Minimum cost arborescences
Dutta, Bhaskar and Mishra, Debasis (2009) Minimum cost arborescences. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.889).
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Official URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/resear...
In this paper, we analyze the cost allocation problem when a group of agents or nodes have to be connected to a source, and where the cost matrix describing the cost of connecting each pair of agents is not necessarily symmetric, thus extending the well-studied problem of minimum cost spanning tree games, where the costs are assumed to be symmetric. The focus is on rules which satisfy axioms representing incentive and fairness properties. We show that while some results are similar, there are also signifcant differences between the frameworks corresponding to symmetric and asymmetric cost matrices.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HF Commerce|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Cost allocation, Game theory, Stability, Symmetry (Mathematics)|
|Series Name:||Warwick economic research papers|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick, Department of Economics|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Official Date:||8 January 2009|
|Number of Pages:||30|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
A. Bogomolnaia, R. H., , and H. Moulin (2008): \Sharing the Cost of a Capacity
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