even more aggressive boundary maintenance activity. It is a world of 'ideal objects' and 'threatening objects' with very little in between. I have already indicated that the overall structure of this analysis reflects this tendency. Here I would just like to suggest a few examples of 'splitting' processes with their own built in de-stabilising ambivalences. In PARTS 2,3, and 4 I shall outline this split world in some detail.

4.1.5.1 Geographical splitting

One of the most common splitting strategies is the attempt to devise moral maps of the world, where the density of moral depravity literally varies according to geographical area.

Yes, there's a natural dividing line anyway. I am very conscious that I keep talking about ***** and generalising very much and, of course, it is very different people in ***** , its quite diverse But there is a natural dividing line, it's ***** Avenue, which runs along the middle. It's the main road. North of that you've got what is called the ***** Estate and South you've got the ***** Estate. And you only have to walk around to see the difference. Most of it, well until they started selling off Council houses, most of it was Council accommodation both sides of the line. But the Northern half of the Estate was far more respectable, for want of a better word, than the lower half. V4

These maps constantly destabilise themselves since within the bad areas it is asserted that there are many (if not a majority of) 'respectable' people. Sometimes it is claimed that some roads are bad, sometimes it is parts of roads, sometimes whole housing estates or parts of the city. The fluidity of the social process refuses to be pinned down within this moral/symbolic ordering. But this complexity and ambiguity simply come to be viewed as further signs of impending chaos.

4.1.5.2 Community fragmentation and alienation

In response to a question about whether this officer and his colleagues feel alienated from the community they police, he said

Its not just the Police, a lot of the other groups, they are all minority groups. I don't know what the percentages of the population are, be it white Asian, West Indian, or whatever else, they are all quite small and I think all the other groups feel that as well. I think from what they say to you going about your work.

They feel alienated from you as well.

Yes and among each other as well. T1

This sense of fragmentation of the community, its polyvalent hostility and disorganisation, and the alienation of the police from it, stands in marked contrast to the feelings which police officers have for communities with which they identify as ideal 'respectable - law abiding - home owning - hard working' communities. It is quite clear that police officers have markedly contrasting affective orientations to the communities they work in. To suggest that they *universally* treat their work as a *service* to a generalised community with which they identify, which they respect, and whose interests they seek to represent, is clearly misleading.

4.1.5.3 Two communities: the "silent majority"

Sometimes it is argued that all the trouble emanates from a small minority which is supposedly reviled just as much by the rest of the community as by the police. The rest of the working class community is made up of decent working people constituting a "silent majority" who really support the police and their actions but are often afraid to speak out. Their 'silence' of course means that the contents of their opinions can be asserted by police officers without fear of any contradiction. Police officers, apparently, just 'know' what these people think. It is difficult, under the circumstance, to avoid the suspicion that there is, at least some, an element of fantasy in this empathy with the "silent majority".

At other times there is a more blanket condemnation of whole communities, especially where they are composed of ethnic minorities or are the occupants of council housing estates. But the same officer can shift between these quite different, and apparently contradictory, constructions of the situation with alarming rapidity and without being in the least bit disturbed by the apparent inconsistencies.

When asked about the resentment apparently caused by an infamous "clear up operation", for example, officer's employed this strategy of dividing the community in two. It was claimed that the "silent majority" of the area were "really" in favour of the operation and were "reassured" by a large, high profile, aggressive, police presence. This reflects the fact that, according to the police, bad relations with the "black" community "is not a race problem, it's a criminal problem".

The perception of the "Afro-Caribbean" community oscillates between the binary division of "hard core criminals" versus "respectable law abiding" community, and the more general view of a whole flamboyant, promiscuous, morally degenerate, "street wise" culture which is extremely hostile to authority and inherently acts as a magnet for "vice" of all kinds. One officer explained to me that these people are "basically fun loving but lazy and irresponsible" and he attributed this to the fact that "they've come from an area albeit

generations back where they had time to laze about in the sun and didn't do an awful lot and you get inborn traits" X5.

Here are a few examples of the endless 'silent majority' refrain.

There are a lot of good people that are there, but you only need a small number of people in a small area to make it look bad don't you. V1

Not to forget that there are a lot of decent people out there as well. But they are necessarily under pressure from, maybe, just a small part of the Community. I don't really know what sort of proportion the Community is against the Police but people, especially on the lower half of the Estate, don't like their neighbours to know that they associate with the Police. V4

A lot of people do want us in *****, but obviously you've got the tiny minority who certainly don't want us in *****, they don't want us in *****, don't want the police at all, and that's it, full stop. T3

This latter officer is the same officer who only minutes before referred to policing area 'T' as 'the black problem' in a blanket condemnation of the "black" community. the same officer also said this

Do you think there is any form of respect for the police down there?

Yes, a lot of the older community, a lot of the older coloured people who have been here sometime, they treat the young black kids with the contempt they deserve. They know these are the young lads that are causing the problems. T3

His usage of "coloured" and "black" is I think significant. The former is felt to be harmless - "as good as gold" he frequently says. "Black" is heavy and threatening however. Very different affective charges are attached to these two terms in this officer's discourse.

4.1.5.4 Alienation from the rest of society and the splitting of perspectives

Many officers believe that the nature of their work gives them a privileged perspective on the world. This reinforces the strength of their belief in their dark vision of things and builds in a resistance to any other

perspective. All other views are either corrupt, stupid, naive or worse.

As I said before they don't appreciate what really is happening out there. They've got their nice cosy little house. They go to work in their office. They work in their office all day. They drive home in their nice cars, go home to their nice houses that are warm and cosy, watch the news, see what's happening around the world, the topical things which are happening around the world, go down to their nice pub or club, come home again, sleep in their nice bed, go to work the next day. It is only when they come back and find their house broken into that they start seeing the reality of the way things are. V3

Clearly this cannot fail to leave the police officer with a reinforced feeling that an unbridgeable gulf exists between the police and the rest of society. This can only result in further pressures towards insularity, and an unshakeable belief in their own, dark, vision.

4.1.5.5 The policeman as split personality

Finally I wish to indicate a process which is not so much a form of 'splitting' as an attempt by the police officer to compartmentalise his own being in a way which is simply not sustainable and which therefore leads to further anxiety.

This police officer displays clearly the rigid mental compartmentalisation made necessary by very powerful group pressures to conform to certain patterns of prejudice and paranoia on the one hand, and powerful external pressures to conform to certain 'presentational' rules, in the eye of the public, on the other.

I haven't actually seen any incident I've been to, I haven't actually seen much. There is usually friction, there's not policemen stirring it up through any real wish to. They might make private comments afterwards of course, they often do but that is the nature of people isn't it to have one face for doing their professional job and having another face when they have finished with it.

So you feel that other face doesn't affect your work?

It doesn't come into the scenario when they are dealing with whatever is being dealt with. I mean, obviously, whoever you are dealing with might say a different thing when you are

back in your crew bus or whatever. I don't know. T1

It seems unlikely that he whole-heartedly believes that these powerful group feelings have no effect on police practice. Later in the interview the mental tensions which this compartmentalisation and self-delusion imposes is made plain.

I think any group of people will suffer if all people are basically the same with basic views I mean they are going to get more and more interested in those views and obviously that does happen in the Police Force as well as anywhere else. It doesn't matter really how open you are and how much you think about these things, at the end of the day you tend to conform to the natural role so, in some ways, stereo-types are right when you are at work and when I go home I can do what I want. T1

There *are* common patterns of affective orientation, prejudice, contempt, hatred, fear, loathing and idealisation. The pressures to conform to these common patterns are enormous; so enormous that even the most embedded officers feel its suffocating weight. The tension created between this 'performance' for the group and the 'performance' for formal public presentational purposes is very large. The further tension created with privately held feelings and beliefs often adds a further layer of contradiction. This level of complexity is unbearable within an affective culture in which complexity is itself suspect, and indeed viewed as the worst kind of weakness. In many ways the affective dynamic, of the police subject, can be summed up as the endless attempt to drive complexity out from itself (thus the terrible group pressures to conform). As is often the case however the inability to remove complexity within results in projection of that complexity outwards onto paranoid objects. Thus the attempt to manage complexity within becomes the attempt to manage, or eliminate, complexity outside.

4.1.6.0 Permanent Crisis

What pervades these transcripts is a sense of permanent threat and permanent crisis. "I treat it as being tense most of the time, or all the time, you can't go far wrong" T3. This results in an apocalyptic orientation to the world. There is a very real sense of immanent catastrophe. Sometimes they clearly exaggerate their claims in order to make a point. But the themes of degeneration, crisis, and immanent chaos are so persistent and all pervading that it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that this paranoid structure of feeling is somehow a key to understanding police culture.

In the following sections of this chapter I shall elaborate on some of the details of this structure of feeling. Clearly the many elements of the complex constellation of affective zones of intensity cannot be easily separated from one another. For the sake of convenience however I shall look at this split world under the following categories of affective experience: *the major threatening object (4.2.0.0)*, *the minor threatening object (4.3.0.0)*, *the threatening mechanism (4.4.0.0)*, *the ideal object (4.5.0.0)*, and *affective policing styles (4.6.0.0)*.

4.2.0.0 PART 2 - THE MAJOR THREATENING OBJECT

These are a series of people, groups and communities which are themselves, felt to be, dangerous, criminal, degenerate and disgusting in various ways.

4.2.1.0 (Major object 1) The dangerous individual

Two key conceptual and affective devices in the police world-view strike one almost immediately. One of these is the conceptualisation of a dangerous collectivity - "the criminal fraternity". I shall be saying more about this in a moment. The other key device is an individualising one. This is the notion of the "dangerous individual". Where it is believed that an individual has been "active" for some time and is perceived to pose a threat to society, officers will inform their colleagues, their superiors, and even prosecutors, that this person must be brought to trial and must be dealt with severely. Here feelings about "threat", "dangerousness", "inherent criminality" and so on are being brought to bear on the importance attributed to a particular case.

Now, I was in court recently where...three black youths had committed a robbery on this man when he had just used the services of a prostitute who, in fact, was a younger lass from one of the better-off areas. How she got into that sort of environment I don't know. And the solicitor argued that it was unjust that the two girls had been allowed out on bail so the two prostitutes in the house, two girls had been allowed out on bail and the three lads looked as though they were going to get a remand in custody. And the Solicitor was arguing, "Look, you are treating these people differently. Where is the logic in this?". But, of course, you've got to look at the reality of the situation as well - that those three men are dangerous. The two girls, they are committing basically the same offence, they were in it together but they aren't dangerous. V4

Not only is the girl not dangerous but she is from a different "environment". This establishes from the beginning that she is not 'essentially' dangerous in the way that the "black youths" are. The affective charge on "younger lass" is quite different to that on "black youths".

4.2.1.1 "Getting a job" on someone

Sometimes an officer will start a personal campaign against someone he believes to be "dangerous". He will go out of his way to get a criminal conviction on the individual in order that he will become a "marked man", a "known offender" someone with "a record", and will, therefore, be subject to close surveillance in the future, ensuring that any further minor offence will provide further convictions. The particular offence is of little consequence to the police officer. What concerns him is the inherent dangerousness which underlies the criminal act. As I indicate in my discussions of alcohol related crimes (4.4.4.0), and also police discretion in general (4.6.2.3), it is clear that the reverse is also true. If an individual who is not considered to be inherently dangerous commits a petty offence it is likely to be overlooked. Thus what is often being policed is not crime itself but felt levels of criminality and dangerousness. The officer *feels* that some people are a *threat* while others are not.

4.2.1.2 The Marked Man

Officers often express the belief that when someone commits a string of offenses then close surveillance (questioning, searches, observation etc) in the future is justified and that in a sense when people commit offenses they "forfeit part of their civil liberties". People are "painting targets on their back" by becoming "known offenders" and it is ultimately part of a police officer's duty to be suspicious of such "dangerous" people.

4.2.1.3 Targeting threats

A common tactic used is that of targeting. This is where individuals who are suspected, by police officers, of being "active" (ie. currently involved in criminal activities), are given special investigative attention. This is a tactic used particularly by CID departments. This suspicion is based on the collation of rumours. These rumours come from informants who have themselves been offenders, or who "live on the edge of crime". The only people they can give information about are people who they have some kind of association with. In this way the nature of police investigative practices constantly reinforces the perception that all criminals know one another, that there is a closed, relatively homogenous and inherently "criminal", "criminal

fraternity".

It is not difficult overall to see how an individual can go from being the focus of an individual officer's bad feelings to being the object of massive surveillance and general paranoia.⁸

4.2.2.0 (Major object 2) The "criminal fraternity" - material of everyday policing

In the perceptual field of the police officer the dangerous individual is located in an underworld, of mostly petty offenders, where criminal activity is the normal way of life because "they know no better". Due to the pattern of collusion of rumour from informants, there is a perception of a high level of inter-association, they form an identifiable community in the police officer's mind, a "criminal fraternity".

The dominant perception is of a separate world, a world "below the surface" of people who are quite different to "society" or the "respectable community" in quite specific ways. It is a world set apart where people have a different way of life from the rest society, a way of life which presents a constant threat which must be guarded against. Habitual criminals are people who, it is claimed, were brought up by parents who were themselves habitual criminals. They tend to marry habitual criminals and their friends are habitual criminals. They have grown up knowing nothing else, they have no values, they do not know right from wrong and thus are indelibly and irremediably criminal in "nature", they are "bad" people, the "bottom of the barrel". Most crime, it is claimed, is committed by this group of people, this "criminal fraternity". If you could get rid of this group of people you could get rid of most crime.

The logical conclusion from the assumption that habitual crime is committed by people who are inherently "criminal" and inhabit a criminal world is that if you want to find out about all the crime that is going on then you just talk to and keep an eye on the friends and relatives of offenders.

The mental picture really is that there are really two communities in *****, the community that you see living on the surface and the people that are living just beneath the surface, that element that live close by or in the criminal fraternity, which is quite a big criminal fraternity, and you will realise that while there are persons doing observations on a house, for instance, you will see people coming and going and all those people come and go and you will know they are associating in crime somewhere whether its a brother and sister, or whatever. They seem to stick together. They use certain pubs, certain cafes in town, there's

a strong bond between them. Y1

These people are the names and faces which provide the basic material for everyday policing. They are known by the police and in some respects enjoy a certain rapport with them. At the same time the police officers clearly express their distaste for these people, their friends and families, and their way of life. They clearly express a belief that these people are inherently morally degenerate and that they therefore present a threat to all things 'respectable' in society.

4.2.2.1 The human dustbin: dirty work in the "Transitional Zone"⁹

I don't know when they started going down to ***** and when that became their area, but obviously it's not just the black person it's just that you've got bail hostels there, and that sort of thing. Why do people put bail hostels where they're so tempted by all the drugs and all the street crime that goes on? To put bail hostels right in the middle of there, I mean it's crazy. On the other hand, I wouldn't like a bail hostel near me, but I'm sure there is some happy medium that you don't have to put it in a bloody place where the temptation is so high. There's so much street crime going on it's unbelievable. T3

Why are there so many bail hostels, he wonders, in an area with so many temptations, and then concludes that of course he wouldn't want them near him, confirming his opinion that this area is basically a human dustbin. "Even the complaints are rubbish" said another officer. Another explained, in the field study, how he had been asked by one Asian man to "remove dog shit from his front door step". This, for him, seemed to both sum up the type of work which policing this area involved and also sum up the more general public attitude towards policing (police are there to do all of the 'dirty work' that the 'respectable' folk don't want to even hear about). What angers the police officer more than ever is that he is not even allowed to just get on with the job and do it as he sees fit. Instead he is asked to do a 'dirty' and near impossible job with his "hands tied behind his back" because of his senior officers' fears of political pressure and media outrage, together with a whole host of "meddling do-gooders" who never cease to demand 'accountability', and produce "excuses" for these peoples criminal behaviour and unacceptable attitude to authority. They ("do-gooders") do all in their power to undermine anything good the police do, blow up every mistake they make and generally try to mask the otherwise obvious reality which is that policemen are really "the good guys".

Deeply tied into the affective orientation to the 'transitional zone' as dirty, amoral, and inherently criminal is the anxiety about the challenge which such transience poses in terms of surveillance, knowledge,

predictability and control.

Yes, obviously we've got a lot of, you are obviously aware of the recent murder of a vagrant. There are a lot of vagrants and people in *****, the ***** Road area who are of no fixed abode. Not necessarily tramps but people who move from place to place to place. It's ever so difficult to trace these people either to arrest them or interview them as we are trying to now for this murder. T3

This desire for predictability and control is, as I shall show in due course, also manifested in obsessive concerns with employment, home ownership, family, and education, as disciplinary, life-structuring mechanisms.

4.2.2.2 Good class villains and the habitual petty offender

I have looked at the police officer's strong tendency to "split" the world into extremes of good and evil. Here however I should like to point to a special case of this. Officers make certain important distinctions within the "criminal fraternity" itself. One of these is that between "good class", "professional" criminals and habitual petty offenders. In the case of the former there is often a grudging respect for the criminal if he is "good" at what he does, and there even appears to be a certain rapport. There is a conviction that the "good class professional" should be treated "firmly but fairly" in the battle of strategy and wits.

For the police officer the habitual petty offender, however, is quite different from the professional "villain". They are the lowest of the low. They are "pathetic", "hopeless", of "low intellect" (usually this means simply that they are "so stupid" that they "cannot tell right from wrong"). It is believed that some of them are so institutionalised that they cannot live properly outside of prison so they are happier to be inside. In one way or another they are people who are deserving of no sympathy or respect. They have "chosen" the "easy option" rather than working hard and becoming "respectable" citizens. They are weak people who cannot resist the temptation. Crime is "like a drug" to them, they are hooked and "they do not have the moral fibre" to resist. Habitual criminals are morally condemned for similar reasons to drug addicts, because they are "weak" "parasites" with "nothing to offer society". Police officers explain individual's habitual offending in terms of their upbringing, parental control, education, influence of peers, and so on, but they simultaneously blame the individuals for their own predicament by maintaining that they could have been different: they could have been "respectable" people but they chose not to be.

You've got, I suppose in some ways you've got a sophisticated criminal but you bring them in and they just say no comment. This [other] sort of thing, they go out and do some stupid job, come back in and whether they are caught, bound to rights or not, they just say no comment and you've got to prove it all the way..... It's low intellect, on the dole and they want a bit of extra money. Greed I suppose isn't it, basically. It's people that need the money. They don't work a lot of them. V1

In the example below there appears to be a further split in police perceptions of this latter, despised, section of the criminal underclass. On the one hand there are people who don't actually go out of their way to commit crime but who are so inadequate that they just create social trouble by default. Then there are the hopeless petty offenders.

And, I think, beyond that there are two types of, two major types of crime in *****. There is the domestic side which involves all sorts of people who don't necessarily come to notice otherwise. They are not necessarily dishonest. They don't necessarily hate the Police even. But they come to our notice simply because they beat up their wives or they beat up their children or neglect their children, or whatever. Although they commit criminal offenses by assault, I don't think of them as criminals. They're just, a lot of the time they are socially inadequate. They do stupid things, they get drunk and get themselves into trouble. Then there is the criminal side who go out. That is their vocation to commit crime.
V4

4.2.2.3 The unemployed

Unemployment is discussed in more detail elsewhere as a 'mechanism' which is felt to be threatening for a whole series of reasons. However we can also see this concern expressed in terms relating to the 'threatening object' of actual unemployed people. What we find again and again is the assertion that they are unemployed because they have chosen to be unemployed. They are morally bad, objectionable people.

4.2.2.4 The crime of being a claimant

When asked to compare social security fraud with tax fraud, in terms of seriousness, most, at first, stated

that both were equally bad. But elaborations often went on to point out, however, that tax avoidance was understandable as nobody likes paying taxes and everyone wants to keep a bit more of "their own money". This is linked to all kinds of fantasy scenarios excusing such fraud

It may be that person has a genuine need for more than he is entitled to have perhaps or to evade that tax because he needs that money for a young child that is dying and he needs an extra thousand pounds in order to put that child into a private hospital to get treatment. V3

On the other hand social security fraud was felt to be an unqualified evil, even when it was suggested that perhaps these people may have needs even more pressing than tax evaders. Eventually it becomes clear that the 'real crime' is being a benefit claimant in the first place.

Presumably the arguments about need are more likely to apply to the person on benefit?

...If they are in need then it is either self generated because they haven't been responsible with whatever money they've got, they don't use it properly and therefore it boils down to them and it's their fault and therefore they are the ones to blame but they ought to be assisted in some way. Educated in the way they spend their money, not given more money, just because they have spent all the rest of it on booze and fags. Assist them in how they spend their money and look after themselves basically. V3

4.2.2.5 Violence

The "criminal fraternity" are also felt to be inherently violent.

You've got the low income person, it's greed isn't it basically. I mean it must, I suppose, really be the sort of person who likes to inflict injury on people. You've got that sort of man out on the streets, that just wants to go out on a Friday or Saturday night for a fight and likes beating people up or likes to smash up the pub and throw glasses about, who likes to pick an argument. You don't generally find that sort of person living in ***** , but you would find that sort of person living in ***** or ***** . V1

It is astonishing how consistently such statements come from individuals which Robert Reiner might

categorise as "New Centurions". That is, officers who, themselves, clearly enjoy action, speed, and violence. An arrest which requires an officer to show his physical prowess is far more highly valued than an arrest where the individual comes quietly. Stories of violence are constantly told and indeed often exaggerated. Who is it that "likes beating people up"?

4.2.2.6 The cunning of the "criminal fraternity"

Despite repeated assertions that "these people" are of "low intellect" and completely "socially inadequate", the police simultaneously claim that they have a special kind of cunning.

A lot of the younger people are very aware of what the Police can or can't do. The police powers and so forth. And, therefore, know that they can use the law to protect themselves, as opposed to the rest of society shall we say. They can use the law to - not get away with things - but they know how to use the law to avoid being caught, being prosecuted, and so forth. T1

The cunning use of law is the re-articulation of law by the voice of the 'other'. The univocal mobilisation of law by the state is challenged. The notion of being "street wise" seems also, in the hands of police officers, to signify a special kind of delinquent cunning, which makes it possible for them to be simultaneously stupid and clever.

4.2.2.7 Hatred

Whatever the surface appearances might seem to suggest in reality "they hate us" is the repeated refrain of the police officer when speaking of these supposedly threatening groups. "It is total hate basically of the police. They'll do anything to annoy, upset or push their luck" V3. It might be argued that some level of very real hatred exists on the part of the groups which concern the police. This is no doubt true. We must then ask to what extent is this hostile feeling itself a response to the paranoid behaviour of the police? Can we speak of a mutually paranoid encounter?

4.2.3.0 (Major object 3) Problem Families

The "criminal fraternity" is closely linked to the notion of "problem families". Police officers get to know certain names, these names are often the names not merely of individuals but of whole families such that

individuals coming from these families are seen as potentially troublesome from the outset. The perception is of families with generations of degenerates.

Most of them are from criminal families, their parents - or certainly mates - are criminals themselves. And they have been taught the trade? Yes, they've been apprentices since the age of five. W3

Family life suffers because "lower class" women are not "intelligent" or "educated" enough to be good mothers whilst their husbands or boyfriends attitudes prevent them from being good fathers. The concepts of "lower classes" and "problem family" are brought together.

Why do you think ***** the estates, have this particular crime problem as opposed to *****?

I suppose it's just really the upbringing of the children. That's what I put it down to. People living in ***** tend to have a better upbringing, are taught right and wrong. The people in the ***** estates are the problem families and don't seem to care what their children get up to, or what happens and then gradually they get led astray. V2

To paraphrase a number of typifications of the "problem family", at its most extreme, it is "large" with "mother inadequate and sleeping around, father coming home pissed and kicking the kids and wife around, and interfering with the twelve year old daughter". They "don't care about their kids", they "don't supervise their kids" and "they don't teach them the difference between right and wrong". Their parents are so morally degenerate that the children "cannot respect them so how can they respect any other form of authority". Children in such an environment grow up without "respect for authority", with no sense of "right and wrong", often with an encouraged "anti-police" or "anti-authority" attitude, believing that a degenerate "way of life" is normal, in addition to all the usual problems of adolescence. They spend much of their time "on the street" coming under "the influence" of their peers and older children from a similar background.

There is a perception that many working class families are reasonably "respectable", particularly those in employment, but at the other end of a continuum is the totally degenerate 'under class', the "criminal fraternity". The "problem family" and the "criminal family" are to a great extent merged into a single undifferentiated degeneracy. But while the quote at the beginning suggest one kind of household this next one

suggests something a little different.

It's not just deprivation, it's just the level to which life can sink if you like. You've got to go into a house and find out there's no carpet on the floor and it's covered in dog shit and there are rabbits walking all over the food in the kitchen and people keeping pigeons in their kitchen. The kids walking round, without even having a wash for a couple of weeks, in old clothes. You need to actually get into that sort of house and to be in an environment where you have got little kids of six and seven wandering round streets late at night before you can really get the flavour of it. V4

It is important to note that these discourses contain many contradictions. For example (as I shall show in due course) many officers claim that young working class men who have presented a problem to the police in their late teens and early twenties often cease being a problem when they take on the responsibility of a family. Thus the family is seen as a potential cure for the moral ills of the lower classes but the "problem family" is simultaneously seen as the breeding ground for and outcome of these ills. The working class man who is in transition between his family of origin and a newly formed family unit is felt to be the greatest threat to the social order. The "problem family" however is seen as the source of difficult young men. There is a tension then between viewing the "lower class" family as on the one hand a potential source of moral corruption but on the other a potential source of responsibility and moral stability.

4.2.3.1 Asian alien family standards. Afro Caribbean non-standards, in the "Jungle"

The major "black area" of the city in fact has a population of predominantly Afro-Caribbean origin but also various Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Indian, Afro-Asian, Chinese and others. There are further religious divisions, Hindu, Moslem, Sikh, etc. These latter groups tend to be viewed under the umbrella term "Asian". So the community is actually extremely diverse. Indeed the "Afro-Caribbean" community is of diverse origin.

In the 'mind set' of the police however a stereotyped "Asian" family life is contrasted with the, equally stereotyped, "Afro Caribbean" family. They claim that "Asians" have very strong family ties, strong "family discipline" and a rigid structure of authority and "respect". This, they say, is partly to do with "Asians" being "very religious" and their religion imposing very rigid structures of authority on family life. Because of this, they say, "Asian" children are much less of a problem for the police. They tend not to get into trouble, and when they do a word, either with a parent or some old and respected member of the "Asian" community, is

usually enough to ensure that the child will be, both, punished and made to comply with certain standards of behaviour in the future. These strong extended family structures "keep themselves to themselves" (i.e. they tend not to be demonstrative, 'visible' people) and they are self policing in many respects. Also, it is believed that, they tend to inculcate a general respect for authority in their children so that they don't become a problem to the police, even after they leave the tight family confines of childhood.

This then is one side of the police view of the "Asian" family. They have structured, ordered, generally decent lives guided by a respect for the family and for authority. They have all of this because they are generally "responsible", "hard working" people who "care" about their children. In a word, they have "standards". Of course the "standards" they have are derived from cultures and religious codes alien to police officers. This creates much ambivalence in the minds of police officers since they (police officers) seem to have a respect for such alien standards where they coincide with their own standards but where they do not, it is believed, in general that "they" ("Asians") must change and live "like the rest of the British People" since "they have chosen to come here", "they can't expect us to adapt to them". Hostility to multi-cultural education and any minor concessions to religious observances (e.g. Sikhs' not having to wear crash helmets) was shown. While there is some respect for "Asians" because, on an abstract level, they live according to fairly rigid "standards", and this is something to be respected in itself, they are far from being viewed as model citizens. Their value system, because they are alien, may often be viewed as unfair and even irrational. Indeed another, and to some extent contradictory Asian stereotype is of a "hot headed and irrational nature". Police officers often demonstrated a visceral dislike of "Asians". This was reflected, particularly, in derogatory jokes about "Pakis"; jokes which were apparently a perfectly 'normal' part of the cultural environment.

In contrast to "Asian" families, "Afro Caribbean" families are believed to be extremely loose and disorganised. Whilst on one hand some officers claim that older "Afro Caribbean" people are basically law abiding, respect the police, want them around and would openly support the police if it weren't for the fear of reprisals, on the other hand they claim that they are irresponsible parents. They "don't care about their kids", they "let them stay out till all hours of the night" unsupervised and as soon as possible they "kick them out" to fend for themselves. "Afro Caribbean" parents are bad role models, their lives are disorganised and unstructured, they don't provide anything for their children to "look up to", their homes are dirty and chaotic. Fathers, in particular, are said to be promiscuous, and jokes about the sexuality of black people in general is commonplace in the 'canteen culture'. Perhaps the best way to put it is that in their familial, and other, relations, black men are felt by police officers to be impulsive and desire driven, rather than morally ordered, men. Black people are often described as "animals", or in animalistic terms.

Thus the stereotype of the "Afro Caribbean" family is of a present but inadequate, irresponsible and perhaps promiscuous mother, a generally absent and even more irresponsible and promiscuous father (usually involved in crime of one sort or another) and an ever growing undisciplined, unsupervised, uncared for, bunch of children. The community collectively is often referred to as a "rabbit warren", a "bolt hole" and so on but perhaps most evocative and significant of all is the general nickname given to the community. It is called "The Jungle".¹⁰

4.2.4.0 (Major object 4) "The black problem"

When asked to identify the policing problems specific to the area in which this police officer worked (an ghettoised inner-city) he responded without hesitation - "Obviously, what you mean is obviously ***** and the black problem" (T3). This "black problem", The fear and loathing of the ethnic minority communities in general, is a very real organising principle in the police officer's systems of thoughts, practices and *feelings*.

4.2.4.1 Inherently violent

The police stereotype of the Afro-Caribbean 'way of life' asserts not merely that it is morally degenerate, but that it is virtually uncivilised, if we are to take the name "Jungle" seriously with all the connotational meanings it evokes. Of course the name "Jungle" refers not merely to the perceived animalistic nature of "black" family life but also to the supposedly inherent violence of these people. Police officers express quite openly a belief that "Afro Caribbean" people are inherently more violent and commit nastier crimes than other people. They are, quite simply, more inherently dangerous to society than the average white person. It may not be stretching things too much then to suggest that police officers *feel* that "black" people require closer surveillance and control than other people.

Well, there's a much larger coloured population here. The crime is more prevalent and tends to be more violent.

Why is that?

Well, I think that probably the West Indians, in particular, are perhaps more prone to using violence. I mean, generally, we have got to say that housing in this area is of quite low quality. It's not very well looked after whoever's responsibility it is and they are tightly

packed on top of each other, it's like a rabbit warren. T1

Here we can see the projection of an inherent violence onto the 'threatening object', directly associated with other key paranoid mechanisms and images. In this case the obsession with housing and how well it is maintained as a gauge of moral degeneracy, together with the image of a rabbit community (associated in popular imagery with excessive and uncontrolled breeding).

4.2.4.2 The structure of the "black criminal fraternity"

The black "criminal fraternity" is perceived to be split between an older group of individuals, many of whom are first generation immigrants, and a younger group ranging from the mid twenties downwards. The older individuals run illegal drinking and gambling clubs and perhaps do some dealing in stolen goods. The younger group is itself split between a hard core of "criminals" in their early to mid twenties with a large "fringe" of "impressionable" younger delinquents who view their slightly older peers reputation for criminality and anti-police attitudes as desirable.

They start doing a little bit of shop-lifting, they hang around with the wrong sort of people. They end up getting involved in with the prostitutes, the ones that have got a bit about themselves that seem to be cleverer and then obviously there's the drugs and from there on, you know, burglaries.... T3

It is claimed by police officers that some antagonism exists between the older generation of criminals, who prefer a quiet life, and the younger ones who create tensions and attract the attention of the police.

4.2.4.3 Black youth hedonism. The flaunting of criminality, the mocking of authority, the profits of crime

There is a concern then amongst police officers with the supposed influence of older 'criminals', in their early to mid 20s, on the youth. The fear is that in the "black" community "crime seems to pay". This is true to a lesser extent on the white council estates, but more so here for several reasons.

Firstly the crime which goes on is more visible. Even where officers are reasonably tolerant of soft drug dealing they are extremely concerned about it being so visible "on the street". The black community is felt to be of serious concern because of the high level of "street crime". This concern is obviously tied to other fears such as those relating to violence and threatening appearance on the street. Not only is the crime itself

(prostitution, drug dealing, street robbery, etc) very visible but so, it is claimed, are the benefits of such crime.

Police officers regularly argued rhetorically that if there is so much unemployment and deprivation, how do these people manage to afford expensive cars and clothes? The black community are viewed as people who are primarily concerned with a certain "flashy", "street wise" and "expensive" appearance. This is not seen, as in the case of middle class professionals, as a sign of hard work and therefore of moral respectability but, as an explicit flouting of authority. These people are literally flaunting their criminality for all to see. Police officers go to great lengths to explain that these appearances must not be misinterpreted. "You wouldn't believe how these people really live behind closed doors", these people aren't really "respectable". The implication is therefore that anyone in the black community who appears to have the trappings of a respectable lifestyle, must *necessarily* have acquired them by non-legitimate means. They are criminals flaunting their criminality and the rewards it brings both to impressionable youths and to the wider society thus making the police service seem visibly impotent.

Whilst young black men may, supposedly, make "£500-£600 per week" from a "life of crime" (in drugs, prostitution etc), they are "unlikely to ever find a job paying them that sort of money". They explain this not by admitting that there may be structural and attitudinal obstacles to black working class youths finding a good job, but by claiming that they are simply unwilling to "work their way up the ladder from the bottom". A key worry about all youth, but especially about black youth, is that they "want everything *now*", they aren't willing to work for it so they take the "easy option", there is an underlying lack of moral fibre.

The fear is that youths see crime apparently paying off for those slightly older than them and are thus drawn in. They gain both financially and in status amongst their peers. A 'criminal' identity and "anti-police" attitude provides street credibility. Young black men will always "act up" in groups even when they are reasonably "cooperative" (deferent) when alone.

4.2.4.4 Public visibility: "the mob".

Black youths are perceived to be "hanging around", looking "threatening", getting involved with the "wrong people", in "things they shouldn't". More threatening than that however is felt to be the group dynamics, the "mob element", the inexplicable way in which "they" will "band together", create a "crowd" to "undermine" the authority of the police officer at the slightest signs of trouble. Not only do "black", communities have all the signs of a disordered and morally degenerate community (similar to the white

working class council estates) but in addition they have this almost incomprehensible (to police officers) community solidarity.

4.2.4.5 Bad attitude and a "chip on the shoulder"

The main account police officers offer for such apparent crowd behaviour is that "black" people have a common "chip on their shoulder". The issues they have resentments about however (mainly "slavery" and past experiences of prejudice, it is suggested) have long since gone and they now provide merely "an excuse" for what are basically degenerate and unacceptable attitudes and forms of behaviour. The "chip on the shoulder" theme is an endless refrain.

4.2.4.6 "Them" as racist and resentful (projected prejudice)

At times the "chip on the shoulder" theme reaches fairly elaborate levels in which the relatively deprived, powerless, and controlled, community, is itself represented as the resentful and prejudiced aggressor.

I think they probably first came to this country perhaps they had a very trying time, settling in. Certainly, it goes well back beyond coming here anyway. They have got a grievance about the slave trade and everything else because Bristol was the centre of that, so I'm led to believe. They have deep grievances against white people in general. Asians, I don't find so much because in fact they are welcomed in, half of them come from Uganda anyway before they come to us. T1

The experience of poverty, prejudice, and powerlessness on the part of the Afro-Caribbean community is effortlessly flipped over into "grievances against white people" which "they" have. In response to a question about the usefulness of race relations training the same officer said..

I think - a lot of people would see it as sort of inverse racism. Giving them priority - greater needs to them than the rest of the community..... I don't think, overall, I don't think the police force behaves in a racist way in any way shape or form. I defend that to the last. I think obviously there are individuals who perhaps are, but from what I have seen much of the racism is black against white. T1

First a splitting takes place in which the source of any 'badness' in the 'ideal object' (in this case the police

themselves) is 'split off' (as the "individual") and is left hanging. Then 'badness' is 'projected' onto the black community. They become the cause of their own persecution.

4.2.4.7 "Their" perceptions of "us"

Linked to the above are more general projections/fantasies about how "they" see police officers.

Well obviously they see the Police as the white middle-class stereotype, male dominated group which go round bullying everybody round to comply with the laws. That is how I think they see us rather simplistically. T1¹¹

I have already suggested that police officers regularly fantasise about being laughed at amongst other things, but I shall explore more fully the theme of paranoid fantasies regarding how the 'other' perceives 'self' in Chapter 5.

4.2.4.8 The unreliability of ethnic minorities as witnesses - liars

Not only are "black" people in some way inherently criminal but they provide unreliable witnesses because "they lie", "they are hostile", "they are crafty" because "they don't speak English properly" and therefore "can't communicate properly".¹² What convinces police officers, perhaps more than anything, that "black" people are unreliable is the fact that, in given policing situations, they produce interpretations which, for police officers, are patently untrue. "Whatever you do they always say "it's because they are black", that "you are harassing them because of their colour". So the "chip on the shoulder" theme is linked to the notion that black people cannot tell the truth. Indeed they cannot give a reliable account of reality at all. What starts out as a clash of interpretations of a given situation, something which officers *feel* bad about since it questions the legitimacy of their own interpretation (i.e. their authority), turns into a perception of "black" people as unreliable and basically liars - "even the children lie" said one officer.

4.2.4.9 Grudging awe of the tough men on the front line: a secret identification

Despite all the evident feelings of disgust, paranoia, and contempt which police officers demonstrate in relation to the black community, even here there is much ambivalence. I suggested in the earlier section on 'splitting' (4.1.5.3) that there are constant processes of 'splitting' going on even with regard to the black community itself. Sometimes an invisible, silent, law abiding majority, which 'really' supports the police,

becomes discursively convenient. At others this vanishes as the black community becomes the undifferentiated "black problem" (4.2.4.0). A further more subtle ambivalence exists, though glimpsed fleetingly. This is the occasional appearance of a kind of grudging awe for the "hard cases" on the "Frontline". For some officers the way that these "hard" individuals stick unyieldingly to their own hatreds and paranoidias regarding the police themselves is more respectable than the yielding tolerance of some of their own more liberal police colleagues.

You go out with a community involvement officer who speaks to the black people who would speak to us anyway, not even he could go down to the front line and try and speak to some of the main people there, they wouldn't give you the time of day. T3

It is almost as though the paranoid position generates more respect for a paranoid and destructive 'enemy' than for a tolerant, bridge building, 'friend'. There is a sense in which the 'enemy' is important for the survival of paranoid definitions of, and experiences of, the situation? but it perhaps goes deeper still than this.

The paranoid subject has to face up to and stand firm against a paranoid 'enemy' but he can deal with such an 'enemy' because he feels he knows precisely what he is dealing with. Things are black and white (literally in this case), a clear, clean break exists, there is no confusion and no ambivalence. The paranoid enemy presents a hard, rigid, aggressive, but unambiguous exterior, there is mutual hostility. This is a 'cold-war' in miniature, and it has the same kind of dark, paradoxical mutual dependency to it.

What the paranoid subject position really cannot deal with, at any level, is any kind of softness, or yielding quality. This is always interpreted as weakness in less paranoid colleagues. It is associated with ambivalence, the blurring of boundaries, confusion and, ultimately, chaos. Such softness and blurring can arouse the most destructive feelings.¹³

4.2.4.10 White criminals in the black community

Not only are the "black" population degenerate but so, also, are white people who associate with them. The white "druggies" are described as "pathetic creatures" "preyed upon" by black dealers. White criminals who "run with the blacks" are "even more dangerous" than their black counterparts.

In fact in all honesty the most dangerous ones of those are white people.

Why is that?

Why, I don't know. People who manipulate the system. They don't get caught very often. Because the type of crime they do does make it difficult to catch them. They have got to be virtually caught in the act. They are not going to admit anything so the only way to catch them is in the act, they are usually carrying masks and wearing them so they aren't going to be identified. I think, actually people might be intimidated not to say who they are. T1

Ultra-dangerous white people who commit virtually undetectable crimes, who wear masks so that they cannot be identified, and who intimidate others into silence. It is hard not to feel that there is an element of fantasy in all of this. Of course what distinguishes them from run of the mill white criminals is that they are made doubly dangerous by their transgression of racial boundaries. They become hard to categorise. Much of the perceived danger may well be the projected threat to the police officer's own cognitive categories. It is not clear what this criminal is, what is the nature of his criminality, he slips in and out of focus. These blurred edges, this opacity turns to pure menace - a masked evil.

4.2.5.0 (Major object 5) Youth

Young people pose a problem for the police due to a perceived lack of internalised moral self-regulation and a high propensity to live a 'loose', disorganised, unstructured lifestyle, often in a very 'visible' way (I shall explore police officer's accounts of why this is so in the section on 'threatening mechanisms'). Where young peoples' moral self regulation and external supervision is felt to be at its lowest and their illegitimate occupation of time and space at its highest, then the concern deepens.

The police officer's mental map of the distribution of the problem, is of a concentration of particularly difficult youthful populations in certain areas at certain times. The nature of the communities in certain areas is felt to worsen the problem associated with youth. The moral degeneracy associated with "Afro Caribbean" "black" communities and predominantly white, working class council estates, are brought together with general concerns about the supervision and regulation of youth to make white working class and "black" youth, perhaps the core concern for most uniformed police officers. "Over seventy percent of crime is committed by this age group", they claim.

4.2.5.1 Universal suspiciousness of the young black man

When describing what kind of suspicious circumstances they look out for, in the "respectable", "well to do" areas of the city, police officers almost invariably describe either a "scruffy" white youth of the kind found on white working class council estates, but more often than not they will describe a "black, suspicious looking youth, carrying a bag" or "four blacks in a scruffy old car in the early hours of the morning". These are people who are "out of place" they "don't belong" they must be "up to no good" and they will be stopped and searched. It is difficult to see how the black youth can win. If he is on his "own ground" he is being territorial and (as I shall show later - 4.4.3.1) that must be "stamped out" if he is outside his area he must be "up to no good" and therefore must be searched. If he drives a flashy car and wears smart clothes they are probably stolen or at least illegal, he is flaunting his criminality and making the police seem impotent, an attitude which must be confronted, therefore he is stopped and questioned. If he drives a scruffy car, that means he's "going to do a job", probably in a stolen and/or illegal car, and, again, must be stopped and searched. If on foot, particularly at night he is probably on his way to, or back from a burglary, in groups they are probably doing muggings, and so on. The interlocking and often contradictory discourses are simultaneously mobilised so that the legitimate occupation of time and space for the "black" youth in particular is extremely limited "acting suspiciously" covers virtually everything that a "black", male, youth can do.

Every aspect of "black" behaviour seems to move in this spiral. Police officers perceive the "black" community as acting unacceptably or suspiciously and therefore take what they see as appropriate action. This produces a change in behaviour, a response which is itself perceived as unacceptable or suspicious. Legitimate action is virtually impossible, it is *always* constructed as non-legitimate, as *threatening*. Particularly in the case of young, "black" men.

4.2.5.2 Working class "black" boys grow up quicker so are more culpable

As with all the rest of police discourse (and our culture in general perhaps), there is a constant tension between causal explanation/determinism which threatens to remove responsibility from the offender (peer pressure, family background, etc) and the need to attribute, moral responsibility to the offender in order to rationalise their punishment. As the individual approaches adulthood the emphasis shifts from the former to the latter, but police officers point out that young, working class boys, and even more so young, "black", working class boys "grow up" much more quickly. They are "hard" and "streetwise", they are "capable of stealing a car and driving it down the motorway by the time they are eleven". Thus adulthood arrives far

sooner, for these boys and so, therefore, does the attributions of moral responsibility.

4.2.6.0 (Major object 6) Alternative lifestyles

The initial approach to the legitimacy of alternative lifestyles, in particular "travellers", "gypsies", "hippies", "squatters" and so on, is usually to produce an apparently tolerant statement. This however is rapidly followed by qualifications of the type "its OK so long as...". These continue until it becomes apparent that in fact alternative lifestyles are alright as long as they aren't actually alternative.

I mean I myself don't see anything wrong with people being hippies, as long as they abide by the law, I mean that includes paying their dues to society.

In what way?

If you've got the benefits of society you should contribute to it. Just because you are a hippy, if you decide that you are going to live out in a field and you still want cars to go about in, you should still have that car taxed. If you are using the facilities and you want the facilities of that county you should be paying something towards it. If you are making your clothes pegs and that, you should be paying tax but there is nothing wrong with somebody that wants to go back to nature, I mean, why not. As long as they don't cause problems for somebody else.....I think they have got to contribute to society and I don't think it is right that they just squat in the middle of the road, and that they should go into somebody's land, I think that is unfair. I think they've got to live as the rest of us to some degree, they've got to live without causing problems to other people. V1

Ultimately the crux of the matter is that their appearance, their music, their food, their smell, their way of speaking, are "causing problems" to people. Just being what they are is a problem. *It is not that they arouse strong feelings because they are a problem, rather they are a problem because they arouse strong feelings.* This seems to be the case again and again in relation to the objects experienced as threatening by the police. They arouse strong feelings in the police officer, and in the people and groups whom he idealises: feelings of revulsion, disgust, anger and resentment. Why do they have such strong feelings about what, from another perspective, could easily be argued to be a relatively innocuous range of minority groups?

What do you think about people with alternative lifestyles?

Personally as long as they comply with the law and don't upset people and annoy people.

Upsetting and annoying people is slightly different to complying with the law isn't it?

Put it this way, say you are gypsies. The majority of gypsy transit sites are covered in rubbish and dirt, filth and dogs everywhere and that would annoy the people who live nearby. It could be that it is 'behaviour likely to occasion a breach of the peace'. I mean if the bloke who lives right next door to this big heap of smelling rotten human excretion or whatever, food waste and other rubbish, which is lowering the price of his house by several thousand pounds, he is not going to be very happy with that and persistence of what the gypsies are doing could eventually get that bloke to such a stage. Especially if it's directed at him in a personal way by some of the gypsies, he is provoked into taking some sort of irresponsible action, ends up hitting one of them or shouting and causing a scene, then a breach of the peace has occurred because of the way the gypsies has behaved.

Shouldn't he be arrested for that?

More than likely he would be arrested. However, the court would probably decide that he was provoked into that action because of the behaviour of the gypsies. Therefore, he would have mitigation and he would probably, I don't know what the court would decide but the way we are taught is that somebody who is provoking an action which constitutes a breach of the peace might be prosecuted for that offence, and might even be convicted.

So presumably that is taken into account?

That's right. If he has committed an offence there and his continued presence there would make things worse then you have got to remove that source of inflammation so to speak.

V3

We have obviously got certain squats and I am sure again they frequent the area because they can get into houses which are vacant and they can squat. Plus there are drugs freely available and its suits them to lead this sort of lifestyle. They can come and go with their friends.

Do you feel they are groups which have to be watched then?

Yes of course I do.

Why.

Again you can't tar them with the same brush but obviously there is a lot of drugs moved by people on the convoy. It is always helpful to know if they are convoy people - for solstice and things - you've got to keep intelligence going. T3

A highlight of this latter officer's work is the gathering of "intelligence" about the, apparently rather innocuous, celebration of a pagan festival. If he were pressed he might find all kinds of rationalisations for these feelings. The illegal occupation of peoples land (though of course in relation to Stonehenge this is itself a post hoc innovation - for many years this aspect of the festival was perfectly legal), the state of their vehicles, and most often (as shown below) the use of illegal drugs. But it is not these that he first, and most spontaneously, mentions. What he mentions first is a signifier of the affective difference of the travelling community, their affectively alien festival. Even where he has recourse to the rationalisation of illegal drug use it is important to note that he does not refer, in the first instance, to the actual offence itself which is in fact *possession or trafficking* of illegal drugs. What he refers to is, again, their alien way of enjoying themselves - their *use* of drugs. It is this which he quite evidently finds viscerally disgusting and threatening. This issue of 'alien' 'structures of enjoyment' is something I shall explore further in Chapter 5.

As in the case of alien and threatening sexuality we find that the most common next step in the rationalisation of these feelings of fear and revulsion is the evoking of the 'ideal', and extremely affectively charged, 'object' of the child victim.

The people that use it abuse it and drag other people down... Morally they are always trying to get other people involved, they've always got young children involved in some cases. I would say morally that's wrong. T3

4.2.6.1 Homosexuality

Sexuality, homosexuality, and perceived forms of sexual deviance are key topics of 'canteen' jocularly and also form the basis for common "pet hates". In particular there is the regular obsession with policing the use,

by some homosexual men, of public lavatories for sexual liaisons. Ultimately, this use of valuable police resources is, almost always, justified by the utterly unsubstantiated claim that these men pose some kind of threat to children.

I find it offensive. men with men and men with children, I think there's nothing moral about that. Men with children, I think you've got to protect those children. I don't think that's a moral issue at all. Men with men in their own homes, no offence. As long as they are self-consenting adults, it's up to them. But when it comes to the fact that, it must be 18 months to 2 years ago now, one of the city centre shops, ***** in fact where it happened, it's rife, and when you think there are young children using these toilets, and the parents unsuspecting send them in there. Certainly there was 11 people arrested within about 2 hours, I think that's disgusting. Whether you think it's morally wrong, but it's corrupting those children. That's about it really. T3

From the first sentence male homosexuality and child sexual abuse are effectively equated and placed on the same moral level (despite his later disclaimer about self consenting adults his *feelings* are already clear). A tirade of disgust follows regarding this undifferentiated object of fear and loathing. As he himself puts it, sexuality is, from the police perspective, "a very touchy subject".

4.2.6.2 Being a problem by being different

What emerges again and again is the simple fact that strong hostile feelings arise which are directed towards minority groups of almost every kind. The fact that these *feelings* are themselves the basis of the 'problem' becomes increasingly apparent.

4.3.0.0 PART 3 - THE MINOR THREATENING OBJECT

It quickly became apparent that aside from the major objects of threat described earlier there also exist a whole host of more minor and indirect threats. While the 'major threatening objects' are themselves direct sources of 'chaos', and are therefore morally degenerate, the 'minor threatening objects' obstruct the ability of the police officer's to get on with his vital mission of stamping out such 'chaos', and perhaps even encourage 'chaotic' activity. I shall focus here on three groupings of such objects. First I consider the threat supposedly posed by other parts of the criminal justice system itself - including other parts of the police service. Second I look briefly at feelings towards so called "agitators, extremists, and do-gooders". Finally

I will look at feelings towards the mass-media.

4.3.1.0 (Minor object 1) Other policemen and the criminal justice system

The average police officer's sense of immanent threat extends inwards to include institutions and individuals whom one would have expected to be identified as friend and ally. But it is perhaps the ultimate demonstration of the all pervading sense of threat that even fellow officers are often kept at arms length.

Whilst the sense of solidarity and mutual dependency within a "relief" is extremely high - unusually so - these feelings of trust and co-dependency extend only a very short distance under most circumstances.

Firstly, it is not uncommon to find, within the "relief", a marginalised scapegoat figure. For example in the case of the group with which I undertook field observations, an individual had been picked out as a "trouble-maker", who was felt to be both incompetent and untrustworthy. The level of hostility towards him had developed to such a level that senior officers had been forced to take him off normal operational duties and give him a desk job "for his own safety". I went to great lengths to discover what exactly he had done to deserve this treatment. As far as I could ascertain, what it amounted to was the fact that he was an Asian police officer who refused to laugh at racist jokes and objected to the continual use of racist terminology. This made him, in the view of his fellow officers, an outsider and someone who could not be trusted when it came to the crunch.

When I asked senior officers why he had been put behind a desk, they explained that the most important priority for a police officer working in an inner-city area is the guarantee of fast backup if things go wrong. When someone becomes seriously marginalised a very real danger exists that backup will arrive just that crucial few minutes too late. In other words it was not the marginalised officer who could not be trusted, but his paranoid colleagues. Projection has led them to perceive threat in him, or at least amplified their initial perceptions.

Secondly, even within the close group it is commonplace for officers to be extremely secretive with one another. Where they work in pairs they will often share information. Outside these limits however they "keep things very close to their chest"

Thirdly, this secretiveness and associated suspiciousness becomes all the more intense as one moves outside the narrow confines of the "relief". Other "reliefs" on the same division will be regarded with a good deal

of suspicion, other departments will be regarded with resentment or contempt. In particular the relationship between uniformed and plain clothes departments is often hugely hostile

The ripples of paranoia spread, it seems, from the enemy within, outwards through the force itself, into the rest of the criminal justice system, and on out to fill the much of the police officer's world.

4.3.1.1 Treacherous, weak, and incompetent superiors

The next ripple in the pool is the fear, suspicion and anger, amongst lower ranks, felt towards superior officers. A clear division between "blue shirt" and "white shirt" ranks exists. A further divide is overlain upon this, however. That is the divide which exists at the level of inspector. Each group has an inspector. If he is felt to be an individual who "leads from the front", and, above all, "looks after his men" then he may be respected and even the object of some affection. Above the rank of inspector however all officers are felt to be potential, if not actual, betrayers of their men. A good example of this suspicion of superiors is the story of the period preceding the big "cleanup operation" which I describe in the discussion of the 'control of territory' in the section on 'threatening mechanisms' (4.4.3.1).

Similarly with regard to ongoing concessions to the "sensitivity" of the situation, in a volatile inner city area with a large ethnic minority population, many sergeants and constables feel that this is a sign of weakness in their senior officers and that it is perceived as such by the criminal black community as they can only respect what they fear (a common theme in the policing of working class council estates also). It is also felt that the general public perceive it as a sign of weakness (see 4.6.4.0 for more details of "sensitive" versus "positive" policing).

4.3.1.2 Weak and inconsistent Crown Prosecution Service

Hostility towards the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) is almost universal. They are felt to be incompetent, inconsistent, cowardly and even corrupt (to the extent that practices such as plea bargaining are felt to be a corruption of 'real' justice). The issue here is a complex one. The CPS have taken over a set of functions previously performed by the police themselves. Police control over that area of the criminal justice process has been removed. Its operation cannot therefore be made to conform to the affective orientations of the police. In particular we can see that an extra-legal definition of guilt and innocence operates within police

discourse and feeling.

Obviously if you know that someone's done it, there are times when you know they've done it, it's just whether you can prove it and I don't think they back us up very well, on occasions anyway. They do tend to bottle out of jobs. T3

To the extent that the establishment of the CPS was intended to reduce miscarriages of justice, by minimising the effects of such extra-legal definitions, and feelings, on prosecutions (the temptation to fake evidence and so on), police hostility would seem to be a demonstration of the success of the CPS. Indeed what police officers seem to be saying is that 'if only they could think and feel like us everything things would be better'. A regular suggestion is that CPS lawyers should "spend a day in a police car in order to see what's really happening", as though they would suddenly see everything just as the police do. What they are really saying is "if only we had control, things would be much better". Power, control and feelings are almost always intertwined in the world of the police officer.

4.3.1.3 Weak and inconsistent courts, corrupt lawyers

In the section on 'threatening mechanisms' I discuss the ways in which police officers view inadequate punishment as a major mechanism in the reproduction of criminal behaviour. However, as the individuals responsible for this inadequate punishment, judges and magistrates themselves frequently become the objects of derision and anger. In addition, it is not uncommon for defence councils and criminal defence lawyers to actually be identified with the criminal. Criminal defence lawyers are deeply distrusted, especially when they invade the 'sacred space' of the police station.¹⁴

4.3.1.4 Right to silence

The right to silence is viewed not as a right which we all have, which potentially provides some protection against miscarriages of justice, but as the precise opposite. It is, according to police officers, a devious means by which "known" criminals, and their corrupt solicitors, cheat justice. The threatening nature of the right to silence is proven by the very fact that it, on occasion, prevents prosecution or contributes to not-guilty verdicts. This reasoning only makes sense in the context of a general assumption that the police know far better than anyone else (including magistrates and juries) who is 'really' guilty. The police officer in the following quotation justifies his suspicion of the right to silence by reference to an ideal object ("society") which he otherwise seems to view as incapable of adequately judging its own members. Note also that there

is an implicit splitting process taking place in which the right to silence is not the right to silence of members of "society", Instead it becomes a kind of external threat to "society's" will that an "explanation" should be given.

The right to silence is very one-sided..... someone can be interviewed and say nothing for half-an-hour they can then get a copy of that interview plus all the other evidence amassed and then, with their solicitor, concoct a story which then means that they are not prosecuted and that to me doesn't appear to be what justice is about... If the rest of society thinks that this person should give an explanation to justify the facts, without having seen all the police evidence first, then he should stay in the police station... Bearing in mind that my personal opinion is that most people who go before the court are probably guilty by the mere fact that some of the others who don't go to court probably are as well. There are so many cases that could go to court that don't... I still think that probably at least half the people who are found not guilty - getting away with it is probably a harsh way of putting it. T1

4.3.2.0 (Minor object 2) Agitators, trouble makers, middle class extremists

The "extremist - agitator" is another common folk devil of the police. When dealing with strikes, for example, police officers argue that, on the whole, they are dealing with law abiding working people, but that picketing situations are fertile ground for "trouble makers", "extremist agitators", "infiltrators" and so on. Rather than looking at the strike situation as a demonstration of a collective grievance they prefer to understand the situation as one where ordinary people are being "led astray", "duped" and "used" by "extremists" for their own ends. There is an image of small "extremist" groups whose objectives are unlawful and who therefore see the police as an obstacle to their own ends. These extremists attempt to politically influence other people in, unlawful ways, and tempt other more naive (and vulnerable) people into potentially unlawful activities. Thus the sometimes quite aggressive policing of strikes and demonstrations can even be rationalised as the protecting of misled people from themselves. The most disliked of these "extremist agitators" are those from middle class backgrounds and particularly those who are famous (actors, journalists, musicians etc.). These are people with "all the advantages in life" but they still "need a cause" to champion.

Another theme repeated regularly is the claim that middle class left wing troublemakers supposedly

champion the rights of the criminal at the expense of the victim. The victim appears as a key ideal object in the affective world of the police officer (4.5.2.0). The offender is the direct threat to this object but the left wing do-gooder, civil rights campaigner, political activist etc. is an indirect threat.

The apparent rejection of such critical left wing political perspectives, is however again tinged with ambivalence. As I show in the section on class in "threatening mechanisms" there is a good deal of guilt, confusion, and anxiety about the police role in the reproduction of social inequality (4.4.5.0). The following officer, for example, without any relevant questioning, spontaneously launched into a defence of the police against the charge that they are a repressive instrument of government.

They see the police as perhaps a tool of the government, especially so when they are being evicted from their houses. They feel that the police then are a party to them being evicted even though we are only there to prevent a breach of the peace and to make sure nothing untoward happens. They feel just having our presence there that we are part of the system that is kicking them out of their house, or whatever. The CND people who sit down in front of missile wagons. They are dragged off by the police basically, not because we have to let those lorries past because they are carrying nuclear weapons or whatever and we disagree with their protest. It is because they are causing an obstruction of the highway which is an offence for which they can be arrested. That is all we are doing there. We are doing our job to allow free passage of vehicles and foot passengers on the highway. Whereas they think that we are only dragging them off and arresting them because we don't agree with them protesting against the nuclear missiles. They see us as a tool of the government then or whatever. V3

What else could they be but an instrument of government? This ambiguity regarding the fragmented and antagonistic source of police authority and the consequent feelings of ambivalent anxiety will be explored in more detail in Chapter 5. My point here is that this anxiety, perhaps even shame, feeds strong feelings of hostility towards objects which remind the police officers of this ambivalence. *At least in part, the left wing radical threatens the police identity, not because the police officer fails to understand the radical point of view but because he understands it all too well, and this makes him feel bad.*

4.3.3.0 (Minor object 3) The mass media

The mass media in general are felt to be strongly hostile to the police. In many conversations during the field

study this emerged as an extremely important focus of powerful feelings of anger and resentment. The media are seen to be corrupting in a number of other ways however.

4.3.3.1 The mass media and moral corruption

Young unemployed people in particular are seen as subjected to the tempting pressures of the media. Often characterised as passive victims of corrupting influences. Pumped full of rubbish, pop music, fashion, material desires, everything but values. They want "everything now" rather than "working for it". Unemployed youths are often seen therefore as lacking moral fibre and a work ethic. They want what other people have got and have no inhibitions about taking it. This is an argument even more prevalent in discussions of "black" youths. Mass media influenced youth is viewed as a strong and uncontrolled source of material desires. The fear amongst police officers is that these desires are no longer being kept in check by the imposition of the necessary set of moral standards and work ethic by either parents or schools.

4.3.3.2 The glamorising of crime in the media

Another perceived danger for police officers is what they see as the "glamorising of crime" in the media. Television in particular is felt to present crime as something exciting and desirable. This causes young people to view crime and dealings with the police as a form of excitement, a game.

4.4.0.0 PART 4 - THE THREATENING MECHANISM

In addition to the criminal 'objects', and the 'objects' which threaten to undermine the ability of the police to do their job, there are thought to be a number of 'threatening mechanisms' and processes going on in the world.

4.4.1.0 (Mechanism group 1) The threat to disciplinary processes and institutions

For police officers there are certain key social processes and institutions which ensure a minimal level of disciplining of the general population's day to day activities. This in turn provides a minimal level of predictability for the police officer, and therefore a minimal *feeling* that this population is controllable. These processes and institutions centre mainly around family, work, property (particularly home) ownership, and education. Mechanisms which push people outside of the embrace of these institutions, or which, in the

police officer's, view destabilise these institutions, are deeply threatening.

4.4.1.1 Unemployment and moral degeneration

Unemployment is felt to be unacceptable as an explanation for crime when it appears to remove responsibility from the offender. In other words unemployment cannot be seen as an explanation/excuse in itself. Rather unemployment tends to be seen as an indicator of something else inherent in the offender. That is the person's level of self-discipline and self-control and the degree to which the individual embraces the values which police officers see as crucial to the stability and order of society, values which they see themselves representing.

Police officers, repeatedly, assert that there is no reason for people to be unemployed. There are jobs out there "if they want them". These people just "don't want to work".

I believe there is employment about if they want to work. Really when you come down to it, it's the people who don't want to work. At the end of the day they are quite happy to scrape a living by doing a bit on the side, to get enough money for a bit of petrol in their cars and a few pints at the pub. V2

Officers working in an area with a high level of unemployment amongst Afro-Caribbean youths, for example, claimed that they had proved this by citing examples where they have got jobs for black youths through "community involvement" schemes. This supposed refusal to work reflects a level of moral degeneracy in the individual or community. They see these people as being unwilling to accept responsibility and unwilling to make a contribution to society.

There is recognition of the fact that some people are unemployed against their will. This poses no difficulty in the minds of police officers however since unemployment is seen simultaneously as both the cause and effect of moral degeneracy. Enforced unemployment is itself felt to be likely to turn a "decent", "honest" person into a moral degenerate. An acceptance of defeat, a loss of willpower and order in ones life, a loss of pride and responsibility lead to a downward spiral of disintegrating "standards" and thus to potential criminality.

This degeneracy is not only a source of moral revulsion for police. Police officers explain that a central feature of good 'police craft' is getting to know the movements of the population within the beat area where the officer works. This is especially true of community beat officers. If the movement of the population

is predictable, then it is felt that patterns of crime are predictable in time and space. Work imposes a high level of routine and thus predictability on a population. Unemployment, however, is seen by Police Officers as a source of boredom, of unstructured, and therefore unpredictable, lifestyles. Unemployed people spend their time "hanging around" getting involved in things they shouldn't and with people they shouldn't. In the words of many officers, "They've got time on their hands". This "time" comes to be associated with "temptation" and unpredictability (fluidity rather than stasis).

...employment does affect what goes on I think.

In what ways does it affect things?

Well they have nothing to do, so they go out and do things wrong basically... There is no structure to their lives. V3

What is striking is the sense that there is a fluidity about the unemployed persons lifestyle which strikes at the heart of the police officer's ordering and disciplining function. It is clear that the pragmatic aspects of police work cannot easily be separated from the affective ones. Again we find control and feeling deeply interlocked. A lifestyle which frustrates the police officer's sense of being in control makes him *feel* bad. These bad feelings are expressed in the moral condemnation of the unemployed person: not because they have broken any law or made a nuisance of themselves, but simply because they are unemployed. *The elaborate theories about moral degeneracy could easily be taken, then, as post-hoc rationalisations of the police officer's projected bad feelings.* This is a pattern we shall see repeatedly in relation to anxieties about control.

4.4.1.2 Home ownership

Council house dwelling is regarded as an indicator of moral degeneracy. People who live in council houses do so because they lack the responsibility necessary to buy their own houses. It is claimed that where people have bought their council houses this has in turn had a positive effect on the sense of responsibility, structure and order of the community. The area has quickly "cleaned up" in terms of crime but interestingly also in terms of physical dirt. It is striking how closely physical dirt, squalor, chaos, are associated, in the mind of the police officer, with, perceived, moral degeneracy and innate criminality. Thus, the dirtier a person is, or their dwelling is, the more likely they are to be criminals and also the more morally repulsive they are. This

applies even to the state of someone's garden or their car. An untidy garden and an unsightly car standing in the road are signs that a 'problem family' lives here.¹⁵

As in the case of unemployment, lack of home ownership is regarded as leaving the individual or family outside of certain life ordering and disciplining mechanisms - the need to pay a mortgage, the need to maintain the property if it is to keep its value, the sense of identification with the property that comes with these commitments. Without these mechanisms in place there is again the potential for a certain fluidity, unpredictability, carelessness, lack of commitment, lack of seriousness. This makes the police officer feel uneasy. Yet again he does not feel in control and this makes him *feel bad*. *Again these bad feelings, relating to anxieties about control, are 'given sense' in terms of moral condemnation and elaborate theories of moral degeneracy.*

These feelings of unease are focused, in the main, on the council estates or substandard private sector rented accommodation, what is known as "bedsitland". The relationship between crime and council housing in the minds of police officers is a well established one. Police officers from every station overwhelmingly identified the council estates as the prime sources of criminality in their mental maps of their areas. The only exception to this was at a station from which a large "black" and "asian" community was policed. Here the "black" area as a whole (council housing, private rented accommodation and private housing) is seen as the prime source of problems. Even here however the council flats are identified as being particularly troublesome. The difficulty here was that private housing and council housing were not as clearly separated geographically as they were in other areas and also that, of course, the racial issue in this area tended to obscure the normal distinctions made by police officers between the type of people who live in council houses and the type that own their own homes. The black area as a whole is viewed by police officers as having a similar territorial status to the mainly white working class council estates.

It is important to note that police officers do not always consider council estate tenants as a whole to be criminals. They oscillate between blanket condemnation, and 'splitting' the community with the claim that there are mostly good people living there but that the area is ruined by a few bad people. Often they fall into "pockets", you tend to get "bad streets" it is claimed. The theory they put forward is that it is a result of council housing policy whereby "bad families", "bad payers" are all put in one area because nobody else will tolerate them. A vision of criminality, badness and moral degeneracy breeding, multiplying and growing out of control (unless contained) is conjured up. These are "diseased" parts of an otherwise reasonably healthy community. At other times however police officers betray their intolerance of council estate communities as a whole (this ambiguity was dealt with in more detail in the section on 'splitting', 4.1.5.3).

4.4.1.3 Youth and the dangers of the period of transition

Youth or more specifically 'adolescence' is a period of transition. Puberty, then leaving school, then leaving the family of origin, are all aspects of the adolescent developmental process picked out by police officers as significant. It is a period "twixt childhood and manhood" where new "temptations" and desires are arriving on the scene. (I should point out here that most comments made about youths refer to young men/boys. This is simply because it is they who are perceived to present the greatest problem. Young women/girls are seen to be a problem in some communities but on the whole not as potential offenders but rather as inadequate mothers generating a potential for "problem families"). This period of intermediacy then is felt to present a potential problem. Such young people are regarded as, by nature "rebellious". This is because they "think they have grown up" but really they are still "immature". It is simply a matter of time before they "realise the error of their ways", that "older people are wiser than them". Or at least this is the ideal, the hope, this is how many police officers look back on their own adolescence, late teens and early twenties, and also how they look upon their own sons. There is a perception, however, that in some communities, in some circumstances things go badly wrong. In some circumstances young people go way outside the acceptable moral territory of what is "normal" and sometimes don't come back.

There is, then, a strongly expressed belief that many of the young men of the white working class community will grow through their early phase of "yobbiness". There is a period of adolescent rebellion, unemployment, adverse peer pressure mixed with the generally degenerate "way of life" of the working class communities which produces the "yob". A young "disrespectful", "trouble making", "beer drinking lout" with a "gang mentality". He will commit various petty offenses (public order, car theft, criminal damage etc) throughout adolescence and into his early twenties. Then however, he will probably stop. This is because generally he takes on the "responsibility" of "a wife and children". He doesn't want to be bothered with the hassle involved in these "immature" acts of "bravado". The key here is "responsibility". At the same time that the "responsibility" of a family is viewed as a potential cure for white working class adolescent "delinquency" the working class family is itself viewed as a potential source of corruption and degeneracy and in the extreme as a virtually pathological form, the "problem family" (as I have shown in the section on "threatening objects" 4.2.3.0).

What sort of criminals, what sort of people are they?

They usually range from about 15 to 23, that kind of age group. When they get older and settle down, get married they tend to disappear from the scene and you get the children who

are gradually working their way up. It seems to go in cycles. You seem to deal with the same amount of people all of the time until they gradually fizzle out, then a new set come along and that's the way it goes.....It seems to be the age group that are always out doing the petty stuff. I'm not saying that, I think they get older and wiser. I still don't think that they necessarily aren't involved. I tend to think that perhaps when they get older they don't get quite so active. They get a bit wiser. They tend to go into a bit of receiving or something like that.

So they don't actually stop, they just don't get caught?

No, some stop. Once they settle down and get married and have kids, they don't tend to go out because of some kind of responsibility and they go out and start working. They've got the money so they don't really need to..... V2

Most families and children exist somewhere between the extremes of respectable working class family on the one hand and problem family on the other. At the more 'respectable' end of the continuum, it is believed that young men will tend to drag themselves out of delinquency and into employment and the responsibility of something approaching 'respectable' family life whilst towards the bottom end they will progress to become hardened adult recidivists and have 'problem families' of their own.

So there are, loosely speaking, two possible paths upon which the juvenile delinquent can embark depending on the nature of family life, employment, home ownership and other stabilising and disciplinary influences.

In conclusion, however, it is important to note that the ambiguities do not end here. While on the one hand police officers express these beliefs that 'delinquents' "grow out of it" at some point, on the other hand they often express the feeling that persistent offenders are "beyond help" after about the age of eleven. Whatever the outcome, though, the 'period of transition' is, for police officers, another zone of indeterminacy, fluidity and potential chaos, where their ability to monitor and control is threatened. *Again the threat to control, bad feelings, and moral condemnation are locked together.*

4.4.1.4. The move to less visible criminality

So the picture remains murky and charged with ambivalence. The "job element", who will grow out of it, and the hardened recidivist who won't, lie on a continuum so that everyone must be subject to suspicion, 'guilty until proved innocent'. For example it is believed that many "ex-yobs" will involve themselves in less visible forms of criminal activity when they get fed up with the hassle of repeated visits to the police station and the courts. "Receiving" of stolen goods is believed to be favourite amongst these along with the running of "dodgy businesses" (so even apparently legitimate enterprises are likely to be subject to suspicion given the perceived nature of the persons moral character). There is never a complete escape only a partial 'salvation' into respectability as the quote from V2 above shows.

4.4.1.5 Why there are no ameliorative effects of family life on black men

The potential for 'salvation' is regarded as being even lower amongst the "black" community however. The problem is that here parenting is felt to be more generally degenerate. "Normal family life" is felt to be virtually non-existent (see section 4.2.3.1). Thus family life is not seen as a potential source of "responsibility" for "black" men and so that avenue of 'salvation' from degeneracy and criminality is closed off. There is believed to be more of a tendency for young black men to progress from their "high street profile" 'delinquency' to become part of the "hard core" of lower profile but hardened and more serious criminals (this was explored in the section on the 'structure of black criminality' in 'threatening objects' 4.2.4.2).

4.4.1.6 Education, intelligence, discipline, and values

Another way in which unemployment, moral degeneracy and criminality are drawn together is through ideas concerning education and intelligence. People who are unemployed are often people who are of "low intelligence" and have received a poor education, say police officers. For this reason they cannot get a job paying the sort of money they would like to earn so they prefer not to have a job.

The added twist to the tale however is that due to their lack of "intelligence" and "education", they possess no moral barriers to prevent them from offending in order to provide themselves with money. "Intelligence" and a "good education" is felt to be equivalent to moral conformity. Unintelligent and ill-educated people

just "don't know the difference between right and wrong".

The school itself is seen as a potential site of moral tutelage and life ordering discipline. It also keeps kids off the street much in the same way that employment keeps adults busy. Those who do not attend school are another part of this slippery, fluid population 'leaking out' of the police officer's set of ideal disciplinary mechanisms. The situation is worsened by the fact that schools are not performing their moral tutelage function adequately. Police officers find themselves in a situation of fundamental disagreement with teachers about what schools are actually for. They often find this implicit conflict exploding into open conflict when they try to visit schools. Far from giving the police a sense of a predictable and controllable population in the making, schools are often perceived as enemy territory into which infiltrators have to be sent in order to "get the kids on our side". *Again this sense of a lack of control of territory, a block on surveillance, and a challenge to the authority of their vision of the world makes police officers feel bad. Again we find bad feelings interlocked with a lack of control and moral condemnation.*

The object of fear and loathing then is, so called, "permissive" schooling where it is believed children are often taught to resent authority in general, and police authority in particular. Whilst education is felt to be a potential avenue for "bringing the kids over to our side" (ie "schools liaison") it is at the same time felt to pose a threat in its present form.

They've got the school full of yobs and they're bringing them up, and they, in a lot of respects, encourage them because they behave like yobs themselves, a lot of them V8

They "spend all their time teaching them about their rights" said another officer.

4.4.1.7 The threat of modern family life.

While discipline is under threat in the school, from lack of regular employment, in the problem family, and in areas where people lack the responsibilities associated with home ownership, it is also felt to be under threat in the modern family in general. One officer expressed the belief that when he was younger the "man went out to work and the woman stayed at home" thus ensuring close supervision of children. There is a general belief that today, however, with "changing standards" and material necessities the trend is for "both parents to work". Thus there is a lack of actual supervision at certain times of the days and when parents are at home they are "both tired" and likely to "give in" to their children's demands. Thus children tend to have "too much money" and "no respect for material things", "either their own property or anyone else's".

This problem is felt by many officers to be compounded by the generating of material desires by advertising and the mass media in general. Material desires unconstrained by moral standards. Young people, particularly from the more 'degenerate' sections of society "want everything now" and they "aren't willing to work their way up to it". The "work ethic" is felt to be severely under threat. Young people "want things" so they "take them".

4.4.2.0 (Mechanism group 2) The ineffectiveness of punishment

Where the disciplinary functions of work, family, and school have broken down one would perhaps assume that police officers would look to the punitive regimes of the criminal justice system for reassurance. It appears, however, that they have no confidence whatsoever in the other arms of the criminal justice system. The criminal justice system appears in some ways worse than useless to the average police officer. It is felt that the courts and the Crown Prosecution Service are hopelessly incompetent (as has already been discussed in the section on "minor threatening objects", 4.3.1.2 and 4.3.1.3).

Obviously the punishment, or whatever, is not working, otherwise they wouldn't be habitual offenders.

Is it not strong enough or is it the wrong sort of penalty?

I don't know, certainly in some cases its strong enough. I don't think there is a very good standard of, they can go to court one day and be fined £100, the next day they can get a conditional discharge. The evidence is exactly the same and they been found guilty or whatever. There's certainly, there are habitual offenders who should be caught and be locked up. I don't know if that's going to help them. T3

It is clear that police officers almost universally express the opinion that much more, harsh, and consistent punishment is needed in order to redress the imbalance, supposedly, created by the removal of the scope for informal punitive activity carried out by the police themselves.

Just putting somebody into prison I don't think will stop them from re-offending again unless they are put away for such a long time they don't want ever to be there again. V3

4.4.2.1 The growth of parental hostility to informal policing, the weakness of the courts, and the sense of impotence

Whilst, according to police mythology, the policing of juvenile offenders often used to take an unofficial form, a "clip round the ear with the cane" and so on, this is no longer possible. Whereas "at one time if a child went home and told his father he had been clipped round the ear by a policeman he would have got another one", today the parents "come into the station screaming at you about touching their little boy". The result is that officers feel themselves to be on the "defensive" and will tend to enforce the law "by the book" thus dragging the child into a "legal charade" which has no effect other than to show the child that nothing much can be done to them and reinforce their perception of the police service as impersonal, hostile, but ultimately impotent. The policing of juvenile offenders and the "legal charade" surrounding it is felt to be worse than useless. The key issue, according to police officers is the lack of appropriate punishment for either juvenile offenders or young offenders who have reached the age of full adult criminal responsibility. "They walk away laughing" said one officer.

I think the main problem with juveniles is that they - talk amongst themselves and they know that nothing will happen to them for a long long time and when things start to happen they start talking to other juveniles that tell them the ropes. You'd have ever such a hard job to get the lid back on juveniles and that is because they talk about one another, they talk to one another about crime, how to get out of it. They think it's good. I remember when I was a kid, if you got in trouble with the police it was, once again a social stigma. VI

4.4.2.2 Differing social positions and power of deterrence: having nothing to lose

Many officers believe that punishment - and in particular prison - has a quite different effect on different types of individual. This difference in effect, they claim, is derived from differences in social status. The "respectable" member of the community has far more to lose in terms of status than the habitual offender. Unemployment is associated generally with a descent into moral depravity, normlessness and finally a lack of respect for others and for oneself. This lack of self-respect provides a final damning twist to the spiral as police officers feel that the conviction and punishment of unemployed offenders possesses no deterrent value in terms of its stigmatising effect, since such offenders have no social status or sense of self-respect to lose. Thus, token punishment is of no value whatsoever. Instead much harsher forms of punishment are felt to be necessary in order to control the behaviour of this section of society. Indeed it is felt that amongst

young people from the "criminal fraternity". and its fringes, imprisonment can actually confer status, it gives the individual "street credibility" and so on. Thus the deterrent effect of the stigma surrounding imprisonment applies to people from different parts of society with different force. It is felt, then, by some officers, that habitual offenders should face special penalties. On the whole these people are getting off with ridiculous sentences, and not only laughing at the system but creating a drain on its resources. Many officers question whether such offenders should even get legal aid.

4.4.2.3 Peer pressure, bravado, the kudos of criminality

Officers explain that most youth offending is petty. It is not done primarily for personal gain, it is done out of bravado, to impress one's peers. Obviously the more time young people have on their hands the more they can and are likely to engage in such illegitimate self structuring of their time. Thus, parental supervision, and later on employment/unemployment, are crucial factors (and also are perceived to have certain demographic characteristics). In addition such illegitimate structuring of activity will be perceived to be at its highest where the individual is not restrained by any stigmatising effect generated by contact with the police. This effect is felt to be weak amongst young people anyway (they have little 'standing' in the community or at work to be threatened by such stigma and also the level of moral responsibility attributed to them by society is not the same as that of an adult, though this does begin to change in the late teens to early twenties) but amongst young people in certain communities the reverse of stigmatism is felt to take place. Young people can build status amongst their peers on the basis of a 'criminal identity'. Also there are circumstances in which the prospect for status of a 'legitimate' kind in the future is so remote that a continuation and development of the "reputation" is likely.

[For many] there isn't a stigma attached. To a lot of the yobs in *****, going to prison is actually going to be part of their credentials I suppose. If they haven't been to prison, they're not proper villain. They're not one of the lads really if they haven't somehow got into trouble at one stage. V4

4.4.3.0 (Mechanism group 3) Loss of respect, the problem of territory, and the sense of impotence

Police officers often appear to be reacting to a sense of impotence. This they explain in terms of the supposed loss of certain powers, the supposed change in attitude of the public to informal punitive practices, and the supposed deterioration of the courts. Other factors are involved however. Police officers feel they have lost the respect of people right across the social spectrum but feel particular hostility from the working classes.

or at least certain sections of the working class.

Working class officers will often insist that it is only working class people on the "wrong side of the law" who are hostile to the police but they simultaneously claim that they feel a general lack of respect. When one digs a bit deeper into this concept of respect one often finds that police officers are not simply talking about people's acceptance of the "rightness", or legitimacy, of a police officer's presence, judgement and interpretation of a situation, but also about the element of fear lying in the interaction between police officer and potential offender.

Officers feel on the one hand that public accountability has tied their hands so that they have to "take much more stick" without being able to do anything about it and also some officers believe that their own superiors and colleagues do not have a "positive" enough attitude, they are not prepared to be aggressive enough when aggression is required with the result that all police officers suffer from the consequent lack of respect.

4.4.3.1 Losing control of territory

One area where the anxiety over respect, legitimacy, and potency becomes most acute is in the control of territory. This problem arises in all of the inner city and council estate areas I have been discussing. It arises most overwhelmingly, however, in inner city areas with large ethnic minority populations. There are certain roads which the police believe young black youths think they (the youths) control. In the past, and even now to an extent, it is claimed that "normal" policing did not take place on these roads. Officers tell stories about times when they were chasing cars which went into these areas of "the Jungle" and they suddenly received calls over their radios to stop the chase and withdraw. Calls for assistance in the area were ignored. These stories usually come as part of accounts of a large scale "clear up" operation which was carried out several years ago.

This is a condensation and paraphrasing of several narrative accounts of this situation. "When the riots occurred we weren't prepared for them, we backed off and that was our first big mistake. After that we lost control of the territory. Our supervisory officers were weak and contributed to the undermining of our position in the community by letting them get away with murder rather than risk another explosive situation, and all of the political and media attention which that would have incurred. Because of this we had to go through hell in policing the community. We had to put up with abuse, both verbal and physical (shouting, stone and bottle throwing, spitting, etc) and all the time we had our hands tied. Not only did we get a hard time from the black community but other ***** people started to point the finger at us, asking why we didn't

treat this community the same as any other, why these people didn't have to have road tax or driving licences or a basic respect for authority the same as anyone else. We couldn't give them any reasonable answers. We felt humiliated, impotent and angry about the situation. Some of us began to take time off sick because we couldn't stand the misery and frustrations and anxiety of the job. Then came the clear up operation. It was described in the newspapers as a large scale drug raid. It was nothing of the sort. It was an everything raid. We went there to clear up all forms of street crime and to re-establish control of the territory in other words to re-enable ourselves to do our job in the area, to prove it wasn't a no go zone"

Officers describe with some relish how they re-established control of certain key roads where previously they just couldn't work properly. In particular they enjoyed the raiding and closing down of a particular cafe which had a well established reputation for open drug dealing and extreme hostility towards the police. It had become a symbolic focus of intense feelings on both sides. The fall of this little 'fortress' had powerful significance.

Clearly getting shouted at and having bottles thrown at them is not in itself a pleasant experience. One gets a strong impression, however, that this is not the real issue. These officers would not have been disturbed nearly so much by this experience had they the power to respond "positively", as they put it. Limits of any kind on the police officer's freedom to engage in informal punitive activity and/or formal law enforcement creates immense anxiety and resentment. However there is also an anxiety associated with having to take responsibility for sensitive decisions where discretion does exist. In other words it is another no win situation for the police officer at the affective level. If his discretion and powers are reduced he feels anxious, impotent, and resentful, if his discretion and powers are increased he feels anxious and fearful - "certainly it had a hold on me I suppose - am I making the right decision? -or whatever" (V4). I shall be looking at these issues again in the section on "sensitive" versus "positive" styles of policing (4.6.4.0).

4.4.4.0 (Mechanism 4) Alcohol

In the section on 'alternative lifestyles' I looked at the role of drugs in the police officer's affective set-up. I argued that they are viewed as threatening not primarily because of their criminogenic effects (though these are a cause for concern), but because taking drugs is felt to be simply immoral in itself. Alcohol however is suspect only to the extent that it is seen to be, in certain circumstances, a criminogenic agent. As is also the case with drugs there is a general concern about loss of self control, and a linking of this to dirt and moral degeneracy.

Again, I've been drunk on many occasions, in the Navy. But thinking on it, there has never been any reason why I should have been drunk. I think it is an exercise of self control really. Afterwards you always wish you weren't drunk the night before don't you. On the other hand looking at it, I suppose, drunkenness is offensive on the street. People don't want to see people lying around the road and being sick everywhere and urinating up against the fence post or whatever. It's offensive, so over the years, people have always said that. I think it shouldn't happen on the street or in public view perhaps or not to the annoyance of people around them. V3

This concern becomes far more acute however when young people are believed to be drinking. Young people are perceived to be getting access to alcohol at an earlier age than ever before and if and when they get jobs they have the money to spend on it, get drunk and cause problems. This is because they are "immature" people gaining access to an adult activity, they can't control themselves.

The crowd, noise, fighting and sense of threat associated with drinking by young men of "lower class" background is felt to be intolerable. These are the "yobs". "You wouldn't believe it" said one officer "on Friday and Saturday night there are literally thousands of young people just walking around aimlessly" this together with "the availability of alcohol" presents a "constant public order problem". The regulation or attempted regulation of swarms of chaotic young people with "too much money", "no code of conduct", "looking for trouble", is a source of deep anxiety.

The most astonishing aspect of the whole alcohol discourse however is the way that it can be seen as an indication of moral degeneracy when playing a part in an offence committed by someone from the "criminal fraternity" or otherwise 'degenerate' section of society, but is interpreted as an excuse, a mitigating factor where more "respectable" individuals are involved. The alcohol "problem" is felt to be concentrated demographically. This is not necessarily because some communities drink more than others (though this is, felt to be, part of it) but more because, when they drink, "different people react differently".

I arrested a chap who damaged a front door, obviously well educated, lot of money, wealthy sort of chap for his age, but he had an argument with his girlfriend and decided that he was going to go up to somebody's front door and smash all the glass. He was under the influence of drink and the way I resolved it in the end was to speak to the person whose house it was and try to basically find out what action they wanted taken. Would they accept, because the chap I arrested was quite happy to offer money to compensate them

without having any criminal proceedings. That was explained to the householder and he was happy to accept the money from the chap. Therefore there was no criminal proceedings. V3

Such accounts are extremely common. During my fieldwork one officer told me a story about an individual he had arrested for smashing all of the windows of a church. The individual turned out to be a doctor who was having domestic problems, had gone out and got drunk, and decided to smash up a church. He was sent away with a caution. This, it was felt, was a "respectable" person who had been temporarily taken over by alcohol, in some ways he was regarded as the real victim of the offence. In the case of the "yob", however, the fact that he drinks, and the effects it has on him are all confirmation of his fundamentally degenerate character.

4.4.5.0 (Mechanism 5) The ambivalence of class

Despite the constant tendency to split the social world into "respectable", law abiding middle classes and a dangerous criminal underclass with the respectable working classes hovering somewhere in between, for many police officers this seems to be merely an attempt to resolve what are really much more ambivalent feelings about the effects of structures of inequality and their own place in them. In some cases extremely complex and ambivalent class analyses emerged as in the case of this long serving uniformed sergeant.

Peoples backgrounds, does it affect the likelihood of them coming to your attention?

It must do really. I mean you've got the more sophisticated criminal living in the richer areas, you've got those. But there it is a more sophisticated crime. Basically, if you think of a burglary, the actual time that they take to get in when they are going to get caught is very very short. The main time you are going to catch them is when they have got the gear in the back of the car driving home. Basically that's the time that they are at most risk, is when they're with the gear. If you have got a sophisticated crime, say computer fraud, the policeman on the street isn't going to see that. How's he going to catch them? Yet they're doing the same thing, but once again they've realised their risk is minimal, and the chances of getting away with it is good, and if you look at the banks are they going to prosecute? They're not are they. They don't like to think that their computer systems, well they don't like to publicise there is access to their computer system, that people can steal. So you get this very sophisticated criminal that thinks he is going to get away with it, and maybe if he

gets caught he may get a heavy fine rather being put away. Let's be honest if you think about it, this society that we're in is such that a company can basically steal millions of pounds off somebody by just going bankrupt and the directors can hide behind their company and yet a bloke on ***** can go across and steal his neighbour's loaf of bread and get a criminal conviction. So I suppose people see this difference don't they, and you find that people that commit sophisticated crime can quite often get away with it.

How do you view that sort of crime, tax evasion or illegal share dealing, how do you view it morally with regard to the sort of things that you see here?

Basically, I suppose we do not get involved with it.

How to you as a policeman or how to you as a person do you view it?

I feel I think how I said. Basically it would appear to me that Government, they accept that millions of pounds can be stolen by legitimate means, but it's no less that somebody is at a loss for millions of pounds by somebody doing some corrupt but legal practice; against the bloke that steals his next door neighbour's bike for nothing. The bloke with the millions of pounds gets away with it and the bloke that takes £10 doesn't. That's always been England hasn't it. I mean it's like the blokes that were starving. This is why company law and everything came in. I mean we're here I suppose in some ways to protect the rich, aren't we, we are really.

Is that how you see yourself?

We don't but to some degree, we do protect people in the higher echelons, we don't no, the police don't, I think law does. I think law, the rule of law is such that they are protected.

You spend most of your time with people from the lower echelons?

Unless something comes to light. I mean you get policemen that love to go and put a fixed penalty on a Rolls Royce, because I suppose they feel that person deserves it more than maybe somebody in the heart of ***** because he can afford to do it and maybe they can't. So you get that sort of thing. You see what I'm getting at do you?

Oh yes I see exactly what you're getting at yes.

It's sad isn't it, it's sad?

Yes, it is very sad.

It's true. Of course the masses in some ways must realise that because they see it don't they. They see people with lots of money getting away with lots of things and they think why can't I be there.

Do you think that affects their attitude to the police when they see that happening.

I suppose basically, their attitude to the police will not change. Their attitude has got to be a little bit anti, I think it has got to be. They see us as their, as between them and everyone I suppose, getting everything. If we weren't there it would be absolutely terrible. They'd just ransack the place. They try to ransack the place when we are there let alone if we weren't there.

You seem quite amused about it in some ways?

It is yes. If you let it get to you it would drive you up the wall wouldn't it. V1

Later on he says

...you get individuals who maybe feel that they are on the higher echelons of society who can get away with trivial offenses but don't like the idea of people on the low echelons of society, getting away with trivial offenses. V1

His class analysis is quite open but he finds it extremely difficult to square with his identity as a police officer. Such accounts are very reminiscent of the diaries of the Victorian policeman John Pearman analyzed in Carolyn Steedman's work (discussed in section 2.2.0 of Chapter 2).¹⁶ One finds precisely the same ambivalences. On the one hand a sense of injustice, shame, guilt, or resentment at the recognition of being servants of the rich. On the other hand this does not seem to temper the sense that the lower-working and unemployed classes are indeed morally degenerate and dangerous. What results is a kind of *hardened*.

cynical, despair. Everything is corrupt, nothing can change this on any grand scale, things can only get worse. The only way to "stop them from ransacking the place" from the point of view of the officer quoted above is for the police to be so efficient, so tough, that this increasing chaos remains contained (a condition of 'stasis').

Villains, they are out to get what they can. For as long as they can get away with offenses by using hard methods, they will. The only answer to respect for the police is for the police to be effective. The only way you can be effective is by catching people that offend and by sentencing them with some method that is a deterrent. V1

Above he sees corrupt but immune masters, below he sees "stupid", "greedy", "workshy" people who want what others have so they just take it. As in the case of Pearman, identity problems abound here. This becomes particularly apparent when one realises that there are also ambivalent feelings about the 'respectable' middle classes.

The following officer clearly recognises the utter alienation of the police from the community and the implicit injustice of the situation, however he cannot hide his disgust at their attitude and way of life.

I think, a lot of people don't really want us up there. And you become detached from the Community that we Police. In that we are on the whole, middle-class, fairly privileged group of people and the people in ***** are, on the whole, relatively under-privileged and working-class and more than that lower working-class, if you want to divide into occupations.

What sort of effects does that kind of class difference have?

First of all, according to the Registrar General's classification, we are working-class as Policemen. But I think in our attitudes and our way of life we are very much middle-class. And I think it takes a few years before a bloke coming into the Police Force or the girl coming into the Police Force really understands the way of life of people who live in places like *****. I think most of us have grown up to respect the Police, respect law and order, to respect authority and it's a bit of a shock when you go to somewhere like ***** and they don't. But, today that is the norm. To be antagonistic towards the Police. That is quite normal to resent authority. V4

Class emerges then as a point of real ambivalence in the police officer's discursive and affective world. Like John Pearman many of today's police officers have come from working class backgrounds themselves, some even had friends in their youth who went on to criminal 'careers'. Some were even a little 'delinquent' themselves in their early youth. Others have come from respectable middle class backgrounds but now find themselves as outcasts. Many police officers claim that if they go to parties or social functions of any kind they avoid telling people that they are police officers since its effect is at best to kill conversation, but more often than not to evoke hostility. One policeman told me how he was verbally attacked at a Parent Teachers Association meeting when word got around that he was a police officer. It is as though they are felt, by themselves and others, to have been contaminated by their "dirty work" (see section 4.1.3.4).

4.4.6.0 Policing the explanation of crime

We can see then that police officers believe in the existence of a variety of 'threatening mechanisms' which are felt to explain the perceived behaviour of the groups and individuals whom they feel pose a real threat to society. Here an officer combines a number of these themes in an explanation of the nature of criminality of 12-25 age group on a predominantly white, working class, inner city, council estate.

There is no structure to their lives (due to unemployment) and they've done it before, they get away with it, they do it again and get away with, then do it again and again until they caught. Then they think getting caught is not that bad after all, then they get a slap on their wrists from the court, initially. Then they go out and do it again. Then as they get older, it gets more serious, they try out different things and it goes on like that until in the end they finally end up locked up. But then they get even more bitter, or it appears that they get even more bitter and just go out to deliberately break the law. V6

This sort of off the cuff, but well developed, theory of the aetiology of criminal behaviour is very common in police discourse.

4.4.6.1 Demanding an account

However, despite the fact that the following officer had similarly indulged in endless speculation about the possible causes of crime and the nature of criminality and society in general, when asked a direct question on the matter he responded with this

I think that it would be very difficult to get the information out of these people as to exactly why they do things. I mean, if you actually question someone as to why they do wrong. They can't very often really give you an answer, they don't really know. They can't tell you what it's remedied - they can't tell you why they did such and such an action. T 1

At some level these people and their actions are mystifying, unintelligible, meaningless. What seems to happen is that the police officer can only recognise an account of an action as intelligible if it is constructed within particular discourses. He demands that the delinquent give an account of himself within these limits. But of course within the limits of police discourse all the delinquent can say about himself is precisely that his action is bad, unreasonable and deserving of punishment. Indeed this is of course what the "good class villain" (referred to in chapter 2, section 2.4.2) does. He speaks the language of the police officer - "it's a fair cop". Much of what is so irritating and disgusting, for policemen, about other categories of "police property" (as described in chapter 2, section 2.4.2) - racial minorities, hippies, juvenile delinquents etc, is that they refuse this articulation of themselves to dominant discourses. They attempt to make themselves and their actions meaningful through languages, forms of reasoning, and views of the world which are totally alien to the police officer.

It seems utterly inconceivable that the majority of the 'delinquents' with which this officer deals have no intelligible reason for their actions. It is however perfectly conceivable that he 'cannot hear them' when they do give their accounts of themselves. It may even be that their (for the police officer) unintelligible accounts provoke the kind of visceral, revulsion which Harold Garfinkel found to be directly associated with disturbances of the taken for granted 'normal' conditions of reality, and its foundation in accounting processes (Chapter 1, section 1.3.0). When I say that he 'cannot hear them' I don't mean this simply in the sense that his discourse makes it impossible for him to understand their accounts. His discourse is always bound up with his emotion. Their invalid or apparently incoherent accounts irritate him, make him angry. Being deafened by anger and deafened by discourse cannot be separated, as Garfinkel's work seems to suggest.

4.5.0.0 THE IDEAL OBJECT

In contrast to the large number of 'threatening objects' and 'mechanisms' a smaller number of objects appear in the police officer's world-view as 'ideal', 'loved', 'good objects'. These are objects to be protected. They are always threatened, by the 'threatening objects' and 'mechanisms' I have detailed. Here I shall outline a

few of the key examples of the 'ideal object'.

4.5.1.0 (Ideal object 1) The family and the "respectable way of life"

I have already commented at length on the antithesis of the 'good family' the so called "problem family". This already gives some indication of the ideal to which police officer refers, as do the claims about the nature of the mechanisms which supposedly threaten the family (loss of respect for authority, 'abnormal' sexuality, unemployment etc.). Mostly, in fact, the ideal family exists in police discourse only in this sort of 'negative' fashion - it is the antithesis of all of the things they hate, suspect and fear. But occasionally they will overtly articulate what they value (at least in theory).

family commitments, people who are in regular employment, people who are striving to improve their houses, high mortgages, its just a way of life which I wish to protect. Y1

4.5.2.0 (Ideal object 2) The victim

My only sympathies lie with the victim more than the offender. I think there are enough groups going around looking after offenders and criminals and prisoners. There are not enough groups looking after victims. V4

The victim plays a major role at the centre of the police officer's moral/affective register. A key sentiment is that there are too many do-gooders worrying about the rights of the offender; what about the rights of the victim? Police officers like to feel that they are the protectors of the weak and vulnerable. The ideal type is an old lady who has been conned out of her life savings or had her handbag snatched. But the truly defenceless victim is becoming harder and harder to find particularly where the crime is well planned and executed and involves a substantial sum. Theft from large anonymous institutions, for example, is felt as a less serious affront to moral decency than theft from individuals. Even in the case of the latter the proliferation of insurance leaves many police officers with a serious affective dilemma. They find it difficult to get worked up about an insurance company losing money.

The overall effect of this may be to shift the affective focus of moral condemnation even more strongly onto petty crime where easily identifiable victims exist. Street robbery or mugging is of course the paradigm case of this.

4.5.3.0 (Ideal object 3) Extra legal protecting of the "community"

We can often find an abstract ideal community articulated as victim, threatened by "problems". What, precisely, constitutes their problematic character is hard to ascertain; noises, visible presence in public space of "undesirables" without specified legitimate purpose, threatening, bizarre, or unsightly appearance. Any minor transgression of the everyday structured patterns of "normal" neighbourhood life can constitute a "problem" because they arouse anxiety and other bad feelings. The following officer already discussed in the section on 'alternative lifestyles' said

We've got to serve the people in the community that we serve basically. That is part of the definition of our job. The policeman has to support the community. The majority of the community say they don't want gypsies there putting a big pile of dirt there, then in the event it turns out that something happens, we've got to obviously work within the law but with the assistance of the community who you serve, especially if it is just a minority of people that are causing the trouble. V3 (this is a continuation of a diatribe on 'alternative lifestyles', 4.2.6.0)

Police officers themselves are, as they themselves point out, highly attuned to such anomalies and idiosyncrasies for that is part of police craft. Police craft is about having an acute set of *feelings* about the normal and the abnormal in a "community".

4.5.4.0 (Ideal object 4) Interpreting the "spirit of the law" to serve "society"

This sense of the abstract "community" as ideal object and potential victim is often expanded into a sense of 'society' as an ideal object.

I think we are here to serve society aren't we. It's what society wants.

Not just the law?

No if you look at Devlin, he was one that interpreted law and he was always thought of as a good judge. A person that can interpret the law to what society needs is much better than a person who just.... Even if you make the wrong decision, it's still better I think if you can interpret the law as it is meant to be. Because people twist the law, they bring it in and

that's why the rules are so complex.

How do you decide on what society needs, how do you decide that?

I don't know, I suppose it's in you. It's from your experience isn't it and how you interpret society. You might interpret it completely wrong.

As a policeman you think you are in a good position to interpret society?

We must see a lot more of society because we see people from all walks and you speak with people of all walks. You get involved with so many different things, you must really I suppose be in a position to make a little bit better judgement than....T7

It is important to recognise just how ambivalent these feelings are however. A police officer will often say in one sentence that he works to protect society and in the next condemn that very same society as corrupt, morally degraded, and collectively stupid and ungrateful. His anger is often aroused, however, by the seeming inability of society to conform to his image of what it should be (I shall explore this ambivalent relationship to "society" further in chapter 5).

4.5.5.0 (Ideal object 5) Important and unimportant laws

The law itself is often regarded as a key object of positive identification. The police officer as law-enforcement officer. In response to a question about how he would like disrespectful juveniles to view the police this officer replied that

Its not how I think they should view the Police it's how I think they should view the law of the land. The Police are only acting, they are only trying to ensure that most people comply with that for the safety of everybody else. T1

But then he says

Obviously some laws aren't as important as others but the important ones should be kept to. T1

4.5.5.1 The adequacy of the law

Later on the same officer says of the law

I mean parts of it are inadequate for the Police to keep everyone safe. I mean, we can't possibly stop every mugging in the street. I am sure there are ways of making it easier for people to be caught if they do commit it. T1

The ambivalence of the police officer's relationship to the law as 'ideal object' is laid bare. It is to be respected by the threatening 'other' for the sake of everyone else's safety, yet he views it himself with disdain - as inadequate, sometimes even an obstacle, to the task. But what task? When pushed further he says

..if we go back to the scenario of the drug dealer again, you've got to think well is it really worth pursuing it here, can it be dealt with later, can it be dealt with another time..... You have to weigh up the consequences knowing that in this sort of area ... the West Indians who are the main ones involved, are such that if they see one of their friends being as they see it attacked, attack might be a very strong word but if we try to arrest one they see it as an attack on their group, they don't really understand and feel it is an attack on them as a group and therefore they will protect him. T1

Two source of ambivalence can be discerned here. On the one hand we have the, not uncommon, figure of policeman as social contract theorist (law as 'general will'). On the other hand the possibility that enforcement of the law can in some cases lead to increased levels of social trouble. We see that, as Bittner (and, as we shall see, Foucault also) argued, the function of policing extends into a space well beyond law enforcement.

I think the Police Force are becoming more aware of society's needs, wants, pressures and don't just carry out things regardless just because it's right or because it's the law there is obviously more discretion there than there used to be. T1

So if the principle of justification for police action is not moral "rightness" or the law then what is it? This is a question I shall explore further in chapter 5.

4.5.6.0 (Ideal object 6) Mr average, the woman, the child

Sometimes the image of the victim becomes more specific. In response to a question about the policing of public decency this officer articulated three, graded, 'ideal objects'. 'Mister average', the 'delicate woman', and, perhaps one of the most common of all vulnerable 'ideal objects', the 'innocent child'.

You mean whether I'd arrest a woman running topless in the street or men running naked through the streets. Yes, could be difficult to do. I think the only criteria is, what is Mister average going to consider this to be? We've got topless women in most of the newspapers. Quite often on television. On the other hand, if you let women off and not men because women will obviously be more indignant about a man doing that than a man would about a woman automatically. I'd say that we'd treat everything the same but I mean you've got to consider what the average person thinks is indecent. Not my own personal values because quite frankly I don't worry too much about anything. But when children were there what would the position be - should it be something that should be curtailed?

V1

With regard to drug use this officer has recourse to the 'child victim'

the people that use it abuse it and drag other people down, so in that respect yes. Morally they are always trying to get other people involved, they've always got young children involved in some cases. I would say morally that's wrong. T3

Increasing levels of anxiety seem to be attached to these 'objects' of concern. The role of the police officer as *police protector* of "society", "community", "law" as 'ideal object' is overlaid by the police officer as *male protector* of woman and child. Something else enters the mixture when sex and sexuality are involved however. Perceived, or fantasised sexual threat evokes far more powerful anxiety and destructive feelings than any simple physical threat. This is glimpsed above but on occasion it comes much more to the fore (recall the section on homosexuality, 4.2.6.1, when a fantasy of an innocent child victim also appeared).

4.6.0.0 PART 6 - AFFECTIVE POLICING STYLES

Another way to approach the question of the affective structuring of police-work is to listen to what police

officers say about what it means, to them, to be a police officer. This is not so much a question of what they feel about their surroundings but rather a question of what they feel about themselves, what they are doing, and how they should do their job. I am not arguing that orientation to 'self' and orientation to 'other' are two separate issues, clearly they are two sides of the same coin, but it is nevertheless a convenient distinction to make at this point.

4.6.1.0 The ambiguities of policing

The first thing to say is that police officers themselves find it no easier than academics to put together a coherent definition of what it is they do.

How would you describe, to an ignorant member of the public who doesn't know much about policing, what it involves, what it's all about?

I would explain that it comes down to the protection of life and property and the detection of crime really. That's the way I look at it. That's the way I try and explain it. That's what I set out to do. I'm interested more in crime and that's what I aim to do. V2

The problem appears to be, as Egon Bittner pointed out over two decades ago, that there really is no hard and fast boundary around the police remit and mandate. They often protect life and property, but sometimes they actually threaten or destroy life and property, they often detect crime, but sometimes they actually commit crimes. Indeed they transgress the boundaries of their formal remit so regularly and so systematically that, as outlined in chapter 2, Egon Bittner was moved to argue that in fact their function must extend beyond their formal remit to include the much more general, and vague, function of dealing with "social trouble" in general.¹⁷ Here law enforcement becomes only a means to an end and the job of the police officer becomes a much more complex attempt to balance many conflicting social forces and demands.

On the other hand the strong pressures not to act on their formal mandate can lead to feelings of confusion, a strange sense of guilt or shame at not fulfilling the formal requirements of their police identity, and ultimately resentment and hostility which is invariably directed back towards some social out-group (see the section below on resistance to "sensitive policing", 4.6.4.0).

4.6.2.0 A desire for order

One strong common feature of all interviewees was the very positive attitude towards order and discipline as the foundation for a "decent" way of life. The need for discipline was repeated again and again in relation to the inadequacy of education, the family, the effects of the media, unemployment and so on. Perhaps one of the most striking indicators of the extent to which police officers *identify their own occupation with discipline* was the large number of ex-servicemen and the reasons they gave for joining the police service.

4.6.2.1 Ex-services

There has been a good deal of debate in police studies about whether the characteristics of police occupational culture and police psychology are derived from the nature of the work itself or from the type of people who tend to join the police. As suggested in chapter 2, the former explanation has been favoured. One interesting example of where the latter may hold at least some water, however, is in the case of recruitment of ex-service men and women. Again and again one hears them explain that they were drawn to the police because they were used to a disciplined, hierarchical, and highly ordered, environment and they believed that this was what they would find in the police force.

When I came out of the Royal Navy I applied to join the Police Force. I was used to a uniformed environment, disciplined environment. V3

Asked whether he felt that his forces background affected his attitude to the job he said

It is useful in the station. It doesn't, I don't think, do any good out on the street. However, it may affect the way you speak with different people because you are speaking to people who you feel are senior to yourself and you speak to them differently than to people who you feel are below yourself. V3

4.6.2.2 Ambivalent feelings about PACE.

The general desire for order, clear cut boundaries, and predictability pervades much of what police officers feel and believe. One interesting and surprising example however was with regard to the Police and Criminal

Evidence Act (PACE). A mixture of feelings emerged. Some, especially older officers, felt that it had tied their hands with regulations. They felt that it had reduced their discretion. For other, perhaps younger or at least shorter serving officers, however, it had brought a welcome order and predictability in an increasingly ambiguous and threatening world

The big worry with PACE was that it was going to screw us all down, I don't think it has really, I think you've got to live with it. Some people try to bend the rules and you just can't do. I don't think there is any problem, you don't have to bend the rules, if you stick by it. That way there is no grey areas, there is black and white and that is that. There's no worries, you either do it, if you don't you're in trouble. You've lost the job, it obviously standardises it all. T3

4.6.2.3 Use of discretion in combatting the threat to order

As I have already indicated, police officers believe that punishments affect different people differently depending on their social standing. Do they act on the basis of such beliefs however? An area in which it is clear that they do is in that of using discretion regarding whether an individual should be "booked" or verbally cautioned ("advised") for a minor offence. Officers explain that in the case of a minor offence they will tend to give a verbal warning when they believe it will be sufficient. They gauge this on the basis of the appearance and attitude of the offender. The major pre-requisite is that the offender should show signs of remorse and an acceptance of police authority and definition of the situation. Another thing to take into account is whether an individual's attitude and appearance suggest that the offence committed was a one off or whether it is part of a general life style involving criminal and generally irresponsible activity. So using discretion is all about having a *feeling* for the level of threat, danger, criminality which lies beneath the crime itself. *Apparently very similar circumstances can be dealt with very differently by the police officer depending upon how he feels about the situation.*

It's only a proportion of the community that have ever committed these offenses. Occasionally you get the odd one that crops up and has never committed an offence before. Sometimes the best way of dealing with that kind of person is a caution which I've done in the past. If I think this is a one-off job and it's not too serious then I think sometimes it's better off to treat him. He's made one slip up, perhaps he'll never make it again. V2

Of course this necessity for (and desire for) discretion can find itself in tension with the desire for clear cut rules, as indicated in the last section. This is yet another source of unwelcome ambivalent feelings.

4.6.2.4 "Pet hates" and "gypsies warnings": The enjoyment of willing order

I think, though, that we can get much deeper into the affective structure of discretion. Speaking about the more informal dimensions to police-work this officer commented that

People have pet hates, rightly or wrongly.... For instance no seat belts is an offence, and that is my pet hate. I won't go looking for somebody but I will stop someone with no seat belts. It all stems from something as simple as that and it goes up all the way. If you go to a large disturbance, again a lot of the time you go for it and it's all over bar the shouting. Most officers will try, if somebody is mouthing off to try and calm them down some other way. That's the way to do it I think. You have to. You will get the gypsies warning, you will get a couple of warnings and that's it. He's overstepped the line he's got to come. Policemen don't just go and nick people straight away. I am sure if you can send somebody off with a little bit of advice to calm down a bit that's got to be a better idea. T3

These two instances of informal aspects of police-craft are directly linked somehow in the police officer's mind. At first glance it is difficult to see precisely how this is so. "Pet hates" are all about pro-active intervention where others might turn a blind eye, "gypsies warnings" are all about giving someone a second chance where you could in fact go much further. I would suggest that what links these occasions is the pleasure of exercising powers of discretion. Lurking behind the power of discretion is always the threat of potential violence - "he's overstepped the line, he's got to come". The world must conform to authoritarian desires. Where it does not it is threatening and disgusting. The authoritarian will assert itself, first verbally and then physically, but it *will* gain conformity and respect.

As I suggested in the section on 'laughing and being laughed at' (section 4.1.3.6), this complex of feelings is compounded by the conviction that the disrespecter of authority is laughing at authority and will do so all the more if it does not assert its will most firmly.

4.6.3.0 Towards a typology of affective orientations

It has become commonplace in the police studies literature to assert the existence of a number of 'types' of orientation to police-work. Robert Reiner's summary of this work pulls the various typologies together to come up with four distinct types. These are "the bobby", "the new centurion", "the uniform carrier" and "the professional" (these were discussed in section 2.5.0 of Chapter 2).¹⁸ If we focus on these types not as types of officer but as possible subject positions, and then look at them from an the point of view of affect, I think that they begin to resolve slightly differently. I would say that there are two general groups of subject positions which I would loosely label "the re-moralisers" and "the despisers". Within these two broad groups there are a number of subgroups. The category of the "professional" for example cuts across both of these groups. There are upwardly mobile "re-moralisers" and "despisers". There are also demoralised and even despairing sub-groups on each side. There are also hedonistic and non-hedonistic "despisers".

4.6.3.1 (Type 1) The re-moralisers

For some officers, some of the time, a strong streak of paternalism colours their approach. There is a feeling that intervention is necessary in order to remove the threat of moral corruption. This can involve something approaching a moral re-education programme. Going into schools and "getting them on our side". Going into youth centres, talking to young people on the streets, "getting them involved". This is the "community liaison" approach in which it is felt that the only real long-term solution to the problem of working class criminality is to establish the legitimacy of the police in such areas so that fewer young people see crime as a legitimate and even attractive avenue to take and also so that offenders are more easily apprehended because officers are more integrated into the community and therefore more able to gather useful information. This whole approach revolves around the mythical image of the "British bobby on the beat". Many officers express a desire for a return to the level of integration and legitimacy supposedly enjoyed by police officers in the past. Whether "Dixon of Dock Green" was ever a true reflection of the experience of British police officers is now irrelevant since the image, mythical or not, serves as a reference point for "community beat" oriented policing anyway.

Certainly we are not just there for law and order, I think we can help in schools and things like that, community projects, neighbourhood watch schemes - away from law and order.

What sort of things do you think you can do in schools?

Talking to the children, showing them what we do. Hopefully it will stop some people and give them an idea of what we are doing. It might stop some people from offending in the future.

Because they see that they might get caught or because?

Well because they are shown, perhaps, what is right and what is wrong. At least they are shown what is right and wrong by a policeman, which they might not get at home.

So you think to some extent that policemen should show people what is right and wrong?

Partly yes. It does help if we explain our job and what we are up to, what we are trying to achieve. At the end of the day it might deter somebody from offending and that's got to be a successful result.

Is there right and wrong outside the law itself?

You've got to try, especially with youngsters, you have got to try and put them on the right track, and that just comes as part of the job. V2

4.6.3.2 Re-moralisation - or removal from community?

For some 're-moralisers' "links with the community", "outside activities", "community involvement" and so on are the answer. To break down the anonymity of the uniform, the anonymous symbol of authority. To make these people deal with police officers as individual men who they "know and understand", who are "firm but fair". This is a desire to legitimate or re-legitimate the police officer in the community so that he can "point the young kids in the right direction". For others however the "way of life" is such a strong influence that the only way you could "break the mould" is to take them out of that environment altogether. Since this is not practical on any significant level (though "community involvement" officers do take groups of boys on working holidays etc) the solution is felt to be hopeless in that respect.

4.6.3.3 Re-moralisation - iron hand in a velvet glove

More optimistic 're-moralisers' talk about "winning over the kids at an early age", "getting them involved

in out of school activities" (it is noteworthy that the activities mentioned are usually highly disciplined ones. sport, assault courses, boy scouts etc) and generally making personal connections in the community, breaking down the perception of the police service as an anonymous mass. Some of these officers, however, see this as going hand in hand with more "positive" and "aggressive" styles of policing. The objective is to create an illusion of intimacy for the benefit of the police service. Positively perceived individual officers going out into the community to make contact and collect intelligence for the benefit of the rest of the service.

Some officers have a fantasy of an ideal state of high-tech, hyper-potent, efficiency. Sometimes the fantasy is that this will take a secret form. The officer will appear on the surface as the old fashioned community bobby, but underneath he will be high-tech, invincible, all seeing, all powerful, avenger. One officer in the field trial interviews described his ideal police officer as "Robocop dressed up as Dixon of Dock Green". For others this image of high tech efficiency is to be visible for all to see, they are going to be something that nobody can laugh at.

On the other hand some of these officers believe that recent developments, in particular policing by car rather than foot patrol, have undermined the re-moralising effectiveness of the police, and broken links with the community.

4.6.3.4 (Type 2) Professional crime fighting amongst the 'despised'

Here we encounter what could be argued to be a significantly different type of affective subject position from the one described above.

For many officers, much of the time, resentment, rather than concern or worry, is the normal sentiment towards the "difficult" communities they work in. The deterministic argument which threatens to remove responsibility from the offender is short circuited. Rather than viewing them as the victims of circumstances not of their own making they tend to see people's circumstances as "their own fault", "their choice" to "take the easy option". They do not "place enough value on education" and a "decent" life style, they do not want to "better themselves", they "wonder why they cannot get jobs", they believe "the state owes them a living" and therefore they are not deserving of sympathy.

From this point of view 'community liaison' simply indulges the "mocking" attitude which such communities supposedly have towards the police. While officers with this orientation would not necessarily condemn

community beat policing out of hand, it is, I think, important to note that the benefits they see are in terms of intelligence gathering and detection, rather than prevention.

I don't see the policeman particularly as social workers. I don't think we can afford to be.
I think we do too many jobs. I think policemen have got to be policemen. V1

This sentiment often finds itself couched in the language of professionalism. For many, especially younger, police officers policing should be about professional crime fighting not "social work". Some officers express the belief that it is inevitable that the less well-off in society should "resent interference in their affairs" by relatively privileged people such as themselves but that they should get on with it and do it "professionally", "positively" and "aggressively" where necessary because the reality is, they claim, that if they do not do it then these people would just "ransack the place". They are "troublemakers" they "like to inflict injury" and they must be contained.

Do you think that there is anything you can do about that barrier between you? And do you think that it's necessary to do anything about it?

I think it would be very difficult now. Because, certainly I don't want to be part of that community. I don't want to live in that community. I don't think there is any point in pretending that we are like them in the way that we live. I think that if you try and con people, they will resent it even more. I think really, that I prefer the wholesome approach in saying O.K. you don't like it but we're here. We are here to do a job and we're just going to do it. And really be quite open about it and, yes, we appreciate that we're different and we would rather that the Police Force were more community-based but it isn't. And there is no point in pretending otherwise. V4

4.6.3.5 Containment

The 'despiser's' perception of the area as a human dustbin full of hopeless cases, combined with their feelings that these people don't deserve any sympathy (they get enough undeserved sympathy as it is) produce an attitude of 'containment'. The inherent "vice" of the area must not be allowed to spill out. If society is going to have prostitution, drugs and degeneracy of a visible kind then it should be contained within this area. Not only should the "vice" be contained but so should the people. This seems to be particularly evident in areas with large ethnic minority populations. Police officers will talk on one level

about the need for these minorities to assimilate but at the same time it often seems that 'boundary maintenance' is what they desire.

4.6.3.6 Talking on 'their' level

The 'despiser's' interaction with 'police property' on the street is wholly different from the interactions with "respectable" members of the community. You have to learn to "speak to people on their own level", they claim. It seems that this involves speaking with respectful deference to "respectable" members of the community while "F'ing and blinding" at those people who "do not understand anything else".

Clearly the fact that this "speaking on their level" is often interpreted by "them" as outright hostility does not escape the attention of most officers. It is interaction which is quite evidently charged with hostile affective force. What appears to have occurred is that this affective charge has been normalised within police occupational culture. It has become 'common sense' that this is all that "they" can expect.

Sometimes the only way to get through to certain people is to talk the way they talk and that's swearing and everything else. You do that and then you get through. V2

The officer below linked talking to people on their level directly with a splitting of the world into the good, naive and innocent 'objects' (represented by his wife), and the bad, and disgusting 'objects'.

Perhaps you are talking to somebody that won't understand being spoken to in a civil manner and you might have to resort basic down to earth language, swearing if necessary. Because they might not understand anything else. If you have got somebody who thinks that is offensive and horrible who are stood next to you while you are doing it then they would be offended.

They could find it disturbing but that's the reality of how you have to do your job is it?

I don't believe that my wife would appreciate some of the ways I speak to some people. If it necessitates talking to people in that way. If she did know that I speak to them like that, swearing every other word in order for that person to understand, then she would be shocked because of what I am doing, unfortunately.

So part of the world, has to be protected from that sort of thing?

Not protected but shielded. V3

4.6.3.7 "People don't respond to niceness"

I think the following officer, to some extent, sums up the attitude of the 'despiser'

My view of human nature has probably changed very slightly. But I think it's more attitude, I was probably more tolerant of stupidity and bad behaviour when I joined I'm much less tolerant now.

Why do you think that happened?

I think you just become... you lose patience with people after a while and I've also discovered that, to try and be nice to people doesn't really work. In actual fact, they like to be told what to do. They may not like it but they certainly respond better lots of the time when we tell them what to do forcefully in no uncertain terms. So I think, maybe my personality has changed slightly. V4

This 'despiser' actually recognises his own intolerance, and disgust. He feels that his "personality has changed". He recognises that *he feels quite differently about the world as a result of being a policeman, and, to put it bluntly, he feels bad*. He has almost stated my thesis for me.

4.6.3.8 The limits of typology

It is clear that these are very rough ideal types. The reality on the ground is a combination of the two, and many sub-types can be discerned. I suspect that there are also discernable differences in the level of paranoid affect between different force's organisational culture.¹⁹ By 'combination' I mean not just that individual officers are at a fixed point on a continuum between these ideal types but that there is a dynamic interplay taking place constantly. There are a set of affective tensions which police officers attempt to resolve at an individual and group level. The two subject positions (and their sub-types) are alternative affective resolutions of these tensions. At any one point it is possible to see an officer displaying all of the affective

characteristics of the 're-moraliser', at another the very same officer seems to have shifted much further into 'despising'. Such radical shifts can take place within the context of a single interview (quotes from V2 appear in section 4.6.3.1 on 're-moralisers', and in section 4.6.3.6 on 'despisers') but even more radical are the changes which can take place as the officer moves between working contexts. An officer who appears to be an extreme 'despiser' when amongst a group of colleagues in the back of a Police Support Unit van, will often take on a completely different affective subject position when on foot patrol in an area he knows well, even if that area has its hostile aspects. While there is some basis to typological models I believe they must be approached with extreme caution as they can lead to a picture of police occupational culture which is static. *It is absolutely not my intention to suggest that all police officers have the same static set of emotional responses.* In many ways such stasis is what police officers desire, this is what they do have in common, but, as I have made clear, complexity, ambivalence, and fluidity are never actually driven out as they would like, and of course this lies behind the common spiral of paranoia in their organisational culture. To characterise them as affectively static would be inaccurate - and would be a paranoid strategy on my part.

4.6.4.0 "Sensitive" versus "positive" policing

A further distinction, which to some extent maps onto the types outlined above, is that between "sensitive" and "positive" policing. I have already covered this issue to some extent in my comments on 'controlling territory' (4.4.3.1), and in the section on secret identification with the "hard man" (4.2.4.9).

These anxieties result in an enthusiasm regarding the aggressive display of force provided by the presence of the Police Support Unit van in inner city areas. This style of policing, is extremely confrontational and reminds one more of a force of occupation than anything else. It would never be *felt* to be appropriate in an area with which police officers identified positively. However questions about it consistently elicited the reply that it is absolutely necessary for the safety of police officers in general and also that somehow it only effects the experience that the "criminal" has of the police.

... it intimidates the offender if they are going to attack the Police. But my theory is that it would be annoying to them. T1

This is despite the fact that many officers stated that working in such units created an expectation of trouble and tended to precipitate violent conflict.

The following comment sheds some light on the positive affective orientation to aggressive group work.

If you are on your jack and you are trying to deal with somebody who is twice as big as you are, I don't care how good you are, you've got to be a little bit tactful and either call for a bit of help or sort it out in another way. So if you're there and you've got a van load of people, you are not going to have to bend over backwards to save getting your ass kicked. Have you got enough blokes to deal with it there and then. If it happens with people down at [semi-rural station] I am sure they are much better at dealing with individual incidents than some of the city policemen are. If we called for assistance its there within minutes, whereas they can call and it would take 20 minutes to half an hour. So you have to be a little more tactful. T3

Again we can see an 'enjoyment' of the 'will' to impose order through potential violence. I should emphasise that officers across the board, from the most paternalistic 're-moralisers', to the most bitter 'despisers', all felt the need for such symbols of potential violence. The will to impose an order by force, and the desire to inculcate respect as fear, is never far beneath the surface.

I think we made a mistake in going in to schools and getting to know the community, I don't believe in the Neighbourhood Watch Scheme, nothing like that, that was our biggest mistake. When I was young, if a policeman came in our house then you knew you were in trouble, you feared them really, and I think you do better policing by fear then be do policing by consent, really, at the end of the day. V8

4.7.0.0 CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have presented a set of 'snapshots' of the affective world of the police subject. As I have already indicated, this is not intended to imply that each individual police officer has identical emotional responses to the world. This thesis rests on a discourse analytical framework in which individual subjects are to a great extent a product of available interpretive repertoires (see section 3.3.1). *The analysis focuses on the paranoid interpretive repertoires themselves, and how individual affective bodies move within them, not on individual psychopathology.* What I have been describing, therefore, are the emotional patterns which appear at a relatively abstract level within police occupational culture. I have also tried to give some sense of the tension between the fluidity and fragmentation of that culture, and the common responses to this

fragmentation.

The repeated patterns are

1. Attempts to 'split' the world into very clear categories of good and bad. Hostility is then directed towards these bad 'objects' and 'mechanisms'.
2. Such hostility is generally expressed in terms of moral condemnation, expressions of disgust, hostile humour, and fantasy or real violence.
3. The hostility often seems to be derived from anxieties about losing control (of territory, of youth, of the unemployed, and so on).
4. There is a background of a very dark and pessimistic vision of the world in which danger and threat comes from everywhere.
5. I have suggested that the anxiety about complexity and fluidity in the world, and the sense of impending disaster, is derived both from the police officer's basic mandate to order the world, but also that this is inseparable from projected anxiety about complexity and fluidity within the police subject itself. What the police subject is most afraid of losing control of is itself. It cannot bear complexity within, yet has no choice - the resulting despair is projected outwards in a paranoid suspicion of complexity and difference in the rest of the world.

What I am describing here is a 'cultural paranoia'. In an article called 'Paranoia and the Dynamics of Exclusion' Edwin Lemert argued for a break with the idea of paranoia as a disease-state of the individual.²⁰ He argued that changes in environment and social situation could create paranoid dispositions in people without any special character structure. What, he asked, was the social context of patterns of behaviour and communication such as delusions, hostility, aggressiveness, suspicion, envy, stubbornness and so on. He argued that paranoia and associated exclusion, of the paranoid individual, was a result of unbearable strain placed on "reciprocating behaviours with attached emotions".

Lemert argues that human cooperation requires a grounding of trust and that trust is a function of communication. If trust breaks down, as in the process described above, then communication breaks down and becomes "dilapidated or paranoid". Flows of information break down, perceptions of the 'other' become

distorted and suffused with suspicion and hostility. It is not that the paranoid is "deluded" in believing that other people are 'conspiring' against him. The problem is that the creation of mistrust has cut off much of the communication which might give him some sense of the actual dimensions of such 'threat'. The result is a growing tendency to become "deluded" regarding these dimensions. All of this finds echoes in the relationship between the police and many of the communities they police. In particular, as I pointed out in chapter 1, the police operate under a rule of universal incredulity. It is their job to mistrust.

But while Lemert makes it clear that paranoia can, and should, be analyzed at the social level, missing in his account are:

1. Firstly a sense of the emotional force of such paranoid encounters. Paranoia is not just a state of communication, it is simultaneously an affective form. In Lemert's account there is no sense of the anxiety, suspicion, fear, and anger that make up these relationships. *A social theory of paranoia must locate it not only in communication and interaction but also in the body and its forces, the emotions.*

2. Secondly, my purpose is not to analyze an individual's paranoid relationship with the group, but to analyze an abstracted institutional subject's paranoid relationship to the wider society. *It is necessary, therefore, to find a way of theorising the police as representative of the paranoid cultural pole of a 'Dionysian dialectic' being constantly played out in the modern world.*

The following three chapters will explore various ways in which these theoretical problems might be approached.

Notes

1. One exception to this is N.G. Fielding and J. Fielding, 'Police Attitudes to Crime and Punishment', British Journal of Criminology, Vol.31, No.1, Winter 1991.

2. See for example H. Segal, Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein, Hogarth Press, London, 1975, chapter 5.

3. The concept of 'closure' provides a good example of what I mean when I say that studies of the police can tell us much about ourselves. It seems clear that the pleasure taken in 'closure' is a phenomenon common to most of us. Examining the role of this pleasure in police occupational culture should suggest useful questions which we may ask about ourselves.

4. See for example K. Theweleit, Male Fantasies, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1987.

5. The term "dirty work" comes from E.C.Hughes, 'Good People and Dirty Work', in E.C.Hughes, The Sociological Eye. Chicago, Aldine, 1971.

6. This affective attachment to the abstracted 'image' of the uniform is discussed in section 5.2.1 of Chapter 5.

7. J.Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action Vol 2 - Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason. Heinemann, London, 1984.

8. For excellent discussion of the historical origins of the idea of "the dangerous individual" see M.Foucault, 'The Dangerous Individual', in L.D.Kritzman (ed), Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture. Routledge, London, 1988.

P.Pasquino, 'Criminology: the Birth of a Special Knowledge', in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality. G. Burchell et al (eds), Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1991. This will be explored further in chapter 7.

9. The concept of the "transitional zone" comes from the work of the 'Chicago School' theorists Clifford Shaw and Henry Mackay. The "transitional zone" is supposedly characterised by a transient population (often poor immigrants), with a fragmented cultural tradition, impersonality, lack of informal social control, and general "social disorganisation". C.Shaw and H.Mackay, Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas. Chicago University Press, 1942.

10. Police comparisons between categories of "police property" and animals are particularly apparent in the case of ethnic minorities but are not restricted exclusively to them. Smith and Gray for example note the existence of "a notorious council estate known to the relief as 'the rat farm'". D.J.Smith and J.Gray, Police and People in London: The PSI Report. Gower, Aldershot, 1985, p352.

11. It could of course be argued that this is in fact the way that members of the black community view the police. Firstly such an assumption would involve committing oneself to the same paranoid vision of a homogenous and universally unsophisticated "black community" which the police officer holds. It would also involve committing oneself to the paranoid and essentialist vision of belief and attitude as static and one dimensional as opposed to fragmented, dynamic and contingent. It may well be that some members of the black community view some police officers in this way, some of the time. It may even be the case that a few of them might actually articulate their current feelings in language similar to this officer's. In general however the beliefs and practices of the 'black community' (whatever that is) are dynamic, multi-dimensional, shot through with antagonisms, and driven by shifting patterns of affect. In other words they are similar in character to the beliefs and practices I am seeking to determine in the community of the police. The question in this case, however, is not 'what precisely do the police believe' but how do they feel.

12. This latter criticism and dismissal of evidence as unreliable applies probably equally to ethnic minorities other than "Afro Caribbean". Indeed the Smith and Gray's work for the PSI arrived at precisely this conclusion in relation to the Asian community. Smith and Gray, op cit, pp407-409.

13. One suspects there are profound gender issues implicated here. This is an area which has been explored most fully by Klaus Theweleit. K. Theweleit, Male Fantasies. Polity Press. Cambridge. 1987.

14. This notion of 'sacred space' is one which has arisen in discussions with Peter Jowers. It obviously figures strongly in the works of Durkheim, Mauss and Bataille but has disappeared from most contemporary sociology. In terms of a sociology of affect the idea that space is differentially invested with collective feeling is obviously crucial.

15. The nature of such connections between dirt, ambivalence and immorality is discussed further in Chapter 5, section 5.3.1.

16. C. Steedman, Policing the Victorian Community. London, Routledge, 1984, esp p140-43

17. Bittner's own definition of what the police deal with was "something that ought not to be happening and about which someone had better do something now!". 'Florence Nightingale in Pursuit of Willie Sutton: A Theory of the Police' in H. Jacobs (ed) The Potential for the Reform of Criminal Justice. Sage, 1974, 30. The whole of this excellent article pursues the theme of the police as violent controllers of 'social trouble'.

18. R. Reiner, The Politics of the Police. Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1992, pp 131-132.

19. J.Q. Wilson first described such cultural differences in his seminal work Varieties of Police Behaviour. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1968. See also S. Jones and M. Levi 'The Police and the Majority: The Neglect of the Obvious', Police Journal. vol. LVI, no.4, 1983.

20. E.M. Lemert, 'Paranoia and the Dynamics of Exclusion', in Human Deviance, Social Problems, and Social Control. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1967.

CHAPTER 5: LACAN AND ZIZEK: SYMBOLIC CRISIS AND PARANOIA

5.0.0 Introduction

In this chapter I will be looking at the way in which Jaques Lacan and Slavoj Zizek have theorised Paranoid affective phenomena by looking at 'symbolic crises' arising from tensions between the three orders of the "Imaginary", the "Symbolic" and the "Real". I shall first lay out the significance of these concepts in simple terms in section 5.1.0. In section 5.2.0 I shall make a first attempt at conceptualising the police in terms of Lacan's conceptualisation of the "Imaginary". In section 5.3.0 I shall explore the way in which Zizek, and others, may help us to understand police paranoia as a 'symbolic' crisis emerging in the *tension between the "Symbolic" and the "Imaginary" orders*. In section 5.4.0 I shall explore the possibility of 'symbolic crisis' in the *tensions between the "Symbolic" and the "Real"*. This will enable me to begin to draw links between the disciplinary/governmental (as defined by Michel Foucault) mandate of the police, and their affective orientation. The themes arising here will then be developed in chapters 6 and 7.

5.1.0 "Imaginary", "Symbolic" and "Real"

In the work of Jaques Lacan, and more recently of Slavoj Zizek, one can see the Dionysian dialectic at work. Here, though, a Hegelian influence can be detected in the emphasis on recognition, misrecognition, representation, self presence, identity, and lack of closure. The influence of the Hegelian philosopher Kojeve on Lacan is well known and Zizek proclaims his Hegelianism proudly.

For Lacan and Zizek the subject is constituted at the disturbed interface between three orders of reality. The "Imaginary", the "symbolic", and the "Real". The "Imaginary" is the impulse to find self-presence, stable boundaries, fixed identity, stasis. It emerges in the phantasy of the "mirror-stage" when the infant first alienates its-self into a specular reflective image - first gains a sense of its-self as 'that-bounded-entity'. This sense of boundedness derived from specular alienation is, for Lacan and Zizek, a founding illusion. It is an illusion without which subjectivity could not be sustained at all.

Entry into language - the Symbolic order - threatens to shatter this specular image. The Symbolic order is inherently fluid, playful, unfixable. Only Oedipalisation - the relative fixing of language by the transcendental "Name/Law of the Father" - "sutures" any stability into the play of signifiers. Inevitably while

the "Symbolic" constantly tends towards flux, ambivalence, hybridity and play, the "Imaginary" in horror of disintegration drags us back into identity, order and stasis. The Dionysian dialectic yet again. This closure which the "Imaginary" aims at is impossible given the nature of the "Symbolic" order. This impossibility is "lack". It is regarded as constitutive of subjectivity. It is from this impossibility of self-presence - this abyss at the heart of the Dionysian dialectic - that human love, hate, creativity and destructiveness springs.

The story does not end here since a third order exists. This is the order of the "Real". The "Real" is the body and its forces - the mute senseless existence of the material world beyond the "wall of language". The "real" is directly synonymous with the Kantian "Noumenal". It becomes complexified however by the Freudian context in which Lacan equates it with the unconscious, or, more accurately, it is the equivalent of the Freudian "Id" (the 'non-human within the human' perhaps). It is sufficient at this stage to refer to one of Zizek's footnotes. In discussing the nature of sadism he says

One has to be attentive here not to miss the key point: the other that the pervert aims to *faire exister* is not the big Other qua the virtual symbolic order, but the *Real other*, the other from which the big Other (the 'wall of language') separates us forever. The pervert's aim is to render palpable, via the other's unbearable pain which obliterates the symbolic dimension, the hard kernel of the Real which eludes symbolisation.¹

This, in my view, is part of the secret of the "enjoyment" of violence. Particularly so for a subject which suffers from feelings of unreality and alienation from the "Real", and yet fears engulfment in it. In violence, the paranoid subject can simultaneously make the "Real" palpable, discover it in the cracking of bones and the splitting of flesh, but also keep it at a distance, control and contain it, hurt it and push it away.

Ultimately the "Symbolic" always resists the impulse to stasis of the "Imaginary", the "Real" always resists assimilation by the "Symbolic". "Lack" is therefore redoubled in the radically unassimilable kernel of the "Real" - the "Real other" of the libidinal body.

5.2.0 Lacan on Paranoia and the "Imaginary"

In Lacan's own account of the "mirror-stage" he argues that the "imago" functions as an anticipation of wholeness, control, and self mastery - the so called "ego-ideal". It becomes very powerfully invested with

so-called "narcissistic libido". But this libido is not only narcissistic.

Among those imagos are some that represent the elective vectors of aggressive intentions, which they provide with an efficacy that might be called magical. These are the images of castration, mutilation, dismemberment, dislocation, evisceration, devouring, bursting open of the body, in short the imago's that I have grouped together under the apparently structural term of 'imago's of the fragmented body.....We must turn to the works of Hieronymous Bosch for an atlas of all the aggressive images that torment mankind.²

The "Imaginary", the agency of stasis, order, boundaries - and simultaneously the threat of destruction and dismemberment (recalling *The Bacchae* yet again) - is, for Lacan, not surprisingly, the key to understanding paranoia.

He lists delusional forms which relate to different qualities of paranoia and which exist in a series which corresponds to "the successive envelopes of the biological and social status of the person, [which] retain the original organisation of the forms of the ego and the object".³ So the narcissistic core of the "Imaginary" can come to occupy any of the envelopes.

Primitive organicism (poison).

Magical (evil spells).

Telepathic (influence).

Lesional (physical intrusion).

Abusive (distortion of intention).

Dispossessive (appropriation of secrets).

Profanatory (violation of intimacy).

Juridical (prejudice).

Persecutive (spying and intimidation).

Prestige (defamatory).

Revenge (damage and exploitation).⁴

There is evidence of at least the last seven types of fantasy in mine and others research findings on the police. It could also be argued that obsessions with sexual-pollution correspond to envelope 1, and beliefs about moral contagion and evil to envelopes 2 and 3.

Just as fascinating is Lacan's characterisation of the 'will to know' as fundamentally paranoid in character. He writes of the phenomenology of paranoid experience in one of his patients and says

They are constituted by a stagnation in one of these moments, similar in their strangeness to the faces of actors when a film is stopped in mid-action. Now this formal stagnation is akin to the most general structure of human knowledge: that which constitutes the ego and its objects with attributes of permanence, identity and substantiality, in short, with entities or 'things' that are very different from the Gestalten that experience enables us to isolate in the shifting field, stretched in accordance with the lines of animal desire.⁵

I would like to make three points here. Firstly, as I shall show later, this is precisely the same thesis as that offered by Adorno and Horkheimer - instrumental knowledge gathering and construction is driven by a will to master which in turn is explained through the mechanism of a paranoid fear of the uncontrollable threat of the other. Later in the thesis I shall examine policing as a pseudo-scientific expert discourse but for the moment I simply wish to point to the analysis of scientific objectification as paranoid in nature as a theme common to most of the theories of social paranoia I shall be discussing. Secondly at this point in the paper Lacan compliments Melanie Klein on her work in this area and clearly sees her analysis as complementing his own. Thirdly, contrary to many accounts of the Lacanian schema it is not (here at least) dominated by concern with language. Indeed the organism is very palpably present in this analysis as he discusses "the unthinkable innateness of desire".

5.2.1 The Police as the Social "Imaginary"

Michael Foucault argues in *Discipline and Punish* that the use of spectacular images in the exercise of power, such as public torture and execution spectacles, has waned with the onset of modernity. Power is instead exercised through much more subtle disciplinary techniques which include, crucially, the implantation of systems of self-monitoring within the modern "soul". One of the key means by which this is achieved is through techniques of surveillance which are invisible and mysterious to the observed. Bentham's "Panopticon" design for the modern penitentiary is his paradigm case for this kind of surveillance which leads the observed to be "caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers".⁶ A sense of an omnipresent but invisible 'eye' is internalised. Clearly the police operate according to panopticon principles, but I shall postpone for the moment the question of a Lacanian interpretation of this panopticon 'eye'. For the moment I should like to focus on the fact that the police are somehow divided, or ambivalent, in this respect.

Tony Bennet does not believe that the specular has disappeared from the exercise of power. He points out, in his essay on "The Exhibitionary Complex", that one of the many institutional novelties of the nineteenth century was the development of public museums and exhibitions for the edification and civil instruction of the masses.⁷ This Benthamite innovation seems to serve at one and the same time firstly to inculcate a sense of powerlessness at the enormity of processes so vast, natural, inevitable and beyond our control; secondly to place the modern world at the conclusion of this process as the embodiment of technical advancement and social civilisation and therefore at the top of a hierarchy; and thirdly to place the observer at the centre of this modern world as a participant, albeit an insignificant one, and therefore provide an opportunity for 'identification' with the 'modern world' which is constituted in this discourse. Discourses of evolution, progress and wealth derived from "healthy competition" were articulated onto discourses of nationalism and imperialism. 'Developed' and 'civilised' neighbouring states were 'competitors' in the race for supremacy, and the exploitation and colonisation of 'primitive' regions of the world was justified since these people were qualitatively different from ourselves (distant ancestors in a long continuum of development) and their subjugation was part of a natural and inevitable process. This "exhibitionary complex" was part of the social "imaginary" of the nineteenth century.

The "New Police" were, and are, of course also an "exhibitionary complex".

Amid the bustle of Piccadilly or the roar of Oxford Street, P.C.X. 59 stalks along, an institution rather than a man. We seem to have no more hold of his personality than we could possibly get of his coat buttoned up to the throttling-point. Go, however, to the section-house, and you no longer see policemen, but men ... They are positively laughing with each other.⁸

Allan Silver goes on to argue that the superior social control effects of the "New Police" "stems not only from superior organisation and the rational application of force but also from its presence as the official representative of the moral order in daily life".⁹ Here then the police are the "specular", the "Imaginary" in the institutional structure of modern government. These are two sides to the same coin - the uniform as a 'specular' image on the one side, and the sense of police as a mysterious and omnipresent eye on the other. The "exhibitionary complex" exists together with the principle of "panopticism".

For many police officers both principles are under threat. The specular image of the uniform as a static centre of moral order which can 'hold' in the swirling "Symbolic" maelstrom of modernity has been all but lost in their view. Their assertions of the importance of maintaining respect for the uniform, and their clear anxiety

about losing it, are obsessive. Simultaneously the potential delinquent, the subject of governmental panopticism, no longer senses that omnipresent 'eye' so certainly - maybe he will call its bluff after all, maybe the watcher is impotent anyway (at least this is what the police officer believes is happening).

There are three things to note here then.

1. Firstly, in this account the police appear as an embodiment of the Lacanian principle of paranoia itself - the "imaginary" desire for stasis and self-presence. If this is indeed their collective psychic function then one would expect to find the sharpest antipathy to change, difference, ambiguity and ambivalence.

2. Secondly, they sense powerful forces threatening their ability to carry out this function. Of course one would expect such a sense of threat in a paranoid milieu. Indeed Lacan and Žižek would argue that this is an effect of the "lack" which is constitutive of all subjectivity. The gap between the "Symbolic" and the "Imaginary" will always constitute a threat for the institutional bearers of the social "Imaginary".

3. Thirdly, we already find a line of division at the heart of the police subject. The police subject cannot be consistent, closed, complete because it is at least divided between the functions of "exhibition" and "panopticism". This is just one of many such fault lines however.

In order to elaborate these arguments we need to look to the work of Slavoj Žižek.

5.3.0 Slavoj Žižek on the "Imaginary" and the "Symbolic"

As I suggested above the Lacanian/Žižekian subject is divided not merely along one plane but two. This has produced some confusion in Žižek's work. It is possible to find regular slippage between the Imaginary/Symbolic line of division on the one hand, and the Symbolic/Real line of division on the other. It seems to me that the mechanisms conjoining these regions of crisis (if there are any) are never made clear. Žižek refers to both kinds of crisis as "symbolic". It seems to me that he talks about two analytically separable kinds of crisis however. The first is the tension between "Imaginary" and "Symbolic". I shall refer to this simply as 'symbolic antagonism'. The second is the tension between "Symbolic" and "Real", this I shall call 'idiosyncrasy'.¹⁰

5.3.1 Symbolic Antagonism and Shame

Zizek argues that "'Real' violence is a kind of acting out that emerges when the symbolic fiction that guarantees the life of a community is in danger".¹¹ Ultimately - given the impossibility of symbolic closure, self-presence, identity, stasis etc - the "symbolic fiction" underlying any community is always in danger to some degree. Violence is therefore always hovering just below the surface. The stories which any community tells about itself are always riven with inconsistencies, contradictions, senseless assumptions, and so on. Attempts to foreground such inconsistencies, or transgress arbitrary boundaries and assumptions are met with suspicion, hostility, accusations of moral pollution and disease, and ultimately violence. This model bears comparison with a number of other analyses.

Mary Douglas, for example, considers there to be a universal tendency in human societies to respond to such transgression of social/symbolic boundaries by attributing a confusing mixture of physical and moral pollution to them:

the ideal order of society is guarded by dangers which threaten transgressors. These danger beliefs are as much threats which one man uses to coerce another as dangers which he himself fears to incur by his own lapses from righteousness. They are a strong language of mutual exhortation. At this level the laws of nature are dragged in to sanction the moral code: this kind of disease is caused by adultery, that by incest; this meteorological disaster is the effect of political disloyalty, that the effect of impiety. The whole universe is harnessed to man's attempts to coerce one another into good citizenship. Thus we find that certain moral values are upheld and certain social rules defined by beliefs in dangerous contagion, as when the glance or touch of an adulterer is held to bring illness to his neighbours or his children.¹²

We have seen this attribution of pollution and dirt in police responses to the other. But to reiterate the problem, what has rarely been dealt with in analyses such as Douglas's is the affective force of this loathing of the supposedly morally and physically polluted.¹³

Anthony Giddens attempts to deal with similar issues in his book Modernity and Self Identity.¹⁴ In the chapter called "Existential Anxiety and Ontological Trust" he points to the fragility of the 'natural attitude' and the flood of anxiety attending its disruption (citing Garfinkel). This constitutive anxiety is similar to the Lacanian "lack" I have already indicated. Giddens also discusses the human activity of identity construction

through narratives of self. Again this is very similar to Žižek's account of the subjects constant retroactive search for a full and complete self-presence amongst the incompatible fragments of the self.¹⁵ Giddens is optimistic about peoples' ability to live with the plurality, fragmentation, hybridity, difference which pervade the modern world. He admits, though, that some people cannot deal with difference, they become paranoid in the face of diversity. His explanation for the apparent division between trusting individuals and paranoid individuals is fundamentally rooted in infantile development. This is where the individual will develop the ability or inability to trust, to bear diversity and fragmentation; to tolerate an ambiguous identity and an ambiguous symbolic environment. He paraphrases R.D.Laing as saying that ontologically insecure individuals are unable to sustain a continuous narrative of self - they constantly experience anxiety about being crushed, engulfed, obliterated or overwhelmed by external events (the Lacanian "Real").

The use of a developmental explanation of existential trust/anxiety makes it unduly individualistic, psychologistic and static. It would imply that an individual's level of trust/anxiety was fixed throughout life (subsequent to very early developmental stages) regardless of social context. Whilst it may be arguable that a basic substratum of existential trust/anxiety is laid down very early on, to argue that subsequent social context is irrelevant is, I believe, unsustainable. *In this thesis I am arguing for a sociological understanding of paranoia in which individuals can move in and out of paranoid orientations depending on their settings. We are all potentially paranoid.*¹⁶ Giddens develops this rather questionable developmental explanation of paranoid tendencies into an equally questionable typology of normal and abnormal psychic type. To premise a 'normalising' schema on such a developmental model both compounds the initial error and introduces a further, perhaps sinister, political dimension. Indeed this seems to be a major lesson of Michael Foucault's empirical studies.

Despite the severe shortcomings of Giddens' analysis, he usefully uses the concept of "shame" in a technical sense to mean the exposure of hidden traits which compromise the narrative of self identity. So "shame" is the result of symbolic antagonisms. This "shame" produces anxiety - an 'ontological insecurity' that cannot be symbolised within the context of the subject. A major theme in studies of paranoia is that it is always linked in some way to aspects of the self which are unacceptable to the self and have, therefore to be projected onto others. Perhaps, then, "shame" (in this technical sense) is dealt with through paranoid projections - as 'unwanted elements' are projected onto 'others'.¹⁷

Ernesto Laclau has recently devoted much attention to the issue of symbolic "antagonism/dislocation".¹⁸ His notion of "antagonism" is derived from a reading of Lacan in combination with Foucault and Gramsci. The specific dynamics of the tensions between "Symbolic", "Imaginary" and "Real" are absent in his account

however. Symbolic "antagonisms" are simply incompatible, or mutually deconstructing discourses (such as patriarchy and democracy, or free-will and determinism, for example). The consequence is that "lack" (the impossibility of discursive completeness/closure) appears only as a kind of window of opportunity - a space within discourse in which the new can always appear out of cultural hybridity. It is always the place of potential freedom and the emergence of creative subjectivity. Indeed he argues that the subject is this "lack". This is all very well, and a veritable industry of new-left 'politics of difference', has emerged out of this perspective. But because it neglects the "Imaginary" and "Real" dimensions of the psychic order, there is no sense of the fear of change, and the potential for hatred of the different, at the heart of human individuals and communities.

To summarise. One could construct a theoretical model following Zizek, Giddens and others, in which symbolic antagonisms at the heart of the subject, may lead to an inability to sustain a coherent self narrative. This produces an *affect* Giddens calls "shame". This affect is itself un-symbolisable. In other words it cannot be made meaningful to the subject and it cannot be made to *belong* to the subject.¹⁹

This inability to integrate an affect into the symbolic field is what Victor Burgin (following Lacan) refers to as "foreclosure".²⁰ "Foreclosure" is part of the mechanics of paranoia. The affect associated with the "foreclosure" manifests itself in the form of the appearance of dangerous and threatening qualities attached to external objects. The affect has then become attached to objects which help to sustain the subjects solidity rather than threatening its existence. If the threat to existence is experienced it is experienced as a threat from outside rather than from within. Threats from outside can, it seems, be dealt with much more easily than threats from within and can function to reinforce the individual or community. The threat from outside simply needs to be destroyed, eliminated, purified.

Why might policemen be plagued by "shame", and thus by paranoia, and how can we explain their vulnerability to it without resorting to the sort of developmental psychoanalytic explanations used by Giddens? Many symbolic antagonisms at the heart of the police subject have shown themselves in the research findings, and I have already referred to the considerable number of incompatible demands made on the police subject which Steedman catalogues in the emergence of the Victorian police identity. It could easily be argued that the police subject is plagued by dislocation and "shame". I would like to explore one key example of what I take Zizek to mean by a "symbolic antagonism" one which threatens the "symbolic fiction" which guarantees the life of the police community.

5.3.2 Sovereignty and Governmentality

Here I am going to explain police paranoia by looking at the 'symbolic antagonisms' arising in the police subject due to its divided mandate. This will involve the beginnings of a linkage between governmentality and discipline (in a Foucauldian sense) with police paranoia. This latter theme will then be developed in chapter 7.

_____ for Professional Behaviour Sir Kenneth Newman begins by identifying the two axiomatic principles around which his account of the police function revolves.²¹ These are "The Rule of Law" and "The Queen's Peace". There is a constant tension throughout between these two principles. It seems that they have historically divergent and symbolically antagonistic significance.

To begin with I would like to point to what perhaps seems an obvious but nevertheless crucial tacit assumption lying within the text of Newman's 'Principles'. He says that "in discharging the duty of maintaining The Queen's Peace the Metropolitan Police will cooperate with others in maintaining a state of public tranquillity".²² What is perhaps most fundamental to Newman's ability to make such a statement meaningfully is the assumption of the possibility and desirability of a governable public. It is both desirable and possible to maintain a state of 'public tranquillity'. It is possible through the activities of agencies (the police amongst others) designed to realise that possibility. This assumption of the possibility and desirability of regulating a populace in depth is a recent innovation. Where does it emerge historically and what sort of vision of the world does it imply?

In his analysis of "governmentality", Michael Foucault demonstrates the gradual historical transition from discourses on the problem of sovereignty to discourses on the problem of the "art of government".²³ Two notions which rest on quite different views of the social world and of the relationship between rulers and ruled. For Machievelli, Foucault tells us, the issue was to define the relationship between the prince and his territory, to define the strategies and calculations to effect forcible control over his territory. The central axiom of this discourse of sovereignty is the manifest assumption of the natural subjection of a province and its populace to a transcending external will.

A transcendental 'will' can be found running through Newman's 'Principles'. He says that

Where a conflict arises between the duty of the police to maintain order and their duty to enforce the law, the solution will be found in the priority which is given in the last resort

to the maintenance of public order.²⁴

This 'will' is of course signified by 'The Queen's Peace', the 'sovereign will'. But this is a 'sovereign will' much transformed since the time of Machiavelli. This transcendent imperative derives from a gradual assimilation of the logic of sovereignty and its transcendent 'will', into a discourse which superseded it. The logic of sovereignty *per se* has been superseded but its traces remain as crucial elements in police discourse. This sovereign will appears as a *transcendent duty* which the police must discharge which may *override their commitment to, and constraint by, the 'Rule of Law'*.

How can this have come about and in what way can the logic of sovereignty have been superseded between the 16th and 19th centuries? Foucault analyses an early anti-Machiavellian text, that of Guillaume de La Perriere. What is most striking about La Perriere is that he writes not of sovereigns but of "governors". His definition of "the governor" is very wide, governors of households, of souls, of provinces, of children, of convents, of religious orders, of families and so on. Whilst the sovereign is singular and external, or transcendent, forms of government are multiple, internal and immanent to the state. Government operates not over but within society.

The "art of government" became the "science of government" over the next 200 years. During the processes of demographic and monetary expansion, "economy" develops as a field of reality constituted by a technology oriented towards "the problem of population". Indeed the concept of a quantifiable and manipulable population is *invented*. A technology in which a set of 'autonomous regularities' are to be known via the collection of statistical data.²⁵ The appearance of the family as an object of extreme concern in police discourse is not new. It has had a privileged place in governmental discourse from the very beginning. Indeed it was from the notion of "oeconomy" denoting the "meticulous attention of the father towards his family" that the notion of "economy" as "meticulous attention" to population was derived.²⁶

As "economy" became the field of reality within which government was exercised and "population" became the object of "economy" and "economics", so the objective of government comes to be articulated as the "welfare of the population". A population is seen to have needs which must be known and dealt with. The development of this technology, the final transition from the structures of sovereignty to the science of government, signals the birth of political-economy for Foucault. The major problem for government becomes the development of disciplinary technologies by virtue of which a population may be managed in depth in order to realise the "proper disposition of things" as dictated by the science of political-economy. For Foucault Governmentality is three things:

1. the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principle form of knowledge political economy and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security:

2. the tendency which, over a long period and throughout the West, has never ceased to lead towards the pre-eminence over all others (sovereignty, discipline, etc.), of this type of power which may be termed government. This resulted in the formation of, on the one hand, a whole series of specific state apparatuses pertaining to the government and, on the other, to the development of a whole complex of 'savoir':

3. the process, or rather the result of the process through which the State of Justice of the Middle Ages, which becomes the Administrative State during the 15th and 16th centuries, gradually comes to be governmentalised.²⁷

"The Rule of Law", in this context, is not crucially important in itself, the mark of the governor is not the right to kill but knowledge of the 'disposition of things' - from the point of view of governmentality, *law is simply a means for achieving the correct "disposition of things"*.

5.3.3 The Police and Governmentality

Though written a decade earlier, Allan Silver's account of the novel organisational features of the 'new police' is uncannily similar to Foucault's account of governmentality, and serves to underline my argument here.

The self organisation of social control engaged in by the agrarian propertied class via the militia, posse, yeomanry and magistracy prior to the mid 18th century was not appropriate for the new urban order. It exposed the ruling classes to direct resentment and potential attack from those they exploited. It simply exacerbated class antagonisms. As Edwin Chadwick put it

In several instances where there was an effective resistance given to rioters, we have been informed that the animosities increased, and rendered permanent by arming master against servant, neighbour against neighbour, by triumph on one side and failure on the other, were even more deplorable than the outrages actually committed.²⁸

The urban industrial and commercial bourgeoisie were not prepared to expose themselves to the risks associated with self protection and did not believe that they could do so effectively anyway. As others have argued the Benthamite tradition perceived a need for a rational disciplining of civil society which could contain and mediate the class antagonisms potentially present within it. The scientific legislator was to create artificial structures of power capable of maximising social utility. In particular writers such as John Annet have been keen to point out the extent to which this was to be a rational framework of 'social security' for the support of 'free' economic activity. Indeed that for the Benthamites 'security' became the general prerequisite for abundance, utility, and, most of all, it is what we really mean when we speak of 'liberty'.²⁹ The impression we get is of a cold, superhuman calculation of rational interest on the part of Benthamites, such as Chadwick, who are portrayed as the key movers of reform, often against stiff opposition from within the ruling classes. Whether the motivation for reform was quite so rational is certainly highly questionable, and is an issue I shall return to.³⁰

Silver argues that whatever the ultimate motivation there was a growing perception of a need for an institutional buffer between antagonistic social classes, an institution which would draw animosity onto itself and which would create an apparent separation of constitutional authority and economic dominance. Traditionally the army had functioned to some extent in this capacity. They were able to respond to extreme revolutionary crisis but not to everyday social control needs within civil society. The problem lay in their mode of organisation. Military organisations, at least in the nineteenth century, were designed either to do nothing or to attack and destroy an enemy - in Foucauldian terms they exercised a strictly "repressive" power.

When the Metropolitan Police, the first professional force organised along modern lines on mainland Britain, were established in 1829 their principles of organisation were extremely novel and quite different to that of the army. There had been some precedent set by the Bow Street force under the Fielding brothers and private police forces such as the Thames River Police. But the extent of their emphasis on crime prevention, beat patrol, and strict bureaucratic operational rules combined with a level of discretion (admittedly more limited than is the case today) was ultimately quite unprecedented. The police were designed for the penetration of civil society, for prevention, detection, surveillance, intelligence gathering, stealth. They were highly flexible in their organisation. Able to spread out in a diffuse saturation of the social body but also able to concentrate in an organised fashion at short notice in order to respond to public order crisis.

the policed society is unique in that central power exercises potentially violent supervision over the population by bureaucratic means widely diffused through civil society in small and discretionary operations that are capable of rapid concentration... fluid organisation ... can overcome numbers.³¹

This is in contrast to the perceived lack of cohesion and organisation of the 'dangerous classes' themselves. In principle a very large 'mass' of the dangerous classes could be overcome by a much smaller number of police officers responding in a flexible but highly disciplined fashion. This would be the case not only in public order crises but at the level of everyday control, pacification and surveillance. Silver describes the police then, not only as the embodiment of "pervasive moral display", as suggested above, but also as the embodiment of "governmentality".

5.3.4 "Symbolic" and "Imaginary" Identity in the Police

It is clear then that there is a fundamental continuity between the imperatives of governmentality to penetrate pacify and manage populations in depth, and the function of the police. Foucault is talking here about the policed society. This reveals a tension in the police subject. In the "Symbolic" order the police officer is identified with the juridical subject - "the rule of law". "The rule of law" is however only one tool in the toolkit of governmentality. *There is a lack of fit between the principle legitimating the presence of the police officer at the symbolic level, and the actual governmental functions I have identified.* The police officer is a fundamentally antagonistic subjectivity. We find this is evident in Kenneth Newman's own discourse. He asserts that "the fundamental values of British society are underpinned by procedure and legal assumptions" and that "these values emphasise a just balance between order and freedom and a marked abhorrence of unfair or arbitrary action by the State or its officials"³² also that it is necessary to strike "the optimum balance between the collective interests of all the citizens and the personal rights of individuals".³³

...the British ideal is that policing should be shaped by the consent of the population. Such consent is conditional upon the observance by the police of the individual's rights and liberties. Only in this way will the respect of the public be retained and the duties and functions of the police be capable of being effectively discharged.³⁴

This is pure classical liberal rhetoric employing the tacit assumption of a social contract embodying a collective interest. From this perspective, "the Rule of Law" is the embodiment of collective values expressed via the institution of parliamentary democracy. This is the way in which "the Rule of Law" derives its legitimacy so far as Newman is concerned, and as the embodiment of "the Rule of Law" it is also the way in which policing derived its "Symbolic" identity and legitimacy. We should expect this, since according to Lacan and Zizek the "Law/name of the father" is the principle of organisation of the symbolic. And this institution, the police, must somehow embody that "Symbolic" principle.

Ironically then *"The Queen's Peace"*, sovereign *"will"*, performs the legitimization of the more general pacifying functions of policing that transcend *"The Rule of Law"*. It legitimates the fact that in depth government disciplines, manipulates and shapes a population in a manner which is so detailed and mundane at the point of application that it is logically and practically incompatible with "The Rule of Law" and indeed democratic control. "The Queen's Peace" is, in other words, the "Imaginary identity" of the police officer. Indeed governmentality is the social "Imaginary" writ large. It is the organisation of the "correct disposition of things" - order, fixity, stasis. And of course in discipline we find this at its most extreme - the panopticon "gaze", the specular, the "Imaginary".

To summarise, the police are "Symbolically" identified with the "Rule of Law" but they are always simultaneously the paradigmatic agents of governmentality and discipline, and the embodiment of the image of moral order, fixity and boundedness - the social "Imaginary". They embody in their function many of the symbolic antagonisms which Lacan and Zizek identify as associated with paranoid phenomena.

To underline this set of tensions - here is a police officer articulating his "Symbolic" identity as coextensive with the "Rule of Law"

What image do you think this age group should have of the police? How would you like to see them view the Police?

Its not how I think you should view the Police, it's how I think they should view the law of the land. The Police are only acting, they are only trying to ensure that most people comply with that. T1

And here is another police officer talking about the law rather differently.

You don't feel that P.A.C.E (Police And Criminal Evidence act) has put any restrictions on your ability to do the job?

No. No, I think if anything, it's provided us with more powers, useful ones as well. The general power of arrest for instance, great, terrific. It is really useful. To ascertain name and address. The problems we used to have with that. People just refusing to give details, having only committed perhaps a minor offence, we had hardly a leg to stand on, we were always twisting and bending the rules which isn't right, the law should provide, which it does now. T2

But if the police identity and function is coextensive with "The Rule of Law" then how can the law "not provide" - what is it not providing *for*? The answer is of course 'governmentality' - the underlying police function, the "Imaginary" identity.³⁵

5.3.5 Policing and Positivism

Sovereign will is by no means the only symbolic logic within which the police subject attempts to capture its governmental function. Another angle from which we can see these antagonisms is in the mobilisation of positivist discourse in order to portray law as a tool for the provision for the 'needs of society' so that the 'needs of society' may legitimate that violent surplus that transcends the 'collective will' embodied in the 'Rule of Law'.

Newman states that

...the continuing aim of the Metropolitan police must be to work with others to develop collaborative strategies against crime and disorder. This aim includes invoking the assistance of statutory and voluntary agencies and local authorities. Many of the apparently isolated incidents to which police are called are symptoms of more general and substantive problems with roots in a wide range of social and environmental conditions. The aim of the Metropolitan Police will, therefore, be to work with other agencies to develop what is known as a "situational" or "problem solving" approach to crime prevention, where, rather than merely dealing with individual acts of law breaking, careful analysis is made of the total circumstances surrounding the commission of types of crime, taking better account of wide ranging social and environmental factors, in order better to understand - and counter - the causes of those acts.³⁶

He also writes of

...co-operation with others in the creation and maintenance of a way of life in communities which strikes the optimum balance between the collective interests of all citizens and the personal rights of all individuals.³⁷

Here we see an almost seamless articulation of the social engineering talk of positivism with the rights talk of classical theory. They must "co-operate with local planners in schemes for "designing out" crime and

promoting informal social controls" and also "improve analysis and assessment of environmental factors which give rise to crime, fear of crime and neighbourhood decline".³⁸

As Foucault would no doubt point out the "repressive hypothesis" is not appropriate here. This is not a police force dedicated to the simple repressive task of law enforcement; it is a discourse which manifestly articulates the police as a constitutive power, an agent not just of social engineering but of social "creation", of "governmentality", the "gaze", the "Imaginary".

These comments by Newman could have come straight out of a positivist criminology text book. This is a theme I shall explore further in chapter 7. For the moment it is important to recall the extent to which the "needs of society", and the nature of society, crop up in police discourse. It is also clear that this identification is fraught with ambivalence.

So what is the police officer - The Rule of Law, the social contract, the sovereign will, the social engineer, agent of governmentality, bearer of the surplus violence of pacified modern society? He is all of these. This makes the symbolic life of the police community fragile enough. But as Skolnick points out the police officer is always potentially faced with the "symbolic assailant", the individual, or group which challenges the very fragile symbolic foundation upon which police authority is built. This individual talks a different language, or wants to play by different rules, or points to some of the inconsistencies. For Zizek such threats to the symbolic life of the police community can only lead to hostility and violence, and hostility and violence which is "enjoyed".

5.4.0 Zizek on the "Symbolic" and the "Real": Idiosyncratic Antagonism

All of this takes us some way in beginning to understand the sort of mechanisms which underlie police paranoia. But there is something ultimately unsatisfactory about it. In particular we have moved a long way from the body and its forces, or in Lacanian parlance the "Real". Occasionally however Zizek brings us back to the body.

What holds a community together, according to Zizek, is not a shared set of values, but a "shared relationship towards a Thing, towards Enjoyment incarnate". There are numerous definitions of Enjoyment in Zizek's work, but I think one can summarise it as a certain kind of visceral bodily response experienced through a group, its dynamics, and its "Symbolic" structure. Now the Thing, to which Enjoyment is attached,

always turns out to be an empty tautology or a collection of fragments - the 'British way of life' for example.

As an Eastern European much of Žizek's current interest understandably lies with the way in which the Thing inhabits the politics of nationalism and ethnic hatred - the "nation Thing" - although it is clear that nationalism is not the only locus of the functioning of Enjoyment. On the contrary it appears to be a universal phenomenon. Ethnic communities, he argues, organise their enjoyment through national myths. Ethnic tensions are to do with possession of the national Thing while the 'other' is always accused of "secret", "perverse" and "excessive" enjoyment.

What really bothers us about the 'other' is the peculiar way it organises its enjoyment: precisely the surplus, the 'excess' that pertains to it - the smell of their food, their 'noisy' songs and dances, their strange manners, their attitude to work.³⁹

Alien, *idiosyncratic* bodily presence, uncanny reminders of our own unassimilable body.⁴⁰ This is what sparks off visceral responses. This is an antagonism not between the "Imaginary" and the "symbolic" but between the "symbolic" and the "Real". This is the "Real" punching its way through the "wall of language".

Michael Rustin has recently attempted an analysis of racism based on post-Kleinian psychoanalysis.⁴¹ He believes that racism is a psychotic projective identification. That is, it is a projection of unwanted aspects of the self onto others. Aspects of the self which one is disgusted or frightened by are projected onto other objects, persons or groups; *aspects of the self which cannot be assimilated into the biographical narrative constituting the conscious self*. These are unassimilable forces in the body - frightening impulses - perhaps barely human.

A similar theme can be found in the work of Victor Burgin.⁴² Burgin is however more influenced by Lacanian themes. As such the notions of "inner" and "outer" which dominate Rustin's model are not found in Burgin. His is a concern with the inevitable failure of the subject to be fully constituted in the "Symbolic" field, but again because of the unassimilable, unthinkable "Real". This is the basis for Lacan's notion of the "return of the Real". As we have seen, what is at the heart of paranoia is not repression but "foreclosure".⁴³ Here there are unthinkable elements of the "Real" at the heart of the subject. This foreclosure, or inability to coherently assimilate the heterogeneity of the libidinal body, into the narrative of the subject, results in the return of the affect associated with this foreclosure in the form of external objects possessed by threat, in other words paranoid objects. "The mechanism of symptom formation in paranoia requires that internal

perceptions shall be replaced by external perception".⁴⁴ The idiosyncratic individual or group is always a potential target of paranoid hostility because their bodily, affective strangeness is an uncanny reminder of the "Real".

Zizek claims that antagonism to the other is manifested in a conviction that the idiosyncratic other has somehow "stolen" ones enjoyment. The "Thing" has been poisoned, spoilt, infected, eroded, cast aside, polluted and so on. The "British way of life" has been ruined. In a great hall of distorting mirrors the multitude of ethnic communities mutually define themselves in this manner. Ultimately the myth of "stolen enjoyment" is the structure of enjoyment. Spiteful, paranoid, resentful, fearful, and destructive fantasies are the structure of ethnic enjoyment. The final ultimate irony is that "What we conceal by imputing to the Other the theft of enjoyment is the traumatic fact that we never possessed what was allegedly stolen from us: the lack is original".⁴⁵ And of course, as I have shown, precisely the same is true of the police community. The attachment to ideal objects and golden ages which they never had, the belief in an enemy within threatening those ideal objects, the sense of terminal decline and immanent apocalypse, most of all the "enjoyment" of paranoid interpretations of the world.

5.4.1 Che Vuoi and the Sinthome

In The Sublime Object of Ideology Zizek develops another angle on this question of the gap between the "Symbolic" and the "Real".⁴⁶ As we have seen, the phenomenal experience of the subject is constituted in a "Symbolic" field. This field he and Lacan call "the big Other". What we know of the world is mostly a function of the way in which we make sense of it within the symbolic field - 'the big Other'. This means that concrete 'other people' are always 'known' in this way. It is very much a case of a Kantian projection of a priori categories onto a noumenal world. The problem is that objects in our symbolic universe (including those with which we are attempting "Symbolically" to identify) cannot give account, by virtue of their "Real" qualities, for the symbolic mandate we attach to them. They are radically incommensurable with our interpretations of them. The "Real" in them constantly punches holes in "the big Other" - there is always a huge heterogeneous surplus in the world beyond what we can capture "Symbolically". This opens up a void of unknowability - "lack".⁴⁷ What does he, she, it, really want - what does he, she, it, really intend - what is the "Real" essence of he, she, it?⁴⁸ This anxiety, which is built into the relationship between self and other, Zizek calls "Che Vuoi?" - or, as he puts it, "You're telling me that, but what do you want with it, what are you aiming at?"⁴⁹

From this perspective then paranoid anxiety is a manifestation of "Che vuoi?", the paranoid subject's

demands upon paranoid objects to inform him regarding their intentions and desires. Such paranoid objects resist domestication in the paranoid subjects "big Other" and seem at the same time to gain power both to inspire anxiety and to determine his fate. He persistently constructs paranoid fantasy scenarios in relation to the paranoid objects in an attempt to make meaningful his anxiety. His attacks upon them are attempts to eliminate his experience of "Che vuoi?". His objective is to eliminate this "lack" in "the big Other" to bring it into total cognitive fullness in order to facilitate mastery of it.

Meanwhile such objects have hidden intentions, qualities, propensities, powers - they are 'after something from us'. There are of course many objects which for the police subject have such threatening but obscure desires. The police subject can be read as the paradigmatic case of the collective hysterical response to "Che vuoi?" in the modern world. What do the dangerous classes, problem families, ethnic minorities, hippies, alcoholics, vagrants etc. really want?. The therapeutic, rehabilitative response is the attempt to interpret "Che vuoi?" via the Christian tradition. Give them what they need - 'love' them (re-moralise them?). The punitive response involves a fantasy scenario of threat, danger, contagion, decay followed by hostility, anger, violence - an attempt to destroy "Che vuoi?" and make the "British way of life" cognitively complete and perfectly manageable. The police are the drive to cognitive totalisation enacted as paranoid projection. So we find a combination of drive towards domestication of the "Other", as paranoid object, and virulent hostility towards the "Other". Again one could easily interpret this as the force behind Foucault's "governmentality" and "disciplinary technologies".

Zizek's account of "Che Vuoi?" does not stop there however. The subject himself is also stuck with a symbolic identity which he cannot properly account for by virtue of any 'Real-essential' properties he has. Indeed the heterogeneity of his own libidinal body constantly breaks the bounds of his symbolic identity. The subject always has impulses incompatible with his symbolic identity - this is why such impulses are repressed, why we have an 'unconscious'.

So, loaded with this mandate, the subject is automatically confronted with a certain 'Che vuoi?', with a question of the Other. The Other is addressing him as if he himself possesses the answer to the question of why he has this mandate, but the question is, of course, unanswerable. The subject does not know why he is occupying this place in the symbolic network. His own answer to this 'Che vuoi?' of the Other can only be the hysterical question 'why am I what I am supposed to be, why have I this mandate? Why am I... (a teacher, a master, a king)?' Briefly 'Why am I what you (the big Other) are saying that I am?'⁵⁰

We have already seen that the police subject occupies many (often antagonistic) locations in 'the big Other'. Now we begin to see that these "Symbolic" identifications also exist in an antagonistic relationship to the "Real" of his material, libidinal body. If the symbolic assimilation of the body is indeed impossible then what exactly happens to the body in the process of the attempt at its symbolic capture? Zizek says

By filtering through the sieve of the signifier, the body is submitted to castration, enjoyment is evacuated from it, the body survives as dismembered, mortified. In other words, the order of the signifier (the big Other) and that of enjoyment (the Thing as its embodiment) are radically heterogenous, inconsistent; any accordance between them is structurally impossible.⁵¹

Somehow bodily "enjoyment" ("jouissance") is drawn out of most of the body and concentrated in certain key symbolic fragments. Some of these fragments attach to the body itself (so called erogenous zones) and others which seem to become sources of enjoyment elsewhere in the subjects field of signification.

We have already said that the signifier dismembers the body, that it evacuates enjoyment from the body, but this 'evacuation' (Jacques-Alain Miller) is never fully accomplished; scattered around the desert of the symbolic Other, there are always some leftovers, oases of enjoyment, so called 'erogenous zones', fragments still penetrated with enjoyment - and it is precisely these remnants to which Freudian drive is tied: it circulates, it pulsates around them. These erogenous zones are designated with D (Symbolic demand) because there is nothing 'natural', 'biological' in them: which part of the body will survive the 'evacuation of enjoyment' is determined not by physiology but by the way the body has been dissected by/through the signifier (as is confirmed by those hysterical symptoms in which the parts of the body from which enjoyment it is 'normally' evacuated become again eroticized - neck, nose....).....*Perhaps we should take a risk and read symbolic desire ... retroactively, from Lacan's later theoretical development, as the formula of sinthome: a particular signifying formation which is immediately permeated with enjoyment.*⁵² (My italics)

And thus we return to the "shared relationship towards a Thing, towards Enjoyment incarnate" - "Enjoyment" as it inhabits certain structures of cultural signification - national myths, dress, music, dance, gender roles - 'the British way of life'. This Zizek now designates as the "sinthome".

As I have shown police officers don't live in a universe exclusively made up of threatening object (though

this is almost the case). For there to be threatening objects and forces there must be threatened 'ideal objects'. I have shown how they construct a number of these objects - the 'decent way of life' 'the victim', 'the community', 'society', 'the law', 'Mr Average'. These objects can never conform, in the "Real" to the police officer's "Imaginary" and "Symbolic" identifications with them. He gets caught up in a relationship of "Che Vuoi?" with his ideal objects. They have never really been 'whole' and 'pure' but they are perceived to have degraded. We have seen how all of these ideal objects are perceived to have been violated, spoiled, or stolen by the threatening object. From Zizek's theoretical point of view, this is the police officers' "structure of enjoyment" - their "sinthome".

5.6.0 Conclusion

Lacan and Zizek help us to think about how hostile, destructive and paranoid affects are central to the dynamics of some (if not all) communities. The major mechanisms suggested are associated with two levels of symbolic crisis.

1. There is the possibility that the construction of the subject in the "Symbolic" order may be riven with such contradictions and instability that the destructiveness associated with the "Imaginary" and its desire for stasis and boundedness comes to the fore. I have suggested why I think that the police subject may be plagued by permanent crisis of this sort due to the conflicting juridical and governmental identities and functions of the police, an antagonism which is exacerbated by the police officers status as almost pure embodiment of the social "Imaginary". This is only one (though a major one) of the sites of symbolic contradiction in the police subject.

2. There is the fact of the impossibility of capturing and mastering the "Real" within the "Symbolic", in particular the "Real" of the material body and its radically heterogenous libidinal forces. The "Real" is "unthinkable", it is unconscious but it punches through the "Symbolic" occasionally. This is particularly likely to happen when the paranoid subject is confronted by an idiosyncratic bodily presence. The consequence is often visceral revulsion, disgust, potential violence. This is clearly the kind of response detected in many police encounters with ethnic minorities, and other social outgroups. I will therefore be exploring this question of idiosyncrasy and the visceral in the next chapter.

Finally, I have begun to draw Foucault's model of modernity as disciplinary society together with the notion of paranoia. This is a theme I shall pursue further in chapter 7.

Notes

1. S. Zizek, 'Invisible Ideology', in Journal of Political Ideologies, Volume 1, Number 1, February 1996, fn14.

2. J. Lacan, Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis, in Ecrits: A Selection, trans. Alan Sheridan, Tavistock, London, 1977, p11.

3. *Ibid*, p17.

4. *Ibid*, p17.

5. *Ibid*, p19.

6. M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1987, p201.

7. T. Bennet, 'The Exhibitionary Complex', New Formations, No 4, Spring 88.

8. "The Police and Thieves", London Quarterly Review, July 1856, p93, quoted in A. Silver, 'The Demand For Order in Civil Society: A Review of Some Themes in the History of Urban Crime, Policing, and Riot', in The Police: Six Sociological Essays, D.J. Bordua (ed), John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1967.

9. A. Silver, *op cit*, p14.

10. Though this usage of the term comes from Adorno and Horkheimer it is quite appropriate to use it here, as I shall show.

11. S. Zizek, *op cit*, p22.

12. Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger, Routledge, London 1978, p3.

13. A notable exception to this, as I shall show, is Adorno's analysis of authoritarian and anti-semitic ideology. T. Adorno et al, The Authoritarian Personality, Norton, New York, 1969, and Adorno and Horkheimer's analysis of 'The Elements of Anti-Semitism' in Dialectic of Enlightenment, Allen Lane, London, 1973.

14. Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self Identity, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1991, pp. 35-69.

15. The concept of "retroactivity" is an important one for Lacan and Zizek. It refers to the constant reworking of memory and history into fictions with attempt to assimilate as much of the heterogeneity of human experience as possible. But of course the process is always untidy - some elements will not fit the narrative and therefore have to be repressed or foreclosed. For Zizek's discussion of retroactivity, see S. Zizek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, Verso, London, 1989, pp100-105.

16. This is also why I have avoided many of the more mainstream psychoanalytic accounts of 'paranoid personality' phenomena. Even if they do give accurate accounts of the developmental determinants of paranoid pre-disposition this is not my concern here. I am interested in the question of whether there are socio-physiological determinants of potential paranoid orientation throughout life. To some extent the Kleinian tradition acknowledges this possibility in that it identifies "paranoid/schizoid" versus "depressive" *positions* as opposed to *personality types*. But nevertheless it lays a heavy emphasis on the infant's development of an inner "object" universe at a very early stage. Nevertheless there are some interesting sociological writings in this tradition. Particularly impressive is the work of Paul Hoggett, especially his 'A Place for Experience: A Psychoanalytic Perspective on Boundary, Identity, and Culture', in Society and

Space. vol 10, 1992. Also his unpublished paper from 1995 called 'The Internal Establishment'. Also very impressive is the work of Isabel Menzies Lyth, Containing Anxiety in Institutions: Selected Essays. Free Association Books, London, 1988, M. Rustin, The Good Society and The Inner World: Psychoanalysis, Politics and Culture. Verso, London, 1991, J.Bird, 'Bodies, Boundaries and Solidarities: A Psychoanalytic Account of Racism and Ethnic Hatred', in J.Weeks (ed), The Lesser Evil and the Greater Good: The Theory and Politics of Social Diversity. Rivers Oram, London, 1994.

17. Rustin, op. cit., pp 57-84.

18. E.Laclau, New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time. Verso, London, 1990, pp39-60.

19. Of course in normal usage "shame" indicates a situation in which the individual is faced with actions, traits, incompatible demands which he *does* live with at a conscious level, though this 'living with shame' is extremely uncomfortable. Here I am using the term (because we are short of appropriate vocabulary) to refer to situations where the crisis of subjectivity is so serious that the "shame" is impossible to 'live with'. What then are the consequences.

20. Victor Burgin, 'Paranoiac Space', New Formations. no 12, Winter 1990, p67.

21. K.Newman, The Principles of Policing and guidance for Professional Behaviour. Public Information Department of the Metropolitan Police, London, 1985.

22. Ibid, p9.

23. M.Foucault, 'Governmentality', in G.Burchell et al (eds.), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality. Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1991. pp87-104.

24. Newman, op cit., p9.

25. See also Ian Hacking, 'How Should we do the History of Statistics?', in Graham Burchell et al. (eds), op. cit.

26. M.Foucault, op cit.

27. Foucault, op. cit., pp102-103.

28. First Report of the Commissioners Appointed as to the Best Means of Establishing an Efficient Constabulary Force in the Counties of England and Wales, London, 1839). Quoted in A. Silver, op cit, pp 10-11.

29. J. Annette. 'Benthams Fear of Hob-Goblins: Law, Political Economy, and the State', in Capitalism and The Rule of Law. Bob Fine et al (eds), Hutchinson, London, 1979.

30. It is ironic that though Annette explains Bentham's project for legislation in rational choice Marxist terms, he invokes Bentham's irrational nightly "fear of Hobgoblins" in the opening paragraphs. What is he saying despite himself here?

31. A. Silver, op cit, p8.

32. Newman, op. cit., p10.

33. Ibid, p13.

34. *Ibid.* p11.

35. Egon Bittner makes a very similar point about the police being agents carrying the surplus violence after the pacification of modernity - a role which simply made the law just one of their tools - a means to an end. He puzzles about why this conclusion had been so firmly resisted by researchers. But of course the legality of the police is a fundamental "Symbolic" founding myth of modernity. E. Bittner, 'Florence Nightingale in Pursuit of Willie Sutton: A Theory of the Police', in Jacobs. H (ed) The Potential For Reform of Criminal Justice. Sage, London, 1974. E. Bittner, The Functions of the Police in Modern Society. Jason Aronson. New York, 1975.

36. Newman, *op. cit.*, p12.

37. *Ibid.* pp12-13.

38. *Ibid.* p14.

39. S. Zizek. 'Europe's New Republic of Gilead'. New Left Review 183, Sept 1990, pp50-62.

40. I have taken the term idiosyncrasy from Adorno and Horkheimer's study which I shall be looking at in the next chapter. However I have used it here as I think it identifies perfectly what Zizek is getting at.

41. Michael Rustin. The Good Society and the Inner World. Verso, London 1991, pp57-86.

42. Victor Burgin. 'Paranoiac Space', New Formations. no 12, Winter 1990, pp61-75.

43. *Ibid.*

44. Quoted by Burgin. *op. cit.*, p65, from S. Freud 'Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia', 1911.

45. *Ibid.*

46. S. Zizek. The Sublime Object of Ideology. Verso. London, 1989.

47. It may be that we can discern two slightly differing usages of the term "lack" in the Lacan/Zizek schema. The two usages applying to the two areas of symbolic crisis. One the one hand "lack" as 'lack of stasis', boundedness, self presence in relation to the "Imaginary". On the other hand "lack" as 'unknowability' of the "Real" in terms of the "Symbolic".

48. Of course there can be no "Real essence" since Lacan's "Real" is radically heterogenous.

49. *Ibid.* p111.

50. *Ibid.* p113.

51. *Ibid.* p122.

52. *Ibid.* p123.

CHAPTER 6: ENLIGHTENMENT AND ALIENATION FROM NATURE: ADORNO AND HORKHEIMER'S THEORY OF MASS PARANOIA

6.0.0 Introduction

Perhaps the most seminal analysis of mass paranoia in the twentieth century is Adorno and Horkheimer's essay on 'The Elements of Anti-Semitism' in Dialectic of Enlightenment.¹ Despite the time that has passed since its first publication, it remains a powerful, insightful and passionate piece of social theory. It conjoins society, politics, culture and economy with the body and its forces in a remarkable way. It has its weaknesses, but it seems to me that it provides a powerful model for the sort of social theory that is necessary if the affective dimensions of human experience and action are to be understood. I have quoted liberally from the original text in order to impart some of the power of their vision and the subtlety of their analysis. In section 6.1.0 I have discussed the relationship between self consciousness, the instrumental orientation to the world, and alienation from nature. In section 6.2.0 I have looked at Adorno and Horkheimers' analysis of Fascism and what it tells us about related phenomena. In section 6.3.0 I have looked at scientific rationality as an impulse to dominate emerging out of "false projection". In section 6.4.0 I have looked at paranoia as an aspect of an unstable ego, which drives a will to order and control the external world. In section 6.5.0 I have examined Adorno's notion of "authoritarianism" and suggested that it might be modified for use as a theory of cultural forms and subject positions rather than personality types.

6.1.0 Self-Consciousness and Instrumentality as Alienation

At the heart of Adorno and Horkheimer's thesis is the claim that we are the unwitting victims of our 'biological prehistory'. We are small and vulnerable creatures in a terrifying world. The major mechanism we have evolved for coping with this condition is "mimesis". "Projection as fear is a form of mimicry. The reflexes of stiffness and numbness in humans are archaic schemata of the urge to survive: by adaptation to death, life pays the toll of its continued existence."²

We are possessed by a primeval urge to mimic our natural environment and in the extreme to mimic inert lifeless matter.³ Adorno and Horkheimer argue that the history of the human species is one of self-alienation and repression of such instinctual impulses. This is revealed in the structure of mythology. The image of Odysseus tied to the mast of his ship, while his men plug their ears to the voices of the Sirens, becomes a

metaphor for the building of internal walls holding back nature and the spontaneous flow of passions - self consciousness brought about through the driving out of Dionysus.

The primeval mimetic instinct has been deformed, through this process of repression, in modern society into the urge to control and rationalise "circumambient nature".

Civilization has replaced the organic adaptation to others and mimetic behaviour proper, by organised control of mimesis, in the magical phase; and, finally by rational practice, by work, in the historical phase. Uncontrolled mimesis is outlawed.⁴

Science and technology are a deformed manifestation of this instinctual urge. The urge to mimic the environment is transformed into the categorial framework of science in which the radical heterogeneity of the natural environment is absorbed within universal categories. Scientific categories work by taking phenomena in the natural world and trying to identify in them that empirical content which makes them identical. For example, what makes all delinquents fall under the category 'delinquent' despite their empirical differences? Instead of directly mimicking the environment we assimilate the environment by making radically 'different' elements of it 'the same' under the signifiers of our categories. Effectively we characterise the environment in our own image - we make it like us.

The ego has been formed in resistance to this mimicry. In the constitution of the ego reflective mimesis becomes controlled reflection. "Recognition in the concept," the absorption of the different by the same, takes the place of physical adaptation to nature. *But the situation in which equality is established, the direct equality of mimesis and the mediated equality of synthesis, the adaptation to the object in the blind course of life, and the comparison of the objectified thing in scientific formulation, is still the state of terror.* Society continues threatening nature as the lasting, organised compulsion, which is reproduced in individuals as rational self preservation, rebounds on nature as social dominance over it.⁵ (My emphasis)

So primeval mimesis has become transformed through the constitution of the reflective ego and the consequent development of determinate judgement ("the mediated equality of synthesis") into instrumental rationality. Instrumental rationality, as the urge to make 'controllable and inevitable' is viewed as the heart of domination, both of nature and of men. Mimesis is transformed into domination.

6.1.1 Paranoid projection: Ressentiment and the Forbidden Body

But how does this transformation occur? It takes place via the emergence of paranoid projection. 'Projection' in the context of Adorno and Horkheimer's work is the process whereby the subject experiences certain qualities which are part of itself as though they were in fact 'real' qualities of some object, or objects, in the world 'outside'. These qualities may be simply the elements of the subject's conceptual apparatus (time, space, colour, quantity, natural objects, types of person, types of society etc.) or they may be affective forces of some sort.⁶ *Paranoid projection is simply that form of projection where the affective qualities experienced are bad, threatening, evil, destructive etc.*

The affective forces which form the basis for this paranoid projection arise from a complex process. The socially excluded are representatives of the psychically excluded, the uncanny. Thus they become the focus for ressentiment and worse. Crucially, what makes these groups reminders of the repressed is that they are 'felt' to be different at some very deep, physical level. Their bodily gestures, their smell, their habits of dress, their music, are somehow disturbing, even repulsive. They are accused of being 'dirty', 'promiscuous', 'like animals', 'savage' and so on. Precisely the factors Zizek identifies in his account of "enjoyment" of ethnic hatred. It is not, of course, that the 'other' really is 'closer to nature' in some way. What is different is the way in which culture inhabits the body and its forces: what Zizek calls "structures of enjoyment". When we are amongst people who's "structure of enjoyment" closely parallels our own we feel at home. We are able to keep the body and its forces in our command. In a sense we don't even notice its presence.⁷ But the presence of a different "structure of enjoyment" pushes the body to the foreground - it reminds us of something strange but simultaneously familiar. In Lacan and Zizek's vocabulary this is the "Real" punching its way through the "Symbolic" (as we have just seen in Chapter 5). Thus begins the cycle of paranoia, destructiveness, and "enjoyment". From the point of view of the paranoid subject the 'other' is "idiosyncratic" as Adorno and Horkheimer put it - or "sublime" as Kant and Lyotard would put it - or "uncanny" as Julia Kristeva puts it. Their very 'otherness' unintentionally brings about the "trouble" that Garfinkel sets out to provoke. "The mere existence of the other is provocation".

Those blinded by civilisation experience their own tabooed mimetic features only in certain gestures and behaviour patterns which they encounter in others and which strike them as isolated remnants, as embarrassing rudimentary elements that survive in the rationalised environment. What seems repellently alien is in fact all too familiar.⁸

According to Adorno and Horkheimer there seem to be two levels upon which this serves to arouse strong feelings. Firstly, it is a reminder of a kind of idyllic peace, fulfilment and happiness which the 'masses' long for but can never have. "Those who express ideas which all long for, peace, a home, freedom - the nomads and players - have always been refused a homeland."⁹ More specifically, in relation to liberal democratic egalitarian ideology, they describe a sort of class based resentment.

Because the cheated masses feel that promise in general remains a lie as long as there are still classes, their anger is aroused. They feel mocked. They must suppress the very possibility and idea of happiness, the more relevant it becomes.... Those who spasmodically dominate nature see in a tormented nature a provocative image of powerless happiness. The thought of happiness without power is unbearable because it would be true happiness.¹⁰

The persecuted 'other' appears as a receptacle for the resentment of the 'masses' regarding their own betrayal.

A second, connect theme is that, certain individuals and groups stand as reminders of the repressed natural pre-history. The presence of the persecuted other is a direct reminder of the individuals outlawed and repressed longing for a return to pre-social direct union with "circumambient nature" and the pre-social body.

The multifarious nuances of the sense of smell embody the archetypal longing for the lower forms of existence, for direct unification with circumambient nature, with the earth and mud. Of all the senses, that of smell - which is attracted without objectifying - bears clearest witness to the urge to lose oneself in and become the "other." As perception and the perceived - both are united - smell is more expressive than the other senses. When we see we remain what we are; but when we smell we are taken over by otherness. Hence the sense of smell is considered a disgrace in civilisation, the sign of the lower social strata, lesser races and base animals. The civilised individual may only indulge in such pleasure if the prohibition is suspended by rationalisation in the service of real or apparently practical ends. *The prohibited impulse may be tolerated if there is no doubt that the final end is elimination* - this is the case with jokes of fun, the miserable parody of fulfilment. As a despised and despising characteristic, the mimetic function is enjoyed craftily. Anyone who seeks out "bad" smells, in order to destroy them, may imitate sniffing to his heart's content, taking unrationalised pleasure in the experience. *The civilised man "disinfects" the forbidden impulse by his unconditional identification with the authority which*

*prohibited it; in this way the action is made acceptable. If he goes beyond the permitted bounds, laughter ensues.*¹¹ (My emphasis)

These two levels of antagonism seem to parallel Zizek's two levels remarkably closely.

So what the persecuting individual seems to hate is in fact longed for "There is no anti-Semite who does not basically want to imitate his mental image of a Jew, which is composed of mimetic cyphers".¹² The persecuted other appears as a threatening object precisely because it represents and threatens to awaken forbidden longings in the persecuting subject. These longings are paradoxically allowed to express themselves through direct identification with the authority which on the surface seeks to repress them. They are expressed in sublimated forms. Most importantly the subject expresses those longings by finding enjoyment in the persecution of those outgroups which are reminders of the repressed longings themselves.¹³ The dialectic of Dionysus and Pentheus yet again.

The research findings on police culture in relation to attitudes to sexuality, ethnic minorities, youth culture, alternative lifestyles, and so on could be interpreted in the light of this theoretical model, as responses to idiosyncrasy which arouse resentment and remind the police subject of the heterogeneous, ever changing, ambivalent, libidinal body against which much of its disciplinary armour is constructed. Attitudes to homosexuality for example, or indeed the material in Smith and Gray's account of police attitudes to sexuality in general (see chapter 2 section 2.4.4). Also the unpleasant humour regarding the sexual conduct and attributes of ethnic minorities perhaps.

6.2.0 Fascism

Adorno and Horkheimer also view the ritual paraphernalia of fascism, the marching, the music, the hysterical speeches, as forms of sublimated expression of primeval longings. Here, for Adorno and Horkheimer lies one of the keys to Fascism.

The purpose of the Fascist formula, the ritual discipline, the uniforms, and the whole apparatus, which is at first sight irrational, is to allow mimetic behaviour. The carefully thought out symbols (which are proper to counterrevolutionary movement), the skulls and disguises, the barbaric drum beats, the monotonous repetition of words and gestures, are simply the organised imitation of magic practices, the mimesis of mimesis. The leader with his contorted face and the charisma of approaching hysteria take command. the leader acts

as a representative; he portrays what is forbidden.....*Fascism is also totalitarian in that it seeks to make the rebellion of suppressed nature against domination directly useful to domination.*¹⁴ (my emphasis)

The basic affective support of Fascism is, paradoxically, the energy derived from the very primeval longings which it seeks to suppress. They arrive at the conclusion then that Fascism is premised on a paranoia or "false projection" which is made into the basis for a whole political ideology and definition of 'normality'.¹⁵

The actual paranoid has no choice but to obey the laws of his sickness. But in Fascism this behaviour is made political; the object of illness is deemed true to reality; and the mad system becomes the reasonable norm in the world and deviation from it neurosis.¹⁶

One might ask why should not this be the key to the affective attraction of any cultural/ideological formation? In fact the implication of Adorno and Horkheimer's thesis is that it is, since the text is an analysis of modernity in general. Fascism simply stands as an extreme manifestation of tendencies which are present throughout all modern societies. *Adorno and Horkheimer's work is an analysis of culture and ideology as paranoia.* Ultimately Fascism, mass culture, scientific ideology, and the ideologues and image makers of liberal democratic politics play on the same primeval longings. In particular there is a generalised urge to control which drives the whole rationalisation process, and thus the development of the whole disciplinary edifice of what Foucault calls, "governmentality". *The analysis of Fascism is not just about Fascism, it is about all of us.*

6.3.0 Projection, False Projection and Scientific Rationality

So this is far more than a critique of Fascist ideology. Projection is a constitutive element of all human perception. It was, of course, this very process which Kant struggled to theorise. The process of reflective judgement involves the projection of 'inner' conceptual constructs onto 'outer' circumambient nature and the reciprocal modification of conceptual constructs through the assimilation of circumambient nature.

Between the true object and the undisputed data of the senses, between within and without, there is a gulf which the subject must bridge at his own risk. *In order to reflect the thing as it is, the subject must return to it more than he receives from it.*¹⁷ (my emphasis)

This "gulf" is, of course, precisely the "gulf" that Lacan and Žižek identify between the "Symbolic" and the "Real". For Adorno and Horkheimer "within" is the "Symbolic" and "without" is the "Real". Because of this "gulf" there is *always* a danger that the object will become possessed by something which does not belong there, so to speak.

Adorno and Horkheimer argue that to avoid this danger it is necessary for the rational subject to gain firm control over the separation of his/her "affective and intellectual life" - to fully develop reflective capacities. *The real disease of modern civilisation stems from the lack of reflection involved in judgement.* The erosion of the individuated subject and consequently of the potential for reflective judgement lies at the heart of this pathological condition "The morbid aspect of anti-Semitism is not projective behaviour as such, but the absence from it of reflection."¹⁸ Thus the positivist, instrumental, scientific orientation, which has no moment of "negation", or reflection on the role of the subject, in the constitution of its own knowledge, becomes implicated in precisely the same complex as that of Fascism.

Whenever intellectual energies are intentionally concentrated on the world outside; wherever we are involved in persecuting, fixing and seizing, in those functions which have been intellectualized from the primitive suppression of animal nature into scientific methods of controlling nature, the subjective process is easily overlooked in the schematisation, and the system is asserted to be the thing itself.....*the unconditional realism of civilised humanity which culminates in Fascism, is a special case of paranoid delusion which dehumanizes nature and finally the nations themselves.* Paranoia takes root in the abyss of uncertainty which every objectifying act must bridge. Because there can be no absolutely convincing argument against materially false judgements, the distorted perception in which they appear cannot be cured...Because truth implies imagination, it can happen that distorted personalities take the truth for fantasy and illusion for the truth.¹⁹ (My emphasis)

Scientific rationality is often a form of false projection. It systematically misrecognises its own role, as a mechanism for constructing an interpretation of the world, in constituting the objects it perceives. Qualities which the scientific paradigms themselves project onto the natural world are experienced as qualities of nature itself. To the extent that the scientific orientation conceives of nature as a set of potentially dangerous objects to be dominated by its own rationality we can say that scientific rationality is essentially paranoid.

Here we see that there are very striking parallels between Adorno and Horkheimer's analysis of scientific

rationality as paranoid in character, and Lacan's analysis of "paranoid knowledge". The argument is virtually identical in structure.²⁰ Indeed in Lacan's early work the paradigm is still highly biological rather than Hegelian-linguistic, making the line of argument look uncannily similar to Adorno and Horkheimer's.²¹

6.4.0 The Inner and the Outer: Paranoia and the Desire for Control

The paranoiac, then, through lack of individuation, erosion of the capacity for reflection, and consequent loss of any ability to perceive the subject's role in the constitution of the phenomenal world (i.e. reflective judgement) has lost sight of the boundaries between inner and outer. The subject's own struggle with its internal demons is played out as a struggle with external 'demons'. Domination consequently appears as the ultimate logic of paranoid disposition. The subject struggles to control itself by controlling the external objects onto which it has projected its own qualities. Paranoia drives the subject towards the approximation of omnipotence.

Instead of the voice of conscience, he hears other voices; instead of examining himself in order to decipher the protocol of his own lust for power, it attributes the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion" to others. It overflows and fades away at one and the same time. It invests the outer world boundlessly with its own content; but it invests it in fact with the void: with an overstatement of mere means, relations, machinations, and dark practice without the perspective of thought. *Domination itself, which, even as absolute rule, is only a means, becomes its own purpose and extraneous purpose in uninhibited projection; indeed it becomes purpose as such.*²² (My emphasis)

So domination is itself a response to paranoid projection. The 'lust for power' is an instinctive self preservation response based on false projection.

6.4.1 The Economic and the Psychic

Is economic power also of this kind? Is the lust for accumulation and utility (greed) itself a response to false projection? This would mean that the mode of economic behaviour is subordinate to the paranoid forces I have been discussing. Here lies an area of ambiguity in Adorno and Horkheimer's thesis. On the one hand, it is clear that an attempt is made to give an account of the desire structure and mechanism lying behind the urge to dominate, control, order, terrorise, and 'purify' as found in twentieth century science, politics, culture,

and mass psychology. The explanation given relies on viewing the dynamic of economic development (to the extent that it involves the limitless desire to accumulate, exploit and dominate) as subordinate to a psycho-biological process - irrational affective forces originating in man's ancient biological infrastructure. On the other hand, the explanation given for why these affects erupt in the way they do in our time is one based on economic development. In explaining the erosion of the individuated reflective subject they argue that economic forces lie behind it. It is a consequence, in particular, of the erosion of competition, entrepreneurship, formally free labour markets, the relative autonomy of the state and civil society, the bourgeois family and its individuating, ego structuring functions. All of this has been undermined by the emergence of monopoly capitalism and its merging with the state, together with mass politics and mass culture.

When the big industrial interests incessantly eliminate the economic basis for moral decision, partly by eliminating the independent economic subject, partly by taking over the self employed tradesman, and partly by transforming the workers into objects in trade unions, reflective thought must also die out. The soul, as the possibility of self comprehending guilt, is destroyed. There is no object left for the conscience because the responsibility of the individual for himself and his family is replaced by his contribution to the apparatus, even if the old moral assumptions are retained.²³

Current conditions erode the inner life of human beings, removing whole dimensions of reflective capacity, grinding subjectivity down to what Marcuse famously called "one dimensionality".²⁴ This erosion of individuation, of ego boundaries, of our powers of self understanding, makes us less able than ever to tolerate internal ambivalence, and more likely than ever blindly to project our anxieties.

Here we see that there is an oscillation between the privileging of the psycho-biological forces of paranoia, and the privileging of the economic. Clearly what is implied is mutually conditioning relationship between the two. This is never made explicit however. They return to economic determinism although in an attenuated form.

In fact I think that Adorno and Horkheimer have demonstrated an important fact without quite making it explicit. This is that instrumental activity is generally assumed to be motivated what we want to get out of it at the end. It seems clear from their analysis however that it is driven by the pleasure derived from controlling activity itself. We don't like efficient economic activity because it brings wealth, we like it because we like controlling activity. We don't like bureaucratic administration because of the ends it

produces, we like it because of the controlling activity and sense of order it provides.²⁵

A whole ideology of utility and rationality has grown up around instrumental activity - an ideology which is necessary because by definition we cannot recognise the real reasons for our desire to control. This is most clearly the case in policing activity. Policemen do not police because they wish to eliminate crime, they police because they enjoy the activity of controlling and disciplining the objects of their paranoid feelings. This was made quite clear by the responses when I asked what was the thing they enjoyed most in the job. They did not answer that a crime and disorder free day was the most pleasurable thing. They answered that what they liked most was discovering and solving a crime, or some other worthwhile piece of police-work. This is their "structure of enjoyment". I would argue, then, that in their overall thesis Adorno and Horkheimer come remarkably close to Zizek yet again.

6.5.0 Cultural Authoritarianism

To summarise, then, as a result of particular historical conditions, the disintegrating subject is caught up in a situation without clear boundaries between inner and outer, self and other. Without any reflective capacities to establish such boundaries, objects in the subjects phenomenal world seem to relate directly to him and become possessed by his own qualities. The desperate urge to retain Being - inner control and substance, even at a diminished level, manifests itself in the urge to control these objects. And the inner threat to the integrity of the subject is experienced as a threat from without, so the abolition of this threat involves the abolition of the threatening object/other. Pleasure is then derived from the dissipation of internal anxiety through the abolition of apparent external threat. Of course the appetite for such abolition is insatiable since the ultimate source of the anxiety lies in the subjects own disintegration

If it is said that divine power attracts creation, satanic power likewise draws everything into its own impotence. this is the secret of domination. The compulsively projecting self can project only its own unhappiness - from the basis of which it is cut off by reason of its own lack of reflective thought...*For the ego which sinks into the meaningless abyss of itself, objects become allegories of destruction which contain the meaning of its own downfall.*²⁶
(my emphasis)

The police officer's apocalyptic vision is, as I have already suggested in chapter 4, an allegory of the plight of the police subject itself.

This anxiety and propensity for paranoid projection is absorbed into a collective form of sublimation. "The normal member of society dispels his own paranoia by participating in the collective form".²⁷ To reiterate the point, this is a story about all of us. Paranoia is a cultural pole which the police just happen to inhabit more than most because of their organisational mandate and fragmented subject position.

At the heart of all of this is weak ego formation. In Adorno and Horkheimer's view weak egos make for "authoritarian personalities", blind hatred, prejudice, suspicion, conspiracy fantasies, and the urge to dominate and control or destroy. In the Authoritarian Personality qualitative and quantitative research findings were presented which more systematically chart the coordinates of a personality syndrome.²⁸

Nine key characteristics of the authoritarian syndrome were identified:

1. *Conventionalism*. Rigid adherence to conventional, middle class values.
2. *Authoritarian submission*. Submissiveness, uncritical attitude towards idealized moral authorities of the ingroup.
3. *Authoritarian aggression*. A tendency to be on the look-out for, and to condemn, reject and punish people who violate conventional values.
4. *Anti-intraception*. Opposition to the subjective, the imaginative, the tender-minded.
5. *Superstition and Stereotypy*. The belief in mystical determinants of the individual's fate; the disposition to think in rigid categories.
6. *Power and 'toughness'*. Preoccupation with the dominance-submission, strong-weak, leader-follower dimension; identification with power figures; overemphasis upon the conventionalised attributes of the ego; exaggerated assertion of strength and toughness.
7. *Destructiveness and cynicism*. Generalised hostility, vilification of the human.
8. *Projectivity*. The disposition to believe that wild and dangerous things go on in the world; the projection outwards of unconscious emotional impulses.

9. Sex. Exaggerated concern with sexual 'goings-on'.²⁹

This maps onto my own and others' research findings on the police. *The authoritarian personality model can be adapted as a model of certain aspect of police occupational culture as a whole.* Of course Adorno and Horkheimer were not really interested in individual psychology, they were interested in the collective affective dynamics of authoritarian politics and cultures. It is perhaps not surprising therefore that the model should fit the collective dynamics of the agents of coercive governmental control. The ambivalence in their work regarding whether they were describing paranoia as a cultural phenomenon or an individual psychopathology derives from the fact that their work came before the so called "linguistic turn" in social theory which has done so much to "decentre" the subject. They simply did not have a vocabulary to talk of 'discursively constructed subject positions'. Instead of looking at the cultural constituents of fragmentary subject positions they end up analyzing "weak egos". This draws Adorno, at times, into a very static psychology, as in The Authoritarian Personality.

At times Adorno attempts to link the wider structural changes described above to changes in the family and child rearing practices. Cold, rigid parenting, deprivation of affection, severe taboos on affection for, and from, the mother, extreme but often unpredictable discipline, severe non-loving fathering. This all resulted, Adorno believed, in difficulties in the resolution of the Oedipus complex. Consequently the ego was fragile, the super-ego spiteful but not properly internalised so that it tended to get projected onto idealised authoritarian father substitutes, and the ability to cope with taboo impulses severely restricted. As a whole the individual lacks flexibility, an ability to deal with ambivalence.

A similar kind of account is given by Klaus Theweleit, in his book Male Fantasies. He records the case histories of a group of men crucial in the rise of Nazism; the so called 'Freikorps'; an early induction into the 'armoured body' of the gymnasia, the cadet school and profound sexual inhibition, coupled with a teenage experience of warfare; the homo-erotic bonding with male comrades and lack of adult relationships, sexual or otherwise, with women, which the war experience entailed. This was articulated onto a powerful imagery ("Imaginary") of nationhood, of motherland, perfect, ideal and pure. This imagery of nationhood was articulated directly onto a parallel imagery of womanhood. There is a highly rigid dichotomy. On the one hand the nurse, madonna figure, image of purity, innocence and chastity. On the other hand, is the image of the whore, the seductress, the defiled and defiling witch. The armoured body and the image of ideal purity become associated with the motherland, an ideal object and an impregnable fortress to be defended at all costs. But from what? From the threat of engulfment and defilement by the filth of communism and its personification the whore, temptress figure. The sexually available woman is simultaneously desired, loathed

and feared as the most dangerous presence in the 'Freikorps' psyche (the intrusion of the "Real"). These men are not drawn sexually to the ideal 'type' of woman. Once married to a suitable figure of purity they lose interest (these women are by definition sexually unavailable of course and function only as highly idealised images. Any prolonged contact with the 'actual' woman would threaten the ideal nature of this image) and yearn instead for war, for threats of defilement to be cleaned up through the purifying process of destruction, planned and executed together with male comrades. Their obsessions lie almost exclusively with the 'threat', the communist 'whore'. The working class, sexually 'available' woman is their "idiosyncratic" other. War and purification is their "structure of enjoyment".

Of course the Freikorps affective order is extreme, but nevertheless Theweleit is describing it precisely because the difference between the Freikorps and many other male milieu much closer to home is one of degree not kind. We don't have to see the police as Nazis in order to recognise that in the idealisation, paranoid hostility and aggression, longing for male comradeship, violence and action, ambiguous and insecure attitudes to sexuality and women, and fear of engulfment, we can see many of the characteristics of the police affective culture that I have described. Men in general can also detect, perhaps more faintly but present all the same, echoes of our own "male fantasies". This is why, as I have already suggested, the police tell us something about ourselves. Nevertheless Adorno's and Theweleit's developmental theories of authoritarianism are very static unlike the cultural model found in The Dialectic of Enlightenment and throughout this thesis.

6.6.0 Conclusion

It seems then that Adorno and Horkheimer give us an account of the centrality of paranoid forms of orientation to the world. It is an account which begins from the relationship between culture and the biological infrastructure. They give:

1. a general account of self-consciousness as painful alienation from nature (in particular our own bodies);
2. a more specific account of how this can result in paranoia under social/political/economic conditions which produce weak ego individuation (fractured and ambivalent subjectivity, in my theoretical vocabulary);
3. an account of how such paranoia can itself act back upon social/political/economic formations:

4. an account of how "idiosyncratic" individuals or groups can become the objects of paranoia by somehow disturbing the affective fabric of the authoritarian's experience of the world;

5. an account of how such paranoia is linked to instrumental rationality and the desire for domination and control.

6. an account of the role of certain kinds of parenting and early experience in creating weak ego's and thus the propensity for authoritarian, paranoid orientations to the world.

A particular weakness is in the relationship between 2 and 6. There is a lack of discussion of the relative importance of pre-disposition, fixed in early childhood, versus the current conditions of the individual. What is most likely to make a person authoritarian, the parenting they experienced or the type of society/organisation/group they find themselves in now? Clearly one could have a pre-disposition but never be in a situation where one's authoritarian tendencies are made manifest. Can even non-authoritarian types be made paranoid, rigid and aggressive by being put into organisations that are conducive to such orientations? Or has the erosion of strong reflective ego's become so endemic as to have created a world full of potential authoritarians?

Certainly, as I have suggested, the evidence suggests that policemen enter the force with fairly authoritarian orientations, but that the organisation magnifies them. Given the symbolic and libidinal complexity and ambiguity of the experience of the police officer, combined with the need to repress such complexity in this rigid, disciplinary milieu, it is not surprising, in view of this theoretical analysis, that such magnification takes place.

Notes

1. T.W. Adorno and M. Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment. Allen Lane, London, 1973.

2. Ibid, p180

3. Precisely what the nature of this mimetic drive is appears somewhat vague. At least two fairly clear strands can be drawn out however. The quotations given in the main text suggest an impulse born out of terror of natural predation creating a kind of instinct to camouflage oneself by merging with the inert environment, by 'adaptation to death'. Elsewhere, however, it seems more of a sensual longing rather than a terror driven impulse - "archetypical longings for the lower forms of existence, for direct unification with circumambient nature, with earth and mud". Also it is not only an urge to merge with external nature. We can read it through Horkheimer and Adorno's story (told via their reading of the myth of Odysseus) of man's construction of self,

of inner life and subjectivity, as a traumatic alienation from nature-in-man. Thus the urge for a merging with the natural environment can also be interpreted as a longing for identity with the 'pre-social body'. Since, as William Burroughs puts it, 'orgasm is identification with the body', mimesis begins to look perhaps like an amalgam of Thanatos and Eros. It is both 'approximation to death' and identification with a libidinal body, which, after the disintegration of subjectivity, merges with the world.

4. Adorno and Horkheimer, op cit, p180.

5. Ibid, p181.

6. Clearly these are ideal types. In 'reality' the objects of our perception come already possessed by affect. The projection of categories is not easily separable from the projection of feelings.

7. This is presumably one of the reasons why sociology tends to treat society as a disembodied intersubjectivity.

8. Adorno and Horkheimer, op cit, p181.

9. Ibid, p183.

10. Ibid, p 172.

11. Ibid, p184.

12. Ibid, p184.

13. Note that in Freudian terms the persecuting subject can be viewed as playing out the role of a vicious super-ego since when it attacks the persecuted object it is in fact attacking taboo longings in its own unconscious.

14. Adorno and Horkheimer, op cit, p 184. The notion that Fascism (and ultimately all modern ideology) uses, as the support for its technique, the unconscious manifestations of those forces which it represses at the conscious level also appears in Zizek's account. He makes exactly the same point about totalitarian ideology but in his Lacanian vocabulary. 'The Jew is the means, for Fascism, of taking into account, of representing its own impossibility: in its positive presence, it is only the embodiment of the ultimate impossibility of the totalitarian project - of its immanent limit. This is why it is insufficient to designate the totalitarian project as impossible, utopian, wanting to establish a totally transparent and homogenous society - the problem is that in a way, totalitarian ideology knows it, recognises it in advance: in the figure of the 'Jew' it includes this knowledge in its edifice.' Slavoj Zizek, The Sublime Object of Ideology. Verso, London, 1989.

15. Freud himself says "we have seen that it is not scientifically feasible to draw a line of demarcation between what is psychically normal and abnormal: so that the distinction, in spite of its practical importance, possesses only a conventional value". S. Freud, 'An Outline of Psychoanalysis', in The Standard Edition of The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, trans J. Strachey, Vol. XXIII, Hogarth Press, London, 1964.

16. Adorno and Horkheimer, op cit, p187.

17. Ibid, p188.

18. Ibid, p189.

19. Ibid, p193.

20. J.Lacan. 'Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis', in Ecrits. Tavistock Publications, London, 1977, p17.

21. One can only speculate on the possible connections here. However, Lacan's early papers on paranoia and aggression were written in the same period of the 1930s that Adorno and Horkheimer were developing their ideas in this area. Walter Benjamin may have been a decisive link between the Frankfurt School and the French surrealist circles from which French post-structuralists have clearly taken so much. For some indication of the involvement of Benjamin with Breton, Bataille, Blanchot, Caillois, Kojève etc. see, for example, Denis Hollier (ed), The College of Sociology 1937-39. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1988.

22. Ibid. p 189.

23. Ibid. p 198.

24. H. Marcuse, One Dimensional Man. Abacus, London, 1972. Adorno and Horkheimer's account of human alienation from "circumambient nature" is Freud's story of the psychological development of the individual subject told as the psychohistory of human civilisation. However, as with the individual, civilisation can regress and do so in pathological forms. The tragedy from the point of view of Horkheimer and Adorno is that no sooner had mankind collectively evolved a reflective subjectivity potentially capable of escaping the blind determining forces of nature and history than historical forces themselves began to grind that reflective subjectivity back into the dust. This, for Horkheimer and Adorno, is the key to understanding man's vulnerability to blind irrational forces in the twentieth century - a pathological regression to a less reflexive form of subjectivity. It is interesting that Maria Warner made a very similar point in her Reith Lectures of 1995. In discussing models of masculinity dominant in contemporary mass culture she remarked that they are almost totally of the 'problem solving through destructive force' variety. The notion of 'problem solving through wit and cunning' - the Odysseus model of masculinity - is no longer viewed as a viable or desirable option in our culture. Unreflective brawn and destructiveness, the unleashing of blind affect linked to destructive technologies, rather than self aware, intelligent, creative subjectivity, is the order of the day.

25. Of course this is hinted at in Weber's diagnosis of modernity in which instrumentality becomes an end in itself. See Economy and Society. University of California Press, 1978, chapter 2 and the writings on bureaucracy.

26. Adorno and Horkheimer, op cit, p192.

27. Ibid, p197.

28. T. Adorno et al. The Authoritarian Personality. Norton, New York, 1969.

29. Ibid, p228.

CHAPTER 7: DISCIPLINE, GOVERNMENTALITY, AND DESIRING-PRODUCTION

7.0.0 Introduction

Michel Foucault has a perspective on modern industrial society as primarily characterised by what he refers to as "disciplinary" techniques of social organisation. The primary characteristics of disciplinary regimes are explored most fully in Discipline and Punish and I shall not be discussing them in detail here. However this image of modernity as hierarchical, disciplined, regimented, impersonal, normalising, and surveillance oriented, is integral to this thesis. Professional policing is to be understood as a major component of the "governmental" state as conceived by Foucault (and discussed in chapter 5).¹ Indeed in many ways it is its purest embodiment. In this chapter I shall be working, after some preliminaries, towards a fully affect driven understanding of Foucault's "disciplinary society" and shall argue that this is in fact how Foucault intended us to understand his work. I shall be drawing on the work of Deleuze and Guattari in order to accomplish this.

In section 7.1.0 I shall look at how policing may be regarded as a power/knowledge matrix in Foucauldian terms (a general theme which has recurred throughout the last two chapters). In section 7.2.0 I shall look at the way in which Foucault's work falls into the neo-Nietzschean tradition - thus making it a theory of the body and its forces. In section 7.3.0 I shall look at the relationship between Foucault's work and the work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. This will enable me to argue that Foucault's work is actually a theorisation and empirical study of paranoid forces in modernity. In Section 7.4.0 I will use this model together with Allan Silver's analysis of the emergence of the 'New Police' to theorise the place of the police at the centre of this paranoid pole of modernity.

7.1.0 Power/Knowledge

One of Foucault's greatest achievements has been the concrete empirical demonstration of links between the epistemic and the political - knowledge and power (although Nietzsche got there in theoretical terms well before Foucault of course). 'Discourse' - his term for the power/knowledge 'fabrication' of social reality - has become a rather loosely used concept however. The discourses with which Foucault is concerned are generally quite specific, relatively bounded, clusters of terms, concepts and practices. They are oriented towards the creation and consolidation of fields of *expertise* in various areas of supposed *deviance and*

abnormality and as such are simultaneously concerned with the *measurement of object populations* against established standards of normality. In addition to this measurement the expert communities are also established within their own discourses as experts in the application of *regimes of normalisation*. In other words they are empowered to measure people to see whether they conform to certain standards of normality and then apply techniques for the purpose of transforming those individuals who do not match these standards.

Running in tandem with these discourses is the development of an image of human beings as creatures with inherent 'qualities' which are potentially measurable and transformable using scientific techniques. According to Foucault, this image of human beings is itself an innovation of the 19th century and it has had huge consequences for our self understanding. All of Foucault's historical studies - psychiatry, medicine, the human sciences, the development of the discourses of delinquency, sexuality, governmentality - demonstrate these characteristics. Experts are empowered to normalise object populations using standards and techniques embodied in systems of knowledge (psychiatry, criminology, medicine, sexology, psychoanalysis, political economy etc.). The psychiatrist's power, for example, is constituted by his/her location within the power/knowledge matrix known as psychiatry, and that power is constituted *in relation* to the object of his/her expertise - the insane. Psychiatry as a discourse constitutes madness, expertise in madness, and power relations between, and within, bodies - "biopower".

7.1.1 The Science of Policing

How then can professional policing be illuminated by this notion of discourse? Is the police officer empowered as an expert? In what is he/she an expert? Against what standard/s is the police officer's object population being measured? How does the police officer measure his/her object population? Who are the object population exactly and where are they located? What techniques of normalisation is the police officer as expert empowered to employ?

The general assumption that policing should embody the application of scientific techniques to the regulation of population has been quite explicit from the very beginning. Indeed Patrick Colquhoun spells it out in the opening pages of his Treatise on the Policing of the Metropolis of 1797.

Police in this country may be considered as a new science: the properties of which consist not in the Judicial Powers which lead to punishment and which belong to magistrates alone; but in the *prevention and detection of crimes*, and in those other *functions* which relate to

internal *regulation* for the well ordering and comfort of civil society.² (original emphasis)

For the Benthamites in general the whole problem with traditional forms of social control was precisely that they were *traditional*. They had not derived from rational scientific planning rooted in a materialist, utilitarian calculus. I have shown how Allan Silver characterises the rise of the "New Police" as a process of governmental rationalisation. But we can go further than this. I have also pointed out that Steedman records the process whereby "Mid-Victorian society began to enumerate itself" and did so via the transmission of "statistical information", and it was "provincial police officers, acting as social statisticians [who] played a direct role in this process".³

The end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century saw a proliferation of positivist models of man and of crime and criminality. Indeed criminality as a specific state, objective presence, or social fact, in the sense in which we understand it today, only appeared with the development of positivism since, of course, the classical view of man assumes that we are all potentially capable of criminal acts to the same degree. In this sense there are only criminal 'acts' in the classical model, the criminal 'type' is an invention of positivism. The early positivists' discourse is couched in the language of 'scientific objectivity', but the basic strategy of organising a hierarchy by the use of connotations of dirt, defilement, abomination (ie things and people which should not be allowed to exist in the world and whose dangerous presence must be neutralised), danger, and possible contagion, is precisely the same as those discourses of "purity and danger" which Mary Douglas identifies in virtually all societies. Indeed police officers appear able to switch between notions of inherent criminality, inherent pathology, inherent moral degeneracy and inherent evil at will. The content of the discourse changes but the form remains very similar at the level of splitting, exclusion, and hostility.

So what is the delinquent in positivist criminological discourse then? For criminologists such as Enrico Ferri, he is a savage and abnormal being. He is inherently dangerous. He has qualities which make him *different*. It is these qualities which determine that he will inevitably commit crime. No free-will, just a straightforward chain of cause and effect. This means the delinquent is measurable, quantifiable and understandable in scientific terms. But who or what is he dangerous *to* since the social-contract vanishes from positivist discourse along with the metaphysics of free-will? As Pasqual Pasquino shows, the new theme was 'social defence' or 'social security'.⁴ The terms first appeared in a book published by an Italian jurist soon after 1830. It argues for the replacement of notions of crime and punishment with the concepts of 'social offence' and 'social defence'. The criminal is dangerous to "society", the latter conceived as an object with certain functional requirements.

According to Pasquino, the usefulness of Penal law as a form of intimidation begins to disappear with the 'social theorists' since it is only a small fraction of those who commit crimes who are capable of responding in a rational calculated way to the threat of punishment - those Liszt calls "occasional delinquents". For the 'real' criminal however intimidation is useless since he has a perverted nature. The only solution for him is neutralisation of some kind. This may vary from simple removal from society to 'physical liquidation'. Within this context Pasquino says that

...there opens up a vast domain of intervention for what the International Union of Penal Law will term social hygiene, designed to act as a preventative mopping up of the social breeding grounds of crime.⁵

We see discourses of pollution and purification being articulated but not this time the 'filth' of the 'dangerous classes' but the 'filth' of the 'social breeding grounds' of 'abnormal criminal types'. And in the new discourses the 'filthy' object appears within a scientific discourse drawing on anthropology, psychiatry and medical metaphors of infection, disease, hygiene and so on. Such theories gained vast influence over the thought and practice of both expert and layman with respect to the actiology of crime. Liszt defines law breaking as

the defective state, demonstrated by the act committed, of the social mentality necessary for life in the community... my object is to designate the material content of infraction which is not created by law but presents itself to law, and which is thus definable outside and beyond law. But above the law there exists only society itself, organised in the State. Hence it is here that the principle of infraction is to be sought.⁶

As in the discussion of governmentality in chapter 5, law has then assumed the status of a mere tool for provision for the 'needs of society' where it had once been the "Symbolic" embodiment of the social-contract. We have then a quite different conception of the nature of crime, criminality and pollution articulated within the context of a quite different view of the nature, of man, and of society, from that of the classical theorists of the Enlightenment

Now where did this image of criminal man emerge and what was its lived context? Foucault, of course, traces two zones of emergence. Firstly, in the context of the penitentiary in which it became possible to objectify the criminal under panoptical surveillance, the criminal became a "case".

The introduction of the 'biographical' is important in the history of penality. Because it establishes the 'criminal' as existing before the crime and even outside it.....At this point one enters the criminological labyrinth from which we have certainly not yet emerged.⁷

This was how aetiologies, typologies, sub-species, indicators, and regimes emerged. Secondly, and crucial to this development, however was the influence of medicine and psychiatry

one sees penal discourse and psychiatric discourse crossing each other's frontiers; and there, at the point of junction, is formed the notion of the 'dangerous' individual.⁸

This, then, is the constellation of the medical, psychiatric and penal which Foucault sets up as the point of departure of the "criminological labyrinth". He never says as much but one assumes that Cesare Lombroso is the paradigm case here - professor of psychiatry at Pavia, director of the lunatic asylum in Pesaro, professor of forensic medicine and psychiatry at Turin, later to become professor of criminal anthropology, and of course the father of biological-positivist criminology. But surely something crucial is missing here. The explanatory models and imagery of early *sociological*-positivist criminology were rooted not in the enumeration of the penitentiary and asylum but in the enumerative practices of the "provincial police officers, acting as social statisticians" referred to by Steedman (see Chapter 2, section 2.2.0). And of course this has continued to be the case up until the present day (or at least until the advent of large scale self report surveys).

Positivist criminology is the establishment of a technology of alienness. There is a certain orientation inherent to policing practices (targeting, methods of collection and collation of information, detection and so on) which is oriented towards and, I would argue, simultaneously productive of, the very same 'otherness' or 'alienness' which we find in positive criminology. I would argue that positivist criminology derives its alien object from a knowledge of the world which is coextensive with the practices of professional policing. At the level of police policy making rhetoric (such as Kenneth Newman's quoted in chapter 5, section 5.3.5) positive criminology pays back its debt to policing, but with the addition of the legitimating language of scientific objectivity. As I said earlier, Newman's quotes might easily have been taken from a criminology text book.

The logic of positivist criminology is often present in police discourse relating to 'the criminal fraternity'. Solutions proposed vary from containment and neutralisation to the re-moralisation of immoral individuals. All solutions are however premised on the assumption of an 'alienness' to be dealt with. On the one hand,

officers will continually deny that they deal out special treatment, but will simultaneously tell you the special ways in which they *do* treat some people. Such systematic differentiation of treatment on the basis of tacit typologies has long been documented by police studies researchers, from Skolnick's discussion of the "symbolic assailant", to Reiner's and Holdaway's police relevant categories which I discussed in chapter 2 (section 2.4.2).⁹

Along with the typologies there are theories of causation. I have shown the way in which the socialisation functions of the family play a pivotal role in police discourse as they often do in positive criminology. Stable, gainful employment is also perceived to be of central significance in the creation of a smoothly functioning community. We have seen theories of contagion by peer influence, theories of racial determination, theories of youth crime, and theories of the dangerous individual, amongst others. Above all they believe (when it is convenient to think, speak, or act in such terms) that they know what sort of a thing society is, and what its needs are - though, as I have suggested, this identification is constantly frustrated and disrupted by the 'Real'.

We can see then that policing and positivist visions of criminal man are inseparable parts of the same disciplinary technology. Modern professional policing is, at least in part, positivist-criminology in action. Policemen are people who "know their patch", its dynamics, its categories, the laws and forces which govern it. They have systematic theories of criminogenic propensity and contagion, of moral degeneration and a complex symptomology to enable them to chart and deal with its progress.

A further dimension to this interlocking is that the governmental function of police-work, which I discussed in chapter five, directly parallels the positivist orientation as articulated by Liszt, in which law is a tool of governmentality, subservient to a higher authority - in this case "society", and in which, as Pasquino puts it, "a whole domain... of social hygiene" opens up.

It is evident that Policing is firmly embedded in the scientific objectification of man which so concerns Foucault. We have seen in the last two chapters how Lacan, and Adorno and Horkheimer, link such scientific objectification directly to paranoia. But I would like to get another angle on this through another possible reading of Foucault.

7.2.0 The Neo-Nietzschean Subject

I have described the way in which Foucault emphasises how objects of supposed scientific knowledge are, according to him, constructed within fields of discourse which constitute power relations - especially when those objects are people or populations. A further and extremely important dimension of his analysis explores the social/political construction of subjectivity within discourse. One of the most fundamental illusions of post-Enlightenment thought, according to Foucault, is the belief that freedom lies in self-mastery, self-knowledge, self-discovery, autonomy, self-development, reflective consciousness and so on. Instead, says Foucault,

The man described for us, whom we are invited to free, is already in himself the effect of a subjection much more profound than himself. A 'soul' inhabits him and brings him to existence, which is itself a factor in the mastery that power exercises over the body. The soul is the effect and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the body.¹⁰

How is this possible? To some extent it is clear that the claim relies on nothing more complicated than a Kantian argument about the nature of the process of identification. Identification of objects in our phenomenal experience relies upon assimilating a radically heterogeneous world of noumena under a set of categories. We have for example a category 'mountain'. We then subsume a whole series of, empirically, quite different lumps of rock under this category in order to identify them as 'mountains'. This is the basis for cognition of the world around us. What about cognition of self? The basis for self-consciousness is really very similar. Self-consciousness is also the product of processes of identification. This identification also operates through systems of categories. I am a father, I am a husband, I am a university lecturer, I am a socialist, I am a boating enthusiast, I am an Italian, etc, etc. Foucault adds to this three claims. Firstly, that the depth, complexity and differentiation of these identifications and therefore of self-consciousness has greatly increased in the modern world; he charts the history of the construction of this complex subject. Secondly, that because these identifications take place within the context of discourse they - and therefore the whole of subjectivity, self-consciousness, inner life - are implicated in power relations. Finally, because of the latter point any attempt to free ourselves by further developing self-consciousness can only lead to deeper entanglement in these complex webs of power relations. This is really where Foucault diverges most seriously from Adorno and Horkheimer. For them the solution to "false projection" is always "reflective consciousness" - self-control and self-mastery. For Foucault such projects of self-mastery are always illusory, implicated in power relations, and perhaps also paranoid in themselves.

The claim is of course far from original. Nietzsche says much the same thing. For him self-consciousness is always forged out of the repression of instinct and subsequent resentment.

All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwards turn inward - this is what I call the internalisation of man: thus it was that man first developed what was later called his "soul." The entire inner world, originally as thin as if it were stretched between two membranes, expanded and extended itself, acquiring depth, breadth and height, in the same measure as outward discharge was inhibited. Those fearful bulwarks with which the political organisation protected itself against the old instincts of freedom - punishments belong among these bulwarks - brought about that all those instincts of wild, free, prowling man turned backward against man himself. Hostility, cruelty, joy in persecuting, in attacking, in change, in destruction - all this turned against the possessors of such instincts: that is the origin of the "bad conscience".¹¹

We can clearly see the germ of Discipline and Punish in here; indeed Foucault even uses the term "soul". We have a body inhabited by an "inner life" which is simultaneously a social construct and a prison of the instinctual body. Indeed in the next few pages Nietzsche develops the first expression of what will become a major working thesis for Foucault - namely that it is in the disciplinary shaping of a population into a *governable* state that the conditions of 'bad conscience'/'inner life' first arise. Importantly, then, the body in Nietzsche's Genealogy is inhabited by 'forces', 'energies', 'intensities'. Nietzsche's 'body' is a libidinal body. We can see not only Foucault in this quotation but also, of course, Freud.

The presence of bodily energies in Nietzsche's account is not a minor matter. Bodily energies are an expression of the "will to power" itself. Consciousness is merely a particular - and, in Nietzsche's view, a perverted - expression of the "will to power", once it is turned inwards upon itself. The "will to power" appears as the fundamental energy of the cosmos - an energy which flows through, amongst other things, human bodies. The way in which Nietzsche describes this bodily energy and its channelling inwards into an inner life is at times extremely proto-Freudian. Perhaps the most striking example of this is his critique of Schopenhauer in the third essay of On the Genealogy of Morals. His final comment amounts to the clearest expression of the theory of sublimation that one could hope for

...the sight of the beautiful obviously had upon him the effect of releasing the chief energy of his nature (the energy of contemplation and penetration), so that this exploded and all at once became the master of his consciousness. This should by no means preclude the

possibility that the sweetness and plenitude peculiar to the aesthetic state might be derived precisely from the ingredient of "sensuality" (just as the "idealism" of adolescent girls derives from this source) - so that sensuality is not overcome by the appearance of the aesthetic condition, as Schopenhauer believed, but only transfigured and no longer enters consciousness as sexual excitement.¹²

So Nietzsche was very firmly proto-Freudian and in a very materialist fashion. He comments immediately after the above quotation that he intends to write an essay on the "physiology of aesthetics", and indeed On the Genealogy of Morals could just as well have been called 'On the Physiology of Morals'. His purpose is to trace the evolution of a system of primitive bodily affects into inner-life, moral-consciousness, and the emotions associated with such inner moral-consciousness - ie. love, hatred, envy, jealousy, paranoia, and the other various forms of what he generally terms "ressentiment". He does so because he believes that all of these various moral and emotional states are products of an impotent craving for power - they are part of the slave mentality.

7.2.1 The Role of Affect in Foucault's Work

Now Foucault has spoken freely in many interviews of the deep impression made on him by his reading of Nietzsche's works, and indeed, as I have indicated, even a very superficial reading of On the Genealogy of Morals reveals the depth of this influence. So if instincts, drives, bodily energy etc. play such an important role in Nietzsche's work, then why do they fail to appear in Foucault's account despite his acknowledged debt to Nietzsche? The answer is that, in fact, they do appear. It is unfortunate that the Anglo-American assimilation of his work has often interpreted him as a kind of sophisticated social constructionist.¹³ Foucault's work is far more than this however. Throughout Discipline and Punish he repeatedly makes the assertion that "it is always the body that is at issue - *the body and its forces*, their utility and their docility, their distribution and their submission".¹⁴ The 'body' is not an empty cipher in Foucault's work - it is an *affective body*.

This affective energy appears first in Madness and Civilisation in the form of "The Great Fear"¹⁵. Foucault's thesis is that the 'rational' modern subject and the modern state were forged simultaneously from the mid 17th century through an accelerating process of confinement of the heterogenous elements of society (the lunatic, the criminal, the indigent, the vagrant, the libertine etc.). This both served to constitute a homogenous population which could continue to be subject to surveillance, measurement, normalisation, and what he later came to call 'governmentality', and also served as the basis for processes of identification

enabling self definition of 'normal', 'rational' selfhood ("I am sane", "I am law abiding", "I am decent", "I have self-control", "I am heterosexual" etc.). But it seems that the energies constrained by this prison house of identification had to go somewhere. A terrible anxiety about the invisible 'goings on' behind the walls of the houses of confinement arose. The most monstrous fantasies about depraved sexuality and forms of brutality began to circulate. Also there were confused fears of contagion. At one level, they were fears of disease left over from the time when these houses had been for the confinement of leper colonies. But even then such fears had always been mingled with fears of moral corruption. Such fears resumed on a much amplified scale.

The evil which men had attempted to exclude by confinement reappeared, to the horror of the public, in a fantastic guise. There appeared, ramifying in every direction, the themes of evil, both physical and moral, that enveloped in this very ambiguity the mingled powers of corrosion and horror. There prevailed, then, a sort of undifferentiated image of "rotteness" that had to do with the corruption of morals as well as the decomposition of flesh.¹⁶

In other words the heterogenous 'other' in its condition of invisible confinement "fascinated men's imaginations and their desires". "The Great Fear" was to a large extent a paranoid projection then. The real fear was less about what lay behind the walls of the houses of confinement than what lay behind the walls of the rational, modern subjects own consciousness. The external 'other' and its seething heterogenous affects precisely paralleled the internal 'other' and its 'polymorphous perversity'. This parallels both Lacan's and Adorno and Horkheimer's models very closely. According to them, self-consciousness is forged through alienation from undifferentiated circumambient nature (the mirror stage, and the myth of Odysseus respectively). In both cases this results in the paranoid projection of unconscious fear and longing onto outgroups who are constructed as objectification of the unconscious 'other'.

The next move Foucault makes is a crucial one. He argues that this anxiety was effectively the driving force behind the development of psychiatry proper as a domestication of the 'other'. Psychiatry was to purify, observe, and make transparent the reality of madness. It was to 'know' madness in order to bring it into the light, make it safe, manageable, controllable.

It was as a result of this reactivation of images, more than by an improvement of knowledge, that unreason was eventually confronted by medical thought. Paradoxically, in the return to that fantastic life which mingles with the contemporary images of illness, positivism would gain a hold over unreason, or rather would discover a new reason for

protecting itself against it.... The ideal was an asylum which, while preserving its essential functions, would be so organised that the evil could vegetate there without ever spreading; an asylum where unreason would be entirely contained and offered as a spectacle, without threatening the spectators; where it would have all of the powers of example and none of the risks of contagion. In short an asylum restored to its truth as a cage.¹⁷

In Madness and Civilisation it is clear that the driving force in human history is a collective socio-psychological phenomenon - "The Great Fear". The energy channelled through this fear seems to be derived from the repression of the instinctual, corporeal body by creation of the rational subject. The body with its smells, excretions, autonomic reflexes and so on, become 'other' - the embodiment of unreason, moral decay, and indeed disease. The body unregulated by rational, moral subjectivity is a diseased body. The heterogenous 'other' behind the walls of the houses of confinement is a mass of unregulated bodies - the corporeal 'other' out of control - literally. The point is that the 'will to power/knowledge' of psychiatry is driven ultimately by the energies of the corporeal body and its affects in a perverted form - in exactly the same way that Nietzsche's slave mentality (slave morality, inner life, bad conscience etc.) is driven by ressentiment. Again this directly parallels Lacan's and Adorno and Horkheimer's theses. For Lacan, paranoia motivates "paranoid knowledge" and, for Adorno and Horkheimer, "false projection" motivates instrumental rationality, science, positivism etc.

Many commentators, Foucault himself included, have argued that Madness and Civilisation is his least Nietzschean book. If one were to go only on the number of times he uses the word 'power' then this would be true. However, if one looks at the extent to which the social psychology of affect and emotion play a role then the opposite is arguably the case. In Discipline and punish, in contrast, "The Great Fear" gets only a minor mention in the penultimate chapter. Affect and emotion barely appear in any obvious way. Indeed Discipline and Punish often appears to rely on a neo-Marxist argument for its historical dynamism.

The growth of capitalist economy gave rise to the specific modality of disciplinary power, whose general formulas, techniques of submitting forces and bodies, in short, 'political anatomy', could be operated in the most diverse political regimes, apparatuses or institutions.¹⁸

Here, as elsewhere in the book, the dynamics of economic development are in fact given causal primacy. Indeed in an interview first published in 1983 Foucault playfully admits that Discipline and Punish was far more Marxist than he was prepared to admit at the time because at the time of its publication it was

fashionable to be a Marxist.¹⁹

Nevertheless the corporeal, affective body appears as "the body and its forces". Economic development seems to be the determinant of the specific forms of regulation of this body - including the constitution of the "soul" quoted earlier. Physiological energies mediated through socio-psychological structures no longer seem to be the motor of history as in Madness and Civilisation. Rather physiological energies seem to become the tool of economic projects. There is more to this than immediately meets the eye however.

the body is also directly involved in a political field; power relations have an immediate hold upon it; they invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit signs. The political investment of the body is bound up, in accordance with complex reciprocal relations, with its economic use; it is largely as a force of production that the body is invested with relations of power and domination; but, on the other hand, *its constitution as labour power is possible only if it is caught up in a system of subjection* (in which need is also a political instrument meticulously prepared, calculated and used); the body becomes a useful force only if it is *both a productive body and a subjected body*.²⁰

"Labour power" is not a natural given then as Marx would have us believe. The body and its forces have to be subjected to political investments - control, training, discipline - in order to make them into potential labour power. But where then do these projects derive their energy? What drives the literal self-creation of the bourgeoisie?

What we find is an oscillation in Foucault's work between a history driven by economic developments and a history driven by collective affect. This is exactly the same tension as can be found in Adorno and Horkheimer's analysis in Dialectic of Enlightenment. The tension is never made fully explicit or resolved in either Foucault's work or Horkheimer and Adorno's. To find a serious attempt to confront the materialist duality of corporeal, libidinal body, on the one hand, and productive activity and associations, on the other, we have to look to the seminal work of Deleuze and Guattari. They make clear their intention with the key term at the heart of their early work - "desiring-production". Marx and Freud are swallowed up within a Nietzschean framework. Desire and production are simply two aspects of the cosmic energy of the 'will to power' or "desiring-production". Indeed economic activity is subsumed as one instance of the wider productive activities which constitute society generally. This is an analytics of socio-libidinal flows.

7.3.0 Deleuze and Guattari's theory of Desire, its Relationship to Foucault's Power/Knowledge, and to Psychoanalysis

While it is unnecessary to go into a great deal of detail here regarding Deleuze and Guattari's "schizoanalytic" model and its specialised language some basic points are necessary.

Much has been made of their critique of the traditional western philosophical model of desire. This model posits desire as lack, a void. We desire because we lack something. Rather in the same way that Foucault rejects a negative model of power for a positive constitutive model, so Deleuze and Guattari opt for a constitutive model of desire as the energetic source of productive processes. Desire is not a void it is a creative energy. Lack or need on the other hand is something which is itself *produced* socially. Two points should be made here. Firstly both Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari's constitutive agencies (power and desire) are direct descendants of Nietzsche's constitutive "will to power". Secondly there is nothing really separating them from someone like Lacan, or indeed Freud himself, other than a matter of semantics. Deleuze and Guattari's "desiring-production" is Freud's "polymorphous perverse libido" and Lacan's "Real". Deleuze and Guattari's "anti-production" is Freud's Oedipalised "sexuality" and Lacan's "lack". Freud, Lacan, and Deleuze and Guattari, all provide analyses of the detailed way in which "will-to-power", "desiring-production", "polymorphous perverse libido" is turned back on itself into "anti-production", Oedipalised "sexuality", "lack". In other words, as Lacan makes quite clear, they (the Freudians) are embarked on an analysis of the constitution of the subject and the way in which "lack" (Deleuze and Guattari's "anti-production") inhabits the heart of this subject. Deleuze and Guattari's objective is to get beyond the analysis of the subject, since the constitution of the subject is only part of the much wider story of the flow of desire in networks of "desiring-machines" which constitute society. But the crucial differences between Deleuze and Guattari, Freud, Lacan, Adorno and Klein lie only in their politics. Whereas for the majority of the psychoanalytic community some level of coding of libidinal flows, and some level of stability of the subject as a coding of such flows, is desirable, for Deleuze and Guattari the political objective is the maximisation of the scrambling of codes, the decoding and setting loose of the subject, the general "de-territorialisation" of all restrictions on desiring-production.

Deleuze and Guattari's major protest against psychoanalysis is not that it has got its analytics of socio-libidinal flows wrong, but that it is complicit, *in the clinical setting*, with the paranoid 'shoring up' of certain investments of libidinal energy through its reinforcement of the Oedipal family structure. It helps to constitute certain forms of "anti-production". Rather than seeking to "deterritorialise" desiring-production, it works, with the institutions of the state, to "reterritorialise" desire into anti-production. Now Deleuze and

Guattari identify the coding or "reterritorialisation" of desire (within systems of anti-production such as the state) with power. That is what power is - a limiting, or turning inwards, of desiring-production. The Oedipal subject, "lack", the family, the state, and any other principle of stasis (including of course the police) are therefore identified with power.

All of this puts a rather different slant on Foucault's own critique of psychoanalysis. Foucault criticises the idea that sexuality is repressed. He argues instead that it is produced and that psychoanalysis is implicated in its production. Many have assumed that this means that the 'body' in Foucault's work is a non-libidinal body.²¹ However we can now see that in terms of Deleuze and Guattari's analysis 'sexuality' for Foucault is a form of "lack" - an anti-production where desire has been turned back upon itself in the context of the constitution of the subject. Power/knowledge does not repress sexuality; it constitutes it as a coded, inward turning, limited, anti-productive form of desire. Indeed, as we know, power/knowledge is not repressive at all - it is constitutive of the social realm. Exactly as it is for Deleuze and Guattari.

This reveals Foucault's critique of psychoanalysis as less fundamental than is generally believed, since of course psychoanalysts themselves never really said that sexuality, in the sense Foucault means it, is repressed. Rather what was asserted was that the polymorphous perverse demands of the Id are curtailed, structured, turned inwards and repressed, by the demands of reality and social taboo. The consequential outcome is adult sexuality and subjectivity. In the end libidinal energy has to find a channel through which to flow. The Unconscious is simply all of those potential channels (or "desiring machines" as Deleuze and Guattari would put it) 'other' than those which are in the end constituted as adult sexuality and subjectivity. Again then the difference between Foucault and the psychoanalysts is less a theoretical than a political one. Foucault views psychoanalysis as implicated in the 'shoring up' of a 'normal' adult sexuality which consigns many viable forms of pleasure to the realm of the unconscious, and simultaneously pathologises human representatives of those disqualified pleasures, as mad, perverse, sick and so on. It also then shores up the persecution of these representatives of the 'other' of 'sexuality', persecution resulting from the fear and guilt, in the 'normal' subject, at the 'perverse' possibilities lying behind the walls of the unconscious.

7.3.1 Deleuze and Guattari's theory of Capitalism the state and Desiring-Machines.

For Deleuze and Guattari, then, the modern subject is simply one kind of desiring-machine among many. It is one possible way of diverting the flow of desiring-production within which nature and society are constituted. They tend to analyze the individual body as a series of parts which can be integrated into many different desiring machines - eating machines, talking machines, writing machines, looking machines. Parts

of the body are linked to other objects, signs and energy flows, in endless systems of productive activity. The connections which can be made, the channels which can be formed, are in theory infinite. The "schizo" (the hero/in of *Anti-Oedipus*) is the perfectly random connector. She randomly connects signs, energy flows, data, knowledge, fantasy, objects, and bodies in new flows of desiring production. She is the most extreme version of the so called 'nomadic subject'. This is a subject defined not by its fixity of identity but by its endless migration across the networks of desiring machines. In some ways to call him/her/it a subject at all is a misnomer. It could perhaps more accurately be called the anti-subject.

What makes the non-nomadic subject, and indeed society as we have so far known it, is the limiting of connectivity, the closing down of certain possible avenues of desiring-production. This is the "anti-production" mentioned above. According to Deleuze and Guattari there are three distinct social forms of regulation of desiring-production. Each of these forms is associated with a particular type of "socius". This is a fetishised object from which all desiring-production *appears* to emanate (there can be smaller objects from which desiring-production *seems* to emanate - charismatic individuals, national flags and so on - these are collectively known as "miraculated bodies"). In "primitive" societies the "socius" is "the body of the earth", in "barbaric" societies it is "the body of the despot", and in capitalism it is "the body of capital" (as Marx points out, the relationship between labour and capital is reversed so that the product of labour's productive activity appears to emanate from capital).

In "primitive" societies, desiring-production is coded through systems of filiation and alliance embedded in kinship relations and through "primitive" systems of representation which may actually involve writing on the body (tattooing, scarification etc). The importance of the latter is that it establishes systems of representation within an economy of pleasure (on the part of those doing and observing the scarring, tattooing etc) and pain on the part of those experiencing it (initiates into various stages of the social body). According to Deleuze and Guattari this "primitive" system of representation establishes relationships of privilege, obligation and control, the primary mediating unit of which is "debt". Their conception of the origin of debt then is true to Nietzsche's own in which it is associated with the right to obtain pleasure by inflicting pain on the debtor.²² Painful initiation is simply society's exacting of its price for one's basic entry into it. Debt, then, is a unit of desire, which sets in motion flows of exchange of goods.

"Despotism" is established by invasion of "primitive" society from outside. The despot overcodes all social relations in relation to himself. All privilege and obligation appear as emanating from him, all debt gravitates towards him. "Despotic societies" are characterised by the invention of writing proper, bureaucracy, and the state. This complex, together with the family, is the primary system of "anti-production". It is defined by its

basic function of limiting and fixing desiring-production. Systems of representation are made stable, and recording, surveillance and normalisation gradually begin to proliferate. They do so only up to a limited point however since until capitalism proper gets under way the imposition of such coding of desire (and thus social relations) is relatively easy.

Capitalism emerges within despotic society as a growing tendency to make everything function as a commodity and become exchangeable for everything else. Signs, bodies, objects, ideas, information all become equivalent/exchangeable. This has a tendency to erode any limiting of desiring-production. The capitalist market is fundamentally schizophrenic - it combines anything with anything into desiring machines which can realise profit. This results in an explosion of flows of desiring-production. The stability of signification of despotic societies is lost as signifiers migrate across desiring machines, taking on ever different significance. Indeed up to a point signs themselves become meaningless - they are simply transitory conduits of energy flows linking flows of electricity, with images, with bodies and so on. The sign is an organisation of matter. The inner life of the subject is eroded until it exists only, as Baudrillard suggests, as a series of intensities migrating across the surfaces of a global mediascape of commodified signs. The end limit of this erosion of the subject into anti-subject is of course the "schizo" - capitalism has a fundamentally schizophrenic tendency. So why aren't we all schizo's? The answer is that capitalism has not completely erased the primitive and despotic systems of 'miraculation' and coding. The family and the state are retained (so far) within capitalism as agencies for recoding or, as Deleuze and Guattari put it, reterritorialisation. Capitalism oscillates between schizophrenia and paranoia. The latter is effectively terror of the disintegration of the subject and of the heterogeneity of possible desiring machines, turned to an impulse to recode, rigidify, limit, homogenise, normalise etc. As Bentham argued, the state creates the conditions of security within which the free market can operate. What this 'security' amounts to is a certain libidinal stability. As Deleuze and Guattari put it capitalist societies...

are caught between the Urstaat that they would like to resuscitate as an overcoding and reterritorialised unity, and the unfettered flows that carry them towards an absolute threshold. They recode with all their might, with world wide dictatorship, local dictators, and an all-powerful police, while decoding - or allowing the decoding of - fluent quantities of their capital and their populations. They are torn in two directions: archaism and futurism, neoarchaism and ex-futurism, paranoia and schizophrenia.²³

The Anti-Oedipus was of course written well before the era of Reaganite/Thatcherite reform. However the implication is of course that accelerated deterritorialisation, encouraged by an increasingly free hand for the

activities of de-regulated markets, goes hand in hand with intensified regulation via an extension of the scope of criminal justice, state policing, surveillance and normalisation, and also attempts to re-assert the grip of the Oedipalising family.²⁴

7.4.0 The Police and Re-Territorialisation

I would argue that most Anglo American readings of Foucault have been partial. In the light of Deleuze and Guattari we can read him as he meant us to.²⁵ *The proliferation of discipline, normalisation, surveillance, and governmentality are the concrete manifestations of the paranoid pole in the libidinal-economy of capitalism.*

Allan Silver's account of the birth of the "New Police" reads initially like a straightforward Weberian account of the "rationalisation process". I have already pointed out that it fits remarkably well with Foucault's theory of "governmentality". But if looked at through the lense of the Foucauldian/Deleuzian model then something far more illuminating appears. The mood of the early 19th century, as Silver describes it, is one in which there was a growing *anxiety* concerning not only personal safety but also the more general stability of the social order. Newspaper articles and books of the period articulate a widespread fear of the 'dangerous classes'. An advocate of police reform writing in 1821 says

The most superficial observer of the external and visible appearance of this town, must soon be convinced, that there is a large mass of unproductive population living upon it, without occupation or ostensible means of subsistence; and , it is notorious that hundreds and thousands go forth from day to day trusting alone to charity or rapine, and differing little from the barbarous hordes which traverse an uncivilized land... The principle of [their] action is the same: their life is predatory; it is equally a war against society, and the object is alike to gratify desire by stratagem or force.²⁶

Silver also points to the development of discourses of 'licentiousness', a certain anxiety about the growing existence of a class of people with money but lacking the moral restraint to enable them to spend it wisely. There is a horror not merely of those who are destitute, and thereby pose a potential threat to the privileged, but also of those who transgress a certain symbolic boundary. Those who do not possess the correct cultural capital but who may be in possession of resources not befitting their lowly symbolic status. This anxiety reappears very forcefully in the world view of contemporary police officers, in their anger and suspicions

concerning the young black man in an expensive car, wearing expensive clothes, in their loathing of the young working class man out on a Saturday night drinking and involved in disturbances which are attributed to his having 'too much money to spend'. Young people, working class people and black people are simply not *supposed* to have money to throw around, if they do then this is interpreted as a sign of licentiousness and even of flaunted criminality (these are uncontrolled and unacceptable flows of "desiring-production").

A more pertinent symbolic crisis, in the Victorian era, was perceived in the form of the 'indulgent wealthy', those who transgressed the boundaries of the Protestant bourgeois work ethic. Of course the indulgent aristocracy and occasionally degenerate bourgeois wealthy were and remain out of the reach of the police on the whole. Nevertheless Protestant values of hard work, deferred gratification and an aversion to profligacy and sensuality have become a core feature of police affectivity ("anti-production"). They were instilled into the lower rank, as Steedman argues, in order to provide a good example to the working class community (later to be followed of course by the entry of agencies of social control into the working class home to instruct them in hygiene, childrearing practices, moral tutelage, family planning and so on) and also to act as a barrier to moral contagion of the police constables themselves (such barriers to "flow" and "contamination" are all forms of "anti-production"). The main object of police anxiety concerning the work ethic were, and are, *the unemployed*. As Silver points out the 'dangerous classes' imagery of the early 19th century refers not directly to class antagonisms but to the unemployed and unattached during the period of population growth and migration of the poor (In Foucault's and Deleuze and Guattari's terms these are uncontrolled flows of bodies and their forces).

Indeed, as I have shown, police officers feel the link between moral degeneracy and unemployment so strongly that unemployment is seen to be simultaneously both a cause and effect of such degeneracy. Police officers do not view the perceived criminal activities of the unemployed as a result of the need generated by a lack of material resources. Rather their unemployment is viewed as a symptom of an 'inner' moral degeneracy which itself produces the perceived criminality of the unemployed. One becomes unemployed because one is morally degenerate and in the 'rare' case where someone becomes unemployed by chance the state of being unemployed quickly brings about inner moral degeneracy (more chaotic flows).²⁷ From the earliest development of 'The New Police' then we can see a policing identity being forged in the context of an anxiety over an imagined relationship between destitution, moral corruption, profligacy, sensuality, evil and criminality (chaotic flows of desiring-production). An association not uncommon in the 19th century bourgeois imagination but soon to become a central feature of the world view of policemen. The central image of the times, as outlined by Silver, is of the 'unmanageable, volatile criminal mass'. A fear of engulfment by heterogenous chaotic flows.

One could view the gradual development of disciplinary, normalising technologies as a conscious, rational effort on the part of the industrial bourgeoisie to maximise the potential for exploitation of a pacified and disciplined working class. Indeed this has been the usual basis upon which Marxist historical analyses of the period have worked.²⁸ But as I have pointed out, in the last chapter, any argument which premises itself on notions of economic rationality falls short when one asks what the *motive* for rationalised economic behaviour is. To give the answer 'self interest' or 'class interest' is not really an answer at all since it either begs the question of 'interest' itself or falls into tautology. In any case literature of the period reveals a movement driven at least as much by the sort of fears of engulfment, dissolution, chaos and dirt which psychoanalysts and anthropologists (as opposed to Marxist and Weberian critical historians) often emphasise. There is a sense of anxiety and even horror about the 'goings on' in the urban rabbit warren of the "dangerous classes"; and there is simultaneously a 'will-to-know' them. They are constructed as the antithesis of decent, respectable, civilised, peaceful bourgeois family life. They are the "animalistic", "sensual", "carnal", "ignorant", "shiftless", "disorganised", "filthy" and "violent" antithesis of the 'normal' world. They are the 'other' whose existence makes intelligible the bourgeois sense of being civilized, progressive and rational. They are the "barbarous hordes" in our midst referred to by the advocate of police reform quoted above.

As the 19th century bourgeois identity constructs itself therefore it simultaneously constructs its own unconscious - the "dangerous classes" - in an effort to stem the tide of their own desiring-production in an inherently schizophrenic society. Policing in this context is a 'will-to-know' that which is unknowable in an effort to gain mastery over desiring-production, the Lacanian "Real". Mastery in the sense of subjecting to 'the gaze' and to 'normalisation' as Foucault would put it. It is only from this perspective, I believe, that we can understand the massive proliferation of techniques of surveillance, recording and ultimately social engineering. The construction of the "dangerous classes" as chaotic desire makes the imposition of ordered normalising practices upon them essential if they are to be mastered, and normalised in their patterns of desire. Thus the 'knowing' of a population and the physical manipulation and ordering of bodies and their forces are one and the same thing in the exercise of 'disciplinary power'. The constitution of the policed society was a creative moment instigated by the bourgeois imagination to give order to that which was 'sensed' to be chaotic, unintelligible and dangerous, but also the exercise of power upon the body of a population and its forces.

Daniel Defoe commented to the Lord Mayor of London as early as 1730 that

The whole City, My Lord, is alarm'd and uneasy: Wickedness has got such a Head, and the Robbers and Insolence of the Night are such, that the Citizens are no longer secure within

their own safe Walls, or safe even in passing their Streets, but are robbed, insulted and abused, even at their own Doors...The Citizens are oppressed by Rapin and Violence: Hell seems to have been let loose Troops of human D---ls upon them; and such Mischiefs are done within the bounds of your *Government* as never were practised here before (at least not to such degree) and which, if suffered to go on, will call for Armies, not Magistrates, to suppress.²⁹ (My emphasis)

Placing the responsibility for the pacification and normalisation of 'Wickedness' of 'the City', the 'Robbers and Insolence of the Night', squarely in the sphere of government. By 1856 an article in the London Quarterly Review confidently announced that

There seems to be no fear a London mob will ever prove a serious thing in the face of our present corps of policemen. A repetition of the Lord George Gordon riot would be an impossibility. Those who shudder at the idea of an outbreak in the metropolis containing two millions and a half of people and at least fifty thousand of the "dangerous classes" forget that the capital is so wide that its different sections are totally *unknown* to each other. A mob in London is wholly without cohesion, and the individuals composing it have but few feelings, thoughts or pursuits in common. They would immediately break up before the attack of a band of well trained men who know and have confidence in each other.³⁰(My emphasis)

A clearer articulation of the basic principles of governmentality is scarcely conceivable.

As the century went on, then, it is possible to detect a growing sense of relief as dread turns to moralism, indignation, pity, and compassion, amongst the peaceful propertied classes, in the context of a growing sense of security that there was now an organised technology present for the purpose of penetrating, 'knowing' and normalising the 'goings on' of the Victorian underworld ('Those That Will Not Work' as Henry Mayhew titled his book in 1861). The "dangerous classes" had been domesticated by the science of policing in just the same way that the insane had been domesticated by psychiatry.

7.5.0 Conclusion

In reading Silver through a model combining Foucault with Deleuze and Guattari in this chapter I have generated a Deleuzian formula for police paranoia then. There is a libidinal crisis at the heart of the

bourgeois cultural identity; an identity which relies upon a damming up of the body and its forces in a schizophrenic society. This produces anxiety which is projected onto heterogenous elements of the social body and is felt as paranoid horror of the "dangerous classes". This paranoid fear is resolved in a disciplinary 'science' of policing. Again we see how the forces of paranoia converge in the police. They are simultaneously carriers of a refined version of that cultural identity which forecloses its libidinal and symbolic heterogeneity, and at the same time the agents of control forced into permanent engagement with the "dangerous classes", the vessel of all of their unconscious longings and fears. They were, and they remain, caught in a deeply ambivalent situation whilst being unable to tolerate ambivalence, thus they develop a paranoid culture to cope.

If anything the difficulties and complexities of such a position have multiplied. As I have shown, they suffer from extreme moral conservatism (suspicion of 'difference' and 'change' in other words), confused and ambiguous feelings about class, sexuality, and allegiances, extremely confused feelings about the "dangerous classes", similarly confused feelings about the "middle classes" with whom they want to, but cannot, fully identify. All of the elements of symbolic antagonism of the nineteenth century are still present, together with new forms of heterogeneity to cope with. Their 'function', and focus, as the spearhead of paranoid "normalisation" or "reterritorialisation" is, if anything, heightened as other traditional agencies of "reterritorialisation", such as the family and other arms of the state, go into postmodern decline.

Notes

1. See 'Governmentality' by Michel Foucault in The Foucault Effect. Burchell, Gordon and Miller (Eds.), Harvester Wheatsheaf, London, 1991.
2. P. Colquhoun. Treatise on the Policing of the Metropolis. Patterson Smith, New Jersey, 1969 (1797).
3. See the section on Steedman's analysis of the forging of a Victorian police identity in chapter 2.
4. P. Pasquino. 'Criminology: the Birth of a Special Knowledge', in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality. G. Burchell et al (eds), Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1991.
5. Ibid, p242.
6. F. von Liszt, quoted in P. Pasquino, *ibid*, p243.
7. M. Foucault. Discipline and Punish. Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1987. p252.
8. Ibid, p252. Foucault explores this medico-penal concept of the "Dangerous Individual" more fully in an article of that name published in M. Foucault, L.D. Kritzman (ed), Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture. Routledge, London, 1988.

- 9.J.Skolnick, op cit, pp45-48.
- 10.Michel Foucault. Discipline and Punish. Penguin. Harmondsworth, 1977, p30.
- 11.F.Nietzsche, On The Genealogy of Morals (Trans by Walter Kaufmann), New York, Vintage Books, 1969, pp 84-85. Actually either Adorno and Horkheimer or Foucault can be read as the true inheritors of Nietzsche's sentiment, depending on how one reads him. Despite all of his vitriol regarding ressentiment and bad conscience he in fact concludes that the man of ressentiment is infinitely more interesting than the mindless warrior thug of the "active forces". He simply hopes for something which can overcome, in the sense of going further than, the man of ressentiment. It is quite possible to interpret Adorno and Horkheimer's "reflective consciousness" as such an overcoming.
- 12.Friedrich Nietzsche. op cit. p111.
13. See for example J.Weeks, 'The Body and Sexuality', in R.Bocock and K.Thompson (eds), Social and Cultural Forms of Modernity. Open University Press, 1992. He says "Foucault has been the most influential of the theorists of the 'social construction' of sexuality approach to the history and sociology of sexuality". p226.
- 14.M.Foucault, Discipline and Punish. Penguin, Harmondsworth Middlesex, 1987, p25.
- 15.Michel Foucault, Madness and civilisation. London, Routledge, 1989, pp199-220.
- 16.Ibid p203.
- 17.Ibid pp206-207.
- 18.Michel Foucault. Discipline and Punish. Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1987, p221.
- 19.'Critical Theory/Intellectual History' in Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture. L. D. Krizman (ed.), Routledge, London. 1990, p46.
- 20.M.Foucault. Discipline and Punish. Penguin, Harmondsworth. 1987, p25-26.
21. See for example Peter Dews's Logics of Disintegration. Verso, London 1987, pp161-170.
- 22.F.Nietzsche, op cit, pp60-65.
23. Deleuze and Guattari, The Anti Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia Vol. 1. trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1977, p260.
24. There is of course a growing literature on the commodification of policing. See for example F. Leishman et al (eds), Core Issues in Policing. Longman, London, 1996.
25. In the preface to the English translation of The Anti-Oedipus Foucault clearly aligns his work with the Deleuzian project. See G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, op cit.
26. Quoted in A. Silver, 'The Demand For Order in Civil Society: A Review of Some Themes in the History of Urban Crime, Police and Riot', in D.J. Bordua (ed), The Police: Six Sociological Essays. John Wiley, New York, 1967.

27. Decadence and greed, also, are viewed with distaste by policemen wherever they occur in the social hierarchy (some policemen express great satisfaction at the opportunity to tow away an expensive car from a no parking zone). Opportunities to confront the decadent wealthy are few however and even where they do occur the symbolic priority of deference often takes over.

28. A good example of this is S. Spitzer, 'The Rationalisation of Crime Control in Capitalist Society', in S. Cohen and A. Scull (eds), Social Control and The State. Blackwell, Oxford, 1986.

29. Quoted in A. Silver, *op cit*, p1.

30. Quoted in *Ibid*, p8.

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION

This has been a complicated journey through some very diverse material. The underlying reason for this was set out in Chapter 1. There is little in the way of an established sociological tradition suggesting how one might go about examining social phenomena from the point of view of their affective forms. The social actor continues to be treated as a rationally acting individual rather than as a body in a field of emotional forces. Culture continues to be treated, to a large extent, as a series of, codes, structures, or systems, of difference rather than as a series of material flows and forces.¹ As I have shown, it is not that the theoretical tools are completely unavailable. It is rather that sociologists have tended not to use them in the way I am suggesting. Foucault in particular has been subjected to a particularly 'static' interpretation, and many of the major French theorists who could potentially provide a basis for such a sociology (Lacan, Deleuze, Kristeva etc.), while being common currency in cultural studies and amongst some sociological theorists, have had very little impact in theorising empirical sociological research. Empirical sociological studies of culturally embedded affective phenomena are very difficult to find. Indeed precious little has been done in the way of sociological studies attempting to look at phenomena such as hostility, hatred, feelings of threat, feelings of attachment, and so on, since the publication of The Authoritarian Personality, consequently one has to start almost from scratch in bringing together theoretical and empirical materials. The novelty of this approach comes out quite clearly in my methods chapter. There I referred to an article by Foucault to help me argue that affective forms could indeed be 'read off' from text. I had to employ Foucault at that point because it is an issue which does not seem to have occurred to most of those writing the methods literature. It is not an issue on the methods agenda because it is not an issue on the agenda of sociological researchers in general.

My first objective, therefore, has been to help put such questions on the research agenda. I suspect that this will involve not so much an expansion of our image of the social world, as a change in perspective altogether. It is not that affect has not appeared in research findings, rather it tends not to be registered as such because of the way we looked at the world sociologically. Everything begins to look slightly different once the question of affect is foregrounded: a paradigm shift perhaps. In my introduction I suggested the beginnings of a theoretical model for analyzing affect at the social/cultural level. This was a bipolar model which I called the 'Dionysian dialectic'. This theoretical claim, that human emotion inhabits a space between fluidity, flux, 'becoming', on the one hand and stasis, identity, 'being', on the other, has been gradually developed throughout this thesis. Against the background of this theoretical premise I have suggested the existence of *social/cultural forms bound up with the paranoid pole of this 'Dionysian dialectic'*. Such

forms express a desire for order, discipline, control, inclusion and exclusion. They also manifest a suspicion and even hatred of difference, change and fluidity, a suspicion and hostility towards the 'other', and visions of apocalyptic chaos.

In chapter two I suggested that police occupational culture may be examined as a paradigm case of such cultural paranoia. Past research in this area seems to demonstrate the paranoid characteristics described above. Nevertheless this research paints a very static picture of the "police relevant categories" which their world is said to be bound up with. It also paints a fairly static picture of a series of police 'types'. There is little sense of the ambivalence and fragmentation traversing the police subject. The one notable exception to this is Carolyn Steedman's study of Victorian policemen. This is a sensitive study of the history of a changing, multi-faceted and complex police subject, and it has to some extent provided a model here.

I have set out, therefore, to map the interpretive/affective cultural repertoires from which the police subject 'fabricates' himself.

1. I have uncovered and described, in detail, the content of many of the fragmented, and dynamic, affective/interpretive repertoires available to police officers for making sense of the world they inhabit.
2. I have 'read off' the affective forms expressed by those repertoires ('splitting', hostility, disgust etc.).
3. I have charted some of the ambivalence, which permeates this material, provoking anxiety and hostility in subjects dedicated to order and discipline.

As a result I have provided evidence for my basic premise, that these are affective facts, and also for my thesis that the cultural which the police officer inhabits is dominated by paranoid forms. Nevertheless individual police officers inhabit these forms in relatively fluid ways (though they would rather not be so 'fluid'). I have discovered a range of types of affective subject positions between two poles which I called the "re-moraliser" and the "despiser". This is not meant to apply to particular individual officers. My argument is that these are *subject positions not individual types*. Any police officer can inhabit any position on the continuum between the two affective orientations I describe. Individual police officers constantly change their position. Indeed one police officer was quoted both in the section on 're-moralisers'(4.6.3.1) and the section on 'despisers'(4.6.3.6). Different forces will no doubt express paranoid cultural forms to different degrees. But all of this simply serves to reinforce my point that paranoia is a socially determined phenomenon whose effects on the individual vary from one organisational environment to another.

Nevertheless at an abstracted level paranoid forms *do* seem to dominate the police occupational culture in general.

I wish to reemphasise that this has not been a study of the individual psychopathology of police officers. It is not a study of the police authoritarian personality. Such a study would imply that all police officers have the same fixed emotional make-up, that they are, somehow, paranoid personalities all of the time. What I have done is to chart a fluid set of subject positions which any of us could, and to some extent do, fall into. All that is 'different' about the police officer is the sheer volume of paranoid repertoires available to him, and the relatively few non-paranoid repertoires in his occupational culture. There appear to be few repertoires which express an acceptance of ambivalence, which are positive about change and fluidity, are tolerant of difference, and are comfortable and perhaps even excited by the complexity in the world. We can find something of ourselves in the police subject because even if we do have such non-paranoid repertoires available to us we also have our own paranoid ones, and certain circumstances make us all adopt subject positions within such repertoires. This is why we have a sense of uncanny-strangeness and fascination when attempting to understand the police sociologically.

Given that police culture seems to be located at the paranoid pole of the 'Dionysian dialectic' how might we begin to theorise this? I began in chapters 2 and 4 to suggest that it may be connected to the police organisational mandate to 'create order'. When combined with the many sources of ambivalence, fragmentation, unpredictability and so on, charted in chapter 4, then one has a recipe for a 'built in' anxiety, and paranoid responses to that anxiety. The objects and processes within the police officers cognitive field are likely to be sorted into ever more rigid forms reflecting a paranoid cultural interpretation of the world. In chapters 5, 6 and 7 I set out to theorise this process and also to tie it to the wider social processes of scientific objectification, discipline, and governmentality, which define modernity. Does police paranoia, perhaps, tell us something about modernity in general?

In chapter 5 I argued, along with Lacan and Žižek, that the police as agents of governmentality (in Foucault's terms) are in fact representatives of the social "Imaginary". The "Imaginary" is the principle of stasis, boundedness, and specular identity - and the principle underlying all paranoid phenomena. The sacredness of "the uniform" as "moral display" could be understood as a collective "Imaginary". The Lacanian/Žižekian analysis therefore posits the "Imaginary" of the police in a constant struggle with the fluidity of the "Symbolic" (in which they have a quite different 'juridical' identity) and the radical heterogeneity of the "Real". The institutional purpose of the police is to penetrate the 'social body', watch it, and domesticate it; the governmental mandate to ensure "the correct disposition of things". But of course 'the social' in its

"Symbolic" and "Real" dimensions resists Pentheus's attempts at binding, encircling, knowing and controlling. The police have an impossible mandate.

One of the most thought provoking implications of this is that in a world of growing "ontological insecurity" the rest of us may have 'contracted out' our paranoia to the police. Those of us who celebrate difference and hybridity without fear can only do so because we are safe in the knowledge that the police are out there doing the "dirty work". The potentially frightening aspects of diversity and change are contained by the carriers of collective social paranoia. How would the 'liberal minded' *feel* about social and cultural diversity at close quarters if the police were not on the end of the nearest telephone?

Another theme which began to appear in chapter 5 was that of 'idiosyncrasy'. In certain circumstances an alien bodily presence provokes uncomfortable awareness of the "Real" behind the "wall of the Symbolic". With idiosyncrasy I am not talking (here at any rate) about bodies which are somehow alien in themselves. This is not a question of genetics for example. The difference in question is one of affective cultural forms, or "structures of enjoyment" as Zizek calls them. There is nothing 'natural' about such "structures". To make a very crude analogy, they are the 'software' to the body's 'hardware'. Idiosyncrasy is mostly about differences in 'software'. Most of the time we don't notice (or want to notice) the presence of our 'hardware'. But when a differently 'programmed' piece of 'hardware' confronts us (foreign music, dance, speech, cooking and so on) we are reminded of our own mortal, bodily, existence in the "Real". For some of us, some of the time, this is exhilarating, for others it is, somehow, repulsive. "Structures of enjoyment" are not of course complete, coherent structures, though the subjects inhabiting them "Imagine" them to be so. We "Imagine" a special "Thing" which we regard as the source of our "enjoyment" ('nation', 'way of life', 'race' etc.). Since the "structure of enjoyment" is always really fragmentary we are always prone to suspect that something or someone has stolen, or spoiled our "structure of enjoyment". Hostility is directed towards outgroups (ethnic minorities, 'fraudulent' refugees, squatters, homosexuals, and so on) for this crime, and this paranoid phenomenon can become part of the "structure of enjoyment" itself. What I have described in my research findings is the police "structure of enjoyment" from a Zizekian theoretical standpoint. I have uncovered a mass of contradictory and ambivalent cultural fragments with no totality, no overall 'closure'. I found a series of 'ideal objects' with which the police subject attempts to identify, though always in the face of ambivalence. I also discovered, from the point of view of the police officer, a series of idiosyncratic people, groups and activities, which are perceived as threatening to spoil or undermine 'ideal objects' and which therefore become targets of hostility.

In chapter 6 I explored the notion of idiosyncrasy, further, as a reminder of the repressed body, and its

instincts, this time from the perspective of Adorno and Horkheimer's analysis of mass paranoia. They argue that the repression of impulses (such as the mimetic instinct) and associated anxiety relating to possible loss of control of this repressed body, is the driving force behind instrumental rationality, and the urge to dominate in general (the Dionysian dialectic yet again). Adorno and Horkheimer suggest that extreme collective paranoid phenomena such as Fascism tell us something about ourselves, since we all inhabit social worlds containing the affective tensions which have at times resolved themselves into Fascism. But they also suggest that the paranoid forms can be found elsewhere - in science, in liberal democratic politics, in the culture industry, and, I have argued, in police culture. At times in Adorno's work he appears to be explaining these phenomena in terms of the predominance of a fixed personality type. But this does not really fit well with the analysis of paranoia as a social/cultural phenomenon in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. Indeed my own preference for the notion of affective subject positions sits much more comfortably with this latter work. If we read Adorno and Horkheimer in this way then they take us some way towards theorising the 'Dionysian dialectic' at a macro level. We can begin to see human history as a history of affective forces (rather than a series of, individual and collective, rational choices based on some notion of 'interest'). This is linked to a model of cultural authoritarianism, rooted in the unstable repression of the body and its forces. If we read the affective forms described in the account of the "authoritarian personality" not as a personality type but instead as a description of a *cultural authoritarianism* then it looks something like the, much more flexible notion, of a police "structure of enjoyment" - as I have described it in the research findings and chapter 5.

In Chapter 7 I developed further the notion of science as paranoid objectification (a theme which cropped up in Lacan's, Zizek's, and Adorno and Horkheimer's accounts). I suggested how we might therefore look at the police as a power/knowledge matrix (in exactly the same way that Foucault himself analyses the Asylum and the Penitentiary). I argued that the enumeration of the levels and forms of delinquency within the population was, in fact, embedded in the practice of professional policing. This is so to the extent where policing is at least as important in the constitution of the "criminological labyrinth" as the penitentiary, psychiatry and medicine. Just as with the penitentiary the relationship is mutually constitutive. The objectifying and normalising language of positivist criminology becomes a key source of interpretive/affective repertoires for the police - policing and positivism, in part, make sense of each other.

I argued that if we read Foucault through the works of Deleuze and Guattari (as he seems to suggest we should in the introduction to *Anti-Oedipus*) then his whole project looks like an account of the paranoid pole of the 'Dionysian dialectic'. Included in this are the construction of the modern subject as 'rational' (as opposed to 'irrational', 'passionate' etc.); the domestication of the 'other' in its various forms (the mad, the delinquent, the child, the sexually different and so on); the proliferation of discipline, and the wider

developments of governmentality. These are all attempts to dam up the flow of desiring-production, to create stability, passivity, stasis and predictability. They are the means for assembling a multitude of bodies and their forces into the machine of modern society, capitalist production and consumption.

But capitalism seems to have 'built in' de-territorialising effects. What Deleuze and Guattari call "desiring machines" (and what Žižek calls "structures of enjoyment") no longer have the stability over time that they had in the past. They are rapidly broken down and reconstructed for the purposes of exchange and consumption. This is how the channelling of desire through fashion and the culture industry works. It creates fluidity, flux, unpredictable flows. There are schizophrenic tendencies within the capitalist economy.

Such deterritorialisation of the subject, and the paranoid backlash that goes with it, were also central elements in Adorno and Horkheimer's analysis. What I think we find in the work of these various theorists is a convergence in their analyses of the affective conditions of the modern world (though their political perspectives on how things might develop is somewhat different). The processes of deterritorialisation - change, diversity, hybridisation, flux, potential chaos - are accelerating. This indeed has been central to the arguments of theorists of postmodernity. These theorists have described a change in patterns of capital accumulation, the development of, so called, "post-Fordism" or "flexible accumulation". Indeed Lasch and Urry, following Baudrillard, have argued that we have now passed the stage of "flexible accumulation" and moved into "reflexive accumulation" - the marketing of signs. This in itself has involved, from a Deleuzian point of view, a deterritorialisation of circuits of desiring-production. Such deterritorialisation has led to an acceleration of the circulation of capital resulting in changes in our experience of time and space, what Harvey calls "time-space compression". Harvey and Jameson have also described the cultural forms of postmodernism - fragmentation, fluidity, depthlessness, disorientation, and so on - as cultural manifestations of this underlying deterritorialisation of the capitalist economy. Jean Baudrillard has described the erosion of subjectivity and its capture within a "hyperreality" of commodified signs, in the most extreme terms. Jameson's, Harvey's, and Lasch and Urry's neo-Marxist contributions obviously represent one small part of the post-modernism debate. This is not the place to rehearse such a debate however. I simply wish to raise the issue as a relevant one.²

The theorists I have looked at in this thesis examine the paranoid cultural consequences of this increasing deterritorialisation, as well as these "schizophrenic" cultural phenomena.³ Mike Davis, another theorist of postmodernity, has been more attentive to the paranoid backlash (the reterritorialisation) in his work on Los Angeles.⁴ In particular his accounts of the Los Angeles Police Department's extremely and openly aggressive relationship with the black and Hispanic underclass, together with their active cultivation of paranoia in the

wealthy, white middle class enclaves. paints a frightening picture of the direction in which such cultural paranoia may develop. Indeed his description of the developing postmodern world is of a materially 'split' world, in which order is locked into armoured white middle class enclaves and the heterogenous masses of the underclass live outside the enclave walls - an ironic reversal of Foucault's "great confinement" perhaps.

Such forward projections of current developments are at present somewhat speculative. But what is more certain is that cultural paranoia seems likely to converge ever more intensely in an organisation which has a specific mandate to 'make order' in a world of accelerating de-territorialisation. Not only that, but theorists such as Nils Christie have recently argued that, with approaching two million inmates, the United States criminal justice and penal systems have become a major part of the American economy, a "prison-industrial complex".⁵ States such as California have massive prison building programmes, they are *planning for growth*. The American prison population is a 'captive' market. It is the fastest growing sector of the American food industry alone. *Corrections Today* the business magazine for investors in the punishment industry carries advertisements for companies specialising in, amongst other things, prison building, prison management, body restraints, electric stun guns, and "total control packages". *Corrections Today* is a truly frightening *commodification of cultural paranoia*. Describing an article advertising bar coded wristbands for inmates Christie says

Two pictures illustrate the article. Both show black arms - nothing more - with wristbands controlled by white arms in one picture. It is probably not possible to get much closer than that to humans being handled as commodities, based on a technology so well known from the supermarkets.⁶

Readers of the magazine report that it gives the same dark visceral thrill as the "true crime" genre of magazines, or magazines specialising in guns and weaponry. While European penal services have not yet reached this level of commodification, Christie argues that the United States is the "trend setter".

Not only is punishment good business but it appears to be good politics. The "war on drugs" (which has been called elsewhere "a war on blacks"), the introduction of rigid, and draconian, sentencing formulas, support of capital punishment, and the "three strikes" rule have been electorally popular policies in the United States. In this country we have a Home Secretary who is currently toying with some of these policies. Indeed many provisions of the 1994 Criminal Justice Act were widely interpreted as legislative paranoia which was 'playing to the galleries'. As I have indicated in this thesis, police paranoia simply reflects wider currents of paranoid affect, something which political antennae may sometimes tune into.

Some authors have noted the deterritorialisation and increasing commodification of policing itself.⁷ What will be the effects of this further round of deterritorialisation on police occupational culture? The police are providers of "security", they soak up our paranoia, at the price of increasing their own. They have always been in the fear market (recall the quotations from Allan Silver's article in chapter 7). But if fear becomes more explicitly a commodity then how will they respond? Mike Davis's account of the Los Angeles Police Department gives some indication perhaps. But this is something which may require serious thought in the future, and it seems clear that one cannot hope to understand the commodification of paranoia without the development of an affect based sociology of social control of the kind I have begun to develop in this thesis.

While I have begun to think about some of the methodological issues here I believe this needs a lot more work. In particular affective forms do not only, or even primarily, manifest themselves in verbal discourse and text. Observational techniques will have to be developed which are sensitive to the affective aspects of everyday interaction. Descriptions of body-states relating to phenomena such as tenseness, anxiety, aggression, hyper-activity, fear and so on, must be developed and formalised. To take one example, in my fieldwork I noted that one would expect men who had just spent the previous four hours on their feet to flop in a chair and relax during their lunch break. A few did but many spent their lunch breaks playing games such as snooker and badminton or working out in the gym. What does this say about their general states of physical arousal, and how could such material be integrated into sociological research?⁸

In what directions could the theoretical basis for such a sociology develop? While my feeling is that the sort of combination of sociology and psychoanalytic theory developed by Zizek and Adorno takes us a long way, it has its limitations. In particular it refers rather loosely to a body with impulses, but while the social and cultural theory is sophisticated, the physiology is naive to say the least. Deleuze and Guattari are far more eclectic theorists than Zizek and Lacan, and in their more recent work, in particular in *What is Philosophy*, they have raised the possibility of a convergence between materialist philosophy, art and neuro-science.⁹ My own closely related interest is in a convergence between sociology and the sciences of the body. The 'knee-jerk' reaction in sociology against socio-biology has for too long made such a convergence out of the question. The consequence is that reductionist and individualist models of human action have dominated the terrain of the sciences of the body, and in sociology there has been no serious attempt to deal with the somatic. We find biological reductionism on one side and sociological reductionism on the other. But socio-biology does not have to end up in individualistic biological determinism. We all have a somatic level of existence, which involves a body with a complex nervous system. *Our nervous systems are open systems interacting with their environment and with other nervous systems, through the medium of culture.* The affective cultural forms I have been describing in this thesis are embodied in groups of human nervous

systems. But even with a sophisticated understanding of cultural phenomena, how can one properly understand the mechanisms of idiosyncrasy, projection, "enjoyment", attachment, and so on, without having some understanding, and vocabulary for, the material organisation of the human body and nervous system? It is time that sociology fought for the terrain upon which the sciences of the body are located. It is perhaps time for a new, non-reductionist, non-individualistic, socio-biology.

Notes

1. This has begun to change, see for example S.Lash and J.Urry, Economies of Signs and Space. Sage, London, 1994.

2. J.Baudrillard, For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign. Telos, St Louis, 1981. D.Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity. Blackwell, Oxford, 1989. F.Jameson, Postmodernism: Or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Verso, London, 1991. S.Lasch and J.Urry, op cit.

3. Jameson specifically identifies postmodern culture with "schizophrenia". F.Jameson, op cit, pp1-54.

4. M.Davis, City of Quartz. Verso, London, 1990.

5. N.Christi, Crime Control as Industry. Routledge. London. 1993.

6. Ibid, p96.

7. See for example F.Leishman et al, 'Reinventing and Restructuring: Towards a 'New Policing Order' in F.Leishman et al, Core Issues in Policing. Longman, London, 1996.

8. I am grateful to Peter Jowers for pointing out the potential importance of such 'body-states' in a sociology of affect.

9. G.Deleuze and F.Guattari, What is Philosophy? Verso, London, 1994, Conclusion.

APPENDIX 1

Code, age, years of service, rank and department of officers interviewed and transcribed in the main study.

The codes T,V,X,Y, and Z apply to particular stations at which the interviews took place. Descriptions of these stations are given in 'the locations' section of the methods chapter (3.4.4).

- Y1. 40 years old, 22 years service, Detective Sergeant.
- Y2. 31 years old, 10 years service, PC - uniformed.
- Y3. 36 years old, 15 years service, Detective Constable.
- X1. 23 years old, 5 years service, PC - uniformed.
- X2. 29 years old, 2 years service, PC - uniformed.
- X3. 27 years old, 5 years service, PC - uniformed.
- X4. 39 years old, 20 years service, Detective Sergeant.
- X5. 47 years old, 20 years service, PC - uniformed.
- X6. 37 years old, 18 years service, Sergeant - uniformed.
- X7. 35 years old, 16 years service, PC - uniformed.
- W1. 21 years old, 3 years service, WPC - uniformed.
- W2. 34 years old, 10 years service, PC - uniformed.
- W3. 37 years old, 18 years service, Detective constable.
- W4. 25 years old, 3 years service, PC - uniformed.
- W5. 42 years old, 24 years service, Sergeant - uniformed.
- W6. 31 years old, 10 years service, PC on attachment to CID.
- V1. 42 years old, 18 years service, Sergeant - uniformed.
- V2. 35 years old, 14 years service, PC - uniformed.
- V3. 23 years old, 1 years service, PC - on probation.
- V4. 30 years old, 6 years service, PC - acting up to Sergeant.
- V5. 39 years old, 21 years service, PS - uniformed.

- V6. 48 years old, 29 years service, Woman Police Sergeant - Womens police Unit.
- V7. 52 years old, 25 years service, PC - uniformed.
- V8. 40 years old, 9 years service. PC - on attachment to street offences.
- T1. 35 years old, 12 years service, PC - uniformed.
- T2. 35 years old, 7 years service, Sergeant - uniformed.
- T3. 28 years old, 6 years service. PC on attachment to street offences.
- T4. 38 years old, 14 years service. PC - uniformed.
- T5. 39 years old, 13 years service, PC - uniformed.
- T6. 26 years old, 7 years service, PC - uniformed.
- T7. 25 years old, 7 years service, PC - uniformed.
- T8. 25 years old, 6 years service. PC - uniformed.
- T9. 42 years old, 23 years service, Sergeant - uniformed.
- Z1. 40 years old. 20 years service, PC - uniformed.
- Z2. 21 years old. 9 months service, PC on probation.
- Z3. 47 years old, 21 years service, Sergeant - uniformed.

APPENDIX 2

Full listing of sections, sub-sections, and sub-sub-section of chapter 4 - 'The Research Findings'.

4.0.0.0 Introduction

4.1.0.0 PART 1 - AFFECT AT THE MOST GENERAL LEVEL

4.1.1.0 Feeling for right and wrong

4.1.2.0 The enjoyment of closure

4.1.3.0 Sources of bad feelings

4.1.3.1 Stress and trauma

4.1.3.2 Resentment/anxiety about overwork, growing chaos, and lack of understanding

4.1.3.3 Police associated with the bad - linked to alienation and fear

4.1.3.4 "Dirty work" and rejection by the middle classes

4.1.3.5 Anxiety and authority

4.1.3.6 Laughing and being laughed at

4.1.3.7 Boundary between work and non-work

4.1.3.8 The permanence of suspicion, life as policework, the instrumentality of human interaction.

4.1.4.0 The management of bad feelings

4.1.4.1 Resentment and low moral - the impact on "police property"

4.1.4.2 Disgust with idleness

4.1.4.3 When someone is nasty it makes you nasty

4.1.4.4 Perception of hatred and danger of violent attack

4.1.4.5 Cynicism

4.1.4.6 The badness of human nature

4.1.4.7 Human stupidity

4.1.4.8 General feelings of threat

4.1.5.0 Splitting

4.1.5.1 Geographical splitting

4.1.5.2 Community fragmentation and alienation

4.1.5.3 Two communities - the "silent majority"

4.1.5.4 Alienation from the rest of society and the splitting of perspectives

4.1.5.5 The policeman as split personality

4.1.6.0 Permanent Crisis

4.2.0.0 PART 2 - THE MAJOR THREATENING OBJECT

4.2.1.0 (Object 1) The dangerous individual

4.2.1.1 "Getting a job" on someone

4.2.1.2 The marked man

4.2.1.3 Targeting threats

4.2.2.0 (Object 2) The criminal fraternity - material of everyday policing

- 4.2.2.1 The human dustbin - dirty work in the "Transitional Zone"
- 4.2.2.2 Rubbish and good class villains
- 4.2.2.3 The unemployed
- 4.2.2.4 The crime of being a claimant
- 4.2.2.5 Violence
- 4.2.2.6 The cunning of the dangerous classes
- 4.2.2.7 Hatred

4.2.3.0 (Object 3) Problem families

- 4.2.3.1 Asian alien family standards, Afro Caribbean non-standards, in the "Jungle"

4.2.4.0 (Object 4) "The black problem"

- 4.2.4.1 Inherently violent
- 4.2.4.2 The structure of the black criminal classes
- 4.2.4.3 Black youth hedonism: The flaunting of criminality, the mocking of authority, the profits of crime
- 4.2.4.4 Public visibility: "the mob".
- 4.2.4.5 Bad attitude and a "chip on the shoulder"
- 4.2.4.6 "Them" as racist and resentful (projected prejudice)
- 4.2.4.7 "Their" perceptions of "us"
- 4.2.4.8 The unreliability of ethnic minorities as witnesses - liars
- 4.2.4.9 Grudging awe of the tough men on the front line
- 4.2.4.10 White criminals in the black community

4.2.5.0 (Object 5) Youth

- 4.2.5.1 Universal suspiciousness of the young black man
- 4.2.5.2 Working class and "black" boys grow up quicker so are more culpable

4.2.6.0 (Object 6) Alternative lifestyles

- 4.2.6.1 Homosexuality
- 4.2.6.2 Being a problem by being different

4.3.0.0 PART 3 - THE MINOR THREATENING OBJECT

4.3.1.0 (Object 1) Other policemen and the criminal justice system

- 4.3.1.1 Treacherous, weak, and incompetent superiors
- 4.3.1.2 Weak and inconsistent Crown Prosecution Service
- 4.3.1.3 Weak and inconsistent courts, corrupt lawyers
- 4.3.1.4 Right to silence

4.3.2.0 (object 2) Agitators, trouble makers, middle class extremists

4.3.3.0 (Object 3) The mass media

- 4.3.3.1 The mass media and moral corruption
- 4.3.3.2 The glamorising of crime in the media

4.4.0.0 PART 4 - THE THREATENING MECHANISM

4.4.1.0 (Mechanism group 1) The threat to disciplinary processes and institutions

- 4.4.1.1 Unemployment and moral degeneration
- 4.4.1.2 Home ownership
- 4.4.1.3 Youth and the dangers of the period of transition
- 4.4.1.4. The move to less visible criminality
- 4.4.1.5 Why there are no ameliorative effects of family life on black men
- 4.4.1.6 Education, intelligence, discipline, and values
- 4.4.1.7 The threat of modern family life.

4.4.2.0 (Mechanism group 2) The ineffectiveness of punishment

- 4.4.2.1 The growth of parental hostility to informal policing, the weakness of the courts, and the sense of impotence
- 4.4.2.2 Differing social positions and power of deterrence: having nothing to lose
- 4.4.2.3 Peer pressure, bravado, the kudos of criminality

4.4.3.0 (Mechanism group 4) Loss of respect, the problem of territory, and the sense of impotence

- 4.4.3.1 Losing control of territory

4.4.4.0 (Mechanism 4) Alcohol

4.4.5.0 (Mechanism 5) The ambivalence of class

4.4.6.0 Policing the explanation of crime

- 4.4.6.1 Demanding an account

4.5.0.0 PART 5 - THE IDEAL OBJECT

4.5.1.0 The family and the "decent way of life"

4.5.2.0 The victim

4.5.3.0 Extra legal protecting of the "community"

4.5.4.0 Interpreting the "spirit of the law" to serve "society"

4.5.5.0 Important and unimportant laws

- 4.5.5.1 The adequacy of the law

4.5.6.0 Mr average, the woman, the child

4.6.0.0 PART 6 - AFFECTIVE POLICING STYLES

4.6.1.0 The ambiguities of policing

4.6.2.0 A desire for order

- 4.6.2.1 Ex-services
- 4.6.2.2 Ambivalent feelings about PACE
- 4.6.2.3 Use of discretion in combatting the threat to order
- 4.6.2.4 "Pet hates" and "gypsies" warnings: The enjoyment of willing order

4.6.3.0 Towards a typology of affective orientations

4.6.3.1 (Type 1) The re-moralisers

4.6.3.2 Re-moralisation - or removal from the community?

4.6.3.3 Re-moralisation - iron hand in a velvet glove

4.6.3.4 (Type 2) Professional crime fighting amongst the 'despised'

4.6.3.5 Containment

4.6.3.6 Talking on 'their' level

4.6.3.7 "People don't respond to niceness"

4.6.3.8 The limits of typology

4.6.4.0 "Sensitive" versus "positive" policing

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- T. Adorno et al. The Authoritarian Personality. Norton, New York, 1969.
- T. Adorno and M. Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment. Allen Lane, London, 1973.
- J. Annette, 'Benthams Fear of Hob-Goblins: Law, Political Economy, and the State', in Capitalism and The Rule of Law. Bob Fine et al (eds), Hutchinson, London, 1979.
- J. Baudrillard, For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign. Telos, St Louis, 1981.
- T. Bennet, 'The Exhibitionary Complex', New Formations. No 4, Spring 88.
- J. Bird, 'Bodies, Boundaries and Solidarities: A Psychoanalytic Account of Racism and Ethnic Hatred', in J. Weeks (ed), The Lesser Evil and the Greater Good: The Theory and Politics of Social Diversity. Rivers Oram, London, 1994.
- E. Bittner, 'Florence Nightingale in Pursuit of Willie Sutton: A Theory of the Police', in H. Jacobs (ed) The Potential for Reform of Criminal Justice. Sage, London, 1974.
- E. Bittner, The Functions of the Police in Modern Society. Jason Aronson, New York, 1975.
- D. J. Bordua (ed), The Police: Six Sociological Essays. John Wiley, New York, 1967.
- M. Bowie, Lacan. Fontana, London, 1991.
- A. Bryman and R. G. Burgess, 'Developments in Qualitative Data Analysis: An Introduction', in Analyzing Qualitative Data. A. Bryman and R. G. Burgess (eds), Routledge, London, 1994.
- R. Burgess, In the Field: An Introduction to Field Research. George and Allen Unwin, London, 1984.
- V. Burgin, 'Paranoiac Space', New Formations. no 12, Winter 1990.
- M. Cain, Society and the Policeman's Role. Routledge, London, 1973.
- C. Cassell and G. Symon, 'Qualitative Research in Work Contexts', in C. Cassell and G. Symon (eds), Qualitative Methods in Organisational Research. Sage, London, 1994.
- N. Christi, Crime Control as Industry. Routledge, London, 1993.
- P. Colquhoun, Treatise on the Policing of the Metropolis. 1797.
- F. Crews, 'The Unknown Freud', in The New York Review of Books. Vol. XI, No. 19, Nov. 18, 1993.
- T. A. Critchley, A History of Police in England and Wales (second edition), Patterson Smith, New Jersey, 1972.
- M. Davis, City of Quartz. Verso, London, 1990.

- G.Deleuze and F.Guattari, The Anti Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia Vol. 1, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1977.
- G.Deleuze and F.Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia Vol. 2 trans. B.Massumi, Athlone, London, 1992.
- G.Deleuze and F.Guattari, What is Philosophy, Verso, London, 1994.
- P.Dews Logics of Disintegration, Verso, London 1987.
- M. Douglas, Purity and Danger, Routledge, London, 1978.
- E.Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society, Free Press, New York, 1964.
- E.Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1964
- E.Durkheim, Primitive Classifications, Cohen and West, London, 1969.
- J.P.Euben, The Tragedy of Critical Theory: The Road Not Taken, Princeton University Press, Princeton New Jersey, 1990
- D.M.Fetterman, 'A walk thorough the wilderness: learning to find your way', in W.B.Shaffir and R.A.Stebbins (eds), Experiencing Fieldwork: An Inside View of Qualitative Research, Sage, Newbury Park CA, 1991.
- N.G.Fielding and J.Fielding, 'Police Attitudes to Crime and Punishment', British Journal of Criminology, Vol.31, No.1, Winter 1991.
- M.Foucault, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', in Language, Counter Memory, Practice, Blackwell, Oxford, 1977.
- M.Foucault, Discipline and Punish, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1987.
- M.Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1987.
- M.Foucault, 'The Dangerous Individual', in L.D.Kritzman (ed), Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture, Routledge, London, 1988.
- M.Foucault, Madness and civilisation, London, Routledge, 1989.
- M.Foucault, 'Critical Theory/Intellectual History' in Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture, L. D. Kritzman (ed.), Routledge, London, 1990.
- M.Foucault, 'Governmentality', in G.Burchell et al (eds.), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1991.
- S.Freud, 'Project for a Scientific Psychology', in The Standard Edition of The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, trans J.Strachey, Vol.1, Hogarth Press, London, 1964.
- S.Freud, 'An Outline of Psychoanalysis', in The Standard Edition of The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, trans J.Strachey, Vol.XXIII, Hogarth Press, London, 1964.

- H.Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology. Prentice Hall, 1967.
- C.Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures. Fontana, London, 1993.
- H.H.Gerth and C.Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Routledge, 1993 (1952).
- A.Giddens, Studies in Social and Political Theory. Hutchinson, London, 1979.
- A.Giddens, Modernity and Self Identity. Cambridge, Polity Press, 1991.
- G.N.Gilbert and M.Mulkay, Opening Pandora's Box: a Sociological Analysis of Scientists' Discourse. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984.
- C.Gilmour, 'Freuds Androids', in J.Neu (ed), The Cambridge Companion to Freud. Cambridge, Cambridge, 1991.
- P.Gilroy, 'The Myth of Black Criminality', in P.Scraton (ed), Law, Order and the Authoritarian State. Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1987.
- B.G.Glaser and A.L.Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research. Chicago, Aldine, 1967.
- R.Graef, Talking Blues: the Police in their Own Words. Collins Harvill, 1989.
- R.Grimshaw and T.Jefferson, Interpreting Policework: Policy and Practice in Forms of Beat Policing. Allen and Unwin, London, 1987.
- J.Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society. trans. Thomas McCarthy, Heinemann, London, 1979.
- J.Habermas, The Theory of communicative Action Vol 1 - Reason and Rationalisation of Society. trans. T.McCarthy, Heinemann, London, 1984.
- J.Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action Vol 2 - Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason. Heinemann, London, 1984.
- I.Hacking, 'How Should we do the History of Statistics?', in G.Burchell et al (eds), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality. Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1991.
- D.Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity. Blackwell, Oxford, 1989.
- J.Heritage, Garfinkel and Ethnomethodology. Polity Press, Cambridge, 1984.
- D.Hobbs, Doing the Business: Entrepreneurship, the Working Class, and Detectives in the East End of London. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989.
- P.Hoggett, 'A Place for Experience: A Psychoanalytic Perspective on Boundary, Identity, and Culture', in Society and Space. vol 10, 1992.
- P.Hoggett, The Internal Establishment. unpublished paper. 1995.

- S.Holdaway, Inside the British Police. Blackwell, Oxford, 1983.
- D.Hollier (ed), The College of Sociology 1937-39. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1988.
- E.C.Hughes, 'Good People and Dirty Work', in E.C.Hughes, The Sociological Eye. Chicago, Aldine, 1971.
- F.Jameson, Postmodernism: Or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Verso, London, 1991.
- S.Jones and M.Levi, 'The Police and the Majority: The Neglect of the Obvious', Police Journal. vol. LVI, no.4, 1983.
- D.L.Jorgensen, Participant Observation: A Methodology for the Human Sciences. Sage, Newbury Park CA, 1989.
- P.Jowers, 'Towards the Politics of a Lesser Evil', in J.Weeks, The Lesser Evil and the Greater Good: The Theory and Politics of Social Diversity. Rivers Oram, London, 1994.
- P.Jowers and S.Watson, 'Somatology: Towards a Sociology of the Visceral', in D.Owen, Sociology after Postmodernism. Sage, London, 1996.
- N.King, 'The Qualitative Research Interview', in C.Cassell and G.Symon (eds), Qualitative Methods in Organisational Research. Sage, London, 1994.
- J.Kristeva, Strangers to Ourselves. Harvester, London, 1991.
- J.Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection. trans. Alan Sheridan, Tavistock, London, 1977.
- E.Laclau, New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time. Verso, London, 1990.
- S.Lash and J.Urry, Economies of Signs and Space. Sage, London, 1994.
- J.A.Lee, 'Some Structural Aspects of Police Deviance in Relations With Minority Groups', in C.Shearing (ed) Organisational Police Deviance. Butterworth, Toronto, 1981.
- F.Leishman et al (eds), Core Issues in Policing. Longman, London, 1996.
- E.M.Lemert, 'Paranoia and the Dynamics of Exclusion', in Human Deviance, Social Problems, and Social Control. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1967.
- J.F.Lyotard, 'The Sublime and The Avant Garde' in A.Benjamin (ed), The Lyotard Reader. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1989.
- J.F.Lyotard, The Inhuman. trans G.Bennington and R. Bowlby, Polity, Cambridge, 1988.
- P.Manning, Police Work. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1977.
- H.Marshall, 'Discourse Analysis in an Occupational Context', in C.Cassell and G.Symon (eds), Qualitative Methods in Organisational Research. Sage, London, 1994.
- K.Marx, Capital vol. 1. Penguin Edition, Harmondsworth, 1979.

- K.Marx, 'Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts', in Early Writings. Penguin, London, 1984.
- P.Mestrovic, The Coming Fin de Siecle. Routledge, London, 1991.
- I.Menzies Lyth, Containing Anxiety in Institutions: Selected Essays. Free Association Books, London, 1988.
- K.Newman, The Principles of Policing and guidance for Professional Behaviour. Public Information Department of the Metropolitan Police, London, 1985.
- F.Nietzsche, On The Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter Kaufmann, New York, Vintage Books, 1969.
- P.Pasquino, 'Criminology: the Birth of a Special Knowledge', in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality. G. Burchell et al (eds), Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1991.
- G.Pearson, Hooligan: A History of Respectable Fears. Macmillan, London, 1983.
- M.Poster (ed), Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings. Polity, Cambridge, 1988.
- J.Potter et al, 'Discourse, Noun, Verb or social practice?'. Philosophical Psychology 3: p205-17, 1990.
- J.Potter and M.Mulkay, 'Scientist interview talk: interviews as a technique for revealing participants' interpretative practices', in M.Brenner, J.Brown, and D.Canter (eds) The Research Interview: Uses and Approaches. Academic Press, London, 1985.
- J.Potter and M.Wetheral, Discourse and Social Psychology: Beyond Attitudes and Behaviour. Sage, London, 1987.
- J.Potter and M.Wetheral, 'Discourse Analysis and Identification of Interpretative Repertoires', In C.Antaki (ed) Analyzing Lay Explanation: a Case Book. Sage, London, 1988.
- J.Potter and M.Wetheral, Mapping the Language of Racism: Discourse and the Legitimation of Exploitation. Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hepstead, 1992.
- J.Potter and M.Wetherell, 'Analyzing Discourse', in Analyzing Qualitative Data. A.Bryman and R.G.Burgess (eds), Routledge, London, 1994.
- P.Reason and J.Rowan, Human Enquiry: A Sourcebook of New Paradigm Research. Wiley, Chichester, 1981.
- R.Reiner, The Blue Coated Worker. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978
- R.Reiner, The Politics of the Police (second edition), Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1992.
- C.Reith, The Police Idea. Oxford University Press, London, 1938.
- C.Reith, Police Principles and the Problem of War. Oxford University Press, London, 1940.
- C.Reith, The British Police and the Democratic Ideal. Oxford University Press, London, 1943.
- C.Reith, A Short History of the British Police. Oxford University Press, London, 1948.

- C.Reith. The Blind Eye of History. Faber and Faber, London, 1952.
- C.Reith. A New Study of Police History. Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1956.
- M.Rustin. The Good Society and The Inner World: Psychoanalysis, Politics and Culture. Verso, London, 1991.
- H.Segal, Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein. Hogarth Press, London, 1975.
- C.Shaw and H.Mackay, Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas. Chicago University Press, 1942.
- A.Silver. 'The Demand for Order in Civil Society: A Review of Some Themes in the History of Urban Crime, Police and Riot', in D.J.Bordua (ed), The Police: Six Sociological Essays. John Wiley, New York, 1967.
- J.H.Skolnick. Justice Without Trial: Law Enforcement in a Democratic Society. John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1966.
- D.J.Smith and J.Gray. Police and People in London: The PSI Report. Gower, Aldershot, 1985.
- S.Spitzer, 'The Rationalisation of Crime Control in Capitalist Society', in S.Cohen and A.Scull (eds), Social Control and The State. Blackwell, Oxford, 1986.
- C.Steedman, Policing the Victorian Community: The Formation of English Provincial Police Forces, 1856-80. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1984.
- A.L.Strauss, Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987.
- F.S.Sulloway, Freud: Biologist of the Mind. Burnett Books, London, 1979.
- A.L.Strauss and J.Corbin, Basics of Qualitative Research. Newbury Park, California, Sage 1990.
- C.Taylor, 'Interpretation and the Sciences of Man' in F.Dallmayre and T.McCarthy (eds), Understanding and Social Enquiry. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1977.
- S.J.Taylor and R.Brogdan, Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods: The Search for Meanings. Wiley, New York, 1984.
- K. Theweleit. Male Fantasies. Polity Press. Cambridge. 1987.
- B.A.Turner. 'Some Practical Aspects of Qualitative Data Analysis: One Way of Organising The Cognitive Processes Associated with the Generation of Grounded Theory', Quality and Quantity 15, 1981.
- J.Van Maanan, 'Working the Street: A Developmental View of Police Behaviour', in H.Jacobs (ed), The Potential for Reform of Criminal Justice. Sage, 1974.
- D.Waddington, 'Participant Observation', in C.Cassell and G.Symon (eds), Qualitative Methods in Organisational Research. Sage, London, 1994.
- S.Watson, 'Symbolic Antagonism: Police Paranoia and the Possibility of Social Diversity', in J.Weeks The Lesser Evil and the Greater Good: The Theory and Politics of Social Diversity. Rivers Oram, London, 1994.

- D.R. Watson and W.W. Sharrock, 'Something on Accounts', The Discourse Analysis Research Group Newsletter 7. 1991.
- M. Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. T. Parsons, Unwin, London, 1970 (1930).
- M. Weber, Economy and Society. University of California Press, 1978.
- J. Weeks, 'The Body and Sexuality', in Social and Cultural Forms of Modernity. R. Bocoock and K. Thompson (eds), Open University Press, 1992.
- W.A. Westley, Violence and the Police: A Sociological Study of Law, Custom, and Morality. The MIT Press, Massachusetts. 1970.
- J.Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behaviour. Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1968.
- M. Young, An Inside Job. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991.
- S. Zizek, The Sublime Object of Ideology. Verso. London. 1989.
- S. Zizek, 'Europe's New Republic of Gilead', New Left Review 183, Sept 1990.
- S. Zizek, For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor. Verso. London. 1991.
- S. Zizek, 'Invisible Ideology', in Journal of Political Ideologies. Volume 1, Number 1, February 1996.