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Production externalities and two-way distortion in principal-multi-agent problems
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Lockwood, Ben (2000) Production externalities and two-way distortion in principal-multi-agent problems. Journal of Economic Theory, 92 (1). pp. 142-166. doi:10.1006/jeth.1999.2625 ISSN 0022-0531.
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2625
Abstract
This paper studies an otherwise standard principal-agent problem with hidden information, but where there are positive production externalities between agents: the output of any agent depends positively on the effort expended by other agents. It is shown that the optimal contract for the principal exhibits two-way distortion: the effort of any agent is oversupplied (relative to the first-best) when his marginal cost of effort is low, and undersupplied taken his marginal cost of effort is high. This pattern of distortion cannot otherwise arise in optimal single- or multi-agent incentive contracts. unless there are countervailing incentives. However, unlike the countervailing incentives case, the pattern of distortion we find is robust to the precise form of the externality. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D21, D28, (C) 2000 Academic Press.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
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Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions | ||||
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | ||||
Journal or Publication Title: | Journal of Economic Theory | ||||
Publisher: | Academic Press | ||||
ISSN: | 0022-0531 | ||||
Official Date: | May 2000 | ||||
Dates: |
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Volume: | 92 | ||||
Number: | 1 | ||||
Number of Pages: | 25 | ||||
Page Range: | pp. 142-166 | ||||
DOI: | 10.1006/jeth.1999.2625 | ||||
Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||
Publication Status: | Published | ||||
Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access |
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