An Ontology of Practice

by

Kanit Mitinunwong

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Declaration

The thesis is my own work and has not been submitted for a degree at another university.
Abstract

The thesis proposes an account of a notion of 'practice', which provides an understanding of how the world is made intelligible by having thought which is object-involving. The thesis investigates an ontology of practice, the nature of which is characterized in terms of object-engagement. On this account, practice provides content because a subject engages with objects in the world. My main argument is this: if the notion of practice is required in order to account for the possibility of content (that which provides the normative rationalising force on human action), then we need an account of practice in which norms are immanent. The basis of my account is McDowell's reading of Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations. I then develop a further supporting argument that if such an account of meaning is to provide the possibility of content, then we need an account of thought which 'directly' engages with objects in the world. That is to say, the only sort of thought which provides such an account of meaning and thereby provides content is the neo-Fregean idea of singular thoughts, namely, the idea that thought content is individuated by particular objects in the world. To gain such a notion of content, the neo-Fregean view provides an account of thought which satisfies two basic constraints on content, namely, the objectivity constraint and the rationality constraint. The notion of practice characterized under the neo-Fregean view requires an account of demonstrative thought the content of which is derived from the way a subject engages with objects in his environment. On this basis, the notion of practice which I propose captures both aspects of what constitutes content, namely, the aspect of the object the identification of which requires the idea of engagement in thought and the aspect of the subject the characterization of which requires an idea of agency whose engagement is with objects in the world.
Introduction

Historically\(^1\), the issue of practice and action plays a crucial role in ethics or moral philosophy whose concern is to understand human conduct. An example is the Aristotelian notion of *praxis* (action) which is a teleological notion, that is, *praxis* means action with purposes. The Aristotelian concept of practice is concerned with the meaning of the good life, for to understand what *praxis* is, one needs to take it in the context of the aim of living of a person. The debate on the Aristotelian notion of *praxis* is a separate issue which is not my concern in the thesis; however, it provides an important clue to our general understanding of what ‘practice’ means, that is, a meaningful purposive action or an intentional action. The point is how to account for the distinction of a meaningful action and a non-meaningful action.\(^2\) In the context of modern philosophy, the notion of practice seems to be related with the idea of pragmatism.\(^3\) Classical pragmatism, roughly, holds that objective truth is to be substituted with a pragmatic notion of truth or a relative notion of truth which is concerned with a proposition’s value in achieving ends. Such a notion of practice involves the notion of practice as a purposeful action, although it has rejected the idea of purpose or truth as an independent normative constraint on counting what practice is.

Pragmatisim is best seen as motivated by a reaction to ‘Cartesianism’. In general, Cartesianism means the view that what defines knowledge and truth is something internally independent from the external world. In responding to such an idea, knowledge and truth are defined as what is external to what is internal: whether it may be mind in contrast to bodily behaviour; private in contrast to public; individual in contrast to society. The external realm is the realm of action and behaviour. If Cartesianism in that sense is unsatisfactory, then it seems that the task is to find an account of what it is for action to pertain knowledge and truth, that is, an
account of a notion of practice.

My thesis is concerned with an account of practice which underpins an account of what it is for one to understand meaning; and thereby to possess thought content. If the point of understanding meaning in language involves understanding the aboutness or content of human thoughts; and if thoughts provide what rationalises human action, then studying meaning in that sense, namely, the account of meaning in terms of what thought is about, provides an understanding of human action. Its implication may be taken in a way that a study of human action provides an account of what it is for a subject to understand meaning or possess content of thought. Human action in that sense therefore has to be accounted for in terms of action which is directed to what it is about. In other words, there is a distinction between action which has content and that which does not. It is the former notion of action which involves an idea of practice.

The Wittgensteinian notion of practice can be said to be one of many responses to Cartesianism as shown in his ‘private language’ argument. The argument shows that the private meaning of a language concerning sensations and first-person experiences, such as pain, is logically impossible because there is no independent criterion for meaning in such a language. Wittgenstein’s response is to be found in his thesis that ‘meaning is in use’. It is derived from the rule-following argument: the argument that what it is for someone to follow a rule cannot be accounted for without appealing to a notion of rule which is not independently characterizable to rule-following. Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘use’, in which norms or rules are intrinsic, provides a ground for understanding a notion of practice. As Wittgenstein said, practice is the ‘bedrock’ of meaning, i.e. “This is simply what I do.” (PI 217) That is to
say, in a sense, the bedrock is the final justification of meaning. But ‘what I do’ in this sense cannot be taken as ‘what I do’ without constraints, otherwise, practice will not be different from a mere action of doing something which has no content. This means that there is an idea of normative constraint in understanding ‘what I do’. It is what distinguishes practice from the mere act of doing something. When we think about what the notion of practice means, it is indeed this idea of normative constraint on what we do which is the disputable issue. One might say that there is a problem about the source of the normative constraint on content, which is immanent to practice. In particular, there is the question about what it is for a subject to understand meaning or possess content?

However, whether we should tackle the question as about either understanding meaning or possessing content, it involves a hidden assumption about the connection between language and thought. This point is important because it is what drives different responses to the question from where the normative constraint is derived. That is to say, it is the issue whether language is prior to thought. The primary meaning of thought involves the idea of a relation between a subject’s psychology and the world. So if one thinks that language is prior to thought, there are two possible sources of norms, namely, the uncontroversial answer is linguistic structure and the controversial one is linguistic use. If, on the contrary, it is thought which is prior to language, the answer may lie in the direction of the phenomenology of our psychology.

According to the former sort of priority, roughly, the normative constraint in a controversial sense has its source mainly in a common linguistic use. This idea, in general, characterizes the notion of practice in terms of social practice. One reason for this is the attempt to reject the psychologism of meaning, i.e. the idea that meaning is in the mind. In
other words, it is the attempt to reject a Cartesian picture of mind, namely, that mind is independently characterized from external context. But in doing this, it has ignored the notion of point of view which is a crucial notion for understanding how the world which is mind-independent is a constraint on meaning. In order that the notion of point of view is included in understanding the world, such a notion can be accounted for in a modest sense of ‘Cartesianism’, namely, a conception of mind as what provides a way of thinking of the world. In that sense, mind cannot be characterized independently to objects. That is the position which takes thoughts to be prior to language.

However, as I said, the former sort of priority can be a controversial position if it takes the ‘cognitive’ role of a subject in accounting for meaning and use. But, as I will discuss in the thesis (e.g. Brandom and Burge’s view in chapter three), such a notion of cognitive role characterizes mind independently to the world. The problem with this is that such a notion is frictionless or lacks any constraint from the world. In general, apart from such views that I will discuss in the thesis, there are several other views which hold this sort of idea; such as Winch (1958), MacIntyre (1981), Dreyfus (1980, et.al), Turner (1994), Rouse (1996).

Such works propose different varieties of the notion of social practice, the details of which I do not discuss in the thesis. However, they share a similar assumption with Brandom and Burge that normativity does not have its source in the world which we directly perceive; rather the source of norms lies in an epistemic structure (or the idea of social practice) which is independently characterized from the world. I show some examples of such views below in order to illustrate this point.

While Winch concentrates on the idea of rule-governed behaviour in which what characterizes the notion of rule is a social practice, Dreyfus
characterizes the notion of practice as a skillful activity whose subject is an agent who acts toward object in the world. But, for MacIntyre, practice requires an idea of virtuous act which is more than a mere skill, and what provides the source of virtue is in the socially cooperative human activity. (See MacIntyre 1981:187) Turner’s view develops the idea of social practice in social theory by characterizing it in the sense of a naturalistic form of practice. It is the notion of habitus (Bourdieu, P.1990) or what he takes as Wittgenstein’s idea of forms of life, i.e. the idea which suggests that human practice is a form of biological pattern of living organisms. The idea of norms, for Turner, is in what he thinks as a constraint on an account of practice, that is, that account must be able to answer the question of how knowledge is transmitted among members of a social group.

Rouse’s notion of practice claims to be a combination of Winch, Brandom and Dreyfus’s views, in which an agent engages with the world. That is to say, he wants both sides of the constraint on an account of practice, namely, the constraint of the external world which is characterized by an idea of skill (Dreyfus) and the constraint of norms in a social world. However, Rouse’s account of practice cannot be said to meet the constraint of the external world because he thinks that although “practices are always simultaneously material and discursive”, “practices are spatiotemporally open.”. (see Rouse 1996:135) That is to say, for him, the spatiotemporal world is the world which has no norms. To account for practice as embedding in a causal structure leads to the eliminativist view that there are no normative concepts like truth, reason in the causal relation. (ibid.:156) Accordingly, it turns out that the world which a subject engages with in Rouse’s sense is the world which is not spatiotemporally bound. This means that the notion of practice in that sense does not reach out to the world in which norms are originated. The
main problem with such ideas on social practice involves the assumption that the world which we can have direct acquaintance with is the world which has no norms, so that norms are found in the sort of world which we do not directly engage with, that is, the social world. However, the social world does not provide the constraint of the external world which is independent from our will. What we gain at most from the social world is an inferentialist picture of norms the content of which is frictionless. That is to say, as inferentialism is the view that the inferential pattern of reasoning provides content of thought, the problem with inferentialism as I address in the thesis is that the content it provides is the sort of content which lacks the worldly constraint or friction which can only be found in the world with which we perceptually engage. The problem of inferentialism is obviously found in Brandom and Burge’s account of practice, as I will explain in the thesis.

The thesis suggests a way out by proposing an account of practice in which we can directly engage with the world and in which norms are immanent. That account of practice is based on the neo-Fregean view of singular thought. Such an account assumes the latter sort of priority of thought to language. That is because although language, as the vehicle of content, places some constraints on thought, the fundamental constraint concerning what it is for content to have correctness conditions is not supplied by language alone; it is supplied by that which content represents - the world. What I mean by the ‘world’ is that which provides truth-values to thought. Basically, it is a semantic notion, namely, what provides a condition for a thought to be true. It is in that sense that the worldly constraint provides friction to thought or the correctness condition of thought. However, such a semantic notion requires a notion of the world of spatiotemporal objects as what provides semantic values for thoughts. The key case which illustrates that idea and which shows
why a thought requires friction is the case of demonstrative thoughts. That is because demonstrative thoughts are a fundamental sort of thought which link thoughts directly with objects in the material world. A demonstrative thought picks out an object in the physical world as its semantic value. The content of thought is the meaning of a sentence whose semantic value is provided by individuation of an object. Thought in this sense involves the world, in the sense that it needs to be characterized on the basis of the interweaving of mind and world. This means that the source of norms lies in the external world which cannot be characterizable independently from mind.

The notion of practice based on this idea is hence more concerned with the metaphysics of thought, namely, the account of how mind and world are connected. It is that sort of account of the notion of practice that can be called the investigation into an ontology of practice contra to a social ontology of practice. If there is the role of mind in the social ontology of practice, it is what is called the study of the common mind. But the ontology of practice provides the idea that there is the world which is mind-independent and constrains our thoughts, but it is the world which cannot be independently characterizable. If there is the role of a common mind in this sort of practice, it is what at most can be accounted for in terms of ‘a capacity for a meeting of minds’. (see McDowell 1984a) In other words, the possibility of understanding other minds does not require understanding of a commonality of thoughts; rather it requires the understanding that the common mind is constituted by no more than a particular ‘mind’ or person as an object. At most, if there is a social dimension of practice, it can be said to be involved in the sense that thought content is normatively constrained by an engagement with another ‘mind’ or object. However, this is still not similar to saying that a social practice is the origin of norms. One reason is that the idea of social
practice assumes an idea which the notion of practice as an engagement with an object does not assume, namely, a generalization of a pattern of practice which is independently characterizable. The rule-following considerations have shown that such a generalization generates a regress problem because there is no independent worldly constraint. An account of a notion of practice requires both the idea of the world as an objective constraint on our understanding and the idea of our minds as its rational constraint. This means that, to answer the question in the previous paragraph, the notion of practice which provides the idea of what it is to be a possessor of content requires an account of how those two constraints are immanent to practice.

This thesis offers an investigation into an ontology of practice. The notion of practice that I propose is an ontological notion, namely, an account of the notion of practice requires an account of how norms originating from the interweaving of the world and mind are immanent in practice. This means that an account of content requires constraints, namely, the constraint from the world which I call the objectivity constraint (I use 'worldly constraint' and 'objectivity constraint' interchangeably,) and the constraint from the mind which I call the rationality constraint. On this account, practice provides content because a subject engages with an object in the world. The idea of object-engagement is based on the neo-Fregean idea of singular thoughts in which the notion of content provided is a demonstrative content. Demonstrative content can capture both constraints on content. This means that the notion of practice has to be accounted for in terms of the rational link of the subject and object, rather than a pure causal link alone. The notion of practice which shows what it is to be a possessor of content requires the notion of the possessor as an agent who engages with objects.
In order to elaborate the above idea of practice, the thesis is divided into five chapters. I first begin with McDowell's reading of Wittgenstein's rule-following consideration in order to provide a reason why the notion of practice in which norms are immanent is a way out of the dilemma of the rule-following. Such notion of practice relies on a model of norms which constrain use of a language in a unitary sense; that is what I will call the unitary model of use. As mentioned above, this account of practice rests on the notion of thought which is a Fregean notion, namely, thought is the meaning of a sentence, the aboutness of which is grasped from a subject’s 'perspective'. The notion of content hence requires a characterization both in the sense of linguistic content and mental content. By saying that, I mean the notion of content is constituted by both the conceptual element or the inferential structure and the causal element or the referential structure. The connection of both elements is a constitutive connection in the sense that an account of content which is constrained by norms cannot be reduced to either one or the other element. The constitutive account of content can be accounted for as a way out from the dilemma of the rule-following considerations.

That is to say, on the one horn, if what determines meaning is independent from our understanding, the result is either a paradox of rule-following -- whatever we do can be interpreted as following a rule or a regress of interpretation of what a rule is; on the other horn, if what determines meaning is in what we do in the sense that there are no norms built in, then we are at risk of a frictionless picture of what we do. Hence, an account of content which does not fall into the dilemma requires the idea of norms built into what we do.

In chapter two, I elaborate the neo-Fregean idea of singular thoughts. That is because in order to show how norms are intrinsic to
object-engagement, we need a notion of thought which is object-dependent, that is, the idea of singular thoughts. A singular thought is a thought the content of which is derived from an object's individuation. The idea of individuating an object in thought that I bring in here is the neo-Fregean notion of singular thought. That is to say, thought which singles out an object is the thought which provides content that meets two constraints on content, namely, the objectivity constraint and the rationality constraint. The notion of content which is derived from singular thoughts is a demonstrative content, although the context sensitivity of such thought applies also to indexicals—I, now, here. Demonstrative thought is context-dependent, that is, the meaning of the demonstrative is varied to its reference. The two constraints on content are possible only if they are based on the modest notion of Cartesian mind—an account of a subject's perspective which cannot be characterized independently from the external world or the objective framework. So this means that demonstrative content is an externalist notion of content.

Chapter three deals with the issue of externalism of content in order to show that the only externalism which can capture both constraints on content is the neo-Fregean view of singular thoughts. Other sorts of externalism, namely, the causal-theoretic externalism (Putnam) and the social externalism (Burge, Brandom, and Bilgrami) fail to provide either the rationality constraint or the worldly constraint. This shows that perceptual demonstrative thoughts provide the possibility of norms immanent to the engagement of the subject with an object. It is in this chapter that the contrast between the paradigm of inferentialism and representationalism helps clarify the picture of the two constraints. The difference between inferentialism and representationalism is roughly this—while inferentialism prioritises the inferential structure of thought or
language use to the referential structure or the world, representationalism prioritises the referential structure to the inferential one. Social externalism falls into the side of inferentialism the problem with which is that the notion of content is frictionless. In contrast, the singular thoughts externalism can provide what both inferentialism and representationalism want, that is, the idea that content is constituted by both the inferential and the referential element.

Chapter four and five thereby provide the notion of practice based on the ideas in the first three chapters. Chapter four summarises the basic thesis in the previous chapter in order to show that the notion of practice we need is not an interpersonal notion of practice. Rather we need an account of practice as object-engagement which is an intrapersonal notion. The notion of practice in this sense is confined to one particular person in the sense that is based on the modest conception of Cartesian picture of mind; however, it is based on the idea that an engagement with an object provides content only on the basis of the rational link between subject and object in the external world. In chapter four, I focus on the object side. The debates among those who hold the idea of singular thoughts are discussed, e.g. the contrast between two sorts of account of content (McDowell and Peacocke), the contrasting view on the notion of object-identification. (Campbell and Brewer). Then in chapter five, I focus on the subject's side of object-engagement, that is, the notion of agency. The account of practice as object-engagement provides the idea of agency the characterization of which involves the notion of self as a body or an element located in the objective spatio/temporal world. The notion of the self in this sense requires the owner of experiences who engages or acts toward objects in the objective world.
Notes

1. An interesting introduction to history of philosophical aspect of the issue of practice, see Bernstein, R.J. 1971
2. see McDowell 1980
Chapter One: Following a Rule

In this chapter, I shall argue that an account of meaning and content requires an account of human behaviour in which norms are intrinsic. Such an account is crucial as a basis for constructing a notion of practice. The account is suggested by the role of the idea of practice found in Wittgenstein's rule-following argument. The argument shows that "the meaning of a word is its use" (PI 43) and I suggest that the idea of use reveals a concept of practice that provides meaning and content. (PI 198, 199, 202) An account of what it is to understand meaning involves an account of the rationality of human acts. In that sense, it may be said that practice provides a fundamental ground for rationalising human behaviour.

The rule-following argument is introduced because it shows that the central feature of the concept of meaning is that meaning is that which accounts for the rationality of our behaviour. Meaning has a normative rationalising force. That is to say, if, according to the rule-following argument, meaning is understood in terms of use, then the concept of 'use' has to meet two basic constraints concerning the normative rationalising force of meaning. Such constraints are derived from the fact that in accounting for meaning, there is a relation between rules and rule-follower. The first constraint can be called the objectivity constraint because it is the nature of normative patterns to be independent from the rule-follower or language-user; and the second constraint is called the rationality constraint for the normative patterns cannot be independently characterized from their role in rationalising the behaviour of the language-user.

The idea of meaning as use provides an account of meaning which
can account for both constraints. The first constraint is based on the idea that: if a symbol has meaning, then it must satisfy the basic semantic constraint that there exists correctness/incorrectness conditions for its use. It is the basic notion of correctness conditions that provides the fundamental normativity to meaning. The normativity supplied by correctness conditions introduces a basic notion of truth. It introduces a basic idea of objective standards which supplies a normative constraint on meaning. I shall argue that the norms of correct use are intrinsic to use. I argue for this on the basis of my understanding of the rule-following arguments. The intrinsic of norms means that the language-user plays a role in accounting for the normativity of meaning and thereby the objectivity of meaning. The language user’s central role here means that both the objectivity constraint and the rationality constraint have to be met at the same time. Both constraints are accounted for in the way that although the normative constraint is not independently characterizable from a subject’s understanding or point of view, its objectivity, i.e. the objectivity of meaning, does not depend on the subject’s characterization of it.

The two constraints have to be accounted for at once. As I will propose, if the point of the rule-following argument is to account for what it is for meaning to be normative, then the argument must be taken to be concerned with the notion of use in a unitary sense, i.e. the use to which normativity is intrinsic. This is the model of use that I call a unitary model. Such a model is not a reductionist model in which norms are replaced with use or vice versa. It is a model which suggests that the objectivity of meaning, i.e. with objective correctness conditions, can be directly grasped without being reduced either to other sorts of conditions or to the use itself.
By analogy, to understand meaning is to directly 'perceive' truth-conditions, i.e. the conditions under which truth-values/ correctness values can be assigned to a sentence. If such a model of use provides an idea of practice which provides meaning and content, we need a notion of practice in which it is possible to say that one can stand in direct perceptual awareness of that which constrains content, namely, truth-conditions. One way to think about such a constraint --the semantic constraint of correctness conditions -- is to think of it as the constraint imposed on language use by the 'world'. By 'world' I mean both that which impinges on us in perception and that which constrains word use, that is, truth-conditions. It is the same thing that constrains our perception of meaning and our perception of the world. The world is a constraint on content in such a way that although the world is independent from our perception and understanding, it is not independently characterizable from understanding. On that way of thinking, there is a notion of use and hence practice in which the world is not only intrinsic but also directly open to perception.

Briefly, what I will argue for in this chapter is the thesis that following Wittgenstein's idea of meaning as use, the notion of use must be the notion which provides the idea that the norms of meaning are intrinsic to practice. I shall start this exploration by investigating the concept of use according to the unitary model, in particular, McDowell's reading of Wittgenstein. (McDowell 1984a) This investigation is crucial because it provides a ground for developing the idea of practice which I propose in this thesis. I shall then, in the next chapter, turn to employ the theory of singular thought as a way of developing McDowell's reading.

The structure of this chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section provides a general introduction to the problem of rule-following based on McDowell's reading of Wittgenstein. In doing so, I
show that the substantive point underlying different ways of reading the rule-following argument is two contrasting notions of ‘use’ according to the contrasting models of meaning, namely, what I call the two-component model of meaning in which the notion of use is extrinsically constrained, and the unitary model of meaning in which the notion of use is intrinsically constrained. The second section provides some examples of the two-component model and then brings in McDowell’s unitary model for criticising the two-component model. The final section discusses how McDowell’s transcendental argument provides the way out of the dilemma that lies at the heart of the rule-following considerations. This argument offers the picture of practice as constitutive of normativity without a need to reject the objectivity of meaning. On this account, the central question is: How are norms immanent in practice? I provide an answer to this in the next chapter by examining the idea of singular thoughts.

1. The Rule-following Argument

What I will do in this section is to identify the problem of rule-following in a way which provides a reason for taking the unitary model of meaning. However, I show, at the outset, that although in general the rule-following argument can be read as a contrast between a sceptical argument and a non-sceptical argument, the substantive contrast is rather of the different notions of ‘use’, namely, the notion of use according to the two-component model and the unitary model. In the following, I provide a preliminary reason for reading the argument this way, and then a simple reading of the rule-following problem according to the unitary model’s approach. In the next section, I will show why the two-component model -- in particular, as found in Kripke and Wright-- cannot capture the idea of meaning as use and thereby the idea of practice as being constitutive of norms.
1.1. The Contrasting Models of Meaning

The rule-following argument concerns the nature of the normativity of meaning. For an expression to have meaning, it is subject to normative patterns, i.e. the conditions under which an expression can be judged as correct or incorrect. Such conditions can be called truth-conditions in the sense that knowing the meaning of an expression is knowing the conditions of what makes the expression correct or incorrect. The central puzzle put forward in the rule-following arguments concerns the nature and existence of the normative patterns that govern meaning and use. It seems inescapable that there are normative patterns that constitute the correct and incorrect use of words. However, any attempt to state those patterns is met with an infinite regress, for any statement of the patterns can never fully articulate the pattern: any particular statement could always be interpreted in more than one way. This seems to render the very notion of patterns of correct usage unstable. The rule-following arguments then threaten the following dilemma: if there is such a thing as the patterns of correct use, they cannot be articulated without fear of infinite regress, so no account can be given of them. Alternatively, if we reject the idea of the existence of such patterns, then we are left with no notion of the normativity of meaning, the very idea of correctness and incorrectness evaporates. 4

Neither horn of the dilemma is tenable. It has often seemed that the way out of the dilemma is to embrace a reductionist account of the patterns of correct usage in terms that make them stateable without regress. The reductionist move is one that replaces the idea of truth-conditions as the key concept in articulating the patterns of correct usage with a weaker semantic notion, such as assertability-conditions. That is because the reductionist account assumes that the notion of truth-conditions is different from correctness conditions. That is to say, the
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reductionist views the notion of truth-conditions as being stronger than correctness conditions in the sense that while the idea of truth-conditions assumes the idea of an objective truth which is transcendent of our knowledge, the idea of correctness conditions suggest a notion of truth relative to knowledge. The strong notion of truth-conditions, which the rule-following argument is often taken to be against, is the full-blooded truth-conditions captured in the Platonic imagery of norms as absolute fixed standards. What the reductionist account offers is to reject the idea of truth-conditions and replace it with a weaker sort of correctness condition. But the problem is that to reject the idea of truth-conditions in such a way means that there is no place for the normative patterns to provide friction to use which is possible only if they are autonomous from use. An upshot is that it is at risk of providing an idealist notion of pattern, that is to say, an account in which there is no independent criterion external to use which provides a distinction between use which seems to be correct and that which is correct. That sounds similar to the problem of the private language argument, namely, the argument that if there is no independent normative constraint for a language about mental states, then talking about meaning of a private language is absurd because what seems right is not distinct from what is right.5

To be more precise, what the rule-following argument shows is that if the normativity of meaning is transcendent of use, there is a dilemma of following a rule: either there is meaning but then, because of regress, no account is available, or normativity gets lost and we revert to use characterized without norms, i.e. the sub-bedrock. Accordingly, the way out from the above dilemma requires the idea of normative patterns in which truth-conditions cannot be separated from correctness conditions because the core idea of truth-conditions is the correctness conditions. In other words, the pattern of correct usage can be articulated in a way that
the objectivity of meaning is characterizable from within a subject’s perspective. Such normative patterns do not require a reductionist account, and they are intrinsic or immanent to use.6

Indeed, it is better to say that the dilemma arises because of a bifurcation of rules and following the rules or between norms and use. That is to say, the first horn arises from a wide space between norms and use, but then once there is no space, the second horn arises as the problem of no normative friction. To put it in more details, the dilemma arises on a presupposition that the notion of use itself is non-normative, that is, what is in the use is merely a descriptive fact-- what we have done, are doing, and will do with an expression, rather than a normative fact-- what we should do. Such a notion of use requires norms to be added to use in order for meaning to be possible. In other words, the use requires interpretations by norms which are extrinsic to it. But the dilemma of rule-following shows the problems of such notion of use. The first horn tries to specify norms that are beyond the characterization of use. But if norms are rejected as in the second horn, then the notion of use is simply non-normatively constrained, and thereby there is no meaning or content.

However, meaning is normative, so grasp of meaning requires an account of the objectivity of norms which is not independently characterized from the use of the expression and yet which also supplies a constraint on use. That is to say, the normativity of meaning requires a notion of use to which its normativity is immanent. This means that we need a notion of use which has only one component in which the normative constraint is immanent and this provides the basic semantic constraint on content of correctness conditions which are truth conditions. Saying that normativity and thereby meaning is in use still requires some notion of the autonomy of rules, i.e. the objectivity of rules. The question
of what it is for meaning to be normative requires an account of the objectivity of meaning which is both not independently characterizable from a subject's understanding and use, and yet autonomous from use. This means that it is a substantive issue to show the possibility of the notion of use in which the objectivity of rules can be immanent.

Contrasting models of meaning can be drawn from the above in the following way.

The main idea is that —

(M) Meaning is normatively constrained.

There are two possible models of the notion of use which account for (M):

(E) Use is extrinsically normatively constrained in such a way that meaning is composed of two components, namely, the component of use which is neutral or non-normative, for it is characterized independently of the normative constraint and the component of the constraint on use.

From the above model, the latter component is the notion of norms that are extrinsic to use. The second model is:

(I) Use is intrinsically normatively constrained in such a way that there is only one component of what provides meaning, namely, the notion of use which is normative in the sense that although norms are not independently characterizable from use, they are nevertheless independent from us in the sense that they constrain use.

The two possible models (E) and (I) are the contrasting models of meaning which I called the two-component model and the unitary model respectively. 7 Dividing the notion of use in this way helps clarify the term 'autonomy' or 'independency' of norms. There is an ambiguity in this
term that depends on the way the notion of objectivity of meaning is characterized. Objectivity of meaning roughly means that for meaning to be possible, it requires norms for constraining use in such a way that norms are independent from use. But the problem concerns the meaning of the independence of norms. From the two models, there are two meanings for saying that norms are independent from use. On the model (E) norms are independent in the sense that norms are extrinsic to use, that is to say, norms exist independently of the understanding of a user of language. However, the notion of independence in this sense leads to more problems, for the obvious treatment is to take norms as supplied by interpretation. On that treatment, a familiar regress looms. On the model (I) norms are independent although intrinsic to use, that is, norms exist independently of the user, but they are characterized in a way that is dependent on the user's engagement with things. A simple example may be this. Suppose I am teaching a child the game of volleyball. The rules of the game are independent from me and the child in the sense that they cannot be determined by our will. If it is not so, anything can be said to accord with my own will. Whatever I do with the ball is subject to the rules or truth-conditions; otherwise the game has no point. So there must be what makes my playing correct/incorrect. But the independency of the rules cannot be characterized beyond my understanding of what the rules are and thereby in my engagement with the game; otherwise, there will be a threat of regress of interpretation to find the rule as an infinite rail. This means that it is in playing the game where the rules are engaged from my point of view, which constrains my understanding of what the rules are.

In sum, the point is about how to account for the thesis of meaning (M). The two possible models (E) and (I) are the contrasting models of meaning which I think is the substantive contrast underpinning the various readings of the rule-following argument. Such different
readings are mainly known as the sceptical reading and the reductio ad absurdum reading. My point will be that although those arguments propose different readings of the rule-following argument, the differences are superficial. Indeed, they share the model of meaning (E). In the following, I provide a brief outline of why I think the sceptical argument and the reductio argument (of the reductionist sort) share model (E). A more detailed criticism of both arguments, in particular, Kripke and Wright’s view, will be provided in the later section.

1.2. Varieties of Reading of the Rule-Following Argument

Textually, the main difference between the sceptical and reductionist readings concerns PI 201. The sceptical reading takes the first paragraph of PI 201 or the paradox of rule-following as the core idea of the rule-following argument. The argument’s structure is as follows. The premise is that for a language to have meaning, there must be some rules or facts providing meaning to the language. But it is not possible to establish such rules or facts without facing a paradox that every action of following a rule can be said to accord with the rule. The sceptical conclusion is that once there are no facts constituting meaning, language is meaningless. Meanwhile, the reductio reading takes the whole section of PI 201 as the main argument but in such a way that the premise under attack is that of the idea of rules which transcend our understanding. But it is paradoxical to follow the rule as such because it leads to the absurdity that there is no distinction between correctly and incorrectly following a rule. The solution which both sorts of reading suggest is to revise the notion of rule (or as generally known as the objectivity of meaning or what I called the full-blooded notion of truth-conditions) into a weaker concept of rules. The weaker concept then introduces correctness conditions that do not transcend speakers' knowledge, e.g. assertability conditions.
However, both sorts of reading fall into a dilemma. They take the point of the rule-following argument as against the notion of the objectivity of meaning which transcends use, and that the solution is to employ a notion of objectivity which does not transcend use. But this means that what they assume is the idea of the two-component model, that is, to take the notion of use as lacking of normative content, so that it requires another missing component to provide the norms of meaning. That is why the two sorts of reading offer a solution in a way that the normative constraint has to be revised. So, they are threatened with a dilemma. Either there is a regress in the attempts to specify the missing component that provides the normative standard, or that missing component is lost and, with it, normativity. The sceptic faces the loss, the reductionist attempts to make do with something less than what appears to be lost by providing a reduced conception of the normative standards. That is because both sorts of reading share the model of meaning (E).

Having said that, it is probably more obvious to look in particular at the case of the sceptical reading. As mentioned above, it is thesis (M) that both sorts of reading take for granted to be the point of the rule-following argument, namely, that the argument concerns the nature of the normativity of meaning. In order for meaning to possible, it requires a standard of correct/incorrect use of expressions or truth-conditions. The point of knowledge of truth-conditions is that in knowing these conditions, one knows under what circumstances one should/should not apply the expression. That is to say, one has knowledge of a normative constraint on expression use. The rule-following argument appears to propose a sceptical puzzle that consists in showing that such knowledge of truth-conditions is impossible. The puzzle arises from reflections that show that there is no non-circular account available of what it is to know such normative constraints.
The way this idea is usually expressed is to say that understanding an expression, e.g. the word 'game' or the instruction 'add 2' must be to know what determines correct use. The idea of knowledge of normative constraint is just another label for the idea of understanding the normative rule that governs use. The key point to the scepticism is that the content of the knowledge required for knowledge of meaning is a normative content; it is knowledge of what should/should not be done with expressions. The sceptical argument insists that there is no account available in terms of learning and in terms of what one does that could constitute normative knowledge. In learning a concept one learns that it has been used in such-and-such circumstances. The puzzle is how to make the transition from how it has been used to how it should be used. Similarly, an account of what one does with an expression does not show what one should do. The former is simply a record of how the expression is used and from that it is unclear how to derive an account of how it should be used.

This way of characterizing the core shape to the rule-following argument makes plain that the argument assumes that what is available in an account of use is something that lacks the full-blooded normativity required for meaning. That is why the scepticism concentrates on the transition from what is/has been the case, to what should be the case. This is the model (E) or the two-component model: meaning as such requires both use, conceived independently of the normative constraint on use, plus that which provides the normative constraint. The response to this argument structure that I advocate, namely, the model (I) can now be simply expressed. It is the response that allows that the description of use (practice) is a description of something that is intrinsically normative for the normativity is immanent to use. And that is the response that requires that in our use of expressions we can manifest a direct knowledge of
truth-conditions.

In sum, what I have tried to show here is that the general picture of the two sorts of reading of the rule-following argument -- sceptical and reductio reading-- should be replaced with the picture of a contrast between the two models (E) and (I). In the following, I will identify the problem of rule-following based on the framework of the model (I) by considering Wittgenstein’s rule-following argument on a textual basis. In doing so, I divide my review into three main questions. First-- why is an account of meaning relevant to an account of rule and rule-following? That is to say, why cannot the notion of rule be accounted for independently from understanding what the rule is? Second, if an account of meaning requires an account of understanding and use, then in what sense should such an account be given? On this point, there is a contrast of an account of psychologism and behaviourism in which norms or rules are not immanent. So it seems that there is a relation between rule and use/understanding. The last question is that if such a relation is not a reductionist relation, in which understanding a rule always an interpretation, then in what sense should such a relation be accounted for? That is to say, if the use and the rule are not two separate components of meaning, then what does it mean to say that use is constitutive of meaning because norms are immanent to use?

1.3. The Review of the Rule-Following Argument According to the Model (I)

1.3.1. Does an account of meaning require an account of rule?

In non-linguistic activities, the question about following a rule is found in, e.g., playing a game, say, tennis, where there are sets of rules provided as a defining characteristic of the game and also as a standard of correctness. The notion of rule may be accounted for as having two
functions, namely, a descriptive and normative function. Descriptively, rules characterize what it is to play a game. Though such a notion of rule does not prescribe how a player ought to play a game, it provides a constraint in the sense that in order to be counted as playing such and such a game, the player needs to follow an instruction of what it is to play tennis. As rules constrain playing a game, they provide a standard of correctness which normatively constrains playing a game because they say what is correct or incorrect in playing the game. But following the instruction may turn out not to be in the way which the instruction states. This means that in following the rule, there is a normative element of what one ought to do, rather than merely a descriptive element of what we simply do. So it seems that the problem of following a rule is there when one questions whether what we ought to do is in accord with the rule.

Put another way, understanding the meaning of a game or what the game is about is not constituted by the rule; rather it is constituted by the application of the rule in playing the game. That is because even though it is clearly stated what the rules are, the problem still involves the question of how to follow, or actually how rules are applied in practice. However, it seems that rules are what establish what meaning is. That is to say, all the future answers of what is correct or incorrect are already fixed by the rules. It is as if all the possible answers have been set in advance of our applications. (PI 189,190) So that, it is not possible for the future answers to deviate from what the rules state or predict. But such a notion of rules brings in a problem.

Wittgenstein’s example (PI 143,185) shows the problem. One learns the meaning of a rule ‘plus two’ by showing the ability to continue a numerical series, e.g. 2,4,6,8…. If rules determine all the future answers in advance of all the applications, then in teaching a pupil to add
two, the pupil must be able to continue the series on the ground that he is following the rule of add two. But in judging whether he follows the rule, we look at his former answers. This means that what the pupil has learnt about the rule is within the finite examples of numbers, say 1000. A problem begins when beyond 1000, he writes 1004, 1008, 1012. If rules already constrain the step or its answer, then how are we to rationalise his answer in that case? -- whether he follows the same rule of 'plus two' or he has understood the rule in the way that after 1000 the answer will be randomly selected or that means he just doesn't understand the rule at all? That is to say, such a notion of rule, a rigid machine or the superlative fact (PI192), brings in either of the two horns of the dilemma -- either a regress of interpretations of the rule or a paradox that there is no distinction between following the rule and conflicting with it. (PI 201)

So although rules provide a standard of correctness, it cannot be such a notion of rule as the superlative fact, i.e. rules which establish all the answers beyond the characterization of its use and understanding of the subject. This means that in order to grasp their normative power, such grasp must be in the knowledge of use. Knowing how to follow it is indeed a matter of understanding the rule. The question of what counts as knowing how to follow a rule is hence similar to the question of what counts as understanding a rule. In other words, the notion of rule cannot be accounted for separately from the notion of understanding, and thereby from an account of mastery of techniques or use: practice. (PI 199, 202)

Another way to reinstate the above issue is this. Even though it is clearly stated in the rule about what is correct or not, a problem is still possible when we apply the rule, namely, the problem that what we do can be otherwise from what the rule states. In PI 125, a puzzle about the determination of rule on meaning seems to start when we wonder that
even though rules are set, when we follow them, "things do not turn out as we had assumed". It seems that we are always 'entangled' in our own rules. But "This entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand (i.e. get a clear view of)." (PI 125). We want to understand it because it seems that meaning extends beyond what is stated in the rule, that is, beyond the prediction of the rule. It is the 'entanglement' in rules which "throws light on our concept of meaning something." (ibid.)

The possibility of things not turning out as we anticipate even if we are following rules, illustrates a basic point expressed with the idea of entanglement. It might be thought that the fact that things turns out different to what was anticipated shows that whether there are rules makes no difference to what we mean. In other words, meaning is possible even if there are no rules. But that is not right because if talking about rules has no sense, then that would mean that there is no point in talking about meaning at all. If an account of meaning does not require a notion of rule, then there is no meaning in what we do. If there are no rules, then there is no distinction between what seems to be right and what is right.

What the idea of entanglement illustrates is then this: that even though we are governed by rules, and in that sense there must be some sense to the idea that the rule imposes upon behaviour, nevertheless, the rule need not be conceived as something utterly independent of behaviour. We can be entangled in it. What this shows is that although to conceive of rules as independent of use is problematic and invites either a regress of explanation or an implausible platonistic metaphysics about the constraints on use, it still must be the case that a rule that is intrinsic to use provides some notion of imposition; otherwise, there is no standard. The idea of entanglement indicates the core difficulty that needs to be understood,
namely, how can something both be immanent to use and provide standards for use.

P1142-3 may provide some answers. Although the context of PI 142-3 is about the issue of whether understanding is the source of norms, what underpins it is this idea that if there is no distinction between whether what we do is subject to the rule or not, then what we do is just 'broken' or 'comes to an end', that is, it has no 'meaning' in what we do. So there has to be a notion of standard, even if it is not one that is extrinsic to use.

In PI 142, Wittgenstein distinguishes between a normal case: the use of words is prescribed and an abnormal case: if the rule became an exception and an exception the rule, then a language game loses its point. An example is the case of trying to fix the price of a lump of cheese which grows or shrinks by the turn of the scale. There may be two possibilities to understand this case, namely, we need the notion of rule which is fixed or independent from what it measures or else we need the notion of rule which is varied to what it measures. In the latter case, there will be no friction supplied by the rule.

That is more obvious in the example provided in PI. 143. An example is of teaching an order of numbers 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, ... to a pupil. A normal case is that in learning the order, the pupil can be wrong or make a mistake. But an abnormal case is the case in which the teacher takes what he does as a variation of what the pupil does. If understanding the order of numbers is in the sense of the abnormal case, it means that the pupil's capacity to learn from the teacher comes to an end. That is to say, once rules are not independent from use, then there are no rules or no criteria for doing correctly or incorrectly at all. Accordingly, an account of
meaning requires a notion of rules the objectivity of which is both independent from our use in following it and also intrinsic to use. The further question is if rules cannot be entangled extrinsic to the use, then in what sense are they intrinsic to use? That is to say, we need an account of understanding which provides meaning.

1.3.2. What it is to understand a rule?

The ‘entanglement’ with rules illustrates the notion of use which is governed or constrained by rules. Meaning is related to use in a way that use is a part of the notion of rule. This is the concept of thick use or the use according to the unitary model, i.e. the notion of use which rules intrinsically constrain. It is contrary to the concept of thin use -- the two-component model-- where rules extrinsically constrain use. The notion of use which provides the idea of entanglement has to be accounted for as the notion of use in which understanding of the rules is intrinsic. Basically, this is the idea such that understanding of meaning does not require interpretation. But this is different from saying that understanding is accounted for as a sort of use, which means that understanding is use. Understanding is not identical with use because it may mean two things: first, understanding means an outer behaviour or the use; second, understanding means an inner process, which Wittgenstein calls ‘an imaginary application’ (see RFM, p.334, no.32).

Problems with the first meaning concern the idea of behaviourism, namely, the problem that norms are threatened with being naturalised into use. And the problem with this is that under the naturalisation the normative 'should' of meaning is replaced with a non-normative 'is'. This is the point at issue when Wittgenstein asks whether when I think that I understand a rule, I say “now I understand” is similar to “now I can go on” in the sense that it describes a mental process occurring behind a
process of applying the rule. (PI 148-154) To expand the point a bit more: if meaning is use, understanding meaning is characterizable in terms of use; however, this is not meant in the sense that understanding fits with the use in an identical sense. Such a notion of understanding is a reductionist notion or the model which I called (E'), that is, normativity is 'inherited' in use. 11 The inheritance of norms in use means the notion of use being explained in terms of a description of use. If an account of understanding is provided in terms of use or is reduced to the use understood in the thin descriptive sense, then no account seems possible of norms which constrain use. This is because a normative constraint is not independent of use, so that there is no distinction provided between use which accords to the rules and that which is against the rules.

The problem with the second meaning is that if the application is an inner process in the sense that is not related to the external world, it is unclear how a normative distinction within the internal mind is possible. As Wittgenstein said: "And if it is now said: "Isn't it enough for there to be an imaginary application?" the answer is: no. (possibility of a private language)" (ibid.) That is because "A game, a language, a rule is an institution." (ibid.) It means that the application which provides meaning requires the idea of use which is constrained by the external world. 'An institution' in this sense is the normative constraint on meaning which is external or independent from the application.

This is also the point in RFM VI-15 where Wittgenstein makes a distinction between following a rule ("If you follow the rule, you will produce this") and following it as best one can ("If you follow the rule as best you can, you will... "). The difference is that in the former case, there is no genuine prediction of following a rule because "the concept of following the rule is so determined, that the result is the criterion for
whether the rule was followed". (RFM 317) That is to say, following a rule in this sense, one may be able to follow it correctly or incorrectly because the criterion is within following the rule. Meanwhile, the latter case is a genuine case of prediction because it is the case that one tries to follow a rule whether correctly or not. In such a case, trying to follow a rule can be characterized as a mental process where there is no criterion. For the correctness of following a rule to be possible, following the rule has to be characterized as a process that is perceptible externally where an independent criterion can be applied. However, the external process as is characterized as following a rule or use of a word requires the intrinsic of the criterion in use.

If meaning is use, then understanding the meaning of a word cannot be said to fit or cohere with understanding a meaning of a sentence. That is because understanding the meaning is when we use a word or a sentence. But understanding and use seem to be two different notions. When we understand the meaning of a word that we hear or say (use), we understand it in a flash (such as in a form of a mental image of the word); but the use of a word is extended in time. (PI 318) If the meaning of understanding is characterized in terms of use, it means that the notion of understanding is not a mental process which is independent from the external world the direction of which is supplied by the use. The question is that in what sense such a notion of understanding provides the normativity in use?

The notion of understanding occurring in an inner realm independent of external use suggests the idea that understanding meaning can be characterized independently. But such a notion of understanding cannot be a source of norms. Otherwise, meaning would be what happens in the ‘mind’, the problem of which is that one cannot make a distinction
between what is right and what seems to be right just 'in the mind'. The distinction is provided in the applications or in the use, which shows whether one understands meaning, but that is because the notion of use involves a normative constraint which is in the external world. Having said that, it means that meaning is not determined by the sort of understanding which is indifferent to the external world. This is different from the view that the use lies at the surface of the understanding, which means that understanding is something detached from the use. The notion of understanding which does not only characterize the objectivity of meaning but also leaves a space for the autonomy of objectivity is the notion of understanding which is interwoven with external use.  

Accordingly, the way out is to account for the notion of use which is constitutive of rules. The point is that if meaning is in use, understanding has to be characterized in terms of use in the interweaving sense that provides the idea of norms being intrinsic to use. That is to say, there must be the notion of use which 'fits' into the rule in the sense that use is governed by or constituted by rules. And this is where the idea of 'practice' comes in, that is, the idea that following a rule or use is intrinsically normatively constrained.

1.3.3. The relation of use and norms

From the above, it also means that the relation of use and norms or rules cannot be accounted for in the sense that rules are applied in use in the reductionist sense. If understanding a rule is not an interpretation, the only way we can talk about the relation of use and rule is in terms of meaning or content possession rather than in terms of application of rules. That is because application of rules suggests the idea that rules and use are two components of meaning, so that there are possibly many ways for interpreting the rules. I take this as Wittgenstein's point when he rejects
the idea that the relation of rules and use is a causal relation in which understanding a rule requires the ability to apply the rule. (PI 162-4) The idea of causation does not provide the notion of use in which norms are intrinsic because it merely describes use in the past, present and predicts its future. But there is no normativity available in such a notion of use.

Accordingly, the question of how rules and use are related needs to be answered from the model of meaning (I) in which rules are immanent in use. It is in that sense that understanding does not require interpretation. However, the rules or norms are still independent from use, but in such a way that they can be directly grasped without interpretations. It may be still questionable what it means to have a direct understanding of meaning. In the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein talks about the idea of truth or the ‘genuineness’ of an expression. Some examples are expression of mathematical truth, a judgement of colour, expression of feelings or the genuineness of a glance, gesture. The point seems to be about whether the truth of an expression in those areas is determined by experts—agreement of judgement or by rules in which all the possible answers are determined. Mathematicians may take mathematical truth as independent from human belief—“Even though everybody believed that twice two was five it would still be four?” (PI p. 226) If so, it means that to imagine a race who has different beliefs about mathematics would be wrong. But that is not right because, as Wittgenstein says, mathematics is not only a branch of knowledge, it is also an *activity*, which means that a deviation of the rules is possible. But if the deviation is taken as an exception to the rules, then the mathematical games or rules would not be called rules anymore, that is, there are no rules. The point is not that truth-conditions are established by agreement of judgement, rather judgement plays a role in establishing the truth-conditions but in such a way that judgement does not replace truth-conditions with other sorts of
conditions which are derived from the deviation of rules.

Similarly, the case of the truth of expressions of feeling – e.g. “that one can distinguish between a genuine loving look from a pretended one” (PI p.228) – does not seem to be established by an expert, although one may say, “There are rules, but they do not form a system, and only experienced people can apply them right. Unlike calculating-rules.” (PI p.227) or that “the genuineness of an expression cannot be proved; one has to feel it.” (PI p.228) The problem is that if other people do not agree that what we feel is right, then what we mostly do is to take the recognition of the genuineness of feeling as evidence. But it is ‘imponderable’ evidence, namely, evidence which cannot be predicted to be a consequence of the rule or that which cannot be stated directly from following the rule. The notion of evidence brings in a regress of interpretations, that is, in order to recognise something as evidence, one needs to interpret it as a consequence of following the rules that has already happened. Having said that the genuineness of feeling does not require evidence, the point is that it is not that there is no distinction between true and false, genuine and pretending, rather it is that knowing such a distinction is not based on evidence. That is to say, it is based on our direct perception of its truth-conditions, but in such a way that truth-conditions can be characterized intrinsically to our experiences. The notion of genuineness also cannot be accounted for as an independent inner process as the notion of the superlative fact. It may be said that the problem is not in finding ‘how’ we can know such a distinction of genuineness and pretending, rather it is in answering the question of how we ‘possess’ such a concept. An answer which I will provide in the following chapter lies in the idea of a disjunctive account of experience, namely, either what we see is manifestly to be so and so or it appears to be so. It is an account which still requires intrinsic truth-conditions which
can be directly grasped.

Moreover, the issue on whether truth-conditions of an expression are established by a sort of Platonic rules or agreement in judgement\textsuperscript{14} can be summarised as follows. If it is right that the rule-following argument proposes the idea that an account of meaning requires the idea of rules which are independent but intrinsically constrain the use, then it is necessary that judgement has to directly fit into the world, not fit into opinion of experts or a community agreement. However, this does not mean to rule out the possibility of the agreement of judgement in the community's sense. As Wittgenstein says, "...the criterion for this agreement is not just agreement with reference to definitions, e.g., ostensive definitions-but also an agreement in judgements." (RFM 39:343) However, the possibility of the community's agreement is based on the idea that one can know other people's judgement without interpretations. In the following, I will employ the main idea of this review of the rule-following argument, that is, the account of meaning model (I), for criticising some examples of the model (E).

2. The Two-Component Model

In this section, I discuss two examples of the two-component model, namely, Kripke's sceptical argument and Wright's reductio argument in order to show that both share a similar assumption of thin use where meaning is composed of two separate components: descriptive use and its extrinsic normative constraint. The difference between Kripke's (1982) and Wright's (ff.1984) is that while Kripke replaces truth-conditions with assertability conditions, Wright is reluctant to do so in all areas of discourse. Wright suggests that truth and objectivity of meaning can be constructed in terms of objectivity of judgements varied to different areas of discourse, e.g. mathematics, ethics, colours. However,
Wright’s notion of truth is constructed out of use but in the sense which, as I will argue, is extrinsic to the use. Thereby, for this reason, it does not make his position radically different from Kripke’s. This section will show that Kripke’s scepticism and Wright’s view are examples of model (E) the account of meaning of which cannot satisfy the two basic constraints on meaning, and that it brings in the dilemma of rule-following. In the last section, I provide an idea of how the dilemma can be escaped by considering McDowell’s transcendental argument. (McDowell 1984) It is this argument which assumes the model of use (I).

2.1. Kripke’s Sceptical Argument

Kripke’s main idea can be seen from the following quote:

“...if we suppose that facts, or truth-conditions, are of the essence of meaningful assertion, it will follow from the sceptical conclusion that assertions that anyone ever means anything are meaningless. On the other hand, if we apply to these assertions the tests suggested in Philosophical Investigations, no such conclusion follows. All that is needed to legitimise assertions that someone means something is that there be roughly specifiable circumstances under which they are legitimately assertable, and that the game of asserting them under such conditions has a role in our lives. No supposition that ‘facts correspond’ to those assertions is needed.” (1982: 77-78)

Kripke’s sceptical argument on rule-following is, briefly, this – if an expression is to have meaning, there must be some facts or truth-conditions which constitute meaning. The dilemma that flows from the rule-following arguments invites either a regress in stating the relevant facts or an acceptance that no such facts are available. The regress is not
tenable and to accept that there are no facts to determine meaning is paradoxical. Accordingly, the expression has no meaning. The sceptical conclusion poses a threat to the idea that meaning is normative. That is to say, the implication of the conclusion is that there is no substance to meaning. When we speak or use a language, it is meaningless because whether there are norms or no norms governing the use does not make a difference to the use. But that is contradictory to our actual practice of using a language, in which understanding meaning is possible. Hence, there must be a justification for our actual practice. The *Investigations* thereby suggests a sceptical solution that meaning is possible because justifications of meaning are provided by assertability conditions.

The assumption which the sceptical argument rests on is that meaning is normative. But meaning is normative in the sense that its normativity is something to be added into a language because the language itself does not have normative content. What provide its normative content are the facts. The notion of fact which the sceptic is asking for is the notion of full-blooded truth-conditions, namely, the conditions under which a sentence can be judged as true or false, but in such a way that such conditions are beyond the use of the sentence. The sceptical challenge is that such a notion of facts brings in a paradox of following a rule, namely, the paradox that the sort of rules which fix meaning in the way that transcend use obliterates the distinction between what is counted as obeying the rules and what is not. Rules have power in determining our infinite applications in a new case; nevertheless, as they do not have a normative role in our use of language, the question whether the answer in a new case is determined by the rules we understand cannot be justified. This means that meaning cannot be justified by truth-conditions.
Kripke’s well-known example of the rule ‘plus’/‘quus’ is raised here. If one understands the rule governing plus, then one should equate ‘125’ to ‘68+57’. Suppose a pupil has never performed this case. But if he is asked what the sum of ‘68+57’ is, he will answer ‘125’ which is the correct answer according to the arithmetical rule of plus two. A sceptical challenge is: how can he know that his intention to mean ‘68+57’ is ‘125’? His answer is on the basis of his applying the rule plus two in the past. But the problem is that it is possible that in the past he applied the rule ‘quus’ in which the answer is the normal one in all cases up to 56, otherwise 5. What the pupil means by ‘plus’ is actually ‘quus’. This means that if ‘125’ is to be the correct answer, there must be truth of the matter or facts which determine the meaning of ‘68+57’ as a use of plus, not quus.

There may be two possible sorts of facts which can be said to determine meaning, namely, inner facts and dispositional facts. But the sceptic shows that they fail to determine meaning for the following reasons. Regarding the former sort of facts, if facts are established by our inner experiences like sensations, then meaning must be directly accessible because the inner experiences are introspectible or immediately accessible. (see ibid.: 39-54) But the problem is, for Kripke, first, experiences of meaning are different from sensations. In case of experiences of meaning, there is a question of how a word relates to the experience. That is to say, in order to understand the experiences, norms or rules are required for interpreting how a word got applied in such experiences. For Kripke, this is the problem of a regress of rules for interpretation. Secondly, even if we suppose that there is a state of meaning ‘plus’ in the mind, it would be logically impossible for a finite mind to be a source of rules the applications of which are infinite. That is to say, the inner experience is finite in the sense that the inner experience of meaning is merely a series
of present states which do not include the past and future meaning. So it cannot answer the sceptical question which is asking for the infinite applications in future cases, that is, 'What tells me how I am going to apply a given rule in a new case?'. Lastly, if meaning is reducible to experience of meaning, it cannot explain why I *should* give the answer as I have done in the past. That question concerns the nature of meaning that it is normative, rather than descriptive. But experience of meaning is merely descriptive, not normative. Therefore, there is no such experience of meaning which can be analogous with the experience of, say, headache, or mental facts which could be a model for the facts that constitute meaning.

Alternatively, what constitutes meaning may be in the external applications rather than the internal facts. But the sceptical challenge is that the external applications or dispositional facts, i.e. the facts that meaning is accounted for in terms of dispositions to apply the rule, do not determine meaning. The main reason is that such facts provide only descriptive facts of what I will do in the unexamined case, while "The relation of meaning and intention to future action is *normative*, not *descriptive.*" (ibid.:37) So, if one justifies meaning by reference to the external facts, the sceptical question can still be asked "What tells me how I am to apply a given rule in a new case?" (ibid.:43) Similarly, the internal facts cannot be the sort of facts which justify meaning because the same question can be asked "...how our finite minds give rules that are supposed to apply to an infinity of cases." (ibid.:54). Such questions can be raised because there is a paradox that if there are facts justify meaning, then whatever answers we give can be interpreted to accord or not accord with the facts. This means that the distinction between what is the right answer and what is not is obliterated. That is to say, the normativity of meaning is obliterated. The sceptic hence concludes that because of the
paradox that any assertion can be interpreted as following a rule, there is no meaning in what we do with language. In other words, if meaningful expression requires facts or truth conditions, then "assertions that anyone ever means anything are meaningless." (ibid.:77).

But according to Kripke’s Wittgenstein, scepticism about meaning merely shows the untenability of the idea of truth-conditions. That is because the sceptical conclusion does not imply that our actual practice of using a language is meaningless. The point is merely how to legitimise or justify the use. So the solution to the sceptical problem is to replace the idea of truth-conditions with justification conditions or assertability conditions, namely:

"... assertions that someone means something is that there be roughly specifiable circumstances under which they are legitimately assertable, and that the game of asserting them under such has a role in our lives." (ibid.:78)

For Kripke, the community is entitled to judge or correct individual assertions. Practice is accounted for in terms of the community’s use as the criterion for ascribing content of what one means.

2.2. Problems with Kripke’s Sceptic

Kripke’s scepticism implies that something is problematic with the notion of use according to the model (E), namely, the notion of use which is constrained by extrinsic norms. The sceptical conclusion shows an absurdity of the model (E), that is, the absurdity that there is no meaning if there are no truth-conditions. What is not right in Kripke’s reading of the rule-following argument is that -- instead of focussing on the notion of use on Wittgenstein’s main idea of meaning in use by showing the
possibility that norms are intrinsic to the use, Kripke suggests a solution by replacing the notion of norms or rules.

The difficulty is about how to understand the possibility that such a notion of use (E) can deliver norms without facing the problem of either horn of the dilemma. That is to say, the upshot of the attempt to escape from one horn of the dilemma, i.e. the idea of transcendent truth-conditions, leads the sceptic to the other horn, i.e. the situation where there are no norms. Scepticism turns out to show that the dilemma is unavoidable, so that if meaning is to be sustained, there is a need to justify it. But the problem with the sceptical solution is that the justification conditions bring in the problem of regress for interpreting the conditions. That is because if the thesis (M) that meaning is normative is right, and that the dilemma poses the threat to (M), then to account for meaning in terms of justification conditions does not overcome such a threat. On the contrary, it brings in the regress problem of what justifies such conditions.

However, Kripke thinks that that is not to be the problem because Wittgenstein’s answer is in the idea of practice or custom. That is to say, what stops the regress is the brute fact that people agree. (ibid.: 109) However, that answer does not seem to be right because as the fact is brute, it means that there is no normative content. Justifications are required in order that normative content is possible, that is, the normative constraint must be provided. But once such a constraint is not intrinsic to the fact that we agree and use language, it means that the constraint transcends use, the problem of which is the possibility of regress of interpretations. This is surely not the problem which Kripke wants to accept because it shows what Kripke himself had shown, that is, the problem of following a rule arises once we think that what we do with language is nothing but a mere descriptive fact of what we do with
language. This means that there will be no such a problem if what we do with language is intrinsically normative, that is, the notion of use according to the model (I).

The sceptical reading has been also criticised on other grounds. For example, what worries many people is the sceptical solution. Kripke’s idea of the justification conditions is provided by the idea of community’s criterion, but it does not fare better than the individual criterion which he argues against. If the idea that internal facts fix meaning cannot be justified, then the external facts as the community’s criterion cannot be justified either. That is to say, the sceptical question: “what tells the community how it is to apply a given rule in a new case?” can be raised. Apart from that worry, many disagree with the sceptical reading on the ground that Wittgenstein’s idea is not to propose a sceptical question; rather he proposes a reductio ad absurdum against the concept of platonic rules. An example of the disagreement can be found in Wright who thinks that Wittgenstein argues against the notion of the objectivity of meaning on the assumption that there will be an absurdity of taking meaning to be in the mind, rather than on the assumption of the absurdity of no reality of meaning. I turn now to Wright’s idea.

2.3. Wright’s Reductio Argument

According to Wright\(^5\), there are two points on which he agrees with Kripke. First, the target of Wittgenstein’s argument is to reject the idea of a platonistic reality of meaning. Second, what provides normativity for meaning is in the community practice. However, his disagreement with Kripke is this: firstly, Wittgenstein’s rule-following argument is not a sceptical argument, rather it is a reductio argument, namely, an argument which shows that the premise that understanding is always an interpretation is false, rather than showing that there is no reality of
meaning; and secondly, Wittgenstein does not suggest a sceptical solution that truth-conditions have to be replaced with assertability conditions, rather he suggests the idea of grammar of meaning and thinking. In other words, for Wright’s Wittgenstein, there is a reality of meaning in the sense of objectivity of judgement, that is, it is ‘constructive’ in the use and thereby in the linguistic practice. However, we can take Wright’s disagreement in the way that while the first point concerns the rejection of the Cartesian conception of mind in the sense of a self-standing state of mind, the second point concerns the rejection of Platonism of meaning or the objectivity of truth-conditions. Both points share the same sort of rejection, namely, the rejection of self-standing states of affairs. That is because Wright takes the point of the rule-following argument as similar to the Private Language Argument, that is, they reject metaphysical realism. (e.g.,1998:40, 1986:295-297) I look at the second disagreement first by expanding his disagreements in a way which shows that Wright’s account of meaning is however an example of the model (E).

2.3.1. The Ordinary Notion of Intention

According to Wright, the premise which the rule-following argument argues against is that understanding is always an interpretation; and its conclusion is that “there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation.”. What Wright means by this conclusion is:

“...that something other than the exercise of interpretative (rational) faculties enters into the capacity to ‘read’ another’s linguistic behaviour. And the additional something is, crudely, human nature: certain sub-rational propensities towards conformity of response, towards ‘going on in the same way’, which alone make possible the formation of the common conceptual scheme within which our rational capacities can be
exercised.” (1987: 394)

According to Wright, grasp of meaning does not only require interpretation in the sense of the rational faculties, but also require the sub-rational disposition of humans to agree. This means that, as I take to be Wright’s idea, understanding meaning requires both interpretation and something adding to it, which makes the interpretation works. That is to say, understanding meaning does not require interpretations in the mind. The reductio of meaning arises if knowing meaning is reducible to Cartesian internal states where one needs to look for meaning within. (cf. ibid.: 403) So, what provides meaning is not to be inferred internally, rather it is in what Wright calls ‘the additional something’, namely, as I take it, an outward response of human behaviour. However, knowledge of meaning is, in a sense, self-knowledge that can be known without inference or interpretation in the mind. What Wright proposes is the ordinary notion of intention in which a subject is non-inferentially authoritative with respect to its content; in other words, the subject knows the meaning in the past, present, and future case without interpretation, and that knowledge has an infinitary characteristic, to which content can be ascribed. However, I will argue later that such notion of intention faces the dilemma of rule-following in the following sense: instead of rejecting the self-standing state of mind, such a notion turns out to embrace a platonic sort of inner state the problem of which is a regress of interpretation.

Wright’s ordinary notion of intention is a response to the problem which Kripke’s sceptical argument has posed concerning the internal facts that even though they have an immediate and introspectible character, they do not constitute meaning. That is because the internal facts provide only the present state of what the subject means while the sceptic asks for
a justification of what I had formerly meant and what I intend to mean in a future case. Wright thinks that that is true only if it means that knowledge of a present meaning is also inferential. That is to say, what the sceptic actually assumes is that my intention to mean something cannot be known directly; otherwise, the answer to the sceptic by citing my former meaning would have been satisfactory. (see Wright 1984) This means that the problem, for the sceptic, is mainly that the internal facts themselves are finite, so that we can know only the present meaning; hence the internal facts cannot provide the infinitary applications for a new case, which is the characteristic of rules or facts which constitute meaning.

According to Wright’s response to the sceptic, if a notion of intention can be provided in the sense that it is non-inferential and infinite, then such a notion would block the sceptical argument. That is to say, we need an account of self-knowledge in which the ordinary or intuitive notion of intention has both characteristics—non-inferential and infinitary knowledge. Wright’s main idea is that meaning is not within the inner states, rather it is in a sort of quasi-dispositional state of a subject. That is to say, although access to an intention is non-inferential, ascription of its content which is infinite requires knowledge of what is external to the intention, that is, in the ability or performances of the intention. In particular, this is accounted for in terms of attitudinal avowal of intention, to which content can be ascribed under circumstantial conditions. (Wright 1987) In the following, I expand this point in order to consider how ascription of content is possible according to Wright’s ordinary notion of intention.

There is a difference between knowing what I am now thinking and knowing my intentions relating ‘to all situations of a certain kind’ (Wright 1984:113). In the former case, it is infallible to say whether what
I am thinking now is P, e.g. whether I am having a headache. While the latter case includes the knowledge of the former case but in such a way that it is fallible, because knowing my intention that ‘I am having a headache’ can be judged by relating to circumstances and outward expressions. For Wright, the former case is characteristic of a Cartesian conception of mind, namely, within the inner states of mind, there is no fallibility of thought: ‘is right’ and ‘seems right’ are indistinguishable. To reject Cartesianism, the latter case is required, namely, the idea of the ordinary notion of intention-- it is fallible to know my intention relating ‘to all situations of a certain kind’. That is because, as Wright takes it, the inner mind is not independent from the subject’s judgements. That is to say, my intention has “no end of distinct responses, in distinct situations, which I must make if I remember this intention, continue to wish to fulfil it, and correctly apprehend the prevailing circumstances.” (ibid.)

Briefly, the ordinary notion of intention is “the phenomenon of non-inferential, first-person knowledge of past and present meanings, rules and intentions” (1989:236), and it has “...a characteristic of mind-- alongside thought, mood, desire, and sensation--that a subject has, in general, authoritative and non-inferential access to the content of his own intentions, and that this content may be open-ended and general, may relate to all situations of a certain kind.” (1984:113) The infinitary characteristic of the intention or the open-ended responses to the intention accounts for how the normative ability in unexamined cases is possible on the basis of the finiteness of former responses. This infinitary knowledge has, what Wright calls, the general content which has the ‘infinity’ in a similar sense as “...the capacity of any universally quantified conditional. 

\[(x)(Fx\rightarrow Gx), \text{to yield indefinitely many consequences of the form, } Ga, Gb, \ldots \text{, when conjoined with corresponding premises of the form, } Fa, Fb, \ldots \]” (ibid.)
Put another way, according to Wright, the phenomenon of non-inferential and infinitary knowledge can be accounted for in terms of what he calls the phenomenon of *avowal*, namely, the phenomenon of authoritative, non-inferential self-ascription. (1998:14) This phenomenon includes both the non-inferential and infinitary character of knowledge of the self. For Wright, the phenomenon is composed of two sorts of avowal: phenomenal avowal and attitudinal avowal.

The former are the occurrences of mental states or consciousness and sensations which are not *content-bearing states*, namely, states to which content cannot be individuated. (ibid.:15) Meanwhile, in the latter sort of avowal, content can be individuated in the form of propositional attitudes or ‘intentional direction’, e.g. “I think that the sky is blue.”, “I am thinking of my mother.” The two sorts of avowal have epistemic asymmetry. That is to say, the former illustrates the phenomenon of first-person access which is groundless or baseless for answering the question ‘How can you tell?’ because evidences to support my avowal, say, ‘I have a headache.’ are not only not necessary, but it is also absurd to say ‘I don’t know whether I have a headache.’. By contrast, the latter is the attitude or the interpretation of the mental phenomenon or, as what Wright calls, the process of self-interpretation of which criterial justification involves third-person testimony. As the phenomenal avowal is an avowal regarding inner observational realm, it is non-inferential and infallible. Wright takes it as the Cartesian model of mind in which the truth-value of the avowal is immediate to the subject in the sense that only the subject knows whether the avowal is true or not. However, it is infallible because there is no independent criterion for distinguishing what is right from what seems right for the subject. What is inferential, reliable and fallible lies in the outer observational realm, namely, the attitudinal
avowal. It is in this sort of avowal that content can be ascribed and is infinite.

So, for Wright, the phenomenon of avowals provides an account for how both non-inferential and infinitary knowledge of the self is possible. Such a phenomenon accounts for the ordinary notion of intention. As he distinguishes the avowals into two sorts, it shows the asymmetry of first-person/third-person self-knowledge in the sense that the phenomenal avowal is prior to the attitudinal avowal. That is to say, knowing what an intention is is prior to recognising its content. (see 1984). It is not the other way round. Otherwise, he thinks that it will be open to “unwelcome interpretation” (ibid.:113), and the sceptical question will be raised, “...by what principle could I assure myself that those (or attitudinal avowals, my quote) were the thoughts on which I should be concentrating, rather than some other recent ...train?”. (ibid.:112)

However, although Wright’s point is to resist the sceptic by employing the intuitive notion of intention, it is rather apparent from my review of his idea that his notion of intention also belongs to the two-component model as well as the sceptic. This can be seen from the way he makes the distinction between phenomenal avowal and attitudinal avowal such that the former is prior to the latter. It means that content or meaning is something needed to be added to the descriptive phenomenal avowal which turns out to be the self-standing mental phenomenon. But it is the self-standing phenomenon which Wright wants to reject as, for him, the problem which the rule-following argument has shown is the problem concerning the untenability of Platonism of meaning. But to reject Platonism in that way is to embrace the model (E). But, as I already showed, that model is actually the problem which the rule-following argument is supposed to deal with. Before expanding my criticism on
Wright’s idea, I first look at his argument against the sceptical solution that assertability conditions be replaced with truth-conditions.

2.3.2. The grammar of meaning and truth: objectivity of judgement

Wright argues that the sceptic turns out to be self-contradictory in rejecting the notion of truth. That is to say, in rejecting truth, it also makes the statement of the sceptical solution -- what determines meaning is assertability conditions-- not true. But that is absurd for Wright. This means that we need an account of truth which allows ascriptions of truth-values to be possible. That is the notion of truth as objectivity of judgement which is constituted by our linguistic practice.

According to Wright (e.g.1986), Kripke’s sceptic has a Humean basic assumption, namely, a contrast of factual statements with projective statements. The latter includes statements concerning emotion, moral values, and causation. Once the sceptic can prove that meaning statements are not factual statements, then it means that meaning statements are projective, namely, meaning statements are never true. For Wright, such a conclusion brings in a question whether the sceptical conclusion that there is no meaning is also projective. That is to say, the sceptical conclusion and also the sceptical solution are not factual or not true. If that is the case, then the sceptical argument would be absurd. This means that in order that the sceptic can make sense of their conclusion and solution, the notion of fact or truth which Kripke’s sceptic rejects has to be the notion which is sufficiently substantial, that is, it is not the notion of truth in the sense of being factual which is contrasted with being projective. What Wright proposes is that the notion of truth-conditions which is to be rejected has to be the notion of truth being independent from our ability to know it in the sense of Lockean primary qualities.
This means that although to endorse assertability conditions is to reject the notion of truth in the sense that provides an 'objectivity of meaning', i.e. as Wright puts it, — "... the belief that what determines the truth values of these statements is wholly independent of human assessment of them and, at best, contingently correspondent with it." (1986: 283) However, this does not mean that a meaning-statement will never be true or is globally projective or that "...every judgement of the truth of a statement, so every statement, becomes non-factual" (ibid.:275). That is because meaning and intentions are secondary qualities in the Lockean sense, that is, knowledge of intention and meaning is not independent from our ability to determine or track its truth-values. That is to say, such knowledge is defeasible, i.e. acquired evidence can defeat or discount the avowal of intention. The idea of defeasibility is what accounts for the notion of objectivity; in other words, truth is secondary. ^16

Although to reject the objectivity of meaning is to reject the substantial notion of truth, there is 'truth-value' or content which is not substantial in a statement. (ibid.:274) For Wright, there is such a thing as a 'basic statement' whose truth is not substantial, but has objectivity in the sense of objectivity of judgement. That is to say, there is a class of statements which has "...a real subject matter of fact, as apt to be correct or incorrect in virtue of how matters stand in certain objective states of affairs which may be the objects of human cognition." (ibid.:281) This is the class of statements which are non-factual but true in the sense of being correct given human recognitional capacities. The point is this: the content of such statements or their correctness is determined by practice in the sense of 'our ongoing linguistic behaviour' which is grounded on our basic perceptual judgement or our basic common recognitional capacities to have a disposition to use language correctly. That is to say, the only objectivity or correctness we can find in basic statements is the...
objectivity of judgement which is not independent from human cognition.

This means that basic statements do not get their content only from the perceptual or basic judgement, but also from other inferential processes, namely, the reliability of judgements. Briefly, basic statements are statements the content of which is derived from recognitional capacities and/or inferential processes. So, their truth-value is not only determined directly by basic judgement or common perceptual abilities in normal circumstances but also by the consensus of members in that circumstance. Consensus means the sharing of basic concepts, or the sharing of the disposition to agree in basic judgement. (see ibid.:285) For Wright, although consensus merely enhances the likelihood of judgement among members rather than provides a certainty, consensus of human response provides the ground for correctness of judgement. That is to say, the correctness of judgement is accounted for in terms of 'genuine warrant', rather than in terms of the strong notion of truth or the objectivity of meaning.

Wright defines his thesis of 'truth' in terms of genuine warrant in the following way:

"T: For any context $C$, agent $X$, and statement $S$: if $X$ acquires the belief that $S$ in $C$, then there will be certain basic statements relating to the circumstances and process whereby $X$’s belief was acquired such that (1) if he did not actually do so, $X$ could have assessed any of these statements in the course of arriving at his belief that $S$; and (2) $X$ has acquired impeccable, a fortiori genuine warrant for his belief that $S$ only if each such statement is true.” (ibid.: 291)

The first condition is about the possible condition of acquiring the
belief $S$, so that it provides the explanatory condition for the unexamined statement. The second condition provides the concept of truth as ‘genuine warrant’ which is defined by three sorts of defeasibility. The first sort is that a belief is false if there is other stronger or equally strong defeating evidence. The second sort is to show why the original evidence is available. The last sort is to show that some features of the gathering evidences are disqualified. For example, “...the disclosure of pressure leaks in the apparatus, drunkenness in the observer, or a powerful magnetic field which may have affected the gauges.” (ibid.:290) But it is the last sort of defeat which constitutes the genuine warrant because it questions the validity of data, while the first two sorts, though accepting the data, question the capacity of evidence to warrant belief. The validity of data constitutes genuine warrant in the sense that for a particular belief to be genuine warrant, it is necessary that a large class of relevant basic judgements be true. (ibid.:291) So genuine warrant provides true beliefs in the sense which is based on our recognitional capacities.

What Wright attempts to show is that to reject the objectivity of meaning does not commit one to Idealism, rather the objectivity or truth is constructive. That is to say, truth is constructed within human cognition or is within ‘practical controls’ (ibid.:294), in the sense of genuine warrant. This means that our cognition can be fallible because there is an independent object of knowledge, which Wright has put it in terms of basic judgements or perceptual judgements. But because we have agreement of judgement$^{17}$, so the idea of consensus which grounds our recognition of truth is unavoidable.

Although it is right as Wright said that “The price of objective meaning is an absolute conception of truth: a conception absolved from all practical controls.” (ibid.), the ‘practical controls’ in his constructivist
view turn out to be threatened by the regress problem. The problem can be seen from his account of human cognition in the way that there is a distinction of basic judgements from basic statements in the similar way as he distinguished the phenomenal avowal from the attitudinal avowal in case of intention. While basic judgements are ‘unarticulated’, basic statements are the expressed forms of such judgements. It can be said that the content of basic statements is derived from recognitional capacities which are based on judgements plus inferential or defeasible processes. But such a distinction is the characteristic of the two-component model.

2.3.3. Problems with Wright’s Idea

As I mentioned above, Wright takes the point of the rule-following argument and the Private Language Argument that they reject metaphysical realism or, as he takes it, the conception of self-standing states of affairs. This means that Wright equates platonism with Cartesianism. The problem is that the rejection of the self-standing states of affairs turns out to be the rejection of the autonomy of normativity of content. The upshot is the dilemma of the rule-following, namely, the problem of regress of interpretation of the intention and the problem of no norms.

I take it that what Wright means by platonism and Cartesianism is this. While platonism about meaning means the idea that truth-conditions are beyond our ability to recognise their obtaining, Cartesianism means the idea that mental content is beyond public accessibility. Wright conflates them together in the way that both share the idea of independent states of affairs. So to reject such an idea means to reject any independent states of affairs. In rejecting platonism of meaning, Wright offers the idea of objectivity of judgement; and in rejecting Cartesianism, he offers the idea of ordinary notion of intention. But the main idea behind such
rejections is the assumption that content is not possible within the self-standing states of affairs. To reject that idea, for Wright, is to say that the states of affairs are not beyond our cognition, in the sense that it requires some other interpretative method to access such states. However, the problem is this—once the self-standing states of affairs are separated from our conceptual abilities to recognise them, this brings in the problem of the dilemma of rule-following because there is a problem of understanding requires interpretation.

This can be seen from the way Wright separates two sorts of avowal, as mentioned above. Such a separation, instead of resisting the sceptic, brings in the question which the sceptics ask, namely, how is it possible that the two avowals are connected? There must be a justification for how meaning is attached to phenomenal avowal. Wright is offering an account of how that connection is possible with the model of self-knowledge in which content is to be ascribed by having the attitudinal avowal or self-interpretation. But the problem is this model brings back the threat of regress of interpretation of the self.

Wright is assuming that there is a pure ‘self’ which requires interpretation, and the interpretation lies in the way concepts are formed, that is, in our performances or linguistic practice. In that sense, within the ‘self’, there is no concept or meaning, rather “... the formation of concepts is co-eval with the development of intentional linguistic activity. The having of a concept...is immanent in, rather than underlies, competent linguistic performance.” (1991:140) But that is the issue of how concepts are acquired, which does not answer the question of how possession of concepts is possible. It is different because asking the latter question is based on the assumption of the model (I) which the rule-following argument has shown to solve the dilemma which arises from the model
The model (E) confuses learning or formation of concepts with possession of concepts. If the model of self-interpretation is to work, we need to accept that there is a 'pure' and non-conceptual self in order that the process of forming the concept can be assigned to as the interpretation of the self. But that still begs the question against the sceptic about how that process is possible. So Wright’s model of self-interpretation looks unconvincing.

Accordingly, it is legitimate to say that Wright’s idea of use is the two-component model. This is quite obvious from his responses to McDowell’s criticism. (Wright 1998) What Wright wants to reject is the picture in which, as mentioned above, content can be ascribed to the self-standing states of affairs of the mind. The main issue of the debate is that he thinks that McDowell’s mistake is in thinking that mental states are conceptual. That is because, for Wright, it is not always true that we always have concepts involved in those states. For example, “... a dog can be tired, or afraid, or have an itch, without having any concept of those states.” (ibid.:22) Having a concept is a matter of the ability to ascribe attitudinal states to the subject. For Wright, if McDowell is right, then the private linguist can be an autodidact, which is the Cartesian model of mind. For him, we can teach someone to vocalise and thereby to conceptualise his inner phenomenon, in the same way as we can take that somebody is in pain from his behaviour though we cannot see what happens in his mind. (see ibid.:27) The phenomenal avowal which is the Cartesian model of the mind can allow that,

“...at some point, ..., a subject’s competence in the linguistic routines in which, in both the inner and the outer cases, he is trained, will amount to the possession of concepts. And the identity of the concepts then possessed will supervene on the
linguistic intentions of the subject: on the patterns of use which he will be willing to uphold.” (ibid.:28)

The reason why he does not want to accept that mental states are conceptual is because it is the view that the mind is self-standing, to which the epistemic access is not possible. What McDowell would say in response to Wright is this-- in rejecting that view, there is no need to separate the mental states from its conceptual element. That is to say, the point is that it is not necessary to find the explanation or the justification for how we possess concepts. McDowell would certainly agree with Wright that we cannot always know what is in another person’s mind. But, for McDowell, that impossibility arises only when we start from thinking that there is something real ‘in itself’ independently determining what we seem to see. (see McDowell 1991) Then we are prone to find a connection between what one sees in others’ behaviour and what is its cause. But that is a mistake for we will end up with the regress of interpretations of others’ behaviour. However, for McDowell, it does not mean that there is no objectivity in what one seems to see. I will come back to this point in the next section.

However, it may be argued that in rejecting platonism, Wright does not endorse the model (E). This can be seen from his suggestion that in rejecting platonism,

“...the content of a subject’s intentional states is not something which may merely be accessed, as it were indirectly, by interpretative methods...but is something which is intrinsically sensitive to the deliverances of best interpretative methodology.” (ibid.:29)

That is to say, instead of taking content as intrinsic to the subject’s
intentional states, it is something intrinsic to the interpretative methods or
the subject’s judgements. So there is no platonist mythology because an
intention, which determines its subsequent conformity and non-
conformity, is not independent of the subject’s judgements. (ibid.)
However, the account of the subject’s judgements is not to be done in
terms of a dispositional account. To argue for that point, Wright employs
the idea of the default view, as in the following.

The best interpretative methodology which is not independent
from our judgements involves all the infiniteness of the subject’s sayings
and doings. In a similar manner to the case of self-knowledge, the
‘default view’ is the constitutive principle of intentional states which says
that psychological claims are primitively constituted in a subject’s
opinions about herself, which is

“...default authoritative and default-limitative: unless you can
show how to make better sense of her by overriding or going
beyond it. Her active self-conception, as manifest in what she is
willing to avow, must be deferred to. The truth-conditions of
psychological ascriptions are primitively conditioned by this
constraint.” (ibid.:41)

For Wright, the execution of an intention is not a disposition in the
sense that it is characterized by the consequences of that state, rather it
has to be accounted for in terms of what is constitutive of that state. The
constitutive principle has to be understood under the idea of the
objectivity of judgement, which can be detected by what he calls the
control of correctness of judgement. The control of correctness is
accounted for in the form of Euthyphro Contrast, i.e. the biconditional of
the difference between truth as judgement independent and truth as
judgement dependent. (Wright 1989) The point of the control is to show
that truth is constitutive of judgement in a way which can be detected whether it is dependent or not on the judgement. However, a problem is that if the distinction between truth and judgement is obliterated, then the constitutive principle has no point. This can be briefly shown as follow.

Wright designs a test for examining which side of the biconditional is prior for language about, e.g. mind, color, and shape. The test is called the order-of-determination test which "concerns the relation between best judgement- judgements made in what are, with respect to their particular subject-matter, cognitively ideal conditions of both judge and circumstance-and truth." (ibid.:246) The cognitively ideal conditions are what form our best judgement or best opinions, i.e. the normal non-defeasible conditions of human responses. If judgements fail the test, then it means that the best opinions determine the extension of the truth-predicate of judgements ,and "there is no distance between being true and being best; truth, for such judgements, is constitutively what we judge to be true when we operate under cognitively ideal conditions".(ibid.) An example is judgements of colour. If judgements pass the test, then they are extension-reflecting judgements which track independent states of affairs that confer the truth-value on them. An example is judgement of shape or Lockean primary quality.

To put it briefly, the test is about whether a judgement either determines or tracks the extension of truth. In case of a judgement of colour, Wright claims the judgement fails the test because it fails to track the extension of truth or objectivity of colour. So colour is judgement-dependent or judgement determines extension. But a judgement of shape passes the test because it tracks the extension under the ideal condition; that is, it is judgement-independent. Tracking the extension has to be accounted for under ideal conditions --the condition in which the
operational criterion is applied, namely, a ‘normal’ condition which ensures the correctness of the judgements. For example, the lighting condition is good enough to rule out a visual illusion. However, this means that although the judgement of shape passes the test, it is judgement-independent in the sense which is still under the ideal condition or the determinate condition of tracking the extension. That is to say, Wright’s idea of the test on the objectivity of judgement does not really provide the contrast between determination and tracking the extension because even in the case of the tracking judgement, it still employs the method of determination in setting the ideal conditions. That may be due to his rejection of the objectivity of meaning the upshot of which is that once truth is not independent from judgement, then there is nothing to guarantee that there is an independent object of tracking for the tracking judgement. So Wright’s idea of the control of correctness seems to fail to provide the idea of tracking the truth.

However, Wright might argue that this control of correctness relates to the constitutive principle which states that the independent state of affairs is primitively constitutive of the subject’s opinion or judgement. The point is only that the tracking judgement manifests responsiveness to independent states of affairs (1998:42), such as in the case of first-person psychological claims. Judgement about mental states requires, what he calls, the positive-presumptive or the no-self-deception condition (1989:251) or the ideal condition as in the case of other sort of perception. However, what Wright presupposes is the idea of agreement of human response to truth, in which correctness can be tracked. But, as already mentioned, this is problematic because he conflates truth with the tool of tracking truth. The problem is that once there is no distinction between them, it is not possible to talk about meaning. It is the paradox of rule-following that the correct response cannot be distinguished from the
In sum, the main flaw of Wright’s ‘default view’ is his rejection of the combination of conceptual content with mental states, which is the idea of the model (I). The upshot is the attempt to find a connection for them, or the need to construct an account of possessing concepts. As McDowell (1991,1998) says, the default view is just an interpretation of the conceptual mental states of a subject, which he already possesses. So the attempt to link concept with mind is in vain, and finally leads to the paradox of rule-following. Briefly, Wright’s view on both issues concerning objectivity of judgement and self-knowledge are not convincing on the ground that they are threatened by the dilemma of following a rule. The idea of objectivity of judgement requires the idea of basic agreement of human responses to the correctness condition, but this idea falls into the second horn of the dilemma where there are no norms at the basic level. The idea of self-knowledge requires the idea of a no self-deception condition in order that a correct self-interpretation is possible, but this idea falls into the horn where there is regress of interpretation. The main flawed assumption in both issues is the idea of meaning and use according to model (E), namely, the idea that normativity is extrinsic to the behaviour or the use. That is the idea that meaning or concept cannot be combined with the self-standing state of affairs.

This also brings in a problem which concerns the notion of practice. Wright’s notion of practice is employed in order to be a connection or a justification of how the self-standing state of affairs has meaning. But such a notion of practice —our ability or our on-going linguistic use— does not provide the normativity of meaning as it is intended to do. Rather it turns out to be the idea of justification, namely, the defeasibility conditions which proposes not only a reductive account
of meaning, but also conflates the method of judgement with the criterion of judgement. But the idea of defeasibility provides merely a symptom of meaning: it is not constitutive. Accordingly, I conclude that Wright’s account of the notion of use and practice is driven by the two-component model. If we accept that the thesis (M) that meaning is normative is a correct thesis, then the dilemma of rule-following is a real threat to an account of meaning. This means that we need model (I) the idea of which is that normativity of meaning or truth-condition does not lie beyond a context in which our minds play the rational role in understanding human actions. So I turn to the idea of the unitary model of use, which is based on McDowell’s view or as he calls it the ‘transcendental argument’ (1984: 353) in the following section.

3. The Transcendental Argument

The rule-following considerations show that it is in our use or practice which normativity of meaning is embedded. But if the dilemma of rule-following is the problem of understanding meaning and practice, then what we need is an account of practice which is not only an act without interpretation but also subject to a rule. That account, according to McDowell’s Wittgenstein, requires the idea of belonging to “a custom (PI 198), practice (PI 202), or institution (RFM VI-31)” (ibid.: 342). However, the idea of ‘communal practice’ has to be accounted for on the ground which does not fall into the dilemma of rule-following, namely, the ground that understanding meaning is not an interpretation. That is the idea of McDowell’s transcendental argument.

The transcendental argument is what McDowell calls the ‘non-anti-realist’ conception of meaning (ibid.: 350). It says that the account of linguistic use requires the notion of meaning within that account in which knowledge of meaning is not arrived by interpretation. That is the idea of
the model (I). It is contra to the model (E), which underpins the 'anti-realist' conception of linguistic. The problem which McDowell has indicated, especially in Wright's idea, is that the account of following a rule turns out to be the sub-bedrock account in which there is only the 'meaning-free' resemblance of each individual behaviour. According to the transcendental argument, the account of linguistic use requires an account of meaning which is not external to a context of a linguistic community. But it is the sense of a linguistic community which is "...bound together, not by a match in mere externals (facts accessible to just anyone), but by a capacity for a meeting of minds."(ibid.:351). The 'meeting of minds' is the way one can know another's meaning without interpretation. So, in that sense, the 'communal practice' is not what we employ as an interpretation of meaning, rather it is the context within which meaning lies.

However, that does not mean that the objectivity of meaning is lost into the communal practice. Rather meaning is not autonomous from use within a context. The rejection of the autonomy of meaning is only in the sense that the pattern of use extends of itself to new cases without our perspective about the pattern. Saying that the normative constraint of meaning lies in practice means two things. First, the truth-conditional conception of meaning cannot be reducible. For the non-anti-realist, truth-conditions are given in the language that we use and understand. That is to say, when we know that "P" is true if and only if P, what is given on the right-hand side of the schema is the world. Of course, the sense of 'world' here is not the 'world as it is in itself'; rather it is, in Kantian terms, the empirical world. It is the world as already conceptualised, but for the non-anti-realist, there is no other conception of the world. The former conception of the world in itself provides the sort of fact the normativity of which is extrinsic; the latter sort of fact—the empirical
world -- contains normativity intrinsically. However, that does not mean that facts depend on us. So, the second point is that there is the objectivity of meaning which is the constraint on our use. The autonomy of meaning is rejected only in the sense that it can extend its pattern of use of itself without our epistemic/ontological involvement. The epistemic involvement means the involvement of ways of thinking about an object. In that sense, ontologically, we are engaging with the object. However, the involvement cannot be understood in the sense of verification or evidential proof because the evidential proof merely provides an idea that the conceptual involvement is extrinsic to the self-standing facts, which will bring the paradox of rule-following. The example of the problem with such idea of evidential proof has already been shown in the above discussion on Wright's idea of defeasibility conditions.

The idea of objectivity of meaning is suggested in McDowell's idea of a disjunctive account of perceptual experiences.19 (McDowell 1986:151) The disjunctive account of experiences is based on the idea that there are no common characteristics between experiences of appearance and experiences of reality. But they are interwoven with each other in a disjunctive way, namely, "that an appearance that such-and-such is the case can be either a mere appearance or the fact that such-and-such is the case making itself perceptually manifest to someone." (1982:386) This means that involvement with objects is possible to discriminate even if it is not transparent to the subject, the implication of which is the possibility of an independent objective constraint on experiences. However, this account does not rule out the idea that error or illusion is possible. Error is possible, for there is a difference between the two experiences.

Similarly, perception of meaning is a sort of experience. So, the
idea of objectivity of meaning can be accounted for in a similar way, that is, experiences of meaning can be accounted for disjunctively. The disjunctive account of experience of meaning is that \( P \) appears to be true is that \textit{either} that \( P \) is manifestly as so and so or that it seems to be so and so. Such an account provides the idea that the objectivity of meaning cannot be characterized independently from experience of meaning; however, the normative constraint is independent from our own construction. That is the idea that truth-conditions are intrinsic to experiences of meaning. That is contra to the idea which assumes that there is the ‘highest common factor’ of experiences (McDowell ibid.:386), that is to say, the factor of a common experience between veridical and illusory/true and false drives the idea that the normative constraint is extrinsic to the experiences or, in case of language, to the language-use. The disjunctive account of experiences refuses that idea, and thereby, implicitly refuses to employ a generalisation of rule for rationalising human behaviour.

The reductionist view is based on the two-component model which tends to employ the idea of, what I call, hypothetical account of experience, namely, the account that an experience is to have meaning if it is justified by a normative constraint that is extrinsic to itself. Once norms are extrinsic, they are generalized to be a sort of rigid rules which provide ‘explanations’ or predictions of experiences and behaviour. Such norms are generalized to be a universal form of rule, that is, the form that in such and such circumstances, a subject will do so and so. Experiences are merely described as a sort of natural fact to which norms are not intrinsic. On the contrary, the disjunctive account of behaviour does not endorse such a universal rule of experiences and behaviour for norms are particularized into the form that “what he will do if he sticks to his pattern”. (ibid.:349) This means that on the unitary model, there is no
behavioural type which we can generalise.

The transcendental argument's project does not provide an 'explanation' of meaning, rather it provides an account of what it is to 'understand' meaning. That is to say, 'explanation' of meaning merely points to a descriptive fact of meaning, not a normative fact. For example, one may explain the phenomenon that the red sky may 'mean' rain. But 'meaning' in that sense merely signifies or predicts what will happen, not what should happen. Explanation of meaning thereby does not provide the idea of normative fact of meaning. On the contrary, if meaning is normative, then what we need is an account of understanding meaning. In understanding meaning, one knows what one should do with an expression, in such a way that the normativity of meaning is not extrinsic to the use. That is to say, understanding is not always an interpretation because its normativity is already intrinsic to use in a way which is particularized to its norms. So the notion of use cannot be accounted for as a descriptive fact which requires an account of how meaning or content is connected with it.

However, an objection may be this -- if norms are intrinsic to use or behaviour, then one cannot tell which of two similar types of behaviour or use with different intentions is normative or meaningful. For example, raising a hand in a conference is a meaningful behaviour as it is meant to be a sign of communication. But this is different from a hand rising up in a conference. The latter may happen as that person is suffered from Parkinson disease. That is merely a descriptive fact of a situation of that person which happens independently from the subject's intention while the former case is the case of a normative fact. The response from the unitary model would be this-- that there is a criterion for differentiating one case of behaviour from the other, that is, the criterion is in the object that the
behaviour is about or the criterion is in the behaviour. The point is that an extrinsic criterion is not required. That is because constructing such a criterion is merely begging for the problem of rule-following. In other words, the dilemma of rule-following arises once one is trapped with the question of how to construct a definitive criterion for differentiating a common characteristic type of experience or two similar sorts of behaviour. Wittgenstein’s rule-following argument merely points to the fact that there is a grammar of the use of what it is for one thing to be identical with the other, that is, there is the grammar of the idea of resemblance. Such grammar is the idea that the use of symbols is normatively constrained intrinsically, so that it is possible for the grammar to provide meaning.

In sum, the transcendental argument provides the idea of the unitary model of use, in which norms are intrinsic to use in such a way that norms cannot be only characterized transcendentally to the use but is also transcendent to the use. The former is shown in the idea that truth-conditions are available in a language-use. The latter means that the idea of objectivity of meaning is possible in a disjunctive way. On this model, the idea of practice is world-involving, in particular, object-engaging. Based on the idea that the generalisation of rule is not plausible, the world-involving sense of practice can be illustrated by the idea of a ‘singular thought’—the thought of which meaning or content can be singled out in the form of having demonstrative thoughts. It provides the idea of practice in which content can be individuated in terms of the perceptual activity engaging with the object of our attentions. I will discuss this issue in the following chapter.
4. Conclusion

This chapter argues that in order to account for the thesis that meaning is normative or rule-governed, the unitary model of use is required. The two-component model brings in the problem of the dilemma of following a rule. This means that if the thesis that meaning is normative is right, the dilemma is the real threat for an account of meaning which separates use from its normative constraint. I have shown that two examples of the two-component model—Kripke’s sceptical argument and Wright’s reductio argument—cannot escape from such a threat. Meanwhile, the unitary model which is found in the transcendental argument provides a way out of the dilemma. On this basis, the unitary model provides a ground for developing my account of a notion of practice. That is to say, the notion of practice which provides meaning or content involves the idea of use which is world-involving. Use involves the world both in an epistemic level and ontological level; namely, it involves our ways of thinking of an object and involves the object of our involvement. In the next chapter, I show how content can be derived from world-involving use. This requires an idea of thought which picks out objects in the world directly, that is, demonstrative thoughts.
However, proposed expressions, naturalised belonging to the notion of a 'perspectival' point of view against the general discussion of the problem. A strong communitarian view takes the notion of practice in a socio-linguistic sense such as Baker&Hacker (1980 ff); M.McGinn (1997); and other works such as Wright (1984 ff); Brandom (1994); Burge (1979 passim). An obvious individualist view is in McGinn, C. (1984) where he thinks that isolated rule following is possible. Kripke's sceptical solution for the sceptical reading can also be counted as a communitarian view. However, my point will be that those ways of grouping the readings are not quite right because they merely reflect the dilemma of rule-following which is supposed to be dissolved.

4 Based on McDowell's reading of the argument, this is the dilemma of Scylla and Charybdis. (see 1984, 342) The structure of the dilemma can be put like this—
1. Scylla is the situation where following a rule or the use is governed by the sort of super-rigid rules, the problem of which is the regress of rules-interpretation.
2. Charybdis is the situation where there is no normative constraint for following a rule, if a rule is rejected.

The point is that the dilemma is a production of the model in which use is subject to extrinsic normative constraint — call this model 'E'. Once use and norms are separated, there will be the problem that understanding a rule or meaning is always an interpretation, and thereby the dilemma. I will elaborate this issue in more details in the next section.

5 Although the private language argument is another main issue which requires more discussion, it is not my direct concern in this chapter. However, the essence of the argument is linked with the singular thought thesis which will be handled in the next chapter. That is to say, I take it that the private language argument is the argument against a strong Cartesian picture of mind, rather than a modest Cartesian one.

6 The idea that norms are immanent, for the characterization of grammar cannot be done independently of the perspective of the subject, is labelled 'grammar is perspectival' in Luntley, M. (2003 forthcoming).

7 However, there is a variant of (E) which seems to be similar to (I), namely, (E') Use inherits normativity

(E') is actually what McDowell calls the Charybdis of the dilemma. It looks like the unitary model because use is not extrinsically normative. But the difference is that according to (E'), norms are naturalised or 'inherited' in our behaviour toward expressions, so that it does not have a normative rationalising force because such notion of norms is not autonomous or independent from the use. So I count (E') as belonging to the two-component model as well. Generally, (E') is known as a naturalised model, such as, Quine (e.g.1960), Millikan (1984), Dretske (1995). However, I will not discuss this sort of model here in the thesis because I think that as the (E') model is merely a variant of the (E) model in the sense that the notion of use is proposed to be a reductionist notion. That is to say, norms are revised into a factual form of use. (E) also commits a sort of reductionism, so it is enough for the thesis to
show some weak points of the (E) model.

8 What I mean by ‘they’ is the sceptical reading and a sort of reductio reading which revises truth-conditions into other sorts of condition. I make a note here in order to exclude other sorts of reductio reading which are not reductionist, for example, one can call McDowell’s reading a sort of reductio reading as such.

9 In terms of textual reading, the rule-following argument is generally taken from PI 138-242. Although I am not concerned with the exegesis, I think this section provides a crucial clue to the argument.

10 The *thick* notion being employed in the thesis is in common with Williams (1985). The *thick* notion means the notion in which the union of fact and value is expressed. Williams attacks the idea of a *thick* notion or ethical notion or value notion which is attached to the descriptive or naturalistic fact. However, he does not employ the terminology *thin* notion to represent the descriptive fact. What Williams wants is also the idea of *thick* use in the unitary sense, as I have advocated.

11 See footnote 7

12 The notion of understanding being elaborated here is according to the conception of mind I call the modest Cartesian picture of mind which I will discuss in the next chapter.

13 This means that the notion of ‘privately’ following a rule should be taken in the sense of the interweaving picture of ‘privacy’. It is such notion of ‘privacy’ which grounds the idea of practice. So this is not contradicted with PI 202 ‘... ‘obeying a rule’ is a practice. And to *think* one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule ‘privately’: otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it.”

14 See e.g. PI 241, RFM 30:331, 39:343, 49:353

15 Wright (1980) shares some idea with the sceptical reading; but from 1984ff., his reading is more on the side of the reductio reading.

16 Wright defines the notion of truth in the sense of secondary qualities or ‘euthyphronic’. Briefly, he employs the idea of Euthyphro Contrast or the control of correctness, i.e. the biconditional of the difference between truth as judgement independent and truth as judgement dependent. Wright designs a test for examining which side of the bicondition is prior for language about, e.g. mind, color, and shape. The test is called the order-of-determination test which concerns the relation between best judgement or judgement made in cognitively ideal conditions or normal non-defeasible conditions of human responses and truth. (Wright 1989:246) However, this issue is a separate issue which I will not discuss here because what concerns me about Wright’s idea in this chapter is only to show that his reading of the rule-following argument is an example of the model (E).

17 Wright takes Wittgenstein’s ‘agreement of judgement’ as the agreement of “...a specific class of judgements: those which we make responsively, without articulated reasons, under the causal impact of those aspects of our environment which we can most directly perceive” (ibid.:276).

18 Such a notion of understanding which is in the use needs to be taken in the sense of a criterion, not a symptom (PI 354). The characteristic of a symptom is that of when ‘we see the use, we see the understanding’. (see PI 357) That is to say, the understanding is what is hidden or behind the use. It is in this sense that the use is the symptom of the understanding. But the notion of criteria is different. A criterion provides normativity for what we see. But the criterion has to be transcendent of the use or what we see in the sense that it cannot be characterized in a way that is detached from what we see; otherwise, there is no distinction of norms and the use. This means
that the notion of understanding cannot be taken to be a detached inner process which is behind the use, rather it is constitutive of the use.

19 I will elaborate this issue in the next chapter.

20 It is the sort of objection found in argument from twin-earth thought experiment which will recur in following chapters.
Chapter Two: Singular Thought

In the last chapter, I have argued that if meaning as use is normative, then use is constitutive of norms in the unitary sense. The notion of norms which govern use is the notion of the semantic constraint on meaning, namely, the condition under which sentences are correct or not. It is a truth-conditional conception of meaning, in which norms can be characterized within use; however, their objectivity is not determined by the use. In other words, truth-conditions are intrinsic to use, but grasp of truth-conditions cannot be characterized in a way that norms are lost or reduced into the inferential structure or our ways of thinking about what truth is. The idea that understanding of meaning does not always require interpretations means that in order to possess content, understanding meaning or ‘thought’ requires a constraint of directly grasped truth-conditions. For example, in thinking about an object, we need an account of thought which, while acknowledging the way thought reflects our egocentric orientation to things, also shows how, in thought, we are directly engaged with objects. We need an account of thought the characterization of which satisfies both sides-- objectivity of object and its egocentric property. A question that remains to be answered is this -- how are truth-conditions grasped, without interpretations, in such a way that content is provided and is embedded in a structure of practice?

This chapter will show that the sort of thought which offers a notion of content embedded in practice that meets the constraint of direct grasp of truth-conditions is a singular thought, that is, the thought of a singular proposition such that its content cannot be derived if one does not ‘know which’ object one has thought about. However, this is different from Russell’s conception of a singular thought, namely, a belief which derives from direct acquaintance with ‘objects’, i.e. sense-data. Rather it
is the neo-Fregean account of singular thought the content of which can be individuated on the basis of object-dependence in which the know-which object requirement allows different thoughts about the object to be possible.

Thoughts employing a demonstrative mode of presentation\(^1\) provide the key case in which this idea is illustrated.\(^2\) Demonstrative thoughts require both the aspect of a subject’s thought about an object and the aspect of the object of thought being independent from the subject’s thought about it. As demonstrative thoughts are perceptual-based way of thinking, objects of perceptual experiences provide the constraint which is independent to the subject’s thought. Such a constraint also supplies a model for the idea of how, in thought, we are engaged with that which semantically constrains thought. The meaning of ‘engaging with objects’ provides the idea that there is a structure of practice in which we are perceptually engaged with the objects. In other words, the ‘engagement’\(^3\) of our mind with objects in the world provides a notion of practice which is based on the idea of singular thought. However, although this sort of account of content holds on the rational role of our understanding of an object, it is an externalist account. It is an externalism in which the account of content is not only constrained by objects in external world, but also plays an explanatory role in rationalising human action. That sort of externalist account accommodates the idea that the normatively rationalising force of content can be derived from the structure of practice. However, the issue of the neo-Fregean externalism will be investigated in the next chapter which illustrates the idea that singular thoughts provide an idea of engagement with the world, and thereby an account in which the content of a demonstrative sentence depends on a world-involving practice.
This chapter provides an account of how the neo-Fregean idea of singular thought can be a fundamental notion for characterizing the notion of practice that I propose in this thesis; that is, the notion of practice which is constructed in the way that a subject engages with objects. It is neither the notion of practice or engagement which is based on a sort of mental construction like Russell’s Cartesian conception of acquaintance with objects, which does not allow different thoughts about the same object to be possible, nor the notion of practice based on social construction like the idea of social practice of the language use⁴. My central claim is that practice is fundamentally an engagement with things, not with others. The strategy I employ in this chapter is to investigate the idea of singular thought under the framework of the dichotomy of representationalism and inferentialism. I first start with an account of the dichotomy in order to show that according to the neo-Fregean singular thought, in having demonstrative thoughts, such a dichotomy is dissolved. Then in the second section, I provide some reasons for that account. In particular, I consider the question why Russell’s idea of object-dependence does not provide the idea of object from which thought content can be derived, and that a sort of modest ‘Cartesianism’ is required for supporting the idea of the Russellian notion of object-dependence. Then what follows are two basic principles -- Fregean and Russell’s principles--which compose the neo-Fregean account of singular thought. I provide an outline of such an account in the last section. This introduces an account of demonstrative thought, in which the semantic constraint (truth) on thought and the notion of thought as characterized by the egocentric idea of perception are jointly met. The discussion of demonstrative thought will be presented in more detail in chapters four and five. This chapter hence provides an account of the neo-Fregean idea of singular thought in order to provide a ground for developing the notion of ‘practice’ in terms of the idea of ‘object-engagement’ in later chapters.
1. Dichotomy of Representationalism and Inferentialism

Concerning the strategy for developing the point I want to make, as with the last chapter, I have employed McDowell’s dilemma of rule-following as a framework for the investigation, in this chapter, a parallel framework is that of representationalism and inferentialism:

(1) Representationalism is the view that meaning or content is determined by the reference of an expression such that the world or the reference can be characterized independently from our thoughts and experiences, so that the world is independent from thoughts.

(2) Inferentialism is the view that an expression has meaning because of its inferential relation with other connected expressions such that the world cannot be characterized independently from thoughts, so that the world is not independent from thoughts.

As the basic semantic property for (1) is the referential property, and for (2) is the inferential property, this makes it looks as if there is a dichotomy that we have to choose either representationalism or inferentialism. I provide their brief definitions here in order to show that the dichotomy of representationalism and inferentialism can be avoided as well as the dilemma of the rule-following. The way out is to show that demonstrative thoughts are thoughts whose inferential structure turns out to be something that can only be characterized in a referential or worldly way. That is to say, what individuates demonstrative thoughts cannot be individuated independently of an account of our engagement with objects. That way, there is not really a choice between representationalism and inferentialism, the dichotomy is a false one.⁵

The term ‘independence’ seems to be problematic. I suggest that it can be understood in a similar way as the two models of use as mentioned in chapter one, namely the two-component model and, the
unitary model. That is to say,

(3) The world or object can be characterized independently to thoughts in such a way that it is extrinsic to our characterizations of it, so that the independency of objects is something which is added to a subject's thought and experiences.

(4) The world or object exists independently but is not characterized independently in such a way that its independency is intrinsic to a subject's characterizations of it, in the sense that the world is not determined by the subject's thought and perceptual experiences, so that it is rationally possible for different subjects to have different thoughts about the same object.

The model of independency (4) provides the idea that the notion of independency is understood relationally. It should be understood under the concept of constitutive relation of the information link between subject and object. Demonstrative thoughts provide such an idea that objects exist independent of mind and experiences, but it is not independent from our ways of thinking about it. That is to say, as demonstrative thoughts are thoughts the objects of which are individuated directly, it means that the existence of objects has to be independent from thought for the individuation to be possible. The independence of objects provides the idea that thought is fallible; in other words, it is the idea of the worldly constraint which provides a friction for content ascriptions. However, individuating objects involves perceptual experiences. This means that the independence of objects cannot be characterized independently from the way we perceptually identify objects. I will provide an argument supporting this idea in the next section. By contrast, the notion of independence in (3) brings in the dichotomy of representationalism and inferentialism. This point may be better explained in comparison with the dilemma of following a rule in the following way.
What I mean by saying that the dichotomy of representationalism and inferentialism is similar to the problem of rule-following is to make an analogy between representationalism with the horn in which norms are extrinsic and inferentialism with the horn in which norms are replaced with a description of this use. The dichotomy of representationalism and inferentialism arises once the independency of objects is characterized extrinsically to the subject's thoughts and experiences. Representationalism and inferentialism are the result of the model of independency (3), so that it makes it seems that one needs to opt for either of the following semantic properties – reference (the world) or inference (thoughts/concepts)—as prior to the other, for they are independent of one another. If we choose representationalism, the world as independently characterizable from thoughts, then the notion of the world is beyond how we take the world which is in the inferential structure of thoughts. If we choose inferentialism, the view that content is provided within the inferential relation among thoughts, then the world is not independent to thoughts.

Demonstrative thoughts provide what both representationalism and inferentialism want, namely, the aboutness of thought which is subject to the normative criterion of the world and the rationality of thought which involves the inferential structure of thought. By having the thought, such as, 'This is F.', the content of the thought is provided by a thinker's having a direct perceptual engagement with an object under a demonstrative mode of presentation. So saying that the dichotomy is overcome in having demonstrative thoughts means that such an account of content provides the idea that there is no dichotomy of representationalism and inferentialism. In other words, it provides both aspects of content, that is, the aspect of the world which cannot be characterized independently and the aspect of the world as independent to
thoughts. This means that there is a sort of thought content which is conceptual but that which is derived from a direct perceptual contact of a thinker with the world at the same time.

Briefly, we want both types of property for explaining content. On the one hand, representationalism provides the idea that normativity or the world is independent from our thought and provides an objective constraint for having thought; on the other hand, inferentialism provides the idea that meaning can be derived from within the inferential structure, or that normativity is not characterized independently from our understanding and use of language. If we separate these two sorts of normativity from each other, we get something similar to the dilemma of rule-following. That is, while representationalism can be taken as on the side in which if norms are independent from our thought, then the upshot will be a regress of interpretation in characterizing norms, inferentialism can be taken as on the side in which if norms are not independently characterizable from our thoughts, then there will be a risk of being no norms. The neo-Fregean account of singular thoughts takes the middle position in which normativity can be intrinsic to the inferential structure and that representationalist semantic property-- reference-- needs to be characterized in terms of understanding and truth. We need a characterization of representationalism which accommodates inferentialism, which is grounded on Russelian notion of object-dependence. In other words, the account of meaning or content does not require one to prioritise truth or reference to inference; rather they have an equal relation. This is because the account of inferential relation is object-dependent. So I turn now to Russell's idea of object-dependence.
2. Russell's Idea of Object-Dependence

Russell (1911) separates knowledge of objects into two sorts, namely, knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. While the former is the sort of knowledge derived from a direct perceptual relation, the latter is the sort of knowledge derived from descriptions of things. The idea behind this is that, for Russell, meaning is determined by objects or references. That is the idea which Evans (1982) calls Russell’s Principle: the principle that a singular thought is not possible if a subject does not know which object he has thought about. The principle is derived from Russell’s epistemological principle that "Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted." (ibid.:23) However, before going further with the idea of singular thought, I first suggest that we need to differentiate Russell’s specific notion of object-dependence from the more general Russellian or one might say neo-Russellian notion of object-dependence. That is to say,

(5) Russell’s specific notion of object-dependence means the notion of being acquainted with sense-data in which such objects are constituents of thought.

(6) The Russellian notion of object-dependence means the notion of object as that which is singled out in the external world and which is required in order to individuate a thought.

Both notions of object-dependence, actually, require the idea of acquaintance, namely, the awareness of direct perceptions with object. The reason why I do not employ the term 'acquaintance' in (6) is to make a contrast between the notion of acquaintance with sense-data and the notion of acquaintance with an object. Indeed, according to Russell, knowledge by acquaintance is knowledge of an expression which has a referring function. So the correct notion of acquaintance should be treated
as a demonstrative identification of the object which is perceptually present. Before discussing this point further, let's look at the assumption behind (5) a bit more.

According to Russell (1918), sense-data are not mental constructions. Rather they are logical constructions the content of which is perceptual experience. But if sense-data are merely the data about the perceptual experience, this means that they have no content which is provided by objects of experience. It can be said that Russell's notion of acquaintance implies a Cartesian epistemology of object, namely, the idea that knowledge about objects is defined in terms of the inner process independent from the external world. However, having an acquaintance with objects in (6) means that one's inner experiences is in contact with the external world. This means that there is a 'Cartesian' element in the notion of acquaintance, namely, the way that the subject's phenomenology of the inner experience plays a part in determining what one experiences. That is to say, as acquaintance is a direct perceptual experience of a subject, this means that in having direct perception with things, the subject's perspective is playing a crucial role. So we can take this to mean that there is a Cartesian element in the notion of acquaintance in two senses. That is to say, the notion of acquaintance in (5) and (6) can be modified as being based on two sorts of model of Cartesianism, namely:

(5)* Russell's specific notion of object-dependence is based on the notion of 'acquaintance' which involves a strong form of Cartesian epistemology of objects-- a sort of acquaintance which does not reach out to objects in the external world.

(6)*Russellian notion of object-dependence is based on the notion of 'acquaintance' which involves a modest model of Cartesian knowledge
of objects, namely, knowledge of objects is derived from the relation in which the inner point of view and outer object in the external world are not only interconnected but also provide the normative constraint for thought.

(5)* faces a problem concerning non-acquaintance knowledge of objects including non-existent objects. Russell’s solution is that knowledge of such objects is possible by descriptions, that is, by assigning quantification to the sentence containing ordinary proper names and the sentence containing empty names. However, such a solution does not bring in the idea of an object that can be individuated in thought, as I will argue below. On the contrary, (6)* is the ground for the neo-Fregean account of singular thought, in which the Russelian idea provides a fundamental principle for having thought content, namely, a singular thought is available, if there is an object of that thought. This means that (6)* does not face the problem of non-existent object in the similar way as (5)*. Rather what (6)* insists is merely that the sort of thought the object of which does not exist is not a singular thought. And this does not contradict the Russelian notion of object-dependence. In the following part, I will show that we can keep Russelian object-dependence without accepting Russell’s specific notion of object-dependence. There are two main problems concerning Russell’s specific notion of object-dependence: first, Russell’s two sorts of knowledge cannot provide the idea of object from which content can be derived; and second, the reason for that is because of the problematic assumption hidden in Russell’s notion of acquaintance, namely, its strong model of Cartesianism. The upshot is the impossibility of different ways of thinking of an object. I begin with the first point; and then I employ McDowell’s suggestion that a modest ‘Cartesian’ knowledge of object which supports the notion of Russelian object-dependence can account for content. 7
2.1. Russell’s Epistemology of Objects

Russell accounts for objects is in terms of how they are known. In other words, the notion of object is defined in terms of the epistemology of objects. The question is whether such a notion of object is legitimate. I provide an illustration of his idea first, and then show that his epistemology of objects cannot provide the idea of object-dependence in which thought content can be individuated. That is to say, I want to show the inadequacy of (5)*.

According to Russell’s (1918) logical atomism, metaphysical structure is a logical structure which corresponds to the structure of the world. The fundamental structure of reality is composed of logical atoms, not physical atoms.8 The basic logical atoms are *logical proper names* or genuine proper names, i.e. names which are unanalysable and correspond directly to objects. There are only two genuine proper names, i.e. the first-person pronoun and demonstrative pronoun (‘I’, ‘this’) which provide ‘objects’ as constituents of a proposition, because these proper names name objects directly without assigning properties of the objects. Objects of these names are our own minds and sense-data. For Russell, the relation between such names and objects is ‘a cognitive direct relation’ (1911:16) of subject and object, which is called the relation of acquaintance. This means that acquaintance is an epistemological relation which constitutes the basic constituents for a proposition. That is according to Russell’s fundamental epistemological principle, "Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted." (ibid.:23) However, if acquaintance provides the basic constituent of a proposition, it means that, for Russell, objects are reduced to what is available by acquaintance. And it can be said that objects in this sense are merely mentally constructed. The main problem is that a subject cannot tell ‘which’ object
he has thought about.

This can be put as McDowell (1986) says that, in one sense, one can say that Russell’s idea of object-dependence aims at providing the know ‘which’ object as the constraint of understanding meaning. But the problem is that Russell confuses knowing ‘which’ object is represented with ‘how’ the object is represented (1986:140). In other words, Russell confuses the notion of object with the notion of acquaintance, so that his notion of object is problematic because the knowing ‘which’ object requires the notion of object the existence of which is independent from the acquaintance, and one mark of that independence is the scope for the possibility of different points of view on an object. The upshot is that it does not seem to be legitimate to call an object of acquaintance an object. That is because Russell’s idea of object as an acquaintance cannot be referred to, so that the subject cannot tell which object he has thought about. This means that for a thing to be an object, it needs to be possible to be referred to, so that it can be individuated. This problem here is the problem concerning Russell’s implicit assumption of the strong model of Cartesian epistemology of object, namely, the problem that within the realm of the acquaintance which is absolutely independent from its external world, there is no objective point for thought to individuate the object. I will discuss this point in the following section on Cartesianism. At this stage, I will look first at how Russell provides a solution to this problem, namely, the solution that knowledge of objects by description is possible even though the object cannot be referred to. And I will provide a supporting argument for my criticism of Russell’s solution that knowledge by description cannot provide an idea of object-individuation. In other words, Russell’s solution cannot account for how thought is object-dependent.
For Russell, the criterion for being a referring expression is the criterion of direct acquaintance; however, even though the case of names of objects with which we are not directly acquainted are not referring expressions, they are analysable as definite descriptions. The account of meaning is still possible even though we cannot have a direct acquaintance with objects. This means that knowledge of objects is still possible, i.e. knowledge by descriptions. Objects of such knowledge are objects which we cannot know by direct acquaintance, i.e. other people’s minds and physical objects. Such names are ordinary proper names (e.g. London) which, for Russell, can be analysed as a ‘definite description’ (the so and so) or a ‘denoting phrase’ (e.g. a man, every man) (Russell 1905). It means that descriptions do not refer to objects directly, so objects of descriptions are not what we are immediately acquainted with. Rather objects of descriptions are only objects which we can have ‘knowledge about’ through descriptions or denoting phrases. (ibid.:41) So, a proposition which has a definite description, ‘the so- and- so’ as a grammatical subject can be analysed into a form of proposition that “There is something which alone is so-and-so, and that something is such-and-such”. (Russell 1911:31)

In other words, definite descriptions cannot be treated as referring expressions. But as we shall see that Russell’s analysis of descriptions does not involve objects which provide content, even though Russell accounts for knowledge by description in a way which is not contradicted with his epistemological principle. That is to say, a proposition containing definite descriptions is composed of constituents with which we are acquainted. All the constituents of a sentence analysable as descriptions have logical ‘existence’ or universals. But, for Russell, we can be acquainted with universals, besides sense-data and our own minds. This suggests something problematic in Russell’s idea of an object-dependence
because it is not objects or particulars which provide meaning or content. I shall explain first what it means for Russell to be acquainted with universals and then show why that is problematic.

For Russell, a proposition containing a definite description can be reduced to a proposition about 'existence' which is not derived from particulars. That is because 'existence' is a property of the 'form' or schema of proposition, namely, the propositional function (PF). PF contains a variable, i.e. "an undetermined constituent in a propositional function". (1918:98) A PF is "any expression containing an undetermined constituent, or several undetermined constituents, and becoming a proposition as soon as the undetermined constituents are determined." (ibid: 96) (e.g. "x is a man." is a PF, while "Socrates is a man." is a proposition.) It means that what has truth-values is a proposition. But a PF does not have semantic values, because it does not have objects to satisfy the function, rather it has modality- properties, i.e. necessary, possible, impossible. The fundamental meaning of modality is the idea about 'existence', namely, "propositional function is true in at least one instance." (ibid.:98) A definite description of the form "the so and so" expresses uniqueness of property of the object of description. So "The G is F." means there exists one and only one entity which is G and any entity which has G has property F. (Russell 1905) So, a proposition containing descriptions is about 'existence' or 'universals' rather than about particulars. I will provide an argument for this claim after considering further the problem concerning the case of empty names.

Another category of names which involves knowledge by descriptions is the category of empty names or names of which their referents do not exist, e.g. the King of France, a round-square. Empty names seem to be a problem for Russell's theory of meaning because if it
is the case that meaning is the object which a name refers to, then how
does that idea provide an account for names which do not have objects?
If we think of language as a communication system, this question may not
be pressing because we do use such names for communication and
understand them, so to say that they do not have meaning seems to be
counterintuitive. However, Russell would answer the above question
differently because his idea is not concerned with the aspect of
communication in ordinary language, rather he is concerned with language
as a logical structure. So, it means that empty names are not the problem
for him because they can be analysed as variables and hence have logical
‘existence’.

However, the question is-- does that not betray his fundamental
epistemological principle mentioned above that any proposition we can
understand must be composed of what we are acquainted with as
constituents? Russell would answer ‘no’ because he thinks that
knowledge of a proposition is possible even though we are not acquainted
with the ‘denotation’ (the reference). This means that it is not the
denotation or object itself which is the constituent of a proposition. Since
knowledge by descriptions can be analysed into universals, we can be
acquainted with the universals. Russell raises an example of a proper
name in a proposition like “Julius Caesar was assassinated.”. He says it
should be analysed into “One and only one man was called Julius Caesar,
and that one was assassinated.” (1911:26), so that the denoting phrases
which contains Julius Caesar is a constituent (a shape or a noise) and “all
the other constituents of the judgement ....are concepts with which we
are acquainted.” (ibid.) It means that it is the ‘concepts’ or the universals
which we are acquainted with. Hence, it is better to say that, for Russell,
at the end of the day, acquaintance turns out to deliver universals instead
of delivering particulars or knowledge about objects.
An argument supporting my criticism can be found in Strawson's idea of identification of particulars. (Strawson 1959) Strawson's argument is this. If particulars are not perceptually present, then their identifications face a theoretical problem, namely, the possibility of massive reduplications. That is the problem that however much we describe the particular, it is still possible that the descriptions merely duplicate its number, so that the particular cannot be individuated. It means that a particular cannot be referred to or individuated in a non-demonstrative identification. The theoretical solution is that in order that the particular-identification be possible, there must be a condition that our knowledge of particulars has a unified spatial and temporal structure. The only sort of identification which satisfies this knowledge is demonstrative identification. It is the sort of identification which rules out the possibility of multiple identifications. An example may be this. Suppose that we are now having a discussion concerning Mr.X. Without knowledge of who Mr.X is, the discussion cannot go on. There are two ways to identify Mr.X: first by referring to Mr.X or by demonstratively identifying Mr.X; second by describing his characteristic or by descriptively identifying him. That is to say, first, one can point to Mr.X, say, who is sitting at the corner of the room; second, one can describe the characteristic of Mr.X, such as, 'the man with a big glass on his nose who always comes late whenever he has a meeting...'. The second sort of identification raises two possibilities, namely, either that Mr.X may not exist at all or that there may be more than one Mr.X in the room. Even though one tries to add more characteristics to the description, it cannot rule out the possibility of massive reduplications of Mr.X. This means that individuation of Mr.X cannot be done directly without the presence of Mr.X. In other words, only demonstrative identification can individuate a particular.
Some objections to Strawson’s argument may be this. First is the case concerning the possibility of flaws on the subject’s side, for example, the subject may be color blind, blind sighted, taking drugs, so that demonstrative identifications cannot pick out particulars. Second is the case concerning the possibility of flaws in the external world, such as the case that the scene is blurred due to thick fog; the object is unclear due to a reflection of light from some other objects in the scene. Let’s consider the first objection first. Consider the case of the blind sighted person, suppose he expresses a sentence ‘This is a book.’ by pointing to the book. If Strawson’s argument is right, it means that the blind cannot identify the object demonstratively. But the problem is he can point to the book correctly. A response to this objection may be this. The subject in such example does not have demonstrative thoughts. By employing a singular sentence, he merely has a descriptive thought concerning the sentence rather than concerning the objects. (cf. Brewer 1999: 45) An alternative would be to suggest that the subject has a tactile demonstrative, but that would only work while the subject remained in touch with the object and that is really a different example. According to the second objection, Strawson’s response is that there is a context or a situation in which the object in question belongs. That is to say, although the object in the scene is blurred, we can at least individuate which situation, which scene the object belongs to. (see Strawson ibid.: 25) This does not overthrow the idea that descriptive identifications cannot individuate objects. However, there are more fine-grained objections to this idea which I will not discuss them now, but will take them to the later chapters. My further point here is that this problem with descriptive identification can be applied for criticizing Russell’s solution to the problem of empty name, that is, his idea of knowledge by description. The basic point is not an epistemological challenge, but concerns what is constitutive of reference to a particular: description does not determine reference.
Putting Russell’s idea of object-dependence in the frame of representationalism and inferentialism will help to show what the main problem with his view is. Basically, Russell’s idea of meaning is a sort of ‘object-dependence’, i.e. a singular term has meaning if and only if there is an object to which the term refers. From this basis, it may be said that his idea of object-dependence is a form of a representationalism because the basic semantic property is reference. However, it is a sort of representationalism in which knowledge of an object is accounted for in terms of knowledge by acquaintance, so that objects of reference are not independent. That is because he thinks that the constituents of a proposition are objects with which we are directly acquainted. However, it is the sort of acquaintance in which a subject cannot distinguish with which object he is acquainted because it is not an object in external world of which its existence is independent from the subject’s will. So, Russell’s epistemology of object contains a non-representationalist aspect, i.e. the aspect of knowledge of which there is no representational content.

Consequently, in the case of knowledge about objects which we are not directly acquainted with, in order that content can be ascribed, Russell proposes the idea of knowledge by descriptions. However, knowledge by description is an inferentialist sort of knowledge which does not require objects in ascribing content. A problem is that this sort of knowledge does not provide the possibility genuine error. The only possible error is the error from the inferential relation among variables which descriptions are reduced into. It is the sort of internal error the problem of which is that its normative constraint is not independent from the inferential relation. In effect, error is potentially always deferred. Again, the point is not epistemological. It is that the concept of error is one of deferred error, error with respect to other thoughts, utterances, etc. As I have already argued that the problem with inferentialism is analogous to the second horn of the dilemma of following a rule, namely, the problem that there
are no norms if norms are not independent from use. Accordingly, I conclude that Russell’s epistemology of object cannot provide an account of how content about objects is possible.

As mentioned above, Russell’s idea of object-dependence is, indeed, flawed on the point of the epistemology of object, that is, his epistemology assumes the strong Cartesian conception of mind, which is exhibited in his notion of acquaintance. The main problem with this sort of Cartesianism is that when an object is reduced into merely subjective experience, it is not possible for a subject to have different experiences toward the object in that sense. The ability to discriminate experiences requires objects which are not mentally constructed autonomously from objects in external world. In order to understand what the content of experience is, we need the idea of object-dependence which allows that discriminatory ability to be possible. That idea is grounded in modest Cartesianism. I will expand my argument and explain two sorts of Cartesianism which is discussed in McDowell (1986) in the next section.

2.2. Cartesianism

The conception of Cartesianism is the conception that mind is a separate inner process existing independently from its external context. This is the model of ‘independency’ (3) as mentioned above. However, there is an implication in such a conception, which can be taken to mean that the subjective phenomenology plays a crucial role in determining how the external world presents to the subject. Once we consider Cartesianism in this way, the ‘Cartesianism’ is not a real threat to an account of content. That is because ‘Cartesianism’ points to a crucial aspect of understanding content, namely, the egocentric role of thought. What is the real threat is in the way we treat the mind as an autonomous entity which is free-floating from the external world, and then taking this as the only
form of a Cartesian conception of mind. The upshot is that either mind is explained away (e.g. eliminativism) or mind is explained in terms of physicalism. These upshots are not preferable because they ignore the fact that the subjective realm plays the essential role in rationalising human action. Therefore, we need an account of the subjectivity or Cartesianism, which provides that role, namely, the modest form of Cartesianism which provides the notion of 'independency' (4).

Cartesianism can be distinguished into two sorts-- strong Cartesianism (5)*and modest Cartesianism (6)*. Strong Cartesianism, on which Russell's idea of object-dependence is grounded, is the view that mind is absolutely independently characterized from the external world. On the contrary, modest Cartesianism, on which the Russelian object-dependence is grounded, conceives mind not as an autonomous mental entity from outer objects, rather the conception of the mind involves external objects. These two contrasting Cartesian views are based on different metaphysical assumptions about the reality of the external world, as I will explain.

For strong Cartesianism, appearance and reality is divided in a way that appearances are intervening entities between mind and the world. When one perceives an object in the external world, what one perceives is only the appearance or what the mind constructs out of the object. In the subjective realm, there are only appearances the experience of which its subject cannot individuate objectively. That is because the strong Cartesian model treats mind as an absolute independent entity from the external world, thereby appearances as an intervening independent entity. Within the subjective realm, it is not possible for one to individuate experiences which seem to be the same because there is no objective point for one to contrast how things seem with how things are. It might seem
that sufficient coherence within subjectivity would permit a distinction between ‘right’ and ‘seems right’. But that still provides no conception of genuine error. It leaves the concept of error as deferred error, for it is a concept of error in which error in one proposition is dependent on a given evaluation of another. This coherentism is not epistemological, it is semantic and it is semantic error that gets deferred. Hence, there is no concept of falsity and so no concept of truth either. Russell’s idea of demonstratives can be an example. The meaning of ‘this’ is the experience of how an object appears to its subject. Suppose one say, “This apple is red.”, it is not the apple which ‘this’ refers to, rather it is the red-looking data. The problem is that it is not possible for one to individuate an experience about this ‘object’. This means that it is not possible for one to have different experiences about it. A different experience may be the case of an illusory experience of the object or the case of a possible different belief about it, e.g. “This mango is red.” That is to say, there is only a common characteristic of a veridical and illusory experience. So, it can be said that the subject does not know ‘which’ object one has thought about in the sense that its experience is of an object, for there is no conception of the object independently of the experience. The subjective experience itself, according to strong Cartesianism, does not involve objects in the external world which provide the normative constraint for the content of one’s thought.

The problem with strong Cartesianism can be put, following McDowell, as a dilemma of rule-following in this way. On the one hand, the mind according to this model is ‘blind’ because, as mentioned above, there is nothing in the mind that provides normativity, the condition which involves the idea of objects in the world. The strong Cartesianism perceives the mind as ‘self-contained’ (see 1986:153) or free-floating from the objective context in which the mind can be understood as what
provides different ways of understanding an object. So, the mind is ‘blind’ or has no content because there is no normativity within there. However, having said that does not mean that one cannot make judgements about one’s own subjective experiences, that is, about how one’s experiences are, like feeling itchy, dizziness. It is just to insist that judgements about subjective states of affairs will have content only if there are norms constraining the judgement. Such normativity cannot be the data of the experience which has no independent objects for its characterization. Otherwise, one needs a ‘magic’ (ibid.:153), namely, an arbitrary interpretation which will just be whatever is needed to make things work. It is arbitrary because once there are no independent norms and they are independently characterizable, then any interpretation is possible. This means that content cannot be derived by ‘magic’ because there will always be a regress of interpretations without any constraint.

Accordingly, the strong Cartesian model of mind cannot provide a satisfactory account of content because it cannot accommodate the fact that it is rationally possible for a subject to have different thoughts about an object. That possibility requires the idea that the object is independent from us because it needs ‘points of view’ for taking hold of which object it is. The modest Cartesian conception of mind provides that account which captures the rational role of thought. In particular, that account offers the idea of how rationalising human action can be shown possible. Rationalising human action is what provides an understanding of what the content of thought is, which I will illustrate in the following chapters: that what individuates content is the object one is perceptually engaged with. So, I will look at the modest Cartesian model in the following.

The modest form of Cartesianism provides an account of the conception of mind as an interweaving realm of inner with outer world in
the sense that the world is egocentrically related to a subject’s point of view through the subject’s engagement with objects in the world. Note, this means there is such a thing as a point of view and so, in principle, it is possible to have judgements about it. This means that, within the realm of egocentricity, it is possible for one to individuate how the world seems from how the world is. That is because, for the modest model, we are already in the world about which we have experiences. (see Strawson’s solution above) This is different from the strong Cartesianism which brings in the sceptical question that if two experiences have a common characteristic, so that they cannot be individuated which one is veridical, then it means that a subject does not know whether objects really exist. The Cartesian assumes that

(7) mind is absolutely separated from its external world,

so that it is not true to assert that

(8) S knows that p

(9) if S does not know whether the external world exists.  

That is to say, the sceptical doubt is asking for an epistemic justification for (8). But what the modest model of Cartesianism holds is to deny (7), so that (8) and (9) follow. According to modest Cartesianism, any doubts about what reality is need to be asked on the ground that ‘appearances’, in the sense of the egocentricity of experiences, can provide knowledge about the world. Within the realm of appearance, different ways of thinking or points of view about an object are possible because objects are mind-independent. However, points of view are not understood independently of what they are about, which is shown by the idea of our engagement with object. That is because the notion of points of view or sense provides the rationalising role of thought which accounts for actions.
For the modest Cartesianism, experiences which seem to have something in common, e.g. hallucinatory and veridical experience, can be individuated differently by the object of experiences which appears to a subject in a certain way. The account of experiences for the modest Cartesianism is taken as a disjunctive account.\(^\text{12}\) That is to say, the question whether one's perception of an object is veridical has to be taken in a disjunctive form, namely, the question 'which' of the disjuncts is in question -- either one seems to perceive an object or it is the object which is seen. This contrasts with the strong Cartesianism in which the disjunctive conception of experience cannot be applied because, for them, there is a common characterization of experience invariant across the veridical and illusory. Since, for the strong Cartesianism, experiences belong to our mental construction, the individuation of experiences is not possible. The upshot is that when experience is accounted for in terms of an object which is autonomously characterized from how things seem, one needs a purely causal mechanism\(^\text{13}\) which accounts for how such objects provide content. But that sort of causal link is problematic as already mentioned, in that it will be only 'magic' that does the work.

The modest form of Cartesianism provides a notion of inner space, or more precisely, the Fregean cognitive space in which different thoughts about an object are rationally possible. The Fregean cognitive space incorporates outer objects to be 'figured in' (see McDowell ibid.:146) inner mind as a part of the content of thought. So, Russellian object-dependence can be maintained in this form -- objects which figure in our thought are objects of which the appearances or *modes of presentation* are assimilated by our minds. Frege's concept of a mode of presentation picks out the way an object is presented to thought. This suggests the interrelation between inner space and outer objects, which takes Russellian object-dependence into account. So, this means that the inner
mind requires objects in order for thoughts to have content. And that is what the neo-Fregean account of singular thought says.

A common objection to this sort of view is the argument from the twin-earth thought experiment, e.g. Putnam (1975), Blackburn (1984). This sort of objection is still found in e.g. Brueckner (1993), which runs like this. Suppose that there are twins who have all the biological and psychological similarities, but live in different worlds. When Mr. X said, ‘This is an apple.’ in Xworld, Mr.twin-X also said, ‘This is an apple.’ in twin-X world. If what determines content lies in the role of subjectivity or appearances as the neo-Fregean singular thought claims, then it is not possible to discriminate which of the twins has a genuine thought. That is to say, the neo-Fregean account seems to be proposing an internalist account of content, which is contradictory to the idea of singular thought which is an externalist account. An immediate response would be this that this sort of objection assumes strong Cartesianism. The objection takes the notion of ‘appearance’ as an intermediary between minds and the world. But what the neo-Fregean account holds is the notion of ‘appearance’ which is essentially disjunctive. (see McDowell 1986: 157) That is to say, appearances are not an alternative to reality. I will discuss the issue on the neo-Fregean singular thought and externalism further in the next chapter.

In conclusion, what Russell’s idea of object-dependence contributes to the account of content is the egocentricity of thought which is implicit in Russell’s idea of acquaintance with objects. However, the main problem is that Russell’s idea of acquaintance requires strong Cartesianism which isolates the mind from external objects, so that it is not rationally possible for a subject to have different beliefs about the same object, and that egocentricity in this sense does not provide a
semantic constraint for thought because there is no object from which thought can be singled out. By contrast, Russelian object-dependence assimilates the mind with the world. On the basis of this assimilation, singular thought is possible under the condition of Russelian object-dependence--singular thought is available, if there is the object one has thought about. That object one has thought about is the object which presents to thought in a particular way. In other words, Frege’s concept of a mode of presentation of an object is what accounts for how our minds assimilate with the world. However, in order to see how that idea works, a mode of presentation needs to be characterized as a way of thinking about objects, of which the fundamental thought involves demonstrative thought. That is because demonstrative thought is what the ‘reference relation’ between thought and world is all about. But it is the ‘reference relation’ which cannot be characterized independently from the inferential structure of thought. This point will be clearer in the following part.

3. Neo-Fregean Singular Thought

The above part shows the inadequacy of Russell’s specific notion of object-dependence, in particular, with respect to the conception of mind. In this part, I illustrate Evans’s neo-Fregean notion of singular thought which requires the Russelian notion of object-dependence or Russell’s Principle together with Fregean Principle for giving an account of content. It will show that representationalism and inferentialism can be combined in a way that the rationality of different thoughts is possible under the reference relation or the idea of object-dependence. The combination is made obvious by the idea of object-engagement which underpins the idea of demonstrative thought. I first shortly restate the two basic principles of the neo-Fregean, and then the significance of demonstrative thoughts.
3.1. Two Basic Principles

The neo-Fregean singular thought is the thought of a singular proposition, grammatically, being composed of a singular term or a referring expression and a predicate, the content of which is possible only if a subject knows ‘which’ object is singled out. Evans (1982:1-3) defines referring expressions or singular terms in this way. With regard to their traditional grammatical form, the class of referring expressions are proper names; definite descriptions; demonstrative terms and some pronouns. But the point is concerned with their function—a referring expression plays a communicative role for a speaker to tell the audience which object the speaker means, which provides a semantic value to a sentence. It is this fact—the fact that an expression refers to a particular thing—which the neo-Fregean singular thought is all about. Roughly, the neo-Fregean singular thought is based on two principles—the Fregean Principle\(^{14}\) and, as Evans calls it, Russell’s Principle. I provide their definitions as follows.

(10) The Fregean Principle is the principle that it is rationally possible for a subject to take an object to which a singular term refers such that the term takes different senses from other subjects at the same time that they perceive the object.

(11) Russell’s Principle is the principle that in order for an individuation of thought-content to be possible, a subject needs to be able to individuate or know which object one is thinking about.

According to (10), it also means that one can have different thoughts in taking a sentence to be true and another sentence to be false without knowing that the two sentences are about the same object.\(^{15}\) This illustrates what Evans calls ‘the Intuitive Criterion of Difference’ (ICD). (ibid: 18) This Criterion is what picks out senses of expressions in the way that it allows a sentence to have cognitive values or rational values\(^{16}\) beside its semantic values (truth-values). Roughly, rational values of
sentences are the values determined by perspectives or ways of thinking of a subject toward an object, while semantic values are determined by the existence of the object itself. However, both sorts of values are matched in the way that rational values are what accounts for the grasp of an object. Our ‘understanding’ or perspective about an object is what picks out which object we have ‘thought’ about. And this idea about an object is what provides a rationalising explanatory role of human action toward things.

This means that there is a limit to the Fregean Principle, namely, the limit that if one does not know which object the singular terms refer to, then a singular thought is not available. In other words, the limit of the Fregean principle is the Russell’s Principle. So both principles cannot be treated separately. There is a sense in which they are interconnected. That is to say, as the knowing—which requirement requires perceptual based-identification of object, such a knowledge has to be characterized in terms of understanding and knowledge of truth, namely, the basic unit of thought is the sentence-level which provides knowledge about an object, instead of word-level. In this sense, knowledge about a sentence ‘This apple is red.’ involves knowledge of an inferential structure of thought, namely, the ability to generate different thoughts about the same object. It is to know the inferential link of the thought in different possible ways, e.g. ‘This apple is red.’, ‘This apple is from Australia’, or ‘This mango is red’, ‘This ball is red.’ Otherwise, Russell’s Principle will face the same problem as Russell’s specific idea of object-dependence which takes reference as more basic than truth. The problem is that once the idea about object is separated from the generative capacity of thought which provides the notion of truth we get a gap between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by descriptions, which does not contribute to understanding content. This gap just widens the dichotomy of
representationalism and inferentialism if we take representationalism only as knowledge of reference. That is because such understanding of representationalism does not contribute to the understanding of how the notion of an object can be combined or thought of in different ways; in other words, inferentialism cannot be separated from representationalism. That understanding requires knowledge of truth, which, in particular, provides the account of rationalising action. In the following, I will look at how we can get a seamless account of truth and reference by first looking at Frege's puzzle about identity statement.

As generally known, for Frege, we are interested in the notion of sense of an expression because "we are concerned with its truth-value" (1892: 157). This means that Frege's distinction of sense and reference is related to the notion of truth. The distinction is shown by the puzzle about identity statements, namely, the question of how they can be informative. As Frege said,

"...if we were to regard equality as a relation between that which the names 'a' and 'b' designate (bedeuten), it would seem that a=b could not differ from a=a, i.e. provided a=b is true." (ibid.:151)

If Russell's specific notion of object-dependence is correct, that is, names directly refer to 'objects', then that notion cannot explain why a = b is more informative than a=a, if a = b is true. By introducing the notion of sense, Frege can explain why a=b provides more content. That is because the object to which a and b refer can be thought of under different modes of presentation. The requirement of the notion of sense is more obvious in belief-sentences. For example,

(1) S believes that the Morning Star is Venus.
cannot be substituted with

(2) S believes that the Evening Star is Venus.

even if the Morning Star is the Evening Star. These sentences have
different truth conditions, for the role of the name ‘Morning Star’ is not
just to contribute an object to the sentence’s truth-conditions, its role in
compound sentences is also a function of the expression’s rational value.
In other words, as the ICD said, the identity statements can be informative
or may have different thoughts if it is rational for one to agree with the
simple statement \( a \text{ is } F \) and disagree with the simple statement that \( b \text{ is } F \)
even if \( a \text{ is } b \). Though the thoughts or the rational value of the statement
\( a \text{ is } F \) and the statement \( b \text{ is } F \) are different, they have the same truth-
value because they are about the same object. Different thoughts involve
different perspectives or understandings about the object which rationally
explains why the subject behaves differently toward the object. This
means that understanding a sentence requires judgement not only grasp of
its truth-values, but also its rational value. The significance of this point
suggests that the failure of substitutivity in identity statement shows
different perspectives or different ways of thinking about the object which
provides an account of how we act differently toward the object. The
issue is hence that the notion of reference alone does not provide an
understanding of action. Rather it is the way different thoughts involve
understanding and truth which rationalises human action.

This means that an account of singular thought requires
knowledge of understanding which involves truth-conditions rather than
merely reference alone. The reason why it seems that reference is the
basic requirement of an account of singular thought is that singular terms
have reference. But this is not correct. The point here is that the notion of
reference that the neo-Fregean singular thought employs is secondary to
the notion of truth. This can be accounted for in the way that McDowell
(1977: 163) makes a terminological distinction between ‘reference’ and ‘referent’. That is to say, while ‘reference’ means ‘what a singular term refers to’ alone without taking account of its position in a sentence conceived independently of its role as contributing to truth conditions. Objects, as such, as causally integrated lumps of matter, do not contribute to truth-conditions. By contrast, ‘referent’ is a semantic conception of an object, i.e. as that which contributes to the truth condition of a sentence or a whole thought. It accounts for knowledge of objects which provides the semantic value for a sentence. That is because thoughts have objective truth conditions. That is to say, the notion of object at play in talking about objective truth conditions is simply 'that which is required in order for such and such thoughts to be true'. So, what is distinctive concerning the truth conditions of thoughts involving singular terms is the account of perceptual engagement that is required in order to individuate the thoughts expressed by sentences employing perceptual demonstratives. In particular, the knowledge of truth or referent makes it possible for us to understand why one behaves differently to an object.

The reason why the basic requirement of the neo-Fregean account of singular thought is the notion of truth rather than the reference is the following. First, it is to shift from the problem which confronts Russell's object-dependence-idea, namely, the problem about empty names. If reference is the semantic value of a proposition, then we cannot make sense of how a proposition containing empty names has meaning. Actually, that problem shows that the reference relation between thoughts and world cannot be understood on the reference-model or representationalism alone because, on that model, it is not possible for one to understand how different thoughts about an object can be generated under the inferential structure of thought. Second, the puzzle about identity statements shows that knowledge of reference is not sufficient for
understanding different thoughts and hence actions toward an object. It is knowledge of truth or McDowell’s notion of referent which offers this role. We may think of an example. In having a thought, “This is a red apple.”, according to Russell’s notion of acquaintance, it is actually “This is a red-data.” This also means that, for Russell, “I am eating a red apple.” means “I am eating a red-data.”. The problem is that that cannot provide a rationalization of my action toward the apple.

Accordingly, representationalism and inferentialism can be combined under the neo-Fregean account of singular thought. To put it bluntly, Russell’s Principle provides what representationalism wants, namely, the reference relation, but it is the relation which involves ‘referent’ once it is added with the Fregean Principle; and the Fregean Principle provides what inferentialism wants, namely, the possibility of inferential relation among different thoughts about an object. Both may be characterized in this way that—content needs to be individuated at the level of sentence, so that it cannot float free, that is, there must be a constraint on how content is singled out. A basic constraint of thought is the Generality Constraint which provides an account for how different thoughts about an object is possible. It generates the relation between our thinking about an object and its properties or concepts in a way that we can have many thoughts about an object under a systematic connection. This systematicity shows that different thoughts are possible only on the ground of object-dependence that the ability to discriminate thoughts implies individuation of an object. So, the other constraint can be said to be the object-dependence constraint. This shows that the inferential relation and referential relation of thoughts and objects are necessarily interconnected in an equal way.

In sum, the neo-Fregean account of singular thought shows how
the thesis of object-dependence is possible on the ground of the modest Cartesian conception of mind. Both basic principles-- Fregean Principle and Russell's principles-- show how mind and objects in external world engage with each other. However, the further problem is if the 'engagement' relation is to be different from Russell's 'acquaintance', it needs to be able to give an account for the fundamental and most problematic sort of thought, i.e. demonstrative thoughts, because it is the only sort of thought which is the key of how the relation is between mind, language and world. That is the issue I am going to briefly introduce in the following.

3.2. Demonstrative Thoughts

Demonstrative thoughts are thoughts about objects which are identified by demonstrative modes of presentation, or more precisely, the demonstrative ways of thinking about an object. The sort of thought derived from a demonstrative way of thinking of an object is a singular thought. So, it provides the Russellian object-dependence that if there is no object, then that singular thought is not available.

In general, demonstratives are taken to be involved with perception and context. But that is problematic if it is based on a mistaken understanding of the relation of mind and world--the 'fully Cartesian' model as mentioned above. For the modest Cartesian model, demonstratives could be characterized as involving the understanding of how perception provides knowledge about an object. The only context relevant to having demonstrative thought is the context of the continuation of, what Evans calls, the informational link between subject and object. (1982:146)

There are three main characteristics of demonstrative thoughts--
first, the continuation of thought from previous to present contact or the
capacity of the sort which is similar to memory-based thought; second, the
subject remains in contact with the object or has the ability of keeping
track of an object over a period of time; third, the subject has the ability to
locate the object in egocentric space and thereby objective space. (see
ibid.:174) It is the second characteristic which provides the fundamental
basis of a demonstrative thought, namely,

"...a capacity to attend selectively to a single thing over
a period of time: that is, a capacity to keep track of a
single thing over a period of time-- an ability, having
perceived an object, to identify later perception involving
the same object over a period of continuous
observation." (ibid.:175)

What is crucially underpinning all of these three characteristics is
the idea of object-dependence. The ability to keep track of an object is a
fundamental basis of a demonstrative thought because it incorporates both
sides of understanding perception-based identification, namely, the
identity of the object derived from the ability to discriminate an object
over time and the disposition to behave corresponding to the former
identification. In other words, the former provides a normative constraint
deriving from the object, which controls our thoughts toward the object.
(That is, from "This was F." to "This is F now."). And the latter provides
expectations toward the object and hence rationalises our behaviour
toward the object. ("This will be F.").

The first characteristic -- the continuation of previous contact with
an object--provides an account for understanding perceptual knowledge
which is not atomistic like Russell’s knowledge of sense data. The third
characteristic--the ability to locate an object in objective space-- provides
an account for how the demonstrative way of thinking involves the objectivity of thought. That is to say, what determines the truth of a sentence containing demonstratives cannot be only a subject’s experience, but it must be the object which can be objectively describable as of the objective spatial world in which our experiences locate an object. This means that an account of the concept of the objective spatial world requires the account of how egocentric space can be identified with the objective space.

These points require more elaboration which I will provide in later chapters. The point as stated here is to show that demonstrative thoughts have not only the property of referring to objects in the world but also the inferential connection of thoughts in a non-descriptive way. That is, we cannot understand demonstrative thoughts in terms of the form of expressions whose meanings require interpretation from context. Rather demonstrative thoughts involve the form of experiences which engage with objects in the external world. In other words, they involve the form of object-engagement which accounts for how content is possible on the ground of the idea of object-dependence. This means that possessing content involves the relation of understanding perceptual knowledge with the rationalisation of human action. It is from this point that the notion of practice is crucially required for showing the connection between mind and world. I will develop this idea in later chapters.

4. Conclusion

I have argued that, on a certain account of content, the neo-Fregean account, possession of content requires a normative constraint which is independent to a subject and yet intrinsic to our engagement with objects in the world. This requires an account of a sort of thought whose content can be individuated on the basis of object-dependence. That sort
of thought is the neo-Fregean singular thought which provides an account of a fundamental way of thinking about an object in a way which the dichotomy of representationalism and inferentialism can be overcome, namely, the demonstrative way of thinking. However, as the neo-Fregean account of singular thought is based on a modest Cartesian conception of mind, it may look as if objects are portrayed under their appearances. But that does not make the neo-Fregean account of singular thought an internalist model of content. Rather it is a sort of externalism which requires an account of object-engagement which is world-involving. This topic will be discussed in the next chapter.
Notes

I will use the two terms (identification and presentation) interchangeably based on the idea that both terms play a crucial role in understanding the neo-Fregean singular thought. Evans uses the term ‘modes of identification’ instead of ‘modes of presentation’, because ‘identification’ enforces the sense of a subject’s harmonious interaction with an object without losing the significance of both sides (subject and object). Meanwhile the term ‘presentation’ suggests that the object’s role is more active. That is contra to Russell’s ‘acquaintance’ which, Evans (1982: 64n) thinks, suggests a distorted nature of ‘relation’ with objects. That is to say, Russell’s ‘acquaintance’ points to only the (strong Cartesianism) subjective side. (cf. Russell 1911, where he comments on the use of ‘acquaintance’ and ‘presentation’)

According to Evans, the information-based knowledge or content-based knowledge is composed of three sorts of knowledge of object-identification, namely, descriptive identification, demonstrative identification and recognition-based identification. All these sorts of knowledge are based on the object-dependence thesis or Russell’s Principle. However, only the second and the last sort of identification from which content can be provided on the basis of the existence of object of thought. The first sort may be said that it provides a sort of thought which depends on the identification of an identity statement rather than depends on objects. This point will be clearer later on in this chapter. However, I will discuss in details demonstrative and recognition-based identification, which I group them together as a demonstrative mode of presentation, in chapter four and five.

The notion of ‘engagement’ is close to Russell’s notion of ‘acquaintance’. The difference is, as this chapter will show, that ‘acquaintance’ contains a (strong) Cartesian element which is the problem for accepting Russell’s idea of object-dependence. But ‘engagement’ suggests a ‘rational’ link, which already includes perceptual link, between the egocentricity of thought and action with the objectivity of thought. However, this does not contradict McDowell’s use of ‘acquaintance’ (see McDowell 1986).

The issue of the social practice of the language use will be discussed in the next chapter.

Brandon (1994) works within this dichotomy. Brandon starts with inferentialism from which, he thinks, representationalism can be derived. However, from the neo-Fregean perspective, that is a mistake because, in the end, what Brandon gets is merely inferentialism which falls short of the world. The problem with Brandon’s idea will be discussed in the next chapter.

The term ‘reference’ is quite a confusing term. But that is because it is the problem about what an account of meaning should be. According to Frege, there are two layers of meaning—‘Sinn’ and ‘Bedeutung’ or ‘sense’ and ‘reference’, while, for Russell, there is only one layer of meaning, namely, reference. However, the confusion is also shown in various translations of the term ‘Bedeutung’. For example, in Russell (1905), he translates Sinn as meaning and Bedeutung as denotation. Wittgenstein translates Bedeutung as meaning. Evans translates Bedeutung as Meaning or semantic value. However, the translation is not an important issue here. (see also Beaney (1997) about the translation of the term ‘Bedeutung’) But using different terms shows different understanding towards this matter. So McDowell (1977) prefers the term ‘referent’ which suggests the idea of knowledge of truth which involves both object and sense/thought. His way of making the distinction (following Dummett (1973)) between ‘reference’ and ‘referent’ will be discussed below. This point also shows that truth/reference and inference has equal relation. However, I use ‘reference’ in a general meaning— the bearer of name or object.
7. See McDowell (1986, 1991). Saying that McDowell’s idea is ‘Cartesian’ may seem peculiar only if we take the notion of Cartesianism in a general sense. But as I said, the term Cartesianism has another meaning which I take it to be a crucial element in the notion of acquaintance, namely, the meaning which I define it as the modest form of Cartesianism. I will clarify this point in section 2.2. However, an example of a quote may be needed to support my view. McDowell holds the idea of the modest form of Cartesianism as in his reply to C. Wright that, “Wright mentions the picture of the mental as an inner world only in connection with a full-blown ‘Cartesian’ position, with the image of a walled garden to which only its owner has direct access; and he suggests that this picture comes so naturally to us that it is hard to see it as philosophically contaminated. But Wittgenstein is not hostile to the picture of the inner world as such, which can indeed be philosophically innocent. His point is that we go astray when, in applying the picture, we lapse into philosophy.” (McDowell 1991: 148 my italics) So, for McDowell, the conception of singular thought undermines the picture of Cartesianism the sort of which leads to the skeptical problem concerning knowledge of external world. (see 1986: 168)

8. Russell says that “The reason that I call my doctrine logical atomism is because the atoms that I wish to arrive at as the sort of last residue in analysis are logical atoms and not physical atoms... the point is that the atom I wish to arrive at is the atom of logical analysis, not the atom of physical analysis.” (1918: 37)

9. “One may call a propositional function necessary, when it is always true; possible, when it is sometimes true; impossible, when it is never true.” (ibid.: 96)

10. See Wittgenstein PI p. 217e “If God had looked into our minds he would not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of.” The only way to know whom is to look at the person we were speaking of. (see also Evans 1985a: 6)

11. See also Brewer (1999: 47); McCulloch (2000: 253) on the argument against skeptics. The difference between Brewer and McCulloch is this. Brewer thinks that usually, to argue against skeptics, we need to deny (9), but he suggests instead that one can simply insist (8), when the skeptics deny (8). Meanwhile, I agree with McCulloch who said that the Cartesian skeptic actually poses a metaphysical question rather than an epistemic one. To argue against the skeptics, we need to deny (7). However, McCulloch does not explicitly talk about the modest model of Cartesianism. But I take it that it is implicit in his view.

12. See also McDowell 1982 on the disjunctive account of experience. I would like to note here that the disjunctive account of experience is different from the disjunction problem (see Fodor 1990). The disjunction problem is the problem concerning what is true ‘belief’, if belief-content is determined by what causes it. It is the problem because disjunctive truth-condition does not rule out false belief. This means that one’s belief about an object can still be true, though one of the disjuncts is false. So one may have a belief that one sees a cow. But even if it is not a cow, but is something else, say a horse in a dark night, then it is still true that one’s belief content is a cow or a horse in a dark night. The disjunction problem is a problematic consequence following from a sort of the strong Cartesianism. The disjunctive account of experience is an account which is based on a different conception of mind, the modest model, so it does not face the disjunction problem.

13. This does not mean that no account of causal link is required. That is because it is the causal link which provides the idea of how object being the constraint of thought. But the strong Cartesianism can offer only the purely causal link which does not provide a space for the rational role of thought. This point will be clearer in the next section which shows why both Russell’s Principle and Frege’s Principle are required.

14. McDowell’s term, see McDowell 1986.

15. That is, one can take, at a given time, the sentence “a is F” as true and the sentence
“b is F” as false without knowing that “a=b”

It is often called ‘cognitive values’ (e.g. Burge 1979, Evans 1982) But as I will show later on that the notion of ‘sense’ is not only an epistemological notion but it is also an ontological one, that is it involves the notion of object-engagement. So, it is better to use the term ‘rational values’ in talking about ‘sense’, which correctly suggests the role of ‘sense’ in characterizing the notion of ‘practice’.

It is what Evans calls ‘The Generality Constraint’, namely, the condition that thought has a structure such that “if a subject can be credited with the thought that a is F, then he must have the conceptual resources for entertaining the thought that a is G, for every property of being G of which he has a conception.”(1982:104)

This point may be accounted in the way that Evans puts it. Evans argues that Russell’s criterion for a referring expression is wrong because we can find at least one example of descriptions which is referring expressions, namely, ‘descriptive names’, such as ‘Julius’. Such names are connected with descriptions in the way that “the sense of the name is such that an object is determined to be the referent of the name if and only if it satisfies a certain description.”(1982: 48) e.g. “Let us call whoever invented the zip ‘Julius’” (ibid.: 31) That is what is called ‘reference-fixing’ stipulation. The point is that Evans thinks that this is the case which is like empty names which does not refer, but descriptive names refers. This means that there is a thought expressed in this case, even though there is no object. However, it does not mean that Evans takes this case of name as a case of the possibility of different thoughts. What he means here is only to show that ‘direct’ acquaintance is not the right criterion for being a referring expression. Indeed, that sort of criterion brings a lot of problems which makes one doubts how Russell’s principle is possible— if there is no object which one has thought about, there is no thought. So, Evans suggests the truth theories of which referent is not the semantic value, rather it is the truth-condition of a sentence in which “The referent of a=a*” shows that different senses are possible. This means that sense is not an interpretation or epistemological determination of the reference, rather sense or thought is equal to truth. Grasp of meaning is grasp of truth. By this way, Evans’s neo-Fregan account of singular thought can provide an account of how Russell’s principle works, and how empty names are not what threaten that principle.

For examples, the views like Kaplan (1989), Perry (1979) are based on descriptive theory of meaning— the understanding that linguistic analysis provides a solution to the problem about what meaning is. But their views still cannot answer the question about content of thought, where the issue is about the aboutness of language, not about the language itself.
Chapter Three: Varieties of Externalism

In the last chapter, I argued that there is no need to accept the dichotomy between representationalism and inferentialism following the neo-Fregean (NF) account of singular thought. In other words, there is no need to accept that there is a sharp division between two choices. That is because singular thoughts, in particular demonstrative thoughts, are thoughts whose inferential structure cannot be characterized independently of their representational structure, i.e. the structure in which we have direct contact with the world. This means that demonstrative thoughts individuate content on the basis of our engagement with objects, which provides the idea that objects are independent to thoughts. It is in this sense that objects provide a normative constraint to thoughts; put another way, according to the NF singular thought, content is constrained by the world. The world in this sense is a semantic notion, i.e. what provides truth-conditions to thought. However, it is the semantic notion which involves many classes of thoughts in which the world that provides truth conditions to thought is the world of material objects occupying space and time. A demonstrative thought picks out an object in the physical world as its semantic value. That is because demonstrative thoughts are a fundamental sort which link thoughts directly with objects in the material world.

On this account of content, the NF idea of singular thought is an externalist view, namely, a view in which individuation of content involves a constraint from objects in the external world or context. NF externalism hence can be called a world-involving externalism which requires a characterization of practice as object-involving. This chapter will focus on different views on externalism in order to show that understanding a constraint on what it is to possess content requires the notion of practice
which can be characterized as object-involving practice or world-involving practice, rather than as a social practice or linguistic practice. This is because the world-involving practice individuates content in a way that accommodates both the account of the world as objective and thereby supplying the worldly constraint on having thought, and the account of mind as that which has rationalising force. This concept of practice therefore satisfies both the worldly constraint and the rationality constraint. The sort of content deriving from this sort of externalism is content which cannot be separated into narrow and broad content. It is a non-bifurcationist content.

To achieve this sort of notion of practice, I will not directly elaborate the NF account of externalism. Instead I will mainly consider three sorts of externalism, namely, Burge’s social externalism (1977 et al.), Brandom’s socio-semantic or discursive practice (1994) and Bilgrami’s public externalism (1992). I will show that, from the point of view of the NF account of content, these versions of externalisms are not sufficient for understanding a constraint on content which is world-involving. That is to say, none of these satisfy the worldly constraint, for they fail to show that content is constrained by truth conditions that capture a genuine concept of error, rather than deferred error. These externalisms share the central flaw of inferentialism, namely, that the constraint on content is not independent from its inferential structure. My objection is that for thought to have content, it requires a constraint which is independent to it; otherwise, there is a paradox: if no thought could be made to be individuated by an independent constraint, then any thought can be made out to have a content. (cf. the paradox of rule-following PI 201) If so, it would be impossible for a thought to be individuated. That is the problem which I had called a frictionless notion of content. As such, these models of externalism do not overcome the dichotomy of
representationalism and inferentialism. This is not to deny that there can be a social dimension to practice in addition to the idea of engagement with objects. It is only to insist that the former is constitutive of the concept of practice in so far as practice provides the condition for the possibility of content.

This chapter is divided into two main parts. In the first part, I look at the background debate of externalism and internalism. In particular, Putnam’s account of externalism (PE) (1975) and Fodor’s account of internalism (FI) (1987). This part shows why the bifurcation of content is unsatisfactory. The second part is concerned with the counter-bifurcationists: three sorts of externalism (Burge, Brandom, Bilgrami) are discussed and criticised. I will argue that the only tenable externalism is the world-involving one in which content-individuation requires an account of practice as object-engagement. Although there is a social dimension of practice, it needs to be accounted for on the basis of the engagement with objects. Without engagement with objects the dichotomy of representationalism and inferentialism will be reinstated. This is the problem which happens to other sorts of externalism considered --they fail to provide a normative constraint on content. The discussion of externalism in this chapter will contribute to the idea which will be developed in the following chapters, that is, in order to gain the non-bifurcationist notion of content which meets both the worldly constraint and the rationality constraint, we need an account of demonstrative thoughts in which the notion of practice as object-engagement plays a crucial role.

1. Content-Bifurcation

Bifurcationism is the view that what determines content can be separated into two sides, namely, the internality of mind and the
externality of mind. These two sides are set apart as with the strong picture of Cartesian dualism which separates mind from world. Two sorts of bifurcationism on content are: externalism and internalism. The classical examples of these bifurcationists, which I will discuss, are Putnam’s idea of externalism and Fodor’s idea of internalism. As their ideas are mainly based on a semantic background, namely, the notion of intension and extension of meaning, I will explicate the significance of these semantic notions first before going on to discuss their views.

Semantically, meaning or content is accounted for in two ways: namely, content in intensional context or content of a sentence in the context of the propositional attitudes; and content in extensional context or content of a sentence which remains the same under substitutions of coextensive or truth-value identical components. For example, from the sentence in intensional context: "x believes that water is drinkable." and the sentence in extensional context: "Water is H₂O .", it cannot be inferred that "x believes that H₂O is drinkable.". This is because the last sentence may be false as x may not believe that water is H₂O, though the first two sentences are true. In other words, the truth-value of these sentences is not preserved under substitutions of co-referring expressions. This means that the content in those different contexts are not intersubstitutable, i.e. as usually said that extensional content is transparent, but the intensional one is opaque.

However, as the belief-content in intensional contexts is related to the subject’s attitudes, it has a distinctive property: the property of rationalising or explaining the subject’s behaviour, which is different from the property of content in extensional contexts: truth-conditional property. The latter provides content in the sense of the meaning of a sentence, which is derived from the reference or truth-value of thought,
that is, content in the sense of "proposition". As when one thinks that a sentence "The water is drinkable." has the same meaning as a German sentence "Das Wasser ist trinkbar.". These two sentences express the same proposition because they have the same truth-conditions. Briefly, content in extensional contexts is individuated by truth-conditions; and content in intensional contexts which is attributed to a subject's mental attitudes is individuated by the attitude's role in rationalising the behaviour of the subject.

Considering the notion of content under these two different semantic contexts suggests that content can be characterized into two sorts-- that which is individuated by external conditions and that which is individuated by internal states of a subject. The former provides a truth-conditional notion of content and the latter provides the notion of content that explains human behaviour. Bifurcation of content arises from the understanding that the world or truth-conditions can be characterized independently of our thoughts about it. In the following, I will look at how PE and FI provide the notion of content which is bifurcated, and why that is not satisfactory. The main problem is that while PE cannot offer the sort of content which rationalises behaviour, FI does not offer an idea of content which captures the notion of aboutness. The deeper flaw lies in their assumptions about the conception of mind, namely, the strong model of Cartesianism.

1.1. Putnam’s Account of Externalism (PE)

PE (Putnam 1975) is the thesis that the external world or reference determines meaning. For Putnam, the concept of meaning is understood truth conditionally. His main idea is that the meaning of a term cannot be identified with 'concept', if 'concept' is something related to mental states. He thinks that there is a problem in the confusion of varieties of
This problem is concerned with the theory of meaning (like Frege's and Carnap's) which says that extension is the set of things the term is true of; and intension is the 'concept' associated with the term. This sort of theory, for Putnam, rests on two false assumptions, that is, firstly, knowing the meaning of a term is a narrow psychological state; and second, intension (mentally grasping the meaning of a term or having 'concept') determines extension. That is to say, if meaning is taken as the 'concept' of a term, then extension is determined by intension or 'concept'. That is unacceptable because having a concept turns out to be a matter of being in a psychological state in a narrow sense which Putnam calls the methodological solipsist's assumption, i.e. being in a psychological state presupposes a logical possibility of no other subject besides the subject of the psychological state itself. It is the assumption that extension is determined by the psychological state that Putnam challenges.

Putnam designs a thought-experiment in order to show that intension in the sense of psychological state cannot determine extension or meaning. If meaning is taken as being determined by psychological state, then the truth-conditional account of meaning is at stake. So, the thought-experiment shows two aspects of meaning: the extension of meaning is causally determined by objects in the external world; intension which picks out no more than the subject's epistemic criteria for reference where these might fall short of determining reference without embedding in a socio-linguistic context that includes experts.

The thought-experiment is about the meaning of natural-kinds terms. Suppose that the term 'water' is employed by a twin subjects in twin worlds. The meaning of 'water' in world one is \( H_2O \), whereas the meaning of 'water' in the twin world is \( XYZ \). This means that, on the first aspect, what determines the meaning of 'water' is not the mental states of
the twin subjects. If mental states of the twin determine what the term refers to or its reference, then it would be logically possible that a duplicate mental state understands 'water' in a similar way. And that would be methodological solipsist, for each mental state, what they can know is only their objects of thought. The problem is: once their mental states are duplicated, the twins cannot individuate the extension or the meaning of 'water' from their mental states. That is because what makes the meaning of 'water' different for the twins is the fact about the stuff to which 'water' is indexed or the de re 'this' (in "This is water.").

For Putnam, a natural kind term is a rigid designator in the same way as an indexical term is. That is, the extension of the term 'water' is dependent on the actual object in the world ("The water around here."), so the extension can be different in different worlds. As with the extension or the reference of 'I' in "I have a headache." is different from my twin T when using the same sentence. Although I and my twin both have a similar concept of 'I', it is not this similarity which individuates meaning, rather it is the reference of 'I'. In other words, meaning is varied according to contexts. However, for Putnam, objects which indexicals and natural kind terms refer to are not tokens or objects which are sensitive to the subject's point of view, because these terms are rigid. That is to say, those terms index or refer to objects in a way that they have a similar cross-world relation. The cross-world relation is that: "a two-term relation R will be cross-world when it is understood in such a way that its extension is a set of ordered pairs of individuals not all in the same possible world." (ibid.:232) So, whatever tokens are in each possible world, the indexical terms and natural kind terms function as rigid designators which have a same relation of designation in every possible world in which the object or stuff exists, that is, the relation from word to object. A natural kind term is a rigid designator in the sense that "the term
refers to the same individual in every possible world in which the
designator designates". (ibid.:231) So, the question of whether the
meaning of 'water' is H_2O or XYZ is determined not by the mental state
of the subject, rather by the extension or reference of the term.

There is another aspect of Putnam's thought-experiment, the
second aspect, that is, it shows that if intension in the sense of concept or
mental states does not determine meaning, then intension should be
characterized in the sense of a collective 'ways of recognising' object.
This is because, for Putnam, the meaning of a term is relevant to 'use'. So,
what determines meaning is still not the concept or mental entity, but
rather the criteria of meaning or ways of recognising whether something is
in the extension. The criteria are determined by the socio-linguistic use of
experts in a linguistic community. It is not the individual psychological
state which determines whether 'water' refers to H_2O or XYZ, rather it is
the collective use of language which sets the criteria.

The socio-linguistic account of meaning answers the
epistemological question of how we can know that the indexicality of a
term provides a correct criterion to our understanding of the term. For
Putnam, metaphysical necessity does not entail epistemological necessity.
That is to say, though truth is defined by the existence of objects in the
world which is defined by indexing to objects, the fact that language is
used for talking about the world is what constrains our knowledge about
the world. However, this does not mean that if the meaning of 'water' is
partly determined by scientists or experts in the world to which that
language belongs, then truth is an intra-theoretic notion, viz. truth is
dependent on a theory. The notion of truth and extension is closely
connected. For him, to define the notion of truth as an intra-theoretic
notion is like saying that intension (in the sense of psychological state)
fixes meaning. But truth should be characterized as a theoretical relation, instead of an empirical relation, which provides the epistemological relation from extension to intension. In this sense, intension can be taken as the socio-linguistic criteria of meaning.

However, that seems to show something problematic about Putnam’s view. What he tries to establish is that meaning is externally determined in the sense that it is indexed to objects and socially dependent. In other words, context is defined in both ways—indexical and social. It looks as if content is context-dependent, or what content is depends on the context in which words refer. But the twins in Putnam’s thought-experiment are set to have common mental states which can be said to be not varied in different contexts, so this means that there is a notion of content that is not context-dependent. In other words, it may not be legitimate to call it ‘content’ because what defines content requires the possibility of being individuated from the subject’s perspective. In particular, the sort of context which Putnam characterizes is the context which is characterized independently from mental states. It can be said that his externalism falls into a sort of representationalist view because representationalism is the view in which objects or references are accounted for as not sensitive to a subject’s point of view. Consequently, if content is externalistically individuated as Putnam perceives it, then it does not provide an explanation of behaviour as we ordinarily think, that is, understanding why people act differently toward an object requires an account of the rational psychological role of a subject toward the object. The issue of the explanatory role of content is also the ground on which Fodor thinks that PE is not sufficient.
1.2. Fodor’s Idea of Internalism

Fodor (1987) argues that PE provides only a sort of relative content or broad content; namely, narrow content relative to context provides truth-condition, which does not capture the explanatory role of content. However, for Fodor, ‘content’ is possible once it has semantic value, namely, narrow content is not a real content because it is syntactic. But once narrow content is semantically evaluable, i.e. given truth-condition and context, then it has a broad content. Despite the fact that content can be individuated as a broad content, the content which does the explanatory role for behaviour is the mental state or the narrow content. Though Fodor’s view is an internalist view, there is a crucial point in common with other externalists like Burge and Bilgrami, namely, mental attitudes are significant in content individuation because of their explanatory power on behaviour. However, the difference between FI and externalists like Burge and Bilgrami is that while those externalists attempt not to bifurcate content in order to gain its explanatory role, FI bifurcates content into broad and narrow content. However, the main point Fodor argues concerning PE is that it is not incompatible with his individualism or internalism.

The main thesis of internalism is that content is individuated by mental states alone. According to Fodor, externalists like Putnam and Burge (1979) are looking for a causal explanation of mental states. They ground their assumption about individuation of mental attitudes on a relation between mind and brain. For Fodor, at least, what Putnam/Burge's thought experiments show is that the mind does not supervene on brain. Their argument is this: if mind supervenes on brain, then mind changes when brain changes; but the Twin-Earth case shows that when brain does not change, mind changes (because of different environments); so mind does not supervene on brain. Fodor thinks that if
what the externalists want is the causal explanation of the mind/brain relation, then they cannot violate the supervenience of mind/brain by substituting it with the relation of mind and environment, because there is no causal mechanism for such a relation.

According to Fodor, the only tenable causal explanation of the mind/brain relation is the supervenient relation in which mental states are narrowly or individualistically individuated. According to such an explanation, different causal properties distinguish different things. That is to say, mental states and brain states have identical causal properties irrelevant to their relational properties (e.g. properties that relate them to speech communities). So, the twins' mental states do have the same causal powers. This may be explained by the fact that the same behavioural effects are caused by the same events, that is, mental states have causal powers for explaining behaviour. Different behaviours are explained in terms of being caused by different mental states, not by other relational states. So, the twins may be in different environments, but they would act the same way as their physical bodies are identical. For example, when they feel thirsty, they drink a glass of water. Though one drinks H₂O, and the other drinks XYZ, they act the same way because their mental states have the same causal power.

Briefly, the above passage shows that in addition to the externalists' mistake in proposing an untenable causal mechanism, their notion of content does not provide explanations of behaviour. For Fodor, mental states are narrow or non-relational, and these have the right causal power for explaining behaviour. However, he thinks that his internalism is not incompatible with PE in the sense that his is individualistic, not solipsistic. I turn to this point below.
According to Fodor, "Methodological individualism is the doctrine that psychological states are individuated with respect to their causal powers. Methodological solipsism is the doctrine that psychological states are individuated without respect to their semantic evaluation." (1987: 42) For the methodological solipsist, mental states are narrow in the sense that they are just potential content. They do not have content because they cannot be evaluated as true or false. But methodological individualism does not deny the relational properties of mental states; "it just says that no property of mental states, relational or otherwise, counts taxonomically unless it affects causal powers." (ibid.) So, Fodor's individualism and PE are not really contradictory in this sense because, for Fodor, the externalist only relativizes a narrow content to context in order that the narrow content can be semantically evaluated or have truth conditions. In other words, a narrow content is a function from contexts and thought onto truth conditions (ibid.: 47). To relativize a narrow content to context is just to broaden the content. And to have a broad content is still irrelevant to the causal power of mental states. For Fodor, in sum, the mind supervenes on brain because the mind's causal power supervenes on brain states. Content (meaning) is determined by the mind's causal power, rather than by relativizing it to a context.

However, Fodor's individualism is unsatisfactory for two main reasons. First, Fodor thinks that though a narrow content does not have semantic value, it is a 'fully intentionalist account' (ibid.: 53) of the causal power of mental states. But the problem is that if what matters for mental states is only the pure schema of thought, which is non-semantic, it makes the context of thought which provides the semantic aboutness irrelevant to the causal explanation. This can also mean that content is context-independent. And if so, then mental states as such or the pure schema do not have semantic aboutness or representational power, which
is a characteristic of content and intentionality. Second, Fodor’s view is based on a line of reasoning that if the explicandum is the same, then the explicans must be the same, that is if behavioural effects are the same, then they have the same cause, i.e. mental states. But that cannot be right. Suppose the twins believe that "Water is here.". Though the twins may dispose to act in the same way, they look for different "here-water".

Their experiences are not in common because what gives content to their thought is the object in their environment which is indexed to their points of view. In other words, there is a possibility of contextualising the explicandum or the behaviour, so the twins do not act the same way. So, it cannot be generalised that there is the law of same effect/ same cause.

Indeed, these issues reflect the main flaw of Fodor’s idea, namely, the idea that thought content which rationalises behaviour is determined by symbols, the content of which is not anchored to a subject’s perspective. This can be seen from his view about the case of demonstratives the anchored content of which does not rationalise behaviour. (ibid.:50) Fodor thinks that demonstratives have ‘anchored content’ when they are ‘used’, that is, whenever we use the sentence containing demonstratives, such as ‘I feel pain.’, the content of ‘I’ refers directly to the speaker, the content of which nobody can share. However, this is not the sort of content which rationalises behaviour. For Fodor, it is the ‘unanchored content’ or the narrow content which has causal power over human actions. This sort of content is derived from when we ‘mention’ that sentence (‘I feel pain.’). By mentioning a sentence, we get the shared content because mentioning a sentence is just to refer to the form of words.

What is not right about Fodor’s view is that the sort of content which he takes to be what rationalises behaviour is the unanchored
content or merely a symbol which is not legitimate to be called a content because it has no causal-rational power. That is to say, once a symbol itself has no anchor to its ‘use’, then there is a gap needed to be filled in between the symbol and the use. We need to fill in the gap because we want to rationalise behaviour, and for that we need the use, not the symbol. Put another way, although, for Fodor, demonstratives in ‘use’ provide content which is anchored to subject, the problem is that it is not the sort of content which rationalises behaviour. That is to say, the sort of content which rationalises behaviour has to be anchored to the subject in a sense that is sensitive to the subject’s perspective and allows different thoughts about the object to possible. However, the sort of content which Fodor proposes to have explanatory power turns out to be the unanchored content which is only a form or symbol. But the problem is that symbols as such do not have causal-rational power. It is only when we think about symbols as anchored to use or perspective that we can say that they have causal-rational power. This means that whether symbols are meaningful or have content requires an anchor to the subject’s perspective. That is the idea of Fregean rational space-- the rational possibility of different thoughts toward the object. Accordingly, the notion of content cannot be the notion of unanchored content, as Fodor thinks, which is actually a mere symbol irrelevant to use. Otherwise, we will not be able to understand or rationalise human actions which requires the account of egocentricity of thought. In the next part, I will look at different sorts of externalism which seem to be non-bifurcationist and anti-internalist.

2. ‘Non-Bifurcationist’ Externalism

In general, the following three sorts of externalism which I will consider in this part can be called ‘non-bifurcationist’ externalism. That is because what is in common among their views is the reaction to content-
bifurcation in PE which precludes the psychological or cognitive role of a subject in accounting for content. Actually, the dispute among their views is concerned with the question about the role the idea of ‘cognitive’ plays in accounting for content. All of them accept the role of Frege’s idea of ‘sense’. However, the main problem concerning their views is briefly this.

Burge’s externalism (1977 et al.) takes Frege’s ‘sense’ as a ‘cognitive’ role which involves a communal description of linguistic meaning, his externalism appears to be not much different from PE. The only difference is that, for Burge, it is not social-linguistic practice (in Putnam’s sense) which is the normative constraint on reference, rather it is linguistic use in a social context, but that is relevant to a subject’s cognitive reasoning. Brandom’s position seems to be close to Burge in the sense that social practice provides the normative criterion in which rational individual beings play a crucial part in characterizing the norms. However, he criticises Burge’s view for making a mistake in separating conceptual from contextual or causal relations, so that Burge’s externalism cannot accommodate both representationalism and inferentialism without falling into a regress of interpretations of the causal relation. Brandom is right, but the problem is that his criticism is based on his socio-semantic externalism which is dominated by the inferentialist mentality. The upshot is that such an account of content is not constrained by norms which are independent from inferential structure. The notion of norms independent of inference is the key to the worldly constraint (or as I called the objectivity constraint) which is derived from the idea of representationalism. It is the notion of normative constraint which can be found in the world as a truth-condition of our thoughts. Concerning Bilgrami’s externalism, his attempt to unify content, or combine representationalism with inferentialism, is suspicious for it is unclear whether his insisting on the idea of ‘general’ thoughts, instead of
‘singular’ thoughts is convincing. Bilgrami takes his position as not a ‘content-externalist’, rather he insists on being a ‘concept-externalism’. The problem seems to be that he endorses the dichotomy of representationalism and inferentialism, which requires an account of how they are connected. But that is also because Bilgrami relies too much on the inferentialist side. All these will be expanded below.

2.1. Burge’s Social Externalism

According to Burge’s externalism, the basis of content individuation is the intensional aspect of content that picked out by the propositional attitudes. His aim is to combine the explication of thought in terms of linguistic use with the explication of meaning in terms of thought (see 1986: 718). Meanwhile, Putnam provides only the explication of meaning in terms of use and reference. I will argue that in Burge’s externalism, although he accepts the psychological or cognitive role in individuating content, his notion of content is not constrained by the world, but rather by language use or social linguistic practice. In particular, though his externalism does not provide an account of content which forces the bifurcation of content into narrow and broad, it still bifurcates conceptual content from non-conceptual context. This is partly due to his misunderstanding that to go against the Cartesian individualism is to go against all sorts of Cartesianism; and that the notion of the world we can have at most is what is ascribed under de dicto (linguistic) attitudes. But the problem is that the ascription of such a notion of the world does not give the notion of the world which provides the aboutness of our attitudes. I will focus on two main questions -- the reasons why he is not satisfied with PE and why his alternative is not convincing.

What underpins Burge’s criticism of Putnam is the assumption that externalism means anti-individualism, and that PE implies Cartesian
individualism, i.e. the view that mental content can be individuated independently from context. He thinks there are two mistakes in Putnam’s view. First, according to Putnam’s thought experiment, the twins’ mental attitudes are constant in the varied environment, that is, although their mental content is affected by context, the mental attitudes are characterized independently from the context. That is because, for Putnam, what individuates content is the differences of extension, not the differences of intension or mental attitudes of the subject. This means that Putnam views the mind or the subject’s thought as being not sensitive to context. This is similar to a Cartesian individualism which views the mind as independent from context.

Second, Burge thinks that Putnam makes a mistake in giving an account of the examples of natural kind terms in terms of indexicality. That is because Putnam’s thought-experiments do not employ natural kind terms as indexical terms in the ordinary sense, namely, in Burge’s view, indexicality always requires *de re* belief or belief which is purely contextual (contra to *de dicto* belief which is purely conceptual). For Burge, attitudes concerning natural kind terms are *de dicto* which presuppose *de re* attitudes, in the sense that without *de re* attitudes, understanding a language is not possible. In other words, those terms are not always beliefs *de re*, but even if they are, the account of such terms requires an account of the psychological role which provides the explanatory role on (linguistic) behaviour. The account of the psychological role for Burge is an account which involves social-linguistic use. Although Putnam takes the social context as the epistemic criterion of meaning, his externalism cannot account for differences of thoughts about the standard use in each linguistic community, and thereby is not sufficient for understanding content which involves beliefs and behaviour. Burge’s main idea of externalism is that the cognitive role which is
required in individuating content is constrained by the shared belief of a community of a language’s users. The world or reference is explained in terms of the referential use or de re attitude/belief. That is the consequence of his anti-Cartesian individualism. I will elaborate his idea a bit below before turning to a criticism of his view.

Although Burge’s externalism employs Frege’s notion of ‘sense’ in accounting for the idea of cognitive value, he disagrees with Frege that ‘sense’ is what fixes the object of thought, and that sense is fixed by “a deep rationale underlying the expression’s use and understanding--a rationale that might not have been understood by anyone” (ibid.:715,n.15). For Burge, although cognitive value presupposes the reference, the cognitive value is connected with the thoughts of other people, which also presuppose the reference. In order to argue against Frege’s notion of sense, Burge formulates the argument of the Fregean theory of sense and reference as follows: first, a physical object is perceived from different conceptual perspectives (in different modes of presentation), i.e. beliefs concerning the object, which are conceptual are de dicto beliefs; second, the conceptual perspectives pick out which object we have beliefs about or de re beliefs; therefore, de re beliefs (about public objects) are really de dicto.

Burge argues that it is not right that beliefs about the reference (de re beliefs) are completely conceptual. That is because de re beliefs are contextual. So, it is not true that de re beliefs are completely de dicto. That is to say, they are two separated sorts of belief. Once the distinction is made, he thinks that the account of the constraint on cognitive value as the shared belief is justified because it means that his externalism can accommodate both beliefs about the world and the psychological role of content within a structure of language-use on which social practice is the
constraint. In other words, beliefs *de re/de dicto* represent two sorts of language-use: the referential use and the attributive use. This means that Burge does not see that distinction as a bifurcation of content, because the connection between them can be accounted for in terms of language use. This can be expanded as follows.

Burge (1977) elaborates the notion of sense or what he calls cognitive value in order to show that *de re* attitude/belief (reference) is a necessary condition for using and understanding language, and *de dicto* attitude/belief (sense) presupposes *de re*. He explains the *de re/de dicto* distinction in the following way. A *de re* belief is “a belief whose correct ascription places the believer in an appropriate nonconceptual, contextual relation to objects the belief is about.” (ibid.:346) However, what he means by ‘nonconceptual’ does not rule out the idea that in making a statement about *de re* belief, one requires ‘concepts’ when one applies the notion of *de re* belief or how the belief about the relation between the object and concepts is acquired. That is because although the object affects one’s perception, one requires concepts in having a perceptual belief. However, because *de re* belief does not always require perceptual contact with the object, the perceptual contact only shows “... the sort of element independent of semantical or conceptual application that is essential to the notion”. (ibid.) Put it another way, Burge’s conclusion is that though *de re* belief does not always require perceptual contact with the object, the perceptual contact is what shows that there is the nonconceptual element in the notion of *de re* belief. *De re* belief is nonconceptual because it is not wholly determined by mental attitudes: the *de re* belief affects the dicta or our ways of perceiving and understanding object. By contrast, the *de dicto* belief, semantically, is "a belief in which the believer is related only to a completely expressed proposition (dictum). The epistemic analogue is a belief that is fully
conceptualised." (ibid.:348) The *de dicto* belief is a fully conceptualised content or fully expressed as a propositional content.

So, *de re* belief is more fundamental than *de dicto* belief because in order to understand a language or propositional attitudes, one needs *de re* attitudes, i.e. attitudes that we have when asserting a proposition containing indexical expressions or when having perceptual contact with objects. A *de re* attitude hence should be considered as an ability (on the part of the subject) to recognize a direct contextual relation holding between a thinker and the object of that thought. So, for Burge, the *de re* attitudes are noninformative because they do not provide more information about the object other than the object itself. Indeed, *de re* attitudes are the ability to understand the referential use of singular terms. By contrast, *de dicto* attitudes are expressed by non-indexical expressions (or descriptive expressions) which are attributively used, and so they are informative for understanding objects. Hence, for Burge, because *de dicto* beliefs are conceptual, they are not fundamental as *de re* beliefs are.

However, the separation of the nonconceptualised context from the conceptual content in this way still leads to the problem of how content can be individuated if not by the context. When content is taken as conceptual but noncontextual, this means that content can only be individuated linguistically and hence is free-floating from context. This means that, as mentioned from the outset of this chapter, content is frictionless, for it is not clear what, if anything, can constrain it. Burge answers this criticism unconvincingly by saying that *de dicto* belief is not free-floating, because what is presupposed in understanding a language is *de re* attitude, so our *de dicto* beliefs presuppose *de re* beliefs. And because language has a communicative function, *de re* attitudes of other people are presupposed in the linguistic community. This means that, in
Burge's view, context is characterized in terms of social practice, and it is that which plays the role in individuating mental content. That is to say, it is the social context which presupposes the extra-linguistic world or the perceptual world. However, it still looks unsatisfactory because the 'presupposition' in question does not seem to allow the possibility that the world can be external to thoughts even though it is not characterized independently from our thoughts. However, to be fair to Burge's externalism, let's look first at how he elaborates a normative constraint in terms of the connection between cognitive role and the role of social context by employing thought-experiments.

An example of his thought experiment (1979) is this. Suppose that, in an actual situation, a subject has a wide range of attitudes about 'arthritis', but one of these attitudes is false, namely, he thinks that he has 'arthritis' in his thigh. It is false because the standard use of 'arthritis' in his community that defers to the doctors' knowledge is that 'arthritis' is an inflammation of joints. However, the thought experiment continues, we can think of a counterfactual situation in which the counterfactual subject is physically identical with the actual subject and has a similar understanding of the expression 'arthritis', but what is different is the standard use in this situation, namely, the meaning of 'arthritis' includes both what happens in the thigh and also to other inflammations. The point of the thought-experiment is to show that when holding the physical subject and the subject's understanding of the expressions constant, while the standard use of the expressions in both situations varies, the extension of meaning is not determined by the internal states of a person, rather by the external or social factor. According to Burge, to say that internal states fully determine meaning would be a sort of Cartesian view of mind involving a full understanding of the object because it is infallible or is not open to doubt. Since Cartesian individualism takes self-evident truth as
what provides content, the necessary condition of understanding the truth must be full understanding. But, as Burge said, "much mentalistic attribution does not presuppose that the subject has fully mastered the content of his thought". (1979:105) So, the requirement of full understanding misrepresents the individuation of mental content. According to Burge, attribution of content involves having a concept about an object, that is, it involves the ordinary possibility that a subject can have incomplete understanding, including the possibilities of misunderstanding and partial understanding of a notion. Perspectival or incomplete understanding of expressions is the characteristic of mentalistic discourse, i.e. intentional discourse.

The point, for Burge, is that a process of characterizing the norms of meaning is a dialectical process between the conventional meaning and different perspectives of the language’s users. In other words, the normative constraint on content or standard use can be viewed from different understandings or cognitive values of an expression, and is changeable according to the interaction of the understanding of concepts between the users and the experts in each community. This is what he (1986) thinks as the application of Frege’s test, namely, the possibility of doubting identity statements means the possibility of finding them informative. So, the conventional meaning or standard use can be doubted or changed according to different cognitive values. The dialectical process of meaning-changing is what Burge calls the normative characterizations (ibid.:703) which to some extent will reach the point of 'reflective equilibrium' (ibid.:716). So the normative characterization is defeasible, but sufficiently reliable for any speaker in a community to identify the conventional meaning. Briefly, the process of meaning change may be defined as the dialectical relation between social context and individual cognitive values.
However, the idea of the dialectical process of normative characterization does not seem to be useful for answering the question of how content which has the aboutness of thought is individuated. It is not useful because it is a process the constraint on which is not independent from the process itself. Burge’s account of externalism seems to bring the world into the inferentialist account, so that it is not a conception of the world about which we have different thoughts, rather the world appears to be manifest in the inferential structure. To put the criticism following McDowell (1984b): by taking de dicto attributions to be fully conceptualised content in the sense of a fully expressed proposition, Burge confuses content with the vehicle of content. That is to say, it is the confusion of "concepts as parts or aspects of the content of representational state, such as belief," or "what is expressed by words" with "concepts as means of representation" or "what does the expressing: to the words themselves" (ibid.:286). Burge makes this mistake because he takes de dicto attributions which are composed of means of representation or linguistic symbols as what have content. But that is the confusion, because, in themselves, means of representation have no content. So, Burge needs to provide an account of how they can be contentful, that is, the account of context. Accordingly, it appears that the notion of content is independent from the notion of context or what fixes the meaning of symbols.

In other words, in Burge’s view, sense or a de dicto belief does not have content or representational power providing that it cannot be fully expressed. But the problem is that the necessary condition of having de dicto belief depends on the vehicles of content, not the object which the vehicle is about. However, for Burge, as the de dicto presupposes the de re, the de dicto seems to have ‘objects’ among its constituents. The problem is that this is not a notion of ‘objects’ which are independent of
the subject's thoughts. This problem looks like Russell's notion of an object, namely, the object about which different thoughts are not possible because once the objects are not independent from thoughts, then whatever thoughts take objects to be, there are no possibilities for thoughts to be false. This means that one cannot talk about whether such thoughts are true or false at all: there is no content of thoughts. This is a notion of object which is insensitive to the subject's point of view. Indeed, the notion of points of view cannot be applied at all. What is implicit in Burge's view is that concept can be independently characterized from its contexts, namely, objects or the semantic conditions under which a thought is true or false. It follows that content is individuated independently from context. That is the implicit upshot of Burge's assumption, which is the point on which he criticised PE. Moreover, the problem is that it forces Burge to find an explanation for how content is possible when concept and context are separated, that is, he needs an account of the connection between them. But this leads to a similar problem to the regress of interpretations in the rule-following argument. That is to say, if a rule is characterized independently from our understanding, then there is a regress of interpretation of what the rule is.8

According to the NF view, that connection is not necessary because there is a contextualised conceptual content. That is the notion of de re senses as McDowell (ibid.) calls it. The thesis of de re sense is the thesis that each sense (mode of presentation) directs to its own res or referent.9 If there is no de re sense, there is no content. This is because "In Fregean theory, utterances and propositional attitudes have thoughts as their contents, and thoughts are senses with nothing but senses as constituents". (ibid.:284) Burge's view on indexicality is similar to Russell's idea of propositions: objects are constituents of thought. By contrast, de re senses are object-dependent which provides content of
thought: demonstrative modes of thought of which senses are constituents. *De re* senses determine or are individuated by their own reference according to our different ways of grasping objects in the form of different modes of presentation.

An example is this: sentences containing an indexical term, such as "I", can be grasped in different ways, though its objectivity is not necessarily communicable. The objectivity of an 'I'-thought is the truth-value of that sentence, which is not only mind-independent but also determined by the sense of the indexical 'I'. The reference of 'I' is determined by the sense of the first-person grasping of the object 'I'. The sense is not a description (*de dicto*) of 'I' as 'someone who is referred by the term 'I'. *De re* senses provide the idea of how ways of grasping an object cannot be separated from the object itself. McDowell hence criticises Burge's *de re* belief that it is barely true or free-floating because "the belief relation has to secure the presence of the predicational tie all on its own" (ibid.:292). In other words, as Burge's *de re* belief is separated from a *de dicto* belief, the content of thought is not provided by binding with an object, but rather by binding with the predication of the vehicle of content (proposition). This means that thought is not constrained by the world, but rather by the vehicle of thought itself.

To summarise, Burge's attempt to connect *use* with the *thought* by the dialectic between meaning and thought, which is bound within social agreement, is not successful. The main reason is that his social externalism still bifurcates content by pulling out concept from context. By doing this, thought does not have content about an object; it requires context for object directed content to be possible. Accordingly, he employs social agreement as the connection of concept and context. Indeed, Burge does not see how that connection can be realised by a conception of
contextualised conceptual content. Burge's externalism begins from anti-individualism, or aims at anti-representationalism by acknowledging the role of thought into his externalist view; but at the end, his view turns out to be similar to the representationalist, in the sense that the world is set apart from thought.

In the following, I will discuss Brandom's socio-semantic externalism\(^\text{10}\) (Brandom1994) which, contrary to Burge, takes both notions of *de dicto* and *de re* as conceptual. He takes inferentialism as prior to representationalism, and attempts to combine both the use and the thought by the concept of *meta-use*, namely, the account of semantics in terms of pragmatics. His project is relevant to my project because his explication of the notion of 'practice' is also grounded on a similar strategy as mine, that is, by employing the notion of Fregean thought, he attempts to provide a non-reductionist account of content by steering a middle way between the poles of the rule-following dilemma. However, his view on normativity of content is different from mine, that is, for him, norms are embedded in discursive practice, or pragmatics. However, Brandom's view fails in a quite similar way to Burge's, that is, Brandom's notion of practice turns out to be constrained by a sort of 'frictionless'\(^\text{11}\) notion of norms. In other words, the normativity of content does not provide a worldly constraint on content.

2.2. *Socio-Semantic Externalism*

Brandom's main aim is to show how semantics can be accounted for in terms of use or normative pragmatics.\(^\text{12}\) His explanatory strategy is that, in an account of thought, inference is prior to representation. However, we will get the representational content in the end. In other words, representationalism will be incorporated into inferentialism.\(^\text{13}\) The upshot is: the notion of 'practice' turns out to be a 'discursive practice' in
which norms are made explicit in terms of inferential propositional content from the implicit norms which are found in social practice. For Brandom, discursive practice, being grounded on social practice, provides not only the objectivity of norms but also the perspectival feature of propositional content, i.e. the semantic externalism or perspectival externalism. (ibid.:633)

The thesis of semantic externalism makes a non-reductionist assumption about semantic content. That is to say, the account of meaning cannot be reduced either to a naturalistic account where the intentional or normative aspect of language is lost or to any non-perspectival (‘bird’s-eye’ view) norms where the problem of regress of interpretation arises because norms are autonomous and will always require interpretations. Brandom also characterizes this as the picture of Wittgenstein’s dilemma which McDowell (1984a) calls a Charybdis, i.e. the paradox of no norms and a Scylla, i.e. understanding is always interpretation. 14 (see Brandom 1994:29) For Brandom, the way out is this. On the one hand, the normative aspect needs to be accounted for as being constituted in the naturalistic world, namely, the idea of normative attitudes is constrained by the world which then needs to be assessed under the meta-normative attitudes. On the other hand, interpretation needs to be accounted for not in terms of rules which are independent of practice, rather interpretations require applications of primitive rules to stop the regress, that is, the sort of normative rules, which provide the background of practice, are norms of inferences. 15 Such norms are composed of inferential relations (sentential level of expressions), substitutional relations (repeatable subsentential components) and anaphoric relations (unrepeatable tokenings level). Accordingly, normative pragmatics takes the world as norms all the way down where meaning and thought can be explained by both characteristics --the
intentional (normative) and the non-intentional (naturalistic). The non-reductionist middle way assumes that there is a distinction between the naturalistic world and the world conceived under norms. This requires a kind of dualism (Kantian dualism). But the distinction is required, for Brandom, to ensure that norms are not lost in a naturalistic reduction. He then explains the normative conception of the world in terms of social practice, rather than in terms of the world as such, for the 'world as such' is the naturalistic world that is normless. Brandom has elaborated these ideas in great detail, but I will only consider his view in so far as it is relevant to this chapter. That is to say, I want to consider how his semantic externalism, which centres on the notion of practice, provides a normative constraint on thought. In other words, the question is whether Brandom succeeds in showing how the objectivity of conceptual content is delivered from practice.

2.2.1. Transcendental notion of norms

The notion of 'norm' which Brandom employs is the Kantian transcendental notion. He calls this notion the 'dualism' of the normative and the factual in order to contrast with Descartes' dualism of the mental and the physical. The Kantian notion of norms does not characterize the normative independently from the factual. That is because the factual is normative. As he said that

"For Kant, rules are the form of the normative as such. To call something 'necessary' is to say that it happens according to a rule, and everything that happens in nature, no less than everything done by humans, is subject to necessity in this sense. Concepts are rules, and concepts express natural necessity as well as moral necessity. So
For Brandom, the Kantian 'dualist' notion of norm is opposed to Descartes' dualism where the two realms of the mental and the physical are absolutely separated without taking the role of concepts and judgements into account. However, Brandom thinks that if concepts do play a role in our judgements about the world, it does not mean that there is no such thing as the natural world independent from our concepts. Rather it means that the world is accounted for in terms of our concepts. That is to say, as concepts are rules; and rules are norms of inference; then the world being characterized as normative is the world which is characterized conceptually. There is no nonconceptual characterization of the world. The world as conceived by concepts - normatively - is a transcendental requirement for content to be possible.

However, the transcendental notion of norms suggests the autonomy of norms from our concepts. Brandom explicates this suggestion by making a distinction between the notion of normative statuses and normative attitudes. The normative statuses are the statuses of norms as independent natural law or objective criteria which are employed in assessing linguistic use. Meanwhile, the normative attitudes are our attitudes of sensitivity to norms, that is, the activities of assessing use. (ibid.:33) For Brandom, the normative attitudes determine the normative statuses. His argument is this. According to his normative pragmatics, forms of expression or linguistic uses are called commitments (i.e. assertional, inferential, referential). The normative statuses are the undertakings of commitments, or the engagement in linguistic use; and the normative attitudes are the attributions of commitments. But the normative statuses cannot be assessed independently from the
perspectives of attributors. Undertakings of commitments are taken as being committed only if there are those who are entitled to attribute those commitments. That is to say, the attributings of commitments are originated in 'our' normative attitudes, namely, social normative attitudes. So it can be said that the attributors or the subjects of the attitudes (the normative attitudes) determine the normative statuses (ibid.:596).

It is rather obvious that norms are all the way down in his account of content. However, Brandom said that, "Grounding normative status in normative attitude does not entail relinquishing the distinction between normative proprieties and natural properties." (ibid.:52) The question is of whose properties are the normative and the natural? They must be properties of the world; but it is the world conceived under a social-normative use of language (inference). This means that the world has an inferential structure, which is an objective form of normative attitudes. That is to say, objectivity is a "...structural aspect of the social-perspectival form of conceptual content". (ibid.:597) This means that claims about objects in meta-linguistic realms or factual claims have content because facts are true claims 'about' objects, rather than that facts somehow "...consist of objects". (ibid.:622) The aboutness of thought is the referential relation where talking about objects is assessed by the true or the false, namely, truth assessments. Hence, the notion of reference is characterized in terms of inference which in the end confers the aboutness or the content.

To expand the above point in another way, there is a contrast between two ways of specifying the content of commitments, namely, *de dicto* and *de re* specifications. According to Brandom, on the one hand, *de dicto* ascriptions involve attitudes concerning whether a linguistic use
is committed to norms (i.e. normative attitudes); on the other hand, *de re* ascriptions involve the statuses of norms in specifying truth or the objective correctness of the use (i.e. normative statuses). The former corresponds to the subjective point of view of the attributors, while the latter conveys the objective correctness of the assessments. But although there is a distinction between *de dicto* and *de re* ascriptions of belief or between the subjective normative attitudes and the objective normative statuses, they can be combined by the meta-normative attitudes or the meta-commitment, that is the social-perspectival form of commitment. It is this form of commitment which confers conceptual content. The structural feature of the social-perspectival normative attitudes provides the objectivity of content because the normative attitudes can be assessed under the truth assessment or the *de re* belief. (ibid.:597) Accordingly, it can be said that the normative pragmatics holds the view that the world or objectivity is included into language in the form of discursive practice or the inference-making activity in which implicit norms or social practice are made explicit.

It should be noted here that Brandom’s point does not sound *radically* different from Burge’s view. It may be true as Brandom argues against Burge that by separating the conceptual from the contextual or the causal relation, Burge’s externalism cannot have it both ways without the regress of interpretation of the causal.\(^{18}\) However, this criticism does not make their externalisms radically different. Apparently, what is different between them is: for Brandom, *de re* and *de dicto* beliefs are only two ways of talking about content, and they are conceptual because both are subject to the meta-normative attitudes. Meanwhile, for Burge, they are two sorts of belief-relation -- contextual relation and conceptual relation. But Burge also accepts that they are two sorts of language use--the referential use and the attributive use, which means that their normative
constraint is social practice. The problem seems to be concerned with the term ‘conceptual’. Brandom takes conceptual (or inference) in a normative sense (contra to causal), while Burge takes it in a descriptive sense (contra to indexical/contextual). For Brandom, content and context are conceptual, whereas, for Burge, content is conceptualised and requires non-conceptual context. But this does not mean that their positions are really different because their views are both based on the inferentialist account. Indeed, it seems to show that what Brandom has done is just to step into a further regress of talking about content by citing what he calls meta-norms or primitive rules. However, I will show later that the inferentialist cannot individuate content which is constrained by the extra-linguistic world. If it is correct that the notion of content has to be accounted for on the basis of both inferentialism and representationalism, then they have to be characterized together or non-bifurcatedly in such a way that the autonomy of the external world provides an objectivity constraint to thought. Before going to that point, let me clarify first Brandom’s notion of ‘practice’ and his criticism of other sorts of social externalism.

2.2.2. Discursive and social practice

Discursive practice or linguistic practice means the inferential practice of rational beings who have propositional attitudes. Following Sellars, Brandom takes an inferential conception of concepts in terms of a practical activity which reveals understanding of concepts. In other words, "inferring is a kind of doing". (ibid.:91) Discursive practice expresses implicit practice, namely, social practice or the practice of giving and asking for reasons among rational language users. In Brandom's words: "Social practices are linguistic practices when interlocutors take up the discursive scorekeeping stance toward one another." (ibid.:628) Social practice is a necessary condition for conferring contentful states. To
possess content, indeed propositional content, is to be "caught up in a web of reasons, by being inferentially articulated". (ibid.:5) Social practice is a discursive practice that provides content. The normative force of the social practice arises when the users of language (saying -we) mutually identify themselves with others as the same kind of rational or normative being. Put it another way, discursive practice which delivers propositional inferential content originates from social practice, i.e. the activities of taking others as common rational or normative beings.

However, according to Brandom, the commonality of normative attitudes or the notion of 'social' norms must not be identified with a sort of communal assessment approach, e.g. Kripke's Wittgenstein, Burge and Wright. Although Brandom agrees with Wright's notion of "ratification-independence" or the idea that social practice can be ratifying as the objective norm, he thinks that the identification of norms with social practice, in which there is a possibility that the community can be taken to be wrong, requires some applications of the objectivity of conceptual norms. (see ibid.:54) The communal assessment approach cannot offer the objectivity of conceptual norms for the reason that the intersubjectivity or the community is used in the sense of the I-we account instead of the I-thou account, as I will explain. (see ibid.: 593)

The I-we account takes the commitment of one individual as contrasting with the commitment of all individuals or the community, so that the community in the 'we' sense is taken as the one which assesses applications of concepts. But, for Brandom, this is wrong because commitment is what is done by an individual, not the collective of individuals. The mistake of the I-we account is to identify the community as a privileged perspective for which the possibility of error cannot be found. Meanwhile the I-thou account of intersubjectivity "focuses on the
relation between the commitments undertaken by a scorekeeper interpreting others and the commitments attributed by that scorekeeper to those others". (ibid.:599) This account does not prioritise an individual to the community or the other way around as the authority. Rather the only authority is the structure of actual practice in a perspectival form, namely, the rules of inferences. Brandom says that "What is shared by all discursive perspectives is that there is a difference between what is objectively correct in the way of concept application and what is merely taken to be so, not what it is --the structure, not the content.". (ibid.:600) That is to say, the space between perspectives or the distinction between the normative status ('objective' perspective) and the normative attitude ('subjective' perspective) provides the perspectival structure which is shared by all rational individuals. This means that community can be defined as a normative structure of I-thou relations in which each member performs the implicit normative social practices. Intersubjectivity in this sense shows that different perspectives about the world are possible, rather than merely one relation of the I-we. However, the different perspectives form the perspectival structure which in turn is what characterizes the notion of the world.

In sum, according to Brandom, the notion of 'practice' means an inferential activity or linguistic practice from which content is delivered. The normative rational force of 'practice' is derived from the inferential or perspectival structure of a rational community. Such a structure of a community can be said to have a derivative intentionality. That is to say, the community derives its rational force from each individual who attributes normative attitudes to other rational members. So, the notion of 'practice', for Brandom, shows how perspectives about the world can confer propositional content from discursive practice. Brandom calls his view semantic externalism or perspectival externalism because it is an
anti-individualist or anti-Cartesian view. This also means that if the notion of community is defined in terms of the *I-thou* relation, then it will not face the problem of identification of the *we* as a sort of Cartesian self for whom error is not possible. Metaphorically, he calls this kind of externalism a tactile Fregean semantic theory, i.e. the model of conceptual content is a model of grasping senses rather than seeing them which is the Cartesian visual model. The difference between them lies in their respective accounts of error: error is possible in the former, not in the latter. For the tactile Fregean theory, grasping sense means reaching for norms by inference making, so a thought can be assessed as true or false. In contrast, for the Cartesian visual model, the idea of error is not possible because inference making is separated from representational or perceptual experiences, so that the world is seen or visualised in separation from being assessed as true or false. So, seeing the world is immune to error.

The *I*-we model has such an implicit Cartesianism, for it provides a subject for whom error is not possible — the community. But then the ultimate constraint on content is provided by this plural subject; and it is questionable whether this provides an independent account of truth. Alternatively, on the *I-thou* model, error is always possible, but in a way that suggests it is always deferrable. The question is whether the activity of inference making (or as Brandom calls it ‘scorekeeping’) is itself constrained by anything other than scorekeeping? What, if anything, makes scorekeeping sensitive to the world?

2.2.3. World-Including or World-Involving?

The question to Brandom’s view may be: Is error made possible by the external world with which our thought is involved, or by the activity of scorekeeping? More simply, is scorekeeping a world-involving activity? If scorekeeping is not world-involving, it is an internalist view. In other words, if Brandom takes the world to be included in thought,
then he cannot claim that his is an externalist view. The notion of thought involving the world is an externalist notion, which conveys the sense of the world as autonomous to thought. However, the autonomy of the world does not mean that the world is excluded from thought. That is because, as I have argued, if the world is excluded from thought, it means that the world is beyond thought in such a way that the characterization of the world does not take thought into account. The problem of excluding the world is the regress of interpretations of how the world can be a constraint on content. Brandom's view seems to take scorekeeping as including the world but gives no account of how the world is involved. His view should be called a sort of strong form of inferentialism, which, roughly, goes hand in hand with the strong form of Cartesianism where content is delivered from the inner representation in which objects cannot be individuated. The strong form of inferentialism takes the world to be revealed with the inferential connections or within the structure of inference.

The way Brandom answers this objection may be the following. The representational contents involve social and linguistic contents. But they are "not merely linguistic-- for they are not entirely up to us in the way in which what noises we use is entirely up to us". (ibid.:528) That is because what is not up to us, as mentioned above, is the structural perspectival form which provides the normative constraint. However, it is correct for Brandom to say that the notion of practice which provides content involves not only inference but also the non-inference, namely, perception and action. But then Brandom accounts for perception and action in a way that cannot be accounted for separately from the inference. Perception is an observational performance producing actions as intentional performances. Representational contents are derived by taking something as or according to the normative attitudes. In this sense,
'practice' delivers contents because 'practice' involves the sort of action which can be characterized as the performance of the attitudes by making an inference. At first sight, what seems to be questionable is whether it is legitimate to equate the notion of action with the activity of inferring. That is because action is the notion which involves objects in external world. There is certainly a conceptual aspect of action, which is what accounts for its intentional aspect. But in order to understand that aspect of action, it is not possible to ignore objects of action. If this is right, then inferring can be said to be merely a part of what accounts for action, not all of it.

Brandom's account of the notion of perception is also implicitly inferential in the sense that perception as the noninferential realm can be accounted for in terms of an inferential understanding. The problem is that that sort of notion of perception does not provide an empirical content or content which is delivered by (conceptual) perceptual experience where its aboutness involves the empirical realm. It is this sort of content which shows that the world is mind-independent. On Brandom's account, it seems that there is no distinction or friction between the world which is the extra-linguistic or the empirical realm and our perspectival attitudes about it or what he calls the conceptual. Although Brandom says that "The objectivity of conceptual content- the way in which its proper applicability is determined by how things are in such a way that anybody and everybody might be wrong in taking such a content to apply in particular circumstances-is not by these means to be explained away.”, what provides content is in the combination of "... the social and inferential dimensions of discursive practice". (ibid.:529) This means that representationalism drops out of the picture because the possibility of error according to this picture is the sort of error which depends on inferential structure. But this cannot confer the notion of content which
captures both the world and its conceptual characterization. The only sort of thought which provides such a notion of content is singular thought. I expand this criticism below.

Brandom's view takes the notion of 'practice' as the act of speech or the act of making inferences. But this notion of practice does not show how the world is a constraint on thought. The notion of 'practice' which shows the objective constraint on thought requires a characterization of thought in terms of non-inferential actions, for there needs to be a constraint on inference. The idea of non-inferential actions involves an account of how perceptual experiences engage with objects. It requires an account of the notion of 'keeping track of an object' in a spatiotemporal world, and thereby the notion of 'practice' is fundamentally related with the idea of singular thought. However, as we will see in the following that Brandom's idea of singular thought cannot account for how conceptual content can be individuated on the basis of his notion of discursive practice. It means that his idea does not pass what I call the test case for an account of content.

Brandom rightly explains the reason why the idea of object-dependence is crucial in semantic theory. The reason is that this idea shows how thought and language possess aboutness-- "...the objects that must be consulted in order to assess the truth of what is believed and claimed". (ibid.:568) But "Treating a claim as true is attributing one doxastic commitment while undertaking another which shares or anaphorically inherits its propositional content." (ibid.) Thus it is obvious that he focuses only on one aspect of content, i.e. the inferential aspect. However, Brandom may deny that because, for him, anaphoric chains involve Frege's notion of sense which provides both "...ways in which objects can be given to us, and... determine the reference of the
expressions occurring in them". (ibid.:572) However, for Brandom, a singular/demonstrative mode of thought is explained as an anaphoric claim. Anaphora is a sort of an inferential connection of concepts in which "the relation of a pronoun stands in to its antecedent." (ibid.:283) Demonstratives provide examples of anaphoric inference in which the unrepeatability of demonstrative tokens is related to other co-referring tokens. So, he would claim that it is not true that his idea cannot account for representational content. He thinks that his view can account for the idea of de re sense. He says, "Anaphoric chains of tokenings--explained in terms of inheritance of substitutitional commitments--provide a model for object-involving, de re senses." (ibid.:572) De re senses are hence anaphoric senses which pick out objects by the conceptual or inferential articulation.

Apparently, it is better to say that the idea of object-dependence for Brandom is actually anaphora-dependent which does not provide the notion of object as that which we engage with in perceptual experiences. (see ibid.: 579) Anaphora-dependent can be understood in a similar way as a descriptive thought rather than an object-dependent thought. The problem with descriptive thought is that content cannot be individuated on the basis of perceptual object. In other words, the object is not what provides content; rather it is the inferential relation among thoughts which provides content. But that cannot be legitimately called content, because the requirement of what it is to be content is that it needs to satisfy what the inferentialism and representationalism provide, namely, both inferential/conceptual relation and referential/representational relation between subject and object. In particular, what is missing in Brandom's externalism is the idea of the external world as a normative constraint on thought. However, it may be said that his account can provide the notion of content which performs the explanatory role or the role of rationalising
actions. That is because the idea of inferential articulation requires a subject’s ability to perform the inference. That ability can be said to be ‘perspectival’ as he calls it. But once there is no worldly constraint for the performance of that ability, rationalising of actions is not possible. So, I conclude that Brandom’s externalism cannot provide the idea of objectivity of content which is world-involving, and hence his notion of ‘practice’ is not convincing as an account for content.

To conclude, Brandom’s tactile Fregean seems unlikely to provide a notion of ‘practice’ individuating content which is constrained by the world. The main reason for this is that the world for Brandom is the world which is already conceived in inference instead of the world which, although thought-involving, is independent from our thought. In spite of the fact that at the outset Brandom tries to steer his way through the rule-following dilemma of no norms and regress of interpretation, it turns out that his semantic externalism loses norms which can be characterizable independently from inference. Normativity, according to his externalism, turns out to be shareability by the common rational beings who have the inferential ability. Though he avoids the community approach by taking account of social practices as the perspectival ‘form’ or ‘structure’ of commitments, this does not help bring the objectivity out of the shareability. Rather it becomes a normativity which calibrates itself without friction with the world. That is to say, inferences alone cannot individuate thought the content of which involves the world as its aboutness. Individuation of content requires both inferentialism and representationalism; otherwise, what we get will be a bifurcation of content in which reductionism of content is unavoidable.

Now the question may remain how a non-social externalism is possible given that what we want is both the world as the constraint on
thought and thought which rationalises actions. Socio-semantic externalism does not look compelling on either ground: it lacks the explanatory aspect for rationalising actions which involves the external world, and consequently does not meet the world-constraint but turns out to rely on the shareability of thought instead. However, as with Brandom’s externalism, the NF view attempts to provide a non-reductionist account of content—where content cannot be reduced to talk on the one hand, and cannot be reduced to thought on the other hand. Bilgrami’s externalism (1992) also offers that sort of account, but the difference is that for Bilgrami it is not necessary that thought is either social-dependent or object-dependent, but rather it is public. For Bilgrami, content is derived from concepts, and concepts are externally derived from objects; but it does not follow that content is object-dependent. However, the problem with Bilgrami’s view seems to be similar to the problem which faces Brandom’s externalism; that is, the problem about the worldly constraint. I will discuss Bilgrami’s main idea and, in particular, his argument against NF externalism in the following.

2.3. Public/Concept-Externalism

The main assumption underpinning Bilgrami’s idea of externalism is the idea that externalism means anti-Cartesianism. Cartesianism, for him, is characterized as an internalism or what he understands as Putnam’s methodological solipsism. In order to reject Cartesianism, Bilgrami argues that it is not necessary to choose between two sorts of externalism, namely, neither social externalism nor content-externalism. Contrary to the former, he defines his externalism as a public but not anti-individualistic externalism, i.e. content can be publicly accessed, which does not assume social norms as what constrains content. Contrary to the latter, his externalism takes concepts to be externally derivable from objects in the external world. But content is not externally derivable. It is
individuated from concepts plus a background or pattern of beliefs about objects. So, his externalism rejects the idea that only singular thoughts can provide content. Put them all together, his externalism holds that the public nature of meaning and thought requires an externalism of concept. So, only general thought is sufficient for setting the publicness of thought. His reaction against social externalism is mainly a reaction to Burge's externalism, which I will not discuss further here. What interests me is his reaction to content-externalism, in particular, NF externalism. In the following, I will first look at his main idea and his criticism of NF view and then offer my objections to his view.

For Bilgrami, there are two main aspects of content-- the unification of content and the locality of content. The first one, which is in common with the NF view, says that content is non-bifurcated into broad and narrow. There is only one content which involves the external world and rationalises actions. It is the sort of content the constraints on which are both how a subject conceives the world and the external world. Content or sentence-meaning is composed of 'concepts' or word-meaning which is determined by external objects. But concepts are not only determined differently by different objects, but also by different conceptions or background beliefs of a subject concerning the term. So, content deriving from concepts is constrained by external world (concepts) and the world as a subject conceives of it (conceptions).

According to the second aspect, content is local or can be ascribed only in a particular context. The context may be understood as a shared-concept or may be a linguistic practice, even though different agents have different background beliefs about the same concept. It is this aspect of content--context-- which contributes to what rationalises actions. Bilgrami's example is the concept expressed by the term 'water'. The
concept of the term ‘water’ is fixed by water in the external world. The background beliefs are any sorts of knowledge an agent has concerning ‘water’ in a particular context. A chemist, in the context of doing an experiment with water, employs his background beliefs concerning his chemical knowledge. But, in the context of drinking water when he feels thirsty, he may have different background beliefs about ‘water’ which are not concerned with chemical knowledge, but have a shared ‘water’ concept with other people in the same situation.

So, it can be seen that the notion of context, for Bilgrami, does not mean a social context of language, rather it is the context in the sense of being ‘public’. That is to say, context is not privately accessible. However, the notion of context cannot be taken as the external object or direct reference because, for Bilgrami, there are no norms at that level. This means that concepts which are derived from external objects are not normative. Different concepts are just different, and cannot be taken as true or false. The normativity of truth and falsehood of concept use only arises at the level of relations between sentences and between beliefs, that is, at the level of content. Content is hence normative because there is the public context. So, the notion of context which provides norms for content is neither social context nor direct referential context. That is one of the reasons why Bilgrami thinks that singular thought is not necessary in accounting for content. I turn now to Bilgrami’s criticism of NF view.

2.3.1. Criticism of the neo-Fregean view

The main motivation behind Bilgrami’s criticism of other sorts of externalism, like Burge and NF, is the worry about the bifurcation of content. I will not discuss how he argues against Burge’s view which shares less common ground with his view than NF. However, it is the same worry which turns him against NF idea of singular thought, that is, it
drives the bifurcation of content. I will show why Bilgrami thinks that the 
idea of singular thoughts is problematic before going to the point of how 
this idea leads to content-bifurcation.

For Bilgrami, Cartesianism means internalism, i.e. the view that 
content can be individuated independently from the external world. He 
argues that in order to argue against Cartesianism, it is sufficient to argue 
that content is composed of concepts which are externally derived. So, 
when NF externalism argues against Cartesianism by insisting on the idea 
of singular thoughts, i.e. the externality of concepts is ‘directly’ fixed by 
external objects, Bilgrami says that NF externalism is too demanding. 
That is because Cartesianism does not claim that having thoughts need to 
be general thoughts, i.e. the thoughts which, as Bilgrami understands, are 
not singular or are not ‘directly’ fixed by objects. So, there is no need to 
argue against Cartesianism by insisting on singular thoughts. General 
thoughts are sufficient for content-individuation which can explain 
actions. In particular, the disagreement between Bilgrami and the NF is in 
“...how we look to the relevance of the outside of his mind”. (1992: 171) 
The relation of thought to the external world, for Bilgrami, has a sort of 
indirectness, namely, content is indirectly related with the external world 
although “it is concepts which are externally constituted out of the causal 
relations that we have with external objects”. (ibid.) This means that if 
there is no external world/objects, having thought contents is still 
possible.

The above criticism is based on the way Bilgrami characterizes the 
idea of singular thoughts. For him, singular thoughts have a ‘special 
ineliminable psychological role’. What he means by this is the following: 
in having demonstrative thoughts, one can have the same thought (not 
singular thoughts) between a hallucinatory and veridical experience. The
reason is not the phenomenological reason, but a semantic reason, that is, the semantic point concerning the inferential role of the concept which is derived from an agent's psychology or his conception of things. This psychological role is ineliminable because indexicality and demonstratives have an element of reflexivity which cannot be paraphrasable without appeal to other indexicals, such as "'I' can only be replaced by the 'thinker of this thought'; 'That' can only replaced by 'the object of this demonstration' or by 'the object in front of me'". (ibid.:163) So, demonstrative thoughts have contents because in a subject's psychological role, there is "...an element of reflexivity, even though there is no external object". (ibid.)

Taking the idea of singular thoughts in this way, Bilgrami holds "a description (or belief) theory of sense or meaning" (ibid.:174) which, he thinks, does not bifurcate content because "the conceptions of things are not to be seen as decouplable from the things". (ibid.) Meanwhile, he thinks that NF bifurcates content into the singular 'concept' and the conceptions of the object. (see ibid.:172) While concepts are expressed by different names applied to an object, e.g. London and Londres, different 'conceptions' of the object are different set of beliefs about the object. So, this means that there are two contents. (ibid.) On the contrary, Bilgrami's theory takes the concepts of terms as what convey beliefs, so there is only one content. He thinks that the NF cannot have it both ways-- the reference and the conceptions of things specified. The only theory which, he thinks, can offer the unification of content is the descriptions theory of sense. In the following, I provide some objections to his view.

2.3.2. Some Objections to Bilgrami's Criticism

My main objection is that Bilgrami's notion of Cartesianism is not fine-grained enough. He clearly states that he takes Putnam's
methodological solipsism as the only form of Cartesianism which any account of externalism is set to reject. That is not correct because NF externalism does not reject the modest form of Cartesianism. So this means that his criticism of the NF is based on this misunderstanding. And this is a reason why Bilgrami cannot see that there can be an idea of singular thought which does not involve content-bifurcation. Another reason is that Bilgrami does not see the connection between the notion of thoughts, objects and actions, in other words, the notion of practice. This may be due to his understanding that Cartesianism means internalism which also includes phenomenological experiences. (see ibid.: 159) The phenomenological experience is an inner experience which is infallible. So, in order to reject Cartesianism, his account of demonstrative thoughts is provided in terms of a descriptive form of belief which can be semantically evaluated, rather than thought which requires the idea of object-engagement.

Before going to the issue of demonstrative thoughts, there is another obvious issue which seems to be contradictory in the way Bilgrami constructs his idea of externalism. That is to say, Putnam’s methodological solipsism\(^ {22}\) is the assumption of the individualistic conception of mind, but Bilgrami holds that his externalism is not anti-individualism. The problem is that once one thinks that Putnam’s methodological solipsism is the thesis which externalism aims to oppose, it seems that one has already adopted the picture of the separation between mind and the world at the outset. That picture is an implicit sort of Cartesian picture which Bilgrami would certainly not want to accept.

What Bilgrami may say in reply is this. According to his account of externalism, a unified content must meet two constraints in which mind and world are not independently characterizable. These constraints are: a
constraint of the world as a subject perceives it and a constraint from the external world. (see Bilgrami 1998: 595) The first constraint is the Fregean constraint which he thinks that his account of externalism begins with and then, he proceeds from there to find out the account of externalism. So, this means that he does not presuppose the absolute separation of mind and world at the outset like Putnam’s view. But the problem is that the Fregean constraint is not incompatible with Putnam’s methodological solipsism. The point is that the Fregean constraint requires the idea of modest Cartesianism, namely, the idea that mind and world are interweaving in the way that it is rationally possible for a subject to individuate which experiences of the same object is veridical on the ground of knowing ‘which’ object one has experience of or thought about. Since Bilgrami misses this point, it not only weakens his criticism of NF externalism, but also leads to what is obscure in his own account, namely, the problem of how his notion of content ‘indirectly’ derives from concept-externalism.

The problem may be due to the issue of the priority of constraint on content. This is the problem which I have stated in the last chapter about the dichotomy of representationalism and inferentialism that we need both semantic properties--reference and inference. On NF view, a question of what is a constraint on content is a matter of priority in the following sense. Both the worldly constraint and inferential constraint are interconnected, so that it seems that there is only one normative constraint, namely, the ‘knowledge’ of truth-conditions. That knowledge involves both Fregean and Russell’s principles. But this does not mean that because NF accepts modest Cartesianism where the role of sense/points of view are what specify the reference, then the external world is ruled out. On the contrary, the reason why we need Russell’s principle is because we accept the Fregean principle. In other words, since
it is rationally possible for us to have different thoughts about the same object, the idea of the worldly constraint is necessary. This accounts for the idea that the inferential constraint is not prior to the worldly constraint in the sense that inferential constraint cannot function if there is no worldly constraint.

The problem seems to be Bilgrami’s account of concept-externalism as a constraint on content. The problem is that if concept which is externally derived is not normative, as he takes it (see Bilgrami 1998), and the notion of constraint, as I understand, is normative, then how can the external world be a constraint on content? To be more precise, Bilgrami says that there are two constraints-- the world as a subject perceives it and the external world. (see ibid.:595) He thinks that concepts are externally constituted out of objects in the external world. But there are no norms at that level: the level of word-meaning, but norms are at the level of content: sentence-meaning. This means that Bilgrami’s externalism separates concepts from content. If Bilgrami wants to maintain the idea that concepts do not provide norms, there are two results-- first, he cannot insist on the externality of concepts as a constraint on content; second, it implicitly follows that Bilgrami’s account of concepts makes it looks as if concepts are object-dependent in Russell’s sense, namely, the idea of an object about which different thoughts are not possible. That is because, for Bilgrami, concepts are not normative or rationally accountable. So if there is no psychological space in viewing objects, then the significant upshot is the idea that singular thoughts, for him, are not necessarily object-dependent.

This leads him to think that one can have a demonstrative thought due to the reflexivity of demonstrative terms the content of which needs no objects. But the problem with Bilgrami’s point here is that
demonstrative content turns out to require an inferentialist account of content, in which the only constraint being provided is the inferential link between expressions. But this inferential constraint cannot provide 'friction' from the world. The problem is, as with Brandom's idea of externalism, that once there is no worldly constraint on content, thoughts do not have aboutness. Briefly, what is required in order to capture the notion of content which has functions of both rationalising behaviour and providing the notion of objective norms is an account which has both the inferential constraint and the worldly constraint.

3. Conclusion

I have argued that if the NF view of content is right. Individuation of content requires an account of externalism which offers friction from the worldly constraint on content. According to the NF idea of singular thoughts, the world is constitutive of thought. But the world is external to thought; otherwise, it will not be the world which makes the Fregean rational space possible. In other words, in order to capture the idea of points of view, we need the idea of the external world which provides a constraint on thought, so that content can be individuated. Accordingly, the sort of content we get is not only normative but also has a rationalising force on actions. Put it another way, I argue that in order to avoid the sort of rule-following dilemma in accounting for content, we need to avoid the dichotomy between representationalism and inferentialism, that is, not to fall into a one sided view of content.

With this picture in mind, I began the investigation with the sort of bifurcationist views of content--Putnam's idea of externalism and Fodor's idea of internalism-- in order to show some problems with these idea that take thought and world in a separate way. Then, I examined three current accounts of externalism --Burge, Brandom and Bilgrami--who share the
common assumption with NF externalism, namely, the assumption that the connection of mind and world plays a crucial role in understanding what it is to possess content. However, I argue that their views still fail to offer a worldly constraint on content. This shows that in order to capture the notion of content which meets that constraint, we need the notion of practice which provides an account of how the idea that the world is constitutive of thought is possible. It is the notion of practice which requires NF account of demonstrative thoughts. I turn to this topic in the next chapter.
Notes

1 "Narrow content is radically inexpressible, because it's only content potentially; it's what gets to be content when-and only when-it gets to be anchored." (1987:50)
2 However, it should be noted here that there is a difference between Putnam and Burge's externalism -- while Putnam does not explain meaning in the intensional or belief context, since he links the methodological solipsism with the psychological aspect of intensity, Burge's externalism is accounted within the belief-context. Fodor ignores this point.
3 The following points are based on Evans,G. (1982:201-4)
4 As he said, "There is no ascription of a peculiarly de re (en rapport) attitude. At most, there is a de re ascription of a de dicto attitude." (1977:346)
5 see Burge,T. 1979 , note 2, p.117, although Burge does not provide a full criticism for Putnam's view here, I think it can be understood as the way I show here.
6 This is an obvious point about how Burge employs Frege's notion of sense in such a way that is different from NF view. That is,for NF, the thesis of the rational possibility of different thoughts is about thoughts toward the same object, while for Burge, it is about thoughts toward the conventional linguistic usage.
7 As he says "Social context infects even the distinctively mental features of mentalistic attributions. No man's intentional mental phenomena are insular. Every man is a piece of the social continent, a part of the social main." (1979:87).
8 See my chapter 1.
9 I have already elaborated this issue of the difference between referent and reference in chapter 2. This should be sufficient for the account that a singular thought has a 'referent' in the sense that it has an object in so far as that is conceived semantically as what it contributes to making the thought true or false.
10 Socio-semantic externalism' is my term. What Brandom uses is 'semantic externalism'.
11 See the term 'frictionless' in Evans,G.&McDowell,J. 1976, pp.xxii-xxii.
12 For Brandom, normative pragmatics is supposed to be contrary to the classical American pragmatism (e.g. Dewey) or the 'stereotypical pragmatism' about truth, whose view is that truth is a property of utility for some end. Brandom criticises this sort of view for taking norm as an end guiding action independently from the agent's beliefs and offering a non-normative or a naturalistic account of norms which is hard to be falsified. (see 1994: 286-291)
13 Representationalism is the view that the representation or the referential relation of language to the world is what provides content; inferentialism is the view that the inferential relation, viz. the logical relation between sentences, confers conceptual content. For Brandom, in the end of his analysis, inferentialism turns out to provide an account of referential properties. But it is reference in the sense of the semantic referential properties, rather than the world which externally constrains thoughts.
14 However, Brandom proposes a non-reductionist middle way differently from McDowell’s. See my chapter one.
15 Brandom opposes pragmatist model of knowledge (know-how) with the intellectualist model (know-that) and said that the latter "...generates a regress, which can be halted only by acknowledging the existence of some more primitive form of norm." (ibid.,23, and also 21)
16 However, as we will see that his idea here does not pass the test case--demonstrative case--for showing how the world is independent from our concept. (see section 2.2.3)
The point is the authority of norms derives from their acknowledgment; in Brandom's words, "...our own acknowledgment or endorsement of a rule is the source of its authority over us-in short that our normative statuses such as obligation are instituted by our normative attitudes." (ibid.:51)

18 see Brandom's criticism of Burge's idea of de re/de dicto belief in n.11,p.713

19 Another two sorts of inferences are the material proprieties of inference, i.e. the logical pattern of inferential relation between premises and conclusions; and the substitution inference, i.e. the substitution of singular terms and predicative part of a sentence. All the three sorts of inferences: material inferences; substitution; and anaphora are connected as inferential connections among concepts which provide conceptual content or inferential role.

20 "The intuition that the hallucinating agent has a singular thought and that he has the same thought as the veridical perceiver is not a phenomenological intuition at all. The point is rather that the semantic or inferential role of the thought in his psychological economy is the role of a demonstrative thought." (ibid.: 162)

21 For Bilgrami's externalism, the constraint is:
"When fixing an externally determined concept of an agent, one must do so by looking to **indexically formulated utterances** of the agent which express indexical contents containing that concept and then picking that external determinant for the concept which is in consonance with other contents that have been fixed for the agent (1992: 5, my underlining, his italics)

22 What Putnam said is that methodological solipsism is the assumption that "no psychological state, properly so called, presupposes the existence of any individual other than the subject to whom that state is ascribed"(Putnam1975: 220)
Chapter Four: A Concept of "Practice"

My main argument of the previous chapters is this. If it is the case that understanding meaning in language involves grasp of content, and that understanding meaning requires no interpretation, then what provides content cannot be independently characterizable from use. Otherwise, the dilemma of rule-following arises, namely, if norms are not inherently constituted in use, then the upshot will be either a regress of interpretations of rules or a paradox of no norms in use. The dilemma can be accounted for in another way by employing the notion of the dichotomy of representationalism and inferentialism. The dichotomy arises when the notion of content is accounted for by precluding one of its constraints – the worldly constraint and the constraint of the inferential structure of thought (the latter is what I called the rationality constraint). The former constraint provides the idea of norms, namely, truth-conditions for thought, while the latter rationalises human actions. To overcome the dichotomy, an account of content requires the neo-Fregean idea of singular thoughts where thought content is singled out by the object in the external world. Such an idea closes the gap of the dichotomy in a way that what provides normativity for thought content is the object which is egocentrically grasped. In this sense, what rationalises human actions are those relations to objects in which the object plays a constitutive role in individuating thought.¹ Such relations are demonstrative thoughts. Consequently, we get a non-bifurcated content, that is, there is only one content which satisfies both the worldly constraint and the rationality constraint.

An individuation of that sort of content requires a notion of practice, i.e. a structure of our engagement with objects, to which norms are intrinsic. In general, practice is taken as an activity aiming at achieving
something. In essence, the account of practice I am interested in is an account of what it is to be a possessor of content or what it is for someone to understand meaning. As that account is to be constrained by both the world and the subject’s point of view, the notion of practice we need is the notion the characterization of which involves demonstrative thoughts. Demonstrative thoughts are accounted for in terms of the notion of object-engagement. The notion of practice hence needs to be characterized as an object-engagement which involves the idea of an ‘intra-personal’ engagement rather than an ‘inter-personal’ engagement. The latter is the account in which a social practice is taken as the source of norms. Some examples of such an account were already discussed as problematic in the last chapter, namely, Burge’s and Brandom’s views. The notion of practice as the intra-personal engagement means that the individuation of content requires an identification of object which is related to the egocentric point of view. Such an engagement is confined within a person in the sense that the engagement in thought or the egocentricity of thought is characterized under the modest Cartesian conception of mind. In that sense, content is embedded in a structure of practice where the connection between the world and a subject’s point of view cannot be independently characterized. Hence, without an account of the world-involving practice, understanding content is not complete.

This chapter proposes the above notion of practice that offers an account of how possessing content or having thought is constituted by a rational connection with the world. That is to say, the account of practice which provides the content of singular thoughts requires the subject to be an agent engaging with objects in the external world in a non-reducible way. This account shows how the idea of singular thoughts which are object-dependent in the sense of Russell’s Principle cannot be separated from the Fregean principle. So this chapter mainly attempts to
characterize what can be called the neo-Fregean notion of practice. Such a notion involves an account of demonstrative identification the nature of which involves the interweaving of the two main aspects-- the object’s aspect of an engagement and the subject’s aspect of the engagement, which I consider in this chapter and next chapter respectively.

The first aspect, which this chapter mainly focuses on, concerns three elements: the ideas of the object of perceptual attention, spatial representation and temporal representation. The three elements are integrally related. The crucial question is how the idea of object which is the source of normativity provides objectivity for the engagement of a subject if the engagement is defined as an ‘intra-personal’ engagement. In the first part, I discuss the connection of norms and behaviour in order to define the notion of practice as a rule-governed behaviour in which rules involves objects in the external world rather than rules of language games or social rules. Then the second part elaborates a notion of practice as an object-engagement.

Briefly, this chapter will answer the question of how the external world as the objective constraint of thought should be illustrated in order to see how practice as object-engagement provides an account of content in which mind and world are interweaving. The account of content I propose is what can be called a one-level account of content but two-stage approach. The meaning of one-level account (OL) is different from that of two-level account (TL) in following way.

1. (OL) Content is provided by a direct conceptual engagement with an object, so that both constraints on content (rationality and objectivity constraint) are satisfied at once.

2. (TL) Content is provided by the conceptual mediation between the egocentricity of thought and its objectivity, so that the two constraints
on content are characterized independently.

I will show, in particular, in section 2.2.1 that OL needs to be two-staged, namely:

3. It is necessary that although content is provided by an unmediated conceptually structured engagement, thoughts of the same type whether or not they are true or false do not have a content in common. That is because thoughts of the same type are distinguishably two-staged: the stage in which thought is mind-dependent and the stage in which thought is object-dependent, so that individuation of a thought depends on object.

An account of content is two-staged for both the rationality and objectivity constraint need to be met to individuate a thought. It is this which guarantees that thoughts of a putative common type-experience (veridical and illusory experience) do not have a common factor because mistake is possible in either the sort of thought we have or the object of perception. There is no common factor of thought available in both the veridical and illusory cases. The common factor in thought arises in TL account because it is staged-less or monolithic, namely:

4. The monolithic account treats the component that satisfies the rationality constraint as of the same type whether or not the thought is true or false.

The upshot of the monolithic two-level account is that thought is individuated by, e.g., the rationality constraint alone, for that provides the common factor independent of truth-value.

As regards the second aspect of the notion of practice, i.e. the aspect of a subject's engagement with an object, a central issue concerns the question of whether objects are individuated by actions (practical abilities), if the idea of objectivity for demonstrative thoughts can be
found in an object-engagement. In other words, in what sense does the objective constraint of thought imply action or a practical aspect of thought? Put it in Campbell’s way (e.g. 1994), in what sense is the ‘detached’ aspect of the subject of thought related to its ‘attached’ aspect? My main contention, which will be further discussed in the next chapter, is to show how the structure of practice provides the connection between thought and world; perception and actions via the notion of agency. On this account, the notion of ‘practice’ I propose provides content which satisfies both the constraint of the world which is grounded on a perceptual linking with objects and the constraint of the aspect of subjectivity which is accounted for in terms of actions and agency. So it is neither perception per se nor the inferentialist notion of belief alone which individuates content.

I. Practice as Rule-Governed Behaviour

As already mentioned, the notion of practice is essential for understanding what it is for language to be about something. Indeed, it is the notion that contributes to the account of how mind and world are related. To understand that relation is to understand how meaning is possible in language, and that is, how content is possible for thought. Given that language is a form of representation, it is the issue about how to give an account of representation in order to understand its representational power, or the aboutness of language.

A problem about representation concerns how the rational power, or the normativity of symbols, is possible. That is the question of from where the representation gets its representational power. These questions involve the question of identification of a correct representation. In respect of language, the question is: what is the normative criterion of meaning? The rule-following considerations are the issue here. ² Suppose
we take the representation as a rule, the question is how a rule determines what is counted as following a rule; or what it is for someone to follow a rule? There are two possibilities: first, it is the rule itself that determines what is counted as following a rule; second, it is the rule-following which tells us what following a rule is.

The problem with the first option is that if the rule is determinative in a way which is independent from our understanding, then there will be the problem about regress of interpretation of the rule because the rule which runs by itself needs a further rule to interpret it. Problems with the second possibility are the following: first, it begs the question because it is the rule-following itself which is the problem, so we cannot answer what is counted as following a rule by looking at following a rule. For example, when trying to explain what a rule is, one might give some examples of following rule. However, examples do not explain what counts as following a rule.

Second, it is a reductionist answer to explain what it is for someone to understand or follow a rule, which is normative, by giving an account of the action of following a rule, which is a descriptive (e.g. behaviourist) view. (This point will be discussed more below.) In other words, it is just a description of what the agent does, not what she ought to do. Though a rule-following, minimally, is exhibited by patterns of ‘sameness’ of actions or regularity of actions, the regularity of actions by itself is not sufficient to count as following a rule because infinite interpretations of the actions are possible, such as, the interpretation that a subject may change the rule or that he is incorrectly following the rule. And this is possible for the simple reason that statements of regularity cover what has happened, not what ought to happen. That can be seen from Wittgenstein’s example of teaching a child a rule of add 2. (see e.g.
PI 185-188) The child may add 2 for a series of number, say till 1000. But after that he may run the series as 1004, 1008, 1012. If understanding a rule is accounted for in terms of regularity of actions, then we cannot understand this child’s adding two whether he has just applied a different rule or he has made a mistake. So, regularity of actions is not sufficient for accounting for understanding a rule. Indeed, regularity of actions provides only the description of actions which cannot single out which action is a correct instances of rule-following. Therefore, what is counted as following a rule requires an account which can single out a normative action, that which manifests a subject’s understanding of the rule; otherwise, there will be the paradox of rule-following: PI 201- “no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule”.

Put it another way, understanding a rule is not individuated by the sameness of actions, rather by the rational aspect of actions. By the same token, the representational power of language is not derived from its representational symbol because there will be regress of interpretations of the symbol. The regress problem will not arise if the representational power is derived from a speaker’s understanding. However, the understanding in question is not the sort of understanding of the strong model of Cartesianism which characterizes the mind as absolutely autonomous from the external constraint. This picture of mind cannot answer the question of how content is individuated. In other words, there is no normative criterion available in the strong model of Cartesianism. An account of understanding which constitutes content needs to be derived from an account of how one acts or follows rules, the characterization of which involves the interweaving of the inner mind with the external world. This means that the sort of actions involving understanding cannot be accounted for in terms of descriptions of actions. That is because the
rational aspect is already built in there, i.e. the notion of ‘practice’ as normatively regulated actions. That is to say, grasp of meaning and content is constituted by practice which is constitutively rational or rule-governed or, as one might say, practice as the rule-governed behaviour. To say that content is ‘constituted’ by practice means that the explanatory relation of action and understanding is a non-reducible and a rational one.

A reductionist account of the relation of action and understanding is possible in two ways. One way is to account that understanding is nothing but action. An example of this account is a behaviourist view which takes action as a manifestation of understanding in a descriptive sense, that is, there is no rational aspect in action. The account of action is provided, roughly, in terms of non-intentional descriptions of states, e.g. physical states. But if actions are driven by rules which can be characterized independently from the belief that one acts according to the rules, the upshot is the paradox of rule-following: every action can be interpreted as following the rule. I will discuss further the problem with this sort of reductionist account below. The other way of reductionist account is that action is explained only in terms of understanding. In other words, following a rule is nothing but understanding a rule, that is, one acts according to rules which depend on one’s understanding. But this is a sort of an inner grasp of rule and leads to the problem of no norms. So either way, practice which constitutes content cannot be explained in a non-normative and reducible way.

The first sort of reductionism can be put in the way that the manifestation of understanding is explained as the causal output of understanding. But the manifested behaviour does not provide the answer as to how rules as the causal input and acts according to rules are rationally connected; that is to say, it does not provide the content we
want or the content which rationalises action. The content derived from actions as the manifested behaviour is only a bifurcated one, i.e. the broad content which explains meaning of behaviour by appealing to context and truth-condition of the physical structure of the subject. Behaviour in this sense is not rational. It is also an issue, as in Kripke's criticism (1982), that if we ask how meaning is possible, then the manifested behaviour does not provide the answer, because behaviour which is non-normative cannot justify meaning which is normative.

So the notion of practice which is non-reducible or constitutive has to be explained in the way that the subject of understanding is also the subject of action, that is the notion of agency -- someone whose reasons for action are a part of a causal relation. However, this is not meant to be the second sort of reductionism: the constraint of understanding is the subject's intentional attitudes alone. That is because it must involve the objectivity of truth-conditions which is world-involving also; otherwise there will be no friction for content individuation. Practice hence needs to be accounted for in the way that a subject engages with the world. It means that causal relations need to be accounted for in the sense that cause and effect is part of a rational relation, that is, the cause of action is the reason for action of the agent. In other words, the subject is an agent whose actions cannot be explained solely in terms of causation, but rather actions are performed under reasons for doing something. That is to say, we need a non-behaviouristic account of practice.

However, this does not mean that we should shun behaviour or action in order to find out what understanding is. Rather, there is a notion of practice which is non-behaviouristic and is constitutive of understanding. In the following, I look at Campbell (1982) where he argues against the behaviourist approach to the notion of understanding.
His argument provides a reason why a non-behaviouristic approach is required. Although I may not agree with all of his ideas, his objection to the behaviouristic approach is correct and helps provide an idea of behaviour which is constitutive of understanding. My dispute with Campbell’s view will be more obvious in later sections.

Campbell argues that the behaviourist account cannot account for how behaviour can be used in individuating understanding of language. What he proposes is a cognitive account of behaviour. (1982:20) His argument is as follows. According to behaviourism, understanding a language is accounted for as behaviour similar to the behaviour of someone who possesses knowledge of a language plus a theory characterizing the knowledge. That is to say, knowledge of understanding cannot be characterized as a part of the understanding. On this basis, there are in general two possibilities for a behaviourist to account for understanding. First, in order to account for what it is for a subject to have knowledge of a language, a behaviourist cannot say that possession of knowledge is the explanation. So, he needs to provide a causal factor underlying the behaviour, which is the internal neural structure of the subject. The problem concerning this possibility is that the behaviourist cannot account for the fact that the neural structure cannot be characterized independently to the subject’s beliefs and desires which are varied over time. That is because the theory of knowledge of understanding does not take account of the variation of beliefs and desires which are combined with the neural structure. Second, a behaviourist may provide a description of beliefs and desires, which may allow for subjective variations. But the problem is that this cannot account for the fact that knowledge of understanding a language is not invariant across beliefs and desires. The behaviourist may argue that what is invariant in accounting for understanding is the subject’s neural structure, which once
the subject acquires the knowledge of understanding, produces patterns of behaviour which are varied to beliefs and desires of the subject. However, this response still does not work because such a description of the neural structure has to be similar to what the theory ascribes. This means that, indeed, what matters for the behaviourist is not the behaviour itself; rather it is the theory.

The main objection of Campbell is hence this. If following the behaviourist account, the behaviour of a subject cannot be distinguished from the one of those who possesses knowledge. It means that we need to look at something else which is not a behaviourist conception of knowledge. For Campbell, the alternative is a cognitive conception. Cognitivism is a knowledge-based account of understanding, that is, understanding of a language is to be accounted for in terms of possession of knowledge. However, it does not mean that knowledge is to be explained in terms of (reduced to) understanding. The problem is how cognitivism is possible without being circular. Campbell’s reply is that cognitivism requires a notion of understanding which is non-verbal. The circularity of cognitivism arises, if one takes belief or knowledge only in a verbal form. For Campbell, there are two reasons why knowledge of understanding does not require verbal or propositional knowledge. First, verbal knowledge is too stable to allow varieties of ways that an object can be thought of, e.g. I may know what x looks like but I can think of him as seen in profile, sometimes as seen full-face. (see ibid.:33) Second, verbal knowledge is too definite. Knowledge of understanding is possible though not yet being verbally expressed. Accordingly, for Campbell, a cognitive approach to understanding is not a circular approach if understanding is explained in terms of non-verbal knowledge.

The above issue is the issue which Campbell disagrees with
McDowell and Evans’s (ME) account of understanding. That is to say, Campbell thinks that ME is an axiomatic-approach rather than a cognitive approach. The axiomatic approach holds that thought is structured verbally or propositionally. Knowledge of the meaning of a sentence (theorem) is based on that of words (axioms). For Campbell, his cognitive approach will not face the problem of circularity because his can provide an explanation of how thought and world get connected without exhausting verbal knowledge. Meanwhile, as Campbell criticizes, that problem will arise in ME’s approach because there is no explanation for the perception of meaning. That is because, for ME, perception of meaning which is linked with perception of (inferential) structure is a pure non-psychic or neural structure, and thereby there is a circularity in accounting for how understanding is constitutive of knowledge of a language.

However, my objection is that Campbell seems to be confused between language as a symbol without content and language as being a structure in thought. The latter provides a reason why an account of thought content requires a constraint of rationality or what rationalises the way we act or use language. This means that ‘perception’ of meaning is not meant to be ‘non-psychic’ or purely physical perceptual experiences as Campbell understands ME, rather it is meant to be the notion of ‘perception’ in which its inferential/normative structure is built. The point here underpins what I will criticize Campbell’s view later on the issue of object-identification. In particular, this involves the idea that individuation of content of thought is provided by the idea of practice as object-engagement. That is to say, Campbell’s view turns out to be that: although it is the non-verbal knowledge which individuates the behaviour constitutive of understanding, what cognitivism states is that such non-verbal knowledge is structured by a cognitive structure, and it is this
structure which individuates content of thought, not the activities of engaging with objects. I will provide some criticism on Campbell’s idea on this point in later section.

In sum, I have argued that practice which provides content needs to be accounted for in terms of rule-governed actions the understanding of which does not always require an extrinsic rule or theoretical knowledge of the understanding (interpretations). Rules as norms are intrinsically in practice. Moreover, the notion of an engagement of agency with the world is required in the sense that both the agent’s understanding and action are rationally related under the objective constraint of the world. That is because if the central question concerning thought and language concerns how mind and world are related, then, following McDowell, there is no need to find a bridge for them. That is, the idea that understanding is not always interpretation. However, that does not mean that mind and world are identical. Otherwise, it is not possible to see how content of thought is individuated. It is under a structure of ‘practice’ that content can be individuated. The notion of practice provides the way out from the dilemma of rule-following. It shows that norms are constituted in the way we act. The problem is how norms are found within practice. The answer is not the notion of practice as an interpersonal engagement. Although I have already discussed this issue in the last chapter, I provide a short section mainly for showing a contrast between the notion of practice being defined as an interpersonal engagement and that which is defined as an intrapersonal engagement.

1.1. Interpersonal Engagement

By the notion of practice as an interpersonal engagement, I mean, for example, the Wittgensteinian community view and the use theory of meaning, such as found in Kripke, Wright, Brandom, Burge. A main
reason why practice is accounted for in this way is the assumption that language is prior to thought. This means that language is viewed as an independent rule detached from understanding meaning, so that there is a need to look for an explanation of how language and thought are connected. The idea of an interpersonal engagement takes the view that it is in a social context of a linguistic practice that meaning is provided. In other words, what bridges the gap between language and understanding is a public context of language-use. As Geach (1971:3) said mental acts have no meaning without connection with the public language-game of describing thoughts. Thoughts in this sense are the sort of “private mental lives” which though they exist have no meaning. It is social practice or how language is used which provides the normative criterion of meaning. A problem concerning the Community view here is that instead of the public criterion showing how language has a representational power, it separates content from language. Public language becomes a sort of interpretation of how understanding is possible—a group interpretation that gets norms by being socially engaged. As an interpretation, it still faces the dilemma of rule-following, and thereby cannot account for content which meets the worldly constrain and rationalises action.

According to Wittgenstein, the way out of the dilemma is practice. In PI 217, practice is characterized as the bedrock of meaning, that is, where there is no justification or interpretation, namely, the concept of practice as forms of life (e.g. PI 241, PI p.226: What has to be accepted, the given, is ...-forms of life.). The problem remains how practice, or a form of life, is normative, because forms of life cannot be accounted for in terms of the natural history of mankind in which there are no norms.6 Neither can it be a practice as an interpersonal engagement where norms are all the way down (e.g. in Brandom’s discursive practice) because there will be no space for normative judgements which are independent from
our will, namely, judgements that enjoy friction from the world. So the notion of practice requires an account of how norms are possible and independent from our will.

Provided that the fundamental question about practice is about the relation of mind and world, it is a question of how mind or thought has representational power. As already mentioned from the outset, the notion of thought includes the conception or our understanding of concepts in language. Thought cannot be accounted for in terms of the strong Cartesian concept of mind where content cannot be individuated. Rather it should be accounted for in terms of a Fregean thought—thought which has sense as a constituent. Having a thought is to be able to apply a concept of an object in a sentence. So thought, as an understanding, and language are crucially connected. However, language is not the bridge between mind and world. It is not the instrument for expressing thought. Otherwise, language would be considered as a rigid machine or a syntactic structure to which semantics or meaning has to be added, and that would lead to the problem of how that addition makes understanding language possible. Rather, language should be considered as a structure of thought and understanding because language contains an inferential structure of thought. In this sense, concepts are already attached to understanding. However, the inferential structure of thought alone is not sufficient for understanding how content is possible. We need an account of what its source of norms is. That is to say, normativity lies in external objects our perceptual experiences of which interweave with the way we generate thought. It is on this ground that the notion of practice should be developed. In the following, I will show how norms are intrinsic to practice which is defined as an engagement of a subject of thoughts and actions with objects.
2. Practice as Object-Engagement

Object-engagement is the crucial characterization of demonstrative thoughts. The notion of practice that is proposed here requires an account of how perceptual engagement with objects provides content. I will focus on this point by answering the following three questions -- first, what are demonstrative thoughts? I answer by looking at the notion of perceptual attention and its connection with the idea of object-dependence. Second, in what sense should we account for the notion of object-dependence? This is the issue of how to account for objectivity of demonstrative thoughts. Third, this issue involves the question of how object-identification relates with spatio-temporal identification.

2.1. The Role of Perceptual Attention

Although there are different forms of identification of objects, as Evans (1982) says, -- demonstrative identification, descriptive identification and recognition-based identification, it is demonstrative identification which is the most basic form for object-identification. However, understanding demonstrative identification, which is the identification at the level of an object and concepts, cannot be separated from an account of its structure which provides content, namely, the inferential structure of thought. If an object is considered independently from the structure of thought, then it is only Russell’s idea of object or sense-data and this is not sufficient for understanding actions. Talking about demonstrative identification cannot be separated from demonstrative thoughts because it is at the level of content which provides the above understanding. So I will talk mainly about demonstrative thoughts. The main point is that demonstrative thoughts have senses as their constituents. That also provides a reason why demonstrative thoughts are the most basic form of thought.
knows—which object one has thought about, the content of which is constrained by both the world and the egocentric point of view which is related to the inferential structure of thought. Those are the two constraints—the worldly or objectivity constraint and the rationality constraint, as I will explain.

The two constraints can be accounted for as the need to satisfy Russell’s Principle and the Fregean Principle. The former provides the idea that thought content requires ‘knowing—which’ object one has thought about. The latter principle provides the idea that—even though it is the object which provides a condition for defining truth-values of thought, thought has a rational value which reflects the subject’s egocentric perspective on the object and which makes it possible for different thinkers to think about the object with different modes of presentation at the same time. In other words, having a thought about an object $a$ that $a$ is $F$, without knowing that $a$ is $G$, is rationally possible because different thoughts about an object provide rational explanation of different actions towards the same object. By having demonstrative thoughts, the source of content is directly from the world with which we are acquainted. The notion of perceptual acquaintance, as already discussed in the earlier chapters, needs to be accounted for as both Russellian and Fregean, namely, acquaintance conveys both the object-dependence idea and the egocentric grasp of the object. So content deriving from demonstrative thoughts is based on our perceptual experiences which cannot be accounted for independently from the egocentric grasp of an object.

Grasping objects in that sense involves the way a thinker perceives and attends to an object over a period of time. It is the notion of sense which defines the experience of perceptual attention to an object with
which demonstrative thoughts are involved. The question is how to characterize the notion of perceptual attention which meets the above two constraints. I will look first at the issue of what the role of perceptual attention is in demonstrative thoughts. And then what it is to say that the notion of perceptual attention is object-dependent.

The notion of perceptual attention is a fundamental idea of demonstrative thoughts. As Evans accounts for this idea it is—

"a capacity to attend selectively to a single thing over a period of time: that is, a capacity to keep track of a single thing over a period of time—an ability, having perceived an object, to identify later perceptions involving the same object over a period of continuous observation." (1982: 175)

A question concerns what perceptual attention means. For Evans, perceptual attention provides a continuous information-link between a subject and an object. It involves at least three things—the subject’s perceptual experiences, the ability to identify and reidentify the object of attention and a period of time. According to Evans, perceptual attention is defined as a capacity. This suggests that attention involves, in some sense, a disposition to act towards its object. It means that attention connects the worldly constraint with the psychological constraint. So perceptual attention is a central notion for accounting for demonstrative content and provides an account of how a demonstrative thought is a crucial thought for understanding actions. However, it is a disputable issue in what sense object-identification requires an account of action. Before turning to that point, let’s look first at what exactly the role of perceptual attention is in demonstrative thoughts.

The reason why the notion of perceptual attention is crucial for
accounting for demonstrative thoughts is that it is the notion which points to objects, namely, the idea of object-dependence. When we perceive a thing attentively, we have a 'this-thought'. If we accept the neo-Fregean idea of object-identification, namely, the notion of \textit{de re} sense or the idea that the idea about an object cannot be separated from our ways of thinking about it, then our perceptual experience of the object is already selective. So the notion of perceptual attention needs to be understood as a selective attention. It is selective only because it is about the object of attention. Thereby, the content of thought is possible.

My point here hence contradicts Hamlyn (1983:67) who distinguishes attention into two types—non-selective attention which is a result of a process of stimulation and selective attention which provides epistemic information about the object. For example, the lines in the Muller-Lyer illusion are an object of our perceptual attention in the sense that they are taken by our perception to be different lengths. But, for Hamlyn, they are non-selective because they are the result of a stimulation process. So for him, attention is taken as a characteristic of perceptual experience. If we follow Hamlyn, there is no point to employ the notion of attention in accounting for perception and information. That is because he equivocates attention with perceptual experience which does not convey the idea of an object of attention. In other words, attention turns out to be the experience itself which points to nothing, and hence provides no content. If that were so, that would seem to contradict the implication of the notion of attention: the notion that points to an object which is the constraint of its content.

The notion of perceptual attention I am interested in is selective attention which is object-dependent. On this point, Campbell (1997) is right to say that the notion of selective attention is what characterizes the
sense of a perceptual demonstrative. (see ibid.: 60) However, a problem with Campbell’s view here concerns his basic assumption that the two realms of objectivity/subjectivity or detachment/attachment or world/thought require a mediation (or explanation) for bridging them together. For Campbell, as thought can be said to represent the world in two forms: linguistic representation (or content) and mental representation (or content), the question is about what links both representations together. The answer will be what provides the mediation between thought and world. Campbell suggests that perceptual attention provides such a link, and thereby is what mediates thought with the world.

Campbell’s view on this point is important because it leads to an important issue about object-dependence. Briefly, Campbell (1984-5) thinks that the object-dependence idea can be accounted for in the sense of existence-dependence. An upshot of his idea that is relevant to my point is that he denies any pragmatic implications in accounting for content. I will argue with his view after showing a connection between the role of perceptual attention and the object-dependence idea. So I look at Campbell’s view on this point in order to show that the notion of selective attention cannot be considered independently from the idea of object-dependence.

According to Campbell, two sorts of content, i.e. propositional content and imagistic content are linked by selective attention. The difference between these contents is this. While the former requires an object for a proposition to have content, that is, a proposition requires a semantic value which is provided by the object of reference, the latter sort of content or imagistic content requires perceptual experiences and mental imagery, which might be said to provide a practical value. For Campbell, selective attention, i.e. “selection of information for further processing” (1997a: 57) provides the link in the sense that for a proposition to have a
content, it requires a selection of information from perceptual experiences.

The notion of attention which Campbell considers is a phenomenological notion. That is to say, for such a notion to provide an idea of object, it has to be derived from an argument concerning empirical perceptual experiences rather than from an a priori argument, e.g. in Evans' view. Evans' argument is a priori for Campbell because Evans' account of demonstrative thoughts is based on propositional knowledge, rather than empirical knowledge. Campbell argues that the notion of attention deriving from propositional knowledge is a notion which is prior to perceptual experiences, so it cannot explain why perceptual attention links thought to the world. Evans' account of perceptual demonstratives is based on the idea that demonstrative reference can be generated from a fundamental idea of an object. (see Evans 1982, section 4.4) The fundamental idea of object is the idea that an object is identified by a distinguishing knowledge from other objects of a same sort. (δ is F.) For example, a spatial object is distinguished from others by its location at a time. For Evans, such identification is objective in the sense that it does not require a point of view. Campbell takes this to mean that such identification is not a demonstrative identification. What provides demonstrative identification, for Evans, is a non-fundamental idea of reference, namely, our egocentric location of the object is identical with the fundamental idea of the object. (this man=δ where δ is a fundamental idea of object)

According to Campbell, this means that, in Evans’s view, demonstrative reference is derived from a non-empirical idea. An unsatisfied upshot is that spatial attention turns to be the only basic form of attention, because objects cannot be thought of independently from
their location. This overlooks the fact that if the notion of perceptual attention is considered on empirical ground, other modalities of attention besides spatial attention are possible, e.g. auditory attention, and thereby object-identification does not necessarily require spatial identification. For Campbell, the reason why spatial attention is thought to be the basic form of attention is because we think about content only of one sort, namely, propositional content. This ignores the other sort of content, imagistic content, which, for Campbell, requires an explanation of how it is connected with propositional content. Once we get the explanation, we will be able to see how thought and the world are connected. The answer for him is that the notion of attention needs to be thought of from the phenomenological level. What he means by this is that: identification of an object is possible on empirical grounds because an object has an objective causal structure which is closely related to the notion of time — "the causal principle of unity of the thing, the way in which the condition of the thing at one time depends on its conditions that at earlier times." (1997a: 63) The phenomenology of objects shows that in referring to an object demonstratively, spatial attention alone is not sufficient, because what is central to singular reference is its causal structure. So, the notion of selective attention that is central to demonstrative identification involves the notion of the causal structure of objects. In grasping such a structure, two sides of content are involved; in other words, there are two sorts of grasp of causal structure: a practical grasp of causal structure and the theoretical grasp of causation. The former is shown in the way we act on an object. The latter provides an explicit causal explanation which employs propositional knowledge (i.e. subject-predicate structure and deductive reasoning), and thereby provides propositional content. For Campbell, propositional reasoning and action on objects are hence two aspects of a notion of selective attention.
A question that will be addressed in the following section is whether Campbell’s notion of attention provides an idea of object that is under our rational attention. That is because it seems that his notion of attention turns to be merely a schematic notion (i.e. the grasp of an object’s causal structure) that does not point to an object in the tactile sense. A reason behind this may be due to the picture that in Campbell’s view, propositional knowledge is merely an aspect of content, while he takes this as contra to Evans’ view that takes such knowledge to be the constraint of content. A problem with Campbell’s view concerning this point may be stated again that he is taking propositional content in the sense of a structure of linguistic symbol rather than language as use. This means that propositional content for him is assumed to be content that is separated from mental content. Language as symbol does not have content because content is possible only when the language is used. That is because the rationalisation of language use requires an account of a speaker’s psychology. Language in use hence has content in the sense that it involves mental content. This can be said to be the idea of Evans’s notion of fundamental /non-fundamental idea of object. It shows that thought is structured in the way which its objective norms are intrinsic to thought, i.e. the object which is independent to thought cannot be characterized independently. Accordingly, Campbell’s criticism that Evans’ notion of attention is not based on an empirical ground does not seem to be right. What underlines the problem mentioned here might be this. If demonstrative thoughts are the sort of thought which provide the idea that objectivity can be intrinsic to thought which is egocentric in nature, then what needs to be clarified is how the objectivity of objects is related to the egocentricity of thought. This point is the key to the notion of object-dependence the discussion of which may help making my point against Campbell’s view. I turn to this issue below.
2.2. Object-Dependence

As I have already discussed in the previous chapter, the idea of object-dependence is Russellian, namely, the possibility of the content of thought depends on the existence of an object. However, in order that the object be grasped as something independent of our will, it requires the Fregean rational space of objects, namely, the rationality principle that allows different thoughts about an object to be possible. This allows for the egocentric perspective of thought. An account of objects, which connects with language, is the Fregean idea of object. That is to say, an object is the condition of assigning a semantic value to a sentence, i.e. an argument that completes the function of a sentence. But these are objects grasped under modes of presentation or objects of thought which we have concepts about, that is, the mode of presentation of an object is its sense. The content of a sentence is its thought which has senses as constituents. So a thought derives its content from an object under a mode of presentation. That notion of object is, as McDowell (1984) puts it, characterized as having *de re* sense, i.e. an object fixed by sense based on our perceptual experiences. Perception plays a crucial role in accounting for the modes of presentation of an object because it is what shows that the object, which can be grasped in different ways, exists independently of our perceptual experiences. Otherwise Russell’s Principle will not work, that is, if there is no object, then there is no content. So it is the object which exists for perception which provides content of thought.

The central issue of the object-dependence idea is the account of how objectivity can be characterized from our egocentric point of view. For Campbell, the idea of an object is a condition of possessing the idea of the objective world --the objective spatio-temporal order. An object is characterized in terms of its causal connectedness in time rather than in terms of its position in a spatial array as presented in acquaintance.
Campbell (1984-5:168-9) hence takes Evans’s idea of a recognition-based idea of object, i.e. the identification of object based on memories and time, as the fundamental idea. The recognition-based idea of object is different from a demonstrative idea of object in the way that the latter requires a point of view, but the former is related to the objective temporal structure. In particular, the recognition-based idea is existence-dependent in the sense that the existence of the object is a condition of the idea of an objective world. However, the notion of object involves also the notion of the self. That is because to possess the idea of the objective world is also to be able to recognise oneself as a part of the objective spatio-temporal structure. So, existence-dependence is different from object-dependence in the following way: while the former is characteristic of the recognition mode of identification which does not require the object characterized in terms of demonstrative acquaintance, the latter is characteristic of the demonstrative mode of identification the object of which exists as being acquainted in time for the subject. However, for Campbell, the idea of object-dependence can be said to be existence-dependent, namely, a demonstrative idea of an object also involves the recognition-based idea. This means that demonstrative identification of an object is existence-dependent only in so far as the object provides normativity or semantic value for a sentence, and that “requires possession of the idea of oneself as in an objective temporal order.” (ibid.:169) So the existence of the recognized object is required for the normativity to be applied.

However, it is suspicious whether Campbell’s idea of an object is sufficient for rationalising actions because of his attempt to avoid the pragmatic aspect of object-identification. This can be seen from his criticism of Peacocke’s view. (Peacocke 1983) For Peacocke, the idea of existence-dependence for intentions is the idea that “…in explaining why
X acts upon a particular object, one must appeal to an intention which relates X to that object; which X could not have had did that object not exist.” (ibid.:167). Campbell thinks that Peacocke’s idea of existence-dependence does not require objects that actually exist because what Peacocke is interested in is explanation of actions rather than thoughts. But, for Campbell, the idea of object is crucial not only because it provides an explanation for actions, but also because it provides the normativity for having thoughts. This means that the existence of objects is a basic requirement for the understanding of the idea of the objective world, rather than for explanation of actions alone. However, the problem with Campbell’s view is this: as his idea of object-dependence is defined as a causal relation of temporal order rather than the object of which we have perceptual experiences and which explains our actions toward things, his idea of object, it can be said, is not tactile enough to rationalise the way people behave toward the world. The issue why Campbell ignores this point is mainly because he tries to avoid the pragmatic view of content: he tries to avoid a one-sided aspect of content.

However, there is a common aspect between Campbell’s view and Peacocke’s view, namely, they both seem to share a two-level account of demonstrative content (TL). Such an account holds that content can be characterized independently from two levels: the non-conceptual level of information link between a subject of thought with an object, and the conceptual application to the information link. That is to say, both Campbell and Peacocke account for content in a way in which the existence of the object can be independently characterizable from the engagement. What drives their ideas toward TL account concerns different worries. What concerns Peacocke is the account of sensational experiences which do not have content; Campbell’s concern is about the practical value of engagement with objects. According to Peacocke’s
two-level account, the information link where an object provides
demonstrative content is separated from the conceptual link where a
subject's cognitive abilities pick up the object and provide an idea of
(type) demonstrative mode of presentation. The problem concerning his
idea is the problem that thoughts are treated monolithically, in which
experiences of the same type cannot be differentiated by a token object.
With regard to Campbell's two-level account, as mentioned above, the
objectivity of objects is separated from engagement with the object. But
this can be meant, in a sense, that objectivity is 'extrinsic' to the
engagement. It leads to the problem that the account of the objectivity of
objects is not in reach of the rational attention of the subject. Put another
way, Peacocke's and Campbell's two-level account of content faces a
problem concerning the two constraints of an account of content, that is
to say, the former faces a problem about the objectivity constraint and the
latter faces a problem about the rationality constraint. I will discuss
Campbell after considering Peacocke's two-level account.

2.2.1. Object-Engagement and the Objectivity Constraint

An object-engagement-- demonstrative mode of presentation of an
object-- involves an idea of an object being known through a perceptual
acquaintance the content of which is a demonstrative content. An account
of a demonstrative content requires an account of in what sense the
perceptual engagement with an object which is egocentric locates the
object in an objective frame of reference. Such an account is important
because the object in its objective location provides the objectivity
constraint on demonstrative content. It is also an account of what it is for
the rationality constraint to meet the objectivity constraint. Such an
account is possible in two senses:

1. object-engagement involves a direct acquaintance with the
object being located egocentrically in its objective location which is co-
ordinated with the egocentric location; and
2. object-engagement requires the conceptual abilities of a subject to co-ordinate the egocentric location with the object in the objective location.

The first account (McDowell 1990) is based on what I called one-level account of content. This is an account which takes the objectivity of content as that which is directly grasped within a demonstrative mode of presentation; in other words, the objective location of an object cannot be characterized independently from its egocentric location. The latter (Peacocke 1983, 1991) is based on what I called two-level account of content. However, Peacocke has called his account an evidential approach which involves a 'constitutive role' of demonstrative mode of presentations. (1983:109) But, as I will argue, the evidential approach is a two-level account. That is to say, the egocentric space and the objective space can be characterized independently, the connection of which is the subject’s cognitive abilities to co-ordinate them in thought.

In the following, I suggest that object-engagement which provides demonstrative content requires a one-level account of content but two stages, that is, the object is actually located in an egocentric space and thereby the objective space; however, the same type of the egocentric location can be distinguished in thought. I first consider the main problem concerning the two-level account. Briefly, the problem is that once egocentric space and objective space are characterized independently, to reconnect them with the subject’s conceptual abilities begs the question of the application of concepts to things. The upshot is that the account of object-engagement is monolithic or free-floating: the object, which is the source of content, does not provide a normative constraint on thought, so that the egocentric engagement with the object does not provide content.
In other words, the monolithic account can accommodate only a descriptive thought which is object-independent, rather than a demonstrative thought which is object-dependent.

Peacocke (1983) calls his account of demonstrative thought an evidential approach, namely, the approach that a demonstrative mode of presentation (mp.) (token) is a constitutive role of a demonstrative type. The evidence is each type of demonstrative mp., ‘which disposes a thinker to judge thoughts containing constituents of that type.’ (ibid.:110) A demonstrative mp. is a token indexed to each particular object. For example, ‘I’, which is indexed to each subject who addresses such term, e.g. Peter, Paul, is a token demonstrative mp.. Its demonstrative type is [self Peter]. (ibid.:108) An example concerning another sort of object may be this. When we perceive an apple, its demonstrative mp. is ‘this’ or ‘that’ apple; its demonstrative type is [this apple]. So there is only one type of demonstrative mp. which accounts for a demonstrative identification. In other words, a type of demonstrative mp. is constitutive of a token mp.. The evidence or the constitutive role of a demonstrative mp. is the type demonstrative mp., which is meant to be the conceptual ability. This can be seen from his account of such a notion that the constitutive role is composed of three elements-- a sortal concept (or what fixes the temporal and spatial condition of the object when a subject has a demonstrative thought), the role of a psychological state of a thinker and some causal relation between them. It is this notion which enables us to understand why one can change a judgement concerning an object. For example, when one sees a bowl from a corner of a room, and has a judgement, “That bowl is made in China.”; and if one walks closer to the bowl, and looks at the print on the bottom of the bowl, he may revise the judgement into, “This bowl is made in Japan.” The revision of the judgement requires not only the perceptual experience of the object (token bowl: this ‘bowl’,
that ‘bowl’), but also the constitutive role of a demonstrative type, namely, the sortal bowl [this bowl]. (see ibid.:110)

Accordingly, it is obvious that Peacocke’s account of demonstrative thought appears to be two-level account of content. That is to say, the demonstrative identification is composed of two levels: the non-conceptual level of the link between subject and object (the level where we get the token mode of presentation) and the level which requires the subject’s epistemic or conceptual ability to identify the first level (the level where we get the type mode of presentation). That is the reason why Peacocke (1991) had made it explicit that, for him, Evans’s view on demonstrative identification does not involve only the actuality of place, but also “an idea of “some epistemic position (the subject) could get into” (Evans1982: 258)”. (1991: 125) The actuality of the place or information-link, for him, provides the thinker the ability to locate the object. (ibid.: 124) Such an ability is the conceptual ability which Peacocke (1983) calls a sort of evidence; and in his revision idea, he calls it a possession condition of concept (1991: 131). 12

An example, which Peacocke raises, is the case of a tree seen at a distance through a haze. Although the haze causes the incorrect egocentric location of the tree, the information link still provides the subject with information about the objective location of the tree. What provides the co-ordination of the egocentric and the objective location is the subject’s conceptual abilities to keep track of the object. In this case, the subject is keeping track of the tree by moving from one position in which the tree is incorrectly placed to another position in which he can place it in the objective location. For Peacocke, it is the conceptual ability to keep track of the object which is the evidence providing demonstrative thoughts.
Peacocke (ibid.) defends such an account of demonstrative identification because if demonstrative identification does not require the conceptual ability to organise the information in the perceptual acquaintance, then there will be a problem that perceptual acquaintance cannot provide a demonstrative content. The conceptual ability allows us to differentiate between the egocentric and objective identification of places. According to his debate with McDowell (1990), he argues that McDowell’s view is counterintuitive. McDowell’s view is this: the object of perceptual acquaintance is presented as in an objective location in the sense that the egocentric location of the object cannot be characterized independently from its objective location. That is because perceptual acquaintance directly involves the conceptually structured information link. So, having a demonstrative thought depends on the condition of having an actual placing of the object. Peacocke takes this to mean that, in McDowell’s view, what provides demonstrative content is the actual co-ordinate point or a correct co-ordination of the egocentric and objective location, but Peacocke thinks that if so, then perceptual acquaintance cannot be a demonstrative identification. This can be seen from the following two cases.

First, suppose that unknown to the subject, due to the heat haze, the tree actually locates at a position $p_1$, but his egocentric location of the tree is at $p_2$. If, following McDowell, having a demonstrative thought depends on the correct co-ordination of the egocentric and the objective location, then it means that the subject cannot be having a demonstrative thought, “That tree is there.” at $p_1$ because there is no co-ordination of such location at $p_1$; in other words, the tree at $p_1$ is not the actual location for the subject. But that is counterintuitive. So, for Peacocke, what provides a demonstrative thought is not that the tree is actually or objectively located at $p_1$, rather it is the subject’s cognitive abilities to
keep track of the object by moving toward the object that provides a demonstrative thought.

Second, suppose a bird is seen near the tree at time \( t_1 \); and still there at time \( t_2 \). The subject has a demonstrative thought of “That bird is there.” at \( t_1 \) because she gets the correct location of the bird at \( t_2 \). But suppose that it flies away at \( t_2 \). If, following McDowell, having a demonstrative thought depends on the correct location at \( t_2 \), then this means that the subject cannot be having a demonstrative thought at \( t_1 \). So, for Peacocke, it is not the correct placing of the object which provides a demonstrative thought, rather it is the ability to keep track of the object from \( t_1 \) to \( t_2 \) that provides one with a demonstrative thought.

However, although Peacocke’s account of demonstrative thoughts is object-dependent, namely, the object provides the source of content, it turns out that what provides demonstrative thoughts is the conceptual abilities of a subject. This makes it sounds as if the actual object is not required in accounting for content. Actually, that is the problem with Peacocke’s view— the upshot of his two-level account of content is that content is not delivered from the object-engagement, rather from the conceptual mediation between an object and a subject. McDowell’s one-level account does not have that problem because perceptual acquaintance involves the conceptually structured information link. His account of content does not face the problem as the above two cases that Peacocke raises. For McDowell, the object is conceptually linked with its mode of presentation. So there is a coordination of the egocentric location with the objective location in the tree case even though in a heat haze. That is to say, the subject can still correctly locate the tree even at \( p_2 \). The reason why it is correct is because there is the object, the tree, in this case, which makes the subject’s egocentric location possible. The coordination is
cashed only when the tree is not there at \( p1 \). So this case is not a problem for McDowell, rather it is the problem for Peacocke. That is because Peacocke takes the two spaces— the egocentric and the objective—as two sorts of space, so that he requires an account of how these two spaces are connected, namely, the cognitive abilities to keep track of the object. For McDowell, if the egocentric and objective locations are two ways of locating in one space, they are not two spaces needing to be co-ordinated.

It follows that Peacocke’s view implies that if there is no object in the scene, then the subject can still be able to have a demonstrative thought because the subject does not loss his cognitive abilities to locate the object.

The second case might be responded in this way that: for the one-level account, even though the bird flies away at \( t2 \), demonstrative identification of the bird is still possible because demonstrative thought is dynamic thought. The one-level account does not require the ability of keeping track of the object as an additional factor for the identification because such an ability is a characteristic of dynamic thought. This means that continuity of thought relating to the object is what provides content, rather than a snap shot of different moments of acquaintance as Peacocke thinks. The reason why Peacocke thinks that the second case is the problem for McDowell is that Peacocke assumes the notion of acquaintance in the Russell’s specific sense \(^{14} \), namely, perceptual acquaintance does not last long enough because its object is its sense data which is not independent from the sense, so that it cannot be said to provide demonstrative content. But for the one-level account, the notion of perceptual acquaintance which provides content needs to be the Russellian notion, namely, the notion of acquaintance requires an object. So the dynamic thought is possible because there is an object for the thought to keep track of.
It is right that McDowell argues that Peacocke's notion of evidence does not help us see how the general ability satisfies the know-which requirement. (1990: 263-4) Although Peacocke's notion of evidence is supposed to do a similar function as Evans's Generality Constraint or the conceptual constraint which Evans employs in order to show that the information-link is not sufficient, for McDowell, Peacocke's notion of evidence does not do what it is supposed to do. Evans's Generality Constraint is introduced only to ensure that the information-link satisfies the know-which requirement, that is, without objects, perceptual experiences cannot provide content. The implication of this is that different objects are what differentiate perceptual experiences which seem to be the same. This is the point why Evans's account is a two-stage approach, namely, content is conceptually structured in a way that there is a distinction between the information-link and the Generality Constraint. By contrast, Peacocke's notion of evidence is monolithic, the problem of which is the implication of a strong form of Cartesianism. That is to say, the monolithic approach "deals once and for all with all its possible occurrences" (ibid.: 265) In other words, it deals with all cases indistinguishably and hence cannot provide the idea of which particular object a subject has thought about. As such an approach is not sensitive to each particular and perception in actual cases, it cannot offer an account of how demonstrative content is possible. On Peacocke's account, demonstrative thought turns out to be free-floating because the object which is supposed to be the source of content is left out as it is characterized independently from our conceptual structure.

Peacocke's two-level account may be defended on the basis that perceptual acquaintance does not always have a representational content. Peacocke claims that the case in which the circumstance is so obvious that a perceptual demonstrative can settle the truth-value of the predication is
not the case which needs an explanation. That is because such a case involves a perceptual concept in delivering content in perception. So he thinks that his theory is better because it can “distinguish an experience with a spatial representational content from a conscious state which in fact roughly covaries with spatial facts, but does not represent them”.

(1991:130) What worries Peacocke seems to be the problem concerning non-veridical experiences, so that what is important is the search for a theory which can account for such experiences. However, his theory presupposes a split between perceptual experiences as the given and the application of the conceptual conscious state of a subject for organising the content. So the main problem is that it leads to the regress of how a concept is applied to things. But that problem will not be the problem for the one-level account because on such an account, concepts are applied to things directly. The veridical and the non-veridical experiences can be distinguished in thought because thoughts are object-dependent. The rationality constraint allows that it is rationally possible for a subject not to know that his perceptual experience is illusory. If that is so, the upshot is only that he neither knows which object he has thought about, nor knows which thought he has. (see McDowell 1990: 258 note7and Evans 1982: 173)

The main problem with Peacocke’s account of content concerns the question of how thoughts get their aboutness or content. Once the engagement with the object is accounted for in such a way that it requires the conceptual mediator to bring in the aboutness, the engagement in question turns out to be the engagement with the conceptual abilities of a subject through the information link. But that does not provide the idea of demonstrative content which is derived from engagement with an object directly. The sort of content which the two-level account provides appears to share a descriptive content the account of which turns out to
be object-independent.

In the following, I look at another sort of two-level account of content, that is, Campbell's view. The problem with this concerns the rationality constraint. The main issue is about how objectivity of objects involves an engagement which meets the rationality constraint. This means that the idea of object has to be within reach for rationalising human actions toward things. So I turn to the point on which I have criticised Campbell’s idea of object above, that his idea of object does not seem to be tactile enough because of his avoidance of the pragmatic force in accounting for content. Moreover, Campbell’s and Brewer’s debate on this issue provides some clues of what should be a plausible idea of object-engagement, and thereby, the notion of practice that I propose.

2.3. Objectivity of objects and the Rationality Constraint

Demonstrative identification of an object requires not only the information-link between subject and object, but also the conceptual element which is accounted for in terms of the Generality Constraint. Although both the information-link and the conceptual element cannot be independently characterized, the former provides the idea that the object is independent from our will, while the latter ensures that thought about the object relates to our point of view. The issue about space and time concerns the former characteristic of demonstrative identification. It is to account for the fundamental concept of an object which provides an objective conception of an object. That is to say, object-identification which involves perception and provides content requires an object which can be located under the spatio-temporal structure. (see Strawson1959: 20) One problem concerns how an identification of object, space and time are connected. Object-identification may require the spatial and temporal frame of reference. However, space and time may not be necessarily
identified by objects. They can be characterized as a non-relative frame of reference. That is to say, space and time can be accounted for without relating to other frames of reference, e.g. object-identification. Such an account belongs to the two-level account, as already mentioned, which seems to be a characteristic of Campbell’s view, namely, the objectivity of objects can be accounted for in terms of a non-engaged frame of reference.

In the following, I consider in particular the views of Campbell (1994, 1996) and Brewer (1999). Briefly, Campbell’s view is that the objectivity of objects is possible only if there is a non-engaged or detached way of understanding objects. The reason for this is the fact that there is an asymmetry between place-identification in which object-identification is not always required and temporal identification which always requires an object. This phenomenon provides the idea that an object can be characterized in terms of a causal relation which is not necessarily an engaged activity. In contrast, according to Brewer’s view, object-identification is crucial in both place and time identification. That is because, for him, perception is what provides content and relates with action. So the objectivity of objects can be provided within the framework of egocentric perceptual understanding and action. In that sense, Brewer also endorses a notion of practice as playing a central role in perception. However, I will discuss the issue of action involving the notion of the self in the next chapter.

In this section, I argue that although the notion of the objectivity of objects in demonstrative thoughts requires the idea of object-engagement, this idea is not necessarily characterized as a pragmatic account of content, namely, the account that content and its objectivity can be given in terms of action or pragmatic value instead of object or
truth value. Rather it is the notion of truth-value the account of which involves the egocentric grasp of the object, or what I have called the rational value of thought. The rational value does not rule out the possibility of the pragmatic implication in the sense that the reason why rationalising action is important is because it is what captures the rationality constraint. However, the rationality constraint is not possible without the objectivity constraint. This means that even though the account of content turns out to have a pragmatic implication, it does not undermine the idea that the object which is the source of content is mind-independent, and thereby that makes the egocentricity of object-engagement possible.

2.3.1. Campbell’s Notion of Object

As I have discussed Campbell’s idea of selective attention (2.1) there are two main reasons why, for him, the basic modality of selective attention is not necessarily visual attention: first, attention in other modalities is possible, and they do not require object-identification, e.g. auditory attention; second, it is only because we are worried about the semantic value of a sentence, that we tend to think that the only form of selective attention is visual attention. Visual attention involves space the identification of which is usually taken as involving object-identification. However, for Campbell, spatial-identification does not necessarily require object-identification because he thinks that the notion of object can be characterized in terms of a causal connectedness rather than as an entity which is identifiably related to its location.

Campbell’s first reason does not seem right because even though we can attend to things around us such as listening to a noise without thinking about it in terms of an object-identification, the source of the noise is still object-dependent. However, with regards to the second
reason, for Campbell, the concern with the semantic value is merely an aspect of object-identification, apart from its pragmatic value. That is to say, the semantic value is the object which provides norms for an application of a concept which in turns requires the self-consciousness of a subject in placing herself as an object in an objective framework. (see Campbell1984-5) But his notion of object is essentially characterized in a way which is not the object in a tactile sense. That is to say, his notion of an object is not characterized in terms of a rational engagement of a subject with the object which involves both semantic value and practical value. Rather it is characterized in terms of causal relations, so that they are sufficiently detached for being a normative criterion of having thought. The causal relations, for Campbell, provide the way of thinking of the objectivity of objects, which involves a narrative self-consciousness — which accounts for how concepts apply to things, in a sense, descriptively.

But that does not seem to be the notion of object which is within the compass of our rational attention. The problem is that his notion of an object does not satisfy the rationality constraint on content, the constraint which cannot be independently characterized from the objectivity constraint. This means that in order to reach the rationality constraint, the notion of object needs to be tactile enough for rationalising human action. In the following, I discuss Campbell’s notion of object, and then provide a criticism of his view by referring to Brewer and Evans’s view.

According to Campbell, the notion of object in ordinary thought is defined as having two causal structural characteristics, that is, an internal causal connectedness and common causes. An object is characterized in terms of its causal properties: the former is the internal relation of causalities within an object, that is, the dependence of what happens after on what happens earlier; and the latter or the common cause is the external relation of causalities among objects. Both characteristics of
objects are related to the spatio-temporal structure in the following sense.

On the one hand, the internal causal connectedness of objects is defined over time. It is what helps identify whether the object of perception is the same one as perceived earlier. The internal causalities enable the tracking of an object by temporal identification. On the other hand, objects can function as common causes of correlated phenomena. (see 1994:4) Objects as the common cause provide informative identity, i.e. if the same object causes different knowledge or observations, then the thought we have about the object can be informative. Knowledge about informative identity of objects helps providing place-identification. But this does not mean that place-identification depends on object-identification. For Campbell, the characteristic of objects as the common cause is different from that of the internal connectedness of the object's causal structure in that the latter enables an identification of an object. The reason is this. The condition, which enables the spatial relation of objects, is the common cause reasoning. But the common cause reasoning works only if there is a common cause of observations, that is, the object which is the common cause of identity judgements. However, the object of observations may appear to be indistinguishable; what individuates an object is hence its own causal structure, that is, the temporal connectedness of the object.

The significance of causal structure as what identifies an object can be seen from the case in which knowledge of an informative identity does not involve the common cause knowledge. That is the case in which one can know an informative identity by tracing the spatio-temporal continuity of objects of the same type at various times. For example, to know that the Morning Star is the Evening Star by finding that there is a continuity of the planets' light over different times. (see 1996: 5) The informative identity of an object in this sense cannot be said to derive
from place-identification because knowledge of the place in this case is changing at various times in the process of finding where the object is. What provides the knowledge of informative identity of this sort is the causal structure of the object or the temporal identification of the object.

However, the object itself as the common cause is not necessarily identified by place-identification, although, in general, knowledge of place can be identified by objects. For Campbell, a capacity for identifying a place is more primitive than a capacity of identifying an object. That is to say, object-identification does not depend on place-identification, and place-identification does not depend on re-identification of objects. On this point, he disagrees with Strawson’s idea (1959) whose view is that place-identification requires object-re-identification. That is because, for Campbell, places can be identified by action or the engaging way of thinking about space, which can be an actual behaviour or a potential one.

Campbell argues for two reasons: first, places may be identified by their spatial relations to some features in the environment. This is the case which Campbell calls the ‘feature-placing’ level of thought, that is, a place can be defined in terms of features instead of physical objects. For example, an animal may identify a place from colours and shape, e.g. red square at \((d, \alpha)\). Or that it is possible that we identify a place by using landmarks which are not necessarily physical objects, e.g. a pool of light from a projector. Second, places may be identified by the subject’s (animal) behavioural relation to its target; in other words, places can be defined by unconscious action or behaviour toward environment. For example, a rat may find its way out from a maze by following its own movement in different directions. (see 1996: 9) That is to say, in keeping track of its own movement, thereby a place, it does not need to think about itself consciously as a physical object because what provides the
idea of a place does not need to be an object. (ibid.: 10)

However, for Campbell, in order to understand the engagement or action, there must be a constraint that provides the objectivity of thought which is a non-engaged, detached or a conscious way of thinking, i.e. the temporal identification. It is a constraint on having thought because it provides the idea of object-identification which is independent from our will or from how we act towards objects. The temporal identification is characterized by the phenomenon of perceptual attention which is a central characteristic of demonstrative thought. (see also 1997: 667) Attention continues or extends over time and is indexed to an object. But a selective attention, for Campbell, is not an engaged activity toward the object (see section 2.1) because attention is a self-conscious phenomenon, while an engaged activity is non-conscious. As attention is always selective, it is conceptually structured. The conceptual structure of attention is the causal structure in which the subject is self-consciously taking himself as an object in the environment, so that he can expect what is going to happen next from what had happened earlier. For Campbell, the reason why the engaged activity is non-conceptual or unconscious is because perception and action provide merely current interactions, while the non-engaged or conscious way of thinking ‘relates to one’s past interactions with one’s surroundings’ (1996: 19). So, in order to understand what an engagement is, there needs to be a non-engaged phenomenon, namely, the conscious ability to identify oneself as an object, which involves temporal identification. 

Having said that, Campbell takes the notion of self as a sort of object which has causal properties as well as other objects. Self is accounted for in terms of the notion of person. So parallel to what he thinks about the notion of an object, a person has two causal properties:
the internal causal connectedness and the common cause. Identity of person is defined by sameness of self over time, that is, the internal causal connectedness of self. The common cause defines the engagement of the self with environment or place. The engagement of the self needs a constraint-- the non-engaged way of thinking about the self. That is the temporal structure of the self, which makes content of thought about the self possible. In brief, for Campbell, the internal causal structure provides the non-engaged self-consciousness, which constrains the engagement or the common cause. But such a notion of self means that the objectivity of objects is still retained even though there is no engagement.

The reason why Campbell is reluctant to account for the objectivity of objects as what is immanent in engagement is that he is worried about the pragmatic view which accounts for engagement as what provides a practical value, rather than truth-values. (see ibid.) For him, in order to understand the possibility of engagement, we need the 'disengaged' way of thinking about objects, which is not necessarily characterized in terms of engagement. So an independent normative criterion is required, that is, the temporal frame of reference. But in order to gain that notion of objective temporal structure, Campbell seems to presuppose the idea that there is a reality of the past which is independently characterized from our egocentric way of thinking. In other words, as the level of conceptual structure is what provides objectivity, Campbell seems to leave the non-conceptual level as the level of an engagement in behaviour, not in thought. That is because an engagement has to be an engagement with objects. Once there is no object for a spatial thought to be engaged with, then there is no engagement in spatial thought. The problem is that this is characteristic of the two-level account of content in the way that the non-conceptual level (spatial thought) is separated from the conceptual level (temporal thought), although it seems
that both are not independently characterizable because they are both characteristics of an object. However, the problem is that such an account of objects does not turn out to be a notion of objects with which we are engaged and by which content is provided. That is to say, object-engagement requires the rationality constraint. In the following, I show, in particular, that Campbell’s notion of object does not meet the rationality constraint.

2.3.2. Can Objectivity be in the Engagement?

In order to show that Campbell’s notion of ‘object’ is not what is within reach of our rational attention, I rely on two following arguments. First, once object-identification and object-engagement are shown to be possible in both spatial and temporal identification, there is no need to appeal to the non-engaged way of thinking of objectivity. Second, if that is so, then it means that the spatio and temporal structure of an object can be accounted for in an objective frame of reference, which cannot be characterized independently from the engagement with an object. However, although Campbell’s account of objects is provided in an objective frame of reference, that is, self-consciousness as a detached way of thinking, it is not the notion of object the identification of which can rationalise a subject’s behaviour toward the object. So, the notion of object has to be defined in terms of its causal relations which involves its rational structure in a way which the object provides a rationalisation of a subject’s behaviour.

Saying that we need a rational structure of an object which rationalises human behaviour can be accounted for in Brewer’s sense, that is, the object as a causal structure has to provide reasons for actions. The first argument can be illustrated following Brewer’s argument which is based on that idea. According to Brewer (1995), content is not provided
by action because action itself does not provide reasons for belief about objects. Action as a blind behaviour does not constitute understanding or a source of knowledge. What provide the source of knowledge or content are rather perceptual experiences and their objects with respect to the egocentric perspective structure. (Brewer 1999:212) Brewer (1996) hence takes object-identification as what is necessary in both spatial and temporal identification. That is because what provides content is perceptual experience under the spatio-temporal structure. Both spatial and temporal identification involve an engaged behaviour. However, for Brewer, perceptual experience is prior to actions because what provides content is perception, not actions. I elaborate Brewer’s argument against Campbell below.

Brewer’s argument against Campbell is this. He argues that although Campbell’s distinction between a detached and a practical grasp of causal relations is a distinction based on the egocentric grasp of spatial representation, rather than a distinction based on the nature of the spatial representation itself, such a distinction cannot provide the detached objectivity that Campbell wants, that is, the notion of an object under a reflective temporal frame of reference. That is because, on egocentric sensitivity to a place, it is possible for a subject to have both a reflective thought and practical grasp of the causal relations of the place to other places. For example, a representation of a place I have now and where I am in it can be the representation which is the basis for reflective thought about the spatial relation which other objects can have related to my place, e.g. about the people who will take different routes to my place, which way will be shorter or longer. However, this representation does not rule out the possibility that I can use it to do something toward the place, like finding my way out of the place when there is no light. (ibid.:23-4) The point is that, for Brewer, it does not seem to be a
theoretical necessity that a spatial representation has to be non-reflective and practical, rather it can be reflective and practical. Once the egocentric frame of reference of spatial representation can be both reflective and practical, then the objective frame of reference cannot be fully characterized as being a reflective, non-practical objectivity.

This means that the asymmetry of the spatial and temporal identification does not seem to be true. Brewer employs the same strategy to show further that in identifying a place, it is possible that its identification depends on an object; and that in temporal identification, it is possible to have a practical grasp of object. For example, it is possible to think about space by thinking about an object relating to place, e.g. an animal may think of a place as “where a particular youngster is waiting to be fed.” (ibid.:34). In parallel, it is not necessary that temporal identification does not require an engagement, because time can be identified by engagement in terms of some unreflective activities. An animal’s behaviour may rely on duration between some events in their lives. For example, the adult males monkey of a certain type will go off hunting at some fixed duration after the first birth in a new spring. (ibid.:32).

If it is right that object-identification is necessary in both place and time, then the notion of objectivity as a non-engaged way of thinking is not attainable. However, Brewer’s objections are based on empirical possibilities, while Campbell’s notion of object is constructed on a logical basis, i.e. a causal structure of object. But if Brewer’s objections show that Campbell’s notion of object is not a logical notion, the implication is that the account of the notion of object requires an account which involves perceptual experiences. This means that it involves perceptual engagement in thought as well as in action. The notion of an engagement
involves an egocentric way of thinking about an object in the sense that perception and actions are connected. The necessity of object-identification in place and time shows that perception as an egocentric relation with an object plays a crucial role in rationalising action.

One way to see that point is to argue, as Brewer (1995) did, that perception and inferences or deductive reasoning are cognitive capacities which provide sources of knowledge for a subject. These cognitive capacities provide reasons for action in the sense that the action causally depends on the reason in virtue of its rationalising an action. This means that mental causation or the cognitive capacities have both aspects of causation and rationalisation. An account of perceptual belief, which is causal and rational, needs to be given in terms of the perspectival, egocentric spatial content of perceptual experience. This egocentric relation is significant not in terms of theoretical or explicit knowledge whose inferential rules just run by themselves and thereby leads to regress of interpretation; but rather in terms of consequences for action and perception of objects. The egocentric relation enables the perceiver to locate objects as they are relative to her understanding. However, as Brewer said, the term ‘perception’ can be taken not only in a literal sense of the perceptual experience, but also in a sense of a perceptual metaphor, namely, perception is understanding. That is because in order to account for causation in terms of rationalisation, “it is a matter of seeing why one is right in doing as one does” (ibid.:247). So one needs to know reasons for action. The idea of the subjective point of view provides the egocentric content that connects object, perception and inferences with consciousness.

Hence, consciousness as a reflective way of thinking cannot be taken to be a non-engaged way of thinking, rather consciousness is the
egocentric relation of the subject's perceptual experience and an object which has consequences for action. Engagement does not mean action in the sense of causally consequential behaviour of the perspectival way of thinking. An account of actions requires the egocentric perception of a subject toward an object. Otherwise, we cannot see how the objectivity of content involves the self-consciousness or the egocentric view which provides an objectivity of objects as mind-independent. This can be put as Brewer said that “objective knowledge is possible from within the subjective perspective of consciousness...” (1999:202), which reveals the mind-independent object from various different perspectives and different circumstances.

It might be asked whether the egocentric relation can provide friction within the objective constraint on our engagement. For Campbell, it is not possible that friction is provided within engagement. That is because his notion of engagement means the egocentric behaviour of a subject toward space, which is an unconscious activity. In order that such an engagement provides content, we need an account of how a conscious way of thinking gets applied to the engagement, namely, the self-consciousness. (see 1994) So it can be said that Campbell's account of content is a two-level account. Certainly, Campbell's position requires that self-consciousness requires both the egocentric and allocentric or objective frame of reference in a way that the former is internal to the latter. (see 1996:17) But as self-consciousness is a narrative way of thinking, it is like a descriptive way of thinking in which thought does not depend on objects. So, what we need is the notion of objects with which we are engaged in thought and which provides the rational account for action, but still the objectivity of thought content is embedded in the engagement.
The second argument against Campbell's view is hence as follows. As the notion of objectivity cannot be legitimately accounted for as a conscious detached way of thinking, we need an account of how objectivity can be intrinsic to egocentric engagement with an object. A way to account for this is to allow that egocentric spatial identification as a conscious way of thinking about space is possible. In other words, it is possible that the egocentric spatial way of thinking cannot be characterized independently from the objective way of thinking. This point can be seen from Evans's illustration of the distinction between 'this-thought' (object-identification) and 'here-thought' (place-identification).

The distinction is this: while a 'this-thought' can be identified only from the information-link or perception, a 'here-thought' can be identified from both perception and action. That is to say, a thought about a place does not need to be characterized by where an object is. Rather it can be characterized in terms of one's disposition to move in the environment; or by having a thought like over there, on the left. That is because a 'here-thought' is a thought which involves the egocentric spatial way of thinking which is defined by the place where I am.

The significance of the idea of object-dependence concerns the idea that content is individuated dependently on the existence of the object in the sense of knowing-which object one has thought about. This includes demonstrative knowledge about place and time, that is to know-which place/time, rather than know-where and when. The latter is a characteristic of descriptive knowledge. Spatial identification or a 'here-thought' provides an idea of egocentric spatial thinking, namely, the way of thinking about space which is related to our point of view. It is crucial in the sense that what characterizes a 'here-thought' is not an object, rather it is our perception of the place and our actions toward the place.
So a ‘here-thought’ is different from a ‘this-thought’ in the sense that a ‘this-thought’ requires an object as what provides content, but a ‘here-thought’ requires either perception of the place where I am or actions toward the place.

Hence error concerning a ‘this-thought’ is error about an object, namely, one does not have ‘this-thought’ if there is no object which the thought is about. By contrast, error concerning a ‘here-thought’ is error about our perception and action. That is to say, error about a place is not that there is no place, rather it is because either our perception is malfunctioning or we cannot act toward the place at all. Suppose I said, “It’s hot here.”, the possibility of error in this case is not that there is no place that is called ‘here’, rather if that sentence is false, it is false because of my own experience (I may be having a hallucination due to taking some drugs). However, error in this sense is not the sort of error deriving from error about knowledge of identity. That is because demonstrative knowledge is not derived from identity knowledge, namely, knowledge about an identity statement. The sentence, “It’s hot here.” provides a demonstrative thought because it is not derived from the identification that ‘here = the place x’; otherwise, the meaning of the sentence “It’s hot here.” is “It’s hot at the place x.” which provides descriptive knowledge. Hence a sentence with a demonstrative identification is immune to error through misidentification because the demonstrative sentence does not have content deriving from knowledge of identity, so demonstrative content will be never misidentified.

Egocentric spatial thinking may be said to provide demonstrative content which is derived from the ability to locate an object in space, in the sense that the subject of thought is an object which is located in a way which is identification-free in the objective space. The idea of objective
space is not what is opposite to subjective space. Rather objective space involves space which is related to the egocentric point of view. In this sense, space can be said to be identified by knowing—which place one has thought about, rather than by the identification of other material objects. Egocentric space is hence not a non-engaged way of thinking; rather it is a conceptually structured engagement.

Parallel to the temporal identification, demonstrative thoughts about time cannot be identified independently from our way of thinking about it. For Evans, recognition based identification provides information based on time and memory because it is a sort of identification the information of which derives from our ability to recognise or re-identify an object as the same again. However, although memory is different from perception in the sense that perception gains the information from objects, memory is only the ability to retain the information, this does not refute the idea that the source of memory information is the object from which demonstrative thoughts derive. (see Evans 1982:272) Campbell’s notion of temporal identification is an identification which is based on recognition and memory in the sense that they are what constitute an idea of object, rather than what retain information about an object. This is at risk of taking temporal identification as the source of information, instead of taking objects as the source. The problem is that once there is no contrast between an object as an independent entity and an object as being conceptually characterizable, then there is no friction to be found in such a notion of object. So saying that temporal identification is a detached or objective way of thinking in Campbell’s sense implies that the notion of object from which memory derives its information is the notion of object which can be characterized independently from our rational attention to it. That is why his account of the temporal identification is an account which does not require an
account of engagement in action for the identification.

However, as Campbell said, temporal identification involves self-consciousness which is non-engaged. This shows that his account of the self as an object is not the sort of self which is within our rational attention. That sort of self turns out to be the self which threatens a regress of the infinite subject of thought. Hence, in order to avoid that regress, we need an account in which the temporal frame of reference is connected with our egocentric way of thinking, that is, the availability of I-thoughts. Self-consciousness and our ability to keep track of time cannot be separated. In other words, temporal identification cannot be characterized independently from the engagement of thought about the self. In this sense, the self is an object which can be located in an objective framework. This can be taken in the sense that the self is one of the objects relating to other objects in a given environment. So it can be said that what provides the objective way of thinking cannot be said to be characterized independently from the notion of ‘object’ or the self. Concerning this issue, in particular, the notion of the self, I will turn to in the next chapter.

3. Conclusion

There are two aspects underpinning the notion of object-engagement: the idea of object-dependence and the notion of engagement as what shows the interplay between mind and world. The former aspect is mainly discussed in this chapter, namely, the idea of object-dependence in which an object is singled out by the knowing-which requirement; and the issue of objectivity of objects. This chapter proposes a notion of practice the characterization of which involves demonstrative thoughts, namely, practice as object-engagement. Such a notion of practice provides an account of content which meets both the constraints of the world and
the rationality constraint of a subject’s points of view. It is the idea of what I called a one-level account but two-staged approach, that is, what provides the possibility of content is a structure of practice to which norms are not only intrinsic but also provide friction to the engagement. The notion of practice in this sense requires an account of an intra-personal engagement rather than an inter-personal engagement. It is an intra-personal engagement which is constrained by the world. The intra-personal engagement requires the understanding of the self as an object relating with other objects in the world in the egocentric way of thinking. However, the objectivity of objects can be found within the engagement with objects. What needs to be further investigated is the second aspect of the notion of practice: the notion of engagement which is involved with the notion of self, agency and actions. An account of action is required in a way that content can be provided based on the egocentric relation between a subject and an object. This will be done in the next chapter.
The term ‘constitutive role’ here is used in the sense of which I shall call later in this chapter a one-level account of content but a two-stage approach, namely, the account in which what constitutes content is the conceptual structured engagement with an object, which needs to be approached on the basis of the distinction of the information link between subject and object and the conceptual link. This is in contrast with Peacocke’s notion of constitutive role which is a two-level account. (Peacocke 1983)

I have discussed the details of the rule-following considerations in chapter one. However, as it stands here, I am concerned mainly with the connection of the notion of practice with the idea of normativity which is characterized in terms of rule-following.

In other words, actions are explained in terms of intentional attitudes, e.g. beliefs, desires.

4 Cf. Davidson 1980

5 However, although I agree with him that an account of understanding requires the non-behaviourist account, my view is different from his in that, for Campbell, practice does not individuate content. This point is related to his view on object-identification, which will be discussed below.

6 The debate on what the ‘forms of life’ is mostly based on the community’s view. See e.g. Hunter, J.F.M. (1971); Garver, N. (1994); Baker&Hacker (1985); Winch, P. (1958)

7 see Evans, G. 1982 on the Generality Constraint as structure of thought. As he said that the constraint is not about how the subject manipulates symbols and it is not about the language of thought which there is no semantics attached to, but rather it is a conceptual point about our conceptual abilities. (pp.100-101)

8 The issue of how concepts and content are related has already been discussed in chapter 2.

9 Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘seeing-as’ of the duck-rabbit picture is also the issue here. That is to say, content of thought derives from our way of thinking about the object which can be characterized in terms of selective attention. But the crucial point is what constrains the content is not only the seeing-as, but it is also the picture itself (in this case, the duck-rabbit picture) which does not allow the attention to be about what is not there. In this sense, to take a constraint as a social practice does not help individuating the content of seeing-as, mainly because the socially constraint can provide only a descriptive thought about the picture, which does not answer to which object we have thought about.

10 Although my proposed idea of practice can be said to be a bridge between these two realms, it is different from Campbell’s view. Mine does not claim that practice is the mediation, rather what I propose is that there is a way to understand how those two realms cannot be independently characterized, that is, by showing that there is an account of practice which can provide that understanding. And this account does not add more entities into the world, because practice in that sense is already there in the world.

11 By evidence, Peacocke means “Evidence*” which “…is wider than evidence both in that it includes for instance experiences which may cause judgements and in that, as introduced, someone may have evidence* that p without having all the concepts from which the thought that p is built up.” (1983: 113)

12 In his reply to McDowell’s criticism (1991), Peacocke has revised his idea in a way
that the latter does not necessarily include the former. However, I will show later that his reply cannot rebut McDowell’s criticism.

In McDowell 1990, there are four points on which he criticises Peacocke as contrasted with Evans’ idea, namely, perceptual demonstratives; memory demonstratives; first-person thought and the general character of Peacocke’s theory of thought. In this section, I look at the issue on perceptual demonstratives first because it is relevant to the object-dependence thesis. In the next chapter, I will look in particular at the notion of self-identification which will concern the issue of first-person thought and memory demonstratives. Peacocke’s general character of theory of thought— the monolithic approach — is implicit in both parts.

See my definition of Russell’s specific notion of object-dependence which is differentiated from Russellian notion or neo-Russellian in chapter two.

Evans’ (1985b) notion of ‘dynamic thought’ is hence different from Campbell’s disengaged way of thinking over time. Dynamic thought involves our ability to keep track of object over a period a time. But in this sense, time is characterized in terms of the egocentric way of thinking about the object which is conceptually structured, rather than in terms of the non-egocentric or disengaged way of thinking.

However, there may be a slight difference between my position and Brewer (1996,1999) in the following way. Although Brewer thinks that the connection between perception and action is coordinative, he takes perception, actually, perceptual understanding, as what provides content rather than actions. So there is a priority of perception to actions in his account of content. But my position is that both perception and action are connected in a way which is embedded in a structure of practice, the objectivity of which lies in the world and the consequential connection of actions toward things. In other words, I take both notions of perception and action as being constitutively connected, and both are what account for the notion of object-engagement. So, the notion of perception cannot be accounted for independently from actions. On this issue, Brewer is right to insist that the connection between perception and actions is co-ordinative. This issue can be seen in his dispute with Peacocke (1983), in which Brewer denies that content of thought can be given in terms of an account of action. For him, he is concerned with the perspectival structure “in the level of thought” (1999:209), different from Peacocke, who he said, is concerned with that structure in terms of intentional action. I will discuss this issue in details in the next chapter which focuses on the subject’s aspect of the engagement with object, namely, on the notion of agency and actions.

I mention this point here only for providing a supporting argument against Campbell’s account of object. The issue on time and demonstrative thoughts can be considered independently as a separate issue which does not concern my point here.
Chapter Five: Practice: Agency and An Engagement

The notion of ‘practice’ which provides the aboutness of thought requires an account of how the world interweaves with the rational mental aspect of a subject of thought. That is to say, it is in the practice of object-engagement, that the objectivity constraint meets the rationality constraint. The last chapter focused on the idea of object-dependence, in particular, on the aspect of the objectivity constraint. This chapter will focus on the subject’s side of the engagement with objects, namely, the rationality constraint; in other words, it will focus on the notion of the subject of the engagement. The notion of subject is crucial for an account of the possibility of content because the information link requires the relation of a subject and object. So there must be the subject of thought which holds the link with its object. But the notion of the subject has to be characterized as an object in an objective order. The main reason is that the notion of the subject as a spatial and temporal object provides an egocentric perspective toward things, the content of which is the engagement of the subject in acting. That is to say, thought about the subject of the engagement or an I-thought involves the idea of the subject of thought as an object in the spatio-temporal frame of reference, the content of which is characterized by the way the subject engages with other objects in the environment. In other words, what characterizes the content of I-thoughts is the subject’s intentional action. This means that the subject in this sense is not only the subject as located in space and time, but also the subject of self-consciousness. The characterization of the notion of ‘subject’ as the subject of self-consciousness or the self cannot be separated from the subject as an object of self-consciousness. On that basis, what connects them requires the idea of the subject as an agent.
The above idea accords with my main thesis of the notion of practice, i.e. norms are intrinsic to practice. That is to say, the objectivity of thought is immanent to the engagement of a subject with an object. To put it in terms of the one-level account of demonstrative content, as mentioned in the last chapter, the perceptual-link cannot be characterized independently from the conceptual or rational engagement of the subject. In order to gain the objective conception of ‘object’, that conception cannot be accounted for independently from a subject’s point of view. In this sense, the notion of ‘subject’ cannot be accounted for in such a way that there is a gap between the subject as a bodily subject and the subject as a subject of thinking. To put it briefly, the one-level account concerning the notion of subject is that:

(OL) the point of view and the subject as the owner of such point of view cannot be characterized independently.

This is to contrast with two-level account, namely:

(TL) the point of view and the subject can be characterized independently.

My contention in this chapter is to defend OL. For OL to be possible, the notion of the subject has to be accounted for in terms of agency, that is, the notion of the self has to be defined in terms of actions toward an object; however, this cannot undermine the idea that there is an agent who acts as a subject. And if the subject is to be defined in terms of agency, it means that according to OL, the notion of point of view cannot be characterized independently from the notion of intentional action. It is this notion of agency which defines what it is to be a subject who possesses content. In other words, the notion of an intentional action provides the idea of what it is for a subject to be rationally engaged with the world.1
Concerning the structure of this chapter, in the first part, I explore further the debate between Peacocke and McDowell on the account of first-person thought and demonstrative content. The problem with Peacocke’s two-level account is parallel to the account of content concerning objects in the last chapter, that is, the problem that the I-thought is unowned. Briefly, according to Peacocke (1983), experiences are not individuated in terms of their subject, rather in terms of a mixed descriptive-demonstrative mode ‘the person who has those experiences’. The problem is that if experiences are characterized independently from their subject, then the notion of action and agency is threatened. The second section provides the idea of what it is to characterize the notion of the self in terms of agency. In this part, I consider a contrast between Peacocke and Brewer’s view (1992,1999) in order to show that Peacocke’s account of intentional action which is accounted for in terms of the egocentricity of spatial thought is not the sort of the egocentric thought the content of which is intrinsic in action. That is because, for Peacocke, action is a manifestation or an application of egocentric sensitivity in the sense that the egocentric sensitivity can be characterized independently to action. The problem is that it opens a gap for accounting for how action gets its content. The egocentric sensitivity provides a normative constraint on action. But if norms are to be characterized extrinsically to action, the problem, as already discussed in chapter one, is that it invites the dilemma of the regress of interpretations of action and the risk of no norms in action. It may not be obvious that Peacocke’s view can be said to belong to the two-component model of use as stated in chapter one; however, there is a possibility that such a model is implicit in his view. An alternative account which may not face such a problem is found in Brewer’s account of an agent the action of whose is not to be characterized independently from the egocentricity of thought. This provides the idea of a subject as an agent whose egocentric spatial
thought is intrinsic to action. The notion of practice as an engagement with objects hence requires the notion of the self as an agent whose engagement is intrinsically egocentric. If practice is to provide content, then an account of content requires both the rationality aspect which is derived from the egocentric point of view of the subject and the objectivity aspect which is derived from the world. Once the subject's side is left out or the self is unowned, the problem is that there is nothing that the world can be contrasted with or make friction with.

1. 'I'-Thoughts and Demonstrative* Content

Self-identification is a way of thinking about a subject of thought with an 'I'-thought. In having thought about oneself, it is necessary that there must be a subject who thinks, rather than merely the phenomenon of thinking without its subject, namely, a demonstrative identification 'this'-thought or 'this-experience. That is because first-person thought is thought about a subject which is both the subject of self-consciousness and the subject as an object or a person, whereas demonstrative thought is the thought about a perceptual object. However, a characterization of first-person thought can be said to have a common characteristic with demonstrative thought, that is, thought about the self is non-mediated, or non-descriptive. Hence I take the content of I-thought as having a demonstrative* content. I call it demonstrative* content, so that it is not to be confused with the demonstrative identification of the self, namely, the reduction of the self to mere experiences or actions the owner of which is characterized independently. I expand this idea below.

'I'-thought is a way of thinking about oneself. The 'I'-thought is neither a thought about the Cartesian self nor the physical self. Rather it involves both the idea of self-consciousness and the self as an object in an environment. That is because an I-thought is a thought about the self
which is directed to the world. The idea of self as an object is driven by
the idea that a way of thinking of the self requires a subject of thought, so
that an information link and an action link with an object of thought are to
be possible. The possibility of such links depends on the idea of object-
dependence, namely, the idea that a thought content is not possible if
there is no object. In the case of ‘I’-thoughts, the possibility of the
thought about oneself depends on the idea that if there is no subject of
thought as an owner of which experiences one has, then there is no
thought about the subject. The subject of thought needs to be accounted
for in terms of a person, so that knowledge about the self can be said to
be knowledge about the objective world in which one is an element. Such
an account of the person cannot be characterized independently from an
account of self-consciousness in following sense.

A way of thinking about the subject allows the possibility of
different predications about the subject, that is, the Generality Constraint
applies to self-consciousness thoughts. (see Evans 1982:209) It can be
illustrated in the following way: the ‘I’-thought grounds on ‘I’-Ideas or
concepts of self-conscious properties, which conform to the Generality
Constraint, namely, the constraint that enables predications about oneself
to be possible grounded on knowledge of the identity that (I = X) is true.
X means the fundamental identification of a person as an object which is
available to other persons at time t. The Generality Constraint enables one
to understand thoughts about oneself in terms of a temporal continuation,
such as ‘I had a headache,’ ‘I am ill,’ ‘I shall die,’ ground on the truth
of the knowledge that ‘I’ picks out an object, one may say, in the third-
person sense, that is, the sense which is available for others to rationalise
my actions.

However, taking ‘I’-thoughts in that way is to take something
from the idea of demonstrative content in accounting for self-identification. That is to say, the content of the self-identification shares a
general character with other singular and acquaintance based
identifications, i.e. place-identification (‘here’-thought) and object-
identification (‘this’-thought). The crucial difference is that ‘I’-thoughts
are thoughts the content of which are about a subject of thought and
action, while the content of a ‘this’-thought is about an object and a
‘here’-thought is about a place. (ibid.:207) In short, the essence of an ‘I’-
thought or self-consciousness is self-reference, that is, thinking about a
subject of judgements. However, as Evans said, an ‘I’-thought is closer to
a ‘here’-thought in the sense that they share the same kinds of elements:
“...an element involving sensitivity of thoughts to certain information, and
an element involving the way in which thoughts are manifested in action.”
(ibid.) But the main differences are that in the case of an ‘I’-thought, I
manifest a self-conscious thought in acting, not in knowing which object
to act on (in the sense of “I do not move myself”, rather “I myself
move.”); and that the knowledge I have is the knowledge of myself as
someone who has knowledge and makes judgements about myself,
different from knowledge about a place.

Although thoughts about the self do not refer to an external object
in a similar sense as ‘here’ refers to a place and ‘this’ refers to an object,
these thoughts have a common characteristic of immunity to error through
misidentification. ‘I’-thoughts refer to a person as an object in the sense
that an expression that “Someone is moving, but is it me who is moving?”
does not make sense. (see ibid.:218) In other words, ‘I’-thoughts have a
content which is derived from identification-free knowledge, namely, the
knowledge that does not rest on the identity of ‘I’ with descriptive
knowledge “the person who has the experiences”. So, in this sense, ‘I’-
thoughts require the idea of a subject as that which is the owner of the
experience is characterized in a non-descriptive sense; in other words, knowledge about the self is non-mediate and direct knowledge, or what I called knowledge which has a *demonstrative* content.

What I have illustrated above is the idea of the one-level account. That is different from the two-level account which is claimed to be more liberal in the sense that it is not necessary that individuation of experiences is in terms of its subject. The two-level account takes ‘I’-thoughts to have a demonstrative content in the sense which is a mixture of descriptive and demonstrative mode of thought. That is to say, the relation between the subject of thought and self-conscious experience can be defined in terms of the ‘constitutive role’ of a description of the (type) self, i.e. ‘the person with these conscious states’ (e.g. Peacocke 1983: 148) However, as I will show, although both the two-level and one-level accounts contend that the notion of the self requires characterization in terms of intentional action or the notion of agency, once the notion of subject is not necessarily required in the former account, the notion of agency is problematic. The two-level account of the content of I-thoughts cannot provide a satisfactory account of the notion of the self in terms of agency. I will expand this point after the following section. In the following, I discuss the debate between McDowell and Peacocke on I-thoughts which is parallel to the debate on object-identification, namely, the problem about the two-level account of content.

1.1. Individuation of Experience

The debate between Peacocke and McDowell concerns the issue of what individuates particular experiences or conscious states. McDowell’s argument is briefly this: if an ‘I’-thought is individuated in terms of experiences rather than in terms of the possessor of the experiences, then the problem is that it begs for an explanation of how the
the notion of a subject is constitutive of experiences or conscious states, which are not individuated in terms of their possessors. What Peacocke argues is that, parallel to demonstrative identification of an object, what is required for an ‘I’-thought is that a thinker has a general ability to think about a particular experience demonstratively: "...because it is his experience without having any independent identification of himself" (1991:129) In other words, for him, a demonstrative identification of a particular experience in terms of its possessor does not necessarily require the actual identification of its possessor in thought. (see ibid.) I expand their arguments below.

According to McDowell (1990), parallel to the ‘know-which’ requirement, an ‘I’-thought requires ‘knowing-whose’ thought it is about. An ‘I’-thought is constituted by the substance or possessor of content, which enables the information link between subject and object. The knowing-whose requirement is required for the individuation of contents of an ‘I’-thought in the sense that it gives rise to the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification. This means that self-consciousness and experiences are individuated in terms of their possessors.

By contrast, for Peacocke, “Persons or minds are individuated by reference to token experiences rather than conversely...” (1983:179) or as he puts it: “Token experiences, which are total in the sense that their type fully specifies what it is like (visually, aurally, etc.) for someone who has that experience, individuate minds or centres of consciousness.” (ibid.:178). That is because, for Peacocke, there is no unified sense of the immunity to error through misidentification concerning ‘I’-thoughts. That is to say, there are two types of case of such an immunity: firstly, the absolute immunity or the infallibility of ‘I’ in “I’m in pain.”; and secondly,
the possible misidentification of ‘I’ due to beliefs about the world, even though ‘I’ never failed to refer, such as, judgements based on memory image, e.g. “I was on an ocean liner” and those based on perceptual experiences, e.g. “I’m sitting at a desk.”. However, there is a unified account of ‘I’ in these two cases, that is, the account in terms of the constitutive role of (type) self, ‘the person with these conscious states’ (ibid.:175) which requires “the thesis that token mental events are individuated by the persons who have them”(ibid.:176). In other words, a demonstrative mode of presentation has the constitutive role in the sense that a mode of presentation may be determined by a description, i.e. the content of the first-person mode of presentation can be ascribed by the descriptive-demonstrative “the person who has these conscious states”.(ibid.:109)

An important implication of Peacocke’s account is that a brain in a vat can think about its pain if there are suitable conditions and evidences for it to know which person has the experience of pain. For him, an account of first-person thought requires an account of the possibility of reference-failure. So an important problem is concerned with how to validate a judgement in the case of the absolute immunity to error through misidentification like “I’m in pain.”, when ‘I’ has no reference, as in the brain in a vat. However, the brain in a vat is not embodied to have an idea of itself as an element in an objective order. So it cannot be said that the brain in a vat can have an idea of itself as both a subject and an object of experiences. McDowell argues that Peacocke cannot maintain both the idea that experiences can be individuated in terms of ‘the person who possesses these experiences’ and the idea that the content of ‘I’-thought is constitutive of the evidential sensitivity of the possessor of the experiences, as I will explain.
According to McDowell, the brain in a vat does not have first-person thoughts, because it can at most respond to a pain, not to that person's being in pain. (see McDowell 1990:261) The expression “I'm in pain,” which has no owner is not an expression whose content is infallibly judged, rather it is unavailable. The case of a brain in a vat would be the case in which there is no ‘I'-thought because there is no substance for the know-which requirement: to know which object it has thought about or to know whose pain it is. So the ‘I' is not available for the judgment. If the brain in a vat can have ‘I'-thought in terms of Peacocke’s notion of a constitutive role which is expressed by “the person who has these conscious states”, then the brain in a vat needs to have an independent ability to demonstratively identify itself as the person who has these conscious states. But there is no ‘I' or the possessor of such states which is independent from the states, so the vat brain can only descriptively individuate the conscious states (: the person who has these conscious states). If so, McDowell thinks that Peacocke’s constitutive role provides no explanatory work for the ‘I'-thought the content of which is non-descriptive. This means that Peacocke’s idea of first-person thought does not provide the idea of the person as an owner of his experiences, rather it offers a neo-Humean view of persons, i.e. a person is independently individuated by his mental experiences.

Peacocke’s response is that his position is not neo-Humean. That is because the thesis that particular experiences and conscious states are individuated in terms of their subjects can be understood in at least two ways which provide a metaphysical claim about individuation of individual events in terms of their possessors. This is different from the neo-Humean which is an epistemic claim about thought about experiences. The first way is what Peacocke calls the Strong Thesis which says that the identity of experiences depends on the identity of a subject. (1991:127) That is
different from the neo-Humean which holds that experiences uniquely determine its subject. That is to say, while the Strong Thesis holds that a subject is not varied if experiences are varied, the neo-Humean holds that a subject is varied if experiences are varied. According to the former, experiences can be individuated in terms of their subject. For Peacocke, McDowell’s criticism is aimed at the neo-Humean, rather than at his position.

However, even though his position is not neo-Humean, the Strong Thesis can be rejected by the split-brain case, i.e. “In split-brain case there can be two experiences which are of the same subjective type, occurring to the same human being at the same time.” (ibid.:127) It seems that, in this case, there are different centres of consciousness of different experiences of the subject. The problem is: what individuates these different centres of consciousness, if the Strong Thesis insists both that the subject of experience is the centre of consciousness and that experiences are individuated by the subject? Peacocke thinks that what is required for individuating those experiences cannot be an independent ability as McDowell says. That is because saying that there are two particular experiences of the same subjective type at the same time already assumes

“...the existence of two distinct experiences in advance when making the two selections. And if, to avoid this, there is said to be only one particular experience, it can be placed in only one of the selections, with the result that we do not have a correct characterization of the stream of consciousness corresponding to the selection which does not include that one particular experience.” (ibid.)

This implies that, for Peacocke, it is the experience (s) itself that individuates the particular experience, rather than the subject of experience. He thinks that though the Strong Thesis can be rejected
because of the split-brain case, his position can be endorsed in a second
way of saying that experiences are individuated in terms of a person,
namely, the Weaker Thesis. That is the thesis that
“particular experiences are individuated at least in part by the
spatio-temporal objects of whose psychological histories they form
a part, in the sense in which even the human being whose brain is
temporarily split has a psychological history.”(ibid.: 128)

For Peacocke, this thesis is still not the neo-Humean account of
the self. That is because the weaker thesis at least assumes that there is a
common psychological history before the split of the experiences. We can
think about experiences in a demonstrative way without having the
independent ability to identify them in terms of the actual possessor. As he
says, “A thinker can think about a particular experience demonstratively in
part because it is this experience, without having any independent
identification of himself.”(ibid.:129)

However, from the Weaker Thesis, it seems that Peacocke takes
memory as a way of individuating an experience or as a way of gaining
knowledge. That is a problem because memory is not what provides
knowledge, rather it is a faculty which ‘retains’ knowledge of past
experiences. (see Evans 1982:235) So saying that individuation of an
experience can be done in terms of its psychological histories seems to be
begging the question of what individuates experience if a person is
individuated in terms of experience. The problem for Peacocke’s view is
that he seems to presuppose that individuation of an experience is a
different matter from self-identification because he wants to maintain both
the idea of subject as the subject of experiences and the idea that
individuation of experiences is not in terms of a person. Thinking that way
makes it impossible to see how one can have a thought about himself in a
non-descriptive way without referring to experience as being individuated by a descriptive sense of a subject. The problem about thinking about the self in a descriptive way is that it does not offer an immediate knowledge about the self, rather it begs for a further interpretation for how content about the self is possible.

Actually, Evans raises a point on the brain in a vat that what is presupposed in this case is the thought that self-identification is the physical-identification, rather than the thought which shows how mental and physical is intertwined in having demonstrative* identification of the self as a person or an object. (see ibid.:255) In particular, Evans argues that the brain in a vat cannot be counted as a subject of experience who has self-knowledge because his experiences cannot be identified as the experiences of ‘which person’ in an objective order. Self-identification requires a capacity of a subject to locate himself as an element or object in the objective order. A capacity to locate oneself is a practical ability in the sense that the subject acts, rather than he acts on himself. (I run; not that I make myself running.) (see ibid.:207) Self-identification cannot be accounted for in the sense that a subject acts on himself because self-identification is an immediate direct identification. To have such a direct identification, what I called demonstrative* identification, the account of the self requires an account of agency or action in which the subject acts. This has an implication in accounting for a notion of intentional action. That is to say, intentional actions cannot be accounted for as a causal consequence of self-identification. Rather they are constitutive of the content of ‘I’-thoughts in the sense of the one-level sense in which action is not to be viewed separately from the subject’s thought and intention.

Peacocke’s view on first-person thought, indeed, involves the idea of action, but in a two-level sense. That is to say, action is a causal
consequence of self-identification or an egocentric identification of objects in the environment in the sense that such egocentricity is characterized independently of action. That is because, for Peacocke, although action is a manifestation or evidence or an application of the egocentric identification, which interacts with belief, desire and intention (even though the intention is fixed), action still can be said to have content if it is answerable to objects in external world. (1983:77) It means that the egocentricity and intention is something independently characterizable from action. In the following section, I consider Peacocke’s view on intentional action in order to show that Peacocke’s account of T'-thoughts cannot offer the notion of agency which is required for an account of a demonstrative content. Then I contrast his account with Brewer’s account of the notion of self-location and agency.

2. Agency and the Self as an Object

Both Peacocke and Brewer share with Evans the basic idea that egocentric spatial thought is a thought which is practical or behavioral in nature. (see Brewer 1992: 27-28, Evans 1982:160) That is to say, in thinking about space, a subject has to be able to place himself in relation to objects around him from his egocentric perspective non-descriptively. In having ‘here’-thoughts, a subject acts on a place rather than perceiving it as the place he occupies. The latter is a descriptive way of thinking about place. The significance of the egocentricity of thought or as Peacocke calls it ‘perspectival sensitivity’, for Peacocke, is that it provides a distinction to action with spatial content and that without content. It is also the distinction for being self-consciousness. For Brewer, the egocentricity of thought provides the idea of self-location which accounts for the idea of agency. The difference between Brewer and Peacocke, as Brewer perceives it, is that Brewer is concerned with the role of the perspectival sensitivity in thought, rather than merely in intentional action.
(Brewer 1999:207) However, such a difference has an implication in that Peacocke’s account of perspectival sensitivity cannot account for how content is possible within the structure of perspectival sensitivity in intentional action, the account of which cannot be separately characterized. Meanwhile, Brewer’s view provides the idea of agency to which the perspectival sensitivity is intrinsic to action. That is to say, perspectival sensitivity is in the co-ordination of perceptual experience and action, which can be accounted for in terms of intentional action. For Brewer, perceptual experience which provides content requires the idea of being an agent whose action is intentional in respect to objects in the environment, so that the account of intentional action is constitutive of the perspectival sensitivity of an agent to things. A consequence of this is that the notion of the subject as defined in terms of agency is necessary in an account for content. In the following, I begin with Peacocke’s account of the notion of intentional action and then contrast this with Brewer’s account.

2.1. The extrinsic egocentricity to intentional action

Peacocke’s account of action is based on the idea of the self the identification of which is not immediate. It can be seen from his agreement with Perry (1979) that first-person thoughts involve actions because actions are consequences of the subject’s first-person belief. If Clark Kent believes “Clark Kent is superman.” but fails to believe “I am Clark Kent.”, he will not act according to the belief that he is superman. Action relates to the ‘constitutive role’ of ‘I’-thoughts because ‘I’-thoughts are constitutive of the first-person mode of presentation (or the first-person way of thinking the type mode of presentation of which is expressed by the word ‘I’). But the notion of belief which leads to action is the notion which has to be accounted for in terms of desire and intention. That is to say, if the first-person belief does not lead to a formation of new beliefs,
then it means that the subject has no intention or decision to act. For Peacocke, the self can undertake an intentional action in the sense that the first-person mode of presentation \((x)\) has an intentional action only if he has some intention to form the belief that \((x)\) is \(F\). This is based on the principle for explaining action that if someone has an intention that the self \(v\) at a particular time, then he tries to \(v\) at that time. (1983:129) It seems that the subject’s intention is another subject different from the self which has belief. This issue, however, is beyond my concern here. The point is that, for Peacocke, what explains action is the intention of the subject which interacts with belief. However, what makes action intentional is not only intention, belief and desire, but also a set of attitudes which give perspectival sensitivity to things in the subject’s environment. (ibid.:77)

According to Peacocke, an intentional action is a manifestation of perspectival sensitivity. By perspectival sensitivity, he means, “... literally a matter, in actual and counterfactual circumstances, of the sensitivity of the subject’s intentional actions to variations in his perspective on the world.” (ibid.:69) A subject who possesses content is the subject who has a perspectival sensitivity or egocentric sensitivity concerning his environment. That is in contrast with a subject’s actions that relate to objects in their environment in a stimulus response fashion in an immediate environment. Such an action cannot be said to have content because the subject’s action is determined by objects in a way which does not take account of the subject’s intention and experiences. If a subject desires an object in his surrounding, his behaviour toward the object will be spatially sensitive in the way that he can change his position in order to keep track of the object. His movement manifests perspectival sensitivity; in other words, perspectival sensitivity is what ascribes content to actions.
Perspectivally sensitive actions involve the subject’s complex array of abilities, which can be accounted for in terms of a holistic structure of the subject’s intention and other actions. (ibid.:63-64) In other words, a purely physical stimulus-response account of action cannot account for how it integrates with other actions and with belief in making a holistic sense of behaviour. In contrast, an intentional characterization of action does not require that account because it is already integrated with the holistic structure of belief-desire. However, for Peacocke, his perspectival holism has two-tiers. That is to say, an action is intentional not only according to the structure of belief-desire and other actions in other circumstances, but also to the fact that even though the desires are constant, action can be said to be intentional. As Peacocke puts the latter tier that,

“even when we hold the desires of the agent fixed, the statement that a certain movement is a manifestation of propositional attitudes about external objects, rather than a mere response to a stimulus, is answerable to facts about what the agent would do if differently situated with respect to the objects and places on which he is acting.” (ibid.: 77)

Briefly, Peacocke’s main idea here is that possession of content has to be accounted for in terms of intentional action which manifests perspectival sensitivity. For him, the perspectival sensitivity is actually a mental map of an organism’s environment. (ibid.:76) However, it is a mental map which cannot be applied without temporal qualifications. That is to say, the sensitivity manifests content which depends on time. That is because possessing the mental map requires the ability of the subject to keep track of his position in relation to objects on the map at different times. Moreover, possessing the map cannot be a general explanation of the perspectival sensitivity of a subject’s actions. That is because
possessing the map requires the subject to apply or use it, that is, to be able to self-consciously keep track of his position on the map. As he said, “if one can do this, one will already be capable of perspectival sensitivity in some range of cases; and if one cannot, one will be unable to use the map. It follows that possession of the map cannot explain all cases of perspectival sensitivity.” (ibid.)

This means that what explains some cases of perspectival sensitivity is the use of the map.

From the above quote, Peacocke seems to assume something circular here; that is to say, possession of the map is assumed to exist in any case whether or not a subject can manifest it. If that is right, the problem is that once an intentional action is considered to be an application of a mental map which is separately characterizable from possession of it, there is a problem of regresses of interpretations of the mental map. The question is: what is it to have a right application? Peacocke’s answer is that there needs to be a non-defeasible explanation of action. That is what he calls the ‘tightness constraint’ of intentional action, namely, the constraint for rationalising action concerning which set of attitudes is the relative attitude to action. (see ibid.: 78) Such a constraint provides an individuation of an intentional action. It answers the question of what sort of content an action is about. For example, a subject is moving toward an object lying together with other objects on a table in a room. What rationalises his movement (that it is about the object of his attention) will be table-relative, rather than room-relative, if a description of his movement contains the claim that he always acts toward the object of his attention from whatever directions he moves toward the table. So he is sensitive to the spatial relation between the table and the object. His movement will be room-relative if a description of the object of his attention, say a cup, may contain something like, “The cup is two
feet from the middle of the north window and two from the door.”. (ibid.:80) The point of the matter is that what rationalises action is determined by the tightness constraint that there are no other descriptions which have more expressive power than the concept in the set of attitudes which is relative to the intentional action.

However, Peacocke’s notion of tightness condition employs a defeasibility notion. A characteristic of such a notion is that it rules out some other possibilities which account for content. But as I have already argued in the first chapter, this sort of strategy does not seem to be plausible in accounting for content because a defeasibility condition merely provides a further interpretation of a normative constraint on content. Peacocke needs to rely on such a condition simply because there is a problem in his account that possession of perspectival sensitivity or the mental map is something to be manifested in actions. The problem is due to the idea that the possession and the application are characterized separately. So, actions turn out to be something which is independent from the perspectival sensitivity of thought to the environment, that is, actions are extrinsically characterized to thought which is egocentric. This has an important result in characterizing the notion of the self as an agent because if actions are explained on their own without referring to what gives them content, there will be a gap that needs to be explained concerning how the intentionality of action or its content and action get connected. An implication is that there is no immediate knowledge about the self engaging with objects in environment, which is the crucial characteristic of being an agent.

So what is wrong with Peacocke’s view is that the only way for individuating content according to the perspectival sensitivity is to be given in terms of how the agent responds to the world in action. What we
need is an account of action which has a combinatorial structure with intention, so that it can be said that the perspectival sensitivity is operating intrinsically to the intentional action. This means that the notion of agency requires an account in which perspectival sensitivity is in thought, rather than merely in action. The difference between them may be said to be based on different approaches to the notion of perspectival sensitivity. That is to say, to focus on the role of the perspectival sensitivity in action is to approach the notion of perspectival sensitivity external to thought or from the third-person point of view, while to focus on the role of the perspectival sensitivity in thought is to approach the notion ‘internal’ to thought or from the first-person point of view. As mentioned above, one reason why Peacocke’s notion of perspectival sensitivity turns out to be extrinsic to thought may be due to his understanding of the idea of self-identification that undermines the notion of the subject as a possessor of experiences. According to such an understanding, the notion of the self is not directly identified: there is a separation of the self as a subject of intention and a subject of action. To approach the notion of perspectival sensitivity ‘internally’, we need an account of the notion of perspectival sensitivity intrinsic to thought and thereby to action. So I turn to Brewer’s account of self-location which provides the idea of how being an agent involves being able to engage with objects in thought.

2.2. The intrinsic egocentricity in action

According to Brewer (1999), an account of content can be provided within the account of the possession of perspectival sensitivity. That is to say, an account of content in the world independent to thought can be given in terms of a subject’s conception of objects of his thought and of objects in the world independent to his thought. It means that mind-independent objects are determined by the perspective-dependent thoughts about their identity, which in turn control and co-ordinate
intentional action with these objects in the world around the subject. (1999: 210) So, in that sense, content can be provided by perspectival sensitivity in both action and thought.

The possibility of perspectival sensitivity in both action and thought is characterized as having two components. The first component is this – in having perspectival sensitivity, a subject has the ability to keep track of an object. But this means that a subject can recognize the object’s numerical identity over time. That is to say, the subject may change his belief but recognize that change as of the same object of his attention when it changes its position over time or even when it appears to be rather different in an unusual visual appearance or in different circumstances. My cat may walk from here to there; it may be hidden under the table in a dark room where I may not be able to tell exactly whether it is my cat; but in having a perspectival sensitivity to the cat means that I can recognize my cat even though its properties are changing over time. The second component is that the ability to recognize the identity of the object is possible even though its spatio-temporal continuity is interrupted. For example, a book was on a table, even though it was moved away for a time, one can still recognize it as the same book which was once placed on a table. These components mean that in having perspectival sensitivity to things, there is a coordination of object independent to thought and object dependent to a subject’s perspective. The point for Brewer is that this is the reason that perceptual demonstrative content is provided by the egocentricity in thought of a subject.

It can be seen that Brewer’s notion of perspectival sensitivity is more centered on the aspect of the subject’s thought than on the aspect of mere action which is the focus of Peacocke’s notion of perspectival
sensitivity. As mentioned above, for Peacocke, perspectival sensitivity is the ability to keep track of the object over time in the sense that it is a manifestation of our possession of sensitivity. It turns out that perspectival sensitivity is extrinsic to action. If the idea of perspectival sensitivity provides the idea that the objectivity of thought can be immanent to thought, then Peacocke's view on this matter means that the objectivity of thought is to be characterized independently to thought. The problem is that it requires an additional component for individuating content of thought, namely, the tightness constraint. Such a component means that content is not possible within the realm of perceptual experiences, so that we need to construct a further condition for interpreting experience. In contrast, for Brewer, perceptual experiences provide content because perspectival sensitivity involves the egocentric spatial perception interacting with our actions. But this also means that there is a possibility that our basic actions (i.e. actions in a stimulus-response fashion) can be perspectival, which also accounts for content of the self. That is to say, the notion of the self is defined in terms of actions which are perspectival. What provides content of the self is an interaction between perceptual experience and basic actions. Basic action is defined in terms of the ability to keep track of an object, which requires the idea of self-locating spatial perception.

Brewer's example involves an experiment on a baby. The baby is expected to see a stimulus object to appear at a window on one side of a room, when a buzzer sounds. But he will be rotated about the center of a room at the same time. The point is this -- if the baby turns to a wrong side where there is no stimulus object, it means that he has learnt merely a spatial response; but if turning to a right side, it means that he can identify the object by an egocentric frame of reference, that is, he can represent the spatial relation between him and the object. In other words, the baby
manifests his egocentric identification of a place and his ability to keep track of it during his changing positions over time. (see Brewer 1992:27,n.6.) The experiment shows that in acting purposively to the stimulus object, the baby has an idea of self-location or the egocentric spatial way of thinking. In other words, in turning to the right side, the baby has an egocentric thought which has content. Perceptual spatial content is derived from the way a subject locates itself in respect to objects in the environment or the ability to locate oneself as a center of the environment. It is in this sense that self-location provides the idea of agency, such that actions are controlled by the co-ordination of the perspectival sensitivity with perceptual objects in the environment. Perceptions hence provide one with the purposive action or intentional action toward objects; and self-location provides content of the self because in acting toward objects in the world, we are agents.

Such an idea of self-location provides the idea that a subject possesses spatial content in a way that does not require the two-level account of intentional action as in Peacocke’s account. In other words, there is no gap between the basic actions or the sort of actions which Peacocke characterizes as the stimulus-response behaviour and the intentional actions or the sort of actions under the conceptual ascription of intention and belief. That is because the basic action is, one may say, already conceptual in the one-level sense. This means that intentional action involves possession of the egocentric spatial content because the content of the self-location is defined in the immediate interaction with objects in the subject’s environment.

If Brewer is right, the notion of agency is to be characterized in terms of a primitive possessor of spatial content. That is to say, the notion of an agent cannot be characterized independently from our perceptual
experiences and their practical capacity. But even though the self-location has a practical aspect, this does not mean that all actions can be rationalised in terms of perceptual interaction with objects. In other words, this does not mean that there is no distinction between merely responsive action and intentional action. A problem may be this-- if what rationalises action is the egocentric sensitivity which determines our conception of objects in the mind-independent world, then asking for an extrinsic criterion for distinguishing a rational action from a non-rational one is misplaced because there seems to be only an intrinsic criterion for rationalising action.

Responding to such a problem depends on the meaning of 'intrinsic'. That is to say, if 'intrinsic' means something internally possessed, in which perceptual experience is to be defined by sense-data, then there will be no continuation of thought in our perspective. But if 'intrinsic' means something intra-personal or the interweaving between our perspective and object in the mind-independent world, then the idea of keeping track of the object over time is dynamic over time because the object is not determined by a subject's will, although it is not independently characterizable. So, what is required in order to make the distinction between responsive action and intentional action involves the subject's ability to keep track of an object over time. That is to say, there is no dynamic thought in the responsive action. The dynamic thought offers the idea of object-identification that provides the idea of the same object again in different times. In accounting for self-location as what characterizes the notion of agency, we need an account of the dynamic thought of the subject toward the object. This also means that the notion of the self is not the notion which can be characterized in term of experiences which do not have continuation in thought. Rather it requires the interaction of perception and action under the idea of our attentive
ability. Such an ability is a self-conscious ability the object of which is the self. This provides the idea that a subject can have an objective reflection of the self. On this basis, we gain the idea of how the notion of the self involves the notion of agency.

In sum, I have argued that in order to find out what it is to be a possessor of content, it is necessary that there is an information link which holds between a subject and an object. The link which provides content is made possible only because the notion of the subject is characterized as what engages with objects, namely, the notion of being an agent. The notion of the self or the ‘I’-thought hence requires an account of the self as both an object and a self-consciousness. Individuation of a particular experience or conscious states of a subject is necessarily in terms of the subject of the experiences in the sense which offers a demonstrative* content. Otherwise, the notion of the self cannot be characterized in terms of agency which requires the non-mediate knowledge about the self. Without the notion of the subject as an agent, there will be no notion of point of view the characterization of which provides the rationality constraint on content.

3. Conclusion

I have argued in this chapter that the idea of practice as object-engagement which provides content that meets the rationality constraint requires the notion of the self being characterized as an agent. That is because thought about the self is thought about acting which is interrelated with the perceptual experiences of the subject. It is in this sense that the notion of agency is defined by the notion of intentional action, i.e. action which is egocentrically directed toward perceptual objects. The notion of intentional action is one-level, namely, action is constitutive of the egocentricity of a subject toward object. This is in
contrast with two-level account which characterizes the egocentricity independent from action. On this account, the problem is then that there is a gap between thought or intention and action that requires a further explanation. The one-level account provides the idea that the rationality constraint is possible only when there is a perspectival sensitivity of the subject toward objects and that the perspectival sensitivity which is in our engagement with objects provides content. This means that an account of content requires the notion of the subject as an owner of experiences. Without the subject, the information link with an object is not possible, and thereby content is not possible.

This answers the question that I set up at the outset that the notion of practice as object-engagement provides an account for what it is to be a possessor of content. In particular, being a possessor of content involves being an agent who engages with objects in the world. This means that the only notion of practice which satisfies that idea requires the account of what it is to be an agent who engages with an object, which is an intra-personal notion of practice. Such an account of practice can meet both constraints on content, namely, the constraint from the spatio-temporal world which is mind-independent and the constraint from the rational psychological space of a subject. By contrast, the notion of practice which confers the source of norms in inter-personal engagement fails to satisfy, in particular, the worldly constraint.

The intra-personal notion of practice provides the idea that norms are intrinsic to object-engagement such that although the world is independent from us, it is not independently characterized from our egocentric grasp of it. Such a notion of practice provides demonstrative content, i.e. the content of thought about objects with which we have a direct acquaintance. However, the object of demonstrative thoughts is not
the idea of thought about objects like Russell's sense-data the notion of which is not mind-independent. Demonstrative thought is object-dependent, but it concerns objects with which our egocentric point of view is required in the engagement. The egocentricity can be accounted for in terms of perceptual attention to the object, which is selective. Selective attention to an object is what connects the idea of object-dependence with the rationality of egocentricity, and is what provides demonstrative thoughts. This means that although thought about the object is selective or egocentrically sensitive, the object is independent from our will. If the object is not mind-independent, then the rationality principle that it is rationally possible to have different thoughts about the object would not be possible.

The notion of selective attention is to be accounted for in terms of the capacity of a subject to keep track of the object over time. It is this notion which answers the question why having a demonstrative thought is a thought the content of which derives from the causal relation between subject and object, but it is a relation which is normative. By keeping track of the object over time, the object as a semantic value of thought is what enables different thoughts (or a rational value) about it to be possible. The idea of keeping track of the object suggests the role of skill and care in the engagement with the object. (see Evans 1982:237) It is because both constraints of content--the worldly constraint and the rationality constraint -- cannot be separated. The notion of skill and care in this sense is a normative notion. This notion is the foundation for developing the idea of virtuous action in the area of ethics and applied philosophy. (e.g. see McDowell 1979,1998c)

It can be said that the idea of practice, as I have mentioned in the introduction, as being confined within the social ontology, detaches the
world from its rational space, so that there is a separation of the causal relation and its conceptual relation. An example of this may be seen in MacIntyre's idea of virtue which has its source of normativity in social practice. (1981) The notion of practice for him is to be distinguished from mere skill. That is because, for MacIntyre, in skillful acts, there is no virtuous aspect which is the crucial characteristic of practice. But that is because his idea of practice already assumes the separation between the world and its normative character. As with the views of Rouse (1996) and other social practice views, their worry is due to the understanding that the notion of practice as a direct engagement with the world is not possible because the causal link with the world is not normative. But that understanding has taken for granted the separation between the causal link and the normative link, so that the source of normativity is conferred to the social ontology instead of the world. But if what I have shown in the thesis is correct, the ontological notion of practice as an engagement with objects in the world is possible. Hence I conclude that if the notion of practice is required as what provides an understanding of the connection of our thoughts and the world, then it is necessary to grasp the notion of practice as an object-engagement of agents.
Notes

1 To think along the same line with the last chapter that the one-level account is two-staged and the two-level account is monolithic, it may be put like this that these accounts have different implications. That is to say, OL is two-staged in the sense that although the point of view and the subject cannot be characterized independently, the subject is required as what individuates the point of view and experiences. In contrast, TL is monolithic in the sense that the individuation of experiences does not require the subject. However, I will not state such implications by using the same terminology of ‘two-staged’/‘monolithic’. That is because when saying that the one-level account is two-staged in the last chapter, that was concerning with the relation between two stages of thought, namely, the information link and the conceptual link. So, to avoid confusions, I will not follow the same structure as the last chapter, although the implications can be taken as I have put here.

2 I construe the idea of I-thoughts following Evans 1982, in order to show why I-thought has a demonstrative* content. This is important because it shows why an account of the subject of thought cannot be an account which employs descriptive thoughts or thoughts about the experiences of the subject, which are not individuated in terms of the subject of the experience, rather in terms of the description of the experiences themselves. This is the main characteristic of Peacocke’s view.

3 This is not the notion of keeping track of an object because the subject is not an object for one to keep track of it, in the sense of demonstrative identification. Rather this idea can be taken as the cognitive dynamics of I-thought which allows a possibility of the thought about oneself to be the thought about an object in an environment. (cf. Cassam, Q. 1997: 189)

4 It will be more obvious later that Peacocke’s account of the self seems to take a first person thought in a similar way as demonstrative thoughts. So one can have demonstrative identification of experiences of a subject. (e.g. “This pain will not last long.”) But his I-thought in this sense does not provide demonstrative* content in my sense. Rather his I-thought in this sense does not provide demonstrative knowledge of the self. This means that the I-thought is unowned.

5 I take Peacocke’s notion of mental map or perspectival sensitivity as the egocentric identification, as I will explain below.

6 So, in turning to the wrong side, the baby’s action cannot be ascribed content.
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