Sequential innovations and intellectual property rights
Payot, Frederic and Szalay, Dezsö (2008) Sequential innovations and intellectual property rights. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.864).
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Official URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/resear...
We analyze a two-stage patent race. In the first phase firms seek to develop a research tool, an innovation that has no commercial value but is necessary to enter the second phase of the race. The firm that completes the second phase of the race first obtains a patent on the final innnovation and enjoys its profits. We ask whether patent protection for the innovator of the research tool is beneficial from the ex ante point of view. We show that there is a range of values of the final innovation such that firms prefer to have no Intellectual Property Rights for research tools.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
K Law > K Law (General)
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Intellectual property, Patents -- Research, Industrial property, Technological innovations, Knowledge management|
|Series Name:||Warwick economic research papers|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick, Department of Economics|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Official Date:||12 September 2008|
|Number of Pages:||18|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
 Anand, Bharat N. and T. Khanna (2000), "The Structure of Licensing Contracts", The Journal of Industrial Economics, 48 (1): 103-135.
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