Specific excise taxation in a unionized differentiated duopoly
UNSPECIFIED. (2000) Specific excise taxation in a unionized differentiated duopoly. PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEW, 28 (4). pp. 351-371. ISSN 0048-5853Full text not available from this repository.
This article considers the incidence and welfare effects of a specific excise tax in a unionized duopoly model with differentiated products, linear demand and cost curves, and wage bargaining. The article allows for both Cournot and Bertrand competition. The article shows that unionization lowers the degree of undershifting of the tax on the producer's net price, the marginal increase in the consumer's price, and the employment loss. The excess burden of an equal revenue tax is higher with a unionized labor market and higher with Cournot than Bertrand competition. Unionization increases the optimal output subsidy with wage bargaining.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HG Finance|
|Journal or Publication Title:||PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEW|
|Publisher:||SAGE PUBLICATIONS INC|
|Official Date:||July 2000|
|Number of Pages:||21|
|Page Range:||pp. 351-371|
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