Power indices taking into account agents' preferences
Aleskerov, F. T. (Faud Tagi ogly) (2009) Power indices taking into account agents' preferences. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. (Warwick economic research papers).
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A set of new power indices is introduced extending Banzhaf power index and allowing to take into account agents’ preferences to coalesce. An axiomatic characterization of intensity functions representing a desire of agents to coalesce is given. A set of axioms for new power indices is presented and discussed. An example of use of these indices for Russian parliament is given.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||J Political Science > JC Political theory
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Russia (Federation). Federal'noe Sobranie , Voting research, Preferential ballot, Power (Social sciences)|
|Series Name:||Warwick economic research papers|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick, Department of Economics|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Number of Pages:||21|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
|References:||1. Aleskerov F., Blagoveschenskiy N., Satarov G., Sokolova A., Yakuba V. "Evaluation of power of groups and factions in the Russian parliament (1994- 2003)", WP7/2003/01, Moscow: State University "High School of Economics", 2003 (in Russian) 2. Aleskerov F., Blagoveschensky N., Konstantinov M., Satarov G., Yakuba V. “A balancedness of the 3d State Duma of Russian Federation evaluated by the use of claster-analysis”, WP7/2005/04, Moscow: State University "High School of Economics", 2005 (in Russian) 3. Arrow K.J. “Social Choice and Individual Values, – 2nd ed., New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963. 4. Banzhaf, J. F., “Weighted Voting Doesn't Work: А Mathematical Analysis”, Rutgers Law Review, 1965, v.19, 317-343. 5. Brams S. “Game Theory and Politics”, The Free Press, New York, 1975 6. Felsenthal D., Machover М "The Measurment of Voting Power: Theory and Practices, Problems and Paradoxes", Edgar Elgar Publishing House, 1998 7. Grofman, В. and Н. Scarrow “Ianucci and Its Aftermath: The Application of Banzhaf index to Weighted Voting in the State of New York”, Brams, S., Schotter А. апd G Schwodiatuer (eds.) Applied Game Theory, 1979 8. Heme, К. and Н Nurmi “А Priori Distribution of Power in the EU Council of Ministers and the European Parliament”, Scandinavian Journal оf Ро1ilitical Studies, 1993, v.16, 269-284 9. Intriligator M.D. “A Probabilistic Model of Social Choice”, The Review of Economic Studies, v.XL(4), 1973, 553-560. 10. Laruelle A., Valenciano F. “Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices revisited”, Mathematics of Operations Research, v.26, 2001, 89-104. 11. Leech, D. “Voting power in the governance of the International Monetary Fund”, Annals of Ореrations Research, 2002, v.109, 375-397. 12. Shapley, L.S., and M. Shubik “A method for Evaluting the Distribution of Power in a Committee System”, American Political Science Review, 1954, v. 48, 787- 792.|
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