Foreign policy and Nation-State building
in Algeria, 1962-1985

Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD in Political Science
by
B. IRATNI

University of Warwick
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TO my Father,

in fondest memory.

To my Father
Abstracts:

This study analyses the intimate relationship between foreign policy and nation-state building in Algeria since independence. It assumes that foreign policy stands as a part and parcel of the process of building a state and cementing national feelings in a society that emerged through a long period of colonisation and a violent struggle for liberation.

This thesis is sub-divided into six chapters to highlight the link between foreign policy and the nation-state building process:

Chapter One underlines the conceptions of the Algerian ideologists with regard to affirming the existence of an Algerian nation and a state well before French colonisation. It also attempts to locate the political forces that emerged as nation-builders and ascertain their achievements.

In chapter Two, the decision-making process is scrutinized through the study of the main actors and institutions forming the foreign community and the interference in formulating and conducting the country's foreign policy.

Sovereignty, as one of the basic foundations of a nation-state unit, constitutes the theme of the third Chapter and is analysed through the efforts of the Algerian leaders to assert their country's sovereignty vis-a-vis its former metropole, France.

Chapter Four relates the state's security and territorial integrity to the regional context, notably to Algeria's relations with her neighbours which have been marked by ideological differences and territorial disputes.

Chapter Five deals with the efforts of Algeria to establish her identity on radical and technocratic perceptions of Arabo-Islamism at home and on a deep attachment to the policy of non-alignment abroad.

Finally, Chapter Six focuses on the link between foreign policy and national economic development as it has been conceived by the state's technocracy and assesses the successes and failures of the economic policy as well as Algeria's role in North-South debates.
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I acknowledge that this thesis could not have been carried out without a generous grant from the Algerian Ministry of Higher Education. I must also thank Mr. Ghamari, Mr. Moughlam and Dr. Bencherif for having helped me to obtain an extension of this grant for another year.

I owe a particular debt to all my family especially my brother Lalaouil and my wife Monika for their unestimable help and encouragement.

Warm thanks go to Mrs Brown who, in addition to typing the thesis, showed me a great deal of patience and kindness.

Thanks, too, go to my friends Dhami, Salah, Abdu, Hakim, Omar Bahl and Fawzia, who have provided me with a sincere friendship and respect, rare to find in these times.
Remarks on the collection of data for this research

For some foreign observers, it might appear quite easy for an Algerian to gain access to a wide variety of Algerian sources including interview, unpublished primary sources and on the spot observations. I must, however, admit that in the course of my research, I found a number of difficulties in obtaining the necessary material for reasons inherent in the secretive character of the decision-making process in Algeria. Beside the nonavailability of satisfactory records of members of the Algerian political elite, lack of published memoirs of exiled opponents or retired personalities, there had been a great hesitation, if not unwillingness, from many high officials to assist me. Also unfortunate was the period in which most of the research work took place (1980-1983). Indeed, because of the instability of the political personnel due to changes inherent in a transitional period, many of these officials who initially agreed to be interviewed finally declined my requests. Political uncertainty, rivalries between groups, matters of promotion or fear of reprisals may have been, in many cases, the reasons behind this reluctance.

Despite several trips to Algeria and long sojourns there - all self-sponsored - and some efforts made through connections, I was not very successful in gathering data from the foreign ministry and gaining a direct access to its archives or documentary sources. Nevertheless, with the help of Mr Ghazali (whom I warmly thank for his assistance and kindness), I was able to interview M. Abada and M. Baghli, former directors at the Foreign Ministry and M. Ogab, a party official. Although they showed a certain deal of sympathy, their contribution did not go beyond the level of officiality, a matter which did not help me to get deep insights into the foreign decision-making process. However, I
feel obliged to thank them for agreeing to be interviewed and for their highly intelligent discourse. In similar vein, I must thank M. Baba-Ali, Nasri and Semmache.

Sensitive information related to chapters one, two and four have been essentially drawn up from discussions with a few people that helped me and specifically requested not to be mentioned in this thesis or to have information expressly attributed to themselves. Regretfully I must comply with their wishes but I would like them to find here a sincere gratitude.

A great deal of other data derived from various official publications, and state-owned newspapers. Despite its ritual discourse and official status, El-Moudjahid proved a valuable source of information to analyse declarations and actions of the Algerian government. The Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, Africa Contemporary Record and Africa Confidential appeared fundamental and indispensable for any study on Algerian politics. Among the libraries well endowed with material on Algeria, and whose facilities I used on many occasions, were the Bibliothèque Nationale and the Institut des études politiques in Algiers; the valuable Centre de recherche sur les Sociétés Méditerranéennes at Aix-En-Provence; the bibliothèque des sciences humaines Cujas and the institut des études politiques both in Paris and the very useful libraries of St Anthony College, Oxford; the School of Oriental and African Studies, London. Books on Algeria were also found at the Universities of Bamberg, Erlangen and Wurzburg in West Germany as well as in Liège in Belgium. As expected for a study on Algeria, works in French have been used extensively and all translations from French as well as from Arabic and Spanish are mine unless otherwise indicated. Sources in German language have been made accessible to me by my
German-born wife who happens to be a teacher of English. Finally, French transliterations of Algerian names have been used in this thesis to avoid confusion over patronymics.
L'Histoire est le miroir du passé et l'échelle (grâce à laquelle on s'élève) du présent. Elle est la preuve de l'existence des peuples, le livre où s'inscrit leur puissance, le lieu de résurrection de leur conscience, la voix de leur nation, le tremplin de leurs progrès. Lorsque les membres d'une nation étudient leur histoire, lorsque les jeunes prennent connaissance de ses cycles, ils connaissent leur réalité et alors les nationalités vivantes et insatiables du voisinage s'abordent par leur propre nationalité. Ils comprennent la gloire de leur passé et la noblesse de leurs ancêtres et n'acceptent ni les dénigrements des dépréciateurs, ni les atteintes des falsificateurs ni les médisances des gens du parti pris.

Sheikh Mubarak Al Mili

A healthy nation is as unconscious of its nationality as a healthy man of his bones. But if you break a nation's nationality it will think of nothing else but getting it set again. It will listen to no reformer, to no philosopher, to no preacher, until the demand of the nationalist is granted. It will attend to no business of unification and liberation. Conquered nations lose their place in the world's march because they can do nothing but strive to get rid of their nationalist movements by recovering their national liberation.

Bernard Shaw

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1Ta rikh al jazair, 1929.
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Theoretical Framework

Both decolonization in the early 1960s and the North-South confrontation combined with the energy crisis in the mid-1970s produced a great deal of writings on the politics of the Non-Western world, especially the new state which had emerged through a more or less violent process of liberation. However, a survey on the works devoted to these states reveals a neglect of studies on their foreign relations. The paucity of empirical studies appears striking although a relatively limited number of these new states have attracted the attention of scholars and students alike. The focus of academic research has generally been on the foreign policies of great or medium powers or on world economic issues. As a result, the literature concerning the external policies of the third world in general and of the new states in particular is still a teething one and thus subject to further investigation.

To our knowledge, Algerian foreign policy remains modestly explored. Only two major works have been devoted to the analysis of this theme as a whole so far but covering events only up to 1978. Such a lack is quite surprising when reviewing French-speaking literature on Algeria, considering this country's important relations with France, its weight in the Maghreb and active role in the North-South skirmishes. The emphasis has instead been put on analyzing its domestic policies, especially the model of economic development. Moreover, the interest of French academics in Algerian politics is perhaps declining, while Algerian scholars and students have been quite cautious to avoid dealing with the study of the Algerian foreign-policy making as they probably felt this
subject was too sensitive. However, it seems that the lack of data on the Algerian foreign-policy decision making proved in many cases the major discouraging factor.

In the field of international relations, attempts have been made to explain the process of foreign policy and construct models for the analysis of individual cases, but the analytical findings remain quite elusive and as far as the new states are concerned no generally accepted theoretical framework exists which can be applied to a single case-study. It seems, however, misleading to think that theoretical models constructed for the study of Western industrialized states could be satisfactorily applied when analyzing the external behaviour of the new states.

'Foreign-decision-making' theories as they had been outlined by Frankel, Snyder and al; or the 'bureaucratic approach' as formulated by Henry Kissinger and developed by Allison and Halperin focused on a well-defined decisional unit, assuming the availability of information on the values, choices and behaviour of the decision-makers and on the structures, regulations and operations of the decision-making process. In many new states, foreign-decision-making is highly centralized and secretive; political institutions are very weak, bureaucracies not well articulated, and the influence of public opinion and pressure groups minimal. The authoritarian character of many of them renders the task of obtaining detailed accounts on decisions quite difficult and in addition documentary material is scant, information on the political elite relatively scarce and free press rarely exists. Like in many new states, the media in Algeria are state property which one could use as an
indicator of the government's view on foreign policy issues, but much of the information provided emphasizes political and economic achievements of the regime as well as the ritual revolutionary rhetoric.

Professor Rosenau's pre-theories and theories of foreign policy offer a more complex and broader model for the analysis of the state's external behaviour through operationalizing five sets of variables: individual, role, governmental, societal and systemic. 'Individual' or 'idiosyncratic' variables refer to the values that distinguish one decision-maker from another; 'role' variables are related to the expectations of the society; 'governmental' reflect the influence of political structures; 'societal' concern factors such as political culture and economic capabilities; and 'systemic' variables pertain to external influence. Although this model may be theoretically attractive; it remains difficult to operationalize its cluster of variables when dealing with either Western or new states. The specification of the variables appears confusing and sometimes overlapping as it seems difficult to determine clearly into which set of variables the data properly fit; and in addition to the failure of explaining how the various variables interact with each other, the distinction between the decision-maker's values and those stemming from the roles they occupy proves hard to ascertain, especially in the case of the new states where there is a significant lack of data on 'role' variables. With regard to these states, Rosenau's ranking of the variables in accordance to their potency presents a number of methodological problems. It seems difficult to distinguish between 'large' and small countries and between 'open' and 'close' political systems and the criteria such as geography and physical resources given by Rosenau are
not sufficient to do so. If it is true that the classification of states rests on a wider number of variables such as surface, population, military, economic capabilities and so on, it nevertheless depends on one's point of view in the final analysis.\(^5\)

Lastly, the stress on the potency of 'individual' factors in the new states seems over-exaggerated. Although Algeria lacked solid political underpinnings, it is not easy to state that the 'determinants' of her foreign policy are primarily idiosyncratic. We will not be concerned with whether idiosyncracies are more important than the geographic, historical and cultural factors but instead why some 'determinants' created more incentives for the Algerian leadership to play a greater role in world politics and adopt a more 'militant' foreign status than other new states and why foreign policy has been more important to the nation-state building in Algeria than elsewhere.

Many political scientists agree that the process of foreign policy in general, results from an interaction between domestic and external environments, while acknowledging that domestic and foreign policies are still ill-defined and the distinction between the two elements is markedly blurred.\(^6\) And as far as new states are concerned, it is assumed that foreign policy is largely an extension of the domestic political environment and/or responding more to internal conditions than to external problems.\(^7\) The separation between the two areas which had been fundamental in the traditional theory of international relations is no longer clear in our era where states are increasingly interdependent. Thus the conception that sovereign states pursue 'national' interests and objectives unrestrained proved too simplistic and irrelevant in the
context of a world gradually dominated by transnational politics. Therefore as it was argued no state operates solely according to its own objectives.

With regard to the newly created states, many political writers underlined the limitations upon and deficiencies of their foreign relations such as strategic location, the degree of domestic stability, limited environment and resources as well as the continuing link between a former metropole with its former colony and the constraints of the international system. By the same token, the classical theory of 'balance of power' which assumes that power or capabilities are the most important source of a state's foreign policy is of a little interest, especially with regard to the new states.

Foreign policy is much more complex and consisting of a number of variables, factors and conditions, the potency and accuracy of which vary from one country to another and over time. In the case of the new states, the formulation of foreign policy remains vague. While authors such as Padhyaya, Crabb for instance conceived foreign policy as the state's exercise of choice of ends and means, Cowan and Good stress instead its objectives. This is a sheer simplism, for states are neither entirely free to make choices with regard to the objectives to be achieved abroad nor are they unrestrained in the pursuit of their objectives. In the case of Algeria, the 1976 National Charter also defines the country's foreign policy as "the reflection of its domestic policy". This is apparently inadequate, for not all national policies can or need be extended abroad.
Studies on Algerian external policies reveal also some analytical deficiencies. Both Grimaud, and Lauff to a greater extent, paid little attention to the analysis of the foreign policy decision-making while Bouzidi remained silent on how domestic and foreign factors affect each other in spite of arguing that Algerian external relations were strongly shaped by a combination of these two sets of factors. Derradji's brief essay seems to postulate that the formulation and the conduct of this country's foreign policy could operate somehow regardless of domestic as well as foreign constraints. Most important in his conceptions are the determinants that accounted for the shaping of this policy such as geography, economy and revolutionary past. The listing and even the specification of variables that might conceivably affect foreign policy does not seem sufficient to apprehend meaningfully the state's behaviour if other crucial considerations such as values, objectives and means of the foreign policy decision makers are not well ascertained. The analysis of elite's attitude appears essential although not exclusive, in the case of new states where a centralized and relatively small ruling elite has been monopolizing much of the state's executive machinery. Given the difficulty of obtaining detailed accounts on the attitudes and decisions of the ruling elites, a mere study of internal and external determinants or factors that may affect the shaping of the state's external relations seems far from constituting a serious alternative for the analysis of the decision-making process and its main actors.

In many academic works that used the 'determinants' analytical framework, the boundaries between domestic and foreign determinants are not clearly stated, and what are labelled "foreign determinants" are not well defined. Does the latter refer to the structures and patterns of the
international system or merely to the policies and objectives of the super-powers? Whatever the merits of a study combining Domestic and Foreign determinants, there is still a need of assessing their interaction in order to explain not only how they affect the decisions of foreign policy matters but also why they are potent in a given nation-state unit and not in another. And even if this exercise is completed, there may be a risk that potency and accuracy of the 'determinants' selected will be affected by the researcher's own perceptions. One possibility that may attenuate this bias consists perhaps in extending the field of investigation from an individual case study to a comparative foreign policy analysis. A pluralistic approach may offer a more useful assessment of the quantification, differentiation, articulation and operationalization of the various 'determinants' under analysis, a process that may lead to a more acceptable global generalization.

To overcome some analytical shortcomings when dealing with the new states, some scholars suggested that foreign policy in these states should be considered not as an independent variable, but as a subsidiary of internal, domestic considerations, and others rightly drew the attention on the reciprocal relationship between nation-state building and foreign policy. In a study devoted to the Algerian external relations under Ben Bella (1962-1965), Mortimer ably stressed that the orientation of the Algerian foreign policy in world politics in its early stage, was an extension of its domestic experience and a continuation of the original revolt of the colony against its economic and human condition. Indeed, on independence, Algeria like many newly independent states, found herself facing the challenge of constructing a viable nation-state. The emerging elites were confronted with daunting tasks
and stark choices, as they had to make the transition from the colonial status to a formally sovereign and independent state. The building of durable and self-reliant nation-states whether it involves socio economic change, the setting up of political and public institutions, or consolidation of the legitimacy and authority of the government appears to be the major challenge the post-colonial ruling elites have been facing. Many of them discovered that formal independence was not by itself enough, as they lacked the capacity to achieve the prime aim of their external objectives and policies. Generally various burdens - such as national disintegration exacerbated sometimes by deep tribal and ethnic divisions; economic backwardness characterized by a severe lack of capital, skilled manpower and modern techniques, unresponsive and unsuitable political institutions dominated by authoritarian and personal rule and inefficient bureaucracies - had drastically limited the impact of many new states on world affairs, while links with their former metropoles or other major powers to acquire aid and protection has impaired their capacity to act as sovereign states. The question whether these problems and shortcomings are structural, as suggested by the dependency school, or stemming from the traditional predicament as assumed by the modernization approach theorists, is beyond the scope of this study. But one contention of our thesis is that colonial experience and the armed struggle for liberation constitute the most predominant feature of these countries which like Algeria, had undergone this double process. The tackling of nation-state building differed from one state to another according to the manner by which they reacted to colonial domination. Because independence came as a result of a violent armed struggle against colonialism, revolt against the colonial
past and order has been more pronounced in Algeria than in other former colonies which achieved independence at the close of a war such as India, Indonesia or Syria, or through a more or less peaceful process, such as Morocco, Tunisia or Nigeria.

The focus of this study rests on the assumption that in Algeria, like in other countries that shed the yoke of colonialism through an armed struggle, the notable feature is the crucial role the state assumed in the process of social change, and foreign policy is but an integrated part in this process. The specific socio economic and political set up has been conducive to the adoption of policies directed against foreign domination be it political, economic or cultural. From the task of creating a modern sovereign state to cementing national unity and identity, the paramount objective of the Algerian ruling elite has been to complete the country's decolonization. For the Algerian leaders, French colonialism had been responsible for the acculturation and depersonalisation of the Algerian people and for the country's economic under-development and dependence despite political sovereignty. It was as an expression of a continuing revolt that Algeria set out to mould from the ruins of the 'ancien régime' what she claimed to be a socialist society, and to adopt what she regards as an anti-imperialistic oriented foreign policy.

Once foreign policy has been conceptualized as a valuable means contributing to the process of nation-state building, it remains to determine what its specific uses are. Rather than simply playing the role of asserting the legitimacy of the regime and the cohesion of the leadership, or merely serving as a seductive means to divert the people's attention from domestic problems, foreign policy in Algeria seems to us
ultimately linked with four basic issues of nation-state building: sovereignty, security, identity and economic development. This study emphasizes the interaction between these issue-areas on the one hand, and between each and the external environment on the other. The sovereignty of the state, for instance, could be more asserted if national security and territorial integrity are better ensured and the recovery of identity may help cement national feelings within the community while economic capabilities may strengthen the state's sovereignty and security. By implication, the four sets of issues have an external counterpart which has to be taken into account. As for Algeria, the state's sovereignty was restrained by links with France; security by tensions with her neighbours, Morocco in particular; identity by the acculturation resulting from a long colonial experience; economic development by foreign capital and the mechanisms of the international economic relations. The interaction is far more complex and is by no means static and rigid. The potency and accuracy of the variables whether domestic or foreign tend to change as demands and constraints change not only within the home polity but also on the international level. Emphasis on the setting up of state structures and economic development for instance had been more significant during the Boumedienne era than under Ben Bella, and the concentration on domestic issues and on the assertion of national identity more pronounced at the present time than in the past.
Notes

The number of published works on the foreign policies of the new states is indeed limited and quite outdated. Among prominent studies on the problems of the former colonies with regard to access to sovereignty and to a new status in world politics, we could cite: Duroselle, J.B. and Meyriat (eds): Les nouveaux Etats dans les relations internationales (1962); Martin, L.W. (ed): Neutralism and non-alignment: the new states in world affairs (1962); Mazrui, A: Africa's international relations" (1977); McKay, V (ed): African diplomacy (1966); and Africa in world politics (1963); Rothstein, R.L.: Foreign policy and Development: from non-alignment to international class war (1976); and the weak in the world of the strong (1977); Thiam, D: the foreign policies of African states (1964); Zartman, I.W: International Relations in New Africa (1966). Discussion of models of foreign policy analysis and attempts to formulate theoretical approaches to the study of foreign policy in the new states have been the focus of the works of Fox, R.T: Nation-building and foreign policy in the former colonial states in Africa (in the new scholar,’ (3), 1970, pp.7-53); Boyce:Foreign affairs of the new states: some questions of credentials (1977); Butwell, R (ed): Foreign policy and the developing nations (1969); Clapham, C and Wallace, W (eds): Theories of foreign policy for the developing countries (1977); Migdal, J.S: Internal structures and external behaviour: explaining foreign policy of third world states (in international relations (1) 5, 1974, pp.510-525); Korany, B: "the take-off of third world studies?"(in World Politics, (35), pp.463-488). A significant contribution to the analysis of foreign decision-making process in some non-Western countries has been provided by McLaurin et al: Foreign policy making in the Middle East: Domestic influences on policies in Egypt, Iraq, Israel and Syria (1977). Kuomegni offers an original - but not highly pertinent - study on determining Africa’s major powers in the 1970s through the analysis of inter-African diplomatic links based on indices of diplomatic representations, missions and state visits. Kuomegni: Le Système Diplomatique Africain (1979).

The role of the new states (in the third world coalition) in world affairs, particularly in the North-South debates has been treated in Benachenhou, A: Le tiers-Monde enjeu (1981); Dominguez, J.J: Mice that do not roar: some aspects of international politics in the World’s periphery (1971); Marshall C. Singer: Weak states in a world of powers (1972); Mortimer, R.A: The third world coalition in international politics (1980); Sid-Ahmed, A: Nord-Sud: les enjeux (1981); Singer, H and Ansari, J: Rich and poor countries (1977); Tandon, Y: Readings in African


5Some studies dealt with the categorization of states on purely quantitative criteria. For instance, D. Vital: The inequality of states (1967); Keohane’s argument seems to be based on subjective criteria relevant to the statesmen’s own perceptions of their abilities and the status of their countries in world politics. Keohane, O.R: “Lilliputians’ dilemma: small states in international politics” in International organization, (23), 1969, pp.291-310; Rothstein links the state’s ‘size’ to the extent of which the state’s security relies on foreign sources. Rothstein: “Foreign policy and development” quoted in Barston, P.(ed): The other powers: studies in
the foreign policy of small states (1973), p.15. Baker-Fox defines small states (in comparison to other powers) according to the recognition of their leaders that their own state's political weight is limited to a local arena rather than a global one. Baker-Fox, A: "The small states in the international system", 1919-1969 in international journal, (24), No.4, pp.751-7.

A critical account of 'quantitative approaches' to distinguish between states could be found in De Ray-marker, D.et al: Small powers in alignment (1974) and an assessment of different approaches to the study of small states's foreign relations constituted the theme of Ganpatsingh's thesis (Foreign policy and small states, 1977).


7For example: Boyce, J.P: Foreign affairs of the new states.

8Barston, A.P: The other powers; Oluko, O (ed): The "determinants of the foreign policies of African states"; Migdal, J.S: Internal structures and external behaviour.

9Morgenthau, for instance, stresses that power is the overriding objective of the states, and the increasing of power will enable them to reach its objectives. Morgenthau, Hans J: Politics among Nations (1967).

10Padhyaya, J Bandy: The making of India's foreign policy; Crabb quoted in Oluko, O: Essays in Nigerian foreign policy; Cowan in Gray: Political determinants; Good, R.C: "State-building as determinant of foreign policy in the new states" in Neutralism and Non-alignment: The new states in World affairs edited by C.W.Martin, pp.3-12.


The process of nation-state building has commonly been regarded by political scientists as fundamental and even vital for the existence of the new states, and also for their survival for the reason, that in many former colonies, loyalties to the nation are believed weak and political institutions and administrative structures far from being definite and well-established. If with regard to the existence and survival of a national unit, the nation-state building has been essential, the ways to achieve it not only differed from one country to another but appeared peculiar in the case of the newly independent states in terms of standard and criteria by which political literature in the West defines the concept of nation-state. This is particularly evident in the view of the conception that has been drawn essentially from the European experience of nationalism at a time when many of the new nations were labelled as uncivilized and in the case of Algeria as the country of 'Barbarians'.

On a moral basis, the Algerian leaders rejected this conception, stressing the great antiquity of their people and its civilization, while in practice, they attempted to cement national feelings and build a modern state so as to lay the material basis for their nationhood. In their views, however, these tasks did not aim at building a nation-state but at ensuring the perennity of the nation and reviving the Algerian state which had been destroyed by French colonialism. The achievement of these objectives proved from the outset, difficult given the lack of national consensus which resulted from the fragmentation of the political elite. This difficulty was, nevertheless, surmounted by the emergence of the army as a political institution (a role conferred upon it by revolutionary legitimacy) and by the ascendancy of the technocracy by
virtue of competence and expertise. It was then around this coalition of officers and civilian technocrats that the process of building a modern nation-state has been carried out and expressed through a rapid economic development based on socialist principles and a strong and centralized state which has left a little room for mass participation and political mobilization.

A. THE HISTORICAL SEDIMENT

1. Past and Present: a difficult linkage

A modern nation may be defined according to Carl Friedrich as "any sizeable population or group of persons which can be called independent (i.e., not ruled from the outside); cohesive; politically organized (it provides a constituency for a government which exercises effective rule within it); autonomous (it accords with the government which claims consent, compliance and support as to make its rules effective); and internally legitimate."\(^1\) In view of these criteria of independence, effectiveness and legitimacy of the national authority; and if we consider as Professor Gellner suggested - the relation between the nation and the state as fundamental for the constitution of a nation in the modern sense (though some nations had preceded the birth of their own states) - few newly-independent countries could boast to encompass well-defined nations in the sense of Friedrich's definition.\(^2\) It was


even argued that in some newly-independent countries virtually no nation-state exists yet. In the case of Algeria, colonialism and the war of liberation as a reaction to it, were believed to have constituted the expression of Algerian modern nationalism which led to political independence and ultimately paved the way for the construction of a would-be modern nation-state. But if modernity were conceived only in temporal terms and only in the light of the European experience as a standard-bearer, Algeria and other former colonies would not only fall into a particular category, (in comparison with the European nation-state models as empirical and well-established units), but would also emerge as a new phenomenon in the life of the people of these new states themselves. The question that may promptly spring to mind is whether these peoples, and particularly their elites, felt their existence as a nation when they engaged in a battle to put an end to colonial domination or only after gaining political independence. Whatever the option one may choose, the implicit idea is that this sequence of nation-state belongs to contemporary history. The result from this intellectual exercise may be the acknowledgement of the absence of a past for these people before the relatively recent rise of the nation-state feelings; or in the eventuality of the existence of this past, there may have been a neglect of relations between past generations and present ones, as what matters most for contemporary political science are recent history and achievements.

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Zartman argues that traditional nation-tribes did exist but without modern relevance. I.W.Zartman: Characteristics of
In Algerian official discourse there has been a strong protest against the assumption that colonization was a 'mission civilisatrice'. In Algeria, it was argued, there had been both a nation and a state well before the French conquest in an attempt to stress the historical continuum of the country as society and people. This affirmation evidently breaks away from the French colonial conception that pre-colonial Algeria was a 'desolated land where nothing existed.' It also refutes the assumption of many foreign writers on Algerian history, especially French ethnological literature, that no Algerian nation existed prior to the nationalist awakening in this century. The reasons given by these writers were the inability of a nation to develop (Gauthier), because of the congenital impotence of the Berbers (Montagne), the conflicts between nation-building and tribal life (Zartman), the continuous local resistance to central authority (Amin), and the lack of preconditions for modern nationalism such as a middle-class, intelligentsia, written language and urban life (Gellner).

Moreover, claims of the absence of nationhood were sustained by reference to the lack of unity and cohesion between tribal resistance to French colonial rule in the nineteenth century and the intense factionalism that characterized the Algerian modern nationalist movement.

It appears difficult to explain tribal fragmentation and the divisions within the nationalist movement with accuracy with regard to the existence or absence of an Algerian nation. The task may be quite easy, however, if one takes into account only the socio-economic and cultural elements as criteria for differentiation. It was elements of the Algerian 'évolués' for instance - coming from the urban middle class and having a better access to French culture - who advocated assimilation and doubted the existence of a nation in contradistinction with the conceptions of segments that originated from a religious and traditional background. Furthermore, the argument that the impact of colonization alone had been responsible for these conflicting attitudes may prove fallacious against evidence that not all French-educated natives did advocate assimilation or reject their own identity and personality which they regarded as being different from those of the French settlers. To understand this cultural pluralism or rather the existence of subcultures in colonial (and present time) Algeria better, the examination of the history of this country may be useful. Unfortunately, it is

precisely the interpretation of this history that gave an abysmal
latitude to the complexity of apprehending meaningfully disagreements
over the existence or the absence of a nation. Those denying its
existence could hardly be accused of lack of intellectual knowledge
because what was perhaps unaware to many natives was not only the history
of Algeria itself, but may be also the existence of feelings of belonging
to a well-defined national unit. In either case, cultural alienation
has been made the chief responsible, therefore simplifying the quest for
an acceptable answer.

Until now, the history of Algeria has not been officially written,
notwithstanding brief and sometimes incomplete accounts provided by basic
history textbooks that have been used at schools and colleges. And
outside the official circles, there has been a remarkable lack of
contribution of Algerian intellectuals and academics to the writing of
this history, despite substantial efforts made in recent years.¹
Despite these shortcomings, the relation of the present time process of
building a nation-state with Algeria's historical roots may be of
significant interest to understand the socio-psychological environment of

¹Contemporary attempts to shed light on this history could
be found in the writings of some Ulema (Doctors of Muslim
Law) such as Ben Badis's articles published by this
association's periodicals between the two world wars, the
valuable accounts of Sheikh Mubarak Al Mili: Taariikh al
Jazair fi Al-Qadim wa al-Jadid (1928) (History of Algeria
in the present and the future (1929), Sheikh Tewfik
Almadani: Taariikh al Jazair (History of Algeria, 1932).
Among the much recent contributions worth mentioning are
the studies of two senior Algerian diplomats: M. Lacheraf:
Algérie, Nation et société (Paris, Maspero, 1965);
Bedjaoui, M: La Révolution Algérienne et le droit
Also important are the highly instructive lectures of M.
Kassim Nait Belkacem, a former Minister of Religious
Affairs, and his book: Shakhsiyat al jazair al dawliwa wa
mawhibatuha al alamiya (Algeria's international personality
the Algerian people and its elites, especially because the exaltation of nationalism as a unifying force and the prominence of the state in both domestic and foreign affairs may not be satisfactorily apprehended without a retrospective analysis of Algeria as a country and people. The difficulty in undertaking such an analysis has been felt by both the members of the Algerian ruling elites and the intelligentsia given diverse interpretations that had led to divergent conclusions and sometimes to radically opposed standpoints. This lack of consensus reflects the crisis of identity Algeria has been facing since independence. Dissonances between Arabic-educated segments and Francophones as well as conflicts between Muslim fundamentalist groups and those favouring secularism and modernization have been exacerbated by the emergence of the Kabyle cultural protest. The acuity of this crisis was such that it was recently publicly recognized by the minister of religious affairs.¹

The approach of the Algerian leaders toward the task of state-nation building may not have been without apparent deficiencies, not because of lack of awareness however, but perhaps because the task of asserting the nation-state feelings has been so daunting that some deficiencies proved difficult to avoid, especially as the historiography of Algeria is hard to assess with accuracy given lack of archives, written documents as well as the falsification of the Algerian history by colonial discourse.²

¹In le Monde September 4, 1980.
²Since independence, Algerian authorities have been involved in negotiations with both Turkey and France to recover a vast amount of important archives and documents relative to Algerian history taken away by these two former metropoles. The issue has not been settled yet.
A striking example of the complexity of this approach may be provided by two declarations of the late President Boumedienne, made to legitimate the regime's efforts to build a strong and modern state in Algeria. The priority given to this task was crucial because as he explained "we cannot achieve anything without first constructing the state. Our revolution is not comparable to others such as those of the USSR, China or Cuba, because there was never a state in Algeria."¹ This assumption, however, contrasted with his affirmation in another speech that the Algerian state "had been dismantled by colonialism".² This incoherence may not be fortuitous but stems rather from a different outlook with regard to issues at stake. If the reference to the inexistence of a state in Algeria, for instance, may be used to justify the regime's Jacobinist tendencies, the affirmation of its existence may respond to the necessity of asserting Algeria's identity and personality.

However, this dichotomy indicated perhaps more this complexity of the search for the self than a mere desarticulation and anomaly in Algerian national ideology.

Ben Bella, independent Algeria's first president, had a clearer position on the absence of state traditions in Algeria, but just like his successor, he believed that this lack resulted from colonial occupation of Algeria. The comparison he drew with the cases of Morocco and Tunisia were of high interest but unfortunately his elaboration did not go beyond common generalities. According to him, Algeria unlike her neighbours "had no state tradition. This situation resulted from the form of colonization our country had known. Tunisia and Morocco had, from

¹Interview to P. Herreman in le Monde, April 4, 1968.
the beginning, preserved the national state (as) it was only added to Tunisian and Moroccan departments a corresponding French department. Thus, many Tunisian and Moroccan administrators acquired experience in authority. It must be added that the nationalist movement in these two brother countries had found an important support from functionaries and high civil servants of the state. In the aftermath of the independence of these two countries, the problem of transfer of power proved relatively easy. These militants have been already at the drive of the state machinery while the elimination of elements that collaborated with colonialism was carried out in a quiet fashion. It has not been the same in Algeria where the nationalist movement had only slightly been marked by Algerian administrators - many of whom occupied minor posts.\(^1\)

2. The perennial character of the Algerian nation

In exploring their past, the Algerian leaders like those in other former colonies, may have inevitably made somehow inaccurate accounts of their own history or created myths of past greatness and idealized traditional values, but this emphasis on glorious inheritance may have been psychologically necessary to bolster the newly-won independence of their countries. The emphasis on nationalism for instance may help cement the unity of the Algerian people and spur the legitimacy of the ruling elites as it serves to conceal linguistic differences and social disparities. Therefore, it was not surprising to find a consensus among the members of these elites on the unity of the Algerian people and on the existence of an Algerian nation before and after the colonization of the country. As El-Moudjahid asserted, this history did not start on November 1, 1954 (the date of the outbreak of the insurrection) nor since

the colonial conquest or the arrival of the Arabs. It did not start
with the Roman conquest. It stretches over twenty-five centuries, since
our people emerged from prehistory and called themselves the Amazigh,
i.e. the freemen."¹

The refutation of the interpretation of Algerian history by
ideologists of colonization is therefore clearly ascertained in the great
antiquity of the Algerian people. It is also a form of revolt against the
'status of indigenat', the concept of second-class citizenship elaborated
by colonial ideology. To French colonial acculturation highlighted by
the precepts 'our Fatherland, France' and our ancestors,'the Gaullois',
the Algerians opposed the existence of their own self as a different
nation with its own history, culture and institutions. Until independence
in 1962, Algerian history, it was claimed, was marked by a major feature:
the preservation of the national identity and resistance to foreign power
invasions. And even when the country was dominated by foreign powers,
partially in ancient times, or completely under French colonial rule,
revolts against the foreign grip never ceased. As the National Charter
asserted: "toutes les tentatives du colonialisme de nier l'existence de
la Nation Algérienne pour mieux perpétuer sa domination, se sont heurtees
a la resistance et a la vigueur de cette nation plusieurs fois
seculaire."² The sense of independence of present time Algerians is
therefore given a historical dimension that goes beyond the insurrection
against French colonialism. But Algeria's fall to foreign submission,
it was claimed, meant neither the absence of economic development,
internal dynamics, national genius, nor a need of colonization to get
access to human civilization and progress. Although Algeria witnessed a

¹El-Moudjahid December 20, 1983.
²National Charter, p.19.
succession of states and kingdoms at certain times or had been a mosaic of small kingdoms at others, feelings of nationhood were believed to have unyieldingly subsisted throughout the country's history.

The nation-state sequence and process of resistance to foreign rule dates back to the third century when Algeria was unified under the state of Numidia which - established by the Berber Chief Massinisa - was thought to have endowed the country with geographical setting and national character. It was because this state was strong and its chief ambitious that the Romans attempted through repeated invasions to divide it and control its naval fortifications and merchant sites. By 208 BC, Numidia became a Roman vassalage until the fifth century when Byzantine rule took over for 100 years. Both Roman and Byzantine domination concentrated on the coastal fringe (the useful Berberie) while many Berber tribes remained in the mountains of Kabylia and the Aures resisting foreign penetration. In these strongholds, Christian influence had been practically negligible as the Berbers were able to preserve their dialect, values and way of life. Only in the cities near the coast and the adjacent land were integrated into the Roman empire; thus some natives were brought within the sphere of Mediterranean civilization and were in contact with Christianity and Judaism. However, Romano-Berber social and cultural aspects and Judaism as outlined in foreign studies of Algerian history, were of little interest for Algerian ideologists. Most important for them was the stress on the unshaking resistance of the Algerian people, its deep-rooted values,
although there has been a significant lack of analysis of the Berber social and economic life. This lack was perhaps inevitable because the cultural patrimony of Algeria was mainly of oral expression.

The crucial episode in Algerian history was certainly the time the country and the rest of North-Africa came under Arab rule in late seventh century at the time when the Arab caliphate was assumed by the Umayyads established at Damascus. The Algerian ideologists speak of the 'arrival' of the Arabs who brought with them a new religion and civilization which were welcomed by the Berber natives after an initial resistance inherent in their traditions of liberty. Diverse interpretations that the Arab arrival was a form of colonization or invasion are rejected vehemently as the ideologists stress that Algerians not only quickly embraced the new faith, but also contributed to its expansion over Europe and the Sahara southwards.¹

In contrast to Berberist militants - who became more active with the 1980 cultural protest in Kabylia - resistance by Berber tribes to the Arab conquerors is minimized and the Kahina - a chieftain from the Aures mountains, considered by the Berber militants as a heroine of the Berber resistance - is assumed to have later tolerated Islam as she demanded that her two children embrace the new religion. Furthermore, there is a belief that Arab and Muslim civilization had contributed to Algerian identity, and Islam in particular, is seen as a fundamental element in cementing Algerian nationalism and strengthening the unity of the

¹The epic contribution of the Berbers to this expansion was associated with the conquest of the Spanish Visigothic Kingdom in 711 by warriors of Berber descent led by Tarik ibn Zayd. Their penetration of Europe reached as far as Poitiers in Southern France in 732.
Algerian people. Not only was the Arab-Muslim civilization thought to have contributed to the maturity of the Algerian nation, but it was also seen as having invigorated it with other elements constituting the nation: cultural, linguistic, spiritual, centralization of the country's economy, the whole sustained by a strong desire for independence and constant attachment to freedom. The people that emerged from this historical experience were conceived neither as a mixture of Berbers and Arabs nor as a juxtaposition of different races and ethnic groups.

As the National Charter put it, Algeria "is not an assemblage of peoples or a mosaic of desperate ethnic groups. This symbiotic relationship between Berbers and Arabs was thought to have been facilitated by similarities between their ways of life and by the assumption that Berbers may have themselves originated from the Yemen."

The prosperity of the new Algeria emerged with the Fatimid rule that stretched all the way from Morocco to Egypt after sweeping away dynasties of Berber origin the Idrisids established at Fez and the Aghlabids of Ifrikiya. Foreign writers on Algerian history noted that the crumbling of the Fatimid empire in the eleventh century—resulting from the plundering invasions of Arab Bedwin tribes, the (Beni Hilal and Beni Solaym), the collapse of the Berber Senhadja tribe, the Zirids, (which assumed the vice-royalty in the Maghreb when the Fatimids moved to Cairo)

\[\text{\textsuperscript{1}}\text{National Charter, p. 20.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{2}}\text{For Ahmed Taleb, the current foreign minister, the Algerians are Berbers more or less Arabized in \textit{Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord}, (10), 1972, p. 386.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{3}}\text{President CHADLI observed that two thirds of the Berber dialect are Arabic or of Arabic origin (interview to Saint Prost in \textit{Paris-Match,} December 4-10, 1981). IBN KHALDUN, the great sociologist of Medieval Maghreb (XIV) could write that the two races had lived in the Maghreb for so long that it is hard to imagine they have lived somewhere else (\textit{Discours sur l'Histoire universelle,} (translation Vincent Monteil, Paris, Sindbad, 1978), p. 9.}\]
and the succession of ruling tribes formed and dissolved through the basis of assabiya, a form of familial or clanish solidarity and esprit de corps - severely hampered the constitution of a modern state confined to the geographical delimitations of present time Algeria. While by the end of the eleventh century, Morocco, for instance, was unified under one Islamic kingdom set up by a Berber-speaking tribe the Almoravids (Murabits) established at Marrakesh, Algeria remained disintegrated as much of its Western part came under the rule of the Almoravid chief Ibn Tashfin, while Bougie on the East was under the reign of the Banu Hamad. By mid-twelfth century, the Almoravids dynasty was swept away by the Almohads (Muwahidun) who succeeded in bringing most of the present time Maghreb under a unified rule until it was disintegrated a century later. Since then, it was assumed that in contrast to Tunisia which had been governed by a single dynasty, the Hafsids, Algeria remained fragmented. The most important kingdom resulting from the dissolution of the Almohad empire was set up by a Zenata group, the Zayanids (Abd al wadids) in Tlemcen in Western Algeria and which lasted more than three centuries (1241-1554) while Bougie in Western Algeria was attached to the Hafsid empire in Tunisia. And while Algeria and Tunisia came under the authority of the Ottomans in the early sixteenth century, an Alawite dynasty claiming Arab Sherifian descent succeeded the Marinids in Morocco and managed to hold the whole country from 1660 until it became a French protectorate in 1912. For many historians, this feature explained Morocco's relative success in surviving as a separate national entity, strengthening the socio-economic structures of the Makhzan state and consolidating national integration.
In Algerian official ideology, the disintegration of the country into several kingdoms that lasted until the arrival of the Ottomans, did not prevent, however, the aspiration to national unity. These kingdoms were believed to have exercised authority over the mainland (through allegiance), undergone a certain level of socio-economic development, and were able to affirm their sovereignty vis-à-vis other nations.¹

This interpretation contrasts with writings of foreign historians, some of whom considered these kingdoms as static tribes which did not erect a state with delimited frontiers and administrative structures, but mainly a political and commercial centre around which gravitated a certain number of tribes that enjoyed a relative autonomy.² The North-African tribal units were also thought to have represented a sub-culture within the Arab-Islamic world, and while they identified firmly with Islam, they remained, it was assumed, on the margin of a wider society, universalistic and non-tribal, as primary loyalties (familial, religious brethren) were predominant.³ Moreover, the evolution toward forms of a modern state, or at least of a European-type of feudal

¹The recent discovery of coins believed to have belonged to these states in the eleventh century led El-Moujahid to assert the significance of money as an attribute of the sovereignty of these states (El-Moujahid, November 23-24, 1934, p.12). See also recent works of Algerian historians: Dr. A. Dhina: Al mamlaka Abi Hammu Musa wa ibn Tashfin al awal (the Abdelwadid Kingdom under the rules of Abu Hammu Musa and Ibn Tashfin I) Constantine, Dar Al Kitab, 1985, and M. Ben Amira: Dawn Alzenata fi al haraka al madhabiya fi al Maghrib (the role of the Zenata in the formation of the ideological movement in the Maghreb) (Constantine, Dar Al Kitab, 1985).
²Gallissot, R: Pre-colonial Algeria (in Economy and Society, (4), 1975, pp.418-445) and Lacoste, Y: General characteristics and fundamental structures of medieval North-Africa (in Economy and Society, (3), 1974, 1-17).
state was prevented it was assumed, by the perpetual shift in the tribal balance of power, by the preservation of cohesion within tribal communities and conflicts between settlers and nomads as well as by the dichotomy between state and society that existed during the Ottoman rule in Algeria.¹

The Turkish era constituted an important phase in Algerian history and sensibly marked its course. There is a consensus that the Ottoman corsairs were called upon by the North-Africans to protect them from incessant expeditions of Christian Spain after the Reconquista and France, and as a result, the Barbarossa brothers Kheir Din and Aruj as commanders of the Ottoman navy extended the sea power of the Turks to North-Africa with the exception of Morocco. Algiers became important to the Turkish empire as an advanced base from which they could launch operations against European Christians, but with the decline of the naval power of the Ottomans, the Turkish Deys at Algiers held a purely local power. The regency, under the nominal suzerainty of the sublime porte, was a kind of an oligarchic military republic with a central authority established in Algiers (Dey) and three Beylikal provinces: Central Algeria (Titteri), Oran (West) and Constantine in the East.

In the studies of foreign historians, the Deys' authority was assumed to have been based on the militias of the Turkish Janitors and a few powerful tribes which being exempt from taxes and endowed with public land (Makhzan) served as tax collectors for the Beylikal authorities. And while many tribes of the hinterland (Bled a Siba or zone of dissidence)

did not recognize the suzerainity of the Regency (Bled al-Turk), others dominated by powerful families (Soff) grudgingly paid a tribute to the Dey. The latter's failure to unify all the tribal communities resulted from the desire of many tribes to preserve their autonomy thus increasing the country's political fragmentation.\footnote{In particular Ch-A. Julien: Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine. See also Gallissot, Pre-colonial Algeria, and Lacoste, J: general characteristics.} This division in the home polity and the marginalization of the natives in socio-economic-political life were categorically refuted by the Algerian ideologists asserting that the state was able to extend its administration to the mainland through institutions, political and cultural organisms directed by Algerians.\footnote{FLN Committee Central's resolution on cultural policy, p.7.} However, the rejection of the disfunctional decentralization of authority as outlined by many writers, has not been sustained with satisfactory insights of the state and societal structures. It was simply asserted that the Turks had melted with the native population and did not constitute a caste distinct and aloof from the rest of the society as it was argued by foreign historians. The Algerian ideologists believed that it was during this ottoman era that the modern Algerian state emerged, given domestic prerogatives (political organization and administration), status of sovereignty and independence the Regency enjoyed at that time. Examples of treaties and conventions signed by the Regency and other foreign powers were cited in abundance to sustain the status of a sovereign nation. In these treaties, it was referred to
as the 'state' or the 'Republic' of Algiers by other nations such as France, Britain, Spain and the USA with which the Regency had established diplomatic and consular relations.¹

However, negative aspects that existed at that time were said to have resulted from the decay that touched the entire Muslim world and not only from the Ottoman rule. In this vein, the French conquest of Algeria was conceived as the result of incessant attempts of invasions and colonization made at the time of the crusades. From the Algerian point of view, the main reason for Algeria's fall into French hands was the diminished power of the Regency after the destruction of the Algerian fleet when supporting the Ottoman navy to suppress the Greek rebellion three years before the French conquest of Algeria in 1830. An extensive rhetoric underlines the Algerian people's resistance to French colonialism and its opposition to the gallicization of the country. Regional resistances led by Bey Ahmed in Constantine and Emir Abdelkader in the West, at the beginning of the French conquest and revolts in some parts

¹FLN's Resolution on cultural policy, p.7.; M. Kassim's valuable and pioneering work on this subject: Shakhsiyat Al Jazair A Dawliya.


In addition to the treaty signed between the Regency and the USA in July 5, 1795, for instance, H.M. Queen Elizabeth provides evidence on a treaty signed between the British and the Algiers Regency in 1765, as she recalled when visiting Algiers in Autumn 1981, that "our common history goes back to ancient time. As maritime nations we had always traded and sometimes fought each other...the 1765 treaty envisaged from that time and forever peace and friendship between the British Queen and the Kingdom of Algiers. I believe we can say that the two parties respect this treaty signed more than two hundred years ago" (quoted in M. Boualem: la question du Sahara occidental, Algiers, opu, 1983).
of the country such as those waved by the Ouled Sidi Sheikh in 1864, Sheiks Al-Mokrani, Al-Haddad, Boumama, the Zaatchas and the Ouled Nail in early 1870s, were not conceived as tribal and disparate or lacking national consciousness as it was advanced by many foreign historians but as an expression of a national resistance of a people deeply attached to its fundamental Arabo-Islamic values. The resistance of Emir Abdelkader after 1830 in particular was thought to have channelled the resistance of an Algerian state which, through the Emir's rule and administrative control, encompassed two thirds of present time Algeria.

The emphasis on the Emir's intellectual qualities and military abilities as he fought the French troops aimed at highlighting the fact that Algeria was at that time a modern state which had its own money, system of taxation, administrative structure and with a certain degree of socio-economic development. The treaty of Tafna signed between Abdelkader and General Bugeau, the commander of the French colonial troops, in 1837 which put an end to the former's resistance was regarded as a legally binding and enforceable international treaty.

In their search for a glorious past, the Algerian ideologists made of the Emir an image of this past and the symbol of the country's long resistance against French efforts of depersonalization and acculturation.

In this vein, the nationalist movement that emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century was said to have originated from this strong and unaltered form of resistance to foreign domination and despite the existence of opposed movements, this nationalism was presented as unitarian, as the different nationalist parties were believed to have militated for a common objective, i.e. independence and liberty of the Algerian people. Algerian nationalism was then conceived neither as
recent nor as a production of Western colonialism as formulated in studies related to the new states. It had, instead, been cemented around three fundamental elements: the ancestral desire for independence, the Arabo-Islamic inheritance of the Algerian people and its unicity. These features have to some extent marked present time Algeria's pursuit of a policy of independence and assertion of her identity. Moreover, if in the Algerian official discourse, French colonialism was seen as resulting in the destruction of the Algerian state, in the marginalization of the Algerian people and in the fragmentation of the nationalist movement which hampered the emergence of a coherent elite, this colonialism, however did not destroy the Algerian nation as such, being only responsible for discontinuities in traditions of the state, the economic backwardness and crisis of identity new Algeria faced in the aftermath of independence.

B. THE COLONIAL PREDICAMENT

1. Marginalization of the Nation

In the official doctrine, colonialism was depicted as a "long and somber night" and in the terms of an Algerian historian and diplomat as a "national crime, a series of destruction, expropriation of land, exiles and massacres."¹ In very few countries of the non-Western world has the impact of colonization been so great, so deep and so crucial for their future as in Algeria. Until her independence she was unlike other French colonies declared a French department and considered as a part of France. And in contrast to Moroccan and Tunisian protectorates which enjoyed a certain sovereignty and a local personality distinct from those

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¹Lacheraf, A: Algérie nation et société, p.38.
belonging to France, Algeria saw her traditional sources of authority and societal structures destroyed, as the French once installed in the country set out to break, through violent oppression, the powerful tribes which had resisted them.¹ The fragmentation of these social and economic structures was accompanied by the transfer of most of the fertile land from the natives to European settlers whose implantation in Algeria became the basis for the colony of settlement. Through the ordinances of 1844-1848 and the 1867 senatus consultus, French rule radically undermined Algeria's system of land tenure, a process that led to the dismantling of the state's foundations laid down by the Emir Abdelkader, the breaking up of the native land aristocracy leaving the rest of the population on the margin of history, deprived of its personal status, traditional culture, and material base.²

Throughout the French rule, the existence of a dual society became noticeable: on the one hand, a powerful minority of settlers dominating politically and economically the country and providing some privileges to a relatively limited small-educated elite of Muslims and on the other,

¹In 1830, a French parliamentary commission reported that: 'we have exceeded in barbarity the Barbarian we came to civilize' (quoted in C.H. Moore: North-Africa (Boston, Little Brown & Cy, 1970), p.40.
²Marshall Bugeaud was also reported to have told the French national assembly in 1840 that "whenever there is a fresh water, fertile land, then one must locate colonos, without concerning oneself to whom these lands belong." (quoted in A. Horne: Algeria, a savage war of peace (Penguin Books, London, 1977), p.29.

the great bulk of the indigenous population lived in misery and illiteracy. The economic dualism consisted of the existence of an agro-industrial sector dominated by the colons. On the eve of the Algerian war, 8000 of them held 2,392,000 hectares of the most fertile land producing much more than all the Muslim peasants who were confined to a traditional sector mainly agrarian characterized by archaic means of labour, aridity of the soil and very low income which came to provide a meagre means of subsistence for nearly ninety-five per cent of the Muslim population. Besides its specific aspect of a colony of settlement, Algeria became a huge market for French goods and a source of the Metropole's labour market as hundreds of thousands of Algerians worked in France sometimes in painful conditions. In addition, as a result of the forced conscription many young Muslims were believed to have died in the two world war campaigns fighting for France. The benefits the French colonialists bestowed from Algeria had been pictured by Algerian ideologists as a savage plundering of the country's human and natural resources.

The colonial dialectic was not limited to these economic aspects only, as the French attempted to eradicate Algerian traditional culture as well. Muslim natives were, then, legally barred from studying their own language and many Zawiya's cultural and educational centres of prosperous brotherhood associations came under constant harassment and control of French colonial administration in an attempt to increase the gallicisation of Algeria. As a result, French-educated Algerians were prevented from getting access to their national culture unlike the Moroccan or Tunisian intelligentsia which enjoyed a bilingual education. However, the process of expanding French culture among the native
population had meagre results. In 1887 there were only seventy-nine French public schools attended by 8963 out of 500,000 Muslims in age of schooling.\textsuperscript{1} In 1948 less than ten per cent of the whole indigenous population could write any language and on the eve of the Algerian independence, only 2,500 out of 50,000 attending universities were of Muslim origin. In addition to its limited scope, the expansion of schools for the natives touched only a few areas of the country concentrating mainly in the Kabylia region. The reasons stemming from the low budget allocated for education and the lack of human and material conditions did not conceal France's attempt to separate Arabs and Berbers on the basis of divide and rule.\textsuperscript{2} Berber particularism was stressed by the colonial administrators as well as French scholars as Kabyles in particular were presented as the most able recipients of Western civilization in comparison with segments of Arab origin depicted as inferior and less mobile and creative. The access of a certain number of Kabyles to French culture consolidated the 'fait Berber' which had to some extent detrimental effect on the unity of the Algerian people during the war against French colonial rule and most in post-colonial Algeria.

The situation was worsened by the persistent refusal of the settlers to grant constitutional rights to the indigenous population which were considered as second-class citizens and remained subject to a legal code of their own, the 'code of indigenat' until the second world war.\textsuperscript{3} To deal with the natives, the French created the 'Arab bureaux' in 1848, a

\textsuperscript{1}Lacheraf, M: L'avenir de la culture Algérienne (in les temps modernes, (19), July 1963-June 1964) pp.720-745.
\textsuperscript{3}Preamble, Communal Charter, p.27.
kind of administrative institution led by French officers well-endowed
with executive powers such as military, legal and collection of taxes.
In 1868, reforms were introduced into the administrative mechanisms and
regulations though without abolishing segregation toward the indigenous
population. As a result, the European-dominated areas were administered
by communes de 'plein exercise', while those of predominantly native
character came under the prerogatives of the 'communes mixtes' where
authority was exercised by a European administrator, eventually
benefiting from assistance from local notables or caids. With this
sub-division, was created a double electoral college system: the first
college comprised the European settlers in their status as French
citizens and a relatively limited population of Muslim évolutés, while the
second college encompassed the whole indigenous population. Each
college was entitled to select the same number of representatives to the
French parliament. With this system, the under-representation of the
Algerian Muslims became evident as one million of European settlers had
voting rights equal to those of roughly eight million natives at that
time (1948). Indeed, only two out of five members of municipal counsels
were Muslim natives and earlier, in the 1901 poll to elect representa­
tives in the 'délegations financières' created to give Algeria financial
autonomy, 93,000 voters out of a European population estimated at 630,000
elected 48 representatives while only 90,000 of the indigenous population
out of a total of 3,600,000 were permitted to vote and only for as few as
21 representatives.1 This discrimination confined the Muslims to their
inferior status and prevented them from gaining substantial participation
in the affairs of their own country, despite occasional reforms to

1ibid.
improve their status. Even the policy of assimilation preached by the colonial establishment did not lure many Muslims to adopt French citizenship and renounce their personal status.

2. Fragmentation of the nationalist movement and the pursuit of legalistic reforms

Initial protest against French colonial policy in early twentieth century emerged within segments of the Algerian-educated elite which began to realize that being able to get access to French culture and standard of life did not bring equal rights and privileges as those enjoyed by the minority of European settlers. With the activities of Emir Ali a son of Emir Abdelkader and Khalid the latter's grandson, claims for the suppression of the 'code of indigenat' increased among the Algerian evolués, many of whom had gathered in a 'Fédération des élus indigènes' in the late 1920s. These aspirations became the driving force of the assimilationist movement which represented segments of Muslim-educated minority and urban middle-class. It's well known figure was Ferhat Abbas, a son of a Caid born in 1889 at Taher near Djidjelli on the constantinois littoral. Abbas trained as a pharmacist and in 1933 was elected as departmental counsellor at Setif where he established a chemist shop. In 1946, he formed the Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien, UDMA, a party that claimed an Algerian state in which the European settlers and the natives would have equal rights, thus implicitly denying the existence of an Algerian nation. In an often quoted statement made in 1936, Abbas said:"If I had discovered the Algerian nation, I would be a nationalist and I would not blush from it as from a crime ... Men who die for a patriotic ideal are honoured and respected. My life is not worth more than theirs. But ... I would not die for the Algerian fatherland because this fatherland does not exist."
I have not discovered it. I cannot find it. I have interrogated history, I have interrogated the living and the dead. I have visited the cemeteries, no one has spoken to me of it ... No one moreover seriously believes in our nationalism, what one wishes to fight behind this world is our political and economic emancipation ... without emancipation of the natives there is no French Algeria."¹ In the official discourse in independent Algeria, the assimilationist movement was depicted as collaborating with French colonialism and being a contempt towards Algeria's traditions and culture.

In contrast, the reformist movement of the Ulama was accredited with some praise and honour. This movement, having its roots in upper middle-class families with scriptural Muslim and Arabic education as well as ascetic inclinations, was largely influenced by the 'Salafiya' movement that spread in the Middle East and was directed against both the assimilationists and religious obscurantism, mysticism and deviationism that existed in Maraboutic circles and certain sects. Its most prestigious leader, Sheikh Abdu Al Hamid Ben Badis was born in December 1889 of a wealthy family of Berber origin but with strong Arabic background. Ben Badis was educated at the Zitouna University in Tunis and spent some time in Cairo where he came into contact with the reformist movement and puritan doctrine preached by Sheikh Abdu, a disciple of the great reformist sheikh Al Afghani whose activities aimed at restoring the grandeur of the original Islam in reaction to the decline of the Muslim world during the Ottoman rule. The plea of the Algerian ulema emerged with the observation made by Ben Badis that Algerian society is "sick, in mortal danger, as regards its faith and its

¹In L'entente, February 23, 1936.
language. It calls savagery courage, and weakness long-suffering. In spite of the efforts of the progressive club and the recent rise of Arabic writings, its culture is collapsing, like its economy. Its learning remains pedantic and ossified. But Algeria is not dead and will not die. It has not been and will not be absorbed. The proof of this lies in its earlier and its recent history. The distinctiveness of the Algerian people, the affirmation of its own cultural identity was affirmed with force by Ben Badis who, in reply to Abbas’s denial of the existence of an Algerian nation asserted that Algeria “has its culture, its traditions and its characteristics, good or bad like every nation of the world, and next we state that this Algerian nation is not France, cannot be France and does not wish to be France.” The separation between the two communities is also clearly asserted in Ben Badis’ well known precepts: “Islam is my religion, Arabic my language, Algeria my country.”

The main activities of the Ulama concentrated on helping arise a sense of religious and national consciousness among Algerian Muslims, around Ben Badis’s precepts that the Algerian people are Muslim and belong to the Arab nation. Propagation of teachings of Muslim fondements and Arabic language was carried out in Quranic schools or Medersas and through the publication of newspapers in Arabic such as Al Muntaquid (the censor) and the Shihab (the Meteor). However, like the assimilationist, the Ulama movement militated within the frame of legality for the sake of achieving their aims and were far from either calling for the complete independence of Algeria or for inciting rebellion and political activities against French colonial rule. This

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2Quoted in Horne, A: A savage war for peace, p.38.
moderation was implicitly rejected by the Algerian state ideologists who
retained mainly the positive aspects of the Ulama movement, i.e. its
important contribution to the preservation of national values through
resistance to attempts of depersonalization of the Algerian people. It
was therefore not surprising to notice that in post-colonial Algeria the
commemoration of the death of Ben Badis was made to coincide with the
celebration of the national day of science and education (Yum al ilm).

More radical and more involved in political activities was the
movement that originated in France within the circles of the Algerian
immigrants and lately developed into a continuum - PPA-MTLD party - which
had a wider nationalistic support and called for an Algerian constituent
assembly, sovereign and elected by universal suffrage without distinction
of any kind, evacuation of Algeria by French troops, and Arabization of
schools. His main figure was Messali Hadj, born in 1898 at Tlemcen in a
modest family. After serving in the first world war in the French army
he worked in France in the well-known Renault car assembly plant in the
Paris region. Together with Hadj Abdelkader, he founded the 'North-
African Star' (ENA) in 1925-6 an organisation which demanded independence
of Algeria. After its dissolution by the French authorities in 1932,
Messali formed the 'Algerian people's party' (PPA) five years later and
then the 'Movement for the Triumph of democratic liberties' (MTLD) after
a long period of harrassment by the French. Messali shifted from his
eyearly communist convictions to supporting an Algerian nationalism largely
inspired from the Panarabist movement advocated by the Lebanese Shakib
Arslan that was sweeping the Arab world at that time. In contrast to
Abbas, Messali emphasized separation of Algeria from France and unlike Ben Badis, his demands were aimed at setting up an Algerian state secular and modernist.

Besides these main movements, stood the Algerian communist party, but with no significant impact on the Algerian nationalist movement. The PCA, formed in 1924 as a branch of the French communist party the PCF and dominated by Europeans was granted autonomy in 1938 by the PCF at its Villeurbane Congress. The Euro-centrism of the party, its domination by non-indigenous elements and its political opportunism did not contribute to make of the PCA a genuine nationalist movement in the eyes of the Algerian ideologists. The responsibility of the PCF in the repression of Algerian demonstrators on May 8, 1945 on the day of celebration of the allies victory over Nazi Germany, accounted for the lack of PCA’s credibility in Algerian official discourse and also was the standpoint of this party that Algeria was: "a nation in formation whose people will be an original mixture of European, Arab and Berber elements which have melted to constitute a new race: the Algerian race. But this nation has not attained its maturity yet."¹

In its diversity, the Algerian nationalist movement had nevertheless emphasized a legalistic approach in its political demands. This strategy was regarded as useful in the context of the emergence of the 'front populaire' in France. Many Algerian nationalists came to regard

¹Statement made by O. Ouzegane, a muslim native and a secretary of the PCA, quoted in Gallissot, P: les conceptions de la Nation Algérienne (in Revue Algérienne des Sciences juridiques, économiques et politiques, (15) 1978, pp.719-741) p.727. Ouzegane's statement resembles the declaration of Maurice Thorez, the leader of the PCF made on February 11, 1939 that Algeria "was a nation in formation, its national character as yet to emerge from the eventual form of a mixture of 20 races, the principal ones Arab, Berber, European and Jewish".
the change of regime in their metropole as an encouraging sign for obtaining constitutional rights and betterment of the standard of living of the Moslem population. The democratic ideals exalted by the popular front in response to the emergence of nazism in Europe convinced them of the necessity to opt for a moderate attitude in order not to jeopardise a certain form of a struggle against the French right wing parties in France and the ultra of the European settlers in Algeria. Amid these optimistic feelings, demands for social and political reforms were presented in 1936 by delegates issued from the Muslim congress that gathered representatives from the Ulama, the UDMA and the PCA. But these demands were turned down by the French government and a year later the Blum-Violette project which aimed at granting French citizenship to some educated Muslims in Algeria without the abandonment of Muslim status and at providing the country with financial authority and civil personality, was rejected by the French parliament under pressure from the colonial lobby and settlers. As a result, the early optimism of the moderate segments of the Algerian nationalists was deeply shattered but not completely extinguished. The struggle for democratic ideals and liberty so cherished by the old generation of the Algerian nationalists especially Ferhat Abbas remained accurate and boosted by the stand of the free world in its conflict against Nazi Germany.

The impact of the world war on the Algerian nationalist movement, however, was quite paradoxical: whereas for the old generation of Algerian nationalists, the war was regarded as a symbol of the struggle for liberty and independence but in alignment with the Free World, it

1 It was perhaps this sense of commitment to liberal ideas that explained contacts the old guard of Maghrebi nationalists including Ferhat Abbas had with General Murphy the Commander of the US troops during the landing of the allied
was a revealing factor for the young militants in the sense that the French empire in its grandeur and power was defeated by German troops in a humiliating fashion. This experience was valuable for the Algerian nationalists since it helped many of them exorcise feelings of inferiority vis-a-vis the French and the courage they showed in the battlefields not only convinced them of their abilities to fight like others but also helped them to discover themselves and extirpate from their minds notions of 'indigenat' and second-class citizens. This new form of national consciousness as revealed by the impact of the second world war was also at the root of the outbreak of violence as expression of modern nationalism when on May 8, 1945 Algerians paraded in the streets to acclaim victory against the Third Reich and claim independence which was promised by France as a reward for their participation in the war against Nazism. These demonstrations were followed by violent French retaliation which left thousands of Moslems dead in Eastern Algeria mainly. These events not only marked a turning point in Algerian history but cemented the nationalism of many young Algerians and incited them to use violence to achieve the country's independence. The last blow to the legalistic approach of the old generation came with the failure to obtain political reforms given the firm opposition of the French settlers' lobby. Although the 1947 statute recognized for Algeria a civil personality, it did not, however, alter discrimination at all levels against the forces in North-Africa. America's declared attachment to the defence of the free world, the emancipation of peoples, and ideals of justice appealed to the old generation of Algerian nationalists in the sense of reaffirming the precepts of the great French revolution which marked the thought of many of these nationalists. Most of them deeply resented the violation of basic civil liberties in Algeria by the country which gave birth to this enlightening revolution.
indigenous population and did not grant Algeria autonomy as the country remained under the control of the 'gouverneur general' who was responsible before the French home office and not to the Algerian assembly. The elections to this institution in which the Algerian nationalist parties participated were rigged by the French administration to protect French sovereignty. As a result, the MTLD, the party with most wide popular support won only eight seats in the second college reserved for the indigenous population. The failure to obtain equal political rights and improve the socio-economic conditions of the Muslim natives, sealed the faith of the legalistic approach that the old Algerian nationalist movement had been pursuing. Therefore bitterly disillusioned by France's failure to live up to its promises, many of the moderate nationalists adopted a radical line with a new generation of Algerian nationalists.¹

3. The FLN crisis of leadership and the emergence of the General-Staff

a) Political attitudes towards the armed insurrection

Moves towards insurrection were initiated by the young militants regrouped within the OS (organization spéciale), the underground organization set up by the MTLD in 1947 to prepare the insurrection. But a few years later, the OS members - disappointed by the unworthy internal divisions within the MTLD over leadership of the party (centralists v Messalists); the moderate attitude of its leader and its inclination for personal rule; the divisions between Arabs and Kabyles;

¹In his memoirs, De Gaulle observed that the 1947 reform was "having at first responded favorably to the Algerian statute, but the Moslem masses and their political leaders soon came to recognize that the reforms were spurious, and abandoning the hopes which had inspired them at the time of the liberation of France, concluded that their own liberation would never be won by legal means" (in Memoirs of hope, translated by T. Kilmartin, (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), p.14.
and stimulated by the wind of revolutionary nationalism which began to sweep away the old colonial rule - set up the CRUA, the Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action.¹ A national liberation front (FLN) was issued from this committee and after a series of clandestine meetings, its founders broke out an armed insurrection on November 1, 1954 through small but coordinated bands of insurgents that struck some French military and police garrisons and depots in various parts of Algeria. The members of the CRUA that set up the FLN known as the nine historic chiefs comprised a 6 men initial nucleus (Ait Ahmed, Ben M'Hidi, Ben Boulaid, Boudiaf, Bitat and Krim Belkacem) joined shortly after by Ben Bella, Khider and Didouche Murad. Although from different social backgrounds, these revolutionaries came from relatively modest segments of the Algerian society and from all parts of Algeria. Ait Ahmed, Krim were sons of Kebyle caids, Ben Boulaid was a craftsman from Batna, Ben M'Hidi, Bitat, Boudiaf came from modest families in Southern Constantine and Ben Bella from Marnia, a little town near the Moroccan border and a family of small sharecroppers. None of them attained a high education level with the exception of Ait Ahmed and only three of them had military training: Krim, Ben Bella and Ben Boulaid, these last two were decorated

¹Intercine conflicts had hampered the unity and the dynamism of the MTLD. In 1949, the members of the Kabyle faction within the party Bennai Ouali, Amar Ould Hammuda, Rachid Ali Yahia were executed. Ait Ahmed was replaced by Ben Bella at the head of the OS perhaps in an attempt to prevent Kabyles assume leadership. In early 1950s, some members of the MTLD's central committee opposed Messali Hadj's personalization of power. The party's congress held at Hornu in Belgium on July 15-17, 1953 decided the exclusion of the 'centralists' led by Hocine Lahouel from the party. To counter these decisions, the 'centralists' organized a congress on their own in Algiers shortly after and ousted two of Messali's aides Mezerna and Moulay Merbah. It was these dissensions within the MTLD that irritated the young militants of the 'OS' which emphasized radical nationalism to patch up these splits.
during the Italian campaign as warrant officers in the French army. Because of their age (averaging 32 in 1954) none of them was engaged in political activities before the second world war and therefore had little similarity with the old nationalist movements. Their major unifying force had been the necessity to use violence to achieve independence, breaking away from the more or less pacifist attitude of the existing nationalist parties and stressing that the liberation of Algeria "will not be the work of one party, but of all Algerians."^1

In the official language, the adhesion of the social strata to the cause was conditioned by the historical evolution of Algeria on the ground that "patriotic and anti-capitalist forces emerged from the middle-class, small urban craftsmen, workers and peasants given the weakness of the Algerian bourgeoisie which resulted from the policy of land expropriation, exodus, oppression and the decline of the Ulama as an institutionalized force".\(^2\) Basically most of the guerrilla forces of the national army of liberation (ALN) came from modest social backgrounds and mainly rural areas. These strata constituted the majority of the Algerian Moslem population and perhaps the most exploited in the colonial agrarian-based economy. Their great involvement in the guerrilla movement was dictated by their precarious social condition and their desire to fight for regaining their land which they regarded as their basic source of income and perhaps of their existence. But the agrarian question in their revolt did not resemble that of the Vietnamese peasantry in the sense that the Algerian rural masses lacked consciousness on their own and did not stress specific demands related to their own needs and aspirations. Moreover their contribution to the struggle against

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^1^El-Moudjahid, (3), Summer 1956.
colonial domination did not exalt a religious revolt or a form of jihad as defined in terms of religious fanaticism as much as a revolt of the oppressed as described by Frantz Fanon.

Unlike the peasantry, the Algerian working class was relatively limited perhaps because of the low level of industrialization of the country and its lack of modern skills. Most of the urban working strata were labourers or involved in small craft activities. In their majority they were of peasant descent and supported the war of liberation as a response to the frustrations proper to a kind of plebian strata. Like the fellahs, they were attached to basic Arabo-Islamic values and were the primary source of ALN recruitment. In the course of the war, they came to form the main corpus of the revolutionary army as freedom fighters (Mujahidin) or as the maquisards in distinction with the politician militants of the FLN. In contrast, segments of the Algerian upper and middle classes did not support the revolution from the start not only because they were suspicious of the ability of the FLN-ALN guerrillas to fight French colonial troops, but also because of their distrust to violence, preferring instead a form of political activities based on rising the national consciousness of the indigenous population around the teaching of religious precepts (like the Ulama) or through the search for emancipation and assimilation like the Muslim 'évolués'. Indeed, it was only in mid-1956 that the association of the Ulama and other political parties such as UDMA and PCA declared their support to the national cause, perhaps after realizing that "the revolution has gone to the streets", to use the terms of Larbi Ben M'Hidi one of its historical chiefs. Therefore, many members of the old parties and of the liberal professions joined the FLN on an individual basis as
stipulated by the FLN leaders. However, being educated most of these segments of the upper and middle classes served in the political apparatuses of the national liberation front and many were able to take over important positions in its leadership after the structuration of the FLN-ALN organization.

b. Attempts to structure the framework of the revolution and their impact on the FLN leadership

It was at the Summam River Valley in August 1956 that the first attempts were made to provide the FLN with organized bodies, structures and political framework. These efforts aimed at unifying actions to sustain a war against the French colonial troops and at making the FLN the spearhead of the war of liberation. On the organizational level, Algeria was divided into six military departments according to geographical considerations. Each department or wilaya came under the control of personalities among the nine historic chiefs, while the general commandment of the FLN was placed under Krim's authority and another chief Boudiaf was charged to coordinate between the 'interior' and the 'exterior'. The latter referred to the three remaining historic chiefs: Ait Ahmed, Ben Bella and Khider who had, outside of Algeria, especially in Egypt, attempted to gather international support and aid for the nascent revolution.

The Summam congress represented for the FLN a decisive step in its strategies and the decisions it took concerned intimately the leadership question, an issue that had serious implications not only on the FLN intra-elite relationships but also on the nature of the political leadership of independent Algeria. Three decisions were taken at this congress: 1) the primacy of the interior over the exterior; 2) the primacy of the political over the military; 3) collegial leadership.
These decisions reflected the balance of power that existed at that time as the congress gathering only representatives of the 'interior' set up the FLN first political directorate, the national council of the Algerian revolution (CNRA) formed out of 17 members. The delegates elected also a five member decision-making body (CEE) supposedly the FLN's executive organ under the de facto leadership of Abbane Ramdane, a rising political figure within the FLN. However, provisions for a directorate and a better organizational frame for the revolution did not prevent conflicts among the FLN leaders. The formation of the CNRA was made according to a co-optation system based on the following selective criteria: the leader and the deputies of each military zone, plus two or three members of the old parties: MTLD, UDMA and Ulama were chosen with alternates for each full member. The criteria of selection angered many of the longest standing militants who found themselves evicted from the CNRA and the CEE to the benefit of newcomers many of whom did not initially support the principle of an armed insurrection like Ferhat Abbas, Al Madani or others regarded as moderate such as Benkhedda or Lamine Debaghine.

The principle of the supremacy of the 'interior' over the 'exterior' aggravated these conflicts as no member of the 'délegation extérieure' was appointed to the CEE and raised the primordial conflict over leadership between Ben Bella and Abbane Ramdane. In Cairo, the former attempted to impose himself as the sole leader of the revolution and consequently was very critical of the Summam congress decisions, while the latter, a skilful strategist and probably the political genius behind the congress proceedings, was not willing to relinquish his newly-acquired authority. To Ben Bella, the congress brought the revolution a bureaucratic apparatus and red tape that gradually divorced it from the realities and the masses since it elevated to leadership and high positions
in the managerial organs, political personalities who, after November the first did not hesitate to disavow our action. Confusion, contradiction, the absence of firm principles thus set in at the head of the FLN. Our capture a few months later enabled leftist and conservative politicians to lead a revolution for which they were not prepared."

The exigencies of the war, combined with the intensification of French repression originated events that in return produced great consequences on the FLN and permitted the emergence of new forces striving for its leadership. As the war went on, the wilayat officers acquired autonomy and increased their demands as ambitions inevitably grew in the absence of the delegation of the exterior and the CEE leadership who had to flee to either Morocco or Tunisia because of the growing insecurity in Algeria especially after the beginning of the dismantling of the FLN urban guerrilla strongholds by the French paratroopers during the battle of Algiers.

In such a context, the second principle set up by the Summam congress referring to the supremacy of the political over the military was doomed to a complete impotence and did not resist the facts. The CNRA second meeting took place in Cairo in October in 1957 and brought marked changes with regard to the FLN's leadership as it elected a second CEE comprising 9 members and reflecting the rise of high officers among the wilaya guerrillas: the colonels: Ben Tobbal (wilaya II), Boussouf (IV), Mahmoud Cherif (III), Ouamrane (IV). In addition to Krim, politicians were retained: the liberal Abbas and the ex-centralist Debaghine, while Mehri an ailing member of the PPA-MTLD was included.

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1Interview to M. Merle in Ahmed Ben Bella (Paris, Gallimard, 1965), pp.113-114.
The emergence of these officers not only undermined the authority of Abbane - who firmly opposed the membership composition of this second CEE - but also led to the creation of a "commandement des opérations militaires" (COM) aimed at coordinating the FLN's military operations. Two branches of the COM were established: one at Oujda in Morocco with authority over the forces of the ALN and the other at Ghardimaou in Tunisia endowed with the control of troops in Eastern Algeria and along the Tunisian frontier. The commandment of the oujda COM branch was given to a rapidly rising young officer, Colonel Boumedienne, the deputy commander and a protégé of Cl. Boussouf the powerful head of wilaya V (Oran region), while the Tunisian branch was directed by Cl. Mohammedi said. Later, the two branches were unified with the setting up of the ALN General Staff (EMG) with Headquarters in Tunisia near the Algerian border.

With France attempting to put an end to the armed insurrection through extensive military operation, the setting up of the line Morice (electrified wires on the Algerian-Tunisian border), psychological campaigns and anti-FLN propaganda as well as harrassment of the ALN maquisards became harsher and efforts to coordinate actions between the 'interior' and 'exterior' became increasingly difficult. The result was a sharp decline of arm supplies to the maquisards, a fact that intensified the hostility of the military chiefs of the interior toward the FLN's political leadership. Moreover, the transfer of the CEE headquarters to Tunis increased the fragmentation of authority within the FLN direction. "Being abandoned, deprived of arms, the wilayat, pointed out Ben Bella, suffered from a deterioration that could have been prevented. They closed on themselves as they had no links in the
exterior and sometimes with one another. They lived autarkically in regions they started to look upon as fiefs and where some commandants ended up acquiring feudal or gang leaders' attitude. Such a situation gave birth to the cultivation of personal links, regional and ethnical affinities by some wilaya high officers. Conversely at the same time, the ALN troops stationed at the borders came to form a decisive political force with regard to the shaping of the FLN policies.

c. The empowering of the "army of the exterior"

The external army acquired better military training, new equipment, arms and recruits while its strength was also preserved by the fact that it was tremendously difficult for its members to cross mine fields on the frontiers to join the ALN fighters inside Algeria. Being kept away from the battlefield, they became increasingly involved in the struggle for leadership. It was in these circumstances that Boumedienne came to cultivate strong ambitions for leadership but lacking the authority and prestige of other guerrilla officers and FLN politicians, he was more concerned with strengthening his position and gathering support from others. As he lacked revolutionary legitimacy, he started building up his power carefully and with patience in the prospective of a post-independence power scramble. Boumedienne came from a modest family of wheat farmers near Guelma in the constantinois but had great ambitions. He attended a Medersa in this town until he was 14 and in 1952 he left the country to avoid being drafted into the French army for service in the war in Indochina. At Cairo, he attended the prestigious Al-Azhar university and received military training at Hilwan at the time of the emergence of Nasser. He joined the maquis in 1955 (at the age of 23)

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1In Ahmed Ben Bella, p.115.
and was sent to Wilaya V where he substituted his real name Mohamed Boukharouba for Houari Boumediene; 'Houari' was a very popular name in Western Algeria and Boumediene was the name of a holy man in Tlemcen, a big city in this region. As Cl. Boussouf became more involved in the CEE affairs, he emerged as the real commander of this military region and at his Oujda headquarters he surrounded himself with loyal officers who in the course of the war came to form the nucleus of the ALN General Staff (EMG). His closest aides included Kaid Ahmed (major Slimane), Bouteflika, Medeghri, Tayebi Larbi and Cherif Belkacem, forming what will be later referred to as the 'group of oujda'in relation to friendship built up at the COM commandment established near this Moroccan town. Their alignment did not result from the fact that they originally came from parts of Western Algeria and nor were they able to construct popular following. Their main features were the common training received at the Oujda-based General Staff Command post-west under the direction of Cl. Boumedienne. Unlike many of the FLN politicians, they were young elements with no pre-war political experience except Kaid Ahmed who was for a while a member of Ferhat Abbas's UDMA and in contrast to most of the officers of the 'interior', they came from relatively well-off social backgrounds and were able to acquire a relatively high level of
education. Like Boumedienne they bore modernist values and radical conceptions being opposed to both the old elite which they accused of political moderation and the 'maquisards' of whom they reproached the populist rhetoric, narrowness of mind and rudimentary methods of guerrilla welfare.

In the course of the war the ALN General Staff was strengthened by young Algerians who deserted the French army bringing with them military expertise and experience. Boumedienne invoked these criteria to justify their integration into the ALN which was resented by the maquisards on the grounds that many of these officers joined the war of liberation quite late and despite the opposition of the maquisards, some of these new recruits were permitted to retain their rank gained in the French army, a matter that facilitated their rapid rise in the ALN's hierarchy.

In addition to its alliance with these professional officers, the General Staff western branch benefited from the support of a certain number of students whose educational skills were to be needed in attempts to modernize the army. Following the May 6, 1956 appeal of the UGEMA, the Algerian Muslim students founded in 1955, thousands of Algerian university and school students went on strike and many joined the UGEMA activist groups and the FLN federation in France or the administrative
apparatuses of the EMG organs based in Morocco and Tunisia. The students participated in raising funds abroad to support the revolution, particularly in France as well as in gathering international support for the Algerian cause from students' unions throughout the world gaining therefore an appreciable experience in the field of political persuasion and negotiation. When the provisional government of the Algerian republic was created, many of them came to serve in its specialized organs where skills were adequately needed. Being young, well-educated and with practically no pre-war political credit they came to identify more with the nucleus of the General Staff than with the maquisards or the old guard of the FLN, therefore many of them came to cultivate links with the Boumedienne oujda-led group. The latter's power and potential was perhaps also regarded as the real source of political advancement and protection, especially with regard to the evolution of the Algerian war.

The context of negotiations between the GPRA and the French government provided the students with a valuable opportunity to assert their increasing importance in Algerian affairs. It was, therefore, evident that it was from this strata that was to emerge the technocratic elite needed to fill the managerial posts in future Algerian state. Socially most of these technocrats came from segments of the petty bourgeoisie. This category given its great heterogeneity was far from constituting a class having its aggregate and well-articulated interests, but simply that the functions which the petty bourgeois elements or their parents once occupied distinguished them from the old traditional bourgeoisie (land and trade) and from peasants with regard to income and level of education. In contrast to Morocco and Tunisia, the technical skills of
the Algerian technocrats did not come from a professional experience acquired within the colonial state's administration but from education achieved in many cases in France.

Provided with professional officers and a technical cadre, organized around a coherent nucleus and well-endowed with military equipment, the EMG embarked upon strengthening the cohesion of the army of the 'exterior' and its politicization. Centres for training political commissaires and administrative personnel were created at the ALN's rear bases in Morocco and Tunisia in preparation for the transfer of power from colonial rule.

With the evolution of the war of liberation, new developments on the international scene helped the Algerian cause. The inscription of the Algerian problem on the UN agenda made the FLN intensify its efforts to internationalize the war and gain support from the international community. The resounding success achieved by Nasser's Egypt after the Suez affair and the access of some colonies to independence, also served as an impetus for the FLN to believe in the success of its own struggle. These prospects led its leadership to create in September 1958 the provisional government of the Algerian revolution (GPRA), a new body gathering representatives of all tendencies including well-known politicians even moderates, in order to be better accepted by the French government in anticipation of eventual negotiations. The GPRA's aim was to "restore the Algerian state and represent it abroad". It also reflected the FLN's attempt to emphasize its determination not to accept

any solution rather than total independence in contradiction to De Gaulle’s declaration of June 4, 1958 in which he promised equality of political rights to the indigenous population.

The rise to the GPRA leadership of the liberal and radical politicians irritated not only the ALN internal guerrilla fighters but also some elements stationed on the Tunisian and Moroccan borders. Faced with increasing hostility, the GPRA led by the liberal Ferhat Abbas simply handed authority to the three most influential military men: the Colonels Krim, Boussouf and Bentobal a troika that held a de facto substantial power, especially after the death of Abbane Ramdane regarded as a dangerous rival.

However, the crisis over leadership became sharper because of the frustrations of some military commanders as the wilayat came under heavy attacks from French colonial troops, especially with the coming to power of De Gaulle. Suffering most from these operations and from lack of arms, they felt demoralized and, therefore, attempted to unify and oppose the GPRA’s attitude which they regarded as uncompromising with the French government’s negotiation proposals. A meeting was held between the Commanders of these four wilayat: Amirouche (III); Al Houes (VI); Hadj Lakhdar (I); Si M’Hamed (IV). But their aspirations were short-lived as the last three died in the battlefield shortly after. This failure undoubtedly marked the decline of the importance of the commanders of the ALN of the interior and the beginning of the extinction of wilayism. In this context, the strength of the external army increased and Boumedienne its most prominent leader, was appointed chief of the ALN General Staff which was set up in February 1960. Indeed the army’s interference became not only decisive but inevitable especially that the issue at
stake concerned the shaping of the future of independent Algeria. The perspective of a negotiated solution for the war, boosted by De Gaulle's willingness to grant self-determination for the Algerian people had already sharpened the FLN internecine conflicts, since the disagreements concerned the political and economic orientation of the future Algerian state, to what extent it had to be dependent on France, the status of the French settlers, and the question of the Sahara. The apprehension of the General Staff were, however, partially relieved with the elimination of Ferhat Abbas from the GPRA's leadership and his replacement by a radical politician Benkhedda; and with the removal of two liberals Francis and Boumendjel from the GPRA negotiating team after the major reshuffle that took place in August 1961 following the failure of meetings with the French government at Melun in June 1961, Evian in May and July and then at Lugrin. But the approval by the GPRA of the Evian agreements in February 1962, paving the way to the independence of Algeria but closely linked to France, came under heavy criticisms from the members of the General Staff led by Boumediene. Although it possessed the real power, the power of the gun, this group did not attempt to take over the GPRA's formal authority as perhaps such a move would have deepened intra-elite conflicts and weakened the FLN's bargaining position with the French government. And despite that Boumediene was conscious of his strength, he was nevertheless aware that some of the FLN leaders enjoyed more credibility and popularity. He then, was patient knowing that time was running in his favour. These considerations led him to ally with Ben Bella whose prestige never altered although he spent six years in France. Like the General Staff, Ben Bella firmly opposed the Evian agreements which he regarded as
preserving French colonial interests in Algeria and like Boumedienne he bore anti-Kabyle feelings and supported a radical social change in Algeria. The alliance between the EMG and Ben Bella was aimed at shaking the authority of the GPRA and was explained by Boumedienne in these terms: "We began contacts with the five historic chiefs detained in France ... we revealed to them the differences which placed us at loggerheads with the GPRA, so as to make the situation clear and unequivocal to all ... we (later) resisted the GPRA's decision to oust us from the General Staff. This decision emanated from an authority which did not have the competence to take an initiative which the militants and the FLN rejected. It was then that Ben Bella came to inform us that he supported our position and that he sided with us against the GPRA."¹ In this position of strength, the General Staff made it clear that the latter's days were counted.

In an effort to heal the breach between conflicting factions and prepare the transfer of power, the National Council of the Revolution (CNRA) met in Tripoli in May 1962 where it formulated a programme for the future of Algeria in which the prominence of the state in political and economic affairs was asserted and the socialist orientation reaffirmed. However, major disagreements concerned the composition of the political bureau to assume the control of the FLN and the resulting outcome was a split into two broad factions: a coalition of groups which did not recognize the GPRA's legitimacy: the General Staff and the Wilayat close to the frontiers: Wilaya I (Aures), Wilaya V (Oran), Wilaya VI (Sahara). The other coalition gathered the majority of the GPRA members and the

Wilayat II (Constantine), III (Kabylia), IV (Algiers region). These wilayat which had suffered most from the war forces were hostile to the General Staff and they came to regard it as a direct threat to their formally established fiefdoms.

On the eve of independence, the FLN was a mere forum for conflicting groups and clans striking for its leadership. The two blocs remained far apart as the GPRA and its allies established their headquarters at Tizi Ouzou in Kabylia while the forces hostile to the GPRA set up theirs at Tlemcen, the native region of Ben Bella and the fief of Boumedienne and his friends of the Oujda group. Amid armed confrontation, negotiations took place between the two blocs in August 1962 and among agreements reached were that the FLN bureau remained as it was suggested at the CNRA meeting in Tripoli and that elections for a national assembly be held on August 23. But fearing that the General Staff policy of modernizing the army would lead to the elimination of their own authority, the wilaya commanders sided with the GPRA in the Tizi Ouzou group and opposed these agreements. As a result, severe fighting occurred between the two groups but the General Staff forces were better equipped than the maquisards whose human potential and energy had been exhausted after years of struggle with the French colonial troops. In the end, the Ben Bella-led group of Tlemcen supported by the General Staff entered Algiers on September 9, 1962. A week later, a national assembly was elected and on September 29, Ben Bella was empowered to form a government. It was clear that the regime independent Algeria was to have would be strongly marked by the army's weight.
C. THE POST-INDEPENDENCE DILEMMA

1. The lack of consensus-building

The colonial dialectic did not fail to have a lingering impact on the nature of politics in independent Algeria. The destruction of Algeria's traditional structures resulted in the decline of the land aristocracy and segments of the traditional bourgeoisie. In this vein, the relatively limited role played by the Ulema in political mobilization attested for the weakness of this social strata and accounted for the largely secular character of the post-colonial Algerian state. Moreover impulses for economic liberalism and political pluralism in this state were hampered by the weakness of the Algerian bourgeoisie whose growth was seriously impaired by colonial capitalism. On the other hand, factionalism prevented the formation of a unified authority to enable the FLN act as a mobilizing channel during the war and as a modernizing force in independent Algeria. In this respect, lack of cohesion of the wartime FLN leadership and the scramble for power impaired the party's efficiency and led to the neglect of the ideological and political formation of its militants and effective mobilization of the masses. They also plagued its political growth throughout the war, accounting therefore for its marginalization in independent Algeria and for its failure to turn into a mass-based revolutionary party. In practice, it proved far from achieving the task of creating an effective bureaucracy and more importantly the establishment of an effective party system capable of structuring the participation of new groups in politics. ¹

¹This task is the central scheme of political institutionalization which Professor Huntington regards as the basis for political modernization. See Huntington, P.S: Political order in changing societies (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968)
Unlike the Vietnamese Communist party for instance, the FLN failed to mobilize the masses around the objectives of a social revolution as its paramount aim had been to gain political independence and in contrast to the liberation movements in Angola, Guinea-Bissau or Mozambique, it did not hold liberated zones where it could gain power base and exercise political and administrative control and therefore gain experience in the exercise of authority over its followers. Although large segments of the Algerian people and especially the rural masses participated in the war of liberation, neither the working class nor the peasantry were able to play a significant let alone a leading role in the FLN politics and until independence, the party remained a front gathering clans and factions. The lack of what Professor Rosenau calls 'integrated structure of national leadership'\(^1\) hampered the existence of a consensus-building, while the absence of a charismatic leader closed the way for the emergence of a nation builder as in the case of Tunisia's Bourguiba, able to stimulate and articulate a consensus of the identity and purposes of the new state.

If in appearance, Ben Bella was constitutionally designated Prime Minister, as he was empowered by the national assembly to form the country's first government on September 26, 1962 and was elected president of the council of ministers three days later, there was no doubt that he owed his rise to power to the Army General Staff.\(^2\) Like the corps of officers and the technocratic strata, Ben Bella was

\(^2\)Did not Boumedienne declare that: "the choice of the armed forces to present Ben Bella to the presidency is not a sentimental choice. We wanted brother Ben Bella to take this post because he is the man capable to assume its responsibilities"? — le Monde, September 9, 1963.
committed to the idea of building a modern and strong state with a highly centralized authority.\(^1\) Then Ben Bella backed by the army, came into conflict with Abbas the president of the assembly and a group of deputies representing segments of the liberal bourgeoisie which favoured the establishment of a parliamentary regime with a multi-party system. And though Ben Bella and his allies shared the desire of the FLN Secretary General, Khider to set up a party system with socialistic orientations, they were firmly opposed to his attempt to transform the FLN into a mass party capable of controlling the activities of the state and confining the army to the barracks.

In April 1963, Ben Bella backed by the General Staff, bypassed the Party by charging the Assembly to draw a national charter that would serve as the basis for the country's first constitution. In doing so, he did not intend to entrust the parliament with the authority of enacting the constitution as most of the deputies were former maquisards and illiterate and also because the Assembly bureau headed by Ferhat Abbas included members hostile to the Ben Bella military coalition.\(^2\) In fact in April 1963, two projects were set out: one by Ferhat Abbas and the other by a group of five deputies, supporting Ben Bella and his military allies. Only their project was submitted to the Assembly in August with Ben Bella's blessings. The constitution issued from this project, adopted on August 28, 1963 and approved by National referendum

\(^1\) 'The first task was to build the state' (interview to le Monde, September 14, 1962).
\(^2\) Only three out of its 10 members were supporters of Ben Bella and his military allies: Ben Allah, Cherif Belkacem and Menjli. After the composition of the Assembly's bureau, Major Menjli a member of the General Staff, proposed another list filled mostly with officers of the General Staff Western branch clearly indicating the army's hostility to the Assembly's bureau (see le Monde September 27, 1962).
on September 8, affirmed Algeria's commitment to socialism and to the
principles of self-management and to anti-imperialist ideals. The
assembly was deprived of executive powers in favour of the presidential
ordinances. Among the most famous were the decrees of March 1963
instituting self-management and nationalizing the properties left by the
ex-French residents.

Refusing to endorse the role of the Assembly as a rubber stamp for
the government's decisions and to espouse the regime's "marxist-leninist"
tendencies, Ferhat Abbas resigned from the presidency on August 12. His
departure and that of a group of liberal deputies left the way for Ben
Bella to extend his control over the Assembly as he helped its vice-
president Ben Allah one of his staunchest supporters to succeed Abbas.
However, in a dictatorial regime, constitutional prerogatives are not of
high significance as the Assembly in fact, was simply dissolved by Ben
Bella on October 10, 1963 on the basis of immediate dangers jeopardising
the state's integrity and on article 59 which constitutionally gave him
full powers.

Moreover, by a subtle manoeuvre, Ben Bella forced Khider to resign
(on April 7, 1963) and personally took over the leadership of the party
as well. By this move, the last attempts of the FLN to assume the tasks
of nation-state building were virtually impaired since Khider was the
most powerful figure within this party and one of the most fervent
advocates of the submission of the state to the party direction.

While the Assembly was left in paralysis and the party in the shadow
of the State power, the Algerian President strengthened his control over
the government which was filled with trusted friends, leftist allies and
the members of the original General-Staff. In the governments formed in
September 1962 and September 1963, technocrats known for their leftist tendencies and who shared Ben Bella's staunch support of a state-controlled economy were appointed, while Boumedienne the patron of the army and his Oujda group aides were also present. The predominance of the alliance military-technocrats meant the elimination of the past political elite from official duties and its replacement by members of the young generation.

The support of Boumedienne and his clan to Ben Bella was assured as long as the latter did not interfere in the army's matters and as long as he respected the army as a political institution. In fact the President's reliance on the ANP became almost inevitable in his efforts to annihilate resistance to the central authority, especially in the context of increasing challenges and dissidences from those prevented from having a share in national-decision-making. The firmest opposition to Ben Bella's efforts to personalize power came from the ex-wilaya leaders determined to preserve their fiefdoms and oppose the policy of reconversion of the army which they regarded as a means to eliminate them from active politics and from territorial bases they gained during the war of liberation. Their reluctance to submit to the central power reflected the resistance of local authority to modernization carried out by the centre and to the establishment of new loyalties the state tends to develop with the periphery.

In September 1963, Mohand Ould Hadj, the ex-commander of the Wilaya III organized a maquis in his Kabylia stronghold where he had control over 15,000 ex-maquisards. He was soon joined by another Kabyle and historic chief Ait Ahmed who, after resigning from the National Assembly, constituted his own party, 'the party des forces socialistes' (FFS).
Boudiaf, another historic chief, allied himself with the Kabyle insurgents and in July 1964, his own party 'the party de la Révolution socialiste' (PRS) merged with Ait Ahmed’s FFS into an opposition movement, the 'comité national pour la défense de la Révolution' (CNDR).

In the South on the edge of the Sahara, and in the regions of Oran and Constantine, similar partisan movements were activated by the ex-wilaya commanders, respectively by Colonel Chaabani and Majors Moussa (Ahmed Ben Ahmed Abdelghani) and Si Larbi. The Algerian-Moroccan conflict of October 1963 brought a pause in the centre-periphery dissensions, as troops of Hadj and Chaabani came in aid of the ANP forces; but the pause proved short. Cl. Chaabani resigned from the FLN’s political bureau and continued his defiance of the central authority, so did Ait Ahmed, being deprived of the support of Cl. Oul Hadj who had rallied Ben Bella’s regime, and accepted a seat in the FLN political bureau. In the autumn 1964 these dissident movements were mastered by the ANP troops led by Colonel Boumedienne. Chaabani was then, arrested on July 8 and executed in September, Ait Ahmed was imprisoned on October 17 and Major Moussa on July 13. Major Si Larbi (Ben Redjem Larbi) gave up his insubordination to the authority of the General Staff and promptly retired from active politics.

The elimination of declared and potential opposition helped Ben Bella to consolidate his own position but made him depend on the army which had been acting as a cooperative ally. The eclipse of some ex-wilaya commanders and maquisards was also sought by Boumedienne who was left with a relatively easy task to carry out the modernization of the army and its transformation into a coherent and well-structured force.
The increasing strength of Boumedienne and the de facto power of the ANP, led Ben Bella to attempt to reduce his reliance on the army and remove the potential rivalry and serious ambitions incarnated by his young defense minister. The prestige gained on the international level, in particular within the Panafricanist movement and the illusion of strength on the domestic level, boosted by the implementation of self-management and the stress of a rhetoric had tempted Ben Bella to extend his control over defence matters, after succeeding in alienating the party, the national assembly and state administration.

Signs of Ben Bella’s intention to concentrate more powers into his hands and lessen his dependence on the military by undermining the cohesion of the General Staff and its nucleus the group of Oujda, became tangible in late 1963 as dissensions between the President and the military establishment slowly emerged. The issue in contention concerned nation-state building tasks as Ben Bella seemed to opt for a form of self-management more or less similar to the Yugoslavian experience and to confine the army to the barracks, while the General Staff emphasized the historical role of nation-state building conferred upon the ANP by its revolutionary legitimacy. The military establishment also opposed Ben Bella’s move towards a Marxist oriented model of development stressing rather the Arabo-Islamic fondements of the Algerian society. Evidence of Ben Bella’s attempt to sap the army’s power was to consolidate his alliance with leftwing militants and intellectuals and by his rapprochement with the workers’ union (UGTA) as he appointed Safi Boudissè, a syndicalist and anti-military in charge of the labour ministry in the government formed on December 22, 1964. At the same time, he attempted to undermine the cohesion of the Oujda group with a view to
weakening the position of Boumedienne within the government. In May 1964 he appointed Cl. Zbiri as Chief of Staff while Boumedienne was on a visit abroad and put Cl. Abid head of the seventh military region. Both were shawi and ex-maquisards and believed hostile to Boumedienne and his clan. Moreover, three of Boumedienne's aides saw their positions undermined: Medeghri, the minister of interior, resigned on July 10, 1964 in protest of Ben Bella's efforts to take direct control over the prefects, Cherif Belkacem was demoted to the education office and Kaid Ahmed ousted from the government in December 1964 after he was accused by Ben Bella of embezzlement and slapped in public. Meanwhile, news of Ben Bella's intention to dismiss Bouteflika and take over the foreign ministry constituted in the eyes of Boumedienne an ample evidence of the president's determination to sap the cohesion of his clan. But it was Ben Bella's decision to create popular militias of the ANP as a step in the process of confining the army into barracks that dramatized grievances between Boumedienne and Ben Bella. The former was ready to make concessions such as the firing of his close assistants Bouteflika, Medeghri and Kaid; to cede the direction of the General Staff to Zbiri, but he was not willing to relinquish his de facto control of the ANP to anyone else, as his strength stemmed mainly from the army, a strength that he had built up, patiently and thoroughly over years. When Ben Bella attempted to do so, he was promptly toppled on June 19, 1965 on the eve of the second meeting of the Afro-Asian movement scheduled to convene in the Algerian capital. Lately Mohamed-Cherif Messadia explained the
reason of the coup in asserting that it "had, in fact, to stop the process that aimed at keeping the ANP in the barracks and isolate it from the popular masses."¹

Ben Bella's thirst for power in the context of economic chaos, provided Boumedienne and the ANP top officers with a good reason to induce other officers and heads of military regions that were not especially friends to him. The coup carried out in a remarkably bloodless fashion, was monitored by Boumedienne and professional officers especially Colonel Chabou and Major Hoffman responsible for the tank division that paved the way to a successful surrender of Ben Bella's residence.

The success of the coup alone assessed the cohesion of the Boumedienne group and the affirmation of the ANP as the leading force in Algerian politics. The removal of Ben Bella was presented by the new leader as a revolutionary readjustment or redemption that had to put an end to the president's cult of personality, ideological deviation, political confusion and adventurous policies. The stress was put on the faith to the ideals of the Algerian revolution and not on a change of the political and ideological options of the country.

2. The consolidation of the Boumedienne regime

The July 7, 1965 Ordinance announced that all political institutions created by the Ben Bella regime were suspended and a council of revolution delegated a supreme authority was set up to conduct the country's policies. Boumedienne was designated chief of government, President of the Council of Ministers and in charge of the defence.

¹Quoted in Criscuolo, J: Armée et Nation dans les discours du Colonel Boumedienne (These d'Etat, University Paul Valery, Montpellier, 1975), p.237.
ministry. The government was formally placed under the authority of the council of revolution. The heavy representation of the military in this council - as only two of its twenty-six members were civilians - indicated the central role of the army in Algerian politics and its attempts to ensure order and security.¹

The consolidation of the Boumedienne regime and the pursuit of the modernization of the country proved a hard and long process. Having seized power through a coup and removed a constitutionally elected president, the new regime gathered around the Oujda group felt the need of enhancing its legitimacy and increase popular support. To achieve this objective, it embarked upon ensuring the coherence of the ruling elite and wipe out political opposition that became active in protest against what was regarded as the right-wing and authoritarian leadership of Colonel Boumedienne. In the process of consolidation, the organization of popular resistant ORP, a front gathering members of the outlawed PCA and Ben Bellist militants was dismantled in July 1966 and most of its leaders were arrested. Three members of the government Hadj Smain and Mahsas all ex-ministers of Ben Bella were dismissed in the same year because of their leftist tendencies and support of self-management

¹ The council of revolution comprised most of the high officers who had a certain influence within the military establishment. However, it was far from being homogenous as it included two main groups: 1. Boumedienne and his aides of the Oujda group: Bouteflika, Cherif Belkacem, Kaid, Medeghri and Tayebi Larbi; a certain number of active officers close to Boumedienne: the commanders of the military regions: Abid (I), Belhouchet (V), Abdelghani (IV), Soufi (III) as well as Draia the Head of the police forces, Bencherif the Head of the Cherchell military Academy and five former members of the wartime EMG: Colonel Mohammedi Said, Majors Boudjenane, Mendjli and Bensalem. 2) The group of former Wilaya commanders: Zbiri (I), Boubnider (II), Mohand Ould Hadj (III), Khatib (IV) and Benhaddou (V).
against state's centralization preached by the new regime. Ali Yahya (agriculture) and Zerdani (labour) were also removed for the same reason and for their links with labour militants and ex-maquisard circles. By mid-1970, the Boumedienne regime succeeded, through the efforts of the FLN led by Kaid Ahmed, in bringing down attempts of militant students to revive their union (UNEA) which was weakened during Ben Bella's reign. It also succeeded in purging the workers' union rank and file of labour militancy and making the UGTA - under the leadership of Benikous, a moderate - adopt a supportive attitude to the regime.

Under Boumedienne, the government exercised in fact real executive powers, although it was formally made responsible before the Council of Revolution. However, this council - being reduced to 9 members from the original 26 following deaths, purges and retirements - remained the depository of supreme authority but did not act as a decision-making body. An indication of its de facto dislocation was the very rare meetings of its members in the late 1960s. Until 1976, the year of the setting up of political institutions and the election of Boumedienne to the presidency of the Republic through universal suffrage, supreme executive power was assumed by Boumedienne through the council of Ministers where the initial nucleus of the General Staff and the group of civilian technocrats retained a large share of the government's prerogatives. The importance of the civilian technocrats increased with the strengthening of the state administrative organs and control over national economy, as the regime embarked upon an ambitious economic development programme and the building of a centralized state. In this vein, the attention of the military-technocratic strata concentrated upon these issues breaking away with the past period where ideological
considerations prevailed. For the new regime, ideological discussions in Algeria "lead nowhere, what counts above all is economic independence and rapid development". The strength of the military-technocracy core combination reflected the remarkable political stability enjoyed by the country since the December 1967 abortive coup of Zbiri, and the relative coherence of the ruling elites. The government formed shortly after its coup (1965) was not changed until 1977 notwithstanding slight reshuffles in 1968 and 1970 and occasional but scarce ministerial appointments. The members of the Oujda group retained key posts: Bouteflika (foreign affairs), Medeghri (interior), Cherif Belkacem (finance) and Tayebi Larbi (agriculture). The technocrats were allocated important economic portfolios and constituted the largest ministerial group confirming the regime's search for technical expertise to achieve social and economic tasks. Most of them were intellectuals with high qualifications and were active members of the wartime student union (UGEMA).

In the beginning of the 1970 decade, the regime broke its alliance with the feudal bourgeoisie with the launching of an agrarian revolution and with the merchant bourgeoisie after the establishment of the state monopoly over foreign trade and the expansion of the public sector. The regime's shift toward a harder socialistic line found, until the mid 1970s, support from the workers' union, the landless peasants and militant students. It also benefited from the support of the unofficial PAGS, a resurrection of the PCA whose numerous members and militants were active within schools, universities, the FLN mass organizations and certain administrative organs and circles. However, until 1975, the country witnessed a large consensus on the political formula as the flow

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1 Interview of Boumedienne to Jeune-Afrique November 26, 1967.
of oil revenues due to huge increase in oil prices helped improve the standard of life of the lower classes, boost the national economy capabilities and permitted the regime to play an active role on the international level, especially in trying to line up the third world countries around demands for a new international economic order.

With the increase of domestic problems and decline of influence in the third world forums in the mid 1970s, the regime faced a quite serious crisis of legitimacy. Economic policy based on industrializing industries did not generate employment for the growing manpower and did not improve the agrarian sector. In addition, the housing crisis, bureaucratic malpractices, rise of inflation and cost of life and the preoccupation of the regime with the problem of Western Sahara increased popular discontent. A series of large-scale strikes in the national companies was accompanied by political protest from members of liberal bourgeoisie and by riots at universities in reaction to the technocratic model of development that sharpened social disparities. All this contributed to shake the legitimacy and the credibility of the regime whose coherence was relatively hampered by signs of disintegration affecting the homogeneity of the Oujda group.

In a visible attempt to enhance the legitimacy of his regime, Boumedienne announced in 1976 the setting up of political institutions, general elections as well as the determination to combat bureaucracy accused of much of the nation's ills. After a large debate over the

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1 In 1976, four members of the old guard of politicians: Ferhat Abbas, Benkhedda, Hocine Lahouel and Sheikh Khereddine issued a tract criticizing the regime's policies. Bloody riots involving students from different ideological obediences occurred in Algiers campuses.

2 Kaid Ahmed was ousted from the FLN leadership in December 1972, Cherif Belkacem from the government in July 1975 and Medeghri died in mysterious circumstances in December 1974.
government-sponsored national charter, a constitution was promulgated on November 22, 1976 in which the president was given extensive powers. Boumedienne, the FLN's sole candidate for the presidency (article 103) was elected on December 10 for a six year period with 95.23 per cent of the turnout in support. In February 1977 were elected deputies for the people's national assembly. For the first time since the 1965 coup, Algeria was endowed with a constitution and a legislative organ and an elected president. The constitutional legitimacy the regime has been seeking was thus established, at least formally. Visibly boosted by this success, Boumedienne attempted to increase the concentration of powers into his hands just as Ben Bella did before him. In addition to being at the same time Head of State, head of the revolutionary council, President of the council of Ministers, the leader of the FLN, the minister of defense and supreme chief of the armed forces, Boumedienne took in 1977 control over religious affairs, the police paramilitary forces, the civil services and administration.

D. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE

1. The ANP as a political institution

The functioning of the Algerian political system owed much to the army which emerged as the principal force in post-colonial national politics, given its possession of the power of the gun and legitimacy conferred up on it by its predominant role in the war. In view of this context, the Algerian army stood as a part and parcel of the process of state formation and is therefore a political institution. The successful intervention of the army in putting an end to the summer 1962 crisis was an indication that the military establishment was the only national institution that could provide law and order in a politically disorgan-
ized society. It also confirmed its intention to act as the guardian of the revolution and watchdog over national unity. On independence, the General Staff appeared as the only group in Algerian society that had sufficient organization, strength, discipline and highly motivated leadership to conduct the affairs of the state as well as the organ best equipped to resolve political and socio-economic chaos that characterized the period of Ben Bella's reign 1962-1965. Given this strength, the Algerian army began to play a major role in stimulating social change, expanding political infrastructure and develop political institutions, therefore emerging as the guardian of the institutionalized state. In the 1976 national charter, the texts related to the army were placed well before those dealings with the party. The part concerning the army represented by Chapter VI of the headline referring to the 'fundamental principles of the organization of the Algerian society', while the texts connected with the party were found under the first chapter of the second section related to 'power and its organization'. The nuance was clear, the army was regarded as one of the basic principles and components of the society, while the party was conceived as the means of power and of its organization. Moreover, the nature of the army remained in the 1976 constitution the same as stated in the 1964 Algiers charter. The only difference between the two charters with regard to the army was that the 1964 charter clearly stated that the army "is under the orders of the government".

The process of modernization initiated by the army and the need of expertise combined with the regime's search for political stability led to the virtual elimination of many of the ex-maquisards and members of the wartime political elite from the national decision-making machinery.
A large number of these elements were dismissed from the ANP following the abortive coup of Tahar Zbiri in December 1967, the assassination attempt on Boumedienne's life on April 25, 1968 and the conspiracy of Krim Belkacem in early 1969. In all these plots a certain number of the former maquisards within the army were presumed to have taken part. The Wilayism spirit was regarded by Boumedienne as an obstacle to his modernization policies and was therefore considerably reduced by the elimination from the council of revolution of the ex-wilaya commanders: Mohammedi Said, Boubnider, Ould Hadj and Khatib. The last three were also dismissed from the FLN's executive secretariat. In the Algerian leader's terms, these were people who "were not able to reconvert and grasp the sense of history. They have not understood that Algeria of 1968 is very much different from that of 1962".\footnote{Interview to P. Herreman (in le Monde, April 4, 1968).}

Consequently, under Boumedienne's tight control, the ANP was progressively transformed from an army of peasants into a professional modern army. The nucleus of the ANP formed out of highly trained officers of the wartime General Staff, supported his attempts to modernize the army and the country's socio-economic structures. Therefore, the intrusion of the army in the state organs and administrative apparatuses increased as former officers of the ANP were earmarked for ministerial posts, others occupied the functions of prefects (walis), or were affected at the head of the state-owned companies, administrative organs and local constituencies, a fact attesting for the presence of the army at all sectors and all levels of the country's socio-economic life. Besides large supplies of sophisticated military hardware mainly from the Soviet Union, and the training of hundreds of the ANP officers in that country, the Algerian
army was well endowed with civil engineering equipment, trucks, skilled working force in order to be able to better contribute to national economic development and emerge as an effective factor in its modernization. The army has also its own enterprises, in particular the one specialized in public works (DNC-ANP) which employed more than 40,000 men making it in size and effectiveness comparable to the gigantic state-owned oil company, Sonatrach. The military conscription made compulsory in 1968 provided the army with potential reservist contingents and also with a quite important labour force employed in building roads, dams, schools, rural villages and highways, in particular the Transaharan highway running from Algiers to Mali and Niger.

When Boumedienne died on December 28, 1978 after a forty-day long coma caused by a rare disease, an emergency congress of the FLN was held to designate the candidate for the presidency. According to the constitution, the president of the national assembly assumed the presidency for a period not exceeding forty-five days until the congress met.1 The meeting took place on January 27-31, 1979 fifteen years after its last gathering in April 1964. Out of 3290 delegates who attended the congress, 640 were representatives of the ANP and 537 were state technocrats and high civil servants, an indication of the preservation of the military-technocracy congruence. Behind the constitutional parody, the weight of the army was determinant in designating the FLN's sole candidate for the presidency. The candidate was chosen among the most influential high officers in particular, the heads of the military regions and commanders of operational units. The nomination of Colonel

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1 According to the constitution, the ANP's president is not entitled to run for the presidency of the Republic (Chapter III, art.117).
Chadli Bendjedid, the commander of the powerful military region of Oran had certainly obeyed the rules of the military hierarchy: he was the longest serving officer in the highest grade and in contrast to what was assumed, his nomination did not reflect the army's role as a broker or as a simple referee between two presumed potential candidates for the presidency: Bouteflika the foreign minister representing a group favouring economic liberalisation and Yahiaoui, the former head of the FLN who represented those advocating a hard socialistic line, but it assessed the role of the military as a determining force. In contrast to these factionalist tendencies, the appointment of Colonel Chadli responded to the army's desire to present a new man with an apparently neutral attitude that was meant to transcend political cleavages or clashes of personalities existing between the army itself and within the ruling elite. His strong hold over the important military region of Oran, his absence of overt involvement in the past period's politics, his discreet posture and aloofness from any group or faction certainly helped him win the army's confidence, as the objective of the military establishment was to assume the role of watchdog over the revolution, safeguard the cohesion of its leadership, ensure domestic stability through keeping order and avoiding intra-elite conflicts. What was then seen as a remarkably peaceful succession and expression of the commitment to constitutional rules and principles of democratic centralism was in fact the articulation of the army's own interests.

The early stage of the Chadli's regime reflected the compromise between new and old forces, as the new government formed on March 8, 1979 comprised no less than 11 technocrats who largely contributed in shaping the country's economic policy under the reign of Boumedienne, while the
political bureau included all the barons of the past regime. However, only Benyahia, Bouteflika and Abdelghani were given ministerial portfolios. The former was even demoted to the formal post of adviser to the president, being replaced as foreign minister by Benyahia. The most significant changes had been the nomination to the important posts of planning (Brahimi) and energy (Nabi). The former, a Harvard graduate and a friend of Chadli as they fought together during the war in Wilaya I and the latter a notable long-time rival of Abdeslam. These new ministers became the spearheads of the new economic policies the Chadli regime intends to pursue.

However lacking the charisma and abilities of Boumedienne, the new Algerian president moved to strengthen his own position by attempting to remove potential rivals and strengthen the party in order to lessen his dependency on the army. At the March 1980 session of the central committee, he obtained the revision of the FLN's status in the direction of reinforcing the prominence of the Secretary-General and in the sense that he was delegated powers to designate and not merely propose the members of the political bureau who in return were responsible before him, in contrast to the 1979 text which attributed the central committee prerogatives to elect the political bureau of the party. Chadli was given full powers by the FLN delegates, especially in the context of university unrest and Kabyle cultural protest, but also in view of eliminating potential rivalry within the party system.

The reshuffle of the political bureau following the fifth session of the central committee on June 30-July 2, 1981 saw the removal of Yahaoui and Bouteflika while the demotion of Abdelghani was completed at the 1983

Abdeslam, Benchelif, Draia, Tayebi Larbi and Yahaoui.
party congress as he lost his post of Prime Minister to Abdelhamid Brahimi though retaining his seat in the political bureau. In addition, the easing out from the government ministers who were close to Boumedienne, permitted Chadli to strengthen his hold over the presidential executive organ. And under the impulse of the new Prime Minister, the regime's policies moved away from the rigidly socialistic line pursued by the past regime to a greater emphasis on the social needs of the people, decentralization and a more substantial association of private capital within policies of national economic development. The government formed in December 1983 was enlarged and many economic ministries were adjuncted sub-ministries in a visible attempt to adjust to technical responsibilities and permit the diffusion of power and political mobilization in order to absorb the recruitment of elements of the young generation of technocrats whose main virtue stems from expertise and no longer from revolutionary legitimacy.

To demarcate itself from the past regime and increase its own legitimacy, the new leadership embarked upon a clean up campaign against personalities and technocrats of the past period, accused of mismanagement, corruption and embezzlement. Bouteflika, Bencherif and Tayebi Larbi were requested by the newly-created 'cour des comptes' to restitute large amounts of public funds they were accused of having appropriated. Other technocrats close to Abdeslam were also sued to discredit the former minister of national economy and energy as well as tarnish the economic policy carried out under Boumedienne.¹

¹Such as Ait Al Hocine the former General Director of the state oil company Sonatrach, Ghozali, the ex-minister of energy and petrochemicals and Keramane previously Head of the national electricity company.
However, the most crucial test of president Chadli in his attempt to consolidate his own position was to reduce his dependence on the army and keep the military as a supportive force to his regime and political moderation. One important means to reduce this dependence has been the reinforcement of the structure of the FLN and the increase of its role in the home polity. Under the impulse of Cherif-Messadia, a former ALN officer and a long-time serving party official, the FLN has been rejuvenated and became more active with regard to the tasks of political mobilization and participation, especially since 1983. Under its supervision, a certain number of mass organizations increased their activities while other associations with specific socio-cultural purposes were created. Moreover, the party's participation in preparing local, legislative and general elections increased and a greater number of its own officials were elected. The obligation that only its members were permitted to take up official functions in the state political and administrative organs (article 120), considerably increased the importance of the FLN at the expense of the PAGS, the semi-official leftwing party which had been relatively active during the Boumedienne era.

The party's presence in the government increased with the appointment of Goudjil (transport), Bouchama (sports) and Rouis (information), the latter being a personal friend of Chadli. And in a visible attempt to stress the prominence of the party in political life at least formally, no active military officer has won a seat as a full member in the political bureau designated in December 1984 with the exception of Colonel Belhouchet who assumed the charge of general inspector of the army, a post that meant to give him a formal occupation rather than real military responsibilities. Indeed, General-major Benloucif, the Chief of
Staff and General Benyelles the Secretary-General of the defence ministry were nominated as alternate members only, just like Abdelhamid Brahimi the Prime Minister who represents in fact, the state technocracy. There is no doubt that the consolidation of the party resulted from the personal will of Chadli and so was the rise of Messadia a member of the FLN political bureau and the representative of the Central Committee's permanent secretariat.¹

Moreover, in his efforts to consolidate his position by strengthening his control over the army, Chadli used the technique of reorganizing the military structure and manoeuvred to neutralize resistance within the ANP to his own power, through purges and by putting his own men in charge of the most sensitive military duties. Prominent officers such as the Lieutenant-Colonels Kasdi Merbah and Selim Saadi were promoted out of their strongholds. However, in practice Chadli's task of keeping control over the military establishment was rendered difficult by the consolidation of military feudalities after the death of Boumedienne. Several heads of military regions gained increased strength in their respective military fiefs and were able to benefit from loyalties of some local personalities and administrators. In view of this context, Chadli's first moves were to take control over the national high security council to supervise military affairs and reinstated a General Staff (that had been suppressed by Boumedienne) in an attempt to break up factionalism within the army and permit a larger diffusion of central power within the military establishment.² He also nominated a deputy to the heads of

¹A presidential instruction No.30 of September 15, 1982 called for a greater drive of the party in all sectors of the economic and political life.
²However in March 1982, General Abbas Ghozaiel, a Chadli's loyal was put in charge of the high security council.
each of the military regions in order to keep an eye on their commanders and remove some of their military responsibilities in favour of these new adjoints.

Furthermore, as ambitions grew, President Chadli seemed eager to hold on to his office and adopt the policy of divide and rule. The institution of the rank of General in 1984 permitted the creation of a well-defined military hierarchy for the first time in the history of contemporary Algeria. If the establishment of this hierarchy responded to military order and rules it did not, however, reflect a strict respect of the military ranking system. By awarding Colonel Benloucif the rank of "General-major" the highest grade and appointing him Chief of Staff, Chadli aimed more at endowing the army with a clear structure to allow a diffusion of power than at concentrating authority in the hands of the highest-ranking officer. The idea of the diffusion of power within the ANP became clearer when Belhouchet was appointed to the formal post of general inspector of the armed forces and later two other generals Abderrahim and Nezzar were designated as deputies to the Chief of Staff, while Benyelles was also promoted general and put in charge of the Secretariat-General of the Defence Ministry, which made of him the de facto army's strong man. The clash of personalities between Benloucif and Benyelles is reportedly constant and their nomination both as alternate members of the political bureau in December 1983, regardless of their difference in ranking, increased speculation over Chadli's desire to cultivate paradox and antagonism to be better able to play off one against the other.
This policy proved necessary to strengthen the unity of the army by transcending regional affinities perhaps inevitable as in most developing countries. Undoubtedly, political stability of the regime assesses the ability of the Algerian army to play down subjective feelings so as to preserve its role of the guardian of the institutionalized state.

Moreover, the reorganization of the military regions in November 1984 saw the promotion of officers of the second generation to lead other regions: Benmaalem (Oran), Betchine (Ouargla), Abid (Tammanrasset), Khellil (Constantine), Zeroual (Bechar). Like Benlouicif the chief of staff and Benyelles the Secretary General of the ministry of defence, most of them are in their late 30s or 40s and have been the product of the modernization of the Algerian army carried out after the country's independence. This reorganization responded to the aspirations of the young officers eager to assume high responsibilities in military duties and circles, especially in the context of renewed tension with Morocco following the latter's alliance with Libya and the increase of domestic civilian opposition and discontent. This opposition whether centered around Ben Bella after his release from prison in 1981 and self-exile, or around Muslim fundamentalists, did not aim at the rejection of Chadli's rule as much as it asserted the emergence of centrifugal forces resulting from the contradictions of the economic policies of the past period, and striving for a greater share in the national income and decision-making. If the Ben Bella-led movement concentrated on the authoritarian aspects of the present regime as it claimed, and the group of prominent women on the emancipation of the Algerian woman; the fundamentalists appeared critical of the embezzlement and westernization of the state technocracy while Berber militants...
protested against massive arabization. The diversity of these protests indicates the greatly marked process of differentiation that Algerian society is currently witnessing. There is much evidence that the regime of President Chadli constitutes a transitory period leading towards a new order different from the socialists' hardline and technocratic model of development carried out during Boumedienne's time. In this context, there has been a strident clash between various groups and clans within governmental and military circles. If the main apparent cleavage exists between those who favour an economic liberalization and a moderate foreign policy and those who advocate the extension of the public's sector and a more radical orientation in external policies, there is a certainty that the issue will be settled not along these ideological and political divisions but essentially through conflict of personalities. Up to the present time, President Chadli is playing a role of broker between the two factions and although he favours a less rigid socialist line and a more emphasis on the social needs of the people, he has nevertheless been cautious not to speed up economic liberalism and political pluralism. The better economic capabilities of the country and the relatively weaker weight of its bourgeoisie have so far permitted Algeria to avoid embarking upon the open door policy pursued by Egypt after the death of Nasser, for instance. The multiplicity of groups and clans with a relatively equal strength also explained Chadli's awareness of doing a Sadat and accelerate Deboumediennization. His centrist position remains at the moment his main force to keep equidistant from both sides and act as a referee. His re-election in December 1984 for a second presidential mandate may stand as an indication of the relative success of this strategy.
On the external level, Chadli's middle-way approach reflects the policy of a broker between East and West, and North and South, and the somehow moderate and less ideologically tempered foreign policy. In this view it appears that the centrist approach to domestic problems that has been followed by Chadli constituted a ferment for the equally centrist attitude adopted on the foreign level as it resulted from the compromise existing between the fractions encompassing the President.

2. The prominence of the state's executive powers-

   a. the reinforcement of presidentialism

The constitutional structure established since independence reserves a prominent place to the state's executive powers and emphasizes the decisive importance of the president with regard to the national decision-making process. This does not imply that foreign policy decisions, in particular, are taken in a constitutional vacuum, but it nevertheless shows that the momentum and the effectiveness of Algeria's institutional structure depends upon presidential direction and control.

Given the historical context of independent Algeria, the Algerian ruling elites regarded the strengthening of the state's organs and the extension of their role in the socio-economic and political life as a crucial means to consolidate their own position. The assertion of the army as a political institution was also seen by the military as most effective within the state structure, in the sense that only a political constitutionalization, even formal and centralized around the state as the supreme authority, would confer the military establishment with a legal status which would help conceal the de facto prominence of the army in the country's political process.
While the intention of the military has been to act as the guardian of the institutionalized state to protect their own interests, the technocracy regarded the reinforcement of the state executive powers as the basis for their political advancement and social privileges. The bureaucracy has, therefore, increased by leaps and bounds with the expansion of the state's administrative and economic activities. As past political elite was eliminated, the party being left in lethargy and the parliament in paralysis, the congruence between military and managerial elites was maximized around the consolidation of the state's powers which meant the strengthening of institutions of the government.

The prominence of the state and the centralization of powers in the presidential office were clearly reflected in the two constitutions Algeria has known, the first in September 1963 and the other in 1976. Both provided the Head of the state with large executive powers as they made him supreme chief of all armed forces and responsible for national defence (art.43, art.111 al. 4 and 5 respectively) and the only authorized body to call state emergency and take exceptional measures in case of dangers against the state (art.59, art.119 and 120). The president is also empowered to appoint all the members of the government (art.47, art.113), all civilian and military functions (art.54, art.11 al 12), to establish martial law, declare and sign peace (art.44, art.119). The president also defines, conducts and implements domestic and foreign policies (art.48, art.111 al 6), negotiates and ratifies international treaties and conventions (art.42, art.11 al.1), appoints and dismisses Ambassadors (art.41, art.11 al.6). However, it should be noted that the 1976 constitution endowed the President of the Republic with larger executive powers than the 1963 constitution. In the terms of the
former, the Head of state incarnates the state at home and abroad (art.111 al.1), represents the guarantor of the constitution (art.11 al.3) and unlike in the 1963 constitution he could nominate and dismiss Ambassadors without propositions from the ministry of foreign affairs, negotiate and ratify international treaties without consulting the National assembly and appoint members of the government as he chooses without two-thirds having to be chosen among deputies. More important, the 1976 constitution permitted him to call a national referendum (art.111 al.14), dispose of a legislative veto (art.55). He could also exercise legislative power during the Assembly vacations (art.113), while constituencies were permitted to formulate a demand for the government to issue projects of law, therefore bypassing the parliamentary prerogatives.

Constitutionally, the Head of state is empowered in the 1976 constitution to control everything while being under no control unlike in the 1963 constitution where the assembly could by a vote of no confidence on the basis of absolute majority force the president to resign. The larger executive powers conferred upon the president by the 1976 constitution reflected in fact the personal power of Boumedienne while during the early time of Ben Bella, the assembly was full of powerful civilian and military personalities who did not support the President's policies. The relative importance given to the assembly at that time resulted from a balance of power which was not entirely favourable to Ben Bella.

After his election in February 1979, President Chadli did not introduce major changes into the constitution promulgated in 1976 by his predecessor. The only amendments passed were to reduce the presidential
mandate from 6 to 5 years and the obligation made for the president to nominate a Prime Minister to assist him. This does not mean a reduction of the president's executive powers conferred upon him by the constitution as the Premier is made responsible before the president and not given substantial authority. According to the art.115 al. 15 of the constitution, the president may delegate some of his powers to the Prime Minister but not those regulating the nomination and the dismissal of a vice-president, members of the government; or those of calling a referendum, anticipated legislative elections and dissolving the assembly. The premier also cannot assume command of the armed forces, decree state emergency, sign treaties of armistice and peace. Neither can he preside over meetings of state and party organs or define and execute domestic and foreign policies. In fact, the authority of the President remained intact as the revision of the constitution did not for instance impose the nomination of a vice-president although the constitution stated the possibility of appointing one or more vice-presidents.

b. the National assembly and the FLN as state's appendages

The first elections to set up a new parliament took place fifteen years later (February 1977) through which were designated 261 deputies for a five year period. Since then, the national assembly, though proclaimed the legislative organ, has seen its legislative powers limited. If it could enact laws with regard to personal status, penal and commercial law, economic and social fields, vote the state's budget, 

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1Law of July 7, 1979 relative to constitutional revision.
2In the March 5, 1982 elections the number of seats was increased to 281.
define the national education policy, it could by no means interfere in military and foreign affairs, though the parliament could discuss matters related to the country's external policies.

In practice, the assembly remained subordinated to the state's executive powers and as a rubber stamp for the government decisions, as it was filled with deputies proposed by the FLN direction under the direct control of the presidential office. It should be noted that deputies are considered to represent a national rather than a local constituency. The majority of deputies are relatively young (averaging 40 years) with little wartime experience, with no substantial regional following or local loyalties and many of them (a third) served previously in the state's organs and apparatuses: former ministers, diplomats, high civil servants and managers of state-owned companies. The intrusion of the state into the parliamentary membership left little room for militants of the party or mass organizations denoting the bureaucratization of the Assembly and its submission to the state's authority.¹ The president of the Assembly (since 1977) is Rabah Bitat, the only historic chief to remain in power. He has a limited political credo and is regarded as a state functionary having served as a minister for a long period of time 1965-1977.

Just as the Assembly was deprived of executive powers, the FLN never assumed a leading role in political mobilization and control and despite the grandiloquence of the rhetoric about the predominance of the party over the state as inscribed in the 1963 and 1976 constitutions, the FLN

¹Only 22 out of 120 candidates serving in the FLN administration were elected in 1977. Moreover, the number of representatives of working class and peasantry is negligible.
has become in fact a mere institutional appendage to the presidency.\(^1\) Declared attempts to revitalise it failed to make it emerge from the lethargy and inertia as to become the real 'parti-derigeant'.\(^2\)

After the June 1965 coup and on the eve of appointing a secretariat executive of the FLN, Boumedienne publicly asserted the prominence of the state over the party. "The FLN, he declared, will be a dynamic avant-garde revolutionary party, functioning according to the rules of democratic centralism and consisting of tested militants. Its tasks will be in conformity with the Tripoli programme but not that of ADMINISTERING or SUBSTITUTE ITSELF for the state".\(^3\) As a result of conflicts between the members of the executive secretariat, this organ was dissolved on December 12, 1967 and Kaid Ahmed a member of the Oujda group and a President's aide was put in charge of the party and responsible for its reorganization. However, Boumedienne did not intend to relinquish his leadership over the FLN as Kaid proved to have a mind of his own and as indication of his authority over the FLN, he chaired himself the important session of this party on December 22, 1970. After the dismissal of Kaid on December 22, 1972, the party remained in Boumedienne's hands, although in practice the administration of the party was assumed by Cherif Messadia, a senior party official with modest political credentials at that time. After the setting up of political institutions in 1976 and in the context of reinforcing his own position,

\(^1\)The 1963 constitution empowered the FLN to "establish the nation's policies and control the activity of the National assembly and of the government". The 1964 charter confirmed the party prominence over the state (art.24) and in the 1976 constitution, the FLN is supposed to orientate the country's general policy (art.98).

\(^2\)Directives related to its organization were issued on March 26, 1966; December 10, 1967; January 24, 1968; October 24, 1968 and February 11-13, 1970.

\(^3\)Speech, July 7, 1965. (emphasis added)
Boumediene appointed on November 14, 1977, Salah Yahaoui as coordinator of the party. A former ANP officer, Yahaoui had been close to the president with whom he shared hardline socialist convictions.

Until the death of Boumediene in December 1978, the FLN's activities were relatively limited. The party was practically absent from the state's administrative apparatuses and was bypassed by the army and by local constituency organs in directing the operations relative to the applications of the agrarian revolution that was launched in 1971. Another aspect of external influence within the party, was the obligation made for the Muhafada - a party instance at the wilaya level - to include also in its bureau the wali (prefect) and the commander of the military region, both regarded as the representatives of the institutionalized state. Moreover, in an attempt to overcome the inertia of the party and also widen the scope of the regime's legitimacy, Boumediene appealed to students and military conscripts to volunteer in campaigning for the success of the Agrarian revolution by explaining its content to the peasants and helping them in their daily work and administrative affairs.

The application of the 'gestion socialiste des entreprises' (the workers' management charter) carried out by the UGTA under the FLN guidance did not touch all the ministries and national companies as originally intended. Invoking reasons of economic efficiency and the principle that politics and business do not mix, the ministry of industry and energy led by Abdeslam was able to stop the intrusion of this new charter in the state oil company Sonatrach in particular. The army also remained outside the FLN control. The ANP has its own magazine.

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1Decision taken at the March 29, 1981 sixth ordinary session of the FLN's central committee.
Al-Djeich (the army) which emphasized the role of the military establishment in the socio-economic development of the country and as the guardian of the revolution and the institutionalized state.

c. the limits of local government

Another aspect of executive centralization is reflected in the increase of the role of the state in local government. The administrative system inherited from the colonial period instituted a pyramidal structure of bodies as the country was administratively sub-divided into 13 Wilayat (departments), 100 arrondissements (districts) and 1590 communes having at their head a wali (prefect), a sub-prefect and a Mayor respectively. In independent Algeria, the object of the administrative organization aimed at deconcentrating the central power and increase popular participation in decisions affecting these regions. However, the state administration remained highly centralized and its control over these constituencies nearly omnipotent. Both the prefect and the sub-prefect, the main decision-makers in their constituencies were state-appointed and depended on their 'Ministère de tutelle' the home office. The communes supposedly the basic unit of the administrative system and which Ben Bella compressed to 1150 for the purpose of effectiveness, were placed under the control of organs known as the 'délegations spéciales' appointed by the president instead of being elected as he initially promised perhaps in order not to provide landlords, religious and traditional chiefs with the possibility to resist let alone challenge the state's authority.

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1The number of Wilayat was increased to 31 in July 1974 (ordinance no.74-09 of July 2, 1974) and to 48 in December 1984 (Law of February 4, 1984). By 1978 the number of the communes was reduced to 691.
The lack of a well-articulated administrative process remained until 1967-1969 when the codes of the commune and the wilaya were enacted and municipal elections held in an attempt to redefine the role of the administrative units and their socio-economic functions as well as make local government focus on political and economic development and provide a two-way channel of access from the central authority to the people.¹

The efforts to decentralize the bureaucratic structure remained formal as the subnational territorial entities may be delegated authority from the central government but they have no inherent authority of their own. Because the Algerian state is unitary, decentralization cannot be made to express some autonomy as decentralization is only "a technique for increasing the active participation of the Wilayat and of the masses in the revolutionary power."² The wilaya endowed with political, economic and socio-cultural prerogatives and operating as an intermediary between the commune and central authority remained, as in the past, headed by a state-appointed wali being the only depository of the state authority whose unicity therefore, rules out the confusion of responsibilities (article 150 of the code of the wilaya). The wali is assisted by an elected advisory body or council whose powers are in reality very limited. Economic projects interesting the constituencies for instance,

²Interview of Boumedienne to Récution Africana (July 2, 1970).
had to be planned and their realisation controlled by a national economic and social council (CNES) a government-appointed body composed of 170 representatives from various ministries, financial institutions, managers of the state-owned companies and from the party organs, created on November 6, 1968.

The constitutional and administrative structure did not permit a free political activity, producing on the contrary a tight centralized governmental executive unwilling to give up its powers and prerogatives.
CHAPTER TWO: THE FORMULATION OF FOREIGN POLICY

A foreign policy of any country cannot be seriously analyzed without understanding the process of its formulation, making and conduct. In this process, the study of idiosyncratic or individual factors is indispensable, because foreign policy is neither a mere description of the external manifestations of a state nor a simple output of the entire national unit.

In contrast to constitutional states characterized by relatively permanent institutions, well articulated bureaucracies and pressure groups, the decision-making in Algeria, like in many new states, has been virtually personal or at least restricted to a small group centred around the president. The constitutional structure in this country proved, when existed, too formal to permit a dynamic interaction between institutions and personalities. This suggests the minor role played by both the parliament and the party in the decision-making process and assesses that responsibility has come to rest in the office of the President. As a result, the institutional organs were merely confined to the role of more or less influencing the policies without having the power of making a formal decision. Moreover, in a context marked by authoritarianism where impermanently rooted institutions have been subordinated to relatively permanent personalities, and given the absence of mass political mobilization, influence of public opinion or group interests on the foreign policy decisions has been minimal. However, this does not imply that the president-led ruling elite was entirely immune from domestic constraints and pressures, but simply that foreign policy
in Algeria underlines the feature of a strong state executive and the tendency to make policy within a small circle operating in secrecy or semi-secrecy.

In this circle of what has been commonly labelled as the foreign community, the President had to contend with rivalries between the few members of the ruling elite consisting essentially of a small coalition between officers and civilian technocrats. And it has been amid these rivalries that the evolution of Algerian foreign policy should also be understood.

A. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY

1. Structure and organization

The foreign ministry in Algeria was not an institution born with the country's independence in 1962, but its formal creation dates back to the outbreak of the war of liberation. The FLN declaration of November 1, 1954 made the internationalization of the Algerian conflict one of its main external objectives.¹

The first manifestation of the wartime diplomacy was then, the setting up of a 'delegation of the exterior' entrusted with the task of gathering international support for the Algerian cause and its first success was the participation - though as an observer - of an FLN delegation in the first gathering of the third world countries at Bandung on January 24, 1955.² At this conference, the Algerian delegates Ait Ahmed and M'Hamed Yazid gained pledges of moral and financial support to the Algerian cause, mainly from the Arab countries. The strength of the

¹See Textes fondamentaux du FLN, p.5.
²The external delegation was formed out of three historical chiefs of the Algerian revolution: Benbella, Ait-Ahmed and his brother in law Khider.
socialist bloc and the emergence of the non-aligned movement gave an opportunity for mustering support for its struggle, in the sense of putting pressure on France to grant the Algerian people independence. The creation of the provisional government (GPRA) in September 1958 gave birth to a foreign ministry led by a radical politician, Dr Lamine Debaghine and diplomatic missions were sent to numerous countries which had supported the FLN cause. Moreover, the FLN actions on the external level were enhanced by the creation of an information bureau in New York, jointly directed by two highly skilful diplomats, Abdelkader Chanderli and M'Hamed Yazid. This bureau edited 'Free Algeria', a magazine which aimed at gaining the support of non-aligned countries and of other countries at the United Nations for the Algerian war of liberation, especially after the inclusion of the Algerian question on the UN agenda and the commencing of negotiations between the FLN and the French government.

Following changes in the GPRA leadership made in January 1960, Colonel Krim Belkacem, one of the most prestigious guerilla leaders, was put in charge of the foreign office. Krim's team included young and competent diplomats most of whom benefited from the already acquired diplomatic experience of the GPRA's Minister of Information, M'Hamed Yazid who will eventually become a prominent figure in independent Algeria's diplomacy. Under Krim Belkacem, the foreign ministry comprised four sections according to geographical divisions: Europe-America, the socialist countries, Africa-Asia, and the Arab world and constituted the principal nucleus of sovereign Algeria's corps diplomatique. After the reshuffle of the GPRA in August 1961, Krim was replaced by Dahlab, a radical politician and one of the most skilled and
entrepreneurial members of the FLN delegation which negotiated the final agreements at Evian. This change resulted perhaps from the pressures of the FLN's general staff and some of the Arabic-speaking maquisards who suspected Krim of showing a moderate attitude at the negotiations with the French government.

Until 1963, the foreign ministry remained in the form of a general secretariat of external affairs and not in a properly articulated structure. With the nomination of Bouteflika in September 1963, this organ was progressively turned into an established unit organized into one general directorate and two additional directorates, one of which dealt exclusively with the French affairs, a matter that indicated the importance Algeria attached to relations with her former metropole - Table II:1. The General Directorate and the other directions covered all aspects of Algeria's relations with geographically determined countries. In practice, this organization appeared quite rigid and there were problems of coordination between the different divisions.

A reform took place in March 1977 unaccompanied by a public government statement to explain the reasons for the reorganization - Table II:2. Apparently, it aimed at improving the effectiveness of the ministry in the context of Algeria's greater involvement in international affairs, increase of the economic capabilities and extension of the diplomatic network. The main changes were the transformation of the old specialised directorate into 12 integrated directions, each headed by a Direction General and comprising directions, sub-directions and bureaus. These Directions could be classified into three categories: 1) functional directions: dealing with economic, political and cultural relations, 2) geographic directions: Arab countries, Africa, Asia, Latin-America,
Eastern Europe, Western Europe, 3) technical directions: related to protocol, press, consular affairs and general administration. The most important change consisted in abolishing the French directorate by placing French affairs in the sub-direction EEC of the direction Western Europe and North-America. The assumption that the reform was only structural and organizational, or that it merely responded to necessary adjustments to a new context marked by the country's external commitments prove too simplistic to explain the relative tardiness of the reform. For the same reason is invalid the argument that the abolition of the French directorate resulted from Algeria's determination to assess the reduction of economic dependence on her former metropole and avoid giving a special character to her relations with the latter as it was the practice during De Gaulle's era.

It seems however that the new structure reflects clearly two sets of considerations. Politically, it aimed at allowing the entry of new elements into the ministry as a result of political mobilisation initiated by Boumedienne to replace the old guard and at reducing the grip of Bouteflika over it. Structurally, it attempted to ease the heavy-centralized structure of the ministry so as to permit an increase of the participation of diplomatic personnel in the execution of some aspects of Algeria's external affairs as the implementation of foreign objectives needed more and more expertise and staff.

Algeria had diplomatic representation abroad well before her independence with the wartime FLN having permanent missions in several countries, mainly the Arab ones and those of the socialist world as well as in Ghana, and Guinea. The structure of these representations in independent Algeria varies from one country of accreditation to another,
given the importance of Algeria's interests in the host country and to
some extent its size. Larger embassies are usually organized in a way
that reflects the compartmentalization of routine work, being divided
into these main sections: chancery, accounts, consular and judicial
affairs, information and culture and military. The mission is headed by
an Ambassador assisted by one or more advisers. In countries such as
USA, GB, France and the USSR, the missions also include an important
cultural section to deal with the affairs of the Algerian govern-
ment-sponsored students, but its head is designated by and is responsible
to the ministry of higher education. In smaller missions such as those in
sub-Sahara Africa, the pattern of organization is comparatively simpler
with regard to the number of diplomatic staff and means due to the
limitation of Algeria's affairs in these countries.

A variety of criteria has been used to justify the opening of
diplomatic missions:

Fundamental considerations: proclaiming itself an Arab country and
belonging to the Arab community and destiny, it was normal for Algeria to
have diplomatic relations with primarily brother Arab countries of the
Maghreb and the Middle East.

Ideological affinities: on the basis of anti-colonialism, anti-capitalism
and anti-imperialism, as is the case with former colonies and the
socialist countries of Eastern Europe, Communist China, North Korea, Cuba
and Vietnam. Political reasons: consideration of non-alignment (such as
Yugoslavia and India) and importance of some third world countries in
international affairs (Brazil, Iran and Mexico) and energy such as
Indonesia, or Venezuela.
Economic considerations: in spite of a rhetoric resolutely anti-imperialist, Algeria has developed close economic relations with the Western world, the EEC Community, Japan, USA and Canada. Her economic policy depended heavily on sophisticated technology, expertise and markets available in these countries.

Prestige: an Embassy certainly reflects the importance or the status of a country abroad. The existence of a large diplomatic network abroad, illustrates to some extent the concern of prestige felt by the Algerian leaders. Indeed, Algeria's representation abroad covers nearly eighty countries and her presence in third world countries and in Africa in particular appeared to be quite impressive. The opening of a series of Embassies overseas in the early 1970s was dictated by Algeria's desire to lead the third world coalition around the demands for a NIEO.

In many cases, there was a combination of all these categories of considerations mentioned above, which played in Algeria's decision to open Embassies for instance in Syria or Nasser's Egypt. However it still remains difficult to single out the most important criterion that justifies the opening of diplomatic representation abroad. But in some cases, the reasons for justification are quite simple. For instance it was for ideological considerations that Algeria opened an Embassy in Addis Ababa, after the downfall of Selassie and the take-over of Mengistu, regarded as a progressive leader. In the case of Kenya, it seems that political consideration was the most prominent criterion, since President Moi was regarded by the Algerian leadership as more liberal and open-minded than his predecessor Kenyatta. Needless to say, the opening of diplomatic representation involves a great deal of
finance, diplomatic cadre, technical and administrative facilities. It seems that in the case of Algeria, a huge effort has been made thanks perhaps to the flows of oil revenues.

2. Recruitment and political influence in the civil service

Unlike in many countries, including some from the third world, the Algerian diplomatic service has not a good deal of generational and familial continuity, perhaps because the history of the Algerian diplomacy is too short to generate such a continuity. Indeed, the foreign ministry like many other governmental institutions and agencies originally recruited from the young generation of the Algerian militants that were at various degrees involved in the colonial struggle, especially within the FLN or its mass organization such as the student unions (UGEMA), general workers' union UGTA and the Fédération de France of the FLN (FF.FLN). The analysis of the senior personnel at the Ministry of external affairs, reveals the heavy reliance on this source of recruitment until the late 1960s with the start of a professional career and the entrance determined by examination and promotions.

A theoretical study of a corps diplomatique, focusing especially on senior diplomats (Ambassadors and heads of directions) might not provide insights on the decision-making, orientation and conduct of a country's foreign policy even though the analysis is sustained by data on social background, values and behaviour of these senior diplomats. If, theoretically, the analysis might be attractive and might offer valuable explanation, it still remains not fully convincing when testing it empirically. The problem one may face is related to the question of how powerful, how influential might an Ambassador be with regard to foreign policy-making and vis-a-vis others in the ministry and elsewhere.
Generally, the diplomat's job is not "to make policy, (this policy) belongs to the politician and the statesman. The tasks of the diplomat is its execution. He transmits details of that policy to foreign governments, he negotiates agreements that seek to advance and embody it." However, it seems that in Algeria as in other developing countries, the role of some Ambassadors has not been limited to executing the country's foreign policy only. The fact that about fifteen people with a long experience in the diplomatic service were appointed ministers and vice-ministers shows the importance of this organ in the state-dominated national decision-making. The number is considerable with regard to the scarcity of governmental reshuffles and the numeric smallness of the ministerial staff since independence. Schematically, the corps diplomatique comprises four categories of Ambassadors and senior diplomats. However, such a categorisation must not be taken as rigid since the criteria used for this purpose are chiefly suggestive and subject to future investigation. Precise data on Algeria's Ambassadors are still elusive and aggregating data about Ambassadors that would point to relate them with group interests is extremely difficult.

The first category refers to the typical militant Ambassador which includes people born between 1922 and 1930, had been involved in nationalist activities before the outbreak of the Algerian armed insurrection, came from relatively privileged segments of Muslim Algerian population, a possibility that permitted them to attend high schools which in turn intensified their political socialisation.

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2Kafi was a son of a Mufti (a Moslem judge), Yazid's father served in the French army. Al-Madani came from a relatively well-off family with a traditional background.
category would include: Al Madani, Benhabyles, Kafi, Messaoudi, Mezhoudi, Hadj Yala and M'Hamid Yazid to cite the most influential among them. Their distinguished character is that they were members of the PPA-MTLD and quite heavily involved in wartime politics. For instance, Kafi and Oussedick were high officers of the ALN, Yala a politico-military official at Khenchela (Wilaya I), Mezhoudi and Madani belonged to the Ulama association. They were also among the first to serve as FLN's representatives abroad: Kafi in Cairo (1961-1962), Benhabyles in Damascus and Tokyo, Yazid at the United Nations. Their early nationalist activities might explain their more marked anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism militancy, and their involvement in the FLN's diplomacy accounts for their higher prestige and experience. They could be regarded more as politicians and ideologues than as mere executive diplomats. Oussedick and Yazid for instance are considered as close to national liberation movements and progressive third world countries, while Mezhoudi and Aissa Messaoudi could be regarded as close to the panarabist core. At Algeria's independence it was logical that they were earmarked for important functions inside the ministry or for important diplomatic posts abroad, especially to socialist countries of Europe and to some leading third world countries. For instance, Benhabyles became successively head of Eastern Europe division at the foreign ministry and Ambassador to Japan (1964-1967), Tunisia (1967-1970), assistant Secretary-General (1974-1977) before being the Secretary-General of the government (1979-1981). Kafi served as Ambassador to Lebanon, Libya and Syria; Oussedick had been successively
in posts in Bulgaria, USSR, India and Italy; Yala was in charge of Eastern-Europe division in 1963, before representing Algeria in Conakry and then in Pekin.

This group had also been a source for ministerial and high civil service recruitment, a fact that shows their importance and position. Benhabyles became Minister of Justice in 1977, Lacheraf of education, Yala served successively as Minister of Commerce, finance and currently he is in charge of the home office.

2. In contrast to the 'militants', the 'technocrat' diplomats were younger (born between 1930 and 1934), came from relatively better-off urbanized families and had been lately involved in nationalist activities, mainly in student unions (UGEMA). This category includes diplomats such as Ait-Chaalal, Bedjaoui, Boulahrouf, Brahimi, Malek, Kellou, Houhou, Taleb-Chaib, Sahmoun and Yaker. Their common feature is that they were intellectuals, mainly immersed in student politics and most of them joined the GPRA's central direction or its specialized bodies where they were probably more useful than in the maquis. In addition, they were regarded with suspicion by the uneducated maquisards, a matter that aggravated the differences between these two segments during the war of liberation and even after. Rahal was director of Cabinet in the GPRA's general affairs ministry (1961-1963), Houhou in its central direction and Malek was the editor of the FLN's organ El-Moudjahid (1957-1961). Some of them participated in the GPRA's negotiations with the French government at Evian such as Boulahrouf and

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1Malek and Kellou were born in 1931, Brahimi and Houhou in 1934. Malek's father was a lawyer and Ait Chaalal's was a wealthy landowner from the Constantine region.

2Ait-Chaalal was president of the UGEMA (1957-1962), Kellou its deputy-president in charge of foreign affairs, Houhou was another deputy-president.
Malek while Bedjaoui served as a legal adviser to the GPRA during these negotiations. It is not surprising to find that all served as Ambassadors to Paris at one time or another: Malek (1965-1970), Bedjaoui (1979-1979), Houhou (1981-1983).

The technocrats' distinctive feature is that they were technically better qualified than the 'militants' and perhaps because of their higher education level and nationalist activities abroad, they held more modernist values. And because of their competence, they contributed largely in shaping Algeria's external economic relations, especially in the context of Algeria's participation in the North-South debate. They were also close to the state technocrats and particularly those in the ministries of economy, planning and finance, with whom they share the same social background, political socialization (UGEMA) and professional experience (GPRA or the Executif provisoire). These considerations helped build friendship and affinities, thus consolidating the technocrat trend and its influence vis-a-vis the ideologists and militant diplomats.

Because of their expertise a certain number of the technocratic personnel were accredited to countries with which Algeria has important economic relations or political relations linked with issues of North-South dialogue: for instance Malek had been successively in post to Belgrade (1963-1965), France (1965-1970), Moscow (1970-1977), Washington (1979-1982) and London (1982-1984); Kellou had been in posts in the UK, West Germany and Argentina; Houhou in Cairo, Canada and France;

Many of them were French Universities graduates: Chaalal and Khene obtained Ph.D degrees, Kellou, Hamdani were graduates in Law, Malek in Letters, Houhou in Economics, Taleb-Chaib attended Paris faculty of medicine and Lausanne faculty of Political Science, Rahal graduated from Bordeaux University and Brahimi from the Political Institutes at Algiers and Paris.
Ait-Chaalal in Brussels, Moscow and Washington. They had also been elected to preside over international conferences devoted to the North-South issues. Ait-Chaalal was the co-chairman of the commission for development of the 1975 Paris Conference, Khene served as Secretary-General of Opec organization (1973-1974) and then as UNIDO's executive director, Jezairy chaired the plenary committee of North-South dialogue, Yaker was a member of the Brandt committee, and Sahnoun was deputy Secretary-General of the OAU and the Arab league respectively.

Like the group of the militants, some technocrat diplomats held at one time or another ministerial portfolios: Bedjaoui (justice 1964-1970); Houhou (sports and youth 1977-1982 and health since 1983); Yaker (commerce 1969-1977) and Khene (public works 1966-1970).

- The third category is formed by the 'career diplomats'. Data and information are not enough to describe this category with accuracy although brief accounts gathered on the foreign ministry personnel may provide good insights into the status, values and objectives of the members of this group. The emergence of the second generation of the 'career' diplomats may have started with the application of a recruitment policy carried out in the later 1960s as a result of two major demands: the expansion of Algeria's diplomatic network and the increasing emphasis on the economic issues in Algerian foreign policy since 1970. Like many of the technocrats of the first generation in the foreign service, they were needed to staff the central administration and diplomatic representations abroad. This policy responded to the fact that the foreign ministry did not wish to go outside its ranks to appoint economic counsellors from other agencies, especially in the context of the elevation of internationally-oriented technocrats of the ministry of
industry and energy to key posts in the national decision-making. The Foreign Ministry instead, preferred to increase the capabilities and skills of its career diplomats by giving them experience in such positions and by broadening the base from which it recruits students, though through harsh examination. This proved necessary in the context of a rivalry with other ministries, especially the ministry of industry and energy as we shall see later.

The major source for recruiting the qualified cadre has been since the late 1960s, the diplomatic section of the national school of administration (ENA) which provides more than half of the foreign ministry recruits each year. The high qualifications of the recipients belonging to the diplomatic section is assed by the very selective procedures to enter the ENA in the first place and by the fact that the access to its diplomatic section rests on academic merit. The entry procedures to the national school of administrative gave therefore a decided advantage to candidates from the urban and middle classes as there had been a strong assumption that candidates are chosen following criteria of personal connections and relations.

Next to the diplomatic section stands the 'external test' which - established since 1971 - requires that applicants obtain a university degree in law, economics or politics before taking the entrance examination. Alike the first source of recruitment through the ENA the external test has been very selective and involved in some cases personal connections as well.

The career diplomats tend to identify perhaps more than others with their diplomatic function. In this respect, they share some similarities with the administrators of the Middle East described by Bill and
Leiden as they "are younger, more likely to support and be ideologically committed to development goals and have been more professional and more aware of modern administrative science."\(^1\) They are also little known to the Algerian public and unlike the militants or the technocrats they have practically never been earmarked for ministerial portfolios with the exception of the appointment as Vice-Ministers of some of them in the December 1983 government which in fact marked their recent but expected rise in governmental positions. Nevertheless, they still have neither the prestige nor the past political and diplomatic experience of the members of the other two groups. They constitute rather a clientele for these groups, searching protection, promotion and political advancement and conceivably act chiefly as executive diplomats. Yet, loyalties have been built up mainly with the older generation of technocrats with whom they share some features, probably because like the technocratic diplomats, they did not effectively participate in guerrilla activities (because of their age); their only virtue stems from their higher level of education and probably from the amount and potency of their connections and ties. Many of the career diplomats came from parts of Western Algeria especially from the Tlemcen region near the Moroccan border. During Bouteflika's time, their importance in the Ministry's internal decision-making grew as they came from the same native region as the foreign minister himself or were able to win his confidence through the use of connections which had a better access to him. Like Bouteflika many

\(^1\) Bill, J and Leiden, C: The Middle East: politics and power quoted in 'Political development and bureaucracy in Libya', edited by Omar J. Fatham et al. (Lexington Books, DC Health Lexington, Massachusetts, 1977).
of them came from families which lived in Morocco during the war and returned to Algeria after independence, after having completed some kind of post-graduation achieved in many cases in France.

This group includes Allouane, Gaouar, Gharbi, Kherbi and Kesri. This geographical trend has been reversed since 1979 after the take over of the foreign ministry by Benyahia who encouraged the ascension within the ministry hierarchy of career diplomats from Eastern Algeria, his native region.

- The fourth category refers to the 'outsider' diplomats who came from other ministries and agencies as well as from three main institutions: the army, the party and the national assembly. The number of these candidates never exceeded twenty per cent illustrating the reluctance of the foreign ministry - especially under Bouteflika - to allow the infusion of outsiders into the diplomatic service. The relatively limited number of the outsiders into this service resulted to a large extent from disgrace as well as from the policy of shuttling abroad potential opponents rather than for services rendered. The appointment in 1964 to Ambassadorial posts of some members of the wartime FLN elite such as Ousseuddick, Gaid, Akkouche and Dahlab and Tayebi and the technocrats Benyahia and Malek resulted from Ben Bella's decision to shun them for opposing his policies. The assignment to diplomatic posts abroad of majors Benmahmoud, Fadhel, Guenenez, Maoui, (all ex-ministers) followed the governmental reshuffle decided by Boumedienne in April 1977, while the diplomatic movements that took place in 1979, 1983 and 1984 aimed at the political oblivion of personalities that were powerful during the Boumedienne era.
Despite the intrusion of outsiders into the foreign ministry (in fact relatively marginal), recent changes that affected its personnel policy indicate shifts to political moderation and emphasis on economic considerations away from revolutionary rhetoric and commitments. To the period stretching from 1962 to 1967 marked by improvisation and transition, succeeded an era (1968-1975) of relative consolidation of the administrative process within the Ministry and continuity of diplomatic personnel and stability. It is noteworthy to remember that only one Ambassador Laaraj Sekkiou resigned from his Ambassadorial post (in Pakistan) in protest at the coup against Ben Bella. Until 1977, the Ministry witnessed a relative inner equilibrium marked by high professional calibre of its leading personnel, a substantial breadth of diplomatic experience at home and abroad, the establishment of high standard and a more or less well sustained system of recruitment mainly of students to fill posts in the central administration as well as in the diplomatic representation abroad.

As political institutions consolidate and the state settles down, the move toward conservatism increases. This trend affected the diplomatic service as well because the foreign ministry has not been completely independent from the country's inner vortex of the struggle for power, especially as the mid-1970s witnessed a strong rivalry between Boumediene and Bouteflika and lately with the increase of personal ambitions of Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, Algeria's foreign minister since 1982. The moderate approach to international issue pursued by Chadli and Taleb Ibrahimi resulted in the elimination from diplomatic offices of the last veterans, mainly the members belonging to the category of militant diplomats such as M'Hamed Yazid, Lacheraf, Mubarak Al Mili, Bounekraf or
others belonging to the category of technocratic diplomats known for their leftist orientations such as Reda Malek and Boulahrouf in particular. The nomination of Abdelhamid Mehri as Ambassador to Paris in 1984 stands as a good example of this new emphasis on political moderation, as Mehri an FLN veteran is well known for his conservative arabic background and distrust of leftist ideology.

B. THE FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING: THE CORE OF THE PROCESS

1. The prominence of the Presidential Office

For the reasons proper to the historical context, the Algerian presidents emerged as the guarantors of the institutionalized state and the guardians of the Algerian revolution which exalted a socialistic way of development and the attachment to Arabo-Islamic values. Whether supported by the army like Ben Bella or emerging from the military establishment like Boumedienne and Chadli, they enjoyed a great deal of authority as reflected by their more or less pronounced inclination to the personalisation of power.

a) The mechanisms of ensuring Presidential prominence

To mark their predominance over the foreign decision-making, the Algerian presidents had attempted to take over the foreign ministry itself (like Ben Bella) or created parallel structures such as personal advisers as did Boumedienne and Chadli. In addition, the subservience of the government to the presidential office facilitated their hold over the foreign decision-making process. From Ben Bella to Chadli, the governments were filled with trusted friends, allies and supporters indicating the inexistence of fundamental disagreements on the broad outlines of the country's policies in general and foreign policy orienta-
tions in particular. This situation was made possible by the relatively stable ministerial coalition, Algeria has known since independence. Prominent figures who had a share in the national decision-making had a long tenure in office and survived the three regimes. For the most important ministerial portfolio there had been only 33 holders since 1962 - Table II:3. This assumes the quite remarkable ministerial stability and restrictiveness of the ministerial personnel, especially if we bear in mind that 8 ministers lasted only one year in office and 6 others for two years. At the end, this observation leaves us with only 19 ministers having occupied the 9 ministries for much of the time stretching from September 1962 to September 1985, and in average only 2 holders per ministry for the entire period.

To highlight the length of this tenure, it is worth mentioning that Taleb-Brahimi served 20 years as a minister, Benyahia and Bouteflika for 16 years, Medeghri, Abdeslam for 12 years, Cherif Belkacem and Abdelghani for 11 years, while Messaoudene, Yala and Yaker occupied ministerial posts for 8 years. This relative stability at the level of the ministerial council enabled the presidents to act with a greater independence especially with regard to major foreign policy issues. Such an ascendancy was also facilitated by the fact that no major disagreements existed between Ministers notwithstanding the 1964-1965 year, the first two years of the Boumedienne rule and the early stage of President Chadli's rule, and with regard to foreign policy issues, dissonances have been even less pronounced. These particular years were revealing signs of a change of regimes like in June 1965 or the consolidation of the new regime as in 1966-1967 with Boumedienne and in 1979-1981 with Chadli. The indication was that rivalries between persons and groups seemed more
crucial than their divergences over the country's fundamental domestic and foreign policies. From Ben Bella to Chadli, the socialistic line carried out at home and the anti-imperialist stance pursued abroad has not been seriously altered. In the shadow of these rivalries, the major discrepancies rested on the ways and means to achieve these policies. To the romantic and populist socialism of Ben Bella, contrasted the harsh and dour brand of the socialism of Boumedienne, while with Chadli, the concentration of the government has been on rectifying the mistakes of the past regime rather than on repudiating the socialist model of development altogether.

Besides ministerial stability, another factor that facilitated the predominance of the presidency over foreign-policy making has been the marked specialisation in Algerian cabinets, a matter which has in turn, weakened the ability of the council of ministers as a body capable of having a determinant impact on the formulation of foreign policy. Since independence, this specialisation appeared operational with Boumedienne holding the Defence portfolio, Bouteflika, the foreign ministry, Medeghri (Home Office) and for the national economy, Abdeslam and then A. Brahimi since 1979. These ministers turned their respective office into fiefdoms and were able to control issues related to their specific areas and departments and their influence on the President was perhaps more individual than collective.

There is no doubt that ministers belonged to different groups and clans and represented the interests of their respective factions. Most notorious have been the Oujda group, the Abdeslam team within the ministerial council which represented the modernist and centralist faction of the state high technology under the Boumedienne rule, while
Taleb-Ibrahimi and Benyahia were regarded as expressing the interests of respectively the conservative and left-wing trends of the state technocracy.

In addition to the subservience of the cabinet to the presidency and the weakness of the ministerial council to act as the main decision-making body, the councils of revolution during Boumedienne or the FLN's political bureau under Ben Bella or Chadli did not either act as decision-making bodies despite occasional meetings to issue declarations on foreign policy. The potency of these organs enabled then the presidents to have a greater hold on the formulation of the country's external policies. Therefore, they made full use of the prestige of presidential receptions and visits, travelled quite exclusively, received innumerable heads of state in Algiers and hosted several international conferences.

b) The Presidential priorities

The Algerian presidents intervened in two main fields: defence and national security and had a personal involvement in handling the relations with the socialist countries and those of the third world.

With regard to national security, there was a strong rivalry between Ben Bella and Boumedienne then the defence minister, but the latter was able to make of the army his touchstone. An indication of Boumedienne's strength was to decide later to counterbalance the Moroccan-Mauritanian take-over of the Western Sahara without the knowledge of many high officers and surely without the consent of his foreign minister Bouteflika. When the latter went to Rabat to seek peaceful settlement with King Hassan in July 1975, Boumedienne charged in October Bedjaoui, (Algeria's representative to the United Nations) to defend the right of
the Saharawi people for self-determination at the Hague Court of Justice, and launch a diplomatic campaign in support of the Polisario front against the Madrid agreement through which Spain handed its former colony to Morocco and Mauritania.\(^1\) To deprive his foreign minister of negotiating with the Moroccan side, Boumedienne entrusted Taleb Brahimi then his personal adviser to assume contacts that took place in 1977 with Reda Guedira, the Moroccan King's confidant.

President Chadli's control over the military affairs was not easy at the beginning because of the diffusion of power that existed within the military establishment and the emergence of military fiefs with the death of Boumedienne in December 1978. However, evidence of the tightening of his hold over the army matters was given by the restruction of the ANP in late 1984 and by putting his own men at the head of military regions. To signal his ascendance over the national defence with regard to the tension with Morocco and Libya, President Chadli presided himself at the meetings which gathered the top officers to discuss matters of national security and in the aftermath of an incident between Algerian troops and Moroccan forces near the border he personally directed military manoeuvres carried out by the ANP perhaps in an attempt to stress his command over the military and show its cohesion and organisation in the context of renewed tension with Morocco. Like his predecessor, Chadli was reluctant to let matters concerning relations with this country slip from his hand. At the all important congress of the Polisario front held in 1983, the Algerian representative happened to be neither the foreign minister nor the head of the party but the minister of justice Boualem

\(^{1}\) On December 10, 1975 an Algerian-sponsored resolution on the question of the Western Sahara was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly.
Baki a close friend of President Chadli. This is quite significant with regard to Baki's lack of political experience and unfamiliarity with state's affairs and handling of matters related to national security. Probably deceived by his foreign minister's soft approach which privileged diplomatic contacts with Morocco while the King seemed unwilling to make any concessions, Chadli moved to tighten his 'droit de regard' over inter-Maghrebi relations. Therefore, he had several meetings with Qadhafi, Bourguiba and even held talks with Hassan in April 1983.

**Shifts in the Presidential mark on the conduct of foreign policies**

Despite the consistent reference to the principle of the foreign policy set out by the FLN during the war, the political orientation and the articulation of interests on the external level differed from one president to another. The style of leadership and personal preference of each of them had to some extent affected the decision-making process, although they shared the feature of imposing a relatively ideological but highly personalistic style of leadership as well as bore basic values forged from a common struggle against the colonial rule. Indeed, the Algerian presidents were the product of the war of liberation which largely shaped their perceptions and views of the outer world. It is then not striking to notice, when looking at the principles of the Algerian foreign policy, that these principles have not been altered, what has changed from one regime to another was undoubtedly a shift in emphasis on issues and priorities as well as in the style of conducting this policy. Their fundamental common characteristic rested on their...
commitments to a socialistic way of development and on their jacobinist
tendencies as defined by the reinforcement of the state's role in all
aspects of the country's life. These two aspects not only sprang from
their modest social origin but also from the lack of local loyalties and
absence of a regional power base. Their legitimacy derived more from
their revolutionary past than from popular following and their power
stemmed more from the army than from the party or democratically-elected
bodies. Thus, their stress on nationalism in independent Algeria
resulted from their inability to identify with anything but the nation,
and their emphasis on economic development was largely determined by the
colonial legacy.

Differences in style and approach to international events were not
based on cultural cleavages derived from either French or Arabic
education, as all the three presidents emphasized Algeria's Arabo-Islamic
ferment and common history and destiny with other Arab countries. In
fact, the basically arabic education of Boumedienne did not prevent him
from advocating a rapid modernisation of the country, a strict separation
between state and religion as well as encouraging bilingualism that was
preached by the westernized segments of the state technocracy, although
he formally called for the massive arabization of the country.

Differences in style and ideological pigmentation, however, stem from
the personality factor but were also determined by domestic and external
constraints which relate to the obvious linkage between national and
international environments. For instance, if Algeria had constantly
worked for the third world solidarity and supported the liberation
movements against colonialism especially in Africa, the content of this
policy and the form of aid and the fashion with which it was carried out
differed considerably from one president to another. While Ben Bella exalted a revolutionary rhetoric and appeared quite passionately committed to Panafrianism, Boumedienne emphasized instead a messianic but methodic and rational approach with regard to the third world issues. Indeed, the former's enthusiasm and revolutionary romanticism contrasted with the latter's austere, enigmatic and visionary attitude. In opposition to both of them, Chadli opted for a discreet and moderate attitude, being himself a quiet reserved and timid person and with less pronounced ambitions. In Ben Bella's desire to cultivate charisma and revolutionary euphoria as well as in his attempt to play an important role in international affairs, the personality factor was not negligible, as he liked to be at the centre of attention and enjoyed spectacular actions and the related popular acclaim.

The relevance of domestic constraints resided in the fact that Ben Bella's involvement in foreign affairs resulted partially from his regime's internal problems. Being restrained at home by a vigorous opposition on the one hand and by his dependency on the army on the other, he thus became immersed in external affairs not only in order to divert the attention from these problems to foreign issues - that appealed to the Algerian people at that time, such as the systematic critique of neo-colonialism and imperialism, -but also in an attempt to enhance his own legitimacy at home. In these circumstances, foreign policy constituted the main field where he had a relatively free hand, therefore he intended to capitalize from this exercise as much as possible. After the death of his foreign minister Khemisti in May 1963, he took over the office until September and played a personal role in the conduct of the country's external policies. In 1964, he spent 74 days
abroad dedicated as many days to entertain leaders mainly from the communist and African countries and the next year he deployed intensive efforts to prepare the second Afro-Asian conference scheduled to take place in Algiers.¹

In his engrossment in the Pan-Africanist movement in particular and third world in general, the external constraints intervened in the form of four considerations:

- France did not obstruct Ben Bella's actions with regard to these issues, as De Gaulle - aware of the considerable prestige the Algerian leader enjoyed among the non-Western world - dreamt of making Algeria France's bridge to the third world in an attempt to counterbalance the hegemony of the super-powers.

- Because the Maghreb was entangled in a cold war era, Ben Bella was less enthusiastic about cultivating close ties with his neighbours than in gaining international prestige.

- The Black continent in particular represented an important field for Ben Bella's concern of anti-colonialism since there were still colonies in Africa and consequently active national liberation movements.

- Nasser's hegemony over the Middle East policies did leave a little room of manoeuvre for the Algerian leader, conversely it left him with a relatively free hand to play a greater order in African affairs and attempt to challenge the Egyptian President's ascendancy in third world politics. The relative neglect of Middle Eastern issues by Ben Bella was indicated by the scarce meetings he had with Arab leaders. The only Arab country he visited was Egypt (in May 1963) and the only Arab leader

he received in Algiers was Nasser in April the same year. And with the exception of the two Arab summits held in Cairo in January and September 1964, it was Boumedienne who represented Algeria in the next Arab summits that took place in the Egyptian capital in early January and late May 1965. However, the relative neglect of the Arab issues did not mean that Ben Bella left Boumedienne with a free hand to shape Algerian Arab policy as his handling of Arab affairs was made through his personal adviser Cherif Abderahmane. Once in power, Boumedienne’s approach to international events markedly contrasted with Ben Bella’s and followed two distinctive phases: 1. From 1965 to 1969, his concentration rested on domestic affairs so as to achieve the urgent tasks of building a strong state, laying foundations for economic take off and maintaining domestic political stability and cohesion of leadership. This demarche markedly differed from that of Ben Bella since Boumedienne appeared more pragmatist than ideologist and perhaps more rational as he seems to have learnt from his predecessor’s experience that popularity and charisma are not enough to remain in power and that there is no effective involvement in world affairs without strengthening the country’s capabilities first.\(^1\) The Algerian president then, was more preoccupied with reinforcing the cohesion of his leadership and army than playing an active role on the international level. Until 1970, the issue of Arab affairs seemed to occupy his attention showing an intransigence with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict and being opposed to Nasser’s "defeatist" attitude. This intransigence stemmed from Algeria’s own experience of the war and aimed also at enhancing the legitimacy of

\(^1\)Did not Boumedienne assert in 1969 that Algeria has "her own problems and her leadership has no ambitions to play a role in the international scene"? (Speech of December 21, 1969 in "Discours du président", (2), p.550.)
Boumedienne’s regime at home. Equally important was that by following this firm attitude, the Algerian leader found another good opportunity to disentangle himself from active involvement in Arab affairs in order to concentrate on domestic issues. To those who accused Algeria of neglecting the Arab issues in particular (Qadhafi among others), he replied that "they failed to prove their abilities in the development field. Indeed making speeches is an easy thing but difficult is the task of economic building, basis of a genuine progress."\(^1\)

The concentration on domestic issues necessitated the reinforcement of stability in North-Africa and thus the maintaining of a kind of detente in the Maghreb despite ideological options of the existing regimes in this region. The result was the several meetings between Boumedienne and other Maghrebi leaders, the signature of treaties of friendship and good neighbourliness with Tunisia, Libya and Morocco in the years 1969–1970, as well as by a boost of Maghrebi cooperation. This evidently asserted the intimate linkage between domestic issues and regional environment, especially in the context of limited economic capabilities of the country.

During this period, as the government was still basically inward-looking and being concerned above all with development and national security linked with the regional environment, the handling of the foreign ministry was the responsibility of Bouteflika. The Algerian president was probably still lacking negotiation skills and diplomatic experience and was therefore concerned with improving his own power and stature.

\(^1\)Ibid.
The second stage referred to the early 1970s which witnessed an increase of Algeria's economic capabilities highlighted by the resounding success of the nationalization of the French oil interests in February 1971 and the rise of the Opec organization with changes which occurred in international energetic market, thus enabling the oil producing countries to enhance their foreign revenues and increase their economic bargaining with the West. Attempts to align the third world countries over the issues of the NIEO were ultimately linked with Algeria's search for a better access to Western technology and capital as well as obtain markets. Having strengthened his position at home and being encouraged by Algeria's economic progress and the strength of Opec, Boumedienne moved to play a more active role in the country's foreign policy. The prestige he gained from the 1971 oil nationalization, from hosting the non-alignment summit in Algiers in 1973, reconciling Iraq and Iran in 1975 and contributing to the Arab-African rapprochement -considerably increased Boumedienne's confidence in his own abilities in the diplomatic domain. It was perhaps these ambitions to make Algeria a spearhead of the third world, that led the Algerian president to intervene further in the orientation and the conduct of the Algerian foreign policy and consequently take over of some of the prerogatives reserved to Bouteflika. An indication of his attempt to have a greater control over the administration of the foreign policy and turn it into an executive organ was his decision in 1971 to put as its Secretary-General, Bessaiah in replacement of Rahal a close friend of Bouteflika who had held this post since 1965. The nomination of Amimour as his personal advisor on foreign policy matters had also deepened the gap between Boumedienne and his foreign minister. This is not to suggest that the president
attempted to wreck completely the prerogatives of his foreign minister but just to allow himself a more active role in the execution of the country's foreign policy, perhaps in order to enhance his international stature, thus satisfying his personal ambitions.

With Chadli, the presidential impact on the formulation and implementation of the country's external objectives followed an ascendant line, from a period of reservation to an era of a greater assertion. The argument that the President's approach to external issues stems from a combination of the personality factor as well as from domestic and foreign constraints finds a full justification in the case of Chadli's presidency. Like Boumedienne his main concern rested on ensuring the regime's position and ensuring the national security and domestic stability and until 1983, his involvement in the conduct of foreign policy has been quiet and less personalistic. His visits to the Middle East in March 1980, in Black Africa in April 1981, Moscow in June aimed at reaffirming a certain continuity in the orientation of Algeria's external policy as well as providing himself with diplomatic experience he obviously lacked. Throughout this period, the conduct of Algerian foreign policy has been diffuse and its orientation somehow incoherent, thus reflecting the strife of divergent forces to have a hold on its formulation and implementation according to their own objectives and interests.

If the political bureau did not constitute a real decision-making body, its membership reflects a great deal of factionalism and the existence of competing ideas with regard to foreign policy issues. On the basis of political and ideological alignments three main groups could be distinguished:
- a radical group committed to a hard socialistic line and to the continuity of a militant foreign policy stance which favoured the cultivation of close links with progressive regimes and socialist countries, thus being firmly anti-imperialist and resolutely hostile to liberal regimes (such as Tunisia) or conservative (Morocco and Saudi-Arabia). This group would include Yahaoui, the former head of the party and a strong rival to Chadli; Benyahia the foreign minister until 1982, and Kasdi Merbah, the former head of military security and currently minister of agriculture. It probably drew support from the radically-oriented officers within the army and some high civilian technocrats who favoured a centralized and a socialist way of development. Both Benyahia and Yahaoui in particular were believed to be close to Muslim progressive forces and sympathetic to Assad and Qadhafi regimes;

- a moderate group which emphasized economic pragmatism and an ideologically tempered foreign policy, thus favouring an increase of the role of the private sector in Algerian economy and a soft attitude toward moderate and conservative countries in general and Morocco and Tunisia in particular, as well as a greater economic cooperation with the Western world, especially France and the USA. Its main figures were perhaps Taleb-Ibrahim the current foreign minister; Abdelhamid Brahimi, currently the Prime Minister in charge of the national economy; Benlouclf the chief of staff; Benyelles the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Defence; Abdelghani, currently the state secretary and Yala at the present time Minister of Interior. These personalities were generally believed to have personal links with well-off families, big
entrepreneurs and businessmen as well as some ties with France and Tunisia (Taleb-Ibrahimi, Abdelghani and Yala) and the USA (Brahimi and Benloucif).

Between these two rival groups, stood the presidential group which advocated a change but at a slower rate without however renouncing the basic principles of the Algerian revolution. In addition to Chadli, it comprised personalities with relatively limited political credo: Colonel Belhouchet, the ANP's general inspector, Benhammouda, the finance minister, Messadia, responsible for the FLN's permanent secretariat and two of Chadli's close friends: Baki (justice) and Rouis (information). Given his lack of authority at the beginning, President Chadli seemed to oscillate between the moderates and the radicals as he tried, perhaps with difficulty, to conciliate between continuity and change in the country's foreign policy. In the competition between these two groups, he attempted to play the role of a broker and adopt a centrist attitude, but it seemed that pressure from both sides substantially increased. The visits he made to a certain number of Arab countries in March 1980, black Africa in April 1981 and Moscow in June were counterbalanced by trips to Belgium, Italy and France (a stop-over) late that year. And the visit to Washington in April 1985 was immediately followed by visits to Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela and Senegal as a result of pressure from the radical group to underline non-alignment as the driving force of Algerian foreign policy. However, Chadli seemed to have moved from the pursuit of a centrist attitude to the function of final arbiter as he tightened his control over the military affairs and consolidated his position after the wrecking of his rivals Yahaoui and Bouteflika and the demotion of Abdelghani, the prime minister. In these conditions his handling of the
country's foreign policy inevitably grew, especially as the regime's attention concentrated on the country's territorial security and integrity with the growing tension with Morocco. His meetings with Hassan in April 1983 and other Maghrebi leaders attested to his greater control over these issues. Nevertheless, there was no doubt that under the pressure from the radical group, Chadli hardened his attitude vis-a-vis Morocco thus contradicting the approach of Taleb-Ibrahimi and the moderate group which favoured diplomatic negotiations with this country. These pressures seemed to have succeeded as the unexpected alliance between Libya and Morocco as well as the secret visit of Mitterand to Rabat in September 1984, were regarded as a direct blow to Taleb-Ibrahim's strategy which President Chadli had initially endorsed. However, this move did not mean a submission to this group but to the acuity of the matters related to the country's territorial security. These reasons were perhaps at the heart of his visit to the USA in April 1985 an unprecedented event in Algerian diplomacy, although issues such as reviving the economic cooperation with this country, the gas contract and diversification of Algerian foreign relations seemed to have been the other reasons for this visit.

2. The Foreign Minister: role and attributions

In two decades of independence, Algeria had only four foreign ministers. This shows the relative record of durability if we bear in mind that two of them died after only a short term in office. Khemisti was Ben Bella's first minister of external affairs from September 1962 to April 1963, the date of his death. Bouteflika succeeded him in December and retained hold over the ministry until March 1979 when the
new president Chadli replaced him by Benyahia. Taleb-Ibrahimi took over shortly after the latter's death in an air crash in May 1982 while carrying a mission of good offices to help settle the Iraq-Iran war.

The successive four ministers share some features proper to the post-independent Algerian elite - 1) youth: all of them were born in the 1930s and two, Khemisti and Bouteflika, became foreign ministers while in their mid-twenties; 2) social background: with the exception of Taleb-Ibrahimi, all came from modest urbanized families; 3) political socialization: all were involved in student politics during the war. Benyahia and Taleb-Ibrahimi had been presidents of the UGEMA in 1955 and 1957 respectively, Khemisti was one of its cosmopolitan leaders while Bouteflika quit secondary school in 1956 when the UGEMA called for a general strike, to join the maquis in Wilaya V.; 4) wartime experience: they were all immersed in political and administrative affairs before becoming ministers - Taleb served a five year sentence for nationalist activities in France (1957-62), Khemisti was directeur de Cabinet of Farès, the President of the 'exécutif provisoire', Benyahia was the Secretary-General of the GPRA and Bouteflika a member of the General-Staff and a close aid of Colonel Boumediene.

According to presidential decrees, the attributions of the foreign ministry are quite limited as the Minister was supposed to be under the high authority of the president of the Republic, charged to carry out diplomatic responsibilities and thus assigned only an executive role. But to limit the analysis to the basic assumption that the foreign ministry has been primarily involved in diplomatic transactions and the day-to-day implementation of decisions reached by the President is certainly fallacious. However, one possibility beyond this simplistic
argument may be the analysis of the role of the foreign minister in some of the country's external issues, as this exercise may help provide useful insights into the study of the foreign-decision making. The period in which Khemisti served as foreign minister (7 months) was too short to permit an accurate view on his role in the shaping of Algerian foreign policy, but it was believed that no major disagreements existed between him and Ben Bella, although the latter had an upper hand on the execution of this policy.1

With Bouteflika the foreign ministry was his own preserve as he ran it as a tight ship, where decisions flowed from above and there was relatively little flexibility at the working level. This style of management was illustrated by the fact that many of the meetings with foreign diplomats took place not in the ministry offices but at the villa "Dar Ali Cherif" turned into a kind of personal residence, away from official circles. The main reason for this prominence in the conduct of Algerian foreign policy, especially in the second half of the 1960s, was perhaps the division of labour that existed between Boumadienne and Bouteflika. This tacit agreement reflected the professional specialization within the Oujda group and constituted probably an element explaining the relative coherence of the ruling group until the early 1970s. Throughout this period, the close relationship he bore with his president, helped the dapper Bouteflika become Algeria's main figure on the international scene. His image inspired youth and enthusiasm while

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1Khemisti was an orphan nursed by Benbella's mother. He accompanied Benbella when he moved to Cairo in 1952 and then went to France to further his studies.
his actions altered revolutionary romanticism with a great deal of pragmatism. He once said that Algeria's foreign policy was "a policy of means rather than of ideas".

Among the major issues the foreign ministry had been preoccupied with had been Algeria's relations with France and economic policy-making. The former remained the chief focus of the country's foreign policy until 1971 when Algeria started to diversify its diplomatic relations, trade exchanges and to participate actively in world affairs. Against this background, Bouteflika attempted to contribute in the shaping of the relations with France and beyond national interests linked to this issue, he was probably tempted to forge his own credibility and prestige in order to increase his stature at home and on the foreign level. The context of privileged relations between the two countries might have provided him with the required incentive to achieve this aim, especially as the foreign ministry had the necessary instrument specializing in these relations, i.e. the department of French affairs, well endowed with technical cadre and expertise at the time when other state economic organs were still in the stage of building up.

Bouteflika's ambitions would be better understood in the latent conflict between him and president Ben Bella over the conduct of Algerian French policy. The designation of Laraj Sekkiou, a former militant of the FLN fédération de France and a President supporter, - as assistant to the Algerian Ambassador in Paris Rahal a technocrat diplomat close to Bouteflika - highlighted this rivalry. And as Bella intended to benefit from the good relationship between Algeria and France, Rahal was replaced by Boualem Moussaoui, a former FLN militant who participated in the battle of Algiers, an indication of Ben Bella's emphasis on revolutionary
ideals in the manifestation of Algerian policy toward France. It remained, however, difficult to locate differences between Ben Bella and Bouteflika with regard to the attitude vis-a-vis France in the particular context of rivalry of persons existing between the two men, highlighted by the hostility between Ben Bella and the Boumedienne group in which Bouteflika was also an influential member. But one valid assumption may be that reasons of ambitions and prestige were at stake between the president and his foreign minister. The former's meeting with De Gaulle in March 1964 perhaps increased the credibility of the Algerian president in the eyes of the French leaders.

After the coup of June 1965, Bouteflika regained hold over the conduct of Algerian policy toward France and attempted to change the status of dependence of his country on its former metropole into a new model based on new relations between developed and developing countries void of neo-colonialism content, without, however, renouncing to forge out of these relations a good partnership and understanding. This new emphasis explained the nomination as Ambassador to Paris of Redha Malek—a highly qualified technocrat with leftwing convictions and long diplomatic experience—who had participated in the Evian negotiations. The signature of the all-important oil agreement in 1965 revised some of the clauses of the Evian agreements in favour of Algeria and constituted perhaps a substantial success for Bouteflika's own strategy. As political relations between Algeria and France strengthened during De Gaulle's reign, personal relations were built up between the two sides. There was no doubt that mutual appreciation and friendly relationships were established between the Algerian foreign minister and the French Ambassador in Algiers, George Gorse a Gaullist and fervent advocate of
French-Algerian relationship as well as with Couve de Murville the foreign minister and Jean de Brogile the Secretary for Algerian affairs. Bouteflika's basic French culture and admiration for the Gaullist opposition to the hegemonism of the super-powers, certainly contributed in making the foreign minister a key link in the Algerian-French relations. It is quite significant that other basically-economically oriented organs, especially that of the ministry of national economy were kept in the important but restricted role of subordinate authorities in the foreign-decision making process. After Bouteflika in June 1967, the only Algerian minister to pay an official visit to France was that of his close friend of the 'oujda group', Medeghri, the interior minister in February 1968. Like Bouteflika, Medeghri shared the desire to preserve the status of privileged relations with France thus favouring a less pronounced process of nationalization of French interests in Algeria in contrast to the national economy ministry led by Abdeslam. The latter's economic policy meant not only a radical change in Algerian-French economic relationship but also an increasing interference of the economic ministry in shaping these relations, a matter that led to the growing rivalry of personalities between Bouteflika and Abdeslam. The balance of policy-making power as well as the content of policy became to change as not only the full range of the economic agencies and state-owned companies began to participate in the concentrated effort of national development but also because the relative success of economic policy carried out by Abdeslam and his technocratic team helped to convince Boumedienne of the necessity of a radical drive in the country's economic policies that implied inevitable consequences for the Algerian-French relations. Moreover as more and more aspects of Algeria's international
relations came to centre on technical and technological considerations, the role of the foreign ministry with regard to these relations and in economic policy making became threatened by the emergence of internationally-oriented technocrats in other ministries and agencies. The technocratic team's search for capital and highly sophisticated technology meant a diversification of Algeria's economic relations and the reduction of her dependence on France in favour of other countries such as West Germany, Italy and the USA in particular.

When negotiations started in January 1971 between Algiers and Paris to revise previous economic agreements in particular the oil issue, the head of the Algerian delegation was no longer Abdeslam but Bouteflika, regaining the prominent place in these negotiations for him and for his aides and experts in the Department of French relations, notably Jamal Houhou, its Director and his assistant Rachid Haddad, two eminent 'technocratic' diplomats within the Ministry. At the height of these negotiations the coordination between the foreign ministry and the economy ministry was operative notwithstanding their competition behind the scenes. While Bouteflika declared that negotiations between France and Algeria were global and would not be affected by negotiations taking place at Teheran between Opec countries and the Cartel of Western concessionary companies, Abdeslam stressed Algeria's attempt to work closely with other Opec members, Libya in particular as well as Algeria's firmness toward foreign oil companies operating in Algeria. The

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The delegation that participated in these negotiations with the French led by Ortoli, the industry minister, included Bouteflika, Houhou and two representatives of the ministry of economy and energy: Ghozali, the General Director of the state oil company Sonatrach and Ait Alhocine, the adviser of Abdeslam.
difference in approach as well as in content to the revision of Algeria's relations with France appeared quite clear and did not mean a mere tactical plan to confuse the French negotiators.

The role played by Abdeslam in the nationalization of the French oil companies announced by Boumedienne on February 24, 1971 was highlighted by frequent meetings with Boumedienne and in particular those that took place on February 4 and 24 after Abdeslam came back from Tripoli. There he attended a ministerial meeting of Opec which assured the support of this organization to Algeria in her battle against the French companies. Highly significant was that the last official meeting between Boumedienne and Bouteflika took place on February 2 some time before the decisions of nationalization.

In an attempt to regain his influence on the conduct of Algerian policy toward France and mend fences with Paris over the question of indemnisation of the French companies affected by the nationalization, it was Bouteflika who engaged in negotiations with the French government's special envoy Herve Alphand. However, with the deterioration of French-Algerian relations since 1971 and intensification of Algeria's economic cooperation with other countries, the role of the foreign ministry in these relations in particular and in economic decision-policy  

1The meeting took place on February 23 gathering the oil ministers of Algeria, Libya, Iraq, Iran and Saudi-Arabia. Before his departure, Abdeslam gave a long and exclusive interview to El-Moudjahid, an indication of his prominent role in the process leading to the take-over of French oil interests in Algeria.

2On the ceremonal level of these two meetings, two aspects are worth mentioning: 1) the meetings took place at Bouteflika's private residence, 2) in the absence of representatives from the ministry of energy; the other participants being diplomats of the foreign ministry: Bedjaoui, the Ambassador to Paris, Houhou and Haddad, the head and deputy head of the Department of French Affairs, and Djoudi, the adviser to Bouteflika's Cabinet.
in general was more and more taking executive form. Moreover with the ascendency of Boumedienne in the conduct of foreign policy, Bouteflika's prestige became eroded. The main disagreements between the two men did not concern the fundamental orientations of the country's foreign policy but arose from rivalries in ambitions and with regard to domestic issues. Indeed, Bouteflika objected to his president's leftward turn of mid-1970s and the dislocation of the Oujda group with the mysterious death of Bouteflika's close friend Medeghri and the departure of Kaid and Cherif Belkacem.¹

News that Bouteflika was to run for the post of the United Nations Secretary General in 1974, and Boumedienne's offer to appoint him Vice-President (a honorific post) in the government formed in 1977, fuelled rumours that Boumedienne wanted in fact to shunt him away from directing Algeria's foreign policy. The relative eclipse of Bouteflika resulted from the concentration of Algeria leadership on two main issues which were not in the range of the foreign minister's powers and capabilities: 1) the Western Saharan conflict whose incidences on Algerian national security became the major concern of Boumedienne and his touchstone, the army; 2) Algeria's contribution to North-South debates which fell in the hands of the ministry of economy and energy and a nucleus of diplomats possessing a high expertise required for the sophisticated formulation of strategies, projects and resolutions. As a result Bouteflika's role was limited to political aspects of Algeria's

¹There were rumours that Bouteflika bore personal grievance against Boumedienne who was believed to have been responsible for Medeghri's death. For differences of conceptions over domestic issues see speech of Bouteflika to students on April 28, 1976 and Boumedienne's replies in his speeches in Constantine in June 8, and Tlemcen (July 11) reaffirming a hard socialist approach.
non-alignment strategy, especially in strengthening the solidarity of the third world coalition in which he was one of the most popular and effective activists.

In contrast to Bouteflika, Benyahia his successor, appeared phlegmatic with a face marked by austere expression but his piercing eyes expressed intelligence and perspicacity. He was considered a hard worker and indefatigable with his discretion sharply contrasting with Bouteflika's jovial temperament and public exposure. Indeed, a long diplomatic and ministerial tenure helped Benyahia acquire negotiation skills and develop a deep knowledge of international politics, a matter that made him probably the most successful tactical and strategist foreign minister Algeria has ever had and perhaps the most versatile minister ever.\(^1\) He was reported to have declared to his confidants "I am here to serve my country, wherever and whenever I am placed."\(^2\) His relative independence from clannish affiliations made him probably the best choice for executing presidential directives in the context of a transitional period marked by a great diffusion of power.

With Benyahia, the regaining of the foreign ministry's prerogative over the conduct of Algerian-French policy and contribution to shaping the country's external economy was due to: 1) his deep knowledge of all aspects of French-Algerian relations and personal relationships with many technocrats inside the foreign ministry and in other governmental

\(^1\) He was successively Ambassador to London (1962-1963); Moscow (1964-1965); Minister of information (1966-1970); higher education (1971-1977); finance (1977-79).

organs; 2) the deterioration of Algerian-American economic relations in the light of the Western Sahara conflict and the stiffness of Soviet attitude toward Algeria because of Chadli's moderate policies, permitted a rapprochement with France which had also been initiated by Giscard D'Estaing in late 1978 and greatly activated by Mitterand's rise to power. The signature of a global agreement with France in September 1980 and the gas deal in February 1982, relatively advantageous to Algerian interests, was perhaps also due to Benyahia's personal contribution and imprint in the substantial improvement in Algerian-French relations. In the context of post-Boumedienne transitional era marked by the progressive displacement of powerful personalities of the past regime, Benyahia supported President Chadli's pragmatist and middleway approach to politics which aimed at keeping a balance between the radically-oriented forces and those favouring economic liberalism and a more ideologically tempered foreign policy. With regard to foreign issues, this strategy was reflected by the role of broker played by Algeria and its most resounding success had been the settlement of the Iran-US hostage issue in January 1981, in which Benyahia and his close aides from the diplomatic service played an active part.

1 Among the members of the delegation he led when carrying a mission of good offices between Iraq and Iran in June 1982 were 14 high technocrats from various ministries considered as his close collaborators.
2 The nomination of Muhammad Sahnoun a friend of long standing as Ambassador to Paris confirms this assumption.
3 Redha Malek and Abdelkrim Ghraieb then Ambassadors to Washington and Teheran respectively. Mostefai a Director of Algerian central bank also played a substantial part in these negotiations, particularly in issues related to financial transactions.
feature of this role of broker was the intensive mediation efforts conducted between Iran and Iraq and which may have made substantial progress toward peace had he not died while embarking upon his mission.

Nevertheless, if the role of broker suited Algeria's diplomacy under Benyahia, the balance he tried to keep between ideology and pragmatism proved quite difficult as he may have felt torn between increasingly endorsing Chadli's drive toward political moderation and his own leftist and militant inclinations. Thus, to follow his own perceptions would have perhaps cost him his post, while the espousal of a moderate line would have discredited him in the eyes of the numerous supporters he seemed to have among the state-technocracy, the army, notably the radically-oriented officers. This uncertainty was expressed by the sliding of Algerian support to Iran without, however, publicly showing a hostile attitude to Iraq, as well as by disapproving of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan without participating in votes condemning the USSR. Moreover, the clash between moderation and militancy was revealed by the difference of emphasis between Benyahia and his president. The domaine where the former's imprint was perhaps personal and stemming from his own convictions had certainly been the forging of friendly relationships with progressive countries of the third world, especially in Africa. But this tendency was somehow altered by Chadli who encouraged an overture towards other unaligned countries without necessarily taking in this view Benyahia's penchant towards the progressive ones. The role of broker seemed to have been the President's primary choice and the cultivation of good relations with moderate African countries for instance expressed his prominence over issues related to Algeria's stand on the Western Sahara which in turn has a substantial impact on her
territorial integrity and security. Thus, given these considerations Benyahia's preferences had been greatly obstructed. For instance, the progressive disengagement of Algeria from the Arab front of steadfastness and rejection may have not been approved by the foreign minister who certainly would have preferred an alignment with Arab progressive regimes and revolutionary forces. And if his diplomatic skills and experience were not disputed, it remained that Benyahia's militancy displeased the moderate segments of the military and civilian technocrats as well as the conservative and traditionalist groups among Algerian political elite. In the context of a revival of Islamic fundamentalism and the strengthening of the private sector, a radically-oriented foreign policy had little chance to survive.

Benyahia's sudden death, perhaps ironically, permitted Taleb-Ibrahimi to take over the foreign ministry, an office he eyed for a long time and allowed the conservative elements in the Algerian leadership to reorient the country's foreign policy in the sense of strengthening relations with Arab conservative countries, diversifying trade relations in order to alter the striking paradox of being ideologically close to the East and economically depending on the West. The de-emphasis on ideology in the manifestations of Algerian foreign policy reflected the diplomatic readjustment operated by Taleb-Ibrahimi in the context of renewed tensions with Morocco and of hostility with Libya in the early 1980s. Moreover, Soviet ambiguous attitude over the Western Sahara might have helped Taleb to incite President Chadli to strengthen relations with moderate countries even the USA so as to enable Algeria to maximise her national security and territorial integrity. In parallel, a greater
attempt to diversify trade relations was made to permit Algeria to win support from a larger number of countries for her policies, particularly on the regional level.

Taleb-Ibrahimi offers an image of gallantry and wide education as he is a better intellectual than a politician. In comparison to his predecessors, his culture has a more Arabic pigmentation and under his impulse, Algerian foreign policy has been less ideologically tempered. This moderation was, perhaps, due to his traditional middle-class family origin and relations with moderate circles in Algeria and elsewhere. His mark on the conduct of the country's external objective certainly responded to Chadli's desire to break with Boumediene's messianic attitude and impose a more moderate substance in Algerian regional policy based on the policy of 'bon voisinage' (good neighbourliness) with other Maghrebi countries and the cultivation of close relations with other conservative states mainly in the Arab world.

Since he took over the foreign ministry, Taleb-Ibrahimi displayed intensive efforts to help find a political solution to the Western Sahara, a conflict of which he knows every aspect given his several secret negotiations with the Moroccan side ever since 1977. His personal relations with certain members of the Royal family and diplomats certainly helped him to constitute perhaps the most valuable interlocutor for King Hassan within the Algerian leadership and probably also the most fervent advocate of an understanding and a working relationship among Maghrebi countries. Yet, he seemed to have difficulties not only to induce King Hassan to accept a form of autonomy for the Saharawi people.
but also in alleviating hostile feelings the Algerian radical officers bore vis-a-vis the Moroccan ruler. The latter's alliance with Qadhafi constituted a harsh blow for Taleb-Ibrahim who has indeed a little sympathy for the Libyan leader, while the move of the radical officers to increasingly support the war waged by the Polisario front seemed to have sealed the fate of his moderate attitude and perhaps personally hurt him.

In connection with his conceptions of a Maghrebi détente, the foreign minister also attempted to strengthen relations with the moderate Arab countries of the Middle East and favoured the moderate Arab peace plan for the conflict with Israel which was adopted at the Fez Arab summit in 1982 without the approval of Syria and a certain number of Palestinian leaders. Taleb's imprint on Algeria's Arab policy was reflected by his success in imposing moderate people to fill the Ambassadorial posts in the Arab world. The main examples had been to send Haddam to Riyadh and Ait Chaalal to Tunis. If the former, an ex-minister of religious affairs shares the foreign minister's sympathy for conservative Arab regimes, the choice of the latter, a primarily technocratic diplomat and of a traditional bourgeois background meant an emphasis on the economic relations with Tunisia in order to provide a basis for the 'entente cordiale' established between the two countries in recent years.

However, it seems that Taleb's room for manoeuvre increasingly narrows in the context of a great political debate within Algeria and of the shifting of alliances on the regional level. It appeared that given his basic intellectual background and moderate convictions, he may find it also difficult to sustain a diplomatic game under heavy pressures and which may involve unexpected upheavals.
C. Favoured Interests

1. The military: the primacy of national security matters

Although foreign policy is generally of less importance to the military than are essentially domestic political questions, foreign policy makers cannot overlook the view of the military on foreign-policy issues. Under Ben Bella, the army did not in the normal course of affairs interfere heavily in foreign policy issues, but was primarily concerned with political order, armaments and the policy toward neighbouring countries, especially the aspects connected with national security and territorial integrity. With Boumedienne and Chadli, the basic goals and limits of foreign policy were set in a fundamental sense by the military, while to a marked degree military influence was made effective directly through the president.

During Ben Bella's period, marked by incessant factional turmoil and improvisation, the military establishment, centered around the Boumedienne-led nucleus of the General-Staff, acted essentially as a group interest in a constant but latent mutual suspicion with the presidency although apparently playing a supportive role to Ben Bella's regime. Throughout Ben Bella's time, the main concerns of the army rested on domestic issue, particularly at making the ANP a viable political institution, strengthening its cohesion, enhancing its capabilities and wiping out the persistent military dissidence represented by the ex-wilaya commanders.

The first most notable reaction of the Boumedienne-led General-Staff was to resist territorial claims raised by Morocco and Tunisia. Shortly after the ceasefire concluded with France in March 1962, troops of the
ALN moved to occupy the disputed areas without the knowledge of the GPRA leadership itself. With the tension of these territorial conflicts, highlighted by the armed clash between Algeria and Morocco in October 1963, the Algerian army under the direction of Boumedienne seemed determined to make of this issue its 'chasse gardée' in opposition to Ben Bella's increasing interference in military affairs. Disagreements between the two sides were fuelled by Ben Bella's criticism of his Defense Minister of having violated the cease-fire agreed upon by Algeria with Morocco, while Boumedienne in fact, refused to accept the defeat of his army as he seemed tempted to continue the war to obtain a military victory in order to deprive his president of a reconciliation with King Hassan that would have given much publicity to Ben Bella's own efforts to settle the conflict with Morocco. However, amid feelings of frustration, Boumedienne seemed eager to retain a 'droit de regard' over the negotiations which took place between the two countries as one of the two members of the Algerian delegation was his close aide, Major Slimane (Kaid Ahmed).^1

The other contention of the army during Ben Bella's rule had been to press for the withdrawal of the French armed forces from Algeria earlier than scheduled in the Evian agreements and for the reduction of the dependence of the Algerian army on French military supplies. To Ben Bella's efforts to cultivate a personal relationship with De Gaulle and preserve the privileged relations between the two countries but based on a spirit void of neo-colonialism, contrasted the ANP's call for the lessening of dependency links with the former metropole, especially on the military field as the military interest in the transfer of technology

^1The other was M'Hamed Yazid a senior 'militant' diplomat.
grew with the increasing strength of the ANP's direction for military fabrication (DFM). The search for diversification of sources of supplies led Boumedienne to have contacts with the Soviet leaders, gaining therefore a substantial share in Algerian-Soviet friendship which was articulated around the close ties established by Ben Bella and Khrushchev. The Algerian defense ministry made then two trips to Moscow to increase military cooperation with the Soviets, one on September 27-October 5, 1963 shortly before the outbreak of hostilities with Morocco and the other on April 23-May 11, 1965. The length of his two visits may have also permitted him to enhance his own position in the eyes of the Soviet leaders. The last visit, made shortly before the coup against Ben Bella might have aimed this objective as well as making of the Soviet Union an ally in the perspective of revising the economic agreements with France. Therefore it was not surprising that Boumedienne's first official visit abroad was to Moscow in December 1965 only six months after Ben Bella's downfall. Since then most of Algeria's military hardware came from the USSR while military supplies from France were limited to supplying National Gendarmerie.

During Boumedienne's tenure, the nature of decision-making within the Defence Ministry and the manner in which its decisions influence foreign policy matters through the council of revolution and the council of ministers remained practically unclear to outside observers. However the most important link appears to be Boumedienne who apparently succeeded in making the army the backbone of his regime. Obviously his confidence in the army's support substantially increased after the removal of hostile ex-maquisards and provided him with the freedom to manoeuvre as the military dimension of political power in Algeria has been manifested in
the prominence of military men in the decision-making apparatuses. But if the military clearly constituted the government's power base during Boumediene's administration, it did not, however, exercise a direct control over decisions related to foreign policy matters since there seems to be a strong assumption that the army's role in the normal course of affairs has not been that of vetoing, providing authority for or revising foreign policy decisions but was confined to the level of supporting the broad links of the government strategy. This relative symbiosis did not suggest that the army's opinion especially with regard to national security matters had been absent or minimal but simply that the formal communication between the military and foreign policy matters in general, seemed to have been Boumediene who certainly had a fairly acute view of the military perceptions with regard to external issues.

Deference of the military in Boumediene's foreign policy was apparent in 1974 when he received support for his firm stand on the Western Sahara that involved a sustained cold war with Morocco. Since then the intensive mobilization of the army and the semi-state of alert imposed within the military sectors situated near the Moroccan borders stood as an indication of a consensus of the army's top officers with regard to Boumediene's decision, notwithstanding discontent within the lower-ranking military staff and young generation of officers as well as conscripts. The most noticeable fact of the military establishment—Boumediene congruence was reflected by the latter's surrounding by top officers many of whom were the President's close aides and belonged to the category of professional soldiers. The most important of these officers were Colonels Chabou; chef de Cabinet of Boumedienne; Abdelghani (Head of the fourth, then fifth military region and then home minister); Yahaoui...
Head of the third military region and then of Cherchell Academy);¹ Zerguini (Commander of the fourth and then third military regions); and the Majors: Bensalem, Boudjenane and Hajeres, respectively a member of the Etat-major quartier-general, Head of the Cherchell academy, and Director of the ANP's political commissariat.

Colonel Chabou, an ardent supporter of modernization was believed to have been Boumedienne's technical genius with regard to military and national security affairs. He was often charged to conduct missions abroad concerning these issues and on other questions involving military expertise. He was for instance sent to the Middle East in September 1970 to hold discussions with President Bakr of Iraq, Atassi of Syria and Arafat the PLO leader in an effort to take all measures to implement the cease-fire reached earlier at Cairo between Hussein of Jordan and Arafat.

After his accidental death in 1971, Chabou's successors in these matters were perhaps two other professional officers Colonel Zerguini and Abdelghani, the former being a close aide to Boumedienne. Zerguini supervised the delicate operation of delimitation of the frontiers between Iraq and Iran following the agreement reached between the Chah and Saddam Hussein in Algiers in 1975 under Boumedienne auspices. Colonel Yahaoui a socialist hardliner and close to the Panarab baathist ideology was supposed to have influenced Boumedienne mainly on Arab affairs. He was perhaps the impulse behind the cultivation of close ties with Presidents Assad of Syria and Qadhafi and a strong opponent of the state technocracy's drive to tie Algeria's economy with the Western world. Conversely, Majors Bensalem, Boudjenane and Hadjeres had stressed a more moderate attitude, being concerned with the assertion of the

¹Yahaoui was basically an ex-maquisard, but had an appreciable level of education though in Arabic.
country's Arabo-Muslim identity, and the exaltation of the basic principles of the Algerian revolution. As the relations with the Polisario leaders became Boumedienne's personal concern, the organization of this movement and its intelligence were assured by Colonel Hoffman, extremely loyal to Boumedienne and a highly trained officer.

At the beginning of Chadli's reign, deference of the military in foreign policy remained centered on domestic issues and on matters related to the country's security and integrity. This deference was far from being coherent and unified as tergiversations, uncertain strategies within governmental and military circles perhaps proper to a transitional period came to mark the first years of the Chadli regime. With the lack of inner stability, authority within the army was not centralized and uniform, and amid rivalries of clans, the interference of the military in foreign policy issues was indeed diffuse and sometimes incoherent.

The most striking manifestation of these divergences had been the complicity of some Algerian officers and state high officials in the Gafsa plot in May 1980, certainly without the knowledge of President Chadli. This group which included Kasdi Merbah, the former head of military security, Benyahia the foreign minister, Yahaoui then the FLN's strongman, was supposed to have supported terrorist activities of a Libyan-backed band of Tunisian opponents. The embarrassment of Chadli and other army officers was evidently clear as the Algerian president personally - and later with the help of General Major Benloucif and of Taleb-Ibrahimi, a notorious anti-Qadhafi - worked to mend fences with the Tunisian government. Another example confirming this lack of consensus on the strategy to be pursued with regard to regional affairs, had been the go-ahead given to the Polisario Front by Yahaoui probably supported
by the radical officers within the ANP and by the Libyan leader, to
However, as the presidential office proved weak to control affairs
related with military and territorial security, the most important move
of the army was to make Lieutenant-Colonel Belkheir Secretary-General to
the presidency in replacement of a civilian technocrat Benhabyles,
probably in an attempt to keep a close eye on the president. Neverthe­
less, this move neither asserted the homogeneity of the military estab­
ishment, nor a convergent attitude to foreign policy issues.

Broadly, two large groups could be distinguished. A first group of
radical officers includes military men who participated in the war of
liberation and are to be committed to the tasks of preserving the basic
values of the Algerian revolution as well as to intransigent nationalism
and rhetoric. They are also opposed to the promotion to higher posts
in the military hierarchy of younger officers, who in many cases had
little or no pre-independence experience, since they have been primarily
the product of the modernization of the army pursued since 1962. In
contrast to the group of radically-oriented officers, the members of the
younger generation have been trained abroad, are more open to modern
techniques, values and Western culture and advocate a less rigid
socialistic line.
They are generally fervent supporters of nuclear programmes and of lessening the dependence of the ANP on Soviet military supplies through a rapid and ample diversification of armaments. Seemingly they are concerned with establishing a detente in the Maghrib and a more balanced attitude between East and West. These considerations may explain their approval of Chadli’s visit to the USA in April 1985, a visit believed as inopportune by the officers with radical orientations. It was then not surprising to see that while Chadli was in Washington, a radical officer General Nezzar went to Moscow in an attempt to reassure the Soviets of Algeria's attachment to the policy of non-alignment and preserve the Soviet source of supply of spare parts and military hardware in case of US reluctance to sell Algeria the needed sophisticated armaments. However, President Chadli seemed to have been induced to endorse this policy of diversification of arm supplies as well as the search for US military technology in an attempt to counter Morocco’s increasing military capabilities and face Libya's bellicose attitude to Algeria.

This categorization remains suggestive as the main divisions within the military establishment lie primarily on regional basis. There is a strong assumption that President Chadli faces pressures from the clan of the East and the one of the West, centered around the strong rivalry existing between General-Major Benloucif, the chief of staff from Annaba, (Chadli's native town) and Benyelles, the Secretary-General of the Defence ministry who comes from Tlemcen. With regard to foreign issues regional affiliation may have also been the basis for regional alignment since Benloucif has been greatly involved in Algerian-Tunisian rapproche-
ment while relations with Morocco have been the major concern of General Belkheir, the Secretary-General of the presidency, believed to be close to the moderate group of politicians. Rumours also had it that Taleb-Ibrahimi, the foreign minister may be sympathetic to the group of the West as he was brought up in Tlemcen and showing a soft approach which privileged diplomatic traditions with Morocco.

Probably deceived by the moderate approach of Taleb-Ibrahimi and Belkheir toward Morocco as well as by the intensive alignment with Tunisia at the expense of an alliance with Libya (while Hassan seemed unwilling to make any concessions) and in the view of the recent Tripoli-Rabat axis and France's lack of confidence in Algeria, the radically-oriented officers moved to press Chadli to reaffirm Algeria's stand over the Sahara issue and disavow his foreign minister. The latter's initiative to favour a form of autonomy for the Saharawi people was promptly rejected by the segments of the military who saw the continuity of the struggle against the Moroccan troops as the main means to wreck Hassan's expansionist policies. An indication of Taleb-Ibrahimi's relative eclipse with regard to this issue had been his absence from the
meeting that took place in February 1985 between President Chadli and Muhammad Abdul Aziz, the President of the Saharawi Republic (RASD) and Bachir Mustafa Sayaad, responsible of the Permanent Secretariat of Polisario's political bureau. The army's view seemed to have prevailed as the recent Polisario's attacks on Moroccan targets was believed to have been endorsed by the radical officers and the FLN which have been anxious to prevent a change in the configuration in favour of Morocco and not let Hassan increase pressure on Algeria through deterrence and diplomatic manoeuvres such as those he successfully conducted with Libya and France in late 1984. If the military attention will continue to concentrate on the state's security and the country's territorial integrity, its interference in these issues will be more fragmented and heterogeneous, perhaps because the Algerian army does no longer represent a monolithic group interest as coherently articulated as during Boumedienne's era. Over the years, it has probably evolved into a microcosm of the political spectrum which exists in Algerian society as a whole today.

2. The State technocracy: The conciliation between business and ideology

Given the decline of the middle classes during the colonial era and in the absence of an effective mass party and well-articulated and coherent ruling elite, the technocracy came to the fore and became to play an important political role in the new Algerian state. This stratum was believed to have originated with the outbreak of the Algerian revolution (Harbi); reinforced its position in the post-independent political structure through the industrialization policy and presence in administrative and public enterprises (Cubertafond) and as a result, this technocracy came to constitute a dominate class (Yefsah), which although
nationalist "rejects in deeds if not in words the political and economic guidelines of the revolution" (Bouzidi). The assumption of these writers is that the technocracy collectively appropriates the surplus through the control it exercises over the state administrative apparatuses and through the dominant role it plays in organizing the economy and distributing the national income. It remains, however, difficult to state that the technocracy constitutes a class let alone a dominant one, because it lacks a real control over the means of production as to be able to appropriate the surplus and also because of the relative coordination between the various branches and levels of the economic sectors. Furthermore, this lack of homogeneity has been aggravated by two sets of factors: factionalism which had in fact marked the entire Algerian political elite in modern times and the administrative nomadism through which civil servants rarely remained in the same office for a substantial period of time. Factionalism certainly underlines the primary clanish character of the Algerian technocracy as many technocrats owed their positions and privileges to rival groups and clans existing

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within the ruling elite or in the military establishment, and thus constituted a clientele for the powerful members of the Algerian leadership.

Schematically the technocracy comprises three main groups: 1. the "political" technocrats whose legitimacy stemmed from their revolutionary past or political socialisation made through the wartime Algerian student association (UGEMA), mainly; 2. the members of the state administration, party and workers' union who have administrative expertise, acquired in many cases within the French colonial bureaucratic system. They came to fill the lower ranks in these apparatuses and constituted the ideological support for the technocratic project and model of development; 3. the "technical" technocrats who also possess the know-how necessary for the industrialisation of the country. This category represents essentially the power base of the political technocracy. Working in the economic ministries and state agencies they acted primarily as the executors of the policies formulated by the political technocrats.

With Boumédiène, the share of the technocracy in the national decision-making substantially increased as the state tended to become the major entrepreneur-employer after the sweeping away of the self-management experience initiated by the Ben Bella regime (and the exclusion of the wartime politicians, ex-maquisards and leftist ministers from the state apparatuses). Indeed, the technocracy's skills contributed in the establishment of the regime's legitimacy through sounding economic success, especially as Boumédiène seemed anxious to demarcate substantially from the rhetoric socialism and romantic
revolutionarism of his predecessor, thus being concerned with building the state institutions and laying foundations for the country's economic take off.

Perhaps the most important group of the political technocrats and technical bureaucrats had been the team of Belaid Abdeslam who served as minister of industry and energy from 1965 to 1979 and is believed to have been the chief architect of Algeria's economic development. In the late 1960s, the Boumedienne regime effectively consolidated his position at home while the state technocracy embarked upon a process of rapid industrialisation and attempted to accommodate to the new changes in the international market which became favourable to the oil producing countries. In those crucial years of 1969-1970, the balance of power within the Algerian leadership changed reinforcing the position of Abdeslam and the state oil company Sonatrach the cornerstone of the country's parastatal system which was run by technocrats close to Abdeslam such as Ait Al Hocine, Liassine and Ghozali. The year 1970 saw the promotion to ministerial posts of highly qualified technocrats believed close to Abdeslam: Khodja (planning); Yaker (commerce). Boumedienne seemed to have aligned himself with the policies of his minister of industry as he also appointed Mahroug his personal adviser for economic affairs as minister of finance in replacement for Cherif Belkacem a member of the Oujda group, a fact that showed the relative decline of wartime politicians.

Beyond geographical alignment, and like the technocratic diplomats, many elements of the Abdeslam team militated in the wartime UGEMA, served in the GPRA's specialized bodies and graduated from French universities.¹

¹Like Abdeslam, all of Ait Al Hocine, Liassine, Mahroug and Yaker were of Kabyle origin, while Ghozali and Khodja
The model of development as carried out by the Abdeslam team did not fail to have a certain impact not only on the formulation of the country’s external relations, but also on its orientation and execution. This model based on accelerated industrialisation led to the integration of Algerian economy into the internationalist capitalist market since the implementation of the industrialising industries necessitated massive imports of technology and capital available mostly in the Western world.

As the implementation of the domestic economic programme required more and more sophisticated technology and massive capital, the move toward a political moderation became almost necessary. The Abdeslam team, then, began to emphasize economic pragmatism and induce Boumedienne to ease relations with the Western world countries. In defence of this pragmatism, the Algerian president referred to the huge gas deal contracted with the US firm El Paso in 1969 as purely commercial because as he said "we have a surplus of gas we want to sell to the USA and which the Americans need...There is nothing strange in such an agreement concluded between a socialist developing country and the world's biggest capitalist state. Algeria's attitude toward the just causes is clear and our country does not need lessons from anybody on these issues whether they concern the liberation movements in Latin-America, Africa or the case of the Vietnamese people...There is neither military base nor

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came from the Tlemcen region. Abdeslam had been in charge of the GPRA's department of economic affairs and Mahroug his director of Cabinet. The latter obtained an MSc in economics in Paris and Liassine attended a polytechnic there, while Abdeslam, Ghazali and Khodja graduated in economics at the University of Grenoble and had been influenced by two French economists at the same university: Perroux and De Bernis. The latter's theory largely inspired the conceptions of Algeria's economic development policy. De Bernis also worked as a technical adviser to the Algerian Ministry of industry and energy during Abdeslam's tenure.
The stress is put on the separation between ideology and economic interests. In dealing with the Western world on economic affairs, Algeria it is argued did not abandon her militant line whether at home or on the foreign level. Thus, the apparent paradox existing between her radical policies and the structure of her trade patterns is not as striking as it may seem. It merely crystallises her economic pragmatism regarded by the technocratic group as necessary to lessen the country's heavy economic dependence on France, increase its capabilities and enhance its status in the international scene. And as the rise of oil and gas production in early 1970s proved necessary for increasing export earnings, the technocrats started looking for Western expertise and finance as well as for foreign markets. Thus, Algeria's cooperation rapidly developed with the USA and West Germany despite the absence of diplomatic relations. But Abdeslam and his team resisted pressures from the radical members of the ruling elite to give up Algerian neutrality over the German question as they were wary about establishing diplomatic relations with Berlin in order to avoid upsetting Bonn with which they set up important economic links despite that relations were cut off in 1964 because of West Germany's support to Israel. Algeria finally recognized East Germany in May 1970 and resumed diplomatic ties with Bonn in December 1971, but it was only in 1973 that she accredited an Ambassador to this capital perhaps in an attempt to conceal the existence of a huge trade with West Germany. In similar vein, the US economic
involvement in Algeria started to increase because the technocratic team felt that the country needed US technology and market to compensate for France's defection. The signature in 1969 of the huge gas contract with the US company El Paso constituted a personal triumph for Abdeslam and his assistants and perhaps also the keynote in the relaxation of Algerian-American political relations after an era of mutual suspicion and distrust, highlighted by the absence of diplomatic ties which resulted from Algeria's protest at America's support to Israel during the June 1967 conflict.¹ Until this rapprochement, Algeria's trade with the USA had been insignificant as economic links between the two countries were limited to humanitarian aid granted by Washington and relatively small sales of wheat.

¹ The new approach to the USA as initiated by the technocratic group meant the reduction of the support to the American black panther movement, and to the hijackings carried out by Palestinian and other leftwing movements.² The visit the US State Secretary for African Affairs, Newsom, made to Algiers in 1972, the first ever paid by a US high official reflected the conception of Abdeslam that ideology and business do not mix.

¹In this Algerian-American rapprochement, Bruno Etienne a French analyst of Algerian politics, suggested the combined influence of Driss Jazairy a top technocratic diplomat and Wilhelm Eagleton the US charge d'affaires in Algiers as both were believed to have attended the same course at one of the Oxford schools. See B. Etienne in 'chronique diplomatique' in Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord, (II) 1971, p.367.

²These considerations led Algiers to hand back to Washington the ransom the members of the Black Panther movement obtained from the US government when they hijacked a plane to Algiers in 1972.
Encouraged by Boumedienne and being better qualified than the politicians, the technocrats became more useful in Arab and North-South forums where economic problems especially the energy issues tended to be predominant. In the early 1970s, they pushed forward for a moderate attitude in the manifestations of Algerian foreign policy particularly with regard to the Arab world, being aware that such a strategy would strengthen Arab solidarity which would in turn serve its broader ambitions, i.e. the implementation of a new international economic order more favourable to raw material producing countries, among them Algeria. It seemed that Abdeslam succeeded in inducing his president to improve relations with the Arab countries of the Middle East which had been strained because of Algeria's firm stand with regard to the Palestinian question, the support to the guerrilla movements in Oman and Yemen as well as the showing of a favourable attitude to the independence of the United Arab Emirates. Therefore under the impulse of the technocratic group, Algeria known for revolutionary radicalism in Arab affairs, started to give up her blessings perhaps reluctantly to an Arab policy that included a peace conference for the Middle East conflict of October 1973 at which the states in conflict would be sitting at the negotiation table in Geneva. Moreover, shortly after the ceasefire, Algeria held an Arab conference which was regarded by the Arab radicals and militant Palestinians as the summit of capitulation, on the basis that it preached the preservation of an Arab consensus and moderate demands. As a result, Algiers received visits by Kissinger, the US State Secretary in December 1973 and October 1974, thus clearly breaking away with the intransigent attitude the Algerian leadership had shown in the aftermath of the previous Arab-Israeli war. And when requesting Western Europe to
Contribute in bringing about a settlement for this conflict, Abdeslam in line with other Arab moderate states, declared "we are only asking for the application of the United Nations 242 resolution".¹ This statement was indeed striking when confronted with the previous declarations of Algerian leaders who rejected this resolution on the basis that it ignored the national rights of the Palestinian people.

The pursuit of economic pragmatism, however, did not constitute a vital issue when Algeria's security and territorial integrity was threatened. Indeed, Boumedienne's attempt to challenge Morocco's take over of the Western Sahara steadily undermined the efforts of the technocratic group to maintain a détente in the Maghreb which would have not only helped a better concentration on domestic economic development but also increased Algeria's trade with her neighbouring countries.² This move inevitably shattered the desire of the technocratic group to embark upon the exploitation of the mineral-rich Gasa Djebilet mines with Morocco and the supply of natural gas to Western Europe through pipelines to be built through the Moroccan and Tunisian territories. This obstacle perhaps forced Abdeslam to give a go ahead to a drastic increase of the production of liquified natural gas which proved later, quite disastrous for the country's economy. Moreover, the deterioration of the trade relations with the US marked notably by the cancellation of the gas deal in 1977, was a direct result of the shift of the US support to

²Mahroug, the Minister of finance was ousted in 1976 following his opposition to a drastic increase of the military budget on the basis that this request was too late and too voluminous to permit a good functioning of the State's financial regulations in accordance with the already scheduled programmes.
Morocco. With the failure of the North-South debates and the growing domestic problems, the state technocracy became the target of popular discontent and criticism from other groups within the ruling elite. The dislocation of the powerful ministry of industry and energy into three sub-ministries during the reshuffle of the government in April 1977, constituted perhaps an attempt from Boumediene to remedy Algeria's economic problems and wreck Abdeslam's technocratic fiefdom.

The rise to power of Chadli and the emergence of moderate segments within the political elite meant also the virtual elimination of Abdeslam and his assistants from the decision-making process as they had been held responsible for Algeria's economic problems. If such a faith marked the demotion of the state technocracy from a prominent position in the home policy to the status of a mere scapegoat, it also led to the confinement of this technocracy to the role of an executive organ with regard to important decisions which remain in the hands of the presidency and the military in final analysis.¹

Under Chadli the spearhead of Algeria's new economic policy and the leading figure of the state technocracy has been Brahimi Abdelhamid who was elevated in December 1984 to the post of Prime Minister with an upper hand over the country's economic affairs. The other influential members of the new powerful group within the state technocracy were believed to be Belkacem Nabi, the minister of hydrocarbons, Oubouzar (planning) and

¹Abdeslam's close assistants Ait Al Hocine, Keramane and Ghozali had been charged by the State's cour des comptes of mismanagement, misuse of public funds and for the low price by which Algeria's gas had been sold to the US company El Paso. Ghozali was even jailed for sometimes before becoming Ambassador to Brussels in 1984. A native of Tlemcen, he owed this nomination to the Tlemcen group led by Benyelles, the Secretary General of the ministry of defense and to the support of Taleb-Ibrahim, the current foreign minister believed close to this group.
Khellef (commerce). Both Brahimi and Nabi are older than most of
Abdeslam's assistants and had a substantial pre-war political experience
(within the MTLD), a matter that perhaps explained their political
moderation and greater emphasis on economic pragmatism as they may have
been influenced by the older generation of Algerian nationalists.
Brahimi, a friend of long standing of President Chadli, was believed to
be with Nabi a firm opponent of Abdeslam's highly centralized economy and
of the extension of the role of the state in the country's economy.
They generally, shared Chadli's encouragement to the private sector and a
greater diversification of trade relations and a close economic
cooperation with France and Tunisia in contrast to Boumedienne. And
with the support of the Tlemcen group as well as of Taleb-Ibrahimi and
Yala the Home Minister, Brahimi was believed to have contributed in the
improvement of economic relations with France since 1982 and in the
recent overture towards the USA.

Despite the opposition of the group of the radical officers and some
militants of the FLN, the drive toward economic liberalization remain,
beyond rivalries of persons and clans, an acute issue in Algerian
politics today.

D. Favoured Interests

1. The party: the symbol of revolutionary ideals

As in domestic life, the party's share in the foreign-decision making
remained quite limited until recently and its role in the formulation of
the country's foreign policy expressed mostly the attachment to the basic

\[^1\]Nabi comes from Tlemcen and the two others from Kabilya,
thus confirming the prominence of these two regions as
chief suppliers of state technocrats.
principles of the Algerian revolution. This emphasis reflected the anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist feelings born by most of the FLN militants who actively participated in the struggle for independence. Many of the FLN officials and activists had been shunted off to the party following their elimination from the state decision-making organs as a result of their removal from the army with the policy of modernization carried out by Boumedienne and his group of professional soldiers. Like the members of the lower ranks of the FLN, most officials had been maquisards and urban guerrilla fighters but in contrast they have a certain level of education though to a lower level than the civilian technocrats' standard. And in many cases this education was in arabic. Given their wartime experience, the FLN strata bore populist feelings which emphasized a socialistic rhetoric with Arabs-Islamic pigmentation and anti-colonialist ferment. They were more inclined to strengthen links with the Panarabist core and national liberation movements than with Western countries which they regarded as the principal support for imperialism and colonialism, an image forged during their own struggle against France. Moreover, lacking scientific knowledge and education they were less able to understand the politics of economic pragmatism preached by the state technocracy. And if they were grateful to this stratum for Algeria's economic growth and improvement of the standard of life of the Algerian people they were nevertheless critical of the Western ideas of the state technocracy and of the close economic ties of Algeria with the Western capitalist countries, which limited the links with Arab states. The main preoccupation of the FLN rank and file had been without doubt the struggle for Palestinian liberation and for the Arab cause in general. Since Algeria's independence, the FLN had not only
provided support for the Palestinian movements but also expressed its solidarity with the Middle East Arab States in their confrontation with Israel. Despite its general atrophy with regard to political mobilization, the FLN had occasionally been active in organizing conferences and manifestations to express solidarity with "brother" Arabs and Palestinians and fellow militants of national liberation movements in Lusophone and Southern Africa as well as Vietnam, especially during Ben Bella's time when anti-colonial struggle was one of the main issues of foreign policy. At that time, the FLN comprised a great number of ex-guerrilla fighters and prestigious leaders of the Algerian revolution such as Mohamed Khider, then the FLN general-secretary.

During the June 1967 and October 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict, the party was active in channeling popular solidarity with the Arab cause and the mobilization of youth so as to increase the number of volunteers to be sent to the Middle East front. It also displayed some efforts in organizing popular manifestations in protest to Nasser's acceptance of the cease-fire in June 1967, to Sadat's trip to Israel in 1977 or to Jordan's clash with the PLO in 1969-1970. Since 1974, the FLN's attention concentrated on the Western Sahara issue, providing moral support to the Polisario front in line with Algeria's solidarity with the right of the Saharawi people for self-determination. Besides, the FLN was provided with the task of preserving and developing relations and solidarity with socialist and progressive countries throughout the world.

Being the symbol of the nation-state and the guarantor of the basic principles of the Algerian revolution, the FLN had also been used to enhance the legitimacy of the ruling elites through the exaltation of issues which appealed to most segments of the Algerian society:
anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. In the case of the Western Sahara, it served as a vehicle to gain support for the Algerian government’s stand in this conflict and in the case of establishing relations with other parties, the FLN had been used to enhance the image of the Algerian leadership within the third world coalition, gather support for Algeria’s strategy for a new international economic order as well as dissipate the doubts of other progressive parties on Algeria’s socialist line. By way of example it is noteworthy to mention that after the coup against Ben Bella, it was a delegation of the FLN led by well-known former maquisards who went touring Africa to stress the new regime’s commitment to the cause of African liberation and economic emancipation.

To be able better to implement these functions of symbolism and propaganda, the FLN was provided with a commission for external relations. Originally, the presidential office set up a department of international studies led by Mohamed Ksouri a Panarabist militant and in 1969 it created within the FLN a department of liberation movements led by Jalloul Malaika a former ALN officer. In 1977 a better-organized commission for external was set up and held by a former ANP officer Colonel Hoffman considered as extremely loyal to Boumedienne.\footnote{Hoffman was replaced by Bouhara also a former ANP officer and minister at the head of the commission in 1983} The commission was subdivided into two departments: one of relations with parties and international organizations. The latter’s included a sub-commission for liberation movements led by Major Saddock Kitouni, regarded as close to liberation movements in Africa.
The party's mass organization such as the women's association (UNFA), youth (UNJA) and the workers' union (UGTA) have also sections of external relations related to their specific domains in accordance with the regime's political and ideological options.

The confinement of the party to the role of complementing actions and policies carried out by the presidential office and the foreign ministry both of which had been chiefly involved in state-to-state relations, led to a discontent within the party in general and the commission for external relations in particular. According to a member of this commission, there has been at the theoretical level, no capitalization and recording of the experiences of Algerian foreign policy, since this policy has been based on general principles rooted in the past revolution, a matter that has led to a circumstantial attitude void of ideological elaboration.\(^1\) To remedy this situation, he argued, the foundation of the country's foreign policy should go beyond its general principles and try to find out channels stemming from the principle of non-alignment which he regarded as Algeria's "seule issue possible". The implicit assumption was that the FLN commission for external relations should assume this role with regard to the new requirements and mutations in the international system.

These opinions, presumably, are widespread within this commission as their members might feel that their role should not be limited to the role of a rubber stamp for decisions taken by the presidential office. Conceivably these demands reflect the desire of the FLN to have a share in the national-decision making in general, being encouraged by Chadli's attempts to make the party better able to play the role of counterweight

\(^1\)Interview with Ogab, head of the division "relations with the parties of Western Europe".
to the army and state technocracy. As a result of this strategy, the party has since 1981 increased its role in mass mobilization and in foreign policy making. The nomination of party officials to diplomatic posts overseas, had certainly permitted the FLN a decisive intrusion within the foreign ministry and a substantial role in the execution of some aspects of the country's external policies. Indeed in contrast to cases of demotion, the infusion of the members of the FLN into the diplomatic service resulted from the rise in the party rank, reflecting the more active role played by the FLN in national politics since the death of Boumediene.

The place for accreditation shows the party's stress and ideological considerations through maintaining close links with progressive countries, mainly of the Arab world. For instance, Hachemaoui, Kara, Ali Ammar have been given posts in Lebanon, Hungary and Libya respectively. Having a basically Arab cultural background their promotion might have served to cool down the increasing discontent among the arabic-educated students and other militants of the FLN. This promotion might have also been used to show that the party can permit as well, an effective access of the militants to high posts and thus enhance its abilities to lure many young cadre and technocrats to activate within the party. Undoubtedly the lethargic state, demagogic rhetoric and inefficiency into which the FLN had fallen, had kept away these social strata from joining it. Intense efforts displayed by Messadia, the FLN strongman, since 1981 to increase the party's role in political mobilization perhaps aimed also at strengthening the role of the FLN in home polity and enhancing his own
position within the leadership, so as to provide himself with a certain autonomy vis-a-vis the President and thus acquire a larger room of manoeuvre.

The desire of Chadli to revitalize the FLN in an attempt to counterbalance the weights of both the army and the state technocracy combined with Messadia's own political experience and skills had certainly allowed the latter to assert himself in shaping the country's policies. With regard to external issues, the direct way of influencing the President, has been the participation of Messadia in meetings that took place between Chadli and foreign heads of state as well as his increasing involvement in conducting missions of negotiations, mediation and persuasion. With the support of the radically oriented-officers of the army, he was able to induce Chadli to opt for a firm attitude vis-a-vis Morocco and strengthen links with the progressive Arab regimes, especially Syria and Libya, and attempt to revive the Arab front of steadfastness in opposition to the moderate line pursued by Taleb-Ibrahimi with the implicit approval of President Chadli.¹

Furthermore, it is probable that behind the anti-French campaign, launched by the FLN since mid-1985 under the cover of the party's attachment to the basic values of the Algerian revolution, aimed at making Chadli turn from a close relationship with France which has been advocated by Taleb-Ibrahimi and Abdelhamid Brahimi, the Prime Minister.²

¹The substantial credibility enjoyed by Messadia in the eyes of Arab progressive forces may be highlighted by his trip to Damascus in May 1984 in an attempt to heal the breach between Assad and the PLO leader, Arafat. And amid negotiations for a Maghrebi summit that took place in early 1985 it was Messadia who was charged to explain Algeria's position to Qadhafi (January 16).

²The most vehement manifestations of this anti-French diatribe may be found in the FLN's own magazine Révolution Africaine. For a subtle attack on French
It is perhaps difficult to ascertain that much of the FLN's standpoints on external issues reflect the perceptions of the party's rank and file, since the personal alignment of Messadia with the core of the radically-oriented ANP officers and his direct access to the president attest the basic clanish character of Algerian politics and the highly personalized feature of the country's leadership. The game of shifting alliances as it has been practised by Messadia, may politically constitute a risk for the party leadership. The task of explaining and gaining support for Chadli's visit to the USA made in April 1985 for instance, represented in fact a dilemma for Messadia and the permanent secretariat of the FLN's Central Committee since the choice between profiting from Chadli's willingness to strengthen the party and the risk of jeopardising this support by opposing the president's move toward political moderation may prove difficult to make. This dilemma in fact reflects not only the weakness of the party to engage as a viable political institution with its specific identity and objectives, but also its divisions into rival factions and clans at a time of an open conflict over the future orientations of Algerian policies both at home and abroad.

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attitude toward Algerian migrants, see interview of M-C Messadia to L'Actualité the organ of the Amicale des Algériens en Europe. (July 10, 1985).
2. Public Opinion: a marginal role

Despite the complexity of its nature, the concept of public opinion has been viewed by political scientists as an important element in the process of foreign policy and as pictured in Western conceptualization, it was believed to exercise indirect influence on the decision-makers. Whether taken simply as a collection of opinions on specific foreign policy issues expressed by individuals or groups outside the executive power or as a factual and active force, public opinion remains hard to define with accuracy even in a participatory democracy in which public interests and values would find a tangible expression in the policy arena. In developing countries in general and in authoritarian regimes in particular, public opinion was assumed to be amorphous, apathetic and with no impact on the formulation of foreign policy. This assumption was easily established given the secretive character and highly centralized foreign decision making in these states and the complicated nature of relationship between society and government.

If one admits that public opinion may be linked with mass opinion, national character of a people may be conceived as the basic ingredient to help us speculate intelligently about the influence of the cultural environment of the national unit on the decision-makers. Mass culture then, may be apprehended in terms of psycho-cultural characteristics and of patterns of thought of a given nation. But to determine the national character of any nation is admittedly difficult because in the present state of knowledge, all generalizations about national character are hypothetical in nature.¹

In this vein, many concepts related to psychological attitudes are derived from individual cases and thus do not lend themselves very easily to a serious analysis of the national character. Some interpretations of the Algerian character may be valuable to understand some basic traits underlying the conditions of patterns of thought and mood of the Algerians, but unfortunately they may not be highly pertinent to assert the capacity of these individuals to understand foreign policy issues, let alone their ability to respond to these issues. Indeed, characteristics supposed to be specific to the Algerian people such as suspicion (Vatin and Leca), 'complexed mentality' (Quandt), 'political apathy' (Moore) and 'assabiya' (Hermassi) are too vague to describe the national values, empirical beliefs and expressive symbols and too individualistic to permit a correlation between the national mood and the degree of responsiveness to foreign policy issues.¹

However, even if this correlation is assumed, the impact of mass opinion on the decision-makers remains hard to assess because of the absence of plebiscites or referendums to collect individual opinions on specific foreign policy issues. Equally public opinion did not prove being even a latent political force given the absence of manifesting opposition or anger to foreign policy decisions in the form of strikes or riots.

With regard to foreign policy issues, this apathy may not be fortuitous given the omnipresence of the state in all sectors of the social life. Thus, individual responsibility became somehow diluted in

¹Vatin, J-C and Leca, J: L'Algérie politique: institutions (Paris, fondation nationale des Sciences politiques, 1977); Moore, C.H: North-Africa (Boston, Little Brown, 1970); Hermassi, E: Political leadership in North-Africa (California, Berkeley, 1972) and Quandt, B.W: Revolution and political leadership.
the vagueness of public property which is itself regarded as an abstract unit, somehow transcending society. Expressive reliance on the 'Etat de providence' (nanny state) implied a certain apathy to politics in general. However, this apathy does not necessarily mean lack of politicization as it may not be exaggerated to assert that Algerians in general are much versed in discussing political issues, especially those related to international issues. It simply attests a lack of public participation in the foreign decision-making in particular given the highly centralized feature of the state's executive powers. Understood in these terms, political apathy may explain the disregard of politics and politicians as rendered in the pejorative expression of boulitique, that is to say a function above the reach of commonsense connected sometimes with negative notions such as brain-washing, propaganda or pure speculation.

Absence of popular responsiveness toward foreign policy issues and impact on the decision-making derive also to a large extent from deep-rooted nationalistic themes and values exalted by the ruling elite and which appeal to large segments of the Algerian people, for instance Arabism, anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism in general. These connotations have been greatly emphasized by the Algerian leaders since they yield them also political legitimacy. In this vein, public opinion has been easily mobilized to muster support for the decisions to support liberation movements throughout the world, especially the Palestinian resistance.

To limit the analysis to this convergence or consensus on the principles defended by Algerian foreign policy may be misleading since it could be easily argued that there exists a nuanced outlook held by mass
opinion over the formulation and conduct of foreign policy. And to dwell on these differences may be highly subjective and analytically superfluous, as the assumptions one could put forward may remain biased and personal.

One useful way to transcend these difficulties, may be to deal more specifically with the foreign policy attitudes and perceptions of the articulate sections of the population. Most significant have been the various opposition movements - all outlawed - which expressed opinions on foreign policy different from those held by the ruling elites. The progressive parties such as the FFS of Ait Ahmed, the PPS of Boudiaf and the MDNR of Mahsas have been critical of Algeria's economic co-operation with the USA and of her involvement in the Western Saharan conflict. However, being sympathetic to the Moroccan cause they lost substantial credibility, in addition to their limited political impact in Algeria. The pro-Soviet "socialist avant-garde party" was tolerated when it gave 'positive' support to the Boumedienne regime and seemed to have made his views known to the President through a certain number of sympathisers of this party within segments of the state technocracy, mainly. However, with the death of Benyahia presumed close to this party and with the rise of the moderates under the impulse of Chadli and Taleb-Ibrahimi as well as the greater drive of the FLN in the home polity in recent years, the weight of the PAGS has considerably diminished. And many of its militants and sympathisers have been removed from the state's bureaucratic apparatuses and responsibilities within the mass organizations, especially the student unions.
The fundamentalist movements are naturally believed to appeal for a greater drive toward Arabism and Islamism. But while the "jihad islami" of Sheikh Mountadhiri seem to have contacts with pro-Iranian shi‘it forces in the Middle East, the "Muslim Brethren" (FM) led by Mustapha Bouali would favour more contacts with Arab conservative circles. On its part the "Movemenr pour la démocratie en Algérie" headed by Ben Bella appears more tolerant than the other two organizations, but it is believed to have substantial support from some Arab countries, Libya in particular. Among its main objection to the orientation of the Algerian foreign policy has been the opposition to Algeria's support for the Saharawi cause calling instead for a solution of the Saharan conflict in a Maghrebi context but that would favour the Moroccan stand.¹

Besides these underground parties and movements, segments of the private bourgeoisie have expressed their views on some important foreign policy issues. Centred around figures of the old political guard such as Farhat Abbas and Ben Khedda, this non-partisan opposition advocated mainly economic liberalisation and a Maghrebi unity founded on a united parliament functioning on terms close to Western political liberalism.²

Finally, the "mouvement culturel berbère" which gathers support mainly from youth in Kabylia and Berber speaking circles of the Algerian worker community in France, has been critical of the 'cultural oppression' exercised by the regime and called for cultural pluralism and less Arabism. Undoubtedly, it is difficult to see the response of the ruling elites to these diverse challenges with regard to the formulation and conduct of foreign policy. To assume that the political moderation and

¹See interview of Ben Bella to the review edited by the MDN, Al Baad il, December 1985.
the strengthening of relations with conservative countries as carried out by the Foreign Minister Taleb Ibrahimi aimed simply at calming down pressures from the fundamentalists, may be oversimplifying the manifestations of social and economic unrest and of the battles between political factions, in recent years.

More than the party and the national assembly, public opinion in Algeria is too disarticulated, too weak politically to make a substantial impact on the foreign decision making process. This process has not been made through clearly defined institutional, bureaucratic and party channels, but tightly held at the top. Indeed, the foreign policy community in Algeria had been centred around the President and restricted to a relatively small circle of groups representing different interests, essentially within the military establishment as a political institution and the state-technocracy as the engineer of socio-economic change.
CHAPTER THREE: THE ASSERTION OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY VIS-A-VIS FRANCE

For the Algerian nationalists, the attainment of political independence did not constitute an end to their struggle of asserting the existence of their people as both a nation and a state.

Estranged in their own country during the colonial times by being denied their own identity and deprived of their sovereignty, they came to believe that the recovery of political independence could provide them with the necessary basis not only to feel their nationhood but also consolidate it vis-a-vis other nation-state units, particularly vis-a-vis France. With the latter, the conflict has been continuous not only in the efforts to wipe out the economic aspects of colonial legacy and dependence but also at achieving a cultural decolonization of Algeria mentality so as to create a new Algerian man from which cultural alienation, inhibitions of the 'indigenat spirit' will be definitely exorcised. Decolonization in terms of economic independence and affirmation of Algerian identity has been regarded as vital for the survival of the post-colonial state and for its access to the community of sovereign nations. But in practice the process proved long and hard.

Until the late 1960s, Algeria in the absence of effective economic capabilities was forced to accommodate to the special relationship with her former metropole which was imposed upon her by the colonial dialectics and peculiar circumstances of the transfer of power. But since 1971, Algeria was able to break these special relations by reducing her economic dependence on France and asserting her political independence and distinct identity. However, lingering aspects of the colonial
legacy have neither permitted a total rupture nor a normal state-to-state relationship, as highlighted by the ups and downs that came to mark Algeria's links with France since then.

A. THE RESTRICTIVE CONTENT OF THE TRANSFER OF POWER

1. The Evian agreements: the preservation of French interests in Algeria

Having been itself a long process of intricate events and tragedies, the Algerian war ended in a complex political context that bred harsh implications for both sides. While General De Gaulle was pushing forward his policy for the birth of an 'independent Algeria but closely linked to France', the FLN leadership was divided over the precise content of this independence. The signature by the GPRA of the Evian agreements on March 19, 1962, codifying the transfer of power and the framework for economic cooperation between France and Algeria was not approved by some FLN members, although it was endorsed by the National Council of the Revolution (CNRA) at its Tripoli meeting in February 1962.

The referendum for independence submitted to the Algerian people put forward a unique question: "voulez-vous que l'Algérie devienne un état indépendant, coopère avec la France dans les conditions définies par la déclaration du 19 Mars 1962?" Thus, the Algerian voters had little choice with regard to the solution worked out by the French government and the GPRA at Evian. The approval for independence (by 99.72 per cent) inevitably included the acceptance of a close cooperation with France, and if certain radical leaders of the FLN did not accept the content of this cooperation, they could hardly reject the referendum's formula of the independence of Algeria.
The Evian agreements granted Algeria a formal liberty in the choice of her domestic policies, in practice however, they substantially restrained the adoption of radical measures which the wartime FLN had endorsed in its various political declarations, particularly the 1956 Summam platform and the 1962 Tripoli charter.

The new state's sovereignty appeared limited by three sets of provisions outlined in these agreements: the presence of the French residents, the maintaining of French military bases in Algeria, and the continuation of France's monopoly over the latter's energy resources.

The status of the French citizens: the agreements asserted their rights to share in equality the protection and privileges granted to all Algerians over a transitory period of three years at the end of which they could opt for the Algerian citizenship or retain their French nationality. Meanwhile, they were promised protection for their properties (as no dispossesion could be taken without fair compensation), permitted to circulate freely between the two countries and transfer assets to France with no restriction. Their religious beliefs were to be respected and so were to be their political rights and access to jobs in Algeria without discrimination.

Through these agreements, the French government aimed at establishing a secular state within a multiconfessional society in Algeria while at the same time granting a privileged status to the European minority and submitting the domestic legal authority of this new Algerian state to international jurisdiction in case of expropriation of French interests in Algeria.
The constitution of a privileged minority formed by remaining French citizens was foreseen by the authors of the Tripoli programme, and many FLN leaders regarded their presence as a constraint against the implementation of socialism and social justice in independent Algeria. The submission to international jurisdiction in case of expropriation was also felt as a serious infringement Algeria's hard-won sovereignty.

The maintaining of military bases: the Evian agreements allowed the French a period of twelve months to reduce their armed forces to 80,000, and a further twenty-four months to repatriate the rest. Moreover, the agreements granted the former metropole, the lease of a naval base situated at Marsa Al Kebir near Oran for fifteen years as well as the lease of other military installations for unspecified period. This included military bases at Reggane, In Ekker, Colomb-Bechar, Hammam-guir; airports at In Amguel, Bone (Annaba), Boufarik and Bousfer and radar installations at Reghaia, and Bou zizi. For a country that won its independence through a seven year long bloody war, these military clauses limited further its national sovereignty.

The control of energy resources: on the economic level, the agreements ensured the maintainance of French interests in Algeria in accordance with France's global economic strategy as aimed through the implementation of the Constantine plan, a five year economic and social development programme for Algeria promulgated by De Gaulle in 1959, in an attempt to shape the course of the Algerian war. Beyond political considerations, the objective was to create in Algeria an industrial infrastructure that would complement France's own industries in the context of restructuring its national economy. Light industries were to be encouraged to absorb the abundant work forces, develop small-scale craft industries and
increase domestic consumption. In addition, agrarian production was to be increased to meet the needs of France and other members of the EEC and export-oriented heavy industries to be set up through the realisation of huge projects such as a plant refinery at Algiers and a metallurgical complex at Annaba. The plan did not aim at the real economic development of new Algeria, but at developing through the systematic exploitation of cheap labour certain products whose final procession would be achieved in the former metropole.¹ It inevitably had a distorting impact on Algeria's economic patterns by conditioning the orientation of her economic development even a few years after the political independence of the country and by neglecting the necessity of reforming the agrarian sector. This plan constituted mainly a means for the French industrialists to achieve capital accumulation through the exploitation of hydrocarbons, a sector that became increasingly important in the French economic strategy after 1956.

Undoubtedly, the preservation of French oil interests in Algeria had been the most crucial element in the economic association set out by the Evian agreements guaranteeing the continuation for a six year period of the privileges French oil companies had enjoyed prior to Algerian independence in the form of large concessions and preferential treatment for new exploration. Under the terms of these agreements, the French state-owned oil companies Elf-Erap and the CFP were holding the predominant French interests in exploration, production and marketing of oil in Algeria and accounting for ninety per cent of the latter's production, while the new Algerian state was offered only a small share in the Arzew gas refinery (Camel) and 40.5 per cent of shares in the SN

Relph Company which controlled 50 per cent of the oilfields of Hassi-Messaoud, Algeria's most important oil reserves. Moreover, non-French oil companies were prevented from obtaining concessions from the new Algerian state except on the basis of association with French companies. But the most severe restriction imposed on the Algerian state was the interdiction to nationalize French oil assets without French consent. This measure and the deprivation of the right to take over land owned by French residents, thus preventing the implementation of an agrarian revolution whose principle was set out by the FLN Tripoli charter, were regarded by the Algerians as a serious infringement of their right of control over their country's natural resources, a matter that later on became the most important issue of contention between the two sides.

Last but not least, the Evian agreements tied the economic development of Algeria to France's financial assistance. Although the French government neither restricted Algeria's right to obtain loans or bilateral assistance from other countries nor restrained her plans of investments, it nevertheless succeeded through the form of aid allocated in directing investments to sectors where French interests were predominant. By integrating Algeria into the French monetary zone, Paris virtually limited the new state's control over its financial transactions and monetary operations, as it could not, for instance, proceed to the devaluation of its currency unilaterally or control the financial transactions of the French companies working in Algeria. Under the terms of the Evian agreements, these companies enjoyed free trade, free transfer of capital and non-discriminatory fiscal taxation.
As a result, independent Algeria's budget, the financing of the country's economic projects and its balance of payments depended largely on French financial inducements.

2. A necessary accommodation - to privileged relations

In its infant stage, the Algerian state burdened with many loads, most of which it inherited from the past colonial period, could hardly afford to emulate the Guinean example of rupture with France and resist De Gaulle's offer of cooperation and privileged relations. The accommodation to his designs was justified by the Algerian leaders as necessary but temporary given the lack of power capabilities for which they made French colonialism chiefly responsible. Thus, they merely regarded French aid as a moral obligation to help them extirpate the burden of underdevelopment inherited from the ancien regime. On November 20, 1962, shortly after the independence, Ben Bella made an urgent call for foreign assistance, especially from France, to tackle the country's economic problems. Soon afterwards, the foreign minister Khemisti and later BoumaZA, the minister of economy, led delegations to Paris to obtain more financial aid and in July 1965, Algeria signed an important economic convention with France known as the oil agreement through which the French agreed to participate in her development, while retaining substantial advantages, mainly in the energy sector. Both Ben Bella and Boumedienne in the early years of his office adopted a quite moderate attitude towards French interests in Algeria. Apart from the seizure of the vacant properties left by the former French residents in

1Khemisti did not get the 1.5 billion Francs of aid he requested, but obtained from Paris, assurance that French aid for the year 1963 will be equivalent to the amount envisaged in the Constantine plan, i.e. 1 billion of French Francs. (Annee politique, 1962 p.32).
Algeria, Ben Bella's achievements in taking over French interests were limited to obtaining shares in some French companies working in Algeria. And until the nationalization of French oil assets in February 1971 marking the end of the privileged relations between Algiers and Paris, the measures taken against French interests such as the banking and insurance network in 1965 and the mining industry in May 1966, were not sufficient to shake France's economic grip on Algeria. In addition, the two Algerian leaders were circumspect in criticizing Gaullist foreign policy despite their customary diatribe against all manifestations of Western imperialism. They, for instance, remained silent on the existence of French nuclear experiments in the Algerian desert confines and on French military supplies to the Algerian army, while denouncing the installations of foreign bases in many third world countries.

It was only after popular protest and discontent about the explosion of a French bomb at the In Ikker testing ground on March 18, 1963 that Ben Bella engaged in negotiations with the French government to speed up the withdrawal from Algeria of the 100,000 French troops except those stationed at Mers el Kebir and in the Sahara, earlier than scheduled. Since then, no nuclear testing occurred in Algeria thus alleviating a heavy burden on Algeria's efforts to express a non-aligned foreign policy.

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1 For instance, increasing shares of the state in SN Repal from 40.5 to 56 per cent and taking 20 per cent in the Algiers refinery, 40 in Caral Renault, 30 in the Sabab-Berliet and 25 per cent in the 'Union industrielle Africaine'.

2 Ben Bella also refrained from criticizing De Gaulle's initiative of sending in February 1964 paratroopers to Gabon to help reinstate Leon M'Ba who had been toppled from power by a military junta.

3 See Ottaway, D and M: Algeria: the politics of a socialist revolution, p.147 footnote 7.
To conceal the country’s economic dependence on France, the Algerian leaders emphasized the reciprocity of interests in their cooperation with the latter and the independent line they pursued on the foreign level. Signing the 1965 oil agreement, Bouteflika presented it as a great achievement between the two sides as it introduced "an original conception of relations between Algeria and France on the basis of equality and reciprocity of interests and respect of each other's sovereignty, thus breaking away from the neo-colonial spirit of the Evian agreements".  

The meeting between Ben Bella and De Gaulle in March 1964 - although unofficial and brief - attested the particular character of the Algerian-French relationship. The success of these talks concerning economic issues and accelerated timetable of the withdrawal of some of the French troops from Algeria was helpful to the image of France and Algeria in the third world. This apparent Algerian-French understanding was spurred by De Gaulle's desire to make Algeria the keystone of his relations with the third world and as a means to reinforce his country's position in the East-West struggles. The statement made before the French Assembly by Jean De Broglie the secretary of state for Algerian affairs highlights this Gaullist conception of forging from the French-Algerian relations a new leadership role for France in the third world, so as to re-establish French influence in the international fora. "Algeria - he declared - has taken the lead in the assembly of poor nations pitted against the rich nations...Certainly while maintaining its cooperation with Algeria, France defends certain interests and strives to counterbalance the tendency of this country to slide toward Communism.

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But Algeria is also, and above all, the narrow door through which we penetrate the third world. A quarrel between France and a North-African state is only bilateral. A falling out with Algeria would jeopardise France's efforts throughout the third world...It is Algeria that opened up for us the road to the Middle East and whose support is useful to us in Latin-America."

The French president's non-interference in Algeria's domestic affairs, his willingness to deal with this country no matter what political regime she chose were apparently not questioned by the Algerian leaders. There is little doubt that De Gaulle did not give or express support to the Kabyle rebellion in 1963, and the expulsion of the dissident Khider, a former Secretary-General of the FLN from France in November 1964 was a further evidence of French neutrality vis-a-vis Algerian internal affairs. Receiving the new Algerian Ambassador to Paris Reda Malek, shortly after the coup against Ben Bella, the French president assured him of "French Republic's greatest sympathy for the Algerian Republic."  

The Algerians seemed, however, convinced that the maintaining of this positive attitude towards their preferences had been possible mainly because of De Gaulle's own will. The opposition of the French Senate and other political parties and groupings to his initiatives concerning French-Algerian cooperation confirmed their beliefs that many segments of the French 'classe politique' especially those linked with the ex-Pieds Noirs lobby bore anti-Algerian feelings. Given these apprehensions, the Algerians felt it necessary to assert their political and economic

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independence with regard to their former metropole. Thus they set out a long-term strategy aimed at gradually taking over French economic interests in Algeria, particularly after De Gaulle’s departure in 1969.

B. THE PRACTICE OF ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY-DOMINANCE RELATIONSHIP

1. Wine and emigration: the lingering aspects of colonial legacy

In their bargaining with the French, the Algerians felt the burden of some aspects of the colonial legacy on their choices and policies. Emigration and wine constituted among the most painful examples of this heritage on the material level while French cultural presence in Algeria had a sometimes traumatic and frustrating effect on the minds of many Algerians. These sequels reflected the typical dichotomy that existed in the colonial - post-colonial continuum. They were brought by the French settlers, contributed to their wealth, to the metropole's economic expansion, its cultural ‘rayonnement’ and were responsible for many of Algeria's socio-economic ills and problems.

a) The wine issue

In the Algerian analysis, wine constituted a crop alien to the Algerian population as wine consumption was contrary to Muslim precepts.1 On independence, a large portion of the country's best land about 350,000 hectares was covered with vineyards, constituting the main source of export earnings. From being the symbol of colonial settlement, wine became the bread and butter of the Algerian economy, while at the same time conjuring up memories of past domination. And it was in their

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1Algeria's memorandum on raw materials, p.21.
economic bargaining with the French government that the Algerian leaders felt the pain of this aspect of colonial legacy, as they realized they had inherited a poisoned gift.

From September 1962 to July 1963, France bought 11 million hectolitres of Algerian wine and in an agreement signed on January 18, 1964, it agreed to buy large quantities over a five year period but with an annual decrease of half a million hectolitres in order to reduce imports from the 1962 level of 15 million hectolitres to 7 in 1968, the year the contract was to end. But the deal was soon undermined with French annual imports falling below the ratios fixed, dropping for instance from 8.1 million hectolitres in 1966 to 3.1 the next year. In early 1967, Paris decided to cut off imports of Algerian wine as a result of its farmers' pressures; and although it was agreed in October 1969 to buy 5 million hectolitres, because that year vintage in France was particularly bad, it unilaterally cancelled further imports of Algerian wine a year later. The effect on Algeria was that the second most important source of foreign currency was cut off, as wine was worth FF 485 million in 1966.

The closure of access to French markets for the Algerian wine forced the Algerian government to undertake a gradual uprooting of vineyards, which proved costly for the country's economy because it affected the incomes of thousands of people working in the wine industry and the land which, exhausted as it was, had to lie fallow for many years before it could be cultivated again. The substitution of vine by other crops has not yet been fully completed as it proved extremely difficult to extirpate viticulture in Algeria without provoking substantial problems for the country's economic structure and balance. Uprooting had touched
about 220,000 hectares of vineyards, representing about 30 per cent of the total vineyard surface.\(^1\) As the substitution of vine by other crops proved hypothetical because of geological, climatic and technical reasons, viticulture could not but be pursued despite a drop in profits resulting from a decline in exports, and although a large portion of the grape harvest had been transformed into juice and dried raisins, earnings remained slim because these two items were not widely consumed in Algeria. Against this background, the government resisted repeated pressures from the fundamentalist segments to stop completely the sale of alcohol in Algeria which is a lucrative business despite the relatively small number of its consumers.

In this intricate context, the Algerians claimed they had made painful sacrifices to diminish dependence on wine exports by drastically reducing production from 15 million hectolitres in 1962 to a mere 2,838,000 in 1980 to match the fall in exports to France from 14,4 million hectolitres to 2,266,000 respectively. The closure of the French market for the Algerian wine resulted in a huge financial loss for the Algerian economy because it proved difficult to find new buyers to compensate for France's defection. The Soviet Union bought 5 million hectolitres in 1967, but for half the price France paid; West Germany yielded to Italian pressure and ceased to import Algerian wine. Ivory Coast has been only a small consumer.

As it appeared, the wine issue illustrated the dependency-dominance situation, Algeria had been facing since her independence. This reliance on France was in fact twofold: when France continued importing Algerian wine, this implied a dependence on French markets, whereas when

\(^{1}\) El-Moudjahid, January 20, 1985.
France ceased buying this wine, Algeria experienced serious financial problems. In both cases, the wine involved substantial costs for Algeria in the sense that the maintenance of the wine industry did not bring sizeable profits over the years because of the ageing of the working force and of the vineyards, the lack of expertise and the rapid decline in French imports of wine from Algeria. One policy to remedy the closure of French markets had been the substitution of vine by other crops but so far the alternatives as experienced proved too costly and sometimes ineffective.

b) Emigration

In the official discourse, emigration like wine has been regarded as a direct consequence of French colonialism and to some extent detrimental to Algerian sovereignty and national pride. The presence of a huge number of emigrants in France, it was claimed, did not result from the economic policy Algeria had embarked upon since the independence but from the economic backwardness of the country's community for which French colonialism was chiefly responsible. The drain of Algerian workers to France since the beginning of the twentieth century had been conceived as a consequence of France's need of manpower for economic reconstruction, especially in the aftermath of the two world wars. From about 4,000 in 1912, the number of Algerian workers in France rose to 100,000 in 1948 and in the early 1960s, it reached 425,000 people contributing to the "efforts of France's economic redeployment". The flux of Algerian migrants since independence increased the number of Algerians living in France to 870,000 making them the largest group of the foreign community in the mid-1970s.
Emigration certainly constituted a double-edged issue for Algeria, while it helped her to overcome partially unemployment and gain benefits from remittance of her migrants, it increased her dependence on the French labour market and eventually proved a constraint on her economic bargaining power with her partner, as Algerian emigrants tended to become the easy scapegoats when relations between the two countries deteriorated. In this sense, emigration remains Algeria's safety valve, but also her Achille's heel.

On independence, severe unemployment and urgent need of capital led to a continuing reliance on the export of the labour force surplus. Migrants' transfers made up as much as 80 per cent of total incomes in many villages of the Kabylia and Aures regions and constituted a huge source of foreign earnings for the Algerian state, amounting to $200 million a year in the 1960s.

To preserve emigration as a safety valve, the Ben Bella government established in 1962 the 'office national Algérien de main-d'oeuvre' (ONAMO), to monitor the channeling of migrants to France. There was thus, a clear desire to make emigration, an "essential element of the cooperation with France" as stated in the declaration of Boumaza, the minister of labour.¹

In an agreement negotiated in 1964 between the new minister of labour Nekkache and French authorities, contingents of Algerian workers were fixed at 12,000 a year, far below Algeria's expectations of 50,000.² In December 1965, Paris pressed for the restriction of the number of Algerian workers permitted to enter France, in retaliation for Algeria's

²This target was agreed upon at the FLN's Seminar on Emigration, (Secrétariat exécutif, Algiers, August 1966).
demands for better economic agreements. A joint committee on this issue was set up, and after difficult negotiations, Algiers finally conceded by accepting an annual quota of 35,000 to be allowed to work in France. The Algerians regarded this measure as a clear evidence of the discriminatory attitude of the French authorities toward the Algerian labour force and a further demonstration of French blackmail, arguing that the French fifth development plan envisaged the creation of jobs for 160,000 new immigrants. The free circulation of people between the two countries and the privileged status of the Algerian immigration in France as contained in the provision of the Evian agreements virtually ended when the French government decided in 1968 to grant visas for Algerian immigrants, valid for 10 years for those who had entered France before January 1, 1966 and five years for others. The 1971 nationalization of French oil interest in Algeria further complicated the issue of emigration as after a meeting of the joint committee in Paris on December 13-23 that year, the French obtained the compression of the Algerian worker contingents to 25,000 annually over the next two years. Visibly disappointed, the Algerians embarked upon lengthy negotiations with the French in an attempt to reverse this decision, but in vain, despite efforts made by Bouteflika on his official visit to Paris on June 3, 1973. To counter French inflexibility, Boumedienne announced the suspension of Algerian emigration to France on August 9. At first glance this decision appeared bold and quite hazardous, but it reflected more than anything else his pride and arrogance and desire to assert Algeria's sovereignty. The Algerian president did not seem unaware of

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1Proces-verbal signed between R. Haddad, Director, French affairs department and Gilbert de Chambrun, Director, administrative and consular affairs at the Quai d'Orsay.
2Politique pétrolière, (4), p.32.
the consequences of his decision when he stated that: "everything is negotiable except the dignity of Algerians", but what seemed more important in his eyes was to stress the determination of the Algerian government not to give in to French pressures whatever the costs. The increase of Algeria's economic capabilities boosted by the rise in oil revenues, facilitated this position in the conception of a continuing struggle against French neo-colonialism and the affirmation of the independence of the Algerian state. Furthermore, Boumedienne's decision was bound to increase the legitimacy of the leadership, the credibility of the state and to enhance the image of Algeria in the non-aligned fora.

Despite the decision of the Algerian government to stop emigration, the number of Algerians living in France steadily increased to more than 900,000 in 1983 as a result of clandestine emigration which proved difficult to control for both sides. The high unemployment rate resulting from an economic policy based on highly capital-intensive industries eventually impelled the Algerian authorities to request Paris to resume the emigration process.\(^1\) The failure of the economy to generate employment and absorb massive repatriation forced the Algerians to adopt a flexible attitude with regard to illegal emigration. The abolition of the exit visa for Algerian tourists under Chadli government in 1979, probably intended as a measure to respect civil liberties, provided many youngsters with a good opportunity to remain in France at the end of their three month stay allowed by the French administration. By 1980, as many as 120,000 Algerians were believed to have used this procedure.

\(^1\)This request was presumably made by Bouteflika when he was received by President Pompidou in Paris in January 1974.
Although repatriation of emigrants has been a constant slogan in the declaration of Algerian officials and the themes of many conferences organized by the FLN, little has been done to proceed to their integration into the Algerian economy.\(^1\) Only 14,000 out of 60,000 Algerian skilled workers, the Algerian authorities announced in March 1975, had been reinserted over a period of three years.\(^2\) And although some measures had been taken since 1977, such as duty free importation on a number of items or access to housing through saving accounts in hard currency, a relatively modest number of Algerian migrants returned home. And so far, the Algerian state, burdened by a booming demography, rising unemployment and housing shortages, has been unable to provide structures for a large-scale repatriation.

Conversely, economic recession and domestic pressures led the French government to envisage forcing gradual departure of Algerian immigrants and Stoleru, the state secretary for immigration was despatched to Algiers in October 1978 for negotiations, as the visas delivered to Algerian migrants in December 1968 were about to expire. Algeria's request to extend these visas for another 10 year period was rejected by the French government which in December proposed instead an extension of one year. At the end of 1979, the French foreign minister J-F Poncet, made a trip to Algiers to obtain a quota of 100,000 departures a year. The Chadli government firmly rejected these demands, stressing the

\(^1\) The National Council on emigration issued recommendations on reinsertion in 1969 and 1972, while a seminar on emigration took place in Summer 1973 and meetings organized by the labour ministry in 1973, all suggested repatriation (see Amicale des Algériens en Europe: Nouvelles perspectives pour l'émigration Algérienne, Eighth General Assembly of Cadres, Nancy 12-13 February, 1977).

principle of the free will of the Algerian migrants to return home; but under pressure, it agreed to a ratio of 30,000 departures annually. In return, they obtained a one year extension for the visas that expired between January 1 and September 1980. However, the improvement of Algerian-French relations in the late 1970s resulted in a global agreement signed in Paris in September 1980 between the Algerian foreign minister Benyahia, and Poncet, which apparently pleased the Algerians. Not only did they obtain the extension of the visas for Algerian emigres, but also the suppression of the departure quotas. Under the terms of this agreement, Paris agreed to renew the visas of 400,000 Algerian workers settled in France before July 1, 1962 for a 10 year period according to the 1968 accord on emigration, while the visas of roughly 270,000 others which expired between October 1, 1980 and October 31, 1983 were to be extended for three years and three months. The French also agreed to facilitate the reintegration of some Algerian immigrants into the Algerian economy through financial inducements and technical training. In opting for an intermediate and provisional solution, Giscard's government attempted to use the renewal of these visas as leverage on Algiers in the perspective of future negotiations concerning gas imports and the release from Algeria of the assets belonging to French enterprises and industrialists.

Although the 1981 change of government in France improved the relations between Algiers and Paris in general, emigration still constituted an issue of contention between them. Indeed, despite the Mitterrand government's decision to regularize the situation of hundreds of thousands of Algerian squatters who had entered France before January 1981 and its favourable attitude to the Algerian immigrant community,
suspicion and tension mounted between Algiers and Paris, following the announcement in Summer 1982 by the French to impose entrance visas on Algerian tourists (as well as on Moroccans and Tunisians). Many Algerians were victims of racial discrimination by French customs officers, and as many as 16,000 were refused entry without reason and in a sometimes humiliating fashion. For the Algerians, this decision to impose visas was not taken to fight terrorism, as the French claimed, but resulted from "a psychosis created by the French authorities which stemmed from economic recession and high unemployment in France." Despite strong reservations, the Algerian authorities agreed to work together with the French customs to regulate visits by Algerians to France in order to curb illegal immigration.

Their good will was a response to assurances by the French premier Mauroy that no measure against Algerian immigrants would be taken without consulting the Algerian government. Since then, a pause on the emigration issue was observed by Paris, which seems to have pleased the Algerians.

Being used as a commodity, the Algerian emigrants have also been the scapegoats, when relations between the two countries deteriorated. They constituted an easy target for racist violence in France, when a crusade against Algeria and her immigrants was carried out by the French right.

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1 For this favourable attitude see the interview of Autin, the French Secretary of State for the migrants in Afrique-Asie, December 7, 1981 pp.25-27.
3 Two officials from the French Foreign Ministry and home office met in Algiers on December 22 with Khédîrî, the head of the Algerian police security.
4 In his reply to the speech given by Mitterand during his visit to Paris in November 1983, Chadli paid a warm tribute to French policy toward the Algerian migrants. For speech see La semaine de l'émigration, November 17, 1983 and El-Moudjahid, November 11, 1983.
wing press and ex-Pied-Noir organizations on the aftermath of the Algerian-French conflict over the oil issue in the early 1970s. Algerians were stereotyped as inferior, uncivilized and responsible for many of France's ills, but the diatribe was more virulent. For instance, le Meridional, a newspaper edited in Southern France wrote: "we have had enough of Algerian thieves, Algerian thugs, Algerian broggarts, Algerian trouble-makers, Algerian syphilistics, Algerian rapists, Algerian pimps, Algerian lunatics, Algerian killers."\(^1\)

Racism was accompanied by the assassination of several Algerian workers in France and these killings have continued although at a sporadic and slower rate than during the two years following the 1971 oil nationalization.

Although emigration served as a safety valve for Algerian labour problems, relations between the Algerian authorities and Algerian migrants in France were strained as a result of the complex role of Banker this community was supposed to play. The Algerian state's attempts in Summer 1982 to extract more foreign revenues from the latter as a result of diminished remittances due to the existence of a flourishing black market, were met by the Algerian emigres with reticence, anger and discontent.\(^2\) Opponents of the Chadli regime took the opportunity to rally dissident emigres, and in Summer 1983, violence broke out between the militants of the official 'Amicale des Algériens en Europe' and members of the opposition at a meeting held in Lyons and

\(^1\) Quoted in M. Bennoune: The Maghribi workers in France (in Race and Class, (17) 1975 pp.41-56) pp.54-5.

\(^2\) In addition to Algerian citizens, 150 Frenchmen belonging to Renault company and working in Algeria stood trial in Algiers in June 1980, being accused of illicit currency dealings and 8 French technicians have been imprisoned since the end of 1979 on similar charges (Le Monde, June 14, 1980).
attended by Ben Bella who publicly expressed his hostility to the Algerian regime. Renewed contacts between officials from the Algerian government and the Algerian 'Amicale' helped ease the tension within the Algerian community in France. But whatever the efforts of the Algerian government, the Algerian emigrant circles in France will remain a source of trouble because of the precarious living conditions of many of its working members and because of their peculiar status in the host country.

Algerian problems with regard to the emigration issue have been seriously aggravated by the case of the Harkis, and children born in France of Algerian parents. The Harkis are Algerian Moslems who fought aside the French during the Algerian war and on the eve of independence, about 200,000 were believed to have fled their fatherland in fear of reprisals and have since been living in Southern France in poor conditions. The Algerian authorities refuse them entry to Algeria except on a case-case basis, invoking the difficulty of guaranteeing their security as these Harkis may face acts of revenge in their native city, village or tribe. However, it seems that the real reason was not mere rancour but the fact that these Harkis collaborated with the colonial enemy. These conceptions seemed present in the thought of President Chadli when, asked by a French journalist on the issue of the Harkis, declared "they had chosen their side. It was the verdict of history. Anyway, you, as a Frenchman, how would you regard those who collaborated with the (Nazi German) occupants?"

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1 In that summer, the visit to France of Khediri, the Head of the police forces was followed by that of Messadia, the 'responsible' for the Permanent Secretariat of the FLN's central committee.
2 Interview to Charles Saint-Prost of Paris-Match, quoted in Révolution Africaine, December 4-10, 1981.
The refusal to let the Harkis and their children enter Algeria had given rise to many protests from the Harkis organizations and their French sponsors in France. The most notable incident occurred in Summer 1975 when 4 Algerian workers were held hostages by Harkis at Saint Maurice L'Ardoise and an official of the Amicale kidnapped near Villeneuve-sur Lot by a group of Harkis in retaliation for the refusal of the Algerian authorities to let a French-born son of a Harki return to France after a short holiday in Algeria.\(^1\) The firmness of the Algerian government and the French jurisdiction had discouraged many of the shrewdest Harkis going back to their fatherland even for a short stay. However, it was only after a series of protests in France that the Algerians agreed to lift the ban on the entry of their children to Algeria.\(^2\)

More complex and more arduous to solve has been the problem of these children or others of Algerian parents born in France before January 1, 1963. They form what is commonly known as 'the second generation' of Algerian emigres in France and represent more a human dimension than a mere issue of contention between Algerian and French jurisdiction. They not only suffer from the ambiguity of their legal status, but also from their acculturation, being as they are, torn between their Algerian-Muslim inheritance and their French culture and citizenship. A young Algerian living in France emphasized this analogy as he stated: "My brother born in France after January 1, 1963 is French we are told; my

\(^1\) The child Borzani Kadaoui was finally released by the Algerian authorities on August 8.
\(^2\) Particularly by the 'Association of the Repatriated and spoliates Frenchmen of overseas' (Recours), as two of its leaders Jacques Roseau and Guy Forzy met with the Algerian Ambassador to Paris Mohamed Sahnoun on April 1980 (Le Figaro, April 1, 1980).
other brothers, my sisters and myself born in France before December 31, 1962 we are told: we are Algerians! How to understand and accept that in a same family some children are Algerians and others French? What is more striking is that all my brothers and I have been called up by the Algerian consulate to undertake our military service in Algeria."¹ A period of time as short as a few minutes seemed to be the crux of the problems as the children born in France from Algerian parents have been considered as French until their majority by the French legislation on the basis of their birthplace while the Algerian authorities regarded them as Algerians by virtue of their Algerian descent. More than 300,000 youngsters were born in France after this date and have been more or less victims of this intricate situation. The option for either nationality has, in many ways, proved hard and frustrating: to remain French citizens would not alleviate some discriminatory attitudes against them in France because of their complexion and patronymic names. An option for Algerian citizenship, on the other hand, meant a more or less early return to Algeria and their integration there was difficult because of their acculturation, as many had never been to Algeria and could hardly speak either Kabyle or Arabic.² Staying in France has not been easier either as 5,000 had been expelled from France in 1980 because of

¹Quoted in El-Moudjahid, November 29, 1981.
²The problem of language has been only partially solved by the efforts of the Algerian government to send teachers to France to help Algerian school attendants improve their Arabic. 374 teachers were believed to have contributed in these efforts and as many as 35,000 of these pupils and 20,000 other Algerians in France were assumed to have received a partial education in Arabic language. See: Aggoun, Y: enseignement de la langue Arabe en France: Préserver l'identité culturelle et préparer le retour (El-Moudjahid, December 17, 1984, p.13) and Abbab, A: enseignement de la langue Arabe en France: réponse à Al-Chaab (in La Semaine de l'émigration (122), 15 May 1985, pp.13-14.)
failing to find a job or having committed unlawful acts. However, most of the Algerian emigres of the second generation had to make this painful choice of opting for either nationality when they were called up for military service by the French authorities as well as the Algerians. Only in October 1983, was this problem solved when, during the visit of Pierre Mauroy to Algiers, it was decided that the military service done in either country will be recognized by the other.

Like wine, emigration had been a crucial aspect of Algeria's dependence on France but in contrast, it had been a continuous phenomenon, as Algeria still relies heavily on the French market for its labour surplus through the maintenance of a huge community of workers in France and through clandestine emigration which became important in the early 1980s and whatever the evolution of the Algerian-French relationship may be, emigration will remain as one of the bases of this entente and at the same time as one of the sources of disputes between the two countries.

2. French cooperation: a curious aid

The model of cooperation France established with Algeria soon came under heavy criticisms from the Algerian government with a stress on what her leaders regarded as French neo-colonial practice violating the spirit of a mutually beneficial economic cooperation, increasing rather Algeria's economic dependence on her former metropole. This dependence was ranging from financial and trade dependence to the lingering aspects

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1 A young Algerian protesting against these measures underwent a hunger strike in Lyons in April 1981, joined by two French clergymen.
2 Title from *la politique pétrolière*, (4), p.22.
of the colonial predicament characterized by wine and emigration issues.¹

As far as French public aid was concerned, the Algerians were disappointed at its reduction in volume from one year to another falling from FF 667 million in 1965 to 400 in 1970. Since 1971, Algeria obtained credits only from French private organisms and banks and many of these loans had to be reimbursed in short term and at a high interest rates.

Another example of malpractice put forward was that out of DA 4,8 billion of aid France committed to pay Algeria over 3 years as part of reparation for the war damages, the Algerian treasury received only 0,4 billion Algerian Dinars.²

In addition to this slump in financial aid French cultural and technical cooperation was declining. In contrast to the Evian agreements and the 1966 convention, the number of French conscripts and their qualifications, it was argued, was far below the level expected. The relatively limited number of teachers and technical cadres provided by France proved to some extent detrimental to the Algerian educational programme as the country faced the gigantic task of reducing the percentage of illiteracy estimated at 90 per cent on independence. At that time, only 18,000 out of 50,000 French teachers remained in Algiers and after the 1966 agreement, Algeria received only 5,000 additional cadres most of which were teachers supplied in the frame of la coopération technique. This number was thought to be extremely minimal

¹As extensively underlined by the Algerian media and official documents published by the state oil company Sonatrach in July 1972: 'La politique pétrolière de l'Algerie' 4 volumes; the Memorandum on Petroleum, raw materials and Development, submitted by Algeria on the occasion of the special session of the United Nations General Assembly, April 1974 and the economic bulletin issued by the Algerian Ministry of Commerce N.34 1981.
²La politique pétrolière, (2), p.12.
since it represented only 10 per cent of the total Algerian teachers of French and insufficient with regard to the 1,835,000 school attendants receiving their teaching in French in Algeria in 1969. Since 1971, the French technical and cultural contribution has met only a third of Algerian needs in technical and cultural staff annually averaging 4,000 teachers at schools, universities and technical institutes. The reduction of the number of French teachers was due to France's substitution of the policy of simply filling up the teaching posts available at schools and institutes by la coopération de formation which aimed at helping Algeria to train her own educators, teachers and technicians. This procedure did not fully satisfy the Algerians on the basis that although this policy of formation would help them Algerianize the staff in the long term, the immediate problem was the great need of teachers in French. Until the present, the number of French teachers working in Algeria has fluctuated around the average of 3,500. For a country where French language - a vivid aspect of the colonial legacy - is still widely used despite the process of Arabization, French cultural assistance remained with regard to the criteria of both volume and quality far below Algeria's urgent needs. Yet again, France's geographical redeployment had been regarded as having negative effects on this particular aspect of the Algerian-French cooperation.

Besides the reduction of the number of French cooperants and conscripts, another complaint concerned French financial contribution in the Algerian cultural programme. This contribution was seen as extremely insignificant as it amounted to only 13 billion of old Francs, a sum believed to be derisory in comparison with the 250 billion the Algerian

1 La politique Pétrolière, (4) p.15 and p.43.
government allocated for education in 1970-1971 and to the fact that 40 per cent of this contribution was earmarked for covering 30 per cent of the salaries received by the French cooperants in Algeria, the rest being paid by the Algerian state. The burden on the latter appears quite heavy as these cooperants were allowed to transfer freely to France up to 70 per cent of their earnings.¹

Another aspect of disequilibrium in the relationship between the two countries had been Algeria's trade dependence on her former colony. In Algerian official economic analysis, this form of dependence could be seen on two levels: 1) the prominent place of France in Algeria's global foreign trade and 2) the deficit in Algeria's trade balance in her exchanges with her partner. Until 1968, France's share in Algerian foreign trade oscillated between 80 per cent and 60 per cent, although steadily declining from one year to another. Despite that it abruptly declined during the 1970-1971 oil crisis and reaching 17.4 per cent in 1979 as a result of the diversification of trade relations pursued by the two countries, France's position in Algerian foreign trade remained important both in volume and value. To shed light on this prominence, the Algerians stressed that the volume of exchanges between the two sides reached in 1963, 5713 millions of DA had not been surpassed only until 1974 when it amounted to DA 7917 millions.² See Tables II:1 and III:2

The dependence of the country's budget on wine and hydrocarbons export earnings constituted in the eyes of Algerians a sequel of the economic policy carried out by the French in Algeria during colonial times. If wine constituted her main export to France from 1962 to 1965, oil and gas made up 53.3 per cent of her total exports to France for the

¹ La politique pétrolière, (4), p.43.
² Bulletin économique, p.6.
period 1966-1971 and reaching an annual average of 92 per cent for the
decade 1974-1983. Another aspect of Algeria's trade dependence on
France had been her heavy reliance on French outlets and technology.
From 1962 to 1966, the French companies had been responsible for the
realization of half of all industrial projects undertaken in Algeria and
until the late 1970s they contributed in the implementation of a quarter
of the latter's total industrial ventures. Until 1975, France had been
Algeria's first industrial partner and it had been her first client until
1979. In 1977, Algeria represented 17 per cent of France's total
exchanges with the third world and accounted for the two thirds of the
contracts France realized in the whole Maghreb and in the period
1975-1977, Algeria was France's second most important client with 7,1 per
cent of total French foreign trade exchanges. In many industrial
sectors, Algeria ranked high in France's total exports buying for
instance 50 per cent of French mechanical products, 9.8 per cent of
steel-made goods and 14 per cent of chemical items. And for 1975-1977
period, she was France's second best client for industrial mechanical
exports with 7.1 per cent and her fifth in 1980 with 5.04.3

Since 1971, Algeria has experienced a grave deficit in her trade
with France. While her imports from the latter increased in volume, her
exports represented a relatively insignificant share in percentage in
France's total imports. In 1969 for instance, Algeria's exports to her
former metropole which constituted 54 per cent of her total exports,
represented not more than 3 per cent of France's total imports for the
same year. See Table III:3.

1 Bulletin économique, p.23.
2 Ibid.
3 Nouveau Journal, (Paris), September 26, 1981.
The Algerians contended that this disequilibrium—resulting from the deliberate reduction of imports from Algeria (decided by the French government in accordance with its diversification policy and geographical redeployment it launched in the late 1960s)—constituted a great prejudice against Algeria's trade balance. As a result France's imports from Algeria fell from DA 2918 million in 1963 to 991 in that crucial year of 1971 and although France's imports from Algeria steadily increased since 1971 to reach 4,810 million Dinars in 1979, this rise was due mainly to the increase of oil price. On the other hand, France's exports to the North-African country though gradually decreasing in value from 1963 (DA 2795 million) to 1973 (2844), followed an ascendency line since then, reaching 6015 in 1979. Algeria's trade deficit with her former metropole was estimated at DA 4,3 billion for the 1968-1979 period, representing from 1973 to 1979 72,2 per cent of the global deficit of Algeria's total foreign trade balance for the same period with maximum levels of 83 per cent in 1973 and 80 in 1977. For that year, it reached a record level in volume estimated at F 4,9 billion.1 Imbalance in trade between the two countries was well assessed by Yaker the Algerian ministry of commerce as he stressed that "from January to November 1975, Algerian imports from France rose to 7.4 billion Francs. The value of our exports in the other direction was 2.8 billion. So the deficit has risen to 4.6 billion. This is an unacceptable situation. Our deficit with France is exactly the equal to the total deficit in our commercial balance. By contrast, it adds up to more than 80 per cent of the total surplus registered by France in 1975."2

1Europe-outremer, August 1981, p.43.
Against this background, trade deficit became a serious issue of contention between the two countries, particularly in the mid-1970s, where their relations were heavily strained following France's attitude over the Western Sahara. Under repeated Algerian criticism, Ornano the French trade minister made a visit to Algiers on June 25, 1975 but no solution to Algeria's increasing trade deficit was formulated. As reprisals, Algeria held up negotiations with the French authorities over a $42 billion commercial deal and the exchange of 5,500 Renault trucks for 3,3 million barrels of Algerian oil.1 And in January 1977, President Boumedienne urged all the Algerian Ministries and companies to stop as far as they could ordering imports from France. Consequently, many contracts were suddenly frozen and inevitably imports from France fell from F 8,8 billion in 1977 to 6,9 the next year, representing a 21 per cent drop.2 However, since the bolstering of Algerian-French relations with the election of President Mitterrand in 1981, Algeria's trade balance with France rapidly improved and it was France which suffered a deficit that amounted to F 3,8 billion in the first half of 1982 because of the decline of its exports to Algeria and the rise in value of its imports from this country due to the high price Paris agreed to pay for the Algerian gas following the huge contract it signed with the Algerian oil company in 1982,3 as we shall see later.

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1Africa Report, July-August 1975.
3For figures see le Monde, September 5-6, 1982.
C. THE ROUTE TO ECONOMIC AUTONOMY

1. The nationalization of French residents' properties

When the French hostility fled Algeria, they left behind a substantial number of properties estimated at 200,000, ranging from farms and estates to small enterprises, factories, shops and flats. Declared biens vacants (vacant properties) and put under the protection of the Algerian state by a decree issued by the provisional executive on September 9, 1962, many of these properties were taken over by Algerian individuals. However, the Algerian state reserved for itself rights on the most important and valuable portion of these 'biens vacants'. Officially the take-over was justified by the failure of the colons to return to Algeria and resume their rights to ownership, but the real reason was that many of these properties were occupied by natives who considered their gain as a reward for their deprivation and fight against colonial rule. Thus many farms abandoned by the colons came under the control of former guerilla fighters and hunger-stricken landless peasants. In this popular euphoria, the Ben Bella government could not but endorse this take-over of French properties in an apparent attempt to rally popular support by deciding in March 1963 to institutionalize and give legal sanctions to the workers' self-management committees set up on the land deserted by the French settlers. In this process, about 1,200,000 hectares of land declared vacant were transferred to self-managed sector.

The Algerian state extended its control over French private capital, and by the late 1960s most of the French private companies operating in the non-oil sector had been nationalized, notably in the mining industry (May 1966) and the water works in early 1978. This take-over was not
accompanied by indemnification, and the Algerians justified this procedure by referring to the exclusive right of the state to nationalize and the repayment for the war damages. In many cases, assets belonging to French individuals or firms had been since then frozen in Algerian banks, and many of the French residents were not allowed to repatriate their earnings. Furthermore, a decree issued on July 13, 1964 required all foreigners when leaving Algeria to prove that they had honoured their tax-obligations.

On the basis of compensation for war damages, the Algerian authorities were adamant in their determination not to grant indemnification, and as early as December 1962, they opposed the meeting of an Algerian-French commission set up to discuss compensation for the first properties taken over shortly after the French settlers had fled the country, and later they resisted requests from Paris to indemnify the owners of the 5,000 farms taken over in October 1963. Under repeated pressure from the Pied-Noir Lobby in France, the French government finally demanded that Algiers respect the clauses of the Evian agreements which stipulated fair compensation for nationalized properties. It even threatened to reduce financial assistance if expropriation of French properties was not accompanied by indemnification, and as retaliation for Algeria's nationalization of 17 French companies in June 1968, it considerably reduced wine imports. The Pied-Noir lobby and groups nostalgic of French Algeria contributed to the deterioration of the relations between Paris and Algiers which occasionally occurred.

In spite of laws and promises to grant indemnities estimated at 50 billion Francs ($10 million) the French leaders, especially De Gaulle were quite reluctant to cede to Pied-Noir pressures because they wanted
to avoid a controversy with Algiers over the indemnification issue, in order not to jeopardise the privileged relations France had been enjoying with its former colony. As a result of the French government's inertia and Algeria's refusal to pay compensation, underground organizations formed by former OAS terrorists or others sympathetic to the Pied-Noir cause, carried out a number of violent actions against Algerian targets, especially in the aftermath of the 1971 Algerian-French conflict over oil. From August to September 1972, four Algerian immigrant workers were assassinated and twelve were wounded; in the following year, fifty others were believed to have been victims of these reprisals. Responsibility for bombings of the Algerian consulate in Marseilles was claimed by an organization called Charles Martell, and bombs were placed at the offices of El-Moudjahid in Algiers in January 1975 and the Algerian tourism bureau in Paris in February 1976. An underground armed group, les 'soldats de l'opposition Algérienne' claimed responsibility for these blasts. Algiers accused Colonel Foucault, a senior officer belonging to the French secret service SDCE of complicity with the bombers of the El-Moudjahid offices whom they duly arrested on January 3, 1976.

If the Algerians were firm in rejecting demands from Paris to grant indemnities for the nationalized French properties, they nonetheless showed their willingness to permit French residents in Algeria to transfer their assets to France, when the French government manifested its will to boost the French-Algerian relations. The decision taken in November 1974 to allow resident foreigners to repatriate their earnings reflected Algeria's positive response to the Pompidou government which despite the oil conflict in 1971 was determined to preserve good
relations between the two countries. But the process of repatriation was called off in retaliation for Giscard's hostility to the Algerian regime. The renewal of Algerian-French understanding after the election of President Mitterrand explained the decision of Algiers (inter-ministerial decision of October 26, 1983) to permit French enterprises and industrialists to transfer this money estimated at F 70 million from Algerian banks to French accounts. They were also allowed to sell out freely their properties, a matter which had been denied to them since 1962.¹ Four days after receiving Guy Frozier, the President of the Association of the former French residents in Algeria (Recours), the Algerian government gave assurances to the French Premier Mauroy when he visited Algiers in October 1983, that the ministry of finance would proceed with the transfer without delay.

2. The control over energy resources

The desire for a revision of the clauses of the Evian agreements that governed the exploitation of oil in Algeria was expressed by the Algerian leaders on many occasions, and if nationalization of French oil interests remained a long-term objective, active participation in the exploitation of their own resources was envisaged for the short-term objective. In her early post-independent stage, Algeria could not afford an aggressive policy leading to the eradication of French economic privileges in the country. The lack of economic capabilities and domestic problems that characterized Ben Bella's period not only prevented such a move but also aggravated Algeria's dependence on French financial aid, technology and markets. To ameliorate a detrimental

¹An inter-Ministerial decision 13-12 of 1982 had restricted French residents to sell their properties only to the Algerian state.
situation resulting from the predominant French interests in the oil sector throughout exploration, production and marketing, the Algerians made no secret of their attempt to increase the state's control over their oil resources. The short-term objective, however, was to transform the oil state company Sonatrach from a mere tax-collector into an active operator in the hydrocarbon sector in order to promote effectively national economic development.

The opportunity to implement these goals came in 1964, when the Algerian government's decision to participate in the construction of the country's third pipeline scheduled in the economic clauses of the Evian agreements was rejected by the French oil companies. The determination of these companies to build and operate this 500 mile gas-pipeline linking Haoud al Hamra to Arzew, on their own, ran counter to the Algerian government's demand of a 50 per cent share in its ownership. With the French refusal to offer more than 10, eventually 20 per cent, the Algerians decided unilaterally to build the pipeline without the participation of the French companies. With loans from British banks ($50.4 million) and the Kuwaiti development fund (19.6), the construction of the 22 million tonnes -annual capacity - conducted by a British company, the CJB group, was completed on March 19, 1966. The Algerian government gave its inauguration a historical dimension during an ostentatious ceremony which was attended by Boumedienne, a number of high officials from the government, the army and the party as well as representatives from friendly countries. In his speech, the Algerian President stressed the ability of the state to fulfil its duties in the framework of its sovereignty, declaring that: "practically inexistent in the process of petroleum industry yesterday, but present today and even
prominent, the state has regained the place it deserves and thanks to that, it can better than ever play the role it was assigned in the domain of transportation. Our conviction is that the state is better placed to organize this service...for the best interests of the national economy and the supreme interest of the nation."¹ For the Algerians, the control over the transportation of gas was a decisive step towards dominating oil and gas process, as it gave them authority in the sphere of transportation, a key sector in the processes of hydrocarbon industry, and increased their bargaining position vis-a-vis the French oil companies.

After harsh negotiations, they succeeded in obtaining an economic agreement regarded as favourable to the state's interests. Signed on July 21, 1965, this contract, known as the 'oil agreement' and valid for fifteen years, provided the Algerian state with a better fiscal arrangement, including an increase in the posted price of oil believed to be higher than the world market price; a greater control over oil exploitation; and more financial flows from French public sources to help implement the country's economic projects. The agreement set up a joint-Algerian-French company, Ascoop, in which Sonatrach and ERAP were to be equal partners in the exploration and the exploitation of oil and gas fields. The French companies committed themselves to pay for 80 per cent of these efforts, and Sonatrach obtained the right to share equal profits derived from new discoveries. The agreements obliged these companies to reinvest in Algeria half of their profits extracted from the exploitation of Algerian oil. Besides the oil deal, France agreed to buy 3,5 billion cubic metres of natural gas from Algeria. Also important

¹Speech at Haoud al Hamra in El-Moudjahid March 21, 1966.
was France’s commitment to help promote Algeria’s industrialization through an aid programme: FF 2 billion grant to be paid over 5 years, with half of this sum consisting of medium-term loans and the rest representing soft loans provided by the French treasury, four fifths of which were to be repaid over a twenty year period at an interest rate of 3 per cent.\(^1\) Moreover, Algeria received FF 200 million in donations, and in December 1966, she obtained the cancellation of her pre-independence debts that amounted to $1.2 billion. The Algerians were satisfied that the July set of agreements permitted them to gain a partial control over the petroleum industry and over oil revenues, although realizing that it neither put an end to French oil interests in their country nor did it eradicate their reliance on the oil concession system.\(^2\) Not only did Gaullist France secure its oil and gas supplies through the maintenance of oil concessions and a preferential posted price (paid in Francs and at advantageous freight costs), it also ensured its prominent position in the Algerian economy and the pursuit of an independent energy policy vis-a-vis other world powers.

Since the 1965 agreement, conflicts between Sonatrach and the French oil companies occurred on several occasions as in the process of extending control over the oil industry, the Algerian state resented what it regarded as neo-colonial behaviour and patronizing attitude practiced by these companies and which it could not bear without feeling its economic sovereignty being threatened. When Sonatrach decided to set up

\(^1\) *Bulletin économique*, p.20.

\(^2\) In a speech on the occasion of the signature of the oil agreement, Bouteflika pointed out that: "a genuine development policy cannot be possible as long as efforts remain limited to the exploration and extraction of the country’s resources in the sole perspective of exporting them in their raw state." In *politique pétrolière*, (1), p.11.
an ammonia and fertilizers plant, for instance, the French national office of industries and Azote (ONIA) and SN Repal proposed to build it, but on conditions which the Algerians considered unacceptable, particularly the engagement not to commission foreign companies for the construction of other fertilizer plants without the prior consent of the French authorities. Another restriction was that ONIA refused to build a plant with a production capacity exceeding 400 tonnes a day. For the Algerians, this restriction reflected the French determination to limit the production to Algeria's domestic needs in order to keep her out of a possible competition in the international market. To assert its sovereignty with regard to economic decisions, the Algerian state company issued a notice to tender in September 1965, and after long negotiations, the French technipensa was given the contract in July 1965 to build a fertilizer plant at Arzew with a capacity of 1,000 tonnes daily of liquid ammonia, on terms the Algerians regarded as advantageous, notably technical training for Algerian youngsters.

Despite its negative experience with ONIA, Sonatrach accepted in April 1966 an offer from the French state-owned company 'Petrole d'Acquitaine' (SNPA) to build at Arzew a gas refinery with a production capacity of 6 billion cubic metres a year, one ammonia plant (1 million tonnes a year) and polyethylene (15,000 tonnes annually). But after feasibility studies that were jointly conducted, SNPA unilaterally withdrew from the realisation of these projects because of the Algerians's intention to acquire the majority of shares in the capital of the joint company and in the marketing of the finished products.²

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Moreover, conflict arising from the determination of Sonatrach to extend its control over the petroleum industry on the one hand and the reluctance of the French oil companies to relinquish the advantages they had previously acquired on the other, became sharp within the Algerian-French company Ascoop set up following the July 1965 oil agreement. The major complaint the Algerians made concerned the relatively low amount of money the French partner invested in the oil prospection in Algeria, a practice they regarded as contrary to this agreement. From 1965 to 1968, they claimed, the French oil companies invested only 20 billions of old Francs, while collecting 380 billion in benefits from the exploitation of Algerian oil resources.\(^1\) According to Ghozali the director of Sonatrach, cooperation "does not consist only of maximising profits and reducing the amount of investment to the minimum required by the agreement. It must take into consideration the prior interest of the partner, that is, the rapid development of its oil domain."\(^2\) This reaction apparently came after efforts by the French government to reduce dependency on Algerian oil through diversification of its oil supplies and its investments to finance prospection programmes of French companies in other oil-rich countries such as Iraq and Libya.

Because of the reluctance of the French oil companies to expand the programmes of exploration to find more oil, the Algerians began to underline their demands for a higher posted price in order to fulfil their objectives of national development. They also argued that prospecting would increase oil production which would in turn enhance their foreign earnings. Therefore, they repeatedly called upon the

\(^1\)Politique pétrolière (I), p.20.
French to enter into negotiations on the basis of the article 12 of the 1965 oil agreement. Due to start on January 1, 1969, these negotiations were delayed until November because of France's domestic problems and the departure of De Gaulle. Throughout the lengthy negotiations, the Algerian delegation led by Belaid Abdeslam and then Bouteflika employed great skill and expertise, trying the make CFP and ERAP accept an increase in the posted price of oil from $2.08 to 2.65 a barrel and then to a level in line with Opec price of $2.85. The French promptly rejected these demands proposing rather an increase of 8 cents per barrel on condition that the Algerians accepted to freeze the posted price for a period of 5 years. Seemingly, the Algerians were not prepared to accept the French proposals, and because of the reluctance of CFP and ERAP to accept their demands, the French government called off these negotiations on June 3, 1970. In retaliation, Abdeslam announced obligation for the French companies to place 90 per cent of their investments profits in Algeria instead of 50 per cent previously and to pay $2.85 for a barrel.

As the rift between the two sides grew wider, tension mounted between the two governments. In Algiers, officials and the media repeatedly emphasized what became known as the 'oil battle' with France. From the demand for a rise in the oil price, the Algerians moved to request an increase in their control over the overall process of oil exploitation. In a speech delivered at Skikda on July 16, 1970, President Boumedienne expressed in a metaphorical style, the symbolic role the oil battle represented in the affirmation of the state's control over the national resources. "Certain groups, he declared, have been

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1'Politique pétrolière, (4), p.327.
unable to understand that Algeria is today an independent country. They persist in believing that oil questions are not a matter of complete and total sovereignty but a sort of co-sovereignty. We say to them: No, oil is ours, as is the gas, since they are well and truly found in Algeria. We were opposed in the recent past to the colonialists who tried to separate the Sahara from the Tell. If we were able to analyze Algerian oil, we should discover that the blood of our martyrs is one of its constituents, because the possession of this wealth was paid for with our blood. Moreover, foreign capital which was invested in the exploitation of our oil has for the most part been recovered and remunerated.¹

Negotiations between the two sides were broken off because of France's refusal to accept the increase in the posted price of oil from $2.08 to 2.85 a barrel and because of its conviction that time was playing in its favour, believing that its former colony would no longer be able to sustain a confrontation given its evident lack of economic capabilities. Thus France deliberately ignored Algeria's determination to gain control over her energy resources, by overlooking the increasing solidarity within Opec, and by believing that lack of capital and technicians as well as absence of foreign buyers for its oil would discourage the North-African country in taking the crucial step to nationalize French oil assets. Moreover, the French seemed to believe strongly in the Libyan alternative to put pressure on Algiers and on the threat to expel some of the Algerian immigrants as reprisals, a fact they assumed would certainly have had disastrous effects on Algeria's fragile

economy. Conversely, the Algerians' determination was spurred by the desire of the Opec state members to get more concessions from the oil companies and also by Libyan support.

With the emergence of Libya as a new colossus in North-Africa, its growing importance in the Opec bargaining coalition and with Qadhafi's aspirations to revive Nasser's panarabic dreams, the Algerians could not but opt for a more radical policy at home and a more determined attitude against French interests in particular. The context - characterized by France's domestic problems, Pompidou's illness, his preoccupation with European affairs, the slight decline of French influence in Africa, and by the availability of Soviet assistance and American technology and financial inducements - gave the Algerians the necessary impetus to push forward their demands on the French oil companies.

The Algerian intransigence grew in intensity on the return of Abdeslam from the Opec Tripoli meeting which saw the rise of the posted price of market crude oil rise from $1.8 to $2.8 and the tax-rate from the level of 50 up to a flat 60 per cent. On January 12, 1971, the Algerian government decided to impose an embargo on some oil shipments to France in an attempt to resume negotiations between the two sides. After days of haggling, the French agreed to reopen these negotiations which then took place in Paris in January 29, between Bouteflika and Xavier-Ortoli the minister of industry, but in vain as the French adamantly refused the Algerian demands. On February 8, the Algerian foreign minister made another call to resume negotiations, but with French refusal to accede to these demands, Boumedienne announced the partial nationalization of French oil interests in Algeria on February 24.
The decisions and the date were given a symbolic value and on the foreign level, the Algerians emphasized their precursory role with regard to the efforts of the Opec countries to abolish the regime of oil concessions and extend the control of the national governments over the process of oil production and marketing.

In the ordinances of February 24, 1971, the Algerian government unilaterally decided to take over a 55 per cent share in the French oil companies and nationalize the gas industry entirely from production to marketing. At the end of this process, Sonatrach had increased its share in the total volume of crude oil extracted in Algeria from 30 to 77 per cent.

The presidential decrees of April 24 confirmed the imposition of a reference price level to be applied for the years 1969 and 1970 as fixed by the Algerian government in July 1970. They also set the posted price at $2.70 FOB (Free on Board) Bedjaia for the period from January 1 to March 19, 1971, while the posted prices applicable for the period starting from March 20, 1971 to December 31 should conform to the dispositions of the Opec prices of the Tripoli agreement reached on April 12, taking into account adjustments to be made for better geographic location and quality of the Algerian oil in comparison with the Libyan oil. The Algerians stressed that these measures were not excessive, as the posted price they fixed included a rate for freight costs similar to that applied by Libya (25 cents). Given the fact that Algeria is geographically closer to France, the differential, they argued, should have been fixed between 20 to 22 cents instead of the 15 they asked for.

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2In 'les hydrocarbures', Ministry of Information and Culture, Algiers July 1971, pp.50-51.
And providing these reasons, they rejected the proposition sent by the French government which stated that it did not dispute the principle of Algeria’s right to nationalize provided the primary compensation to which the Algerians had committed themselves in the Evian agreements and the 1965 oil convention, was paid.\(^1\) The Algerian government offered $100 million as indemnification to the French oil companies affected by the nationalizations, an amount rejected by the French as derisory since it represented only about a seventh of their own estimates. The refusal of Algiers to meet their demands could be explained by a need for capital to finance the ambitious development plan (1970-1973). Although compensation constituted a serious issue of contention between the two countries, as is highlighted by lengthy negotiations and several meetings in Algiers between Bouteflika and Herve Alphand, the French government envoy—neither side wanted a complete rupture. The moderation of the French attitude became more tangible when Paris failed to alter Algeria’s decisions through economic sanctions. In May 1971, CFP withdrew its oil technicians from Algeria and three weeks later, ELF-ERAP repatriated most of its staff there, while the French government decided in December to reduce the annual quota for Algerian migrants from 35,000 to 25,000 and threatened to restrict savings sent home by Algerian immigrant workers. Moreover, it attempted to launch an international economic boycott against the North-Africa state, requesting, for instance, the US to cancel its gas contracts with Algeria, signed in 1969-1970 which were awaiting approval from the US energy commission (CFP), as well as threatening to urge the World Bank to deny Algeria credits. France’s efforts proved a failure: on March 3, 1971, Sonatrach obtained $5 million

\(^1\)Handed by Premier Chaban-Delmas to Bedjaoui, the Algerian Ambassador in Paris on March 9, 1971.
loan it concluded with the 'US Bank Manufacturers Hanover Trust' in December 1970 and in March 25, it signed a loan agreement with 'Banque de Montreal' worth $10 million. Furthermore Sonatrach succeeded in signing contracts with other countries to sell her oil, notably with the USA and Brazil's oil company Petrobas concerning a deal of 45 million tons of crude oil over the next 4 years.

In an apparent move to secure its interests in Algeria in other fields, the French government manifested its desire to settle the oil issue in a new cooperation framework. The visit to Algiers of Jean de Broglie, the president of the National Assembly on July 7, 1971, was understood as evidence of France's moderation.

A settlement was reached between Sonatrach and CFP in June, which granted the latter $60.7 million payable in 7 years on the condition that it paid its tax-arrears of $25 million between August and December 1971. Following an agreement signed on December 12, ELF-ERAP the French state-owned company handed over a part of its capital to Sonatrach because the debts it owed to the Algerian treasury were higher than the amount of compensation agreed upon and fixed at 183,5 million Algerian Dinars by the Ordinances of February 24 and April 12, 1971.1

The result of this process meant the end of the regime of French oil concessions in Algeria, making CFP and ERAP companies holding minority interests, with Sonatrach being the majority partner. Since the February 1971 nationalization, the two French companies accounted for only 7 and 6 million tonnes of oil production respectively in comparison with the 35 million tonnes they were responsible for in the past. Their fate as the most important oil companies operating in Algeria was sealed

when ELF-ERAP stopped producing oil in Algeria in 1975, while CFP obtained a new contract concerning investment and production valid for 5 years in the new framework of association with Sonatrach through which it received between 6 to 10 million tonnes of crude oil annually subject to compulsory investment to be undertaken in Algeria. In July 1977, the Algerian oil company signed another contract with CFP for the sale of 14 million tonnes of condensat for a 10 year period. In this context, contracts with the two French oil companies had lost their 'charactère special' as CFP and ERAP were dealt with as any other foreign company operating in Algeria under a new framework where Sonatrach's weight and power of decision began to predominate. With the affirmation of the state's sovereignty in the economic field, the privileged status of the Algerian-French relationship became to wither away almost irreversibly.

D. PARTNERSHIP AND RIVALRY AND THE LOOSENING OF THE "CHARACTÈRE SPECIAL" OF RELATIONS

1. The search for equality in status and in partnership

If the early years of independence constituted for Algeria a situation imposed on her as a result of the colonial past, the access to control over the natural resources, in the context of changing conditions favourable to oil producing countries, represented a gateway not to the international community to which she formally belongs since being independent, but to a certain international status, to a certain identity in the gathering of nations or what the Algerians like to call 'concert des nations souveraines'. Having assessed the state's control over French interests in Algeria, the Algerians believed they have succeeded in asserting their status as a sovereign and independent state with regard to their former metropole. The access to this particular type of
sovereignty consisted in their eyes, a permanent and hard exercise, as they were conditioned by the challenge to assert their maturity, to legitimize their policies and prove the rightness of their choices vis-à-vis those who not long ago, considered them as inferior, uncivilized, apathetic and as 'indigènes' as they were stereotyped in the French colonial discourse.

In their relations with France, the Algerians seemed perturbed by these images and it was perhaps for this reason that they were anxious to avoid being victims of what some French politicians would consider as an 'indigenous state-nation'. These subjective but deep-rooted feelings had been constant in their dealings with their former metropole and partly determined the peculiar character of the Algerian-French relations. It was difficult to think that these relations could be banal, they were as Boumediene put it "necessary, had or exceptional". This statement reflects, indeed, the cyclical form of Algerian-French relations, alternating between periods of Algerian-French understanding and periods of denouncing French imperialism and patronizing attitudes. The difference of objectives remains significant and constitutes the crux of their troubled relationship. The Algerians believed that relations with France should be based on the respect of mutual interests and that their country should be regarded as independent and sovereign and not as a pawn in French global designs. The conflict has been and still remains the problem of equality not only on the level of power capabilities, but also of equality of status: that the French side should recognize and deal with Algeria as an independent state with its own experience, specific interests and with its Arabo-Islamic
ferment, socialist orientation and non-aligned conceptions. For the Algerians, this search for equality in status has been crucial for the assertion of their own identity and personality, and also for the recognition of sacrifices made to obtain their political sovereignty. From the feelings of being assisted and a junior partner to the access to the status of a sovereign state, the process proved complex and arduous, but the Algerians seemed willing to live up to this challenge. In their eyes, this process has beyond the simplistic legal or formal level, a sacred value for it helps them exorcise any latent inferiority complex the French think they may still have.

The assertion of the self vis-a-vis the other (La reconnaissance de soi par l'autre) has been greatly exacerbated by the Algerian state in its dealings with the French government. This deep motivation which—reflecting a pathetic but insatiable struggle for political independence and cultural decolonization of the mentality of Algerians, many of whom were victims of French cultural alienation—remained essential for the Algerian leaders' state-to-state practice. Attempts to recover archives and documents on Algerian history retained in France aimed also at assisting this search for the self and cultural identity, as these archives were regarded as "the concrete mark of Algerian history". The refusal of the French government to hand them back to Algerians was merely viewed as "an attempt to deny the existence of Algeria before 1962". Another important aspect of Algeria's attempts to ensure her independence vis-a-vis France had been the complete withdrawal of the French troops from Algeria by December 1967. The recovery of military

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1 Declaration of Mohamed Benyahia to El-Moudjahid, November 30, 1981.
2 ibid.
bases formerly occupied by France, especially the Mers el Kebir naval base, did not mean for the Algerians a mere — although decisive — means to protect their country's sovereignty and security but represented a vital step in their efforts to master their own destiny. Having assessed their control over their natural resources and national security matters, the Algerians could then move to establish a new type of relationship with France with a greater self-confidence and strength.

It was amid these conceptions that the maintenance of a cooperation with France on the basis of mutual interests and the need of this country for her own use that made Algeria adopt a conciliatory attitude with the French government which seemed to have accepted the realities of the next context resulting from the February 1971 oil nationalizations. France announced on April 13 the end of privileged relations with Algeria, although remaining determined "to pursue the application of the technical cooperation agreement of April 8, 1966 modified on August 22, 1970 as well as the immigration agreement of December 27, 1968 of which it does not rule the extension if necessary. Finally, France declares herself willing to continue to participate in the framework of international cooperation in the economic development of Algeria. The decisions thus taken by the French government are inspired by the two countries' long-term interests and by their relations as sovereign states."1

The Algerians seemed pleased with the new course of the Algerian-French relationship which ensured them sovereignty over their national resources and reinforced their political independence, as much as the French side had been looking for the diversification of its energy

1Commemuque issued by the Quai d'Orsay. See also speech of Premier Chaban-Delmas to the French National Assembly on April 20. (French Embassy in London, Bulletin mensuel d'informations series 13, No.4, April 1971.)
supplies in the framework of its economic and geographic redeployment, and rayonnement. In a speech at a luncheon given in honour of Bouteflika on July 9, 1973 in his first visit to Paris after the oil conflict, Michel Jobert the French Foreign Minister asserted that "Algeria has now found her place in the concert of nations...you are independent, your independence is questioned by no one." The response of the Algerian government reflected similar conceptions, stressing links of interdependence existing between Algiers and Paris. According to a statement issued on April 20 1971, Algeria's constant concern has been "the search for real and final solutions to the sequels of the past in order to redefine with France a new type of cooperation largely open over the future...Since independence, Algeria has subscribed to a policy of cooperation based on the respect of sovereignty, on equality and reciprocity of exchanges. Such a policy was directed against any attempts to perpetuate neo-colonial domination over (Algeria)'s national resources...The objective appreciation of relations between Algeria and France indicates the existence of many complex interests whose interference and weight would serve as a support and main guarantor for this cooperation...As far as she is concerned, Algeria has...adopted a strategy that would preserve the harmonious development of her relations with France."2

The development of these relations proved in fact important for Algeria, as despite her efforts to diversify her foreign trade patterns, she has relied on France's market for her energy exports and labour surplus as well as French technological outlets and expertise. Equally, the better quality of Algeria's oil, its low freight costs, the

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1 Bulletin mensuel d'information, series 15, No.7, July 1973 p.5.
increasing importance of gas in the French policy of diversification of energy supplies, and the importance of Algerian market for French goods enhanced Algeria's position in her former metropole's foreign trade.¹

This economic interdependence remained constant despite the occasional conflicts and tensions that have characterized the French-Algerian relations since 1971 and constituted the main source of the convergence of interests between the two countries. The remark that Algiers and Paris were "condemned to live together" as Boumedienne emphasized, "if not cooperate", as Chadli realistically observed—became evident, despite political divergencies highlighted by conflicting attitudes over the Western Sahara as the French government made clear its determination to preserve France's position in Algeria's economic schemes, as was emphasized by Giscard's visit to Algeria in April 1974 and his overture in 1978 after a freeze in relations exacerbated by the conflict of ex-Spanish Sahara. Thus after a substantial decrease in the volume of Algerian-French trade in the second half of the mid-1970s, a considerable boost was given to the cooperation between the two countries, following the visit of Francois Poncet to Algiers and that of Benyahia to Paris in 1979, and especially after the access to power of Mitterrand's socialist regime. In exchange for a series of contracts in favour of French companies, worth 35 billion French Francs, the new French government agreed to increase its gas imports from Algeria following the signature on February 3, 1982 of a huge deal that involved a high price paid for the Algerian gas and a financial aid accorded to this country averaging

¹For the role of gas in France's diversification of its energy imports, see interview of Edmond Hervé, the Minister delegate, responsible for energy to Le Monde November 11, 1982.
350 million French Francs annually. Among the main contracts awarded by Algeria was that concerning the feasibility studies and construction of the first part of the Algiers underground by the Sofretu company. Other contracts concerned French participation in the realization of a certain number of small and medium-sized economic projects.

Algeria's desire to strengthen economic cooperation with France was met with the setting up of a joint committee on cooperation following the signature of an Algerian-French inter-governmental protocol on June 21, 1982 by Abdelhamid Brahimi the minister of planning and Claude Cheysson, the minister of external relations. Moreover, a committee for Algeria was created within the CNFP the French Employers Association whose leaders Ceyrac and Berliet visited this country on a few occasions. The intensification of Algerian-French cooperation has been highlighted by numerous visits exchanged by nearly all the ministers of both sides and by the convergence of interests between Algiers and Paris beyond the economic fields as confirmed by five meetings held by Chadli and Mitterrand between 1981 and 1983.

For Algeria, France remains an important partner in three major domains: 1) the consolidation of political stability in the Maghreb, 2) the preservation of Algeria's place in European markets and 3) the efforts to remodel the world economic order.

1. By cultivating good relations with all the North-African countries and by remaining neutral over inter-Maghrebi disagreements, France could, in the eyes of Algerians, help strengthen the independence of the Maghreb and help protect it from East-West confrontation. Thus, Algeria called upon France to contribute in demilitarizing the Mediterra-
nean Sea by freeing it from naval presence of foreign powers, though reproving France’s attempts to impose its own hegemony over the Mediterranean basin, and despite their political differences, Algeria regarded her former metropole as a possible and effective counterweight to super-powers’ interference in the Maghreb and to the destabilizing activities of Qadhafi. After being infuriated by the stand of Moscow and Washington vis-à-vis the Western Sahara, it was to France that the Algerians turned.\(^1\) Paris responded positively as it was also in its interests to counterbalance super-powers rivalry in the Maghreb. Since the mid-1970s, Morocco has become courted by both the USSR and the USA: while Washington increased arms supplies to help Hassan secure his throne, Moscow increased economic cooperation to enhance Soviet image in Morocco to be better able to benefit from any revolutionary perspectives in Morocco, since this country is potentially unstable. Soviet-American rivalry over the Sherifian Kingdom was regarded by France as a threat to its interests not only in this country but in the whole Maghreb.

These considerations explained Giscard’s overtures to Algeria in 1978 after a long period of tension and hostilities.\(^2\) The coup in Mauritania the same year stood as an evidence of the improvement of relations between Algiers and Paris.\(^3\) If the overthrow of Ould Daddah was a deliberate attempt to annihilate any Moroccan territorial claims over Mauritania, since this country is regarded by France as a vital plank in its military strategy in North-West and West-Africa, it was also

\(^{1}\) This desire was underlined in the telegram sent by Boumedienne to Giscard when flying over the French territory on his return home from Moscow where he received medical treatment for his fatal illness.

\(^{2}\) See his speech of February 9, 1978.

\(^{3}\) This possibility was confirmed by Abdelaziz, Secretary-General of the Polisario Front (Le Monde April 13, 1979).
a starting point for Algerian-Mauritanian rapprochement as the new leadership in Nouakchott scrapped the military treaty Ould Daddah had concluded with Morocco, resumed diplomatic relations with Algiers, signed a peace treaty with the Polisario front and has been pursuing an anti-Moroccan policy. However, this Algerian-French alignment did not, in French designs, aim at isolating Morocco or forcing it to relinquish its hold over the Western Sahara, but rather it was a form of leverage to prevent Rabat from sliding into the American sphere of influence and to preserve French economic interests in Morocco. Political stability in North-Africa that should result from the pacific settlement of the Western Sahara problem has been viewed by Paris as a necessary means to keep the Maghreb out of East-West entanglements, thus to reinforce French presence in this region. It was, therefore, against this background that France's offer to help solve this problem should be understood. The refusal of Mitterrand's government to aid Morocco build a railway line linking the 'mainland' to the West Saharan-occupied territory, was also appreciated in Algiers as a concrete illustration of eventual convergence of interests with its former metropole.\(^1\)

2. Given her relative maturity, Algeria hoped to make France her bridge to Europe as much as France attempted to make her its gateway to the third world (De Gaulle), a positive ally (Giscard) and an indispensable partner (Mitterrand). While France, regardless of differences between these regimes, attempted to preserve a good image in the third world and enhance its position between East and West, Algeria badly

\(^1\)El-Moudjahid reported that during the visit of the Moroccan Premier Lamrani to Paris in April 1984, the French government declined Morocco's demand for assistance in building a railway line between Rabat and El Ayoun in the occupied Western Sahara (El-Moudjahid April 13-14, 1984).
needed Europe to avoid being entangled in the super powers' scramble for influence in Africa so as to consolidate her position of a non-aligned country. Moreover she needed Europe both as a source for her energy exports and as a supplier of technology and capital. In Algerian views, Europe may constitute the most stable partner with regard to these objectives because of this region's lack of energy resources and its geographic proximity. Thus, Algerians came to believe that it could play a substantial role in Europe's diversification of energy imports given its huge gas reserves. Neither the Soviet Union nor the US have been particularly in need of Algeria's oil and gas, being themselves among the biggest producers of energy in the world, and having their own clients. Furthermore, no country from the third world could constitute the required market for Algeria's exports or provide her with the technology she needs. Efforts of Algeria had, therefore, been directed at emphasizing economic interdependence with Europe: as a most stable source for the latter's energy needs, as a valuable market for its outlets and also as a valuable card in its bargaining with the USSR gas supplies. These reasons may explain the conclusion by Algeria of huge gas contracts with France, Belgium, Italy and Spain in 1981-82, while negotiations with the US to resume gas supplies have failed so far. In exchange for a higher price for their gas, the Algerians agreed to increase their country's economic cooperation with Western Europe. In their designs, this interdependence could help attenuate fears of recession in Europe, thus dissipating possible reprisals against their migrant workers there, particularly in France.
Needing Western Europe both as a market and support, Algeria has been reluctant to break with France whom she hoped would become the dynamic nucleus for a Europe free from American domination and which would cultivate friendly relations with the Arab world in general and the third world in particular. These feelings were encouraged by the Gaullist line of national independence which the different governments of the French fifth Republic attempted to follow at one time or another. From Pompidou to Mitterrand, French foreign policy had, at times, manifested a strong reluctance to endorse US external standpoints, thus coinciding with Algeria's own visions of world politics. France's good relations with the Arab world dictated by her own interests in this region -constituted another element in Algerian-French alignment, as the successive French governments followed more or less the traditional Gaullist sympathies for the Arab cause, despite Mitterrand's ambiguous standpoints on the Arab-Israeli conflict. ¹ The Algerians particularly appreciated the favourable attitude of both Pompidou and Giscard toward the Palestinian cause as highlighted by the meeting between the French foreign minister Sauvagnargues and Arafat the PLO leader in 1974, and the June 1980 EEC Venizia declaration on the Middle East favourable to the Arab stand, owing much to the efforts of President Giscard D'Estaing. ²

¹ Algeria's main criticisms were directed against the inopportune of Mitterrand's visit to Israel in 1981 and to French approval of Camp David Agreement. Moreover the decision of the EEC, especially that of France to send troops to supervise the application of the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement was regarded as contrary to the spirit of the Euro-Arab dialogue and as threat against security in the Mediterranean (El-Moudjahid November 11, 1981).
² The resolution stressed the necessity and urgency of a global solution to the Middle East conflict, of a just solution to the Palestinian problem and the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. It also called upon Israel to end its occupation of Arab territories (El-Moudjahid, December 12, 1981).
3. The policy of independence attempted by both countries seemed sometimes to serve as a basis for Algerian-French understanding: the opposition of Pompidou to Kissinger's international agency for energy, the efforts of Giscard to boost debates on North-South issues in the 1974-1976 years and initiate a triangular cooperation gathering Europe, Africa and the Arab world as well as Mitterrand's support for Algeria's proposal of global negotiations made at Cuncun in 1981, his decision to increase French public assistance to the third world and critical attitude to the rise of interest rate in the USA -have all been regarded with high consideration by the Algerians in the context of the convergence of interests with France.

This convergence remained constant despite periods of misunderstanding distrust and hostility that prevented a possible long-standing alliance as the two sides believe they could be useful to one another. Being on opposite sides after independence, Algerians and French could hardly ignore one another especially as they know each other well, having once shared a common destiny in the dialectical dichotomy: colonist-colonised. Being representative of each sphere and having common interests in the whole conception of North-South relationship they have been tempted to forge from their bilateral relations an example for the North-South configuration, but they have not been able to transcend their own differences to at least narrow the bridge between the imbalanced condominium and their divergent interests due to disparities in wealth, power and political options.
2. Difficulty in transcending the divergence of interests

As paradoxical as it may appear, there has been a coexistence between the desire to pursue Algerian-French rivalry. This dialectical process may explain why the relations between the two countries alternated between good and tense periods. Although the visits to Algiers by Presidents Giscard D'Estaing (in April 1974), Mitterrand in 1981 and 1983 and the visit by Chadli to Paris in November 1983 were surrounded with the desire to give an impulse to Algerian-French alignment, involving a great deal of emotions and passion peculiar to the special relations between a former metropole and its former colony, they were immediately followed by mutual distrust and hostility as the two sides diverged over issues regarded as crucial for their national interests.

Despite Algeria's reliance on France's market and technology and despite inequality in power capabilities, the Algerians remained determined not only to pursue their socialistic policies at home but also a radical foreign stance. The implementation of these policies did not fail to have an impact on the whole conceptions of French-speaking countries in general and in the Maghreb in particular where France's interests remain vital for its economic and cultural rayonnement.

Claiming that the nature of their struggle for independence conferred upon them a special role in the third world, the Algerians effectively attempted to be at the forefront of the battle against what they called Western imperialism and neo-colonialism. These motivations constituted an impetus to their attempt to assert their country's political sovereignty and implement their foreign policy objectives in the process of assessing the state's identity and personality. In doing
so, the Algerians were conscious of France's opposition and challenge. Their aspirations to the leadership in the Maghreb and expansion of their influence southwards of the Sahara inevitably led to a competition with France, exacerbating their mutual hostility from time to time.

From the outset, Algeria refused to participate in the French-African summits or endorse the concept of French-speaking gathering 'la Francophonie'. She also addressed strident criticisms to the model of economic and military assistance France set up with many of her former colonies in sub-Saharan Africa. To Algeria's ambitions with regard to this region, corresponded France's determination to preserve its huge interests in its former empire, especially during Giscard's reign which saw the strengthening of French-African policy after its slight passivity under Pompidou.

Far from constituting the main source of friction between the two sides in the mid-1970s, the Western Sahara dispute merely crystallised their latent conflict over these areas which France wanted to keep quiet and Paris-oriented in face of Algeria's 'revolutionary elan'. Amid tensions accentuated by this issue, the French made clear that their African policy could not be dictated by Franco-Algerian cooperation as France wants to have political independence and will maintain it. French support for the Moroccan stand and declared hostility to the setting up of an independent state over the Western Sahara were deeply resented by the Algerians who accused the French of playing a 'double jeu', noting that while Giscard declared his hostility to the multiplicity of micro-states, he firmly opposed the United Nations resolution passed in October 1976, requesting France to cancel the referendum it
planned to organize in Mayotte. The French stand over the Western Sahara led Algerians to accuse the French of becoming the "imperialist policeman in the region", participating "in an international plot directed against the Saharawi people and the Algerian revolution through the supplies of arms to Morocco and Mauritania" and "inciting Senegal, Tunisia and Zaire to increase their hostilities against Algeria". ¹ This virulent diatribe was accompanied by condemnation of France's intervention in Lebanon in 1975 and in Zaire in April 1977 and by lobbying to gather support for condemning French policies toward Mayotte and South-Africa at the United Nations and non-aligned fora.² This resolute anti-French attitude increased with Algeria's failure to put pressure on Paris to endorse the rights of the Saharawi people for self-determination and prevent Morocco and Mauritania from consolidating their hold over the Western Sahara territory, a fact that would have serious incidences on Algeria's territorial security and position in the Maghreb.

The capture of six Frenchmen working in the phosphate mines in Mauritania gave the Algerians a good opportunity to play the go-between the French government and Polisario in an attempt to induce Paris to recognize the latter and put pressure on Morocco to alleviate risks of a generalized war in the Maghreb. But their claims that the French

hostages were not retained in Algeria and that France should negotiate directly with the Saharawi movement were refuted by Paris which instead accused Algiers of being behind the Polisario's attacks.\(^1\) By refusing to intercede with the Polisario front following the request of the French government to release the French hostages, the Algerians succeeded in forcing Paris to engage direct negotiations with the Polisario front. These negotiations conducted by a high official from the Quai d'Orsay, proved to be in vain, as the French categorically rejected to endorse the rights of the Saharawis for self-determination or assume good offices between Polisario\(^2\) on the one hand and Morocco and Mauritania on the other. Deceived by France's favourable attitude to her neighbours, Algeria increased her campaign against the regime of Giscard D'Estaing, by showing fervent support for the leftist coalition formed by the French Communist and Socialist parties and by entertaining with their leaders a form of a government-to-government parley. Georges Marchais the PCF Secretary General was received in mid-September 1974 and Mitterrand then the leader of the PS in late 1976. On these occasions, Boumedienne publicly declared that the 'union de la gauche' should come to power in France, being encouraged by Mitterrand's near victory in the French presidential elections in 1974. To embarrass the regime of Giscard on the eve of French municipal elections, Boumedienne obtained from the Polisario front the release of the French hostages during the visit of Marchais to Algiers following that of Lionel Jospin the Secretary General

\(^1\) Louis de Guiringand, the French Foreign Minister declared on May 1, 1977 that "we know very well where they (attacks) came from: a neighbouring country where polisario has its bases (quoted in *Africa Contemporary record* 1977).

\(^2\) In a letter sent to Nimeiry the OAU's president on August 11, 1978, Giscard confirmed France's refusal to conduct such a mediation.
of the PS who met the Polisario leaders in Algiers in November 1977. However, there was a possibility that the decision to release them came after Polisario columns had been heavily tracked down by French 'Jaguar' aircraft fighters. These French pressures or what it was called in Algiers 'la politique des jaguars' highlighted the marked differences in power capabilities existing between Algeria and her former metropole. Moreover, the defeat of the French leftist coalition in the general elections of 1978 contributed to enhance Giscard's position, thus undermining Boumedienne's policy of leverage.

The rapprochement between Algeria and France that developed in the late 1970s and strengthened with the coming to power of Chadli and Mitterrand did not attenuate the conflict between Algiers and Paris resulting from divergences of interests and options. Despite the declared neutrality of the French government on the Western Sahara issue, the Algerians still regard French attitude over this question as ambiguous and confusing since Mitterrand's government, while favouring a referendum with a possibility of dialogue between the interested parties, has not granted the Polisario front diplomatic recognition, despite the fact that the French socialist party favours this.\(^1\) Apparently, the Algerians were deceived that Paris was determined to see that the Franco-Algerian alignment does not offset French relations with Morocco where French interests remain important as it became evident to them that

\(^1\) This standpoint was expressed by Mitterrand in his speech given in honour of Chadli during the latter's visit to Paris in November 1983 (in La semaine de l'émigration November 17, 1983 pp.12 & 13). See in contrast the statement made in Algiers by Jacques Huntzinger, the PS spokesman on international affairs that the PS favoured the right of the Saharawis for self-determination and direct negotiations between Rabat and the Polisario (El-Moudjahid December 16, 1982).
Mitterrand could not—despite what Cheysson called the 'coup de passion' between Paris and Algiers— privilege relations with Algeria at the expense of France's interests in Morocco. The joint French-Moroccan military manoeuvres conducted in November 1982 without the Algerians being informed, created a great deal of surprise and incomprehension within the Algerian governmental circles.\(^1\)

The confirmation that French domestic concerns and interests in the Maghreb and French-speaking Africa were more important than maintaining a special relationship between Paris and Algiers came after the secret visit of Mitterrand to Rabat in August 1984 to request King Hassan to persuade Qadhafi to agree on a joint French-Libyan troops withdrawal from Chad. While domestic pressures and electoral purposes seemed to have prevailed in the French President's move, the demand made before the Moroccan King was an indication of Moroccan influence in African affairs that offered a better entree for France than Algeria, especially after the sudden but significant rapprochement between Tripoli and Rabat.\(^2\)

The Algerians felt Mitterrand's manoeuvre as an affront and outrage completely in contradiction with the warm relationship that developed between them and the French government highlighted by several meetings between Chadli and Mitterrand and sympathies to Algeria of many French

\(^1\)The Algerian Embassador to Paris, Houhou expressed these feelings, stressing that his government, in contrast, has always been informed in advance by the US government of joint US-Moroccan military operations (El-Moudjahid, December 15, 1982). For Algerian disapproval of these operations see El-Moudjahid November 29, 1982, p.1.

\(^2\)Although acknowledging that the two countries share a similar attitude with regard to the Chad crisis, Premier Mauroy confirmed during his 24 hour visit to Algiers on September 9, 1983, that France was not asking Algeria to mediate between Paris and Tripoli. However, it seems that Algerians attempted to convince the Libyans to reach an agreement with the French but in vain.
ministers such as Mauroy, Cheysson, Rocard, Defferre, and other influential members of the Socialist party like Claude Estier for instance. President Chadli, perhaps, felt Mitterrand's move as a personal insult, as not long before, he had publicly referred to the French leader as 'mon ami Francois'. The latter's failure to reassure personally Chadli, confirms the fragility of Algerian-French working relationships. The Algerian hope to make France a reliable and stable ally proved illusory, though the Algerians seem willing to maintain good relations with their former metropole for it possesses considerable utilitarian powers in the form of markets for their labour surplus and energy exports as well as a source for capital equipment and technological expertise.

1 Interview with le Figaro, November 9, 1983.
2 It was Cheysson who went to Algiers in September 1984 to explain Mitterand's trip to Rabat.
CHAPTER FOUR: THE PRESERVATION OF NATIONAL INTEGRITY AND THE STATE'S SECURITY

The jacobinist tendencies of the Algerian leaders, as defined by a devotion to the building of a strong and a centralized state and by the rejection of any supra-national form of government, were regarded by their neighbours as stemming from selfishness, arrogance and hegemonistic temptations. This is a mere simplification of the process of nation-state in Algeria. Indeed, given their historical experience, this process appeared more crucial to the Algerians than to their neighbours, who in contrast had been able to preserve their identity, personality and state traditions during the protectorate, a form of colonization which was neither as deep nor as socially disturbing as in Algeria. Consequently, the reaction to colonial dialectics was more violent in Algeria than elsewhere as the spirit of national consciousness was cemented in the heat of the guerrilla war, while the ideological ferment that emerged emphasized radical perceptions with regard to political and social change. In contrast, the preservation of traditional structures in Morocco and Libya and of the middle-classes in Tunisia accounted for the evolution of these nation-states on the basis of the political conservatism of their respective regimes. The deep antagonism which resulted from differences in experiences stood then as the unequivocal obstacle for the failure to unify the Maghrebi nationalist movements during the colonial times as well as for the accentuation of nationalisms soon after the birth of independent Maghrebi states, thus making the idea of a Maghreb a far remote possibility.

Furthermore, the problem of frontiers resulting from the past colonial period, added to this differentiation in the sense that with the instinct of national preservation of the state's security and national
integrity, Algeria like her neighbours, was not prepared to make any territorial concession that may undermine her own national basis. Against this background, territorial disputes as highlighted by the question of the Western Sahara could not be dissociated from ideological divergences. And if these dialectical dichotomies have accounted for the troubled relationships between Algeria and other Maghreb countries, they have, nevertheless, remained in the background even when the North African countries underwent periods of détente and economic co-operation.

A. ACCENTUATION OF ALGERIAN NATIONALISM

1. Radicalization of national sentiments

During the colonial era, the first attempts envisaging a platform for unity between the North African nationalist movements with the exception of Libya which was then under British protectorate, occurred within Maghrebi student circles in France between the two world wars. In this period, the "association des Etudiants Musulmans Nord-Africains" (AEMNA), founded in 1927, was dominated by Moroccans and Tunisians because of the relatively low number of Algerians studying in the French metropole, just about 30 at that time. Its objectives, however, were more directed at strengthening cultural affiliations among Maghrebi students than on turning into a political forum for nationalistic activities. The two congresses held in Tunis in August 1931 and in Algiers a year later did not make much progress in this direction although the declarations adopted there hailed the unity of the Maghreb. Moreover, despite an agreement made between Messali's PPA and the Moroccan section of the AEMNA in June 1933, contacts between the North-African nationalists remained quite formal and limited. The split within the AEMNA which led
to the creation of the 'Association des Etudiants Musulmans Algériens' in 1933 did not help push forward nationalist demands on a unified basis and neither did the decision of the French government not to let the AEMNA convene its meeting scheduled to take place in Rabat in 1936. In this situation and with the old generation of Algerian nationalists believing that it could obtain political rights from the French administration on a peaceful basis, attempts to create a common front against colonial rule seemed inopportune. In the same vein, nationalist movements in Morocco and Tunisia gathered around the the old political guard also favoured a nationalistic-oriented line relying chiefly on their own potential and abilities. But as these legalistic demands failed, the possibility of unifying efforts to combat French colonialism came under consideration by the nationalist movements in the three countries. Thus in January 1947 a Bureau of the Arab Maghreb was created and a year later a committee for the liberation of the Maghreb was set up as well as a pact among the Algerian PPA-MTLD, Morocco's Istiqlal party and Tunisia's Neo-Destour. Another pact was signed on April 4, 1954 at the Arab league but it was followed by no concrete measure for a coordinated insurrection against French colonial rule. And while in Algeria, the young generation of nationalists resorted to use violence to gain independence, the political parties in Morocco and Tunisia remained committed to achieve that goal through other means. These divergences became crystallized with the FLN initiating a guerrilla war on November 1, 1954 while in the other two countries, the advocates of an armed struggle were overwhelmed by the partisans of a negotiated solution with the French government. Therefore, attempts to hasten the disintegration of French colonialism in the whole Maghreb irremediably failed. Despite that the FLN asserted in its
political proclamation, Algeria's search for national independence in "a
North African context" and despite the secret agreement signed in early
1955 between the FLN's external delegation, Benyoucef the Secretary
General of the Neo-Destour and Al Fasi the leader of the Istiqlal party.
Reasons inherent in the differences of colonial contexts and rivalries
undermining the cohesion of their nationalist movements had led the
Moroccan and Tunisian leaders to turn down the FLN's demand for a
generalized war in the Maghreb.¹ And when these leaders succeeded in
making France grant independence for their countries in March 1956, the
Algerians pointed out that it was their own insurrection that forced
France to relinquish its hold over these territories to be better able to
keep Algeria French. The demise of revolutionary spirit from the Moroccan
and Tunisian regimes bitterly disappointed the FLN leadership and cast
clouds on the likelihood of a drive for unity in the future as ideologi­
cal and political differences were implicitly outlined in the FLN Summan
platform. "It is erroneous, it was stated, to believe that both Morocco
and Tunisia will enjoy a true independence as long as Algeria remains
under the colonial rule."² However, having been granted independence
these two countries believed they could be more useful to the Algerian
cause and thus set to provide the FLN with moral and material support,
granting shelter for thousands of Algerian refugees and bases for the ALN
guerrillas. But for the Algerian leaders this was an expression of a
simple solidarity and not of a total commitment to disentangle the whole

¹In Tunisia there was a strong rivalry between Bourguiba and
Salah Benyoussef an advocate of violence as a means to
achieve independence, while in Morocco there was an
exacerbation of Berber particularism and a challenge to the
legitimacy of King Mohamed V represented by the French
backed Al Glawi.
²Platfonnal de la Soumam, August 1956 in Textes fondamentaux
du FLN.
Maghreb from French presence and influence so as to work effectively for the unity of the Maghreb. The moderation shown by Morocco and Tunisia was dictated by their inability to fight the French troops and by their determination to safeguard their fragile internal cohesion.

It became thus unlikely that the two countries would risk their newly gained independence for the purpose of a war in Algeria which they believed could be settled through peaceful means. To the deep discontent of the FLN leadership both Morocco and Tunisia favoured a political solution of the Algerian conflict which would take into account French stakes in Algeria. At their meeting in Rabat on November 11, 1957 King Mohammed V and Bourguiba "urgently called the FLN and the French government to open negotiations leading to a joint solution aiming at the achievement of the sovereignty of the Algerian people in conformity with the principles of the United Nations and at safeguarding the legitimate interests of France and its settlers in Algeria."¹ The FLN vehemently rejected the call for negotiation that would imply the abandoning of the guerrilla warfare and came to look with scorn on the Moroccan and Tunisian regimes. Relations with Tunisia became strained as Bourguiba attempted to induce the FLN leadership to adopt a moderate line and also move it away from the influence of Nasser.

Further disenchantment of the FLN came with the failure to push forward to co-ordination of policies and lay down foundations for a Maghreb unity after the hopes raised by the conference in Tangiers on April 20–30, 1958 of representatives from the FLN, the Destour and the Istiai'ia party. If the Algerian delegation led by Mehri was pleased with the recognition of the FLN as the legitimate representative of the

¹ Le Monde November 23, 1957 (emphasis added).
Algerian people and if it welcomed proposals for the creation of a Maghrebi consultative assembly, it however, denounced the maintenance of French troops in Morocco and Tunisia being especially infuriated by the fact that the Tunisian government did not learn lessons from the bombing by the French of Sakiet Sidi Youcef in February 1958 in reprisals for Tunisia's support to the FLN guerrillas. For Mehri, the war in Algeria was not that of Algeria alone. This appeal was in vain as differences in political and ideological orientations further increased between the FLN and the regimes established in Rabat and Tunis. Both had embarked upon a liberal model of economic development and a foreign policy regarded by the FLN leaders as pro-Western and thus incompatible with their own options. The adoption by the FLN of a radical programme in Tripoli in April 1962 and the eclipse of the GPRA's authority in favour of the alliance between Ben Bella and the radical officers of the ALN General Staff left no doubt on the nature of state and society the FLN leadership wanted to establish in independent Algeria. In eliminating Ferhat Abbas and then Benkhedda from the leadership of the GPRA, the radical faction within the FLN definitely shattered the hopes of Bourguiba and King Hassan to see a moderate regime running new Algeria.

The nature of leadership as explained in terms of this historical perspective may help explain why ideology has been held responsible for differences existing between the Maghrebi states and rivalries that have erupted occasionally ever since. The Algerian leaders defended their position in strongly ideological terms opposing the rightness of their policies in the face of the reactionary regimes of Morocco and Tunisia. These perceptions were best outlined by Boumediene when he emphatically

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1El-Moudjahid, April 16, 1958.
stated that "for many years, Algeria has been following a clear policy based on the principles of co-existence, stability, good neighbourliness and fraternity. Today we do not regret this because it is still valid in its totality. I simply say that our policy today aims at the destiny of peoples rather than of governments because in final analysis, it is the peoples who will survive. We have pursued this policy of the Maghreb of peoples for the simple reason that we are a revolution. If a conflict exists in the region today (Western Sahara), its reason stems from the huge revolutionary mutations which are happening in Algeria. This is the reason of the conflict. This will remain vivid as long as there will be a popular revolution on the one hand and the exploitation of the man by a man on the other." Consequently radical perceptions were made the basis for a united Maghreb "where the exploitation of a man by a man will be banished, servitude of peasants ended and where foreign capital will be nationalized." The difference existing between Algeria and Morocco was also echoed by King Hassan who pointed out that "many people believed that the problem between Algeria and Morocco concerns a small piece of North African soil." For him, the problem is much deeper since "Morocco is facing an ideological conflict in which Algeria is only a small part. Morocco is standing in the forefront of a struggle in a world which wants to be free and democratic. I regret to say that the ideology which Algeria is following is the one which is attacking us."2

It was not surprising that shortly after her independence, Algeria found herself entangled in a cold war with her neighbouring countries. The manifestations of this type of war had been the accusation made by

\[\text{Speech, June 19, 1975 in Discours du président (6), pp.136-137.}\]

\[\text{Address to a delegation from the Chamber of Deputies, November 10, 1977 in Africa Currents (10), 1978, p.20.}\]
Morocco and Tunisia of Algeria's attempts to export her revolution through the support of leftist opposition movements in these countries. In January 1963, Bourguiba held Ben Bella responsible for an assassination plot against him and for backing the subversive activities in Tunisia of the former followers of Salah Benyoussef. The result was the severance of diplomatic relations between Algiers and Tunis, thus aggravating dissensions between them. On the other hand, King Hassan also accused the Algerian leader of attempting to overthrow the Monarchy by depicting him as the driving force behind the July 1963 plot. And although Algeria denied these allegations, both Rabat and Tunis suspected an alliance between Ben Bella and the Egyptian President Nasser which they believed was directed at spreading socialism throughout North Africa. The animosities between Egypt on the one hand and Morocco and Tunisia on the other were evident because of Nasser's declared hostility to Arab monarchies and liberal regimes. Not only the Egyptian leader declined the invitation made by Hassan to visit Morocco but went to Algiers where he received a much publicized welcome in April 1963.

Algeria's relations with Libya were also affected by ideological dissonances since Ben Bella invited opponents of King Idriss on the occasion of the celebration of the eighth anniversary of the Algerian revolution on November 1, 1963. However, these divergences were not acute since Tripoli abstained from being involved in Maghrebi affairs and given Libya's weakness and the support it provided the FLN during the war, cordial relations with the Senoussi Royal family were established, as reflected by a treaty of friendship signed in February 1963 and the visit of Libya's Premier Al Mountasser to Algiers in December 1964.
This good relationship was also made possible because in contrast to Morocco and Tunisia, Libya did not make demands to alter the frontier with Algeria.

Beside ideology, the border issue has been the other fundamental factor in the dispute involving Algeria and her other neighbours.

2. The link between state and territory

The history of demarcating the border with Morocco goes back to 1844 when agreements were reached between the French colonial administration and Morocco which was a sovereign kingdom at that time. See Map IV 1. Several other agreements consecrated the principle of keeping the boundary the same as when Algeria was under the Turkish Regency. However, because the territorial separation between pre-colonial Algeria and the Moroccan kingdom was unclear, the delimitation of the frontiers proved difficult to establish. The treaty of Lalla Maghnia of March 18, 1845 provided for a detailed delineation of only over a 150 kilometre line from the Mediterranean coast to Teniet Al Sassi in the Atlas Mountains, while the area stretching from the peak of Teniet Al Sassi southwards to Figuig was not demarcated because of the infertility of the land. Beyond Figuig the delimitation of the border was believed superfluous since it was an uninhabitable desert. In 1912, the French established an administrative frontier known as the Varnier line between Teniet Al Sassi and Tindonf. From there, the line veered westwards and subsequently lined southward to a point west of Igli, but beyond this the frontier remained undefined.¹

The basic idea of Moroccan territorial claims was that sizeable parts of the 19th century Sherifian empire which France occupied in 1912 had been "purely and simply attached to the administrative zone of the Algerian south and south-west". On geographical scale, Moroccan irredentism was made clearer by the map of greater Morocco issued in November 1955 by Allal Al Fasi the leader of the Istiqlal party. See Map IV 2. According to this plan, Morocco's historic frontiers did not rest on geography or politics but on traditional islamic concepts by which a territory is defined on the basis of allegiance of the community of believers (umma) to the spiritual leadership (Dar al Islam). Consequently, the present borders of Morocco should be extended to conform to the historical frontiers of the Sherifian kingdom and would then include the vallees of Saoura and Tindouf in Algeria; Mauritania; Timbuctu in Mali and the Western (Spanish) Sahara. The claims made by King Hassan corresponded to the limitations indicated in Fasi's map although it had not been acknowledged officially as such.

As with Morocco, the frontiers of Algeria with Tunisia, Libya, Niger and Mali had been demarcated in the time of French colonisation. Tunisia's southernmost point was kilometre stone 222 as fixed by the French administration. In 1957, President Bourguiba claimed rights over the uninhabited desert south of the line between Fort Saint (222) and Bir Romane and proposed an extension of his country's territory south from Bir Romane to about 30° N on the parallel near marker 233 south of Ghadames. In his plans the prolongation of Tunisia's territory about 35 kilometres west of marker 222 would give Tunisia a greater access to El Borma oilfield in the same area. As in the case of Morocco, the oil

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prospects and mineral deposits which the Sahara was believed to be well endowed with, had urged Algeria's neighbours to make claims so as to obtain a share in this promising wealth.

The Saharan borders in which Mali and Niger had been concerned were annexed by France on December 24, 1902 and were administered as units of the "territoires du Sud Algérien". In June 1905, the French authorities formally separated the territories from French West Africa and on June 20, 1909 a line between Algeria and Niger on the one hand and with Mauritania on the other was defined by a convention known as the Niamey convention.

With Libya, the Franco-Turkish convention of May 19, 1910 provided for the delimitation of the 35 kilometres long section frontier which stretched from Port Saint mark 220 to southwest Ghadames (mark 233). The treaty of friendship signed by the French government and the Libyan kingdom in October 1955 confirmed this alignment and delineated the section between Ghadames and Ghat which was delimited with more details in the exchange of letters of December 26, 1956 between the French government and the Libyan Prime Minister. However beyond Ghat, the line stretching southward to the Niger Tripoint still remained on terms which were not clearly dealt with in the exchange of notes of September 12, 1919 between the French government and Italy which was then in control of Libya. Against the claims made by Morocco and Tunisia especially, the Algerian leaders had shown no disposition to question the delimitation of her frontiers on two distinct levels:

emotionally: the Algerians referred to the historical fact that Algeria existed as a distinct entity under Numidia and during the Turkish rule as a territorial ensemble geographically similar to the present
Despite its unclear legal connotations, this argument rests on subjective feelings given the lack of historical evidence and the inexistence of Algeria as a distinct nation-state unit for much of its pre-ottoman era. According to the Algerian leaders, the symbolic but sacred value of the principle of Algeria's territorial integrity and state security was inherent in the heavy price the Algerian people paid to revive its nation and restore its state in a historically determined territory. Combining rhetoric and firmness, Bouteflika declared: "It has been historically established that Algeria's present frontiers have been historically the blood of almost one and a half million martyrs. It also happened that the atrocities of the war were prolonged in Algeria because of the fundamental problem of the integrity of our territory. These are questions that no authority can tackle without bearing prejudice to the principle defining an independent and sovereign state."¹

As it appears the intimate link between the state and its boundaries is well established as it constituted the raison d'être for independence and sovereignty and the framework for nation-state building. In their experience of an independent country, the Algerians came to realize that neither the consolidation of the state nor the cohesion of the nation could be ensured without the search for maximising national security and territorial integrity. For a leadership which was fighting for the revival of the Algerian nation and for restoring the Algerian state and for a new country that had emerged to ensure these tasks, territorial integrity became the fundamental pillar to embody both the nation and the state. These motivations had been in fact the crux of Algeria's existence as such and not a mere selfishness or arrogance of having inherited a

vast territory well endowed with natural resources and human potential for which she was accused by Morocco and Tunisia. It was out of the nation-state perceptions that Algerian nationalism, which had been built on ideological considerations, takes its material basis and form. On this ground one clearly understands why "frontiers are the razor's edge on which hang suspended the modern issues of war or peace, of life or death to nations ... just as the protection of the home is the most vital care of the private citizens, so the integrity of her border is the condition of the existence of the state."\(^1\) It was precisely this form of existence that the Algerians came to defend with persistence and determination ever since they embarked upon the struggle for independence.

**legally:** the principle Algeria defended was the respect for the inviolability of the frontiers inherited from colonialism which was consecrated for Africa with the signing of the OAU charter in April 1963. The implicit assumption was to keep the boundaries traced in colonial times in order not to create scrambles from reviving old territorial claims. In these views, the feeling was that attempts to remedy the haphazard demarcation of boundaries may lead to a multitude of conflicts which may jeopardise the newly gained independence of a number of African countries. Realism then prevailed over considerations as all the OAU member states subscribed to the inviolability of frontiers with the exceptions notably of Morocco which had made firm reserves on the basis of its territorial irredention and opposition to the 'uti posidetis' principle consecrated by the OAU.\(^2\) For the Algerians, the infringement


\(^2\)For Moroccan legal conceptions, see Maazouzi, M: L'Algérie et les étapes successives de l'amputation du territoire
of the principle would only have negative implications on other African states as well. As Bouteflika put it: "to wish to impose unilaterally the least revision of the Algerian-Moroccan border is without a doubt a precedent of an unfortunate jurisprudence for the future of many African states."^3

On the basis of combing legal argument with concerns of nationhood, Algeria had always expressed her support for the inviolability of frontiers and thus to the state's territorial integrity in cases involving other countries. Therefore she expressed hostility to secessionist attempts such as those in Katanga or Biafra. In both cases, the Algerian leaders reaffirmed their support to the central governments and attacked African states which had recognized these secessionist movements lumping them with "imperialist plotters".4 Moreover, it was the hostility to territorial disintegration that explained Algeria's backing to Ethiopia's efforts to maintain its sovereignty over Eritrea and Ogaden regions as well her resentment to the separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971 or to the attempts of the Kurds to create their own country distinct from the rest of Iraq.

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Morocain (Dar El Kilab, Casablanca, 1976, 244p.), El Oauli, A: "L'uti-posidetis ou le non-sens du principe de base de l'OUA pour le règlement des différends territoriaux" (colloque Association Morocaine d'Etudes et de Recherches internationales" in collaboration with the department of public law, Casablanca, April 1984).
Recent turmoils in India and Sri Lanka were also disapproved of by the Algerian leaders, accusing the Sikhs and the Tamil of putting the territorial integrity of these two countries at risk.¹

When it came to preserving her own territorial integrity and state's security, Algeria's reaction was one of sheer intransigence and determination.

B. Preserving Algeria's status in the Maghreb

1. The defense of territorial integrity

The threats to Algeria's territorial integrity arose when during the war of liberation, France attempted to salvage her hold on the Sahara regardless of the political settlement of the Algerian question. This move came after the discovery of huge oil deposits in the Saharan desert, shortly after the beginning of the Algerian insurrection. Thus in order to secure this considerable wealth necessary for the energy independence of France, the French government tried to provide the Sahara with a status distinct from the rest of Algeria by creating on January 1957 the Ministry for the Sahara and the organization of the Saharan regions, OCRS.

The sudden riches of the Sahara lured the neighbouring countries and encouraged them to demand shares on the basis that France had in the past amputated their respective territories in favour of Algeria. Niger soon agreed to join the OCRS, thus helping France to internationalize the question of the Sahara.

¹For these criticisms see "La provocation Sikh, l'escalade Tamoule" in El-Moudjahid, May 14, 1985
As expected the FLN was adamant about preserving the total integrity of the Algerian territory and moved to seek international support in an effort to keep the Sahara under Algerian sovereignty and prevent it from being "a new Katanga." Several delegations were then sent to Rabat, Conakry, Bamako, Benghazi and Cairo to defend the principle of territorial integrity. These attempts were quite successful as in 1961 all of Mali, Ghana and Senegal approved of the Algerian request while at their meeting held in Yaounde in March 1961, the bloc of moderate African states (the Brazzaville group) rejected France's plan to keep the Sahara under French sovereignty.

The diplomatic offensive launched by the FLN resulted from the decision of the French government to keep the issue of the Sahara separate from the rest of the Algerian question during the negotiations it had with the GPRA in July 1961. These negotiations broke down following the insistence of the Algerian delegation that the Sahara is an integral part of Algeria and that it would not make any territorial concessions. The confrontation between the two sides was passionate and harsh as reflected by the clash between Saad Dahlab a member of the GPRA delegation and Louis Joxe France's chief negotiator. The argument developed by the latter was that the Sahara was created artificially by France and that it never had any connection with Algeria whether historically or geographically. To counter any attempt at partition the FLN called a general strike in Algeria in early July and the violence that erupted highlighted the bitter rivalry between the Algerian nationalists and the French government. Amid this conflict, President Bourguiba urged the latter to accept a rectification in the delimitation

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1El-Moudjahid, June 4, 1961.
of the Sahara to give Tunisia a share in the areas where oil discoveries were made. And in the aftermath of Bizerte crisis of July 1961 Tunisian troops moved to seize posts situated in the Algerian territory. However Bourguiba's attempts to revive his claims were doomed to failure with De Gaulle's acceptance of Algerian territorial integrity in return for privileged relations between France and independent Algeria as agreed upon at the final round of negotiations at Evian in March 1962.

On its part, Morocco informed the GPRA of its territorial demands but in contrast to Tunisia, it accepted an agreement with Farhat Abbas on July 6, 1961 through which it accepted the principle that the border dispute will be peacefully settled after Algeria's independence. See Document IV 3. But shortly after this event, contingents of the ALN moved to regain posts which Moroccan and Tunisian troops had occupied in order to enhance their bargaining position. The Moroccans had in fact occupied the main posts on the Bechar-Tindouf axis on the basis that their inhabitants had paid allegiance to the Moroccan King although voting in favour of Algerian independence during the July 1962 referendum. Moreover, King Hassan claimed that the Algerian troops killed all the members of a tribe in the Tindouf area who had expressed their Moroccanity, as well as 120 Moroccan nationals, despite the efforts of his envoys to Algiers to halt this fratricidal conflict.\(^{16}\) But for the Algerians, these incidents resulted from a manoeuvre to take over Tindouf while Algeria was facing a leadership crisis. Ben Bella then accused Morocco as well as Tunisia of trying to profit from his country's weaknesses so as to undermine the State foundations his regime was attempting to establish. Territorial claims made by these two countries

\(^{16}\) King Hassan: the challenge, p.83.
were bitterly resented by the Ben Bella government in the sense that they contributed to diverting its attention from crucial and acute domestic problems that followed the transfer of power from the colonial era. Therefore when Hassan came to Algiers in mid-March 1963 to remind of the agreement signed with the GPRA in 1961, Ben Bella was anxious to delay discussions over the border issue. He demanded from the Moroccan King time to set up state institutions and strengthen his power at home before opening any negotiations. In doing so, the Algerian leader was in fact only trying to delay indefinitely these negotiations, being determined not to make any territorial concessions. This determination explained his adamant refusal to respond to the call made in April 1963 by Niger's President Diori suggesting that Algeria should convene a conference of all the Saharan countries to lay the bases for their joint exploitation of the desert resources in collaboration with France. Moreover, Ben Bella demanded in May the postponement of the meeting of the Casablanca group scheduled to take place in Algiers in a deliberate attempt to avoid another confrontation with Morocco over the border question. Morocco's insistence, however, did not stop and tensions between the two sides mounted when, in August 1963, Algiers expelled hundreds of Moroccans residing in Algeria while Rabat replied by sending home a certain number of Algerian merchants. A hostile public and press campaign against each other followed with Ben Bella accusing the King of supporting the Kabyle rebellion against his regime. In early October, the Algerian government ordered its troops to dislodge the Moroccan forces who had occupied the posts of Hassi Beida and Tinjoub. Bloody skirmishes occurred amid exchanges of hateful accusations and criticisms, before appeals to negotiations were made.
Burdened by political dissidence at home and weakened by the lack of military capabilities of the Algerian army, Ben Bella favoured a negotiated solution to the border dispute but on the basis of the respect of the status-quo. His Foreign Minister met the Moroccan counterpart Guedira at Oujda on October 3 with the recommendation to reach an understanding with Morocco to avoid the continuation of the fratricidal clash between the two countries. At this conference Morocco agreed to withdraw its troops from the border, with the two sides accepting the normalization of relations, the principle of a meeting between Ben Bella and Hassan in Algiers in the near future and the setting up of a joint commission to discuss the frontier problems. But when this commission met at Oujda on October 15, the gap separating the positions of the two countries remained hard to bridge. Summoned by the Boumedienne-led General Staff, the Algerian delegates contended that a new frontier should be legalized in conformity with the map drawn during colonial times. Further negotiations took place at Marrakesh on October 17, however without success, because the Algerians refused a ceasefire which involved territorial concessions in favour of Morocco. Clashes between the troops of the two sides were resumed with greater severity and tenacity.

To halt this conflict, the Emperor of Ethiopia and then the President of Mali offered their good offices proposing direct negotiations between the leaders of the two belligerent countries. After hesitating, Ben Bella finally agreed to hold talks with King Hassan. The meeting which took place in Bamako on October 19-20 under the auspices of Haile Selassie and Modibo Keita, resulted in the acceptance by Algeria and Morocco of a series of recommendations, the most important being: an
immediate ceasefire, a demilitarized zone between the two countries, and the convening of an emergency meeting of the OAU council of Ministers with the mission to set up a commission that would make proposals for settling the dispute. As scheduled the meeting was held in Addis Ababa on November 15-18 and an ad hoc commission was set up with representatives from three radical countries: Mali, Sudan and Tanganyka and three moderates: Ethiopia, Ivory-Coast and Senegal.

Apparently the commission succeeded in convincing Algeria and Morocco to end hostilities and attenuate the tension which resulted from their border disputes. Indeed in early December the two countries resumed diplomatic relations but Algeria postponed the exchange of Ambassadors demanding first the withdrawal of Moroccan troops from Hassi-Baida and Tinjoub. After a series of negotiations, an agreement was reached on February 20, 1964 by which Algeria agreed to withdraw her troops from the Moroccan town Figuig in exchange for the return of the Royal forces to the positions they held before October 1, 1963. Moreover, the area around Figuig was to be demilitarized and a no-man's land was to be established along the common border with the help of the OAU ad hoc committee. On May 29 a joint commission set up at an Ambassadorial level met and announced that the two sides had agreed to resume free passage of persons across the common border, to let nationals of the two countries who had been expelled during the October 1963 hostilities return to their previous residences and to compensate those who had been victims of expulsion measures.

This new climate in Algerian-Moroccan relations was also possible with the desire of Ben Bella to ease tensions in the Maghreb in anticipation of the Afro-Asian conference Algiers was to host in
mid-1965. Thus he accredited a new Ambassador to Rabat (Ferhat Hamida) and succeeded in bringing the Moroccan government to sign a trade and customs treaty on November 25 with the promise to exploit jointly the raw materials around the adjacent Saharan area under dispute. In emphasizing economic cooperation, the Algerian president was anxious to dispel Morocco's hostility to the territorial status quo as he was convinced what this country and Tunisia had in fact eyed most had been only a mere share in the Saharan wealth. In this context of detente, Ben Bella and Hassan met at Saida on May 12, 1965 being determined as they claimed to maintain this new spirit and new relationships.

After Ben Bella's downfall in June 1965, both Morocco and Tunisia made pressing demands on the new Algerian regime to enter negotiations over the border issue. However, Boumédiène began to show a firmer attitude than his predecessor since he reaffirmed on many occasions the sacred character of Algeria's territorial integrity thus rejecting any attempts that aimed at altering the demarcation of Algeria's frontiers inherited from the colonial period. The nationalization of all iron-ore mines on May 8 1966 left no doubt over his determination to preserve Algerian sovereignty over the territory claimed by Tunis or Rabat. And to protect the newly nationalized mines in the Tindouf area, the Algerian troops carried out imposing military manoeuvres around Merkala.

Immediately after, the Moroccan government accused Algeria of occupying parts of the demilitarized zone in violation of the October 1963 ceasefire agreements. Apparently the Algerians were not impressed with Hassan's declaration on May 18 that his country would not renounce its rights and promptly turned down his demands for revising their measures of nationalization, carried by Moroccan envoys to Algiers on May 20.
However, the fact that Morocco denied rumours of a visit made to Rabat by Major Zerguini a close aide of Boumedienne attested the effect of Algeria's strength and intransigence on the Moroccan leadership. In fact the latter abstained from adopting an aggressive attitude, preferring instead a meeting of the OAU ad hoc commission to discuss the new developments in its border dispute with Algeria.

The commission met at Addis on May 30, but no progress was made as the Algerians refused to enter any negotiations involving their country's territorial integrity and security. And not surprisingly, they opposed a proposal made in August to attend a summit conference with Morocco and three members of the OAU ad hoc committee.

Nevertheless, the irredentist claims of Morocco and Tunisia remained unalterable. In early January 1967 unsuccessful negotiations took place between military delegations from Algeria and Tunisia and in March an acute tension with Morocco arose following severe criticisms made by King Hassan against Algeria. This new controversy -highlighting a sharp rivalry between Algeria and Morocco with regard to supremacy on the regional level - came with Morocco's fears of an increase in Algeria's economic power and military capabilities as Hassan demanded a control by the United Nations of arms potentials in the Maghrebi countries. This initiative was deplored by the Foreign Minister Bouteflika, as the Algerians were anxious to strengthen their military potential in the face of Morocco's irredentist claims.

To divert the attention from this issue and avoid discussing the border problem, the Algerians carefully placed the confrontation with Rabat and Tunis on ideological ground opposing their socialist experience.

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1Speech's excerpts quoted in Le Monde March 5, 1967.
to the tyranny of feudal Morocco and reactionary Tunisia. They also attacked the relations existing between Rabat and Tunis and the USA and accused Washington of building bases in the neighbouring countries "directly menacing Algeria's security". The Algerians did not miss the occasion to depict the US as a crucial element in the plot fomented against the Algerian revolution since relations between Algiers and Washington were in a doldrum following the partial nationalization of American oil interests in Algeria and the failure to conclude a deal over wheat. The polarisation of the Maghreb around ideological divergences and border disputes was aggravated by the radical foreign policy Algeria followed in contradiction with the standpoints of her neighbours. Boumedienne attended the summit conference of the Heads of progressive African states in Cairo in April and Algiers hosted a meeting of African revolutionary parties in May. On his part King Hassan visited Washington in February, Teheran and Riyadh in May.

These ideological cleavages led each Maghrebi country to express support to the opposition movement of the other. King Hassan publicly paid a tribute to Khider who was assassinated in Madrid perhaps under Boumedienne's orders and welcomed Krim Belkacem, another opponent of the Algerian regime, in Casablanca in October 1967. President Bourguiba granted asylum to Colonel Tahar Zbiri after the latter's aborted coup against Boumedienne in December 1967. In reprisal, Algeria gave formal support to the Moroccan opposition and made allegations on the King's responsibility for the assassination in France of the Moroccan leftwing militant Mehdi Ben Barka.

There was no doubt that the Algerian regime bore the hostilities of the Moroccan and Tunisian regimes with a great deal of impatience and annoyance as it found itself unnecessarily diverted from carrying out the tasks of national economic development. The acuity of domestic issues were at that time the prevailing concern of the Boumediene leadership since its political legitimacy at home was yet to be established and the conflict with France over oil and gas resources had just begun.

2. The search for the settlement of the border disputes

By 1969, Boumediene had succeeded in eliminating political forces hostile to his regime through purging the state apparatuses of Benbellist sympathisers and leftist technocrats as well as the army of ex-maquisards, many of whom disliked Morocco and Tunisia for their political conservatism. With the impulse of the technocratic team led by Abdeslam the Minister of economy, the Algerian leader moved to ease tension with Algeria's neighbours being convinced that an armed conflict with Morocco in particular would disrupt the country's ambitious economic development plan. Moreover as the oil conflict with France was crucial for the country's economic take-off, the technocratic group insisted on the preservation of national energies and the concentration of the government on the mobilization of the necessary resources. Abdeslam's argument was that an increase in Algeria's economic power would act as a capability in the country's dealings with its neighbours as economic supremacy would enhance its status in North Africa. Therefore, Boumediene began to show a less hostile attitude to the Moroccan and Tunisian regimes by adopting a global strategy that meant a halt in Algeria's support to the
opposition movements in these countries and an increase of intra-Maghrebi economic cooperation to make a detente in the Maghreb effective and lasting.

This diplomatic overture led Bouteflika to visit Tripoli in February 1969 and obtain the signature of a friendship treaty and in August he was able to conclude an agreement with the Libyans settling the frontier problem between the two countries. The official visit the Libyan Crown Prince Reda paid to Algiers in April was conceived by the Algerians as an evidence of their good will to ensure stability in the Maghreb and as an impetus for the further improvement of relations with Mauritania and Tunisia. With Mali, the visit of President Traore in late January 1970 marked the consolidation of relationships between the two countries and their determination to take practical steps to demarcate the common boundary.

In contrast, this "offensive de charme" proved less easy with Tunisia because of the long time frontier dispute and hostilities between the two regimes. It was not until June 1, 1970 that the agreement signed in May 1967 came to force as Bouteflika succeeded in inducing the Tunisians to accept a treaty of friendship and good neighbourliness valid for twenty years. Bourguiba in fact had hesitated to respond to Algerian offers of economic advantages in return for his abandonment of territorial claims but finally conceded to this formula because of his country's need for foreign revenues that would result from a share in Algeria's gas exports to Italy through the Tunisian territory. In addition, being squeezed between two powerful neighbours and threatened by the ambitions of Qalhafi who took power in Libya in 1969, little Tunisia had little choice.

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1 Boumedienne speech in the address of Prince Reda, April 10, 1969 in les Discours, (2), pp.307-308.
but engage in a rapprochement with Algeria while maintaining friendly relations with Libya as it lacked capabilities to play off Algiers against Tripoli especially when these two sides were coordinating their policies within the OPEC organization in spite of their rivalry for the leadership mantle in North Africa. Against this background Boumediene and Bourguiba exchanged state visits in April and May 1972 to symbolize détente in the Maghreb.

Having resolved her problem with Tunisia the weaker side in comparison with other Maghrebi states, Algeria turned her attention to Morocco. The first step was to switch off support to the Moroccan opponents of King Hassan, in contrast to Qaddafi who depicted the Monarchy as a target of Libya's revolutionary Panarabism. The second step was the contribution to the Moroccan-Mauritanian rapprochement which resulted in the official recognition of the independence of Mauritania by Morocco in 1969. The Algerian leadership regarded the latter's abandoning of territorial claims over Mauritania as the triumph of realism on the basis of the respect of the OAU's principle of the inviolability of frontiers. But conversely, the Algerians were afraid that the settlement of the dispute between Rabat and Nouakchott would provide King Hassan with more incentives to concentrate his claims over parts of the Algerian territory and the Spanish Sahara.

To anticipate this possibility Boumediene attempted to lure Hassan with the assurance of non-interference in Moroccan domestic affairs and with the benefits Morocco could muster through an economic cooperation with Algeria. In mid-January 1969, the two leaders met at Ifrane where they agreed on a treaty of peace, brotherhood, good neighbourliness and cooperation dictated by "the long-standing historical ties between the
two countries and two peoples". On his side, Hassan proposed to drop his territorial claims in return for Algeria's endorsement of his claims over the Western Sahara. Apparently he wanted to push Boumediene into a settlement that would favour the Moroccan stand probably because he expected to reach an agreement with the Spanish government with whom he was having contacts at high levels. But having seemingly failed in his bargain with Madrid, King Hassan had no better choice but to seek an understanding with Algeria with regard to the border dispute and over the Spanish Sahara. Evidently Boumediene was not prepared to let Morocco outmanoeuvre Algeria on the issue of the decolonization of this territory and hurried to respond to Hassan's offer of dialogue. The two leaders met at Tlemcen on May 27 and then at Nouadhibou in September along with the Mauritanian president Ould Daddah in an apparent friendly atmosphere.

But behind the euphoria of such encounters, mutual suspicion was not completely alleviated. Unlike Boumediene, domestic pressures on Hassan were intense in the sense that he could neither force the issue through an armed conflict with Algeria or with Spain nor could he make more concessions without putting his own crown in jeopardy. In the context of discontent in the army, increase of partisanship activities against the palace, Hassan's room for manoeuvre seemed very limited. Boumediene was aware of that and intended to benefit from the King's dilemma. Thus at the Tlemcen meeting of May 1970, an agreement favourable to Algeria was


reached as the two sides agreed to set up a mixed commission to demarcate the common frontier from Figuig to Tindouf it being understood that the definitive line would not alter the de facto border. Thus Algeria's control over the Gara-Djebilet mines was established although the two parties agreed to exploit jointly its mineral resources. This agreement was signed by the two leaders in Rabat on June 15, 1972 during the OAU summit held in the Moroccan capital. Boumedienne was amply satisfied with this accord and did not miss the opportunity to use the framework of the Panafriican organization to stress the solemnity of the ratification of these conventions. And in return for Moroccan concessions, the Algerian president promised to aid the King in forcing Spain to proceed to the decolonization of the Western Sahara. However Boumedienne's optimism did not last since the ratification of this convention by the Moroccan parliament was delayed indefinitely because of mounting pressures from Moroccan military establishment and opposition parties generally hostile to Algeria. Indeed Hassan escaped an assassination attempt on August 16, 1972, less than a year after the aborted coup of Skhirat of June 1971. Boumedienne realized the implications of these pressures on Algerian-Moroccan relations as he became aware that a change of the regime in Rabat might bring a more radical leadership which would be more intransigent over the border issue than King Hassan. Thus, Boumedienne was among the first to greet Hassan after he escaped the assassination attempt.

To ensure a good relationship with Morocco and a détente in the Maghreb, Algeria displayed intensive efforts to increase economic cooperation with her neighbours as the emphasis on economic issues would help transcend border problems and political differences. In Algerian
conceptions, intra-Maghrebi cooperation did not mean regional economic integration but merely developing economic links on bilateral basis and setting up joint projects. Just like the unity of the Maghreb, the principle of regional integration was rejected by the Algerians on the grounds of the incompatibility between their own political orientations and economic model of development and those of their neighbours. To sustain their arguments, they referred to the failure of early attempts to bring about an institutional framework for regional economic integration. In 1966 the ministers of the four Maghrebi states established a Permanent Consultative Committee (CPCM) with headquarters in Tunis to work out a system of regional preference and agreed on coordinating national policies on exports and industrialization. To be effective and operational the CPCM was provided with a centre for industrial studies endowed with financial and technical assistance from a United Nations development programme. However, beyond marked differences in the political orientations of the various regimes, economic integration proved difficult since each of them feared that such an integrative process would disrupt its own economic programme and undermine its teething industries. This economic nationalism explained the reluctance to work for the shifting of trade barriers, duplicate industries and for subordinating domestic projects to supranational designs. More than her neighbours, Algeria refused to subscribe to the CPCM's recommendations on customs tariffs on the basis of state control over foreign capital. Thus, she refused to associate with either Moroccan or Tunisian industrial companies because their capital was largely dominated by foreign sources. In the conceptions of the minister of economy Abdeslam, a Maghrebi product or an industrial good is
Maghrebi when "at least half of its value comes from one of the three countries, should it concern the raw material itself or the additional value obtained after its transformation."¹

In the context of building a sound economic infrastructure and strengthening a nationally-oriented economic development, Algeria then did not accept the principle of regional integration because it might restrain her efforts to obtain foreign technology and assistance necessary for the implementation of capital intensive industries and to win markets for her hydrocarbons exports. Economic nationalism of the state technocracy seemed to have prevailed over unity ideals since this stratum believed that the country's economic potential would make Algeria the central power in the Maghreb and to achieve this objective Abdeslam's technocratic team relied upon the success of its economic experience and model which it conceived as a means to challenge liberal economic experiences carried out by Morocco and Tunisia.

Instead of regional integration, Algeria appealed for an increase in intra-Maghrebi trade on bilateral as well as multilateral basis and through the setting up of common economic projects which would enhance economic cooperation between the Maghreb countries without subordinating domestic economic sovereignty. Consequently the existence of the CPCM seemed fruitless as highlighted by the fact that its ministerial conference of July 20, 1970 which took place three years after the last ministerial session was itself delayed eight times.²

The most important joint project Algeria proposed was back in October 1964 concerning the construction of two gas pipelines, one to Sicilia through Tunisian territory and the other to France through Morocco and Spain. In return both of her neighbours were promised shares in the exported gas as well as financial inducements. However divergences and conflicts between Algeria and her partners as analysed earlier as well as tensions which occurred later severely impaired this project as only the pipeline to Sicilia was built and completed in 1983 after a long delay.

On bilateral basis Algeria's trade with her neighbours remained very low despite several agreements and despite the fact that by 1968, Algeria became Morocco's chief trading partner in Africa thanks to oil exports. With Tunisia nine economic conventions were signed in 1969 but were only partially implemented. Nevertheless, Algeria benefitted from the disposal of 400 Tunisian teachers and technicians in 1970, while a joint project concerning the building of a cement plant near Al Borma which was finally completed in late 1975.\(^1\) Most significant was Algeria helping Mauritania financially to create its own national currency (ouguiya), nationalize its steel company (Miferma) and revise its economic agreements with France. However the attempts to increase intra-Maghrebi cooperation after an era of detente in the Maghreb 1969-1973, were inevitably altered with conflicts between Algeria and her neighbours as crystallized by the Western Sahara conflict.

\(^1\) El-Djeich, August, 1975, p.14, also Jeune Afrique, May 6, 1972, pp.8-10.
C. The Lingering Impact of the Western Sahara conflict

1. Implications for Algeria's security and status

Until 1974, a Maghrebi consensus on the basis of the decolonization of the Western Sahara seemed to have been reached at the meetings between the leaders of Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania at Nouadhibou on September 14, 1970 and then at Agadir on July 23-24, 1973. But the consensus did not conceal the existence of disagreement over the future of this territory. Both Morocco and Mauritania attempted to bring the Spanish Sahara under their sovereignty on the basis of their historical claims while Algeria favoured the decolonization of this territory. Antagonism between the two sides sharpened and tension mounted when Boumedienne deliberately moved to undermine the efforts of King Hussain and Ould Daddah to acquire a hold over the Western Sahara. Critics of the Algerian regime argued that Boumedienne attempted to use the question of the Sahara as a subtle means to emerge as the champion of the peoples' right for self-determination so as to divert the attention of Algerians from pressing economic problems which became acute after the euphoria of the oil revenues boom of 1973-74. It was also reported that the Algerian president saw a good occasion to avenge the defeat of his army during the 1963 conflict. However, these arguments were less important in comparison to what it was believed were Boumedienne's conceptions that the establishment of an independent Saharawi state, closely linked to Algeria might provide the Algerians with a share in the Sahara's mineral resources and also with the long-desired corridor to the Atlantic.

Beyond these arguments lay the belief that Boumedienne's design was contrary to the formal engagement the Algerian president made earlier through which he was supposed to have given his blessings to the
partition of the Western Sahara between Mauritania and Morocco providing that the latter abandoned his claims to Algeria's territory. In a speech in November 1977, Boumedienne dismissed all these allegations and particularly the assumption that he had concluded a bargain with King Hassan over the Western Sahara. He stated that "the Moroccan King pretends on every occasion that I have a commitment with him. The truth is that I never had mercantile intentions vis-a-vis a just cause based on sacred principles. I am a militant and not a corrupt politician."  

Officially the Algerian government made clear that he had no claim whatsoever on this territory and regarded its issue as exclusively relevant to the decolonization principle to which Algeria had always subscribed. And the support to the Polisario Front which was fighting for the independence of the Sahara, it was claimed, stemmed from Algeria’s own experience of the war of liberation and from her adhesion to the people’s right to self-determination as framed in the United Nations charter.

The consideration whether the Western Sahara problem was a real issue of decolonization and whether the Polisario front was a genuine national liberation movement were not of vital importance in the eyes of Boumedienne since what mattered most was perhaps to deny Morocco a source of power that might enable it to challenge Algeria's territorial integrity and status in the area. Against this background, the diametrically opposed attitudes of Algeria and Morocco over the Western Sahara highlighted that their rivalry has not been ideological as much as a struggle for power and supremacy - be it economic or military. Thus

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1 Important speech given on November 14, 1977 on the occasion of nominating Colonel Yahouli Head of the FLN, (in Les discours du Président, (8), p.46.
Algeria's major concern has been the fear that Morocco having completed its take-over of the Saharan territory would revive its old claims over the Tindouf area, this time in a much better position than before. In this vein, the perceived danger was that the take-over of this territory would provide Morocco with a power configuration that would surpass Algeria's economic and military capabilities in the foreseeable future. The possibility proved likely when in the aftermath of the 1973-74 energy crisis, Morocco became the world's major exporter of phosphates as its annual production increased to 18 million tonnes and its exports rose from $150 million to more than $1 billion. It was perhaps evident in Boumedienne's conceptions that with the huge mineral resources of the Western Sahara, Morocco's economic prospects would become brighter than before and thus seriously challenge Algeria's well-established economic supremacy in the Maghreb.\(^1\)

The preservation of Algeria's integrity and centrality in the Maghreb have been the reasons behind the support of her leadership to the decolonization of the Western Sahara ever since she became independent. Indeed, Bouteflika handed a memorandum on the decolonization of this territory before the meeting of the OAU's liberation committee held in Addis in 1963 and in November 1965, the Algerian delegate to the United Nations Bouattoura considered the future of Spanish Sahara "of vital interest to Algeria and to the stability in North Africa."\(^2\) There was no doubt that in Algerian views, decolonization should in no case

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\(^1\) With the inclusion of the Sahara, Morocco would control nearly 75 per cent of current world reserves of phosphates.

"jeopardize the balance of power in this region."\(^1\) The implicit concern had been to prevent Morocco from gaining a substantial territorial advantage had Spain decided to proceed to the decolonization of her Saharan colony. Already in March 1967, the Algerian government attempted (through contacts between Bouttoura and the Spanish Ambassador to Algiers) to induce the Spanish government to proceed to a referendum vote in its Saharan territory. At the same time it sought and received support from Mauritania in this enterprise following the strengthening of relations between Algiers and Nouakchott as President Ould Daddah was seeking Algeria's backing in his efforts to obtain the recognition of the independence of his country by Morocco. Obviously, the Algerians wished the issue to be settled in line with a referendum conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. Thus they gave a warm welcome to the initiative of its Secretary-General when he visited Algiers, Rabat, Nouakchott and Madrid in 1975. In parallel, they maintained contacts with Morocco and Mauritania thus confirming Algeria's desire to keep dialogue and concentration going in the hope of seeing this issue solved through peaceful means. Therefore on July 2-4, 1975, Bouteflika made a trip to Rabat to ensure understanding with Morocco on the basis of the resolution endorsed by the two countries over the Western Sahara and on the principle of strengthening detente in the Maghreb. See Document IV 5. Despite these basic assumptions, the context of the talks between Bouteflika and King Hassan still remains unclear but many political observers believed that the Algerian Foreign Minister approved of the

\(^1\)Declaration of Algeria's representative to the United Nations A. Rahal before the meeting of the Security Council, October 22, 1977 in 'Résolution sur le Sahara occidental (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algiers), p.20.
partition of the former Spanish colony between Morocco and Mauritania in return for the ratification by Morocco of a previous agreement by which it accepted the de facto delimitation of the common border.

However, in face of King Hassan's desire to bring the whole of the Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty, the Algerian president disapproved of the efforts of his foreign minister to ensure a compromise and a certain equilibrium with Morocco. In response to the discreet negotiations Hassan was conducting with the Spanish government, Boumedienne charged Beijaoui his ambassador to Paris to defend the right of the Saharawi people for self-determination before the international court which both Morocco and Mauritania had asked to decide whether the Sahara had been a res nullius (belonging to no-one) at the time of Spain's colonization. Boumedienne certainly feared Hassan's option for outmanoeuvring Algeria on the diplomatic and legal front, although the Moroccan King Solemnly declared that he would respect the court's verdict. Thus, he moved to set contacts with other members of the Spanish government which favoured the principle of a referendum in the Sahara. It was then with Boumedienne's blessings that a secret meeting took place in Algiers on September 9 between the Polisario's Secretary-General Sayed Al Ouali and Cortina Y Mauri the Spanish foreign minister who was in opposition to the Moroccan lobby led by Arrias Navarro the Prime Minister and Jose Solis, the President of the right-wing "movimiento nacional". Apparently, Boumedienne expected his diplomatic game to succeed, especially after the boost given by the verdict the international court issued on October 16 which stated that although there had been legal ties of allegiance between some Western Sahara tribes and Morocco and Mauritania, these ties did not amount to
establishing their territorial sovereignty. But his tactics soon received a blow when King Hassan announced on October 21, his intention to organize the 'Green March' a peaceful march into the Sahara to back up Morocco's claims. Indeed, when 350,000 excited marchers started their move, Boumedienne realized that the process of annexation of the Sahara by Morocco was underway. His immediate reaction was to declare that the march was in violation of international law as well as to summon Ould Daddah to come to Algiers (on October 25) in an attempt to prevent Mauritania from joining the Moroccan enterprise, but in vain. More important, he decided to expel about 35,000 Moroccans in reprisals and in an apparent effort to induce the Spanish government to put pressures on Morocco to give up attempts to take over the Western Sahara, he despatched to Madrid the Home Minister Abdeighani and Hoffman a high professional officer. This initiative came after Hassan had called off the Green March and in anticipation of the possibility that Morocco might reach unilateral agreement with Spain at the expense of Algeria. This fear became real when it was announced on November 14 that Spain agreed to relinquish its former Saharan territory to both Morocco and Mauritania, a move that was deeply resented by Boumedienne constituting perhaps an evidence of the failure of his own diplomatic strategy. See Document IV 6. But in order to deny King Hassan a resounding political victory, he declared that "under no circumstances will Algeria be prepared to endorse the 'fait accompli'"¹ and refused to give a hearing to the Spanish envoy Gutierrez Como who flew to Algiers to explain the Madrid agreement.

2. The politics of the war of attrition

The underlying tactics if decided were to sustain a war of attrition which would wear Morocco out and force it to withdraw from the Western Sahara and accept the principle of a referendum supervised by the United Nations. This strategy assumed that Algeria could sustain this war better than Morocco given her greater military power and economic capabilities as well as her international prestige. And in contrast to Morocco, she could conceal this type of war behind the widely accepted principle of the people's right for self-determination which was consecrated by the United Nations and made by the non-aligned movement as one of its five fundamental theoretical pillars. Under this proclaimed principle, the Algerians were able to undergo a war by proxy by combining a constant and unflagging support to the fight waged by the Polisario front with intensive diplomatic lobbying to help ensure the right of the Saharawis to determine freely the future of their country.

Against Moroccan allegations that the Polisario front was a pure Algerian creation the Algerians presented it as a genuine national liberation movement with its own political direction, guerrilla forces and as the only legitimate representation of the Saharawi people as it was recognized as such by the Saharawi tribal assembly, the Yemaa on November 28, 1975.

From late 1975, Algeria offered shelter and assistance to what she evaluated as being 100,000 Saharawi refugees gathered in a camp near Tindouf and provided the Saharawi nationalist movement with offices in Algiers, radio broadcasting facilities and massive diplomatic and military support. It is practically impossible to evaluate this aid because of the relatively well-kept secrecy but there is little doubt
that she had injected the Polisario front with substantial part of Soviet-built armaments, ample logistic aid and training for its guerrillas.

The risk of an all-out war with Morocco was reached when the troops of the two countries were engaged in bloody skirmishes at Amghala, 180 miles inside the Western Sahara in January and February 1976. If these clashes did not bring the two countries on the brink of war, the realism shown by both Boumedienne and Hassan attested that neither of them could win had they embarked upon an armed conflict. This basic evidence led them to continue the policy of attrition since each side was convinced that not only it was backing a just cause but that time was running in its favour.

While supporting the guerrilla activities of the Polisario front against Moroccan positions in the Sahara and military as well as economic targets in Mauritania, the Algerians attempted to put pressure on the Spanish government to scrap the November 1975 Madrid agreement and carry out its duties of ex-colonial power by holding a referendum in its former territory. The leverage used on Madrid was the declared assistance given to the movement for the liberation of the Canary Islands, MPAIAC and the threats to halt energy exports to Spain. But neither of these means appeared to have changed the Spanish attitude as Algeria failed to obtain the recognition of the MPAIAC by the OAU while Saudi Arabia offered Spain to compensate for the defection of the Algerian source of oil supplies. This aggressive attitude led to a freeze in Algeria's relations with Spain as the Spanish government decided to recall its
Ambassador from Algiers in December 1977. As a result trade relations between the two countries deteriorated as highlighted by their conflict over the gas issue.

Tensions which involved Algeria with Morocco were not, however, confined to a bilateral level but were aggravated by Tunisia's alignment with the latter's position. When Tunisia declared its support for Morocco, Boumedienne was convinced of the existence of a French-backed Moroccan-Tunisian axis directed at undermining the foundations of the Algerian regime. This certainly was the real reason behind the annoyance of the Algerian leader at the declarations made by the Tunisian government offering to mediate between them and the Moroccans. President Bourguiba in fact had neither recognized the RASD nor believed in the genuineness of the Algerian support to the Saharawi's right for self-determination. Given these accusations, hatred between Boumedienne and Bourguiba came to surface again as the distrust of the Algerian leader of the latter increased, when during a visit to Tunis on January 15-16, 1978, Boumedienne failed to induce the Tunisian government to condemn French intervention in the Sahara and to cancel the visit that the French Chief of Staff Guy Mery was to pay to Tunis.¹

The Tunisian government was probably alarmed by the close relationship Algeria enjoyed with Libya, especially as Qadhafi never dropped his attempts to destabilize Tunisia after the short-lived Libyan-Tunisian fusion in 1974. In fact, Boumedienne, fearing a French-backed alliance between Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia directed against Algeria, moved to cultivate close links with Libya. Being isolated in the Arab world and at odds with the super-powers because of their positions favouring the

¹See revelations made by Colonel Qadhafi to Jeune Afrique, May 2, 1982, pp.52-3.
Moroccan side, the Algerian leadership inevitably turned to the Libyans. Under the impulse of the Panarabist group led by Colonel Yahaoui, the Algerian President met Qadhafi on several occasions and on 29 December 1975 both agreed to sign a mutual defense treaty. Such an unexpected move denoted that the threats on Algeria's security were so strong that Boumedienne felt inclined to accept this treaty notwithstanding the mutual suspicion between Algeria and Libya and the moody nature and excessive ambitions of Colonel Qadhafi. But the Algerian President intended to use this pact as a means of deterrence capable of refraining hostilities that might come from what he regarded as the trilateral alliance Paris-Rabat-Tunis against the Algerian revolution. The defensive purpose he attempted to make of this treaty was confirmed in the wake of the Libyan-Egyptian conflict of Summer 1977. Boumedienne flew to Tripoli and Alexandria on July 24-26 more in an attempt to ensure a peace between the belligerent countries than on defending the Libyan cause as Qadhafi had expected. This dissonance did not fail to stir up the latent rivalry existing between the two leaders with regard to the leadership mantle of North Africa and to its future. The Libyans in fact did not encourage the establishment of an independent Saharawi state so as to prevent the fragmentation of the Arab Nation. The support they gave to the Saharawi movement aimed mainly at destabilizing the Moroccan regime and in contrast to Algiers, they attempted to incite the Saharawi to set up a federal state with Mauritania which would benefit from Libyan financial assistance and protection. And to push forward his unionist project, Qadhafi moved to strengthen the position of the pro-Libyan faction within the Saharawi movement and tried to lure the Mauritanian president whom he invited to visit Tripoli on April 13-14, 1978. The
Algerians reacted angrily to these manoeuvres but carefully avoiding a controversy that might lead them to lose a valuable ally. Such tactics were necessary to maintain Libyan financial support to the Polisario front, a matter that had considerably helped to alleviate the heavy burden on Algeria.\(^1\) On his side, Qadhafi was aware that he could not sustain a revolutionary foreign policy nor a confrontation with France over the Chad issue without Algeria's support. This convergence of interests was reflected by Qadhafi's visit to Algiers on May 30-June 6, 1978 and by the attempts of the two sides to coordinate their foreign policies.\(^2\) Both participated in the setting up of the Arab rejectionist front in opposition to President Sadat's separate peace agreement with Israel and both showed a hostile attitude to the policies of Giscard's France in North Africa.

In her efforts to maintain an alliance with Libya on defensive terms and with the assurance to respect their territorial integrity and political orientations, Algeria succeeded in dissipating partly the fears of her other neighbouring countries Niger and Mali which had for some time suspected Algiers of endorsing Tripoli's attempts to spread radical influence in Sub-Saharan Africa. Given Boumedienne's commitment, Niger's President Kountche participated in the summit gathering Boumedienne and Qadhafi at Ouargla in April 1976 and at Tripoli in November, aimed at maintaining dialogue between the Saharan states and increasing their cooperation. The Malian leader Traore joined these efforts at the next summit conference held at Niamey in March 1977.

\(^{1}\)Libya granted Algeria $1 billion in December 1978 (see Valeurs actuelles, (Paris), January 8, 1979).

\(^{2}\)The joint communique stated the "total condemnation of neo-colonial military intervention in the Sahara, Shaba and Chad" in Afrique-Asie, June 20, 1975, p.21.
Nevertheless, if Boumedienne succeeded in preventing the efforts of Morocco to turn Mali and Niger against the Algerian-Libyan alliance, the intensive efforts to gather international support for the Saharan cause as a means to alter the 'fait accompli' did not live up to the expectations of the Algerian leadership. After the reluctance of the Arab league to discuss the Western Sahara question and the hesitations of the United Nations to push Spain to proceed to the decolonization of its former colony, the Algerians attempted to get recognition of the Polisario front by the OAU since they believed they had better credentials in African affairs than Morocco. However, by mid-1980, the Polisario front was recognized by only 40 states and its self-proclaimed RASD was consistently refused admission into the OAU.1 At the meeting of the Heads of State convened in Mauritius in July 1976, the RASD received 29 votes against 9 and 16 abstentions while the special summit which they agreed to hold in Lusaka was indefinitely postponed because of pressures from Morocco and its moderate African supporters, Gabon, Ivory-Coast, Senegal and Zaire in particular. Moreover, thanks to this support Morocco was able to undermine the proceedings of the November 1978 meeting of the ad hoc committee set up by the OAU at its summit conference held in Khartum in July with the mission to seek a solution compatible with the principle of self-determination.

With the failure of the policy to alter the 'fait accompli' whether militarily or diplomatically, discontent against Boumedienne's policies increased. Bouteflika and a number of moderate ministers resented the relative diplomatic isolation of Algeria which resulted from her intransigence over the Saharan issue, while the Abdeslam-led technocratic

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123 of which were Africans.
group seemed to disapprove of the substantial drain of Algerian financial potential especially. Moreover discontent among large segments of the Algerian people did not help Boumedienne sustain a firm attitude toward Morocco without showing at least a certain disposition to ease tensions through diplomatic contacts with Morocco. These considerations led the Algerian president to engage a dialogue with Morocco as he charged his adviser Taleb-Ibrahimi to conduct contacts with Moroccan personalities and officials. Negotiations were also carried out between the Polisario front and the Moroccan officials at Ifran in August and September 1977. A secret meeting between Bouteflika and Reda Guedira the King's adviser took place in Geneva on July 2, 1978 to make preparation for a summit between Boumedienne and Hassan but the illness of the former and then his death in December impaired the possibility of such a meeting. However, had it taken place such an encounter would probably not have broken the deadlock over the Saharan problem since the Algerian president was willing to envisage any solution except one repudiating the right of the Saharawi people for self-determination.

After the death of Boumedienne, the Algerian leadership maintained a firm support for the Polisario front, thus shattering Hassan's hopes that a change of the regime in Algeria would bring a shift in this country's stand over the Western Sahara. Morocco's overture to Algeria started with King Hassan sending a delegation to attend Boumedienne's funeral and a letter to Bouteflika to induce him to exercise power on President Chadli. And in a speech on August 30, 1979 he depicted Libya as his main enemy and called for a regional conference to discuss the Western Sahara. These gestures were turned down as President Chadli came under heavy pressures from the group of radicals within the military establishment and the fLN.
to maintain the strategy of the war of attrition initiated by Boumedienne. In their perceptions, this strategy was bound to succeed if not put staunch pressures on the Moroccan King even at the risk of an escalation of tensions between the two countries, because of the combination of four considerations favouring Algeria: 1) economic hardships and social unrest in Morocco; 2) the election to the OAU presidency of the Liberian leader William Tolbert believed more sympathetic to the Saharawi cause than his predecessors Omar Bongo of Gabon and Jaafar Nimeiry of Sudan; 3) a shift in the Spanish attitude vis-a-vis the Saharan problem as Madrid moved to improve her relations with Algeria and establish contacts with the Polisario front so as to

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1. The delegation sent to Boumedienne's funeral was refused entry while the Algerians accepted Fqih Basri a former member of the UNFP and a well known opponent to King Hassan, living in exile in Beyrouth. In his reply to Hassan's letter, Bouteflika reaffirmed Rabat's responsibility for a series of terrorist bombings in Western Algeria and in the despatch of arms to a group of Kabyle insurgents at Cap Sigli near Algiers (see Bouteflika's reply in L'Algérie et l'action internationale, Ministry of foreign affairs, February 1979).  
2. On the economic level, phosphates revenues amounted to only 1.4 billion Moroccan Dirhams in 1979 compared with MD 2.1 in 1978 (see Middle East Journal (57) July 1979). Under the headlines: "Morocco of struggles" and "Morocco: a desperate regime", the Algerian semi-official magazine made Morocco's military adventure in the Sahara responsible for riots in Casablanca in July 1981 and for the budget deficit of the state. According to their estimates, Morocco's forces had increased from 57,500 in 1971 to 120,000 in 1980 while military expenditure reached a $947 million in 1980, ten times more than the 1971 level ($95 million), see Algérie-Actualités, July 29, 1981, p.10 and Révolution Africaine, April 11-17, 1980, pp.40-45. Other sources believed that Morocco's military expenditure constituted in 1979, 45 per cent of the budget investments (Le Monde, April 15, 1979) and the cost of the war running at $500,000 a day (The Guardian, September 26, 1979), its debt service nearing 41 per cent in 1984 and its annual balance of payments deficit reaching $2 billion (Parker, B.B: appointment in Oujda in Foreign Affairs (3), 1985, pp.1095-1110).
preserve its economic interests in Algeria. In September 1978, Javier Ruperez a representative of the Central Democratic Union UCD attended the Polisario's fourth congress at which he announced the support of his government for the right of the Saharawi people for self-determination and later the Spanish Prime Minister Suarez came to Algiers and met with Ablaziz the leader of the Polisario front; 4) the rapprochement with France discussed in chapter III, was followed by a military coup in Mauritania in July 1978 fuelling rumours that France was behind this change of regime with Algeria's blessings and perhaps formal complicity. The departure of Ould Daddah left the Algerians with a good opportunity to encourage the new ruling committee in its attempts to demarcate itself from Morocco and settle its differences with the Polisario front. Being economically poor, and militarily weak, Mauritania could not resist their pressures or the repeated attacks of the Polisario guerrillas notably on the country's vital economic centres: the Zouerate iron-ore mines and the Zouerate-Noualhibou rail link. Consequently the Mauritanian military committee was brought to sign a peace treaty with the Saharawis under Algerian auspices on August 8, 1979 by which it accepted to relinquish its Western saharan share of Tiris Al Gharbia to the RASD, thus putting an end to the state of war between the two sides. See Document IV 7.

The jubilation of Algeria and the Polisario front was cut short when Morocco promptly moved its troops to take over the territory from which Mauritania had withdrawn. Shattered frustrations were felt by the Algerians and the Saharawis as they came to realize Morocco's staunch determination to pursue its Saharan venture.¹ Nevertheless, they gained

¹Benyahia, the Foreign Minister compared the Moroccan take-over to the policy of Anshlus and Israeli annexation, Le Monde, August 8, 1979.
some satisfaction from undermining the Moroccan-Mauritanian alliance by keeping Mauritania away from Moroccan influence. Later in March 1981, the first reaction of the Algerian government to the attempted coup in Nouakchott (backed by Morocco) was to airlift supplies of arms to help secure Ould Haidallah's regime and to send to the Mauritanian capital Taleb-Ibrahim and Lt.Cl. Belkheir to express Algeria's support. However, the immediate response to the Moroccan invasion of Tiris Al Gharbia was the encouragement given to the Polisario front to continue its guerrilla activities inside the Moroccan territory in the occupied Sahara. Among the most important operations carried out by the Saharawi guerrillas had been the attacks on the Moroccan cities of Lebouirate in August 1979 and Smara in October as well as on the fortification of the Royal troops at the Ouarkziz in March 1980. Further attacks on Moroccan military positions in the Sahara were undertaken at Boukraa and Rais Lakhal in January 1981 and Guelta Zemmour in March.¹

Fearing the ability of the Polisario to strike even inside the Moroccan territory, Hassan ordered an intensification of military operations against Saharawi guerrilla columns (operation Ohoud) and the building of a wall to protect the mineral-rich parts of the Western Sahara known as the 'useful triangle'. This wall stretches in a southwesterly arc from the old Spanish Saharan-Moroccan frontier to Smara and Bou Craa and ends at the Atlantic coast settlement of Boujadour. Its installations ranged from observation and artillery posts and sandbanks, mine fields and barbed wire to radar devices and electric devices.

¹The battle of Lebouirate was one of the bloodiest clashes between Royal troops and the Polisario guerrillas. Morocco was reported to have lost 100 troops and 10 per cent of its armoured tanks, while the Saharawi victims lost 407 men (El-Pafe, September 18, 1979).
Moreover while Hassan backed the Aosorio a Saharawi movement rival to the Polisario front to mount terrorist actions inside the Algerian territory, King Hassan repeatedly threatened Algerians with the right of hot pursuit. The risk of an all-out war was immediately evoked by the Algerian leadership, warning that a conflict between the two sides may go beyond the limits of North-West Africa.

Being forced to drop his threat of a direct confrontation with Algeria, King Hassan moved to outmanoeuvre Algeria on the diplomatic front in an attempt to obstruct the admission of the RASD in the OAU which was nearly obtained at the OAU summit held in Freetown in July 1980. There 26 African states declared their support to the RASD entitling it to become a member state under the provision of the article 28 of the OAU charter, but Morocco argued that since the 'Saharawi Republic' did not constitute an independent state, its admission required the interpretation of the charter and to do so the approval of a majority of two-thirds of the OAU member states was necessary. At the July 1981 summit conference held in Nairobi, King Hassan made the unexpected announcement of a 'controlled' referendum but the idea was rejected by Algeria and the Polisario front as intending to be a mere plebiscite to rubber stamp Moroccan take-over of the Western Sahara. And under pressures from the Algerian delegates and the pro-SADR lobby, the OAU meeting agreed to replace the formula of a 'controlled' referendum by a referendum for self-determination and charged a 7 nation-committee to

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1. In September, Aosorio commandos ambushed one of the ANP's columns, 25 miles of East Tindouf (The Guardian, September 8, 1979 and El Pais, September 8, 1979).
2. Interview of President Chadli to Al Watan Al Arabi in (Le Monde, October 12, 1979).
3. Algeria presented a Memorandum with detailed conditions for referendum.
examine the Western issue on a global scale.\(^1\) Algeria's success was that President Chaili was heard in his role of an "interested party" in the conflict at this committee's meeting in Nairobi on August 24-26, while King Hassan and Abdelaziz the Polisario leaders were called up as the two parties in conflict. And as Hassan failed to attend the next session of the committee on February 8-9, 1982 and mocked the OAU conference as a 'picnic' party, Algeria went all out to secure SADR's application and seemed to have succeeded when the OAU's Secretary-General invited the Saharawi delegates to attend the council of ministers scheduled to take place in late February. However, the meeting was scrapped as Morocco led a 19 country walk-out in protest against the presence of a Saharawi delegation led by Ibrahim Hakim.\(^2\)

Since then the question of the RASD's admission to the OAU has paralyzed the Panafrican organization and was partly responsible for the scrapping of the summit conference due to take place in Tripoli on August 5-9, 1982, although under Libyan pressures, Algeria had requested the Saharawi not to attend it. And when a second attempt to convene the meeting in Tripoli did not succeed, the Algerians placed responsibility for this failure on Morocco and foreign interference in particular American.\(^3\)

\(^1\)Guinea, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Tanzania.
\(^3\)Declaration of the Foreign Ministry spokesman in El-Moudjahid, November 30, 1982 for Hassan's manoeuvres, see El-Moudjahid, December 1, 1982.
3. **Diplomatic costs**

In the eyes of the Algerian leadership, the Western Sahara conflict beyond the issue of decolonization had a direct threat on Algeria and its revolution. The multifarious support Hassan obtained from Arab moderate countries and the strengthening of Morocco's military potential since 1977-78 thanks to US assistance and Saudi finance convinced Boumedienne of the existence of an alliance of right-wing forces against socialist Algeria as he declared in strong terms: "we are facing today a real plot to exterminate the Saharawi people. France supplies arms, Morocco and Mauritania troops and a big Bank in the Middle East provides the financing. In fact, this plot does not only aim the Western Sahara but also at undermining the Algerian revolution."\(^1\)

All the Arab countries except Libya and South-Yemen supported the Moroccan stand and successfully prevented the Arab league from discussing the Western Sahara question. At the United Nations, they voted in favour of the Moroccan-sponsored resolution while abstaining from voting a resolution backed by Algeria supporting the right of the Saharawi people for self-determination.\(^2\) In order to alleviate mounting domestic pressures on Hassan and help him counter Polisario's attacks, some Arab countries, Saudi Arabia in particular, attempted to mediate between Algeria and Morocco. Despite good offices of Crown Prince Fahd and the Foreign Minister Saud Al Faisal, the Saudis failed to make headway since Algeria insisted that

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\(^1\) Address to the fifth Congress of Mujahidin, Algiers, May 24, 1978 in Les discours, (8), p. 79.

she had no claims over the Western Sahara and that only Morocco and the Polisario front were the conflicting parties. Resenting Riyadh's financial assistance which enabled Morocco to purchase arms for the USA, the Algerians moved to adopt an overt anti-Saudi attitude in Arab affairs.

In addition to the Saudi Kingdom, Egypt came openly to support Morocco as President Sadat declared that he was prepared to support King Hassan militarily to the end.\textsuperscript{1} It was then reported that Egypt supplied Morocco with Soviet-built Mig 17 jet-fighters and Sam 7 missiles which had eventually been used against the Polisario's guerrillas.\textsuperscript{2} Apparently, the Algerians saw the Egyptian move as a sign of collusion between Cairo and Rabat in the light of the Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement, but it was also possible that the Egyptian support to Morocco resulted from apprehensions that Libya was to provide Algeria with a vast array of Soviet-built tanks and Mig 23s. Nevertheless, in reprisals for the pro-Moroccan attitude of moderate Arab countries and for Sadat's peace initiatives in the Middle East in summer 1977, the Algerians along with Syria, Libya, South-Yemen and the PLO, participated in the setting up of the Arab front of steadfastness and boycotted Egypt on both diplomatic and economic levels. If Algeria's alignment with this front was to conform to her constant line of supporting the Palestinians, it also meant breaking out from her relative isolation in the Arab world because of her stand over the Western Sahara and at counterbalancing the

\textsuperscript{1}The Guardian, September 5, 1979.
\textsuperscript{2}Ibrahim Ghali, the Saharawi defense minister presented to the international Press some of these arms supposedly supplied by Egypt which the Polisario captured during the Lemgat battle of September 16, 1979. El-Moudjahid also reported the confirmation of these deliveries by a Deputy from Smara who defected to Polisario (El-Moudjahid, October 15, 1979 and El-Pais October 16, 1979 and 27.9.79.)
increasing weight of her neighbours in Arab politics. Tunis had become
the Headquarters of the Arab League after its removal from Cairo and
Morocco a key element in the Saudi-led bloc of Arab moderates and an
important factor in the American strategy in the Middle East and
North-West Africa.

At the same time, the adoption by Algeria of a radical stance in Arab
affairs would permit her leaders to obtain support from the hawkish
states within the rejectionist front with regard to the Western Sahara
conflict. Indeed, the members of this front had been the only Arab
states to express their support to the struggle of the Saharawis. Thus it
was not surprising to see that in order not to lose Syria's support,
Algeria showed a great deal of pragmatism during the 1976 Lebanese civil
war in contradiction with her commitments to support the Palestinian
cause in all circumstances. As a zealous outspoken advocate of the PLO,
Algeria was indeed expected to condemn vigorously Syria's move on
Palestinian forces, but she reacted with a surprising moderation as no
official condemnation of Syria was issued. In fact the Algerians gave
the impression of hesitating since their dilemma was how to avoid losing
an ally i.e. Syria without damaging their credibility vis-a-vis the
Palestinian movement. To conceal their dilemma, they attempted along
with the Libyans to mediate between President Assad and Yasir Arafat, but
the choice of a junior minister Benhammouda to conduct this mediation
perhaps revealed not only the concern of the Algerian leaders not to
engage their own prestige in case of failure of the mediation efforts but
also to avoid a direct confrontation with Damascus which might have
damaged Syrian support to Algeria over the Western Sahara.1

1Balta, P: L'Algérie et Le Liban (Revue Francaise d'études
politiques Africaines, 1976).
Algeria’s stand over this issue did not also fail to have a damaging impact on her relations with the super-powers, thus highlighting the weight of matters of national security and regional problems on the orientation of the country’s foreign policy.

Our concern here is to see the effect of the Western Sahara conflict on Algeria’s relations with the USA, while the Soviet attitude over this conflict will be discussed with a more appropriate setting in the section D of Chapter V that deals specifically with the convergent-divergent dynamics that came to mark Algeria’s relations with the USSR.

The US neutrality on its part, was reflected by the reluctance of the American government to sell offensive weapons to Morocco that might be used against the Polisario front in an attempt not to offset the important economic interests the USA had in Algeria, as long as the conflict between Algiers and Rabat remained within the limits of tolerable tension.¹

However, as the war between Algerian-backed Polisario front and Moroccan troops went on, the Algerian leadership noticed a tangible shift in Washington’s stand dictated by US interests in North Africa. In its eyes this shift appeared when Washington rejected Algeria’s request for a higher price for gas and scrapped some of the huge gas contracts signed in late 1960s. But what the Algerians feared most was an increase in American military assistance to help Morocco neutralize the Polisario front and thus cut off Algeria’s leverage upon this country. Such a possibility came out after the October 8, 1979 meeting gathering President Carter, his adviser for national security Brzezinski, the State

¹The US had turned down Morocco’s $100 million request for military supplies. (Phillip, P: le triangle des armes in L’économiste du tiers-Monde, (46), p.31.
Secretary Vance and the Defense Minister Brown to discuss the eventuality of overt military aid to Morocco. President Chadli made a strong objection to this initiative when he received Ulrich Haynes the US Ambassador in Algiers two days later and probably threatened to help the Polisario front intensify its guerilla attacks on Moroccan territory if Washington decided to lift the ban on arms sales to Morocco. On October 13, the US government cautioned Algeria that in this case it would sell a vast array of arms to Morocco. In fact, three days later it decided to supply Morocco with a huge amount of sophisticated offensive weapons.  

Although there was an assumption that the Carter administration came under heavy pressures from the Jewish lobby in Washington after the visit of the influential Jewish Senator Jacob Javitz to Rabat in June 1979, the Algerians believed that the US decision stemmed from geo-strategic concerns linked with Algeria’s position with regard to the Western Sahara. Thus despite the fact that Cyrus Vance flew to Rabat to urge King Hassan to seek a negotiated solution and Brzezinski came to Algiers to dissipate Algerian worries, the Algerian leaders seemed convinced that Washington aimed at undermining Algeria’s socialist revolution by securing the King’s throne and by making Morocco an effective counter-weight for the Algerian model of socialism in North Africa. These apprehensions certainly reflected the implications resulting from geo-strategic concerns proper to US global designs in the sense that the US, fearing that Hassan might go the same way as the Shah or Somoza, moved to secure Morocco as the West’s closest ally in North and North West Africa. Indeed, in addition to pursuing a liberal economic policy

3 In his alarming call, Brzezinski pointed out that: “we face two problems: one is the growth of Soviet military power...”
at home and having close economic ties with the US and France, Morocco sent troops to Zaire to help Mobutu against Soviet-backed movement in the Sahara region and while visiting Washington in November 1978, King Hassan declared his willingness to challenge Soviet designs in Africa by offering to staff and organize a 20,000 man Panafican army to replace the Cuban troops stationed in Angola. Moreover Hassan played a substantial role in Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement as he secretly met with the Israeli Foreign Minister in Summer 1977 and permitted 1000 Israeli citizens born in Morocco to return and live in his country.

After Hassan's visit to Washington in March 1980, the US government granted Morocco $235 million worth of military aid and in March 1981 the US announced that it would supply M60 tanks, 6 anti-guerrilla jet fighters Owo Broco Rockwell, 24 helicopters Chinook CH47, 6 helicopters Cobra like those which were used in Vietnam and 20 jet Northrop F5. The Algerians were alarmed by the volume of these deliveries to their neighbour and suspected an eventual agreement on strategic cooperation between the US and Morocco in the light of the successive visits of US officials to Rabat and of the accord signed between the US State Secretary Haig and the Moroccan foreign minister Boucetta through which

which has been sustained over the last 20 years and which unless we take matching steps would pose very serious problems for the US in the early 1980, the other is regional conflict, the fragmentation of the wobbly social and political structures all the way from Iran down to South Africa." quoted in R. Legvoreed: the super-powers conflicts in the third world (Foreign Affairs, Spring 1977, pp.755-778) p.756.


Morocco agreed to grant Washington military bases in its territory.\(^1\) Furthermore the Algerians were deeply concerned with the creation of a joint military commission between the US and Tunisia after the visit of the American Deputy Defense Secretary Francis West to Tunis in November. The belief in Algiers was that the establishment in South Tunisia of an US-directed communication network aimed also at controlling large parts of the Algerian territory.

These perceptions of threats against their country's national security made the group of radicals push President Chadli and his foreign minister Benyahia to revise economic agreements with the USA in favour of socialist France in particular. It may also be argued that Algeria's successful mediation to secure the release of the US hostages from Iran did not prove sufficient to induce Washington to adopt a neutral attitude in Maghrebi affairs. The resurgence of US 'imperialism' on a global scale became evident in the eyes of the Algerian leaders as they concluded that US involvement in the West Mediterranean was linked with its strategic and economic interests in the Middle East. In this vein, US "aggression" against Algeria was merely understood as a part of the old cleavage between Western imperialism and revolutionary forces. The despatch by the US of Awacs aircraft to Saudi Arabia and the air-clash with Libya in December 1981 as well as US military manoeuvres in Egypt, Sudan and Oman (Bright stars operation) constituted for the Algerians evidence of the US preparation to protect its economic interests in the Arab world, while the strengthening of Israeli airforce and the attempts to make Saudi

\(^{1}\) El-Moudjahid reported the visits of General James William, CIA Deputy Director, Admiral Inman, Deputy Director (intelligence) and a 5 member delegation led by Francis West, Deputy State Secretary in charge of international affairs.
Arabia and Egypt the new policemen in the region aimed at preventing revolutionary uprising and contain Iranian influence.\(^1\) Therefore the intensification of US military manoeuvres in the Southern parts of the Mediterranean and the US-Moroccan collusion make the Algerian leadership declare that it would result in making of Africa a field for East-West confrontation.\(^2\) Thus not only Algeria expressed her solidarity with Libya in the aftermath of the airclash between the Libyan jet fighters and US air patrol, but also denounced US military strategy in the Middle East at the ministerial conference of the Arab steadfastness front held in Aden on November 18, 1981.

D. A Necessary Diplomatic Readjustment

1. Changes in tactics

The elimination of the Boumediennist group of radicals from decisional making power and the emergence of the moderates with the accession of Taleb Ibrahimi to the foreign ministry after Benyahia's death in May 1982, permitted President Chadli to move away from Boumedienne's tactics of defeating King Hassan through a war of attrition. The new strategy initiated by Taleb Ibrahimi implied the necessity to work for a detente in the Maghreb instead of maintaining a constant tension with Morocco that was detrimental to Algeria's economy. The policy of "Algeria's first" meant also the improvement of relations with neighbouring countries and other powers on the basis of a greater economic pragmatism and a moderate foreign policy.

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\(^1\) El-Moudjahid, November 11, 1981.
\(^2\) Political resolution, sixth session of the FLN Central Committee in El-Moudjahid December 25-26, 1981.
The adoption of such a strategy would alleviate economic and political hardships on the Algerian regime while maintaining pressures on Morocco although with less pronounced hostility and aggression. In the views of Taleb Ibrahimi, the support to the Saharawi right for self-determination could be continued without espousing the extremist and bellicose stand pursued by Boumedienne and still advocated by the group of radicals remaining in the government. Given his diplomatic skills, deep knowledge of regional politics, various contacts with Maghrebi governmental circles and his support from the moderate group within the Algerian leadership, Taleb Ibrahimi certainly made an impact on President Chadli's own perceptions of the implications of the Western Sahara on Algeria's territorial integrity and security. And as Chadli wanted to concentrate on domestic issues to establish his own power, the moderate approach of his foreign minister appeared quite operative and less costly than an extremist attitude which had in the past burdened Algeria financially and led to her relative isolation diplomatically.

President Chadli's endorsement and the support of the moderate officers of Western Algeria origin, were essential for the foreign minister to implement his strategy. However, if the demands of the group of radical officers were kept at bay, there was little doubt that these officers believed that he would fail to obtain a settlement of the Western Sahara because of Morocco's determination to keep this territory under its sovereignty. In these considerations they were determined to put pressure on President Chadli to adopt a hawkish line as soon as the Foreign Minister's strategy proved a failure. It was in this context of challenge that Taleb Ibrahimi embarked upon the policy of "le bon voisinage positif" which Chadli explained as referring to "non-interfer-
ence in domestic affairs of other countries and of non-aggression as well as to a cooperation between neighbouring states." On this basis, the Algerian leadership vehemently rejected pressing demands for a unity with Libya made by Qathafi when he unexpectedly visited Algiers in January 1982. On this occasion, Chadli was adamant that any proposal for unity should not come from a simple agreement between governments but should respond to the aspirations of their respective peoples and must be based on the prior settlement of the border disputes and on a long process of economic measures to pave the way for this unity. Without these conditions, Chadli insisted there would be no serious attempt to work for such a unity. But, while the Algerians prepared plans for economic cooperation during the meeting of representatives from the two governments in March 1982, the Libyans pressed for a political declaration to include the formal acceptance of unity between the two countries.¹

The refusal to meet Libya's request led Algeria into a controversy with her neighbour and to sharp disagreements over regional and international issues, but most significant it increased hostility between President Chadli and Colonel Qadhafi as the latter was believed to have threatened the Algerian leader with an assassination plot and with reviving territorial claims.² With the eclipse of Colonel Yahaoui, a convinced panarabist close to President Qadhafi, relations between Algiers and Tripoli seriously deteriorated despite the mediation conducted by the South Yemeni President Ali Nasser when he visited

Algiers and Tripoli in mid-March 1982. Moreover their relations worsened after the take over of Algerian diplomacy by Taleb Ibrahimi whose political moderation was disliked by Qadhafi.

Libya's threats to destabilize their regime and those of the Saharan states constituted a serious concern for the Algerian leadership and for stability in North Africa. At the summit conference of the Saharan states held in Nouakchott in March 1982 which Qadhafi declined to attend, Chadli addressed a disguised warning to the Libyan leader as he declared that the peoples of this region needed stability.¹ Eventually the increase of Libya's military potential and its growing subversive actions in Sub-Saharan Africa led to the strengthening of relations between Algeria and Mali, Niger and Senegal.

But most importantly, the potential danger Libya constituted for the Algerian regime contributed to her search for improved relations with Morocco and Tunisia. The concertation and dialogue with Morocco in particular conformed to the policy of 'bon voisinage' and implied a reduction in Polisario front's guerrilla activities in favour of intensive diplomatic contacts and negotiations to permit headway in the settlement of the Western Sahara conflict. The basic formula proposed by President Chadli and his foreign minister was to set up a Maghrebi 'ensemble' that would include a Saharawi entity. Paradoxically, the vagueness of this proposal far from breaking up dialogue with Morocco, did lead to renewed contacts between the two sides so as to reach a compromise since each of them seemed to believe that decisive steps to strengthen intra-Maghrebi cooperation might be taken as a prelude to a detente in the region and not necessarily as a platform for settling the

¹Quoted in Résolution Africaine, April 2-8, 1982.
Saharan dispute. On this basis, secret contacts between Moroccan officials and the Polisario front took place in Algiers, while President Chadli met King Hassan in February 1983 on an occasion described by the two sides as historic. It was historic because it was the first official meeting after a long period of discord and important because it constituted a hope to work for a Maghreb of peace and cooperation. A new page in their relations seemed to have been turned when after a meeting in Algiers on March 30-April 3, the interior ministers of the two countries gathered in Rabat three weeks later to issue a declaration stating the determination of the two sides to eliminate "obstacles liable to oppose the ongoing normalization so as to contribute to the building of a united and prosperous Maghreb." A number of measures were agreed upon such as free circulation of persons between the two countries, the resuming of air and rail transport and the development of bilateral economic cooperation. Algeria made a positive gesture in accepting to indemnify the 35,000 Moroccans expelled from Algeria in 1975.

In parallel the Algerians responded favourably to Tunisia's desire to join efforts to strengthen détente and cooperation in the Maghreb. President Chadli was warmly welcomed in Tunis on March 18, 1983 and a treaty of fraternity and concord was signed between the two governments. This treaty, valid for twenty years, reaffirmed the principles of 'bon voisinage' as it reflected more the concerns of good neighbourliness and stability in the Maghreb than laying foundations for its unity. It stipulated the preservation by the two sides of peace and security; the

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1Confirmed by Polisario's Abdalaziz in an interview to El-Moudjahid, May 19, 1983.
abstention from force against one another, refusal to enter a political or military pact directed against the other's political independence, territorial integrity and security, and the commitment not to assist movements which might threaten the security and the territory of the other partner and its regime.

This strategy of peace, stability and friendship combined with a determination to counter Libya's subversive actions on the one hand and Morocco's policy of paralyzing the OAU on the other, brought Algeria a considerable credit from her other neighbours as both Mali and Niger subscribed to the principle of intangibility of frontiers by signing with Algeria treaties officially demarcating the common borders in Summer 1983. On both occasions Algeria stressed the symbolic value of these agreements and underlined the exemplary character of the friendly relationship existing between President Chadli and Presidents Kountche and Traore.

Under the pro-Algerian leadership of Ould Haidallah, Mauritania also endorsed these principles of peace, stability and coordination as it adhered to the treaty of fraternity and concord in May 1983 and signed an accord accepting the official demarcation of the frontiers with Algeria on April 9, 1985. As in the past, the alignment of Mauritania with Algeria resulted from its fears of Moroccan expansionism and from Libyan attempts to destabilize the regime of Ould Haidallah following the

\[1\] See text of the treaty in El-Djeich, April 1983. See Document IV:10.
recognition of the Polisario front by Nouakchott in February 1984, thus turning down Qadhafi's plan of a federation between Mauritania and the Saharawi self-proclaimed republic, RASD.¹

However, if Mali, Niger and Mauritania were expected to respect the principles of the treaty of fraternity and concord, it remained difficult to obtain the endorsement of Morocco and Libya without the settlement of the Western Sahara problem and the border disputes in general. When the Tunisian president came to Algiers on May 29-31, 1983 there was doubt that a Maghrebi consensus could be reached on the basis of the treaty of friendship signed between Algeria and Tunisia as the visit indicated instead the division of the Maghreb along bilateral alignments. The refusal of Morocco to join this treaty shortly after the February 1983 meeting between King Hassan and President Chadli was followed by the defection of Libya to whom Algeria had refused adherence to the treaty unless Colonel Qadhafi dropped his claims over Algerian and Tunisian territories. In reaction, the Libyan leader threatened Algiers and Tunis of using force if possible, to achieve the unity of the Maghreb.²

Seemingly, the shifting of alliances between the Maghrebi states responded chiefly to matters of national security and territorial integrity. While the Tunisians believed that a rapprochement with Algeria would help them counterbalance Libya's threats, the Algerians conceived this rapprochement as a means to prevent an alliance of Tunisia with Morocco and to contain Libya's drive for leadership in North Africa. Consequently, ideological considerations did not matter when state

¹According to le Monde, the Mauritanian governmental newspaper Chaab published a series of documents establishing Tripoli's attempts of destabilizing the Mauritanian regime, le Monde, April 28, 1984.

²le Monde, March 5, 1983.
security and territorial integrity were at stake as Algeria moved to strengthen friendships with a liberal regime she had disapproved of in the past while Tunisia decided to endorse the right of the Saharawi people for self-determination, a principle she had firmly rejected not long ago. Eventually the new Algerian-Tunisian alliance resulted in the strengthening of economic cooperation through the approval of a huge number of projects, notably the opening of the Algerian-Italian gas pipeline via Tunisia which would provide this country with 5,25 million cbm of Algeria's gas exports annually and inducements expected to reach $21.4 million in 1986.

This alignment did not help attenuate bipolarism in the Maghreb with the unexpected rapprochement between Morocco and Libya following the secret visit Colonel Qadhafi made to Rabat on June 30-July 3, 1983. In fact the Algerians were not surprised since they believed that as in the past, Libya was tempted to lessen its diplomatic isolation in North Africa and that Morocco was trying to divert the attention from the Western Sahara issue as usual. But what annoyed them most was the suspicion of a bargain between Rabat and Tripoli which might be detrimental to Algeria's own interests. In their belief, the secret visit paid by the French president Mitterrand to Rabat in April 1984 confirmed the existence of such a bargain on the basis of Morocco obtaining Libyan commitment to drop military assistance to the Polisario front in return for Morocco stopping its support to Hissene Habre and for mediating between Paris and Tripoli for the withdrawal of French and Libyan troops from Chad.

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1Joint communique issued at the end of Bourguiba's visit to Algiers on May 29-31 1983.
2Inaugurated by the Presidents Chadli, Bourguiba and Pertini of Italy at Al Houria filling station on May 18, 1983.
The possibility that an understanding between Morocco and Libya would only aggravate tensions in the Maghreb and accentuate the paralysis of the OAU over the Western Sahara question, made Algiers demand from the Moroccan government a more flexible attitude and distance itself from Libyan influence.1 With Moroccan refusal, the FLN political bureau met on April 10 and issued a declaration reiterating Algeria's support to the Polisario front without reserves and immediately after, the Saharawi guerrillas carried out fierce attacks against Moroccan troops at Zag and Ouled Al Moulat and Grarat where 350 Moroccans were reported to have been killed and 400 wounded.2 In the meantime, the Algerians promptly assured Tunisia of their military support in anticipation of Qadhafi's threats. The Algerian Chief of Staff General Major Mustafa Benloucif met with his Tunisian counterpart in Algiers on April 10. Faced with the recrudescence of Algerian-backed Saharawi attacks and diplomatic setbacks within the OAU, King Hassan moved to stir up the latent conflict existing between Algeria and Libya. Given the growing animosities between Chadli and Qadhafi, this task looked easy. At their meeting at Oujda in mid-August, Hassan succeeded in making Qadhafi sign a treaty of 'Arabo-African Union'. Promptly, the Algerian government disapproved of this treaty and turned down the proposal of subscribing to it, carried over by Qadhafi and Reda Guedira the King's adviser when they hurried to Algiers to calm down Algeria's anxiety.3 The Algerians were convinced that the Moroccan-Libyan pact was clearly directed against their country's security and its friendship with Tunisia since it contradicted

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1 Visit of Col. Belkheir the Secretary-General of the Presidency to Rabat on April 6-7, 1984.
3 For proposals for a unity between Morocco and Algeria made by Rabat and their rejection by the Algerian government, see Le Monde, September 29, 1984.
the spirit of the treaty of fraternity and concord signed between Chadli
and Bourguiba in February 1983. In fact the article 12 of the Oujda
pact stipulated that "any aggression against one of the member states
would constitute a threat against the other."¹

The existence of two treaties highlighted in fact, an increase of
bipolarism in the Maghreb on tactical considerations related to national
security matters and not on ideological or political alignments, while
the rules of this new game seemed to be based on a competition by which
each side wanting to prove the other wrong. In this play, Algeria moved
to help the Polisario front intensify its military activities against
Morocco less in order to show the determination of the Saharawi to
continue the war than to prove that Algeria could sustain support of the
guerrillas even without Libya's financial and military assistance.²

Against this background, the Polisario front carried out attacks against
Moroccan positions in the Sahara in July and against Smara section of the
Wall in August as well as a series of military operations undertaken in
the framework of an intensive offensive it launched on October 10 under
the headline "offensive of the Great Maghreb." In this exercise of
showing off muscles, another means was the go-ahead given to a diplomatic
offensive in the OAU gatherings since paradoxically, the Oujda treaty
signed between Rabat and Tripoli seemed to actually serve better the
interests of Algeria and the Saharawi cause than those of either Morocco
or Libya. While the Qadhafi-Hassan alliance was regarded in African

¹Le Monde, August 2, 1984.
²In an interview, King Hassan confirmed that Libyan assistance to the Polisario front had ceased for more than
a year, le Monde, November 10, 1984. For the Saharawi ability to carry on the war without Libya's aid
see declaration made by the Polisario leader Mustafa Sayyad, le Monde, October 31, 1984.
circles as bizarre, the shift of Algeria's African policy towards moderation was highly praised. Algeria, in fact, showed a deliberate anti-Qadhafi line as she strengthened her relations with moderate African states especially Senegal, Ivory-Coast, Kenya and successfully lobbied to prevent the Libyan leader assuming the OAU Chairmanship in favour of Mengitsu of Ethiopia. And in contrast to Morocco's arrogant behaviour vis-a-vis the Panafrican organisation and to its attempts to cripple its proceedings, Algeria under the efforts of Taleb Ibrahimi largely contributed in salvaging the existence of the OAU by persuading the RASD to abstain from its meetings and by shifting support to Hissen Habre away from the Libyan backed faction of Goukouni Ouddei.¹

These diplomatic efforts were rewarded by the official admission of the RASD into the OAU in its twentieth summit conference held at Addis Ababa in December 1984. And in parallel, Algeria and the Saharawi went on intensifying the war of attrition against the Moroccan Kingdom. With this position of strength, Algeria refused to attend any Maghrebi summit to discuss regional unity or the future of the Sahara the Saharawi liberation movement despite intense efforts that took place between the Maghrebi governments from early December 1984 to February 1985.² Morocco having apparently refused Algeria's plan of a form of federation with the RASD while Algeria was adamant that any solution of the Western

¹The Chadian Foreign Minister Garara Lassou was received in Algiers in late August 1984 and in December 1985, Chadli had talks with Habre.
²President Chadli declared that Algeria was not prepared to construct the unity of the Maghreb on the dead body of the Saharawi people (Speech to the third national conference on development in El-Moudjahid February 29, 1985); see also comments of Taleb Ibrahimi quoted in Marchés Tropicaux et Méditerranéens, February 1, 1985, p.259 and March 8, 1985, p.364.
Sahara conflict should come from direct negotiations between Rabat and the Saharawi liberation movement as was recommended by the OAU meeting held at Addis Ababa on June 6-12, 1983.¹

2. Reversing political alignments

From being aligned with Moscow with regard to foreign political issues and economically dependent on the Western outlets and markets, and from attempting to play a role of a broker between East and West and North and South, Algeria seemed to have moved towards a greater political moderation and embarked upon a policy of economic diversification with a greater emphasis than in the past. While relations with Moscow tended to be on the whole less warm than in Boumediene's time, there have been more contacts with Washington to ease the political stalemate which had characterized Algerian-US relations in spite of close economic ties.

Asked to explain the significance of this new shift in the orientations of Algerian external policy, Taleb Ibrahimi stressed the predominance of purely nationalistic objectives as he declared that "our policy is first pro-Algerian, then pro-Algerian and lastly pro-Algerian. It is in this sense that one could talk of a reorientation of our diplomacy."

This policy of diplomatic readjustment was partly due to the preoccupation of Algeria with regional issues affecting national security matters. These concerns led Algeria to seek support for her policies from moderate countries after departing from the radicalism of Boumediene. On the Arab level, Algerian moderation appeared in her endorsement of the Arab consensus initiated by the Saudi-led group of Arab conservative countries which preferred a political solution of the Palestinian problem that included the recognition of the right of Israel

to exist as it was implicitly agreed upon at the Fez Arab Summit of September 1982. In the light of this Algerian-Saudi connivance, there was speculation that Algeria hosted the conference of the Palestinian National Congress in February 1983 against Syrian and Libyan opposition in connection with Saudi contribution in Algerian-Moroccan rapprochement of the same period. Algeria’s move toward moderation increased her credibility in the eyes of the Saudis and other conservative countries while her hostility to Libya’s policies reinforced the determination of these states to encourage Algeria as a counterweight against Libyan subversion in North and Sub-Saharan Africa. It is in this context that the recent rapprochement with Egypt should be understood after years of freeze in their relations following Sadat’s visit to Israel in 1977. Improving relations with Cairo would help Algeria put heavy pressures on Libya to slow down its subversive activities on the one hand and incite Cairo to try to temper Morocco’s stiffness on the other. In any case, the Algerians were pleased with their abilities to induce the Arab moderates to rely more on them to maintain stability in North Africa than on the alliance between Morocco and Libya. The financial assistance received from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait since 1982 may be regarded as a reward for Algeria’s moderate policies in North Africa and for the active role it played to induce Iran to end the war with Iraq. Besides this moderation on the regional level, the most important implications of Taleb Ibrahimi’s diplomatic readjustment were a loosening of ties with the Soviet Union and the improvement of relations with the USA.

With Libya getting most of Moscow’s favours in North Africa and Morocco reaping the fruits of economic cooperation with the Soviet Union, it became increasingly difficult for Algeria to maintain good relations
with the Soviets without pursuing the Boumediennist line. However, with
the accentuation of conflicts in the Maghreb, such an option proved in
the end single-minded and quite impotent as it resulted for Boumedienne
in heavy costs for Algeria on the economic level and a relative
diplomatic isolation. Indeed, Algeria could no longer sustain the costly
war of attrition along the same lines pursued by the past regime. To
compensate for the dwindling of oil revenues, she was forced to adopt a
moderate line to win the markets of the Western countries for her gas
exports, while she was led to diversify her source of arms supplies to
maximize state security and territorial integrity.

The reverse of political alignments was therefore thought much
beneficial than a rigid alliance with Soviet Union and Libya.
Consequently in the context of winning more support for her policies,
relations with the Soviet Union had to lose in warmth, depth and utility.

And as national security concerns had been the basis of diplomatic
readjustment, the Algerians set out to enhance the military capabilities
of the country by searching for sophisticated armaments from everywhere,
thus trying to break the heavy dependence on Soviet source. Amid these
efforts, the most significant moves were the attempts not only to induce
the US government to soften its attitude toward Algeria but also grant
her weapons and military hardware. Direct official contacts were
established with the US administration and among the first important ones
were the visit of Colonel Benloucif, the Secretary-General of the defense
ministry to Washington in Summer 1981 followed by that to Algiers of a US
military delegation, the first ever made to independent Algeria.
The policy of detente in the Maghreb pursued by Taleb Ibrahimi did not fail to have a positive impact on Algerian-US relationship in the sense that Washington responded favourably to Algeria's move toward political moderation by adopting a balanced attitude between Algiers and Rabat, thus breaking away from the overt diplomatic and military support it had previously given to Rabat. After a period of aggressiveness, the Reagan administration began to soothe its relations with Algeria and seemed to respect the seriousness of the Chadli regime and his moderate policies, particularly on the Maghreb and Arab levels. In May 1983, General Walters, the US roving Ambassador came to Algiers to request the Algerians to use their influence to help break the Lebanese stalemate and in September the US Deputy Secretary for political affairs Eagleburger expressed when visiting Algiers, his admiration for Chadli's role in the constructive developments in the Maghreb. Evidently the Algerians welcomed this change in the US attitude, but seemed quite cautious not to slide into an overt optimism and not appear as turning away from their basic principles of positive non-alignment. This approach was underlined when Vice-President Bush came to Algiers on September 13-14 in the first official visit ever made by a high member of the US government to independent Algeria. From the outset, it was stressed that the US

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1 El-Moudjahid noticed this shift of attitude in statements made in Rabat in early September 1983 by Mrs Kirkpatrick the US representative to the United Nations, as she affirmed that the US government was taking no position vis-a-vis the sovereignty over the Western Sahara but favoured a political settlement of the conflict on the basis of the resolution taken by the OAU summit held at Nairobi. In Algerian perceptions this position amounted to US recognition of the right for the Saharawi people for self-determination and for direct negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario, El-Moudjahid September, 2-3, 1983.

2 Le Monde, September 15, 1983.
Vice-President was the guest of the Algerian national Assembly therefore not engaging directly the Algerian government. Equally significant was the fact that a junior state official Djelloul Khatib was charged to reply to the speech made by M. Bush before the Algerian parliament. In his address, the US Vice-President regarded Algeria as a "serious spokesman for the causes of reason and equity" and although acknowledging that the two countries had different interests and objectives, he saw no "incompatibility between the interests of both Algeria and the USA in a world where nations are truly independent and prosperous." The implicit concern was obviously to try to dissipate Algeria's worries over US temptations for world hegemony: "we do not want, he added, to forge the World according to our image and it is not our philosophy - we respect the independence of others even when their methods are different from ours." In his reply, Khatib insisted on the strengthening of Algerian-US economic and cultural cooperation and avoided mentioning political issues. These matters were left with some discretion to the FLN's department of external relations to deal with in a deliberate attempt not to put too much emphasis on a rapprochement with the USA that might lead to misunderstanding of Algeria's real objectives. The apparent concern was probably to minimize the impact of Bush's visit on the orientation of her foreign policy and stress the existence of disagreements with US policies, notably in the Middle East. Against

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1 El-Moudjahid, September 14, 1983.
2 Ibid.
3 Meeting between Hoffman the Head of this Department and Haywood Rankin in charge of the Maghrebi affairs at the US department of state.
this background, the Algerian leadership turned down a stop over at Algiers for talks, requested by the US State Secretary Schultz during his Maghrebi tour in early December 1983.

However, despite differences in political and ideological options as well as in power capabilities and influence, the two sides were brought to work for a viable understanding and cooperation in the light of the alliance between Morocco and Libya. In this context, the US tried to encourage Algeria to maintain political moderation and move away from Soviet influence as well as attempting to make of her a counterweight for Libya's ambitions in North and Sub-Saharan Africa. On their part, the Algerians aimed through the strengthening of relations with Washington more to spite Libya and Morocco than sort out long-standing differences with Washington. With this argument, Taleb Ibrahimi seemed to have succeeded in pushing forward his policy of a working relationship with the US against the suspicions raised by the group of radical officers and some high officials of FLN. His meeting in Algiers in early January 1984 with Reagan's special envoy to the Middle East, Rumsfeld may have been the prelude for preparing the official visit of President Chadli to the USA, the first ever paid by an Algerian president to this country. The visit eventually took place in mid-April 1985 and resulted in a tacit accord on coordinating efforts to ensure stability in the Maghreb. But most important it resulted in the agreement by the US government to sell arms to Algeria as the Pentagon has put Algeria on the list of friendly countries susceptible to benefit from US credits and military supplies.¹

¹Until then, Algeria was only granted a licence for the sale of 6 Lockheed C-130 transport aircraft valued at $100 million on the condition that they will not be passed on to the Polisario front (The Economist Intelligence Unit (2), 1982, p.7; Le Monde, 18-12-1981.
It was perhaps in this sense that one should understand the comment made by El-Moudjahid on the visit of Chadli to Washington when it simply stated that "the Algerian president has the abilities to be heard and to convince."\(^1\)

The attachment to the country's fundamental options was emphatically stressed as immediately after, President Chadli paid a visit to Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela and Senegal. And it seems that the policy of diversification of arms supplies as well of a balanced approach between East and West may be the most valuable means to assert a genuine non-aligned policy, thus underlying the faith in the basic principles of the 'Algerian revolution'.

\(^1\)El-Moudjahid (April 14, 1985).
CHAPTER FIVE: THE ASSERTION OF THE STATE'S IDENTIFICATION

The accentuation of Algerian nationalism found its cultural expression in attempts of the Algerian leaders to assert national identity and personality. This cultural process expressed through the state, and exalted the cultural unity of the Algerian people and a national identity based on radical perceptions proper to the Algerian ruling elites.

In the process of nation-state building, cultural nationalism as it has been expressed by these elites was thought necessary to safeguard the hard-won political independence and strengthen the foundations of the newly-formed Algerian state. However, behind the coating of national ideology, the state's identity helps to bolster the legitimacy of the military-technocracy strata since the ideological values flowing from above serve also to justify the national economic model of development and the actions of the regime on the international level. In this sense, ideology and bureaucratic sources of legitimacy complement each other and operate through two basic and interrelated features: radical pragmatism at home and anti-imperialism on the foreign level. Internally, the process of identification had been based on radical perceptions of Arabism and Islam as ways of life and thought while externally it was based on belonging to the third world communities and socialist bloc and directed against all manifestations of colonialism and imperialism.

If the reference to Arabo-Islamism serves to assert the identity of the state, socialism may be used as an instrument to consolidate the foundations of the states both at home and on the foreign level. The
two notions are correlated in the sense of a strong affirmation of both Algerian identity and independence, a matter that helps understand the accentuation of Algerian nationalism on cultural terms. Indeed, though the Algerian leaders link their destiny with other third world countries in general and Arab brother peoples in particular, the feelings of belonging to these communities aimed at ensuring the emancipation of these peoples through a continuous fight against foreign domination. The paramount objective has been the search for wider solidarities while at the same time preserving the state's distinct identity and personality. However, if during her early stage the emphasis on identification and on revolutionary ideals had strong ideological connotations, economic concerns came to prevail eventually as the cleavage between ideology and technocracy tend to partially overlap with the rapid development of the huge bureaucracy of the welfare state and the perceived threats from abroad.

A. A technocratic vision of national ideology

1. Radical and broader perceptions of Arabo-Islamism

As conceived by official ideology, both arabism and Islam have been thought necessary to assert the state's identity and thus act as symbols of unity and identity of the Algerian people. Because the state is unitarian, its ideology and religion could not but be uniform. This interpretation implies a deliberate effort to transcend ethnic linkages such as those between Arabs and Berbers.

The reference to Islam has been quite easy given the great uniformity in Algerian Islam - as all Algerians (except the M'zabite Khariji) are sunni and of the malekite rite - in addition to the role Islam played in the past as a source of unity and resistance of the Algerian people to
French colonialism. In contrast, the process of affirming the Arabism of Algeria posed a problem because of the complex historical process Algeria had undergone, a complexity highlighted by the occasional linguistic cleavages between Arabic and Berber speaking groups. As explained in the first chapter, the Algerian ideologists overlooked these differences stressing instead the racial symbiosis of the Algerian people believed to be formed out of Arabs and Berbers. In this sense, the reference to Arabism has no racial connotations but is connected with the key problem of cultural authenticity on terms of way of thought and moral values. Arabism, then, tends to play the symbolic role of personifying the nation. It is against this background that Bella’s famous statement of "je suis Arabe, je suis Arabe, je suis Arabe," should be understood. As he explained, Arabism "means above all a philosophy and ethics. For we Algerians, who had fought racism, Arabism could be nothing but a way of life and thought. There is no future in this country without Arabism. This is the objective of our revolution."¹

To lay the foundations for a commitment to Arabism, the use of Arabic language was gradually extended to schools and sections of the administrative and economic life. Not only was Arabisation meant to wean Algerians from an alien language and culture (French) but also at becoming a basis for national identification. Here again, the use of the Arabic language tends to transcend linguistic differences that exist in Algerian society for the purpose of national unity.

This is a clear rejection of demands made by certain Algerian intellectuals to make the Algerian dialect - a colloquial form of classic Arabic - or the Berber as national languages besides Arabic. In the official ideology, Arabic language was presented as neither a "dead language" as claimed Kateb Yacine, a well-known radical writer, nor as the languages of the masses in opposition to the conception that makes French a language and a culture of the elites.1 Boumedienn made it clear that "language should be attached to the materialistic development of the society as it is true that the decline of the arabic language occurred when the Arab Muslim civilization had known a period of stagnation and decay. The day Arabic becomes an instrument of labour and communications at the petrochemical plants at Skikda and the steel complex at Al hadjar, then our language will be the language of iron and steel."2 Once again, the link between identification and development is clearly ascertained.

Given the cultural impact of colonial legacy, bilingualism has been conceived as necessary, though only circumstantial, so as "to assume the transition from colonial teaching to a truly national one".3 This cultural pragmatism reflects in fact the logics of the technocratic way of development since most of the state technocracy involved in economic

1Kateb Yacine's interview to La République (Oran) November 7, 1972. Another radical writer A. Mazouni also defended the popular languages against the prominence of Arabic. See his culture et enseignement en Algérie et au Maghreb, Paris, Maspero, 1969.
decision-making have been educated in French and in many cases abroad. It is not surprising that this conception of using French only as an instrument of labour and technics has been criticized by some Arabic-speaking intellectuals and traditionalist segments on the basis that it is a form of cultural alienation since no language is neutral.1

More than a moral sanctuary and an effective instrument for deriving public support from large segments of traditionally devout and conservative Algerian people, the Islam preached by the ruling elites has been viewed as a militant inspired by the traditions of radical Islam in opposition to the inert, passive and reactionary Islam of the private bourgeoisie at home and of some other Arab countries. However, this conception of Islam contains neither religious euphoria nor the type of radicalism expressed by the extremist visions of 'jihad', nor an expression of clerical institutions. In Algeria, the clergy participates in educational activities but does not constitute a substantial political weight in the regime's power hierarchy since religious figures have been excluded from the core elite. Moreover, religious affairs have been, in fact, under the strict control of the state and the Imams considered as civil servants and by no means providing a major influence on matters of policy decisions.

The attachment to Arabo-Islamism does not limit itself to the feelings of belonging to Arab and Islamic communities and their destinies but attempts to go beyond the considerations of the old Arab nationalism or those of panarabism and pan-Islamism. These two notions underline a

new perspective: an Arabo-Islamism breeding radical socio-economic change and being primarily directed against all manifestations of Western domination throughout the world. In this vein, the primary concern has not been the search for Arab unity or panislamic ideal but merely to increase links of solidarity with Arab and Muslim peoples on the basis of a common struggle against imperialism. Such concerns were clearly asserted by the 1976 national charter that Algeria "works tirelessly for the Arab unity ... but this unity will not be the result of simple agreements between governments and less the product of temporal situations ... It is the socio-economic transformations as well as the political choices of the masses that should become the determinant factor for the implementation of this historical enterprise."¹ In practice, the Algerian leaders do not favour any form of unity which would transcend their own nationalism, and have been reluctant to join some other Arab countries in their attempts to establish projects for unity. In accordance with the anti-imperialistic conception of Arabo-Islamism, the Algerians attempted to transcend the confinement of these two notions to basic racial or religious linkages in international fora. In practice, the Algerians sided with the group of Africans in the conferences devoted to Arab-African dialogue, and declined to adhere to the Islamic pact proposed by the Saudi King in 1966 which aimed at assembling all the Muslim nations, on the grounds that such a pact would reinforce the position of the conservative Arab states against the progressive ones, among them Algeria. Anti-imperialistic perspective was also the reason for Algeria's rejection of joining any "Arab crusade against Persian Iran". Thus, Algeria came to support the Iranian

revolution which she regarded as fundamentally anti-imperialist and in
doing so, she wished to reinforce the radical trend within the Islamic
community in order to oppose what she saw as a racialist tendency and
political conservatism in the Middle East in particular.

2. Non-alignment: an evolutionary content

In Algerian official ideology, imperialism is essentially linked with
the Western capitalist world and is believed to have manifested itself
through two fundamental means: a direct domination of the third world
countries as it was the case with colonialism and the maintaining of the
new nations in the state of underdevelopment and dependency through the
regulations of the world system.

Like many new states, Algeria has been strongly motivated by the
ideology of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism stemming from memories
of colonialism and the long and sometimes bloody colonial struggle.
During the war, the FLN denounced the multifarious assistance France
received from the Western world as it observed that "Algerian people had
to fight the American-led Atlantic coalition at all levels. Nato and
the US in particular spurred France's finance in order to permit the
French to continue the war."¹

Conversely, the anti-colonialism of the USSR and the socialist bloc
was viewed by the FLN as positively contributing to dismantling
colonialism in general, but Moscow's ambiguous approach to the Algerian
war and the subsequent attitude of the Algerian communist party and its
mentor the French communist party (PCF), raised the suspicion among the
FLN leadership that the Soviets were following an opportunist line.
Moscow favoured the principle of self-determination for the Algerian

people, but refrained from overtly supporting or supplying the FLN with military equipment in a deliberate attempt not to alienate Gaullist France which was then adopting a foreign policy which did not coincide with the US standpoints. In fact, the USSR recognized the Algerian provisional government (GPRA) only shortly before Algeria's independence. It could be argued that this reluctance and ambivalent attitude toward the Algerian war also contributed to the sometimes cool relationship between independent Algeria and the Soviet Union. In opposition to the West and in distinction with the East, the Algerian state founded the outer manifestation of its identity in the non-aligned movement. This process followed two stages:

i. In her first post-independence era, Algeria, in the absence of a solid economic experience and lack of power capabilities, had exalted political consciousness as a means to preserve the identity and interests of her third world peers. Until the end of the 1960s, she expressed a non-aligned policy on essentially political terms with an emphasis on the necessity to hasten the end of colonialism. The struggle of liberation was then regarded as forming the "core of all the national liberation wars and a decisive step in shrinking the basis of colonialism".¹ From one president to another the support to the national liberation movements has been unremitting, because anti-colonialism has been an essential value in the process of the state's identification, since it stemmed from memories of the war the Algerians themselves experienced. And having — as Professor Irene Gendzier put it — "made the transition between resistance and a government in power, the

¹Boumedienne's speech to the OAU summit conference held in Algiers in September 1968 in Discours du président (2), p.59.
Algerians felt in position to know the advantages of each stage as well as the responsibility which each imposes and therefore were tempted to appear as a model for the national liberation movements."¹

In a speech entirely devoted to the struggle against colonialism, given at the address of the OAU founding meeting held at Addis Abeba in May 1963, Ben Bella passionately declared that this charter will remain a dead letter unless we take concrete decisions, unless we lend unconditional support to the peoples of Angola, South Africa, Mozambique and others ... There has been talk of a development Bank. Why have we not talked of setting up a blood bank? A blood bank to help those who are fighting in Angola, Mozambique and South Africa ... Thus the day that Portugal attempts to undertake a further evil action, such as that against Senegal or the Congo, in Guinea or against any other African country, it will find the whole of Africa united opposing it. These peripheral countries must know that we owe a ransom to African unity. A ransom had to be paid for Algeria's liberation. It is because Tunisian brothers died at Sakiet Sidi Youssef ... that Algeria is free ... Thus, African brothers agreed to die a little so that Algeria might become an independent state. So let us all agree to die a little or even completely, so that the peoples still under colonial domination may be free, and African unity may not be a vain word.²

More than any other war of liberation, the struggle for Palestine has been regarded by the Algerians as identical to their own. As the 1976 charter put it, the liberation of Palestine "is in our conscience and preoccupation ... it is a problem that is identical with our liberation. This is the reason why our commitment is without reserves and implies the acceptance of all the sacrifices including the one of blood."³

In the official discourse, the Palestinian problem has been conceived as a 'fait colonial' in the sense that the occupation of Palestine and the establishment of the state of Israel are depicted as colonial policies in which the Zionist diaspora backed by the Western power deprived the native Palestinians not only of their land through Jewish settlement and repression, but also of their identity as it was the case of the Algerian people during the French colonial rule. In this vein, the fight of the Palestinian people has been regarded as "a struggle for national identity and the suffering of the Palestinian people as similar to that of the Algerian people."\(^1\) To sustain their argument, the Algerian leaders came to view Israel as a state whose foundations are based on "abject racism, religious fanaticism and territorial expansionism".\(^2\) The link between Israel and imperialism is implied in the belief that this state played the role of 'US policeman' in the Middle East as it could not survive without the assistance provided by the Western world. Thus, in the eyes of the Algerians, the Arab struggle should not be directed only against Israel but also against imperialism as a whole. Here again, the notion of anti-imperialism prevails over considerations of racial or religious struggle against Israel as exalted by some other Arab countries.

From Ben Bella to Chadli, assistance to the national liberation movements in general and to the Palestinian resistance in particular, has been consistent and multiform, ranging from diplomatic to military

\(^1\) Ibid.
support, though there has been a change in style from one leader to another. This substantial aid has been admitted by Algerian leaders and by several leaders of national liberation movements.

ii. With the emergence of economic considerations, Algeria was inclined to go beyond the political content of non-alignment stressing the necessity of remodelling the international system regarded as working at the expense of the new and weak states. To maximise their own security and search for a redistribution of the world's economic resources, the Algerians called for the alteration of the balance of power, thus preaching a new conception of non-alignment. In this context, Algeria not only attempted to lead a joint alignment of the third world states in contradistinction with both East and West but also hoped to see a loosening of bipolarism and hegemony of the super-powers over the world's political and economic affairs. In the eyes of the Algerians, the third world is left on its own: on the one hand there are the USA which they regard as the "world's policeman" armed with a "big stick" and on the other hand, the Soviet Union which has its own alliances. The former was held primarily responsible for major conflict

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1 Boumedienne confirmed that thousands of guerrillas belonging to various national liberation movements had been trained in Algeria (see Le Monde, April 11-12, 1965). Sam Nujoma, the leader of Namibia's national liberation movement declared that the Algerian revolution "has always been a source of important support for the liberation movements in Africa, Asia and Latin-America" (interview to El-Moudjahid, December 30, 1980); Samora Machel, the Mozambican president revealed during Chadli's visit in April 1981, that "we broke out our revolution with Algerian arms and it was with Algerian arms that Zimbabwe had continued its struggle for national liberation" (in Revolution Africaine, April 16, 1981). And when visiting Algiers in January 1983, Premier Mugabe confirmed that the "Zimbabwean people will never forget the great sacrifices, Algeria made to help them gain independence" (interview to El-Moudjahid, January 19, 1983).
in the world: Indo-China, Middle East, Africa as well as for the injustices of the international economic order. And although, acknowledging the fact that the socialist bloc had played a great role in encouraging the stream of the struggle against colonialism and imperialism, the Algerians were disappointed with the Soviet Union's preoccupation with a balance of power with the USA without taking into consideration the specific interests of the third world.

B. A militant attachment to Arab and Palestinian causes

1. The politics of militancy and intransigence: Boumedienne vs Nasser

During the early years of independence, Algeria's Arab policy followed a low profile because of Ben Bella's great involvement in panafriicanism and Nasser's hegemony over Middle East politics that had become tangible since the 1956 Suez Canal crisis. The Algerian president did not attempt to challenge Egypt's Arab diplomacy, being anxious to maintain the militant alliance with Egypt which proved useful when Algeria was entangled in the 1963 border conflict with Morocco. Like the Egyptian President, Ben Bella came to support the Iraqi regime against the Kurdish rebellion and at the May 1965 Arab Summit held in Cairo, the two leaders severed diplomatic relations with West Germany because of her support of Israel. In contrast, Boumedienne then Defense Minister and his aides of the General Staff were irritated by Nasser's patronizing attitude and to express their own points of view they came to cultivate strong links with the Palestinian armed branch 'Fatah' and its young militants, among them Yasir Arafat. The commitment of Fatah to a guerrilla welfare free from Egypt's tutelage certainly appealed to Boumedienne and his group. It was under their pressures that Algeria
volunteered at the 1964 PLO founding meeting in Cairo to provide military training facilities to Fatah guerrillas. At this meeting, Bouteflika emphatically declared that there "is no freedom for Algeria without the liberation of Palestine." This statement could be regarded as a disguised signal of the Algerian army's opposition to Nasser's strategy which aimed at ensuring his leadership over the Arab world. Immediately after, Palestinian combatants received training at the ANP's camps and the PLO established a bureau in Algiers. After the June 1965 coup, Algeria's relations with Egypt reached a low point. Hostilities between Boumedienne and Nasser increased because the latter's sympathies obviously rested with Ben Bella and also because the new Algerian president reaffirmed his preference for a Palestinian front free from any Arab state leadership, notably that of Egypt. As a result of these disagreements, Egyptian military advisers and a certain number of teachers were sent home, and in reprisals for Nasser's decision not to attend the Arab Summit Algeria hoped to hold in September 1966, Boumedienne postponed his trip to Egypt in August. However, the concentration of the new Algerian regime on domestic issues prevented Boumedienne from playing an active role in Arab politics, and, until the June 1967 war, Algerian Arab policy followed a passive course.

The war provided Boumedienne with a valuable occasion to express his militancy and fulfil his country's responsibilities vis-a-vis the Arab cause. On May 8, 1967, the Algerian president addressed letters to the leaders of Egypt and Syria offering Algeria's support and a week later a delegation led by the ANP chief of staff Colonel Zbiri was despatched to

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^1Quoted in Chagnollaud, P: Maghreb et palestine (Paris, Sindbad, 1977), p.120.
^2See article of Hassanain Haikal in favour of Ben Bella in Al Ahram, June 24, 1965.
Cairo to offer military assistance to Egypt in the eventuality of a war with Israel. The Algerian media called for the mobilization of the people, stressing the need of Arab unity and predicting victory. By the end of May, the 'council of revolution' announced officially the mobilization of the people and took the decision to send 2,500 troops to the front. The Algerian government despatched 19 Soviet-built MiG jetfighters to the front in addition to the 15 aircraft promised by Bouteflika during his visit to Cairo on the day following the outbreak of the war.\(^1\) It also decided to take measures against the USA and Great Britain as reprisals for what it perceived as an Israeli-imperialist plot against the Arab nation. On May 31, the Algerians cancelled negotiations with Washington concerning the import of 200,000 tonnes of wheat and announced the closure of Algerian ports to US shipments as well as to those which supported Israel. Two days later, oil exports to the USA and Great Britain were cut off and their oil companies operating in Algeria were taken over by the state. Though these nationalizations concerned companies exploiting only a small amount of Algerian oil, they were presented by Algerians as an expression of their solidarity with Arab brothers to fight imperialism as a whole. Diplomatic relations with the USA were broken as a gesture.

\(^1\) See the article of A. Ammimour, former adviser to Boumedienne: Baina assumud wa tassady (between resistance and rejection in Al jumhuriya, October 14, 1982). According to Mahmoud Riad, then Egypt's foreign minister, Bouteflika informed him that Algeria was placing all it had in military equipment at the disposal of Egypt and that Boumedienne had decided to send all available planes to the front. See his: struggle for peace in the Middle East (London, Quartet books, 1981), p.301.
However, Algeria's hopes for an Arab victory over zionism and imperialism turned to a deeply resented military defeat and humiliation after only six days of fighting. The acceptance by Egypt of a ceasefire was regarded by the Algerians as an act of treason toward the Arab cause and they immediately reacted by expressing sharp criticisms of Nasser's failure and rejected the US-mediated ceasefire. Huge anti-Nasser demonstrations were organized by the FLN throughout the country and efforts to mobilize youth were pursued in the hope that an armed struggle against Israel could be resumed. For a people who had successfully fought a colonial power, defeat proved just unbearable. It was reported for instance that in reply to Nasser's fear that the Israeli army was able even to occupy Cairo, Boumedienne angrily said: "so what? If Israel had occupied Cairo or Damascus, it would have been the beginning of its end because Israel could not defeat the Arab nation for two obvious reasons: the geographical factor and the human potential of the Arab world." ¹

The shift of Egypt and Jordan toward the quest of a political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict led the Boumedienne regime to break away from the Panarabist ideas preached by Egypt and to attempt to challenge Nasser in Arab fora. Therefore, it was under Algerian insistence that the Arab summit held in Cairo endorsed the subsequent trip of Boumedienne to Moscow on July 17 to request military assistance needed to continue the war. But the Soviets did not respond to Boumedienne's quest. Disappointments over the USSR's reaction, added to the frustrations over the moderate attitudes of Egypt and Jordan, increased Algeria's intransigence with regard to the Arab-Israeli

¹Ammimour, M: Baina assumud......
conflict. Along with the Syrian leader, Boumediene did not attend the Arab summit convened in Khartum in August 1967, as an expression of his refusal to endorse any compromising initiative on the Palestinian question which might be worked out by the Summit under the influence of Egypt and other moderate Arab states. As the Algerians expected, the resolutions neither mentioned the principle of the pursuit of military actions against Israel nor did they call for any economic sanctions against it. And while Egypt accepted the resolution 242 of the UN security council, the Algerians firmly withheld their approval of this resolution on the grounds that it ignored the national rights of the Palestinian people because the Palestinians were simply referred to as refugees.

The split between Algeria and Egypt became overt when Boumediene opposed the plan proposed by the Egyptian defense minister General Fawzi at the Arab summit conference convened in Rabat on December 21-23, 1969. The Algerian president rejected the demands of the Rais for more financial and military aid from other Arab states to make Egypt definitely superior to Israel over a period of time, disapproved of the three year waiting time stipulated by the Egyptian plan, and regarded its demands as unreasonably big. On his way back to Cairo from Rabat, President Nasser stopped at Algiers in an attempt to heal the breach but Boumediene was adamant against modifying his position.

The rupture between the Algerian militant line and Egyptian moderation was confirmed when Egypt accepted in July 1970 a peaceful settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict drafted by the US state secretary, William Rodgers. For Boumediene, this plan would "bring a catastrophe to the Arabs as it merely aimed at neutralizing the
Palestinian resistance."¹ Concrete manifestation of his disagreements with President Nasser was Boumedienne's decision on August 12, to recall the Algerian troops that had been stationed on the Suez canal since the 1967 war and his later refusal to attend the Arab summit held in Cairo on September 22-27. But most important was to appear as champion of the Palestinian cause. Thus, the Algerian government moved to provide the Palestinian resistance with great support, especially in the context of the combativeness of the Palestinian guerrillas against Israeli targets carried out from the bases in Jordan and Southern Lebanon. These activities directed by the PLO under the leadership of Yasir Arafat, after the removal of the pro-Nasser Hammuda, gave the Algerians a good opportunity to prove their conviction that only a partisan war would enable the Palestinians to regain their territory.

With the increase of the guerrilla war, relations between the Palestinian resistance and Jordan as well as with Lebanon became heavily strained and resulted in bloody confrontations in Summer 1969. The Algerians promptly condemned the attempts of the Jordanian troops to dismantle the Palestinian bases and called for an immediate ceasefire. Represented by Kaid Ahmed, the Head of the FLN, Algeria participated together with Egypt, Libya and Sudan in a committee of enquiry to bring about a peaceful settlement to the dispute. And on September 26, Colonel Chabou, the Secretary-General of the Defense Ministry, was despatched to help take all the necessary measures to implement the cease-fire agreement reached at Cairo between King Hussein and Arafat. However, as this ceasefire was violated by Jordanian forces and the Algerian embassy in Amman hit by bomb attacks, Algeria decided to cut off

diplomatic relations with the Hashemit Kingdom in July 1970 and after repeated Jordanian attacks on the Palestinian bases, Boumedienne severely criticized King Hussein in a speech delivered on March 29, 1971.

This firm alignment of Algeria with the Palestinian resistance was confirmed by the emergency meeting of the council of revolution in September 1971 which decided an increase of aid, amounting to $20 million worth of arms and equipment.\(^1\) By that time 80 per cent of the Fatah armaments were believed to have been provided by Algeria.\(^2\) In addition, hundreds of Palestinians, mainly teachers and students, were living in Algeria and the PLO was granted broadcasting facilities on July 14, 1970 following the closure by the Egyptians of the Cairo-based "voice of Palestine". On the diplomatic level, Algiers accredited as Ambassador to Lebanon, M'hamed Yazid, a veteran militant diplomat known for his pro-Palestinian feelings in a clear attempt to establish permanent contacts with the Beirut-based Palestinian leaders. This unflagging support was accompanied by backing what were seen in the west as terrorist actions, especially the hijackings carried out by George Habbash's popular liberation front (FPLP) over the period 1968-1970.\(^3\)

Under these circumstances, Algeria's diplomatic isolation from the Arab world increased. Besides Egypt and Jordan, relations with Syria became complicated when the new President Assad moved toward a working

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\(^1\) N. Grimaud also reported that Algeria provided the Palestinians with $400,000 and an additional aid amounting to DA 200,000 offered by the Algerian red crescent. N. Grimaud: La politique extérieure de l'Algérie..., p.301.
\(^2\) M'hamed Yazid, in L'Orient le jour, August 14, 1971.
\(^3\) On June 13, 1968, a civil plane belonging to the Israeli airline El-Al was hijacked to Algiers by militants of the FPLP. Only non-Israeli passengers were liberated there. As reprisals for this lenient attitude, the world organization of pilots threatened to boycott Algerian plane and passengers.
relationship with Egypt involving a political settlement to the Middle East conflict. An incident to highlight Algeria's dissonances with Syria was the decision of the Syrian authorities to intercept and confiscate large shipments of heavy and light armaments sent by China to Fatah via Algeria.

The only major Arab country to share Algeria's intransigence vis-a-vis the Palestinian question was Iraq. In mid-June 1970, a senior official of the Iraqi Baath party Aysami visited Algiers and had talks with the FLN leaders. The joint communique affirmed the principle "of the armed struggle to liberate Palestine and the occupied Arab territories". This convergence of attitude was further confirmed during the visit of an FLN delegation to Baghdad in July the same year.

2. Consolidating Arab solidarity for the grand design

Attempts to break this diplomatic isolation resulted from the desire to adapt to the changes that occurred on the international scene, notably within the world energy market. Having overcome major challenges to her regime at home, nationalized the French oil interests and succeeded in laying foundations for a détente in the Maghreb, Algeria needed the solidarity of other Arab countries to succeed in her grand design, i.e.: to lead the third world coalition in its battle for restructuring the international economic order. To make this project possible, the state technocratic group induced Boumediene towards a moderate attitude in Algerian Arab policy. This eased relations with other Arab conservative states which had been strained because of Algeria's militant standpoints. Indeed, in addition to its intransigence with regard to the Palestinian

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1In Révolution Africaine, July 4-10, 1970.
question, Algeria had also granted recognition to the liberation front of Oman, adopted a positive attitude towards the independence of the United Arab Emirates, and supported the republican rebels in North Yemen.

The change in attitude was highlighted by the visits of the Saudi King Faisal in June 1970 and June 1973, Presidents Sadat and Qadhafi in May 1972, and of the Lebanese Prime Minister Saeb Salem in March 1973. The change was also noticeable in Boumedienne's declaration that the future of the Arab nation is "linked with the liberation of the occupied territories ... (while) the destiny of the whole Arab nation will remain linked with that of Palestine".¹ Most tangible manifestation of Algerian commitment to Arab solidarity, however, was the unconditional and massive contribution to the Arab cause during the October 1973 conflict. When the war broke out, Algeria promptly sent about 5,000 soldiers to the front, made available 60 jetfighters most of them Soviet-built Mig 21s, 100 tanks and supplied Egypt with 2 million tonnes of oil and Syria with 1 million. But most significant was Boumedienne's order of armaments from the Soviet Union that amounted to $200 million which he paid cash and in dollars.² This amount of support was a substantial financial sacrifice with regard to Algeria's need of foreign currencies for the second four year development plan. But for the Algerians this was made for the sole sake of Arab solidarity and it was this line they came to emphasize since in practical terms, Arab solidarity would help them in their search for the restructuring of the international economic order. When Egypt accepted the US-sponsored ceasefire agreement on October 23, the Algerian government in contrast to

¹Speech to the address of Presidents Sadat and Qadhafi, May 1972 in Discours du Président (4), p.8.
²For this purpose, Boumedienne went to Moscow on November 13-14.
its attitude after the 1967 war, did not disclose its position imme­diately. It was only a week later that an official communiqué announced that Algeria’s support to the front line arab states remained unaltered.

To many foreign observers and leftwing militants in Algeria, this reaction not only sharply contrasted with Algeria’s attitude after the ceasefire ending the 1967 war but was also regarded as a betrayal to her own commitment to the Palestinian cause. However, the Algerian leaders regarded the 1973 conflict as a military and above all a moral victory for the Arabs, believing that if the military manoeuvres had ceased, the struggle against Israel had not stopped. The war, they claimed, had to be pursued through other means, namely the consolidation of Arab solidarity, the use of Arab economic and financial potential to force Israel and her allies to accept peaceful negotiations that would lead to the recovery of Arab-occupied territories. At Algeria’s initiative, the first Arab meeting after the war was convened in Algiers on November 24-29. For Boumedienne, it constituted an occasion to try to establish himself as the champion of the Arab cause and ensure the Arab solidarity that was apparently cemented after the war. All the Arab leaders with the exception of Iraq’s Hassan Al Bakr attended the conference. Algeria proposed and had accepted the recognition of the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Also important in the eyes of the Algerians were the adoption of resolutions reaffirming the need to reinforce inter-Arab military and economic cooperation as well as strengthen Arab solidarities with Black Africa. The use of the oil weapon was in the direct line of Algeria’s objectives and expectations. If the oil embargo agreed upon at the October 17, 1973 OAPEC meeting in Kuwait was conceived as an important leverage to bring the
Western world to exercise pressures on Israel, it also constituted in the eyes of the Algerians a valuable means for the Arab oil-producing countries to increase the prices of their oils and thus of oil revenues in order to finance their economic developments. At this meeting, the Algerians pushed for and obtained a cut in Arab oil exports to countries which supported Israel, by a minimum of 5 per cent with immediate effect and then every month until an Israel withdrawal from the occupied territories. If Algeria insisted on an oil embargo on the USA, Netherlands, Portugal and South Africa, she showed a soft attitude towards the other EEC countries for reasons inherent in her own interests. The oil embargo she herself imposed on the USA was not detrimental to either her foreign earnings (oil supplies to the USA represented at that time only 5 per cent of her total exports) or diplomatic relations (which had been cut off since June 1967).

In addition, at the Kuwait OAPEC meeting, the Algerian delegates made subtle efforts to prevent the extension of the embargo to gas exports since they were then involved in huge gas deals with US companies. Therefore, given the small amount of petroleum they were selling to America, the Algerians pressed the other Arab countries notably Saudi Arabia to maintain embargo on their oil shipments to the USA but in contrast they resisted the attempts of the Gulf states to increase pressures on the European nations which aimed at forcing them to withhold support to Israel in favour of the Arab cause. For the Algerians, an alliance with Europe would help weaken the hegemony of the Western bloc and would enhance the chances of Euro-Arab co-operation as both sides shared interdependent economies: the Arabs needing technology and the Europeans energy. The other Arab countries accepted Algeria's demand for
strengthening dialogue with Western Europe but decided at the Oapec meeting held in Vienna on March 18, 1974 to lift the oil embargo upon the USA. Though the Algerians were reluctant to end the oil embargo, they agreed in order to maintain a common attitude necessary to enable the diplomatic efforts of the Arab countries which aimed at inducing the USA and Israel to accept negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict.

To facilitate convening an international conference over the Palestinian question, which Egypt and Syria firmly favoured, the Algerians received in December 1973 and October 1974, the US State Secretary Henry Kissinger who had been pushing forward his 'step-by-step' strategy aiming at providing a political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

3. The return to radicalism

Since the mid-1970s, Algeria's involvement in Arab affairs has steadily declined. Domestic problems coupled with preoccupation over the Western Sahara forced the Algerian leadership to adopt a low profile in its Arab policy but with a more pronounced radicalism as a response to the support of most of the Arab countries for Morocco, the deterioration of relations with France and the backing of the USA for King Hassan.

With the bipolarism that appeared in the Arab scene following President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in September 1977, Algeria strongly supported the Palestinian cause and joined other Arab radical states in the efforts to isolate Egypt diplomatically and counter-attack the moderate line pursued by some conservative Arab countries towards the Palestinian question.
Gathered in a "front of steadfastness and rejection" set up in Tripoli on December 2-5, 1977, Algeria along with Libya, Syria, South Yemen and the PLO called for a freeze of diplomatic relations with Egypt, the boycott of Egyptian companies that would cooperate with Israel, and the transfer of the Arab league headquarters from Cairo. After Egypt signed the Camp David agreements in September 1978, Algeria and her partners in the steadfastness front succeeded in calling an Arab summit in Baghdad on November 2-5 without the presence of Egypt and issuing a resolution condemning the Camp David agreements. To rally wider support against these agreements, Boumedienne toured the Middle East, the USSR and Yugoslavia on November 3-16 but his efforts failed as Saudi Arabia which had emerged as a key element in Arab affairs was determined to lead a moderate Arab consensus.

The rise of Chadli to power did not alter this radical line because of pressures by Benyahia and the radical officers to pursue a Boumediennist line not only with regard to the Western Sahara but also within Arab circles. A radical attitude was then maintained with Algeria boycotting the Arab summit held in Amman in November 1980 as a result of the PLO's decision not to attend. The reason given was that the Algerians did not want "decisions to be taken in the absence of the Palestinians" since they feared that the Amman meeting would nullify the

1After the visit of the Saudi foreign minister to Kuwait, Qatar, Arab Emirates and Oman, the Gulf states demanded on October 30 that Egypt must not be expelled from the meeting, probably because a rapprochement between the Arab states and Egypt was under way through the good offices of King Hassan of Morocco who had secretly received the Egyptian Vice-President Tuhami on October 21.
October 1974 resolution which recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and endorse King Hussein's plan for a solution of the Middle East conflict that would exclude the PLO.

Previous political alignment was maintained as President Chadli attended the two summits of Arab steadfastness held in Libya, the first at Tripoli on April 13-15, 1981 and the second at Benghazi on September 16-18, reiterating commitments agreed upon at the first conference. Moreover, Algeria declared her support to the Iranian revolution which she came to regard as a positive event, though she disapproved of the way it had been conducted. For the Algerian leaders, it was important that Iran was no longer the US policeman of the Gulf as it used to be during the Shah. Also important for them, was that the new Iranian regime supported the Palestinian resistance and the struggle waged by the Polisario Front.

The militant line pursued by Algeria was thought necessary to respond to what she called the renewed aggressive policies of imperialism against the Arab world, particularly in Southern Lebanon.

During hostilities between Palestinians and Israeli troops in May 1981, the Algerians expressed their support to the Lebanese government and Arafat through messages from President Chadli and called for an emergency meeting of the Arab league to examine the situation in Lebanon. The Arab foreign ministers met at Tunis on May 22, and expressed solidarity with Syria and the PLO. They also called for an immediate ceasefire and respect for the unity and integrity of Lebanon. When on August 7, the PLO accepted the US plan for a ceasefire drafted by Philip Habib, the Arab foreign ministers were due to meet but strong disagreements prevented the convening of the conference. A bloc of the
moderates led by Saudi Arabia manoeuvred to obtain a meeting that would discuss a global settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict while Algeria and the other states of the steadfastness front demanded a meeting that should deal exclusively with the Lebanese issue. In fact, the Algerians were anxious to see an emergency conference held as they hoped it could strengthen Arab militant solidarity in order to prevent US and Israel from pursuing their policies in Lebanon. As a step to unite the Arab ranks, the Algerians attempted to reconcile the conflicting parties in Lebanon. Though their sympathies lay with the progressive Lebanese factions and the Palestinian resistance, they came to stress the necessity of dialogue and unity to counter what they regarded as Israeli expansionism (with the annexation of the Golan Heights) and plots against the Palestinians, with the announcing by the Saudi Crown Prince Fahd of his peace plan. For this purpose, the Algerian Ambassador to Beirut met Premier Chafik Al Wazzan in September and Lakhdar Brahimi the presidential adviser on Arab affairs went to Lebanon and Syria in mid-November to preach unity among the conflicting parties on the eve of the Arab summit conference. The main source of inter-Arab divergences appeared to be point 7 of the Fahd’s plan which implicitly called for the recognition of Israel by the Arab states. The moderates -Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Morocco in particular - seemed willing to accept the principle of recognition providing that Israel withdrew from the Arab-occupied territories and accepted the establishment of a Palestinian states on the West Bank and Gaza. In contrast, Algeria and her hard line partners insisted that Israel should implement these demands without any condition. Israel’s recognition, they argued constituted a mere secondary question for the time being.
Against this background, Chadli, Assad and Qadhafi declined to attend the Fez summit held in November, leaving their respective foreign ministers with the mission of preventing the adoption of the Fahd's plan by this meeting. In fact the conference reached a deadlock and was postponed sine die though the final declaration asserted that the debates over the plan were only adjourned. For the Algerians, the breakdown of the summit was regarded as a success for the steadfastness front and for the Palestinian cause, believing that the Palestinians had at Fez "escaped the peace of cemeteries." Behind scenes, the Algerians along with Libyans and Syrians were backing the Palestinian radical factions of the FDLP and FPLP as well as other influential PLO officials such as Qaddumi and Abu Jihad to prevent Arafat and his moderate allies from accepting the Fahd plan. This intransigence aimed also at weakening the position of King Hussein who seemed to favour the other peace plan issued in September by President Reagan which stressed only the principle of autonomy for the Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza and gave an important role to Jordan in eventual negotiations with Israel at the expense of the PLO. Immediately after the visit of King Hussein to Washington, El-Moudjahid criticized "Jordan's search for a US solution".

1. Algérie-Actualités (842); December 3-9, 1981, p.15.
2. El-Moudjahid reported the declaration of Qaddumi in which he rejected the point 7 of the Fahd plan (El-Moudjahid, November 17, 1981).
3. In an interview to BBC in November 1982, King Hussein revealed that he had called the PLO to recognize Israel and transmitted a message to the Israeli labour party in which he declared his readiness to negotiate a security agreement with Israel (in Le Monde, November 11, 1982).
The fragmentation of the Arab world was further increased by the Iran-Iraq war, the aggravation of the civil war in Lebanon and the repeated interventions of Israel in this country in June 1982. In this dramatic context, the Algerians watched helplessly the dislocation of the Arab ranks. The death of their foreign minister in May 1982 while in a mission of good offices between Iran and Iraq was traumatic and stirred up their frustrations over the incapacity of the Arab and Muslim countries to mend their fences.

The escalation of the Middle East crisis came when Israeli troops invaded Lebanon in an attempt to dismantle the PLO bases and help the Lebanese government to establish its authority over its own territory. Algeria immediately reacted to the Israeli move by President Chadli sending messages to his Lebanese counterpart and to Arafat expressing Algeria's support as well as dispatching two high FLN officials Mehri and Messadia to Damascus on June 11. Later, the new foreign minister Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi went to the Syrian capital to obtain the approval of President Assad and other leaders of the Palestinian resistance for the convening of an emergency Arab summit. But this conference did not take place probably because some Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia were hoping that a US mediation would bring about a peaceful settlement to end hostilities between Israeli and Palestinians. With this obstacle, the Algerians could do nothing but attend the meeting of the Arab foreign ministers that was convened on June 26, three weeks after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. At this meeting, Taleb-Ibrahimi presented a working paper hoping that it would serve as a basis for the proceedings of the conference. The document called for 1) unanimous indignation at the Israeli invasion; 2) the support for the Palestinian and Lebanese
combatants; 3) the condemnation of the US support of Israel; 4) the reaffirmation of the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people; 5) the revision of Arab relations with other countries on the basis of their position vis-a-vis the situation in Lebanon; and finally, 6) the dispatching of ministerial delegations to the capitals of the members of the security council.\textsuperscript{1} The Algerian plan was rejected and only its last suggestion was accepted. Accordingly, Taleb led one of the two delegations set up by the meeting to Paris, Moscow and Pekin.

As a result of Israeli intervention, most of the Palestinian guerrillas were forced to withdraw from Beirut in August 1982. While some of these forces pulled out toward the Bekaa Valley where Syrian troops were stationed, about 5,000 Palestinian combatants left Lebanon for remote places like Jordan, South-Yemen, Sudan and Tunisia. At the PLO's request, Algeria received 700 of them while Arafat came to Algiers on September 11 in search for more assistance from the Algerian government "in the tragic moments faced by the Palestinian resistance".\textsuperscript{2}

The Palestinian tragedy in Lebanon ended neither with the cease-fire negotiated by Philip Habib the US mediator, nor with the PLO withdrawal from Beirut. On September 17, 1982, the Palestinian civilian camps of Sabra and Shatila in the Lebanese capital, were atrociously massacred. According to the Algerians, these massacres were committed by the Israeli troops under the personal responsibility of General Ariel Sharon, the

\textsuperscript{1}El-Djeich (232), September 1982, p.20.
\textsuperscript{2}El-Djeich, the ANP's news organ hailed "the arrival of the Beirut heroes at Biskra" where the Algerian army disposes of a training camp for commandos. El-Djeich, September 1982, p.20.
Israeli defense minister. As an expression of its deep sorrow, the Algerian government cancelled the festivities that were to be organized to celebrate a religious feast as well as the preparation to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the outbreak of the Algerian revolution.

With the danger of the crumbling of the Palestinian resistance, the Algerians began to emphasize the necessity to reach an Arab consensus as an indispensable means to fight Israel, arguing that ideological conflicts which had split the Arabs were detrimental to the Palestinian cause. Given the dynamics of the 'diplomatic readjustment' initiated by Taleb Ibrahimi, they attempted to demarcate themselves from the Arab steadfastness front and break away from the radical stance which proved costly in the past. This new strategy resulted in a rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, a more balanced attitude between Iran and Iraq and a clear support to the PLO leadership in particular, in contrast to Syria and Libya.

4. Preserving the Arab consensus and Palestinian resistance

It was at the PLO's request that Algeria - represented by Taleb Ibrahimi - endorsed the Arab peace at the summit which took place again in Fez in September 1982. This plan differed from the initial project of Fahd (now King) as its resolutions asserted the "reaffirmation of the Palestinian people's rights for self-determination under the leadership of the PLO its sole and legitimate representative and the creation of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital." Under these terms, 

1El-Moudjahid carried on its front page "Massacres dans les camps palestiniens" in big characters, together with "babies, children, women shot face to the wall" and a big picture showing a small girl who had been killed (El-Moudjahid, September 22, 1982). The Algerian paper estimated at 3,000 the number of victims slain in these attacks, compared with 1,400 given by Arafat (interview to Time, September 27, 1982) p.10.
Algeria participated in the committee of the seven Arab countries that toured the capitals of the security council’s members in November-December. However, the Arab mission failed because of the opposition of Israel and its allies notably the US and Great Britain to associate the PLO in peace negotiations unless this movement publicly recognised the existence of the state of Israel.

As a result, the PLO leadership came to consider a common attitude with Jordan at the expense of other radical Palestinian faction and Syria. To counter a Jordanian-PLO solution to the Middle East crisis, Syria moved to set these factions as well as the Shi‘it groups in Lebanon against Arafat and his moderate allies. President Assad was in fact anxious to regain a grip over the PLO which he lost after the evacuation of Beirut by the Palestinian guerrillas and after the rapprochement between King Hussein and Arafat. In his eyes, a compromise between Jordan and the PLO and the recovering by Lebanon of its independence and territorial integrity would deprive Syria of a serious card to bargain with in case of negotiations with Israel over the Golan heights. Being supported by the Soviet Union which was poised to gain a substantial weight in the Middle East politics and by revolutionary Iran and Libya, President Assad attempted to emerge as the key figure in any peace negotiations even at the exclusion of the Arafat-led PLO leadership.

Though Algeria was aware that there will be neither peace nor war without Syria, she was extremely reluctant to back Hafed Al Assad against the PLO in order not to weaken the Palestinian movement. For President Chadli most important is Palestine as it “constitutes the central issue in the Middle East”\(^1\) while the occupied territories are merely “an

\(^1\)Speech, November 1, 1983 in El-Moudjahid, November 2, 1983.
extension of the Palestinian question."¹ Thus the Algerians turned to
the moderate Arab countries Saudi Arabia in particular to help secure the
cohesion of the PLO.

The rapprochement with Saudi Arabia and the assistance to Yasir
Arafat were highlighted by the visit of King Fahd to Algiers in November
1982. The presence in the Saudi delegation of the ministers of oil,
labour, planning in addition to the foreign minister Saud Al Faisal,
indicated Algeria's search for economic co-operation with the Saudi
Kingdom as well as for a common attitude to help maintain Opec status in
the world energy market following the oil glut. Beside these common
objectives, the Algerians stated that it was the duty of the two sides
"to grant the PLO all assistance it needs to achieve its objectives".²
The presence of Arafat in Algiers at the time of Fahd's visit and his
participation in the talks between Chadli and Fahd certainly reflected
these concerns. In concert with the Saudis, the Algerians attempted to
help achieve Palestinian unity as they offered to host the meeting of the
Palestinian congress (PNC) in contrast to Syria and Libya which seemed
to favour an alliance of the leftwing Palestinian organizations against
Yasir Arafat. On January 16, 1983 the Libyan capital held a meeting
gathering the representatives of the radical factions FPLP, FDPLP,
FPLP-GC of Jibril and the pro-Syrian Saika. Their resolutions firmly
rejected the Reagan plan, the Fez decisions and the PLO-Jordanian
negotiations.

¹Interview to the French TV FR3 in Discours du président
{1), p.50.
²Declaration of Taleb-Ibrahimi in El-Moudjahid, November 25,
1982.
After intensive efforts, Algeria succeeded in bringing all the Palestinian factions to convene the PNC meeting in Algiers in mid-February.¹ In the opening speech to this conference, Chadli called for unity among the Palestinians, referring to the example of the wartime FLN which, he argued, had been able to overcome its internecine conflicts on its own. His recommendation could be regarded as a hidden criticism of the failure of the Palestinians to solve their internal problems without the interference of other Arab states.

Throughout the meeting and behind the scenes, Taleb-Ibrahimi and Messadia worked tirelessly, to preserve the unity of the Palestinian ranks, stressing at the same time Algeria's neutrality in order to avoid being criticized for manipulating the Palestinians or favouring one fraction over another. Their main preoccupation had been to help preserve the cohesion of the Palestinian resistance as Taleb-Ibrahimi declared that Algeria would "accept all the decisions taken by the PNC" and that she would "work for the strengthening of the unity and cohesion of the Palestinian and Arab ranks as well as for a Syria-PLO rapprochement."²

The PNC conference reaffirmed the rejection of Reagan's plan and Camp David agreements but approved of the pursuit of dialogue with Jordan. Such a consensus appeared as a clear triumph for the moderate line preached by Yasir Arafat. However, this victory was short-lived as the

¹Amid these efforts, President Chadli sent a message to the Saudi King on January 17 and in early February he despatched his adviser on Arab affairs L. Brahimi to Riyadh and Damascus. He had also separate talks with Arafat, Habbash, Hawatmeh and Ibrahim Koleilat the Murabitun chief.
May 3 meeting between Assad and Arafat broke down and heavy fighting broke out in Lebanon between Syrian-backed dissidents of Fatah led by Abu Musa and the troops loyal to Arafat.

Shortly after, Chadli's adviser Lakhdar Brahimi flew to Damascus to induce Assad to work out a compromise with Arafat and after receiving the Palestinian leader, the Algerian president went to the Syrian capital in June, in an apparent effort to heal the Syrian-PLO breach. His attempt did not succeed as the Syrian-backed Fatah dissidents went on dismantling the strongholds of the troops loyal to Arafat in Tripoli, thus forcing them to evacuate the second biggest town in Lebanon. As a result about 4,000 of Arafat men left for Yemen, Egypt and Algeria.

Algerian bitterness and sorrow were expressed in Chadli's statements that "it was the Palestinians and only the Palestinians who should take decisions to determine their destiny especially in the event of a future international conference on Palestine." According to Chadli, the Algerian president stressed that he would oppose any attempt that aimed at imposing any foreign grip on the PLO. And to mark Algeria's solidarity with the PLO, the FLN organized a popular meeting in Algiers at the end of October, with the presence of Abu Iyad, a close aide of Arafat. Furthermore, Algerian diplomats attempted to reconcile the various Palestinian factions and help to preserve the credibility of the PLO.

At the end of March 1984, Arafat came three times to Algiers, while

1 Interview of Chadli to Afrique-Asie (297), June 6, 1983, p.12.
2 Chadli's statement in a report to the FLN fifth congress in Révolution Africaine, December 30, 1983 - January 5, 1984, p.25. And in an article entitled "it is enough", El-Moudjahid condemned the violent actions of Fatah dissidents (El-Moudjahid, November 4-5, 1983).
3 In an interview to El-Moudjahid, Abu Iyad declared that "Algeria has taught us the spirit of independence and of decision in El-Moudjahid, November 2, 1983.
President Chadli received other Palestinian leaders and in mid-May, Messadia toured the Middle East to gain support for the PLO. As a result, two inter-Palestinian meetings were gathered in Algiers in April and May to work out a compromise and agree for the convening of the PNC's conference. However, it seems that differences among the Palestinian leaders prevented a consensus, as the Palestinian movement remains profoundly divided. In this context, the Algerians could only issue a declaration calling the Arabs to transcend their futile conflicts, respect the independence of the Palestinians and consolidate their unity as well as work for a consensus to dissuade Israel from another military aggression.  

Another example of Algerian distancing from the front of steadfastness and from the radical policies pursued by Libya and Syria had been the refusal to join them in condemning the negotiations carried out by the Lebanese government with Israel under the auspices of the US State Secretary Schultz. The Algerians did not disclose their position over the acceptance by the Lebanese government of the US mediated plan on May 17, 1983. On May 21 the FLN political bureau met and issued a statement reiterating support to the Palestinian resistance but did not attack the policies of President Gemayel. It seemed that the Algerians did not want to alienate the Lebanese leadership as a hostile attitude would ruin the chances of a national reconciliation in Lebanon, retard the withdrawal of Israeli troops and obstruct a rapprochement between Gemayel and the PLO.

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1Meeting of the FLN political bureau April 10, 1984 in El-Moudjahid, April 11, 1984.
2Demands made during the visit to Algiers of Labidi, the Libyan foreign minister on March 15 and Faruk Al Charaa the Syrian State Secretary for foreign affairs on May 20. In between, the Algerians received Al Bissat, the special envoy of President Gemayel.
Algeria's main attacks had been directed at the terms of the Schultz plan itself which she accused of attempting to neutralize Lebanon and deprive the PLO of its bases in this country.¹

As a reward for this constructive approach, President Gemayel paid a successful official visit to Algiers on November 4.

Beside this moderate attitude in Arab affairs, Algeria moved from overt support to Iran to a more balanced approach between Teheran and Baghdad in order to attenuate bipolarism that affected both the Arab and Islamic worlds. Pressed by some Arab countries, Algeria agreed to resume her mediation between the two warring parties but Iran's obstinacy proved a great obstacle for the Algerian diplomats to overcome.² Torn between their fundamental support for the Iranian revolution and requests from the Gulf states for Algerian mediation, they moved to adopt a discreet attitude and a much tempered ideological approach to the Iran-Iraq war.³ Thus they attempted to develop economic links with these two countries in

²In October 1983, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sheikh Sa'ad Al Sabah declared that "we will demand from Algeria - because of her good relations with Iran - to help end the war in the Gulf and convince Iran to negotiate with Iraq."
(Interview to Le Monde, October 4, 1983.)
³At the ministerial meeting of the Arab league held in Baghdad on March 4, 1984, the Arabs called upon Iran to accept a cease-fire, otherwise they would reconsider their relations with Teheran. As Algeria favoured the call for negotiations between the belligerent countries, the Iranian foreign minister Dr Akbar Velayati came to Algiers the same day the Arab foreign ministers met in Teheran in an attempt to induce the radical members of the Algerian government to prevent Taleb-IlBrahimi from putting in practice the resolutions agreed upon at Baghdad. In his declaration to the Algerian press he reiterated Iran's conditions for the settlement of the war, conditions regarded by the moderates as unacceptable since they demanded the total and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops, the reimbursement by Iraq of Iran's war costs estimated at $150 billions and the public judgement of Saddam Hussein by an international tribunal.
order to de-emphasize political considerations in their dealings with them. These concerns explain the visit of the Iranian deputy Prime Minister to Algiers in March 1984 and the signature by Algeria of an important economic agreement with Iraq following the visit of the Iraqi minister of water works in June 1983.

Along with this ideological de-emphasis, the Algerians contributed to the efforts of other Arab and Muslim states to bring about a political settlement to the war, especially after the risks of its extension to other states of the Gulf following attacks on oil tankers by the two belligerent countries and Iran's subversive activities in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. These concerns explained the visits Talib Ibrahimi paid to Teheran, Damascus and Riyadh on March 21-24, 1984. On May 7, President Chadli received the Pakistani foreign minister whose country embarked upon a mediation between Iran and Iraq and in early June he despatched to Teheran Rabah Bitat, the President of the National Assembly and Abdelghani, the state secretary to Bagdad. The choice of two junior officials reflected Algeria's drive to participate in the existing efforts to help ease tensions in the Gulf without being directly involved in another mediation which might prove unsuccessful because of Iran's intransigence and the suspicion of certain extremist groups in Iran over Algerian partiality. As the war went on, this careful attitude seemed the only way for the Algerians to work for an Arab consensus without seriously offsetting their relations with either belligerent party.

Located far from the confrontation zone of the Middle east and being relatively aloof from the crux of Arab politics, Algeria could easily afford to adjust her Arab policy according to events affecting the Arab world as a whole and to her own interests without great costs. And if
she has been flexible with the use of Arab solidarity, her commitment to
the Palestinian issue may help her enhance her image of a radical and
revolutionary country whenever needed.

C. The quest for a militant non-aligned movement

Until the early 1970s, Algeria's non-alignment expressed a political
and radical content directed mainly at raising the consciousness of the
third world, helping national liberation movements to get rid of the
colonial grip and reinforcing the socialist bloc against what the
Algerians regarded as Western imperialism. But with the increase in
power capabilities and need to cope with the new changes in world
political and economic affairs, Algeria came to underline economic issues
as the main objectives of developing countries. From the mid-1970s, her
role in lining up non-aligned countries declined because of the lack of
cohesion and weakness of its state members and the harsh realities of
world politics. To remedy the withering of the third world coalition,
Algeria shifted from a radical attitude to moderation so as to preserve
non-alignment as an active force in the context of the resurrection of
the cold war threats that came to mark the early 1980s.

This evolution does not, however, suggest a clear cut between
ideology and pragmatism, as Algeria's non-aligned policy has been a quite
subtle blend of the two ingredients in which the emphasis shifted
according to immediate interests, concerns and changes in priorities.
In this sense, militancy has been tempered with realpolitik without
seriously undermining basic values essential to her process of national
identification.
1. Emphasis on revolutionary ideals

Among the first manifestations of the FLN's establishment of a diplomatic identity was to inscribe its foreign policy within the neutralist movement of newly independent states that emerged in reaction to the persistence of colonialism and to entanglements in the cold war coalitions. To gain support for its own struggle of national liberation and identify with the movement of the new states, the FLN was permitted to participate in the first gathering of what were then called the third world countries at Bandung in April 1955. As the Algerian delegates expected, the conference condemned colonialism in all its forms and most important it adopted an Egyptian motion proclaiming Algeria's right for independence. However, the hope of the Algerians that the neutralist movement would emerge as a decisive force to hasten the decolonization of their own country and reduce East-West tensions became shattered given the divisions within the third world on ideological grounds and alignment with the great powers. With the Suez affair in 1956, the coup in Iraq in 1958, the crisis of Berlin 1958-1962, Cuba 1961-1962, the renewed tension over Formosa and the troubled decoloni-

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1 Besides the North Atlantic Treaty organization (NATO) signed between Europe and the USA in April 1949, there were the Warsaw pact concluded on May 14, 1955 between the USSR and its European satellites; the South-East Asian Treaty organization (SEATO) signed at Manila in 1954 between the USA, UK, Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, Pakistan and Thailand and the Baghdad pact set up on Feb. 24, 1955, between Iraq, Turkey joined by the UK on April 5, Pakistan on September 3, Iran on November 3 and Jordan on December 13.

The competition between the Communist and the free worlds in the first half were manifested by the crises of Korea, Formosa in South-East Asia; Guatemala and Costa Rica in Latin-America, Syria and Iraq in the Middle East. Concerns of national security led the Prime Ministers of India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia at Colombo from April 28 to May 2 and at Bogor in Djakarta on December 28, 1954 as a prelude to the Bandung conference.
zation process in the Congo, the FLN thought it more opportune to gather support for its cause from the neutralist states than in engaging in ideological debates that might complicate its search for the independence of Algeria. Support for Algerian independence was granted at the meeting of the Afro-Asian people's solidarity conference in Cairo in December 1958 and in Conakry in April 1960 as well as at the conference of independent African states held in Addis Ababa in January the same year. However, ideological cleavages among the new states affected their attitude toward the Algerian conflict.

11 former French colonies, met at Abidjan in October 1960, called for a peaceful solution to the Algerian conflict in a way not to alienate France.\footnote{The Brazzaville group included all the Francophone states in Africa except Mali, Guinea and Togo.} And at their meeting in Brazzaville in December, they favoured the principle of a referendum in Algeria and urged France to enter negotiations with the FLN to end the conflict. But for the FLN leaders this moderate attitude aimed at helping France to safeguard her stakes in Algeria, notably her hold over the Saharan oil which De Gaulle wanted to salvage regardless of a political settlement of the Algerian question.

To counter the moderate policies of these states, known then as the Brazzaville group, and the other group of Monrovia formed out of moderate states of Gambia, Nigeria, Libya, Tunisia and Togo, the FLN joined Guinea, Mali, Morocco and the UAR in a radically oriented gathering set up at Casablanca in January 1951. This group was strongly critical of French colonial policies, and support to Israel and very hostile to the moderate African states and their alignment with the Western capitalist world. Despite these divisions, the new states felt the need to unite given their status in the world scene and the common
problems they faced. Thus in an attempt to secure their own independ­ence at a time when the cold war polarized the world into two antagonistic blocs, these states met at Belgrade in September 1961 in what was to become the first summit conference of the non-aligned movement. There they adopted resolutions defining a non-aligned state as a country pursuing a foreign policy of national independence based on peaceful coexistence, supporting the national liberation movements and eschewing multilateral or bilateral military alliances with a major power. This evidently excluded a great number of moderate countries and newly independent Francophone states and exacerbated the cleavages within the non-western world.

After Algeria's independence, Ben Bella forced the dissolution of the radical group of Casablanca in an attempt to advance the cause of unity among the newly independent states, especially in Africa. But despite the founding of the OAU in March 1963, divisions among radicals and moderates remained acute in Africa as elsewhere. Feeling that his country had a special role in the third world conferred upon it by its struggle in remodelling the international system, the Algerian leader resolutely indulged in a foreign policy directed against colonialism and imperialism and set out to rally the progressive forces, especially through the Afro-Asian movement. A clear evidence of Algeria's revolutionarism was a hostile attitude adopted toward the conservative regimes of Morocco and Tunisia as indicated by the acute tensions of Autumn 1963. And to manifest Algeria's anti-colonialism, Ben Bella provided diplomatic and military support to most of the national liberation movements in Africa. At the first OAU council of Ministers in September 1963, he announced that 1,000 soldiers of African movements were trained in Algeria and that
he had 10,000 Algerian volunteers at the disposal of the African revolution. He also called on the African states to set up a unified force with the mission of liberating the rest of Africa. His suggestions were not approved by other members of the OAU and instead a committee of liberation was established in which Algeria eventually played a prominent role. This setback did not prevent Ben Bella from personally involve in the anti-colonial struggle by receiving the leaders of the liberation movements in Algiers and by establishing direct contacts with African heads of state, especially the progressive ones such as Modibo Keita, Nyerere, Sekou Toure, N’Krumah and Nasser, despite the Ghanian and Egyptian Presidents' resentment at Ben Bella's excessive exposure in Afro-Asian circles. Nevertheless, his anti-imperialism manifested itself through the overt support he gave to the Congolese rebels and, with the help of President Nasser, he attempted to exclude Tshombe the Katangese leader from the OAU and non-aligned summits held in Cairo in 1964. It was this militant trend that Ben Bella came to stress in the Afro-Asian gatherings attempting to emerge as a champion of the progressive camp against the efforts of Yugoslavia which was preoccupied with the assertion of the non-aligned movement as a neutral force in the East-West confrontation. Despite the attempts of Tito to convince Ben Bella - when the Algerian leader visited Belgrade in March 1964 and when he himself came to Algiers in April 1965 - Algeria did not back up the convening of the non-aligned conference because of the divisions among its member states and threats against their security as highlighted by the US bombings in Vietnam.
Having been chosen to convene the second Afro-Asian conference, Ben Bella did not want to miss the occasion to reinforce the progressive and revolutionary trend in this movement. For these reasons, he was not disposed to take sides in the Sino-Soviet split that had affected the cohesion of the Afro-Asian coalition. Tshu En Lai was cordially welcomed when he visited Algiers in December 1964 and in March 1965 and Ben Bella paid a highly successful visit to Moscow in May 1964. But on each occasion, the Algerian leader abstained from any involvement in this dispute. Strict neutrality was observed though the Algerians had been irritated by the polemics between Moscow and Pekin and their negative implications for the Afro-Asian movement. These effects were particularly tangible during the meeting of the executive committee of the Afro-Asian organization (AAPSO) held in Algiers in March 1964. At this meeting, M'Hamed Yazid, the chairman of this committee made the worries of the AAPSO clear as he declared that the Sino-Soviet dispute "must not be raised anew at any future meetings of this organization. The Afro-Asian people participating...cannot tolerate a resumption of the dispute at organization meetings. Otherwise, it will become difficult for them to participate in the organization meetings in the future...In order to preserve its solidarity the Afro-Asian people will use every available

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1 When at the initiative of the Indonesian President Soekarno, 21 Afro-Asian countries met at Djakarta in April 1964 to celebrate the tenth anniversary of Bandung, it was left to the OAU to designate one of its capitals to decide the venue of the next Afro-Asian conference. And at its ministerial meeting of July 17, Algiers was unanimously chosen.
means to prevent resumption of the dispute."^1 And to maintain the cohesion of the movement, Yazid was charged by the AAPSO secretariat with a mission of conciliation to the major African-Asian capitals.

The June 1965 coup against Ben Bella did not help the new Algerian leaders to convene the Afro-Asian meeting as scheduled despite intensive efforts of Bouteflika. Some African states, especially Egypt, Ghana and Guinea called for the postponement of the conference, while China was against any participation of the Soviet Union in this conference. Visibly annoyed by the attitude of China and other member states, the Algerian issued an official communique stating that "postponement will not signify a victory of the Chinese position but rather a victory for the imperialists who have all alone banked on divisions among the progressive forces."^2 With this postponement, the demise of Afro-Asianism was sealed off while the decline of the non-alignment became tangible in the second half of the 1960s because of the diminution of cold war tensions and schisms that appeared in the great powers blocs. Anti-colonialism also began to wither away as a unifying force as more and more colonies achieved independence. Moreover, attempts to invigorate the non-aligned movement proved extremely difficult after the deaths or departures of Nehru in 1964, Modibo Keita, N'Krumah in 1966, Soekarno in 1967 and the decline in prestige of Nasser following the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war. In this context, the Boumedienne leadership adopted a passive attitude in the late 1960s being itself preoccupied

^1Quoted in Kimche, D: the Afro-Asian movement: ideology and foreign policy of the third world (Jerusalem, Israel University Press, 1973)
with its internal problems. But this did not prevent Algeria maintain­
ing the image of a revolutionary country as she attempted to revive the radical trend particularly in Africa. Addressing the UAR national assembly in November 1966, Boumedienne called for a common front of socialist countries and newly independent peoples to resist the various types of imperialist pressure forcing them to give up the policy of non-alignment and preventing them from completing their solidarity.¹

In February 1967, an FLN delegation led by Salah Boubnider and Major Hoffman went on a 20 day African tour to promote a conference of revolutionary and progressive parties in Africa. In April, Boumedienne - along with Nasser, Nyerere and Ould Daddah - attended a little summit of revolutionary African states in Cairo. However, these efforts were without a success and as a result, the Algerian leaders adopted a quite legalistic approach and a more pragmatic line, without abandoning their support for the national liberation movement. Indeed, Algeria was among the first African countries to sever diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom on December 18, 1965 following the unilateral declaration of independence of Rhodesia.² One of the bitterest critics of the Biafran secession was Boumedienne who not only launched blistering attacks on the "imperialist backed autonomists" but also barred the Biafran delegates from attending the OAU summit he hosted in September 1968. The convening of this summit in Algiers as well as the Panafrican cultural

¹Africa research bulletin, December 1-13, 1966.
²Along with Ethiopia, Ghana, Somalia, Sudan and UAR, Algeria participated in the OAU committee of five on Rhodesia to recommend concrete actions against the Rhodesian regime. The committee met at Addis in February 1966 and at Lusaka in October. Algeria was also a member of the committee set up by the UN security council to supervise the application of economic sanctions decided against the Salisbury regime.
festival in July 1969 appeared as a deliberate attempt to participate in African affairs after a relative period of isolation due to domestic problems and involvement in Arab affairs. This overture towards African solidarity was highlighted by the visits to Algiers made by Senghor in February 1967, Traore in January 1970 and General Gowon in August, visits alternated with that of the pro-Marxist leader N'Gouabi in March 1969.

These diplomatic contacts also indicated Algeria's desire to gather support for her battle against the French oil companies and for her attempts to lead the non-aligned movement on a militant basis around the crucial issues facing developing countries, notably on the economic level. The Algerian leaders welcomed Yugoslavia's suggestion of the necessity of convening a non-aligned summit (made during Tito's visit in November 1969) and duly participated in a 16 member committee charged to prepare this summit conference planned to take place in the Zambian capital in September 1970. But from the outset, the Algerians made it clear that they would oppose the conception of a non-aligned movement as a moral and political force only. Thus, they announced that Algeria would withdraw from this movement if the South Vietnamese provisional government was not admitted as a full participant in the Lusaka meeting. However with the determination of Yugoslavia and South-East Asian states and with the desire of other moderate countries not to radicalize the movement of the non-aligned, the Vietnamese provisional government was admitted only as an observer. Another setback for the Algerians was that the Cambodian seat was left vacant as a result of the coup against President Sihanouk. Boumedienne declined to attend the meeting, making clear his opposition to a non-alignment as a mere organizational

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1Speech of Bouteflika to the Lusaka meeting in El-Moudjahid, September 13, 1970.
principle. In his view, the process of detente between the super powers might be a good opportunity for the developing countries to make more demands on the West so as to assert themselves on the world scene. Thus, Algeria tried to lead a joint alignment of the third world states in contradistinction with both East and West in an attempt to accelerate the loosening of bipolarism and the hegemony of the super-powers over the world's political and economic affairs.

This new concept of non-alignment was meant to go "beyond the system of political conferences where actions were limited to defining world wide objectives without proceeding to their implementation. The non-aligned policies should be instead effective in the economic domain, because non-aligned states which do not control their natural resources are in fact dependent and aligned toward a bloc in spite of their own will." The implication of this new philosophy is that demand for a redistribution of the world economic resources may contribute to the individual's search for the definition of a post-colonial personality and identity. Thus, a more pronounced emphasis on transforming the basis of North-South relations was conceived as an extension of the initial solidarity of protest that the non-alignment movement had attempted to identify with since its emergence.

To push forward the demands of the third world, the Algerians wished to see a nucleus of radical states capable of engineering a militant approach which would be trusted by other developing countries. Solidarity of the third world became then the leitmotive of Algerian diplomacy. For analytical purpose, the political aspects of Algeria's

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\(^1\)speech to the UGTA congress, April 4, 1974 in Discours du Président (4), p.221.
designs are discussed in this sub-section, while the economic issues linked with North-South debates will be treated in more detail in the section related to her strategy of development.

2. Attempts and failure to line up a militant coalition

Having put an end "to French neo-colonial interests in Algeria after the 1971 oil nationalizations", and ensured a detente in the Maghreb with improved relations with moderate Arab countries, the Algerians attempted, in concert with other progressive countries, to direct the non-aligned movement toward militancy and revolutionary commitments. At the Georgetown ministerial meeting, they lobbied for and had approved the admission of the Vietnamese provisional government and Sihanouk's Grunk as full participants and with the help of radical states such as Cuba, Iraq, Syria and Libya, they succeeded in passing a resolution that called for a systematic support to the liberation movements in Africa and elsewhere and to the governments of Chile, Peru and Panama in their attempts to reduce US influence over Latin-America. Moreover, at the ministerial conference of the group of 77 held in Santiago in August 1972, Algeria and her allies pushed for a radical restructuring of international economic relations against the propositions of the moderate countries which favoured limited propositions that might be more easily accepted by the North.\footnote{The group of 77 was originally formed out of 75 developing countries at the UN General Assembly session of November 1963. It was extended to two other countries making 77 a number by which the group is still known, though it includes more than 120 members at the present time.}

After intensive diplomatic efforts, the Algerians were able to host a successful fourth summit conference of the non-aligned states in September 1973, considered by many political observers as a second
Bandung not only with regard to the high level of attendance but also to the number of prestigious leaders present at the meeting.\footnote{The conference regrouped 77 participant states (65 full members, 16 national liberation movements, 3 observers: Austria, Sweden and Switzerland). Among the prominent third world leaders present were: Bandaranaike, Castro, Faisal, Gandhi, Gowon, Kuanda, Qadhafi, Sadat, Senghor and Sihanouk.} From the outset, this meeting guided by the Algerians, was marked by a dramatic shift of interest and preoccupation. The resolutions adopted there condemned Israel, recognized the legitimacy of the struggle of the Palestinian people, called for self-determination in the Western Sahara, insisted on the increase of support to the liberation movements and rejected the hegemony of the super-powers.

Other recommendations of the meeting endorsed an economic programme largely influenced by the Algerian doctrine. There was no doubt that in the eyes of the Algerians, the struggle against colonialism and imperialism combined with the quest for a new international economic order was the only way for the non-aligned movement to achieve economic emancipation and political independence of its member states and the most effective means to transcend internecine ideological divergences such as those raised between Castro and Qadhafi at the Algiers meeting. To ensure third world solidarity, the Algerians concentrated on helping reach a political understanding between Arab and African states and winning the support of Asian and Latin-American countries which had been on the margin of the non-aligned movement.

The Arab-African dialogue emerged with the desire of the Arabs especially Algeria, Egypt and Libya to isolate Israel in Africa diplomatically by showing that the "struggle of Africans against colonialism and racial discrimination was not different from the struggle
of the Arabs against Zionism and imperialist domination". It was with this argument, by which Israel and South-Africa were depicted as pursuing the same philosophy, that 28 African states voted at the UN General Assembly of November 1975, an Arab-sponsored resolution stating the equation: "colonialism=racialism=zionism". To cement this Arab-African convergence, the Algerians succeeded - at the Arab summit they hosted in November 1973 - in inducing other Arab countries to sever links with Portugal, Rhodesia and South-Africa, impose an oil embargo against these states and provide African countries with oil and financial aid. At this meeting attended by President Mobutu of Zaire as a representative of the OAU, the Arabs decided to set up funds to help "African brothers" promoting their economic development. As a result about $6.7 billion of assistance has been committed by the Arab states between 1973 and 1981 through various organisms such as the Arab Bank for economic development in Africa and Opec's special fund for development. With this substantial assistance, the African connection proved useful for the Arab cause as most of the African states broke their diplomatic relations with Israel and it was with their help that Yasir Arafat the PLO leader was permitted to address the UN General Assembly in September 1974 and attend the OAU summit conference held in Kampala in July 1975.

To extend the impact of the non-aligned movement, and strengthen its position in the imminent negotiations with the North, Boumedienne visited Cuba and South-East Asia in March 1974 and received in July 1975, Echeverria the Mexican President who had emerged as an ardent advocate of North-South dialogue. And in order to counter US manoeuvres to weaken the third world coalition by playing off the Opec member states against

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1Speech of Boumedienne to the OAU summit conference held in Addis, April 26, 1973.
non-oil developing countries, the Algerians successfully lobbied for the adoption of a motion affirming the solidarity of the third world states with their Opec brethren at the joint meeting of the non-aligned countries and the group of 77 held in Dakar on August 4, 1975 only as few days before the second session of the preparatory meeting of the Paris conference on international co-operation.

The militant approach Algeria pursued so zealously did not, however, bring tangible gains for the third world coalition. In fact, most of the economic demands put forward by the Algerian-inspired group of 77 failed because of the reluctance of the North on the one hand and because of the divisions among developing countries on the other. If in the eyes of Algerians, the reluctance of the former was predictable, disunity of the third world constituted a great setback. The risk of the crumbling of this coalition came with a combination of political disputes and economic disparities:

1) Within Opec, Algeria’s search for increases of oil prices was hampered by Saudi Arabia’s drive for a moderate pricing policy to avoid aggravating the world’s economic crisis and jeopardizing the good relationship the Kingdom enjoyed with the USA. After the 1979 second oil boom, Opec’s status in the world energy market and its bargaining power steadily declined as a result of the oil glut.

2) Cohesion between third world states did not live up to Algerian expectations as the non-oil developing countries badly hit by the world economic crisis and oil bills began to show a hostile attitude to Opec and particularly to Algeria and her radical allies who had refused to temper their demands or grant them concessional oil prices. Opposition to Algeria’s radical stance inevitably grew as many of the non-oil
developing states especially in Africa and Latin-America started looking for trade and financial arrangements with the industrialized nations, thus undermining Algeria's design of radically remoulding the international economic structures.

3) On a similar basis, Arab-African solidarity did not make further progress, as the African states became increasingly critical of the Arab stand. On the moral level, the African leaders resented the arrogance of some Arab states which in some cases reminded them of memories of past slavery. Politically, they were not willing to become the appendage of the Arab world or become entangled in intra-Arab disputes. And after Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1977, they felt there was no need to maintain a cold war with Israel. Thus at the OAU summit held in Monrovia in 1979, many African states refused to condemn the Camp David agreements, while others such as Central-Africa, Gabon, Ivory Coast and Zaire responded to Israel's diplomatic offensive in Africa in order to counter Libyan ventures and subversive policies. With these difficulties, the foundations of Arab-African dialogue laid down at the Cairo meeting in March 1977 proved fragile. It was not surprising that the first session of the joint ministerial conference scheduled to take place in September 1978 was delayed until June 1979 and then simply cancelled.

Besides these divisions between groups, the cohesion of the non-aligned movement became seriously undermined with rivalries between moderates and radical states as highlighted by the polemics between Castro and Tito, and by the conflicts between Algeria and Morocco, Libya and Egypt, Libya and Chad, Uganda and Tanzania, Vietnam and Cambodia, Zaire and Angola, and the Iraq-Iran war in particular. If these
cleavages were perceptible at the non-aligned conference in Colombo in 1976, they were acute at the 1979 Havana meeting and responsible for the cancellation of the summit conference due to convene in Baghdad in 1982.

Algeria did not escape being entangled in these internecine disputes. She was herself being accused of adopting a radical stand often aligned with Moscow's position, while she accused Morocco of violating the principles of the non-aligned movement through territorial expansionism. Criticisms against Algeria mounted after she supported the Soviet-Cuban involvement in Angola. Her anti-Sadat policy and hostility to the Moroccan regime. This radicalism led Algeria to clash with many moderate states and increased her isolation within the non-aligned movement. Indeed, despite her efforts, the 1976 Colombo summit did not endorse Algeria's call for the recognition of the Polisario Front. President Tito, for instance, insisted that the Western Sahara question should be left to more appropriate regional and Arab gatherings. And at the meeting of the bureau of the non-aligned held in Algiers in June 1976, the Algerian position faced a strong Moroccan lobby represented by Senegal, Ivory Coast, and Zaire in particular. Over the Angolan issue, the Algerian radical stand was also rejected by a number of moderate sub-Saharan states as expressed by the anti-Algerian feelings among these states, at the OAU special ministerial session on Angola held at Addis in February 1976.1 Given her concerns over national security as exacerbated by the Western Saharan issue, Algeria had clearly chosen her camp.

1It was the Minister of Trade Layachi Yaker who represented Algeria in this meeting perhaps in order to keep the prestige of Boumedienne and Bouteflika clear of the mudslingings, Africa Confidential (17), 4, 1976, p.4.
by supporting for instance Tanzania against Uganda and participating in
the project of setting up an anti-imperialist front to advance the world
revolution.¹

Internecine problems of non-alignment were inevitably affected by the
feelings of the resurrection of the cold war as manifested by the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Soviet-Cuban ventures in Africa,
Israel's intervention in Lebanon, US "aggressive policies" in Central
America (Nicaragua) and the persistence of Western colonialism (Falkland
Islands).

In the context of ideological divisions among non-aligned states and
their aggravation by East-West rivalries, commitment to the spirit of
non-alignment lost substance and effectiveness. Efforts to attenuate
dissensions were regarded by the Algerian leaders as necessary to
transform the non-aligned movement into an effective force between the
East and West blocs. Return to non-alignment principles and the
rejection of foreign intervention in the affairs of developing nations
constituted then the two issues Algeria began to call for. As far as she
was concerned, she moved toward a political moderation that emphasized an
attachment to the basic values of a non-aligned state. Thus, in the
framework of the political readjustment initiated by President Chadli,
the stress has been put on asserting Algeria's Arab-islamic identity
diversifying her military and economic relations. As a result, the

¹At a conference held in Cotonou in January 1978 and which
regrouped Algeria, Libya, Guinea, Cuba, Angola, the Soviet
Union, North Korea, the Saharawi republic, and the
communist parties of France, Portugal, Italy, Ethiopia and
Somalia.
paradox between alignment on the Soviet standpoints and military supplies on the one hand and economic dependence on the Western capitalist countries on the other was gradually dissipated.

This new image of moderation was particularly stressed by President Chadli during his tour of 11 African states in April 1981 as he reaffirmed Algeria's attachment to the OAU, her respect for the principles of non-interference in other countries' affairs and the need for Africa to oppose military alliance with foreign powers and free itself from entanglement in East-West competition. To illustrate his conceptions, he revealed his disagreement with Libya's intervention in Chad and subversive activities in sub-Saharan Africa by calling for a conciliation between the Chadian factions and refusing to help Libya by sending Algerian troops to Chad.

With this political moderation that exemplified a respect to the non-alignment spirit, and with evidence that Morocco was violating the principles of both the OAU and the non-aligned movement (through territorial expansionism and military alliance with the USA), Algeria was able to obtain recognition for the Polisario's self-proclaimed republic by the OAU and the recognition of this movement by powerful non-aligned states such as India, Yugoslavia and Nigeria. In demonstrating an authentic orientation of the non-aligned movement, President Chadli paid official visits to Yugoslavia, and India in April 1982 where he called for a new breath and invigoration of this movement.¹ It was these

¹Support for the non-aligned movement was also sought from China, as Chadli visited Pekin in April 1982. The quest of the Algerian president was facilitated by the desire of the Chinese leaders to reinforce solidarity with the third world and their backing of the right of the Saharawi people for self-determination. This convergence was confirmed by the visit to Algiers in December 1982 of Zhao Ziyang, the President of China's state council.
objectives, he stressed with vigour when addressing the seventh summit conference held in New Delhi in March 1983. And to put into practice his commitments, the Algerian leader renewed contacts with other Latin American countries. The Falkland Island crisis, the tough policies of the Reagan administration in Central America and the economic problems of the Latin-American continent certainly gave him a good opportunity to induce Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela to join the non-aligned movement as did Columbia in August 1982. For this purpose, Chadli toured Mexico, Venezuela and Brazil in May 1985 and it was with the credentials of a non-aligned state that he paid a visit to the USA a month earlier, a visit which aimed at expressing the important role that the non-aligned movement should play in world politics and at being heard and taken into consideration by the super-powers.

D. An alliance of interests with Eastern Europe

Attempts to cultivate links of friendship and mutual co-operation with the socialist bloc appeared in a direct line with the desire to pursue nationalist objectives on the grounds of asserting Algeria's specific identity and political independence. Though the Algerian path of development was different from that of the socialist countries, the USSR in particular, and despite Algerian emphasis on a non-aligned stance in her foreign policy manifestations, the relationship with the socialist bloc proved useful with regard to the evolution of Algerian needs and expectations. Friendship with the socialist bloc was thought to serve Algeria with regard to two sets of interrelated objectives: 1) To enhance the radical image of Algeria so as to reinforce the process of the state's identification and to gather support for her anti-imperialistic
line. 2) To benefit from economic and particularly military assistance from the socialist bloc to improve the national economic capabilities as well as ensure the state's security and territorial integrity in face of foreign threats. However, in their experience on the foreign level, the Algerians came to realize more and more that the socialist countries had also their specific interests and objectives which did not always correspond with their own concerns. These differences came then to mark the sometimes troubled relationship with the socialist countries, alternating common interests with divergent options.

1. Socialist but not marxist

From the outset, Algerian socialism differed from the Marxist conceptions as the Algerians did not see incompatibility between Islam and their socialism. This distinct identity was publicly affirmed by Ben Bella to Khrushchev as he stated that "our Islam is a militant one and perfectly compatible with socialism and that is why I told my interlocutors (Nasser and Khrushchev) that Algerian socialism is a Moslem one. Furthermore our friends and notably Khrushchev well understood that we were Moslems and socialist and there again, Algeria made a positive contribution to the development of socialism."\(^1\)

On ideological terms, the Ben Bella regime stood closer to the orthodox conception of socialism than the Boumedienne leadership. The 1964 Algiers Charter implicitly referred to the class struggle as it warned of the potential dangers of the petty bourgeoisie. In contrast, the 1976 national charter remained silent on the existence on any form of class conflicts, stressing instead the unity of the people and the unity

\(^{1}\)Speech on the occasion of the first part of the High Assouan Dam scheme, quoted in the Egyptian Gazette, May 20, 1964 in Orient (2), 1964, p.67.
of its revolution, while socialism was given an essentially economic and developmental meaning. As the 1976 charter put it, socialism in Algeria does not stem from "materialistic metaphysics and is not linked to any dogmatic conception alien to our national genius... (and) the socialisation of the means of production constitutes the fundamental basis of socialism."¹

In the conceptions of the military-technocrats coalition, the proletariat in Algeria's socio-economic structure (and in the new states in general) has no significant weight because the colonial or neo-colonial exploitation did not result in the "formation of a relatively important working class, but it accelerated the impoverishment of the peasantry."² Thus, the basic principle of the Marxist orthodoxy of the dictatorship of the proletariat has no real potency in the case of Algeria. Ideological cleavages between the regimes of Ben Bella and that of Boumedienne may suggest a different conception of relationship toward the socialist bloc, especially given the different model of socio-economic change pursued by two Algerian leaders. But in either case, there has been a cautious demarcation from national experiences carried out in the Eastern European countries and from their foreign policies which the Algerians regarded as opportunistic and not always conform only to the basic principles of international socialism. Though from Ben Bella to Chadli, the basic standpoints of Algerian external policies had been in convergence with those of the Soviet Union, the Algerian leaders attempted to conduct a stance independent from Moscow, making clear that their country did not wish to become a Soviet client, having rather its own experience of socialism to develop in line with its own interests and

²Ibid.
specific values. Therefore, while indulging in a revolutionary rhetoric, using sometimes a Marxist discourse with regard to the state of world affairs, there was no guarantee that the Algerians would proceed to establish the Soviet Union's brand of socialism or act as a simple pawn in Soviet foreign designs.

In confirmation of his rejection of Soviet-style socialism, Ben Bella banned the Algerian communist party in November 1962, making clear his intention to make the FLN the single party in Algeria. The Soviets did not strongly criticize this move, expressing only their "deep regret and anger" and discreetly showed support to the militants of the Algerian communist party and the leftwing ministers in Ben Bella's cabinets. As a result links between the CPSU and the FLN remained distant despite the quite good state-to-state relations. At the twenty third congress of the Soviet communist party in March 1966, the FLN delegation led by Cherif Belkacem walked out of the conference room in protest of the presence of representatives from the Algerian underground Avant-garde socialist party (PAGS). Further incidents occurred when the PAGS was invited to participate in the meeting of the world communist parties held in Budapest in 1968 and the world conference in Moscow in June 1969. To stress his country's ideological choices, the minister of religious affairs Mouloud Kasim spoke at a mosque - when visiting Moscow in August 1971 - "of fraternal ties uniting Algeria with the Muslim of the Soviet Union." Visibly angered by this statement, the Soviet authorities promptly cut short Kasim's visit. But with Algeria's determination to make the FLN the sole state party and the awareness of the salience of this party in Algerian politics, the Soviet leaders allowed the Algerian communists to slip into obscurity and moved to establish ties with the
FLN. This change of attitude, however, cannot be clearly understood without reference to the shift in Moscow's theoretical approach to the third world. Since the 1960s, the stress in Soviet ideology had no longer been on the necessity "of the political leadership of the working class headed by its avant-garde whatever the form of transition to socialism"¹ but on the flexible concept of "national democracy" and "national leadership" in the new states to pave the way for a non-capitalist path of development and building of a socialist society in the long term.

Algeria was certainly conscious that she was held as a practitioner of a non-capitalist way of development by Khrushchev and his successors and regarded as useful in their designs in the Mediterranean notably to get access to warm waters, increase their naval deployment in this sea, erode Western influence and meet Chinese competition when manifested there. These beliefs increased the reliance of the Algerians on Soviet support when needed despite divergences of ideological options and of national interests.

2. Ultimate congruity despite divergent interests
   a. A convergent anti-imperialistic line

   During the first years of independence, the alignment with Moscow helped Ben Bella to emphasize his revolutionary credentials in the Afro-Asian movement as his policies were eventually directed at putting an end to colonialism and opposing what he called the imperialist plot. In this struggle, the third world line shown by Moscow, in a context marked by a relative cold war, was necessary for Algeria given her lack

¹Speech of Khrushchev to the twentieth congress of the CPSU in February 1956 quoted in Rush, M (ed): the international situation and soviet foreign policy (Columbus, Ohio, Charles E. Merrill, 1970), p.184.
of power capabilities and the weakness of non-alignment as a new force in world politics. Convergence with the socialist bloc appeared in the common attitude taken by both Algiers and Moscow against "manifestations of imperialism and Neo-colonialism" throughout the world and particularly in the new states. In issues of decolonization like those of the Congo, Vietnam and Portuguese Africa, Algeria adopted a line that coincided with the attitude of the socialist bloc in issuing declarations, voting resolutions at the United Nations and providing military support for the liberation movements with radical political options.

A common anti-imperialistic stance was also tangible in the cases of the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Indeed, after attending the UN General Assembly in November and conferring with President Kennedy in Washington, Ben Bella went to Havana where he condemned the US blockade over Cuba and expressed Algeria's support to the Cuban revolution.

Having fulfilled their duties in contributing to the anti-imperialist struggle, the Algerians turned to Soviet assistance for their own needs. On the economic level, they obtained from Moscow a loan of $100 million in 1963 and $128 million in 1964. And to transform an army of peasants into a modern and professional one as well as help ensure the state's security and the country's territorial integrity, Boumedienne, then the Defense Minister, visited Moscow from September 27 to October 5, 1963 to secure an important arms agreement. During the conflict with Morocco in mid-October, the Soviets responded favourably to Algerian request for more armaments and Cuba quickly provided Algeria with T34 tanks 50 military experts and about 400 tank troops.
At the end of 1964, Algeria received 25 Mig 15s, 17s and 21s, 35 II-28 bombers and 150 tanks. In March 1965, 260 officers went to the USSR to receive military training and in April following the visit of Boumedienne to Moscow, Algeria secured an agreement on arms and training. For the Soviets, it was clear that their assistance would permit Algeria to spread revolutionary ideals in North Africa and reinforce the Arab militant front around the Cairo-Algiers axis so as to counterbalance the US and French influences exercised through the conservative regimes of Morocco, Tunisia and the Gulf states. A significant manifestation of this convergence was the two-week visit Ben Bella paid to Moscow in May 1964 where the Algerian president was warmly welcomed by Khrushchev, made a hero of the Soviet Union, and awarded the Lenin peace prize. The joint communique at the end of the visit stated that the "Soviet side very highly appreciated Algeria's policy of positive neutrality and non-alignment" while the Algerian delegation "fully supports the tireless struggle of the Soviet government and personally of Khrushchev for relaxation of international tension."\(^1\)

The departure of Khrushchev in 1964 and the coup against Ben Bella in June 1965 did not have a serious impact on Algerian relationships with the socialist bloc.\(^2\) For the Algerians, the maintaining of such a friendship was necessary to help them revise privileged relations with France and acquire a military superiority over their neighbours that would act as a deterrent for their territorial irredentia. On their part, the Soviets continued to hold up Algeria as a practitioner of a non-capitalist development and saw her as useful in their attempts to

\(^1\)Orient (Hamburg), (2), 1964.
\(^2\)In contrast to the USSR, Cuba was critical of the coup and as a result the Cuban press agency was urged to close its Algiers bureau (see Le Monde, July 2, 1965).
challenge the West's hegemony over world affairs. This convergence resulted in Boumedienne leading an important delegation to Moscow in December 1965 to obtain more economic and military assistance. After Boumedienne's trip to Moscow, Algeria concluded several contracts through which the Soviets contributed to the realization of a number of projects, such as a glass unit at Oran producing 10,000 tonnes a year, a metallurgical mercury complex at Ismael with an annual capacity of production of 377,000 tonnes, an iron-ore plant at Al-Abed and an electric plan at Annaba. However, the major venture in which the Soviets participated at that time was the huge Al-Hadjar steel plant the cost of which was estimated at $300 million. They also helped to build several technical centres, among them the Boumerdes institute specializing in the training of engineers and technicians, mainly in the energy domain. Besides, Soviet cultural assistance had been quite important as by 1967, 3,000 Soviets were working in Algeria: 500 teachers, 300 physicians, 300 oil teachers. By 1972, 2,200 local engineers and technicians and over 13,000 skilled workers had been trained by the Soviets in Algeria.¹

As a result of this economic and cultural cooperation, the volume of Algerian-Soviet trade increased by 250 per cent from 1965 to 1967, rising from $12 million in 1966 to $55 million in 1967 and to $145 million the following year. By that time, the USSR ranked third in Algeria's exports and sixth in her imports. The major feature of this intensification of trade exchanges had been the signature of an economic agreement on December 28, 1968, through which the Soviet Union agreed to import from Algeria annually and for a seven year period, 25,000 tonnes of citrus

fruits, 500,000 tonnes of oil, 5 million hectolitres of wine and 100,000 tonnes of minerals. In return she would supply industrial equipment and finance industrial projects in Algeria.

Besides this intensive economic cooperation, Algeria responded favourable to the call made by the Soviets in 1966 for an alliance between the progressive Arab states to confront imperialism and reaction. Indeed, alongside the USSR, Algeria was adopting a radical and militant foreign policy, notably in Arab affairs. This honeymoon was, however, perturbed by Soviet attitude towards the June 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict, as Boumedienne's request for more arms to enable the Arab to continue the war was met by Soviet circumspection and reluctance.

Visibly irritated, Boumedienne criticized the USSR's opportunism noticing a "contradiction in the Soviet's political analysis. For instance, they insisted on violently resisting reactionary forces throughout the Arab regimes while at the same time calling for a total Arab alliance regardless of extreme ideological differences."2

To atone for these divergences, the Soviet President Podgorny was sent to the Arab capitals in June-July 1967 to mend fences with the Arab leaders promising more arms to the Arab confrontation states notably Egypt. In July 1968, the Soviet Defense Minister Grechko paid a visit to Algiers to fulfill these commitments at a time when the Boumedienne regime was urging French troops to withdraw from their bases in Algeria and when US naval deployment in the Mediterranean became increasingly important. By the end of 1968 there were in Algeria 2,000 Soviet

2 Confidence made to the Egyptian foreign minister Mahmoud Riad. See Riad, M: the struggle for peace, p.50.
military advisers and about 2,000 naval advisers. Concerns of national security were behind Algeria's soft attitude towards the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean, though she believed that the most effective deterrent against any foreign military intervention could be the neutralization and demilitarization of this sea. Thus while denouncing US naval incursions in the Mediterranean, she came to tolerate Soviet manoeuvres there because it could constitute a counterbalance for the US in this region. Boumedienne made his optimism clear by declaring "we are not like those who had been alarmed by the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean ... We regard the presence and activities of the US sixth fleet dangerous for our independence. In our eyes, the entry of the Soviets in the Mediterranean represents a factor of balance. But it goes without saying that we prefer to see neither of them exercising power in the region. The Mediterranean for Mediterraneans is the best formula. We are ready to co-operate with any power which sincerely aims at this objective."^2

Despite the fact that the Algerians consider the neutralization of the Mediterranean as a remote possibility given fierce East-West rivalry there, they attempted through various conferences to strengthen the impact of this ideal among Mediterranean countries, especially the progressive ones. And though they looked for military assistance and protection from Moscow, they have denied the Soviets acquisition of

^1 Interview to Lacouture J. and S., quoted in El-Moudjahid, March 11, 1969.

^2 In a speech addressed to the Soviet Premier Kosygya during his visit in October 1971, Boumedienne demanded the dismantling of all foreign bases in the Mediterranean. This was also echoed by Bouteflika in his lecture 'L'Algerie et l'Europe' delivered in Brussels on June 29, 1972.
military bases in Algeria, granting the communist power only naval
facilities, airfield landing and refuelling privileges. Rumours in 1968
and 1969 that Algeria turned over to the USSR the Mers el Kebir base were
firmly rejected by the Algerian leaders.\footnote{El-Moudjahid, June 24, 1968 and January 17, 1969.} They only occasionally
threatened to do so in case of pressures from Nato's military exercises
and strategies in the Mediterranean.

As an expression of her desire to maintain a useful friendship with
the Soviets, Algeria came to the rescue of the USSR in the UN debates
over the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, although she has in
principle always shown a great hostility to foreign intervention in
domestic affairs of sovereign states. Algeria certainly would have
preferred to avoid this dilemma through the adoption of a passive and
equivocal silence, but unfortunately she had to make her standpoints
clear as she was a rotating member of the security council at the time of
Soviet invasion. Before the meetings of this council, the Algerian
delegation tried with much energy to delay debates which would in
practice maintain a status quo favourable to the Soviet Union. The
Algerian representative Bouattoura pointed out that "no real discussions
and consultations had taken place among all members of the council" and
the haste of some representatives, he complained, was "in great contrast
to the complacency shown when it was question of Africa, Asia, Latin-
America or the Middle East." He went on arguing that Algeria "firmly
adhered to the principle of self-determination, withdrawal of foreign
troops, and the settlement of all problems within the framework of
establishing peace based on justice and stability. Those principles as
set out applied as much to Czechoslovakia as to Vietnam and Palestine ...
In this present situation, the path of cold war chosen by the council was damaging to socialist Czechoslovakia and would block a just solution."¹ Algeria then duly abstained from voting on a resolution condemning the Soviet invasion passed by the security council on August 23, 1968.

To highlight this cordial relationship, Bouteflika went to Moscow in March 1969 and Podgorny the Soviet President paid a visit to Algiers on April 26, the Bulgarian leader on May 24 and Marshall Sychalsky the president of the Polish State council on October 6. This alliance was then feared by Washington as the US Secretary of Defense McNamara observed that "the Soviet thrust into the Mediterranean and the Middle East represented a potentially serious threat on the equilibrium of this region and the West Mediterranean. The Maghreb and the horn are the areas of Africa of most immediate strategic concern to the US - North Africa covering the southern flank of Nato and the Horn standing at the approaches to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. The Arab-Israeli war and the continued Soviet-sponsored Algerian military build up added to the basic instability of the area. The delivery of over $200 million worth of Soviet equipment to Algeria since 1965 continues to alarm her moderate neighbours."²

The early 1970s witnessed a shift in Moscow's objectives in the third world, bringing about what the Algerians regarded as pragmatic and opportunist strategies. However, instead of distancing themselves from the communist power, they attempted to accommodate to this new Soviet design for the purpose of maintaining friendship without subscribing to the USSR's conceptions of world detente and economic pragmatism.

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²McNamara, R.S.: The essence of security (New York, Harper and Row, 1968), p.28
b. Accommodation to Soviet pragmatism and opportunism

The motivations of the Brezhnev leadership seemed to be related more to trade and economic co-operation with many of the third world countries than with political and ideological affinities. It was in this context that Prime Minister Kosygin toured the North African countries in October 1971. In Rabat, he considered the development of friendly Soviet-Moroccan relationship as "another example of the effectiveness of the policy of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems," and in Algiers he observed that "with Algeria embarking upon her economic development schemes under its new plan, new possibilities are arising for economic co-operation with the Soviet Union and other states belonging to the socialist system where economy is planned on the basis of long range state plans." 

Seemingly, the Algerians were not disturbed by the balanced policy Moscow attempted to follow in North Africa as such pragmatism responded also to their own efforts of maintaining detente in the Maghreb, diversifying their country's trade relations and lining up the developing world against the hegemony of the West. To assert their new pragmatic approach, the Algerians received the Chinese Minister of Trade on October 20, only a few days after Kosygin's visit and in March 1972, they were the hosts of the President Ceausescu of Rumania who had begun to show

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1In a speech to the twenty fourth congress of the CPSU in 1971, Kosygin regarded socio-economic co-operation with the third world countries as "mutually advantageous and by expanding trade with them, the Soviet Union will gain the opportunity of satisfying fully the requirements of its own national economy", in Pravda, April 7, 1971.
3In November 1972, the Algerian Trade Minister Yaker led a delegation to China and North Korea.
many similarities with the policies of the non-aligned movement thus establishing a greater autonomy vis-a-vis the Kremlin. Moreover, the Algerian press did not miss opportunities to stress Yugoslavia’s independent foreign policy and choice of self-management. If Moscow’s strategies in North Africa responded to setbacks it faced in the Arab world, it also indicated its desire to strengthen economic co-operation and friendship in Algeria particularly in the clear attempt to have a greater share in Algerian market after the end of ’privileged relations’ between Algeria and her former metropole. On the occasion of the Moslem year, only forty-eight hours after the Algerians announced the nationalization of the French oil interests (February 24, 1971), the Soviet leadership sent a message to the Algerian government stating that “the continuing strength and co-operation between the Soviet Union and the Algerian republic fully accords with the interests of the peoples of our two countries, the cause of peace and universal progress.”1 And during his visit to Algiers in November, Kosygyn expressed his considerations for Algeria’s dynamic non-alignment directed at supporting struggles against imperialism and foreign domination and consolidating peace.”2

However, as Algeria reinforced her economic links with the Western world especially the USA and as she attempted to lead the third world coalition in the North-South debates, relationship with the Soviet Union became less warm, though remaining cordial because of the convergence of interests. The Algerians observed that in the early 1970s, the Soviet attitude toward the Arab world was ambiguous and opportunistic. In Algerian analysis, the Soviet stand toward the Middle East shifted from the support for the Arabs to fight Israel by all means to a more moderate

1 In El-Moudjahid, February 26, 1971.
2 ibid., November 9, 1971.
stance since Brezhnev's meeting with the US president Nixon in 1973. To stress his bitterness, the Algerian leader declared that "Moscow is not the dynamic centre of the revolution as it used to be in 1917." And it was perhaps in order to embarrass the Kremlin that he defiantly made public a supposedly confidential message Leonid Brezhnev sent to him on October 8, 1973 as a response to Algerian letters to each of the permanent members of the security council following the outbreak of hostilities between Arabs and Israelis. In this message, the Soviets urged Algeria and the Arabs to strengthen their solidarity and make available all possible assistance to Egypt and Syria in their war efforts. In Algerian eyes, this was simply contradictory with Soviet practice, since the Soviet leadership refrained from providing the Arabs with effective support in order not to jeopardise detente with the USA. For Algerians, detente should be global and involving all states great and small and not circumscribed by a balance between Moscow and Washington at the expense of the security of the new states and developing countries. This Soviet-American connivance and bipolar detente were denounced by Boumedienne when he declared at the opening speech of the non-aligned held in Algiers in September 1973 that the "world is divided between rich and poor". Immediately the Soviet leadership reacted through a message sent by Brezhnev to Boumedienne contesting that the Soviet Union should be put on the same level with the USA. Nevertheless, a critical attitude to Soviet's pragmatism and opportunism did not prevent Algeria from maintaining friendly relations with the USSR with regard to her new needs and expectations, especially because of tensions with Morocco over the Western Sahara.
In the beginning of this conflict, the Soviet Union supported the right of the Western Sahara people for self-determination as she voted for the Algerian sponsored resolution at the UN General Assembly in September 1975. This attitude was then based on ideological grounds as Moscow seemed to prefer seeing the Algerian style of socialism spread down the Atlantic coast through the establishment of an independent state in the Sahara close to Algeria, a matter that would substantially reduce Western, especially French influence over this region. In the aftermath of the clash between Algerian and Moroccan troops at Amgala in early 1976, the USSR promptly agreed to meet Algeria's request for more military assistance following the visit to Moscow of Colonel Yahaoui on May 30.

To many foreign observers, this was interpreted as a reward for Algerian contribution in Soviets' efforts to help the Angolan regime against the Western backed 'rebels' of the FLNA and Unita. During this conflict, Algeria was reported to have served as a "major transit for Soviet arms and airlift to Angola while Algerian pilots were believed to have helped man Soviet-built Migs based in Brazaville".¹

However, as the war in the Western Sahara went on, the USSR began to show a neutral attitude dictated by economic considerations which seemed to have prevailed over ideological affinities with Algeria and her protegee the Polisario Front. Indeed on March 16, 1977, the USSR signed a 30 year agreement worth $2 billion hailed by King Hassan as the "contract of the century"² and unconfirmed rumours emerged from Rabat that Moscow assured Morocco of its neutrality over the Western Sahara.

conflict. In addition to their interests in phosphates and fisheries potential of Morocco, the Soviets perhaps came to believe that an intensive economic co-operation with Morocco would provide them with a foothold and enhance their image with various groups in the Kingdom in order to be better placed to benefit from any revolutionary upheaval that might occur in this potentially unstable country. To achieve these objectives, Moscow cautioned Algeria not to pass military aid on to the Saharawi movement. Obviously, the Soviet-Moroccan co-operation had infuriated the Algerians but nevertheless they avoided a resolutely hostile attitude to the Soviet Union, being poised to maintain Soviet military assistance they badly need in case of future confrontation with Morocco. In fact, the FLN's organ 'Révolution Africaine' addressed severe criticisms mainly at the Moroccan regime.²

Such an attitude seemed to have paid off when the Russians accepted Algeria's demands for more armaments after increasing hostility between Algeria and France combined with the overt support of the USA to Morocco. In early 1977, a delegation from the Algerian Defence Ministry flew to Moscow to inform the Soviet leaders of the mobilization of French intervention troops based at Dakar, and in December of the same year, the Soviet Chief of Staff paid a friendly visit to Algiers, probably to discuss arms agreements.³ Cuba also responded to Algerian need of

²Issue of June 1, 1977.
³Presumably it was French raids against a Polisario column operating near the Mauritanian border that had given a good reason for the Algerians to ask for more arms and a part of which was to be channelled to the Polisario front, see Le Monde, January 14, 1979. According to the US government data, Soviet Union transferred to Algeria $1.8 billion worth of modern arms from 1975 to 1980, see Remnek, R.B: Soviet military interests in Africa in Orbis (28), 1984, pp.123-143.
military equipment and diplomatic support. Fidel Castro came to Algiers in March 1977, followed by the six-day visit of his brother and Defence Minister Raúl in June. As a result, Cuba sent a small number of aircrafts and technicians and, allegedly, Cuban military experts helped the Polisario guerrillas.

Among the objectives of Boumediene's trip to Moscow in January 1978 were the search for moral and military support for Algeria and for the Arab front of steadfastness and rejection set up to counter Egypt's peace treaty with Israel. The joint communique issued at the end of the visit stated that the Soviet side supported the right of the Saharawi people for self-determination in accordance with the UN resolutions, and condemned the Camp David agreements between Egypt and Israel.\(^1\) Soviet attitude, however, seemed quite cautious as there was no mention of the Polisario front or condemnation of Moroccan policies in the occupied territories in order to avoid completely alienating King Hassan. But Boumediene seemed quite satisfied with the Soviet stand as he apparently achieved his main objective of convincing the Kremlin to increase military supplies to his army. In a message he sent to the Soviet leaders in November 1978, the Algerian president praised their "tireless efforts to strengthen friendship and reinforce world peace".

After the death of Boumediene in December 1978, the Algerian-Soviet relationship became less friendly. The Kremlin leaders were obviously deceived by the election of Chadli to the Algerian presidency since they founded their hopes on the FLN's strongman Colonel Yahaoui, one of their closest friends. The dismissal of Yahaoui and other Boumediennist officials from power in 1981, the relative economic liberalization

\(^{1}\)See "tourée du Président Boumediene au proche-orient, en Yugouslavie et à Malte" in Discours du President (8), p.52.
pursued by President Chadli since then and his efforts to diversify Algeria's political and trade relations contributed further to the coolness of Algerian-Soviet relationship. In this perspective, the Soviets seemed to have turned to Libya which had in the meantime showed an aggressive attitude toward Western interests in the sub-Sahara and a resolutely anti-US standpoint. It seemed then that in the context of the resurrection of cold war threats, the USSR had been looking for faithful allies to reinforce the socialist bloc.

With the deterioration of its relations with Qadhafi, the Chadli government was alarmed at the amount of modern weapons the USSR provided for Libya. Chadli made known his worry to the Soviets when visiting Moscow on June 8, 1981, a little more than a month after Qadhafi's trip to the Soviet capital (April 25-27). Apparently, the Algerian president did not respond positively to Soviet request of adopting a harsh socialist line or firmly allying himself with the Soviet-backed Libyan-Syrian axis. Instead, he had been slowly attempting to wipe out the image of radical and extremist Algeria forged in Boumedienne's time by stressing Algeria's islamism and positive non-alignment.¹ Under the drive of Taleb-Ibrahim the 'diplomatic readjustment' also implied a marked shift from an alignment with the Soviet stand over foreign policy issues. In addition to the moderate line followed in Arab politics, the strengthening of economic relations with Western Europe as well as the relaxation of relations with the USA given the concerns of national.

¹At the Islamic conference held in Islamabad in January 1980, Algeria in contrast to Libya did not firmly oppose a Saudi sponsored resolution condemning Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and at the summit conference of the Arab steadfastness front convened in Tripoli in September 1981, Algeria opposed the proposal made by Libya and South-Yemen that the front should sign a defense treaty with the Soviet Union.
security, Algeria moved to consolidate political and economic relations with China and Yugoslavia. However to stress his non-aligned policy and calm Soviet suspicions, President Chadli paid official visits to Hungary and Czechoslovakia in April 1984 while receiving the East German leader Honecker in November and the Polish president Jaruzelski in December 1985. In Budapest and Prague, the Algerian presidential delegation obtained declarations supporting the OAU resolutions that called for direct negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario front as well for the implementation of the national rights of the Palestinian people. Indeed, despite his visit to the USA in April 1985, President Chadli was anxious to maintain cordial relations with the Soviet Union in a clear attempt to establish a balanced attitude between Moscow and Washington. The visits made by a high ranking military delegation to Moscow at the time of Chadli's trip to the USA and that of Messadia the FLN's Deputy Head in December 1985, as well as the visit to Algiers in December 1984 of Marshall Gorchkov, the Soviet first Vice Minister of defence indicated the congruity of interests between the two sides: Algeria needing Soviet military and economic assistance and the USSR desiring to secure a working relationship with Algeria in its attempts to erode the West's influence in the West Mediterranean. This convergence seems likely to continue despite occasional divergence inherent in their specific interests.

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1Joint communiques in El-Moudjahid, April 28 and 30, 1984.
CHAPTER SIX: THE PROCESS OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Since independence, Algeria has been pursuing an economic policy largely conditioned by a combination of two basic factors specific to a former colony that gained political sovereignty through a national war of liberation: 1) the colonial legacy illustrated by a dependent economy based on commodity products and 2) the nature of the political leadership that emerged with the national struggle for independence.

In the official discourse, the process of economic development was not demarcated from ideology as it was regarded as a means to cement the country's identity and independence and transform a backward society into a socialist and modern one.

To achieve these objectives, the Algerian leaders had adopted a hostile attitude toward private enterprise and foreign capital through a predominant role the state played in nationalizing foreign interests, mobilizing resources for development and in directly controlling and managing the country's economy.

The relation of development to foreign policy has been highlighted in the link between power capabilities and the ambition to play an active role in world politics. "To have an efficacious foreign policy argued Boumediene, it is indispensable to have first a healthy economy as the task of development will necessarily lead us to a well defined foreign policy not only with regard to the struggle for freedom but also for the just causes in the world."¹ This parallelism between economic development and foreign policy has been well articulated in their evolution which followed three distinct phases:

1. The first period stretching from 1962 to 1967 was characterized by a policy of improvisation that emphasized revolutionary ideals in the absence of economic experience.

2. Since 1969, the implementation of an ambitious economic programme coupled with changes in the world energy market contributed in enhancing Algeria's position in third world gatherings and in the North-South axis.

3. By the mid 1970s, thorny domestic problems coupled with the preoccupation over the Western Sahara and the decline of Opec's bargaining power, contributed in the loss of prestige in the international scene and accounted for the drive toward political moderation both at home and on the foreign level. This shift became tangible with the rise of Chadli to power corresponding to a period of conservatism as the state settles down breaking away from revolutionary euphoria and rhetoric.

A. STRATEGY FOR RAPID DEVELOPMENT

1. The triumph of the technocratic model

   It was in revolt against the socio-economic patterns of colonial domination that the wartime FLN nationalists formulated, through the Tripoli programme, the broad lines of an economic strategy to be implemented in independent Algeria through radical reforms. The consensus includes two basic foundations for this policy: 1. the call for a socialist-oriented economy based on nationalization of local private large business and foreign capital in all sectors, particularly the French and 2. the prominence of the state in the economic activities. The Algerian political elite which emerged with the process of a revolutionary war, particularly the professional soldiers of the ALN and
the group of technocrats was ideologically committed to development goals and favoured a form of state capitalism to preserve their own position, gain social privileges and eventually meet the demands of the various segments of the Algerian people eager to benefit from the acquisition of political independence.

The Algiers charter formulated by the Ben Bella regime in 1964 confirmed the central role of the state in the national economy and the socialist orientation of this economy through the nationalization of the means of production. However, pushed by a certain number of former maquisards and leftist intellectuals, as well as by radical militants of the trade union movement, Ben Bella endorsed the principle of self-management, following the take-over by poor Algerian peasants of land and properties left behind by the French settlers. After declaring these properties vacant, the Algerian president decided to nationalize and give a legal status to the workers' self-management (autogestion) through the March 1963 decrees. In the agrarian sector, about 1,200,000 hectares representing a third of the country's cultivable land and employing 200,000 permanent and seasonal workers came under self-management, while in the industrial sector, only 450 enterprises employing 100,000 workers and concerning mainly small-scale industries and trade business were touched by autogestion. However, behind rhetoric, attempts to make the self-managed sector an organized political and economic force were not enough to overcome obstacles that hindered its implementation. The disastrous economic situation resulting from high unemployment, large-scale uprootedness among rural masses, lack of skilled manpower, financial resources and modern techniques impaired the development of the self-management process. In addition, the hostility of peasants and
workers to state-directed collectivisation and bureaucratic practices seriously hampered efforts to carry out this experience. And conflicts over leadership and absence of a coherent ruling elite prevented attempts to embark upon an effective development policy. Large segments of the political elite, particularly the Oujda-group-led professional officers and the civilian technocrats disapproved of Ben Bella's economic policy on the grounds that it was marked by improvisation and decisions of prestige without rational planning. Further criticism was that it was influenced by Trotskyist advisers such as Harbi and the Greek Pablo Raptis whom they accused of making Algeria a terrain for revolutionary experiment and trying to implement self-management principles at the risk of creating anarchic situations and ideological adventurism. Other social groups, such as the industrialists and landowners, were also hostile to Ben Bella's inclinations to the East-European type of development on the basis that it would result in the marginalisation of the private sector. Moreover, these fears were shared by the stratum of small businessmen as Ben Bella immediately opted for the setting up of a form of parastatal network in the small scale entrepreneurship under the control of the self-management committees.

However, pressures from the Oujda group and the technocrats forced Ben Bella to strengthen the role of the state in economic management by setting up national corporations and extending its control over foreign interests in the country. As a result state-owned companies were created in 1964 such as Sonatrach (hydrocarbons) and SNS (metallurgy) while state's participation in the exploitation of the country's resources was also increased. Therefore partial nationalizations
were undertaken as the Algerian state took shares in the SN Repal oil company, gas plant at Arzew and in car (Renault) and lorry (Berliet) assembly plants.

With the June 1965 coup, the experience of self-management to which Ben Bella was devoted had been steadily swept away by the development policy carried out by the managerial group led by the minister of national economy, Belaid Abdeslam. This economic strategy departed from the basic assumption that the country should not remain a supplier of cheap raw materials and labour for the industrialist world and an importer of its manufactured goods, but it should utilize the national resources, especially oil and gas to build up large enterprises as to manufacture intermediary products to meet the needs of the industrial sector and provide a major stimulus for the modernization of the agrarian sector. The petrochemical industry for instance would provide insecticides and fertilizers for soil to boost production.

Based on the theory of 'industrializing industries' developed by the French economists Perroux and De Bernis, this strategy gave little attention to the manufacture of consumer goods as the objective was that an export-oriented development strategy could make Algeria an industrialized country by the early 1980s. To carry out this strategy, heavy industry was regarded as the real engine for economic development. This type of industry envisaged by the Tripoli programme was not arbitrary but resulted from the nature of Algeria's economic resources, namely oil and gas and the model of economic development experienced during the colonial period.
Having inherited a relatively well-developed infrastructure, Algeria intended to continue many of the objectives of the Constantine plan which conceived the country's economic development around the establishment of a steel work plant at Annaba and petroleum and gas complexes at Skikda and Arzew. The technocratic group also believed that agriculture, in a country where cultivable land is relatively limited, agrarian structures distorted, techniques archaic, rural working force unskilled and exodus to town massive, could hardly provide a source for the state's primitive accumulation of capital, especially as, besides sizeable mineral deposits of copper, iron-ore, lead, phosphate, uranium and zinc, Algeria has substantial oil resources and huge gas reserves in her Sahara desert. Oil made Algeria the tenth biggest producing country in the world in the late 1960s, with an annual average production of 40 million tonnes, while gas made her the world's third with reserves estimated at 3.6 trillion cubic metres.

To achieve a substantial level of industrialization, the Algerian leadership embarked upon a long process consisting in extending the public sector and developing the energy sector which it regarded as the backbone of the country's industrialization.

The setting up of huge state corporations in all sectors of the economy initiated during Ben Bella's rule was continued in order to control all stages from exploration to marketing. Extensive decision-making power and huge financial resources were allocated for these enterprises which had been run by state-appointed managers most of whom had been trained abroad. Eight of these state-owned firms have absorbed some 35 per cent of total investment allotted to industry since 1970. The oil company Sonatrach the biggest of them all, employed more than
100,000 workers and imposed itself as one of the most important oil companies of the third world with regard to activities ranging from exploration, drilling and production of oil and gas to refining, transportation and marketing.

The extension of state control over the national economy was accelerated by a process of nationalizing foreign assets in the country in order to better use these resources in promoting the 'industrializing industries' and engineer a large scale economic infrastructure by boosting basic industries such as iron and steel as well as those of the metallurgical and mechanical sectors. In 1965, the Algerian state nationalized banks, insurance companies and in April 1966, it took over the mining industry as well as the interests of Anglo-American oil companies Esso and Shell in August 1967, Sinclair in April 1969, Amif, Philip's petroleum in June 1970 and Mobil oil in November the same year. And as a result of the February 1971 nationalization of French oil assets, the share of Sonatrach in oil production rose from nearly 4 million tonnes in 1966 to 38.5 million tonnes in 1972.

The success of Sonatrach in managing and marketing oil helped Algeria gain access to world markets, while the booming rise of oil prices since 1971 encouraged the Algerian leadership to increase oil production to obtain more revenues to be invested in other basic industries. Sales of energy products necessitated the construction of new liquefaction plants, pipelines and special tankers. In 1966, two oil pipelines were built, one linking In-Amenas to La Skhirra on the Tunisian coastline (775 kilometres) and the other linking Haoud al-Hamra to Skikda (805 kilometres). In 1973, the latter was doubled with another pipeline and in 1983 was completed the undersea pipeline from La Skhira to Sicilia.
Two gas pipelines were constructed in 1972 and 1973, the first one linking Hassi R'mel to Skikda and the second Hassi R'mel to Arzew. Oil refineries were set up at Hassi Messaoud and two huge gas plants were completed one at Skikda with a capacity of 8.2 million cubic metres a year and the other at Arzew with 10.5 million cubic metres annually.

It was clear that the Algerian planners wanted to expand the hydrocarbon sector as they intended in the framework of the Valhyd project elaborated with the US company Chemical Bechtel, to invest $50 billion in ten years to develop oil and gas production and reach the level of 115 billion cubic metres of liquified natural gas (LNG) to be exported by the early 1980s. This amount of money seemed impressive as it corresponded to treble Algerian GDP in 1977. The importance of the hydrocarbon sector could also be seen in terms of absorption of public investment, contribution to the GDP and to the country's exports and foreign earnings as shown by tables VI:1, VI:2 and VI:3.

The vital importance of the hydrocarbon resources in Algeria's economic development affected Algeria's foreign policy in two ways: the continuous push for increase in oil prices and secondly the search for markets for her energy exports, as well as technological assistance and finance from abroad especially the Western 'capitalist' countries, to implement the highly intensive capital industries.

2. Foreign trade: the logics of the national development policy

To develop the national economy, the Algerians had been seeking technology, markets and finance from everywhere, regardless of considerations of political and ideological nature. Moreover, the determination to lessen the economic dependence on France led the Algerians to diversify trade relations but the requirements of the policy of
"industrializing industries" resulted in the heavy reliance of the country's economy on the Western technology and outlets. And this, despite the revolutionary rhetoric and anti-imperialism zeal exalted by the Algerian leaders.

The magnitude of the volume of trade with the Western capitalist world is shown by the fact that the EEC countries and the US accounted for nearly 90 per cent of Algerian external exchanges for the whole period 1963-1978 and in value, Algeria's trade with the USA alone (DA 63097 million) was nearly twice the trade with Eastern Europe, Africa, Latin-America and the Arab world put together.

Table: Algeria's foreign trade: geographical division (1963-1978)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>in volume (millions of DA)</th>
<th>in percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>200273</td>
<td>58.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>63097</td>
<td>19.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>15739</td>
<td>4.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>9605</td>
<td>1.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>4580</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab World</td>
<td>4252</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>340382</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adapted from annual statistics provided by the Direction des Douanes Nationales

As it appears co-operation and trade with the non-Western capitalist bloc had been negligible, despite some efforts to expand economic relations with countries of Eastern Europe and those of the third world. In fact, the very nature of Algerian economic policy and natural resources had considerably limited the possibility of Algeria to turn to a close economic co-operation with these countries as many of them do not have what Algeria needs most: technology and capital. Neither could they constitute a major market for Algeria's energy exports.
a. Limits of the co-operation with the Eastern bloc

During the 1960s, Algeria's co-operation with Eastern Europe, the USSR in particular, substantially strengthened for two main reasons: the availability of Soviet assistance at a time when Algerian economy was heavily dependent on France and when economic ties with the EEC partners and the USA was not yet developed because the country's capacity of absorption was still limited. However with the implementation of the industrializing industries requiring Western technology and markets, co-operation with the Eastern bloc inevitably declined for the whole 1970 decade.

From the point of view of Algerian technocrats, the development of trade with the Socialist bloc was hampered by the latter's reluctance to sign more long-term global agreements such as those concluded in 1964 and 1968. Indeed, the accord signed in February 1972 with the USSR was valid for two years only. The Soviets also refused to accept certain products of Algeria's light industries, grant loans at low interest rates, and put into practice an agreement through which they accepted to load on their ships half of the volume of the goods they imported from Algeria. Besides, the mechanisms of trade exchanges proved too inadequate to permit the development of Algerian co-operation with the Eastern bloc. As it was practised, the 'system of clearing' had not been advantageous for the Algerians who preferred to sell their goods - especially oil - in the dollar currency instead of exchanging them for other products. They also complained that the products, particularly those imported from the Soviet Union, were sold above the world market prices, while the prices paid by Moscow for Algerian goods were far below world market prices. Another complaint was that the Soviet Union bought minerals from Algeria
at a low price and sold them to Western Europe for foreign currencies and at higher prices. Furthermore, the slow bureaucratic procedures inherent in the heavily centralized economies of East European countries, their rigid trade structures and rigorous methods of state planning had been responsible for the delays in the signing of contracts and their implementation. For instance, it was not until 1973 that the Soviets signed an agreement on maritime co-operation negotiated five years earlier.\footnote{\textit{This agreement concerned the sharing of freight costs by the two countries. It was accepted by the USSR after pressing demands from the Algerians, notably at the February 27, 1973 meeting between Bouteflika and Grusinov the Soviet Ambassador to Algeria.}} The importance of these problems certainly explained the visits to Algiers of the Soviet trade minister Petolichev in February 1972 and that of Zorin, the roving Ambassador in April the same year.

However, if these problems reflected the coolness of Algerian-Soviet relations in particular in the early 1970s, they were also due to the nature of the Algerian development policy and the limits of Soviet assistance especially its energy expertise which was not really adequate for the specific needs of the Algerian economy. In fact, the USSR itself needed to import sophisticated technology from the West to promote its own hydrocarbons industries and most important, energy also constituted an issue of contention between Algiers and Moscow since the former feared Soviet competition with regard to winning West-European markets.\footnote{\textit{According to an agreement signed in 1981, Western Europe would import 25 per cent of its gas consumption from the Soviet Union by 1985, corresponding to 45 million cubic metres a year. The deal with West Germany includes a price of \$5.40 per million of BTU, a level well below \$6.11 Algeria was demanding to achieve price parity with her oil.}}
As Algeria turned to an extensive co-operation with the Western World to implement her economic project that required sophisticated technology expertise and capital, trade exchanges with the East European countries inevitably declined. As a result, Algeria's imports of raw materials and semi-products from the Eastern bloc attained a mere 5 per cent of her total imports in this category in the late 1970s. And during that period, the participation of the East European countries in Algeria's economic programme remained limited to the realization of small and medium-sized projects, mainly in light industries sector, agriculture and waterworks.

Like with the Eastern bloc, the very nature of Algeria's development policy and natural resources did not permit Algeria to strengthen economic co-operation with her third world peers. Thus what was regarded as a striking paradox between her militant foreign policy and orientation of trade relations reflected in fact an economic pragmatism that aimed at developing Algeria's capabilities on the basis of the economic policy carried out by the state technocratic team.

b. Co-operation with the third world

Globally, Algeria's relations with the third world countries on the economic domain remained quite limited as her trade with them still represents a minor part in percentage of her total external exchanges. Not only the volume of this trade remained small but it was fluctuated from one year to another. And though Algeria set up joint commissions with several developing countries and signed a great deal of contracts, many of which have not been fulfilled or at least only partially, a number of these accords concerned only a small volume of trade exchanges.
Much of Algeria's imports from the third world were made up of raw materials as she was importing for instance coal from Mozambique, frozen meat from Argentina, timber, gold and crude diamonds from Ghana, sisal, skins and coffee from Angola and Ivory Coast, while exporting mainly small quantities of oil and petroleum products as well as textiles, tinned food and electrical appliances.

The main features of Algeria's co-operation with fellow developing countries consisted mainly in supplying technological expertise, setting up joint companies and providing loans and free grants on the basis of common interests and mutually beneficial association. For instance, she claims only 40 per cent of capital in these mixed companies, ensuring that the partner retains the majority of shares and control over the venture in conformity with one of Algeria's most cherished leitmotive, i.e. the right of developing countries over their natural resources. Under these terms, mixed companies had been set up with Guinea in 1973 to exploit jointly iron-ore deposits at Nimba, fishing companies with Benin and with Guinea-Bissau in 1975, and companies to process timber with Mozambique and Congo through the building of plants with a capacity of production of 15,000 and 100,000 tonnes respectively, a part of which will be imported by Algeria. Moreover, the Algerian oil company Sonatrach has set up joint associations with Yemen's oil firm Yemeco and Syria's Syapco to help these countries exploit their oil resources. It is in this domain that Algeria's co-operation with the third world has been most important as the North African country could with no exaggeration, claim to possess one of the most advanced and perhaps the most competent expertise and know-how in the whole South with regard to oil industry. In fact, Sonatrach is also currently conducting operations of boring and
drilling in the Mafia Islands in Tanzania, a venture in which the Algerians contributed a $10 million loan with flexible terms of reimbursement. It is also currently involved in the setting up of national hydrocarbon industries in Ghana, servicing refinery at Nouadhibou in Mauritania and oil prospection in Mozambique, while its subsidiary companies are helping to consolidate Mali's national company of petroleum Petrostock and build four stock containers for oil products in the regions of Gao and Timbuctu. Possibilities of exchanging technology in the oil industry has also been reviewed with Mexico following the visit of President Chadli to Mexico in March 1985.

On the cultural level, Algeria has many agreements with Arab and African countries. In addition to exchanges of cultural programmes and organization of Algerian cultural weeks, Algeria contributed in the formation of cadres from the third world countries. Since independence, 17,742 technicians coming from sixty two developing countries and from national liberation movements have received training in Algeria. 52 per cent were Africans and forty five per cent from other Arab countries.\(^1\) In 1979, 459 African students were registered at Algerian universities and institutes and in 1982 there were 2250 students coming from over 50 countries belonging to the Southern hemisphere. These universities offered a wide range of social and scientific subjects such as studies in energy provided by the well-known institute of hydrocarbon situated at Boumerdes near Algiers and in Telecommunications at the Oran institute. In addition, a great number of Africans from mainly Guinea, Congo, Mali and Mauritania received paramilitary and technical training at the Somaa

\(^{1}\text{APS (Algerian news agency): Les axes fondamentaux de la co-opération internationale in El-Moudjahid, January 1, 1985.}\)
police academy near Algiers and at institutes for the formation of gendarmes. Algeria also made available grants for African and Arab students. In 1982, 500 Africans and 50 Yemenis were the recipients and for the 1983-1984 academic year, there were 3,500 from the third world studying in Algeria, 2,500 of whom were sponsored by the Algerian government.  

Another form of technical assistance consisted in sending experts and cadres to the Southern countries. In 1982 about 150 Algerians were working in Sub-Saharan Africa. Algeria also financed the building of secondary schools in Ruanda and granted Ethiopia one million dollars aid to carry out a campaign against illiteracy.  

On the level of communications, the network between Algeria and the rest of Africa happened to be quite limited, although she has, since independence, lobbied in African fora for the strengthening of road, airline, and maritime links among Africans to permit the development of an inter-continental co-operation which would serve as a basis for mutual understanding and working relationships. At the OAU meeting at Addis in 1964 Ben Bella backed the project of building a Transaharan road and experts from 13 African countries reached unanimous basic agreement on its construction estimated at $800 million. But as these joint efforts proved slow, Algeria decided to build her own highway with public finance and the use of labour force provided by the national service conscripts, without however renouncing through the Transaharan committee at gathering the financial participation of other countries and international organisms into this project.

1 Ibid.  
2 Orient (2), 1964, p. 7.  
3 The Committee held talks in Jeddah in February 1978 over the question of financing the unified parts of the highway.
Nigeria was at one time interested in this project and in the building of the section linking Agades to Kano to help channel some of its exports to Europe through Niger and then Algerian ports, but it finally decided not to do so. Some Nigerian officials might have seen in the highway a means to enable Algeria to expand her influence in sub-Saharan Africa and the Islamic parts of Nigeria and thus challenge Nigeria's claims for leadership in West Africa. Economically, the highway aimed not only at getting Algeria's Saharan confines out of isolation, improving their economic infrastructure but also at increasing road traffic and exchanges of goods between Algeria and her Southern neighbours especially Mali and Niger as two sections of the Saharan road are being built to these countries' border. The Algerian-owned transport company SNTR is operating a regular overland lorry service from Algiers to Kano. In addition, the discovery by the Algerian state-owned firm Sonarem of substantial deposits of gold, tungsten and uranium near these frontiers made the importance of the highway quite vital in Algeria's nuclear plans.

Beside road communications, Algeria has direct telephonic connections with the Maghreb countries and Mali and satellite links with Angola, Ivory Coast and Sudan. She also helped some sub-Saharan African countries such as Benin and Seychelles set up telecommunications centres. In the domain of airline, maritime transportation and freight she has certainly made a great effort to establish airline connections with most of the Arab countries and a certain number of sub-Saharan Africa such as

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Delegates were from Algeria, Nigeria, Mali and from various financial such as the African Bank for Development, the Opec special fund, the UN development fund and the Saudi fund for development.
Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal as well as Cuba. Maritime links have also been set with Guinea-Bissau, Ghana and Mozambique.

However, co-operation with the third world like with the socialist bloc remained, in comparison with economic ties with the western world, marginal not only in volume but also in value, a matter that indicated the integration of Algerian economy in the international capitalist market.

c. The need of Western co-operation

The prominence of the western world in Algeria's global trade and economic co-operation could be seen at two levels: 1) the volume of this trade and 2) the level of technological transfer and financial assistance. For the period 1963-1978, Western countries accounted for nearly 90 per cent of her total trade exchanges. Moreover, the EEC and the US provided more than 70 per cent of Algerian imports of capital goods and semi-finished products which as a category constituted more than 65 per cent of Algeria's total imports for the whole period. Another aspect of Algeria's dependence on the West was indicated by her almost exclusive reliance on European and American markets for her energy exports which represented nearly 95 per cent of Algerian total exports for the decade 1967-1977. Since the early 1970s, the USA imported more than 45 per cent of Algerian oil while the rest was delivered mainly to France, Western Germany, Italy, Spain and Japan. These countries had also been the main importers of Algerian natural and liquefied gas. (Table VI:4)
Such a dependence on foreign outlets becomes highly significant if one considers that American purchase of Algerian oil which averaged 55 per cent of Algeria's total petroleum exports hardly accounted for more than 8 per cent of US total oil imports. In addition, the 17.6 billion cubic metres of Algerian LNG imported by the USA in 1977 represented 28 per cent of Algeria's gas exports but a mere 2 per cent of US gas consumption.¹

The prominence of EEC in Algeria's trade and economic co-operation rested evidently on geographic proximity, historical links and on the complementarity of exchanges between the two sides. Until her independence, Algeria was treated as an integral part of the European community. Afterwards, she continued to benefit from the de facto membership privileges conferred upon her by the relationships to her ex-metropole. In 1964, she entered formal negotiations with the EEC in an attempt to obtain a global agreement covering the entire field of technical and financial assistance, the status of Algerian workers in the community member states and trade exchanges but these efforts failed. Formal arrangements were reached by the 1976 agreement permitting Algeria to export duty-free about 7.7 million tonnes of refined petroleum annually, to have preferential access for olives and oil as well as loans and grants, but these measures were regarded by Algerians as hardly satisfactory because of the EEC's refusal to grant entry of Algerian workers to the European labour market, the inequality in trade exchanges between the two sides and because of the limitations imposed on some Algerian exports. In addition, Algeria complained that her products which benefited from the de facto preferential access to the EEC markets

¹Africa confidential (19), 1978, p.3.
represented in fact only between 3 to 4 per cent of the value of her total exports.\(^1\) The provisional agreement of 1977 did not meet her demands as she was even forced to reduce exports of wine to the community by 80 per cent.\(^2\) However, these disagreements did not prevent an increase of trade between Algeria and EEC member states individually although Algeria experienced a considerable trade deficit. This diversification into other European partners, also helped Algeria to reduce her trade dependence on France which until 1976 was her first trading partner. Conversely, it left room for a substantial rise in her trade with the USA which resulted in making this country supplant France as Algeria's most important trade partner in the mid-1970s. Indeed, Algeria's exports to the USA increased from $200 million in 1973 to $2200 in 1974 representing 42 per cent of her total exports, while her imports from North-America rose from $167 million in 1973 to 487 in 1978.\(^3\)

...content and forms of the co-operation with the West

The contribution of Western countries in Algeria's efforts of development covered a wide range of operations: constructing oil and gas liquefaction plants and industrial complexes; supplying equipment and machinery and providing technical as well as financial assistance. France contributed to the implementation of a high proportion of economic projects in her former colony especially in the 1960s. West German companies have since then been mainly responsible for the realization of projects in the mechanical industry as they accounted for a third of the

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\(^1\)See speech made by Driss Jezairy, former Ambassador to Bruxelles and EEC to the conference on co-operation with the EEC, held under the auspices of the Friedrich Ebert foundation quoted in El-Moudjahid, December 14, 1981; see also his interview to Radio france quoted in L'action, March 15, 1981.

\(^2\)El-Moudjahid, July 11, 1977.

\(^3\)Africa Confidential, May 12, 1978, p.2.
contracts concerning this branch between 1968 and 1975. One of their main
ventures had been the building of the bicycle and motor cycle factory at
Guelma in Eastern Algeria. Meanwhile firms from the USA, Japan, and to a
lesser degree Great Britain had been prominent in the expansion of
Algeria's petrochemical industry. US companies, in particular, had also
been involved in projects as varied as telecommunications, electrical,
agrarian and water-works.

This type of co-operation did not take the form of direct investment
as it was experienced in countries with free market economies, but was
regulated under the control of the Algerian state which had been imposed
on all the country's external transactions since 1967. From that time,
foreign firms had been commissioned by state organisms and national
companies to help implement industrial projects scheduled in the
successive development plans, through a complex mechanism of selective
criteria in the framework of the state's monopoly over foreign trade.
Successful foreign contractors were then engaged in joint ventures
through the setting up of mixed companies or on a turn key basis. These
forms of association had been widely used, especially in the domain of
oil exploitation and the first venture of the mixed company type was
experienced with the US oil firm Getty in October 1968. In accordance

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1Breves economical: relations Algero-Francaises, Ministry
2B. Hamza rightly argued that "direct foreign investment as
traditionally defined has no major role to play in the
economy of Algeria. However this may be a misleading
impression of the true involvement of foreign investment.
By way of example, US investment in Algeria is less than
$100 million. Such a modest sum does not represent the US
economic and commercial activities which included more than
70 firms with contracts totalling several US billion
dollars." B. Hamza: the legal aspects of technology from
development to developing countries with special reference
to the Algerian experience (unpublished PhD Thesis, law
School, University of Warwick, March 1984,) note p.262.
with this agreement, Getty agreed to hand over to Sonatrach 51 per cent of its assets in exchange for the lifting of government controls, exploration permit and liberal fiscal regime. It also accepted to be taxed at 55 per cent, invest $160 million for prospecting over a 5 year period, and grant the Algerian company $225,000 in donations. Moreover, Sonatrach acted as the operating company and was to receive 88 per cent of the profits from the jointly owned company. Similar conditions were imposed on other foreign companies which entered this form of joint venture with Algerian state-owned enterprises. Between 1970 and 1974, mixed companies were also set up with several US firms such as Altest pits tests, Baker oil tools incorporation, Aldria (Sondage) and Dresser industries to provide the necessary machines for drilling. With Italy's oil company ENI, Sonatrach created a joint company ALCIP for the construction of a 2,500 km gas pipeline to link Hassi R'Mel to Cap Bon in Tunisia and thence to Mazara del Vallo on the Sicilian Coast at the initial cost of $850 million.

The second form of association with foreign capital had been the use of the turnkey system through which foreign firms plan, build, equip the plants and help the Algerians to operate them. They pull out as soon as the operation can be left entirely to the nationals. The most important venture on a turnkey basis had been the contract signed by Sonatrach and the US El-Paso company on October 9, 1969, considered at that time as the major Algerian-American economic project as well as the world's biggest LNG deal. Through its terms, Sonatrach agreed to supply the US with 10 billion cubic metres a year of liquefied natural gas and for a 20 year period. The deliveries were expected to start in 1978 after the building of gas refineries at Arzew and Skikda with the help of mainly
American companies and loans. One of these companies, the giant Bechtel corporation was commissioned to complete work on the LNG 1 at Arzew, the world's largest liquefaction plant, after the dismissal of the US company, Chemico corporation, while another American firm Pullman-Kellog was earmarked for the building of another plant LNG 2 with a similar capacity production (10.5 billion cubic metres annually). Japanese companies (Isoh and Japan gazoline) were commissioned for the construction of a smaller refinery plant (2.5 million tons of oil) regarded at that time the largest business contract Japan had signed with an African country. A British company, Pritchard-Rhodes was awarded in May 1971 a $50 million contract to build the fifth and sixth liquefaction units at Skikda to increase production of LNG. And a West German firm Deminex and a consortium won a contract on a turnkey basis for exploration providing for the supply of 30 million tonnes of crude oil by 1977 and involving an investment of DA 230 million over 12 years.

Several other ventures on this basis had also been set up with Western companies in other branches of industry. For instance, the contract between SNMC and West German companies: Klockner Hambot Deutz concerning the construction of an entirely automated cement plant with a 1 million tonne capacity production a year, and with Wedag for the building of a cement complex at Meftah near Algiers with a similar capacity and considered then as the largest in Africa. On its part the steel manufacturer company SNS signed a 10 year technical assistance agreement with Nippon Steel to realize an integrated steel plant at La Macta in Western Algeria, while Japanese Mitsubishi electric company and America's GTE international system won contracts to set up an earth satellite communication system.
However, problems of maintenance, shortage of spare parts, the quickly-outdated form of technology imported, the low level of local expertise added to the extra costs due to the ever-rising price of imported equipment and capital goods had rendered the turnkey formula less effective than the Algerians expected. To remedy these inefficiencies, they proposed a new form of contract on a turnover basis by which the foreign companies involved are bound to provide technical training, assistance for young Algerian cadres and ensure maintenance after completing the construction of plants and factories. Foreign contractors have nevertheless been reluctant to accept this new formula on the grounds that time and cost involved proved considerable, but in the eyes of Algerians, this attitude merely shows the reluctance of the Western countries to permit a developing country to acquire and master advanced technology that may increase its competition in Western markets and elsewhere. The Algerians were also not prepared to invest a huge amount of money most of which acquired through foreign loans, as long as transfer of technology remains only a form through which foreign firms maximise their profits at the expense of their country's economic development. The financial burden proved quite hard to bear as Algeria massively borrowed from Western financial organisms and the World Bank to help implement a great number of ventures she set up with Western companies. As a way of example, the huge Sonatrach-El Paso deal of 1969 was financed by several Western banks through loans and credit facilities totalling $658 million. The reliance on these sources for domestic investments resulted in the increase of Algeria's external debt for the plans 1974-1977 and 1978, estimated at nearly $18 billion and representing about half of the country's GDP of 1978. It also led to threats from
Western banks especially US to restrict further loans except on projects bringing a quick return to investment because of Algeria's poor credit rating due to a drop in her oil revenues in the mid-1970s.

To reduce the structural dependency of their economy on the Western markets and outlets, the Algerians attempted with a great zeal to switch the attention of the developing countries on the necessity of radically remodelling the international economic patterns.

B. THE NECESSITY OF A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (NIEO)

1. Algeria's global strategy and practice

a) A revolt against the inequalities of the world system

In their experience of a modern nation-state building, the Algerians felt the weight of their colonial legacy and the inequalities between developing countries and the industrialized nations as heavy burdens on their economic development and on that of their third world peers. The growth of modern capitalism in Western countries is believed to have resulted from the exploitation of the third world through colonization and unequal exchanges.¹ In a speech addressed to the Conference of the 77 group convened in Algiers in October 1967, Boumedienne pointed out that "Europe and the US have exploited the national resources of the third world countries. The independence of the great bulk of these countries did not put an end to old colonialism which is still maintained in these countries through diverse forms such as the right of foreigners over

¹Speech delivered by H.E.A. Rahal, Algerian representative to the UN in From a new international political order to a NIEO (undated document, Ministry of foreign affairs, pp.1-29).
property, their control over national wealth, the acquisition of raw materials at cheap prices and the exports of manufactured products at high prices and through the banking system."^1

In Algerian views, the link between national development and international economic structures is particularly stressed, since the implementation of their economic policy depended also on the regulations of the international economic market. In practice, the Algerians came to realize that the mechanisms regulating technology transfer, price indexation of primary commodities and manufactured goods, as well as access to markets of the industrial world and loan facilities have all been manipulated by the Western countries for their own interests at the expense of the developing ones. To sustain their arguments and especially the point concerning indexation of the prices of raw materials, the Algerians argued that copper, which constituted 22 per cent of the LDC's exports, saw its price falling from $7377 a tonne in 1970 to 1367 in 1978, iron-ore from $24 a tonne to 12 and cotton from $161 a tonne to 138.2 And as far as oil is concerned, they observed that its purchasing power has deteriorated because of the rise in the price of manufactured goods, capital equipment and technology imported by the Opec countries. They also complained that aid allocated to the third world has not always served the interests of the recipients, while loan conditions as practiced by the World Bank have in many cases impaired the effective implementation of economic projects in the developing countries. The World Bank, the Algerians claimed, refused financing the first plant of

^2Réunion internationale pour la coopération et le développement, Cancun, Mexico, October 22-23, 1981 (Ministry of foreign affairs, 1981), p.3.
ammonia and nitrogeneous fertilizer products they intended to build
themselves on the basis that it was too large for the needs of Algeria,
but once built and solely with national financing, the production
capacity of the plant, they argued, was not even sufficient to meet half
those needs. Moreover, Algerian request for a loan from the World Bank
to finance boat building capacities was rejected because the Bank
favoured instead loans to the Algerian private sector for importing
boats.

The Algerian approach to the problems of the international economic
relations has been global, linking for instance the problems of
information and news, as well as the exploitation of the seabed to the
issues of world commodity and the NIEO. Thus, if problems facing the
third world are various and sectoral, their solution should be global as
the Algerians believed that the aspects of the international system are
intimately interlocked and interdependent. Therefore, this global
perspective has been stressed by Algerians in the North-South debates
with a great zeal and determination.

b. Efforts to mobilize the third world around the North-South
debates.

To push forward the third world demands they consistently called
for the solidarity of the developing countries which they regarded as
necessary to bolster the South's bargaining power; but to be effective,
this solidarity should be paired up with economic independence of the
third world countries which requires national ownership and control over
natural resources as well as the promotion of industrialization and
self-reliance.

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\textsuperscript{1}Ibid.
The desire to play a leading role within the third world coalition led the Algerians to involve themselves deeply in North-South debates. At these fora, the Algerian representatives and particularly the state technocrats displayed a great deal of diplomatic skills in presiding over conferences and working groups, formulating strategies, drafting resolutions and narrowing the gap between conflicting attitudes in order to push further the third world demands. Algeria also hosted numerous gatherings of the developing countries, in particular the meetings of the group of 77 in October 1967, the non-aligned conference summit in September 1973 which adopted economic programmes largely inspired by the Algerian doctrine, endorsing its main precepts: self-reliance, sovereignty over national resources, industrialization as the key for economic independence.

However, the failure of the third world to break the opposition of the North to reform the international economic system at the UNCTAD held in Santiago in 1972 was deeply resented by the Algerians who therefore came to realize how fragile was the weight of the South and how tenacious was the determination of the developed countries in rejecting demands for a NIEO. As a consequence the initial enthusiasm gave way to a more rational but more aggressive approach as the Algerians found themselves

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1 As Boumedienne put it after the Santiago UNCTAD III: "hopes of developing countries had been once more shattered by the selfish attitude of the rich countries and how, in such conditions, not to realize that the only solution for these countries is that of the complete take over of all the natural resources to be used for the development and emancipation of their peoples" (Conference, 8th Arab petroleum congress, Algiers, May 28, 1972 in les discours du Président, (4) p.34). Bouteflika also echoed that: "the road of third world economic emancipation does not run through UNCTAD but rather through third world institution to reclaim control over economic resources" (in El-Moudjahid, November 8, 1972.)
at the forefront of the South in its confrontation with the countries of
the Northern hemisphere that became tangible in the context of the energy
crisis of the early 1970s. The immediate objective of the Algerian
diplomacy was then to preserve and strengthen the unity of the third
world particularly with regard to US desire to play off the LDCs against
the Opec member states which were then accused of being responsible for
the world's economic crisis and inflation and for the severe recession
that daily hit the economies of many of the developed as well as
developing nations.

Given their vision that the world's crisis is global and its
solution should come from structural reforms of the international
economic system, the Algerians promptly requested the UN to convene a
meeting where all primary commodities should be considered. Although
the session was convened under UN auspices in April 1974 and on behalf of
the non-aligned movement, the Algerians regarded it as a major success
for their constant diplomatic work. Evidently, their great satisfaction
was that a UN General Assembly was studying the problems of raw materials
as a whole and not only the problems of energy as proposed by most of the
Western countries and a few non-aligned states such as India, Sri Lanka
and Guyana. The special session adopted a Declaration on the establish­
ment of a NIEO and the programme of actions designed to implement this
declaration. The main resolution endorsed most of Algerian suggestions
formulated by Boumediene in his speech to the Assembly, namely: 1)
permanent sovereignty over natural resources and the right to national­
ization according to national law; 2) the right of developing countries
to establish commodity 'producers' associations, and 3) a proposal for
linking commodity export prices of LDCs to the price of imported goods
from the industrialized world. The recommendations of this special session were short-lived, a matter that bitterly disappointed the Algerians. Their reaction was to blame the cupidity of the Western world and of the US in particular for being responsible for the North-South stalemate.

Nevertheless, Algeria found herself entangled in a diplomatic battle as pressures mounted from developed countries and others of the third world to convene a conference entirely devoted to the energy problems, because oil prices were held responsible in many cases for their economic stagnation and decay. To resist these pressures, Algeria attempted to win the support of Opec and the non-aligned movement for the gathering of an international meeting that would not be confined only to discuss energy problems as it was initially suggested by President Giscard D’Estaing of France. Although Opec agreed on the principle of global negotiations at its ministerial meeting held in Algiers on January 24, 1975, some of its member states such as Saudi Arabia and Iran seemed later quite reluctant to endorse it in order not to upset their American ally. But at the summit conference of this organization they hosted in March, the Algerians succeeded in inducing the Saudis to back the principle that the Paris conference should concern problems of raw materials and economic development in line with the previous resolutions issued at non-aligned and 77 groups fora.

1 Memorandum on petroleum, raw materials and development presented by Algeria on the occasion of the UN Special Session, April 1974.

2 The idea of an international conference on North-South issues was first suggested by Sheikh Yamani at Opec Geneva Meeting in August 1974.
After obtaining support from the Opec organization, Algeria succeeded in getting the backing from other non-aligned countries for her policy of confrontation with the North by assuring them of financial assistance from the oil-producing countries. Thus, at the first meeting of the Heads of state of Opec he hosted in March 1975, Boumedienne proposed the creation of a fund with $10 to 15 million initial capital and it was under his insistence that the spokesman of the group of 77 was invited by the meeting to present the specific demands of the developing countries.¹

It was in this position of strength that the Algerians approached the first session of the preparatory meeting on North-South dialogue which took place in the French capital in April 1975 gathering representatives from both hemispheres.² However clashes over the agenda soon arose: while the US maintained their initial intention to see a conference dealing exclusively with energy problems, the Algerians instead pressed for structural reforms of the international economic system. The preparatory meeting failed to agree on the definition of the agenda as the representatives of the third world led by Algerian delegates firmly resisted American pressures and although accepting that energy would be treated separately, they adamantly rejected US attempts to make it the central theme of the conference. The Algerians criticized Kissinger's suggestion of a new gathering on energy with some discussion on raw materials and accused Washington of attempting to

¹See his opening speech to this conference in Les discours du président, (6), 1975.
²The participants were 4 Opec countries: Algeria, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela; 3 representatives of non-Opec developing countries: Brazil, India and Zaire; the USA, EEC, Canada and Japan.
separate energy issue from the economic development of the third world and to impose a solution to the problems of oil prices that would consider US interest only.¹

Boosted by the support of Opec and of other developing states, the Algerian delegates approached the second session of the preparatory meeting of the Paris conference with a greater confidence and determination. The preparatory committee now extended to 17 other participants met them on October 13-15 to determine the composition of the four commissions and the co-presidences.² Algeria obtained a seat in two commissions: energy and development and co-presiding the latter (with the EEC) as a tribute for her sustained efforts in the North-South spleen.³

But after a harsh and long process of negotiations in early February and from June 1976 to June 1977, the Paris conference reached a deadlock and was finally cancelled as the interests of the two sides proved irreconcilable.

The Algerians perhaps more than any other participant, resented the collapse of the Paris conference and the failure of a radical approach in the North-South debates for which they had been largely responsible. The reluctance of the West to meet the demands of the third world such as the indexation of raw material prices and the increase of public aid in favour of LDCs led some powerful countries of the third world coalition to attempt evicting the radical states led by Algeria from directing the movement's search for a NIEO. Thus the preparatory meeting of the

²The new participants were: Argentina, Australia, Cameroon, Canada, Egypt, Iraq, Jamaica, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, and Zambia.
³Co-Presidence of the Commission on co-operation went to M. Ait Chalal, Algerian Ambassador to Belgium and the EEC.
non-aligned at Lima in May 1975 saw the efforts of Argentina, India and Yugoslavia to impose a more moderate line in the dialogue with the North. Algeria's aggressive policy in this dialogue also received a setback when some LDCs concluded separate agreements with the EEC known as the Lome convention and which received the support of the UN economic commission for Africa and of the OAU.

In this unfavourable context, Algeria's efforts to preserve solidarity within the world coalition, particularly in the meetings devoted to South-South co-operation were doomed by the increasing gap between Opec member states and other third world non oil countries as a result of the increases of oil prices. The oil bill did not fail to have devastating inflationary effects on the economies of the latter, a matter that seriously jeopardized the solidarity of the third world.¹ To counter this disunity, the Algerians embarked upon a campaign to explain that Opec was not responsible for the deficit of the balance of payments of other developing countries as it was claimed, as well as make clear that South-South co-operation in general and Opec aid to the third world were not a substitute for North-South dialogue. Thus, they rejected demands that Opec should grant concessional prices for oil for its fellow third world countries on the grounds that only the 'valorization' of export products could help them remedy the deficit of their balance of payments. But pressures on Algeria and Opec mounted at the 1976 Colombo summit meeting of the non-aligned movement, as a group of countries led by India, Yugoslavia and Guyana demanded that South-South dialogue should

¹In 1974, the oil imports cost them $1,500 million and about $57.8 billion in 1980. See C. LUN: oil prices and developing countries in the World Today (30), 1974, pp.400-410 and Van Praag: Deadlock in the North-South debates, ibid (36), 1980, pp.469-475.
exclusively consider the problems of energy, thus excluding other fields of co-operation. And at their June 1980 meeting held in Manila, the Asian countries urged Opec to adopt a specific programme in the field of energy in favour of other developing countries. Among the proposals made were the establishment of a system of compensation for oil bills and a system of preferences for these countries, the guarantee of their supplies in petroleum and the creation of a fund to finance urgent projects in a certain number of developing countries. The Algerians regarded these proposals as an attempt by some of these states to have a right of say in the fixation of oil prices, and lobbied instead for a conference that should embrace all aspects of South-South co-operation in which energy could be one of several items on a wide-ranging agenda. And in a deliberate attempt to switch the attention of non-Opec countries away from the issue of energy problems, they proposed to convert Opec's special fund into an agency for development, at the ministerial meeting of this organization which took place at Taef in May 1980.¹

Behind these divergences, however, the conflict concerned whether the debates devoted to co-operation among developing countries should be the impetus for North-South dialogue. The Algerians were adamant that South-South co-operation is but a supplement to North-South issues. But, with the lack of progress in North-South relations, the weakness of the non-aligned movement and the risk of the crumbling of the third world coalition, they moved to adopt a more flexible attitude with regard to demands formulated by other countries. This temperance was also

¹This agency was to be endowed with $20 million initial capital to finance economic development with an emphasis on loans and profits that would foster trade among developing countries and lessen their dependence on the industrialized nations.
necessary to gather support for their stand over the Western Sahara, an issue that had contributed in the division of the non-aligned movement since the Colombo summit. To head off the growing resentment felt against their militant foreign policy and against Opec in both hemispheres, the Algerians attempted to invigorate the bargaining power of the third world coalition through advocating the idea of global negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations.

c. Global negotiations as a means to maintain the North-South dialogue

Launched at the 1979 Havana non-aligned summit, the Algerian initiative received support from developing countries and as a result a committee to prepare the global negotiations conference scheduled to take place in September 1981 was created at the UN and chaired by Driss Jezairi one of Algeria's most technocratic and skilful diplomats. However, as world recession became acute and problems caused by the energy crisis urgent, Algeria's long-term programme of radically reforming the international economic structures started to lose support especially from non-oil developing countries. The global negotiations were indefinitely delayed as the Western world made it clear at its summit held in Ottawa in July 1981 that it was not prepared to entrust crucial agenda items to the decision of the UN General Assembly where the third world has a decisive voting majority. In addition, Algeria's insistence on discussing structural problems such as inflation and deterioration of trade exchanges was opposed by some moderate developing countries such as India, Sri Lanka and other African and Latin American states which favoured debates restricted to emergency measures to be taken in favour of the developing countries. Most of these countries had been badly hit by the world recession; especially by the increase of
oil prices in 1979 and the deterioration of trade terms which led to a slump in their exports earnings and consequently in the rise of their external borrowings. The economies of many of them remained so heavily dependent on commodity trade that tariff preferences for manufactured goods which could be obtained from commodity policy and even the stabilization of export earnings (Stabex scheme) as envisaged by the Lome convention did not compensate for decrease in their commodity export earnings. Their attention was therefore concentrated on monetary problems as they demanded at the fifth UNCTAD convened in Manila in May-June 1979, the creation of a new longer-term facility to finance the deficit of their balance of payments through improvement and liberalization of the IMF compensating financing facilities. They also urged the World Bank and the financial institutions in the developed world to find a solution for their external debts whose rates reached alarming levels.

With the emergence of monetary problems, Algeria's quest for global negotiations based on long-term perspectives was overshadowed by other initiatives such as the Brandt report and the plan initiated by the Mexican president Portillo, presented to the 34th session of the General Assembly. The Algerians criticized the former on the ground that it did not propose structural changes in the existing international economic

\[\text{-- See programme of survival, report of the independent commission on international development issues under the chairmanship of the former West German Chancellor W. Brandt (Pan books, London, 1980, 304p.). For Algeria's criticism of Portillo's plan see the work of A. Sid Ahmed a former official at the Ministry of Industry and Energy, nord-sud: les enjeux (OPU, Algiers, 1981).}\]
structures and rejected the latter because it gave a sheer priority to the problems of energy, thus overlooking other crucial problems the South has been facing for decades.

Nevertheless, with the failure of UNCTAD meetings at Nairobi (May 5-31, 1976) and Manila (May 7-June 3, 1979) over North-South issues, pressures mounted for an international conference outside the UN. Mexico was therefore able to gather 22 heads of state from developed and developing countries at Cancun in October 1981. On this occasion, the Algerians led by President Chadli clashed with the US who reiterated their opposition to Algeria's idea of global negotiations under the UN auspices opened to all states, favouring instead another round of consultations with only the countries that were present at Cancun. The Algerians regarded this move as a deliberate attempt by Washington to see the North-South issues discussed in specialized organisms where the voting power of the Western world predominated.¹ Such fears were confirmed when the conference convened in Dakar in March 1982 between African banks and the World Bank and the IMF failed to meet African demands. The report presented by the World Bank maintained in fact, the rigid conditions for lending and overlooked major structural problems faced by the developing countries, e.g. the rise of interest rate,

stabilization of the price of primary commodity products, trade protectionist policies adopted by industrialized economies as well as the increase of the third world external debts.¹

In their efforts to conciliate between the discussion of urgent problems and those related to the structural remodelling of the international economic system, the Algerians proposed at the non-aligned summit conference held in New Delhi in March 1983, a strategy based on two phases: the first stage would consist in launching negotiations in January 1984 with selected agenda of emergency problems to be discussed while the second step over three years, would concern long-term questions relevant to the reform of the world economic order. But this strategy did not receive a wide support from other developing countries on the ground that it was time consuming and longer lasting as many of them wanted to find immediate solutions to their most urgent problems: debt and inflation especially as the growth of GDP in the third world fell by 3 per cent in 1980 to 0.6 in 1981. The acuity of monetary and financial problems facing the South obliged the Algerians to rally other developing countries in their demands for emergency solutions, thus tempering their drive for global negotiations at the UN. At the Belgrade UNCTAD meeting, Algeria was elected deputy spokesman of the 77 group over monetary and financial questions while her new foreign minister Ahmed Taleb pleaded for the convening of an international conference on these problems when addressing the 38th General Assembly of the UN in October 1983.

¹See report made by the Algerian Minister of finance, Benhammouda at this meeting and also the memorandum drafted by the conference and presented by its rapporteur, A. Bessakhouad, Director of the Algerian Central Bank (BCA) in Révolution Africaine, March 12-18, 1982, p.13.
2. 'Valorization' of oil resources through the preservation of Opec Unity

Algeria's role within Opec has largely reflected the country's economic needs and objectives as well as the limits of a small oil-producing country within this organization. For the Algerians, the emergence of this third world oil cartel constituted "the most concrete and spectacular example of the importance of raw materials to the oil producing countries, the vital need for them to control their resources, operate the levels of price control, and lastly the great possibility of a union of raw material-producing countries." But the recovery of natural resources, they stressed, has no significance without those countries assuming the control of prices since oil is an exhaustible natural resource and evolving capital risk and dependence on international trade as well as on highly sophisticated technology imported from the West. And given drastic changes in the international energy market in the late 1960s, they were eager to transform the income of oil, a mere form of rent into the forms of productive activities to enable the country achieve a certain degree of economic development in a relatively short time. As domestic economic growth depended largely on oil industry, the Algerians aimed through Opec activities at achieving two main objectives: 1) the national control over natural resources and 2) the control over price indexation in order to expand oil industry which in return would engineer a large-scale economic development. In their eyes, only the quest for unity among the so much differentiated member states, would lead to the effective implementation of these objectives.

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1 Algeria's Memorandum on petroleum, raw materials and development.
2 See interview of Belaid Abdeslam, the minister of industry and energy to El-Moudjahid, February 2, 1971.
since the position of Algeria with regard to the level of oil production was not strong to impose their own strategies on other Opec members. See table VI:5.

If Algeria has then constantly been pushing for an increase of oil prices, she was nevertheless cautious not to adopt an extremist attitude that would isolate her within Opec, or ruin the chances of reaching a consensus that would more or less work for her own interests. Her dilemma then, has not been between adopting a hawkish line and preserving the unity of Opec without fulfilling her own objectives, but the ability to reconcile these two aims to realize at least some of her basic objectives. A balanced approach seemed not only the most concrete and viable strategy to follow as Algeria could not afford to opt for either extreme. Thus, it was not surprising that she alternated the two forms of tactics within reasonable limits in an attempt to preserve the cohesion of the Opec organization which she joined in 1969 in a context marked by two main features: her involvement in a harsh dispute with France over the oil issue and changes in the structures of international energy market.

a) the quest for national control over oil resources and prices

Opec emerged against the low prices practiced by the cartel companies which dominated the oil market until the 1950s. Later, the decline of the hegemony of the major oil companies resulting from the existence of a free market outside of their control (USSR's exports), and from the multiplicity of smaller but effective oil firms, combined with the booming demand for oil (as less coal was available on the energy market in the late 1960s), helped to strengthen the bargaining power of the oil-producing countries, thus enabling them to extract better
concessionary terms from the multinational oil companies. The June 1968 declaratory statement on petroleum policy issued by the Opec organization decided that "tax preferences prices to be unilaterally determined by governments and the participation of the producing countries in existing concessions justified by _clausula rebus sic stantibus_ that is to say by reasons of fundamental change of circumstances."  

This also favoured Algeria and Libya because of the closing of the Suez Canal after the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the break in a pipeline in Syria forcing the Western countries to shift their oil supplies from the Middle East to North Africa. Compared to the Middle East, their crude oil enjoyed an appreciable value in the international market due to its enhanced freight advantage and better quality. And with the fall of 1969 witnessing a sharp increase of Western demand for petroleum and particularly for Libya's oil, the Algerians were impatient to get access to the control of the oil process from production to marketing which was largely dominated by the French companies. The objective behind this was also to boost their country's economic capabilities in order to emerge as the central power in North Africa in the face of Libya's booming power. In the late 1960s, Libya had in fact become Europe's biggest oil supplier and in a deliberate attempt to increase its bargaining power, Tripoli decided in summer 1970 to reduce its oil output from 3,000,000 barrels a day to as little as a million, provoking a relative disarray in the Western world since many European countries had only 60 to 65 days of oil supply, a fact which forced them to deal directly with Opec.

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However, the Algerians did not want to let Libya become the sole impetus for revolutionizing Opec strategy vis-a-vis the Western oil cartel. Thus they moved to set a working relationship with Tripoli as the Algerian minister of industry and energy Belaid Abdeslam invited his Libyan counterpart for talks in Algiers in an attempt "to co-ordinate the position of the two countries and unify their efforts to create a powerful front capable of preserving the interests of the two peoples against the monopolies." The next step was to put into practice demands for higher oil royalties and it was following Algerian initiatives, that the Opec meeting held in Caracas in December 1970 decided to adopt the resolution (120) that established a 55 per cent minimum rate of taxation on profits, an increase in posted prices and a definition of a new basis for the calculation of quality differentials. Until the late 1960s, the price at which Algeria was selling her oil to the French companies was 35 per cent cheaper than those of Libya while the posted price of Algerian oil was 20 per cent below those experienced by other Opec states. To increase her price to these levels and particularly to Libya's, Algeria demanded a referential price to be fixed at $3.33 a barrel and urged the oil companies to accept the principle that to each tonne of oil extracted should correspond a new tonne discovered. ¹

After the stalemate of the Teheran meeting of February 1971, due to the refusal of the Western oil cartel to accept Opec's demands, Algeria joined Libya, Iraq and Saudi Arabia in a meeting held in Tripoli on March 21, 1971. There they fixed the level of taxation at 55 per cent, an

¹See interview of Belaid Abdeslam to 'l'avenirre' in El-Moudjahid, January 31, 1971.
increase of 52 cents per barrel in posted prices including 10 cents premium for low sulphur crude (Algeria and Libya) and an annual increase of 5 cents in posted prices.

Being assured of Opec solidarity at least in words, the Algerians announced a day later the partial nationalization of French oil assets in Algeria, thus setting an example for the other Opec member states to follow. Algeria's prestige within Opec increased with France being unable to counter the 1971 nationalization measures and with Libya, Iraq and Venezuela emulating the Algerian take over of national resources.

If the recovery of these resources constituted for Algerians a resounding success for their strategy, it did not, however, mean for them the end of the domination of the Western countries over price indexation. The assumption underlying the quest for indexation was that the real value of the oil commodity has decreased in terms of trade vis-a-vis oil consuming countries since 1974 in the sense that the rise in oil prices did not compensate for the deterioration of the purchasing power of oil resulting from the regulations of the international financial system that had been exclusively manipulated by the Western states. Since the US dollar had been the money through which oil exports were paid, its devaluation against gold by 7.89 per cent decided by the Nixon administration on August 15, 1971 was regarded by Algeria as responsible for the reduction of the purchasing power of Opec oil. This situation led the Algerians to attempt to put the oil-producing states in a better position to regulate the mechanisms for fixing oil prices in order to increase oil revenues to finance national economic development. At the

1See lecture given at the conference organized by the West-German Fredrich Ebert foundation by the Opec Secretary-General, the Algerian A. Lamine-Khâne in El-Mujtamaa (Bonn) (7), July-August 1973, p.3.
two Geneva meetings held in the second half of 1972, the representatives of Algeria and other Opec states made the oil companies accept a 8.49 per cent and then 11.9 per cent rise in price as a compensation for the effects of the devaluation of the dollar. They also decided that prices would in future be adjusted monthly according to a weighted average movement of eleven major currencies against the dollar. But the Algerians preferred instead a viable formula of price indexation to protect the purchasing power of oil. In their views, a pricing system based on occasional adjustments in line with the fluctuations of the US money and of other currencies proved inadequate and too dilatory to compensate for the decline of the value of oil. As a way of example, the rise of Opec oil prices decided in the aftermath of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war was followed by a downward trend of prices and revenues in 1974-1975. Consequently, the price of the Algerian light fell from $14 a barrel in the first quarter of 1974 to a mere $11.73 in the third quarter of 1975. See Table VI:6.

At the Opec ministerial meeting held in Algiers in February 1975, Belaid Abdeslam proposed a new formula to counter the erosion of oil prices and revenues. In his conception, the rise of these prices should not be linked to the fluctuations of the dollar but to a complex system which should take into account a number of criteria such as the price of manufactured goods, the rate of inflation and the terms of transfer of goods and technology for the economic growth of developing countries. But beyond these technical mechanisms, Saudi Arabia's determination to slow down the increase of oil prices for geopolitical and strategic reasons proper to the Kingdom, proved the major obstacle to Algeria's drive for a more adequate system of price indexation.
Indeed, to protect their own interests, the Saudis were adamant in their refusal to accept much higher prices which "will hasten the days when Opec's grip is loosening and if we force Western countries to invest heavily in finding alternative sources of energy, they will. This could take no more than ten to twenty years and could result in reducing dependence on oil as a source of energy to a point which would jeopardise Saudi Arabia's interests. Saudi Arabia will then be unable to find markets to sell enough oil to meet its financial requirements. This picture should be understood."\(^1\)

At the Opec meeting in Quito in June 1974, the Saudis had unilaterally decided to increase their country's oil output and lower the price of its Arabian light by $2.50 a barrel. If this move irritated the Algerians, it did not however lead them to adopt an extremist attitude that could alienate Saudi Arabia, being aware that the Arab Kingdom could use the oil tap to force an oil slick that may result in the crumbling of oil prices. Therefore, at the Vienna meeting of December 1974, the Algerian delegation accepted the Saudi initiative to freeze the oil prices for a nine month period.

Moderation was necessary to cement the unity of the Opec organization in order to reach two sets of interlocked objectives: 1) a formula of price indexation that could protect the deterioration of the purchasing of the Opec oil and 2) the consolidation of the Arab consensus and the solidarity between Opec and the third world that emerged after the October 1973 war. Concerns for this unity in the context of North-South debates were apparent behind the good working relationship

\(^1\)Sheik Zaki Yamani, interview to the economist, April 11-17, 1980, p. 77
existing between Algeria and Saudi Arabia despite deep ideological differences as well as behind Boumedienne's efforts to reconcile Iraq and Iran at the first Opec summit conference held in Algiers in March 1975.

However, after the euphoria of the mid-1970s, and despite the 1979 oil 'shock', Opec's bargaining power in terms of regulating the prices of oil and spurring the demands for a NIEO considerably decreased. Besides the failure of the Paris conference and the crumbling of the third world coalition, the rise of the oil prices in 1979 resulting from a political upheaval in Iran was artificial and short-lived. The apparition of an oil glut due to the increase of production in non-Opec countries and to large cuts in energy consumption in the western world proved quite detrimental to Opec's dominance over production and exports and to the economies of its member states. In this new context of challenge, Algeria and her Opec partners attempted to avoid the fall of oil prices and to preserve the organization status in the world energy market.

b. the preservation of the Opec's price structure and the future of the organization

Until the oil glut, the Opec system of price fixation has worked with demand for light balanced by weaker demand for the cheaper heavy crude. The situation has now changed as modern refineries can produce as much products from the heavier crude as from the light. Thus demand for Algerian (as well as Libyan and Nigerian) oil witnessed a substantial slump. Japan for instance refused to continue importing oil from Algeria because of this country's expensive blend. This situation worsened with Saudi Arabia's drive to slow the oil spiral by flooding the market in order to increase its foreign earnings as reserve currencies started to dry up. Thus Saudi's highest ever increase of oil output reached in early 1980, 10.3 million barrels a day up from 9.5 previously.
The outcome of the Kingdom's freedom to fix its price, the better competitive prices it practiced and its high level of oil production resulted in heavy pressure on Algeria and other populous Opec member nations and in this context, confrontation within this organization was looming as disaccord on fixing the reference posted prices sharpened at the Opec ministerial meeting held in Caracas in early 1980. There Algeria and other hawkish states failed to make Saudi Arabia set its reference price at around $28 a barrel.¹ Fearing that divisions may split up the organization, Algeria stressed the necessity to reach a compromise to preserve its unity, because as the Algerian minister of energy put it, "the state of oil market and economic relations between the industrialized and developing nations coupled with Opec's interests and responsibilities required a strong organization."²

At the ministerial meeting he hosted in Algiers in June 1980, Nabi was joined by the oil ministers of Iran, Iraq, Libya and Nigeria in pressing for higher prices of oil, demanding that the crude marker should be set at $32 a barrel and differentials at up to $5 a barrel and promptly agreed to increase their posted prices to the $37 a barrel limit.³ However, Algeria and her allies soon faced Saudi opposition to a rise in the price of the Arabian light as it stayed at $28 a barrel weeks later. After constant pressure from Algeria and the hawkish states and months of haggling about the price structure, a consensus was

¹ See interview of Belkacem Nabi to P.C. Robin in Revolution (Paris), March 28–April 13, 1980, p. 28–29.
³ The price of Saudi crude (Arabian light 34⁰ API) was taken as a marker or a benchmark for which prices for other crudes are measured taking into account quality and freight advantages (proximity to markets).
reached at Bali in December and the price of the Saudi crude marker was fixed at $36 a barrel while the price of better quality blends and oil with freight advantages was put at $41 a barrel.

Algeria's satisfaction with these decisions was soon undermined: while some countries like the war-torn Iran and Iraq, and Venezuela raised their oil prices by 10 per cent to obtain more revenues, others like Saudi Arabia increased their oil outputs. To force the Saudis to revise their policies, the Algerians brought together at Hassi Messraoud on June 22, 1981, representatives from Opec African countries: Gabon, Libya and Nigeria which possess better quality crude. Algeria obtained from them an engagement to co-ordinate energy policies and to refuse to meet Saudi demand to lower oil prices. These pressures partially succeeded when the Saudis agreed at the October 1981 Geneva meeting to cut their oil output from 9.5 million barrels a day to 8.5, but this level was higher than the one requested by Algeria: 7 million barrels a day. Moreover, the price of the Arabian light remained unchanged ($34 a barrel) and in these conditions Algeria and other Opec countries realized the difficulty to set differentials for their light crude because Saudi Arabia was also demanding in return a doubling of the fixed $1.50 price differential between its Arabian light and the African sweet crude. But Algeria and her African partners firmly rejected the Saudi demand on the ground that the prices of their light were already selling above their spot market rate. In the third quarter of 1981, the price of Algerian Saharan blend averaged $40 a barrel.

Moreover, the aggravation of the world's glut did not fail to have disrupting effects on the hard-reached cohesion of the African members of Opec. While Algeria was pressing for a drastic reduction of oil
production by the major producers of this organization to combat the oil slump, Nigeria for instance proposed levels of differentials between heavy crudes and light ones at only $2.5 a barrel higher than the Opec benchmark price. The meeting finally settled for a compromise deciding a maximum of $4 a barrel differential. Thus the price of the Algerian sweet crude was put at $37.90 a cut of $2.0 a barrel. Moreover, when Indonesia, Iran and Nigeria, burdened with many domestic problems, were forced to sell their oil $1 a barrel cheaper than the Algerian oil, Algeria found it difficult to win new clients for its light crude, though Libya was facing a boycott from American oil companies and the caprices of the French ones.\(^1\) Algerian exports were then reduced to 470,000 barrels a day and revenues slightly decreased despite a rise of the price of condensat by $2 a barrel from November 1981.

With the oil glut worsening, oil prices crumbling, threats to Opec unity were deeply felt by Algeria and in an attempt to find a solution to the problems of overproduction, she joined other member states at Quito to set production ceilings for each country. Thus Opec's total oil output was put at $17.5 million a day and Algeria was assigned 650,000 barrels a day which represented 61.9 per cent of her average oil production over the last ten years.\(^2\) The implication for Algeria was that she needed an output of 1,200,000 barrels a day to balance her current accounts. If the Algerians subscribed to these restrictions, they were also infuriated by the lack of discipline within Opec which prevented a uniform price structure and quotas of production to be respected by all the member states.

\(^1\)Nigeria sold its oil $36.5 a barrel instead of $37, Indonesia (Sumatra light) $34 instead of $35, Iraq $34.60 (34.60) in El-Moudjahid, November 6-7, 1981.

\(^2\)National Concord, March 14, 1981.
The direct result of indiscipline was a rise of Opec production to 23 million barrels a day while demands for Opec oil averaged only 18.5 million barrels a day and despite the efforts of Algeria within the Opec monitoring committee at its session held in Vienna in December 16-18 1982, illegal practices within Opec persisted. And when Nigeria decided to cut down its oil price by $5.5 a barrel in February 1983, Algeria immediately called for an emergency conference in an attempt to find a viable solution to the slump in Opec foreign earnings and the collapse of unity. At the meeting which took place in London in early May, she received the support of Iran, Venezuela and Ecuador in demanding the maintenance of the benchmark price at $34 a barrel and the reduction of Opec total output down to 14 million barrels a day. After harsh debates, the Saudi-led moderates decided a cut of the Saudi marker price to $29 a barrel but obtained in return the fixation of differential prices around an average of $1 to $1.57 a barrel. But while Iran rejected the new price and Venezuela refused the production ratio it was allocated, Algeria opted for a more moderate line, aware of the fragility of the Opec unity. Indeed the Algerian minister of energy did not favour a policy of obstructing the consensus reached in principle.

It proved difficult for instance to define exactly the boundary between light and crude oil and condensate and since gas liquids were not covered by Opec agreements, a number of the member states have been seeking to maximize their production. On their part, the Algerians firmly opposed that condensate and other gas liquids used in petrochemical industry should be covered by Opec agreements. Indeed, they were by no means willing to see the prices of refined petroleum products restricted as these items had substantially compensated for the decline of oil exports and were expected to become with gas exports, the main source of foreign earnings as planned by the five year plan 1984-1989.
despite the fact that he admitted that his country would be deprived of $2 billion in revenues as a result of the fixation of the price of its oil at $30.5 a barrel.¹

The lessons learned by the Algerians with regard to the Opec policies in the early 1980s were that even if this cartel reaches compromises on production quotas and differentials from one meeting to another, the average cost of Opec may remain well above that of the member states to sell their full quotas without offering illicit discounts. The prospects for the organization seem also gloomy with its share in the world-wide business dwindling from 53 per cent in mid-1975 to barely 30 per cent a decade later and with the unsuccessful efforts to persuade Mexico to join Opec or induce Great Britain or Norway, not to lower their oil prices. Consequently, the poorer and more populous members seem unlikely to be willing to put the organization's good ahead of their own pressing economic needs. In this context, Algeria's dilemma is that she also cannot sustain a downward trend of oil prices because it may result in the decline of the prices of her gas and petroleum products as well. And as the exports of these items constituted her main long-term objectives, she tried to salvage the unity and the cohesion of Opec since this organization still represented for her the only forum to exercise a substantial leverage on the West with regard to price indexation of raw materials which is regarded as vital for the growth of her own economy.² When the Iranian oil minister strode from the

¹Interview of Belkacem Nabi to Afrique-Asie, May 9, 1983, p.47.
²The third Arab conference on energy she hosted in Algiers in early May 1985 may have been an attempt to discuss some proposals of a long-term strategy. For this perspective see interview of Nabi to the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Madjaless in El-Moudjahid, December 23, 1984.
conference hall at the July 1985 Geneva meeting in protest at any reduction in average Opec prices, Belkacem Nabi promptly followed him in an attempt to persuade him back to the negotiating table. This gesture undoubtedly reflected Algeria's concern to help preserve Opec's unity and perhaps ensure its survival.

With these gloomy aspects, the dependence of Algerian economy on energy exports appeared quite dramatic and it became urgent for the Algerian leaders to remedy this situation.

C. THE SEARCH FOR A MORE BALANCED NATIONAL ECONOMY

1. Restructuring of the economy

The policy of 'industrializing industries' did not bring about a well-balanced economic growth and did not extirpate the mechanisms of economic underdevelopment from Algeria. Major problems such as the neglect of agriculture, the heavy reliance on hydrocarbons as well as obstacles inherent in the transfer of technology had impaired the transfer of economic performance.

The marginalization of agriculture was indicated by the decline of the share of this sector in the GDP from 12.9 per cent in 1967 to a mere 7.2 per cent in 1978.¹ And while agrarian production per capita increased in Morocco by 18 per cent and in Tunisia by 35 it decreased by 13 per cent in Algeria between 1960 and 1976.² Imports of foodstuffs dramatically increased the draining of a substantial amount of the country's foreign assets and forced the government to stringent limitation on consumer goods and causing occasional food shortages as

²Valeurs actuelles, January 1, 1979, pp.27-29.
population in Algeria nearly doubled after independence, reaching 20 million in 1978. In addition to the lack of capital, equipment and fertilizers, as well as rural exodus, disorganization and weakness of the marketing network, the sector of 'agrarian revolution' also suffered from the subtle opposition of former landowners, the tediously inefficient bureaucratic practices and peasants discontent with collectivisation. Moreover, the socialist agrarian sector has been hit by structural disorganization, degradation of its infrastructure and the ageing of the work force and of the arboriculture patrimony.\textsuperscript{1} On the social level, the 'industrializing industries' policy did not generate massive employment for the growing manpower. Only 1,100,000 jobs were created for the decade 1967-1978 making a rate of unemployment oscillate between 19 and 25 per cent of the active population. The priority given to production of capital goods at the expense of consumer goods resulted also in the partial neglect of social services and needs, particularly housing, a problem that proved hard to solve, notwithstanding substantial efforts made by the government in recent years.

On the industrial level, economic performance remained low as nearly 95 per cent of the state's export earnings were made up by the exports of oil and gas. The heavy reliance on this sector and on foreign borrowing to meet manufacturing deficits, did not encourage the manufacture of local goods, while the import of technology proved costly and quickly outdated. In this respect, total expenditure of the three development plans (1967-1978) reached 402.5 billion DA, this being well beyond the level of 146.4 billion DA of planned investments.\textsuperscript{2} Moreover, most of

\textsuperscript{1}Speech of Selim Saadi, the minister of agriculture in Révolution Africaine, December 31, 1982-January 1, 1983, p.24.
\textsuperscript{2}Bilan économique et social, p.3.
the state-owned companies faced deficit and many of the huge plants, such as the Skikda plant, built with massive foreign assistance and loans, had been running at only thirty per cent of their capacity of production.¹

As it appeared, neither the euphoria of the 1973-1974 booming increase of oil prices, nor the setting up of gigantic industrial complexes and hydrocarbon plants were able to prevent the emergence of many of Algeria's socio-economic problems. The failure to make Algeria "the Japan of North Africa" partially impaired Algeria's revolutionary elan in third world forums and marked the relative failure of her policy of confrontation with the West. These limitations on the foreign level coincided with Algeria's increasing entanglement in regional affairs with the appearance of the Western Sahara problem on her Western borders.

Since its coming to power, Chadli's government introduced new changes in the country's economic policy in an attempt to remedy the decrease in national capabilities, ensure domestic stability and enhance the position of the new regime. Therefore, a greater attention has been given to satisfy the social needs of a rapidly growing population, by partly removing the economic austerity imposed by Boumedienne.

To remedy sectoral imbalances that have affected the national economy, the Chadli regime embarked upon reforms characterized mainly by attempts to improve agriculture, associate national private capital in the country's economic development and reduce dependence on the hydrocarbon sector.

¹The production of cement for instance was estimated at 5.2 million tonnes in 1978 meeting only 52 per cent of Algeria's needs (in bilan économique et social, p.83).
In the agrarian sector, farmers have been allowed to sell crops directly to the public as a result of the removal of the commercialization co-operatives set up by the past regime in the framework of the 'agrarian revolution'. And peasants of the private sector who representing 60 per cent of the peasantry and tilling 4.1 million hectares - have been granted better access to public loans, material equipment and fertilizers. A substantial rise in agrarian production has been achieved since, although many problems inherent in the nature of climatic conditions, lack of fertile land, working force and spare-parts remain acute.

Signs of a gradual, though slow economic liberalization, became tangible with the desire of the Chadli regime to help the private sector in general increase its participation in the national economic development. Under Boumedienne, this sector was heavily criticized for its huge profits, parasitic practices and was more or less resolutely kept away from politics, especially in the early 1970s when Algeria underwent a markedly radical model of development. However, in spite of the predominance of the public sector and the state monopoly over foreign trade, the importance of this sector in the growth of GDP was by no means negligible. In 1973, it made up for more than half of the industrial production: 5884 million DA against 9049 made by the public sector, but by 1976, it contributed for 5609 against 22471. This share seems quite important when one considers that a large part of the production value achieved by the public sector came initially from energy exports. In
other sectors, such as textiles, leather and shoe industries, the production realized by the private sector was higher than that of the public one.¹

The new regime initiated several measures in favour of the private in an attempt to control the increasing growth of the private sector and make it more useful in the country's economic development as to partially compensate for the poor economic performance of the state-owned industries. Thus the sixth session of the FLN's Central Committed held on December 22-24, 1981 was entirely devoted to the situation of this sector on the basis of a report of an ad hoc commission set up in May. Undoubtedly, seeds of a move toward a more economic liberalization are there. A law codifying investments of the private economy (82-11) was adopted in August 1983 through which a series of facilities were granted to the private sector such as bank loans, fiscal incentives and allowances to import duty-free capital equipment up to DA 100,000. In 1983, 117 projects above DA 3 billion presented by private investors were given a go ahead by the national commission of investments. Many of these projects concerned building materials, foodstuffs, textile industries and tourism, sectors that have direct social impact and which were underprivileged during Boumedienne's time.

The lessening of the heavy dependence of the country on hydrocarbon revenues constituted one of the main objectives of the five year development plan launched in 1980 as it attempted to encourage industrialization mainly to satisfy consumer needs that had been met formerly through imports as well. Therefore, investments allocated for industry

and hydrocarbons estimated at 157.7 billion DA represented 38.6 per cent of total planned investments for the period 1980-1984 while in the preceding plan, their share in total investments corresponded to 43.4 per cent. The plan also envisaged a decrease of the hydrocarbon's share in the GDP and a substantial rise of the material production, given the tangible improvement in this sector since 1980. During this period, industrial production and services reached an annual average of 7.7 per cent of the GDP growth and the output of industry alone increased by 20 per cent in 1982 from the previous year. In contrast, hydrocarbons saw their share declining from 36 per cent in 1980 to 27 in 1984.

Limited reserves of oil combined with the downward trend of oil prices in 1980 and with the gloomy prospects for international trade of LNG have led the Chadli government to adopt a long-term strategy - formulated at the December 29-31, 1980 session of the Central Committee of the FLN - based on the preservation of oil reserves to meet growing domestic demands and on the development of the gas industry as Algeria has huge potential of this energy.

Indeed, with the share of crude oil in the hydrocarbons sector dropping from 83 per cent in 1980 to 48 per cent in 1983, condensates, petroleum refined products (LPG) and natural gas in particular were planned to make up 80 per cent of the country's exports by 2000.

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1 El-Moudjahid, January 20, 1983.
Table: Hydrocarbons exports 1970-2000 (million tonnes of oil equivalent)

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<td>51.5</td>
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Source: Ministry of energy quoted in the South, special report on Algeria, December 1985, p.70.

2. The gas battle

One of the major features of the new energy policy was to break away with the project of the Abdeslam team to make Algeria the biggest LNG exporter in the world (115 billion cubic metres annually in the late 1980s) because of the gloomy prospects for the exports of this form of gas and the exorbitant costs made to develop the country's capacity of natural gas. These costs involved the setting up of refineries, pipelines and distribution network achieved through large investments, most of which had been financed by loans from abroad. Moreover, the LNG venture had been even more expensive because of high transport costs, loss of volume in the process of production and in the operations of freezing and unfreezing. Beside these intrinsic problems, the future of the LNG industry looked grim with regard to changes that affected the international energy market.

In the early 1970s, LNG was thought a lucrative business because of the availability of the US markets, technology and finance as well as of high levels of oil prices. But in the late 1970s, prospects for LNG exports became gloomy because of new discoveries of gas in the USA, the
existence of cheap petroleum resulting from the world's oil glut, the reduction of energy consumption in the Western countries and their switch to coal and other sources of energy. On the other hand, technology related to the construction of undersea pipelines for the transport of gas has been satisfactorily tested and proved cheaper and safer than the transport of gas through special tankers. Given this unfavourable context for LNG, Algeria cancelled a certain number of economic projects, in particular the huge LNG III plant at Arzew. However, to compensate for the loss of exports' earnings and offset investments made in the past, she moved to ask for higher prices for the gas she was selling to Western countries on the basis of pricing her gas exports at the Btu equivalent of the landed price of her own sweet crude.¹

From the outset negotiations were conducted in an atmosphere resembling the context of the oil battle with France in the late 1960s. Again, as a producing country, Algeria was tempted to play a pioneering role in pushing for an increase of energy prices to assert the state's control over the price indexation of its raw materials. But in this battle, she felt she was isolated because of the refusal of major gas producing countries (USSR and Denmark) to seek parity between oil and gas prices and of the failure of the Oapec to set up a common strategy over the indexation of the gas prices, at its meeting in Algiers in June 1980. Because of oil abundance, some Opec countries of the Middle East did not develop the gas industry while others were discouraged by the costs involved, the cheap image of gas and by the existence of gas exporters such as Soviet Union, Netherlands, Mexico and Canada. Moreover, Abu

Dhabi which had emerged as an important gas exporter among the Arab states, thought needless to internationalize the gas issue since it was selling most of its gas to Japan at a price above the world market. However, these obstacles did not discourage Algeria in her search for higher price of her natural gas perhaps for 3 main reasons: 1) the contracts should be somehow honoured as Algeria and her EEC partners made substantial investments to cover for the whole operations related to the natural gas deal. Thus, she warned that she was prepared to abandon her entire liquefaction programme if customers would not agree to pay substantially higher prices for LNG. 2) Algeria has been an important market for these countries since they accounted for more than 90 per cent of her global exchanges. For France, Belgium, Italy and Spain, Algeria has been one of their most important clients in the whole developing world and arguably one of their most valuable interlocutors in third world politics. 3) Algeria also constitutes a reliable source of gas supplies outside the Soviet grip, a matter that enhanced her position in the East-West bargain over the gas issue. This was the argument defended by the US government in his attempt to prevent the EEC member states from increasingly depending on the Soviet gas, encouraging them instead to deal with Algeria.

Algeria's policy of revising the gas prices concerned the contracts signed with her main clients El Paso (USA); Gas de France, ENI (Italy); Distrigas (USA) and Enagas (Spain). After the 1979 oil shock, the Algerians believed that the right price of gas should be at least $6.11 per million of Btu, a level promptly rejected by their clients as
exorbitant. By that time, Algerian gas was priced between $2.60 and $3.70 per million Btu at the terminal flange depending on contract and destination.

| Main purchasers of Algerian gas and evolution of the selling prices |
|-------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
|                         | Annual quantity (cm/bn) | Price end October 1979 ($mBtu) | FOB price November 1982 ($mBtu) | Landed price January 1985 ($mBtu) | Deliveries status 1986 |
| GDF                     | 9.1               | 3.70              | 5.12              | 5.47              | current           |
| Distri-gas Belgium      | 5.0               | 4.80              | 5.47              | current           |
| Distri-gas (US)         | 1.15              | 3.92              | 4.44              | 5.47              | halted            |
| Panhandle (US)          | 4.5               | 3.92              | 7.18              | suspended         |
| El Paso (US)            | 20.0              | 3.05              | -                 | cancelled         |
| Snam/ENI (Italy)        | 12.0              | 2.92              | 4.40              | 5.18              | current           |
| Enagas (Spain)          | 5.0               | -                 | -                 | current           |

The US energy authorities (FPC), noted that Algeria's asking price was above the landed price in the USA territory, about $5 per million of BTU and was determined not to accede to Algerian demands in order to avoid similar requests from Canada and Mexico, the gas of which was being sold at the US borders at $4.95 and $4.85 a million of BTU respectively. To dissuade the Algerians from making any further demands, the FPC withheld in December 1978 approval of the gas contract signed between the
American company Tenneco and Sonatrach. Immediately, the Algerians linked US reticence to national security questions concerning their socialist orientation and support to the Polisario front.

In April 1980, Sonatrach held up shipments to France and to the USA in an attempt to force them to reopen negotiations which were broken at the request of GDF and El Paso. However, these tactics failed because Algeria could not cut back on gas production and exports without jeopardising the financing of future economic programmes. Thus she was willing to consider setting aside the earlier parity in return for an increase in economic co-operation and for a continuation of gas supplies.

As a result her asking price dropped to $3.50 a million of BTU. This flexibility resulted in the resumption of negotiations with El-Paso in April with the Italians during the visit of President Pertini to Algiers in May and with the French on October 30 with the visit of Giraud the French minister of energy. While Americans and Italian failed to meet Algerian demands, the French offered first a basic price of $3.20 a million of BTU, then $3.60 to be applicable as from January 1, 1980. The Algerians rejected this proposal and in retaliation for French refusal to accept their asking price, they supplied GDF with only 2.5 billion of cubic metres in 1980 instead of 4 billion cm as scheduled and reduced CFP's quota of Algerian crude from 10 million tonnes down to 3.¹

Besides these negotiations, the Algerians were able to conclude a contract with British Gas Corporation in early February 1981 through which the latter agreed to import 1 billion cm of LNG from January to June the same year at an FOB price of $4.60 which is expected to reach $4.80 by July. This small but real success invigorated Algeria's will

to push forward her demands with her other more important clients. And in February 1981, the Algerians succeeded in bringing representatives of El Paso back to the negotiation table after a freeze of 10 months during which the Algerians claimed to have lost about $600 million because of the suspension of gas deliveries. To many observers, this move was dictated by Algeria's hope that her role in securing the release of American hostages in Iran in January, would induce the Americans to accept her demands of raising the gas price. Whatever the validity of this assumption, the negotiations conducted by Sadek Boussana a General Director at the energy ministry and Dean Hinton the US State Secretary for economic affairs were broken off.

Negotiations with the Italians were not successful either, despite a meeting between Nabi and Pandolfi, the Industry Minister in Rome in February 5-7. The reason perhaps was that the Italian state company ENI was reported to be close to signing a contract for Soviet gas concerning 8.5 billion cubic metres a year and at prices around $4.70 a million of BTU at the Czech frontier. Obviously, the Italian negotiators were testing Algeria's patience and awaiting the outcome of negotiations between Sonatrach and GDF of France, before deciding on the next move. Resenting Soviet competition and infuriated by the game played by their clients, the Algerians imposed slow custom procedures on Fiat light cars and trucks worth $77 million in an attempt to force the Italians to accept their demands. Further actions were taken such as the decision to reconsider a $400 million contract signed with the Italian Pirelli group for a tyre project and another contract worth $500 million for the building of a plant to construct industrial vehicles concluded with Fiat

in December 1980. Most important, however, was the postponement of the start of gas supplies to Italy through the Hassi R'mel-Sicilia pipeline, scheduled to take place in mid-1981. Algerian pressures seemed to have paid off as the Italian ministers of trade (E. Manca) and of industry (M.A. Bisaglia) rushed to Algiers in August to attempt to secure the huge trade interests Italy has in Algeria. Meanwhile, Algeria's confidence in obtaining a rise in gas prices grew following the agreement of the Belgian company Distrigas in April 1981, to import 5 billion cubic metres annually from Algeria for a 20 year period and at a basic price of $4.80 per million of BTU FOB applicable as from January 1, 1981. The success of Algeria was relative as the contract concerned only a small quantity of LNG exports in comparison with the existing contracts with El Paso or GDF for instance and included a price lower than the one she had been asking for. Eventually, the price was derived from an indexation system based as to 50% on the value of a basket of oil imported by Belgium and 50% on the value of crude oil by LNG producing countries.

Nevertheless, following Belgium, the French signed on February 3, 1982 a contract with Algeria involving an FOB price fixed at $5.12 million of BTU believed to be 20 per cent higher than the price agreed upon between GDF and Soviet company Soyougas exports. The acceptance by France of this price termed as 'political' resulted from the Mitterand government's desire to strengthen political and economic relations with Algeria. The success obtained with France and Belgium certainly enhanced Algeria's bargaining power with the Italians who were still refusing to accept her demands. Because exports to Italy concerned
natural gas and not LNG, Algeria demanded an FOB price to be fixed between $4.40 and $4.5 per million of BTU, while the representatives of ENI were proposing only $3.75.

The French example forced Italy to accept Algeria’s request on similar grounds, in exchange for an increase of Algerian imports from Italy after negotiations highlighted by the visits to Rome of Benyahia in late January 1982 and Nabi in June 1983.¹

In contrast, the Algerians have been unsuccessful with the Americans. After a long process of international arbitration, the Algerians received in December 1983 news that Trunkline-Panhandle decided to suspend its gas imports because of the deterioration of the LNG prices on the US market. This decision surprised the Algerians who were earlier given assurances by Hodel the US secretary for energy that the Sonatrach-Panhandle contract would not be affected. As a result, the US imported in 1983 only 1.1 billion cubic metres of Algerian natural gas in line with the terms of the Distigas contract.

With Spain, negotiations proved hard and long, but after agreements signed with France, Belgium and Italy, the Algerians concentrated their efforts to force Enagas to accept their demands. A round of negotiations took place in March 1983 and Nabi met with his Spanish counterpart Solchaga in Madrid in early April and in Algiers in May.² But despite these contacts and the trip to Algiers of Solchaga in mid-December, negotiations between the two sides proved fruitless, as Spain, it was reported, was revising its national energy policy to limit the use of LNG.

¹Indeed, the Minister of Trade, Nicola Capria came to Algiers in September.
²The importance of these negotiations was reflected by a meeting in Algiers on March 3, 1983 between Chadli and Alfonso Guerrero the Spanish Vice-President.
in its programmes. With Algeria's efforts to find alternative clients to compensate for the loss of the Spanish market and reduce imports of Spanish goods, the Spanish government agreed on a rise of Algerian gas to secure its economic interests in Algeria which until then, had been Spain's first trade partner in Africa. During the visit to Algiers in February 1985 of the Spanish Foreign Minister Moran, an economic agreement was signed and Enagas agreed to indemnify Sonatrach $500 million in compensation for a suspension of gas imports.

The conclusion of contracts with Belgium, France, Italy and Spain involving 'political' prices has been a resounding success for the Algerians. Not only political relations were consolidated but also bilateral trade exchanges. The visits made by President Chadli to Bruxelles (December, 1982), Rome (November, 1982), Paris (November, 1983), Madrid (June, 1985) and that of Taleb Ibrahimi to Bonn (September, 1985) were alternated with visits to Algiers of the Presidents Pertini of Italy in May 1983; Mitterand of France in October 1982; and Gonzales of Spain in March 1985. If this indicated the politics of interdependence, it did not, however, constitute a permanent state of affairs given the sometime troubled relationship Algeria has had with Western Europe. Problems related to divergences in interests were highlighted by the

1These efforts resulted in a formal agreement with Austria following the visit of W. Pahr the Austrian foreign minister on January 11, 1983. Japan had accepted to increase oil and gas exports from Algeria at already agreed prices in conformity with international market new developments, in return Japan was granted a contribution in Algeria’s five year development plan. Finally, Yugoslavia was believed to have signed a contract with Sonatrach for the importation of 20 million cubic metres of LNG over twenty years.
deterioration of political relations with France since mid-1984 and with Spain which had readjusted her diplomatic relations in favour of the Atlantic world.

The fragility of the 'political' prices was confirmed by rumours over recent demands made by France and Italy on Algeria to lower the selling price of gas as a result of the decline of oil prices to which the price of Algerian gas was aligned. However, the Algerians firmly denied these allegations assuring that the price of their gas remained unchanged. But the late decisions to revise some contracts involving French companies, notably the construction of the Algiers underground may stand as an evidence of the existence of such a bargain and of the uncertainty of the terms of the gas deals as agreed upon. A strong assumption may be that Algeria wants to keep these deals at least for some time to come, being confident that oil prices will go up again in the future. Time seems then a primordial factor in Algeria's game and only an analysis in retrospective would tell if the Algerians were right.

Meanwhile, trade exchanges remain in the background as a solid element in the convergence of interests whenever possible and as a means for Algeria to diversify her commercial relations in the framework of the new economic policies. Indeed, both the restructuring of the national economy and readjustment of political relations sensibly affected the orientation of Algerian foreign trade in recent years.

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¹Notably the visits to Algiers of the French minister of energy Auroux in September 1984 and the Italian Premier Craxi on November 11.
²For Algeria's denial, see Marché's Tropicaux et Méditerranéens, September 21, 1984, p.2323.
3. Reorientation of trade relations

Structurally, the accent has been put on productivity and developing agriculture and other sectors such as textiles and light industries in order to improve the efficiency of the impressive economic infrastructure that was laid down through the setting up of huge plants, complexes and capital-intensive projects. Therefore, the policy of big contracts with foreign countries and the import of massive technology was abandoned as there was an insistence of using the country's existing over capacity before building new firms and units. To prepare the period of 'l'après-pétrole', this was regarded necessary because an increase of exports of manufactured goods would help Algeria diminish her trade deficit in the short-term as well as compensate for the decline of oil revenues. And given the multiplicity of small and medium-sized projects and concerns of improving maintenance, a greater diversification of trade relations was also needed. On the level of trade exchanges, the part of the Western world remains, however important, about 90 per cent of Algeria's total foreign trade, but two notable changes have occurred: the decline of trade with the USA on the energy domain and the expansion of co-operation with other EEC countries, Japan and Canada as well as some countries of East Europe and the third world.

a) A reappraisal of the content of co-operation with the Western countries

Because of the cancellation of the gas contracts, exports to the USA represented only 15 per cent of Algeria's total exports in 1982, while they accounted for 55 per cent in 1980. At the same time, US share in Algerian total energy exports fell to 20 per cent in 1983 as the USA
bought only a third of Algerian oil production (327,000 barrels a day) while they were importing about 56 per cent of this production in the second half of the 1970s.

However, while co-operation in the energy domain abruptly declined, efforts to obtain US expertise to modernize the agrarian sector succeeded in agreements between the two countries with the visits of the US state secretary for agriculture, John Block, on February 2, 1984 and that of President Chadli to Washington in April 1985. As a result in June, Algeria became the first country to benefit from the newly instituted export subsidiary programme, purchasing $117,000,000 worth of grain. In parallel, or perhaps as a result of the departure from the past period policy of gigantic projects especially in the energy sector, Algeria has been borrowing less from US private companies, privileging instead credit facilities from the World Bank which accepted to finance a certain number of medium-sized projects in agriculture, transports and water works. If Algeria has been considered as a good credit risk by private financial organisms, the turn to the international public organisms may have also political implications, i.e. the desire to fashion out of these links, exemplary relations between the Western dominated financial institutions and a developing country eager to assert its political independence and sovereignty. The Algerian state-owned press agency (APS) praised the policies of the World banks towards Algeria, noting that this bank provides assistance to developing countries by giving priority to investments that help them to become productive. This statement seems

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1 The presidential delegation included also the minister of agriculture, Kasdi Merbah/
surprising when one looks at previous negative comments of the APS on the conditions the World Bank fixed when negotiating loans with the third world countries. It may not be exaggerated to believe that the development of links with the World Bank aimed also at easing the political divergencies between the USA and Algeria.¹

Political considerations also help to explain the strengthening of economic relations with the EEC countries, especially France, Belgium and Italy. Trade exchanges blossomed with the acceptance by these countries of high prices for Algerian natural gas and from their more or less positive attitude toward the Algerian-backed principle of self-determination for the Saharawi people. This increase was manifested by the fact that Algeria accounted for 20 per cent of EEC's total imports of natural gas in 1983, while 60 per cent of her total supplies came from these countries. France, on its part, became Algeria's first trade partner in 1983 accounting, however, for only 20 per cent of her former colony's total trade. This indicates the efforts of diversification pursued by Algeria as in 1962, 90 per cent of her total trade exchanges were conducted with France. In October 1981 and January 1982, the planning ministers of the two countries discussed agreements related to $2 billion new French contracts and after the economic convention signed between Taleb Ibrahimi and Cheysson on June 2, 1982, bilateral trade totalled $5.07 million. And as a result of the 'political price' of gas,

¹The President of the World Bank M. Clausen paid a visit to Algiers in January 1984, and had talks with Premier Abdelghani and the foreign minister Taleb Ibrahimi.
France's imports of hydrocarbons from Algeria amounted to F26 billion while Algeria's imports from France increased from F4 billion to F25 billion in 1983.\(^1\)

Beside reasons inherent in the politics of the 'political price' of gas, a particular effort had been made toward Japan and Canada. If Japan had been a traditional partner for Algeria in terms of business because of its advanced technology, efficient expertise combined with absence of political content in the relations with Algeria, the recent overture toward Canada may be explained by the pro-third world shown by this country and its ability to channel North-American technology packaged in French.\(^2\)

Japan then, became the fourth most important supplier of Algeria in 1982 providing equipment and technology in return for quantities of oil, about 5000 tonnes of copper annually, and 42,000 tonnes of iron-pig to facilitate the payment of the pipelines. In addition, to a $50 million sale of 15,000 Honda cars paid with crude oil, Japan had been awarded two major hydrocarbons contracts backed by Japanese soft loans after the visit made to Algiers in April 1981 by a high-ranking delegation from the Japanese federation of economic organizations: one worth $54,4 million involving Mitsubishi corporation and concerning the building of associated gas extraction and treatment facilities at zerzaitine; the other ($250 million) was won by Kobe steel for the building of 1.2 million tonne a year LPG recovery and processing plant at Hassi R'mel.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) *Marchés tropicaux et Méditerranéens*, October 10, 1984, p. 2623.

\(^2\) *The South*, December 1985, p. 84.

Co-operation with Japan is expected to expand, especially in the domain of energy where Japanese expertise may be needed to partly make up for the loss of US technology in this domain.¹

With Canada, co-operation concerned exports of wine, phosphates, ammonia, non-ferrous metal and citrus fruits in return for expertise and assistance in building works (such as the Makam al Shahid) and railway sectors. In 1981, Algeria received 13 of the locomotives it agreed to buy from Canada and in November 1982 she signed 2 contracts providing for the construction of 32 centres of maintenance and 2 institutes for training in favour of the national transport companies SNTR and SNTV.

Like in the case of Japan, trade with Canada is expected to expand because of the absence of a political climate surrounding the relations between the two sides, a matter that would attenuate political connotations usually linked with business with Western capitalist countries. An intensive co-operation with these two countries may look less striking and less controversial than economic links with France with which memories of past domination are still vivid in the conscience of some Algerian leaders or with the USA which has been held responsible for the world's ills in the Algerian official ideology. In any case, the separation between ideology and business is once more prevalent, since what matters for the Algerian ruling elites is national development.

Ideological considerations remain however also important in Algeria's efforts to a more balance non-aligned policy. Therefore, the new Algerian leaders tried to develop economic links with some countries

¹For the prospects of an increase of Japanese contribution in Algerian economic programme see the interview of A. Bencheikh, Algerian Ambassador to Tokyo, given to Pana (review of Japanese public opinion on the Islamic world), weekly report, May 10, 1980.
of Eastern Europe and of the third world, since a greater diversification of trade relations may give Algeria a larger room of manoeuvre in third world politics and enhance her image of a truly sovereign nation.

b) A steady shift to some countries of Eastern Europe

The coolness of the political relations between Algeria and the Soviet Union resulted also in the decline of economic links between the two sides. Since 1978, Algeria has no longer been the most important trade partner of the Soviet Union in Africa. Since then, it was Romania which eventually ranked first in Algeria's global trade with East-European bloc. Moreover, the decrease of the Algerian-Soviet trade was also highlighted by the failure of the USSR to fulfill its engagement to grant Algeria a loan amounting to DA13 billion according to the terms of the 'accord-cadre' signed in April 1980.

To warm up political relations and strengthen cooperation between the two countries, President Chadli paid a visit to Moscow in June 1981. And after the meeting of the joint committee in Algiers in November, the USSR agreed to undertake a number of economic projects in Algeria. In the industrial sector, the communist power was to carry out prospect studies in the raw material-rich Hoggar as well as build a cement plant at Jelfa with 500,000 tonne annual capacity, a flat glass factory at Oran, new facilities at El-Hadjar steel complex and a thermic central at Jijel. However, the financing of the last project was to be entirely made by Algeria. To help improve the agrarian sector, a formal agreement was signed in December 1982 by which the USSR agreed to set up three pilot-farms in Eastern Algeria and send 15 experts to assist Algeria in the domain of forestry and pasture.\(^1\) Soviet expertise in some

\(^{1}\) *Algérie information*, December 1982.
aspects of agrarian development and prospection for natural resources seemed to attract the Algerians' attention given the priority accorded to agrarian development to reach self-sufficiency and to new discoveries in mineral wealth. Therefore, the Soviet Minister of water works visited Algiers on June 4, 1983, while at the inauguration of the week of Algerian-Soviet friendship in October, the Soviet delegation was led by the minister of geology Rouniv.

Because of ups and downs that characterized the political relationship with the Soviet Union, Algeria attempted to increase economic co-operation with other countries of Eastern Europe. The turn to these countries would not only compensate for an eventual defection of the Soviet Union but would also help Algeria win their sympathy for her assertion of political independence and a more balanced non-aligned policy.

On practical terms, the East European countries were believed able to participate in the projects that were given priority: agriculture, housing, transports and light industries, sectors which demand less investments and less expertise than the hydrocarbons industries for instance. These considerations led the State Ministry for foreign trade to organize an international conference on trade between Algeria and the Eastern bloc in December 1981, as well as to a session of the joint Algerian-Czech committee which had not met since 1972.

Trade volume with Czechoslovakia increased from $6.6 million in 1970 to 76 in 1982, while exchanges with Hungary jumped from $80 million in 1980 to $140 million three years later. In the housing sector Romania was expected to build 20,000 houses and flats in Western Algeria (Saida, Mascara and Mostaganem); Hungary about 5,000 flats in the East of the
country (Annaba and Guelma) and West Germany companies were earmarked for the construction of 34 training institutes and equip 28 other centres for professional education. In other sectors, Czechoslovakia was to help build a transmission centre at Tipasa near Algiers, an electrical plant at Skikda, a shoe and leather factory at Sidi Bel Abbes and a complex of pumps at Berrouaghia in Central Algeria. With Bulgaria an agreement was signed in November 1981 and this country accepted to construct a section of the road linking Hassi R'mel to Alghar. In addition to this form of co-operation, Hungary granted Algeria a $100 million loan after the visit of the Hungarian Foreign Minister Puja in April 1982.

The dialectics of the political readjustment involved also some efforts to develop Algeria's co-operation with the South, especially those countries which have a certain impact in third world politics.

c) The utility of co-operation with the South

Narrowly, the improvement of economic relations with these countries may be advantageous for Algeria in the sense that she could trade with them on an equal basis. And generally, while affirming that South-South co-operation is not a substitute for North-South co-operation, she believes that a greater co-operation between developing countries could lead to identifying common objectives which favour partnership and co-operation between North and South. However, if these two sets of considerations reflected the strengthening of trade relations with Argentina, Brazil and Mexico for instance, the turn to co-operation with China, India, Senegal and Yugoslavia followed Algeria's option for a more balanced line with regard to third world issues.
Having good capacities for exporting some manufactured and capital goods as well as a good deal of expertise in energy, Algeria favoured the increase of trade and co-operation among developing countries on this basis instead of calling for regional economic integration or being involved in lengthy discussions over financial and monetary problems facing the third world. Such concerns explained the convening of an international conference in Algiers in early May 1982 devoted to South-South co-operation in the domain of capital goods. This sector has been of a particular interest for Algeria since her policy of 'industrializing industries' required a massive absorption of capital goods necessary for expanding industrialization and increasing the volume of manufactured goods for exports.

As fulfilments of these objectives, Algeria has been able to sign in May 1983 a contract with Yugoslavia for the supply of 10 millions of electrical bulbs made by the state-owned chemical manufacturer company SNIC. In May 1985, she agreed to help Senegal construct a factory for car spare parts. Sonatrach is currently participating in the exploitation of Tanzania's Kimbid area in a venture regarded by Algerians as ideal for this co-operation since it combines financial assistance provided by the Opec fund, know-how by a developing country (Algeria) and managerial control by Tanzanians. Another example of this form of South-South co-operation has been the signature of a contract in September 1981 between the Algerian state-owned manufacturer company SNS and India's public firm Bharat heavy and plate vessels. This contract was regarded by the Algerians as the first major technological transfer venture involving developing countries, and according to its terms, the

69 Interview of B. Nabi, the Minister of energy to Algérie-Actualités, May 9, 1983.
Indians agreed to supply Algeria with experts and technology in the domain of timber-work and copper smith brazier's ware as well as technical training for Algerian workers in this sector.

Among other important new developments in Algeria's turn to developing countries concerned domains traditionally reserved for Western countries: nuclear research, energy and finance. Nuclear co-operation may help Algeria produce some kind of armaments and obtain additional source of energy to be used for other purposes as her proven reserves of uranium in 1981 were believed about 50,000 tonnes. For these purposes, Argentina agreed to provide a 500kw and 20 per cent uranium-enriched nuclear reactor. Brazil was also solicited for nuclear research assistance following the visit of Yala the Minister of finance on June 5-6, 1981. On the energy domain, an agreement was signed with Yugoslavia in April 1980 for the prospection of gas resources in Algeria. And following the July 1984 visit of the Mexican Minister of energy, F. Ochoa, Algeria signed an important 'accord-caire' with Mexico providing for the setting up of joint companies for exchange of technology in the hydrocarbon sector in particular.

Finally, with the new political understanding reached with the conservative Arab countries of the Middle East, Algeria has been able to benefit from Arab finance. In 1984, she received about $701 million development financing from funds sponsored by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Bank. Saudi contribution in some economic projects in Algeria has been quite consistent in recent years. At the end of

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1 Visit preceded by that of Major Abdeslam Touati, the director of the ANP's military fabrication department (DFM).
2 A large part of which was obtained by Benhammouda the Minister of finance at the meeting of the council of the governors of Arab banks held in Algiers on April 18, 1984.
November 1983, an agreement was signed through which Algeria was granted a $51 million loan from the Saudi fund for development (SFD) to partly finance the build up of a port at Jenjen near Jijel; 66.7 million of DA for the reconstruction of the city of El-Asnam which was badly hit by an earthquake in Summer 1981. And following the visit of a Saudi financial delegation in early 1984, Algeria was awarded a long-term credit of DA 5 million for the building of two dams and the extension of the railways network. Other loans from the Saudi Kingdom were expected to finance the construction of a railway line between M'sila and Bordj Bou Arreridj as well as two dams at Gargar and Ain Dalia. And with Saudi help, the Islamic Bank agreed in May 1983 to provide the state-owned steel manufacturer SNS with credit facilities worth $20 million.¹ Financial assistance from Kuwait was also important as Algeria received DK 4.5 million loan reimbursable in 15 year period to finance the Algerian section of the fourth inter-Arab telecommunications network aiming at linking the Maghrebi countries.² Another loan ($18 million) from the Kuwaiti-based fund (Fades) was made available to finance the construction of a hospital in Tiaret. In addition to credit facilities to help financing the building of a dam at Meskiana and the extension of the rail network in the Wilaya of Annaba, the Algerians encouraged the possibility of creating joint companies with Kuwait for the production of pharmaceutical products.³

Diversification of trade relations will certainly be pursued with a much greater determination not only given the dialectics of restructuring the national economy but also the dynamics of political readjustment.

¹Al chark al Awsat, May 9, 1983.
²Grand Maghreb (8), January 1982, p.4.
³According to Algerian health authorities, such a project would save Algeria an estimated $200 million a year.
carried out by Taleb Ibrahimi. There has been, indeed, a belief that these processes would help lessen the country's economic dependence on a determined country or a group of countries and ensure a greater political independence. In this vein, the Minister of trade Khellef toured successively, Moscow and Washington in mid-April 1984, Paris in mid-July and paid a visit to London in December 1985. For similar reasons, Taleb Ibrahimi went to Sofia and Bonn in September 1985 while Premier Brahimi visited Greece in January and Yugoslavia in March the same year. In parallel, Claude Cheysson as an EEC Commissar came to Algiers in November to discuss with the Algerians plans for extending trade exchanges with the European community. Important economic agreements were also signed with Hungary in January, Mauritania in March, Italy and Yugoslavia in July. However, with attempts to assert a more balanced non-aligned policy, trade relations may continue to diversify but this trend may be affected by the outcome of rivalries existing between groups forming Algeria's ruling elite.
CONCLUSION

Foreign policy in Algeria appears to constitute part and parcel of the process of building a modern nation-state as it plays an important role on consolidating the foundations of the new states (political legitimacy); its physical preservation (territorial integrity); material basis (economic development) and cultural ferment (identity). These tasks have been intimately interlocked on the basis of an interaction between internal dynamics and external constraints and have been articulated essentially around the political stratum that expressed itself exclusively through the prominence of the state in conducting domestic and foreign policies. Structurally, the state in modern Algeria rests on formal institutions that permitted neither mass participation nor class conflict with regard to the conception of a state as a forum for power struggle. It remained in fact as an executive and legislative organ of the society firmly controlled by a relatively small political elite dominated by a number of groups where officers and technocrats tend to predominate.

The nature of colonial dialectics and the war of liberation in Algeria prevented the orientation of the state toward either the forms of political liberalism or socialistic collectivism. In this process, both the national bourgeoisie and the working class were weak and thus unable to emerge as leading political forces. Seeds for political conservatism, as defined in terms of traditionalism, were not possible, given the decline of traditional strata and aristocracy with regard to power and cultural influence that resulted from the destruction of Algeria's traditional structures during French colonialism. In the course of the war, the army emerged as a revolutionary force with its own model of nation-state building, in contradistinction to capitalism conceived as a form of economic organization of the society and conservatism as an
expression of political aspirations and beliefs of the national bourgeoisie. The result was the institution of a form of state capitalism as the members of the military core elite as well as the technocrats came from neither liberal or traditional upper classes but from the petty and middle classes expressing a revolt against colonial domination in its aspects of archaic capitalism and cultural oppression. In the absence of nation builders and with the power of the gun conferred upon it by the necessities of the war of liberation, the army turned into a political institution and played the role of the guardian of the revolution and of the constitutionalized state. A strong and centralized state in which the army assumes the central role of nation-state builder appeared the only means for the military stratum and the technocrats as the engineer of socio-economic change not only to preserve and consolidate their de facto power but also to muster privileges that would derive from the prominence of the state in the socio-economic and political life.

Culturally, this process of consolidating power and gaining interests has been expressed through a technocratic vision of the national ideology that rejected political conservatism, on the basis of its reactionary character, and scientific socialism, on the grounds of its incompatibility with Arabo-Islamic values although these values have been perceived through a radical angle in an effort to demarcate from the orthodox conception of Arabo-Islamism usually linked to moderate and conservative segments of society. This military-technocratic project of nation-state building appears omnipotent and was channelled through a coherent continuum whether politically, economically or culturally. It is therefore in this light that the relation between nation-state
building and idiosyncratic factors is well ascertained and it is on this basis that sovereignty, territorial integrity and identity of the nation-state have been articulated.

National sovereignty conceived in reaction to colonial sequels and to dependency on France helped to consolidate the military-technocratic project in the sense of asserting independence vis-a-vis France economically and culturally. By breaking the dependency status, economic capabilities of the state were improved thus enhancing the power of the military-technocratic stratum. At the same time, the weaning of cultural alienation appears necessary as the assertion of a distinct identity based on cultural decolonization helps 'immortalize' the material sense of national sovereignty.

Territorial integrity could not be dissociated from the security of the state and therefore from the consolidation of power of the elites. The accentuation of Algerian nationalism - as defined by the rejection of any supra-national authority and the desire to emerge as the central power in the Maghreb - finds its material expression in the attempts to preserve the territorial integrity and security of the state. Territorial irredentia claims waved consistently by Morocco and occasionally by Tunisia and Libya were met with a firmness stemming from the instinct of existence and preservation of the self. Bilateral dispute crystallized by the conflict of the Western Sahara attests to the accentuation of nationalisms in the Maghreb in which Algeria's centrality, status and ambitions cannot be overlooked.

These effects of consolidating the state ensuring national sovereignty, identity and territorial integrity have not been without social tensions as highlighted by discrepancies in wealth and influence at home and, without, regional tensions and a cleavage between aspirations and realities in the outer world.
Building a strong and centralized state endowed with theoretically well articulated political institutions did not generate a circulation of elites on the basis of extensive political recruitment and mobilization but produced a relatively small circle of rival groups in which the members have been integrated and eliminated through a system of clientelism. Indeed, national-decision making remained in the hands of a powerful group around which gravitated a mosaic of clans hard to locate given the secretive character of the Algerian political elite and the rapidly changing alliances and counter-alliances based mainly on conflicts between persons. To the Boumediene-led clan of Oujda seemed to have succeeded the group of high officers from Eastern Algeria centered around the Chief of Staff, General Belloucif.

Paradoxically, this closed system has been able to survive perhaps because political recruitment obeyed this system of clientelism which has also been used extensively given the highly centralized pattern of administrative and technocratic employment on the one hand and the relatively easy means of embezzlement and quick social promotion on the other. These procedures and achievements were made possible by privileges deriving from the specific nature of a centralized administrative structure, civil service and omnipotence of the public sector in the socio-economic sphere. Needless to mention that the technocracy's inducements were also important because of the huge resources drain from the hydrocarbon exports especially during the early 1970s.

During the early stage of consolidation of the Boumediene regime (1965-1969), political opposition was mastered through the use of the power of the gun (assassination, purges, forced retirement). But the period stretching until 1976 was marked by a high domestic stability and the strengthening of the core elite thanks to the combined oil health and important role played by Algeria on the foreign level. Since then,
chronic deficiencies of the economic strategy aggravated by the dwindling of oil revenues could no longer conceal the increasing social differentiation and fragmentation. Popular discontent emerged especially against the bureaucratic stratum which has been, therefore, criticized for cultural westernization, huge privileges, bureaucratic malpractices, food shortages and housing crisis.

The effect of social disparities naturally embraced the cultural field as highlighted by the cleavage between Arabophones-Francophones and more recently exacerbated by the emergence of Muslim fundamentalism and Berber cultural protest. Both phenomena resulted from a contradiction between extensive arabization and the choice of economic development. While the increase of Arabization did not satisfy the Arabic-speaking lower classes because of their exclusion from jobs and professional responsibilities, segments of the Kabyle population felt that too much arabism would lead to the extinction of the Kabyle dialect and values and therefore to their existence as a distinct ethnical group. If extremism shown by some Berber and Muslim militants is deplorable and dangerous for the unity of the Algerian people, this reality should not be dissociated from problems related to inequalities in income in general. Whether directed against the westernization of the state bureaucracy or against the arabism preached to the political elite, cultural protest reflects in fact the anger of segments that were left on the margin of national decision-making.

In this context, the call for more injection of arabism in political and administrative life, stemmed from a large number of the traditionally devout Muslim population who regarded the return to Muslim precepts as a means to restore a kind of social-justice as outlined in the basic principles of the Sharia (Muslim Law). Given the acuity of socio-economic problems, the fundamentalist militants found a good opportunity
to channel the discontent of the impoverished classes, principally in the
cities' outskirts and rural areas. This form of opposition to the
technocratic model of development came initially from Arabic-speaking
students during riots on campuses in the years 1975-1977 and with the
deepening of social disparities, it turned into an underground opposition
which launched subversive actions against the state forces (police and
genarmerie) since 1981. And an extremist group led by Said Bouali had even
set up a maquis in the region of Larbaa near Algiers which the central
authorities had failed to dismantle. It is reported that this group and
that of Sheikh Mountadhi had gained increasing support in the wave of
the resurgence of Muslim fundamentalism that is sweeping the entire Arab
world since the outbreak of the Iranian revolution.

The other aspect of the identity crisis as expressed by the Kabyle
protest came from the impetus represented by some Kabyle-speaking
students during riots at the University of Tizou Ouzou in 1981 and a
certain number of Kabyle intellectuals gathered in the outlawed "Ligue
Algerienne des droits de l'homme". In the eyes of the regime, the danger
of the Kabyle protest may not be crucial as long as it remains confined
to specific cultural demands but the risk may be that some Berber
militants, especially within the migrant Kabyle circles in France, may be
tempted to raise the sensitive problems of ethnic divisions which until
recently have not been a serious issue for the central authority.
Whatever the nature of the cultural clash, the crux of the problem for
the regime remains in its ability to contain discontent through
socio-economic reforms. Both the Kabyle protest and fundamentalism
represent a danger for domestic stability as the Chadli government
appeared torn between maintaining the dour brand of socialism as
experienced during the Boumediene era, and pursuing a certain form of
liberalism under pressures from the private bourgeoisie which became
increasingly important as a result of the contradictions of the state-managed economy. Indeed, to opt for the former would only increase discontent from large segments of the population who had suffered from the economic austerity imposed by Boumediene, while to embark upon the latter would not attenuate this discontent as many in Algeria believe that an open door à la Sadat would benefit only the privileged classes and increase the country's dependence on foreign outlets. President Chadli has so far adopted a lenient attitude towards Berber and Muslim activists (as highlighted by the light sentences pronounced against some of them in December 1984), perhaps in order to maintain national cohesion and preserve his own regime. This moderate and balanced approach proper to the personality of the Algerian leader, may probably not remedy this situation as socio-economic unrest appears inevitable given the decrease of oil revenues and the deficiencies of the past economic policy despite recent adjustments. Whatever the choice, it appears that the deepening of social disparities may be hard to alleviate as the tackling of these problems may change with the outcome of rivalries between the clans composing the ruling elite.

Economic problems combined with the nature of the political leadership had also become acute with the lingering problem of the Western Sahara which has been viewed by the regime as having direct implications on the state's security and territorial integrity. Indirect involvement over this issue proved a heavy burden on the country's financial resources and a constraint on the conduct of its foreign policy.

Until recently, Algeria and the Polisario Front had rejected any political settlement that did not consider the right of the Saharawi people for self-determination and the Polisario movement as the legitimate representative of this people. Neither military victory of
the Saharawi guerrillas nor the war of attrition to erode Morocco's hold over the Western Sahara as expected by Boumediene, proved possible because King Hassan could not hand over this territory without seriously dooming the foundations of his throne. Indeed, in contrast to Algeria, the question of the Sahara became a national issue in Morocco and perhaps the most effective means for the King not only to divert the attention of his people away from domestic problems but also to line up the political opposition solidly behind him. Therefore, after a long and painful tension between Algeria and Morocco and the huge sacrifices made by each of them to force the issue in its favour, the conflict reached a stalemate. This kind of status quo seems hard to maintain given economic problems both came to face.

One way to break this negative deadlock, may be a generalized war but in a context of equilibrium of forces neither side wants it, having probably learnt lessons from the fruitless Iraq-Iran war. It is also difficult to see how the Polisario Front and Algeria would accept the principle of a referendum over the Western Sahara. This solution may prove inoperative even though the referendum would be carried under the UN or OAU auspices. Had the referendum taken place, disagreements would still remain as it may be expected for instance, that after their return to their homeland to participate in the referendum, the Saharawi refugees from Algeria would have found themselves merely swamped and the polling easily skewed by imported Moroccans posing as Saharawis. On the other hand Morocco has always rejected population statistics given by the Polisario front (more than 700,000) as it recognizes the number of Saharawis at only 74,000 in conformity with the census conducted by Spain in 1974.
In this intricate situation, there may be solid reasons not to believe in the possibility of a political settlement of the Saharan dispute on the basis of a referendum. The alternative may consist in finding a compromise formula through direct negotiations between Moroccans and Saharawis with the participation of Algerians and Mauritanians as interested parties. In this vein, one option favoured by Algeria may be the setting up of a federation between Morocco and the RASD in the framework of a united Maghreb conceived on the basis of intensive regional co-operation and co-ordination of foreign policies.¹ To sustain the viability of their argument, the Algerians stressed that this form of unity would help the Maghrebi states to remedy their socio-economic problems which are in many cases similar, and to preserve political stability threatened by Libya's subversive actions on the one hand and what the Algerians regard as imperialist aggression against the Arab world on the other. The implicit concern for the Algerians is undoubtedly their desire to ease tensions in the Maghreb and prevent the entanglement of this region in East-West competition in order to concentrate on economic issues which they consider as the most crucial challenge for the stability of the respective regimes at the present time. Thus, the Algerian leaders came to believe that only a solution to the economic problems could prevent a socio-political unrest in the Maghreb as each state faces potential threat represented by the Muslim fundamentalists who have been increasingly irritated by the long-standing tensions between the regimes. It was therefore not surprising that on the aftermath of US bombings of Libya in April 1986, the Chadli government issued a declaration emphasizing the necessity of the Maghrebi

¹Intensive diplomatic contacts between all the Maghrebi states have been made recently in addition to the indirect negotiations that took place in New York in mid-April between Moroccans and Saharawis, through the offices of the UN Secretary General and Meddoune Fall on behalf of the Senegalese president Abdou Diouf, the acting chairman of the OAU.
states to embark upon a common economic programme as a solid step toward a united Maghreb. This pragmatism, however, may be hampered by the exacerbation of political conflicts between the Maghrebi states and their inability to cope with an eventual social unrest. In this condition, the use of a war as a means of diversion may not be a remote possibility, especially in Morocco where the Saharan venture has a profound popular adhesion.

Apparently, the Algerians are conscious of this risk as a war would have a devastating effect on their economy. Against this background, pragmatism may be pursued on the basis of reinforcing links with Tunisia and Mauritania and attempting to calm down Qadhafi's adventurism. And to strengthen this approach, Algeria may continue the diversification of its political and economic relations as well as maintaining the image of a serious and responsible non-aligned country. Consequently, a more balanced attitude between the super-powers and the consolidation of economic links with the West European countries perhaps with more vigour than in the past may be expected.
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1962

July 1: Referendum in Algeria.
5: Proclamation of Algeria's independence.

1963

January 8: Algerian-Tunisian negotiations over the border issue.
15: Moroccan delegation in Algiers to discuss the problem of frontiers.
18: Laroussi Khelifa, Minister of Industry in London (gas exports).

Tunis severs diplomatic relations with Algeria.
20: Military delegation led by Kaid Ahmed arrives in Leopoldville.

Popular meeting in Algiers between Ben Bella and Roberto Holden, the leader of the Angolese national liberation front.


10-15: Official Visit of President Nasser.

September 15: Ben Bella elected president of the Algerian republic.

October 5 - November 2: Algerian-Moroccan border conflict.

1964

January 16: Negotiations between Boumaza and De Broglie (wine).
25: Bouteflika in Bamako (Ad hoc committee on Algerian-Moroccan conflict).
28: Periple of Kaid Ahmed in sub-Saharan countries.

February 1-4: Visit of U. Thant.
21: The National Assembly ratifies Algeria's adhesion to the Arab League.
21-25: Visit of Ben Bella to Guinea.

March 1-5: Visit of Ben Bella to Yugoslavia.
13: Brief meeting between De Gaulle and Ben Bella at Champs.

19-23: Visit of Guinea's President A. Sekou Toure.

27: Visit of the Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio.

April 17: Visit of Mali's President Modibo Keita.

20: Bourguiba's visit delayed.

24-29: Visit of Eric Williams.

25-18: Visit of Ben Bella to the USSR (until May 5), May Bulgaria (6-11); Czechoslovakia (11-13); Egypt (14-18).

28: Meeting of Algerian-Moroccan mixed committee in Temcen (agreement on free circulation of persons).

June 13: Visit of Driss M'hammedi, General Director of the Moroccan royal cabinet and Gl. Oufkir, Director of security forces (Algeria's implications in clashes at Oujda between the royal troops and dissident forces). Bouteflika denies these allegations.

24-27: Visit of Massemba Debat of Congo.

July 19: Meeting in Cairo between Ben Bella, Bourguiba and Hassan II.

August 17-21: Visit of Modibo Keita.

September 28 - October 3: Visit of Niger's President Hamani Diori.

October 5-10: Summit conference of the non-aligned countries.

12-14: Visit of Cuba's President Osvaldo Dorticos.

November 5: Second summit conference of the Arab League.

24: Meeting of the FLN political bureau (Congo events).

26: Visit of Choi Yong Kan, President of North Korea.

26-28: Meeting of Maghrebi ministers of economy in Tangiers.

December 4-8: Visit of Libya's premier Muntassir.

January 5-9: Boumedienne in Baghdad and from 9 to 12. Attends the Cairo Arab summit.

25-29: Visit of Che Guevarra as Cuba's minister of industry.

March 25-29: Visit of Eric Williams, Premier of Trinidad.

April 13-19: Official visit of Tito.

14-16: Ben Bella in Bamako and then in Conakry where he attends a meeting with Sekou Toure, Modibo Keita and N'Krumah.

27: Meeting in Cairo between Bouteflika and Nasser.

May 11: Boumedienne in Moscow.

12: Ben Bella meets Hassan in Saida.

18-19: Official visit of Italian Foreign Minister Fanfani.

June 10-12: Meeting at Tammanrasset between Ben Bella and the Nigerian president H. Diour.

19: Coup against Ben Bella led by Defense Minister Boumedienne.

July 27: Setting up of the FLN's 'secretariat executif'.

August 17: Bouteflika in Conakry to obtain Guinea's support for the convening of the Afro-Asian conference.

September 13-17: Arab summit in Casablanca.

December 13-18: Official visit of Boumedienne to Moscow.

18: Diplomatic relations broken off with the UK (Rhodesia's question).

1966

February 2: Opening of the third oil pipeline linking Hassi Messaoud to Arzew.

March 14-17: Arab summit in Cairo.

May 8: Nationalization of mining resources.

27: Nationalization of insurance companies.

September 15: Publication of the code of investment.
22: Ministerial reshuffle.

November 4: Meeting Boumedienne, Nasser, Zouayen of Syria.

1967

January 1: Ordinance related to communal code.

February 2: First communal elections.

May 22-27: Seminar on Arab socialism.

May 24: Tahar Zbiri, ANP's chief of staff in Cairo.

25: Meeting of the council of revolution announcing the mobilization of the people.

29: Decision to send troops to the Middle East front.

June 5: Arab-Israeli war breaks out.

6: Nationalization of some US and British oil companies.

: Diplomatic relations with USA severed.

12-13: Brief visit of Boumedienne to Moscow.

21-23: Official visit of Bouteflika to Paris.

July 9: Boumedienne visits Cairo, Damascus and Moscow.

12-17: Restricted Arab summit in Cairo attended by Boumedienne.

17: Boumedienne and the Iraqi President in Moscow (arms deal).

22-27: Seminar of Arab Lawyers in Algiers.

25-26: Visit of Syrian Prime Minister Zouayen.

December 15: Aborted coup against Boumedienne.

1968

March 3-4: De Gaulle reiterates his invitation to Boumedienne to visit Paris.

: Official visit of M. Rial, the Egyptian foreign minister.

7: Ministerial reshuffle.

June 7: Official visit of Libya's Prime Minister.
July 16: Speech of Boumedienne to the meeting of the OAU liberation committee held in Algiers.

22-23: An Israeli plane is hijacked to Algiers by the FPLP.

September 13-16: Fifth OAU summit in Algiers.

26: Visit of Gl. Fawzi, the Egyptian defense minister.

October 20: Official visit of the Chinese trade minister Hsiang Kim.


11-16: Official visit of Boumedienne to Rabat

15: Algerian-Moroccan treaty signed.

March 10: Meeting in Algiers of the African ministers of Labour

April 10-13: Official visit of Libya's Crown Prince Hassan Reda.

26: Official visit of Podgorny, the President of Soviet praeidium.

26: Adoption of the Charter of the Wilaya.

May 16: Official visit of N'Gouabi, President of the Congolese people's republic.

24: Election of first municipal assemblies.

June 24: Official visit of Todor Zivkov, President of Bulgaria.

July 2: Algeria becomes a member of OPEC organization.

21: Ordinance related to the constitution of government.

: Opening of the Panafriican festival in Algiers.

September 1: Qadhafi seizes power in Libya.

22-25: Islamic summit in Rabat

October 2-3: Visit of Schumann, the French Foreign Minister.

6: Official visit of Marshall Spychalsky, President of the Polish Council of State.

November 5: Visit of Tito.
December 21-23: Fifth Arab summit in Rabat.

1970

January 1: Visit of the Malian President Traore.

February 2-6: Official visit of Syria’s President Atassi.

April 16-19: Official visit of Qadhafi.

May 23: Algeria becomes a member of OPAEP.

27: Meeting in Tlemcen between Boumedienne and Hassan II.

June

Official visit of the Saudi King.

July 27

August 4: Egypt and Jordan accept the Rodgers plan.

August 12: Algerian troops stationed on the Suez Canal called back.

September 14: Meeting Boumedienne-Hassan and Ould Daddah.

19: Meeting Boumedienne-Hassan in Mohammedia.

22-27: Arab Summit in Cairo (boycotted by Algeria).

28: Death of President Nasser.

26-30: Official visit of Boumedienne to Libya.

October 4-8: Official visit of Kosygin.

11-12: Meeting Boumedienne-Qadhafi at Ouargla.


1972

April: Belaid Abdeslam visits Riyadh and Damascus.

20-27: Official visit of Boumedienne to Tunis.

May 4-6: Meeting in Algiers between Boumedienne, Sadat and Qadhafi.

9: Visit of Fidel Castro.

22: Visit of President Bourguiba.

23-

June 6: Fifth OAPEC summit in Algiers.
June 10-11: Boumedienne in Tripoli.

28: Official visit of Cambodia's President Sihanouk.

July 1-12: First Arab youth festival in Algiers.

September 7: Official visit of the Sengalese president Senghor.

11: Official visit of Ahidjo, the President of Cameroon.

November: Bouteflika attends the Arab ministerial summit held in Kuwait.

December 5: Official visit of the Chilean President, Allende.

1973

February
17-18: Meeting Boumedienne-Qadhafi in Constantine.

March 17-23: Official visit of Saeb Salam, the Lebanese Premier.

April 26: Completion of the first section of the Transaharan Highway El-Golea-InSalah.

May 11-13: Meeting Bourguiba-Boumedienne at Kef.

27-29: Boumedienne stops over at Cairo and Jeddah en route to the Addis Ababa OAU summit.

June 10-12: Official visit of Faisal, the Saudi King.


September: Fourth Non-alignment summit in Algiers.

29: Boumedienne announces end of Algerian emigration to France.

October 6-11: Fourth Arab-Israeli war.

7: Algerian Jetfighters arrive in Cairo.

13: Algerian-Jordanian diplomatic relations resumed.

14-15: Brief visit of Boumedienne to Moscow (arms deal).

18: Oil embargo decided.

November
2-6: Boumedienne visits Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, Kuwait and Riyadh.

24-29: Arab Summit in Algiers (PLO recognized as the sole representative of the Palestinian people.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 13</td>
<td>Stopover of Kissinger at Algiers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-30</td>
<td>Official visit of Bourguiba.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 12</td>
<td>Aborted attempt of unity between Libya and Tunisia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>Restricted Arab summit between the leaders of Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Islamic conference in Lahore, attended by Boumedienne.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-23</td>
<td>Visit of Boumedienne to Tunis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1</td>
<td>Boumedienne's tour of South-Asia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 19</td>
<td>Emergency session of the UN General Assembly on raw materials (Boumedienne delivers a speech-programme).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 12-16</td>
<td>Boumedienne meets Sadat and Arafat at Alexandria on his way home after attending the OAU summit held at Mogadiscio.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>Visit of Kissinger.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-15</td>
<td>Arab summit in Rabat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>Diplomatic relations resumed with the USA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Nationalization of 15 French enterprises.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>Visit of Mitterand, leader of the French socialist party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 26</td>
<td>Boumedienne, Sadat and Assad meet with King Khaled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 10-12</td>
<td>Official visit of Valery Giscard d'Estaing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 4-6</td>
<td>First summit between heads of state of Opec countries in Algiers. Boumedienne mediates between the Chah of Iran and Saddam Hussein, Iraq's vice-president.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 10</td>
<td>Meeting Boumedienne-Ould Daddah at Bechar.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
July 1-4: King Hassan receives Bouteflika.
14-17: Visit of the Mexican president Echeverria Alvarez.
19: Meeting Boumediene-Bourguiba in Annaba.

September 9: Secret meeting in Algiers between El-Ouali, Polisario's Secretary-General and Cortina Mauri, the Spanish foreign minister.

October 21: King Hassan announces the Green March.

December
20-23: Opec ministerial conference in Vienna. Ministers held hostages by a pro-Palestinian terrorist group, liberated in Algiers.
28: Meeting Boumediene-Qadhafi.
30: Algerian and Morocco call back their respective Ambassadors.

1976
February
2-3: Boumediene receives Jalloud the Libyan Premier.
13-14: Boumediene in Tripoli.

March 7: Morocco and Mauritania cut diplomatic relations with Algeria.
8-9: Boumediene meets Qadhafi and Kountche Niger's President in Ouargla.

November

December 10: Boumediene elected president of the Algerian republic.

14-15: Official visit of Iraqi's vice-president Saddam Husayn.

1977
March 6-9: Boumediene attends the Afro-Arab summit in Cairo.
20-22: Boumediene attends the summit of Saharan states in Niamey.

May 10: Official visit of the Togolese president Eyadema.

July 24-26: Boumediene in Tripoli and Alexandria to mediate between Egypt and Libya.
October

November 2: Visit of Libya's premier Jalloud.
19: Visit of Sadat to Jerusalem.

December
1-5: Summit conference in Tripoli of the Arab steadfastness front.
13: Visit of G. Marchais, Secretary-General of the French Communist party.

1978
July 2: Meeting in Geneva between Bouteflika and Guedira, Adviser to Hassan.

September 17: Camp David agreements.

October 3: Visit of Stolern, French State Secretary for immigration.
28: Boumedienne send messages to presidents Al Bakr of Iraq and Asad of Syria.

November
3-16: Boumedienne tours the Middle East, Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Malta.
28: Boumedienne send a message to Nimeiry, OAU's president.

December 2: Death of Boumedienne.

1979
January : Chadli Bendjedid elected President of the Algerian republic.
2: Message of Chadli to the Presidents of the two Yemens calling on them to end the conflict between the two countries.
14: Message of Chadli to Ayotollah Khomeiny, expressing Algeria's solidarity with the Iranian revolution.


August 8: Accord between Mauritania and the Polisario Front in Algiers, ending the war between the two sides.

1980
January
February 11: Visit of Malian President Traore (OAU Ad hoc committee).

March 22-29: Chadli's Middle East tour (Saudi Arabia, the two Yemens, Arab Emirat, Qatar, Bahrein, Kuwait).

April 27: Chadli sends message to Khomeiny and Beni Sadr expressing Algeria's support after US operations to rescue hostages held by the Mujahidin.

May 4: Visit of Stolern, the French secretary for immigration.


June 4: Benyahia visits Syria, Kuwait, Arab Emirats, Qatar (mediation between Jordan and Syria).

October
11-12: Meeting in Paris between the French-Algerian joint commission.

November 8: Official visit of Da Costa, president of Sao Tome.

11: Official visit of Masire of Botswana.

December
8-11: Official visit of Mozambican president Machel.

14-19: Official visit of General Giap.

1981

7: Polisario's attacks at Bou-Craa and Bais Lakehal.

10: Benyahia in Tunis.

11: Visit of the Tunisian foreign minister, Caid Essebsi.

11-13: Official visit of Gensher, the West-German foreign minister.

12: Visit of Jalloud, the Libyan premier.

20: Visit of Taleb-Ibrahimi, the presidential adviser to Niger and Mali.


February 5: B. Nabi, the minister of energy in Rome.
10: Visit of Premier Abdelghani to Tunisia.

17-19: Meeting in Algiers between foreign ministers of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Mali and Chad.

March 16: Aborted coup in Mauritania.

17: Taleb Ibrahimi and L. Belkheir, Secretary-General of government in Nouakchott.

24: Polisario's attacks on Guelta zemmour.

April 12: Chadli tours 11 African countries.

14: Tension on Algerian-Moroccan border.

16-18: Ministerial session of the co-ordination bureau of the non-alignment movement on Namibia, held in Algiers.

19: Chadli meets Qadhafi in Algiers.

May 18: Visit of Canadian Prime Minister.


June 7-9: Opec ministerial meeting in Algiers.

9-11: Official visits of Chadli to Soviet Union and Bulgaria.

July 12: Visit of Syria's president Asad.

August 5: Chadli sends a message to Khaled, the Saudi King.

6-8: Visit of French foreign minister Cheysson.

October 28-30: Visit of Edem Kodjo, Secretary-General of the OAU.

November 6: Meeting in Paris between the French socialist party (Jospin) and the FLN (Hoffman).

7: Visit to Paris of H. Khederi, Head of the police security.

9: The UN General Assembly decolonization committee adopts a resolution (73 for, 7 against and 34 abstentions) calling Morocco and the Polisario front to negotiate.

24: Chadli receives Dreyfus, the French minister of industry.
24-26: Twelfth Arab summit held in Fez (Benyahia represents Algeria).

December 15: Talks between Benyahia and Walter Vernon, special envoy of the US State Secretary, A. Haig.

30: Visit of Lord Carrington, the British Foreign Minister.

1982

February

8-9: Second meeting of the OAU ad hoc committee to discuss the Western Saharan question. Chadli attends but Hassan declines the invitation.

May 4: Meeting in Algiers of the political commission of Arab steadfastness front.

16: Official visit of President Aasad of Syria.

19: Stopover at Algiers of President Mitterand of France.

June 5: Israel invades Lebanon.

11: FLN delegation led by Mehri to Damascus.

12: Visit of the Saudi foreign minister.

July 15: Visit of the Iranian president Musavi Khomeiny.

August 1: Declaration of the FLN's politburo over the situation in the Middle East.

29: Visit of Presidents Haidallah of Mauritania and Traore of Mali.

September 14: Arab summit conference held in Fez.

9: FLN politburo examines the situation in the Middle East.

October 3: Visit of President Habyanimana of Rwanda.

6-8: Taleb-Ibrahimi presides over the sixth ministerial conference of the 77 group at the United Nations.

9: Visit of Kamal Jumblat, the leader of the Lebanese socialist party.

12: Meeting in Washington between Taleb and the US vice-president Bush.

12-16: Fifth congress of the Polisario front. Boualem Baki, the minister of justice represents Algeria.

18-20: Official visit of Strongal, Head of the Czech government.

19: Visit of the French President Mitterand.

22: The Committee of the 7 led by King Hassan arrives in Washington. Taleb represents Algeria.

25: Visit to Nouakchott of Prime Minister Abdelghani.

26: Visit of Arafat.

November 9: The Iraqi president Saddam Husayn stops over at Algiers.

10-12: Conference of democrat lawyers in Algiers - theme: "Mediterranean: lake of peace".

21-23: Official visit of the Saudi King Fahd.

21-24: Official visit of Perreira, President of Cap Vert Islands.

December 6: Official visit of the Portugese president, Ramalho Eanes.

6-8: Visit of M. Baldridge, US State Secretary for Trade.

7: The Committee of 7 arrives in Pekin.

10: The Committee of 7 in Moscow.

10-17: Official visits of Chadli to Italy, Belgium and a stop over at Paris.

20: Visit to Moscow of Premier Abdelghani.

21: Visit of Major Al Hamidi, member of Libya's revolutionary commandment.

24-27: Official visit of Zhao Ziang, President of China's State Council.

1983 January, 6: Convention of delimitation of frontiers signed between Chadli and Kountche.

17: Message from Chadli to King Fahd.

18: Chadli receives the Mauritanian foreign minister Ould Minih.
18: Chadli receives Hawatmeh (FPLP) and Habbash (FDPLP).

19: Official visit of Mugabe, the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe.

30: Official visit of Ali Nasser, the South-Yemeni president.

February 3: Arafat in Algiers.

Meeting of the Palestinian National Council in Algiers.

9: Visit of Taleb Ibrahimi to Cuba.

: end of proceedings of the Algerian-Malian commission related to the delimitation of the common border.

23: Abdelghani visits Upper Volta, people's republic of Congo, Rwanda and Burundi.

Chadli meets King Hassan near the Algerian-Moroccan border.

March 6: Second conference of Arab-African youth in Algiers.

18: Visit of Chadli to Tunis and signature of Algerian-Tunisian friendship treaty.

April 23: L. Brahimi, special envoy of Chadli in a mission to Damascus, Amman and Riaf.

May 7: Abdelghani in Teheran.

Chadli receives Boutaleb the Moroccan special envoy.

15: Official visit of President Gemayel's special envoy.

: Message from Qadhafi to Chadli.

18: Visit of the Italian president Pertini.

21: Meeting of the FLN’s Politburo to discuss the Middle East crisis.

: Visit of Al Charaa, Syria's assistant minister for external affairs.

24: Chadli receives Vernon Walter, the US roving Ambassador.

25: Chadli receives Baly the Tunisian defense minister.

25-27: Yala, the minister of interior in Rabat.
Chadli receives Boutaleb, the Moroccan special envoy.

Official visit of Bourguiba.

Visit of Arafat.

Visit of Qadhafi to Rabat.

Treaty of Oujda signed between King Hassan and Qadhafi.

Visit of French premier Mauroy.

Message to Chadli from King Khaled.

Message to Chadli from Qadhafi.

Celebration by the FLN of the twentieth anniversary of Al-Fatah.

Meeting between Talen Ibrahimi and Rumsfeld, Reagan's special envoy to the Middle East.

Official visit of Bourguiba.

Islamic conference in Casablanca.

ANP (Algerian people's assembly) ratifies frontier convention signed between Algeria and Mauritania as well as the adhesion of Mauritania to the treaty of friendship.

Important ministerial reshuffle.

Visit of the US State Secretary for agriculture.

Visit of Traore, the Malian president.

Mauritania recognizes the RASD (Polisario's self-proclaimed republic).

Visit of Iran's foreign minister Dr Velayati.

Visit of Kellef the Trade Minister to Washington.

Taleb Ibrahimi visits Teheran, Damascus and Riaf.
April 10: Declaration of the FLN's politburo on the situation in the Maghreb.

12: Messages from Chadli to King Husayn and to Qadhafi.

13: Message to Senegalese President Diouf.

15-17: Official visit of Olof Palme, Sweden's premier.

16: Visit of Kuwait's foreign minister.

18: Meeting in Algiers of governors of arab banks (Algeria, Kuwait, Sudan and Saudi Arabia).

19-22: Meeting in Algiers between representatives of Palestinian factions.

24-26: Official visit of Chadli to Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

29: Meeting in Rabat between representatives of Morocco's Istiglal party, Neo Destour and the FLN to celebrate the twenty-sixth anniversary of the Tangiers meeting. Mehri and Yazid represented Algeria.

May 3: Meeting between Nabi, the Minister of energy and his French counterpart, Auroux.

3-7: Official visit of Pakistan's foreign minister.

13: Visit of General Capillon, Chief of Staff of the French armed forces.

14: Official visit of Albert Rene, president of the Seychelles.

14-15: Second session in Algiers of the inter-Palestinian commission.

15-16: Visit of Messadia to Damascus.

17: Tunisia calls back its high commissioner from Tripoli.

26: Visit of C. Nucci, French minister of co-operation and development.

28-30: Meeting Nabi-Arroux.

June: Messages from Chadli to Ali Khomeiny carried by Rabah Bitat and to Saddam Husayn (by Abdelghani).

September 15: Tripartite meeting at Nouakchott: Ould Daddah, Chadli and Traore.
18: Official visit of President Ali Nasser of South Yemen.

19: Visit of the French President Mitterand.

November 4: Visit of the Lebanese president Gemayel. Chadli awarded the Lebanese high distinction.

11: Chadli attends the twentieth OAU summit conference held at Addis Ababa.

17: Official visit of Honecker, First Secretary of the East-German Socialist Party.

24: Chadli receives message from Mauritania’s new ruler Ould Taya.

1985

January 4: Visit of Caid Essebsi the Tunisian Foreign Minister.

7-11: Official visit to Greece of Premier A. Brahimi.

8: Visit of R. Guedira, adviser to King Hassan.

17: Meeting in Tripoli between Messadia, FLN’s permanent Secretary and the Libyan Premier Jalloud.


29: Visit of Taleb-Ibrahimi to Tunis.

February 2: Visit of Caid Essebsi.

4-6: Official visit of Turgut Ozal, the Turkish Prime Minister.


9-10: Visit of A. Brahimi to Tunis.

9-12: Talks in Paris between the PS and the FLN.

10-12: Official visit of Ghana’s president Rawlings.

11-14: Official visit of King Husayn.

19: Official visit of Chadli to Burkina Faso.

29: Accord Sonatrach - Enagas of Spain.

March 2: Taleb Ibrahimi in Tunis.
3: Official visit of the South-Yemeni President Ali Nasser.
11: Official visit of Spain's Premier Gonzales.
13: Taleb Ibrahimi visits Burkina Faso, Senegal, Mali and Niger.
14: Meeting between Yala and Guedira.
17-18: Official visit of Chadli to the USA.
19: Official visit of Zhao Ziyang, President of the Chinese state council.
25: Official visit of A. Brahimi to Yugoslavia.
May 3: Third Arab meeting on energy held in Algiers.
: Visit of Kountche, President of Niger.
8-15: Official visits of Chadli to Mexico, Cuba and Venezuela.
16: Visit of Chadli to Senegal.
24-25: Visit of N'Guessou, President of the People's Republic of Congo.
June 10-12: Visit of friendship of Indian Premier Ghandi.
15-16: Landing at the Algiers airport of the US plane hijacked by a shi't extremist group.
23: Visit of Messadia to China.
25: Official visit of Mali's president Traore.
: Visit of French Premier, Fabius.
25-26: Official visit of Sweden's Premier Palme.
July 1-3: Visit of Chadli to Spain.
12-13: Visit of Abdelghani, State Secretary to Bangladesh.
16: President Mitterand receives Khelfef, Minister of commerce.
18-20: Twentieth OAU summit conference in Addis Ababa.
24-25: Visit of the Cuban foreign minister, Malmierca.
30: Signature of an agreement over oil and gas exports with Yugoslavia.
August 4: Algeria announces its non-participation in the Arab summit to be held in Fez.

21: Meeting of the FLN's politburo to discuss the "edification of the Maghreb".

25: Visit of Tunisia's foreign minister.

29: Visit of Cuba's foreign minister.

September 2: Visit of Chadli to Tunis.

18: Official visit of Taleb-Ibrahimi to Bonn.

28-30: Visit of M'Zali, the Tunisian premier.

October 2: Meeting FLN's politburo (Israel's raid over PLO's base in Tunisia).

10: Visit of Chadli to Tunis.


25-27: Visit of Messadia to Iran.

December 2: Visit of Poland's president Jaruzelski.

Visit of Senegal's president Diouf.

Official visit of a Soviet military delegation.

13-14: Visit of Messadia to Moscow.

15: Talks between Chadli and the Chadian President Habre.

23-25: Fourth congress of the FLN.

Death of Ferhat Abbas, the former president of the GPRA.

Taleb-Ibrahimi visits Mali and Burkina Faso (border conflict).
Appendices
Chapter One
### THE NINE HISTORIC CHIEFS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position in 1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ait Ahmed, Hocine</td>
<td>Opposition, lives abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ben Bella, Ahmed</td>
<td>Opposition, lives abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ben Boulaid, Mustafa</td>
<td>Dead in 1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ben M'Hidi, Larbi</td>
<td>Dead in 1957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boudiaf, Mohamed</td>
<td>Opposition, lives abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bitat, Rabah</td>
<td>President of the Algerian people's assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Didouche, Mourad</td>
<td>Dead in 1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khider, Mohamed</td>
<td>Assassinated in Madrid in 1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krim, Belkacem</td>
<td>Assassinated in Frankfurt in 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full Members</td>
<td>1985 position (new incumbents only)</td>
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<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbane, Ramdane</td>
<td>Assassinated in Morocco in 1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbas, Ferhat</td>
<td>Retired (Dead in December 1985)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ait-Ahmed, Hocine</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ben Bella, Ahmed</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ben Boulaid, Mustafa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benkhedda, Benyoussef</td>
<td>Retired</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ben M'Hidi, Larbi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bitat, Rabah</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boudiaf, Mohamed</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dahlab, Saad</td>
<td>Retired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debaghine, Mohamed-Lamine</td>
<td>Retired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khider, Mohamed</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Krim, Belkacem</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Madani, Tewfik</td>
<td>Dead in 1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouamrane, Amar</td>
<td>Retired</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yazid, M'hamed</td>
<td>Head, FLN commission for solidarity with the peoples.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zighout, Youssef</td>
<td>Dead in 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Names</td>
<td>Positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbas, Ferhat</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krim, Belkacem</td>
<td>Vice-President, Armed forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ben Bella, Ahmed</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debaghine, Lamine</td>
<td>Minister of foreign affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bentobbal, Lakhdar</td>
<td>Minister of interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cherif, Mahmoud</td>
<td>Minister of armaments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boussouf, Abdelhafid</td>
<td>Minister of General Liaisons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francis, Ahmed</td>
<td>Minister of economic affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yazid, M'hamed</td>
<td>Minister of information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benkhedda, Benyoussef</td>
<td>Minister of social affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madani, Tewfik</td>
<td>Minister of cultural affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehri, Abdelhamid</td>
<td>Minister of North African affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ait-Ahmed, Hocine</td>
<td>Minister of state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bitat, Rabah</td>
<td>Minister of state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boudiaf, Mohamed</td>
<td>Minister of state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khider, Mohamed</td>
<td>Minister of state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khene, Lamine</td>
<td>Secretary of state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oussedick, Omar</td>
<td>Secretary of state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stambouli, Mustafa</td>
<td>Secretary of state</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Second GPRA, January 1960

Abbas, Ferhat
President

Krim, Belkacem
Vice-President, External affairs

Ben Bella, Ahmed
Vice-President

Bentobbal, Lakhdar
Minister of interior

Boussouf, Abdelhafid
Minister of armaments

Francis, Ahmed
Minister of economic affairs

Mehri, Abdelhamid
Minister of social and cultural affairs

Yazid, M'hamed
Minister of information

Ait-Ahmed, Hocine
Minister of state

Bitat, Rabah
Minister of state

Bouilaf, Mohamed
Minister of state

Khider, Mohamed
Minister of state

Mohammedi, Said
Minister of state

Third GPRA, August 1961

Benkhedda, Benyoussef
President

Krim, Belkacem
Vice-President, Interior

Ben Bella, Ahmed
Vice-President

Dahlab, Saad
Minister of foreign affairs

Boussouf, Abdelhafid
Minister of armaments

Yazid, M'hamed
Minister of information

Ait-Ahmed, Hocine
Minister of state

Bitat, Rabah
Minister of state

Bouilaf, Mohamed
Minister of state

Khider, Mohamed
Minister of state

Mohammedi, Said
Minister of state
## 1. Members of Ben Bella's Three Governments

### A. First Cabinet, September 1962

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names</th>
<th>Cabinet Post</th>
<th>1995 Position</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bentoumi, Amar</td>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medeghri, Ahmed</td>
<td>Interior</td>
<td>Dead (1974)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khemisti, Mohamed</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Dead (1963)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francis, Ahmed</td>
<td>Finance</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ouzegane, Amar</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>Dead (1980)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khobzi, Mohamed</td>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>Merchant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khelifa, Laroussi</td>
<td>Industry-Energy</td>
<td>Civil Servant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boumendjel, Ahmed</td>
<td>Reconstruction, Public works</td>
<td>Retired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bounaza, Bachir</td>
<td>Work &amp; Social Affairs</td>
<td>Retired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benhamida, Abderraamare</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nekkache, Mohamed</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Medicine practice</td>
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<td>Mohammed, Said</td>
<td>War Veterans</td>
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<td>Lives abroad</td>
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<td>Religions foundations</td>
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<td>Hadj Hamou, Mohamed</td>
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<td>Hassani, Mohamed</td>
<td>Post and Telecommunications</td>
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### B. Ben Bella's Second Government (September 1963)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Names</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ben Bella, Ahmed</td>
<td>President</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boumediene, Houari</td>
<td>Defense</td>
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</table>
Mohammedi, Said  
Ouzegane, Amar  
Hadj Smain, Mohamed  
Medeghri, Ahmed  
Bouteflika, Abdelaziz  
Boumaza, Bachir  
Mahsas, Ahmed  
Boumendjel, Ahmed  
Nekkache, Mohamed  
Cherif, Belkacem  
Madani, Tewfik  
Zaibek, Abdelkader  
Kaid, Ahmed  
Batel, Said  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ben Bella, Ahmed</td>
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<td>Bouredienne, Houari</td>
<td>Vice-President and Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammedi, Said</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
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<td>Cherif, Belkacem</td>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>Cherif, Abderrahmae</td>
<td>Minister delegated to presidency</td>
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<td>Bedjaoui, Mohamed</td>
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<td>Bouteflika, Abdelaziz</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
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C. Ben Bella's Third Government (December 1964)

<table>
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<td>Bouredienne, Houari</td>
<td>Vice-President and Defense</td>
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<td>Mohammedi, Said</td>
<td>Vice-President</td>
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<td>Cherif, Belkacem</td>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>Cherif, Abderrahmae</td>
<td>Minister delegated to presidency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bedjaoui, Mohamed</td>
<td>Justice</td>
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<td>Bouteflika, Abdelaziz</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>Name</td>
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<td>Mahsas, Ahmed</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dellici, Nourredine</td>
<td>Commerce</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boumaza, Bachir</td>
<td>Industry and Energy</td>
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<td>Hadj Smain, Mohamed</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Housing</td>
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<td>Boudissa, Safi</td>
<td>Work</td>
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<td>Nekkache, Mohamed</td>
<td>Health, War Veterans</td>
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<td>Batel, Sadek</td>
<td>Youth &amp; Sports</td>
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<td>Religions Foundations</td>
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<td>Zaibek, Abdelkader</td>
<td>Posts and Telecommunications</td>
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<td>Amrani, Said</td>
<td>Administrative Reform</td>
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<td>Ouzegane, Anar</td>
<td>Tourism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ghozali, Sid-Ahmed</td>
<td>Undersecretary for Public Works</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. BOUMEDIENNE'S GOVERNMENTS

A. First Government, July 1965

President, Defense Minister
Colonel Houari Boumedienne

Secretary of State
Rabah Bitat

Foreign Affairs
Abdelaziz Bouteflika

Interior
Ahmed Medeghri

Agriculture
Ahmed Mahsas

War Veterans
Boualem Benhammouda

Commerce
Nourredine DellecI

National Education
Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi

Finance
Ahmed Kaid
B. Second Government, April 1977

Head of State, Defense Secretary
Houari Bounedienne

Minister-Advisor to the President
Mouloud Kassim

Minister to Presidency in charge of religious affairs
Colonel Ahmed Abielghani

Interior
Larbi Tayebi

Agriculture and agrarian reform
Mohamed Said Mazouzi

War Veterans
M'hamed Halj Yala

Commerce
Sid-Ahmed Ghozali

Energy & petrochemicals
Mostafa Lacheraf

Fundamental and secondary education
Abdellatif Rahal

Higher education and scientific research
Colonel Ahmed Bencherif

Water works, environment & forests
Mohamed-Seddick Benyahia

Finance
Lt. Colonel Mohamed Aouchiche

Housing & construction
Belaid Abdeslam

Light industries
Mohamed Liassine

Heavy industry

Housing & Reconstruction
El-hadi Halj Smain

Religious Affairs
Belaid Abdesslam

Information & Culture
Bachir Boumaza

Youth & Sports
Abdelkrim Benmahmoud

Justice
Mohamed Bedjaoui

Posts & Telecommunications
Abdelkader Zaibek

Health
Tedjini Haidam

Tourism
Abdelaziz Maoui

Work
Abdelaziz Zerdani
Information and culture
Youth & Sports
Justice
Posts & Telecommunications
Health
Tourism
Transports
Work and professional formation
Public Works
State Secretary for planification
Secretary General to the Government

Redha Malek
Djamel Houhou
Abdelmalek Benhabyles
Colonel Mohamed Zerguini
Said Ait-Messaouene
Abdelghani Akbi
Colonel Ahmed Draia
Mohamed Amir
Boualem Benhammouda
Abdellah Kamel Khodja
Smail Hamdani
3. MEMBERS OF CHADLI’S THREE GOVERNMENTS

First government: March 8, 1979.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<tr>
<td>Abdelghani, Ahmed Benahmed</td>
<td>Prime Minister and Interior</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bouteflika, Abdelaziz</td>
<td>Adviser to the President</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ibrahimi, Ahmed-Taleb</td>
<td>Adviser to the President</td>
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<tr>
<td>Benhabyles, Abdelmalek</td>
<td>Secretary-General of Presidency</td>
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<td>Benyahia, Mohamed-Seddick</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saadi, Salim</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ghozali, Sid-Ahmed</td>
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<td>Ghazali, Ahmed Ali</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nabi, Belkacem</td>
<td>Energy and petrochemical industries</td>
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<td>Ait-Messaoudene, Said</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liassine, Mohamed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yala, M’hamed Hadj</td>
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<td>Brahimi, Abdelhamid</td>
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<td>Kharroubi, Mohamed-Cherif</td>
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<td>Oumeziane, Mouloud</td>
<td>Labour</td>
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<td>Zerguini, Mohamed</td>
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<td>Aouchiche, Abdelmadjid</td>
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<td>Messadia, Mohamed-Cherif</td>
<td>War Veterans</td>
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<td>Baki, Boualem</td>
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<td>Houhou, Djamel</td>
<td>Sports</td>
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<td>Goudjil, Salah</td>
<td>Transport</td>
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Second government: July 15, 1980

Abdelghani, Ahmed
Prime Minister

Lt.Col. Belkheir, Larbi
Secretary-General to the presidency

Ibrahim, Ahmed Taleb
Foreign affairs

Saadi, Salim
Agriculture

Yala, M'hamed
Interior

Baki, Boualem
Justice

Ait Messaoudene, Said
Light industries

Allahoum, Abdelmajid
Tourism

Goudjil, Salah
Transports and fishing

Bouhara, Abderrazak
Health

Oumeziane, Mouloud
Labour

Ghazali, Ahmed Ali
Housing and urbanism

Kherroubi, Mohamed Cherif
Education

Breghi, Abdelhak
Teaching and scientific research

Brahimi, Brahim
Energy and petrochemical industries

Brahimi, Abdelhamid
Planning and territorial improvements
Bakhti Nemiche, Djelloul  
Bessaiah, Boualem  
Khellef, Abdelaziz  
Kasdi, Merbah  
Rouis, Bachir  

Bekka, Abdenour  
Kortebi, Mohamed  
Chibane, Abderrahmane  
Nabi, Mohamed  
Meziane, Abdelmadjid  

Rouighi, Mohamed  
Benfreha, Ahmed  

Ould Khelifa, Larbi  

Khatib, Djelloul  

Oubouzar, Ali  

Mme Ounissi, Zhour  

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**Third government: December, 1983**

Brahimi, Abdelhamid  
Abdelghani, Mohamed ben Ahmed  
Ibrahim, Ahmed-Taleb  
Yala, M'hammed Hadj  
Ben Hammouda, Boualem  

War Veterans  
Information  
Commerce  
Heavy industry  
Posts and telecommunications  
Youth and sports  
Public works  
Religious affairs  
Professional formation  
Culture  
Secretaries of state: Forest and agricultural development  
Fishing and maritime transport  
Secondary and technical education  
Civil service and administrative reform  
Foreign trade  
Social affairs  

Prime Minister  
Minister of state to the presidency  
Foreign affairs  
Interior  
Finance
Baki, Boualem
Merbah, Kasdi
Rouis, Bachir
Bessaiah, Boualem

Goudjil, Salah
Nabi, Belkacem
Saadi, Selim
Messaoudi, Zitouni
Rouighi, Mohamed

Khellef, Abdelaziz
Kharroubi, Mohamed-Cherif
Brerhi, Abdelhak
Nabi, Mohamed

Bouchama, Kamel
Houhou, Djamal-Eddine
Ounissi, Zhor, Mme.
Benfreha, Ahmed
Bakhti Nemiche, Djelloul
Belayat, Abderahmane
Chibane, Abderahmane
Meziane, Ablemadjid
Oubouzar, Ali

**Deputy ministers:**
Benzaza, Mostafa
Ettayeb, Leila, Mme.

Justice
Agriculture
Information
Posts and telecommunications
Transport
Energy and petrochemical industries
Heavy industry
Light industry
Irrigation, environment and forests
Commerce
National education
Higher education
Labour and professional training
Youth and sports
Health
Social protection
Public works
War Veterans
Construction and housing
Religious affairs
Culture and tourism
Planning
Fisheries
Secondary and technical education
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<td>Harbi, Noureldine</td>
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<td>Aberkane, Mohamed</td>
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<td>Isli, Mohamed-Arezki</td>
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<td>Belkaid, Abubakr</td>
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<td>Abbdellaoui, Aissa</td>
<td>Environment and forestry</td>
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<td>Benamar, Mostafa</td>
<td>Budget and public property</td>
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<td>Mentouri, Mohamed-Salah</td>
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<td>Hocine, Hadj</td>
<td>Chemical and petrochemical industries</td>
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<td>Azzouz, Amar</td>
<td>Labour</td>
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<td>Sakfali, Zine al abidine</td>
<td>Tourism</td>
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<td>Nourani, Abdelmalek</td>
<td>Urban planning</td>
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<td>Hamrouche, Mouloud</td>
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### Council of Revolution, July 1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abdelghani, Ahmed</td>
<td>Head, fourth military region</td>
<td>State Secretary</td>
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<tr>
<td>Benhamed, Colonel</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Abid, Said, Colonel</td>
<td>Head, first military region</td>
<td>Dead, December 1967</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belhouchet, Abdallah, Colonel</td>
<td>Head, fifth military region</td>
<td>ANP's inspector</td>
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<tr>
<td>Benchirif, Ahmed, Colonel</td>
<td>Head, Gendarmerie</td>
<td>Retired</td>
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<td>Bendjeddid, Chadli, Colonel</td>
<td>Head, second military region</td>
<td>Head of State</td>
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<td>Benhaddou, Othman, Colonel</td>
<td>Co-ordinateur, FLN</td>
<td>Dead, 1977.</td>
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<td>Bensalem, Abderrahmane, Commander of Major national navy</td>
<td>Dead</td>
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<td>Bouabid, Salah, Colonel</td>
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<td>Bouijenane, Ahmed, Colonel</td>
<td>Member, General Major Staff</td>
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<td>Boumediene, Houari, Colonel</td>
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<td>Boumaaza, Bachir</td>
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<td>Bouteflika, Abdelaziz</td>
<td>Minister of foreign affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chabou, Mourlay Abiel-Kader, Colonel</td>
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<td>Dead, 1971</td>
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<td>Cherif, Belkacem</td>
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<td>Draia, Ahmed, Colonel</td>
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<td>Khatib, Youssef</td>
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<td>Mahsas, Ahmed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name</td>
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<td>Dead, 1972</td>
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<td>Zbiri, Tahar, Colonel</td>
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**First Political Bureau, August 1962**

<table>
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<tr>
<td>Ben Allah, Hadj</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ben Bella, Ahmed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bitat, Rabah</td>
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<td>Khider, Mohamed</td>
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<td>Mohammedi, Said</td>
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**Second Political Bureau, April 1964**

<table>
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<tr>
<td>Ait Al Hocine</td>
<td>Deputy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ben Allah, Hadj</td>
<td>Vice-President, Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ben Bella, Ahmed</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benmahdjoub, Omar</td>
<td>Deputy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boumedienne, Houari</td>
<td>Defense Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boumaza, Bachir</td>
<td>Minister of Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bouteflika, Abdelaziz</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaabani, Mohamed</td>
<td>Head, fifth military region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khatib, Youssef</td>
<td>Deputy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahsaa, Ahmed</td>
<td>Minister of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medeghri, Ahmed</td>
<td>Minister of Interior</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mandjji, Ali</td>
<td>Vice-President, Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ould Hadj, Mohand</td>
<td>Dead, 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nekkache, Mohamed-Seghir</td>
<td>Minister of Social Affairs</td>
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</table>
Zahouane, Hocine
Zbiri, Tahar

**Political Bureau, February 1979**

Abdelghani, Ahmed
Abdeslam, Belaid
Affane Guezzane, Djillali
Amir, Mohamed
Belhouchet, Abdallah
Bencherif, Ahmed
Bendjeddid, Chadli
Benhammouda, Boualem
Benyahia, Mohamed
Bitat, Rabah
Bouteflika, Abdelaziz
Draia, Ahmed
Ibrahimi, Ahmed-Taleb
Mazouzi, Mohamed
Merbah, Kasdi
Tayebi, Larbi
Yahaoui, M-S

**Political Bureau, June 1980**

Belhouchet, Abdallah
Bendjeddid, Chadli
Benhammouda, Boualem
Bitat, Rabah
Bouteflika, Abdelaziz
Mazouzi, Mohamed
Yahaoui, Mohamed-Salah

Political Bureau, June 1981

Abdelghani, Ahmed Prime Minister
Baki, Boualem Minister of religious affairs

Belhouchet, Abdallah
Benjeddid, Chadli
Benhammouda, Abdallah
Benyahia, Mohamed Seddick
Bitat, Rabah
Messadia, Mohamed-Cherif Minister of war veterans
Yala, Hadj M'hamed Minister of finance

Political Bureau, December 1983

Full members
Abdelghani, Ahmed State Secretary
Baki, Boualem Minister of Justice
Belhouchet, Abdallah Army's Inspector
Benjeddid, Chadli
Benhammouda, Boualem Minister of Finance
Bitat, Rabah
Ibrahimi, Ahmed-Taleb Minister of Foreign Affairs
Messadia, Mohamed-Cherif Head, FLN 'secretariat permanent'
Yala, Hadj M'hamed Minister of Interior

Alternate Members

Benloucif, Mostafa, General Major Chief of Staff
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benyelles, Rashid, General</td>
<td>Secretary-General, Ministry of defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brahimi, Abdelhamid</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merbah, Kasdi</td>
<td>Minister of agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rouis, Bachir</td>
<td>Minister of information</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Selected biographies
Ben Bella, Ahmed:

Born in Marnia near the Moroccan border in 1919. Son of a small shop-keeper. Primary education received in French in his native town. A passionate for football, played for local teams and was a trainee at the Olympic club of Marseilles. During the Second World War, he served in the French army and participated in the Italy campaigns where he gained numerous distinctions for his bravery and courage. After the war, he returned home and militated in the PPA and was a founding member of its "organisation speciale" (OS) and then its President. Arrested in 1950 for masterminding the hold-up of the central post-office in Oran. Escaped the same year and fled to Egypt. He was a founding member of the FLN and an active element of its external delegation (1954-1956). At Cairo he cultivated close relations with Colonel Nasser. Arrested in August 1956 after the hijacking of the plane carrying him with other FLN leaders from Rabat to Tunis. Remained in prison in France until the March 1962 cease-fire. Allied himself with the Boumedienne-led General Staff against the authority of the GPRA, a matter that enabled him to become the first Prime Minister of independent Algeria and then her first President until June 19, 1965 when he was toppled from power by his defense minister, Colonel Boumedienne. In prison in secret confinement until 1980. Married in prison to a journalist and adopted two children. Remained in house arrest until 1981, since then he lived in self-exile in Switzerland and France and became the President of an Arab-sponsored league of human rights based in London. Turned to Muslim fundamentalism and is currently heading an opposition
movement to President Chadli, the MDNA. In December 1985, he and Ait-Ahmed issued in London a political programme for a united opposition front.

Boumediene, Houari:

Born (probably on August 23, 1932) in Heliopolis, near Guelma, Eastern Algeria of a poor family of peasants. His real name is Mohamed Boukharrouba. He went to French primary school in Guelma and then to Koranic school of the Kettania. In 1952 he left Algeria to avoid being drafted into the French army for military service and went to Tunis and then to Cairo where he attended the Al Azhar University. After the outbreak of the insurrection he came in contact with the FLN external delegation and underwent training at the military academy of El Helwan. In 1955 at the age of 23 he joined the maquis of Wilaya V in Western Algeria. His organization skills, firmness and authoritarianism helped him to become assistant to Colonel Boussouf, the commander of Wilaya V whom he replaced in October 1957. He became a colonel shortly after, and in September 1958 was named commander of the COM western branch. In February 1960 he was appointed the Head of the General Staff of the entire ALN with headquarters at Ghardimaou in Tunisia. There he forged a strong military basis and power and was able to challenge the authority of the GPRA whom he disliked the political moderation and the policy of compromise in the negotiations with the French government. After resisting the orders of the GPRA President Benkhedda to dismiss him from the ALN and dismantle the General staff, he joined Ben Bella in a tactical alliance. Appointed defense minister in the first government formed in September 1963,
first vice-president as well a year later and a member of the FLN PB in April 1964. Masterminded the process of the modernization of the Algerian army and decisively helped Ben Bella to eliminate potential military and political opposition to his regime. He succeeded in overthrowing Ben Bella through a well organized and a bloodless coup on June 19, 1965 and held the function of President of the council of revolution, Head of State and of the Council of Ministers, Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff. Elected President in December 1976. Died in December 1978 of a rare blood disease.

Bendjedid, Chadli:

Born March 14, 1929 in Bouteldja a small village near Annaba, Eastern Algeria, of a relatively well-off family of wheat peasants. After attending French primary school, he held several modest jobs. Joined the maquis in 1955 at the age of 26 and fought in Wilaya I (Aures). In 1960, he received the grade of Captain and became Head of the 13th battalion of the ALN external army based in Tunisia and then Deputy Head of the operational commandment, Northern region. During the 1962 summer crisis he supported the Boumediene-led General Staff against the GPRA's leadership. Appointed head of the military region of Constantine in 1963 and then of Oran a year later. He became member of the council of revolution after the June 1965 coup retaining the commandment of the Oran military region and in 1969 he was promoted to the grade of Colonel. After the death of Boumediene he was the army's candidate for the presidency. Elected on February 7,
1979 and re-elected in December 1983. At the same time he has been the Secretary General of the FLN and the de-facto Minister of Defense.

FOREIGN MINISTERS

Khemisti, Mohamed:
Born in Marnia, Western Algeria. He was orphaned and later nursed by Ben Bella's mother. At the outbreak of the war he was a student and became one of the metropolitan leaders of the UGEMA. He served as directeur de cabinet to M. Fares the President of the "executif provisoire" 1960-1962. After independence he was named Minister of Foreign Affairs, a post he held until April 11, 1963 when he was shot, victim of a crime of passion.

Bouteflika, Abdelaziz:
Born, March 2, 1937 in Oujda, Morocco. Son of a turkish bath owner. After the strike called by the UGEMA, in 1956, dropped his studies at a secondary school and joined the ALN, Wilaya V. There he became a close assistant to Boumediene then commander of this wilaya, and obtained the grade of major under the nickname of Si Abdelkader Al Mali in connection with his supervision of military operations of the ALN in the Sahara along the borders with Mali. With Major Slimane (Kaid Ahmed), Medeghri, Cherif Belkacem and Tayebi Larbi they came to form what was then called the "group of Oujda" extremely loyal to Boumediene. When Boumediene moved to the Ghardimaou headquarters of the General Staff in 1959, Bouteflika went with him, therefore cementing a close friendship. During the GPRA’s negotiations with
the French government, he served as Boumedienne's special envoy to Ben Bella and other FLN leaders imprisoned in France. In the first government formed by Ben Bella in September 1962, he was appointed Minister of youth and sports thanks to Boumedienne. He became Minister of foreign affairs, after the death of Khemisti in April 1963. As a member of the Oujda clan and a Boumedienne protegee he came into conflict with Ben Bella who attempted to have an ascendancy on the conduct of Algerian foreign policy. Ben Bella's decision to oust Bouteflika from government in late 1964 was one of the major reasons of the Boumedienne-led coup of June 19, 1965. Since then Bouteflika was made a member of the council of revolution and has held the foreign minister portfolio until February 1979. The death of Boumedienne led to his demotion to the formal post of adviser to President Chadli (February 1979-December 1980) and to political disgrace as he was dismissed from the FLN political bureau and suspended from the Central Committee in 1981. He has lived since in a self exile in Switzerland avoiding trial for misuse of funds. Apparently retired and has been involved in no political opposition, suffering from a kidney disease.

Benyahia, Mohamed-Seddick:

Born January 3, 1932 in Jijel of a socially modest family. Graduated in Law from the University of Algiers. In 1955 he became president of the Algiers section of the UGEMA and a year later he was elected alternate member of the CNRA set up by the FLN Summam congress. Secretary-General of the GPRA 1958-1962, participated in the Melun and Evian negotiations and in numerous international conferences as an FLN

Taleb-Ibrahimi, Ahmed:

Born in 1932 near Setif in Western Algeria in a well-off arabic-educated family. His father Bachir was the president of the Ulama association. Brought up in Tlemcen in an intellectual and bourgeois milieu and received a doctorate conciling between medicine and arabic literature. President of the UGEMA until his arrest in 1957 for nationalist activities he remained in prison in Fresnes, in France, until the independence of Algeria. Imprisoned by Ben Bella for two years because of his opposition to revolutionary socialism. After the June 1965 coup he was put in charge of the ministries of national education (1966-1970), information and culture (1970-1977) and then adviser to the Presidents Boumediene (1977-1978) and Chadli (1979-1982). Minister of foreign affairs since the death of Benyahia and a member of the FLN politburo.

TOP POLITICIANS

Abdelghani, Ahmed Benahmed:

Born March 27, 1927 in Ghazaouet, Western Algeria. Became member of the PPA at the age of 16, arrested in 1945 for nationalist activities and liberated a year later. Served in French armed forces before
joining the maquis in 1955, Wilaya V under the Commandment of Boumedienne. After Algeria's independence he was put in charge of the first military region, Algiers 1962-1964 and then of a battalion in Western Algeria, where he led a dissent movement of ex-maquisards against Ben Bella's authority. Arrested in April 1964 and condemned to death but was pardoned by Boumedienne. After the coup, he was made a member of the council of revolution, commander of the fourth military region, Ouargla (1965-1967), President revolutionary court, Oran (1969). Promoted Colonel (June 1969) while in charge of the fifth military region, Constantine until 1974 when he replaced Medeghri as minister of interior. Believed extremely ambitious, he came into rivalry with President Boumedienne and then Chadli. In February 1979, he became a member of the Politburo and at the same time Prime Minister in charge of the Home Office. In 1981, he was outstripped of this ministerial portfolio and in December 1983 he was demoted to the post of state secretary.

Bencherif, Ahmed:

Born April 25, 1927 at Djelfa in the Central high plains. He was a sergeant in the French army and attended officers school at Saint Maixemet in France. In 1957, when as a second lieutenant stationed at Cherchell, he was arrested for providing arms to the ALN. In July 1957 he defected from the French army and joined the Wilaya IV and in July 1960 became commander of this wilaya and a member of the CNRA. In October 1960, he was captured and condemned to death but escaped execution after the intervention of the international Red Cross. He remained in prison until March 1962 and went to Wilaya VI, gaining the
rank of Colonel. On September 17, 1962 he became Head of the Gendarmerie until 1977 when he was demoted to the minor ministerial post of environment following his opposition to the agrarian revolution enacted by Boumedienne. After the latter's death he was a potential contender for the presidency along with remaining members of the council of revolution. However lacking sufficient support he backed Bouteflika against Yahaoui the FLN's strongman. Member of the FLN political bureau (March 1979) and head of the party's commission for youth and sports. Removed from the party in 1981 being accused of embezzlement and corruption, but the charges were dropped. Retired from politics. A powerful figure in the army until his disgrace in 1977. Considered a moderate and close to Bouteflika.

**Cherif, Belkacem:**

Born July 31, 1933 at Beni Mellal, Morocco, of a bourgeois family. He attended French schools and university in Morocco. He joined the maquis (Wilaya V) after UGEMA's strike in 1956. He became head of the General Staff, western branch and a close aide of Boumedienne. He was elected to the National Assembly in September 1962 and a year later he was appointed minister of national orientation. He was demoted to minister of education in December 1964 as a result of Ben Bella's efforts to undermine the Boumedienne clan. After the June 1965 coup he was named co-ordinator of the FLN Executive Secretariat and remained in that post until December 1967. In March 1968 he was put in charge of the ministry of finance. Increasing dissonances with Boumedienne led to his disgrace as he was demoted to the honorific
post of State Secretary in July 1970. He was forced to resign in 1975 and leave the country after indiscretions related to his private life. Regarded as a moderate.

Draia, Ahmed:
Born May 10, 1929 at Souk Ahras in Eastern Algeria. He joined the ALN early in the war and was involved in the plot against the GPRA in 1958. After serving a two year prison sentence, he was charged to help a maquis in Southwestern Algeria. After independence he commanded the ANP forces in that area and in September 1963 he integrated the national security forces, becoming its Head in March 1965. After the coup d'Etat he was made a member of the council of revolution, retaining his hold over the national security until 1977 when he was demoted to the ministerial office of transports. He was made a member of the FLN politburo in February 1979 but was soon removed from the party organs shortly after alongside the other "barons of the ancient regime". Retired from active politics but believed to have retained a substantial influence within the Army and the national security forces (police), notably among radical officers of Eastern Algerian origin.

Kaid, Ahmed (alias Major Slimane):
Born March 17, 1927 in Tiaret of wealthy landowner parents. He attended French school in his native town, the French military school at Hussein-Dey in Algiers. He militated in Ferhat Abbas's UDMA but joined the FLN immediately after the outbreak of the insurrection.
He became a member of the General Staff, western branch and then assistant chief of staff of the ALN. Being close to Boumedienne he supported the Tlemcen group against the GPRA during the 1962 summer crisis. He was elected to the national assembly in September 1962 and a year later he was named minister of tourism but was forced to resign by Ben Bella in December 1964. He was elected a member of the FLN central committee in April 1964 as a Boumedienne 'protege'.

After the coup, he was made a member of the Revolutionary Council and put in charge of the ministry of finance until December 1967 when he was appointed head of the FLN. In 1972 he was forced to resign because of his opposition to Boumedienne's socialist policies, notably the agrarian revolution, as he was believed to represent the class of big landowners. He died in exile in Morocco in 1976 after leading a kind of opposition to Boumedienne. Regarded a moderate, close to conservative middle classes.

Medeghri, Ahmed:
Born July 23, 1934 in Saida, Western Algeria. He was a teacher there until the war broke out. He joined the maquis, and fought in Wilaya V where he came to cultivate close ties with Boumedienne and attained the rank of major. After independence, he served for a short time as wali of Tlemcen and then in September 1962 he was elected to the national assembly and named minister of interior thanks to Boumedienne. He was also elected to the FLN politburo. He resigned from the interior ministry in July 1964 in protest at Ben Bella's efforts of concentrating executive powers. After the coup of June 1965, he was made a member of the council of revolution and named
again minister of interior, a post he held until his mysterious death in 1974. A powerful minister and chief architect of the administrative and constitutional organization of the Algerian state. Believed to have challenged Boumedienn’s authority. He was considered a moderate and a close friend of Bouteflika.

**Messadia, Mohamed-Cherif:**

Born in 1930 in Souk-Ahras of a modest family. Joined maquis early and fought alongside the Tunisian border, attaining the rank of Captain. He was involved in the 1958 plot of the colonels against the GPRA. Like Draia, he was sent to Southern Algeria to organize a maquis there, having benefited from Boumedienn’s grace. After independence, he became an FLN official (commissaire national) but was expelled from the party because of his opposition to Ben Bella. After the June 1965 coup, he reintegrated the party and was put in charge of its information department. In 1974 he was elevated to the unofficial post of Head of the FLN, a charge he held until 1977. In February 1979 he became a member of the newly formed central committee and named minister of war veterans. In December 1983 he became Head of the permanent secretariat of the FLN’s central committee and the de facto assistant Secretary General of the party. A panarabist, close to radical officers of Eastern Algeria origin.

**Nekkache, Mohamed-Seghir:**

Born in the Tlemcen region, Western Algeria. Trained as a doctor and joined the FLN after the war broke out. After independence, he became close to Ben Bella and was named minister of health (September 1962),
social affairs (September 1963) and health, social affairs, war
veterans (December 1964). Elected to the political bureau in April
1964. He was arrested, during the coup of June 1965 and remained in
prison until November 1968. Since then he practiced medicine in Oran.
He was arrested in 1983 following charges of supporting Ben Bella's
opposition movement and accused of detaining illegal arms. Released
shortly after but was put before trial in December 1985 for the same
charges. He was, however, relaxed. He is considered extremely
loyal to Ben Bella.

Rouis, Bachir:
Born February 2, 1940 in Medea, Central Algeria. He joined the
maquis in 1956 and fought in Wilaya IV. ANP officer 1962-1967 in
Oran military region (1962-1967) and chef de Cabinet of its Commandant,
Chadli. General-Director Ministry of agriculture in charge of a
national enterprise, Onalait. Elected Deputy 1977, Secretary of the
Blida Muhafada 1981; Minister of posts (1981), information 1983 and
alternate member, Political Bureau. A moderate, attached to the basic
principles of the Algerian revolution

Yahaoui, Mohamed-Salah:
Born in 1932 in Barika, Aures region. Educated Koranic school;
joined maquis in 1955 and fought in Wilaya I where he alternated
guerrilla operations with political activities, in his role of
political Commissar. Delegate of the ANP to the FLN congress, April
1964, and member of its central committee. Member of the council of
revolution and Head of the third military region 1965-1969, Director of the Cherchell military academy until November 1977 when he was nominated the FLN 'co-ordinateur'. Promoted Colonel in 1970. Potential candidate to the presidency after the death of Boumedienne. Deputy Head of the FLN and member of the political bureau until 1981 when he was removed from active politics because of his challenge to President Chadli. Retired from politics but believed to have retained a substantial influence in military and party circles, particularly among officers and militants of Eastern Algeria origin. A convinced Boumediennist, a socialist hardline and close to the Panarabist core.

HIGH OFFICERS:

Allahoum, Abdelmajid (Major);

Attailia, Mohammed (General);
Born in Guelma, Eastern Algeria. Fought in Wilaya I and lost an arm. ANP officer, Deputy commander, fifth military region Constantine. In 1974, he was put in charge of the first military region (Blida).
Promoted General in 1984. He successfully resisted the efforts of Chadli to wreck his military fiefdom. A powerful figure in the ANP and a hardliner with however a limited political credo being committed to the basic principles of the Algerian revolution.

Bouhara, Abdulrazack (Lieutenant-Colonel):


Belhoucchet, Abdullah (Colonel):

Born June 1, 1924 at M'Daourouch near Sedrata, Eastern Algeria. He was a Sergeant in the French army before joining the maquis and fighting in Wilayat I and II. In 1958, he was involved in the 'conspiracy of the colonels' against the GPRA and like Draia and Messadia was arrested in January 1959 by the Tunisian army at the request of the ALN. Released from prison in October 1960, he joined Bouteflika in the maquis along the Mali border and then became Commander of that maquis. In the 1962 summer crisis he sided with the Tlemcen group as a supporter of Boumedienne. After independence he was put in charge of the commando school at the Cherchell military academy and in 1963 he was named head of the FLN federation in the
Saoura department. In June 1964, he was appointed commander of the fifth military region (Constantine). After the coup, he was made a member of the council of revolution and in December 1967 he became commander of the first military region (Blida). He was loyal to Boumedienne. Member of the FLN politburo since February 1979 being at the same time inspector general of the army. His authority has declined in recent years, but remains a symbol of the spirit of ex-maquisard.

Chabou, Abdelkader (Colonel):
Born in 1924 of a rich family of Western Algeria. He attended French schools and passed his A levels and then went on to the French army cavalry school at Bou-Saada. With the rank of major, he deserted the French army in 1958 and joined the ALN in Morocco. After independence, he was named Chef de Cabinet of the ministry of defence, a post he held until 1971 when he died in a plane crash in the Algerian desert. A skilful strategist and very close to Boumedienne.

Hoffman, Slimane (Major):
Served in the French army and graduated from Saint Cyr military academy. He deserted the French army in 1961 and joined the maquis where he won Boumedienne's confidence. After independence he became commander of the Tank officers. He helped Boumedienne carry out the coup of June 1965 and successfully prevented the march of armoured division towards the capital during the attempted coup of Tahar Zbiri in December 1967. In 1969 he was named wali of Algiers. In 1979, he was elected to the FLN Central Committee and was put in charge of
its department of external affairs until 1983. A highly trained officer, loyal to Boumedienne and close to the group of radical officers. Believed to have been a key figure in the intelligence service and in Algeria's relations with the liberation movements, especially the Polisario front.

Merbah, Kasdi (Colonel):


Saadi, Selim (Lieutenant-Colonel):

ZERGUINI, Mohammed (Colonel):


PROMINENT TECHNOCRATS

ABDESLAM, Belaid:

Ait Messaoudene, Said:

Benhabyles, Abdelmalek:

Benhamoudia, Boualem, (Dr):
Brahimi, Abdelhamid (Dr):  

Ghozali, Sid-Ahmed:  
Hamdani, Smail:


Liassine, Mohamed:

Born in 1934 at Dellys, Greater Kabylia. Graduate, Paris polytechnic; Engineer, roads development; Director, ministry of industry 1963; Director industrial production, office Algerien de l'action commerciale (OFLAC); national managing director, national steel corporation (SNS), 1964; General Manager, bureau d'étude et de réalisations industrielles (BERI); member, advisory council for hydrocarbons, mines and energy 1967-1977. Minister of heavy industry 1977-1981; retired. A close assistant and friend of Abdeslam.

Mahroug, Smail:

Born October 21, 1926 in Bougaa, Smaller Kabylia. Education Paris University, BSc, MSc in economics. Joined FLN in 1962. Director of planning, Director Cabinet of head of economic affairs, GPRA (1962); Director Caisse Algerienne de développement 1963-1965; Director General, ministry of finance 1965-1966; economic adviser to President 1966-1970; Chairman group of 24 IMF 1976; minister of finance

Mehri, Abdelhamid:

Nabi, Belkacem:
Yala, M'hamed Hadji:


PROMINENT AMBASSADORS

Bedjaoui, Mohamed:

Brahimi, Lakhdar:


Houhou, Djamel:


Kafi, Ali Hussain:

Kellou, Mohamed-Messaoud:


Malek, Redha:

Oussedick, Omar:


Rahal, Abdelatif:


Yazid, M'hamed:

Born in Blida near Algiers. His father served in the French army. Educated in French in his native town. He militated in the PPA-MTLD and in the 1953 session of this party he sided with the 'centralists' against the leader of the MTLD, Messali. He joined the FLN in 1955 and was made a member of the CNRA. Active member of the FLN 'délegation extérieure' and attended various international conferences.
including the Bandung meeting as FLN representative along with Ait-Ahmed. He was with Chanderli, responsible for the FLN bureau in New York and worked tirelessly for the inscription of the Algerian question on the UN agenda as well as for gathering support for the Algerian cause. Minister of information, GPRA, 1958-1962 and participated in the negotiations with the French government in Evian. At independence he was elected to the National Assembly and became the head of its committee on foreign relations. He also served as Ben Bella's personal envoy and as Algeria's representative to the Afro-Asian people's solidarity organization (AAPSO). He became Algeria's permanent representative to the United Nations in 1966, a post he held until 1971 when he was appointed Ambassador to Lebanon until 1979. During that period he was believed to be the link between the Algerian government and the Palestinian resistance. In February 1979, he was elected to the FLN's central committee and in 1981 he was put in charge of the Arab league bureau in Paris. He was called back to Algiers in April 1984 and has been since then a member of the Permanent Secretariat of the FLN's central committee in charge of solidarity with peoples. A leftist, with strong links with progressive forces and national liberation movements, especially the PLO.
Chapter Two
The Ministry of foreign affairs 1965-1977
established from Decree,
August 17, 1965. Official Journal
of the Algerian Republic 10-71
of August 27, 1965.

| TABLE II 1 |

THE MINISTER
Algerian Embassies

The Secretary-General

General inspection of
diplomatic posts

The Deputy Secretary-General

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<th>Internal organizations</th>
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Table II2: THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1977

The Minister of Foreign Affairs

The Secretary-General

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Gl. Direction: International economic relations

Direction: Sub-Director Sub-Director Sub-Director Sub-Director Sub-Director
international economic relations

Direction: Sub-Director Sub-Director Sub-Director Sub-Director Sub-Director
international political affairs

Direction: Sub-Director Sub-Director Sub-Director Sub-Director Sub-Director
Arab countries

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Africa

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West-Africa

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Middle-East Arab League

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United Nations Political affairs and inter-regional conferences

Sub-Director Sub-Director Sub-Director Sub-Director
AU and sub-regional organizations Africa, Astral, Central and East

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cultural and scientific affairs and technical cooperation

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<td>Year</td>
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<td>1960</td>
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<td>1963</td>
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<td>Mohamed</td>
<td>Interior</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Mohamed</td>
<td>Interior</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

Table 113: Occupants of Selected Key Ministries of Algeria: 1962-1984
Chapter Three
TABLE III: ALGERIA'S TRADE WITH FRANCE 1963-1979 (millions of DA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEARS</th>
<th>IMPORTS</th>
<th>EXPORTS</th>
<th>TOTAL TRADE</th>
<th>BALANCE</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>2795</td>
<td>2918</td>
<td>5713</td>
<td>-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>2449</td>
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<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>2329</td>
<td>2282</td>
<td>4611</td>
<td>-47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>2166</td>
<td>2070</td>
<td>4236</td>
<td>-96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>1817</td>
<td>2118</td>
<td>3945</td>
<td>+241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>2273</td>
<td>2263</td>
<td>4536</td>
<td>-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>2200</td>
<td>2510</td>
<td>4710</td>
<td>+310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2631</td>
<td>2667</td>
<td>5280</td>
<td>+36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>2273</td>
<td>991</td>
<td>3264</td>
<td>-1282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>2023</td>
<td>1263</td>
<td>3383</td>
<td>-657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>2844</td>
<td>1667</td>
<td>4511</td>
<td>-1177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>4706</td>
<td>3211</td>
<td>7917</td>
<td>-1495</td>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>7937</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>10437</td>
<td>-5437</td>
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<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>6014</td>
<td>2863</td>
<td>10172</td>
<td>-4058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>7115</td>
<td>3057</td>
<td>10171</td>
<td>-4058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>6599</td>
<td>2755</td>
<td>9354</td>
<td>-3844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>6015</td>
<td>4810</td>
<td>10825</td>
<td>-1205</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table III2: FRANCE'S PLACE IN ALGERIAN FOREIGN TRADE 1963-1979 (in percentage)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IMPORTS</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>37,7</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18,3</td>
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<tr>
<td>EXPORTS</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>23,5</td>
<td>22,2</td>
<td>12,6</td>
<td>3,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>31,8</td>
<td>27,5</td>
<td>18,9</td>
<td>17,4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: constructed from *statistiques du Commerce extérieur*, Ministry of Trade, Algiers December 1978.*
Table II.3: ALGERIA’S TRADE DEFICIT WITH FRANCE 1973-79

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEARS</th>
<th>GLOBAL TRADE BALANCE</th>
<th>TRADE BALANCE WITH FRANCE</th>
<th>IN PERCENTAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>-1.397</td>
<td>-1.177</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>+982</td>
<td>-1.495</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>-7.068</td>
<td>-5.437</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>-1.419</td>
<td>-3.152</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>-5.445</td>
<td>-4.058</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>-10.145</td>
<td>-3.844</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>+3.711</td>
<td>-1.205</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-28.203</td>
<td>-20.368</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Chapter Four
MAP IV 1: ALGERIAN BOUNDARIES

MAP IV 2 : GREATER MOROCCO

-------- present time frontiers
-------- borders claimed by Allal Al Fassi


Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi du Maroc et le Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne, animés par les sentiments de solidarité et de fraternité maghrébines, conscients de leur destin africain et désireux de concrétiser les aspirations communes de leurs peuples, ont convenu ce qui suit:

Fidèles à l'esprit de la Conférence de Tanger du mois d'avril 1958 et fermement attachés à la charte et aux résolutions adoptées par la Conférence de Casablanca, les deux gouvernements décident d'entreprendre l'édification du Maghreb Arabe sur la base d'une fraternelle association notamment dans le domaine politique et économique.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi du Maroc, réaffirme son soutien inconditionnel au peuple algérien dans sa lutte pour son indépendance et son unité nationales. Il proclame son appui sans réserve du gouvernement provisoire de la République Algérienne dans ses négociations avec la France sur la base du respect de l'intégrité du territoire algérien. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi du Maroc s'opposera par tous les moyens à toute tentative de partage ou d'amputation du territoire algérien.

Le Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne reconnaît pour sa part que le problème territorial pose par la délimitation imposée arbitrairement par la France entre les deux pays trouvera sa résolution dans les négociations entre le Gouvernement du Royaume du Maroc et du Gouvernement de l'Algérie indépendante.

A cette fin, les deux gouvernements décident la création d'une commission algéro-marocaine qui se réunira dans les meilleurs délais pour procéder à l'étude et à la solution de ce problème dans un esprit de fraternité et d'unité maghrébines.

De ce fait, le Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne réaffirme que les accords qui pourront intervenir à la suite des négociations franco-algériennes ne sauraient être opposables au Maroc quant aux délimitations territoriales algéro-marocaines.

Sa Majesté Hassan II           Son Excellence Ferhat Abbas
Roi du Maroc                  Président du G.P.R.A.

Rabat, le 6 Juillet 1961
TREATY\(^1\) OF BROTHERHOOD, GOOD-NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS AND CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF MOROCCO AND THE DEMOCRATIC AND POPULAR REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA.

The Kingdom of Morocco and
The Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria,

Desiring to strengthen the bonds of brotherhood, friendship and
good-neighborly relations which are dictated by the long-standing
historical ties existing between their two countries and peoples,

Prompted by their mutual desire to strengthen and reinforce the
bonds of brotherhood between them in all fields, and especially in the
economic and cultural fields, on the basis of mutual respect for national
sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in the internal
affairs of the other Party and equality between the two Parties in their
common interests,

Desiring to participate, through their mutual relations, in
building the greater Arab Maghreb, unifying the Arab nation, strengthening
African unity and attaining world justice and peace,

Wishing to establish mutual co-operation and consultation in all
matters relating to the attainment of peace and in resistance to all
forms of aggression in accordance with the provisions of the United
Nations Charter,

Convinced that the establishment and strengthening of friendly
relations and mutual co-operation will benefit both fraternal countries
and peoples,

Believing that their mutual relations will contribute to the
attainment of the goals and principles of the United Nations Charter, the
Charter of the League of Arab States, and the Charter of the Organization
of African Unity,\(^2\)

Have resolved for this purpose to conclude the following treaty,
and have appointed the following Plenipotentiaries:

His Excellency Dr Ahmed el-Iraqi, Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Kingdom of Morocco, and

His Excellency Mr. Abdulaziz Boutefliqa, Minister for Foreign
Affairs of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria,

who, having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have
agreed as follows:

Article 1

The Kingdom of Morocco and the Democratic and Popular Republic of
Algeria shall maintain perpetual peace, firm friendship and fruitful
good-neighborly relations, inspired by the spirit of the long-standing
brotherhood between the two fraternal peoples, and shall strive to build
a prosperous common future.

\(^2\)Came into force on 15 January 1969 by signature, in accordance with
article 7.
Article 2

The two Contracting Parties undertake to strengthen their common bonds in all fields, and especially in the economic and cultural fields, as a contribution toward expanding the areas of mutual understanding between the fraternal Moroccan and Algerian peoples and consolidating the friendship and good-neighbourly relations between them.

Article 3

Since mutual economic co-operation provides a firm basis for peaceful and friendly relations and leads to the advancement of both countries, the two Contracting Parties shall promote mutual efforts aimed at the expansion of co-operation in all fields, for the benefit of both countries.

Article 4

In the event of a dispute or conflict of any kind, the two Contracting Parties shall prohibit the use of force against each other and shall strive to settle the dispute by peaceful means, in a spirit of friendship, brotherhood and good-neighbourly relations, in pursuance of the principles and resolutions of the United Nations, the League of Arab States, and the Organization of African Unity.

Article 5

Each Party undertakes not to join any alliance or confederacy directed against the other Party.

Article 6

In order to strengthen the ties of solidarity and brotherhood which bind their two fraternal peoples, in accordance with the spirit of good-neighbourliness and mutual confidence between them, the two Parties resolve to submit all matters pending between them to joint commissions which shall be responsible for finding appropriate solutions thereto within the framework of the relations between the two countries, employing such procedures as they deem appropriate to the attainment of their common wish to overcome all obstacles and to make swift progress toward establishing the co-operation which both Parties desire.

Article 7

This Treaty shall enter into force when it has been signed and the instruments of ratification have been exchanged.

Article 8

This Treaty shall remain in force for twenty years following the date of its entry into force, and shall be automatically renewed for a further period of twenty years unless one of the Contracting Parties informs the other Party in writing, one year before the expiry of the Treaty, of its desire to terminate it.
Done at the royal palace of Ifrane, on 26 Shawwal 1388 (15 January 1969) in two original copies in the Arabic language.

For the Kingdom of Morocco:  
Ahmed EL-IRAQI

For the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria:  
Abdulaziz BOUTEFLIQA

Cette visite entre également dans le cadre de la coopération étroite qui existe entre les deux pays dans tous les domaines conformément aux nobles objectifs qu'ils poursuivent, tendant à l'édification du Maghreb Arabe et à la poursuite d'une politique de dialogue fructueux, de concertation et d'assistance mutuelle.

Cette politique résulte des rencontres historiques entre Sa Majesté le Roi Hassan II et Son Excellence le President Houari Boumediene ainsi que des traités et conventions conclus entre les deux pays frères.

Sa Majesté le Roi Hassan II a reçu en audience M. Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Au cours de cette audience caractérisée par la franchise et la cordialité, le ministre algérien a déclaré que l'Algérie, tout en réaffirmant qu'elle n'a aucune visée territoriale sur le Sahara Occidental sous domination espagnole, enregistre avec pleine satisfaction l'entente intervenue entre les deux pays frères, le Maroc et la Mauritanie, en ce qui concerne cette région, entente qui tend à la consolidation de la sécurité, de la tranquillité et la stabilité et de la coopération. Cette dernière aura, à coup sur, des effets bénéfiques sur cette région vitale du Maghreb Arabe.

Attachées au principe de la lutte contre le colonialisme sous toutes ses formes, les deux parties algérienne et marocaine sont convaincues de la nécessité de parfaire la coordination de leur action en vue de mettre fin, dans les plus brefs délais à l'occupation espagnole et aux manœuvres du gouvernement espagnol visant à maintenir d'une manière ou d'une autre sa domination au Sahara.

Soucieuses de consolider et d'élargir la coopération et de tout mettre en œuvre pour lui assurer le plus grand succès, les deux parties entendent procéder à la réalisation des projets adoptés d'un commun accord et non encore réalisés et d'entreprendre toute action propre à accélérer l'édification du Maghreb Arabe.

El-Moudjahid, July 5, 1975.
ACCORDS ET RESOLUTIONS SUR LE SAHARA OCCIDENTAL

1 - L’ACCORD TRIPARTITE DU 14 NOVEMBRE 1975

L’accord de Madrid, signé par l’Espagne, le Maroc et la Mauritanie contient les dispositions suivantes:

- L’Espagne réaffirme sa décision de décoloniser le Sahara Occidental, en cessant d’être puissance administrante.
- Le rôle de puissance administrative est immédiatement confié à une administration intérimaire, à laquelle participe le Maroc, la Mauritanie et la Jemaa; un gouverneur général espagnol, et deux gouverneurs adjoints, l’un marocain, l’autre mauritanien. La présence espagnole prendra fin définitivement avant le 28 février 1976.
- L’opinion de la population, exprimée par la Jemaa, sera respectée. En ce qui concerne les phosphates et "pour ce qui est de la Société de Bou Craa proprement dite, l’accord de Madrid a tracé un schéma d’exploitation du gisement avec une participation marocaine de 65% et une participation espagnole de 35%".

2 - ACCORDS MAROCO-MAURITANIENS (14 avril 1976).

Son Excellence le Président de la République Islamique de Mauritanie et Sa Majesté le Roi du Maroc, se référant à l’avis consultatif du 16 octobre 1975 de la Cour Internationale de justice reconnaissant l’existence de liens juridiques d’allégeance entre le Roi du Maroc et certaines des tribus vivant sur le territoire du Sahara et l’existence de droits, y compris certains droits relatifs à la terre, qui constituaient des liens juridiques avec l’ensemble mauritanien.

En conformité avec la déclaration de principes signées à Madrid le 14 novembre 1975 et transmettant à l’administration intérimaire avec la participation du Maroc et de la Mauritanie et la collaboration de la Jemaa les responsabilités et les pouvoirs détenus par l’Espagne sur le Sahara.

Considérant la consultation de la Jemaa, réunie en session extraordinaire le 26 février 1976,

Décident de conclure la présente convention et désignent à cet effet leurs plénipotentiaires: M. Hamdo Ould Mouknass, ministre d’État chargé des Affaires étrangères, et Docteur Ahmed Laraki, ministre d’État chargé des Affaires Étrangères, lesquels après avoir échangé leurs pleins pouvoirs, reconnus en bonne et due forme, sont convenus de ce qui suit:

Article Premier. - Les Hautes Parties Contractantes conviennent d’un commun accord que la frontière d’État établie entre la République islamique de Mauritanie et le Royaume du Maroc est définie par la ligne droite, partant du point d’intersection de la côte Atlantique avec le 24e parallèle nord et se dirigeant vers le point d’intersection du 23e
parallèle nord avec le 13e méridien ouest; l'intersection de cette ligne droite avec l'actuelle frontière de la République islamique de Mauritanie constituant la limite sud-est de la frontière du Royaume du Maroc.

A partir de ce dernier point, la frontière suit vers le Nord la frontière actuelle de la République islamique de Mauritanie jusqu'au point constitué par les coordonnées suivantes: 824/500 et 959, telles qu'elles figurent sur la carte paraphée et annexée à la présente convention.

Art. 2. - La frontière d'État entre la République islamique de Mauritanie et le Royaume du Maroc, telle que définie à l'article premier ci-dessus, constitue la frontière terrestre et délimite également dans le sens vertical la souveraineté dans l'espace aérien ainsi que l'appartenance du sous-sol. En ce qui concerne le plateau continental, la délimitation est constituée par le 24e parallèle nord.

Art. 3. - Il est créé une commission mixte maroco-mauritanienne en vue de procéder sur le terrain au bornage de la frontière entre les deux pays, telle que définie à l'article premier ci-dessus.

Art. 4. - Au terme de ses travaux, la commission mixte établira un acte constatant le bornage de la frontière maroco-mauritanienne. Cet acte sera joint à la présente convention.

Art. 5. - La présente convention entrera en vigueur à la date de l'échange des instruments de ratification conformément aux procédures constitutionnelles en vigueur dans les pays.

Art. 6. - Des son entrée en vigueur, la présente convention sera enregistrée au secrétariat général des Nations Unies conformément à l'article 102 de la Charte des Nations unies.

Document IV:7

- ACCORD MAURITANO-SAHARAOUI du 5 AOUT 1979


Après négociations, les deux parties ont convenu de ce qui suit:

- Considérant l'attachement des deux parties mauritanienne et saharaouie au respect scrupuleux des principes des chartes de l'OUA et de l'ONU relatifs aux droits des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes, à l'intangibilité des frontières héritées de l'époque coloniale,

- Considérant le désir sincère des deux parties d'instaurer une paix juste et définitive, la République islamique de Mauritanie et le Front Polisario, conformément aux principes de la coexistence pacifique, du respect mutuel et du bon voisinage,

- Considérant la nécessité impérieuse entre les deux parties de trouver une solution globale et définitive au conflit garantissant au peuple sahraoui ses pleins droits nationaux et à la région la paix et la stabilité.

a) La République islamique de Mauritanie déclare solennellement qu'elle n'a et n'aura pas de revendications territoriales ou autres au Sahra Occidental.

b) La République Islamique de Mauritanie décide de sortir définitivement de la guerre injuste du Sahra Occidental suivant les modalités arrêtées en commun accord avec les représentants du peuple sahraoui, le Front Polisario.

Le Front Polisario déclare solennellement qu'il n'a et n'aura pas de revendications territoriales sur la Mauritanie.

Le Front Polisario, au nom du peuple sahraoui et la République Islamique de Mauritanie, décident par le présent accord de signer entre eux une paix définitive. Les deux parties ont décidé de la tenue de rencontres périodiques entre elles en vue de veiller à l'exécution des modalités enoncees au paragraphe "a".

La cérémonie de signature s'est déroulée en présence de M. Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, membre du Bureau politique, ministre conseiller à la Présidence et président de la Cour des Comptes, de M. Ablelhamid Mehri, membre du Comité central, ministre de l'Information et de la Culture, de M. M'Hamed Yala, membre du Comité central, ministre des Finances et de M. Ait Messaoudène, membre du Comité central, ministre des Industries légères.
Document IV:8

THE VOTES OF ARAB STATES ON THE WESTERN SAHARA QUESTION
(December 10, 1975)

PRO-ALGERIAN RESOLUTION

Resolution 3458/A (XXX) as recommended by fourth committee A/10427
adopted on December 10, 1975, meeting 2435 by roll call vote of 88 to 0,
with 41 abstentions.

Abstaining
- Bahrain
- Egypt
- Iraq
- Jordan
- Oman
- Qatar
- Saudi Arabia
- Sudan
- Tunisia
- United Arab Emirates

PRO-MOROCCAN RESOLUTION

Resolution 3458/B as recommended by fourth committee, A/10427, adopted by
Assembly on December 10, 1975, meeting 2435, by roll call vote of 56 to
42 with 34 abstentions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In Favour</th>
<th>Against</th>
<th>Abstaining</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Bahrain</td>
<td>- (Algeria)</td>
<td>- Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Iraq</td>
<td>- DR of Yemen</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Jordan</td>
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<td>- Kuwait</td>
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<td>- Lebanon</td>
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<td>- Mauritania</td>
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<td>- Oman</td>
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<td>- Qatar</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Saudi Arabia</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Tunisia</td>
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<tr>
<td>- United Arab Emirates</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE DE LA REUNION DE RABAT 
du 30 Mars au 3 Avril 1983

Un communiqué de presse algéro-marocain a été rendu public samedi à Alger et Rabat, à l'issue de la visite au Maroc d'une délégation algérienne, conduite par M. M'Hamed Yala, membre du Bureau politique, ministre de l'Intérieur.

Voici le texte intégral du communiqué:

"Dans le prolongement de la rencontre historique du 26 février entre Son Excellence M. Chadli Benjedid, Président de la République, Secrétaire général du FLN et Sa Majesté Hassan II, roi du Maroc, et suite à la visite de travail effectuée du 30 mars au 3 avril 1983 en Algérie par M. Driss Basri, ministre de l'Intérieur du gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi, M. M'Hamed Yala, membre du Bureau politique, ministre algérien de l'Intérieur, a effectué, à la tête d'une importante délégation, une visite au Maroc du 25 au 27 mai 1983, à l'invitation de son homologue marocain.

Au cours de son séjour, M. M'Hamed Yala, porteur d'un message du Président Chadli Bendjedid, a été reçu par Sa Majesté le Roi Hassan II.

Il a eu l'occasion de s'entretenir notamment avec les personnalités marocaines suivantes:

- Le Premier ministre du gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi, M. Maati Bouabid.
- Le Président du Parlement, M. Bey Ould Sidi Baba.
- Le ministre d'État chargé des Affaires étrangères, M. M'Hamed Boucetta.

"Le séjour du ministre algérien de l'Intérieur a été marqué en outre par une série d'entretiens, empreints de fraternité, de franchise et de mutuelle compréhension avec son homologue marocain, au cours desquels les deux responsables ont fait un large tour d'horizon des principales questions intéressant en particulier les rapports entre les deux pays frères.

"Les deux parties, qui se sont vivement félicitées de l'évolution des relations entre les deux pays, ont convenu de tout mettre en œuvre en vue d'une normalisation des rapports de solidarité et d'échange entre les deux pays frères et s'engagent à œuvrer ensemble avec toute l'ardeur qui convient en vue d'aplanir toutes les difficultés et d'éliminer tous les obstacles susceptibles de s'opposer à la normalisation engagée, afin de contribuer à l'édification d'un Maghreb uni et prospère.

Cette perspective a conduit à l'adoption d'un train de mesures concrettes visant:

- La libre circulation progressive des personnes et des biens.
- Le rétablissement des lignes aériennes dès le début du mois de juin 1983 et des lignes ferroviaires le plus rapidement possible dès que seront levées certaines contraintes d'ordre technique.

- Le développement et l'intensification de la coopération aux multiples plans des collectivités locales, de la protection civile, des transmissions, de la Sureté nationale et de la formation."
TRAITE DE FRATERNITE ET DE CONCORDE
BETWEEN ALGERIA AND TUNISIA,MARCH 19, 1983

Article 1er:
Les deux hautes parties contractantes s'engagent à œuvrer d'une façon continue pour la sauvegarde de la paix et de la sécurité entre elles et d'une façon générale envers tous les pays du Grand Maghreb Arabe et ce, dans le but de renforcer les relations de paix de fraternité et de bon voisinage existant entre les deux pays et basées sur leur appartenance au Grand Maghreb Arabe, sur l'unité de leur destin et sur le respect du principe de souveraineté nationale d'égalité des droits des peuples à leur droit de disposer de leur destin.

Article 2:
Les deux hautes parties contractantes, s'engagent à s'abstenir de recourir à la menace ou d'utiliser la force pour le règlement des différends qui unissent les deux peuples, pour la préservation d'une coopération fraternelle et fructueuse et pour assurer une paix durable entre-eux fondée sur le respect mutuel de l'intégrité territoriale, de l'intangibilité des frontières nationales, de la souveraineté et de l'indépendance politique de chacune d'elles. Elles s'engagent à résoudre les différends qui pourraient surgir entre elles par la voie de la consultation, de la négociation ou par toute autre voie pacifique.

Article 3:
Les deux hautes parties contractantes s'engagent à s'abstenir d'adhérer à toute alliance ou ensemble de nature militaire ou politique avec un ou plusieurs autres Etats contre l'indépendance politique, l'intégrité territoriale ou la sécurité d'une des parties contractantes. Les deux hautes parties contractantes s'engagent à n'autoriser aucune initiative ou action de nature belliqueuse prise par un ou plusieurs autres Etats contre l'une des deux parties.

Article 4:
Les deux hautes parties contractantes s'engagent à n'autoriser aucune organisation ou activité ou concentration sur le territoire de l'une des deux parties de nature à porter atteinte à la sécurité de l'autre partie, ou à son intégrité territoriale ou à une tentative de changer son régime par la violence.

Article 5:
Les deux hautes parties contractantes conservent leur complète liberté d'action en vue de signer tout accord avec d'autres Etats s'il ne contredit pas les arrêtés du présent traité.

Article 6:
Ce traité reste ouvert à l'adhésion d'autres Etats du Grand Maghreb Arabe qui acceptent ces décisions avec l'accord des deux hautes parties contractantes.
Article 7:
La durée de ce traité est de vingt ans. Son approbation reste soumise aux dispositions constitutionnelles de chaque pays et entre en vigueur à compter de la date d'échange des instruments de ratification. Ce traité sera reconduit pour la même durée si aucune des deux parties contractantes ne l'annule par écrit, un an avant la fin de la durée en vigueur.

Ce traité a été rédigé en langue arabe, à Tunis le 19 mars 1983. Il est signé par le président Chadli Bendjedid et le président Habib Bourguiba.

in El-Djeich, April 1, 1983.
Le débat sur le Sahara occidental a eu lieu vendredi soir avec l'examen du projet de résolution sur le Sahara occidental. Le Maroc a vainement tenté de bloquer la discussion en proposant une suspension de séance, mais sa proposition mise au vote, a été rejetée par 30 voix contre 15 et 4 abstentions.

La résolution adoptée par le 19ème sommet a été mise au point par un comité de rédaction comprenant le Sénégal, la Mauritanie et l'Éthiopie.

Voici le texte intégral de la résolution sur le Sahara occidental légèrement amendé dans la nuit de vendredi à samedi après un long débat par le 19ème sommet:

"La conférence au sommet des chefs d'État et de gouvernement de l'Organisation de l'Unité Africaine, réunie en sa 19ème session ordinaire à Addis Abeba (Éthiopie) du 6 au 11 juin 1983,

"Ayant examiné le rapport du comité de mise en œuvre des chefs d'État sur le Sahara occidental;

"Rappelant l'engagement solennel pris par Sa Majesté le Roi Hassan II lors du 18ème sommet d'accepter l'organisation d'un référendum sur le Sahara occidental en vue de permettre au peuple de ce territoire d'exercer son droit à l'autodétermination;

"Rappelant avec gratitude que Sa Majesté le Roi Hassan II a accepté la recommandation de la 6ème session du comité ad hoc des chefs d'État sur le Sahara occidental contenue dans le document AHG-103 (XVIII) B Annexe 1, ainsi que son engagement à coopérer avec le comité ad hoc dans la recherche d'une solution juste, pacifique et durable;

"Réaffirmant ses résolutions et décisions antérieures sur la question du Sahara occidental et en particulier la résolution AHG-RES.103 (XVIII) du 27 juin 1981;

"1) Prend acte du rapport du comité de mise en œuvre des chefs d'État sur le Sahara occidental;

"2) Exhorte les parties au conflit - le Royaume du Maroc et le Front Polisario - à entreprendre des négociations directes en vue de parvenir à un cessez-le-feu visant à créer les conditions nécessaires pour un référendum pacifique et juste sans aucune contrainte administrative ou militaire en vue de l'autodétermination du peuple du Sahara occidental sous les auspices de l'OUA et des Nations unies, et demande au comité de mise en œuvre de veiller au respect du cessez-le-feu;"
"3) Invite le Comité de mise en œuvre à se réunir dès que possible et en collaboration avec les parties au conflit pour définir les modalités et tout autre détail pertinent en vue de l'application du cessez-le-feu et de l'organisation du référendum dans les six mois à venir;

"4) Demande aux Nations unies d'installer conjointement avec l'OUA une force de maintien de la paix au Sahara occidental en vue de garantir la paix et la sécurité au cours de l'organisation du déroulement du référendum;

"5) Donne mandat au comité de mise en œuvre de prendre, avec la participation des Nations unies, toutes les mesures nécessaires afin d'assurer l'exécution correcte de la présente résolution;

"6) Demande au comité de mise en œuvre de faire rapport à la 20ème conférence au sommet des chefs d'État et de gouvernement des résultats du référendum, en vue de permettre au 20ème sommet de prendre une décision finale sur tous les aspects de la question du Sahara occidental;

"7) Décide de continuer à étudier la question du Sahara occidental;

"8) Demande au comité de mise en œuvre, dans le cadre de son mandat, de tenir compte des procès-verbal aux des 18ème et 19ème sessions ordinaires sur le problème du Sahara occidental et à cet effet invite le secrétaire général de l'OUA à mettre à la disposition du comité tous les textes des procès verbaux sus-spéciés;

"9) Se félicite de l'attitude constructive des dirigeants sahraouis qui, en se retirant volontairement et provisoirement, ont permis au 19ème sommet de se réunir".

in Revolución Africana, June 17-23, 1983
Chapter Six
Table VI1: PLANNED INVESTMENTS 1967-1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTORS</th>
<th>IN VOLUME* (millions of DA)</th>
<th>IN PERCENTAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hydrocarbons</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>46.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>44.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Industry</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>90.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>9.32</td>
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</table>

* prices of 1978

Source: Constructed from Bilan économique et social, 1980.

Table VI2: PER CAPITA GROWTH - Selected Sectors 1967 and 1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTOR</th>
<th>1967</th>
<th>1978</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>volume</td>
<td>percentage*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydrocarbons</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Hydrocarbon Industries</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Industry</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* as of GDP

Source: ibid
Table VI3: HYDROCARBON EXPORTS (million of DA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hydrocarbons Exports (Crude Oil)</th>
<th>Natural Gas Exports</th>
<th>Total Exports (Crude Oil + N.G + Products)</th>
<th>Hydrocarbons Sector as percentage of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>2,812</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>4,097</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>3,118</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>4,951</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>3,288</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>5,305</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>2,972</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>4,565</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>4,627</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>6,163</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>5,675</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>8,751</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>16,792</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>20,115</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>15,131</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>19,115</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>18,700</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>22,821</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>22,342</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>26,320</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>21,546</td>
<td>1,008</td>
<td>26,216</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>30,824</td>
<td>2,210</td>
<td>37,990</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>41,084</td>
<td>3,774</td>
<td>53,500</td>
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</table>

Table VI4: SONATRACH: LNG AND NATURAL GAS EXPORT CONTRACTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BUYER</th>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>QUANTITY (Billion cubic metres per year)</th>
<th>PLANNED DELIVERY DATE</th>
<th>TERM OF CONTRACT</th>
<th>STATUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British Gas Council</td>
<td>UK/Canvey Island</td>
<td>1.11 billion m³</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAZ DE FRANCE</td>
<td>FRANCE/Le Havre</td>
<td>0.56 billion m³</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAZ DE FRANCE</td>
<td>FRANCE/POS</td>
<td>3.70 billion m³</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISTRIGAS</td>
<td>US/EVEREST - Boston</td>
<td>1.90 billion m³</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENagas</td>
<td>Spain/Barcelona</td>
<td>4.76 billion m³</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Operational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EL-PASO I</td>
<td>US/Cove Point</td>
<td>10.95 billion m³</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Operational (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sub-total of operational sales 22.98 billion m³

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BUYER</th>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>QUANTITY (Billion cubic metres per year)</th>
<th>PLANNED DELIVERY DATE</th>
<th>TERM OF CONTRACT</th>
<th>STATUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DISTRIGAS</td>
<td>Belgium/Zeebruge</td>
<td>5.29 billion m³</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Contract signed &amp; approved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAZ DE FRANCE</td>
<td>FRANCE/MONTOIRE</td>
<td>5.45 billion m³</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Contract signed &amp; approved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRUNKLINE</td>
<td>US/LAKE CHARLES</td>
<td>4.76 billion m³</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Contract signed &amp; approved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THYSSENGAS/Brigitta</td>
<td>WEST GERMANY</td>
<td>4.23 billion m³</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Contract cancelled in 1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUHRGAS/SALZGITTER</td>
<td>WEST GERMANY</td>
<td>11.90 billion m³</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Contract signed &amp; approved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FERNGAS/GASUNIE</td>
<td>NETHERLANDS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENI (2)</td>
<td>ITALY (Gas pipeline)</td>
<td>12.00 billion m³</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Contract signed &amp; approved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUNISIA (2)</td>
<td>TUNISIA (Gas pipeline)</td>
<td>1.20 billion m³</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Contract signed &amp; approved</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sub-total of approved sales 45.90 billion m³

TOTAL OF Operational and approved sales 68.88 billion m³

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BUYER</th>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>QUANTITY (Billion cubic metres per year)</th>
<th>PLANNED DELIVERY DATE</th>
<th>TERM OF CONTRACT</th>
<th>STATUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EL-PASO II</td>
<td>US/MATAGORDA BAY</td>
<td>10.90 billion m³</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Contract cancelled in 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TENNECO</td>
<td>US/ ST JOHN</td>
<td>10.60 billion m³</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Contract signed &amp; approved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Canada/Brunswick</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWEGAS</td>
<td>SWEDEN</td>
<td>1.70 billion m³</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Contract signed &amp; approved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FERNGAS (3)</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>2.00 billion m³</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Under negotiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YUGOSLAVIA (3)</td>
<td>YUGOSLAVIA</td>
<td>2.00 billion m³</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Under negotiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAS DE FRANCE (4)</td>
<td>FRANCE</td>
<td>10.00 billion m³</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Operational</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Contract abandoned in 1980.
(2) Natural gas through hassi-R'MEL/TUNISIA/SICILY pipeline
(3) Natural gas through Hassi-R'MEL/TUNISIA/ITALY pipeline

Table VI: ALGERIA AND SAUDI ARABIA: General Statistics (1974)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>POPULATION (1,000)</th>
<th>POPULATION GROWTH (%)</th>
<th>GNP per capita</th>
<th>OIL RESERVES (millions of tons)</th>
<th>LIFE SPAN OF OIL RESERVES</th>
<th>PRODUCTION (OIL) (millions of barrels)</th>
<th>OIL REVENUES ($ billions)</th>
<th>NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION (1979) (1000 bl)</th>
<th>FINANCIAL ASSETS (December 1973) in $ million</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALGERIA</td>
<td>16,300</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>970</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>335.71</td>
<td>4,162</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>8,529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAUDI-ARABIA</td>
<td>8,200</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>16,764</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>2,947.8</td>
<td>27,213</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>14,380</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: various tables in Algeria's memorandum on oil and raw materials (1975)

- for natural gas production: OAPEC, Economics Department.
Table VI.6  THE EVOLUTION OF THE PRICE OF THE ALGERIAN LIGHT CRUDE (in US$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>45° Hassi Messaoud FOB Bedjaia</th>
<th>34° Saudi Light FOB Ras Tanura</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961-1963</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>1.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-1970</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>1.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971 (i,ii)</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>1.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971 (iii,iv)</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>2.33 a/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>2.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973 (i)</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>2.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973 (ii,iii)</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>2.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iv)</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>5.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974 (i,ii,iii)</td>
<td>14.00</td>
<td>11.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(iv)</td>
<td>12.75 a/</td>
<td>11.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975 (i)</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>11.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii,iii)</td>
<td>11.75</td>
<td>11.25</td>
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<tr>
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<td>21.00 a/</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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\* Average (in terms of length of time applicable) of a number of price values for the first three quarters of 1980 include a $3.00 exploration fee.
