Blackorby, Charles and Szalay, Dezsö (2008) Regulating a monopolist with unknown costs and unknown quality capacity. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.858).

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Abstract

We study the regulation of a firm with unknown demand and cost information. In contrast to previous studies, we assume demand is influenced by a quality choice, and the firm has private information about its quality capacity in addition to its cost. Under natural conditions, asymmetric information about the quality capacity is irrelevant. The optimal pricing is weakly above marginal costs for all types and no type is excluded.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HF Commerce
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Information asymmetry, Trade regulation, Quality control, Cost control
Series Name:	Warwick economic research papers
Publisher:	University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Official Date:	24 June 2008
Dates:	Date Event 24 June 2008 Published
Number:	No.858
Number of Pages:	42
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access (Creative Commons)

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