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Re-Imagining EUrope through the Governance of Migration

Introduction

“Europe”, Achille Mbembe (2017, 1) notes, “is no longer the center of gravity of the world. This is the significant event, the fundamental experience, of our era.” The de-centering of Europe, or EUrope, and its (self-)provincialisation (Chakrabarty 2000) can be observed nowhere better than during and after the mass migrations of 2015, when over one million people entered this former centre of gravity without authorisation (UNHCR 2019). Though migratory movements on such scale occur also in other regions of the world, it forms this era’s significant event and fundamental experience for EUrope, clearly demonstrating that “[t]he question of Europe itself has become inextricable from the question of migration” (De Genova 2017, 22). The entanglement between EUrope and migration has, of course, a much longer historical trajectory (Vigneswaran 2019; Hansen and Jonsson 2014; El-Tayeb 2011). In the early 1990s, in light of increasing EUropean communalisation, Jacques Derrida (1992, 5) wondered about “something called Europe”, asking “to what concept [...], to what singular entity should this name be assigned today? Who will draw up its borders?”, while Étienne Balibar (1991, 7) asserted: “Before there can be any serious analysis of racism and its relationship to migrations, we have to ask ourselves what this word ‘Europe’ means and what it will signify tomorrow.”

Although the question of EUrope has thus been raised in the context of borders and migration in the past, the year of 2015 forms a caesura. Characterised by some as “the long summer of migration” (Kasparend Speer 2015) but by most as the migration or refugee ‘crisis’ (New Keywords Collective 2016), the unauthorised migrations from the ‘Global South’ instigated a turmoil in the political union of EUrope, the magnitude of which is rarely fully grasped. The struggles over migration and its control since 2015 operate as a “diagnostic of the present” in a Foucauldian sense (Foucault 2001, 634), revealing the present condition of EUrope. At first sight, its condition seemed critical when barbed-wired fences were erected between EUropean (and European) countries to prevent or at least divert migrant movements, when EU member states and institutions fragmented and clashed along the question of reception and relocation, and when the 2016 referendum result in the UK, considerably impacted by anti-migrant sentiments, seemed to lead to a weakened EUrope. For some, “[t]he refugee crisis was Europe’s 9/11” (Krastev 2018), a catastrophe in the wake of which the very unity of this polity and its role in the world became questioned. In particular the tumultuous processes of national re-bordering appeared to threaten the idea and being of the EUropean ‘post-national’ project, a project often imagined as the very transgression of borders. The reinforcing and hardening of multiple national borders seemed to lead EUrope to the brink of collapse.

This article advances a different assessment of the present condition of EUrope. It argues that more attention needs to be paid to the ways in which contemporary forms of migration governance and border control coincide with, and indeed are constitutive of, processes of ‘EUropeanisation’. 2015’s crisis over migration triggered not merely national re-bordering practices and exacerbated conflicts within the EU along multiple fronts. It also, seemingly paradoxically, reinforced processes of EUropeanisation based on a shared desire to ensure that migrations on such scale via sea and land would remain a historic anomaly, a crisis never to repeat itself. This shared desire has prompted thoroughly EUropean efforts in the governance of migration which further consolidated EUrope’s bordered space. Since 2015, we witness how a border regime that is of EUrope is solidifying at an unprecedented pace so that it is precisely in the drawing up of borders and the governance of migrant populations that something called EUrope emerges before our eyes.
Speaking of EUropeanisation through migration governance does not suggest the absence of conflict between different constellations of EU institutional and member state actors. Far from being a harmonious process, it is rife with friction, tension, and contradiction. However, such moments of conflict are often mistakenly viewed as revealing fundamentally discrepant rationales in migration governance which seem to put in doubt the very possibility of a concerted form of EUropean ‘borderwork’ (Rumford 2006). By examining two particular moments of conflict over migration, this article suggests that we need to depart from taking these conflicts at face value and instead interrogate what they mean to disguise – namely the degree to which contemporary border drawings have already become EUropeanised. These conflicts, often between representatives of EU institutions and those of member state governments, serve to maintain and reinforce particular imaginaries: on the one hand, the imaginary of the EU as a tolerant and liberal post-national or trans-border project, and, on the other, the imaginary of member states maintaining national sovereignty and the ‘monopoly of violence’.

What is meant to be preserved is the illusion of distinct realms of influence, authority, and ‘power’, precisely in light of the vanishing of that which seems to keep these realms distinct.

This article is organised into four main parts. Part I traces one of the dominant imaginaries of EUrope, namely the idea of EUrope as a post-national and trans-border project. Since its foundation, EU policy elites as well as EUropean public intellectuals have framed EUrope as a “postnational constellation” (Habermas 2001), often through tropes of movement and the transgression of borders. The project of the EU is said to have emerged through the overcoming of rigid political, social, and geographical borders. When confronted with actual migrant movements across its borders and territories, such imaginary of EUrope becomes inevitably challenged, but also reinstated. Part II explores supposedly ‘EUropean’ and ‘un-EUropean’ ways of governing migration by examining responses to the mass movements during and after 2015 that seemed to reveal conflicts between the level of the supra-national EU and the level of individual member states. It focusses on two particularly insightful moments: first a dispute between Hungary’s government and the European Commission over violently enforced barriers erected in the path of transiting migrants in 2016, and second, the tensions that arose between Italy, other EU member states and the Commission when Italy’s governments decided to ‘close’ its harbours to rescued migrants in 2018. Part III critically assesses some of the ways in which EUropean borderwork is differentiated along seemingly delimitable ‘levels’ of governance. Levels of analysis approaches reinforce such an a-priori separation between the supra-national and the national and obscure the entangled nature of EUropean migration governance. This separation also allows for a recoding of border violence. Violence that emerges in the governance of migration is commonly disqualified from the supra-national level and re-directed to those frequently regarded as failing to adhere to EUropean values, especially ‘rogue’ member states or third countries. Part IV makes the case for a new conceptual vocabulary to capture the EUropeanness of the border. EUropean forms of migration governance composes a border regime that deeply interweaves actors, policies, and practices. The conclusion asks to pay greater attention to the interwoven practices through which EUrope draws up its borders violently – only then can we really come to terms with something called EUrope.

1. Imaginaries of post-national and trans-border EUrope

The political project and community of EUrope is often imagined through post-national and trans-border tropes and ideals. EUropean policy elites and public intellectuals, thus those who
seem to speak “in the name of Europe” (Walters and Haahr 2005, 4, emphasis in original), typically frame Europe as a peace project ceaselessly ‘on the move’, transgressing borders of nation-states (Bhambra 2016). Though accepting borders as a “historical given”, Robert Schuman, one of the Europe’s ‘founding fathers’, declared in 1963 that “we want […] to take away from borders their rigidity and what I call their intransigent hostility” (cited in Maas 2013, 97). About 50 years on, in 2012, Herman Van Rompuy and José Barroso, presidents of the European Council and Commission, declared this vision a reality. In their Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech “From war to peace: a European tale”, they held:

Over the past sixty years, the European project has shown that it is possible for peoples and nations to come together across borders. That it is possible to overcome the differences between ‘them’ and ‘us’. (European Commission 2012)

Europeanisation through the coming-together across borders is said to have coalesced with “a consensual pooling of sovereignty [sic] in which every one of us accepts to belong to a minority” (European Commission 2000). With foes seemingly becoming friends and with barriers turning into bridges, an ever-more integrated economic, political, social, and cultural community emerged that gradually culminated in the right to free movement of EU citizens within the union.

This imaginary where the transgression of borders appears as Europe’s raison d’être, identity, and telos has been reinforced not merely by policy elites but also by public intellectuals such as Zygmunt Bauman (2004, 7), who writes:

Europe came to be the birthplace of a transgressive civilization - a civilization of transgression (and vice versa!). We may say that if it is measured by its horizons and ambitions (though not always by its deeds), this civilization, or this culture, was and remains a mode of life that is allergic to borders – indeed to all fixity and finitude. It suffers limits badly; it is as if it drew borders solely to target its intractable urge to trespass. 

Roberto Esposito (2018, 214) ascribes this supposed deep-seated urge to trespass borders to Europe’s foundational myth, in which princess Europa was abducted by Zeus in the form of a bull. “Europe has designated uprootedness and travel with no return”, Esposito notes, so that its “characteristic space” would not be “that of a land, of a continent, or of a container but that of the sea, in other words of the crossing, itself understood as a transitory metaphor.”

Although this imaginary of Europe as a transgressive project – even “a perpetual migrant in its myth, its geography, and its idea” (Gafijczuk 2017, 29) – precedes the emergence of the EU and its predecessors, the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community, processes of European integration in the aftermath of the Second World War and the fall of the Iron Curtain with successive rounds of widening, deepening, and enlarging have shaped and reinforced such imaginary (Outhwaite 2017). Even if there is no singular conception of Europe - a polity described varyingly as a polycentric entity, a network, a borderland, a cosmopolitan construct, an intergovernmental organisation, a normative soft power, an empire (Rumford 2008, 30–31; Sjursen 2006; Zielonka 2006) – trans-border or post-national imaginaries feature in many conceptualisations of Europe.

Compelled by its foundational myth and in accordance with its purported values and identity, Europe, the Commission (2018a) asserts, “will never be a fortress”. Instead, Europe believes itself capable of governing migration effectively and based on “[our] common European values
and our historic responsibility” (European Commission 2018b) while remaining an open-minded community: “We want to be more efficient at managing our borders, whilst upholding and defending our values of openness and tolerance, because Europe will continue to offer safety to those in need of protection” (European Commission 2018a). In particular in view of migrant suffering, EUropean policy elites are quick to assert that “Europe needs to uphold its moral and human duty” (European Commission 2019a). According to EU high representative Federica Mogherini (EEAS 2016) when commenting on several shipwrecks of migrant boats in May 2016, “[t]he refugee crisis we are facing [. . .] puts our deepest values, even our identity to a test. It is a moment of truth to see if we are really Europeans and if we are really a union.” A year later, with reference to the intended introduction of the ‘Muslim ban’ by the US government, Mogherini critically noted:

we have in Europe a history – and here I think I do not speak only for the European Union – that has told us that every time that one invests in divisions and wars, you might end up being in a prison, if you build all walls around you. And we have a history and a tradition and an identity based on the fact that we celebrate when walls are broken down and bridges are built. (EEAS 2017)

One could certainly, and with justification, view these assertions to EUrope’s ‘allergy’ to borders in the very moment of advocating for inevitably exclusionary migration policies as ‘schizophrenic’ (Stierl 2018), or as merely rhetorical, “no more than a smoke screen that plays on sentiment in order to impose the law of the market and the brutality of realpolitik” (Fassin 2012, 2). One could also point out that these sentiments are certainly not unique to EUrope and its policy elites. As Didier Fassin (2007, 151) notes, “the administration of human collectivities in the name of a higher moral principle which sees the preservation of life and the alleviation of suffering as the highest value of action” has been observed in other contexts as well. Indeed, Adrian Little and Nick Vaughan-Williams (2017, 535) have detected “the emergence of a transnational discourse of compassionate border security that fuses humanitarian and militarised logics”. Nevertheless, to see these sentiments expressed by EUropean policy elites simply as fig leaves would ignore the role and importance of EUrope’s imaginary of itself as a trans-border and post-national polity that is not merely continuously told, affirmed, and believed but which directly impacts on the ways in which EUrope governs migration.

2. Governing Migration in EUropean and un-EUropean ways

“Migration governance”, the Commission (2011, 6) suggests, “is not about ‘flows’, ‘stocks’ and ‘routes’, it is about people.” However, when some of these people breached EUrope’s external borders en masse in 2015 and early 2016, with many subsequently crossing several internal EUropean (and European) borders, attempts to govern them were driven by the desire to shut down particular routes, especially the maritime ones via Turkey and Libya, as well as land routes through the Balkans. Much scholarly attention has already been paid to the so-called EU-Turkey deal, the closure of migration corridors through the Balkans, or the agreements between the EU and the Libyan Government of National Accord (İşleyen 2018; Kallius 2016; Cuttita 2017; Moreno-Lax 2018; Albahari 2018; El-Shaarawi and Razsa 2019; Stierl 2019). Rather than adding to the analysis of these measures per se, this part focuses on specific but revealing moments of conflict between EUropean policy elites and two EU member states, Hungary and Italy. In these moments we can observe how those who seem to speak in the name of EUrope are compelled to assert the trans-border and post-national idea of EUrope vis-à-vis member state governments that are said to pursue nationalistic, xenophobic,
of Hungarian Fences

The relationship between the Commission and the Hungarian government under prime minister Viktor Orbán have been fraught with tension or outright antagonism for some time, and increasingly so after what both referred to as the ‘migration crisis’ of 2015. Most recently, in February 2019, the Hungarian government launched a poster campaign depicting both Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and billionaire George Soros and alleging that they supported irregular forms of migration into the territories of Europe – a campaign that according to a Commission spokesperson “beggars belief” (BBC 2019). About a year-and-a-half before, in September 2017, the Commission had rejected Hungary’s request to contribute financially to the Hungarian border fences to Serbia and Croatia. The Hungarian government had sought about four hundred million Euro as compensation for its effort of “protecting all the citizens of Europe from the flood of illegal migrants” (Deutsche Welle 2017). Justifying its decision to reject such request, the Commission explained that although it supported the border management of EU member states, for example with surveillance equipment, “[w]e are not financing the construction of fences or barriers at the external borders” (Euobserver 2017).

One can certainly wonder about the sincerity of the Hungarian request and whether any concessions from the Commission were genuinely expected. However, the sincerity of Hungary’s assertion that it had ‘guarded’ and ‘protected’ EUrope as a whole, rather than merely its own national territory from migrant ‘intruders’, cannot be easily dismissed. For those migrants who crossed through the Balkans in 2015 and 2016, Hungary was never intended as a place of settlement but merely a space to be transited to western and northern EUrope, which prompted Orbán to characterise the ‘migration crisis’ as a “German problem” (BBC 2015). Hungary was thus indeed enforcing not merely its own border but a EUropean one, precisely what the Commission (2002, 9) had envisioned already in 2002 when reminding EU member states that in order to thrive “towards integrated management of the external border”, they were “now guarding the borders of the Member States of the European Union, [and] should therefore, see their activity as a contribution to a European check and surveillance network”.

Nonetheless, Hungary received little praise or recognition for its radical ‘defence’ of the EUropean border and the Schengen zone. Underpinned by Orbán’s overtly anti-Muslim and anti-migrant rhetoric, the scenes of Hungarian police forces beating and pepper-spraying vulnerable people on the move seemed too crude to be lauded (Al-Jazeera 2015). Instead, representatives of EU institutions and several member states voiced their concern at the time, scolding the Hungarian government for its ‘un-EUropean’ behaviour (InfoMigrants 2018). Luxembourg’s Foreign Minister Jean Asselborn even called for Hungary’s temporary exclusion or expulsion in order “to protect the cohesion and values of the European Union” (BBC 2016). For those who spoke in the name of ‘tolerant’ EUrope, it seemed all too clear that Hungary was enforcing borders in an un-EUropean way.

At the same time, there can be little doubt that all actors concerned were aware that the determination of the people on the move could be thwarted only through ruthless actions of the countries along the Balkans, including Hungary, something that in particular western and northern EU member states but also the Commission had desperately desired. Ultimately, the mass migrations were halted through the construction of barriers along certain migratory routes and acts of mass refoulement in the Balkans, in combination with an overall reduction of
'migrant pressures’ from Turkey through the EU-Turkey deal. Still, the actions of Hungary, considered an increasingly ‘rogue’ and illiberal EU member state were scolded, seen as conflicting with the European way of governing migration. Hungary’s border enforcement strategy, though quickly imitated by several other EU member states, was largely viewed, “in international media, and by several politicians and policymakers [as] an aberration from the European Union asylum policy” (Kallius 2016, 135).

In a report on Hungary’s role in the ‘migration crisis’, Attila Juhász, Bulcsú Hunyadi, and Edit Zgut (2015, 7) argue that “the conflict within the European Union has reached an unprecedented level between those countries that accept and those that reject a European refugee and migration policy based on solidarity.” For them, the failure of particular member states, such as Hungary, to show ‘solidarity’ and cooperate with other member states and EU institutions in migration governance has meant that “the EU cannot solve the refugee crisis” as member states would have to grant the EU “the power to do so, which means less power would remain in their own hands.” Juhász, Hunyadi, and Zgut point to the paradox that these nationalist member states would criticise the EU for its insufficient response to the ‘crisis’ while “consistently [refusing] to grant the European community the necessary powers.”

Countering this dominant perception of Hungary’s un-European migration measures, Annastiina Kallius (2016, 135) has convincingly made the case that the Hungarian “strategy, manifested by the construction of legal and physical border fences that result in pushbacks to Serbia and in the blanket rejection of asylum applications based on safe third country regulations, [was] a continuation of EU policies of restricting access to asylum through similar measures of externalization.” Hungary’s fences and the ‘defense’ of its European borders did not constitute a radical departure from European ways of enforcing borders, yet it was widely understood and criticised as conflicting with European values underpinning seemingly humane forms of migration governance. Hungary, as Bernd Kasparek and Marc Speer (2015) astutely note, was “pilloried for its callous attempts at maintaining the rules of the European border and migration regime”.

According to Kallius, not the fencing out and refouling of migrant populations formed a “rupture in Hungary’s continuity with EU border policy” but the moment “when the Hungarian government organized transportation of migrants through its territory to the Austrian border in autumn 2015.” When Hungary transported thousands of people into other European countries via a “formalised corridor” (Speer 2017), “the Hungarian government completely and utterly disregarded the Dublin regulation, that very European Union legislation that had caused the deadlock in the first place” (Kallius 2016, 140). This rupture in the European border regime was short-lived, in particular due to pressures of ‘countries of destination’, such as Germany and Austria, so that a second migrant ‘march of hope’ via the Balkans did not materialise.

**Of Italian Harbours**

In matters of migration governance, also the relationship between EU institutions and Italy has been rather complicated. For years, Italian governments have lamented about a lack of solidarity within the EU in terms of the relocation of migrants who arrived via the Mediterranean. In the run-up to Italy’s 2018 general election, the populist Five Star Movement and the far-right League, which would eventually form the government coalition, combined anti-migrant with anti-EU sentiment. In particular the League, similar to the Hungarian Fidesz party, claimed that EU institutions and certain EU member states promoted ‘illegal immigration’ to Europe only to then let a few member states ‘pay the price’ and ‘carry the burden’. Once in power, the League under interior minister Matteo Salvini continued to
confront specifically the Commission and the French government by announcing to “fight pro-migrant policies supported by Macron and Soros”, and spearhead, together with Hungary, changes in EU institutions (Guardian 2018a). In accordance with such ambitions, the Italian government declared Italy’s harbours closed for rescued migrants in June 2018, which led to several ‘stand-offs’ with non-governmental rescuers who had to wait for days or even weeks at sea until the rescued migrants were disembarked, mostly only after the Commission had brokered relocation arrangements with several other EU member states (ECRE 2019). Through its uncompromising stance, Italy’s government forced both EU institutions and member states to relocate migrants, thereby rupturing the European ‘hotspot approach’ and the Dublin regulation.

Since May 2015, when the European Agenda of Migration first introduced the hotspot approach, migrant reception had become increasingly ‘Europeanised’, though only in a particular sense, with several EU agencies becoming involved in the registration process, including Frontex, Europol, EASO and Eurojust (European Commission 2015a). This Europeanisation of migrant registration did not lead to a greater communalisation of the issue or a ‘burden sharing’ among EU member states. Quite the opposite was the case. As Giuseppe Campesi (2018, 211) puts it, the “objects of control” of the hotspot approach were not merely arriving migrants but also the border authorities in Italy and other “frontline member states” who were now monitored by said EU agencies. Thus, the hotspot approach, “a tool for preventing the secondary movement of asylum seekers” (Campesi 2018, 214), ultimately reinforced the Dublin system which Italy, among other ‘frontline’ members, had long deemed unfair. Past Italian governments had come under critique for undermining EU asylum policies when allowing migrants to move on to other member states without being fingerprinted in Italy. In 2015, the Commission even instigated legal proceedings against Italy for not registering the newly arrived in the EU-wide Eurodac fingerprint database. In its ‘Progress Report’ for the same year, it recommended Italy to ensure a “100% fingerprinting rate for arriving migrants to be achieved without delay” and to create a “solid legal framework […] in particular to allow the use of force for fingerprinting and to include provisions on longer term retention” (European Commission 2015b).

Though in a different way, Italy’s ‘closed harbour policy’ of 2018 likewise undermined the Dublin regime by rejecting the first-country-of-entry principle and by failing to comply with the “obligation to register asylum claims” (ECRE 2019, 5). In this way, Italy enforced a de facto communalisation of migrant reception, though merely on an ad-hoc ‘ship by ship’ basis. As past governments had long demanded, migrants arriving via the sea were now relocated EUrope-wide. Even if it is true that “Rome’s move came at the price of considerable diplomatic tension with Malta, France and Spain, which criticized the closure of Italian ports as illegal, cynical and even ‘disgusting’” (Cusumano and Gombeer 2018, 7), such tension quickly dissipated. It’s strict border measures which undermined Europe’s reception system, shifted the ‘burden’ onto EU institutions and other member states, and brought Salvini under investigation by Italian prosecutors for ‘false imprisonment’ and ‘kidnapping’ of rescued migrants, sparked friction but no lasting diplomatic rows (Guardian 2019a). Requests for Italy’s expulsion from the EU for conflicting with its ‘cohesion and values’ could not be heard.

At first sight, especially when juxtaposed with the Hungarian example, these rather toned-down reactions toward the Italian “disembarkation crisis” (ECRE 2019, 3) appear remarkably inconsistent. A closer look at the statistics of migrant arrivals helps, however, to approximate an explanation. By the time Salvini declared Italy’s harbours closed, in June 2018, the migration ‘crisis’ along the central Mediterranean had largely been ‘solved’, though not in
public perception. Already months before, the number of migrant arrivals in Italy had drastically declined. In comparison to the year prior, when over 119,000 people reached Italy via the Mediterranean, merely roughly 23,000 people did so in 2018, of whom fewer than 10,000 arrived after the new Italian government had come into office in late May 2018 (UNHCR 2019). Of these migrant arrivals, many did not come under the ad-hoc relocation regime and were simply registered in Italy as before - something that was largely ‘covered up’ in public (Euronews 2019a).v

Given the decline in migrant arrivals via the Mediterranean, Fabrice Leggeri, the director of the EU border agency Frontex, declared in February 2019 that there was no longer a “burning crisis with the irregular crossing at external borders” (Reuters 2019). In light of this significant decline, the realisation seemed to settle in that an overt political confrontation with Rome over its ‘un-EUropean’ migration policies would be beneficial neither for the Commission nor for other ‘frontline’ member states – it was clear that the political stakes were of rather symbolic nature. Indeed, though critical, the Commission displayed sympathy for Italy’s ‘cry for help’, knowing well that brokering relocations for the few hundred migrants affected by the Italian blockade was manageable, even if the procedure was nevertheless conflictual, lengthy, and largely intransparent.vi Without much hesitation, the Commission (2019b, 3) took on the “ad-hoc coordinating role to enable safe disembarkation” in order to “provide predictability and avoid tensions”. It certainly did not appear to be a ‘bad look’ to be the pragmatic broker of migrant relocation and the finder of solutions to prolonged migrant suffering at sea.

Just as Italy, the ‘frontline’ member states Malta and Spain had long been critical of what they considered a lack of solidarity in EUrope concerning the distribution of arriving migrants. Though initially disapproving of Italy’s ‘closing’ of harbours, Malta quickly followed suit and denied entry to NGO ships as well which “arbitrarily deprived rescued persons of their liberty and obstructed the right to seek asylum” (ECRE 2019, 4). For example, in April 2019, the NGO Sea-Eye was blocked near the island nation for ten days and allowed to land only after Germany, France, Portugal, and Luxembourg promised to relocate the 62 rescued migrants. Also Spain’s initial critical attitude toward Italy’s restrictive policies softened in light of migrant arrivals in Spain rising to record levels along the western Mediterranean route in 2018 (Schwarz and Stierl 2019). After welcoming 629 migrants onboard the NGO SOS Méditerranée, considered a ‘humane’ reaction to Italy’s blockade which handed Salvini his first political victory though costing Italy 200,000 Euros for the boat escort to Valencia (ECRE 2019), also Spain began to mimic Italy’s measures by blocking the departure of the rescue boats of the Spanish NGOs Open Arms and Salvamento Marittimo Humanitario (Euronews 2019b).

EU institutions and member states involved in this (non-)conflict over closed harbours and migrant relocation were aware that the actual issue had been ‘solved’ elsewhere - not single-handedly by either EU member states or institutions, but through concerted EUropean measures. The solution to the ‘crisis’ in the central Mediterranean was found in the externalisation of border controls, pursued collectively by the Italian government, EU institutions and other member states. Only through the financing, training, equipping, and politically legitimising of Libyan authorities could migrant arrivals in EUrope be reduced. These Libyan authorities, known for their violent treatment of escaping migrants, repeated breaches of maritime and international human rights conventions, and their own involvement in the ‘smuggling industry’, were able to enact what Italy, other member states, and EU institutions had long worked toward, the drastic reduction of migrant crossings via the central Mediterranean Sea (Stierl and Mezzadra 2019).
3. Too violent to be of EUrope?

In the context of unauthorised migrant crossings into EUrope, the much-mediatised political tensions between certain EU member states and institutions are regularly interpreted as the result of fundamentally discordant approaches to the governance of migration. The repeated scolding of Hungary’s border measures and, though to a lesser degree, those of the Italian government, reinforces a binary imaginary of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ ways of governing migration, with some deemed more humane and EUropean, others less humane and rather un-EUropean. However, the frictions around Hungary’s fences and Italy’s closed harbours do not reveal an irreconcilability of political aims in the governance of migrant populations. Despite the constant provocations of the Hungarian and Italian governments toward the ‘pro-migrant liberal elites’ in Brussels, all parties concerned were keenly aware that merely thoroughly EUropean efforts would ensure the reduction of migrant arrivals, which, after all, was and continues to be a shared desire.

In 2016, as mentioned before, the ‘long summer of migration’ came to a halt only due to border enforcement measures that were of EUrope, in particular the radical deterrence practices by EU (and non-EU) states along the Balkan route and those incentivised by the EU-Turkey deal. The deal outsourced migrant interceptions at sea to the Turkish coastguards in return for financial support pledged to Turkey – a total of six billion Euro, including two billion Euro from the EU budget (European Commission 2018c). In 2018, the sea-crossings from Libya could only be radically reduced through the combined efforts by EU institutions and member states in building up the so-called Libyan coastguards and increasing aerial surveillance off north African shores by deploying assets of Frontex and the EU naval operation Eunavfor Med. At the same time, EUropean maritime assets were withdrawn from the most contentious, and deadly, area near the coast of Libya so as to avoid being forced into rescue operations that would, in all likelihood, lead to disembarkations in EUrope.

That despite such obvious entanglement of border enforcement measures the semblance of distinctly EUropean and un-EUropean ways of governing migration can persist is in no small part due to attempts by EU institutions, particularly the Commission, to maintain the imaginary of EUrope as a peaceful post-national and trans-border polity vis-à-vis attempts by EU member states to maintain the illusion of their ‘sovereign control’ over borders. Often reproduced by levels of analysis approaches, one primary mechanism through which the entangled nature of EUropean migration governance is disguised is to juxtapose what is carried out on either the supra-national level of the EU with what is carried out on the national level of individual member states. Conflicts that frequently arise are thus seen as an inevitable consequence of incongruous rationales and values guiding sovereign or ‘post-sovereign’ forms of migration governance, with the former considered less humane than the latter.

Viewed in this way, the process of EUropeanising migration governance, if considered at all, is understood as the simple transfer of competence over migration policy ‘upward’, to the ‘EU level’, and thus a loss of ‘sovereignty’ for the member state. Leila Hadj-Abdou (2016, 106-107) refers to the process of EUropeanising migration policy as the “process by which key decisions about public policies are gradually transferred to the European level”, involving “a shift away from a national to a post-national framework of immigration politics and immigration policy making”. That conflicts then appear between these levels of governance seems implied as the process of EUropeanisation is routinely equated with “a strengthening of the rights of immigrants” (Hadj-Abdou 2016, 116) as well as with the limiting of the ability of
EU member states to pursue the restrictive and nationalistic migration policies they desire. This partition between national and supra-national (or post-national) or value-driven and sovereignty-driven governance hides more than it reveals, as it obscures the myriad ways in which the EUropean border regime entangles levels of governance, even to an extent that speaking of distinct levels appears misleading.

This unfortunate partition allows for what I call a recoding of border violence. Migrant suffering and anti-migrant violence are consistently dissociated from actions taken by the political union, commonly disqualified from the supra-national EU ‘level’ and (re-)ascribed to individual EU member states or third countries, often considered those failing to live up to EUropean norms and values. Though deeply entangling different ‘levels’ of governance, the EUropean border coincides with a superficial but highly symbolic and meaningful recoding and (re-)nationalisation of border violence. There are forms of violence, such as abandonment and ‘pushing-back’ at sea or of beating people on the move across land borders that cannot return to EUrope as that would tarnish its dominant imaginary of itself. These border measures are simply too violent to be of EUrope. When Hungary used teargas and batons on migrants at newly erected fences, it brought images of physical violence and those of ‘hard borders’ into EUrope, images contrary to how EUrope wants to be understood before itself and the world, namely as a trans-border and post-national polity. The quick denunciations of Hungary’s use of force demonstrated that EUrope’s deniability in implications in anti-migrant violence needed to be preserved even if its effects, the reduction of migrant crossings to the north and west of EUrope, were praised.

While institutional actors such as the Commission cannot appear to contribute to a violent ‘fortress EUrope’, some of its member states, including Hungary and Italy, can accept a degree of ‘blame’ for border violence, not least as their governments’ exploitation of anti-migrant sentiments resonates with much of their electorate that carried them into office in the first place. The benefit for EU member states to (re-)demarcate national territories, precisely in light of the EUropeanisation of the border and the supposed erosion of their ‘national sovereignty’ and ‘monopoly of violence’, should not be under-estimated. Especially in questions of migrant admission or rejection, there is a strong interest among member states to retain at least the illusion of having ‘sovereign control’ and being the ultimate enforcers over who gets to ‘come in’ and who ‘stays out’. This remains the case even in the seemingly paradoxical situation where an EU institution requests from an EU member state to increase the use of ‘sovereign violence’ in order to maintain the rules of the EU asylum system, which was the situation when the Commission asked Italy to use force in the process of fingerprinting migrant arrivals in order to guarantee that the Dublin regulation would be upheld.

Of course, the most draconian forms of anti-migrant violence need to be fully disqualified from EUrope’s doing and nominal political turf. The diffusion of EUropean borders through their vacillation, externalisation and emergence ‘everywhere’ (Balibar 2004, 1) has the somewhat paradoxical consequence of making it increasingly difficult to definitively discern their EUropean dimensions. Atrocities of the sort that occur in spaces such as Libya cannot be re-absorbed by even the most staunchly anti-migrant EUropean government and thus need to be concentrated in the less visible or visibilisable spaces seemingly not of EUrope. As the examples of the EU-Turkey deal and the agreement with Libyan authorities show, the outsourcing and externalising of the EUropean border is pursued collectively by EU institutions and member states with the shared aim to reduce migrant departures and to find a spatial resolution for the forms of border violence that necessarily accompany migrant deterrence efforts. The disqualifying of violence from EUrope’s doing is particularly stark in the north
African context. Although EUropean forces continue to be directly involved in mass refoulement operations of migrants back to Libya, in breach of international law and refugee conventions, the Commission (2019c, 2) maintains that “[t]he EU does not practice push-backs and no migrants saved by European boats are ever returned to Libya. Our priority is to prevent people taking dangerous journeys in the first place and to provide protection and support to vulnerable people along migratory routes.”

4. Re-Entangling the EUropean Border

Contemporary EUrope is regularly portrayed as being in disarray, with migration constituting one of the main reasons for conflict. The line dividing EUrope is often drawn between those seemingly advocating for ‘hard’ borders and restrictive nationalist migration policies, in particular governments in the south and east of EUrope such as the Visegrád Group, and those arguing for a more humane and collective ‘management’ of migrant populations, especially EU institutions and seemingly progressive member states such as France and Germany. These divisions map onto political attitudes either favourable or sceptical toward the EU and fuel the idea that these conflicts over migration shake the very foundation and future of this post-national and trans-border polity. What falls regularly out of view are the many ways in which such conflicts have overshadowed processes of EUropeanisation through the governance of migration that have accelerated since 2015, which deeply involve both EU institutions and member states.

In 2017, the Commission issued a warning to EU member states, stating that “[r]eturning to a pre-crisis mode of isolated, uncoordinated, national action is not an option and would betray years’ worth of collective work to better the collective European response to managing migration” (Guardian 2017). Though the Commission exaggerated the lack of cooperation in migration governance pre-2015, collective EUropean measures taken during and after the ‘migration crisis’ have signalled a turning point. The Commission’s (2019b, 1) suggestion in 2019 that “we have made more progress in the space of 4 years than was possible in the 20 years preceding them” appears rather accurate. Looking back to the years following “the most severe refugee crisis the world has seen since the Second World War”, the Commission (2019b, 1) outlined how both EU institutions and member states have “put in place the building blocks of a new, more sustainable way of managing migration and border security in the EU.” Some of the main achievements listed include the European Agenda on Migration, the Hotspot Approach, the EU military operation Eunavfor Med, the EU-Turkey deal, the launch of the new European Border and Coast Guard, the successful fight against smuggling networks, the ad-hoc coordination role of the Commission in migrant relocations after stand-offs at sea, the training of Libyan coastguards, and the increase in returns of migrants to countries of origin and transit.

Despite this unprecedented EUropeanisation of borderwork, the duality between seemingly EUropean and un-EUropean ways of governing migration is maintained, as both ‘sides’ profit from such duality. It is this separation that allows the Commission (2018a) to assert at the very moment of instigating more restrictive policies and building up migrant interception capacities of third countries that “we are not proposing a militarisation of our Union.” And it is this separation that allows EU member states to muster electoral support through attacks on the “pro-migration majority” in Brussels who would ‘invite’ migrants into the union, as Orbán reiterated in 2019 (Politico 2019). In order to counter this illusionary separation, a conceptual vocabulary is needed that is able to capture the EUropeanness of the border, thus the
complexity of EUropean migration governance that entangles a range of actors, policies, and practices, and that results in widespread anti-migrant violence.

Over recent years, and often inspired by the work of Michel Foucault, conceptual frameworks and vocabularies have emerged that attempt to make sense of the entangled ways in which migration is being governed. Departing from traditional and state-centric logics of sovereign authority, notions such as assemblage, apparatus, dispositif, or governmental regime have become more central in conceptualising the myriad of actors, systems, and rationales that coalesce in the governance of migration (Walters 2002; Hess and Kasparek 2012; Feldman 2012). For Tsianos and Karakayali (2010, 376), “the concept of regime makes it possible to understand regulations of migration as effects, as condensations of social actions instead of taking regulations functionalistically for granted.” Rather than a hierarchical system of government, the EUropean border regime entangles authorities, policies, and technologies to a degree that a neat distinction between what is done by or on behalf of the EU or its member states cannot be maintained.

There indeed is a “fluid assemblage of agreements and actors”, as Luiza Bialasiewicz (2011, 299) suggests, “with considerable slippage between the bordering practices of Member States and what is done ‘on behalf’ of the Union.” Employing the concept of regime to conceptualise EUropean borderwork allows to interrogate such ‘slippage’ between what are often regarded as distinct levels of governance. Conceiving the workings of the EUropean border regime as a fluid assemblage means that it makes little sense to separate neatly between the national member state level and the supra-national EU level, and thus helps to re-entangle what is continuously made to appear as distinct realms of authority, responsibility, and violence. That conflicts over migration are routinely and mistakenly viewed as indicating antagonistic rationales in EUropean migration governance, as the example provided in this article show, does not erase the fact that there are significant tensions within EUrope. These tensions, however, do not map neatly onto a binary conception of EUropean, and thus humane, vis-à-vis national, and thus inhumane, forms of migration governance.

Indeed, although Hungary’s actions against those on the move along the Balkans were widely criticised as conflicting with EUropean values, they aligned with deterrence and externalisation practices that are part and parcel of EUrope’s border architecture, manifest for example in the Aegean Sea in light of the EU-Turkey deal. Kallius (2016, 137) is thus correct when noting that it would make little sense to “[sketch] the Hungarian ‘case’ at first, followed by the European ‘context’, because the two are chronologically and contextually interwoven and interlinked.” The closure of the Balkan route can thus not be reduced to a Hungarian (or Eastern EUropean) issue but would have to be regarded as the effects of Hungarian-EUropean borderwork. Not reducible to the autonomous actions of any particular actor or state, it would be more precise to understand what occurred along the Balkans in 2015 and 2016 as the interplay between migrant mobilities and the workings of an internally complex EUropean border regime.

Similarly, instead of viewing the blocking of migrants at member state harbours as a distinctly Italian (or Maltese) issue, it should be understood as the effect of Italian-EUropean borderwork. While retaining a particular Italian inflection, it needs to be situated within the EUropean context that includes, for example, prior tensions over the Dublin regulation and the question of migrant relocation as well as the concerted attempts to outsource migrant interception to EUrope’s Libyan and other third country allies. Utilising the concept of regime in the context of EUropean migration governance thus helps connecting what is often meant to
be kept distinct. By re-entangling the EUropean border we can better articulate the EUropeanness of the border also in order to grasp the violence it exerts, often far beyond what is considered its nominal political sphere.

**Conclusion: Something called EUrope**

The imaginary of EUrope as a post-national and trans-border project, even a community ‘allergic’ to borders and ceaselessly on the move, seems to stand in tension with a EUrope of hard borders with which migrant others violently collide. This tension is often resolved through partitions between supposedly supra-national and national levels of governance, EUropean and un-EUropean, or humane and inhumane ways of regulating migration. In accordance with such facile partitions, we seem to see EUrope’s ethos of tolerance and openness threatened by the nationalist desires of some EU member states to resurrect barriers along sovereign lines. Conflicts between EU member states vis-à-vis EU institutions (or other ‘pro-EU’ member states) over unauthorised migrations into the political union thus appear to be the logical consequence.

This article has argued against taking these conflicts at face value. By reinforcing distinctions between levels of governance that have long ceased to exist, they create the illusion of antagonistic approaches in the governance of migration. Instead of replicating “analytical procedures that presume a radical dualism as a ground of scholarly credibility” (Walker 2010, 257–258), often detectable in levels of analysis approaches, this article has made the case for a more nuanced account that does not deny particular (national) inflections and tensions within the EUropean border regime while honing in on the deep entanglement of EUropean (and non-EUropean) actors, policies, and practices in the governance of migration, interwoven and constitutive of one another to a degree that untying them would be impossible. Processes of EUropeanisation in the context of migration are not new and have accelerated also in light of past ‘migration crises’. To give but one example, in 2006, the increased migrant movements to the Canary Islands prompted the first large-scale operation of the newly formed EU border agency Frontex and effectively externalised EUrope’s border into west Africa (Carrera 2007). Nonetheless, the struggles over migration and its control in 2015 and after constitute a caesura and triggered processes EUropeanisation at an unprecedented pace – there is no reason to suspect that EUrope is at the brink of collapse after which EU member would guard their ‘sovereign’ turfs independently.

The persisting idea of EUropean and un-EUropean ways of governing migration allows EUrope to maintain its post-national and trans-border imaginary and EU member states to stress their sovereign authority. This tacit agreement comes, however, with considerable risk. Through the constant presentation of itself as an open and tolerant polity, EUrope has given ammunition to those who increasingly come to understand EUrope as “the totem of all that stands in the way of the homely” (Amin 2017, 92). As Ash Amin (2017, 91) writes: “Now migrants – their presence, needs and rights – are cast as the prime threat to national security, well-being and cohesion, and Europe is cast as the unruly space that allows this threat to grow.” Those characterised by Nicholas De Genova (2015) as “patriotic Europeans” challenge the dominant imaginary of EUrope and reject what it seems to stand for: a transborder polity underpinned by cosmopolitan values and humanitarian virtues. Not least due to EUrope’s re-telling of its own tale, it becomes “increasingly seen as a space of encroachment, instability and uncertainty”, as having “lost its lustre as a place of progress, security and solidarity” (Lewis and Amin 2017, 2).
The growing right-wing tide throughout EUrope risks to tip the ‘balance’ that was struck, which allowed only EU member states to both bask in and be scolded for the exertion of sovereign violence vis-à-vis migrant others while supra-national EUrope could maintain its transgressive trope and the role as admonisher of violent and un-EUropean forms of border enforcement. With anti-migrant sentiments connecting ever-more explicitly with anti-EU sentiments, one must wonder whether the EU’s ability to camouflage and distance itself from anti-migrant violence has led to the paradoxical situation where EUropeans turn their backs on the EU due to such concealment, simply because EUrope can be traced only with difficulty in the perpetration of anti-migrant atrocities. Somewhat provocatively, then, the question must be raised whether its post-national habitus has displaced and concealed EUrope’s actual involvement in the creation of ever-more deadly border obstacles to an extent that this imaginary now comes to haunt EUrope.

Possibly, those considered by Orbán, Salvini and co as the pro-migrant Brussels elites have come to acknowledge the risk in maintaining the chimera of post-national and trans-border EUrope. Though certainly not owning up to EUrope’s implication and complicity in anti-migrant violence, attempts are being made to define more clearly ‘who draws up EUrope’s borders’, to paraphrase Derrida (1992, 5). Seeking to turn the EU border agency Frontex into a fully-fledged “European border police force”, as called for by German chancellor Angela Merkel (Reuters 2018), the now re-branded European Border and Coast Guard Agency intends to soon grow into a 10,000-person-strong standing corps (European Council 2019). Though unable to agree on a EUropean search and rescue operation in the Mediterranean, the EU continues to engage militarily in its ‘anti-smuggling’ campaign through operation Eunavfor Med. And in September 2019, the Commission president-elect Ursula von der Leyen proposed to change the migration commissioner’s title to “Protecting our European Way of Life” (Deutsche Welle 2019). When we pay closer attention to the ways in which something called EUrope emerges in the drawing up of borders and the governance of migrant others, we may, finally, find an answer to Balibar’s (1991, 7) question about “what this word ‘Europe’ means and what it will signify tomorrow”.

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\[ii\] The term ‘EUrope’ problematises frequently employed usages that equate the European Union with Europe and Europe with the EU and suggests, at the same time, that EUrope is not reducible to the institutions of the EU (see Stierl 2019).

\[iii\] According to Paul James (2019: 41), “an imaginary is not the particular ideas or beliefs held by people, but the collation of those ideas in a larger social frame.” For Manfred Steger (2009: 6; also 2008), social imaginaries can be understood as “implicit ‘backgrounds’ that make possible communal practices and a widely shared sense of their legitimacy.” Drawing on the work of Charles Taylor, he further notes: “The social imaginary offers explanations of how ‘we’ - the members of the community - fit together, how things go on between us, the expectations we have of each other, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie those expectations.” For Steger, such imaginaries constitute “shared visions of self and community” and become ‘real’ as “namable collectivities” through common practices, repetitive performances, and the “social construction of space.” Though “feigning permanence”, social imaginaries are subject to change and thus form “temporary constellations”.

\[iv\] The ongoing diplomatic rows between the French and Italian governments have several roots – in matters related to migration governance two issues are notable: disputes over the ‘dumping’ of migrants in Italy, who had already crossed into French territory (Al-Jazeera 2018) and the siding with oppositional factions in war-torn Libya (Guardian 2018b).

\[v\] According to Salvatore Martello, the mayor of Lampedusa, by downplaying migrant arrivals and no longer publishing the locations of landings, the Italian government seeks “to try and show Italians that there aren’t anymore landings” (Borderline Sicilia 2019).

\[vi\] Given that “there is no systematic oversight or centralised information collection” (ECRE 2019, 6), it is unclear how many individuals have been actually relocated under the ad-hoc relocation system. Following the German government, up until the 11th of April 2019, 152 individuals were relocated, 31 from Italy and 121 from Malta (see Deutscher Bundestag 2019).

\[vii\] More than simply the national and supra-national ‘levels’ of governance, the concept of regime encompasses a range of actors, including international organisations and NGOs. To discuss their important role in the governance of migration would exceed the scope of this article. For analyses of the role of IOM and UNHCR in the international governance of migration, see Scheel and Ratfisch 2014 as well as Andrijasevic and Walters 2010.