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Experiencing (in) time

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Shardlow, Jack (2019) Experiencing (in) time. PhD thesis, University of Warwick.

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Official URL: http://webcat.warwick.ac.uk/record=b3443032~S1

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Abstract

In this thesis I present a phenomenological investigation of our experience of time – of things as they fall within time – and suggest that something important goes missing in recent debates. This is the notion of a point of view. I believe that articulating the sense in which we have a point of view in time, and what this is a point of view upon, is crucial to an account of how things are for an experiencing subject.

In the first chapter, I elucidate the specious present. I argue that theorists appeal to the specious present under two guises without explicitly distinguishing between them; yet these two conceptions are not identical, while one entails the other the reverse is not true. In the second chapter I defend an appeal to the specious present (as developed in the first chapter) against proponents of what I refer to as snapshot models of temporal experience. I argue that perceptual experience minimally presents something of some non-zero temporal extent as such.

In the third chapter I discuss how we are to characterise experience over intervals of time of a greater extent than the specious present. I offer a proposal on which a subject is invariably presented with a positive temporal extent, with this interval marking the partition between the past and the future for the subject. In the fourth chapter I compare and contrast our experience of objects and events, and our experiential point of view in space and in time. Among other things, I argue that getting right how things are for the subject requires an appeal to the subject’s asymmetrical awareness of times either side of the specious present. In fifth and final chapter I demonstrate that appeal to an experiencing subject’s tensed temporal perspective can explain the sense in which time seems to pass.

Item Type: Thesis or Dissertation (PhD)
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Time -- Philosophy, Presentism (Philosophy), Time perception
Official Date: March 2019
Dates:
DateEvent
March 2019UNSPECIFIED
Institution: University of Warwick
Theses Department: Department of Philosophy
Thesis Type: PhD
Publication Status: Unpublished
Supervisor(s)/Advisor: Hoerl, Christoph ; Soteriou, Matthew
Sponsors: University of Warwick. Centre for Arts Doctoral Research Excellence
Format of File: pdf
Extent: 207 leaves
Language: eng

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