From “La lucha está aquí!” to “we’re natural diplomats”: Generational change and Hispanic elite engagement with US foreign policy

by

Benjamin Mark William Gannon

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This thesis is dedicated to the three women in my life: Karen, Charlotte and Jenny.

A continuous source of love, inspiration and support.
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Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work. No part of this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree at any other university or institution of higher learning. I further declare that no material contained within this thesis has been used previously, or has been published.

Word Count

71,267
Abstract

The Hispanic population is the largest ethnic minority group in the United States and is projected to make up nearly one in three Americans by 2050. While the consequences of this demographic shift continue to be a growing area of interest for researchers of domestic politics, the potential implications for US foreign policy remain relatively overlooked. This paucity of attention is due in part to an assumption that Latino elites are almost exclusively focused on domestic concerns at the expense of foreign policy, evidenced by a lack of observable attempts by Hispanic elites to lobby the US government to influence foreign policy outcomes.

This thesis argues that this assumption is misguided as it fails to appreciate the extent to which Hispanic elites engage with US foreign policy where it highlights, advances or compliments their domestic agenda. To demonstrate this point, the thesis examines case studies of foreign policy engagement by three political generations of Hispanic American elites: The Chicano generation in the 1960s and early 1970s, the Exile generation during the 1980s, and the pan-ethnic Latino generation from the 1990s to the present day. Drawing on extensive interviews with foreign diplomats, Latino advocacy organisations and Hispanic Americans working within foreign policy-related careers in the federal government, the thesis demonstrates that when the scope of foreign policy engagement is sufficiently broadened, a history of sophisticated discourse and policy engagement is revealed. The thesis findings therefore offer an original contribution to knowledge through the novelty of its central claim, the inclusion of new empirical evidence, as well as through the presentation of a new analytical framework – that of the political generation as a unit of analysis – with which to study ethnic minority group engagement with US foreign policy.
Introduction

“Make America Mexico Again!” was a slogan that materialised as one of the many rallying calls for Hispanic campaigners during the 2016 election cycle. Beginning as a Twitter hashtag, its usage and popularity grew exponentially after a young activist in New York named Jeronimo Saldaña began raising money for the refrain to be printed onto red baseball caps in a satire of Donald Trump’s ‘Make America Great Again’ (MAGA) campaign.¹

As Saldaña explained in media interviews following high sales of the caps, the idea was to highlight what he perceived as the anti-immigrant undercurrent behind the MAGA messaging. From early in the campaign, Trump had claimed that the first half of the 20th century represented the zenith of US power, prestige and national accomplishment and it was to this imagined moment of American greatness that he was promising voters a triumphant return.² Like many Hispanic activists, Saldaña suspected that behind this sentiment lurked an emphasis on an un-stated additional characteristic of this period: It reflected an era when the US population was overwhelmingly white, with Hispanics comprising less than 3.5% of the overall population.³ As a result, many activists objected to what they interpreted as the dog-whistle meaning being signalled with this slogan: an appeal to a less ethnically diverse America, a time when the rights of many minority groups were significantly limited.

The sentiment behind “Make America Mexico Again” (MAMA) was therefore an attempt to turn the narrative being promoted by the Trump campaign on its head, by drawing attention to the historical circumstances that led to many Hispanics finding themselves within the territorial boundaries of the United States:

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² Ibid.
emphasising that for much of US history, the land that now comprised the southwest United States had in fact been part of Mexico. The transferal of sovereignty over much of the southwest territory only occurred following the ratification of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which ended the Mexican-American war in 1848 and saw large swathes of land stretching from California to Colorado become incorporated into the United States. As a result, the message that activists wanted to convey in 2016 was that for many Hispanics, their families had never actively crossed the border to enter the United States; their citizenship was instead a consequence of the machination of 19th century US foreign policy. As a slogan, “Make America Mexico Again” therefore served to emphasise an ‘origin story’ that was radically different from the conventional depiction.

Saldaña and his fellow Hispanic activists did not mean for the sentiment behind this slogan to be taken literally. Instead, they were using this theme to discredit the notion of a romanticised Anglo-dominant period in US history, by challenging the status of Hispanic immigrants as a subject of political discourse. This slogan was taken up by many pro-immigration groups and adorned banners, posters, and t-shirts of campaign activists. A viral YouTube video by a pro-Clinton political action committee saw young Latino activists criticise Trump’s immigration stances while wearing MAMA T-shirts.⁴

In contrast, conservative political commentators and anti-immigration groups chose to view the adoption of the MAMA slogan as a symbol of the threats posed by immigration itself. Some suggested the sentiment was to be taken as evidence of a threat from Mexican nationals unwilling to assimilate to US political values.⁵ Others interpreted it as a warning of the mobilisation of voting immigrants by a Democratic


party that had encouraged a narrative of non-assimilation in the hope of securing votes from immigrants.⁶

The adoption of the MAMA slogan and the conservative reaction to it - a relatively small vignette within an electoral cycle overflowing with news-worthy idiosyncrasies - reflects two distinct traditions of engagement with the history of US foreign policy, its implications for national security, and the consequences of immigration: The first tradition concerns the use by Hispanic activists of a politicised re-evaluation of US sovereignty over the territorial southwest as a vehicle for challenging the public discourse surrounding Hispanic immigrants. The second tradition; the framing of Hispanics as a threat to the United States, can be seen in the conservative reaction to the MAMA slogan: The suggestion that its use by Hispanic activists reflected a community that refused to politically assimilate, instead choosing to flirt with alternative political loyalties to Mexico, reflects a sentiment that has been a prominent feature of public discourse since the late 1980s.

The case study of the MAMA slogan’s success offers a glimpse at the kind of complex engagement with US foreign policy, diplomatic history and national security that Hispanic activists have conducted for decades. Despite this, academic scholars of ethnic interest group engagement with US foreign policy have tended to dismiss the role of Hispanic Americans, pointing to a lack of any influence on the outcomes of US foreign policy as evidence of a lack of engagement on the part of Hispanic elites.

However, as the MAMA case illustrates, there is an obvious space for Hispanic engagement with the wider discourse surrounding US foreign policy, including a sophisticated inter-contextualisation of the history of US foreign policy with contemporary domestic-orientated policies such as immigration. As a result, this thesis will explore and analyse the depth of Hispanic engagement with US foreign policy, in the hope of drawing attention to an under-studied topic area.

⁶ See, for example: D. Cadman, “Make America Mexico Again”, Center for Immigration Studies, 16 May, 2016. [https://cis.org/Cadman/Make-America-Mexico-Again]
This thesis is based on the central research question: *Under what circumstances, and in what ways, do Hispanic American elites engage with US foreign policy?*

To answer this question, the research consists of an analysis of engagement with US foreign policy by three political generations of Hispanic American elites.\(^7\) It draws on interviews conducted between 2015 and 2017 with nineteen nationally-focused Latino advocacy organisations (LAOs), two environmental policy-focused LAOs, sixteen Hispanic American individuals working in foreign policy-related careers within the US federal government, and three Mexican-American civil rights leaders that participated in the anti-war protests within the Chicano movement during the late 1960s and early 1970s. In addition, further interviews were conducted with ten individuals working within the diplomatic and consular networks of three states: The United Kingdom, Canada and Mexico, as well as with a diplomat from a fourth state that wished to remain anonymous. Further research was conducted from an analysis of historical documents from archives held at the University of Southern California; the University of California, Los Angeles; California State University, Los Angeles; as well as the East Los Angeles Library.

The thesis makes the following original contributions to knowledge, based on the following four claims:

Firstly, it demonstrates that Hispanic American elites do engage with US foreign policy in a number of ways, but do so where it supports or compliments their domestic-focused campaigns and agendas. In addition, since the emergence of the pan-ethnic Latino generation elites from the 1990s to the present day, the thesis confirms the findings of earlier research studies that argue that Hispanic American elites do not routinely lobby the US government on behalf of Latin American states.

\(^7\) In this thesis, the term ‘Hispanic’ and ‘Hispanic American’ are used interchangeably to refer to individuals and groups originating from Latin America, or who identify with a Latin American heritage. These terms are operationalised so as to encompass both national origin groups such as Mexican-Americans or Cuban-Americans, as well as pan-ethnic labels referring to the Latin American ethnic demographic in the US as a whole. The term ‘Latino’ is used to refer specifically to individuals and groups who fall within the ‘Latino generation’ category outlined in Chapter 2.
Secondly, it demonstrates that by broadening the analytical scope of foreign policy engagement, it is possible to identify a range of examples of foreign policy engagement than that which had been previously considered by the academic literature. Whereas the majority of previous research had limited the scope of its analysis to the extent to which Hispanic Americans have a direct influence on policy outcomes, this study broadens out the perimeters of legitimate ‘foreign policy engagement’ so to encompass engagement with US foreign policy discourse, resulting in a considerable amount of additional foreign policy engagement being revealed.

Thirdly, whilst this provides new empirical evidence to substantiate and support the findings of some previous literature that Hispanic American elites are not the ‘threat’ to US foreign policy that high-profile critics have suggested they are, it also critically challenges a number of literature assumptions, including that the domestic-policy and foreign-policy agendas of Hispanic American elites were mutually exclusive.

Finally, it emphasises the necessity of recognising the importance of different Hispanic political generations in order to understand Hispanic American foreign policy engagement, and presents a generational approach, based on the work of Mario T. García, as an alternative analytical framework for understanding foreign policy engagement.

This chapter will provide an introduction to the main thesis. It will first demonstrate the contemporary relevance and importance of this research question, presenting it within the context of the significant demographic changes that have occurred within the United States since the 1990s, and the anticipation that Hispanic Americans are likely to rise in importance as political actors as they come to represent an increasingly large percentage of the overall US population in the 21st century. It will then demonstrate the importance and need for new research examining the foreign policy engagement by this Hispanic American community, given that the assumption of Latino political ascendancy has led a number of important US international
partners to significantly increase their outreach efforts to Hispanic elites within the US, under the assumption that they will come to play an important role in determining the future of US bilateral relations with their respective governments. These activities are examined in further detail in four case studies of states which have increased their engagement with the Hispanic community since 2012: that of Israel, the United Kingdom, Canada and Mexico. The chapter will then provide an outline for the structure of the thesis, summarising the case studies and themes within each chapter.

The political ascendancy of Hispanic Americans

Within the last decade, there has been an upsurge in research investigating the racial and ethnic demographic makeovers that are set to transform the United States. By 2050, the United States is predicted to be an ethnic minority-majority population, partly from immigration, but also due to exponential growth in domestic-born minorities. The Hispanic population will continue to be the driving force behind much of this change. In 2011, Hispanics became the second largest ethno-racial group in the US, and in 2014 became the single largest overall ethnic group in California, the state with the largest population, and is set to do the same in Texas by 2022.

The statistical significance of Hispanics, coupled with their heavy concentration in key swing states such as Florida, has led to some analysts, such as the demographic consultancy firm Ethnifacts, to declare the next hundred years as the ‘Hispanic Century’. In this analysis, the 21st century will be characterised by the social, economic and political ascendancy of Hispanic Americans. Following a logic of

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strength through size, such predictions anticipate that as Hispanics will continue to play an ever-increasing role in the labour market, enrol in education and participate in social security programmes, their political power is likely to increase even further.

As a result, the last few years have witnessed the emergence of a public intellectual discussion over the extent to which these demographic changes, and the growth in the Hispanic American population, is likely to have an impact on the way that US foreign policy is conceived, debated and conducted. In a 2014 article for Chatham House, the UK-based international relations think tank’s ‘US Policy’ director and the former National Security Council staffer Xenia Wickett, suggested that the US’ rapidly changing ethnic composition, driven by Hispanic American growth, could lead to a more “open” and “accepting” foreign policy.11 Following the same theme, two US think tanks, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) have in recent years establish diversity programs, inviting ethnic minority speakers to contribute to discussions on foreign policy issues in the anticipation that ethnic perceptions will be of increasing importance in the 21st century.12 Looking specifically at Hispanic Americans, the Chicano Council on Global Affairs conducted a survey of Latino perspectives on US foreign policy in 2015 to determine how far their views were consistent with the rest of the US population13, and in the same year a joint paper published by the US-based Center for American Progress (CAP) and the Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE) in Mexico examined the possible impact of the growth of the Hispanic American population on US-Mexico relations.14

13 The results of this survey are analysed in further detail in Chapter 5.
In addition to this recent domestic curiosity in the potential impact of Hispanic Americans on US foreign policy, the growing political importance of the demographic has led to an increased interest in the community from foreign states looking to ensure their long-term bilateral relations with the US. In particular, this has become a priority for states that have a significant number of economic and political ties to the US and who view the long-term maintenance of positive relations with Washington’s elected government as a national priority. As part of this research project, the Hispanic outreach efforts of four states with significant political, economic, social or historical ties to the US were examined: These were the states of Mexico, Canada, the United Kingdom and Israel. As will be demonstrated in the next section, in the last few years, all four of these states have significantly increased their diplomatic engagement with a Hispanic American audience.

**Mexico**

Out of the four case studies examined here, Mexico has the longest history of developing connections with the Hispanic American community in the US. This is hardly a surprise given the size of the Mexican diaspora and the immediate proximity of the US-Mexico border as well as the economic importance of financial remittances from Mexican migrants to regional economies in Mexico. The importance of these realities to Mexico’s national interest has resulted in Mexico maintaining through a well-establish consular network, a relationship with Mexican-American organisations that have claimed to represent both Mexican nationals working within the United States, as well as undocumented Mexican immigrants.

However, the level of outreach to the Hispanic American community has increased significantly in recent years. The embassy of Mexico began actively tracking the

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15 Some scholars have suggested that these states constitute four of the five most prominent ‘special relationships’, alongside that of Japan, for the US government. See: P. Williams, *British Foreign Policy Under New Labour, 1997–2005* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), P. 37.

16 In a personal interview on the 19th of May, 2017, Alejandro Celorio Alcántara – the head of Hispanic and Migration Affairs at the embassy of Mexico in Washington – explained that while the majority of Mexico’s outreach was targeted at Mexican-Americans, the embassy engaged directly with pan-ethnic ‘Hispanic’ and ‘Latino’ organisations whilst working under an assumption that the
number of Mexican-American migrants as well as overall immigration patterns in 2014, following an assessment that the number of children entering the United States from Mexico was going to have a huge impact on the dynamics of the demographic composition of the US population, which would, in turn, have an impact on the US-Mexico relationship. The same year, Mexico substantially increased its outreach to Mexican-Americans living within the US that were potential beneficiaries of the then newly-announced Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) initiative, that had been a cornerstone of President Obama’s immigration policy. In addition to providing legal, educational and consular assistance to DACA beneficiaries when the program was first announced, some consulates have since agreed to pay the $495 renewal fees for individuals that cannot afford the cost.

For Mexico, this outreach to the DACA recipients has been driven as much by a concern with Mexico’s image amongst Hispanic Americans as it has with fulfilling consular obligations to Mexican citizens living illegally in the US. Mexican officials had been concerned that for second and third generation Hispanic Americans, the image of Mexico presented by their immigrant parents is a negative one, with socio-economic and political conditions sufficiently bad that it forced them to migrate north. The fear for Mexico’s politicians is that as these later-generation Latinos gain in political influence, their prejudices towards their ancestral homeland will result in a damaging of the US-Mexico bilateral relationship. Therefore, the increased level of outreach since 2014 reflects an enthusiasm from Mexico to capitalise on immigration reform as a way to build bridges with these Mexican-Americans. Alejandro Celorio Alcántara, the head of Hispanic and Migration Affairs section at the Mexican embassy in Washington, articulated this sentiment in his interview:

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17 Interview with Alejandro Celorio Alcántara, Natalia Jimenez and Ximena García, 19th May, 2017.
18 Ibid.
20 Interview with Alejandro Celorio Alcántara, Natalia Jimenez and Ximena García, 19th May, 2017.
People came to this country in the 1960s and 1970s and 1980s with a mindset that Mexico is corrupt and the institutions are weak. So we have to do a lot to regain their trust and rebuild those bridges. Their children, and DACA, has helped a lot. Because those kids that were brought here, when they were three or four, in the 1980s, had heard a lot about corruption in Mexico and blackmail opportunities. So when they were served by the consulates to obtain their DACA status, they were able to see that the consulates do a lot more than issue passports... and we want them to think that “Mexico is not what I thought it was”, so we have a lot of consular diplomacy, and we are very aggressive in sending the message that Mexico is a lot different, a lot has changed since your parents came.21

This sentiment reflected an active concern that the negative image of Mexico amongst later-generation Hispanic Americans poses a significant threat to Mexico’s standing as the Hispanic American population grows in the 21st century. These attempts at displaying the generosity of the Mexico diplomatic apparatus in aiding the immigration process for undocumented Mexicans in the hope of casting itself in a benevolent light, has been accompanied in recent years by attempts to bring DACA recipients, who the Mexican government fears will share the same prejudices about Mexico as 2nd and 3rd generation Hispanic Americans, to Mexico for cultural and educational exchanges, in the hope that this promotes an affinity with a Mexican heritage.22

These overtures to the Mexican-American community reflect the opposite of an attempt to leverage the presence of a large diasporic and heritage population in the US into a foreign policy lobby promoting Mexico’s interests. Instead, Mexico is putting considerable outreach efforts into an attempt to counteract the damage of the existence of this population: Rather than mobilising a Hispanic lobby, the Mexican government would appear to fear the consequences of one. As Alejandro Celorio Alcántara expressed in his interview, this realisation has in part been driven by a recognition that Mexico has, in the past, taken its emigrated population in the US for granted, assuming that they would cooperate with the Mexican government

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21 Interview with Alejandro Celorio Alcántara, 19th May, 2017.
22 Ibid.
to promote its political agenda. As he explains, the approach since 2016 has been radically different, with a focus on building cooperation on more modest areas of agreement:

So we’ve been sending this message, and developing this relationship of respect and trust. We might not agree on everything, we know we share heritage, we are both perhaps born in Mexico, but your views and your decision to live in the US were already made and you want to be Mexican in the United States. And if you disagree with the policies of Mexico, that’s fine, let’s work together.

As this brief examination demonstrates, there is evidence that Mexico’s Hispanic outreach in recent years can be characterised by both an increased emphasis on proactively establishing relationships with Mexican Americans and Hispanics, as well as a decided shift in tone towards a more conciliatory narrative that recognises an inherent distrust by many Hispanics towards their ancestral state of origin.

Canada

The Canadian government has also increased its Hispanic outreach efforts in recent years, particularly following the 2016 election. When asked in an interview if the increased outreach effort to the Hispanic American community in that time was a result of the forecast growth in the Hispanic population, James Villeneuve, the Consul General of Canada in Los Angeles, confirmed that the consequences of demographic changes on the perception of Canada was indeed important:

There’s no question that that’s part of it. When you start having demographics here, and elected officials here representing the demographics here, clearly these people will not only have local influence but they will also start to develop national influence. And just like if you had an elected official from one of the northern states like Michigan, they may have a strong understanding of Canada because of the geographic position, but here we would need to articulate our position with groups of people that may be a little bit

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23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
different or not have a lot of knowledge of Canada. Most immigrant groups would be from Mexico or Central American countries, so they have a pretty good knowledge of Mexico or Latin America but not necessarily a strong knowledge of Canada.  

In this case, the Canadian outreach strategy is principally concerned with the prospect of the Hispanic American community challenging the familiar and positive image of Canada that it has developed in its bilateral relations with the US over many generations. However, much of Canada’s Hispanic outreach since 2016 has also been driven by the emergence, since the election of Donald Trump, of policy issues that have the potential to have a large impact on both Canada and Hispanic Americans. In particular, this has focused on two principle subjects: NAFTA and border security. The calling into question of the NAFTA agreement by President Trump has led the Canadian government, through local consulates, to establish joint discussions with US and Mexican groups on the impact of any reform to the free-trade arrangement, which have included Hispanic organisations as part of those discussions.

In addition, the centrality of border security and immigration reform to the 2016 election, and the promise of a stricter immigration process by the Trump administration, has led to a significant increase in Hispanic outreach by the Canadian embassy and consulates within the US. These outreach discussions have taken two distinct strands: The first has been to react to a concern that Trump’s hard-line stance on Latin American immigration has led to an increase in the number of undocumented individuals leaving the US and crossing the border into Canada, as well as a spike in asylum requests, prompted by Canada’s reputation as a refugee-friendly host. As James Villeneuve explained in his interview:

We’ve also now having to deal with the potential of a large number of people with undocumented status thinking OK if we’re going to get deported, Canada might be a

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26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
destination. We’ve never had a situation like that before where people want to leave the United States and come to Canada: Normally, they’ve got here and this is where we want to be. And while it’s not like there’s a flood of this going on, we’ve had to establish an education program, and we’re using our networks with the Latinos communities to turn that on very quickly.29

As a result, Canada sent Pablo Rodriguez, a Spanish-speaking, Argentinian-born Member of Parliament to Los Angeles to conduct a series of interviews with Spanish-language media and meet with Central American consuls as well as refugee groups to discourage their crossing the northern border to claim refugee status in Canada.30

The second strand of immigration-focused outreach has been an attempt to lobby Hispanic American elites on the differences between the US’ northern and southern borders: Canada has developed a concern that the post 2016 discourse on ‘border security’ could result in an argument for a tightening of border checks between the US and Canada, driven by Hispanic elites. As a result, the LA consulate has devoted attention to lobbying these elites on the difference between the borders, including taking a delegation of Hispanic American elites to Canada to see the border operations first hand.31

Canada’s outreach efforts have focused on Hispanic American elected officials and advocacy organisations. Canadian diplomatic officials began attending NALEO’s annual conference from 2014, where they lobbied Latino politicians on areas in which they felt Canada’s policies would be seen as exemplary based on Hispanic policy preferences, such as on the topic of addressing climate change (as will be seen in the example of the UK, this is an area in which Canada wishes to advertise its extensive activities to a Latino community that they perceive as sympathetic to climate change action).32 Therefore, Canada’s outreach efforts to Hispanic American elites has increased considerably since 2012, a reflection of both their anticipation of

29 Interview with James Villeneuve, 21st September, 2017.
31 Interview with James Villeneuve, 21st September, 2017.
32 Ibid.
the growing political importance of the Latino demographic in constructing US-Canada policy, but also as a result of post-2016 Trump administration policies that mutually concern both Canadian and Hispanic American interests in a manner never before seen.

The United Kingdom

The British government has also demonstrated considerable outreach efforts towards the Hispanic community in recent years. As in the case of the Canadian government’s efforts, the UK embassy in Washington DC interpreted the results of the 2012 election as a turning point in the political ascendency of the Hispanic American vote and forecast that the Latino community would only grow in political influence as the demographic increases in size.\(^\text{33}\) Echoing a sentiment expressed by Israeli officials, Matt Reents, the Head of Politics at the British Consulate-General in Los Angeles, articulated the importance of developing a relationship with the Hispanic American community in terms of maintaining the UK’s long-term interests in the US:

> We’ve been talking about Hispanic outreach for some time and our typical line is “we won’t have a special relationship in thirty years if we don’t do Hispanic engagement”. That special relationship is going to look very different in thirty years because America is going to look very different in thirty years.\(^\text{34}\)

The importance of continuing the ‘special relationship’ has been the principle lens through which Hispanic outreach has been considered by the UK government. Of particular concern has been the extent to which the growth of the Hispanic population within the US will have an impact on popular perceptions of the UK and US-UK relations among the US public.\(^\text{35}\) Given the importance of shared historical and cultural experiences in promoting the UK’s agenda in Washington, a Hispanic American demographic with a non-European heritage, with a large percentage of the

\(^{33}\) Interview with Susannah Goshko and Ian Wiggins, 17\textsuperscript{th} May, 2017.

\(^{34}\) Interview with Matt Reents, 18\textsuperscript{th} September, 2017.

\(^{35}\) Interview with Susannah Goshko and Ian Wiggins, 17\textsuperscript{th} May, 2017.
community having arrived in the US since the 1980s, poses challenges to the way in which the British government can deploy those shared experiences effectively.

In a hope of addressing these concerns, the UK embassy commissioned private polling on the perception of the UK and of British culture among a sample of the Hispanic American population since 2013. This was driven by a fear of a possible “affinity gap”, where Hispanics felt less of a connection towards the UK than the general US population (which had a higher percentage of individuals with a British heritage). However, the survey in fact found that interest in the UK was as relatively high among Latinos,\(^{36}\) with Hispanic Americans displaying a high degree of affinity with both cultural emblems of the UK such as music and football, as well perceived political priorities for the British government such as climate change. In these areas, Latinos showed a much stronger interest than the rest of the US population.\(^{37}\)

The findings from this research has resulted in the UK constructing a strategy of outreach towards Hispanic American elites that have centred on the different Latino communities based around the UK’s consulates in LA, Miami and Houston. Efforts in Florida have focused on developing ties with Cuban-American business elites,\(^{38}\) Mexican-Americans in Texas, and Mexican as well as Central American groups in California, that were more typically represented under a pan-ethnic ‘Latino’ label.\(^{39}\) Much of these energies have been focused on arranging visits for local Hispanic elites to visit the UK to experience British culture: In 2015, the consulate-general in LA sent a Mexican-American social media personality to visit the UK alongside Jorge Ramos, a news anchor for the Spanish-language news channel Univision, who had been sent from the Miami consulate.\(^{40}\) Similarly, the UK government is developing an active pipeline of emerging political elites, with each consulate nominating two individuals.

\(^{36}\) Ibid. Ian Wiggins clarified that there was more of an affinity gap between non-college educated Latinos than those with a college degree.

\(^{37}\) Interview with Matt Reents, 18th September, 2017.

\(^{38}\) Interview with Alexander Miles, 13th May, 2017.

\(^{39}\) Interview with Susannah Goshko and Ian Wiggins, 17th May, 2017. Susannah Goshko emphasised that, whilst they recognised there were differences between these Hispanic sub-groups, they maintained pan-ethnic terminology when framing their overall outreach strategy.

\(^{40}\) Interview with Matt Reents, 18th September, 2017.
with a total of twenty, that the UK can establish a working relationship with and invite to the UK for political and cultural exchanges, with the embassy in Washington anticipating that a significant proportion of these would be expected to be Hispanic in the immediate future.\textsuperscript{41}

Since 2012, the UK government has also undertaken significant outreach work with Latino advocacy organisations. For example, they have organised workshops with the Hispanic Association of Colleges and Universities (HACU) since 2014 to promote Hispanic American students to study in the UK.\textsuperscript{42} Echoing the initiatives of the Canadian consulate, in 2017 the UK consulate-general in LA established a relationship with the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO), attending both their annual conference and ‘boot camp’ in DC for newly-elected officials, in which they hosted a workshop on the impact of Brexit as well as presenting an argument as to why Hispanic American officials should develop an interest in foreign policy.\textsuperscript{43} In 2018, the British embassy secured the right to develop a webinar series on foreign policy for internal educational use by NALEO’s membership, advertising this as a useful service for new Latino politicians and officials provided by the British government.\textsuperscript{44}

Thus, the United Kingdom’s outreach efforts mirror those of Canada’s in the sense that they were instigated in a significant way by the 2012 election results, and have focused on Latino political elites as the main target of engagement.

\textbf{Israel}

Over the past decade, there has been considerable Hispanic outreach committed by both the Israeli government as well as the Jewish-American pro-Israel lobbies within

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{41} Interview with Susannah Goshko and Ian Wiggins, 17\textsuperscript{th} May, 2017. Susannah Goshko stated it was vital that the UK establish relationships with future political figures early, as it was “too late” once they were in Washington as their foreign policy views were likely to be “fixed”.

\textsuperscript{42} Interview with Luis Maldonado, HACU, 17\textsuperscript{th} April, 2016.

\textsuperscript{43} Interview with Matt Reents, 18\textsuperscript{th} September, 2017.

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.
\end{footnotesize}
the United States. As in the cases of British and Canadian outreach, a key driver of Israel’s decision to establish firmer ties with the Hispanic community was the 2012 election, in which the perception of the growing political importance of Hispanic elites in policy discussions resulted in a significant escalation of efforts to reach out to the community in order to promote pro-Israel policies and foster a positive image of the state. These efforts were catalysed by a concern among pro-Israel groups that the future of US support for Israel was reliant on a sufficient degree of solidarity and sympathy from the US population, and Hispanics, without the historical or political ties to the Jewish state, pose a potential threat to that solidarity. In the weeks following the 2012 election, Michael Freund, the American-born Israeli founder of Shavei Israel, a conservative pro-government outreach organisation, and the former deputy communications director for Prime Minister Netanyahu, published an opinion piece in the Jerusalem Post stressing the need for Israel to reach out to a Hispanic American demographic growing that was growing in political influence:

In 2012, Latinos constituted 10% of the US electorate for the first time, having added four million new registered voters in just the past four years. It is no wonder, then, that various Republicans are now racing to figure out how to win a larger share of the Hispanic vote in the future. Israel, too, needs to pay more attention to the Hispanic wave that is sweeping the American political world. In light of their growing clout, the Jewish state must take proactive steps to reach out to Latinos and enhance their familiarity and knowledge of Israel. To put it simply: we need to launch a comprehensive and coordinated hasbara, or public diplomacy, campaign that makes Israel’s case to Hispanics directly and “en Espanol.” In a democracy, demographic dynamism translates into political strength, and it won’t be long before we see a slew of Latinos rising through the ranks to the heights of decision-making power in Washington.45

This call to action has been met by both the Israeli government and Jewish-American organisations within the US. From 2016, the Israeli consulate in New York began a series of outreach events with Hispanic churches in the city, including cultural and

artistic exchanges. In an interview about one particular event in 2017, Dani Dayan, the Israel consul general in New York emphasised that the rationale behind the event was a recognition that “Israel will not be able to maintain the level of support it has in American society” if it neglected to develop a relationship with Hispanic Americans. A particular focus of outreach efforts has been attempts to increase the profile of the state of Israel itself among the Hispanic population: Organisations such as the college student-oriented StandWithUS have focused on providing funding and dedicated workshops to Hispanic students, establishing a dedicated ‘Hispanic Outreach’ department in 2018 that offers ‘Latin American Fellowships’ to select Hispanic Christian students to become ambassadors for Pro-Israel policies on campuses and promote a Zionist position. In March 2018, the organisation ran a series of talks at a Hispanic church youth conference in Houston, providing merchandise and information about the group’s pro-Israeli positions. Other organisations have focused on targeting Hispanic American elites. The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) held its inaugural ‘Hispanic Outreach’ summit in August 2016, an invite-only event that specifically targeted national and local elected Hispanic officials and leaders of advocacy organisations, from areas with a high concentration of Hispanics, or a district with a Hispanic representative in Congress. The summit, with travel and expenses for the Hispanic visitors paid for by AIPAC, emerged out of recognition from AIPAC that “as the Hispanic community grows both in numbers and political activism, its leadership plays an increasingly prominent role in shaping national foreign policy”. Following this same sentiment, the American Jewish Committee (AJC) in 2016, through their Project Interchange

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47 Ibid.
platform that finances and organises visits to Israel for foreign diplomatic and political elites, took a delegation of Latino elites, drawn from elected officials as well as advocacy organisation leaders, to tour Arab-Israeli incorporation projects within Israel, in the hope of stimulating interest in Israeli approaches to immigration and assimilation issues among Hispanic Americans. In an attempt to consolidate this relationship, in January 2017 the AJC launched the Latino Jewish Leadership Council (LJLC), with the stated goal of working “to further strengthen Latino-Jewish cooperation in advocating for issues of shared concern and values cherished by both communities.” The LJLC’s membership consists of Hispanic American and Jewish-American leaders from political, corporate and advocacy backgrounds, and includes a number of organisations from the National Hispanic Leadership Agenda (NHLA). In 2018, the organisation’s first annual conference, convened in Washington, had an agenda that included Puerto Rico’s reconstruction, the status of DACA, and US support for Israel.

This approach that attempts to combine a policy platform of support for Israel with interest and support for Hispanic American policy concerns such as DACA reflects an ongoing strategy by Pro-Israel organisations to win influence with Hispanic elites through the presentation as Israel, and Jewish-Americans, as natural allies on topics of importance for the Latino community. The AJC’s Belfer Institute for Latino and Latin American Affairs (BILLA), established in 2005, began to focus heavily on the Hispanic American community after 2012, emphasising what it advertised as the similar unique relationships that Latinos and Jewish-Americans have when it comes to international concerns. The organisation’s website asserts importance of these similarities on its website: “BILLA’s innovative approach recognizes the organic ties

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53 Ibid.
between U.S. Latinos and their native or ancestral homelands, which echo the Jewish connection to Israel.”

Such a narrative seeks to stress solidarity between the Jewish and Hispanic communities not only in terms of both communities having a mandate to be interested in US foreign policy towards their countries of origin, but also based on their shared experience as immigrant groups to the United States. For example, in justifying organising a group of Hispanic American writers to visit Israel in 2016 funded in part by the Israeli government, Irwin Katsof, the director of ‘America’s Voices in Israel’ - a pro-Israel lobby - emphasised that both groups should see themselves as “natural friends” as “they have a similar history: Immigrants to the United States, struggling to establish themselves in a foreign land.” For many Pro-Israeli groups, this has resulted in organisations taking an active interest in immigration, in the hopes of building a common agenda with Hispanic American advocacy groups. As a result, Jewish-American groups since have begun lobbying support for immigration reform in Congress, and have helped organise local support across the US. Gideon Aronoff, the then-president of the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, outlined the importance of this philosophy in 2010, when he stated that “If we want to engage with the Latino community on issues that are of concern for us, including Israel, we need to engage on issues that bother their community”. Since 2017, Pro-Israeli organisations such as the Jewish Community Relations Council has encouraged its local branches to devote energies to supporting the agendas of local Hispanic Americans, such as training local synagogues to provide ‘rapid response’ to help undocumented immigrants during deportation raids.

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In addition to the momentum generated since the 2012 election, Hispanic American outreach efforts by the Israeli government and pro-Israel organisations within the US has been driven in the past decade by a concern that the Hispanic population within the US has a lower opinion of Israel than the mainstream US population. A poll by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) in 2011 found that 42% of foreign-born Latinos, and 20% of native-born, were likely to agree with anti-Semitic statements as defined by the ADL.\(^{59}\) In addition, a 2012 survey commissioned by the AJC found that 31% of Hispanics reported that they had no “familiarity” with Jews on a day to day basis\(^ {60}\), and a 2011 study commissioned by the New York-based Foundation for Ethnic Understanding suggested that 46% of Hispanic Americans felt that the U.S. provided too much support for Israel.\(^ {61}\) As a result, this backdrop provided a strong incentive for the government of Israel and its US-based lobbies to establish ties of solidarity and political alliances with Hispanic American leaders beyond simply reacting to demographic change, and, as a result, the period between 2012 and 2018 has seen significant outreach efforts between the two communities, suggesting that Israel views the Hispanic American community as one of future importance for determining the nature and scope of US-Israel policy.

Through an examination of the recent Hispanic American outreach efforts by these four states with historically-important relationships with the United States, there is convincing evidence that the US' international partners are interpreting the demographic growth of the Hispanic American community as a sign that the Hispanic population is only going to becoming more influential in US politics over the coming decades. Not only have all four states significantly increased their outreach efforts in various ways since 2012, but they have specifically pointed to the need to develop


\(^{61}\) S. Shamir, “Poll: Nearly 50% of Hispanic Americans Believe U.S. Too Supportive of Israel”, Haaretz, 28th May, 2011. [https://www.haaretz.com/jewish/1.5143332]
ties with Hispanic American elites as part of their long-term strategies for the future maintenance of their ‘special relationship’ with the US.

**Existing literature**

Despite the focus from other states on the demographic growth of the Hispanic American community having potential implications on the framing and delivery of US foreign policy, existing academic literature has largely neglected the study of Hispanic Americans, either as a potential source of US foreign policy influence, or as participants in foreign policy discourse. As this thesis will outline, the research that does exist, whilst useful, has been somewhat limited by a relatively narrow focus when looking at the issue of Hispanic American engagement:

Firstly, the existing literature has concentrated on the existence of home-country ties between Hispanic American groups and their country of origin, or between diaspora communities and their homelands. In particular, there has been an extensive focus on the extent to which Hispanic Americans, either as a single pan-ethnic group or as individual national-origin communities, have attempted to operate as ‘ethnic lobbies’ seeking to influence the outcomes of US foreign policy towards a particular Latin American state with which they feel an ethnic affinity. In this sense, the existing literature has sought to identify how far Hispanic Americans operate as a foreign policy lobby in the same manner as other ethnic groups such as Jewish-American organisations lobbying for Israel. Secondly, whether through an analysis of the implications on US bilateral relations with specific states such as Cuba or Mexico, or through the scrutiny of the implications of Hispanic American participation in international affairs on the larger state of US-Latin America relations, the existing literature has limited the analytical framework for considering Hispanic American engagement with US foreign policy to an almost exclusive contextual focus of the population’s Latin American heritage.

As a result, this literature fails to account for the possibility of Hispanic American engagement beyond these narrow analytical confines: That they may participate in
foreign policy debates on issues beyond simply in their countries of origin; that they may engage with foreign policy discourse without necessarily having a significant impact on policy outcomes, and that Hispanic American elites may engage with foreign policy without resorting to forming into organised ‘lobbies’. In short, the narrow analytical focus taken by the existing literature risks overlooking subtler, but no less informative, methods of foreign policy engagement by Hispanic Americans.

The thesis will, therefore, set out to demonstrate how a more nuanced and complex understanding of Hispanic American elite engagement with US foreign policy can be identified when the analytical frame is sufficiently widened to incorporate a broader engagement with foreign policy discourse as well as outcomes. In addition, by adopting an analytical approach that considers Hispanic elites as distinct political generations, each with unique characteristics, important differences between Hispanic generations in terms of foreign policy engagement across different decades can be accounted for. Finally, by examining the intermestic nature of many US foreign policy issues, the thesis is able to identify ways in which Hispanic American elites are able to incorporate an engagement with US foreign policy into their otherwise domestic-focused campaigns, something largely overlooked by the existing literature.

**Chapter outline**

Chapter 1 of the thesis consists of the literature review. It outlines the limited available literature on Hispanic engagement with foreign policy, and demonstrates the different areas of focus within this body of research. These include the scholarship examining how far Latinos have attempted to operate as an ‘ethnic lobby’ for their countries of origin; studies that looked evidence of transnational engagement between Hispanic communities and Latin America, such as through home-country associations as well as financial remittances; and research that examines the extent to which Hispanic Americans hold different views on foreign policy compared to the wider US population. The chapter contextualises this literature within the wider discourse of the ‘culture wars’ of the 1990s, which focused
on the role of immigration and demographic change in altering the political identity and socio-economic wellbeing of the United States following the end of the cold war.

Chapter 2 presents an alternative framework for examining Hispanic American engagement with US foreign policy that is to be used throughout the thesis. Building on the work of Mario T. García, it outlines an adapted generational approach to understanding Hispanic American elites: This approach identifies that the Hispanic community can be divided into distinct political generations over the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, and that each generation contained within it a unique organisational structure and political culture. These differences between each political generation resulted in notably different types of foreign policy engagement by political elites within each generation, across different decades.

Using this generational approach as a conceptual framework for understanding the changing nature of this foreign policy engagement by Hispanic Americans from the late 1960s to the contemporary era, it then briefly outlines the three political generations that will be examined as case studies in this thesis: The Mexican-American ‘Chicano’ generation in 1960s, the Cuban and Central-American ‘Exile’ generation during the 1980s, and the pan-ethnic ‘Latino’ generation in 1990s.

Chapter 3 examines US foreign policy engagement by political elites within the Chicano generation from 1965 to 1974. Specifically, it examines the different ways in which US foreign policy was articulated and operationalised by the ‘four horsemen’ leaders of the movement, as well as by the leadership of the Chicano Moratorium Committee that organised Mexican-American protests against the war in Vietnam. It identifies three ways in which Chicano elites engaged with US foreign policy: Firstly, by engaging with foreign policy discourse: the chapter demonstrates how a critical re-interpretation of the romantic history of US foreign policy and the notion of manifest destiny was an integral component in constructing Chicano ethnic nationalism, La Alianza’s Land Grant campaign in 1966, and the Brown Beret’s occupation of Catalina Island in 1972. Secondly, by engaging with policy: the chapter demonstrates how high-profile opposition to Vietnam War was used to bring
attention and support for Chicano domestic civil rights campaigns by linking the injustices of the war to injustices faced by Mexican-Americans in everyday life. Finally, by engaging as private diplomatic actors: The chapter demonstrates how La Alianza and the Raza Unida Party, two of the four major Chicano organisations, attempted to lobby Mexico to make Chicano civil rights a diplomatic issue in US-Mexico bilateral ties, and looks at the international outreach efforts by Cesar Chavez’ National Farm Workers Association (NFWA) to promote farmworkers’ strike.

Chapter 4 examines the ways in which the Exile generation elites engaged with US foreign policy during the 1980s. In particular it looks at how which Cuban exile elites made opposition to Castro regime central to their political agenda. This allowed the Cuban-American community to enjoy substantial political and financial benefits as a result of the elite’s close ties with the Reagan administration. The chapter then looks at the ways in which the Central American exile community contributed to protests against US foreign policy in Central America as part of the Central American Peace and Solidarity Movement (CAPSM). In both cases, the level of foreign policy engagement was a reflection of the fact that the exile status of the elites meant that they had an intention to return to their countries of origin and therefore their attempts to influence the Reagan administration were driven by a very different motivator to other Hispanic generations that were committed to US citizenship. In this sense, the elites of the Exile generation in the 1980s were operating in a way that closest reflected an ethnic lobby. The chapter then contrasts this high-profile engagement by Exile elites with the lack of engagement by Mexican-American elites during the same period, which saw Mexican-American organisations resisting criticising Reagan-era foreign policy in part due to their desire to present a more mainstream, politically-incorporated image following the radial nationalism of the Chicano generation.

Chapter 5 examines foreign policy engagement amongst the pan-ethnic Latino generation elites in the contemporary era, with a particular focus on the post-2012 period. In doing so, it looks at engagement with US foreign policy among a selection of the most high-profile national Latino advocacy organisations (LAOs) in US, drawn
from organisations with membership of the National Hispanic Leadership Agenda, an umbrella of the most politically influential Hispanic American groups. This chapter confirms some findings of previous studies from the 1990s, indicating that Latino generation LAOs continue to avoid emphasising foreign policy issues on their agendas in the manner of ‘ethnic lobbies’, and do not engage with US foreign policy to the extent witnessed by either the Chicano or Exile generation elites. This is due to the pan-ethnic nature of the Latino generation, in which elites must represent a diverse population of different national origin groups, and therefore must construct policy agendas based on a limited range of shared domestic, socio-economic priorities rather than utilising an ethnic affinity for a particular country of origin. However, the chapter finds that on certain intermestic topic areas where US foreign policy issues overlap with these socio-economic priorities, there is the possibility of an emerging Hispanic foreign policy agenda with which LAOs are willing to engage. As the chapter outlines, this is the case in particular with two policy issues: Immigration, as well as climate change and the environment.

Chapter 6 examines the arguments used to promote Hispanic participation in US foreign policy by Latino foreign policy practitioners (FPPs), drawn from self-identified Hispanic Americans working in foreign policy-related careers within the US government. The chapter identifies three narratives used to promote the recruitment of Hispanics into foreign policy roles in the federal government: Firstly, that Latinos are natural diplomats: That the experience of Hispanic Americans having to navigate two different cultures (and often two languages) makes them ideally suited for diplomatic careers. Under this argument, they are often more capable of understanding foreign ‘high-context’ cultures than Anglo-Americans given their similarities to Latin American culture. Secondly, that recruiting more Hispanic Americans and diversifying the US foreign policy workforce will benefit the US image abroad: This is an argument that Hispanic diplomats and foreign policy practitioners representing the US will over-turn stereotypes and allow for better relations, particularly in the developing world. Finally, it examines the argument that recruiting a greater number of Hispanic Americans will result in better foreign policy decisions being made by federal agencies. As the chapter outlines, this uses an argument that
a more diverse workforce will allow for better decision-making than would happen with a homogenous group. The chapter establishes that the deployment of these three narratives represents a sophisticated and coordinated effort between Hispanics working within foreign policy institutions and the US federal government, and represents a willingness to emphasise the ethno-cultural nature of Latino engagement with US foreign policy by practitioners.

The case studies that will be examined in this thesis and outlined above were selected in part out of a desire to include a relatively comprehensive chronological account of the major ‘moments’ of Hispanic elite engagement with US foreign policy from the 1960s onwards. Principally however, the case studies of the Chicano and exile political generations were identified due the focus and attention they receive in wider literature on the history Hispanic political elite behaviour during the latter half of the 20th century. The relatively high-profile status within the history of the Hispanic American population in the United States of both the Chicano movement in the 1960s and 1970s, in addition to the arrival and political mobilisation of Cuban and Central American refugees during the 1980s, meant that it was possible to identify from the existing literature available on these topics moments of foreign policy engagement by Hispanic elites, or themes and issues that were related to foreign policy that was being presented as part of a historical, domestic analysis. As a result, these offered a potentially rich vein of Hispanic elite engagement with US foreign policy that had previously been relatively overlooked by existing scholarship.

As indicated above, the semi-structured elite interview was deployed as the principle research method for gathering evidence in this thesis. As Alan Morris identifies in *A Practical Introduction to In-depth Interviewing*, this method has several advantages over conducting larger-scale surveys:

> It is possible to get an idea of how people see the world through the use of a survey questionnaire, observation, blogs and secondary sources, but the strength of the in-depth interview lies in its ability to create a research space in which the interviewee is
able to tell their story and give the researcher a range of insights and thoughts about a particular topic.\textsuperscript{62}

To this end, interviews were used in this thesis as this allowed for a qualitative analysis that could complement the information that had already been offered by previous literature on the topic of Hispanic engagement with US foreign policy that had deployed survey data and analysed large-scale trends. By interviewing Chicano civil rights leaders in the 1960s, it was possible for them to offer an interpretation of how they felt their actions fitted into a sense of foreign policy engagement, and which specific actions they felt were important or had been most successful during the Chicano movement, given the hindsight of several decades. In the case of semi-structured interviews with Latino advocacy organisations and Hispanic foreign policy practitioners, the interview method overcame the problem of a lack of documentary evidence and secondary source material with which to assess the perspective and thoughts of contemporary Hispanic elites on US foreign policy matters.

The principle disadvantage of the interview, as identified by Morris, is the possibility that the information being provided by the interviewees is inaccurate.\textsuperscript{63} This is of particular concern with the interviewees from the Chicano movement, who were being asked to provide information related to specific historical events in which they were participants and incorrect information therefore endangered the ‘historical accuracy’ of the case studies. As a result, archival research was undertaken, principally related to the chapter 3 case study of the Chicano anti-war movement, in order to attempt to triangulate the information being provided by interviewees and minimise the risk of inaccurate information being presented in interviewee testimony.

Much of the analysis in Chapter 4 of foreign policy engagement by exile generation elites was drawn from secondary sources, as was elements of the analysis of

\textsuperscript{62} A. Morris, \textit{A Practical Introduction to In-depth Interviewing} (London: SAGE Publications ltd, 2015), P. 5.

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., P. 7
speeches, poetry and activities by Chicano elites in Chapter 3. Where these secondary sources were used extensively, it was because the available material provided excellent examples of empirical evidence to support the central thesis claims, and had not been previously examined or considered by the primary literature on Hispanic elites in US foreign policy. Therefore, by introducing these secondary sources into the analysis, it highlights important additional empirical material to the wider debate, from research that had previously been absent from the academic discussion on Hispanic engagement with US foreign policy.

When deploying the term ‘elite’ in this thesis, it draws on Ursula Hoffmann-Lange’s operational definition, with elites as “groups or individuals with regular and substantial influence on important decisions within an organization or a society” that “command important resources enabling them to influence important decisions”. 64 In this case, this relates to the ability of Hispanic individuals and organisations to command ‘resources’ and ‘influence’ related to the topic of US foreign policy. Individual Hispanic Chicano leaders from the 1960s and 1970s, in addition to national-origin and pan-ethnic advocacy organisations during the 1980s and present-day respectively, were all able to command the resources of their relevant Hispanic networks and were recognised as legitimate ambassadors for either a constituency of the Hispanic population, or the Hispanic population as a whole. As a result, in the case of contemporary Latino generation advocacy organisations and Hispanic foreign policy practitioners, they were considered ‘elite’ for the purposes of this thesis as they would likely be considered legitimate representatives of the Hispanic community when speaking on US foreign policy issues by the US government, media and foreign policy establishment: Latino advocacy organisations due to their status as ambassadors on domestic politics, and Hispanic foreign policy practitioners due their existent foreign policy expertise.

When using the term ‘Hispanic’, this thesis defines this as individuals and communities of Spanish-speaking origin in Latin America & the Caribbean, who self-identify either with a pan-ethnic Hispanic label or with a Latin American or Spanish Caribbean national-origin label. This definition does not assume a pan-ethnic identity amongst the Hispanic population and indeed, the changing nature of this identity, and its instructive role in the evolution of Hispanic elite composition and behaviour, is explored in Chapter 2. ‘Latino’ is used to describe elites that belong to the pan-ethnic Latino political generation, or to the membership of those organisations since 1990 where the actions of the membership would appear to be publicly invoking a sense of political or cultural pan-ethnicity.

Whilst the scope of this thesis is contained to an analysis of the extent to which Hispanic elites engage with US foreign policy, it nevertheless raises important questions concerning the nature and role of power within the United States and how it operates within the American state. In particular, both the conceptual framework of political generation and the empirical accounts of differing types of foreign policy engagement, present potential challenges to the pluralistic model of the state. Specifically, the evolution in political engagement between Hispanic generations, from a platform of opposition towards the US government to one of active incorporation, indicate that Hispanic elites believe they can best achieve political success where they configure an image of their community to best fit within a pluralistic model, and in turn work ‘within the system’.

However, rather than providing evidence that the pluralistic model therefore best explains the operation of power in the US state, it in fact suggests the opposite: By conforming to an image of successful ethnic assimilation, this leaves any established ethnic hierarchy within the US power structure unchallenged. In the case of foreign policy engagement, the shift from a position of resistance to deference over government planning and execution of foreign policy further hints at the continuing strength of the Anglo-Saxon cultural hegemony within establish foreign policy elite networks.
Whilst these conceptual areas are not the focus of this thesis, their potential implications for the wider debate over the role and nature of power within the US are revisited in the Conclusion.
Chapter 1: “Latinos are more concerned with domestic issues”: A review of the existing literature concerning Hispanic engagement with US foreign policy

Introduction

This chapter will outline the relevant literature that researches Hispanic American engagement with US foreign policy. It will begin with an examination of the literature that considers whether Latinos operate as a traditional ethnic lobby akin to Jewish-Americans. It will then identify some of the problems with this literature, in particular the lack of focus on the priorities and level of engagement of Latino elite actors, before highlighting the useful insight offered by the small number of studies that have so far been conducted on Latino elites. It will then examine scholarship that looks at individual aspects of possible Latino foreign policy engagement, including various features of a hypothesised ‘transnational’ identity that incorporates both Latin American and US political engagement.

Finally, it will outline the ways in which this existing literature, whilst useful, is limited by the context in which a significant proportion of the research was published: Much of the literature was written against a backdrop of the high-profile anti-immigrant narratives of the ‘culture wars’ of the 1990s. The chapter will therefore observe the tendency for much of the existing literature to be influenced by a desire to respond to the claim by prominent public intellectuals that any Latino engagement with US foreign policy is going to represent a ‘threat’ to the security and prosperity of the US, and will highlight the claim by several authors that Latinos are expected to have a detrimental impact of US foreign policy by virtue of their growing size as a demographic as well as their reluctance to assimilate towards the traditional American political values that inform foreign policy decision-making.
Overall, the literature on Latino engagement with US foreign policy is notable mostly due to an overall scarcity. Since 1970, there has only been one dedicated monograph, in addition to a handful of chapters and articles devoted specifically to the topic. Of the relevant literature that does exist, it can be found into two distinct research areas. One area concentrates on measuring the extent to which Latinos operate as a traditional foreign policy lobby, building on the body of scholarship that has looked at the circumstances in which ethnic minority groups interact with US foreign policy more generally. The other area of literature looks at the extent to which Latinos engage in transnational interaction with their countries of origin through home-town associations and financial remittances. Whilst these analyses offer useful insight on particular perspectives of foreign policy engagement, they nevertheless leave certain aspects unexamined: These studies look mostly at the relationship between Latinos and Latin America, or between individual communities and their countries of origin. In addition, these have tended to ignore examinations of elite Latino actors in favour of focusing on the demographic as a whole. The main study that does choose to look at elites, a 1997 study by Harry P. Pachon, Rodolfo O. de la Garza, and Adrian D. Pantoja offers a useful insight into the foreign policy preferences of a sample of 454 Latino political and business leaders. This provides a useful starting point for further examination, but offers a static picture of foreign policy leaders and therefore warrants re-visiting.

**Latinos as an ethnic lobby**

The first major area of research that explores Latino engagement with US foreign policy attempts to ascertain the extent to which Latinos can be considered an ‘ethnic lobby’ that would seek to advance the interests of their ethnic ‘kin’ in Latin America. Ambrosio defines such lobbies as representing organised interest groups that ‘seek to influence U.S. abroad in line with a specific agenda’ and that they represent “political organizations established along cultural, ethnic, religious, or racial lines that

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seek to directly or indirectly influence U.S. foreign policy in support of their homeland and/or ethnic kin abroad.”

Since the end of the Cold war, a flurry of research has focused on investigating the presence of such lobbies, their factors in success or failure at swaying policy and their relative overall influence relative to other non-ethnic lobbies. Melvin Small makes the case that foreign policy lobbies are well-placed to play an influential role in the foreign policy-making process, due to the sizeable role Congress plays in foreign policy, a consequence of the separation of powers. Tony Smith suggests that following the end of the Cold war, ethnic interest groups took advantage of the opportunities afforded by these institutional set-ups, and coupled with a lack of any foreign policy consensus following the Cold war, they have since begun to play an increased role in the foreign policy-making process. His analysis is negative in tone: he follows Huntington and Schlesinger in suggesting this reflects a worrying move away from a foreign policy guided by the US national interest.

Drawing the opposite normative conclusion, Shain argues that the processes of the US politico-cultural system, where a citizen is automatically enfranchised to engage with the public sphere and the political process so long as they adhere to the liberal-democratic principles at the core of US political culture has meant that ethnic diasporas have been tolerated and sometimes even celebrated as evidence of the plurality and diversity of US society. His conclusion agrees with Smith’s analysis that lobbies exist and play a role in US foreign policy, but where Smith forecasts negative consequences, Shain celebrates this new phenomenon as a welcome and proportionate one.

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69 Y. Shain, Marketing the American Creed Abroad: Diasporas in the U.S. And Their Homelands (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
Ambrosio attempts to reconcile these two positions by claiming that with the re-convergence on combatting terrorism that dominated US foreign policy after 9/11, successful ethnic lobbies need to convince the wider public and decision-making actors that their specific agendas are in line with wider national interests.  

Others have looked at the circumstances under which an ethnic lobby could be successful: Saideman, for example, attempts to determine how the structure of an ethnic lobby affects its ability to influence policy.  

He puts forward the case that smaller lobbies are at an advantage due to lobby over specific policies of influence to a homogenous, specific community. He provides the example of Armenian Americans successfully lobbying against an extension of aid to Azerbaijan, making use of their small size and cohesive, clear agenda. Rubenzer goes further and develops a qualitative analysis of multiple case studies of lobbies in an attempt to isolate which factors determine their influence, and finds that despite numerous hypothesis put forward by different academics, only the organisational strength and the level of political activity are important determinants of successful minority influence, with energetic, well-organised lobbies having the most success.

Building on this larger literature that attempts to map out the influence at ethnic lobbies generally, there has been a limited number of studies that have either focused on the extent to which Latinos constitute their own ethnic interest group for the purposes of foreign policy, or have examined the possibility of Latinos forming one in the near future. Generally, there are very few texts that examine Latinos as a foreign policy interest group and of those that do exist, there is little consensus over methodology or definition over what constitutes an ethnic interest group, or what can be considered foreign policy behaviour. In addition, of the literature that exists, it can be divided into two categories: studies that examine Latinos specifically, and


those that use Latinos as comparative case study alongside other ethnic groups as part of an analysis of a model of ethnic interest group behaviour.

Generally, the studies reflect a consensus view that Latinos, as a cohesive group, are a poor fit under an ethnic lobby model. They also largely agree that Latinos, when examined as an ethnic interest group, do not exert the level of influence of successful groups such as the Jewish-American pro-Israel lobby. Within the literature, there are several hypothesised explanations put forward to account for this: that Latinos within the United States are divided in terms of political interests for a variety of reasons; that Latinos are more likely to prioritise domestic, socio-economic concerns over foreign policy issues; and that where they do look at foreign policy of Latin America, there is little consensus over what should go into proper and effective US foreign relations towards the region.

The principal argument, put forward by Michael Jones-Correa, is that Hispanic Americans have failed to organise themselves into a cohesive and successful foreign policy interest group due to the division within the Hispanic community between first and second generations. The former group will exert a considerable degree of energy on establishing ties with their countries of origin and will participate in transnational activities such as sending remittances back to their country of origin, participating in home-country elections if they retain citizenship of have dual-nationality, as well as showing a generally higher level of interest and concern for the politics and events in their country of origin. However, US-born Latinos, who are able to participate in the US political system and are more likely to have the socio-economic resources or educational background to more effectively participate in influencing US foreign policy towards Latin America, do not do so as their political agendas are dominated by domestic concerns. According to Jones-Correa, it is only on the “intermestic” issue of immigration that the interest of these two distinct Latino groups overlap and result in coordinated and effective lobbying efforts.74

74 Ibid., pp 124-125
Domestic focus of Latino elites

Tied to Jones-Correa’s argument is the claim that Latinos have not demonstrated consistent interest in influence US foreign policy towards Latin America because they have little active interest in doing so due to the more immediate need to improve the socio-economic situation for the Latino community that is disproportionately likely to experience poverty; low rates of school completion; be the victims of crime as well as receive insufficient access to affordable healthcare. As a result, the policy agenda of organised Latino groups is dominated by domestic concerns. Foreign policy towards Latin America is therefore not pursued with the same level of energy and enthusiasm as it may be by other ethnic groups.75

Additionally, other authors have forwarded the explanation that Hispanics have resisted attempts to influence US foreign policy with regards to Latin America because there is no consensus over what that policy should look like, or what should constitute the policy agenda that Latinos should lobby on. Beyond individual cases of home-country relations with their specific Latino communities such as Cubans and Mexicans, a broad political consensus regarding Latin America policy does not exist within the Latino community as a whole.76

Confounding this lack of policy consensus is the desire by Latinos, particularly first generation immigrants, to not want to appear disloyal to the United States. Appearing to lobby for the interest of foreign governments or on behalf of Latin American interests would risk calling into question the intentions of Latino interest groups in a manner that Huntington warned of.

As a result of both the lack of consensus and the incentive not to appear disloyal, no established organisation has effectively organised to lobby the US government on

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behalf of all Latinos regarding foreign policy, in the way that Cuban Americans have done so with Cuba policy.

Thus, much of the literature that focuses on the role of ethnic minorities such as Latinos and their engagement with US foreign policy has focused on the extent to which groups have organised themselves to influence the US government’s position regarding the country of ancestry or of particular interest for the ethnic group. Whilst there has been debate over the extent to which such ethnic ‘lobbying’ has an overall influence on US foreign policy, there is a consensus that some individual groups have had success in organising along such lines.

Literature that has examined how far Latinos can be seen as a successful ethnic interest group on this basis has been relatively scarce. That which does exist has generally emphasised the obstacles that prevent Latinos from effectively ‘lobbying’ on behalf of Latin America, including a lack of consensus over policy, community divisions between immigrants and US-born Latinos, and the emphasis placed on the socio-economic agenda of Latino political activists. From the perspective of an ethnic interest group, Latinos can be considered a modest success at best.

**Problems with this literature**

Whilst this literature provides useful analyses that offer insight into particular aspects of foreign policy and international engagement, the focus on the ‘ethnic lobby’ analytical framework as the principle lens through which foreign policy engagement is viewed is problematic in several ways.

Firstly, these studies focus on the Latino demographic as a complete unit of analysis. As a result, they, in general, do not attempt to make a claim about which elements with the Latino community are most likely to represent the community in foreign policy matters, or is likely to take a disproportionate interest in foreign policy. In particular, none of this literature considers the role of Latino elite actors in the foreign policy process, which may offer useful insights into the way in which political representatives of the Hispanic community forward a foreign policy agenda, or the
extent to which they take an interest in foreign policy issues and how their preferences may be different from non-Hispanics.

Secondly, whilst the recent literature examining the domestic impact of Latinos has recognised the unique position that the demographic is in in terms of their unprecedented displacement of Anglo-Saxons in a growing number of states, the literature examining foreign policy engagement has largely failed to accommodate this fact. With studies that attempt to examine Latinos’ fitness as an ethnic lobby, they rely on organisational models that were developed to explain previous patterns of immigration in the 19th and 20th centuries. However, treating Latinos as simply another manifestation of an incoming immigrant community to the ‘melting pot’, ignores the unique demographic change that will occur over the next several decades. With the US set to become a minority-majority, it is doubtful that these old organisational models, which rely on there always being a statistically dominant ethnic majority, may not be useful. Making direct comparisons with the Jewish or Armenian lobbies, with ethnic groups that continue to represent relatively small proportions of the overall population, is therefore problematic.

Thirdly, what little empirical evidence that is offered by the literature is often based on analysis of aggregate statistics. Conclusions are drawn from large-scale surveys of Latino voters or random samples of the community, or trends are analysed from overall census data. Whilst undoubtedly useful in providing the kind of analysis that would be less easily available to an individual researcher, it can only offer limited understanding of the relationship between Latinos, ethnic identity and political preferences. It leaves unexplored any explanations from Latinos themselves as to why foreign policy preferences may be different from the mainstream, or explanations as to why they choose to engage or not engage with US foreign policy.

Finally, the existing literature focuses overly on the level of direct influence Latinos have had on specific examples of US foreign policy. Whilst attempting to gauge their influence on US foreign policy is indeed important, an equally relevant question is
whether Hispanics show an interest in US foreign policy even if it does not have an impact at present, as a potential consequence of demographic growth could greater impact in the future.

These points mean that the existing literature, whilst useful, only offers partial insight into Latino engagement with foreign policy and their capacity to act as international actors. A greater focus on elites, qualitative methodology and a wider examination of engagement with foreign policy beyond simply looking at Latin America and government influence is necessary.

**The importance of ‘elites’**

Given the limitations of a literature that focuses primarily on the Latino demographic as a whole, there are potential benefits to an approach that focuses on the role of elites and uses Hispanic American elites as the principal unit of analysis and for research. There are two principal motives why this is a prudent choice of focus and, by extension, why it is necessary to incorporate two different definitions of ‘elite’ as a source from which to draw the research sample.

The first reason reflects the nature of the subject matter: The reality of US foreign policy is that it is dominated disproportionately by elite actors. This occurs at multiple levels of US foreign policy: It is elite-driven when relating to formal decision-making as this is an area that remains heavily concentrated among government institutions such as the Department of State, Department of Defense and centrally within the National Security Council. Beyond this, formal oversight of foreign policy is elite-driven insofar as it constitutes a power that is invested in Congress, through the functions of foreign affairs-focused committees and the ability of the Senate to scrutinise Presidential appointments for foreign policy-related jobs. Coverage of foreign policy by the media remains the vestige of a network of professional foreign and diplomatic correspondents. Beyond that, wider scrutiny of US foreign policy is provided by academics working within related university departments, as well as think tanks, NGOs and the political party not currently running the administration.
The actual conduct of US foreign policy conduct is carried out by a workforce of diplomats, military and intelligence officers, US trade representatives and a select few other groups that represent the US government in some formal diplomatic capacity on a full-time basis.

The individual specialists involved in the day-to-day execution of these various foreign policy activities would be considered to possess foreign policy expertise and can broadly be considered to represent the foreign policy elite. Given the uniquely privileged position of such elite actors, it would be prudent and logical to include Latinos that operate within this foreign policy elite as a source of insight.

The second reason relates to the nature of Hispanic politics. The political organisation and representation of Latinos is dominated by elected officials as well as around ethnic interest groups. John A. Garcia identifies several variations of such groups, including mass-membership ones such as advocacy groups like the League of United Latin American Citizens, or professional-based organisations, such as those representing business interests or Hispanics within a particular trade or industry. In addition to this, organisations can be class-based or gender based. They can also be tied to elected representatives such as the Congressional Hispanic Caucus Institute.

This has two implications for researching US foreign policy: Firstly, Latinos claiming to represent the community in such a way are likely to be the first to be reached out to provide a Latino perspective on foreign policy issues by the federal government. Secondly, with any perceived growth in the importance of the Latino electorate, the power of such elites will grow as a consequence as long as they are seen by the community and US population generally as legitimate. Therefore, it is logical to examine the perspectives and engagement with foreign policy of such organisations.

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In addition to this, public diplomacy and international engagement efforts by Latinos, which can be seen as both peripheral to and of consequence to US foreign policy, will also be dominated by elites. Such activities typically involve institutional engagement as well as establishing relations between different foreign political actors and organisations. Any such un-official diplomacy of this nature is likely to be conducted by elites representing Latino interest organisations. This presents an additional reason to examine the international engagement efforts of such groups.

Given the relevance of both conceptions of ‘elite’ that concern both Latinos and US foreign policy, it is necessary to examine examples of both in studies attempting to gain a more complete picture of Latino engagement with US foreign policy.

**Towards an expanded focus on foreign policy**

Given the limitations of the existing literature, it would be advantageous to consider ways in which the areas of scope for academic investigation could be widened, to offer a more complete picture of Latino engagement with US foreign policy. Much of the literature that (negatively) forecasts an increased impact for Latinos in US foreign policy assumes that the interests of Latinos will be different from those of current foreign-policy decision-makers, and that this will, in turn, be detrimental. Whilst much of the response literature that looks at empirical examples of Latino influence on US foreign policy paints a much more modest picture of historical and recent impact, they have largely avoided the question of whether the actual policy agenda of Latinos differs from their Anglo-Saxon counterparts.

Therefore, whilst the question of how much have Latinos attempted to influence foreign policy has been partially answered, the more inherent question of ‘influencing towards what end?’, remains disappointingly ignored. A plurality of views towards Latin America has been alluded to as a feature of the Latino community, but this does not address whether there is a similar plethora of views towards other foreign policy issues. Therefore, it is essential to look at whether there
is a coherent foreign policy agenda among Latino elites, and how far this does or does not differ from non-Latinos.

In addition, to gain a more complete picture of foreign policy engagement, it is necessary to look beyond attempts to influence the government over specific policy. Whilst this is undoubtedly a useful starting point, it leaves out other possible avenues of foreign policy engagement. For example, it leaves un-explored the extent to which foreign policy is a dimension in the domestic agendas of Latino elites: To what extent do Latinos choose to incorporate US foreign policy into arguments to support domestic agendas, or as part of their process of binding Latinos into a common political community? And, was such a use of foreign policy the case, in what forms does it take, and why? Investigating such aspects of engagement could potentially offer useful insight into whether or not Latinos articulated an alternative foreign policy agenda, or an alternative interpretation of the national interests behind US foreign policy.

As well as this, by limiting foreign policy engagement to simply government influence, it excludes other avenues of attempts at influencing US foreign policy. One example would be whether there had been any attempts by Latinos to lobby foreign governments to influence US policy from the ‘other side’ of diplomatic relations. A most likely avenue would be lobbying Latin American states, to which Latinos would have specific ties and interests, to influence the bilateral relations between those states and the US.

Furthermore, outreach to foreign political actors, perhaps an indicator of an appetite for international engagement, is also un-explored. If Latinos were to demonstrate evidence of outreach to political bodies outside of the United States, this would perhaps offer an indicator of foreign policy preferences were their domestic influence to grow. In addition, the question of why and how such outreach were to occur would also provide a useful insight.
Beyond these points, the literature was, in places, also limited in its treatment of foreign policy issues and preferences as being distinctly separate from domestic concerns. Foreign Policy is taken largely to be the extent that they concern themselves with traditional security dimensions of US-Latin American relations, as well as the application of soft power in the region. Lindsey offers a typical example of this rationale:

Groups such as the National Council of La Raza and the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund have concentrated their focus on the economy, civil rights, and immigration because those are the issues that matter to their members. Given the economic challenges facing the Hispanic community today and the relative security that most Latin American countries enjoy, foreign policy is not likely to galvanize Latinos any time soon.78

However, maintaining this kind of clear distinction between foreign and domestic politics is problematic. By limiting the definition of foreign policy concerns to traditional security and geopolitical interests, it leaves the possibility that an engagement with US foreign policy can nevertheless be taking place in a political agenda focused on “the economy, civil rights, and immigration”.79 From the perspective of the researcher, looking for foreign policy in the domestic agendas of Latinos is prudent for three main reasons:

1. Domestic concerns are increasingly becoming inextricably interlinked with foreign policy. Rather than being mutually exclusive, a comprehensive foreign and economic security policy requires as much attention to the interior dimensions and implications as they do to the exterior. Issues such as immigration (and indeed, immigration reform), economic growth, and the impact of environmental degradation are increasingly intermestic in nature – meaning they have overlapping and inseparable domestic and international

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79 Ibid.
dimensions. Therefore, omitting them as issues from an analysis of foreign policy engagement leaves an incomplete picture of Latino influence.

2. Latino elites may draw on aspects of US foreign policy as part of a traditionally ‘domestic’ agenda. A reluctance to formally advocate for specific foreign policy positions does not automatically mean engagement with US foreign policy is excluded from the substance, agenda-items or narrative of domestic campaigns.

3. By examining how Latinos engage with domestic issues that have the potential to become foreign policy concerns, it provides potential insight into how they may choose to engage with US foreign policy and what agendas they may adopt. For example, support or opposition for the domestic implications of a free-trade agreement, environmental legislation or civil rights reform could all offer indications how similar and related issues would likely be supported or opposed when replicated at the level of international diplomacy.

Of the ‘domestic’ political issues that could be considered intermestic, immigration is likely to offer the most insight into potential Latino foreign policy preferences. It is also, as Jones-Correa points out, the issue on which Latinos are most likely to successfully influence government policy.\(^80\) Therefore, omitting it is an issue from an analysis of foreign policy engagement leaves an incomplete picture of Latino influence. As Domínguez points out, immigration policy has historically been very much considered an instrument of foreign policy by the US government – who used the immigration status of Cubans both as a tool for furthering Cold war policies, as well as seeing the control of the border as a wider national security concern.

Therefore, an expanded focus on the wider Latino engagement with foreign policy that looks beyond simply their ability to influence the government and looks at the

extent to which interaction with US foreign policy can be found in their domestic agendas, as well as attempts to connect with foreign political actors and governments, offer fertile new avenues for insight.

**Literature on elite engagement**

Given these considerations, it is clear that there is new avenue for Latino engagement with US foreign policy that examines elite actors as a unit of analysis and specifically looks at examples of their engagement and their foreign policy preferences. A good starting point, therefore, is to consider existing literature that has explored the foreign policy positions of Latino elites.

The most notable feature of the literature concerning Latino elites and foreign policy behaviour is the striking lack of it. What there is all analyses the same data set, drawn from a study by the Tomas Rivera Institute in 1996, with the results being published as part of de la Garza and Pachon’s 2000 book *Latinos and U.S. Foreign Policy*.81 It surveyed 454 Latino elites to gauge their interest in foreign policy compared to domestic issues, as well as asking them to rank their foreign policy interests. The results then compared this the rankings by non-Latino US elites. The findings can be seen Table 1.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>% of US leaders saying issue is “very important”</th>
<th>% of Latino leaders saying issue is “very important”</th>
<th>Rank of issue to U.S. leaders</th>
<th>Rank of issue to Hispanic leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preventing spread of nuclear weapons</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defending allies' security</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stopping illegal drugs</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintaining superior military power</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protecting US jobs</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving the global environment</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combating world hunger</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing trade deficit</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing illegal immigration</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. H. P. Pachon, R. O. de la Garza, and A. D. Pantoja (2000)

In their analysis of the data, the authors emphasise that Latino leaders prioritise a domestic agenda. Foreign policy concerns were ranked 6th, behind various social and economic issues. They emphasised that when foreign policy issues were discussed, these broadly reflected the goals of mainstream elites, for example stopping nuclear weapons both come first. They conclude by arguing that this directly contests Huntington’s assertion.
In a 2004 chapter, The Tomas Rivera Institute then reflected on the data themselves but reach a different conclusion. They instead choose to highlight the differences present in the data, such as the fact that 60% of Latino leaders rate environmental concerns as very high compared with 49% of non-Latino elites, and their ranking of it as the 2nd most important issue overall, as opposed to 6th by non-Latino elites. Similarly, they point to the fact that whilst the same percentage of Latino and non-Latino elites rate combating world hunger as ‘very important’ those Latinos that do so rate it of higher overall priority than non-Latino elites. The institute thus points out that this could suggest Latino elites may favour a more liberal foreign policy agenda.

Valeriano also analyses this data set, but from a slightly different perspective. He argues that after 9/11, Huntington’s thesis of Hispanic threat to identity had created a belief that Latinos may undermine the existing national security goals concerning the Middle East. He reaches a similar conclusion to De la Garza et al, arguing that the broad similarities between Latino and Anglo elites meant that Latinos supported mainstream national security goals.

In a 2015 analysis for Latino polling firm Latino Decisions, Pantoja comments on the contemporary foreign policy situation and once again revisits this data set, even though it is now almost two decades old. In this instance however, he differs from his conclusion, suggesting that whilst they did not rank it as highly as domestic issues, the fact that Latino leaders were able to convey a slightly different set of foreign policy preferences suggested that they have a potential role to play in foreign policy in the future.

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The second major strand of research looking at Latino engagement with foreign policy looks specifically at the extent of transnational ties that exist between Latino immigrants and their descendents, and the Latin American states from which they immigrated, in part as a way of determining potential foreign policy influence. To that end, the research has tended to look at a range of transnational activities that could be considered indicative of Latino-Latin American political engagement, in particular examining the nature of economic as well as political ties between Latinos in the US and the Latin American states from which they originated. A significant proportion of the research therefore focuses on the following individual areas:

**Literature on remittances, hometown associations and political affiliation**

A principal focus of the research looking at the economic impact of immigration concerns the financial transferals of income from Latino immigrants within the United States to the family members that remain in their countries of origin. DeSipio and de la Garza note that a recent World Bank estimate suggested around $123 billion was sent in financial remittances from the United States in 2012, almost a quarter of the entire global total for that year. Cortina et al. estimated that in 2004, 60% of Latin American immigrants in the US sent money home as remittances. Cortina and de la Garza emphasise the critical importance of this transferal of money by immigrants to their families back home to the rural economies of Mexico and Central America. Given the significance of such remittances to the economic health of Latin American economies, it makes logical sense for the continued wellbeing of immigrant communities to being a high priority for the foreign policy agendas of Latin American governments.

Strongly associated with the impact of financial remittances is the literature that specifically examines the organisations that develop to facilitate the effective

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transferal and use of the money. In particular, there has been a focus on the existence and activities of hometown associations (HTAs), or organised efforts by immigrant and ethnic communities from a particular region or town to support immigrants living in the US as well as facilitating cultural and developmental projects in these locations of origin. Given the positive implications of such organisations, some Latin American governments have taken active steps to encourage such initiatives – Mexico has established the ‘3x1’ initiative in which they guarantee a contribution of 3 dollars for every dollar for development projects provided by a HTA. The obvious links with the socio-economic development of Latin America has made the extent of HTA activity by Latinos an area of interest to researchers. Leiken examined the scope of efforts by the Mexican government to strengthen political and cultural ties with HTA’s during the 1990s, concluding that Mexico saw HTAs as a potential vehicle for the establishment of a political lobby as the growth of the Mexican-American community was outpacing the national average. De la Garza and Hazan examined the consequences for incorporation of HTA political activity and concluded that whilst there was significant relationships between HTAs and Mexico, HTAs could also serve as a catalyst for political incorporation into the US as they provided a mechanism for immigrants to familiarise themselves with US political values.

Another area of obvious interest to researchers concerns the extent to which Latinos continue to follow and participate in the politics of their home-countries or counties of ancestry. As Gershon and Pantoja demonstrate, according to the 2006 Latino National Survey, around 60% of Latino immigrants profess to follow home-country politics, and this interest remains largely as strong among US-born respondents.

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Researchers also focus on the role of dual-nationality in hindering integration into the United States by Latinos. As DeSipio and de la Garza point out, in the last 20 years twelve Latin American states have legalised dual-nationality for US-based citizens, including Mexico and Nicaragua.\(^{91}\) This has facilitated the ability for US Latinos to formally participate in the domestic politics of Latin Americans states, and in the case of Mexico has seen the active pursuit of Mexican immigrant voters by candidates in the Presidential election. In addition, as dual-national citizens they often have the right to make use of public services of their country of origin, including the right to seek office themselves, as well as petition for aid and representation from the diplomatic apparatus of their home-country in the United States. For researchers, this not only has implications for questions concerning how this impacts the ability of Latinos to politically incorporate into the United States, but also for how it impacts the bilateral relations between the United States and the various Latin American states with dual-nationality citizens living with the US.

Despite the relative abundance of studies looking at transnational ties, no consensus has yet emerged on how far the data supports or refutes Huntington et al.’s assertion that Latino residual political interest in Latin America will hinder or affect their political incorporation in the US. Indeed, a number of scholars perceive these various forms of transnational interaction between Latinos and their countries of origin as having negative consequences for their ability for Latinos to involve themselves fully into the political life of the United States. Renshon follows the work of Huntington and Buchanan that sees the continuation of political ties to their countries of origin raises the spectre of divided loyalty for Latinos.\(^{92}\) He further suggests that not only does dual-nationality increase rates in which second generation Latinos choose to identify using non-American labels, but that dual-nationality in the 1990s was

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principally encouraged by Latin American governments such as Mexico and the Dominican Republic as an avenue to further the political lobbying opportunities within the Latino community.\textsuperscript{93}

Others emphasise that the consequence of participating in the political and social life of both the United States and the country of origin results in a decreased level of participation in the US compared to those with exclusively US citizenship: Straton et al. looked specifically at the impact of dual citizenship among first generation Latin American immigrant communities and found that dual citizens were less likely to consider themselves American, feel a civic responsibility towards the United States or speak English than Latin American immigrants possessing US nationality only.\textsuperscript{94} Cain and Doherty suggested that dual citizenship specifically depressed voting registration, participation on the electoral system and rates of naturalisation among immigrant communities.\textsuperscript{95}

Other scholars have offered an optimistic appraisal of the data and suggest that transnational engagement does not hinder involvement in US political life by Latinos. These suggest generally that Latinos that come from Latin American states that encourage greater transnational ties can feel safe in the knowledge that their formal association with their countries of origin will not be threatened by an active participation in US politics and working towards naturalisation. Jones-Correa\textsuperscript{96} in an influential 2001 article, contested the claim that dual-nationality hindered political incorporation: Analysing data from 1965 to 1997, he concludes that immigrants with dual-nationality are more likely to naturalise as US citizens than those who are not. Pantoja took the argument a step further and claimed that transnational ties could

in fact foster political incorporation, in a study that looked at civic engagement among Dominican immigrants.\textsuperscript{97}

Whilst this body of research looking at transnational ties offers a useful perspective on a certain aspects of Latino engagement with foreign policy, the focus is limited largely to whether an increased engagement with Latin American politics will limit their engagement with US politics and an incorporation in US political life, or help to facilitate it. However, as Gershon and Pantoja observe, the level of transnational engagement is as much determined by socio-economic status of Latinos than by years of residence in the United States:\textsuperscript{98} Latinos with a higher income and higher level of education are significantly more likely to visit their country of origin and participate in Hometown associations. In addition to this, they are more likely to participate in political life in the US. This suggests that whilst transnational ties generally increase with time spent in the US, a relative economic and social elite of Latinos increase their transnational activities once they become established politically in the US.

Ultimately, this research focusing on the trans-national economic and political participation of Latinos provide some useful information in framing research looking at Latino engagement with foreign policy. Firstly, it indicates that to varying degrees of complexity, Latinos, when taken as a population that is not distinguished between US-born and non-US born, remain significantly tied to Latin America; principally through significant economic remittances, but also through political connections such as voting. As an ethnic minority demographic in the United States, Latinos are unique actors in this regard.

Secondly, this research tells us that there is a significant chance that Latinos are only likely to increase this engagement with Latin America as the population continues to

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\textsuperscript{98} S. A. Gershon and A. D. Pantoja, "Latino Immigrant Transnational Ties: Who Has Them, and Why Do They Matter?," P. 77.
grow, mean that the Latino population in the US remains a hugely significant part of bilateral relations between the US and the Latin American states that are the beneficiaries of the economic remittances and maintain political ties with their diasporas. Thirdly, it indicates that Latinos are likely to become more politically and economically involved with Latin America as they become more socio-economically advantaged in the US, something that is likely to continue as the population grows and the size of the Latino middle classes rises.

The Latino threat narrative

There remain some overall issues that leave the existing literature problematic. Firstly, and of greatest concern, relates to the objectivity of the research. Political, ethical and ideological motivations of the individual authors appear to have influenced their analysis in many cases. In particular, much of the literature on how far Latinos will influence US identity falls under the shadow of earlier literature published during the “Culture Wars” of the 1990s that framed Latino participation in foreign policy, and Hispanic immigration generally, as having negative consequences for the political, economic and social wellbeing of the United States. To understand the academic literature therefore requires an understanding of the political context in which it functions:

Much of the works discussed in this chapter have been either overt or tacit responses to earlier literature that suggests that the changing demographics within the United States, and in particular the relative growth of the Latino demographic, will likely have a significant impact on United States foreign policy. For the most part, such analyses have been negative in tone: It follows a line of argument that the national interests to which the US government calibrates its foreign policy objectives is informed by a clear consensus over what constitutes American national identity. A dangerous by-product of changing ethnic demographics is a lack of assimilation by minority groups such as Latinos towards this identity, which threaten to cloud the vision of US foreign policy interests.
Many of the most high-profile authors that forward such interpretations of the effects on national identity of the growth of the Latino population emerged in the 1990s following the end of the cold war. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. warns that core American values such as respect for democracy will be put at risk as the enthusiasm within educational establishments of promoting a diverse range of minority cultural traditions places the fundamental core US national identity at risk. He sees the core US identity as a heritage-free descriptor: to be ‘American’, an individual must shed their previous ethnic allegiances; by adopting the US identity: “The point of America was not to preserve old cultures, but to forge a new American culture”.

In his 2004 book, *Who are we?,* Samuel Huntington puts forward the case that Latinos as a demographic group, populated primarily by Mexican immigrants, pose a threat to the traditional ‘American Creed’ which constitutes the essential value-set that informs US identity and interests. In doing so, he built on a 1997 article in which he echoed Schlesinger’s sentiments concerning the negative consequences of value pluralism. He argues that whilst traditionally immigrant groups have assimilated into US society over time, Mexicans have instead formed their own cultural enclaves with distinct values. Traditionally, US identity has been based on culture and creed, which is in turn built upon what he says are identifiable and distinct ‘American’ values drawn from the US’ Anglo-Saxon heritage:

The English language; Christianity; religious commitment; English concepts of the rule of law, including the responsibility of rulers and the rights of individuals; and dissenting Protestant values of individualism, the work ethic, and the belief that humans have the ability and the duty to try to create a heaven on earth, a ‘city on a hill’.

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100 A. M. Schlesinger Jr., “The Cult of Ethnicity, Good and Bad,” *TIME,* July 1991, P. 26
103 S. P. Huntington, *Who Are We,* P. 34.
Huntington contends that Mexicans, who represent the ever-increasing majority of Latinos, are unwilling to learn the English language; that their Catholic heritage prevents them from adopting the traits associated with Protestantism, and their fertility rates mean they will overtake Anglos within the century. This, in effect, represents an existential crisis for the United States mainstream population.

These texts were published at a time in which the consequences of shifting public attitudes on a range of political issues were a prominent topic of national discussion in the public sphere. Both Schlesinger Jr and Huntington served as the academic contributors to a wider set of conservative voices that identified the end of a consensus on political values that had supposedly previously existed in US civil society. In a part of a wider debate that sociologist James Davison Hunter labeled in 1991 as the new “culture wars”, the arrival of the 1990s marked a vociferous discussion on both the accuracy, causes and consequences of claims that the US public was becoming increasingly polarized on a range of political issues including abortion, gay rights and the role of the state. Huntington and Schlesinger’s accounting of the dangers for US foreign policy of a society that does not subscribe to a single set of values fit into this wider narrative, and amplified what might have otherwise been relatively obscure intellectually-orientated arguments into positions of national prominence. Indeed, the role of un-assimilated Latino immigrants in aggravating the cultural divide was similarly highlighted by one of the most prominent voices in the conservative side of the “Culture Wars”, Patrick Buchanan. Buchanan’s *Death of the West* and *Suicide of a Superpower* follow a similar line of argument to Huntington. The former White House Communications Director under Reagan suggests that as the demographic shifts indicate the white population of the United States is set to continue experiencing declining birth rates over the next century, non-white minorities such as Latinos will erode the WASP identity of America.

Huntington and Buchanan’s books became bestsellers and were echoed in sentiment by other by conservative public intellectuals such as Peter Brimelow, who published the strongly anti-immigration work *Alien Nation* in 1995.\(^{107}\) These authors shared the powerful sub-narrative that claimed that Hispanics were both unwilling to assimilate and were exacerbating the cultural polarisation across the US. But it remained Huntington’s thesis that had the most profound claim for the consequences for US foreign policy: That Hispanics possessed an essentially different set of cultural values from those found within the traditional American Creed that had dominated the US from its colonial origins. Unlike previous new arrivals of ethnic immigrant groups, Latinos were unwilling to shed these different cultural values in favour of assimilating to the Creed. Not only did this threaten to undermine or erode the national values that go into formulating the US’ national interest in the world, but were immigration into the South West to be left unchecked, Hispanics could seek to claim the region as an autonomous Spanish-speaking province and advocate for cessation from the United States. This reflects a wider concern with concept of the ‘Reconquista’: That Latinos not only harbor alternative ideological views to mainstream Americans, but in fact hold political allegiance to foreign states. At best, this culminates in sympathy for Latin American governments, and at worst an active desire to secede from the USA. This fear forms a central part of what Leo R. Chavez considers calls ‘the Latino threat narrative’.\(^{108}\)

This can take on a passive form, such as the suggestion that, through a lack of proper assimilation, Latinos, particularly immigrants, continue to show political loyalty to the nations of their heritage over the United States. A more active and overt form of this narrative is the suspicion that Latinos, Mexican-Americans in particular, have a desire – and in some cases actively planning – to gain autonomy over the South West territory of the United States and return it to Mexican sovereignty, as it was before it became part of the United States. Within the narrative, this takes two strands: One which suggests this would happen *de facto* as a result of overwhelming Latino

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population dominance of the region, giving it a culture that demography that is effectively identical to a Latin American state. The other is that this would happen deliberately, via a campaign political violence on the part of disgruntled Latinos.

Proponents of this idea have held this up as a worst-case consequence of Latino involvement in foreign policy ever since. In a 2001 article for Foreign Policy magazine that served as a precursor to Who Are We?, Huntington warned that this process of re-conquest has already begun:

Demographically, socially, and culturally, the reconquista (re-conquest) of the Southwest United States by Mexican immigrants is well underway. A meaningful move to reunite these territories with Mexico seems unlikely, but Prof. Charles Truxillo of the University of New Mexico predicts that by 2080 the southwestern states of the United States and the northern states of Mexico will form La República del Norte (The Republic of the North).109

As a result, the prominent legacy of these narratives has had an impact on the development, framing and conclusions of the literature on Latinos and US foreign policy. The most notable example of this is the analysis of the Tomas Rivera survey of Latino elite opinion of foreign policy. Pachon, de la Garza and Pantoja, in response to Huntington, use the data on elite preferences as evidence that Latinos are unlikely to transform the consensus opinion on foreign policy priorities as the current Latino views are sufficiently similar to the Anglo mainstream. This is an interpretation of the data that is continued by Valeriano in his 2007 paper. However, when writing more recently in the context of giving greater political respect to Latinos as a political block, both of these authors reach the opposite conclusion, using the same data. Thus the political context into which the individual publications are embedded has obvious implications for the academic neutrality of their research conclusion, and therefore must be treated with caution when used as a possible platform for future research.

Further to this, there is an additional problem that is characteristic of the literature that looks at Latino elites. Since the majority of the pieces on Latino elite preferences have been based around the single Tomas Rivera study, much of the conclusions that they draw are hard to generalise into the future. In particular the primary argument that Latino elites are unconcerned with foreign policy because of the more pressing socio-economic concerns of the wider Latino population leaves open the possibility that this could change if the associated domestic circumstances begin to improve. However, the conclusions have tended to instead treat Latino interests as static, leaving unconsidered the possibility that as more Latinos enter the middle class, they may take a greater interest in foreign policy. Therefore, the conclusion that they are less interested is temporally situated; it can only capture a picture of ‘now’.

**Existing literature within the context of the ‘culture wars’**

The collective literature that looks at Latino engagement with foreign policy is comprised of several different research areas, united by an attempt to uncover Latino transnational behaviour, or attempts by Latinos to form a foreign policy lobby. In doing so, they comprise both those authors that take a pessimistic interpretation of potential Latino involvement in international affairs, fearing divided loyalty could lead to Latinos promoting the agendas of to Latin American governments, as well as those that reject that the premise that such divided loyalty is a genuine possibility among Latinos. Very little research has focused on foreign policy engagement of Latino elite actors, but where initial studies have been conducted, they show areas of possible differences in policy preference between Latinos and non-Latino elites, indicating that further qualitative research on Latino elites could provide new insights.

Overall, much of this existing literature must be considered in the context of the ‘culture wars’ of the 1990s, and the post-cold war focus by the likes of Huntington, Buchanan and Brimelow on the way in which the discourse surrounding Hispanic American engagement with US foreign policy has been produced and reproduced. As has been demonstrated, and will be revisited in Chapter 5 of this thesis, this context
has cast a long shadow on the way in which Hispanic American foreign policy has been conceived and researched, by both academics and Hispanic elites themselves.

The ferocity of the ‘culture wars’ had a notable influence on the academic literature: The accusation that Hispanic Americans posed a possible ‘threat’ to the United States due to an un-shakeable interest in (or preference toward) their countries of origin, led to a brief but fruitful period of scholarly attention on the importance of Hispanic foreign policy engagement. In particular, scholars made great efforts to undermine Huntington’s claim that an increase in the Hispanic population would have negative consequences for US foreign policy. The most productive outcome of this period was the wealth of information generated concerning Hispanic American relations with their countries of origin, in terms of political, economic and social ties. It also provided dedicated scholarship on the extent to which Hispanic Americans were willing to operate as foreign policy lobbyists following the cold war.

Whilst this literature is helpful where those topic areas are concerned, it is nevertheless limited: The strength of influence of Huntington, Buchanan and the ‘culture wars’ discourse has constrained the existing scholarship to a limited focus on Hispanic American interest in their countries of origin. As a result, much of the literature assumes that the ‘ethnic lobby’ is the appropriate conceptual frame for analysing engagement with US foreign policy. Thus, studies within the literature continuously reached the conclusion that Hispanic Americans were acting as not ethnic lobby seeking to influence any particular administration, because they were neither organised as such, nor did they show any interest in doing so. The main advantage of this focus was therefore providing sympathetic activists in the ‘culture wars’ with the ammunition necessary to disprove the ‘Latino threat’ narrative and the claims of Huntington and co.

However, the dominance of the ethnic lobby conceptual framework leaves the literature suffering from several significant disadvantages: Firstly, it misrepresents the nature of the Hispanic American elites following the end of the cold war through to the contemporary period: It considers them as a diaspora community that will
fundamentally politically identify with their ‘home country’ outside the United States, rather than as an ethnic minority group within the US population whose membership is overwhelmingly likely to consider the US government as the one to which they owe their political allegiance, as would be the case with any other domestic minority group. Beyond undermining the claims of Huntington, Buchanan and co., the finding that such a minority group within the US does not lobby for a foreign government is relatively unremarkable. Instead, by limiting the analysis to a narrow focus on lobbying for a country of origin, it leaves little room for other possible forms of foreign policy engagement.

The incentive to focus so predominantly on the ethnic-lobbying model has not been helped by the tendency for the US federal government, various Latin American governments, the media and think tanks to, at various times, treat Hispanic American population as a source of potential foreign policy lobbies, as has been demonstrated in this chapter. As a result, this has made Hispanic American elected officials, as well as various organisations and community leaders, potential research subjects to be measured to assess their level of influence on US foreign policy.

Therefore, taking the advantages and limitations of this existing literature into account, Chapter 2 will present a new analytical framework that has the potential to overcome some of the restrictions imposed by the limited ethnic-lobby and home-country focus of previous scholarship. Taking into account in particular the problematic nature of an existing literature that has paid relatively little attention to the nature of Hispanic elites, Hispanic sub-group differences, and the possibility that the Hispanic demographic has the capacity to structurally change over time, the chapter outlines an approach to examining Hispanic elite engagement with US foreign policy that places the political generation of Hispanic elites as a central focus of enquiry. As will be outlined, this draws on the work of Chicano and Hispanic studies scholarship that emphasises the importance of interpreting the political history of Hispanic American elites through the prism of distinct political generations. In this instance, the thesis will examine the case studies of the Chicano generation during
the 1960s and 1970s, the ‘Exile’ generation of Cuban and Central American refugees during the 1980s, and the pan-ethnic Latino generation in the contemporary period.
Chapter 2: A generational approach to analysing Hispanic elite engagement with US foreign policy

Introduction

This chapter will set out how the limitations identified with the existing literature in Chapter 1 can be addressed through the adoption of an alternative framework for analysing Hispanic elite engagement with US foreign policy. It adapts an approach to considering Hispanic political behaviour advocated by several scholars of Hispanic American history, most notably Mario T. García: That political engagement amongst the Hispanic American community across the twentieth and twenty-first centuries should be considered through the lens of distinct political generations. To García, the history of the Hispanic American population in the United States has been characterized by a succession of separate political generations, each with their own demographic, socio-economic and political features. By placing political generation at the heart of the analytical framework, the changing nature of foreign policy engagement over time can be better understood in the context of the different ideological projects, group identities and political structures that have characterised these changing generations.

The chapter then sets out an argument for placing political elites as the central focus of analysis of the thesis over a focus of the Hispanic population as a whole. In doing so, it considers the alternative manifestations of Hispanic elites, and identifies those which have not previously been considered by the existing literature.

Following this, the chapter then briefly outlines three generations of Hispanic political elites that will be analysed throughout this thesis: The Mexican-American ‘Chicano Generation’ in the 1960s and 1970s, the Cuban and Central American ‘Exile Generation’ during the 1980s, and the pan-ethnic ‘Latino Generation’ that reached political prominence during the early 1990s through to the present day.
Limitations of existing literature

Beyond the drawbacks of the existing literature on Hispanic American engagement with foreign policy discussed in Chapter 1, there remains several additional issues concerning the chosen unit of analysis within much of the literature that need to be addressed. In particular, the relatively narrow focus on both large-scale trends within the overall Hispanic population, as well as the search for a Latino ethnic lobby model, have limited the scope for intellectual discovery. In addition, the lack of breadth afforded within the definition of key terms such as ‘Hispanic’ and ‘Latino’ have had direct consequences for the kind of interpretations that can be drawn from Hispanic political behaviour.

Firstly, as was demonstrated through the presentation of existing literature focus in Chapter 1, much of the existing literature has heavily focused on examinations of trends and policy preferences amongst the Hispanic population as a whole. Whilst this has a potential use in determining how far the demographic share common perspectives on foreign policy issues, it nevertheless fails to account for the disproportionate role that elites play in the formulation and delivery of US foreign policy.

Secondly, whilst some literature will strive to identify differences between national origin groups within a Hispanic or Latino sample, much of the existing literature leaves the dynamics of the Hispanic American community as a ‘black box’. A heavy emphasis on the analysis of survey data has resulted in only limited discussion of the way that Hispanics are negotiating their political identity and the extent to which Latinos identify with the labels to which they been attributed. Furthermore, by declining to problematise and interrogate beneath the ‘Hispanic’ label, there is no mechanism to account for any substantive changes or disruption within the community in terms of size, age distribution, identity traits, economic disparity, political affiliation or the percentage of immigrants compared to native-born Hispanic Americans within the composition of the overall population.
Thirdly, much of the existing literature fails to inquire as to how far pan-ethnic labels such as ‘Latino’ or ‘Hispanic’ have had differing levels of legitimacy at different historical periods. Given the significant changes to the composition of the Hispanic population in terms of national origin group since the 1960s, it is highly likely that these terms have had varying levels of political purchase at different times. By failing to acknowledge this, it leaves open the possibility that a pan-ethnic label that was appropriate during one decade may be inappropriate in another.

Fourthly, the existing literature largely fails to take into account the importance of the changing structural composition of Hispanic political organisations over time. Instead, the central focus of much of the research has focused on identifying how far Hispanic organisations have structured themselves as a traditional foreign policy lobby. Whilst this is useful in so far as determining whether Hispanic organisations affect foreign policy outcomes towards specific states, it leaves unexplored the possibility of wider engagement with foreign policy discourse by my more general Latino organisations.

These last three problems are particularly acute, given the significant demographic changes that have occurred within the overall Hispanic population over the past fifty years: At the beginning of the 1960s, the flow of immigration from Latin America was at its lowest since the first major wave of Mexican immigration around the turn of the 20th century, with less than a million foreign born immigrants residing in the US, with the overwhelming majority of this population being of Mexican extraction. At this time, the Bracero guest worker program was the largest influencer of Mexican immigration, with settlement patterns dominated by the availability of jobs in manual labour on farms. This complemented the existing Hispanic population’s relatively homogenous Mexican-American heritage,


\footnote{M. Tienda & S. M. Sanchez, “Latin American Immigration to the United States.”, Daedalus, Vol. 142, No. 3, 2013. See Figure 1.}
geographically situated in the Southwest. The other notable source of Latin American immigration during the 1960s were Cuban political refugees leaving the island in the wake of the communist revolution in 1959. This relatively stable pattern was overturned in the late 1970s and 1980s, which saw an explosion of new Spanish-speaking communities arriving into the US in a new wave of Latin American immigration. Whilst the majority of this new population was from Mexico, pushed in part by political and economic turmoil, this immigration wave was also characterised by a significant increase in new arrivals from Central America and the Caribbean, and Cuba in particular. This saw an increase in the total foreign-born Latin American population in the US to 3.8 million in 1980 to 7.4 million in 1990. In addition, this period saw a marked increase in the percentage of these immigrants arriving as young, low-skilled males: Between 1970 and 1990, the number of Latin American men aged between 18 and 33 entering the US with a high school degree or less rose from 11.6 to 34% of Mexican immigrants, and from 13.2 to 23.7% from the rest of Latin American and the Caribbean. This period also saw significant changes in the distribution of Hispanics across the US: Whereas 1960 saw Mexicans predominantly located in the southwest with Puerto Rican and other Caribbean communities located in urban centres in the Northeast, by the 1980s new Hispanic population centres began to emerge, such as Miami and southern Florida.

Therefore, given these significant changes to the composition of the Hispanic population over a relatively short space of time, it is essential that any examination of Hispanic political behaviour, including engagement with the discourse of US foreign policy, take into account that the nature and legitimacy of pan-ethnic terms such as Hispanic or Latino may well vary considerably between decades over the last 50 years and have evolved in meaning over this period to accommodate the significant demographic changes.

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112 Ibid.
113 A. Burke, “Why undocumented immigration from Latin America will slow to a crawl – even without a border wall”, Brookings, 23rd March, 2017. [https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2017/03/23/why-undocumented-immigration-from-latin-america-to-the-u-s-will-slow-to-a-crawl-even-without-a-border-wall/].
Towards a generational approach to interpreting Hispanic behaviour

Given the problems identified with the existing literature, this chapter will outline a generational approach to analysing Hispanic engagement that recognises the importance of examining the distinct, historically-situated political cohorts of Hispanic elites that have made claims to represent Hispanic populations (either as specific national origin communities, or pan-ethnic ‘Hispanics’ more generally) at various points since the second half of the 20th century. These cohorts, as will be outlined, represent three distinct political generations of Hispanic elites. By adopting this generational approach, it is possible to identify similarities and differences in the nature of foreign policy engagement between different generations, as well as reconciling the fluctuating ethnic labels with which Hispanics have identified, contested and discursively negotiated, into the analysis.

The importance of biological generation as a mechanism for understanding differences in statistical patterns and behaviour within the Hispanic immigrant population has long been recognised by numerous academic disciplines. For example, the notable differences between first, second and third generation Hispanics has been given extensive focus in topics ranging from assimilation patterns114, education115, healthcare116, birth outcomes117, childhood health118, and crime119, among others. Whilst this research highlights an obvious importance of biological generations in understanding the socio-economic outcomes of Hispanics,

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understanding how Hispanic communities came to terms with the rapidly changing composition of their own demographic and how these changes were discursively negotiated both within the Hispanic population and within the wider United States, requires a broader definition that recognises the importance of shared historical experience to the manifestation of a Hispanic generation’s identity:

Rodolfo Alvarez suggested in a 1973 paper that the history of the Mexican-American experience in the United States, for example, could be considered up to that point through the lens of the ethnic experiences of four biological generations: the ‘creation’ generation, the ‘migration’ generation, the ‘Mexican-American’ generation and the ‘Chicano’ generation. Alvarez defined generation as “a critical number of persons, in a broad but delimited age group, [that] had more or less the same socialization experiences because they lived at a particular time under more or less the same constraints imposed by a dominant United States society.” Under this framework, different generations of Mexican-Americans could interpret and engage with the political, economic and social system within the US in different ways and with different narratives, depending on the specific historical events that informed their collective experience as an ethnic community.

Given these observations, the potential importance of generation as an operating dynamic of the Hispanic American demographic is highlighted. This is significant not just for determining issues such as levels of assimilation and socio-economic integration, but also to help answer questions as to the manner in which the demographic itself is participating in the domestic and foreign policy discourse across different immigrant generations. To help address this question, this thesis will adapt and operationalise the analytical use of ‘generation’ deployed by the Chicano historian Mario T. García. Where Alvarez ties the analysis of Mexican-American generations to their biological origin, García follows an alternative definition of

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generation building on the work of German sociologist Karl Mannheim, in which the shared social and political historical experiences of a group can determine their collective consciousness and thus affect how the group will perceive of and react to the outside world. Crucially, García’s approach stresses an importance on the definition of generation beyond the biological relation to the foreign-born parent or grandparent of a Hispanic American. Instead, the definition that he deploys focuses instead on the importance of the political generation: incorporating the distinct and complex political, racial, ethnic and ideological dialogues that were a defining characteristic of each generation. In doing so, García identifies how each generation is a product of its time, its geography and its political and economic place within the ‘melting pot’ of the USA.

García argues that there are three distinct political generations which have played prominent roles within Hispanic American history across the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Firstly, In Mexican Americans: Leadership, Ideology and Identity, 1930-1960, he presents a group that consisted of the first US-born Hispanics of the first large wave of Mexican immigrants that had emigrated around the turn of the twentieth century. This generation were characterized by childhood experiences of the Great Depression and early twentieth century racial discrimination in schools and public spaces. This generation participated in World War II and set up some of the first Hispanic American civil rights organisations. In The Chicano Generation: Testimonios of the Movement, García presents the ‘Chicano Generation’ – referring to the group that identified and participated in the Mexican-American Chicano political movement of the 1960s and 1970s. Finally, in The Latino Generation: Voices of the New America, he offers the ‘Latino Generation’, which consists of the children of immigrants from Mexico, the Caribbean and Central America who came

to the United States during the 1970s and 80s, who have grown up experiencing the consequences of globalisation, technological innovation, and the ‘culture wars’ of the 1990s (which were discussed in Chapter 1).\textsuperscript{126}

In the \textit{Latino Generation}, García outlines how the distinct identity and characteristics of the current, Latino political generation is a product of three experiences: the ‘immigrant story’, referring to the historical patterns of immigration from Mexico and then Latin America, that delivered individuals and communities into this category; the racial and ethnic identity of Latinos; and ‘historical agency’, referring to how far Latinos choose to identify with, interpret, and continue the political and civil rights agendas of the previous generations.\textsuperscript{127}

García himself stresses that this approach to generation in his three case studies does not constitute a comprehensive social scientific study, but rather represents his interpretations as a historian on the differences between Hispanic American elite engagement across different decades.\textsuperscript{128} And in contrast to the accepted use of generation within literature on immigration and ethnic history, the literature of International Relations (IR) has historically almost entirely overlooked it.\textsuperscript{129} Perhaps recognising the potential importance of generation as a determinant of political behaviour, IR scholarship has only just begun to take it seriously as a unit of critical analysis, with a small but emergent body of literature.\textsuperscript{130}

Despite not being designed principally for use as a tool for foreign policy analysis, this framework nevertheless offers a potentially more useful template to make sense of Hispanic engagement with foreign policy: The internal discourse, socio-economic dynamics and the manner in which US politics, governance, ideas and policies are

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{126} Ibid., PP. 22-25.
\item \textsuperscript{127} Ibid., P. 7.
\item \textsuperscript{128} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{129} For an overview of the limited available literature, see T. Luecke, \textit{Generations in World Politics: Cycles in U.S. Foreign Policy, the Construction of the “West,”, and International Systems Change 1900-2008}. PhD dissertation: The Ohio State University, 2013. P. 7
\item \textsuperscript{130} See for example, B. J. Steele and J. M. Acuff, (eds.), \textit{Theory of Application of the “Generation” in International Relations and Politics} (New York: Palgrave, 2012).
\end{itemize}
perceived and reacted to can in fact differ significantly across different generations of political elites. For García, this approach was deployed to illuminate both the change and continuities between civil rights agendas across different generations, and how each generation made sense of their identities in the context of the economic, social and political discrimination that they experienced. However, the importance and relevance of these dynamics are just as important when trying to make sense of differences in foreign policy engagement by Hispanics groups across time, something that current research has generally declined to study.131

This approach therefore offers an excellent analytical framework with which to resolve the main problems identified with the existing literature: Through allowing for the variances between different Hispanic American subgroups to be accounted for both between subgroups and across historical periods, a generational approach enables an analysis of US foreign policy engagement that incorporates the various ways in which Hispanic Americans have perceived, discussed and reacted to US foreign policy between different generations.

The importance of elites

In addition to utilising a generational approach, it is necessary to incorporate elites into the analytical framework. As outlined in in Chapter 1, the majority of the existing literature has largely neglected any specific focus on the role of Hispanic American elites in US foreign policy, which, as the chapter argues, represent disproportionately important source of foreign policy influence. Instead, the literature has traditionally focused either on analyses of large-scale survey data organised lobbying efforts, large-scale trends such as remittances, or evidence of local home-country engagement such as through home-town associations, or through diaspora voting behaviour.132

132 See Chapter 1 for an overview of these various literature sub-topics.
As a result, where the literature does incorporate political elites in their analysis, it generally results in a focus on one of three categories of foreign policy elite:

Firstly, it looks at Hispanic elected officials. This concerns either those elected to national office in DC, or at the local level such as state legislatures, city council, or local executives. In particular, there has been a focus on the extent to which Hispanic officials have been the recipients of successful lobbying efforts for large-scale initiatives such as NAFTA. This allows for a focus on how far Hispanic politicians promote the interests of either the US government, or that of Latin American governments such as Mexico. Whilst useful to determine how far Hispanic elected officials vote with regards to legislative foreign policy issues, a narrow focus on elected officials as Hispanic elites misses the possibility of foreign policy engagement by political advocacy organisations.

Secondly, where the literature has taken Hispanic advocacy organisations as a unit of analysis to determine elite behaviour, it has done so with a focus on how far these organisations operate as an ethnic foreign policy lobby, attempting to compare their efforts against the examples of supposed ‘successful’ lobbies. Whilst this literature is useful in concluding that, with the exception of the Cuban-American lobby, there are no significant example of Hispanic American organisations adopting this model, the narrow focus on organised lobbying efforts with regards to a specific state avoid the possibility of a foreign policy engagement at a broader, more discursive level by these same Hispanic organisations.

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133 See for example, J. I. Dominguez, “Latinos and U.S. Foreign Policy”, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, No. 6, 2005. Dominguez’ analysis looks at the role of Hispanic politicians in Washington during the NAFTA legislative process.
134 Ibid.
135 On an example of Latinos as pan-ethnic block being compared to ethnic lobbying efforts of other organised groups, see M. Jones-Correa, “Latinos and Latin America: A Unified Agenda?”, in T. Ambrosio (ed.) Ethnic Identity Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002); On a comparison between Mexican-American lobbying efforts and other organised groups, see R. O. de la Garza, “U.S. Foreign Policy and the Mexican-American Political Agenda.”, in M. E. Ahrari (ed.), Ethnic Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy, (New York: Greenwood, 1987).
Finally, the existing literature will identify governmental actors themselves as the principle elites that should be studied when looking at the influence of Hispanic foreign policy engagement. In this regard, this typically involves a focus on the policy outcomes of a particular US administration, to assess how far these have been in any way influenced by the efforts of Hispanic American lobbying. The other governmental actor that the literature engages with is that of foreign governments themselves, specifically those within Latin America. This is part of an attempt to analyse how far foreign governments will attempt to establish diaspora lobbies within their emigrant communities within the US, and how successful such efforts have been. Again, whilst such a focus on governmental elites is useful in examining the extent of home-country lobbying and influence on the policy outcomes of the US government, it limits the scope of the analysis by declining to examine the influence of Hispanic American actors within governmental foreign policy institutions, to determine what if any unique perspectives they bring to the policy formulation and delivery process.

By limiting the focus on these specific definitions of political elite, the existing literature has largely overlooked two important varieties of foreign policy elite: That of non-elected political elites outside of ethnic lobbies, as well as Hispanic Americans working as foreign policy practitioners (FPPs) within the foreign affairs agencies of the US government.

Focusing on elected officials, ethnic lobbies and governmental actors discounts the voice of Hispanic American actors who are likely to be able to exert significant impact on the way in which the Hispanic demographic as a whole engage with US foreign policy. In particular, it fails to include non-elected political elites that do not organise as an ethnic lobby but nevertheless have the capacity to shape Hispanic engagement with foreign policy discourse. This includes individuals and organisations that have

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the power and influence to make representative claims on behalf of the Hispanic community. This could include cultural leaders, community organisers and civil rights activists. In addition, this could include Hispanic advocacy organisations that typically advanced domestic issues or that attempt to represent the population at the national level. These elites could have influence either for a brief period and over a particular set of issues, or for a longer period of time and represent an established authority over a particular Hispanic community or specific issue.

In addition, a second important manifestation of Hispanic foreign policy elite that is frequently overlooked by the existing literature is that of Hispanic American foreign policy practitioners working within the federal government. This could include Hispanic Americans serving as career diplomats or analysts working with foreign policy institutions such as the Department of State or the US Agency for International Development, those working as researchers within foreign policy think tanks, or foreign affairs specialists within academia.

In both of these instances, these elites have the potential to be seen as legitimate voices for their communities on foreign policy subject matters, given either their existing foreign policy expertise, or a legitimate status as recognised ambassadors for the community on domestic political matters.

Within wider literature on foreign policy analysis, the perspective of domestic elites is recognised as a legitimate and useful source of insight to determine foreign policy engagement. Therefore, it is somewhat surprising that there has not been a great deal of research looking at the level of engagement by non-elected political elites within the Hispanic community outside of looking for evidence of home-country lobbying.

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137 For example, for a focus on elites in foreign policy, see: I. Parmar “Anglo-American Elites in the Interwar Years: Idealism and Power in the Intellectual Roots of Chatham House and the Council on Foreign Relations”, International Relations, Vol. 16, No. 1., PP. 53-75
Towards a Generational analytical framework

Therefore, this thesis will utilise an alternative framework for understanding Hispanic engagement with US foreign policy. This is based on an incorporation within this thesis of an adapted version of García’s generational approach, as well as a broadened definition of the term elites that will incorporate both non-elected Hispanic political elites and Hispanic Americans working within the foreign policy establishment of the federal government.

It will adapt García’s model by focusing on the foreign policy engagement within the Chicano generation in the 1960s and 1970s as well as examining engagement by the Latino generation from the 1990s through to the contemporary period. However, it will also suggest a new generation with which to focus the analysis: That of the ‘Exile’ generation in the 1980s. This was a period characterised by the political organisation of both Cuban and Central American political exiles within the United States, set against the backdrop of high profile involvement in the politics and violence of Central America by the Reagan administration. This case study was chosen for inclusion in this thesis for two principle reasons. Firstly, both the intervention by the US government in Latin America, as well as attempts by Cuban exile elites to influence the US government’s policies towards the island, represent prominent activities in this history of the later cold war, as well as being relatively well-known events within US public discourse. As a result, their relevance to this thesis topic and their relative importance in the history of post-war US foreign policy, means that their exclusion as a case study from the thesis would leave both a notable gap in the chronological timeline of this analysis, as well as leave one of the most high-profile moments of Hispanic engagement with US foreign policy un-examined. Secondly, as will be outlined in Chapter 4, the examples of both the Cuban and Central American exiles represent the closest that any Hispanic elites have become to operating within the ‘ethnic lobby’ model discussed in the existing literature. As a result, it is important to understand the important distinctions between these Exile elites and the later Latino generation, in order to better understand why Hispanic elites from the 1990s onwards became reluctant to engage with US foreign policy.
The analysis will therefore use these three Generations as case studies to determine not only the extent to which these generations engage with US foreign policy, but to also identify the manner in which the nature of this engagement changes between the periods in which these generations operate.

Furthermore, the analytical framework will take as its central unit of analysis the political elites within these three generations. This will allow a new level of insight previously missed by the existing literature that failed to sufficiently broaden the definition of foreign policy elite.

To contextualise the case studies within the framework of these generations, the chapter will outline a brief overview of the changing nature of political elites across these different generations from the 1960s through to the 2010s. This will illustrate the extent to which Hispanic elites have changed over time from representing a predominantly Mexican-American community to incorporating the entirety of a pan-ethnic Latin American-origin demographic.

**Chicano Generation**

The Chicano Generation reflects the group of Mexican-Americans that identified with and participated in the Chicano movement during the 1960s and 1970s. At its core, this was a political and cultural movement that reached its peak with the California farmworkers strike in 1965, through to the to the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. It incorporated a Mexican-American civil rights agenda that demanded improvements in the social, economic and political conditions of Mexican-Americans, and featured a number of separate campaigns by different elites, across different parts of the geographic Southwest. Whilst the movement was characterised by decentralized campaigns, the ideology and ideational engagement within the

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movement included consistent features. These included a deliberate invocation and conscious espousal of Mexican heritage as a positive quality that should be embraced, rejecting the notion that the cultural legacy of Mexico should be discarded in favour of assimilation. In particular, the movement’s ideology rejected the legitimacy of the conventional ideas of immigrant assimilation and of the US political system. In its place, it presented a counter-narrative in which the US political and economic system operated as a tool of oppression against the Mexican-American population.

The Chicano generation elites were characterised by a focus on a number of high-profile and charismatic individual leaders of various different movements and protests, though within a number of areas of the movement such as the Crusade for Justice and the Chicano war moratorium, the participants of the movements were disproportionately students and young Mexican-Americans.

The major themes and historical events associated with Chicano generation elites are explored in detail in Chapter 3.

**Exile Generation**

The Exile Generation refers to the collection of Hispanic immigrant groups that arrived in the United States as political refugees, during the mid to latter half of the twentieth century. In particular, these groups were driven by refugees from Cuba, following the 1959 socialist revolution, as well as from Central American states such as Nicaragua, Guatemala and El Salvador, who began arriving in large numbers following the escalation of civil wars within the region from the 1970s onwards. During the heights of the cold war, exiles from these groups organised themselves so as to influence US foreign policy towards their home countries, in the hope of resolving the political situations that led to their exit.

The presentation of the Cuban population that began arriving in the US in 1959 as exiles, is a common (though not exclusively-used) practice within both academic and
public discourse, and is a term that has been consistently deployed by US presidents when publically discussing the community, especially when referencing the first wave of arrivals.\textsuperscript{139} Central Americans who arrived in the US fleeing political violence are less regularly afforded the exile label, instead being typically referred to as refugees by media and political commentators.\textsuperscript{140} However, despite the widespread use of the exile label to refer to Cubans living in the US, the specific concept of an ‘Exile generation’ as its own political generation is original to this thesis: By affording the elites from these communities a common ‘exile’ label, it emphasises the shared characteristics, interests and behaviour, and recognises that these unique features affected their engagement with US foreign policy in a sufficiently distinctive way that it becomes necessary to think of them as a distinct political generation in their own right.

García himself does not include this generation as part of his analysis, due to his focus on the evolution of the Mexican-American community and his attention on the broader changes in domestic circumstances and political behaviour of Mexican-American elites. However, as will be outlined in Chapter 4, the Cuban and Central American exile communities undertook considerable engagement with US foreign policy during the 1980s. As both Cuban and Central American foreign policy engagement was driven by similar principles and reflected a significant engagement by Hispanic population with US foreign policy, they have therefore been included together as a cohesive generation in this analysis to complement the political generations already identified by García. This reflects not only a unique epoch in the history of Hispanic elite engagement with US foreign policy due to the high-profile

\textsuperscript{139} For example, in a speech in Old Havana during his historic visit to the island in March of 2016, Barack Obama referred to the US’ “Cuban exiles” that “love Cuba” and for whom many “still considers [the island] their true home”, (See: R. T. Beckwith, “Read President Obama’s Speech to the Cuban People”, \textit{Time}, 22\textsuperscript{nd} March, 2016. [http://time.com/4267933/barack-obama-cuba-speech-transcript-full-text/])

\textsuperscript{140} For example, Barack Obama specifically used the term ‘Central American refugees’ in a speech thanking the Mexican government for their efforts to ‘absorb’ individuals that cross their southern border seeking asylum. (See: D. Nakamura, “Obama thanks Mexico for ‘absorbing’ Central American refugees. His own administration wants to turn them away.”, \textit{The Washington Post}, 20\textsuperscript{th} September, 2016 [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/09/20/obama-thanks-mexico-for-absorbing-central-american-refugees-his-own-administration-wants-to-turn-them-away/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.f51239db4ed4])
nature of the home-country lobbying efforts, but it also marks a significant moment in the evolution of the Hispanic American community from a collection of ethnic origin groups to the presentation of a pan-ethnic label.

**Latino Generation**

The Latino Generation refers to both the state of the Hispanic population in the decades following 1990, as well as the state of the political elite that represents it. García defines the broad population of the Latino Generation as compromising the children of the new immigrants that arrived in the United States from Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean from the late 1970s through to the 1990s. As a result, this is the first Hispanic generation to represent a genuinely heterogeneous mix of Latin American backgrounds. This generation is also characterised as “coming of age” at a time when the United States economy experienced unprecedented levels of globalisation, which had effects on both the US and Latin American socio-economic landscapes. In addition, the Latino Generation grew up alongside a recognition of the growing political clout of the expanding Latino demographic, alongside a revolution in communication technology that has allowed Latinos to communicate both externally with their countries of origin and with strangers more globally, as well as with other Latinos across the US. The final characteristic of Latino identity that García emphasises has been informative in developing the generational mindset has been the emergence of neo-nativism following the culture wars of the 1990s. As García emphasises:

> Neo-nativism represents a surge of anti-immigrant sentiment in this country in response to increase undocumented immigration, especially from Mexico. This has led to such anti-immigrant actions as the passage of Proposition 187 in California in 1994 that denied most state services to the undocumented, including hospital care and education for their undocumented children... Those children... who crossed the border as babies or as very young children became Dream Act Latinos who have had to live, if not in the

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142 Ibid., PP. 23-25
shadows, at least with the burden of their personal limitations, such as in education, due to their status.\textsuperscript{143}

As a result, the wider population that makes up the Latino generation represents a number of novel positions within the history of the Hispanic population: They are at once a recognised growing political entity and, at the same time, the subject of open criticism of their status and place in the United States. Most importantly, they are the first true Hispanic community to represent diverse international origins.

The Latino Generation elites, which will exist as the focus of analysis in this study, reflect a different set of novel characteristics. As will be outlined in Chapter 5, Latino elites claiming to represent the community are concentrated within large-scale, national advocacy organisations that operate within the framework of the US political system. They emphasise the legitimacy of the pan-ethnic component of the Latino demographic in the hope of leveraging this for greater political capital.

However, the transition from the country of origin labels that characterised the Chicano and Exile generations, to pan-ethnic Latino and Hispanic labels, did not occur overnight, nor was it a process that developed organically from within the population itself. As will be outlined below, this process reflected a co-constitutive effort from both the Hispanic elites themselves, in conjunction with the federal government and the media, to legitimate the pan-ethnic Latino label. As will be further explored in Chapters 5 and 6, this process and its outcome has directly impacted the ways in which Latino Generation elites can engage with US foreign policy discourse in the twenty first century.

\textbf{Transitioning to a pan-ethnic label}

By the 1990s, the banner under which Hispanic American political engagement had been conducted at the national level had transitioned from being along national-

\textsuperscript{143} Ibid., P. 25
origin lines, to the now-commonplace ‘Hispanic’ and ‘Latino’ labels. This represented more than just a change of terminology; organisations and advocacy groups, in framing their constituents in such a way, were making the active choice to assume a pan-ethnic identity and make a claim to be representing a united ethnicity over a collection of individual groups that had happened to share similar characteristics.

Scholars had initially identified the concept of a Latino pan-ethnicity in the previous decades. Padilla had observed the interaction between Puerto Rican and Mexican-Americans in Chicago during the 1950s and 60s and noted that, as a consequence of sharing a finite physical and political space with growing populations, a collective consciousness emerged that took the form of a new identity that existed ‘above’ national origin labels and transcended cultural differences, formed out of the commonalities between the two Spanish speaking, predominantly Catholic groups, both of whom were minorities in a predominantly Anglo city.144 Thus pan-ethnicity, from a theoretical perspective, is a fundamentally new identity, mutually conceived by different Spanish speaking groups once sufficient social and geographic conditions are met, that surpasses the traditional boundaries between the groups.

The topic of Latino pan-ethnicity represents a continuing area of scholarly enquiry. Researchers have questioned both the existence of such a phenomenon and speculated on the necessary conditions for its development. As with many questions of social identity, it represents a site of interest to a number of social science disciplines. For the purposes of this study, however, it is the possible political consequences that are relevant, and the examination of to what extent the development of pan-ethnicity amongst the Latino population brings with it consequences for Latino political behavior and the nature of elite engagement.

In trying to make sense of how this rapid rise in pan-ethnicity came about, it is necessary to look at the development of the term within the United States census,

as it was through this process that the categories of ‘Hispanic’ and ‘Latino’ were first offered as legitimate identities to individuals from Spanish-speaking backgrounds. The first attempt at measuring the size of the ‘Latino’ population was the 1970 census. A long-form version of the questionnaire that was distributed to a sample of the population included the question “Is this person’s origin or descent—" with the choices of responses being “Mexican”, “Puerto Rican”, “Cuban”, “Central or South American”, “Other Spanish” or “No, none of these”\(^{145}\)

By the 1980 census, this question was included in the short form questionnaire that was distributed to the entire population. This time the question was worded: “Is this person of Spanish/Hispanic origin or descent?” ‘Hispanic’ was now the explicit overarching category under which the entirety of responses based on national origin group were subsumed.

The decision to use the term “Hispanic” had come about following recommendation of a specially convened Hispanic Task Force, part of a larger initiative within the federal government to find more appropriate labels for ethnic minorities that could be used for official purposes. The term ‘Latino’ was offered on the 2000 census as an alternative label, though the two were treated as interchangeable for statistical purposes.\(^{146}\)

Attempts to measure the size of the Latino population through the census had proven problematic. The 1970 long-form question gathered 9.1 million respondents, which was half a million below other estimates of the size of the Hispanic demographic. Furthermore, in an indication of the confusion around the question, over 1 million individuals who answered the question were not of Spanish-speaking origin, and had likely mistaken the “central or south American” option to refer to a geographic region of the United States. The official data from the census did not attempt to update or correct these figures, making the designated Hispanic population size from the period hard to gauge. The ‘Central or South American’ category was removed in time for the 1980 census, but a different problem emerged


\(^{146}\) Ibid.
when several hundreds of thousands of non-Hispanics mistakenly answered the question by circling the “amer” part of the “yes, Mexican, Mexican-Amer., Chicano” response. There were yet others whose stated language and origin suggested they were Latino but had failed to identify explicitly as such. This all resulted in a significant degree of confusion, and raised a question mark over the legitimacy of the ‘Hispanic’ category. At the very least, the first two official attempts to categorise Spanish-speaking national origin groups under a common label produced questionable statistical data, and ultimately resulted in a somewhat flawed picture of the extent of pan-ethnic identification in the 1970s and 1980s.147

Given these problems, the legitimacy of the ‘Latino’ label is open to challenge. For the purposes of this project, it is necessary to look at how far has the label been successfully ingratiated amongst the target Latino audience themselves. Public affinity with pan-ethnic labels can suggest whether it has been embraced by Latinos, which can in turn indicate how far it can be used as an avenue for political mobilisation. In the 1990 Latino National Political Survey (LNPS), around 1 in 3 respondents chose to identify with a pan-ethnic label such as ‘Hispanic’ or ‘Latino’. This suggests that at the start of the new decade, pan-ethnic labels held a degree of acceptance but they remained secondary to national origin group as the primary method of identification. By 2006, this had changed considerably, where 87% of respondents in the Latino National Survey claimed identification with such a label.148 This suggests that within 15 years, support for the concept of a common Latino identity had more than doubled within the general Hispanic population; a dramatic increase that suggests that a belief in the concept of pan-ethnicity does indeed exist and is shared among the vast majority of Latinos.

147 Ibid.
This raises a subsequent question of relevance to this project: if a pan-ethnic identity is recognized amongst the target population, does this have implications for how Latinos engage with the political process?

Kaufmann investigated the potential impact that a pan-ethnic identity would have on the ability for Latinos to engage with other minority groups and work together for shared political goals.\textsuperscript{149} Given that being able to advocate whilst representing a larger ‘block’ of potential voters increases that chances of success, it could potentially prove a highly useful tool for a Latino organisations. To examine the possibility of such inter-minority cooperation, she examined a sample of Latino survey respondents from 1999 and found that respondents that expressed a high level of pan-Latino identity were more likely to feel a greater degree of affinity towards African Americans, believing that they have shared goals and challenges as a fellow discriminated group\textsuperscript{150}. This has significant implications for the potential for Latinos to build mass coalitions with African American advocacy groups.

Building on this research, others looked at the how far Latinos expressed a sense of linked fate with each other. It is well documented that African American political engagement as a block is enabled by the fact the most African Americans see their personal fortunes dependent on the necessary success of the race as a whole\textsuperscript{151}. Were Latinos to be able to operate as a similarly cohesive block, a similar sentiment of linked fate should also be present. Sanchez examined the 2006 Latino National Survey results and found that 77% of respondents believe that the fate of their national origin group is intrinsically tied to the fate of Latinos as a whole, and 68% indicated they believed their individual success was also dependent on Latinos doing well.\textsuperscript{152}

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\textsuperscript{150} Ibid.


In addition to this, recent survey data from the Pew Hispanic Center suggests that Latinos overwhelmingly express a desire to be presented by a ‘national’ political leadership figure. 74% say it is either ‘extremely’ important or ‘very’ important for the success of the Latino political agenda to have an individual that can represent them in the public sphere. It is not clear how far Latinos would be willing to accept a Latino individual from a national-origin group other than their own, but what is clear is that three-quarters of Latinos are comfortable with an individual representing a pan-ethnic identity to the rest of the US population.

Therefore, despite the controversy over its origin and the limits and scope of its potential impact, statistical evidence would suggest that Latinos display an affinity with a pan-ethnic label and that this is likely to inform the manner in which they engage with the US political system.

**Hispanic Generational elites in context**

This overview demonstrates how Hispanic generational elites followed a pattern of evolution from national origin groups based around charismatic individuals, to established national advocacy organisations that make claim to represent the entirety of the Latino population. Thus, it is clear that elites changed significantly as they evolved from Chicano and Exile generations into a pan-ethnic, Latino generation, both in terms of outreach strategy and organisational structure. In addition, the generations themselves were substantially different in terms of the population compositions that the elites were representing: Chicanos were grounded in a premise of resistance to the perceived oppression of an illegitimate US political infrastructure, and worked to construct an ethnic national identity around that premise, with elites representing a relatively uniform Mexican-American constituency. By contrast, ‘Latino’ as a category is inherently more contested; as a result, its elites cannot draw on the same level of homogeneity as the Chicano or

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Exile elites, who were speaking to populations drawn principally from similar
backgrounds and countries of origin.

Thus, this poses an important question from a foreign policy perspective: Given the
significance of change in structure and composition between different Hispanic
generations, did engagement with US foreign policy change as a consequence?
Through the utilisation of a generational approach within this thesis, using the case
studies outlined above, it is possible to attempt to answer this question in a manner
that provides an account for both differences and continuities between these
generations. Deploying this approach also offers a more nuanced understanding of
individual case studies of Hispanic American foreign policy engagement during the
latter half of the 20th century, by placing them within their generational context.
Chapter 3: “This very place is our Vietnam”: Chicano Elite engagement with US foreign policy, 1965-1975.

Introduction

This chapter will analyse the nature of foreign policy engagement by Chicano generation elites within the Chicano movement, during its main period of activity from 1965 to 1975. It will establish that the Chicano elites engaged with foreign policy discourse in three principle ways: Firstly, a critical re-appraisal of the history of US foreign policy towards Mexico, the nature of westward expansion, and the concept of an American ‘manifest destiny’ were all crucial components of the critical narratives underpinning Chicano ideology. Secondly, Chicano elites established a high-profile, organised anti-war platform in response to the disproportionately high number of Mexican-Americans killed in the conflict, tying opposition to the war to their wider civil rights campaigns. Finally, a number of Chicano elites conducted significant international outreach efforts, establishing direct relationships with the government of Mexico, as well as organised labour movements in Europe, in the hope of securing international support for their efforts.

As will be demonstrated in this chapter, the case study of Chicano elite engagement with US foreign policy ultimately supports the main claims in this thesis:

Firstly, these findings support the claim that Hispanic elites engage with foreign policy where it supports and complements their domestic agendas. The three methods of foreign policy engagement outlined above were utilised by Chicano elites as part of an attempt to bring greater support to their civil rights campaigns, whether by solidifying the Chicano identity around a narrative of resistance, bringing attention and public support to their local operations, or lobbying foreign actors to provide international and diplomatic interest in their crusade to liberate the barrios.
Secondly, it supports the claim that widening the scope of foreign policy engagement beyond an analysis of evidence of home-country lobbying, it is possible to find meaningful and substantial engagement with foreign policy and foreign policy discourse: For Chicano elites, the injustices brought about by the legacy of US foreign policy was a principle lens through which Mexican-American history and socio-economic problems were considered. This in turn meant Chicano elite approaches to campaigning and relationship-building were left inextricably contextualised to the wrongs of US foreign policy. Despite this engagement, relatively little academic attention has been afforded to this period in Hispanic American history by the existing literature of US foreign policy, despite it representing a moment of considerable public engagement with foreign policy and cold war doctrine, against the backdrop of US military intervention in Southeast Asia.

Thirdly, the chapter supports the claim that, by utilising a generational approach to understanding Hispanic elite leadership, the nuances of Chicano US foreign policy engagement is revealed: Both the oppositional nature of Chicano ideology, coupled with the relatively homogenous, Mexican-American community that it represented, meant that elites were able to build the movement’s identity around a revisionist history that placed Mexican-Americans as the historical and continuing victims of an oppressive US foreign policy. Furthermore, an organisational structure where social protests were led and centred around a relatively small number of high-profile, charismatic leaders, resulted in the possible avenues of foreign policy engagement being different for Chicano elites than for the Exile Generation and for the Latino Generation elites examined in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.

The structure of this chapter consists of a brief outline of the Chicano movement, its principle leaders, campaigns and Ideas. It then presents the ways in which Chicano elites critically engaged with the history of US foreign policy, demonstrating how elements of the movement constructed an alternative ‘manifest destiny’ based on ethnic nationalism, solidifying the essentially resistive nature of Chicano identity. It then outlines how opposition to the war in Vietnam became a central component of the movement, seen in both the literature and art that emerged at the time, as well
as in the organised marches against the war that were conducted between 1969 and 1971. This section incorporates interviews with two Chicano civil rights leaders that served as co-presidents of the Chicano Moratorium Committee, which organised the largest ever march against the war, in Los Angeles in 1970. The chapter will then outline how various campaigns of the movement conducted international outreach efforts, attempting to build relationships with foreign policy actors in the hope of securing international and diplomatic support for their local campaigns.

**Outlining the movement**

The Chicano movement, or *El Movimiento* was a political and cultural movement that took place principally from around 1965, with the commencement of the farmworker strikes in California, to the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. 154 It was, at its core, a demand for improvements in the political, social and economic status of Mexican-Americans, and included specific campaigns for land reform, labour rights and educational opportunities, among others. These were often separate campaigns that were un-coordinated and steered by separate elites, across different parts of the geographic Southwest. However, whilst the movement was inherently decentralized, it was nevertheless characterized by several unique features, which applied across the movement. These included a conscious espousal of Mexican heritage as a positive quality that should be embraced, rejecting the notion that their language, values, religion and customs should be discarded in favour of the Anglo-Saxon cultural establishment. As Garcia summarises: “One of the objectives of the Movimiento was to liberate Mexican-origin people from a sense of cultural inferiority”. 155

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The Chicano movement can broadly be considered as a youth movement: a central feature of its membership was a new generation of US-born citizens of Mexican heritage that openly rejected the general commitment to assimilation of the previous generation of Mexican-Americans. This included a marked generational difference concerning perspectives on military services, with younger Chicanos rejecting service in the military as a path to societal integration. In many individual cases, this was at odds with their the ‘Mexican-American’ generation parents, who had often viewed military service as a display of patriotism and as way to demonstrate their deservingness for a recognised place within the US, and bring a wider public acceptance towards their community.\(^\text{156}\) In place of such sentiments, the younger generation at the heart of the Chicano movement rejected the idea that a contribution to the state in this manner was a necessary requirement of participation in US society, encouraging instead a more critical interpretation of the place of the Mexican-American community within the existing socio-economic and political structure.\(^\text{157}\) A 1969 manifesto published in La Raza, a Chicano magazine published in LA, typified this sentiment:

> Why this sudden awakening? Actually, it is not as sudden as it looks. Its first manifestations begin in the period following the Second World War. Mexican-Americans emerged from that conflict with a new determination to make their sacrifice count. No ethnic group had received a larger proportion of decorations, and few had sustained as large a share of casualties. These veterans challenged in and out of court the blatant legacy of discrimination still prevailing in the Southwest, often displayed by the glaring signs of the brutal words “No Mexicans allowed”.\(^\text{158}\)

The movement did not include a rigid ideology. There was never a consensus over what did and did not constitute Chicano thought and as Jorge Mariscal points out, the movement’s philosophical basis was contained ideas of both nationalism and internationalism.\(^\text{159}\) The popularity of different ideas changed over time, as well as


\(^{157}\) Ibid., 10–11.


varying from geographic location and between different organisations. However, Ignacio García nevertheless identifies four ‘phases’ where certain ideas were incorporated into the movement’s ideological development and made it unique from previous Mexican-American generations. Firstly, it involved a critical re-evaluation of the place of the Mexican-Americans within the US socio-economic and political structure that rejected the existing model of immigrant-incorporation as a failure. Secondly, it inspired Mexican-Americans to re-discover their history and encouraged a positive appraisal of their heritage. It advocated a celebration of Mexican history and culture, removing it from its perceived lower rung on an ethnic hierarchy that privileged Anglo-Saxons as an ideal to be assimilated towards. In the third and fourth phases, this heritage became a central focus of the movement’s identity and was incorporated into a new wave of political activity that opposed the Anglo-Saxon model of assimilation.\footnote{I. M García, \textit{Chiconismo}, PP. 9–12.}

The structure of the elite within the movement was much more based around the disproportionate dominance and influence of individual leaders than had been the case previously (or is the case today). A class of charismatic personalities dominated Chicano leadership, and this has been reflected in academic study of the period, which has focused disproportionately on high-quality biographical accounts and the testimonios of movement leaders. The main organisations were often headed by a charismatic individual (invariably a man) with a national profile, but the day to day of organisational activity was often anchored around the initiative of local chapters and communities. As a result, they were often cash poor but membership rich, which led to campaigns centred on public marches and demonstrations. Whilst Chicano history included a relatively wide range of individual elites and groups, the most high-profile and the most influential for the longest period were the organisations based around the so-called “four horsemen”\footnote{R. T. Rodríguez, “The Locations of Chicano/a and Latino/a Studies,” in J. C. Rowe (ed.), \textit{A concise companion to American studies} (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell (an imprint of John Wiley & Sons Ltd), 2007), P. 205.}: Reies Tijera and La Alianza Federal de Mercedes, who were based in New Mexico and campaigned for land-grand reform; Rodolfo
“Corky” Gonzales, and the Crusade for Justice, based in Colorado; Cesar Chavez who, along with Delores Huerta and others led the United Farm Workers and campaigned for labour and farmworkers rights in California; and José Angel Gutiérrez, who served as President of La Raza Unida Party, a Southwest-wide political party that formally participated in the US electoral process on a Chicano policy platform and had a number of electoral victories in Texas.

Despite the influence of Chicano elites in the 1960s and 70s, as well as the often-revered status of a number of Chicano leaders today among the Latino community, the period of the Chicano movement remains relatively ignored by scholars of ethnic minority engagement with US foreign policy. The foreign policy perspectives of Chicano elites themselves have been left virtually unexamined. This is perhaps a consequence of the dominance of the domestic agenda that was characterised by the movement elites’ high-profile local and national campaigns. However, that domestic concerns took pre-eminence does not mean that foreign policy and international perspectives were not of significant importance to the movement: these dimensions are present in the politics, activities and ideologies of the movement, in varying forms, throughout its existence.

To correct this omission, this chapter will outline and demonstrate how and when Chicano elites engaged with US foreign policy and international issues. It will begin with an examination of the way in which one of the central ideas that underpinned the Chicano identity, that of the mythical Mexican homeland of Aztlán, included a sophisticated re-examination of the history of U.S. foreign policy in the Southwest, the use of manifest destiny as a justification for territorial expansion, and contests the legitimacy of US sovereignty. The second section will focus on Chicano elite opposition to the Vietnam War, including organizing the largest anti-war demonstration in US history in Los Angeles in 1970. The final section will look at the international outreach efforts of Chicano elites, attempting to leverage relationships with foreign political actors either to strengthen their domestic agenda, or to build solidarity with foreign movements to which they sympathized.
The Chicano challenge to manifest destiny

‘Chicanismo’ – or the political ideas and ideology that underpinned the Chicano movement, were contested throughout the 1960s and 70s, and still continue to be the subject of debate today. It contained within it a number of different strands and positions reflecting its geographically de-centralised structure. However, the most prominent issue that dominated Chicano thought revolved around the relationship between Mexican-Americans and the space in which they found themselves in the United States, both physically and culturally, and how this interaction contributed in the conscious production of new, Chicano, identity. \(^{162}\) It included a critical re-evaluation of the manner in which the United States annexed the territory in the Southwestern states, and the historically-situated narratives used to justify its right to govern.

A prominent counter-narrative within the Chicano movement was a rejection of the legitimacy of the US sovereignty in the Southwest. This was centred on the concept of ‘Aztlán’: a name for the legendary homeland of the Aztec civilisation that had stretched from Mexico as far north as California and Colorado. \(^{163}\) Chicano leaders encouraged Mexican-Americans to think of themselves as direct descendants of indigenous Mexican populations: they were the spiritual inheritors to the territorial Southwest, and by extension their claim to the land was of higher precedence than that of the more recently-arrived Anglo-Saxon population. With this came a renewed focus on historical US foreign policy in the Southwest and its expansion into Mexican territory as well as a refutation of the claims of Manifest destiny that had been used to justify it. Instead of the result of the natural march of Anglo progress, Chicano elites put forward an alternative picture of a brutal occupation by an imperialistic aggressor.

Tijerina and the Land Grants

A challenge to the physical territory had begun earlier with Reies Tijerina and the political organisation that would go on to become La Alianza Federal de Mercedes (translated in English as Federal Land Grant Alliance). A charismatic evangelical preacher, he moved to New Mexico in the 1950s and became interested in the Land Grant struggle. This concerned the territory that was ceded to the United States by Mexico in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 that ended the Mexican-American war. The treaty had guaranteed Mexican citizens that were living in territory that was to become part of the United States would have their rights to the land honoured under US law. In the end however, US authorities recognized only a small percentage of claims by Mexican farmers. 164 As a result, Tijerina and La Alianza sought to argue that the US had violated international law and that the ‘Hispanos’ living in New Mexico had the legitimate right to the land. They argued that the current occupiers of the land, in large instances by the federal government itself, were there illegally and that their sovereignty based on the hundred-year-old international treaty was invalid.

Tijerina and La Alianza initially sought to rectify the situation through the existing legal and political apparatus and built up their organisation to a size that allowed them to petition both the courts and meet with local elected officials for redress. By 1965, La Alianza had 14,000 members and its national conference the following years was attended by over 20,000 delegates, and Tijerina’s outreach efforts included both a television and radio program. 165 However, these efforts were largely unsuccessful, and La Alianza began to turn to symbolic acts of militancy. In 1966 the organisation staged an occupation of the Carson national forest in northern New Mexico, in which they proclaimed that the territory, according to international law, was the rightful property of its legal Mexican owners that had been previously recognized by Mexico in the 19th century. Rejecting the sovereignty of the United

States government over the land, they declared the territory the “Republic of Joaquín del Río de Chama”. 166 On the first day, two officials from the U.S. Forest Service were subjected to a symbolic trial for trespassing on independent Mexican land. 167 Tijerina admitted after the occupation had ended that the move was meant to draw national publicity to the land grant movement and not an earnest attempt to declare the park independent from the U.S. 168

In a limited sense, the actions of La Alianza in Carson national forest denoted an attempt by a local group of activists to draw wider attention to the contested legality of U.S. ownership of former Mexican landholders’ property in New Mexico. But the manner and tactics used to do so reflect the importance of re-examining the received history of US foreign policy in the Southwest to their strategy for achieving their political objectives. In its theatrical appearance, the symbolic takeover of the park based on theoretical violation of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo represented a clear and direct challenge by La Alianza to the legitimacy of US’ sovereignty over the land, drawing on the stipulations of an international treaty signed after a 19th century US-Mexican war. However, despite the symbolism of the takeover, Tijerina’s organisation was not advocating the outright political secession for Mexican-American landowners. Instead, they were attempting to leverage the spectre of a claim for political independence in order to deliver legal entitlements within the existing US system. This was a challenge to the basis of assumed Anglo pre-dominance in the region. The origin of the border was a consequence of US foreign policy, and the legality of its subsequent governance lay in a bilateral treaty. As a result, the very foundations of the legitimacy of US control were contested, with the intention of putting the status quo political structure on the defensive.

Corky Gonzales and the Crusade for Justice

In Colorado, a movement for social right was being built around another charismatic speaker, Rodolfo “Corky” Gonzales, a former boxer turned political activist. The Crusade for Justice emerged out of a series of campaigns by a proportion of the State’s Mexican-American population on issues of civil rights, education reform and police brutality. Like La Alianza, they also campaigned over the issue of land grants, but were primarily concerned with achieving socio-economic justice. Gonzales had previously been an active participant in local politics, working with the Democratic Party and rising to the position of a local ‘captain’. However, he quickly became disillusioned with this role after experiencing corruption within the party first hand and dismissing it as an avenue to improve the conditions for minorities.\textsuperscript{169} He felt that Mexican-Americans were unable to fully integrate into American society due to an un-willingness on the part of Anglos to offer the socio-economic and political parity that supposedly lay at the end of the assimilation process into the wider Anglo-Saxon society. At the same time, he recognized that many Mexican-Americans were actively participated in US foreign policy via military service in the hope of achieving such parity. He instead encouraged his compatriots to embrace their rich Mexican heritage as a source of pride in the face of Anglo pressures to conform. He articulated his sense of frustration, betrayal and a colonized people in the poem “I am Joaquin”:

“My blood runs pure on the ice caked
hills of the Alaska Isles,
on the corpse strewn beach of Normandy,
the foreign land of Korea,

and now
Vietnam.

...

I have made the Anglo rich

Yet
Equality is but a word,
the Treaty of Hidalgo has been broken
and is but another treacherous promise.
...
Part of the blood that runs deep in me
could not be vanquished by the Moors.
I defeated them after five hundred years,
and I have endured.
Part of the blood that is mine
has labored endlessly four hundred
years under the heel of lustful
Europeans.
I am still here!”

The poem attempted to capture a sentiment of a generation of young Mexican-Americans, who felt similarly disillusioned with the promise of equal treatment through assimilation by ‘Anglo society’ and felt that they remained socially and politically marginalized and demanded a civil rights campaign to address their situation. Gonzales’ response was to work with the Crusade for Justice to promote a Chicano political identity. Rejecting assimilation outright, it advocated instead that Mexican-Americans embrace their multiple indigenous and Spanish ancestries. It turned to a romanticized Mexican history and shared culture, and asserted that these should form the basis of a common ethno-political identity for Chicanos.

At the heart of this ethnic culture building lay the mythologised concept of ‘Aztlán’. To Chicanos, this represented the legendary homeland of the Aztec people – an indigenous civilisation that dominated Mexico immediately before the arrival of the Spanish. The location of Aztlán was theorised to exist north of Mexico and within the boundaries of the United States. To Chicanos, the physical space of Aztlán became synonymous with those Southwestern states that had been within the borders of Mexico before the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. As Chicanos considered themselves to be the direct descendants of the indigenous Aztecs, they therefore were the spiritual ‘owners’ of the South West territory. Aztlán was their nation and territorial homeland, to which the Anglo-Saxon newcomers were simply political occupiers. This mythology became the anchoring concept for much of Chicano ideology and infused their political activity. At its heart was a celebration of the fact that Chicanos were inheritors of a culture and ethnic legacy that pre-dated United States. It presented an alternative Manifest destiny based on Mexican heritage in a narrative that placed Mexican-Americans as the central political actor in the history of the Southwest United States. U.S. annexation of Mexican territory was no longer the inevitable result of progress, but rather an act of brutal occupation following a war of conquest, using oppression as principal tool of social control. ‘Aztlán’ as a concept allowed the promotion of cultural hegemony within the territory with which Chicanos were dominant, and provided moral legitimacy for demands for self-determination.

This emerging nationalism still needed a written articulation to clarify its message and present a cohesive ‘mission statement’ to Chicanos, the Mexican-American community at large, as well as the wider US population. In March 1969, Gonzales

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173 Ibid.

convened a gathering of Chicano activist groups hosted by the Crusade for Justice in Colorado. This became known as the first National Chicano Liberation Youth Conference and was attended by around 1500 activists from various Chicano organisations across the Southwest. There, the attendees agreed upon and ratified a document known as ‘El Plan Espiritual De Aztlan’, which set out the founding ideals of Chicano nationalism and the political objectives of the movement. The idea of the document was to serve as the “common denominator for mass mobilization and organization” and enshrine the sentiments of Chicanismo. El Plan listed 13 goals that would lead to self-determination for Mexican-Americans, and finished by emphasizing the agenda’s eventual goal of achieving national self-determination for the people of Aztlan:

A nation autonomous and free - culturally, socially, economically, and politically- will make its own decisions on the usage of our lands, the taxation of our goods, the utilization of our bodies for war, the determination of justice (reward and punishment), and the profit of our sweat.

The tone of the Plan reflected the strength of feeling among delegates that Aztlan represented a spiritual home for Mexican-Americans and afforded them the moral authority to seek a political revolution to reclaim their rightful sovereignty over the land. Whilst this attitude was in reality largely symbolic – none of the major Chicano elites advocated that Aztlan should attempt to become an actual independent state – in flirting with the notion of a legitimate claim to separation, it did none-the-less reinforce the challenge to the traditional narrative of an Anglo-Saxon Manifest destiny leading to a progressive expansion into the South West. The prominent Chicano poet Alurista, who attended the conference and wrote a pre-amble to the Plan, emphasised in his writing this contested narrative of sovereign legitimacy:

177 Ibid.
In the spirit of a new people that is conscious not only of its proud historical heritage but also of the brutal "gringo" invasion of our territories, we, the Chicano inhabitants and civilizers of the northern land of Aztlán from whence came our forefathers, reclaiming the land of their birth and consecrating the determination of our people of the sun, declare that the call of our blood is our power, our responsibility, and our inevitable destiny. We are free and sovereign to determine those tasks which are justly called for by our house, our land, the sweat of our brows, and by our hearts. Aztlán belongs to those who plant the seeds, water the fields, and gather the crops and not to the foreign Europeans. We do not recognize capricious frontiers on the bronze continent.  

The fact that the conference attendees had chosen to issue a Plan was itself symbolic. Political documents such as this has a long association with the commencement of a number of violent political revolutions in Mexican history. This demonstrated two things: It reiterated to Chicanos that the heritage of European Mexican culture was to be celebrated and seen as a primary identity alongside older, indigenous cultures. To wider America, it hinted at the possibility that a similar revolution was about to occur were the political demands of the Mexican-American people not addressed. As if to signify both of these attitudes, conference attendees organized a march to the Colorado state Capitol building, where they lowered and replaced the State flag with the flag of Mexico and announced that the territory was now the “territorio liberado de Aztlán” (Liberated territory of Aztlán). 

**Gutiérrez and the Raza Unida Party**

In addition to these protest activities, a number of Chicano elites were determined to build an organized infrastructure through which Aztlán could become a political project. Whilst Gonzales and other leaders had become disillusioned with the Democratic Party, they had not so readily abandoned a willingness to work within

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178 Ibid.

the existing institutional framework for democratic politics. Gutiérrez outlined this position in a rally in May of 1970:

We have had other problems which we have known about for a long time. For instance, the fact that the Mexicano can’t cope with the culture of the monolingual creatures that abound in South Texas. You see, we’re literate in Spanish, so we can’t recognise the name of John Waltberger on the ballot, but we sure as hell recognise Juan Garcia... Supposedly in this kind of democratic society the citizenry is encouraged to participate in the political process – but not so in South Texas. Someone asked me recently whether I thought any type of system other than the American political system could work in South Texas. I thought about it for a minute and suggested that the question be reworded because we ought to try the American system first (Applause). 180

The solution became the creation of a formal Chicano organisation for getting Chicano elites into elected office: The Raza Unida Party (RUP). Emerging as a political force from 1970 onwards, it expanded to multiple party chapters across the states of the South West. However, it was José Angel Gutiérrez’s Texas operation that proved to be the most successful: they built on local campaigns for socio-economic issues that were already in place, particularly in the Winter Garden region near the border, which had a heavy Mexican and Mexican-American population. 181 From 1969 the RUP under Gutiérrez campaigned for office in three local cities and won 15 out of the 16 seats they contested, and took control of the city council of Crystal City. 182 The RUP’s message and policy platform was built around the same sentiments of self-determination and Chicano ethno-cultural nationalism found in the Plan. This sentiment can be seen for example in the preamble of the Oakland chapter of the RUP:

We see that our lands were stolen from us. We see that the only payment was in poverty, starvation, disease, racist mockeries made of our language and culture and race... Given

182 L. García Bedolla, Introduction to Latino politics in the U.S., P. 91.
that these factors of oppression form the common denominator that unites us, THEREFORE WE THE PEOPLE OF LA RAZA, have decided to reject the existing political parties of our oppressors and take it upon ourselves to form LA RAZA UNIDA PARTY, which will serve as a unifying force in our struggle for self-determination.¹⁸³

While emphasizing the revolutionary nature of the Chicano struggle and the right of Mexican-Americans to the land, the RUP showed a clear commitment to the principle that government-organised democratic elections were the appropriate avenue for achieving Chicano political aims. The revolutionary message of the movement and challenge to US sovereignty was taken in a more literal sense by other Chicano organisations. On August 30th 1972, a youth militant organisation known as the Brown Berets – named after the headwear worn by members – undertook a ‘takeover’ of Catalina Island off the coast of California.¹⁸⁴ The group had adopted a similar organisational model to the Black Panthers; they had chapters across the Southwest and were involved in a number of high profile protests and demonstrations in California. Activists wore uniforms reminiscent of Latin American paramilitary soldiers. During the ‘takeover’, 26 members ‘invaded’ the island, which was then a popular high-end resort, and unveiled a Mexican flag overlooking the main harbor. In the confusion, the city manager’s office initially mistook the group for soldiers from the Mexican army.¹⁸⁵ The invaders claimed the islands had not been ceded by Mexico to the US in the terms of the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, and that therefore the US was illegally occupying the island. They claimed they were therefore re-taking the territory on behalf of Mexico. David Sanchez, the ‘Prime Minister’ of the Brown Berets who led the takeover of the island, outlined the motive of the action in his interview:

It actually emerged out of the anti-war marches: After it died down in 1971, I said ok we can’t let the movement die here let’s continue it. So the last part of the campaign was

Catalina Island. Because we had 35 soldiers that were trained in peaceful conditions, it was something that we knew we could accomplish. And one of our protest was that we wanted better conditions for the Mexican American community. The other statement was about the treaty of Guadeloupe Hidalgo that had came about at the end the Mexican-American war. In that treaty, there are certain rights granted to Mexican Americans, including the right to traditions and the right to speak Spanish, as well as the right to go up and down the streets without facing roadblocks. So we wanted to bring focus to the treaty and show people we had rights.  

Therefore, as with Tijerina’s occupation of Carson National Forest six years earlier, the actual purpose of the ‘invasion’ was to raise awareness of the social problems faced by Mexican-Americans and specifically to generate sufficient publicity to communicate their concerns to politicians. As with Tijerina’s symbolic ‘reclamation’, the imagery reflected the importance of the presentation of the Anglo population as illegal occupiers to the movement and the continuing use of historical US foreign policy as a strategic tool for furthering their domestic agenda.

In fact, the centrality of narrative of occupation and the stressing of the right of Mexican-Americans to the sovereignty of Aztlán was in fact so pronounced that some within the movement feared it moving from symbolism to physical separatism become an actual goal of activists, and the political ramifications that such a move would bring. In 1970 in a story entitled Mutations, Chicano activist and author Ricardo Sanchez wrote a fictionalized Plan in a 1970 response to the Plan de Aztlán that called for a revolution on the part of Mexican-Americans to reclaim their rightful sovereign territory:

We pledge ourselves to the reclamation of our lands at whatever the cost... be it irrefutably known throughout the world that Aztlán is free, that revolution is here, and that if our blood must flow in order to secure our nation, we are fully prepared to fight in the barrios, cities, fields and valleys that our people might live in harmony, love, and economic rectitude... If war is the only avenue open to us, we here and now declare before all the

186 Interview with David Sanchez, 16th September, 2017.
peoples on the Americas, before all nations everywhere, that we have exhausted all other avenues in our struggle to regain our freedom from oppression, exploitation, racism, and de-humanization foisted upon us by the new-oligarchical despotism of the gringoistic u. s. of a.;
we thus proclaim our freedom and separation from the United States of Amerika, and hereby give notice that we are Aztlán, a mestizo nation predicated on the principles of dignity, worth, freedom, human-ness, and love. Viva el mestizaje, VIVA LA RAZA DE BRONCE! 188

The fictional plan was titled “Libertad o muerte” Aztlán es nuestro...” (“Liberty or Death: Aztlán Is Ours”) and in the story, the author goes on to document how the message incited Chicanos to take part in a violent and bloody uprising against Anglos, resulting in a great number of deaths and the damage to the South West. This highlighted the strength of concern that political militancy could turn to violence and indicated the dominance of the idea of Aztlán representing an alternative manifest destiny for Chicanos by the height of the movement’s activities in 1970. 189

That the idea of actual separation was even contemplated reflects the success of the Chicano movement elite’s invocation of an alternative history of US foreign policy as a core aspect of the movement’s identity. Without the challenge to Anglo-Saxon notions of manifest destiny that were an anchoring feature of Aztlán, they would have been without a rallying central idea that supported the narrative of a unified Chicano nationalism.

Given the consistency with which Tijerina used the narrative as part of the campaign for Land reform and Gonzales and Gutiérrez deployed it to describe the shadow of racial oppression in their analyses of Mexican-American socio-economic conditions, it is clear that the spectre of US foreign policy was thus a present feature at the heart of Chicano movement discourse.

188 M. R. López, Chicano Timespace, P. 42.
189 Ibid., 42.
Chicano opposition to the Vietnam War

Among the Mexican-American generation during the 1940s and 50s, there had been a relative consensus that making attempts to demonstrate loyalty and a patriotic disposition towards the United States was necessary to hasten their successful acceptance among the mainstream population. To this end, they were keen to distance themselves from their immediate Mexican immigrant status. Whereas in the early decades of the twentieth century immigrants had been keen to maintain their immigrant status due to the benefits it provided – Mexican diplomatic consuls took an interventionist stance in protecting their expatriate community from exploitation – the Mexican-Americans elites made efforts to encourage an image that the community was making active steps towards assimilation to the American way of life. At its core was an assumption that mere residence in the United States and economic participation were insufficient criteria for true citizenship. Instead, the onus lay upon Mexican-Americans to demonstrate worthiness. With the onset of World War 2, US foreign policy provided this opportunity: by serving in the military in Europe and the Pacific, Mexican-American men “proved their deservingness” of fully-fledged US nationality. In an interview, Félix Gutiérrez - a prominent Chicano anti-Vietnam activist and now Professor of Journalism at the University of Southern California, explained the importance of this phenomenon:

US forces had been greatly strengthened by Mexican Americans in World War 2 and the Korean War, and Latinos and Mexican Americans had highest percentage of Medal of Honor winners in World War 2. The military was seen as a way of moving up and getting out, on an equal basis and footing with others, where you couldn't do it otherwise. So for a lot of people, the significant departure of their life in terms of changing their circumstances had been military service.

192 Interview with Félix Gutiérrez, 7th September, 2017.
At the same time, US entry into the war brought with it a new scrutiny of the political beliefs of Mexican immigrants and in particular, ‘zoot suit’ wearing adolescents were feared to be influenced by fascist ideology out of Mexico. Mexican-American elites, wary of being perceived as a national security threat, sought to highlight Mexican-American participation in furthering foreign policy goals of the US through their high rates of military service. In 1948 a World War 2 veteran named Hector B. Garcia established the American G.I. Forum that promoted improving the domestic socio-economic situation for returning Mexican-American servicemen. The central focus of their narrative was that the sacrifices made on the battlefield and in service to the state afforded them not only acceptance as citizens but also equal civil rights to the Anglo-Saxon mainstream population. Thus the strategy of the G.I. forum was to leverage their role in furthering US foreign policy overseas to improve the domestic conditions at home.

However, the end of World War 2 did also herald the emergence of an alternative perspectives on US foreign policy among the Mexican-American community, albeit on a much more limited scale. Sections of the more radically minded Mexican-American communities began to establish platforms for promoting their political agendas, and the years immediately following the war saw the emergence of organized networks that represented this new, radical position. The Asociación Nacional México-Americana (ANMA) was one such organisation. Founded in 1949, it emerged as the political wing of the Mexicans within the Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter workers in Colorado. It was influenced by the recent establishment of a range of political movement on the Left, and was inspired by the organisational tactics of the Popular Front. Existing from 1949 to 1954, it quickly became one of the dominant elite Mexican-American groups that claimed to be a representative voice for the community, with a number of chapters operating in cities and towns across the Southwest.

Operating at a time when the Cold war was quickly raising popular anti-communism to the forefront of American life and McCarthyism was at its political zenith, the organisation actively encouraged Mexican-Americans to embrace their Mexican heritage and resist calls for assimilation to Anglo-Saxon culture. In a move that Chicano elites would go on replicate a decade later, ANMA embraced a cultural nationalism that emphasised the importance of Mexican history and the Spanish language, and encouraged Chicanos to unite behind their ethnic commonalities. 195

A core platform of ANMA’s political agenda was their critique of US foreign policy during the Cold war. ANMA had organized a meeting in Los Angeles in 1950 of groups that opposed to the escalation of the Cold war, after which an ANMA leader triumphantly announced that 20,000 Mexican Americans had signed the Stockholm Appeal calling for a ban on nuclear weapons. Local ANMA chapters sponsored talks, rallies and fundraisers in support of various peace movement and disarmament initiatives. Following the US’ decision to commit troops to Korea in 1950, opposition to the war became a central focus of ANMA’s activities. At their second national convention, ANMA passed a resolution encouraging the US Government and the UN to urgently find a diplomatic solution to the conflict, 196 and in 1951 they encouraged Mexican-Americans who were opposed to the war to actively write to President Truman and petition him to bring a peaceful, early end to the conflict. 197

The focus of ANMA’s leaders campaigning revolved around the argument that the domestic, socio-economic problems that Mexicans faced were being continuously worsened by the US’ involvement in Korea. Firstly, Mexican-Americans were being disproportionately drafted into the military and formed a much higher percentages of the war casualties. In 1951, the Denver chapter of ANMA convened a ‘Peace Committee’, which noted that whilst Mexican-Americans made up only 10% of

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196 M. T. Garcia, Mexican Americans, P. 209.
197 Ernesto Chávez, “¡Mi Raza Primero!” P. 17.
Colorado’s population, they represented 28% of soldiers from the state killed in Korea. They identified that this was a trend across the Southwest, with disproportionate ratios of population percentage per state to death per state in Arizona (20% to 44%), Texas (17% to 30%) and New Mexico (49% to 56%). 198

Secondly, ANMA leaders highlighted a negative link between the war in Korea and an increasingly hostile social, economic and political climate for Mexican-Americans domestically. Anti-communist laws like the McCarren Act, which targeted Mexican political associations, and anti-union laws like the Taft-Hartley Act, which targeted organized labour, were restricting the avenues with which Mexican-Americans could have their interests represented. 199

Additionally, Mexican-Americans were disproportionately on low-incomes salaries, had to contend with an increase in taxes and a cut in social welfare programs to pay for increasing cost of the war in Korea. Thus, by demonstrating that the domestic wellbeing of Mexican-Americans was directly tied into the foreign policy of the US government, ANMA leaders were keen to emphasise the need for Mexican-Americans to take a keen interest in the international conduct of their government in the Cold war. This again challenged the received convention that military service was an appropriate avenue for Mexican immigrants to demonstrate a commitment to the United States and earn the same rights and privileges as Anglo-Saxons. As Garcia references, this sentiment is typified in the comments of a teenage Mexican-American girl at the time, when she said: “we’re good enough to fight and die in Korea for nothing, but not good enough to get jobs at home without discrimination and to be treated with equal respect and dignity.” 200

This argument – that US foreign policy not only negatively impacted Mexican-Americans but also did so in an unfair, disproportionate matter – would be used again by Chicano elites opposing the Vietnam War 15 years later.

ANMA’s open critiques of US foreign policy and its refusal to respond to the pressures

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199 Ibid., P. 210.
200 Ibid., 210.
of McCarthyism were, ultimately, the cause of its downfall. Its leadership was accused throughout its existence of being dominated by communists and having ties with the US Communist Party. As a result, it was the subject of considerable government and media scrutiny. The FBI, having infiltrated and studied the organisation, formally registered ANMA as a security threat to the US in 1952, and while ANMA’s leadership tried in vain to appeal the decision, this was followed two years later with them being declared a subversive organisation by the Attorney General’s office. ANMA’s stance on the Korean War made them a target for media criticism. As Garcia notes, in an interview during the ANMA’s national convention in El Paso in 1952 the President of ANMA, Alfredo Montoya, was accused by a local newspaper of refusing to “give a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer to whether or not he or his organisation favors action against Red aggression in Korea” and described him as a “Red Front Leader”. Ultimately, the organisation succumbed to the pressure and ANMA activity at local chapters had ceased by the end of 1954. Despite their short tenure, the position of ANMA elites on US foreign policy and foreign interventions laid a framework that would be taken up a decade later by the Chicano movement. 201

The alternative approaches of elite Mexican-American organisations like the GI Forum and ANMA foreshadowed the difficulties that some Chicano elite groups would later encounter when trying to draw activists from both the youthful student movement sympathetic to the radical anti-war politics of ANMA, as well as more traditional rural farmworkers of the Mexican-American generation that were deeply reluctant to countenance expressing criticism of US foreign policy. Cesar Chavez and the UFW, which relied on the support of both groups found this a challenging position to have to negotiate. Wary that during the heights of anti-communist rhetoric conservative commentators were openly suggested that Chavez and the boycott organisers had communist sympathies202 (and likely hoping to avoid the fate of

201 Ernesto Chávez, “¡Mi Raza Primero!”, P. 18.
ANMA a decade earlier), he initially placed the boycott organisers very much on the
side of the government concerning foreign policy action in Southeast Asia during the
early years of the campaign, including holding a rally in 1965 in celebration of Latino
military servicemen in Vietnam. However, by 1970 Chavez committed to an anti-
war position, having moved from the open support to neutral silence during the mid-
to-late 60s. As this chapter will demonstrate, this shift reflected not only the strength
of anti-US foreign policy sentiment among the Chicano movement by 1969, but also
the acknowledgement that the war was having a direct impact on the socio-economic
reality for Mexican Americans and that making Vietnam a focus of the campaign
would directly advantage their goals.

Context and outline of anti-war activities

In the mid-to-late 1960s, the critical re-examinations that had led to the Chicano
movement rejecting the received history of the Southwest region – that of American
foreign policy as Manifest destiny - in favour of a portrayal of aggressive imperial
expansionism by an Anglo-Saxon ethnic majority, also informed the manner in which
Chicano elites responded to contemporary US foreign policy. The Vietnam War,
which was the dominant international news story throughout the height of the
movement’s main decade of activity, similarly dominated the focus of Chicano
political protest. Critique of US foreign policy in Southeast Asia thus became an
important aspect of campaigning, and for some specific groups, opposition to the
war became a defining aspect of their political identity.

On the 16th of September 1969, a young Chicano activist named Rosalio Muñoz, who
had recently received his letter informing him of his conscription into the military, led
a procession of over a hundred supporters to the Armed Forces induction centre in
Los Angeles. There, he read a statement before the military and the media in which
he publically refused his draft orders, accusing the conscription system of
systematically discriminating against Mexicans to allow an easy supply of military age

203 Ibid., P. 287
men to be expended in pursuit of US foreign policy objectives. Muñoz characterized such a system as representing a genocide against the Mexican-American population:

I accuse the draft, the entire social, political, and economic system of the United States of America, or creating a funnel which shoots Mexican youth into Vietnam to be killed and to kill innocent men, women and children. I accuse the law enforcement agencies of the United States of instilling greater fear and insecurity in the Mexican youth than the Viet Cong ever could, which is genocide. 204

Muñoz, a former UCLA student body president, quickly decided that this sentiment reflected strong opposition to the war itself rather than just the draft, and he quickly realized the opportunity for Chicanos to have their own voice in the growing anti-Vietnam movement at the time. He began coordinating with Corky Gonzales and the CFJ in Denver, and planned a series of Chicano-run demonstrations and public rallies against the war for the following year. A Chicano Moratorium Committee (CMC) was formed to organize the protests and act as a central authority for the various Chicano groups that wished to participate, with Muñoz elected co-chair with David Sanchez, the leader of the Brown Berets. 205

An initial rally was held in Los Angeles in December 1969 to gauge the level interest among Chicanos and build momentum, attracting over 2,000 participants. A subsequent demonstration held in February 1970 attracted crowds of 5,000 people, bringing Chicano activists and local groups from across the Southwest region. Over 20 smaller-scale local protests were held throughout that summer, concluding in a march on August 29th named by the CMC as the National Chicano Moratorium and held in Laguna Park in east Los Angeles. Attracting an estimated crowd attendance of 20,000 to 30,000 people, it was the largest such demonstration against US foreign policy in Southeast Asia of any minority group during the Vietnam War. 206 Tragically, the protest ended violently after police clashed with protesters and a riot broke out,

ending with the death of two Chicano activists and Ruben Salazar, a journalist for the LA Times that had covered the Chicano movement.207

This chronology of organised Chicano anti-war activity demonstrates at the very least a significant engagement with US foreign policy discourse. However, to make sense of the nature of this engagement, why it played such a prominent role and how it fitted into the larger strategy of promoting the agendas of the movement elites, it is necessary to examine the principle arguments used by the Chicano movement that informed their anti-war stance. Muñoz, Gonzales and the Chicano elites who endorsed the anti-war campaign focused their message around three main themes: That first is that the war was disproportionately negatively effecting Mexican-Americans; Secondly, that the socio-economic and political situation of the Vietnamese people meant that Chicanos had more in common with their supposed enemies than with Anglo-Saxons in the US; and thirdly that US foreign policy in Southeast Asia was merely an extension of their imperialist ambitions to dominate third world populations and should not be endorsed by already-oppressed Chicanos.

The domestic consequences of Vietnam

Muñoz, Gonzales and the Chicano elites who endorsed the anti-war campaign focused their message around three main arguments. The first, most common and most successful message was an emphasis on the unequal manner in which Mexican-Americans were impacted by the war compared to the Anglo-Saxon majority. In the same way that ANMA had taken exception to the disproportionate number of Mexican Americans killed in Korea, Chicano activists tapped into a similar indignation over Vietnam. In 1969 Ralph Guzman, a Political Science professor at the University of California Santa Cruz, released a report entitled ‘Mexican-American casualties in Vietnam’ that highlighted a similar disproportionality:

207 Ibid., P. 172.
Mexican American military personnel have a higher death rate in Vietnam that all other servicemen. Analysis of casualty reports for two periods of time: one between January, 1967 and March, 1969, reveals that a disproportionate number of young men with distinctive Spanish names do not return from the Southeast Asia theatre of war. Investigations also reveal that a substantial number of them are involved in high-risk branches of the service such as the U.S. Marine Corps. 208

Overall, he concluded that whilst Mexican-Americans were just 11% of the Southwest population, they represented almost 20% of all soldiers killed in Southeast Asia. In his report, he went on to suggest possible reasons for this. For a minority group that had long had its loyalty to the US questioned, military service offered an opportunity for demonstrating patriotism. The American G.I. Forum routinely highlights the high number of Mexican-Americans that are decorated for gallantry and distinction in the Armed Forces, suggesting this encouraged young Mexican-American youths to enlist. Other reasons included the wish to provide a steady source of income for impoverished families, as well as the relatively low level of Mexican-Americans in higher education at the time, which left very few Mexican-Americans eligible for an educational deferment. 209

Emphasising this last point, he concludes: “Whatever the real explanation, we do know with a high degree of certainty that Mexican Americans are over-represented in the casualty reports from Vietnam and under-represented in the graduating classes of our institutions of higher learning.” 210 These findings were widely spread among young Chicano activists, and led to a common sentiment that not only was the military draft system inherently unfair to the socio-economically marginalized Mexican-Americans. In his interview, Muñoz emphasised how the Moratorium Committee used these statistics to present what they perceived as an inherently discriminatory military that preyed upon Mexican-Americans:

209 Ibid., PP. 371-373.
210 Ibid., P. 373.
I think one of the things that had a big impact was operation one hundred thousand. That in '66, McNamara came up with the manpower plan and they lowered the standards for entering the army. Part of that was things like English proficiency, and things like physical size - Mexicans and Puerto Ricans tend to be shorter - and it was presented that the service was a good place to gain training and experience, and, as they are cutting poverty programs, the government said that the armed service will provide that, but if you look at the actual statistics, we were just going straight to the front lines.211

As Félix Gutiérrez suggested in his interview, this message was particularly successful given the relatively youthful audience for – and membership of – the Chicano movement, as the prominence of specific injustices caused by the war were likely to be immediately recognizable to a population of draft-eligible young Mexican-American men:

So you see your young people, or at least they young boys, are being taken by the draft and going into the military, and ultimately many of them are not coming back. So if we are going to invest in our future, we needed to see where we are at risk and one place we were at risk was in Vietnam. These things were controlled by local draft boards in terms of who got drafted. I got a student deferment which meant I had no risk as long as I was a college student, but a kid who got out of high school and went to work to support his family and help out his mom and dad, he'd get drafted. With the farmworkers, Cesar Chavez was saying that the kids who were the sons of the growers were getting agricultural deferments, but the ones who were actually the migrant workers - who were the ones who were actually picking the crops - they had a hard time getting it because the local draft boards were not very racially diverse. ... So we saw the draft and the war as a furtherance of the discrimination that we were facing at the hands of society that did not treat us with respect or even equal.212

In addition to this, many Chicano elites used the war to emphasise that even for those Chicanos who returned alive, they faced discrimination and inequality at home. Muñoz himself recalled the impact that this new approach had had on galvanizing support at a rally in the December of 1969:

211 Interview with Rosalio Muñoz, 15th September, 2017.
212 Interview with Félix Gutiérrez, 7th September, 2017.
People spoke about the war and how it was damaging to the Chicano community. They integrated their political issues, such as the farmworkers’ struggle, the schools, police abuse, welfare rights, conditions in the barrios, and other issues, to the protest against the war. What was impressive to me was that these different movement groups were comfortable fitting these issues in with the antiwar issue. This held the key to future organizing of the Chicano antiwar movement.  

At the same time that this message was being articulated by political organisers, it also became a feature within artistic expressions supporting the Chicano movement. Such an example can be seen in the poem “Indict Amerika!” by Ricardo Sanchez, in which he makes the call for activists to transfer their commitment to fighting in Vietnam towards more immediate war at home:

now here this very place
    is our viet-nam,
from tierra amarilla
    to court house steps,
...
if our blood must flow,
    let it become an engulfing ocean
drowning our oppressors;
if we must fight,
    the enemy is here,
not in Asian jungles ...

The success of this new narrative was obvious and Chicano elites recognized its potential benefits: Firstly, it drew a prospective new base of support from those who opposed the war but had remained indifferent to Chicano activities. This potential support came from two principle groups: Conservative Mexican-Americans that had

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become disillusioned with the war but had previously avoided getting involved in the domestic Chicano protest movements, as well as anti-war activists from the wider US population. In both instances, the attempt was to leverage high profile opposition to the war to build attention and support for Chicano civil rights campaigns. In his interview, Muñoz confirmed that the level of opposition to the war not just across the Mexican American community, but across the US public generally, meant that it was relatively easy to build support for the moratorium:

Yes I think there was a genuine awareness of the problems of the war that came through. I think early on there was at least, though after a while they also had the whole psychology of "we have to be for our boys over there" as well as a more general anti-Communist sentiment at the time, but I think in general yes it was a very strong mindset... The feeling was people were coming back so damaged, with the Agent Orange and the drug addictions and heroin. As a result, it was fairly simple and fairly easy when I began organising to be able to convince people on the grassroots level and this sentiment was there. And these other people [non-Chicanos], they saw that and they felt that.215

This emphasised the importance of the war, in the mind of Chicano elites, as a vehicle for developing wider interest in the movement and sympathy for its agenda. The second major benefit concerned its use as a catalyst for consolidating the Chicano movement itself. By directly tying the war to their domestic situation, it not only highlighted the injustice with which US foreign policy was adversely affecting the Mexican-American community, but it also encouraged fresh Mexican-American participation in the movement by suggesting that those Chicano youth fighting bravely in Southeast Asia should transfer that energy to fighting at home, against the ‘real’ political battle which was the one for domestic equality. As Muñoz recalled, this became the takeaway message:

I wasn’t aware at that moment that at this first moratorium we were developing what would become the key theme of the Chicano antiwar movement: “¡La lucha está aquí!”

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(the struggle is here!) This theme was inherent in my “J’Accuse” proclamation. It began to be a slogan at the December 20 demonstration. 216

David Sanchez expressed a similar sentiment in his interview. He outlined how the main victory of the anti-war protest was the catalytic way in which it spurred a greater focus on the socio-economic and justice campaigns that Chicanos were fighting in the Barrios:

The effect of the Moratorium was that it really helped bloom the Mexican-American civil rights movement. Because it brought so many people out of their houses to protest. Traditionally people stay home and watch TV and they see the war on TV. But in so far as actually coming out and doing something about it, this was the first effort. The other thing was that there was a very strong Chicano identity at the time. ... that’s why we fought, why we formed the Chicano Moratorium committee, because of our people, our people were being killed and abused. 217

Therefore, Chicano elites were able to communicate the perceived injustices experienced by the Mexican-American community in the 1960s and 70s through the prism of US foreign policy. Both Muñoz and Sanchez reported a belief that this approach benefitted the Moratorium’s efforts to emphasise the wider socio-economic inequalities, and unfair treatment on the part of the government. By highlighting the high death rates of Mexican-Americans in the war as a basis for an organised, high-profile anti-war campaign, the Chicano elites were able to deploy an emotive foreign policy issue to benefit their local civil rights campaign.

Empathy with the Vietnamese

The second major approach that the Chicano elites utilized to emphasise that Chicanos should be united in their opposition to the war, was to encourage empathy with the embattled Vietnamese. They observed parallels

217 Interview with David Sanchez, 16th September, 2017.
between the experiences of Mexican-Americans at the hands of US foreign policy and the Southeast Asian population against which they were fighting. To this end, Chicano elites promoted an identification based on shared victimhood. As a Chicana activist wrote for an activist newspaper in 1969, the Vietnamese peasants had suffered the same process of illegal land-grabs by the government that Mexicans experienced after the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. This attempted to emphasise that, as was the case in 19th century Southwest, the American government was using its foreign policy instruments to back up property theft by local elites. 218 In a speech at Arizona State University in 1970, “Corky” Gonzales made the comparison explicit, outlining his rationale behind his opposition to the war:

This is the same government that says you must fight for us. We say this is the same government that enslaved all the Blacks. The great white father is theirs, not ours; he belongs to that side of the Mississippi River... We can evaluate that. Then evaluate that this part of Mexico, Aztlan, was taken in an aggressive war of expansionism even worse than the war in Vietnam. 219

Highlighting the socio-economic realities that the Vietnamese and Mexican-American community faced offered two simultaneous advantages. Firstly, it forced the narrative of the war in Vietnam to focus on the very real human participants rather than a faceless an abstract communist threat. This perhaps helped to disentangle the conflict from its larger cold war narrative and place the suffering of the population as the central point of reference. Secondly, it re-emphasised the articulation of the Chicano movement that Mexican-Americans represented an oppressed people. By encouraging individuals to find comparisons between the conditions experienced by a rural peasantry in a far off ‘third world’ country, it offered a much starker portrait of the position of Mexican-Americans in the United States. In an official statement on the place of Mexican-Americans in the war in La

218 L. Oropeza, ¡Raza Sí! ¡Guerra No!, P. 94.
*Raza,* the Chicano Moratorium Committee emphasised the shared victimhood of both the Chicanos and Vietnamese:

Historically, Chicanos have only been offered the dirtiest work of American society. Chicanos pick the crops, man the factories, sew the clothes, was the dishes and clean the mess of white America... the demonstrations aim to expose the fact that second to the Vietnamese, the heaviest burden for the war have fallen on the Chicano community.\(^{220}\)

Other uses attempted to portray the cultural values of the Vietnamese as something to be aspired to in their own struggle against the United States. Luis Valdez, an UFW activist, playwright and poet established the amateur theatre company *El Teatro Campesino,* which produced and performed plays highlighting Chicano issues and in particular encouraged empathy between Mexican field workers in the US and rural farmers in Vietnam. In his 1971 poem *Pensamiento serpentino,* he makes his admiration for the Vietnamese clear:

Cesar Chavez’s, NON-VIOLENCE is one of the most violent forces around because it is positive and because it originates with God. And for those who don’t understand all this, ell, there’s Vietnam with all its human love, its pristine positive spirit which it will not allow to be conquered... And that is the true victory of Vietnam: to not be devoured by HATE when every day death rains down upon them. We all have that moral strength thanks to the resistance of those heroic peasants. In the face of that, how can we let the enemy rob us of our humanity with a little racism and police brutality? Compared to the Vietnamese, our life at the hands of the gringo has been an afternoon stroll set to accordion music.\(^{221}\)

Challenging the US government’s narrative that the Vietnamese represented a menacing threat, Chicano elites attempted to present them as a nation with similar socio-economic backgrounds and histories of oppression at the hands of imperial powers. The hope, therefore, was that the emphasis on the shared mistreatment would build domestic support for the Chicano civil rights agenda. However, for such

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\(^{220}\) Chicano Moratorium Committee official statement, referenced in “Chicanos and the War”, *La Raza,* Vol 1. No. 3, Special Issue. 1970. P. 10

\(^{221}\) L. Valdez, “From ‘Pensamiento serpentino,’” in George Mariscal (trans. and ed.), *Aztlán and Viet Nam: Chicano and Chicana experiences of the war* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), P. 231.
arguments to draw sympathy and be endorsed by Chicano activists and elites alike, they relied on theoretical assumptions around the imperialist nature of the US state and a belief in the characterisation that both Mexican-Americans and Vietnamese peoples were part of a wider struggle against the domination of international oppressors. That popularity of such sentiments reflect the role and influence of Marxist and internationalist thought on the Chicano movement.

**The role and influence of Marxism**

A significant factor in the foreign policy perspectives of different Chicano organisations and a determining factor behind the stance against Vietnam War for many, was the influence of Marxism on significant segments of the movement. In his seminal analysis of the ideological construction of Chicanismo, *Brown-Eyed Children of the Sun*, Mariscal delineates the various strands of Chicano nationalism and identifies that Marxist ideas and political theory fed into an interest in internationalism that was popular with a number of Chicano elites. Informing, in particular, the claims of solidarity with the Vietnamese people was a worldview that saw Mexican-Americans as part of an international third-world movement, struggling against the oppressive foreign policy of US imperialism. As Mariscal points out, such a radical engagement with Marxist ideas sat alongside other, more essentialist strands of cultural nationalism within movement ideology that rejecting traditional White, European philosophy, but nevertheless played an influential role in the thoughts and actions of movement leaders. As Muñoz Jr points out, its influence varied significantly across different groups, and within organisations, which often saw different levels of subscription to Marxism depending on geographic area. For example, within the Californian branches of the Raza Unida Party, there was significant variation: The Riverside branch contained virtually no Marxist influence at

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223 C. Muñoz, Jr., *Youth, Identity, Power*, P. 146.
all, whereas the Oakland branch included a significant number of members from the Socialist Workers Party. 224

The level of engagement with Marxism often had a direct impact on the extent to which groups took an active interest in international issues. As one of the most Marxist-influenced branches, the Oakland RUP chapter included a foreign policy agenda in their party platform that reflected a belief in the global, tyrannical nature and scope of the US state and the imperialistic designs of their foreign policy:

La Raza Unida Party supports the right of self-determination of all nations. We are opposed to the intervention of the United States into the internal affairs of any nation. We demand an end to United States support to every oppressive regime from Mexico to Vietnam.

A. We demand the release of all political prisoners in Latin America, especially our brothers in Mexico.
B. Free Puerto Rico.
C. Immediate withdrawal from Southeast Asia.
D. Support of the Palestinian Liberation Struggle.
E. Free all colonies and territories of the United States. 225

The influence of a radical Marxist appraisal of US foreign policy can also be seen in other Chicano elite groups. In particular, the perspective that international struggles were fundamentally placed between oppressors and oppressed groups within the capitalist system helped to further dispel any notion of the US as possessing a legitimacy to operate as the exceptional actor in world affairs. Instead, through a portrayal as twentieth-century colonisers, and a parallel between the experience of Chicanos and those of other oppressed groups internationally was maintained. As Reies Tijerina demonstrates such sentiments in his memoirs:

The Manifest destiny of the United States again was coming to pass since it was involved in the internal affairs of fifty other nations. Many people across the world were

224 Ibid.
championing their causes for homeland: The Philippines, India, Africa, and the Arab world. The United States forced the Arabs to leave their lands, which they had occupied for two thousand years, to make way for Israel. These are some of the explanations that I give our community about our struggle for the land. 226

The advantages of presenting the Chicano struggle in this way in such a context are obvious. By contextualising their agenda as part of a larger moral plight to free oppressed peoples served the purpose of both increasing the importance of an otherwise specific and localised campaign such as La Alianza’s to the realm of an international struggle, but also alluded to a sense of inevitability that their campaign against the Anglo-Saxon elite would be successful, capitalising on the same momentum that was propelling third world movements across the globe.

However, the engagement with Marxism was by no means universal within the Chicano movement, nor was it without its problems. As David Sanchez emphasised in his interview, the divides over Marxist ideology and campaign tactics ultimately brought down the Brown Beret organisation:

We had our problems with some of the people who were more on the sides of the Soviets over the years and wanted us to take a more socialist point of view, but that was not our view, our view was for progress. It was the fight for progress and the Vietnam War was getting in the way of our progress in the community... We had those who were influenced by Cuba or the Socialist movement, they wanted an organisation that was more violent in its fight against the system. I found myself in a situation where I was opposed to violence. But I was worried that violence would drain us because we'd be stuck in court all the time. And it was very difficult because for me, the Brown Berets were not a socialist organisation we were a civil rights organisation, and to me the Vietnam War was a civil rights issue, because we were going there disproportionately.227

Whilst engaging with US foreign policy discourse presented opportunities for Chicano elites to fashion a cohesive identity for the movement, as well to increase support

227 Interview with David Sanchez, 16th September, 2017.
and exposure for their movement, it was not the only type of engagement with US foreign policy that they utilised during this period. There were also examples where elite organisations conducted independent outreach to foreign governments, populations and political actors to further their specific agendas.

**Chicano international outreach**

Chicano elites attempted to reach out on their own and form international links with external political actors, demonstrating that they recognised the importance of reaching beyond their local environments to find sympathetic voices that could become allies for the Chicanos’ domestic agendas. This included both outreach with official governments as well as opposition groups, foreign media and appeals to sympathetic elements within foreign populations.

Given the proximity and links, Mexico was a popular target for Chicano groups. Reies Tijerina, in an attempt to promote awareness and gain foreign support for La Alianza’s campaign for land grant reform, made numerous visits and appeals to Mexican political actors. Ahead of a trip to the country in 1961, he outlined in a speech to his followers how a direct appeal to Washington by the Mexican government on behalf of La Alianza, would make the land grants an international relations issue and would elevate their agenda up the priority list of the US government:

>The United States is too busy with the nations of the world to attend to us. Besides, the letter we sent to President Eisenhower on December 12, 1959, had a cold response. They told us there was no justice. That’s why Mexico is our only hope... if they listen, investigate our case and then present it to the United Nations. 228

Tijerina and La Alianza recognized the potential benefits of making their campaign a diplomatic issue at a time when the White House was prioritizing international security. On a trip in 1959 he sent a memorandum to the Mexican foreign secretary

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228 Ibid., P.41.
on behalf of the former Mexican states that had been ceded to the US in 1848, setting out their plea over the land grant question. On a visit in 1961 he met with former President and general in the Mexican Revolution, Lázaro Cárdenas, Tijerina suggested that were all peaceful options for reform to be exhausted, then La Alianza and Chicanos would have “no other road but to choose between death and slavery”. 229 This was followed by a conference for the Mexican media at the National Press Club in Mexico City, in which he stressed that Mexican-Americans were a colonized and oppressed people who had been subjected to decades of theft and discrimination at the hands of Anglos backed by the US government. He further re-emphasised the Chicano critique of the narrative of Manifest destiny that dominated teaching of the history of US foreign policy towards Mexico:

They teach that the Anglo pacified and civilized the Southwest, but they do not teach that our parents were the Spanish and Mexicans that settled from St. Augustin, Florida, to San Francisco, California... Our children never learn about the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo or the history of the loss of our lands. They only know Anglo history and how the Anglo wants it to be known. 230

In his memoirs, Tijerina indicates that the Mexican press was enthusiastic in its support for La Alianza, and assured him that the “secret” true history of American oppression of Mexican-Americans would be told across Mexico. When Luis Echeverría became President of Mexico in 1970, Tijerina used capitalized on the new administration’s active promotion of a tercermundismo foreign policy to seek out a powerful international ally, and in November of 1972, he made the first of several visits to the President in Mexico City. According to Tijerina’s memoirs, the US government was so concerned about the exchange that they applied pressure to resist Tijerina receiving a visa, and it was only after personal intervention by Echeverría that his visit was confirmed. 231 The President hosted Tijerina and other Chicano elite representatives on several occasions during the mid-1970s, and authorized and facilitated a vehicle convoy of Chicano protestors to travel from Texas

229 Ibid., P. 42.
230 Ibid., P. 44.
231 Ibid., P. 176.
through to Mexico on June 12th, 1976, where 86 activists were greeted at the presidential residence.\textsuperscript{232} As he recounts in his memoirs, Tijerina and the La Alianza leadership used their address to the President to once again emphasised that they wished for the Mexican state to help elevate their land-grab campaign to the level of a foreign relations issue, using the institutions of international relations to do so:

What my brothers and I asked the president was for Mexico to take our complaints to the United Nations. This treaty was an international one, between the United States and Mexico, and jurisdiction applied in that forum. In 130 years since the United States signed the treaty, it has not done justice and has violated our human rights. That’s why it was natural that we would come to Mexico and ask this country to present our case before the United Nations and to form a special international commission to investigate our complaints.\textsuperscript{233}

Throughout the 1960s and 70s, Tijerina and La Alianza’s leadership saw the potential benefits of internationalizing their local civil rights activism, and devoted considerable resources to encouraging Mexico to become their sponsor at the level of diplomatic relations (Echeverría, for his part, promised to raise the issue in bilateral meetings with President Nixon rather than formally take it through the mechanism of the UN). Tijerina also reflected on the potential danger of this approach: the more the Chicano movement reached out to the Mexican government in an independent capacity, the more it risked the movement being seen as a security threat by Washington. After further meetings with the Mexican Attorney General and officials as part of a formal investigation into the Land-grant issue, he speculated that he was under greater surveillance by federal intelligence agencies: “They consider me the most dangerous man because I am establishing the relationship of the U.S. Southwest with Mexico and all of Latin America”.\textsuperscript{234}

At the same time as Tijerina’s efforts for La Alianza, José Gutiérrez also invested time into reaching out to the Mexican government. He believed that the RUP had a unique

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{232} Ibid., P. 225.
\item\textsuperscript{233} Ibid., P. 225.
\item\textsuperscript{234} Ibid., P. 227.
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opportunity to influence Echeverría’s administration to align Mexico’s foreign policy with the interests of the RUP and the Chicano community. ²³⁵ Gutierrez met several times with Echeverría both in Mexico and the US. ²³⁶ His main lasting successes came through the establishment of cultural and educational ties between Mexico and the Chicano movement – in 1972 Echeverría and Gutiérrez organized a scholarship for Mexican-American would-be medical students to train in Mexico and avoid potential discrimination in the US from medical schools. Under President Portillo these scholarships were widened to include arts and social science students. ²³⁷

Given these examples of attempts at reaching out to foreign political actors to further the goals and influence of El Movimiento, it is somewhat surprising that they are omitted from analyses of Latino elite engagement with foreign policy. In the occasions where they are considered, the potential significance is often downplayed. De la Garza, for example, suggests that the reason for Tijerina’s enthusiasm for outreach with the Mexican government was simply because they were too radical in their domestic politics to be able to achieve their goals within the existing US system and therefore were left with no other option. ²³⁸ He also cites Mexican officials who suggest the primary reason Echeverría entertained delegations from La Alianza was for a calculated political advantage, rather than genuine sympathy for their campaigns. ²³⁹

While it will likely never be possible to ascertain with any degree of certainty how genuine the administration under Echeverría was in its public commitments to helping La Alianza, other indicators would suggest the president was indeed earnest in his offers of support. As Gómez-Quiñones and Vásquez observe, his outreach to

²³⁹ Ibid., P. 578.
the Chicano community was consistent with his commitment to a foreign policy that proactively engaged with disenfranchised “third world” groups. 240 Additionally, a number of his senior advisors and officials had close ties to the Chicano movement through family and friends. And as Garcia-Acevedo points out, Echeverría did indeed express his desire to see greater treatment of Chicanos during private meetings with President Nixon, as he had promised Tijerina. 241 Regardless of the lasting influence of these visits on Mexican policy towards the Mexican-American community or Mexican foreign policy towards the United States, it nevertheless demonstrates the willingness of elites within the Chicano movement to reach out directly with Mexico as they felt it would benefit their domestic socio-economic agendas through the prestige that comes with a formal diplomatic relationship.

For Cesar Chavez and the UFW, it was the US government under Nixon that made the first move to utilise foreign policy to influence a local Chicano campaign, in this case the outcome of the grape boycott. They discovered that the Defense Department, which was officially forbidden from using its resources to influence the boycott, increased its purchase of grapes from 6.9 million in pounds in 1968 to 11 million in 1969, and the quantity shipped to Vietnam had jumped from 550,000 pounds to over 2 million the following year. 242 In testimony before the Senate Labor Committee in 1970, Delores Huerta presented these figures and outlined what the UFW saw as the government capitalising on its foreign policy infrastructure to subvert the boycott:

How can any American believe that the U.S. Government is sincere in its efforts to eradicate poverty when the military uses its immense purchasing power to subvert the farmworkers’ nonviolent struggle for a decent, living wage and a better future?... It is a

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240 Juan Gómez-Quiñones and Irene Vásquez, Making Aztlan, P. 287.
cruel and ironic slap in the face to these men who have left the fields to fulfil their military 
obligation to find increasing amounts of boycotted grapes in their messkits? 243

This brought an international dimension to their campaign in California and provided a stark reminder that if their campaign was to be successful they would have to engage with the international nature of the market for grapes. In addition, Chavez and the UFW leadership understood the potential benefits of reaching out beyond the local political area and that attracting international sympathy could be beneficial both in terms of providing greater publicity as well as putting further pressure on the global supply.

Chavez and the UFW leadership therefore dispatched UFC members to spread the boycott to foreign markets. In Canada, a UFW campaigner named Jessica Govea worked with a number of Anglo and Chicano volunteers in a successful campaign to convince grocery businesses in Toronto and Montreal to refuse to purchase California grapes. They held news conferences and rallies across Canadian cities and encouraged public overtures of support from the Canadian labour movement.244 In the UK, Chavez instructed Elaine Elinson, a London-based activist, to organise European support for the UFW’s efforts in the late 1960s. Britain was identified as the fifth largest importer of grapes and was a primary target for distributors to potentially unload the grapes that they were unable to sell domestically due to the boycott. As a result, growers were selling twice as many grapes to UK buyers than they had before the boycott began.245

In 1960s London, Elinson found an audience within the labour movement that was sympathetic to Chavez and the UFW and was already involved with boycotts of South African imports in protest of the apartheid government.246 Given that support for

244 M. Garcia, From the Jaws of Victory: The Triumph and Tragedy of Cesar Chavez and the Farm Worker Movement (Berkeley, CA, United States: University of California Press, 2014), PP. 84–88.
246 M. Garcia, From the Jaws of Victory, P. 97.
anti-colonial movements around the world had been a recent hallmark of left-wing criticism of British and American foreign policy in the UK, Elinson recognised the benefit of representing the UFW boycott as an extension of the same campaign:

There was a great deal of support at the student and political meetings. This was a time when many of the former European colonies—Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), Namibia, Mozambique, and Angola—were fighting for liberation, and the height of the Vietnam War. British workers and students were anxious to learn about the UFW struggle and to take action to help. 247

She made efforts to develop ties and commitment of support from with British trade unions, and in particular the powerful Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) which made public guarantees to disrupt the importation and transport of Californian grapes and refused to unload shipping containers of grapes at London docks. The British press covered the efforts to internationalise the boycott, and the TGWU made a formal complaint to the US embassy in London that suggested the image of the US in the eyes of the international community was placed in jeopardy by the denial of workers’ rights. In the sternly-worded address, it stated that: “the millions of dollars which are expended to portray America as the bastion of democracy caused some delegates so to make an analogy of the late Dr. Goebels and Adolph Hitler’s Germany in respect of these workers”.248 Elinson continued this campaign of encouraging trade Unions to refuse to unload California grapes the following year in Sweden, when the growers attempted to unload their excess produce on the Scandinavian market.249

Building on the international solidarity with the UFW movement and capitalising on his international renown, Chavez visited London himself in 1974. This was likely an attempt to raise further awareness of the plight of Chicano farm workers and solidify support, and perhaps in an effort to develop friendly relations with the newly-installed Labour government under Harold Wilson and thus gain an influential

247 E. Elinson, UFW Memoir, P. 4.
248 Ibid., P. 6.
249 Ibid., P. 8.
international ally. He met with Clive Jenkins, the general secretary of the high-profile and rapidly-growing Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs and had just been appointed the National Research and Developed Council, a body established to investigate labour relations. Following his visit, the Trades Union Congress formally re-affirmed their commitment to the boycott, and the ASTMS petitioned the Houses of Parliament and Buckingham Palace to avoid purchasing the boycotted produce.

Figure 1: Cesar Chavez meets Clive Jenkins at ASTMS Head Office in London, 18th September, 1974. (Source: Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick)
Conclusion

This chapter demonstrated that Chicano Generation elites during the period from 1965 to 1975 were far more engaged with US foreign policy and international actors than had previously been appreciated. This engagement came in three principal forms: Firstly, the Chicano ideology incorporated as a central idea the concept of Aztlán, which included a tacit rejection of Anglo-Saxon Manifest destiny as a narrative of legitimisation for the history of US foreign policy in the Southwest region and a justification for aggressive territorial expansion. It instead offered an alternative argument for the sovereign rights of Chicanos based on their ancestral claims to the land.

Secondly, opposition to US foreign policy in Southeast Asia formed a central component of the agendas for a large number of Chicano groups, which incorporated both reflections of their domestic situation as well as empathy for the Vietnamese, and could be seen in both artistic expression as well shown in large scale protests that were organized and led by Chicano activists. Finally, Chicano elites also utilised efforts to reach out to international actors. In the case of some groups, such as Tijerina’s La Causa, this was to encourage the Mexican government to turn their local land-grand campaign into an international relations issue. For other groups, it was a way to encourage solidarity between oppressed groups, such as Cuban revolutionaries. And for the United Farmworkers Union, international engagement was an attempt to both increase international publicity for their local campaign, as well as attempting to extend the power of a national boycott into an international one. Overall, Chicano elite engagement with foreign policy and international outreach comprised a much greater element of their overall strategies than previously thought, and reflects an appreciation for the importance of foreign policy and as well as an understanding of the advantages of internationalising domestic Latino agendas.

The relative diversity of this foreign policy engagement during this period serves to highlight the extent with which Hispanic Americans involved themselves in
international issues in a diverse set of different ways. This included engagement with foreign policy discourse through the critical re-evaluation of the history of US expansion into the Southwest as well as the de-legitimisation of the concept of an Anglo-Saxon manifest destiny, instead providing a Hispanic parallel claim to the territory through the presentation of, and advocation for, Aztlán as a Chicano homeland. In addition, in included engagement with actual policy, through the high-profile organised campaigning against the military draft, the unequal treatment of Mexican-Americans in the army, and ultimately the war in South East Asia itself. Finally, it included engagement in international political outreach, through the establishing of relations with the government of Mexico as well as with labour unions in Europe.

In addition, this chapter illustrates how the case study of Chicano elite engagement with US foreign policy supports the main thesis claims. Firstly, by highlighting the three types of foreign policy elite engagement that were evident during the main decade of the Chicano movement, the thesis claim that Hispanic American elites do in fact engage in significant ways with US foreign policy discourse is reinforced: By widening the scope of the enquiry beyond an attempt to measure a causational link between the efforts of an organised Hispanic lobby and the outcomes of US foreign policy, it is possible to identify a broader and more focused engagement by Chicano elites that was less concerned with affecting administration policies internationally and more concerned with wielding foreign policy issues to engineer change in their local communities.

This highlights a second thesis finding: That Hispanic elites engage with foreign policy where it supports and complements their domestic agenda. In the case of Chicanos elites, these agendas concerned building a cohesive and functioning Chicano movement ideology, as well revolved promoting their civil rights campaigns for Mexican-Americans in the Southwest.

Finally, this case study supports the thesis claim that a generational approach to analysing Hispanic elite engagement with US foreign policy reveals the contextual
detail necessary for understanding this engagement. In the case of the Chicano generation, the distinctive organisational structure based around charismatic individual leaders, the ethnic nationalism based on a critique of the US polity, and the backdrop of the cold war and the conflict in Vietnam, all served to create a set of conditions that enabled a specific Chicano foreign policy engagement that was unique to the time-period and to Chicano elites.
Chapter 4: Foreign policy engagement among Cuban and Central American exiles during the 1980s

Introduction

This chapter will look at foreign policy engagement by elites within the Exile generation. As was outlined in chapter 2, this consists of national origin groups that emerged out of the new wave of immigrants from the mid twentieth century through to the 1980s, that arrived in the United States as refugees fleeing political turmoil in their states of origin. This chapter will focus on Cuban and Central American exiles during the 1980s. Foreign policy elites within these groups were characterised by an active intention and desire to return to their home countries, and thus, as will be outlined, their domestic interests were inextricably tied to US foreign policy.

As will be demonstrated in this chapter, these groups came closest to organising along the lines of an ‘ethnic foreign policy lobby’ akin to the Israel or Armenian lobbies: Exile generation elites devoted time and resources in the attempt to influence US foreign policy towards their country of origin, through direct appeals to both the US government as well as actors within wider US civil society. In the case of the Cuban exiles, this involved the establishment of organisations with the stated goal of influencing foreign policy outcomes, drawing on significant sources of funding. In this sense, Exile generation elite engagement in the 1980s best fit the ethnic lobby template that has become a subject of considerable inquiry within the academic literature.

The case study of the Exile generation highlighted in this chapter provides evidence for the main claims of this thesis. Firstly, it reiterates the importance of widening the scope of analysis to incorporate a broader focus beyond examining a particular group’s influence on the outcomes of US foreign policy. Whilst the Cuban Exile community has been previously studied by the existing literature, there has only
been limited attention on the foreign policy efforts of other Hispanic Exile groups. Whilst an assessment of policy outcomes helps to illuminate the strength of Cuban influence on the US government, it risks overlooking activities and efforts by other Exile groups that did not achieve the same level of impact on foreign policy outcomes, but nevertheless demonstrated a significant level of engagement with foreign policy discourse.

Secondly, the chapter emphasises the extent to which Exile generation elites were choosing to focus on foreign policy because it promoted or complemented their domestic agendas. As these groups principally consisted of diaspora communities that, at least initially, had the intention to return to their countries of origin, their ‘domestic’ concerns were outside of the US. As a result, it was only through hoping to influence US policy towards their home country that they could address their domestic agendas. In addition, in the case of the Cuban exiles, once it became clear that return to the island was unlikely, they continued to leverage the benefits of adopting a pro-US foreign policy stance to enrich their local socio-economic and political circumstances in south Florida.

Finally, these case studies emphasise the importance of adopting a generational approach to Hispanic elite engagement with US foreign policy. Utilising this approach reveals how engagement with foreign policy was fundamentally different for Hispanic Exile communities than it was for Chicanos, Mexican-Americans or pan-ethnic Latinos. Furthermore, it emphasises the extent to which the organisational structure of the elites within the Exile communities was unlike those of the Chicano or Latino generations, influencing the extent to which these elites were able to incorporate foreign policy into their campaigns.

The structure of this chapter consists of an examination of attempts by Cuban Exile elites to influence and legitimise the Reagan administration’s foreign policy towards Cuba. It outlines how, as the Exile community became fully-fledged Cuban-Americans in the 1980s, this foreign policy stance was rewarded with political and economic enrichment for the Florida-based Cuban population. The chapter then examines
attempts by exiles from the conflicts in Central America to influence sympathetic voices within US civil society to provide resources for the region, as well as to pressure the Reagan administration into changing its Central American policies. Finally, it demonstrates how Mexican-American elites at the time abandoned the focus on foreign policy seen during the Chicano movement in favour of incorporation within the US political system, leaving exiles as the most prominent Hispanic elites in the foreign policy in the 1980s.

**Cuban exiles**

Cuban exiles began arriving in the United States in significant numbers following Fidel Castro’s revolution in Havana in 1959, arriving as political refugees from the newly-installed socialist regime. According to María Cristina García, this new Exile community consisted of three broad ideological groups: the former conservative allies and supporters of ousted President Fulgencio Batista, those that wished to see a return to the democratic institutions promised in the 1940 constitution, and the left wing former allies of Castro that had rejected revolutionary socialism. These groups were united in their desire to see the overthrow of the new Cuban government.

The exiles settled in Florida, establishing an enclave in Miami. By the end of 1980, the initial wave of Cubans had been joined by a second: over one hundred thousand Cubans arrived between April and October of that year as part of the Mariel boatlift, in which a number of Cubans were allowed to leave Cuba and take up refuge in the US by Castro. Whereas the original exiles had consisted of a disproportionate number of wealthy, educated individuals arriving in the United States with a high degree of social and economic capital, the second wave of arrivals contained a high number of

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unskilled workers with low levels of education compared to those that arrived twenty years earlier.\textsuperscript{251}

By the start of the 1980s, a political elite had firmly established itself within the Cuban-American community living in Miami. This elite was dominated by individuals from the initial wave of exiles that arrived immediately following the revolution, as well as by their second-generation children that had been born in the United States. These political elites were drawn from the community’s economic leadership; they were dominated by wealthy Cubans that owned businesses and were politically conservative in their outlook. The most prominent vehicle through which this elite involved themselves in foreign policy was through the establishment of the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF). Established in 1981 by a charismatic second-generation Exile named Jorge Mas Canosa, CANF served as a means through which Cuban Exile elites were able to channel resources and efforts into overthrowing the Cuban government. Principally, this was to be achieved through aiding and promoting the Cuba policy of the Reagan administration. CANF was organised along the lines of the highly-successful American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPEC) which lobbied to influence US foreign policy towards Israel, with its leaders aspiring to emulate that organisation’s success.\textsuperscript{252} CANF’s efforts included a lobbying organisation, the Cuban American Foundation (CAF), as well as a Political Action Committee (PAC), the Free Cuba PAC. As Susan Eckstein points out, the PAC dominated in this area, receiving 99% of all financial donations made to PACs by Cuban-Americans from its establishment in 1982 to the turn of the century.\textsuperscript{253}

CANF engagement methods in the 1980s consisted of a variety of approaches designed to encourage a hard-line stance against Castro. These included providing political donations to the election campaigns of Congressional candidates based on

the strength of their opposition to the Cuban regime, as well as lobbying the US government and the Reagan administration itself on Cuba to encourage an uncompromising policy towards the Island. In return for the support of the government over Cuba, CANF offered vocal public support and endorsement for the administration’s anti-communist policies in Central America.\textsuperscript{254}

One of CANF’s most notable single achievements during this period was the establishment of the Radio Martí radio station in 1983.\textsuperscript{255} Modelled on Radio Free Europe, the station was designed to broadcast pro-US propaganda to the island. Named after Cuban cultural icon José Martí, the hope was that the station would serve to weaken Cuban popular support for the regime. The Cuban government was able to block the signal and prevent islanders from listening, however in spite of this, CANF was still able to persuade Congress to allocate $10 million worth of funding for the project, emphasising their influence on Cuba policy spending.\textsuperscript{256}

On first impressions, the nature of Cuban Exile elite engagement with US foreign policy would seem significantly different to that of Chicano elites a decade earlier. However, the fundamental difference between the two generations – that Cuban-Americans represent an Exile community whereas Chicanos look to represent a community of US citizens – actually illustrates the similarities between the rationale for engaging with foreign policy: The importance of the domestic political agenda of the Hispanic elites is still key for both generations and determines the nature and extent of foreign policy engagement. For early Cuban Exile elites, these domestic social, economic and political concerns were fundamentally tied to the island, as they fully expected to return. Torres emphasises how strongly this influenced the identity and mindset of the Exile elite:

\begin{quote}
As long as there was a possibility of returning to Cuba, those who left identified themselves as citizens of the island and temporary visitors to the United States. From
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{254} Ibid., P. 106.
\textsuperscript{256} S. E. Eckstein, \textit{The Immigrant Divide}. P. 109.
the beginning of the revolution almost everyone, refugees and U.S. policymakers alike, had anticipated that Cuban exiles were only in the United States for the short time it would take for the Cuban revolution and Castro to fall.257

As a result, Cuban Exile foreign policy engagement can be viewed through the lens of their domestic, home country civil rights agenda. Even as it became clear by 1980 that a swift return to the island was increasingly unlikely and that Cuban exiles were here to stay in the United States, the mentality of this Exile status continued to inform the attitude of second generation Cuban-Americans like Mas Canosa and the CANF leadership. As Fernández pointed out in 1987, their “unyielding posture is born out of their collective Exile experiences. Inspired by the “loss of their homeland,” they have felt compelled to alert the United States to the dangers of communism and to eradicate it wherever it appears”.258 For second generation elites, preserving this Exile mind-set remained critical to retaining a cohesive and relatively homogenous community identity. In the quest to ensure its continued dominance, elites enforced Cuban-American support for a staunchly anti-Castro policy in the 1980s through the continual suppression of dissenting opinions within the community, allowing elites to present a unified voice to non-Hispanics.259 Thus, their operationalisation of US foreign policy discourse allowed CANF leaders and other elites to legitimise their claim to represent the interests of the Cuban exiles, affording them political status within national foreign policy discussions as well as allowing them to consolidate power within the Cuban-American community.

For Cuban-American elites, maintaining a high-profile engagement with US foreign policy also brought additional benefits to the community beyond furthering their eventual goal of realising regime change in Havana: It also provided considerable

political and economic rewards both for the Exile elites themselves, as well as for the wider Cuban American community in South Florida. In particular, as organisations such as CANF had built a reputation as staunch supporters of the Reagan Administration’s foreign policy doctrine of ardent anti-communism, Cuban-Americans became the beneficiaries of significant government patronage, enjoying privileges and opportunities not available to other Hispanic groups.

The Cuban-American community had already been the recipients of significant amounts of government financial support. As Stepick and Stepick point out, the Cuban Refugee program had been established to provide assistance to those fleeing the island in the wake of the revolution. Cuban exiles that arrived between 1965 and 1976 had received close to one billion dollars in financial aid from the program. This was in part to help with the cost of transportation from Cuba to the United States, and in addition, the program provided the remaining funding to Exile families as well as to the local public bodies in Miami that assisted them.260 No other arriving immigrant group had received this level of funding, and reflected the symbolic location of Cuban exiles within the context of the cold war.

In addition, by the 1980s, the Cuban exile elites in southern Florida had leveraged their status as victims of the cold war for government patronage in terms of employment. Capitalising on their willingness to both strongly align with the government’s anti-communist stance as well as their desire to return to the island, the government enthusiastically incorporated the community into their foreign policy infrastructure. From the early 1960s, the CIA employed nearly twelve thousand Cuban-Americans within Miami.261 In fact, the agency became one of the biggest employers in Florida itself, running a considerable variety of front businesses employing exiles, including, according to Stepick & Stepick, “boat shops, gun shops, travel agencies, detective agencies, and real estate agencies”.262 Cuban exiles also

261 Ibid., P. 77.
262 Ibid.
benefitted from special legal accommodations that facilitated their incorporation into US life. For example, the state of Florida passed laws that allowed Cubans to easily recertify themselves, so that they could work in the US. Dade County, which held jurisdiction over the city of Miami, had introduced a bilingual education provision for newly arrived exiles in 1960. Cuban-American firms were also advantaged in their treatment as economic partners by the local government, with, for example, 53% of the minority contracts for the county’s rapid transport system going to Latino-owned firms by the 1980s.263

Beyond the wider benefits for the Cuban-American population as a whole, Exile generation elites were themselves direct beneficiaries of their foreign policy stance in the 1980s. CANF in particular enjoyed lucrative funding. As de los Angeles Torres observes, CANF and other exile groups benefitted from President Reagan’s ideological disposition that preferred private spending over government intervention in local services.264 When dealing out contracts related to US-Cuba policy, Cuban Exile businesses led by pro-Reagan Exile elites were the obvious choice. CANF, for example, received just under 1.7 million dollars from the State Department to run a program that would relocate Cubans in third countries to the United States. Other Exile elite groups were subsequently sub-contracted to provide services such as health care and counselling to these new arrivals.265 Therefore, for CANF, maintaining an active, pro-US foreign policy engagement proved extremely beneficial for the personal enrichment of the Exile elites. In 1986, Mas Canosa was accused of using the foundations’ influence and status within Washington to secure a 25-million-dollar development deal on an island in the Biscayne Bay owned by the city of Miami, which was rumoured to include Jeane Kirkpatrick, the then former US delegate to the United Nations and Reagan foreign policy official, as an investor. The deal only fell through after the original financier was discovered to have had business ties to communist governments.266

263 Ibid.
264 M. de los Angeles Torres, *In the Land of Mirrors*, P. 122.
265 Ibid.
For the Reagan administration in the 1980s, establishing a close association with the Cuban Exile elites on foreign policy issues brought the opportunity to present to the rest of the United States a face for the victims of communism, and provide a legitimising voice to their anti-communist foreign policy. In addition, it allowed the Republican party to advertise a Hispanic supporter base, at a time when their standing with other minority groups was low. For Exile elites, this close association brought the abovementioned economic benefits but also political access: Not only did Cuban-American elites enjoy a close dialogue with high-level administration officials, but Exile elites were appointed to positions within the federal government. Illustrating the extent of this mutually-beneficial relationship, by 1988, CANF had received $390,000 worth of financing via grants from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a Congressionally-funded organisation designed to promote democratic values internationally, whilst CANF members had provided $385,400 worth of donations to the political campaigns of politicians willing to support the organisation’s anti-Castro agenda.

Altogether, the success of CANF in the 1980s demonstrated the extent of the socio-economic and legal advantages available to the Cuban-American community - and to Exile elites specifically - due to their foreign policy engagement. As Stepick and Stepick emphasise:

> With about 75 percent of Cuban arrivals before 1974 directly taking advantage of some kind of state-provided benefits, and with virtually everyone profiting from indirect aid, the total benefits available to the Cuban community appear to surpass those available to any other U.S. minority group. Miami Cubans translated the favourable reception by the U.S. government and the millions of dollars of resettlement assistance not only into a self-sufficient economic enclave and thriving international economic city but also in a “direct line” to the centers of political power in Washington.

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267 M. de los Angeles Torres, *In the Land of Mirrors*, P. 122.
268 Ibid.
269 Ibid., P. 117.
Throughout the 1980s, these “direct lines” were utilised for an energetic foreign policy engagement by Exile elites, both for the promotion of a ‘domestic’ agenda tied not only to their desire to realise their eventual goal of a return to their island homeland, but also the ‘domestic’ agenda of improving their political and economic circumstances in their newfound Miami home.

Central American exiles

Whilst foreign policy engagement in the 1980s by organised Cuban exiles remains relatively well-known in both academic study and public discourse within the US, Central American exiles fleeing the conflicts in Latin America were also a notable source of engagement, with elites from political refugee communities participating in various forms of attempted influence. Central American exile elites shared with Cubans a desire to influence US foreign policy towards their countries of origin in the hope of impacting the internal political power structures. However, unlike the Cubans, Central American exiles did not, on the whole, attempt to lobby the US government directly, as their interests were generally at odds with the anti-communist priorities of the Reagan administration. Instead, they attempted to lobby sympathetic actors within wider US civil society on the left, in the hope of both gaining resources to aid the war efforts within Central America, as well as generate public pressure on Reagan to end the US supply of aid to anti-communist groups. Central American exiles during the 1980s were dominated by refugees from three countries of origin: El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala.

El Salvador in the 1980s was in a state of civil war, which began at the start of the decade in 1980 and only ended in 1992. It was precipitated by years of political unrest between left and right wing factions, with CIA-backed generals suppressing reformist movements amongst the farming peasants in the Salvadoran countryside. A military Junta had been instituted following the election of Carlos Humberto Romero

in 1977, ushering in an era of significant violence, with an estimated eight thousand civilians being killed in 1980 alone in clashes between the military, its associated paramilitary factions, and the coalition of left wing guerillas under the banner of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMNL).\textsuperscript{272}

The political situation in Nicaragua in the 1980s was characterised by violent confrontation between the Sandinista government and US-backed armed opposition groups known collectively as the Contras. The socialist Sandinistas had taken control of the country in a popularly-supported revolution in 1979.\textsuperscript{273} The Reagan administration imposed an economic embargo in 1985 and resisted international diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis.\textsuperscript{274} From 1981 and throughout the decade, the CIA began working with and training the Contras, directing their counter-revolutionary activities. These included the organised killings of suspected pro-Sandinista civilians, kidnappings and sabotage. In addition, the CIA undertook direct action in Nicaragua itself, conducting an aerial bombing campaign and mining harbours.\textsuperscript{275}

Guatemala also witnessed considerable violence and political turmoil in the 1980s. It saw conflict between the pro-US right wing government and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG), which had formed as a coalition of the four largest guerilla rebel groups in 1982. The US government supported the efforts of the Guatemalan military through a direct aerial bombing campaign against suspected rebel villages, and the Pentagon supplied a thousand special forces to train counterinsurgents in the Guatemalan highlands.\textsuperscript{276} In addition, the US and Guatemalan governments supported a range of clandestine anti-communist death squad that orchestrated killings against the rural population.\textsuperscript{277}


\textsuperscript{274} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{275} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{276} L. García Bedolla, \textit{Latino Politics}. P. 217.

\textsuperscript{277} Ibid.
Given the extent of the violence within Central America and the significant political and military role that the US was willing to take to influence the outcomes, the 1980s also saw the emergence of organised campaigns on the part of elements within US society to oppose US foreign policy towards the region, and to bring about an end to the conflict more generally. These campaigns, led by non-governmental organisations, church groups and civil society organisations and incorporating a variety of tactics to undermine the Reagan administration’s efforts, became known as the Central American Peace and Solidarity Movement (CAPSM). Their activities included sending aid and volunteers to the region, bringing refugees into the United States, lobbying Congress to deny funding to the administration’s policy efforts, and promoting public awareness campaigns for the plight of the Central American civilians.

However, despite the relatively high-profile position of the CAPSM in the story of US foreign policy towards Central America during the Reagan years, the role of Central American exiles themselves within this movement has been historically overlooked by academic literature. This is, in part, due to the fact that many Central American exiles within the United States were at a disadvantage compared to Cubans, which limited their ability to involve themselves in foreign policy lobbying. Héctor Perla suggests three principle reasons to explain this disadvantage: Firstly, the majority of Central American arrivals were political refugees and not US citizens. Unlike Cubans, they did not enjoy preferential treatment from the US government that saw an expedited legalised immigration process. Therefore, the status of many Central Americans was highly precarious, restricting their ability to participate in political activities. Secondly, unlike the early Cuban exiles that left the island with their family units, many Central American refugees arrived from countries where their

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families and associates faced the possibility of being targeted for violent reprisals were they to become high-profile activists. Thirdly, the Reagan administration had deliberately portrayed the CAPSM as a Soviet-backed movement in which well-meaning US citizens were being misled into supporting communist activities. As a result, there was a deliberate attempt to downplay Central American attempts to directly lobby the US public.  

Despite these obstacles, Central American exiles played a significant role in the CAPSM. As Perla points out, this was largely left to political and social elites that had the resources and ability to overcome the risks of angering the political powers back in their home countries. Again, as with the Cuban exiles community, Central American exile elite engagement with US foreign policy was fundamentally driven by a domestic concern: As the individuals residing within the United States had the intention to return to their countries of origin, attempts to influence US policy towards the region was out of a concern to resolve their domestic conflicts at home. As Perla outlines, this participation included a range of different CAPSM activities:

Firstly, exile elites participated in engineering nationally-focused ‘solidarity’ movements within the United States. The Nicaraguan solidarity movement, for example, began in the late 1970s and was in full force by the start of the 1980s, and was driven by Nicaraguan left-wing Exile elites. Initially, these groups promoted the aim of highlighting the brutality of the Samoza regime within US civil society. By shedding light on both the violence within Nicaragua as well as the involvement of the US in supporting the government and local militaries, it was hoped that a sufficient amount of public solidarity could be engineered so as to put pressure on the Reagan administration into dropping its support for Samoza. Initially, Exile elites had formed organisations targeting the Central American immigrant

280 Ibid.
281 Ibid.
282 Ibid., PP. 169-170.
populations already living in the US, including the Comité Cívico Latinoamericano Pro-Nicaragua en los Estados Unidos in San Francisco, and the Nicaragua Solidarity Organization, the Committee in Solidarity with the People of Nicaragua, and Los Muchachos de DC in Washington. Other organisations had branches across the US, including the Casa Nicaraguan. The hope was that Central American immigrants and other Hispanic groups would show a concern for the escalating violence in the region. However, due to the obstacles to refugee engagement identified above, Exile elite organisations quickly turned their attention to building political solidarity within the wider US population in opposition to Reagan’s pro-Samoza policies. Once the Sardinistas took power in Nicaragua, these groups began instead to focus on building relationships between the government and sympathetic actors within US society. These efforts included raising money for the government’s political agenda and organising visits to the US by Sandinista officials.

A similar effort was made by Salvadoran Exile elites looking to build a solidarity movement within the US population. A precursor to what would become the main Salvadoran solidarity network had already been established in 1975, when a group of Salvadoran student immigrants in San Francisco, outraged at a mass killing of protesting students in San Salvador, formed the Comité de Salvadoreños Progresistas (The Committee of Progressive Salvadorans) in San Francisco. These students established ties with their counterparts within El Salvador, producing and sharing literature for both Central American and US audiences and organised a protest outside the Salvadoran consulate. By the 1980s, Salvadoran exiles had established fully-fledged solidarity organisations, with the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES), the most prominent and successful of these, being founded in 1980. CISPES was the end result of an active attempt by the FMLN leadership to build a solidarity movement within the US that could limit the effectiveness of US foreign policy in the country, with rebel commanders visiting the

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284 Ibid.
285 Ibid.
287 Ibid., P. 148.
US in 1980 to facilitate the creation of CISPES out of existing Exile organisations.\footnote{Ibid., P. 149.} CISPES maintained regular contact between Exile communities in the US and rebel groups within El Salvador, taking delegations of US activists to witness the brutality of the US-backed regime first hand, and bringing victims of violence to the United States to provide public testimony of the atrocities to public audiences.

Central American exiles also played a key role in the ‘sanctuary’ movement and its goal of undermining Reagan-era policy towards the region. As Stoltz Chincilla et al. outline, the movement represented the collective, organised efforts of churches, religious groups and Central American exiles to provide shelter and protection within the US for refugees fleeing the violence in Guatemala and El Salvador that had entered the country illegally.\footnote{N. Stoltz Chinchilla, N. Hamilton & J. Loucky, “The Sanctuary Movement and Central American Activism in Los Angeles”, \textit{Latin American Perspectives}, Vol. 36, No. 6, 2009. P. 102.} Whilst this movement was a broadly religious one that was led by and drew in a large percentage of non-Hispanic members, Central American Exile organisations nevertheless provided significant logistical support. In particular, the Central American Resource Center (CARACEN) was formed in Los Angeles as an overseeing organisation to coordinate sanctuary efforts by Central Americans living within the United States to take in new refugees.\footnote{H. Perla, Jr., “Si Nicaragua Venció, El Salvador Vencerá”, P. 153.} A similar Exile-ran organisation, El Rescate, was established to provide medical services for newly arrived refugees.\footnote{N. Stoltz Chinchilla, N. Hamilton & J. Loucky, “The Sanctuary Movement and Central American Activism in Los Angeles”, PP. 108-109.}

As with the solidarity movements, one of the main goals for exile elites was to leverage the refugees seeking sanctuary to raise awareness of the Reagan administration’s foreign policy in Central America, along with increasing public sympathy for the plight of the exiles themselves. In the case of the sanctuary programs, the physical havens themselves provided a space in which refugees could openly provide a counter-narrative to the administration’s framing of the CAPSM as a pro-Soviet agenda. The importance of this as part of the overall effort to undermine
US policy is emphasised by a refugee, quoted in Stoltz Chinchilla et al.: “It was a place where we could tell our own stories – a place from which we could challenge U.S. policy toward Central America”. In addition, the sanctuary network provided a continual source of first-hand testimonies from the refugees themselves, who were often dispatched across the US to advertise their cause by organisations within the movement by telling their stories of being the victims of US-backed violence. Perla summarises the importance of these testimonios when discussing a case study of a female refugee:

This seemingly simple act of recounting her personal experience with state-sponsored terrorism to total strangers – and especially to citizens of the country whose government was responsible for bankrolling the atrocities committed against her – had been repeated innumerable times before by other Central Americans over the course of the 1970s and 1980s. This narrative performance (testimonio) was essential for Central American refugee and immigrant activists’ organizing strategy of building public opposition to the Reagan and Bush administrations’ foreign policy toward El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua.

Therefore, the activities of Central American elites in both the solidarity and sanctuary movements during the 1980s reinforce the importance of their Exile status to understanding the rationale behind their engagement with US foreign policy. As with the Cuban exiles, their symbolic (and, in some cases, literal) status as temporary and unwilling political refugees in the US meant that their principal concern was the domestic situation in their homeland. Given their personal circumstances as being located within the US, and the significant role that the Reagan administration was playing within the region, it made logical sense for them to devote considerable time and resources in attempting to influence US foreign policy in the hope of bettering the situation in their countries of origin.

292 Ibid., P. 113.
293 Ibid., P. 107.
**Mexican-American elites in the 1980s**

In contrast to the energetic and high-profile engagement with US foreign policy by Cuban and Central American Exile groups, Mexican-American elites during the 1980s largely turned away from the active incorporation and contextualisation of US foreign policy into major domestic campaigns that had been such a prominent feature of the activities and the agendas of the Chicano generation elites. Instead, they largely focused their efforts on re-incorporating themselves into the existing political framework of the US, running for elected office and inserting themselves into the machinery of the Democratic Party. In this sense, they largely abandoned the radical anti-US platform of Chicano nationalism in favour of the opportunities for the attainment of political power through the democratic process. This transition from ethnic nationalism to political incorporation played out in the context of surging numbers of new Latin America immigrants from the Exile generation, as well millions of new immigrants as from Mexico itself. As a result, Mexican-American elites in this period began the evolution from charismatic leader-led, relatively homogenous organisational structures, to formally-instituted Washington lobbies that began to claim to represent this collection of new immigrants under a ‘Hispanic’ label.

Before the movement was overshadowed by these new, politically-incorporating elites, the Chicano Generation elites had certainly been willing to engage with US foreign policy towards Cuba and Central America during the mid-to-late 1970s, providing a critical perspective on the same issues that would go on to dominate the Exile generation’s agenda during the 1980s. Chicanos typically interpreted the actions of the US government in Latin America within the context of oppression, and the Cuban revolution as an inevitable consequence of decades of US-backed exploitation. For example, a 1972 article in La Raza covered a visit by Chicano activists to the island on behalf of the magazine, extolling the virtues of the socialist regime’s approach to addressing the same problems of socio-economic inequality that Chicanos had been campaigning on, such as improving access to healthcare and
levels of education. Reflecting a widely-held sentiment within the movement, the editorial claimed the Cuban revolution to be a result of a history of “aggression enacted upon her” from the ever-present threat of an imperialist United States. A similar interpretation had been provided for making sense of the violence in Central America: In a 1970 article on the conflict in Guatemala, La Raza editors pointed to US foreign policy as the source of the conflict, describing the Guatemalan government as having “strengthened its neocolonialist conditions and of direct dependence, not only in its relations with the United States but also through the indirect mechanisms resorted to by U.S. imperialism in Central America for penetration and control.” Thus Chicano movement elites found themselves largely at odds with the sentiment of Cuban Exiles, but in solidarity with Central American refugees, with a critical appraisal of US policy towards Latin America complementing their narrative of the US as an oppressive regime.

However, whilst the Chicano movement elites may have been willing to engage with US policy, their place as the dominant and high-profile representative voice of a politically active Mexican-American community was rapidly diminishing. With the winding down and withdrawal of troops from Southeast Asia by the mid 1970s, the momentum and cohesive energy of the movement’s central foreign policy platform had evaporated, and the various, disparate campaigns across the Southwest that had made up the movement were either in a process of resolution or were being marginalised. By the 1980s, Chicano elites were no longer able to command the attention of the US media or organise campaigns in the way that they had in the late 1960s. This loss of influence coincided with the arrival of the wave of new immigrants from Mexico and Latin America. In his personal interview, David Sanchez reflected on the dramatically transformative impact this immigration had on the existing Hispanic population, which had previously been relatively homogenous, dominated by second and third generation Mexican-Americans. As he suggested:

296 Ibid., P. 82.
Let me tell you what happened. In the late 1970s, millions and millions and millions of people came across the border from Central America and Mexico. Those are your Latinos. They don’t identify with the people that have been here for many years. Half of them are Spanish speakers and most of them speak more Spanish than English. And it’s changed. I don’t know if it was done on purpose or what. But I think to some degree, the Latinos were brought in to kill the Mexican American movement. Because when you bring in refugees to overpopulate you, you kill the movement... Mexico was having such bad, double digit inflation and so was the whole region. All of a sudden you have millions of people crossing the border and they don’t identify with Mexican-Americans, they don’t identify with Chicano, they identify with Latino. So they have a different focus: it’s half here and half in their foreign country. So in a way they killed the movement over here. All of a sudden here in LA, it used to be 75% Chicano surnames and 25% Latino, now it’s the other way around... They don’t speak English, it’s only Spanish. Their world is in Mexico, or Central America. It’s not here. So it kills the possibility of a movement.

Such a fatalistic appraisal reflected a general sense of disappointment that the historical zenith of political power for the Chicano Generation had passed, but nevertheless touched upon the reality that, during the 1980s, the Mexican-American community had begun transitioning power towards a new set of elite leaders that were better placed to accommodate the new immigrant arrivals. These elites reflected a desire to work within the established political system rather than in opposition to it, opting to focus on gaining power through elections, and re-double the efforts to use both new and existing Hispanic organisations to focus on conventional lobbying efforts. This not only saw a re-legitimasation of the US political infrastructure and modes of governance, but witnessed the ascendancy of a new generation of Mexican-American leaders that wanted to distance themselves from the Chicano label. As Laura E. Gómez identified in her interviews with Mexican-American senior elected officials in the mid-1980s, there was a clear preference among elites to shift from the Chicano label to a pan-ethnic ‘Hispanic’ one, due to, in the words of one interviewee, a desire to avoid the association with radical opposition to the US as “all words are associations, and so those people who said ‘I’m a Chicano,’ were greeted with “All right, you’re a Chicano, and you’re going to give

298 Interview with David Sanchez, 16th September, 2017.
As Gómez explains, this reflected the new Mexican-American political elite’s desire in the 1980s to commit to a strategy of political incorporation to address their domestic agendas: “Many of those interviewed conveyed a conscious decision to depart from the confrontational politics of the 1960s and 1970s... Frequently, this new political outlook was denoted by euphemisms such as “pragmatic”, “issue-oriented” and “coalition-building”.

This shift in focus towards working with large-scale, national organisations and committing resources to the democratic system saw significant political breakthroughs for Mexican-Americans during the 1980s. Toney Anaya became only the second Hispanic elected governor of New Mexico in 1982, the same year that Henry Cisneros was elected mayor of San Antonio and Federico Peña became the first Mexican-American mayor of Denver a year later in 1983. At the national level, three Mexican-American Congressmen, “Kika” de la Garza (TX), Ed Roybal (CA) and Henry B. González (TX) had joined up with two Puerto Rican colleagues to establish the Congressional Hispanic Caucus (CHC) in 1976. As was outlined in Chapter 2, this period also witnessed a significant change in the structural architecture of elites themselves: Non-elected Mexican-American political elites abandoned the local, grassroots movements based around charismatic leaders and instead began focusing on permanent, national organisations as the principle vehicle through which they could claim to represent the community, heralding an evolution that would culminate in the emergence of the Latino Generation in the 1990s.

As a result of these changes, Mexican-American engagement with US foreign policy in the 1980s depended significantly on the disposition and enthusiasm for foreign policy issues by individual organisation leaders. As Chicano-influenced leadership was replaced by Latino-influenced control throughout the decade, the level of engagement dropped accordingly. For example, Mario Obledo, who served as

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300 Ibid., P. 53.
302 Ibid., PP. 68-69.
president of LULAC for two terms in 1983 and ‘84, used his presidency of the organisation to criticise Reagan administration foreign policy. He led a delegation of LULAC leadership to Cuba on a fact-finding mission in September 1984, meeting with senior government officials including a four-hour meeting with President Castro, a meeting in which both sides agreed that a normalisation of relations between the US and Cuba should be a goal of US foreign policy.³⁰³ The following month, he led a similar fact-finding trip to Latin America, spending five days across Mexico and Central America. As part of that expedition, Obledo met with Nicaraguan Sadinista junta leaders Daniel Ortega and Sergio Ramirez and agreed to send a LULAC representative to observe the 1984 elections, as well as using the meeting to denounce the US government’s support for the Contras.³⁰⁴ However, the following year, LULAC delegates elected a Republican, Oscar Moran, to the presidency. Moran dramatically reversed the anti-Reagan stance of Obledo and, over the three successive terms as leader, moved the organisation away from any criticism of US foreign policy, instead worked to build positive corporate and governmental relations and kept LULAC’s focus squarely on domestic issues.³⁰⁵ In addition, Mexican-American nationally elected officials in the 1980s were generally unwilling to involve themselves in the administration’s anti-communist policies towards Latin America. The CHC never spoke out against the conflict in Central America, and three Mexican-American members actually voted in favour providing ‘humanitarian’ funding for the Contras.³⁰⁶

This shift away from the level of foreign policy engagement seen by the Chicano generation elites perhaps reflects a recognition on the part of Mexican-American elites by the mid 1980s that a critical interpretation of US foreign policy was no longer complementary with promoting their political agenda. Unlike the grassroots protest

³⁰⁶ C. Muñoz, Jr., Youth, Identity, Power, P. 180.
movements of the 1960s and 70s that characterised the Chicano generation, a commitment to political incorporation and seeking elected office necessitated strategies for building electoral coalitions beyond the Mexican-Americans community. This meant engagement with US foreign policy, for which there was little space to find common ground or obvious political interest between different communities, was abandoned.

Furthermore, the emerging adoption of pan-ethnic labels such as ‘Hispanic’ and ‘Latino’ by Mexican-American elite organisations was beginning to impact the types of representative claims that the elites could make, which in turn impacted the type of political agendas they could build. As will be explored in further detail in Chapter 5, the transition to a pan-ethnic audience from a relatively homogenous national origin group severely limited the ability of Mexican-American elites to engage in foreign policy discussions: They could not participate like Exile generation elites concerned with a country ‘back home’ engulfed in political turmoil, nor could they deploy a critique of US foreign policy to build a common ethnic identity, as had been the case in the Chicano movement.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has demonstrated the extent to which Hispanic elites from the Exile generation were heavily involved in US foreign policy during the 1980s. This included both through the establishment of organisations designed to lobby the US government directly, as well as through generating wider public solidarity and awareness for particular aspects of Reagan-era policy. This was highlighted through the case studies of the Cuban as well as Central American Exile communities and their political leadership in the United States. Whilst the example of Cuban-American influence has been previously well-documented, the case study of engagement by Central American refugees has received less academic attention. However, as this chapter has underlined, the impetus for foreign policy engagement was the same between both groups, despite radically different audiences for this engagement and different levels of success at influencing foreign policy outcomes.
The main dynamic that informed Exile elite engagement with US foreign policy was their desire to influence the political situation ‘back home’ in the countries from which they found themselves involuntarily separated. Recognising the power of the US over the fortunes of Latin American governments, Exile organisations sought to affect the disposition of both the US government and US society towards a particular faction within the political conflicts that raged both in Cuba and Central America. In contrast, Mexican-American elites by the 1980s were much less interested in foreign policy than their Exile generation Hispanic counterparts, due to a fundamental unwillingness to tie US foreign policy towards the domestic priorities of the Mexican-American community. This, therefore, reflected a significant departure from the strategies of the Chicano generation elites seen a decade before.

These findings offer support for two of the principle claims of this thesis. Firstly, it further confirms the claim that the domestic relevance of US foreign policy is important to understanding foreign policy engagement by Hispanic elites: For Exiles, their principle domestic agenda did not lie within the United States as was the case with other Hispanic generations, but in fact with their countries of origin, to which they had either an actual intention to return, or saw their own interests as tied to the political outcomes within these ancestral homelands. Therefore, given the importance of US foreign policy in influencing these outcomes in both the Cuban and Central American examples, it is not surprising that elites from both groups sought to sway the Reagan administration’s position through a campaign of high-profile engagement. Secondly, it supports the claim that a generational approach is necessary to examine and make sense of Hispanic elite engagement with US foreign policy over time: The unique circumstances that the Exile generation found themselves in during the late 1970s and 1980s and the generationally-specific context in which they operated provides an explanatory framework for understanding why Cuban and Central American elites were much more willing to engage with US foreign policy, whereas those Mexican-American elites caught in the transition between the earlier Chicano and later Latino generational identities,
representing an increasingly heterogeneous demographic and fully committed to the US as ‘home’ over Mexico, were not.

In addition, the Exile generation case studies examined here provided a useful historical context in which much of the existing literature on Hispanic engagement with US foreign policy can be considered. Given the explicit attempts at forming coordinated lobbies and the dedication of time, energy and financial resources to influencing the bilateral relations between the US and the countries of origin by Exile elites, the nature of foreign policy engagement in this period does in fact most closely resemble the ‘divided loyalty’ fears that pervaded much of the early literature, led by Huntington and Buchanan, and provided the inspiration for the ‘ethnic lobby’ model that de la Garza, Dominguez and others sought to identify in the Latino demographic in the 1990s. Given the then-prominence of these Exile lobbying efforts providing the backdrop for the academic debate in the 1990s, it is perhaps unsurprising that the literature was predominantly concerned with a narrow focus on home-country lobbying efforts.

However, the utilisation of the generational approach confirms that there is little for Huntington et al. to fear. The prism of generation illuminates a picture in which the 1980s represented a unique moment in the history of Hispanic American foreign policy engagement, in which relatively small demographic communities led by political Exiles had the disposition, incentives and resources to involve themselves in the public discourse on US foreign policy. However, the antecedent and subsequent patterns of both Hispanic immigration and elite organisation confirm that this was indeed a unique moment in US history: The foreign policy engagement by the earlier Chicano generation had taken on a different manner and was driven by different concerns. Likewise, Mexican-American elites in the 1980s shied away from US foreign policy because they saw themselves as committed to participating in mainstream politics and saw little purpose in challenging Reagan’s international agenda. Unlike the Cuban Exile elites who found significant political and economic benefit in supporting the government’s anti-communist policies even after their prospects of
returning to their island homeland had diminished, Mexican-American elites in the 1980s had nothing to gain and plenty to risk by engaging with foreign policy issues.

Intellectual and public fears over the prospect of Hispanic American divided loyalties based on the experiences of Exile generation engagement in the 1980s was therefore misplaced. As will be outlined in Chapter 5, it would be the stance of the cautious Mexican American elites, rather than the lobbying Exile elites, that would better reflect the nature of foreign policy engagement by the Latino generation from the 1990s and into the contemporary period.
Chapter 5: “The world is getting smaller”: Intermestic issue engagement among national Latino advocacy organisations in the 21st century

Introduction

This chapter examines the nature of foreign policy engagement amongst Latino advocacy organisations (LAOs). It demonstrates that whilst LAOs continue to prioritise the bulk of their resources towards domestic policy issues over foreign affairs, on two particular topic areas there is notable Latino interest: Immigration continues to be a key policy around which LAOs organise, and the environment and climate change represents an emerging area of concern. In both cases, it is the inherently intermestic nature of these issues that has encouraged LAOs to engage: both topics are as much grounded in the day-to-day lives of Hispanic Americans within the US as they are in international policy. As a result, Hispanic survey respondents are disproportionately likely to emphasise these topics as priorities than non-Hispanic citizens. Therefore, this chapter highlights these topics as forming the potential basis of a future unique, Latino foreign policy agenda. In addition, it demonstrates that Latino-generation elite organisation continue to engage with foreign policy where it promotes and complements their domestic agenda.

The chapter illustrates several important factors relevant to the wider context of Hispanic generational elite engagement with US foreign policy. Firstly, it demonstrates that the pattern of Latino-generation engagement has not significantly changed since it was first examined by Pachon, De la Garza & Pantoja in their study of Hispanic elites in the 1990s.307 This represents an important finding, given the considerable changes that have occurred across the US foreign policy landscape since

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the late 1990s. Secondly, it confirms that the generational shift from country-of-origin groupings to pan-ethnic ‘Latino’ organisations as the principle vehicle through which elites claim representation of the Hispanic community is entrenched within both the policy discourse and the political networking mechanisms within Washington. As a consequence, LAOs are no closer to operating as ethnic lobbies for Latin American governments in 2018 than they were in the 1998. Finally, by analysing the nature of LAO engagement in policy areas rather than direct influence on foreign policy outcomes, potential topic areas for a future Latino foreign policy agenda are revealed that had previously been overlooked by the existing literature.

The structure of this chapter consists of a brief history of the development and ascendancy of Latino advocacy organisations as the principle representatives of the Hispanic population in national politics during the 1990s, and charts their limited engagement with foreign policy issues. It then examines the seminal 2000 study by Pachon, De la Garza & Pantoja that surveyed the foreign policy positions of Latino elites during the late 1990s, before comparing the findings from that study with more recent survey data and insights from interviews with LAOs conducted between 2015 and 2017. It finally examines how on the two intermestic issues of both immigration and the environment and climate change, there is a developing interest among LAOs that has the potential to form the basis of a unique Latino foreign policy agenda in the future.

**LAOs and the Latino Generation**

As outlined in Chapter 2, by the 1990s, the principal arena of Hispanic elite engagement had shifted from country-of-origin, regional organisations to large-scale bodies with a presence in Washington, DC. These LAOs had, to varying degrees, adopted pan-ethnic ‘Latino’ labels and made claim to represent the interests of the entire Hispanic demographic.\(^{308}\) In addition, their organisational model had evolved

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away from the local civil rights protests and ethnic nationalism orchestrated around high-profile leaders of the Chicano generation, towards a focus on lobbying the federal government to commit energy and resources to Hispanic causes, to a point where, as Garcia argues, “Latino organizational leadership has become more institutionalized in the sense that organizational skills, networks and institutional positioning has supplanted charismatic appeal”.

This general transformation is highlighted most prominently in the creation of the National Hispanic Leadership Agenda in 1991. The NHLA, which represents the forty oldest and largest Latino advocacy groups, includes formerly Mexican, Cuban, Puerto Rican and Central American groups among its membership, as well as those that have always explicitly claimed to represent Hispanics, such as the National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO). Of the current forty members, only two – the Cuban National Council and the National Puerto Rican Coalition – maintain a national origin label in their name. The rest have moved to express a commitment to representing a national Latino constituency as overtly as possible, including in some cases, by changing their organisational name entirely.

The NHLA represents bodies from business, professional associations, advocacy and education. Yet this loose conglomeration of diverse groups is able to successfully endorse a cohesive political agenda whilst claiming to represent a single, united minority, deploying pan-ethnic terms such as ‘Latino’ and ‘Hispanic’ over national-origin groups. Mora contests that this ambiguousness is strategic and deliberate on the part of the organisations so that their representative claims to be the

309 Ibid. P. 132.
310 See a full membership list at the NHLA website: https://nationalhispanicleadership.org/about-nhla/nhla-membership. [Last accessed 21/5/2016]
311 For example, the Mexican-American Women’s National Association changed its name in 1990 to ‘MANA A National Latina Organisation’ to widen their appeal. Similarly, the New York-based Institute for Puerto Rican Policy changed its name in 2005 to the National Institute for Latino Policy, to invoke a pan-ethnic and national remit. Following the election of Donald Trump in 2016, the National Council of La Raza (NCLR), one of the largest Hispanic advocacy organisations, changed its name to UnidosUS, to distance itself from the Chicano-era connotations of ‘La Raza’.
ambassadors for a large voting block remain unchallenged.\[312\] Therefore, for such representative claims to work, LAOs have to rely on centering their day-to-day advocacy concerns on issues that concern the community as a whole, rather than national-origin specific interests. Given the high level of feeling of pan-Latino shared-fate reported amongst Hispanics, the primary efforts and political activism lies with the socio-economic concerns that affect the daily reality of the majority of the Hispanic population.\[313\]

**Latino elite engagement with foreign policy during the 1990s**

It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that these structural changes in the organisational architecture of the Latino generation elite was correlated with a declining interest in US foreign policy: Throughout the 1990s, there was a significant absence of engagement with either international issues or US-Latin American relations by LAOs. On the surface, this could be considered somewhat surprising given that it coincided with increased speculation among both the academic and public sphere that the end of the Cold war would herald a new era in which ethnic concerns could rise to the forefront of US foreign policy debates, with the prioritizing of super-power engagement no longer taking up the oxygen of immediate geo-political concerns.\[314\]

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\[314\] Concerns for an increased focus on narrow ethnic interests supplanting national priorities extended beyond the pessimistic forecasts for the domestic landscape of US policy formulation. In a speech in January of 1993, Madeleine Albright warned of the risk of “fragmentation” of populations across the former Soviet Union along ethnic lines, following the collapse of the bi-polar system. See: H. Brands, *From Berlin to Baghdad: America’s Search for Purpose in the Post-Cold war World*, (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2008), P. 112.
Anticipating such a scenario, public intellectual and political scientist Arthur Schlesinger Jr. warned of the anger of promoting multiculturalism within education, fearing that the United States would lose perspective of its own identity (and by extension, its political priorities) now that categories of ‘us’ and ‘them’, which had once been conveniently provided by the Cold war, were no longer available to keep US identity from fragmenting.315 At the same time, International Relations scholars were forecasting that a new era of international politics based on ethnic identity lines was about to commence. The international order was on the precipice of a new era, one in which states would play a diminished role in the immediate conduct of foreign policy, with the ascendance of non-state actors taking its place, including domestic populations organised into interest groups.316

Against the backdrop of such speculations and coupled with a growing population that seemed to increase exponentially with each decade, it is unsurprising that there was a level of anticipation surrounding the role that Latino Generation elites, now representing a legitimate and ascendant pan-ethnic block, might play in the post-Cold War US foreign policy landscape. Much of this speculation took the form of negative and alarmist warnings about the potential dangers of increased immigrations swelling the ranks of a Latino demographic that, with a culturally distinct set of values and foreign language, would threaten American identity at home, and through a failure to the American way of life, would maintain dangerous ties to their countries of origin, where their political allegiances really lay. At best, they would struggle to reconcile divided loyalties to both the United States and the homeland they left behind. At worst, Latinos could actively lobby on behalf of the interests of Latin American governments and actively pursue their political agendas.

As previously outlined in Chapter 1, best-selling books by public intellectuals, such as Peter Brimelow’s *Alien Nation* and former Reagan staffer Patrick Buchanan’s *The Death of the West* typify this sentiment. However, the most high-profile warning (and intellectually impactful) came from renowned Harvard historian and political scientist Samuel Huntington. In a 2004 book entitled “*Who are we?: The Challenges to America’s National Identity*”, he set out the case that the growth of the Latino demographic threatened both American identity and sovereignty. Continuing a theme established in his influential book *Clash of Civilizations*, he claimed that Hispanics possessed an essentially different set of cultural values from those found within the traditional American Creed that had dominated the US from its colonial origins. Unlike previous new arrivals of ethnic immigrant groups, Latinos were unwilling to shed these different cultural values in favour of assimilating to the Creed. As outlined in Chapter 1, the extension of this argument was that this failure to assimilate not only threatened to undermine or erode the national values that go into formulating the US’ national interest in the world, but were immigration into the southwest to be left un-checked, Hispanics could remould the region as an autonomous Spanish-speaking province with the effective political and cultures values of Mexican communities.

Despite these negative forecasting for Latino ethnic lobbying, as part of an anticipated explosion of ethnic identity politics seizing the discourse of US foreign policy, Latino elite involvement with foreign affairs during the 1990s was notable by its absence. From the end of the Cold war, there has been very little in the way of high profile initiatives emerging from Latino organisations, or political commentary.

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321 S. P. Huntington, *Who are we?*, PP. 130-136.
on administration foreign policy goals or conduct that would seek to proffer any kind of critique from a Latino perspective.\textsuperscript{322}

One exception in which Latinos did play an active participatory role concerned the ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Both the US and Mexican governments were eager to elicit the support of the Latino community (and in the case of Mexico, specifically their diaspora population living and working in the southwest United States), hoping that they would readily endorse a project that they would perceive as beneficial for the two countries to which they had significant ties.\textsuperscript{323}

As Dominguez notes, as part of this campaign, the Mexican foreign minister established a ‘General Directorate’ with a responsibility for promoting a new dialogue between Mexico and Mexican-American leaders\textsuperscript{324}. National honours were bestowed upon prominent Mexican-American elites by the administration of Carlos Salinas, the then president. The Mexican Trade and Industrial Development Ministry actively encouraged influential Mexican-American politicians and organisations to lobby for NAFTA’s ratification, of which the most actively prominent were LULAC and the NCLR.\textsuperscript{325}

However, the impact of these initiatives were not particularly successful in mobilizing Latino elected officials to vote for NAFTA due to any perceived Mexican benefits. Whilst all but one Mexican-American Congressman voted in favour of the ratification, this was only after the Clinton Administration sought to assuage the concerns of Rep.


\textsuperscript{324} J. I. Dominguez, “Latinos and U.S. Foreign Policy”, \textit{Weatherhead Center for International Affairs}, No. 6, 2005.

\textsuperscript{325} Ibid., pp 29-30.
Esteban Torres, a leader of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, that job losses in members’ constituencies would be tackled with a multi-million-dollar investment package. All Cuban-American and Puerto Rican members voted against the bill, fearing it would unduly hurt their respective local communities.

Beyond the NAFTA example, Latino elite engagement with US foreign policy during the period were largely restricted to matters concerning immigration reform or topics over which Latino elected officials were functionally required to involve themselves, such as where a bill on refugee status for Central Americans or Cubans necessitated a vote. Beyond this, organisations have not taken on any prominent initiatives.

Given that initial historical examination of Latino elite engagement with US foreign policy shows an apparent record of inactivity, it is somewhat surprising that the same period of time has been overshadowed by fears of Latinos lobbying to represent their countries of origin. It was this somewhat contradictory state of affairs provided the emphasised for academic research on the subject. As a result, the 1990s saw a number of studies undertaken that looked at Latino systematic involvement with US foreign policy. During the middle of the decade, the Tomas Rivera Policy Institute, a California-based think tank that focuses on Latino polling, conducted several studies on Latino involvement with a range of foreign policy-related topics, from remittances to local ties with foreign diplomatic corps. As was outlined in chapter 1, these findings were collated and published in the edited volume *Latinos and U.S. Foreign Policy:*

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328 For example, one area in which the Hispanic Caucus in the 1990s was particularly concerned was with extending protections and government programs to illegal immigrants. See: K. J. Cooper, “Hispanic Caucus Shows Its New-Found Clout”, *The Washington Post*, 2nd October, 1993. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/10/02/hispanic-caucus-shows-its-new-found-clout/cbe73a59-582b-47bf-85f1-775bd1e84b87/?utm_term=.ad60a51c5d07]

“Representing the Homeland”? by Rodolfo O. de la Garza and Harry P. Pachon. As was discussed in Chapter 1, of particular relevance within the collection was a survey of the foreign policy views of 454 Hispanic elite individuals, drawn from organisations, academia, media representatives, business leaders and public officials. The study, by Pachon, De la Garza and Pantoja and entitled ‘Foreign Policy Perspectives of Hispanic Elites’, looked at the priorities of Latino leaders as well as comparing their foreign policy positions with non-Hispanic elite actors. The findings, explored previously in Chapter 1, are presented here again in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>% U.S. leaders saying issue is “very important”</th>
<th>% Latino leaders saying issue is “very important”</th>
<th>Rank of issues to U.S. leaders</th>
<th>Rank of issue to Hispanic leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defending allies’ security</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stopping illegal drugs</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintaining superior military power</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protecting U.S. jobs</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving the global environment</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combatting world hunger</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing trade deficit</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing illegal immigration</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Elite foreign policy preferences, from Pachon, de la Garza and Pantoja (2000)


The study found that of the top five US policy goals that Latino elites were asked to rank, all were domestic considerations except for preventing the spread of nuclear arms. Improving education and race/ethnic relations were considered the immediate and most pressing priorities, whilst traditional foreign policy concerns such as ‘strengthening the United Nations’ and ‘defending the security of US allies’ were at the bottom of the list of priorities, only ranked as ‘very important’ by 19% and 8% of Latino leaders respectively. Other common areas of focus for US foreign policy, such as combatting international terrorism, improving the United States’ relations with other states, and maintaining position of international military superiority were all considered ‘very important’ by less than half of all respondents.

When considering the specific foreign policy views of Latino elites in comparison with those of their non-Latino counterparts, the authors of the study emphasise that with regards to the majority of the nine issues that they were asked to consider, there was only a small variation in the priorities given to each topic. For example, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons was considered to be the top priority for both groups, and roughly equal percentages reported that stopping the flow of illegal drugs was a ‘very important’ goal of US foreign policy. What is also notable is the extent to which Latino concerns for the Latin American drugs trade – something often seen as an area of particular interest due to the unique Latin American dimension – is equally shared with non-Latinos, suggesting it may principally be seen through a security lens over an ethnic one.

These statistics are useful in indicating for the first time with empirical data the priorities of Latino elites. However, there are several shortcomings with this study: Firstly, as was highlighted in Chapter 1, this study was conducted to serve as a response to Huntington et al.’s assertions about the supposed dangers of Latinos harboring loyalties and political ties to their countries of origin. The authors of the edited volume explicitly frame it as such, noting the public negative speculation that was occurring at the time about the supposed true motives of Latinos and their elite representatives. The subtitle of the text, “Representing the Homeland?” illustrates this fact, suggesting a very real motive for the authors was to actively counter the
claims that Latinos are lobbyists for Latino America. Possibly as a result of this, the authors avoided highlighting and analysing the points over which Latino elites and non-Latino elites differ, perhaps out of a concern to emphasise that Latino elites’ foreign policy interests are the same those of wider America. Nevertheless, notable differences in policy preferences between Hispanic and Non-Hispanic elites are evident from the responses. For example, as is clear from Table 2, there is a substantial difference between Latino and non-Latino elites on the issue of defending allies’ security, which is only considered a ‘very important’ issue by 8% of Latinos compared with 60% of non-Latinos, and on improving the global environment, which is ranked second in the order of importance by Latinos, it is however considered ‘very important’ by less than half of US elites generally.

Secondly, and likely also as a result of the specific focus on the Latinos’ relationship with the Latin American ‘homeland’ and the extent of any national origin group interaction with the governments in their place of origin, this study fails to examine or take into account broader foreign policy considerations. For example, it does not consider how the focus on domestic issues could also have a possible international dimension, or the extent to which cultural values amongst Latinos may lead to an alternative interpretation of issues that may be never the less considered low priority.

Thirdly, the study is somewhat limited due to its restrictions as a principally quantitative study. Whilst it is certainly helpful in capturing a useful perspective and introducing empirical data into an erstwhile entirely speculative debate, it does not offer the ability to help make sense of precisely why Latino elites made the choices that they did. Whilst the study did include several ‘follow up’ interviews with a handful of respondents, it was not always clear who these were with and they mostly served to provide separate, complementary information (such as that Hispanic elites considered Mexico to be the most important international ally for the United States),
rather than going into depth behind why an elite individual chose the rankings that he or she did for foreign policy preferences.\(^{332}\)

Finally, the analysis and conclusions that the authors draw from the survey data and the accompanying interviews suggest that Latino elites are not interested in foreign policy topics because of the immediacy of domestic concerns such as access to education and healthcare that take priority for the Latino population that the elites are representing.\(^{333}\) Foreign policy is a luxury to which they cannot afford to devote energy and resources to. However, if this conclusion is indeed accurate, then it can only offer us at best a static analysis that captures the sentiment of the specific leaders at the time. Much has changed since the respondents were polled in 1997, including the international environment in which the United States operates. This leaves a question of how far these stated perspectives are pertinent and relevant to the discussion of Hispanic elite foreign policy engagement in later years, with a new cohort of Latino elite leaders.

The invasion of Iraq and its continued troop commitment during the Bush administration provided a notable source of analysis of the Hispanic population’s preferences on a key foreign policy issue in the time following the de la Garza and Pachon study, with a number of surveys of Hispanic support for the war being conducted by the Pew Research Center from before the invasion, through to 2007. These results showed that overall, Latinos were consistently more likely to oppose the invasion and the continued presence of troops in Iraq, with only 46% of Hispanics indicating support leading up to the war compared with 60-70% among the general population\(^{334}\), and 66% of Hispanics wanting to a troop withdrawal by 2007, compared to 50% of survey respondents generally.\(^{335}\) At the same time, Hispanics

\(^{332}\) H. P. Pachon, R. O. de la Garza & A. D. Pantoja, “Foreign Policy Perspectives of Hispanic Elites”, PP. 25-30

\(^{333}\) Ibid., P. 23


were heavily targeted by the US military as part of their recruitment efforts during the Bush administration, who saw the Hispanic population as a relatively untapped source for potential enlistment during the early 2000s. Some high profile Latino organisations, such as the National Council of La Raza and LULAC, accepted sponsorship financing from the US military in exchange for access to Hispanic members at their national conferences and local meetings to promote military careers. These efforts were largely successful, with participation rates in the military increasing to 12% at the end of the war (and 18% in the Marines), compared to a low of 4% during the early 1980s.

This mix of increased military participation by Hispanics, coupled with a developing consensus that the Hispanic population was largely opposed to the continuation of keeping troops in Iraq, led LAOs to take a stance advocating a full military withdrawal, and it was included as a resolution in the NHLA’s 2008 policy agenda.

However, aside from LAOs adopting a collective stance against the war by the end of the Bush administration, there was limited involvement in – or commentary on – Bush-era foreign policy during the era of the ‘war on terror’. In a 2007 article, Brandon Valeriano attempted to contextualise the Pew Research Center survey data within the academic responses to Huntington and the anti-Hispanic narrative of the culture wars, suggesting that despite the relatively lower level of support for Bush-era policy compared to the rest of the population, Hispanics were on the whole supportive of the invasion of Iraq. To Valeriano, this indicated that as a population, Hispanics supported the national security policy of the government and thus

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336 A. Gumbel, “Pentagon targets Latinos and Mexicans to man the front lines in war on terror”, The Independent, 10th September, 2003. [https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/pentagon-targets-latinos-and-mexicans-to-man-the-front-lines-in-war-on-terror-86229.html]


disproving any accusations of disloyalty. This suggests that the legacy of the culture wars continued to cast a shadow over Hispanic elites during the early part of 21st century and limited their ability to contribute to national foreign policy discussions in the aftermath of 9/11.

**LAO engagement under Obama and Trump**

Whilst there is little evidence of active foreign policy engagement by LAOS during the Bush administration, there remains a question over whether the attitudes identified in the Pachon, de la Garza and Pantoja are equally present in the contemporary-era, under the administrations of Presidents Obama and Trump, or whether they have changed. To help answer this question, semi-structured interviews were conducted with representatives of seventeen LAO constituent members of the National Hispanic Leadership Agenda. Member organisations from the NHLA were chosen as these constituted the most significant national voices serving as ‘ambassadors’ for the Latino community on policy issues to the federal and state governments, as well as the media. In addition, membership indicated the organisations invoke the legitimacy of the pan-ethnic ‘Latino’ label.

The LAOs interviewed represent the diversity within the NHLA umbrella: They included business-focused organisations such as the U.S.-Mexico Chamber of Commerce, others were national-origin focused groups like the National Puerto Rican Coalition; industry-association groups such as the National Association of Hispanic Publications and the National Hispanic Medical Association, as well as historical civil rights organisations like the NCLR and the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC). Questions were semi-structured so each individual conversation was different, but were broadly anchored around seven principle questions, listed in Table 3.

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341 Ibid., P. 42.
The interviews were conducted as a means of testing how far the findings from the Pachon, De la Garza & Pantoja study could still be seen to apply in the immediate contemporary period, as well as to produce more recent evidence of LAO perspectives to help understand the current state of engagement of elite organisations towards US foreign policy issues. The resulting insight suggests that Latino generation LAOs are, as anticipated, continuing to prioritise domestic policies over international issues in their lobbying and advocacy efforts. Following the generational framework, this suggests that rather than evolving towards a new generational model, the characteristics of organisation and representation that

Table 3: Interviewee semi-structured questions

1.) Could you give me some background on your role and how you came to work in this field?

2.) Do you believe Latinos share a common culture, or a common identity? If so, what do you think that common culture or identity is comprised of?

3.) What kind of role do you feel Latinos have played, and will play, in foreign policy?

4.) Are there particular foreign policy topics or areas that may be of particular interest or relevance to the Latino community as a whole? If so, what do you think those are? If not, why do you think so?

5.) There is a perception that Latinos traditionally have not taken as much as an active role in foreign policy, including working in foreign policy related careers. How accurate is that and why might that have been the case?

6.) Do you think Latinos will play a larger role in foreign policy in the future? What do you think this will look like?

7.) A February 2015 survey found that Latinos were more likely to rate climate change as a ‘critical threat’ to the US and that combatting world hunger should be a ‘very important goal’ of US foreign policy compared with the US population as a whole. Furthermore, Hispanic respondents were more likely to have a favorable view of the United Nations than non-Hispanic respondents. Based on your experience, what do you think might account for these differences?
defined the Latino Generation elites in the 1990s have become entrenched over the subsequent two decades. However, by expanding the definition of foreign policy engagement to incorporate intermestic issues, the interviews highlighted two areas of foreign policy interest in which there is an emergent Hispanic LAO agenda: Immigration as well as the environment and climate change.

**The continuing salience of domestic issues**

The first and most striking observation was that Latino organisations, on the whole, do not actively campaign on foreign policy issues: None of the seventeen organisations represented had a set of policy positions on US foreign policy topics, and none actively sought to actively communicate to the federal government their organisation’s perspective on a foreign policy issue.

The majority of respondents articulated that whilst the decision to exclude foreign policy was not necessarily a conscious one, they were focused primarily on domestic policy concerns, such as those related to immigration reform, educational access and healthcare. Pressed further on why they had focused on these areas, the majority of respondents communicated that this was due to the fact they were of an immediate pressing concern for the Latino community that they represent: The socio-economic reality for the majority of Latinos means that education, the economy, jobs and healthcare top the agenda and these concerns are communicated from the Latino population through to the organisations that represent them on a national stage. Others reported that their focus on domestic concerns was due to a limitation of resources. A perceived lack of available funding, access to decision-makers within government, and a lack of foreign policy expertise within the organisations themselves, meant that the majority of organisations could cover only a relatively small range of policy issues, and foreign policy was not considered a high priority. Others argued that as the policy positions of many Latino organisations were designed to reflect the consensus views of their membership, it would be difficult to take a foreign policy stance due to a lack of a common viewpoint amongst organisational membership. As José Rámón Sánchez, the Chair of the National
Institute for Latino Policy (NILP) (a New York-based policy center established in 1982 as a Puerto Rican-focused organisation that publishes research studies on Latino and Puerto Rican issues), articulated in his interview, this lack of consensus was in part a reflection of the continuing strength of national origin group identity continuing to play a role within the Hispanic population:

A lot of Latinos still have connections to their country of origin. Both emotionally, psychologically and sometimes physically because they travel back and forth and sometimes economically because they provide remittances back to their families in their home countries. So there is this issue of how to bring together these various Latino groups. And there are some groups that have tried to do that and have succeeded organisationally, there are a few that have local chapters across the country that bring in various groups, and on paper it looks like a good way to bring together groups but they haven’t been able to develop Latino leaders. So, it’s a bureaucratic organisation of Latinos but not a political organisation of Latinos in the sense of being able to develop leaders that they feel can represent their community.342

Given these obstacles, a commitment to engage with foreign policy was not considered to be worth the expenditure of time and resources.

On the whole, this lack of an active foreign policy focus by elite organisations, instead choosing to favor an immediate focus on domestic issues, is broadly in line with the findings of the 1997 study. As then, the principle response given as to why foreign policy topics were not a central feature of Latino elite engagement with politics is that foreign policy is not an immediate concern for the majority of Latinos within the United States who continue to exist in positions of socio-economic disadvantage compared to the angle population.

The second notable observation is that overall, the organisations were highly skeptical of the possibility of a cohesive and unified ‘Latino’ consensus on foreign policy, or that Latino elite actors have a discernable foreign policy agenda that is

342 Interview with José R. Sánchez, Chair, National Institute for Latino Policy (NILP), 9th February, 2017.
different from non-Hispanic political elites. Instead, they demonstrated a significant range of perspectives over what could be considered Latino foreign policy preferences, and why said preferences were important. As Amy Hinojosa, the president and CEO of Mana, ‘A National Latina Organisation’ (founded in 1974, MANA is the largest women-focused Hispanic organisation, and has focused efforts on campaigns related to reproductive rights for Hispanic women), emphasised in her interview:

That is where you get a little more segmented due to regional loyalties and different countries of origins; you’ll get a different answer from South Americans, to Central Americans, to people from the Caribbean to people from Mexico. So I think that’s where you start to see segmentation on their opinions on international issues. So in that regard, I don’t think there’s anything that’s over-arching. Now, if we are talking about international relations as it relates to the war on terror, or to the global economy, there I think you get back to where Latino and Hispanics fall in line with average Americans.\textsuperscript{343}

Whilst there was significant variation amongst responders, there was general disagreement with the possibility of a consensus among Latinos over what issues were important for foreign policy, or indeed over which methods of conducting foreign policy were preferable. The overwhelming majority indicated that any political consensus was limited to domestic policy, (with the exception of immigration, depending on whether this was considered to be primarily a domestic or foreign policy issue).\textsuperscript{344} Whilst many responders indicated that Latinos might have foreign policy issues that they care about, there was reluctance in many cases to articulate what these issues might be. In addition, the majority, however, emphasized that foreign policy preferences will stem from the experiences of Latinos within the United States, just as it informs domestic priorities.

\textsuperscript{343} Interview with Amy Hinojosa, President and CEO of MANA, 15\textsuperscript{th} September, 2015.
\textsuperscript{344} This was expressed in the majority of interviews, in particular with Amy Hinojosa, 15\textsuperscript{th} September, 2015; Laura Maristany, Associate Director, NALEO Education Fund (NALEO), 15\textsuperscript{th} September 2015; Julian Teixeira, Senior Director for Communications, National Council of La Raza (NCLR), 12\textsuperscript{th} September, 2015; Carmen Jorge, Vice President, Congressional Hispanic Caucus Institute (CHCI); Hilda Crespo, Vice President for Public Policy, ASPIRA Association, Inc., 14th September 2015; Luis Torres, Director of Policy and Legislation, League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), 16\textsuperscript{th} April, 2016.
The third general observation that can be taken from the interviews is that Latino organisations are unsure about what role they should, and likely will, play in any future Latino engagement with foreign policy. They are doubtful that their role as ambassadors for the Latino community at the national political level on domestic issues being replicated when it comes to foreign policy.

When asked why they have not engaged with foreign policy, they point to the same structural factors that they use to explain why the Latino demographic as a whole is not interested in foreign policy. Firstly, a number of representatives identified a lack of available resources that could be devoted to foreign policy matters, even if they were of potential interest to the Latino community or the elites themselves. As Rafael Fantauzzi, the President and CEO of the National Puerto Rican Coalition (NPRC) (a non-partisan group that seeks to lobby for the interests of Puerto Ricans in Washington and raise the profile of Puerto Rican economic and political concerns), explained in his interview:

I will tell you that the majority of our organisations are very under-funded... and right now, the Latino community has so many disparities from within our own borders, that trying to also reach outside of our borders will probably be stretching ourselves.345

This also highlights the second factor most frequently cited as an explanation: The continuing sense that domestic concerns such as jobs and education should take up the immediate time and energy of organisations. Finally, they also highlighted the need to find a consensus amongst their respective’ membership bases on policy positions – something that is often elusive over foreign policy matters. Furthermore, two interviewees suggested that due to the reliance of many organisations on private funding bodies, the leadership of many groups will often be sensitive to avoid taking positions on issues that could jeopardize potential sources of revenue, which maintaining established foreign policy preferences could do.

345 Interview with Rafael Fantauzzi, President and CEO, National Puerto Rican Coalition (NPRC), 4th September, 2015.
When interviewees expressed optimism that Latinos would increase their engagement with foreign policy in the future – or were asked to make a judgement working under such an assumption – there was no consensus over how that engagement should be translated to the national stage through elite Latino actors, or which actors should take the initiative on foreign policy matters. Many interviewees expressed doubt that Latino organisations would ever take on this role in a significant way, suggesting that in the both the short and long term, goals would likely remain focused on domestic issues. Miguel Ferrer, the former managing editor of Huffington Post’s *Latino Voices and Black Voices* and the director of programming at AOL Latino, illustrated that sentiment in his interview:

I don’t think [a concern for foreign policy] will come from the large domestic-focused organisations, for the reason that they are domestic-focused. Even as things improve there are still challenges and things to be defended so I don’t think their sphere is likely to change to foreign policy.  

Where they did see a role for advocacy and interest organisations, it was largely limited to focusing on getting more Latinos elected to national office, which would increase their exposure to foreign policy through increased opportunity to oversight positions, as well as increasing the percentage of Latinos within foreign policy jobs in the federal government, both through pressuring the government to diversify their workforce, and through encouraging Latinos in high school and college to consider foreign policy careers. Indeed, there was a strong consensus amongst LAOs that Hispanic Americans are under-represented in the foreign policy establishment within the federal government. The majority of respondents pointed to structural and/or cultural barriers to explain this, but were divided on the specific reasons or solutions needed to correct this.

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346 Interview with Miguel Ferrer, former Managing Editor of HuffPost Latino Voices and Black Voices, 10th May, 2016.
347 For example, this was expressed in interviews with Al Zapanta, President and CEO, United States-Mexico Chamber of Commerce (USMCC), 11th September, 2015, Laura Maristany, NALEO, 15th September 2015; Julian Teixeira, NCLR, 12th September, 2015 and Carmen Jorge, CHCI, 17th September, 2015.
A significant number suggested that there was insufficient investment in outreach to the Latino community on the part of the recruiting agencies such as the Department of State or the US Agency for International Development (USAID). As Luis Maldonado, the Chief Advocacy Officer of the Hispanic Association of Colleges and Universities (a non-profit organisation representing the interests of 492 higher education institutions that have over a 25% Hispanic student demographic), and a member of the Council of Foreign Relations, offered an example of this sentiment in his interview:

The data shows us the limitations in the current makeup of the federal government’s team that sets foreign policy in this country. Hispanics are just nowhere to be found there. They are not part of the decision making tree. The State Department has done a piss-poor job of recruiting, diverse workers.\footnote{348 Interview with Chief Advocacy Officer, Hispanic Association of Colleges and Universities (HACU), 17\textsuperscript{th} April, 2017.}

Maldonado echoed other interviewees in arguing that recruitment into foreign policy careers had traditionally focused on targeting universities located in the geographic North East that traditionally had low levels of Latino enrollment: As Al Zapanta, the CEO of the U.S.-Mexico Chamber of Commerce (USMCOC) and former Assistant Secretary of State for the Interior summarized in his interview, there is a perception that foreign policy agencies \textit{“don’t recruit west of the Mississippi”}.\footnote{349 Interview with Al Zapanta, USMCC, 11\textsuperscript{th} September, 2015.} Additionally, there is an expectation amongst recruiters that applicants would be expected to take up departmental internships; something that Latinos often lack the resources to do.

Another common suggestion was that the Department of State and other foreign policy agencies fail to appreciate the potential of Latinos as foreign policy practitioners, either because they have traditionally focused on Middle East and Asian regional experts over those with Latin American expertise, or that they do not recognise the language and cultural understanding that many Latinos can bring to foreign policy conduct in Latin America. In his interview, Luis Maldonado presented
this problem in terms of the inevitable limitations it will have for US foreign policy
delivery if the government overlooks the unique diplomatic skillset of Hispanic
Americans:

At HACU, we are trying to not only show the government the future, we are trying to
point to the wave that is coming, demographically speaking. And we'll miss those
opportunities if we do not educate Latinos and entice them to enter these worlds,
because there are certain limitations in American foreign policy, being driven by people
who have no affinity and no cultural ties. I'm generalising here I understand that, but
foreign policy as it relates to the Western Hemisphere is what it is because Hispanics are
not part of it. And I would argue that we would bring a different set of perspectives, both
historical, linguistic, cultural - you name it, because that's where our community
originates from.350

A third explanation put forward was that the foreign policy bureaucracy displayed an
institutional reluctance to diversify its workforce: That there was an assumption that
foreign policy careerists were traditionally characterised as being ‘Yale, pale and
male’, and that, unconsciously or not, there was an inclination amongst recruiters to
continue hiring patterns that according to Zapanta, reflected “An old boy and old girl,
Eastern, Ivy League, elitist institution.”351

However, the advantage of conducting qualitative in-depth interviews with these
organisations over the survey of policy preferences taken in 1997 is that it makes it
possible to ‘shed light’ on the possible dynamics that are underlying these stated
positions that have remained so remarkably unchanged in twenty years. The majority
of stated reasons put forward to explain the lack of foreign policy engagement – the
immediate focus on domestic issues, the necessary lack of political consensus, and
the problem of lack of resources and access to political decision-makers to justify
allocating limited time and funding to foreign policy – at first reflect two possible
explanations for why there has been no engagement with foreign policy from the
1990s until the present day.

350 Interview with Luis Maldonado, HACU, 17th April, 2017.
351 Interview with Al Zapanta, USMCC, 11th September, 2015.
The first is that the socio-economic realities for Latinos have remained static since the 1990s: that the over-riding need for domestic issues continues to take precedence. This analysis would be even more surprising given the growth of the Latino population in the intervening period, having more than doubled from 22.3 million in 1990 to an estimated 55.3 million by 2014, suggesting that the socio-economic situation for Latinos has remained flat despite the increase in size both of US-born and foreign born Latinos.\textsuperscript{352}

The second explanation is that these proposed accounts are all a consequence of the structural changes that had occurred in the organisational composition of the most prominent Latino organisations by the 1990s. The move to represent a pan-ethnic, national minority over a collection of distinct national origin diaspora groups has limited the ability of elite organisations to take up policies that are of interest to the majority of the ‘pan-ethnic’ demographic.

The emerging foreign policy agenda

It would appear on first analysis that this transition to the pan-ethnic representative model will mean that foreign policy will remain as excluded from their agendas in the future as it has been since the beginning of the 1990s. However, through an examination of additional survey data, the possibility of an identifiable set of Latino foreign policy preferences remains viable.

A survey of 2,108 Latino adults, conducted in 2015 by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, examined the foreign policy preferences of the Hispanic population\textsuperscript{353}. It was conducted in both English and Spanish, and is the first attempt in the 2000s to


quantify the foreign policy positions of the Latino demographic. Whilst concluding that there was agreement on the majority of issues between Latinos and the mainstream population, they found three areas in which Latino respondents had a notably different preference: 54% of Latinos considered climate change to be a ‘critical threat’ to US security, as opposed to just 34% of non-Latinos; they were considerably more likely to state that combatting world hunger should be an important priority for US foreign policy (56% of Latinos, compared to 39% of the general population), and that Latinos were more supportive of the United Nations as an actor in international affairs than non-Latinos (79% of Latinos were in favour of strengthening it as an institution, over 62% of non-Latinos. Furthermore, 66% of Latinos were in favour of using the UN to ‘resolve international conflict through negotiation’, compared to only 47% of non-Latinos).

This would indicate that there are indeed some issues that the Latino population has a noticeably different position on to the non-Latino population and that would appear to be tangible enough to be observed under the pan-ethnic ‘Latino’ label. What de la Garza et al. failed to identify in the 1997 survey of Latino elites is that some of these same preferences are also discernable amongst the elite respondents. For example, where respondents were asked to rank what they considered to be the ‘very important’ goals of US foreign policy, Latino leaders ranked ‘improving the global environment’ as the second most important goal after nuclear non-proliferation, compared to U.S. leaders generally who ranked in 6th. Similarly, Latino leaders ranked ‘combatting world hunger’ as the fourth most important goal, compared to 7th amongst non-Latino respondents. By contrast, where non-Latinos ranked ‘defending allies’ security’ 2nd and ‘maintaining superior military power’ 4th, such traditional foreign policy concerns were considered of far less importance to Latino leaders, who ranked them 8th and 9th (out of 9 options), respectively.

The similar observable differences in both the 1997 and the 2014 surveys suggest that there had at least been historically a time where Latino elites had a different interpretation of US foreign policy priorities to non-Latinos, and that this sentiment would appear to be traceable amongst the general demographic in the contemporary
period. Therefore, the data from these questions were put to the representatives from the Latino organisations as part of the interviews to determine whether a similar response is evident today. They were told of the differences between Latinos and non-Latinos in the 2015 Chicago Council survey, and asked what they thought might account for these differences.

In their responses to this question, the majority of interviewees identified two likely explanations for these differences. Firstly, that these priorities were a reflection of the daily experiences of a very high proportion of the Latino population within the United States. As Julian Teixeria, the director of communications at the National Council of La Raza (NCLR) (the largest and best-resourced Hispanic advocacy organisation, that campaigns for immigration reform and a ‘path to citizenship’ for undocumented immigrants) articulated in his interview:

> A lot of Latinos here in the US have to deal first hand with climate change. Farmworkers for example are exposed to pesticides and there are huge problems associated with climate and climate change. With world hunger, there are Latinos in the nation that still live in slums: they don’t have portable water, they don’t have money, they don’t have food.  

The contention, then, is that Latinos are disproportionately likely to live in polluted areas, work in sectors that were at risk from the effects of climate change, and were more likely to have experienced food poverty in the United States or have left a country of origin in which they did. This would mean that these foreign policy issues are more likely to be directly relevant to their daily lives. Secondly, some interviews attributed them to cultural differences. In particular, they focused on general commonalities that were often listed as the most commonly cited different value between Latinos and non-Latinos, that of the central importance of family: either that Latinos were more likely to have family members in countries of origins which were suffering from poverty or environmental degradation, or that the value of

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354 Interview with Julian Teixeria, NCLR, 4th September, 2015.
family afforded Latinos with a greater capacity for empathy with the plight of foreign population suffering from such hardships.

In both cases, interviewees were able to point to explanations that fell within the possible remit of pan-ethnic model: a cultural value that was broad enough in definition to encompass a heterogeneous mix of different national origin groups, as well as a shared socio-economic situation that affected a large proportion of the population.

These responses would indicate not only identifiable areas of difference between the foreign policy priorities of Latinos and non-Latinos, but that there is also a viable avenue for these topics to be engaged with by organisations, working in the context of the domestically-grounded, socio-economic explanations provided for them. This would appear to be particularly feasible in two topic areas: immigration and the environment.

The immigration agenda

Jones-Correa had previously identified immigration as the only detectable foreign policy topic on which the Latino community could galvanise the support of both US-born Hispanics and foreign-born Hispanic immigrants, based on the behaviour of Latino advocacy groups and elected Hispanic officials during the 1990s. Since then, immigration has remained a touchstone of LAO policy campaigns, to which they continue to devote considerable energy and resources. They played a significant role in organising and supporting the large-scale Hispanic protests against the proposed 2006 immigration reform bill that would actively target undocumented

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immigrants\textsuperscript{356}, organising demonstration across the country.\textsuperscript{357} They campaigned heavily against the anti-immigration laws passed in Arizona in 2010 that allowed for the detention or arrest of suspected illegal immigrants based on racial profiling.\textsuperscript{358} Furthermore, there was an overwhelming consensus among interviewees that immigration reform was of paramount importance to their particular organisation’s efforts, as well as emphasising the continued importance of immigration as a unifying subject area for LAOs, anticipating this would only grow as immigration once again became a prominent topic of public discussion.\textsuperscript{359} Ahead of the 2016 election, Immigration reform remained a principle agenda piece for the NHLA, appearing in their official agenda for the election.\textsuperscript{360}

Issues associated with immigration took on a position of prominence during the 2016 election cycle, including the advocacy of anti-immigration narratives by numerous candidates during the Republican primaries\textsuperscript{361} as well as drawing considerable media coverage throughout the election campaign. This increased attention, coupled with subsequent focus of policy efforts aimed at reducing immigration by the Trump administration, will likely serve to increase the organised efforts by LAOs to campaign


\textsuperscript{357} The then-president of LULAC, Hector Florez, spearheaded a narrative reminiscent of the Chicano Generation’s Vietnam protest messaging. At a rally in Dallas in 2006, he complained that Latinos were being presented as national security threats in Bush-era securitisation policies, despite being disproportionately represented in the casualty statistics of the “war on terror”: “There were 19 people that attacked our country. None of them had the name of Rodriguez, Martinez, Flores, Gonzalez. But, most certainly, many of the dead that are coming back from Iraq do have the names of Gonzalez, Martinez, Flores.”. See: J. Ludden, “Hundreds of Thousands March for Immigrant Rights”, \textit{NPR}, 10\textsuperscript{th} April, 2006. [https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyid=5333768]

\textsuperscript{358} In a statement by the NHLA responding to the bill being signed into law, they framed the law as part of larger efforts to discriminate against the Latino community: “During a time when hate crimes against Latinos and immigrants is on the rise, the signing of this bill increases the fear of violence and insecurity among Latinos in Arizona and the entire country.” See: NHLA, “Statement of the National Hispanic Leadership Agenda Condemning Arizona Governor Brewer on Enacting Anti-Latino, Un-American and Un-Constitutional Law”, Washington, DC. 26\textsuperscript{th} April, 2010.

\textsuperscript{359} As reiterated in interviews with Laura Maristany, NALEO, 15\textsuperscript{th} September 2015; Julian Teixeira, NCLR, 12\textsuperscript{th} September, 2015; Hilda Crespo, Aspria, 14th September 2015; Luis Torres, LULAC, 16\textsuperscript{th} April, 2016 and Luis Maldonado, HACU, 17\textsuperscript{th} April 2016, among others.


\textsuperscript{361} P. Elliott and A. Altman, “The Republican 2016 Field Takes a Hard Right on Immigration”, \textit{Time}, 20\textsuperscript{th} August, 2015. [http://time.com/4005245/republican-president-immigration/]
on immigration issues in the immediate future. LAOs have been active opponents of plans to construct a wall along the Mexican border\textsuperscript{362}, as well as opposing the ending of the DACA program for Hispanics who entered the US illegally as children.\textsuperscript{363} More recently, the NHLA in coordinated effort with the Hispanic Caucus has spear-headed opposition to the removal of temporary protected status (TPS) to Central American refugees, leaving them at risk of deportation.

This continued, intense focus on immigration by LAOs is insightful. Firstly, it confirms the hypothesis of Jones-Correa that immigration is an area of intermestic focus around which Hispanics can organise effectively, unifying all sub-sections of the Hispanic demographic. In addition, given the relative ferocity with which illegal immigration has become a feature of hostile narratives of security threat for Latinos, it suggests that both the security and international dimensions of the immigration debate are likely to become an increasingly important component of the wider discourse, necessitating that LAOs engage with the foreign policy element of the debate. Such a shift in focus is already apparent, with the 2016 NHLA agenda calling for the US to devote resources to addressing the political and economic factors within Latin America that are propelling illegal immigration.\textsuperscript{364}

As Luis Torres, the Director of Policy and Legislation at LULAC\textsuperscript{365}, suggested in his interview that both the effects of immigration policy would continue to be of particular importance to Hispanic Americans due to personal experiences, as well as

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\textsuperscript{362} In their letter to Congress objecting to proposed funding for the border wall, the NHLA frame the immigration policies of the Trump administration as a “humanitarian crisis”. See: National Hispanic Leadership Agenda, “Re: NHLA Opposition to H.R. 6136, Border Security and Immigration Reform Act of 2018”, 20\textsuperscript{th} June, 2018. [https://nationalhispanicleadership.org/images/06_20_18_NHLA_Ryan_Immigration_Bill_Opposition_Letter_FINAL.pdf]


\textsuperscript{365} LULAC is the oldest Hispanic advocacy organisation in the US, having been founded in 1929 in Texas as a Mexican-American group. It campaigns on Hispanic civil rights issues and operates principally as a decentralised structure of local chapters and activist networks.
that the economic drivers behind immigration are increasingly being viewed within a wider international context by LAOs:

Number one, Mexico is right across the border. Two, Mexicans continue to be a large amount of the immigrant population that comes to the US every year, although we’re at net zero migration from that country, it’s still a very sizeable shift in people. So I think on the Mexican American front, there’s sort of a constant replenishing of the immigrant experience into the Latino fabric, so that there’s a constant stream - a friend, a neighbour, that is directly impacted by the US hardline immigration policy or the US economic deals and policies, which to many of our folks translate into economic immigration policies because if you strike NAFTA for example, when NAFTA happened many farmers lost their jobs and many of them ended up picking tomatoes and whatever else in the US, and many folks on our side who oppose NAFTA saw that not only as an economic policy but an immigration policy because you’re going to get those people migrating for work. So I think, if you look at it from that lens, you can see how some of these seemingly domestic issues are international issues, especially when economic policy forces Latin Americans to emigrate to the north out of desperation or whatever it is.\footnote{366 Interview with Luis Torres, LULAC, 16\textsuperscript{th} April, 2016.}

This sentiment highlights both the extent with which LAOs continue to anticipate immigration being a central topic of importance to the Hispanic community and therefore for the agendas of LAOs, as well as the recognition that this issue is inextricably linked with numerous themes of international economic, security and diplomatic policy, offering an avenue for potential further engagement by directly addressing these intermestic qualities.

**The environment and climate change agenda**

An analysis of findings from both the Pachon et al., as well as the 2015 Chicago Council surveys, demonstrate that the environment and climate change are foreign policy topic areas in which there is an immediately discernable difference between the preferences of Hispanics and non-Hispanics. The Pachon et al. survey found that
Hispanic elites were most likely to rate ‘improving the global environment’ as the second most important foreign policy goal for the US, compared to a rank of sixth from non-Hispanic respondents. As has been previously stated, the Chicago Council survey found that Hispanic Americans were significantly more likely consider climate change as a critical threat to the US. This suggests that there is a clear and consistent pattern amongst the Hispanic demographic to prioritise the environment as a foreign policy issue compared to mainstream population, and offering an identifiable position with which LAOs could develop a policy platform.

Historically however, there has been no substantive engagement with environmental or climate change as an aspect of foreign policy by the NHLA or any major LAOs. This may be in part be explainable by historical lack of recognition of the environment as a foreign policy topic area in its own right: When interviewees were asked to suggest areas of foreign policy engagement, many proffered more conventional topic areas of foreign policy, such as those related to military intervention, security, and alliances. This would suggest that for the majority of LAOs, foreign policy as an abstract concept has historically constituted a relatively fixed and alternative ‘world’ with clear, defined borders that is inherently distinct from the domestic issues with which they engage on a daily basis.

However, this position has begun to change. In recent years there has become a recognition of both the environment as well as immigration as legitimate foreign policy topics. As Amy Hinojosa emphasised in her interview, Latino organisations were becoming increasingly aware that, particularly on the topic of immigration, there is a recognition developing that effective policy can only be considered with reference to the international political ‘push’ factors that are compelling many Latinos to leave Latin American states for the US, highlighting an acceptance that the traditional boundary between the domestic and the international is dismantling:

367 Such sentiments were expressed in a number of LAO interviews, including those of: Hilda Crespo, Aspira, 14th September 2015; Luis Torres, LULAC, 16th April, 2016, Luis Maldonado, HACU, 17th April, 2016. and Amy Hinojosa, MANA, 15th September, 2015.
Traditionally we have been reactionary to the realities of poverty, low education, and high dropout rates... But the world is getting smaller, meaning we now have to look at human trafficking, and the drug war, and all those things that are pushing folks into the United States... I think we need to start thinking about it in those terms.368

It is further beginning to manifest also in the policy positions taken up by some organisations. In recent years, a number of smaller organisations have begun to specialise directly in the issue of climate change, including the DC-based GreenLatinos, Voces Verdes, and the Latino Coalition on Climate Change. And whilst the interviews clearly demonstrate that the most prominent Latino organisations under the NHLA banner have yet to take up these issues as part of their active policy positions, there are signs that they are beginning at least to recognise the foreign policy implications of these issues on which they campaign from a domestic-focused perspective. In the 2016 version of the NHLA’s Policy Agenda, a document released every four years ahead of the general election that details the policy areas considered of highest concern for the collective membership, includes for the first time a call for the US to take action on climate change through leadership in the international community.369

There is further evidence that the topic of the environment and climate change is of growing importance to the Latino community. The findings of the 2015 Chicago Council study are supported by findings from others. A 2017 study by the Yale Program on Climate Change Communication found that Latinos are disproportionately likely to consider climate change to be real and represent an issue of vital importance.370 In addition, Latinos are more likely to report in surveys that they support Congressional action to combat climate change than non-Hispanics.371

368 Interview with Amy Hinojosa, MANA, 15th September, 2015.
Mark Magaña, the founder and CEO of GreenLatinos (a DC-based coalition of environmental and Hispanic activist networks, that campaigns on both climate change and domestic environmental issues that affect Hispanic communities) argued that there are three principle reasons why Hispanic Americans are disproportionately likely to care about the environment and climate change: Firstly, that Latinos care about the environment because it represents a cultural attribute. Secondly, that Hispanic Americans are more likely to show an interest because a significant proportion is likely to have Latin American connections, where the effects of climate change and environmental problems are more acutely felt. And thirdly, that they care about the environment because the consequences of environmental degradation are disproportionately likely to affect them personally in their immediate local surroundings in the US.\(^\text{372}\)

**Environmentalism as a cultural attribute**

Magaña emphasised that Latinos are naturally more likely to engage with environmental policy as conservation and environmental protection are common cultural attributes amongst Hispanic Americans:

> I find that Latinos are more culturally conservationist than they are membership conservationist. I am not an environmentalist because I saw a movie, or joined Sierra Club, or because I bought a Prius. You find that Latinos are environmentalist because it’s what their grandma taught them and what their parents taught them. How to conserve, re-use, and re-repurpose… they have a natural respect that isn’t related to a policy issue.\(^\text{373}\)

For GreenLatinos, this cultural legacy makes Latinos inherently more concerned with environmental policy in general and explains differences in survey responses. The existence of a Hispanic ‘culture of conservation’ has long been hypothesised by

\(^{372}\) Interview with Mark Magaña, Founding President and CEO, GreenLatinos 15\(^{th}\) May, 2017.  
\(^{373}\) Interview with Mark Magaña, GreenLatinos, 15\(^{th}\) May, 2017.
academic literature\textsuperscript{374}, but has only recently been incorporated into the narratives used within the environmental sector. For example, ‘Latino Outdoors’, a community programme designed to encourage urban Hispanic children to take part in outdoor activities, points to a “conservation cultura” that informs Latino engagement with the environment, whereby for Latinos, “conservation is woven in our cultural practices and rooted in our history and traditions”. \textsuperscript{375}

Using a similar narrative, Irene Vilar, the founder of the Americas Latino Eco-Festival – an annual gathering of Latino environmentalists – emphasises that respect for the environment is ingrained within the cultures of Latin America, which makes it relatively easy for US-based environmental movement to harness these cultural legacies when drawing on Latino support.\textsuperscript{376}

**Environmentalism as a legacy of Latin American extraction**

In his interview, Magaña suggested that for many Latinos, the experience of the consequences of environmental degradation were something that they either experienced first-hand, or were likely to have close friends or relatives that had done so:

> Latinos look at the effects of climate change for their brother and sister’s friend in their countries of origins, where there are much more significant effects and repercussions from weather-related events associated with global warming and climate change. So the immediate thought is, I have to give more remittances to help rebuild the well in my country of origin. My cousin’s farm is flooded or there is a drought, so maybe they’ve got immigrate. Here, when those things happen, FEMA comes in and you get relocated

\textsuperscript{374} See, for example, F. P. Noe and R. Snow, “Hispanic Cultural Influence on Environmental Concern”, \textit{The Journal of Environmental Education}, Vol. 21, No. 2, PP. 27-34.

\textsuperscript{375} Latino Outdoors, “Unearthing our Conservation Culture”, latinooutdoors.com, 8\textsuperscript{th} June, 2015. [http://latinooutdoors.org/2015/06/unearting-our-conservation-cultura/]

\textsuperscript{376} H. Miller, “Latino Cultures Have a “Green” Legacy, Says Festival Founder”, \textit{TriplePundit}, 4\textsuperscript{th} December, 2014. [https://www.triplepundit.com/2014/12/latino-cultures-inherently-environmentalist-says-festival-founder-irene-vilar/]
and get help with a new job. But there, you have to make life-changing decisions about what to do. 377

This was an explanation with which Adrianna Quintero, the founder and executive director of Voces Verdes (a non-partisan network of Hispanic political activists, environmental scientists and businesses that encourages Hispanic interest and activism in public debates over climate change) concurred in her interview. As she explained: “the most consistent finding of our polling and focus groups was that people would state that... “I remember when I visited my grandmother in Mexico and I could barely breath”. So there is a focus not only on what’s happening here but also there.” 378 For both GreenLatinos and Voces Verdes, the potential of a strong Latin American connection provides an immediate international dimension to the wider discourse on the environment and climate change for Latinos, which would not necessarily exist amongst other demographic groups.

Environmentalism as a domestic priority

However, to both Magaña and Quintero, it was the importance of the first hand, lived experience of environmental problems that were of most importance when making sense of Hispanic Americans’ disproportionate interest in the topic as a matter of policy. As Magana argued in his interview:

If I see a coal-fire power-plant in my neighbourhood but not one in the wealthier neighbourhood -and they don’t have the recycling plant or the freeways or anything – and my child has asthma and there’s inequity, then they’ll get into the policy political debate. But they’ll do it at a very local level: “I want to get rid of old smoky right here”. 379

This sentiment is supported by recent statistical evidence. A report by the National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) in 2016 found that Latinos consider themselves to be disproportionately affected by environmental issues living in the United States

377 Interview with Mark Magaña, GreenLatinos, 15th May, 2017.
378 Interview with Adrianna Quintero, Founder and Executive Director, Voces Verdes, 15th May, 2017.
379 Interview with Mark Magaña, 15th May, 2017.
than non-Hispanics.\textsuperscript{380} A separate poll conducted by the New York Times, Stanford University and Resources for the Future (an environmental NGO) in 2015 found that Latinos were more likely to consider climate change as a problem that affected them personally, and were in favour of increasing government spending to tackle it.\textsuperscript{381}

This last motivator – the domestic grounding of Latino interest in the environment – that has begun to spur the more traditional LAOs to engage with the environment and climate change and incorporate them into their advocacy agendas. To accompany the NHLA’s decision to add climate change to its official agenda for the first time in 2016, it hosted a conference jointly with LULAC and the Hispanic Federation to promote the environment as a topic for with which Latinos should be proactive campaigners.\textsuperscript{382} This was hosted on Capitol Hill by Representative Raul Grijalva (D AZ-3rd District), a Hispanic Congressman long noted for his support of environmental causes.\textsuperscript{383} In addition, in 2017 LULAC launched a protest campaign outside the EPA to protest President Trump’s proposed cuts to the department’s funding.\textsuperscript{384}

Therefore, there is clear evidence that LAOs are beginning to engage with the environment and climate change in a substantive and organised way, embracing the intermestic nature of the policy by campaigning on both domestic and foreign policy aspects. This suggests that it is likely to join immigration as a significant, intermestic policy area to which LAOs devote resources and lobbying efforts.

\textsuperscript{380} National Resources Defense Council, “NRDC Report: Latinos Are Especially Hard-hit by Climate Change”, 13\textsuperscript{th} October, 2016. [https://www.nrdc.org/media/2016/161013]


\textsuperscript{382} M. Salay, “Latinos and the Environment: A Conversation on Pollution, Toxic Chemicals, and Conservation Efforts”, \textit{LULAC}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} June, 2016. [https://lulac.org/blog/Latinos_Environment_conversation_pollution_toxins_conservation/]

\textsuperscript{383} In addition, Adrianna Quintero emphasised in her interview that she felt was a sense of momentum and increased interest on environmental and climate change policy amongst the 2016 intake of Hispanic elected officials. She cites the example of Nanette Barragán (D-CA) becoming the inaugural chair of the Hispanic Caucus’ first ever environment committee in 2017.

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that, despite significant changes in the foreign policy landscape since the late 1990s, Latino advocacy organisations are no closer to conforming to the model of an ethnic lobby advocating for a specific foreign policy towards Latin American governments than they had been twenty years ago. This does not mean however, that the conclusion of De la Garza et al. that this means that Latinos do not concern themselves with foreign policy is accurate. Instead, this chapter has presented a case that, when the definition of ‘foreign policy engagement’ is sufficiently broadened so as to incorporate intermestic issues, there is clear evidence of an emerging Latino lobby on the topics of both immigration as well as the environment and climate change.

Firstly, this chapter has confirmed the findings of De la Garza et al. that the nature of foreign policy engagement by LAOs is relatively similar to the findings of their study with regards to the extent to which Latino elites participate in home-country lobbying. None of the 17 Latino organisations interviewed had participated in any substantial organised efforts to lobby on behalf of a particular Latin American government, or on behalf of the political or economic interests of the region as a whole. This is an important conclusion for several reasons: Firstly, it confirms that the dynamics of the Latino generation elites operate the same in 2018 as they had done during the 1990s. Given the significant changes to the foreign policy landscape in the intervening period, it is a useful finding in-and-of itself. In addition, it also highlights a further observation: That the dynamics of the Latino generation elite, based on pan-ethnic representative claims made by national advocacy organisations as outlined in Chapter 2, remain firmly entrenched within the political power networks of Washington and within subsequent policy discussions. Given the significant organisational and demographic changes that occurred within the Hispanic American elites in the preceding thirty years, it is pertinent to confirm that the LAOs, claiming to represent the entirety of the Hispanic American demographic, retain their position as the legitimate ambassadors of the Latino population within foreign policy discourse.
In addition, by viewing foreign policy engagement in the context of the operating mechanics of the Latino Generation elite, this chapter has demonstrated circumstances in which Latino elites do indeed engage with foreign policy. Whereas de la Garza et al. dismissed the lack of evidence of an organised home-country lobbying effort as evidence of non-interest in foreign policy on the part of Hispanic-elites, using the framework of the Latino Generation established in Chapter 2, it is possible to reach an alternative perspective: Given that LAOs make representative claims to represent the entirety of the Hispanic demographic, they can only advance an agenda that reflects the broad, shared interests of the various sub-groups within that demographic, which invariably reflect domestic interests. However, unlike the findings of De la Garza et al., this does not leave the domestic and foreign policy realms as mutually exclusive: Under this analysis, there is no evidence to suggest that Latino elites are uninterested in foreign policy due to the need to focus on domestic policy. It only confirms that any foreign policy engagement would be predicated on the relevance of a foreign policy issue to a wider Latino domestic policy priority.

As has been demonstrated in this chapter, there is indeed evidence of Latino foreign policy engagement where there is a clear overlap between the domestic policy agenda of LAOs and foreign policy components. On the intermestic issues of immigration and the environment and climate change, there is clear evidence of a growing interest and organised campaigning by LAOs that engage with the foreign policy discourse. On immigration, this finding confirms the hypothesis of Jones-Correa that immigration is a foreign policy area on which Latinos can reconcile the interests of both foreign and domestic born Hispanics, and suggests that this engagement is only likely to increase in the future. On the topic of the environment and climate change, this is an area of intermestic policy interest that has not been previously considered by the existing literature. The fact that there is clear evidence since 2014 that LAOs are engaging with the topic in conjunction with Hispanic elected

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officials, offers a new avenue for which Latinos may well develop a unique perspective and policy advocacy around a key foreign policy issue.

Therefore, there is evidence that there are tentative, identifiable foreign policy issues around which LAOs can build a unique Hispanic foreign policy agenda. These findings support the central thesis’ claim that the extent of foreign policy engagement is only apparent once the definition of foreign policy engagement is broadened beyond simply analysing direct lobbying efforts to influence policy outcomes towards Latin American states, as well as supporting the claim that the nature and texture of foreign policy engagement is best understood through the framework of changing generational elites within the Hispanic American population. Finally, it supports the principle thesis claim that Latinos can and do engage with foreign policy, but do so where this supports and complements their domestic agendas. In the case of LAOs, this is apparent in the growing advocacy of intermestic issues, and on the issues of immigration and the environment, there is evidence that this engagement is only going to grow in the future.
Chapter 6: “I’m here because I want to contribute”: Narratives promoting Hispanic participation in US foreign policy among Latino foreign policy practitioners since 2012

Introduction

This chapter demonstrates how Hispanic foreign policy practitioners (FPPs) of the Latino generation engage with US foreign policy discourse by deploying narratives that the cultural heritage of Hispanic Americans leaves them particularly suited to careers in diplomacy and foreign policy analysis. In doing so, they complement the wider domestic agenda of Latino generation elites of increasing employment opportunities for Hispanics within the federal government.

The chapter reveals several aspects in which Hispanic FPP engagement has evolved since the 1990s and suggests a changing attitude towards the conceptual and organisational presentation of a pan-Latino ethnic identity within a foreign policy setting. Firstly, in pursuit of greater access to jobs and promotion opportunities for Hispanics in foreign-policy related careers, FPPs have transitioned away from a reluctance to discuss any shared cultural attributes of Hispanics, towards a willingness to actively promote the organisation and mobilisation of Hispanics as a pan-ethnic minority group with a common culture and common experience. Secondly, compared to the late 1990s, there is a substantial level of active coordination between FPPs and the foreign policy agencies of the federal government based on this conceptualisation of a pan-ethnic, culturally homogenous Latino minority: Explanations behind, arguments for and solutions to the topic of Latino under-representation as agents of US foreign policy are now filtered through this lens, leaving a pan-ethnic Latino label firmly ensconced within the wider discourse.
The structure of this chapter consists of an examination of the two main arguments used by Latino generation foreign policy practitioners to encourage the federal government to make the institutions of US foreign policy more accessible for Hispanic Americans: The first, that the heritage and lived experience of Hispanic Americans produces individuals that are ideally-suited to careers in diplomacy. The second, that increasing the percentage of Hispanics in the workforce will diversify the overall pool of talent tasked with implementing US foreign policy, benefitting its delivery as a whole.

It then examines the structural and conceptual consequences of the promotion of a pan-ethnic Latino minority label within the foreign policy agencies themselves, before framing these activities within the wider context of Hispanic generational elite engagement with US foreign policy.

**The ethno-cultural argument for foreign policy participation**

Foreign policy practitioners have forwarded several principal arguments as to how Hispanic Americans, due to their experience and cultural traits, can benefit the execution of foreign policy. In addition to this, various agencies and departments of the federal government concerned with foreign policy have themselves forwarded these arguments, as well as separate arguments used to justify diversifying their employee base to include Latinos based on the utility of having a more heterogenous workforce related to foreign affairs. In recent years, Latino foreign policy elites and the federal government have coordinated these narratives as part of wider efforts to encourage Latino recruitment into foreign policy-related careers.

The arguments most typically forwarded by Latino foreign policy elites reflect the sentiment that greater Latino involvement in foreign policy at the day-to-day level would bring advantages due to the unique status of Latinos themselves: Given their heritage, circumstances and historical domestic experience in the United States, Latino employees bring specific benefits that aid in the effective delivery of US foreign policy.
The most prominent of these arguments is the suggestion that Latinos themselves would come to a career as official US representatives with an ideal skillset already acquired from a lifetime of navigating their own social realities: For many US-born Latinos who are either from families with high number of first generation immigrants or are from local communities that retain strong cultural traits of their country of origin, they have experienced two simultaneous ethno-cultural environments: that of their immediate family and ethnic community, as well as that of the ‘traditional’ US culture that they will have encountered through their institutional experiences in the education system.\(^{386}\)

According to this argument, this experience of socialisation has resulted in US-born Hispanics having to have navigated these two different cultures in order to adapt to US life, as well as internally reconciling both cultures in order to form their own identities. Ramon Escobar, a Rusk Fellow teaching at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University and former Latin America specialist at the State Department, puts forward this argument in his interview:

> Latinos are essentially born and raised to be effective diplomats because they are often already, before they are even in middle school, understanding, deconstructing and then repackaging complex cultural experiences to their parents, who might not understand what they are seeing, and then vice-versa; translating linguistically and contextually what their father or mother or grandfather or grandmother are saying and seeing and then translating back to whoever they are interacting with in the States.\(^{387}\)

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\(^{387}\) Interview with Ramon Escobar, State Department Rusk Fellow, Georgetown University, 2015-2016, 11\(^{th}\) April, 2016.
To Escobar, who had previously been Special Assistant to the Special Envoy for the Colombia Peace Process in his career as a diplomat, many Hispanic Americans have had to act as language and cultural interpreters to both first generation immigrants acclimatising to their new life in the United States, as well as to Anglo Americans interacting with these new immigrant communities. The effective sentiment of this argument therefore being that the formative experience of second and third generation Latinos means they are natural diplomats: they have an inherent appreciation of the existence of cultural divides; an innate ability to psychologically reconcile these differences, and intrinsic capabilities to both communicate across them and translate between them.

Such an argument relies on a premise that there exist specific cultural differences between Hispanic communities from Latin America and Non-Hispanics within the United States, and that these differences have formed a significant enough disparity that the Latino children of first generation immigrants would need to develop skills to navigate both. This premise therefore appears to be invoking research from communications theory. In particular, it draws on Edward T. Hall’s Culture Context model, which contrasts ‘high context’ cultures such as those found in Latin America and the Middle East which are generally identified as favouring long-term interpersonal relationships, ‘insider status’ and verbal agreements, with ‘low context’ cultures such those in the United States and the United Kingdom which favour short-term relationships, written agreements and less identifiable ‘insider status’. As a result, in a high-context cultural environment like Latin America, information is communicated in a manner that relies heavily on context to be understood.

Therefore, under this ethno-cultural argument presented by foreign policy practitioners, having a familiarity with the high-context culture of Latin America has advantages for US foreign policy, as the ability to successfully operate in those

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environments can provide significant advantages for diplomats serving in other regions that contain similar high-context cultures, such as the Middle East. That such a cultural difference could be advantageous for Hispanics was discussed in an interview with a Hispanic postgraduate student and Pickering Fellow, who advocated this position:

Latino[s] tend to be high context culture and so that brings in a different perspective, where most people in the State Department are low context culture... but we understand how that works, even if its intuitive, subconsciously. So when we go to these policy meetings and somebody is asking about how our family is doing or is kind of going around the subject, we can get to the point because we understand how that works: we've seen it, we've grown up with it.\(^{390}\)

For this interviewee, who was about to begin their career as a foreign service officer, Latinos are able to leverage an intrinsic understanding of the dynamics in which these cultures operate, and are thus able to thrive in these environments and adapt back and forth between the two cultures. Furthermore, this is something that they are more likely to manage than Anglo-Americans who have only experienced the low-context culture that is predominant within the US as well as within the US federal government.

Of the specific foreign policy institutions, the CIA has been the most enthusiastic to champion this importance of the Latin American cultural heritage as an asset to foreign policy delivery. In a 2014 official publication that focused on an ambition to promote ‘diversity in leadership’ within the agency, they provide a ‘business case’ for why diversity amongst their staff, generally speaking, is important:

One of the principal lessons of our nation’s recent history is that culture matters. Multinational corporations hire individuals who are familiar with local languages and cultures in order to make inroads into foreign markets. Research shows that teams that include even one member of the team’s target demographic are more likely to

\(^{390}\) Interview with a Hispanic Pickering Fellow, 11\(^{th}\) April, 2016.
understand their audience. The effectiveness of the Agency’s analysis and operations depend on understanding, valuing and leveraging the full diversity of the workforce.391

The CIA frames this desire to have the target demographic for a specific foreign policy goal represented at the planning table as achieving ‘cultural competence’. This logic, once established as an assumption for increasing workforce diversity, can then be seen explicitly applied in a Latino context. A typical example of this is offered in a July 2014 booklet produced by the agency to encourage applications from ethnic minority candidates, where a case study of Javier, a current Latino CIA operative is presented:

Over the past 12 years, he has worked shoulder to shoulder with CIA officers and foreign officials in support of counterterrorism and counter-narcotics efforts around the world. His native language ability and keen understanding of Latin culture has allowed him to contribute to the CIA’s mission in a meaningful way.392

The message here is clear: by employing Latinos who demonstrate a familiarity with high-culture Latin American heritage, including speaking Spanish, then the CIA is better placed to overcome the cultural dissonance between US and Latin American culture, to the benefit of furthering their foreign policy goals.

This sentiment, of the inherent value to US foreign policy of the Latin American cultural heritage of Latinos, is also incorporated in a November 2015 report on the future of US diplomacy by the Center for American Progress, an influential DC-based think tank. Here, they present the case that in future it will be possible for a Latino to reconcile their loyalty to the United States with a loyalty to their Latin heritage. Again, they encourage this to be thought of as an asset for US foreign policy:

These are only first steps; as their political and economic influence expands, U.S. Latinos will play a much more relevant role in defining U.S.-Latin American relations. Countries throughout the Americas—including the United States—need to realize that strong

identification as a U.S. Latino and loyalty to the United States can comfortably co-exist with strong ties to countries of origin. 393

Another report by the Wilson Center and the Pacific Council on International Policy in 2012, entitled ‘Sharing Space with our hemispheric partners: A Latino Perspective on U.S. Policy toward Latin America’ made this point even more forcefully:

Latinos know Latin America better than most other segments of the U.S. population because of their personal and linguistic ties, family histories, and consequent cultural kinship with the region. These language skills and cultural affinities can help form a bridge between the United States and its southern neighbors. Even more important, Latinos’ personal and familial histories cause them to look at U.S. foreign policy from a perspective that is both different from the current crop of foreign policy practitioners, and better suited to the demands of the current and future U.S. relationship with Latin America. 394

The ‘Latin America specialist’ argument for foreign policy participation

The tone of the Wilson Center et al. report incorporates an additional component of this argument: That the cultural knowledge that Latinos can bring to foreign policy delivery extends beyond the inherent ability to reconcile high-culture and low-culture divides, and in many cases includes a level of expertise of Latin America itself, based on the Hispanic cultural heritage. This argument is therefore contextualized towards US foreign policy aimed towards Latin America specifically, and suggests that Hispanics with Latin America expertise can benefit foreign policy both in terms of their potential capacity as diplomats interacting with local officials, as well as in terms of strategic thinking towards the region more generally.


The justification for the claim that Hispanic Americans are likely to bring a higher level of expertise related to Latin America is based on interest, language and ethnocultural receptivity. Firstly, several interviewees stressed that Hispanic Americans are disproportionately likely to have an interest in the politics and events within Latin America and their particular countries of origin. As one former Latino ambassador explained: “We don’t think of it as foreign policy but we care about what happens in the region. We care about the earthquake in Nicaragua for example, or the floods in Mexico, because of the family and cultural ties. We haven’t lost those over several generations.”  

Secondly, Latinos as a population have a much higher percentage of Spanish language fluency and general-understanding than non-Latinos, which provides organisations like the State Department with a rich pool of potential candidates that can be immediately inserted into local communities, thus allowing them to begin working quickly without the need to be trained to a sufficient level. In addition to this, as one interviewee noted, individuals who are raised in dual-speaking households are in better position to be able to learn additional languages more quickly; given the high rates of bi-linguists among Latinos, this should make them theoretically more attractive to recruiters in the US government. Eduardo Vargas, Deputy Director at the Centre for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives at the USAID, encouraged this idea in his interview: "Most Hispanics come from bilingual homes. Whether or not one language is more dominant than the other, studies have shown, the more languages you speak and the more you are exposed to, the easier it is for you to do analytic thinking and the easier it is for you to pick up a different language."  

395 Interview with Ambassador Lomellin, United States Ambassador to the Organization of American States, 2009-2016, 12th April, 2016.  
397 Interview with Eduardo Vargas, Center for Faith Based and Community Initiatives (CFBCI) Deputy Director, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 2014-2017, 15th April, 2016.
Thirdly, under this argument, Latinos are better placed to successfully represent the United States in Latin America due to avenues for access that their ethnic heritage affords them. Whilst there has historically been a suggestion that Latinos would be unsuitable in diplomatic roles in Latin America because they would be unwelcome in their receiving state by the local political elites (either due to a sense that the demographic inferiority of the Latino population as a whole in the US would be reflected in the political order within the State Department, or out of a fear that they had been sent a ‘Trojan horse’), Latino interviewees emphasized the opposite: that being of the same ethnicity as the local population was, in fact, advantageous as it allowed them to be seen with greater levels of commonality. There is a greater chance that they will be received as fellow ‘Latin Americans’ and that this can afford them more avenues for successfully conducting diplomacy than non-Latinos would have in the same environment. In an interview with Dr Frances Colon, the Deputy Science & Technical Advisor to the Secretary of State with a background as an environmental expert in Western Hemisphere affairs, she offered a personal case study of such an interaction. A diplomat and scientist of Puerto Rican heritage, she recounted an example of how this dynamic advantaged her during an official trip to Cuba in which she met with the science and environment ministries:

The fact that I was Caribbean, of Puerto Rican origin, that completely understood their day-to-day realities, that could speak to them not only in their language but their slang and idiosyncrasies, and that I was a scientist, was a completely different paradigm and they would often say “well you know what we are talking about”... so it was definitely a different approach than the many interactions they had had with US government officials that did not look like them, understood their issues because they learned them through books and tables – here was somebody that had grown up very much like them, but was behind the US flag... and there was sort of a “OK, she understands us, she has both best interests at heart” and they gave me access that for a while, people at

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headquarters could not understand… and that certainly had everything to do with who I specifically was in their eyes.399

Under this argument, Latinos, by their very nature, can strategically deploy their cultural and linguistic commonalities with other Latin Americans to gain disproportionate levels of access and opportunities than could be achieved by non-Hispanic foreign policy practitioners. Therefore, it is evident that the argument that Latinos are ideally suited to be diplomats based on supposed analytical and communicative skillsets drawn from their ethno-cultural heritage exists as a valid, public-facing justification for efforts to increase Hispanic recruitment in foreign policy roles. As has been demonstrated, versions of this argument have been communicated by the federal government, think tanks, as well as by Hispanic foreign policy practitioners themselves. All of the above examples of this argument share two conclusions: Firstly, by increasing the number of Hispanics working in foreign policy roles, the federal government is able to harness the resources of a pan-ethnic Latino demographic where first generation immigrants often have direct experience of the culture of a region with considerable U.S. interests. Secondly, they are able to utilise the skillset of second and third generation Hispanic Americans who have developed cross-cultural interpretative skills that effectively makes them ‘natural born’ diplomats.

The diversity argument for foreign policy participation

The second major argument deployed by foreign policy practitioners to make the case that Latinos can benefit foreign policy is to emphasise what are perceived to be advantages of diversifying the US’ diplomatic corps more generally to include more recruits and senior staff from a more nationally-representative range of demographic backgrounds. Doing so would increase the number of Hispanics by default. This argument is set out in two ways: Firstly, by arguing that having a diverse diplomatic corps helps to present the US as a more legitimate meritocratic and egalitarian

399 Interview with Frances Colon, 7th April, 2016.
democracy. Secondly, by arguing that there are psychological benefits that greater diversity can bring to the foreign policy decision-making process.

This argument goes beyond the specific benefits that Latinos can bring to foreign policy in-and-of themselves, and instead focuses more broadly on the virtues of widening the pool of talent within the foreign policy labor force to reflect more accurately the demographic composition of the wider US population. As Latinos are an actively growing relative percentage of this population, such arguments are favorable to Latino elites making a case for greater Latino involvement.

The first strand of this argument is that, as the United States seeks to present itself to the world as an example of values such as democracy, freedom and equality of opportunity, it is vital that the foreign policy practitioners, which in the case of diplomats represent the literal ‘face’ of the United States to the international community, should accurately reflect the diversity and heterogeneity of the American population. Under this narrative, the US risks looking hypocritical if diplomatic overtures for states to promote equality of opportunity domestically are delivered exclusively by white, Anglo-Saxon men.

By this same logic, the argument carries that by employing a wider range of ethnic individuals in front line foreign policy jobs, the US’ official positions of promoting democracy and civil society abroad carries greater legitimacy. A Hispanic ambassador that served during the Bush and Obama administrations and wished to remain anonymous, expressed this sentiment in his interview:

> It has become quite clear that as a business model for the United States, diversity - having a diverse representation - makes all the sense in the world because you are, after all, dealing with foreign cultures and if you bring people from different cultures - not only Hispanics but Asians, people from the continent, basically all parts of the world - that we as an institution would become much better able to do our job, not only because we
would be preaching diversity but we would be practicing it and we would be incorporating it within our own institutions. 400

For the ambassador, this is even more important in the State Department as US diplomats act as the front-line representation of the federal government, making it essential that they as an organisation make efforts to diversify. Thus, recruiting higher numbers of Latinos and increasing their level of participation in the foreign policy process is an essential component in ensuring this process of diversification is successful.

The sentiment of this argument is identifiable in the official ‘Statement on Diversity and Equal Employment Opportunity’, issued in 2015 by then-Secretary of State John Kerry, a prominent feature of the State Department Careers website, in which he summarizes this position: ‘In order to represent the United States to the world, the Department of State must have a workforce that reflects the rich composition of its citizenry’ 401. The relatively high profile position of this short statement on diversity on the website for would-be diplomats indicates that this is a sentiment that the State Department is keen to see expressed as often as possible. This extends to not only its outward appearance to the general public, but internally as well. In a July 2012 edition of the department’s official in-house magazine, State, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the then Director General of the Foreign Service and Director of Human Resources, echoed Kerry’s tone: “A diverse workforce demonstrates our country’s values and interests, reinforcing our message of inclusion and freedom... it is critical to our success as we conduct 21st-Century diplomacy. A Department that represents America to the world should be representative of America.” 402

In addition to this, Latinos serve additional advantage of being able to engage communities seen as ‘developing’, or in communities which also have a

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400 Interview with a Hispanic ambassador and senior official in the Department of State, 11th April, 2017.
heavily diverse population, in ways that Anglo-Saxon foreign policy practitioners would not necessarily be able to. As Latinos represent a community known to be socio-economically disadvantaged, they can be received with a greater level of solidarity than in communities that occupy similar socio-economic positions, or by political elites within developing states. Under this narrative, this affords Latinos additional opportunities to foster good-will with receiving communities as they can play a role that than Anglo-Saxons could not. An example of this, in a 2012 Huffington Post article that argued for the benefits of having Latinos in the State Department as part of a more generally diverse workforce, they present the case that the very existence of this Hispanic Heritage Month, and its associated celebration of Latino culture, can pay dividends for foreign policy conduct by Latino diplomats:

Latinos can help create relationships because they are born into a diverse background and master the world’s second most spoken language, Spanish. For instance, Pablo Quintanilla, a former member of the State Department’s Foreign Service said he used the Hispanic Heritage Month as a vehicle to engage in race diversity and language for young people in China. “When the Chinese community saw a Hispanic American speaking in Mandarin they were shocked, but welcoming. As a result, I realized that there was an instant bond in our South to South relationship.” This means that sending Latinos to Asia builds cultural trust more efficiently and effectively that can add value in building solid partnerships with the growing region.

The second strand to the argument that increasing the diversity more generally among foreign policy practitioners will improve foreign policy delivery is that greater diversity will lead to an improved capacity for decision-making. Under this narrative, the foreign policy organisations are drawing on the arguments that greater diversity in a workplace setting in a business has proven psychological benefits for those operating within a team or group: studies have demonstrated that the quality of problem-solving in groups is improved when the membership of that group is more

403 The CIA makes an alternative argument based on this same logic. Then-CIA Director John Brennan was quoted in a 2015 internal agency report on diversity as stating that the CIA needed a diverse workforce in order to “facilitate secret missions in countries where minorities go unnoticed.” As quoted in Yamily Habib, “The CIA is Looking For You”, AL DÍA News, 4th October, 2017. [http://aldianews.com/articles/politics/cia-looking-you/50144]

The narrative presents this as being just as applicable in an institutional setting related to foreign policy as it is in a corporate setting: US foreign policy can best be served when a range of perspectives and backgrounds are featured in the planning and analysis of how it should be delivered.\footnote{An emergent body of research exists on the decision-making benefits of workforce diversity in foreign policy settings. See for example: M. Werz, \textit{Diversity as Foreign Policy Asset} (Washington, DC: The German Marshall Fund of the United States: Policy Paper, 2006); and J. Wamala, “A Theoretical Approach to Demographic Diversity in the Diplomatic Service: A Study of the U.S. Foreign Service”, in A. Chase (ed.), \textit{Transatlantic Perspectives on Diplomacy and Diversity}, (New York: Humanity in Action Press, 2015).} An example of this, in October 2015, Joaquin Castro, a Latino Congressman from Texas, introduced the ‘\textit{Foreign Affairs Inclusion Reporting Act}’ Bill to Congress, which would force the State Department to take on more ethnic minority candidates and to report their progress every four years to a Congressional committee. He justified the bill using the idea of greater team decision-making: “A \textit{variety of views, backgrounds, and experiences contribute to more creative thinking and efficient problem solving, both of which play a crucial role in our nation’s diplomatic efforts}”.\footnote{Joaquin Castro, quoted in P. Kasperowicz, ‘Dems demand more diversity at the State Department’, \textit{Washington Examiner}, 28\textsuperscript{th} October, 2015. [http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/dems-demand-more-diversity-at-state-department/article/2575124]}\footnote{C. Morello, ‘Tillerson: Hate is not an American Value’, \textit{Washington Post}, 18\textsuperscript{th} August, 2017. [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/tillerson-hate-is-not-an-american-}

Foreign policy institutions have been quick to incorporate this argument into their narrative promoting diversity. In 2017, then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson emphasised the improved “work product” resulting from diverse the “points of view” brought by a more heterogeneous workforce.\footnote{Similarly, a 2015 CIA published}
report into recruitment argued framed their need for greater diversity as a key part of their ‘business case’ for increasing diversity:

Heterogeneous groups are more likely to reach sound decisions. Diverse groups benefit from collaboration among people with different perspectives - new ideas can emerge, individuals can learn from one another, and they may discover a solution to the problem... The Agency faces complex and weighty decisions and problems daily—in its analysis, operations, technical challenges, and support efforts—and diversity strengthens the CIA’s ability to arrive at the best decisions to enable mission success.409

Ultimately, it is evident from an examination of the interviewee responses as well as published material from the federal government, that Latino generation foreign policy practitioners deploy two main arguments to promote greater recruitment, based on an argument that Hispanics are culturally advantageous to foreign policy delivery. The narratives used in these arguments range from the benefits of Latinos to act as ‘natural diplomats’, to their expertise of Latin America, to their ability to diversify the decision-making process.

This reflects a clear shift from the reluctance to focus on culture that was observed among interview responses from Latino advocacy organisations in chapter 5. Instead, Latino foreign policy practitioners demonstrate a whole-hearted embrace of culture as a vehicle for the promotion of a key domestic goal: greater Hispanic recruitment into foreign policy related roles within the federal government. In addition, as has been demonstrated here, the narratives of these arguments have been mirrored in the official publications of foreign policy agencies and in the public communications of its representatives. This reflects the depth of coordination and mutual reinforcement between Hispanic FPPs and the federal government, treating a culturally-homogenous, pan-ethnic Latino block as the assumed organising principle of Hispanic Americans.

Foreign policy practitioners organising as a pan-ethnic demographic

For Latino Generation elites, active identification with - and promotion of - a pan-ethnic minority status extends deeper than the presentation of the argument that Latinos are natural diplomats, and has led to structural changes within the foreign policy infrastructure of the federal government.

The first shift concerns the manner in which Hispanic employees have organized themselves within the organisational structures of the various foreign policy agencies, to reinforce a status as a minority demographic. A key example has been the establishment, promotion and internal inclusion of the Hispanic Employees Council of Foreign Affairs Agencies (HECFAA) within the Department of State and USAID, to act as the internal association representing Latino employees. HECFAA follows a template that the federal government established within the foreign policy agencies to act as a voice for various minority groups, and there are parallel organisations representing female, African-American and LGBT employees. This platform has been used with notable success in recent years: HECFAA has lobbied senior leadership to promote targeted recruitment efforts and to encourage Hispanic promotions to senior positions.

Latino foreign policy practitioners have subsequently capitalized on this image of Latinos as a singular minority group, recognized and organized as such by federal employers such as the Department of State, and used it as a tool for encouraging greater targeted recruitment efforts. They have emphasized a focus on shared Latino cultural traits and socio-economic realities, including targeting universities located in the southwest United States and promoting opportunities for Latinos to be actively

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411 For example, in his interview on the 16th April, Josue Barrera discussed a meeting in 2014 between HECFAA leadership and Secretary Kerry in which they agreed on the importance of greater Hispanic representation within the State Department.
educated about foreign policy as a career choice. In addition they have advocated for formal mechanisms of support for them to overcome the structural obstacles to successfully navigating the competitive world of the foreign policy bureaucracy, including promoting the introduction during the 2000s of fellowship schemes designed to provide a structured pipeline for individuals from minority backgrounds to take up careers related to diplomacy. In addition, they have emphasised the importance of encouraging Latinos being promoted to senior leadership and high-profile positions within foreign policy, to act as role models to encourage further Latino recruitment into foreign policy. Carmen Cantor, the Director of Civil Service Human Resource Management in the State Department with extensive previous experience in recruiting and employment within the Foreign Service, emphasised the importance of this last point:

"It's important you see yourself in those positions. This year, we had two Hispanics running for Presidents, Marco Rubio and Ted Cruz. ... It takes time but you do see it. We do need more Hispanic ambassadors. The more we get out there, the more our students, our children, can see that. It's a matter of being a role model."

The success of such narratives is not limited to the State Department. Structural efforts within the CIA to increase diversity in recruitment and promotion mirror this approach. The 2016-2019 ‘Diversity and Inclusion Strategy’ includes several initiatives designed to encourage the promotion and recruitment of minority applicants. These include the structured mentoring of existing employees, a

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412 For example, a number of interviewees emphasised that they first seriously considered careers in foreign policy after being exposed to a ‘Diplomat-in-Residence’ at college. This is a program established by the State Department to combat the stereotype that foreign policy agencies do not recruit ‘West of the Mississippi’. The program assigns serving foreign service officers in campuses at historically-associated with minority students, and in geographic locations which are under-represented in the department. ‘Diplomats-in-Residence’ then attempt to promote careers in the foreign policy to students in the region.

413 For example, the Thomas R. Pickering Fellowship and the Charles B. Rangel fellowships are funded by the State Department and offer a fully-funded Master’s degree program for individuals from minority groups that have been historically under-represented within the State Department and incorporate a series of internships and mentorship schemes. Both require graduates to commit to five years of employment with the Foreign Service upon completion. The Donald M. Payne International Development Fellowship offers an equivalent program at USAID.

414 Interview with Carmen Cantor, Director, Civil Service Human Resource Management, U.S. Department of State, 15th April, 2016.
framework of experience to build a “pipeline for leadership”, re-configuring the agency’s recruitment and student outreach efforts to better reach minorities, and fully integrate the recognised internal organisations of minority groups such as Hispanics so that they have access to senior leadership figures.415

However, whilst the focus on an ethno-cultural minority status has secured organisational recognition, it has also resulted in the explanations for the lack of historical Latino participation in foreign policy being conceived and interpreted through the lens of culture: Just as the promotion of a culturally homogenous, pan-ethnic label has delivered significant structural benefits to Hispanics within the federal foreign policy workforce, it also has meant that culture has become the organising principle through which explanations for Latino under-representation in foreign policy careers is framed and considered. As was highlighted in the following illustrations with several interviewees, these cultural explanations range from perceived family pressures to questioned political loyalties:

One such explanation is that Hispanics are culturally averse to the lifestyle of frequent travel characteristic of a diplomatic career. As one interviewee, who was at a very early stage in their State Department career and wished to remain anonymous, reflected:

When I told my parents that I wanted to be a Foreign Service officer, they said: “why are you going to a third world country when we just came from one so you wouldn’t have to?” So there’s a sense that this is the greatest country in the world, we left everything to come to the United States, why would you want to leave it? There’s again the sense of family where I’m the first person in my family to leave the state of Idaho... so there’s that family tie.416

According to Ambassador Lino Gutierrez, a retired career diplomat of Cuban heritage that previously served as the ambassador to Nicaragua in the mid-to-late 90s and the

416 Interview with a Hispanic Pickering Fellow, 11th April, 2016.
Ambassador to Argentina from 2003 to 2006, this kind of parental influence represents a significant problem when trying to encourage young Hispanics to consider diplomatic careers. In particular, a desire amongst first-generation Hispanic parents for their children to pursue more traditional careers thought of as aspirational puts pressure on Hispanic graduates to gravitate towards professions conventionally associated with higher socio-economic status such as “the traditional jobs like doctor, lawyer and businessman. Not the foreign service.”

Compounding the problem, these cultural assumptions of familial pressures on Hispanics are prevalent within foreign policy institutions themselves, forming a potential culturally prejudicial barrier for Latinos. For example, Josue Barrera, the Executive Diversity Outreach Manager at the Department of State and Vice President of HECFAA, stressed that assumptions about Hispanic culture could inform attitudes towards recruitment within the State Department. When asked whether he had encountered obstacles to recruiting Hispanics, he suggested that these perceived cultural traits had, over time, led to an institutional assumption within the State Department that Hispanics have a cultural bias against careers in the Foreign Service which hindered outreach efforts:

We had, once upon a time, a stereotype that Latinos don't want to go far; they are glad to stay at home and work in agriculture. There was a predetermined idea about what is expected... Every now and then you'll still hear it from a senior leader who will say "kids from Mexico never want to leave" and those of us who are here will put our hands up and say "I'm not in South Texas any more. I'm here because I want to contribute".

Such a concern for the problems of geographic mobility can evolve into cultural prejudices concerning the political loyalties of Hispanic Americans themselves: Some interviewees insisted that this sentiment did continue to exist within the foreign policy bureaucracy, suggesting that there remained a level of institutional

417 Interview with Ambassador Lino Gutierrez, United States Ambassador to Argentina, 2003-2006, 12th April, 2016.
418 Interview with Josue Barrera, Executive Diversity Outreach Manager, Civil Service Human Resource Management, U.S. Department of State, 16th April, 2016.
assumption from some government leaders that Latinos, with status as recent immigrants, are suspected of having questionable loyalty. For example, Eduardo Vargas reflected on the type of dialogues that perceptions of unconfirmed loyalty can produce within foreign policy agencies in his interview:

I think one of the things that has kept us out is that if you are Hispanic and you are representing the US government, the question is “where are you from?... Where are you really from?... You are American but people might see it with a bit of an asterisk, that your primary alliance or your primary interests are going to be your parents’ homeland or where you came from, versus the United States. I think that kind of stigma is quite common in immigrant groups.419

Therefore, the promotion of Latino culture as part of a strategy to increase structural reforms that benefit Hispanic recruitment have the consequence of compounding any perceived cultural limitations of the Hispanic demographic as much as helping to overcome them. From interview discussions with Hispanic FPPs, it is clear that presenting an image of confounded cultural stereotypes is as much a necessary component of engagement with foreign policy discourse as is the promotion of perceived positive cultural attributes.

Ultimately, the extent to which Latino-generation elites have consolidated and institutionalised their minority status underlines the central importance of the Latino label within foreign policy institutions. The ethno-cultural framing as a pan-ethnic group with distinct shared cultural characteristics extend beyond mere rhetoric: It has had a substantive impact on the way in which Hispanics have been conceptually and logistically processed within the foreign policy infrastructure of the federal government. In particular, interviewee responses emphasise that the challenges to both recruitment and retention of Hispanic individuals are conceived of and processed through an ethno-cultural lens. As a result, potential solutions have been proffered with Latino pan-ethnic demographic as the central unit.

419 Interview with Eduardo Vargas, 15th April, 2016.
The federal government has responded to this challenge with the construction of an explicit architecture based on the assumption of a pan-ethnic ‘Latino’ status. Within the Department of State and USAID, HECFAA has been recognised as the established platform for the promotion of Hispanic interests, enabling the effective advancement of a culture-based argument for Latinos as ‘natural diplomats’, demonstrating the extent to which the government has reinforced a pan-ethnic label of ‘Latino’ as the legitimate subject in the discourse concerning Hispanic involvement in foreign policy.

Conclusion

Through an analysis of interview discussions as well as government policies and official publications, this chapter has demonstrated the extent to which Latino-generation foreign policy practitioners engage with the discourse of US foreign policy by promoting arguments that Latinos can and should deploy specific cultural attributes to improve the execution of foreign policy.

This has revealed important dynamics in the interaction between Hispanic FPPs and the government agencies responsible for foreign policy, as well illustrating the extent to which Hispanic foreign policy elites working within diplomatic and intelligence careers engage with foreign policy discourse in important but different ways to other Hispanic elites, both historical and contemporary.

Firstly, unlike the positions of the Latino advocacy organisations examined in Chapter 5 that stressed shared political interests as the main source of Latino perspectives on foreign policy, Latino FPPs emphasise the central importance of a common culture as the defining element with which to interpret the potential strengths and possible

420 Whilst HECFAA within both the State Department and USAID have the most visible external presence, equivalent organisations exist within other foreign affairs agencies. The CIA administers ‘Agency Resource Groups’ along similar principles to the affinity groups within the State Department and USAID. In a 2008 interview promoting agency efforts to diversify, a Hispanic CIA employee named ‘Sandra’ described the role of the Hispanic Advisory Council (the Latino ‘Agency Resource Group’) as an opportunity to network with more senior Hispanic employees to encourage mentorship opportunities. (See “The People of the CIA... Hispanic Employees bring Diversity of Thought to the Agency”, 16th October, 2008. [https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2008-featured-story-archive/hispanic-heritage-month-part-2.html]).
problems facing Hispanics pursuing foreign policy careers. This highlights a return by
to a centralising of culture within the pan-ethnic Hispanic identity that had been
successfully utilised by Chicano elites during the 1960s and 1970s, examined in
Chapter 3. However, where Chicanos had used culture as part of a platform for the
promotion of an ethno-nationalism centred on the political marginalisation of
Hispanics, Latino-generation elites invoke particular common cultural traits as
essentialised aspects of a pan-ethnic Latino identity. In addition, compared to
findings from previous literature examining Hispanic foreign policy elites, over the
past twenty years there has been more of an explicit and willing recognition of a pan-
ethnic ‘Latino’ status within foreign policy agencies among Hispanics.421

The focus on shared cultural attributes has been used to great effect to promote
further Hispanic recruitment and promotion within foreign policy agencies. It has
allowed for the development of sophisticated arguments, coordinated and shared
between Hispanic elites and the foreign policy departments and agencies of the
federal government, that greater Hispanic recruitment would benefit the delivery of
US foreign policy, in significant part due to the cultural heritage of Latinos, fortifying
them a with cultural skillset that effectively renders them ‘natural diplomats’. In
addition, the deployment of these arguments have been complemented by the
consolidation of structured, recognised Hispanic minority groups within the foreign
policy bureaucracy based around the premise of a pan-ethnic Latino identity. As a
consequence, this has facilitated cultural explanations becoming the default lens
through which the lack of Hispanic representation within the foreign policy agencies
of government – as well as possible solutions to this lack of representation – have
been conceived and processed by both Latino-generation elites and the federal
government itself.

421 See for example, R. O. de la Garza, “Introduction” in R. O. de la Garza & H. P. Pachon (eds.)
Latinos and U.S. foreign policy: representing the “homeland”? , PP. 10-12. FSO interviewees between
1997-1999 indicated a reluctance to emphasise a Latino ethnicity within the State Department for
fear of being tied to the “cucaracha circuit” of Latin American diplomatic posts. In addition, they
stated that emphasising their Hispanic heritage can raise concerns over divided loyalties among
colleagues, and can disappoint foreign governments that fear a Hispanic ambassador would be
unlikely to carry the political weight of an Anglo-American ambassador. Thus, the emboldened focus
by 2018 on the benefits of a Latino cultural heritage and institutionally-recognised status is a
significant development.
Conclusion

This chapter will serve as a conclusion to the thesis. It will revisit the central findings from the case studies of the three generations examined in this study, and outline the principle themes drawn out of the analysis. It will then examine what these findings and themes reveal about Hispanic American elite engagement with US foreign policy, and demonstrate how the evidence gathered from these case studies support the main thesis claims presented in the introduction. Following this, it will emphasise why the findings of this research project make an important contribution to the existing literature, as well as why an academic examination of Hispanic elite engagement with US foreign policy is an important topic of study in 2018. Finally, it will examine the findings from this research project in the context of Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 election and his administration’s subsequent policies on immigration and border security. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of possible avenues for further research enquiry, building on the findings from this project.

Three generations of Hispanic American elites

This thesis has presented an analysis of the diverse and complex ways in which Hispanic American political elites have engaged with US foreign policy. It has achieved through the utilisation and deployment of a generational approach to understanding Hispanic elite behaviour, having adapted the concept of a generational framework first conceived and popularised in the work of Mario T. García. The three Hispanic case studies examined in this study were the Chicano generation, the Exile generation and the Latino generation, with each case study revealing unique forms of foreign policy engagement by elites from individual generations, as well as commonalities across all of them.

The case study of the Chicano generation elites examined their engagement with US foreign policy during the 1960s and early 1970s. It found that this generation, which was characterised by decentralised, mass-movement campaigns centred around
charismatic individual leaders, engaged with US foreign policy in three distinct ways. Firstly, it engaged with US foreign policy discourse. This was evidenced through the way in which a critical re-interpretation of the history of US foreign policy, US western expansion and American manifest destiny were a central component in the construction of Chicano ethno-nationalism, which was the central identity of resistance adopted by the movement. A symbolic protest against the perceived illegitimacy of US sovereignty in the southwest United States formed a central narrative within Reies Tijerina’s land grant campaign during the 1960s, and the Brown Beret’s occupation of Catalina Island in 1972. Secondly, they critically engaged with administration policy, using opposition to the Vietnam War to generate support for their local civil rights campaigns, culminating with the Chicano Moratorium marches in 1969 and 1970. Finally, they engaged as private diplomatic actors, with Reies Tijerina’s La Alianza and José Ángel Gutiérrez’s Raza Unida Party attempting to lobby the government of Mexican president Luis Echeverría to make Chicano civil rights an international diplomatic issue, as well through the international outreach efforts of Cesar Chavez’s National Farmworkers Union to develop European trade union support for the California farmworkers strike.

The case study of the Exile generation elites examined engagement with US foreign policy during the 1980s. It found that both Cuban and Central American elites, representing relatively homogenous populations that had been politically dislocated and wished to return to their actual or symbolic homeland, organised and participated in campaigns to influence the US foreign policy outcomes of the Reagan administration. In the case of the Cuban exile elite, this came in the form of support for the US government’s policies and was rewarded with political and economic benefits for the Cuban population in Miami. The Central American exile elites opposed US foreign policy, and joined a coalition of US political actors in an attempt to apply public pressure to the government to end their campaigns in Central America.

The case study of Latino generation elites in the contemporary period examines engagement with foreign policy by national Latino advocacy organisations, as well as
by Hispanic Americans working as foreign policy practitioners within the federal government. This found that in the case of LAOs, there was very limited active engagement with conventional US foreign policy issues, as well as no consistent organised effort to influence US foreign policy towards Latin America. When interviewed, organisations stated that this was due to a need to focus on the socio-economic, domestic concerns that were a priority for Hispanic Americans living in the United States, rejecting the suggestion of an ethnic, cultural homogeneity that could inform Hispanic elite preferences for a foreign policy agenda. The case study found that where they are most likely to engage with US foreign policy was on intermestic issues such as immigration, as well as the topic of the environment and climate change. The case study further found that for Hispanic foreign policy practitioners, advancing an ethno-cultural definition of a pan-ethnic ‘Latino’ identity that emphasised the cultural advantages that Hispanic Americans can bring to foreign policy delivery, allowed them to promote a series of arguments to justify why Hispanic American recruitment into foreign policy careers within the federal government should be encouraged and promoted. These arguments were ingrained within the narratives around minority recruitment and were broadcast by both the Hispanic FPPs themselves as well as by various foreign affairs agencies of the government.

The importance of the research

In addition to illustrating the rich and multifaceted nature of US foreign policy engagement by elites from different political generations across several decades of US history, collectively these case studies reveal several important findings that, when considered in the context of the existing academic literature on ethnic interest group engagement with US foreign policy, offer an original contribution to knowledge. As was outlined at the outset of the thesis introduction, these findings have been categorised into four distinct ‘thesis claims’.

Firstly, the case studies in this thesis demonstrate that Hispanic American elites do engage with US foreign policy; engaging with discourse, with specific policy issues
and through acting as international political actors. However, as was evidenced across all three case studies, Hispanic elites will only engage with US foreign policy where it supports, promotes or complements their domestic political agendas.

Secondly, the thesis demonstrates that by sufficiently broadening the analytical scope of US foreign elite engagement so as to encompass engagement with foreign policy discourse, policy preference discussion and international outreach, a considerable expanse of important and multifaceted engagement is revealed beyond a simple measure of explicit attempts to influence US foreign policy outcomes towards Latin America.

Thirdly, the thesis provides empirical support to substantiate some of the findings of existing research. In particular, the observation in Chapter 5 that Latino advocacy organisations continue to resist engaging with a foreign policy agenda, and do not lobby for their ancestral homelands, support the findings and pioneering research of Rodolfo O. de la Garza et al. However, it also challenges a number of assumptions found within the literature, including the focus within existing research on separating the domestic agendas of Hispanic elites from the foreign policy agendas of ethnic lobbies, demonstrating that where the assumption of mutual exclusivity is removed, opportunities for foreign policy engagement where the foreign supports the domestic agendas of Hispanic elites are revealed.

Fourthly, through the wealth of insight produced by the analysis of three political generations in this research, this thesis confirms the utility of employing a generational approach in order to research Hispanic American elite foreign policy engagement, and presents this approach as an alternative analytical framework. This in turn validates the analytical framework of Mario T. García, in which Hispanic elites are conceived through, and categorized into, distinct political generations, each with its own characteristics, behaviour and idiosyncrasies.

These thesis claims provide an important addition to the existing literature and represent an original contribution to knowledge. In addition to the claims above,
adopting a generational approach for this research helps to offer additional explanatory context for the high-profile concern of Samuel Huntington in the 1990s that demographic change and immigration patterns were leading to a ‘Hispanic challenge’ in the United States. For Huntington, continued Latin American (and particularly Mexican) immigration risked leading to an influx of Hispanics that did not wish to assimilate into the mainstream US population, preferring instead to maintain their existing Hispanic cultural and political values, with the eventual consequence that this risked endangering the Anglo-Saxon ‘American Creed’ that underscored the US national interest.

This thesis, by deploying a generational approach, reveals that Huntington’s claims were likely conceived against a historical experience of both the Chicano generation – which had indeed emphasised the importance of resisting assimilation, promoting a Chicano nationalism and delegitimising the US political system – and the Exile generation, which had seen many years of high-profile attempts to influence US foreign policy outcomes towards a specific Latin American country of origin to serve that Exile community’s interests. Against this backdrop, the claims of Huntington can be better understood. However, as the thesis demonstrates, by the 1990s, the Mexican American and later the pan-ethnic Latino elites had structurally and ideologically adapted to commit to working within the US political infrastructure, building coalitions of support with other US interest and business groups, and to focus on socio-economic concerns over foreign policy. By viewing US foreign policy engagement within the framework of a generational approach, it becomes clear that by the time Huntington began expressing his concerns, they had already been resolved.

**Hispanic foreign policy engagement in the age of Trump**

As outlined above, the central claims of this thesis make an important contribution to the existing literature and help to further the academic understanding of Hispanic American engagement with US foreign policy, in addition to helping to frame this existing literature within its historical and political context. However, the findings of
this research also offer a potential utility beyond the literature debate: Given the
domestic political environment in which Hispanic Americans find themselves in 2018,
the findings of this research can serve as a relevant and timely tool with which to
analyse, understand and anticipate the different possible ways in which Hispanic
elites will choose to respond to the challenges and opportunities provided by the
election of Donald Trump to the Presidency in 2016.

Donald Trump’s election campaign introduced an unprecedented degree of focus on
the Hispanic American population within the US and, from the outset of his
campaign, he made attacks on Mexican immigrants a prominent campaign issue. In
his original speech announcing his intention to run for president in June of 2015, he
portrayed immigrants in a negative light:

> When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. They’re not sending you.
> They’re not sending you. They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re
> bringing those problems with us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re
> rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.\(^{422}\)

Trump was quick to emphasise these comments within the context of the Mexican
government’s hostility towards the US. In an interview a month after his speech, he
blamed the Mexican government for deliberately sending “the bad ones” across the
border.\(^{423}\) This was followed by a statement furthering this narrative, arguing that:

> The largest suppliers of heroin, cocaine and other illicit drugs are Mexican cartels that
> arrange to have Mexican immigrants trying to cross the borders and smuggle in the
> drugs. The Border Patrol knows this... likewise, tremendous infectious disease is pouring

\(^{422}\) M. Ye Hee Lee, “Donald Trump’s false comments connecting Mexican immigrants and crime”, *The

\(^{423}\) H. Walker, “Donald Trump just released an epic statement raging against Mexican immigrants
across the border. The United States has become a dumping ground for Mexico and, in fact, for many other parts of the world.\textsuperscript{424}

This account sought to emphasise Hispanic immigration within a context of a collection of different security threats, deliberately orchestrated by a foreign power. To combat this menace, Trump proposed the construction of a wall along the entirety of the southern border, to create a barrier of physical security between the United States and this proposed menace from the south. Trump repeatedly underlined the importance that the wall would be paid for by Mexico itself, promising to compel their government to do so through a threat of using the power of the presidency to end the flow of financial remittances from Mexican immigrants to their families back home.\textsuperscript{425}

Such rhetoric became a high-profile message of the Trump campaign, with such sentiments repeated at rallies across the campaign trail. By all accounts, this approach delivered the desired results. In a 2018 paper by Newman, Shah and Collingwood, they suggested that this anti-Mexican inflammatory rhetoric delivered Trump a cornerstone of his Republic voting bloc: Comparing data on the approval ratings for Trump amongst Republican voters before and after his initial speeches on Mexicans immigrants and the prospect of border wall, they found that support for his candidacy improved significantly after the speech, amongst voters in areas that had seen a high-degree of Hispanic population growth.\textsuperscript{426}

As a result, Hispanic Americans living with the United States, have, since 2016, found themselves as a legitimate topic of conversation within the wider public discourse on national security within the US. The rhetoric of the Trump campaign, and the subsequent focus on immigration and border security by the Trump administration,

\textsuperscript{424} Ibid.
has resulted in the securitisation of Hispanic immigration: Since 2017, Trump has sought to focus the dialogue on his border policies around the threat posed by organised, violent Latin American gangs, rather than families or individuals. In particular, the Central American MS-13 criminal network has been a specific target of focus, with Trump emphasising supposed acts of violence carried out by the gang within the US, as well as encouraging the media and politicians to dehumanise them when discussing the risks they posed to the US border: Speaking at a May 2018 White House event to promote tightening border restrictions, Trump emphasised that MS-13 were not “people, these are animals, and we’re taking them out of the country at a level and at a rate that’s never happened before.” These attempts at both dehumanising undocumented immigrants, as well as framing them within the context of violent criminal networks, has enabled the president, in conjunction with conservative media outlets, to present Latin American immigration to the US in terms of a national security ‘crisis’ for the US, one which necessitated the use of an aggressive response. In April of 2018, Trump instructed Secretary of Defense James Mattis to authorise the deployment of 4,000 US military personnel from the National Guard, along with vehicles, military equipment and helicopters, to the southern border to assist with border security, in response to a “drastic surge of illegal activity” from Mexico.

The justification for the administration’s decision to issue new guidelines in April 2018 that sanctioned a “zero tolerance” policy for handling undocumented immigrants found at the border, which resulted in children being separated from their parents and housed inside wire mesh compartments at detention facilities, was similarly justified using this narrative. Vindicating the need for such measures in his authorisation of the policy, Attorney General Jeff Sessions suggested that the “national security” and “public safety” of the US was under threat, and that “a crisis has erupted at our Southwest Border that necessitates an escalated effort to

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prosecute those who choose to illegally cross our border”. Homeland Security Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen similarly referred to Hispanic immigration in 2018 as a “national security issue” when defending the zero-tolerance policy, invoking Trump’s campaign images of Mexicans as rapists and criminals, stating that “these children, some of them were raped, they’re abused... they’re already recruited into a gang because that was the only way they could survive.”

For Hispanic Americans, the narratives around immigration in 2018 is therefore eerily familiar to the sentiments expressed at the height of the ‘culture wars’ twenty years earlier. The presentation of a ‘Latino threat’ in the 1990s share a number of characteristics with the current rhetoric emanating from the Trump administration: a viewing of Hispanic immigration within a national security lens, a pessimistic outlook for the consequences of an unchecked, growing Hispanic immigrant population, as well as the conceptualisation of the existence of a growing Hispanic American demographic as a ‘crisis’ that requires immediate address through security policy.

Thus, the political landscape since the 2016 election is one featuring extraordinary levels of hostility towards Hispanic Americans, legitimised into public discourse through its deployment by the apparatus and infrastructure of the US government, driven by an anti-Hispanic mandate following Trump’s victory. For Hispanic Americans living within the United States, this new-found antagonistic environment presents them with two possibilities: the first being to react with open hostility towards the adherents of these policies, organising political protests and aligning with political allies that oppose the administration, with the second being to engage in a more conciliatory dialogue that legitimises the securitisation of the immigration debate. In addition, the new political landscape presents the possibility of Hispanic

Americans furthering the process of pan-ethnic identification, strengthening inter-Hispanic ties on solidarity in opposition to the president’s policies. It also presents the possibility of a fracturing of the pan-ethnic ‘Latino’ label, with the pressures of public antagonism towards Latin American groups encouraging some national origin groups to disassociate themselves from new arrivals from Mexico and Central America.

Utilising the generational approach adopted in this thesis therefore offers an important analytical tool for making sense of the ways in which Hispanic Americans may choose to process and react to this new political environment since 2016. Through a consideration of the different methods of foreign policy engagement seen across the three generations examined in this research, it is possible to anticipate and understand the different ways in which Hispanic elites are likely to engage with US foreign policy when responding to President Trump’s policies.

Since 2016, the administration’s policies have touched on themes that have been present in the case studies of the Chicano, Exile and Latino generation eras. Firstly, the seeming reigniting of the Latino threat narrative with Trump’s campaign represents a return to the prejudicial narratives that were explanatory factors behind the Chicano generation’s rejection of the US system in favour of a vocal ethnic nationalism in the 1960s and 70s, as well as the decision by Latino generation elites to emphasise their political loyalties to the US and its political system in the late 1980s and 1990s.

Secondly, the Trump administration’s policies concerning Cuba as well as Central America echo the political stance and policy positions that had been adopted by the Reagan government during the period of the Exile generation in the 1980s. For example, the Trump administration decided to abandon the ‘Cuba thaw’ initiative that had been a cornerstone of Barack Obama’s foreign policy and that had resulted in the first meaningful warming of relations between the two states and the easing
of travel and business restrictions.\textsuperscript{431} After initially supporting the improvement of bilateral relations between the two countries on the campaign trail, Trump adopted a policy of fierce opposition to easing relations in the latter half of 2016, following several campaign visits with Cuban exile groups in Florida.\textsuperscript{432} On Central America, the president has moved to end the ‘temporary protected status’ of refugees from El Salvador and Nicaragua, which had seen renewals in this status under the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations.\textsuperscript{433}

Hispanic American elite responses to these policies have also reflected elements of foreign policy engagement that incorporate tactics and approaches from across all three political generations. Firstly, the rise in anti-Hispanic rhetoric has seen a burgeoning re-emergence of, and interest in, the Chicano movement and Chicano-inspired protest movements across the southwest.\textsuperscript{434} These reflect a desire to promote a sense of national ethnic pride in Mexican-American and pan-ethnic Hispanic status, whilst echoing the critical challenge to the legitimacy of the model of immigration political incorporation that had characterised the original Chicano movement.

Secondly, the administration’s policy of escalating deportation of undocumented immigrants, coupled with the ending of TPS status for hundreds of thousands of Central American refugees, has resulted in the re-emergence of tactics deployed during the Exile generation’s opposition to Reagan’s Central America policy in the 1980s. The post-2016 era has witnessed the emergence of a new sanctuary movement, with Hispanic organisations and religious institutions providing shelter to undocumented Latin American immigrants and attempting to shielding them from

\textsuperscript{433} T. Kopan, “DHS ends protections for nearly 90,000 Central Americans”, CNN, 6\textsuperscript{th} May, 2018. [https://edition.cnn.com/2018/05/04/politics/immigration-tps-honduras/index.html]
In addition, Trump’s move to return to a hard-line stance on Cuba and tighten business and travel restrictions to the island, has seen the emergence of vocal Cuban-American support for Trump from amongst the remaining Exile generation organisations. Some Latino organisations have adopted an approach reminiscent of the retreat from critical foreign policy engagement made by the Mexican-American elites in the 1980s, as they sought to distance themselves from the oppositional stance of the Chicano movement. In a similar vein, some contemporary organisations have sought to shed their remaining ties to the Chicano era in the hope of avoiding controversy. For example, in 2017 the National Council of La Raza formally changed its name to UnidosUS (which translates as ‘United US’), following a campaign of online criticism in 2016 from Trump supporters of the organisation’s inclusion of ‘La Raza’ in its name. The name was a legacy of its origins as a Chicano movement-inspired organisation, but had come under scrutiny following Trump’s suggestion that a Mexican-American federal judge had shown bias against him in a trial as the judge had been a member of a legal association that also contained the name ‘La Raza’, which Trump suggested indicated a support for Mexican ethnic nationalism. In changing their name out of concern for the implications of a presentation of ethnic nationalism following 2016, the NCLR cast off their link to the Chicano movement.

Given this apparent re-emergence of numerous different types of US foreign policy engagement by the Hispanic American community since 2016, this suggests that the unprecedented hostile rhetoric and policies seen by the Trump administration could result in the emergence of a new political generation of Hispanic American elites that engage with US foreign policy in different ways to the Latino advocacy organisations

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437 C. Moreno, “NCLR, Country’s Largest Latino Advocacy Group, Rebrands As UnidosUS”, The Huffington Post, 11th July, 2017. [https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/nclr-countrys-largest-latino-advocacy-group-rebrands-as-unidosus_us_596527b0e4b03f144e2ea662]

438 Ibid.
that have dominated Hispanic political representation in Washington since the 1990s. Alternatively, it could result in the incorporation of methods of foreign policy engagement seen in previous generations in the agendas and political tactics of the Latino generation elites.

**Long-term implications**

Whilst the challenges and opportunities posed by the election of Donald Trump warrant close scrutiny of the ways in which Hispanic elites will react and respond to a hostile administration, the findings of this thesis also offer an important insight into the potential long-term outlook for Hispanic elite engagement with foreign policy.

The Hispanic American demographic is growing, and despite reports that their ascendancy as a voting bloc was stalled following the 2016 election, it is nevertheless likely that they are going to become a political force within US politics in the 21st century, to the extent that they will be in a position to influence US foreign policy, as a result of their size as an electoral bloc. As was outlined in the Introduction chapter of this thesis, this assumption is shared by several important foreign states with which the US maintains a significant relationship, and is reflected in their escalation of outreach efforts to Hispanic American elites since 2012. As a result, Hispanic Americans are framed within a narrative of political ascendancy, in which Hispanic American elites are destined to enjoy positions of political influence. As a result, there has been a growing audience for Hispanic American policy perspectives in recent years, in an attempt to identify areas of difference or similarity compared to the mainstream population within the US.

As the analysis of the dynamics of the current Latino generation advocacy organisations in chapter 5 has shown, any foreign policy engagement by Latino elites requires an ability to contextualise this engagement to the domestic, socio-economic

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439 For example, Susannah Goshko reiterated in her interview on the 17th May, 2017 that the UK anticipates the growth of the Hispanic population to result in them gaining significant political influence, despite their seeming inability to prevent a Trump victory in the 2016 election.)
concerns that are considered priorities for the Hispanic population. As a result, assuming that Latino generation elites continue to enjoy their position as the recognised and legitimate ambassadors of the Hispanic population within wider US society, any foreign policy engagement will reconcile their domestic priorities with international concerns. Therefore, as was suggested in Chapter 5, future foreign policy engagement is likely to focus on intermestic issues such as immigration, as well as the environment and climate change. With particular reference to climate change, not only is this a relatively recent issue that has come to be associated with Hispanic elites and one that has not previously been considered by the relevant existing literature, but is also a topic on which Hispanic elites are actively being courted. As was discussed in the thesis Introduction, both the Canadian and British governments have sought to develop a working relationship with NALEO and other LAOs by communicating their governments’ strong positions on tackling climate change and environmental concerns, and making this a core platform of their Hispanic outreach efforts. This step suggests that, as the Hispanic population grows, increased engagement with foreign policy matters is something that is driven by encouragement from outside actors, rather than by a demand for Hispanic elite action on these issues within the population.

**Avenues for further research**

Whilst this research project represents an original contribution to knowledge and reveals several important conclusions of interest and use to the existing literature, the findings also suggest a number of areas in which there exists avenues for potential research in the future.

The first avenue of potential further research would be to interrogate possible deeper meaning behind the findings related to the changing behaviour of Hispanic elites over time, from a position of outside radicalism to reconfiguring themselves into organisations designed to succeed within the established mechanism of the US political and economic system. Whilst this thesis has attempted to outline the consequences that this has had on Hispanic elite engagement with US foreign policy,
it has not addressed the question of what this change itself reveals about the nature of the US political system or the networks of power that influence US foreign policy. Parmar and Ledwidge have proposed that the US foreign policy establishment itself contains an ‘unacknowledged racial dimension’ that has evolved over time away from being a biological category towards a cultural, White Anglo Saxon Protestant mindset.\textsuperscript{440} As the authors contend, this mindset is one that a limited number of non-white ethnic minorities have indeed been allowed to adopt in exchange for access to elite-status within the foreign policy establishment, thus reinforcing the privileged status of Waspish-ness as a necessary condition of entrance to positions of influence within the foreign policy for ethnic minority elites.\textsuperscript{441} The imminence of a ‘majority-minority’ US population has therefore provided an impetus for the foreign policy establishment and the US political elite to extend their membership to an increasing percentage of ethnic minority elites willing to adopt this mindset, in order to maintain the hegemonic position of Anglo Saxon heritage within foreign policy planning.

The findings of this research could therefore be further extended to explore the extent to which the case study of Hispanic elite engagement with US foreign policy, and the transition away from critical positioning on US foreign policy matters by LAOs in the contemporary period, offers empirical evidence to support Parmar and Ledwidge’s framework. In addition, it offers the opportunity to contextualise the complex ways that Hispanic elite individuals choose to racially identify themselves against a racialised political structure.

More widely, the findings presented in this thesis offer interesting implications for the debate over the role of power within the American state. Specifically, the contrast between the active assimilationist Latino Generation elites and their resistant, oppositional Chicano Generation counterparts, suggests that Hispanic elites have configured their image to best fit a pluralistic model of power and political

\textsuperscript{441} Ibid.
influence. However, the nature of this engagement and the reluctance to offer a critique of US foreign policy by Latino elites from the 1990s onwards, suggests that in fact, power remains as racialised and Anglo-privileging as Chicano elites were claiming two generations earlier. Further research that explores the empirical findings of this research within the context of competing models of the American state and its power structure, could provide fruitful new insight for this debate.

The second area for potential further academic inquiry concerns the discussion in Chapter 5 of the emergence of ‘the environment and climate change’ as a topic area of likely future engagement as a foreign policy issue for Hispanic American elites. As suggested in the chapter, the possibility of a Hispanic environmental foreign policy agenda had not previously been considered by the existing literature, and therefore this finding offers opportunities for further research. In particular, the underlying explanation behind the apparent difference in policy preference on the environment and climate change by Hispanic survey respondents, compared to the mainstream population, is worthy of further study: As outlined in Chapter 5, interviews with recently-established Latino environmental lobbies indicates that Hispanic elites present both ethno-cultural and socio-economic explanations to account for the unusually strong Hispanic interests in the environment. Further academic research could attempt to establish the validity of these claims, and discern the extent to which a Hispanic concern for the environment and climate change is driven by Hispanic Americans’ Latin American heritage, their disproportionately high chances of living in an environmentally-degraded location within the US, a combination of these, or something else entirely. Furthermore, additional research could offer insight into how a potential Hispanic environmental foreign policy agenda would impact their overall political influence in the United States – whether adopting a distinct, Latino agenda on the environment would have an effect on Hispanic elites’ relationships with conservative and business lobbies both within the Hispanic American population, as well as within the wider US political system. Finally, further research could determine which configuration of Hispanic elites is likely to engage most prominently with an environmental foreign policy agenda, whether that be national or local elected officials, existing national Latino advocacy organisations,
small-scale Latino advocacy organisations with a specific environmental remit such as GreenLatinos, or existing mainstream US environmental and climate change lobbies that could claim to represent the environmental foreign policy concerns of the Hispanic American population.

Given the apparent emerging focus since 2014 on the environment and climate change by Hispanic American elites as well as interest in Hispanic policy preferences on climate change policy by foreign governments, this topic offers a logical and potentially insightful area for future research.

The third area for potential future research concerns the growing interest in the Hispanic American community by foreign governments, as outlined in the thesis Introduction. As this chapter outlined, four states with important bilateral relationships to the US were found to have conducted significant outreach to Hispanic Americans since 2012, with a focus on elected officials and high-profile LAOS such as NALEO and HACU. In the case of Israel, the United Kingdom and Canada, these overtures reflected a desire to make inroads with a demographic to which they generally lacked any historical, cultural or ethnic ties. Diplomatic officials from all three of these states, in addition to Mexico, indicated that these outreach efforts reflected an assumption of future Hispanic American influence in US foreign policy discourse. Therefore, a potential area of future enquiry concerns how far this level of outreach by these four states is indicative of a wider interest from US allies, partners and adversaries in the growth of the Hispanic American demographic. Further research could determine whether the case studies examined here, chosen due to their supposed status of each possessing a ‘special relationship’ with the US, is an outlier in terms of Hispanic outreach, or reflective of a growing interest in Latinos amongst foreign governments. In addition, further research could help to illuminate the type of outreach tactics likely to be used by foreign governments to establish a dialogue with Hispanic Americans: All four governments deployed their extensive consular networks to lead localised outreach efforts, with Israel doing so in conjunction with Jewish-American organisations within the US. Equally, Israel and Mexico conducted outreach in part to improve what they perceived to be negative Hispanic perceptions of these states (or negative perceptions of US aid in the case of
Israel), whereas officials from both the UK and Canada reported wanting to establish relationships where none had existing in a meaningful way before. Therefore, additional research could help to establish how far there is a homogeneity or heterogeneity in the tactics of, and strategic incentives for, Hispanic engagement by foreign governments more generally.

Related to this theme, the fourth area of potential future research concerns the state of current and future outreach by Latin American governments towards their diaspora communities within the US, to the populations with an ancestral heritage in their country, and towards the Hispanic American demographic as a whole. As the examination of Mexico’s outreach efforts in the introduction section illustrated, Mexico has increased its outreach efforts towards the Mexican and Mexican-American children of emigrants within the US, out of a concern that these individuals will have inherited a hostile attitude towards Mexico from parents that experienced violence, crime and government corruption before leaving the country. As a result, Mexico displays a concern that these individuals, once they rise to positions of influence within the US, will threaten US-Mexico relations with their prejudices against the Mexican government. To combat this, Mexico has provided considerable consular assistance to DACA-eligible undocumented immigrants, as well as partially re-framing their outreach within a ‘Hispanic’ rather than ‘Mexican’ context, to accommodate a perceived changing identity of Mexican Americans. Therefore, further research is needed to determine how far other Latin American governments with substantial diaspora and national-origin populations living with the US have adopted similar levels of outreach in recent years, and if they have, how far their rationale for engagement reflects similar sentiments and concerns. In particular, further research on the outreach attempts by the governments of El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic offer the potential of valuable empirical data to contribute to the existing literature of Latin American-Latino relations.

The fifth area of potential future research concerns the findings in Chapter 6 that examined the nature of US foreign policy engagement by Hispanic Americans
working within the Department of State and USAID. This chapter found that Latinos working within foreign policy related careers within these agencies promoted a sophisticated set of arguments to justify the promotion and advancement of Hispanic Americans as foreign policy practitioners, with these narratives being reinforced and rearticulated by the foreign policy agencies themselves. This finding was important as it indicated a significant entrenchment of a pan-ethnic status within these institutions since the mid-2000s, as well as highlighting a coordinated effort to emphasise the ethnic, cultural advantages that Hispanic Americans can bring to bear on foreign policy, something that had not previously been examined by the existing literature. Given these findings, further research needs to be conducted to determine how far the experiences of these foreign policy agencies are reflected in the government more widely. For example, interviews could be conducted with Hispanic Americans working in the US military and federal intelligence agencies as well as in foreign policy roles in both state and local governments. This would help to provide further insight into how far the dynamics of the Department of State and USAID are reflective of Hispanic foreign policy engagement in the US government more widely, or if these represent something of an exception.

Finally, a sixth area of potential further research concerns the possibility that the manner and form of contemporary foreign policy engagement examined in Chapters 5 and 6 may change in the future as a new biological generation of Hispanic Americans replaces older elites. In 2014, 47% of US-born Hispanics were under the age of 18, with 74% being under the age of 33.442 As a result, the majority of US-born Hispanics were not alive during the period of the Chicano Generation, and most will have been no older than a child during the period of the Exile Generation in the 1980s. Therefore, the Hispanic American population is characterised by its relative youthfulness: given the sheer size of the Hispanic population under the age of 18, there is a need to research this group to determine whether their policy preferences, having being formed without any lived experience of preceding political generations,

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may be different from those of the current Latino generation elites. Were this cohort to indicate different foreign policy positions to older Hispanic Americans, it leaves open the possibility that the findings of this research will have less relevance as and when this new biological generation of Hispanic Americans takeover elite positions in the coming decades.

This research was constructed with the principal aim of offering a contribution to the existing literature on ethnic interest group engagement and participation in US foreign policy. As a result, choices and decisions about which intellectual avenues to pursue and which to leave were driven by an awareness of a need to adhere to a relevance to the discussions within this literature, in order for the thesis to make a meaningful, significant contribution. Accordingly, this meant that there were moments throughout the research where the possibility of further intellectual analysis was available but left unexplored in order to adhere to the remit of the central research question. As a result, some of the findings from this study may offer the potential to be useful to research in academic fields related to the study of Hispanic Americans within the United States, but were not explored here. Areas of most likely usefulness concern both the empirical findings of the research, in addition to the analytical framework of the thesis.

Firstly, the finding that Latino advocacy organisations and Latino foreign policy practitioners were willing to articulate and present the discussion of a pan-ethnic ‘Latino’ label in notably different ways, may be of interest to scholars within both Latino Studies and Ethnic studies. In particular, the consistent choice by LAOs to frame ‘Hispanic’ and ‘Latino’ in the context of shared domestic interests compared to the narratives deployed by Hispanic FPPs that emphasised the ethno-cultural basis for a common ‘Hispanic’ and ‘Latino’ identity, reveal interesting observations on the differences between how Hispanic American elites chose to deploy ethnic terminology in different settings and different areas of public discourse.

Secondly, this thesis presents the experiences of both Cuban exiles and Central American refugees during the 1980s as a single and cohesive ‘Exile generation’. This
combination is appropriate as it reflects the similarity of interests, tactics and circumstances between the two communities, and presenting them as a distinct political generation allows their behaviour and foreign policy engagement to be better understood in the context of the preceding and succeeding generations. The use of this generation, original to this thesis, offers a potential analytical tool for historians of Hispanic politics during the 1980s, as well as offering a contextualising insight for research into the emergence of the ‘culture wars’ during the 1990s.

Finally, the use and adaptation of García’s generational approach to understanding Hispanic elite behaviour offers a potential use to researchers of politics beyond US foreign policy. Indeed, the use of the three case study generations explored in this thesis, that of the Chicano, Exile and Latino generations, offers a possible framework with which to address different political questions, using the same approach. In particular, this framework would be of use to scholars wishing exploring Hispanic elite engagement with political thought and ideology, as this would allow a comparison of the similarities and differences between the generations across the cold war into the present day, and recognise the role that the underlying organisational structure of elites within each generation plays in accounting for any differences.
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Chapter title quotes

Thesis title quote:


“We’re natural diplomats”, taken from: Interview with Ramon Escobar, State Department Rusk Fellow, Georgetown University, 2015-2016, 11th April, 2016.

Chapter 1 title quote:


Chapter 3 title quote:


Chapter 5 title quote:

Taken from: Interview with Amy Hinojosa, President and CEO of MANA, 15th September, 2015

Chapter 6 title quote:

Taken from: Interview with Josue Barrera, Executive Diversity Outreach Manager, Civil Service Human Resource Management, U.S. Department of State, 16th April, 2016.
Appendices:

List of interviewees

Chicano anti-war activists

**Félix Gutiérrez**, Professor Emeritus, School for Communication and Journalism, USC Annenberg; Chicano anti-Vietnam War activist

**Rosalio Muñoz**, Co-Chair of the Chicano Moratorium Committee, 1970

**David Sanchez** – Prime Minister, Brown Berets; Co-Chair of the Chicano Moratorium Committee, 1970

Latino advocacy organisations

[ANONYMOUS INTERVIEWEE] – *National Hispanic Caucus of State Legislators* (NHCSL)

[ANONYMOUS INTERVIEWEE] – *National Hispanic Medical Association* (NHMA)

**Arturo Carmona** – Executive Director, *Presente.org*

**Hilda Crespo** – Vice President for Public Policy, *ASPIRA Association, Inc.*

**Rafael Fantauzzi** – President and CEO, *National Puerto Rican Coalition* (NPRC)

**Miguel Ferrer** – Founder, *SOYFERRER* and former Managing Editor of *HuffPost Latino Voices and Black Voices*

**Kevin Hernandez** – Vice President of Policy & Public Affairs, *United States Hispanic Chamber of Commerce* (USHCC)

**Amy Hinojosa** – President & CEO, *MANA, A National Latina Organization* (MANA)

**Carmen Jorge** – Vice President, *Congressional Hispanic Caucus Institute* (CHCI)
Mark Magana – Founding President and CEO, *GreenLatinos*

Luis Maldonado – Chief Advocacy Officer, *Hispanic Association of Colleges and Universities* (HACU)

Laura Maristany – Associate Director, *NALEO Education Fund* (NALEO)

Adrianna Quintero – Founder and Executive Director, *Voces Verdes*

José R. Sánchez – Chair, *National Institute for Latino Policy* (NILP)

Michael Scurato – Vice President for Policy, *National Hispanic Media Coalition* (NHMC)

José Suier – Executive Director, *National Association of Hispanic Publication* (NAHP)

Julian Teixeira – Senior Director for Communications, *National Council of La Raza* (NCLR)

Luis Torres – Director of Policy and Legislation, *League of United Latin American Citizens* (LULAC)

Al Zapanta – President and CEO, *United States-Mexico Chamber of Commerce* (USMCC)

**Hispanic foreign policy practitioners**

[ANONYMOUS INTERVIEWEE] – (A United States Ambassador that served during the administrations of Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama)


Francisco Bencosme – Legislative Research Assistant on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 2015 – present


Ramon Escobar – State Department Rusk Fellow, Georgetown University, 2015-2016; Colombia Desk & Peace Process, U.S Department of State, 2013-2015

Lino Gutierrez – United States Ambassador to Argentina, 2003-2006; United States Ambassador to Nicaragua, 1996-1999

Carmen Lomellin – United States Ambassador to the Organization of American States, 2009-2016

Osvaldo Gómez Martínez – Foreign Affairs Officer, U.S. Department of State, 2010-2014

Jose Perez – Program Analyst, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 2013 – present

Elvie Valle – Pickering Fellow, 2016

C. Eduardo Vargas – Center for Faith Based and Community Initiatives (CFBCI) Deputy Director, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 2014-2017

Foreign diplomats

[ANONYMOUS INTERVIEWEE] – Hispanic outreach, [ANONYMOUS FOREIGN EMBASSY]

Alejandro Celorio Alcántara – Head of Section, Hispanic and Migration Affairs, Embassy of Mexico, Washington, DC.

Ximena García – Team member, Hispanic and Migration Affairs, Embassy of Mexico, Washington, DC.

Natalia Jiménez – Team member, Hispanic and Migration Affairs, Embassy of Mexico, Washington, DC.

Susannah Goshko – Head of Political Team, Embassy of the United Kingdom, Washington, DC.

Andres F. Marchado – Trade and Investment Associate, British Consulate-General Miami
Alexander Miles – Political, Press and Public Affairs Officer, British Consulate-General Miami

Matthew Reents – Head of Politics, Press, & Public Affairs, British Consulate-General Los Angeles


Ian Wiggins – Deputy Head of Political Section, Embassy of the United Kingdom, Washington, DC.

James Villeneuve – Consul General of Canada in Los Angeles, United States