UNSPECIFIED (2000) Production externalities and two-way distortion in principal-multi-agent problems. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 92 (1). pp. 142-166. ISSN 0022-0531

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Abstract

This paper studies an otherwise standard principal-agent problem with hidden information, but where there are positive production externalities between agents: the output of any agent depends positively on the effort expended by other agents. It is shown that the optimal contract for the principal exhibits two-way distortion: the effort of any agent is oversupplied (relative to the first-best) when his marginal cost of effort is low, and undersupplied taken his marginal cost of effort is high. This pattern of distortion cannot otherwise arise in optimal single- or multi-agent incentive contracts. unless there are countervailing incentives. However, unlike the countervailing incentives case, the pattern of distortion we find is robust to the precise form of the externality. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D21, D28, (C) 2000 Academic Press.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Journal or Publication Title:	JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
Publisher:	ACADEMIC PRESS INC
ISSN:	0022-0531
Date:	May 2000
Volume:	92
Number:	1
Number of Pages:	25
Page Range:	pp. 142-166
Publication Status:	Published
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/13345

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