Indifference and Determination:
Kant’s Concept/Intuition Distinction and Hegel’s Doctrine of Being

by

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Declaration

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at any university or equivalent institution and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, this thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

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Abstract

This thesis considers Kant’s concept/intuition model of objective determination [Bestimmung] as presented in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/87) and Hegel’s critical transformation of that model in “The Doctrine of Being,” the first book of the Science of Logic (1812-16/32). Although subject to competing interpretation, the Critique’s “Transcendental Logic” advances the “togetherness principle,” namely, that both intuitional representations (logically characterised by singularity and immediacy) and concepts (mediate and general representations) are required for determinate cognition of empirically real objects. It is often claimed that Hegel’s Logic vitiates this principle via a conceptualist reduction of intuition to conceptual form. I argue that this view misses a central motivation of the Doctrine of Being (or “Being Logic”). My thesis is that the Being Logic begins by ontologically generalising the logical structure of Kant’s concept/intuition distinction, deriving from the being of thought the inseparability of mediation and immediacy in any determinacy whatsoever. From this understanding of determinacy, the Being Logic then derives the minimal logical form of the qualitative determination of singular immediacies (or “somethings”). For Hegel, something in its immediacy is “indifferent” [gleichgültig] to other such somethings in the sense that they cannot be qualitatively distinguished. Hegel follows Kant’s Transcendental Logic in arguing that qualitative determination requires the conceptual mediation of singular somethings; unlike Kant, Hegel accounts for such mediation without constitutive reference to conceptuality understood as an independently articulable propositional form. Thus, rather than advance a one-sided conceptualism, Hegel’s Doctrine of Being provides a logical corrective to Kant’s tendency to present the respective cognitive contributions of concepts and intuitions as independently determinate, as well as to “two-stage” interpretations of Kant that argue for some form of concept/intuition separability. Instead, Hegel’s Being Logic constitutes a systematic derivation and ontological generalisation of Kant’s togetherness principle.
## Abbreviations

### Works by Hegel


### Works by Kant


Introduction
This thesis intends to understand and analyse the way in which the “Doctrine of Being” in Hegel’s *Science of Logic* (1812-6/32) takes up and transforms Kant’s concept/intuition distinction, advanced in its mature form in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781/87). Kant’s distinction between conceptual and intuitional representation, while interpretively contentious, is the cornerstone of Kantian philosophy. As Paul Redding has recently put it, “Clearly Kant regarded his having distinguished structurally different species of representation, concepts and intuitions, as his great breakthrough.” As it is very often said that Hegel is concerned to “overcome” Kantian dualism, one could expect that Hegel would direct particular critical attention to the central Kantian dualism of concept and intuition. As such, Simon Lumsden has suggested that “Overcoming the rigidity of the concept/intuition distinction is perhaps the single most important concern of Hegel’s Logic.” Lumsden’s claim in fact prompted this research project, and I broadly agree that Kant’s account of concepts and intuition is a central concern of Hegel’s *Logic*. In its brevity, however, there are three problems with Lumsden’s formulation.

Firstly, it is not clear whether it is accurate to characterise the concept/intuition distinction in Kant by “rigidity,” or indeed as a “dualism” at all. The term “rigidity” suggests a binary opposition whose terms are mutually exclusive and independently intelligible. Kant is ambiguous on this point. Kant independently advances his account of the intuitional form of representation in the Transcendental Aesthetic section of the first *Critique*, before considering its interaction with conceptuality in the Transcendental Logic. As is well known, Kant defines intuitions as “immediate” and “singular,” while concepts are “mediate” representations “common to several things” (or “general”). (B377). Having distinguished concepts and intuitions in this way, Kant then advances the “togetherness principle” or “mutual dependency thesis,” famously put in the formula: “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind” (A51/B75). Conceptualist readers of Kant hold that “blind” here means that we cannot cognise intuitional representation at all without conceptuality; non-conceptualists hold that intuitions do provide cognition with discriminable particulars. However, James Conant has recently and I think rightly argued that Kant has been consistently misread as committed to a “two-stage” or “layer-cake” conception of cognition, and it is only in the context of such a misreading that questions concerning the cognisability of intuitions in abstraction from conceptuality have any interest or pertinence. On Conant’s reading, Kant does not define two self-standingly intelligible representational forms and then demonstrate their interaction. Instead, Kant begins by “glossing” the opposition between two species of representation, and then shows “over a great many pages” that this opposition must be understood “dialectically,” in the sense that the conditions of possibility of our enjoying one representation is its dependence on its other, and vice-versa.

In my view, Hegel’s *Logic* is demonstrably at pains to present something like the “dialectical” account of concepts and intuitions that Conant attributes to Kant. In this suggestion, I follow Robert Pippin, whose 1989 *Hegel’s Idealism* is usually considered the seminal text for “non-metaphysical” readings of Hegel’s philosophy (more on that appellation in a moment). In *Hegel’s Idealism*, Pippin

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3 I discuss these positions at length in section 2.2.
5 Conant, “Why Kant In Not a Kantian,” 97.
argues that Kant’s philosophy is conceptualist and that this conceptualism motivates Hegel’s post-Kantian project, a line broadly adopted here. On Pippin’s interpretation, Kant argues that “there is no possibility that an intuited manifold could fail to conform to the categories… To the later idealists, it is this claim that must have looked like a serious blurring of the distinction between concept and intuition.” That for Kant intuitional representation requires conceptual mediation to issue in determinate cognition of an object “undercuts his strict separation of concept and intuition,” in turn enabling the Hegelian attempt to account for objective determinacy without reference to an independent “extraconceputal” faculty of sensible intuition. In a more recent work, however, Pippin subtly shifts this earlier reading. It is not that Kant intends a sharp distinction between concept and intuition and then unwittingly “undercuts” it, opening the door to Hegelianism; it is rather that, similar to Conant’s reading, Kant’s distinction is already dialectical:

Throughout his life Hegel characterised his own position by partly invoking and appropriating, and partly criticizing, what he took to be the Kantian understanding of the relation between understanding and sensibility, concept and intuition... But all the passages in Kant already have a dialectical and somewhat unstable form as if already foreshadowing Hegelian logic. Both distinctness and necessary intertwining (inseparability in any claim to knowledge) are emphasised.

Pippin thus motivates Hegel’s project by a reading of Kant in which concept and intuition are already not rigidly opposed. The question is then how exactly the ostensibly “dialectical” “distinctness” and “necessary intertwining” of Kant’s concept/intuition distinction shows up in Hegel’s Logic, and how Hegel articulates and understands this inseparability or togetherness.

On this point it must be said that Hegel himself, unlike Conant, levels the blame for “two-stage” readings entirely at Kant’s door, rather than his “Kantian” interpreters. Hegel argues that Kant fails to consistently present a dialectical account of logical opposition as it is glimpsed in the concept/intuition model, a failure ultimately traceable to his unwillingness to consider the logical structure of representation in abstraction from sensibly-conditioned human cognition. Before considering Hegel’s arguments on this point, I should say here that it does not matter much whether it is the actual Kant or the contemporary “Kantian” or Hegel’s “Kant” that is committed to the layer-cake view; what is important is that both Conant’s Kant and my Hegel are opposed to it. And, as we will see, Conant’s Kant and my Hegel go about their opposition to layer-cake readings of conceptual and intuitional form in very different ways.

The Logic’s abstraction of the logical features of intuitional form from our sensibility leads me to the second problem entailed by the brevity of Lumsden’s formulation. It is prima facie odd to take the Logic to be the critical site of Hegel’s contestation of Kant’s concept/intuition distinction. Hegel’s Phenomenology is a more obvious basis for the Kant-Hegel comparison in terms of concept/intuition. The Phenomenology speaks, like Kant’s critical philosophy, to the non-empirical conditions of empirical knowledge; it begins with a critical account of sensible givenness, arguing that “Sense-certainty” is not sufficient for epistemic entitlement. Hegel’s “critique of the Myth of the Given” – to use Wilfrid Sellars’

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7 Pippin, Hegel’s Idealism, 37.
terminology – is broadly consonant with Kant’s argument in the constructive half of the Critique, i.e. that mere “sensation” is epistemically insufficient, and that forms not derivable from immediate sensory input must be brought to bear by the cognising subject for empirical knowledge to obtain.

The problem with comparing the Critique to the Logic – rather than the Phenomenology – is that it is not concerned with sensibly-conditioned cognition. It is not primarily epistemic but ontological: it is not primarily concerned with reasons for legitimate belief about objects, but the reasons why being is the way that it is. As I intimated above, while I follow Pippin in reading Hegel’s Logic through Kantian conceptualism, I follow Stephen Houlgate in arguing that Hegel’s Logic is an ontological logic, that is, the conceptual categories developed in the logic “are forms inhering in what there is and not just forms in terms of which we think; they are ontological and not merely logical structures.” Houlgate’s position might be called a “revised metaphysical” position, insofar as it does not claim that Hegelian philosophy is committed to a substantial metaphysical entity (“Spirit”) on which all beings are really dependent (“Spirit Monism”), but more modestly to thought’s capacity to disclose the categorial structure of being. While Pippin’s “non-metaphysical” and Houlgate’s “revised metaphysical” positions could be taken as competing strands in contemporary Hegel interpretation, a typology of Hegel studies organised around the question of one’s commitment or otherwise to a “non-metaphysical” view is waning. The reasons for this are fairly easy to appreciate: to take Pippin and Houlgate as examples, both define themselves in opposition to spirit monist metaphysics, and both views are comfortable attributing much of Hegel’s motivation to Kant’s conceptualism: if our cognition of sensible objectivity in general is transcendentally dependent on conceptuality, then conceptuality determinative of objectivity can be legitimately said to be valid only for thought, or whether conceptuality as it is disclosed in our thought also determines mind-independent objectivity. The difference here is much finer than a rapid realist/anti-realist opposition would suggest. Pippin’s formulation is that the Logic sets out “all that ‘being’ could intelligibly be” such that Hegel’s idealism

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10 The Spirit Monist view of Hegel in Anglophone philosophy is usually associated with Charles Taylor’s glossing of “Geist” as “cosmic spirit” in Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 80.
11 This is in part due to partial reconciliations and retractions of key protagonists: Stephen Houlgate has recently mollified his critical characterisation of Pippin in The Opening. See Houlgate “Thought and Being in Hegel’s Logic: Reflections on Hegel, Kant and Pippin” in Wirklichkeit: Beiträge zu einem Schlüsselbegriff der Hegelschen Philosophie, edited by Luca Illetterati and Francesca Menegoni (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2018). Pippin in a 2015 essay distances himself from the “non-metaphysical” label. “Finite and Absolute Idealism,” 159. With that said, Pippin’s most recent statement of his Logic interpretation in the 2017 Oxford Handbook continues in my view to overemphasise the differences between his position and others. “Hegel on Logic as Metaphysics” in The Oxford Handbook of Hegel, ed. Dean Moyar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). I discuss this overemphasis briefly in footnote 153 below. The waning of the centrality of this opposition is also in part due to arguments that the metaphysical/non-metaphysical or “traditional/non-traditional” difference does not capture what is most interesting in Hegelian philosophy. See James Kreines, “Changing the Debate” Philosophy Compass 1.5 (2006): 466–480. I consider the implications of Kreines’ claim for the reading adopted here in conclusion. I should also add that it is possible that the revised metaphysical/non-metaphysical opposition I advance here does not capture the salience of Houlgate’s reading. Dean Moyar’s introduction to the Oxford Handbook provides a tripartite typology of the Hegelian interpretive landscape: Pippin’s Kantian reading, Spinozist “substance-first” readings, and Hegel’s “no priority” approach to the question of the Logic’s ontological status, in which “one takes Hegel at his word that thought and being are identical, and one refuses the question of whether the categories are either our activity or the workings of substance.” Dean Moyar, “Introduction” in The Oxford Handbook of Hegel, ed. Dean Moyar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), xxxi. This typology sits well with Houlgate’s claim that Hegel’s Logic is both “quasi-Kantian” and “quasi-Spinozist” (The Opening, 130).
can have no meaningful “realist competitor.” Houlgate argues that Pippin tacitly appends “for thought” to this claim, and that Hegel’s *Logic* is not limited to a concern with “all that ‘being’ could *intelligibly* be (for thought)” but rather with “all that ‘being’ could intelligibly be.” Given that these positions are differentiated only by qualification and emphasis, it is difficult to consider the choice between them to be defining of one’s Hegel interpretation. In other words, I take it that a “non-metaphysical” reader of this thesis will have interest in and meaningfully engage with the Hegelian structures of intelligibility as I present them – they are, after all, the *same* structures on both accounts – even if a qualified form of the purport of these structures is preferred.

The problem with comparing the *Critique’s* and the *Logic’s* respective structures of intelligibility is that the latter – although certainly targeting Kant’s concept/intuition distinction in some way – does not talk about *sensible* intuitions at all, nor does it directly treat the pure or non-empirical forms that for Kant organise such intuitions, i.e. space and time. And although the *Logic* articulates the same fundamental concepts (or “categories”) as Kant’s *Critique*, it does so in a different register. Like the *Critique*, the *Logic* articulates an ostensibly complete conceptual scheme; however, unlike the *Critique*, the *Logic’s* conceptual scheme is not demonstrated in terms of its applicability to the sensibly-given manifold of intuition. From this perspective, it does not seem as if Hegel “overcomes” Kant’s concept/intuition, but is rather guilty of changing the subject. For this reason, a number of prominent Kantians suggest that Hegel’s *Logic* is *reductively* conceptualist or “super-conceptualist.” On this view, Hegel does not merely claim that intuitions require concepts to be determinate, but reduces intuitional to conceptual form entirely. From the Kantian perspective, Hegel’s claim for a conceptual grasp on being’s intelligibility looks like a return to pre-Kantian rationalism. However, on my reading, Hegel’s Doctrine of Being *does* treat intuitional form as a moment or way of being’s own determinacy. The Being Logic provides an account of the logical structure that characterises Kantian intuitional form at its maximum generality, and in its togetherness with conceptual mediation. That is, Hegel derives the structure of external relationality (logically characteristic of Kantian intuitions) and takes that structure to be constitutive of qualitative determination as such (for Kant, the purview of conceptual form). In the Doctrine of Being, Hegel *generalises* concept/intuition togetherness as the logical form of qualitatively determinate individuality.

This brings me to my third point. The use of “overcoming” to articulate the Kant-Hegel relation is I think misleading; I instead use the term “generalising.” “Overcoming” has its closest textual analogue in Hegel’s “sublation” [*Aufhebung*]. Sublation, as is well-known, is for Hegel an operation in which an ostensibly complete and self-consistent position is revealed to be self-contradictory and so disqualified as a candidate for completeness, or, in Hegel’s language, is not “absolute.” Such a disqualified account is not simply *negated* or dismissed, however, but is preserved as a *moment* of the truth, insofar as it furnishes resources for the more coherent account that replaces

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12 Pippin, *Hegel’s Idealism*, 98.
13 Houlgate, “Thought and Being in Hegel’s Logic,” 111. See also Houlgate, *The Opening*, 141.
15 McDowell frames the Hegelian appropriation of Kantian epistemology in terms of “radicalisation.” *Having the World in View* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2009), 69. I avoid this term due to (a) my preference for retaining “radical” as a descriptor of *political* rather than *philosophical* activity; and (b) my reservations concerning McDowell’s framing of the Kant-Hegel relation, discussed at length in Chapter 3.1.
it. Hegel takes the logic of sublation to be operative in a systematic account of knowledge (in the *Phenomenology*), of being (in the *Logic*), as well as detectable in the historically actual progress of philosophy itself (as outlined in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*). There is much more to be said here, of course. The upshot for introductory purposes, however, is that “overcoming” does not quite catch the moment of preservation in Hegel’s appropriation of his philosophical predecessors. If Hegel is to sublate – rather than simply “overcome” – Kant’s concept/intuition distinction, something of it is to be preserved in Hegel’s own system. In my view, which can only be legitimated in the course of this thesis as a whole, what is preserved is the concept/intuition distinction as a logical account of the necessary conditions of determinacy in general. That is, Hegel’s *Logic* sublates the concept/intuition distinction by ontologically generalising its logical structure.

To argue for the thesis that Hegel’s *Logic* generalises Kant’s “togetherness principle,” however, requires setting aside the specifically cognitive context of Kant’s formulation of that principle. Or, put differently, the concept/intuition distinction must be “lifted” from the cognitive register of Kant’s *Critique* so as to be legible in Hegel’s *Logic*. I achieve this by taking up a pair of terms common to the *Critique* and the *Logic*: namely, determination and indifference. Taking Kant’s pre-Critical work into account, the concept/intuition distinction is effectively an anti-rationalist account of determination [*Bestimmung*], and it is in this way that *Logic* speaks to it. Hegel asks in the first remark of the first chapter of the first book of the *Logic*: “What brings determinacy to indeterminateness?” And then adds: “Kant has answered this question, in his way…” (SL 72/21.83). I hope to show the way in which Hegel’s *Logic* uses the logical resources of the concept/intuition distinction to articulate his own answer to the question of determinacy. Secondly, in this quote, Hegel obviously opposes determination to indeterminacy. That indeterminacy is the negation of determinacy is obvious. But what is not obvious is the centrality of indeterminacy to both Kant and Hegel – they argue, albeit in different ways, for their respective conceptions of determination through its oppositional pair. Moreover, in both Kant and Hegel, determination is opposed to indeterminacy understood more concretely as indifference. Kant’s concept/intuition model of determination results (at least in part) from his pre-Critical confrontation with the content indifference of conceptuality operating alone. In turn, Hegel’s ontological model of determination results (at least in part) from what he takes as indifferent indeterminacy maintained in Kant’s concept/intuition model, this time at the level of intuitions. Or that at least is the story I want to tell. The remainder of this introduction serves as a preliminary justification for an approach to the relation between Kant’s *Critique* and Hegel’s *Logic* through the vocabulary of determination and indifference.

1. “Determination” in Kant’s *Critique*

Given that this thesis connects concept/intuition to Hegel’s *Logic* via the problematic of determination, the reader could reasonably expect as its point of departure a definition of “determination” in Kant. There are two difficulties, however, with providing such a definition – the latter of which will get us to the salience of “indifference” for this project.

The first difficulty with defining determination is that Kant uses *Bestimmung* and its cognates in multiple contexts. As Lewis White Beck memorably puts it, “*Bestimmung* is one of Kant’s favourite words, and he overuses it.”¹⁶ Karl Ameriks has more recently noted that “to determine” [*bestimmen*]...
is a “multiply ambiguous key term” throughout Kant’s work. This ambiguity is primarily traceable to a foundational distinction in Kant between “theoretical” and “practical” philosophy: Kant uses *Bestimmung* and its cognates in logical, epistemological and metaphysical registers (the “theoretical”) as well as in his moral and political philosophy (the “practical”). In the latter practical usage, Kant trades particularly on the term’s German polysemy: alongside the obvious Kantian emphasis on self-determination [*Selbstbestimmung*], *Bestimmung* can also mean “vocation” and “destiny.” This polysemy is continued in post-Kantian idealism, in Fichte’s 1799 *The Vocation of Man [Die Bestimmung des Menschen]* and Hegel’s *Science of Logic.* I should note here that, given the limits of this project and the complexity of “determine” in its theoretical sense, the practical senses of “determine” and “self-determine” will be raised here only insofar as they frame the theoretical uses of the term.

The second difficulty will be treated directly. While Kant in the *New Elucidation* of 1755 does provide a definition of determination, this definition will be problematized and transformed — without for that matter ever being completely abandoned — throughout Kant’s pre-Critical and Critical periods. Proposition IV of the *New Elucidation* holds: “To determine is to posit a predicate while excluding its opposite” (*TP* 11/I:392). Determination is predication issuing in a non-contradictory proposition. Kant in his pre-Critical writings will however come to see this definition of “determine” to be an adequate description only of *logical* determination, inadequate on its own to provide determinate knowledge of empirically real objects. The pre-Critical Kant thus distinguishes between logical and “real” or “objective” determination, against the illegitimate and unreflective extension of merely logical determination to real existence he takes to be endemic to the German rationalist tradition.

In the *Critique*, the concept/intuition distinction is formulated to provide an account of the non-empirical conditions for objective determinacy. As we will see in some detail, the Critical Kant holds that logical determination needs to be supplemented by “sensations” “placed and ordered” “next to” and “after” one another in the a priori forms of our sensible intuition (space and time) in order to constitute determinate objective knowledge or “cognition” [*Erkenntnis*]. In short, the first constructive part of the *Critique*, the Transcendental Aesthetic, argues that our immediate cognitive relation to singular empirical objects is structured by the pure (non-empirical) forms of space and time, which are specific to our sensible receptivity. We do not access empirical objects independently of these forms (“things in themselves”) but only as “appearances” defined as the conceptually undetermined objects of intuition (A20/B34). In the second constructive part of the *Critique*, the Transcendental Logic, Kant provides an account of the conceptual conditions for determination of objects as appearance. Kant still understands these conceptual conditions in terms of logical determination: concepts (whether empirical or a priori) are understood as predicates of possible judgment (A69/B94), non-contradiction remains the *sine qua non* of truth (A59/B84), and the minimal logical forms of judgment constitute the pure or a priori concepts (“categories”) as rules for the cognition of objects (B128). That is, the logical forms of judgment not only regulate logically

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18 As we will see briefly in Chapter 6.2, Hegel’s account of the logical category of determination [*Bestimmung*] in the second Chapter of the *Logic* self-consciously appropriates Fichte by making reference to the “vocation” or “destiny” of the “human being” [*Die Bestimmung des Menschen*]. For a reading of Fichte’s use of the term and a brief, though suggestive account of the relation between Kant’s “thoroughgoing determination” [*durchgängiger Bestimmung*] in the Logic, see Angelica Nuzzo, “A Question of Method: Transcendental Philosophy, Dialectic, and the Problem of Determination.” *Fichte-Studien* 39 (2012): 37-66. "Thoroughgoing determination" will be considered briefly in relation to Kant’s *Critique of Judgment* conception of intellectual intuition (immediate grasp of the totality of possible determinations) in Chapter 5.1.
determinate claims, but also have a determinate objective function: they are ultimately responsible for the mediation of singularities given in the spatio-temporal forms of our sensibility, allowing spatio-temporally individuated objects to be brought together under more general categories (A79/B104-105). Concepts also – and this is what is primarily at stake here – are the ground of the “synthesis of apprehension” that enables singular intuitions to appear “next to” and “after” one another in the forms of space and time at all (on the conceptualist reading followed in this thesis, at least).

There is of course much more to be said on Kant’s concept/intuition model. Here I just want to note that, although predication for the Critical Kant has “real” use only when related to sensible intuitions, logical determination nonetheless remains the minimal form of objective determination. Understanding Kant’s critique and re-deployment of logical determination in his formulation of the concept/intuition model of objective determination is the task of Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis.

2. “Indifference”
A systematic account of just how much of the rationalist edifice remains in Kant’s Critical period is outside the scope of this thesis. I am concerned only to understand Kant’s transformation of logical determination into objective determination via the concept/intuition distinction, and Hegel’s response and alternative to Kant on this point. My point of departure in this is to approach “determination” in Kant through its oppositional pair. The threat of indeterminacy is an over-arching worry in Kant’s pre-Critical work and the first Critique itself, appearing under a string of more or less poetic synonyms and related terms: “emptiness,” “blindness,” “without all content,” “nothing at all” [gar nichts], and most importantly, “indifference” [Gleichgültigkeit]. Henry E. Allison, contrasting Kant’s work with the early modern Cartesian and Lockean paradigm preceding it, suggests that “the Kantian spectre is one of cognitive emptiness rather than global scepticism.” This worry or spectre is front and centre in Kant’s togetherness principle and the “blindness” and “emptiness” of its poles in isolation.

However, it is not immediately clear how empty thoughts are without intuitionally-given content, and, conversely, just how blind intuitions are without conceptual determination. As I mentioned above, the ongoing debate between conceptualist and non-conceptualist readings of Kant’s Critique testifies to the difficulty of deciding on the kind or degree of objectivity provided by intuitional form prior to or in abstraction from conceptual determination: the non-conceptualist argues that intuitions, although conceptually undetermined, do indeed provide us with spatio-temporally discriminable objects; the conceptualist holds in contrast that spatio-temporal discrimination is itself dependent upon conceptual synthesis, such that intuitions without concepts are in fact utterly blind, in the sense that no conscious representation of spatio-temporal individuals is possible. I deal with this debate at some length in Chapter 2. Leaving questions of the cognition of unsynthesised intuitions to one side for the moment, what I want to suggest here is that the indeterminate emptiness and blindness that Kant refers to in his “togetherness principle” are both systematically related to the problem of indifference. Indifference in German is Gleichgültigkeit.

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20 Allison, Henry E. Transcendental Idealism, 160. From a certain (pop-psychological) perspective, Kant’s overuse of Bestimmung and its cognates is consistent with Allison’s picture of a Kant haunted by indeterminacy: he doth protest too much.
literally “equal-validity.” This term will be used by both Kant and Hegel in a number of disparate contexts, but those considered here are each relevant to the problem of objective determination.\footnote{For example, I leave out for a later project Hegel’s account of indifference in the sense of “habit” as a necessary condition of embodied agency in the Anthropology section of the Philosophy of Spirit.}

My treatment of Kant begins with the word *Gleichgültigkeit* as it appears at the very start of the *Critique*, in relation to Kant’s polemic against “Indifferentism to metaphysics.” For the indifferentists, all metaphysical claims are equally valid, at least if the criteria for judgment is substantive contribution to scientific knowledge. Kant’s answer to indifferentism to metaphysics will be to articulate what has remained indifferent within metaphysics. Most broadly, rationalism and empiricism both assume that our knowledge conforms to already individuated objects (an assumption that for Kant constitutes “transcendental realism”). More specifically, on the rationalist side, formal logic in its extension to objective determination is indifferent to the existential status and real relation of its terms: non-contradictory propositions are taken to be valid regardless of whether their content is empirically-drawn or merely thought. Kant’s pre-Critical work demonstrates that, with the resources of formal logic alone, we may find ourselves thinking or judging of *nothing* (no empirically possible thing) when we take ourselves to be meaningfully thinking or judging of *something* (something empirically possible), and not being able to tell the difference. In other words, we need to know the conditions under which our judgments are objectively meaningful or have objective purport, i.e. constitute knowledge of an empirically real object. The Critical Kant formulates his revolutionary distinction between conceptual and intuitional representations to provide this: thought of an object will amount to determinate knowledge if empirical intuitions are brought together (“synthesised”) under (“subsumed”) the rules provided by a priori conceptual form.

As such, I want to claim that “not being able to tell the difference” – being *indifferent* to a difference, lacking the cognitive resources to determine a difference – is the structure of indeterminacy diagnosed by the early Kant. For Hegel, however, Kant has solved the indifference of logical determinations of existence only to shift the problem of indifference down a representational level, to intuitions. I argue that Hegel’s *Logic* picks up on and systematically treats Kant’s account of intuitions – the placement of objects as appearances in the forms of space and time – as themselves indifferent to one another.\footnote{This argument draws on Robert Stern’s account of Kant’s “bundle theory” of the object in *Hegel, Kant and the Structure of the Object* (London: Routledge, 1990), 17-21, as well as James Kreines’ account of humean indifference in *Reason in the World: Hegel’s Metaphysics and Its Philosophical Appeal* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2015). See section 3.2.} These existential and intuitional forms of indifference have a common structure insofar as, in both, distinct terms are indistinguishable; they however treat this problem at different representational levels. In existential indifference, one is not able to determine the difference between something and *nothing at all*; in intuitional indifference, one is not able to determine the difference between something and *another something*.\footnote{Readers of the Logic will already recognise in these forms a similarity to the indistinguishability of being and nothing in the Doctrine of Being’s first chapter and the indistinguishability of self-relating somethings in its second, and I approach these chapters in terms of indifference in Chapter 6.}

For Hegel, the external relation characteristic of Kantian intuitional form means that each intuitionally-given singular object is “indifferent” to every other such object. Intuition represents objects as “outside” of each other, each object excluding other such objects from itself in order to be the spatio-temporally delimited object that it is. However, in the external form of relation proper to intuition, there is no ground in an object’s *immediate* representation for contrastive comparison to – and so qualitative distinction from – objects external to it. In their immediacy, externally related
objects appear without relation. Kant is aware of this problem, and in the synthesis of apprehension and reproduction in the A Deduction argues that, in order for intuitions to be distinguishable from one another, conceptuality – understood minimally as spontaneous synthetic activity – is required to bring intuitionally-given, externally related objects together in one thought (as I will argue in Chapter 2.2, it is this moment in Kant’s A Deduction that scuttles the non-conceptualist interpretation). But for Hegel, Kant in framing the relation of conceptual mediation and intuitional immediacy in this way has generalised the external relationality characteristic of intuitional form to the concept/intuition model as a whole: the indiscernability of intuitions to one another is resolved only by the application of a conceptuality entirely external to intuitionally-given objectivity. What is required, on Hegel’s view, is a model of determination in which indiscernibility of itself is shown to entail the mediation that Kant figures as an external conceptual operation on intuitional objectivity. Once this is established I hope to show that indiscernibility provides a thematic and conceptual thread linking together Hegel’s various critiques of Kant’s concept/intuition distinction, and in turn connecting those critiques to Hegel’s alternative model of determination as it is presented in the Logic.

3. “Determination” in Hegel’s “Doctrine of Being”

In my reading of the Logic in Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis, I aim to show that for Hegel determinateness is the logical result of indiscernibility itself, and that this constitutes a re-formulation of Kant’s togetherness principle as constitutive of qualitative determinacy in general. A sense of this generalisation can be indicated by Hegel’s take up and transformation of one implication of Kant’s togetherness principle in the introduction to the Doctrine of Being or Seinslogik, entitled “With what must the beginning of science be made?” Hegel writes:

... there is nothing in heaven or nature or spirit or anywhere else that does not contain just as much immediacy as mediation, so that both these determinations prove to be unseparated and inseparable and the opposition between them nothing real (SL 46).24

On the one hand, Hegel agrees with Kant that immediacy and mediation (and we will see in a moment, also singularity and generality) must be brought together in any contentful thought. But Hegel disagrees with those moments in Kant in which the mediation or synthesis definitionally lacking from intuitional representation is framed as being brought to objects in their immediacy. Rather, Hegel makes the ontological claim that the logic of determination – understood as the co-presence of mediation and immediacy – is operative in all object domains (“heaven,” “nature” and “spirit” – that is, those domains whose modes of determination are accounted for by the three parts of the Hegelian system, i.e. by Logic, the Philosophy of Nature, and the Philosophy of Spirit), such that an account in which objectivity is presented as somehow in itself lacking mediation is incoherent.

However, to understand how Hegel takes himself to be licensed to shift the concept/intuition model in this ontological direction, we need to acknowledge and unpack another Kantian resource: Kant’s doctrine of Intellectual Intuition. This complex, multifaceted doctrine – really doctrines – and its take up in post-Kantian idealism is the subject of Chapter 4. Per the concept/intuition model, Kant holds that our thought can “only think” – is limited to the synthesis and subsumption of intuitionally-given objects. In both the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of the Power of Judgment, however,

24 Hegel repeats a version of this claim in EL §21.
Kant argues that we must be able to form the thought of a “divine” intellect that would not be dependent on the forms of our intuition for immediate access to singular objects, and that the logical possibility of such a cognition brings the sensible conditions of our “peculiar” cognition into relief (CPuR B145-46, CPI 271-79/5:401-11). Hegel however, following Fichte, takes Kant’s intuitive intellect to describe our thought’s capacity to immediately grasp its own mediating activity. For Hegel, thought is as much immediately aware of its own activity of mediation.

Hegel’s compression of immediate intuition into thought is present in the Logic’s first category, “pure being.” Hegel draws immediacy into the ambit of thought by defining being as “… pure indeterminateness and emptiness [reine Unbestimmtheit und Leere]. – There is nothing [Nichts] to be intuited in it, if one can speak here of intuiting [Anschauen]; or, it is only this pure empty intuition itself [oder es ist nur dies reine, leere Anschauen selbst]” (SL 59). Hegel may appear to be vacillating here in first questioning whether “intuiting” is relevant to or valid in an ontological logic, but then nonetheless characterising the thought of being in its immediacy as pure “intuition itself” [Anschauen selbst]. Indeed, if intuition is considered to be only ever empirical intuition, then one cannot speak of intuition in a logical ontology. But if Kant’s forms of pure (non-empirical) intuition (space and time) are broken down into their logical components – immediacy and singularity – then thought can be said to immediately intuit its own being, i.e. that there is thought. And this immediacy is “singular” in the Kantian sense reserved for the pure forms of intuition – pure being, like space and time for Kant, is not a general concept under which individuals can be subsumed (A24-25/B39). But in contrast to Kant’s way of proceeding in the Transcendental Deduction, the Logic demonstrates that immediacy is necessarily mediated of itself, without reference to independently derivable conceptual form. The thought of pure Being is immediately mediated by what it is not – pure nothing – insofar as pure being is indistinguishable from pure nothing. Being and nothing are indifferent in the sense that they are neither identical (being is not nothing) nor distinguishable on the basis of any content. They are “non-identical indiscernibles.”25 But the structure of this indifference, if attended to, is already itself a minimal form of mediation: insofar as being in its indifference to nothing “vanishes” into that nothing – and vice-versa – that vanishing movement issues in the category or “thought determination” [Denkbestimmung] of “becoming,” which allows the immediate difference between being and nothing to be articulated.

This in turn enables Hegel, in the second chapter of the Logic (“Existence”) to think through the ontological structure that enables individuals to be both related to and distinct from other such individuals. Again, Hegel’s starting point is indifference. In its immediacy, “something” cannot be distinguished from another such something (its “other”) – Hegel here explicitly calls them “indifferent [Gleichgültig] to one another” (SL 90). Hegel shows that a qualitative determination of something (a something that is not another such something) is dependent on a moment of mediation internal to externally related somethings themselves: the determinateness that something receives by being put into merely external relation with an other is in fact dependent on that other-relatedness being intrinsic to that something itself: “the determining [Bestimmen] from outside is at the same time determined by the something’s own immanent determination [Bestimmung]” (SL 97/21.112). In Hegel’s terminology, determinateness [Bestimmtheit] as the simple negation that distinguishes one something from another (this not that) is a corollary of determination proper [Bestimmung] which accounts for the self-identity of something in and through its constitutive relatedness.

Once these sections of Hegel’s Logic are worked through, it becomes clear that a shared concern of both Kant’s Critique and Hegel’s Logic is a vindication of the togetherness principle, understood more concretely as an articulation of the relation between indifference and determinate difference. Kant’s account of the syntheses of apprehension and reproduction in the A Deduction and Hegel’s alternative derivation of the logical structure of “something” may be seen as determinations of immediate difference, articulating the mediation necessary for qualitative distinguishability between individuals to obtain. In both cases, mediation and immediacy must come together: without conceptuality understood as synthesis, Kant suggests that we could not have more than an immediate and so indeterminate difference between spatio-temporal objects. Similarly, without the spontaneous generation of a mediating thought-determination, Hegel thinks we cannot have more than an immediate, indeterminate difference between pure being and pure nothing, and further, between something and other.

The difference is that, in Kant, togetherness means the bringing together of two independently articulated forms: the external relationality that provides us with individual objects on the one hand, and the conceptual functions of mediation ultimately traceable to the categories derived from propositional logical form on the other. In Hegel mediation and immediacy emerge together as part of a single category derivation: as I have said above, Hegel derives the structure of external relationality (logically characteristic of Kantian intuitions) and takes that structure to be constitutive of qualitative determination as such (for Kant, the purview of conceptual form). In the Doctrine of Being, Hegel take the togetherness of the logical components of concept/intuition as constitutive of qualitatively determinate individuality in general.
Chapter 1. Kant and Indifferentism

Chapter 1.1 seeks to demonstrate that the Critique’s introductory polemic against “Indifferentism” is salient to Kant’s self-presentation of his own project as a critical diagnosis and correction of the “transcendental realism” common to early modern empiricist and rationalist traditions. In Chapter 1.2 I examine two key pre-Critical essays published in 1763: The Only Possible Ground of Proof for a Demonstration of the Existence of God and Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes Into Philosophy. Kant argues that the indifference of rationalist “logicism” to the difference between logical and “real” objectivity results in objective indeterminacy. This prepares for Chapter 2’s consideration of the concept/intuition distinction, first introduced in the 1770 Dissertation but revised for the 1781 Critique, as an attempt to supplement the indifference of logical form in order to account for determinate knowledge of objects.

1.1. Indifferentism to Metaphysics

In the Preface to the A Edition of the first Critique (1781) Kant allegorises philosophy as a “battlefield” [Kampfplatz]. The armies in this military metaphor are the competing rationalist “dogmatists,” whose civil war is repeatedly interrupted by “skeptics,” a “kind of nomads,” and by “empiricists,” who have “recently attempted” (Kant has Locke in mind) to re-ground metaphysics in “physiology.” Taken together, the failure of dogmatists to build from sure foundations, the sceptical hostility to any foundation, and the improper physiological foundation provided by empiricism means that the philosophical battlefield has produced no clear victor. In this allegory, “victory” would be the presentation of a metaphysical “science” capable of the epistemic certainty associated historically with geometry and, more recently, Newtonian physics. These armies are followed by a fourth: “Indifferentism.” The endless disputes of metaphysics results for Kant in a growing indifference to the continued project of philosophy as a science:

Now after all paths (as we persuade ourselves) have been tried in vain, what rules is tedium and complete indifferentism [Indifferentism], the mother of chaos and night in the sciences, but at the same time [zugleich] also the origin, or at least the prelude, of their incipient transformation and enlightenment, when through ill-applied effort they have become obscure, confused, and useless (Ax).

In everyday language, a person is said to be indifferent if they are “unconcerned” by certain circumstances. Indifference, when carried to an extreme, has moral connotations: we can be callously indifferent to the suffering of others; we can be stoically indifferent to our own. What interests me here – and what I think is relevant to Kant’s account of “indifferentism” – is that an indifferent stance to an object or domain is bound up with an epistemic claim for the indistinguishability of qualitatively distinct terms. For both the callous bystander and stoic sage, the distinction between suffering and its negation is not counted as valid—though admittedly only the stoic is concerned to provide reasons for this claim. The stoic believes pain and pleasure to be equally rational, and so acts as if pain and

26 For an overview of the stoic justification for indifference to suffering via a certain rationalist metaphysics in the Hellenistic period, see Pierre Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy, trans. Michael Chase (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1995) 126-29. Stoicism is of course a wide-ranging historical phenomenon and not fairly represented here; I use only the Hellenistic school as an example of an attempted rational legitimation of indifference as a practical attitude. This stoic program in fact extends to a subtle system of “preferred” and “non-preferred indifferents.” John Sellars, Stoicism (Durham: Acumen, 2006), 110-14.
pleasure were identical. To put this in the language of contemporary pragmatist readings of Kantian and post-Kantian idealism, the stoic’s epistemic claim and practical action are to be taken together as commitments. The upshot of the generalised language of commitment is that it clarifies the way in which actions and knowledge-claims must be taken together in order to draw a satisfactory picture of rational agency: if an agent makes an epistemic claim for the indistinguishability of pain and suffering, failure to act on that indifference – by, say, actively seeking pleasure – would provoke a justified challenge to the coherency and consistency of that agent’s ensemble of commitments. With this epistemic component of indifference in view, the everyday usage of “indifference” can be filled out: a person can be said to be indifferent in a situation in which a difference doesn’t “count” for that person as a difference. Indifference means not being able, not wanting, or not licensing a qualitative difference between terms. Indifferent terms thus appear as equally-valid alternatives for action: each is as justified or legitimate as the other, or, put negatively, neither is to be preferred.

Although Kant uses the Romantic “indifferentism” above, the German word for indifference – which Kant prints in bold in the next quoted passage – makes this explicit: “Gleichgültigkeit,” “Equal-validity,” “being valid” or “counting” [gelten] as the same or equal [gleich]. Kant’s indifferentist behaves as if the rationalism/empiricism/skepticism difference makes no difference. The belief licensing this stance is the ostensible failure of metaphysics in all its historical variants to be set on the “secure path of a science” (B ix). For the indifferentist, all metaphysical paths “have been tried in vain,” i.e. attempted without demonstrable extra-philosophical results; judged solely in these terms all metaphysical systems count as the same. For our purposes, Kant’s characterisation as indifferentism to metaphysics can be (perhaps anachronistically) summarised as: differences within metaphysics have not made a difference outside of philosophy, and the latter is the standard by which they are to be judged. All metaphysicians are “as bad as each other” – or, in an ironic mode, as good. In the case of

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27 To use the language of Robert Brandom, epistemic claims and practical stances are both best understood as reversible, normatively answerable “commitments.” Brandom gives a clear introduction to his way of subsuming epistemic contents under normative ones in his reading of Kant in the introduction to Tales of the Mighty Dead. For example: “One of Kant’s master ideas is that what distinguishes thinkers and agents from merely natural creatures is our susceptibility to certain kinds of normative appraisal. Judgments and actions essentially involve commitments as to how things are or are to be. Because they can be asserted according to their correctness (truth/error, success/failure), we are in a distinctive sense responsible for what we believe and do. Kant makes a normative turn: a shift from the sort of ontological demarcation Descartes offers of selves as loci of responsibility.” Robert Brandom, Tales of the Mighty Dead: Essays in the Metaphysics of Intentionality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2002), 21. As we will see in section 2.2 when treating Kant’s account of concept use in the Deduction, concepts are normative in these sense that they furnish a rule for the synthesis of the manifold of intuition. When one subsumes particulars under an empirical concept, one is tacitly committed to providing reasons for that classification, and to integrating that classification with the others that one holds.

28 This understanding of rational agency is developed in Christine Korsgaard, Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

29 Something of contemporary Anglophone quietism is detected in Kant’s indifferentists, insofar as practical relevance must motivate and justify philosophical thinking. Richard Rorty has recently presented Anglophone quietism in these terms: “Most people who think of themselves in the quietist camp, as I do, would hesitate to say that the problems studied by our activist colleagues [aka “the naturalists”] are unreal. They do not divide philosophical problems into the real and the illusory, but rather into those that retain some relevance to cultural politics and those that do not. Quietists, at least those of my sect, think that such relevance needs to be demonstrated before a problem is taken seriously. This view is a corollary of the maxim that what does not make a difference to practice should not make a difference to philosophy” “Naturalism and Quietism,” in Naturalism and Normativity, ed. Mario De Caro and David MacArthur (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 57. Kant’s characterisation suggests that, for the indifferentist, metaphysics is to be abandoned tout court; for Rorty,
Kant’s indifferentists, each metaphysical school is as justified as every other, which is to say, equally unjustified.

I want to suggest that “indifferentism at the opening of the Critique opens onto the philosophical question of determination. That is, indifferentism directs our attention to the conceptual activity of qualitative distinction. Taking “determination” in the logical sense that Kant inherits from rationalism, two subject concepts can be identified under one predicate concept while being determined as distinct under another possible predication. In this way, empirical concepts abstract from differences in the particular objects they subsume. That is, taking as determinative a different classificatory empirical concept will produce a judgment of difference between objects instead of identity (sorted as “chairs,” without further determination, objects A and B are identical; determined as “red,” objects A and B may be the same). As Frederick Beiser puts it: “when a particular is subsumed under a universal there are other universals true of it, and there are other particulars that instantiate this universal.” In other words, objects determined through empirical concept predication remain different in some respects, and the same in others. The upshot of this is that such predication is contestable: one can point to those properties not subsumed under the predicate concept in a determination of identity, or to shared properties in a judgment of difference. As such, one way to talk about the problem that Indifferentism presents for Kant is that it illegitimately makes a determination of identity, instead of difference (“all metaphysical argument is useless” should read: “some metaphysical argument is useless”). In order to contest this indifferentist claim, Kant’s Critique will seek introduce and legitimate criteria under which valid metaphysics can be distinguished from invalid forms.

Kant’s metaphorical language – his description of Indifferentism as the “mother of chaos and night in the sciences” – already indicates Kant’s response to indifferentism. The metaphorical contrast between obscurity and clarity (Enlightenment, Aufklärung) is perhaps to be expected in an 18th Century thinker, but there are two twists on this theme here in Kant. Firstly, the “night” of indifference is at the same time [zugleich] ambiguously seen to give rise (is “the origin or at least the prelude”) to “Enlightenment.” That indifference for Kant is taken to prepare for or coincide with a new clarification is indicative of the track taken in this thesis: as mentioned in Introduction, determination is here articulated through an account of its oppositional pair. The metaphors of night and light, used polemically here by Kant, are also used by Kant and by Hegel in presenting their respective accounts however, philosophy is not itself to be abandoned but practiced in a different way or under a different self-understanding.

31 I am drawing here on Beatrice Longuenesse’s commentary on the logical forms of universality and particularity in Kant: a logical determination of identity has the form of the universal judgment (“All As are B”) and determinations of difference have the form of the particular judgment (“some As are Bs”). Longuenesse, Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Charles T. Wolfe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 131-134, and Kant on the Human Standpoint (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 220-226.
32 For a nuanced examination of the light metaphor in philosophy, see Hans Blumenberg, “Light as a Metaphor for Truth: At the Preliminary Stage of Concept Formation” in Modernity and the Hegemony of Vision, ed. David Michael Levin, Berkeley: University of California Press (1993), 30-62. As we will see in Chapter 6, light and darkness will be Hegel’s preferred metaphors when articulating the emergence of determinacy out of immediate indifference.
of objective determination. Secondly, as we see in the next section, Kant’s indictment of Indifferentism suggests an extreme form of the Enlightenment contrast. As we will see, if taken to their limit, the reasons indifferentists give for the failure of metaphysics would for Kant shut down the practice of reason-giving in general – or at least the discipline whose vocation is to investigate rationality as such.

Kant’s Response to Indifferentism
For Kant, indifferentism misrecognises the determination of the human as thinking, a determination [Bestimmung] that is also a vocation [Bestimmung]. That is, Kant’s response is to oppose the indifferentist charge with his own understanding of human being and the project in which that being is properly engaged. A “philosophical anthropology” – a characterisation of the being of being human – is present from the Critique’s very beginning. To return to the Critique’s Introduction:

For it is pointless to affect indifference [Gleichgültigkeit] with respect to such [metaphysical] inquiries, to whose object [Gegenstand] human nature cannot be indifferent [nicht gleichgültig sein kann]... these so-called indifferentists [Indifferentisten], to the extent that they think anything at all [überall etwas denken], always unavoidably fall back into metaphysical assertions, which they yet profess so much to despise (Ax).

For Kant, indifferentism is untenable because it fails to understand the determination of the human as thinking, and the imbrication of metaphysics in thinking “anything at all.” There are two things going on in this passage: (1) the anthropology noted above, and (2) a certain deflated sense of metaphysics.

1. For Kant, thinking constitutes our necessary determination. I use “necessary” here in the rationalist sense: to negate its predication would “cancel” the subject concept, would contradict it. Were we not to think, we would not be human. As we will see in a little more detail in Chapter 6, Hegel will say the same thing: “the human being is himself thinking, he exists as thinking, thought is concrete existence and actuality... the determination of the human being” in opposition to the “natural and sensuous being” of the animal or “brute” (SL 96/21.112). This philosophical anthropology helps to clarify the sense of indifference discussed above. In Kant’s view, “indifferentism” marks a failure – wilful or otherwise – to articulate an essential or necessary difference, in this case between the human (whose necessary predicate is rationality) and the animal (characterised by the negation of this predicate).

2. To be human is to think “metaphysically,” albeit in deflated sense of the word. Metaphysics for Kant’s audience meant what is now sometimes called German School Metaphysics or Schulphilosophie, i.e. Wolff’s and then Baumgarten’s formalisation of some Leibnizian doctrines.

33 Hegel’s account of qualitative determination begins with a consideration of the identity of being and nothing in terms of the metaphor of pure light and pure darkness (SL 69/21.80). Kant’s account of the distributive (rather than successive) determination of objects in a putative intuitive understanding also proceeds in terms of darkness and light. See Longuenesse’s discussion of Reflexion 5270 in Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 309-10. I consider Kant’s account of intellectual intuition in Chapter 4.

34 In this formulation I am indebted to Andrew Benjamin’s work, in particular Virtue in Being (Albany: State University of New York, 2016). I think it is more historically appropriate to call this project a “metaphysical anthropology,” in the sense that it would be a branch of special metaphysics (not concerned with what it is to be in general, but the being of a certain domain of beings).

35 The association and hyphenation of Leibniz and Christian Wolff’s respective philosophies as constitutive of the “School Metaphysics” of Germany in the 18th Century is traceable to the work of Wolff’s contemporary G.B.
Wolff and Baumgarten’s systems were divided into “general metaphysics” or ontology, which concerns “being qua being,” those determinations (in the logical, predicative sense) shared by all possible beings, and Special Metaphysics, consisting of psychology (metaphysics of the soul), cosmology (metaphysics of the universe), and theology (metaphysics of God). It is sometimes suggested that Kant’s Critical writings are anti-metaphysical, or that Kant is the “gravedigger” of metaphysics. But the above quote suggests otherwise. Karl Ameriks and more recently Nicholas F. Stang have drawn attention to the continuity between “pre-Critical” or “Leibnizian” and “Critical” Kants – the many senses in which Kant remains concerned with traditional metaphysical questions, while at the same time altering their significance. In the remainder of this chapter we will see that Kant in the pre-Critical writings offers a critique of the objective purport of special metaphysics, primarily with a critique of the “ontological” argument for the necessary being of God. This culminates in the Critical deflation of general metaphysics from the determinations of all possible beings to the cognitive conditions for our determinate representation of possible objects. If General Metaphysics is the inquiry into the determination of “pure” (non-empirical) thought, then for Kant a deflated form of such metaphysics is irreducible insofar as non-empirical concepts are a condition of our representation of an objective world. Even our most immediate acquaintance with “physical” objects, we are all “metaphysicians” to the extent that we “think anything at all.” We will see Kant’s account of the irreducibility of non-empirical thought in detail over the remainder of this chapter. Here I just want to note that this conception of pure thought’s relation to the world of experience means a critical correction and re-orientation of metaphysical inquiry as an answer to the Indifferentist charge. It is on this basis that Kant will claim that “There has always been some metaphysics or other to be met with in the world” (Bxxxi). Hegel will echo this point, claiming pure categories of thought are always “mixed in” with our empirical experience of an objective world (EL §38).

Although Kant does not raise it, it is possible for the indifferentist position to renew itself with a familiar argument: if there is always some form of metaphysics in the world, no escape from metaphysics, then there is no “neutral” position from which to judge the value of a given metaphysics. Kant however tacitly responds to this further argument by asserting that reason possesses the necessary reflexivity to determine which of its “metaphysical” determinations — which non-empirical categories of thought — are legitimate. Once reason self-determines its standard, one would be able to determine “better” and “worse” forms of metaphysics in the world, i.e. categories legitimated and

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37 Here for ease of exposition I am relying on Nicholas F. Stang’s introductory summary in *Kant’s Modal Metaphysics* (Oxford: OUP, 2016), 3.


de-legitimated by that standard. The normative dimension of Kant’s project is foregrounded in Kant’s immediate recourse to juridical analogy, the Critique’s eponymous “self-trial” of reason by reason:

... reason [Vernunft] should take on anew the most difficult of all its tasks, namely, that of self-knowledge [Selbsterkenntnis], and to institute a court of justice, by which reason may secure its rightful place while dismissing all its groundless pretensions... this court is nothing other than the critique of pure reason itself (Axi).

In Chapter 5 we will see this juridical understanding return in Hegel’s insistence on radically self-critical thought. For Kant, as for Hegel after him, reason sets its norms itself. Reason self-determines in the sense that it is able to establish which rational forms have a legitimate relation to the world. It is able to “self-correct.”

I said above that Kant’s project can be seen as a deflated “General Metaphysics.” It is important that Special Metaphysics will be preserved by Kant also, albeit again in a suitably deflated form. Both limbs are essential to the rebuttal of Indifferentism. As we will see once we work through the concept/intuition distinction, that distinction is both intended to answer the Indifferentist charge by placing metaphysics on the secure path of a science (a deflationary investigation into cognitive determination), and to integrate into the Critical Philosophy the practical perspective that gave rise to an Indifferentist attitude. Thinking in abstraction from intuitions can provide us with moral ideas – of the Soul and of God – indispensable to our practical self-understanding and efficacy. But to understand this move we need to consider briefly Kant’s relation to the other three armies on the field – rationalism, empiricism, and scepticism, and in turn the concept/intuition distinction itself.

**Indifferentism in Metaphysics**

Kant’s critical re-orientation of metaphysical inquiry can be introduced by drawing attention to a second possible sense of “Indifference to Metaphysics,” though one not explicitly present in Kant’s Introduction. This is the intra-philosophical question of what is indifferent to metaphysics itself, what is as yet (from Kant’s perspective) indeterminate for it, what it does not have the resources to distinguish. When Kant in the Amphibolies and the Canon of Pure Reason outlines what he takes to be the key desiderata of Transcendental Idealism, his self-presentation is in terms of the intervention he takes to be making into rationalism, empiricism, and scepticism and their relation. The “indifferentism to metaphysics” considered above has dropped out of the picture, suggesting that Kant considers it an intellectual position on or about philosophical practice, but not philosophical as such. What I want to suggest in this section however, is that the rationalism-empiricism-scepticism historical nexus, at least as Kant understands it, can be economically approached in terms of indifference as it is sketched in outline above.

For Kant, the dominant strands of early modern philosophy both assume that knowledge means a correspondence of thought to independently determinate objects. While this “transcendental realist” position and the “Copernican turn” that Kant initiates by presenting an opposed “transcendental idealism” is well known, I will briefly set it out. The rationalist metaphysics of the Leibniz-Wolff school and British empiricism both present foundationalist epistemologies. That is, both hold some knowledge to be non-problematic or immediately self-evident, with the validity of all other knowledge claims to be assessed in terms of its relation to this non-problematic foundation. Prima facie, however, the respective foundations of German “School Metaphysics” and British empiricism...
seem completely opposed. For the German metaphysical tradition knowledge of mind-independent reality is secured by the activity of the intelligence. As Beatrice Longuenesse puts it, this rationalism is grounded in an “assumption that logical principles (defining the relations between concepts or propositions) are also ontological principles (defining the relations between existing things and states of affairs), and that one can derive the latter from the former.”\textsuperscript{40} Stang defines this as logicism: The rules of thought hold for all possible being, and the first rule of thought is non-contradiction.\textsuperscript{41} As such, the rules of logic can be applied to clarify the “confused” representations of being we gain through sensory perception (more on this in a moment). Formal logic thus provides a secure foundation for knowledge claims. In contrast, for British empiricism, i.e. the historical trajectory from Locke to Hume, knowledge claims are not to be clarified by recourse to logic, but by reference to discrete perceptual episodes. As immediate sense-perception is taken to be free from epistemic doubt, it can be deployed as a criterion for the evaluation of discursive knowledge claims.

At this admittedly extremely high altitude – an altitude that is at times Kant’s own – Kant argues that the empiricist-rationalist difference is not really a difference at all: they are in fact symmetrical or complementary positions operating under a common assumption. Kant presents this symmetry in his famous statement on Leibniz and Locke in the first Critique’s “Appendix on the amphiboly of the concepts of reflection” (henceforth “the Amphibolies”):

In a word, Leibniz intellectualized the appearances, just as Locke totally sensitivised the concepts of understanding... Instead of seeking two entirely different sources of representation in the understanding and the sensibility, which could judge about things with objective validity only in conjunction, each of these great men holds on only to one of them, which in his opinion is immediately related to things in themselves, while the other does nothing but confuse the order of the first (A271/B327).

Leibniz holds to the intellect as “immediately related to things in themselves,” while Locke takes sensibility to have this immediate relationship to mind-independent reality. Either the intellect operating in isolation can clarify the activity of the senses (rationalism) or the senses taken as providing foundational perceptual episodes can clarify the conceptual (empiricism). The senses for rationalists are only a confused form of reasoning (and therefore can be done away with in reasoning); for the empiricists, our reasoning, if not directly linkable to discrete perceptual episodes, is confused or unreal. Taking these together, it appears possible for one pole or source of knowledge to do the work of the other. Sensibility is reducible to the intellect or vice-versa (“intellectualized appearances” or “sensitivised concepts”). So the apparent either/or (either sensibly-grounded or intellectually-grounded knowledge claims) is dependent on a deeper sense of identity: rationalism and empiricism in fact come at the same epistemic framework from different ends.

Put in terms of the vocabulary introduced above, the empiricist and rationalist intend a difference that is not, from the perspective of the new criteria for determining philosophical positions introduced by Kant, a difference at all. The empiricist-rationalist difference is for Kant indifferent at two levels. These levels are interrelated. Firstly, both empiricism and rationalism assume the possibility and desirability of realism (which I take to mean epistemic “access” to a mind-independent reality of

\textsuperscript{40} Longuenesse, “Kant and the a priori,” 131.
\textsuperscript{41} Stang, Modal Metaphysics, 14.
“thing-in-themselves”) and the normative framework such an assumption of desirability entails. Secondly, both empiricism and rationalism assume that the intellect and sensibility are different only in degree of clarity of access to that reality. That is: one pole is taken to be “clear” in its relation to mind-independent reality, the other a “confused” version of that relation. In other words, empiricism and rationalism start from poles on a continuum different in degree but not in kind; they only disagree as to which pole in fact grounds the desired realism. As Allison puts it, Kant seeks to show that, “despite their many interesting differences, all [other philosophical positions] are at bottom nothing more than variant expressions of the same underlying confusion.”

Kant’s identification of Leibniz and Locke has been criticised as simplistic or reductive. As I suggested above, judgments of identity (“all As are Bs”) can always be problematized or contested by marking differences unsubsumed by the classificatory concept at work (here “transcendental realism”). But for Kant the identification of Leibniz and Locke is philosophically unavoidable: to fail to mark it consigns philosophy to an uncertainty it cannot as philosophy accept, because we human beings in our determination as thinking cannot accept it. As long as (1) knowledge is assumed to conform to the mind-independent properties of objects and (2) knowledge is taken to be reducible to one form or source (either sensible or intelligible), scepticism will insist. As Kant puts it: the “transcendental realist later plays the part of empirical idealist” (A371).

In the case of empiricism, the charge of empirical idealism is relatively straightforward. It is precisely the assumption that objects are already determinate in themselves that leads to fears that our representations of the object do not meet the object. In empiricism, the fear that conceptual activity misses its object is expressed in the need to legitimate conceptual activity with reference to ostensibly already determinate objects in perceptual episodes. As we will see in some detail in section 3.1, with Hume the concept-empiricist legitimation project (“verification empiricism”) does not possess the resources with which to overcome sceptical doubt regarding the correspondence of cognition to its object (cognitive claims for the mind-independent persistence of objects and for a universally necessary relation between objects cannot be provided by experience). This same assumption leads to a symmetrical problem in rationalism: as much as rationalism holds that thought...

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42 I am aware that the “epistemological realism” at stake here is only one of many senses of “realism” (contrast, for example, realism about scientific entities, or realism about moral value).
43 Allison, Transcendental Idealism, 23.
44 “...Leibniz and Locke, for all their differences, [are for Kant] guilty of a common error: Leibniz and Locke are alike in supposing that the intellectual and the sensory, thinking and sensing are on a continuum with one another. Kant argues that in reality faculties of understanding and sensibility are two different stems of human cognition...In his opposition of Leibniz and Locke we find the germs of the canonical division of early modern philosophers into the camps of Rationalists and Empiricists... it is well to recognise that Kant’s own habit of treating Leibniz and Locke as opposed to one another is philosophically somewhat self-serving.” Nicholas Jolley, Leibniz (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), 213-214. With that said, it is important however to note that the opposition between rationalist and empiricist forms of foundationalism was not lost on its respective proponents. Hume’s critique of “substance” in the Treatise as without experiential ground will be briefly cited in Chapter 3. Also important is Leibniz’s long dialogue contrasting his positions with Locke’s, which contests Locke’s “physiological” reduction in terms that Kant himself will substantially appropriate: “That raises another question, namely whether all truths depend on experience, that is on induction and instances, or if some of them have some other foundation. For if some events can be foreseen before any test has been made of them, it is obvious that we contribute something from our side.” G. W. Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding, trans. and ed. Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 49. Kant’s critique of the German rationalist tradition is an attempt to maintain its commitment to a priori truth, but in such a way as to fully and determinately connect to it to objective knowledge, as the condition of such knowledge — the difficulty of this move will become apparent when we turn to its proof in the Transcendental Deduction (2.2 below).
can provide us with access to the reality of things, Kant’s argument – present and persistent from his very earliest work – is that logic cannot provide a determinate claim about a real object. No amount of purely logical argumentation will bring one to knowledge of the real existence of an object. We will deal with this problem in the next section.45

I said above that the assumption of the possibility and desirability of realism understood as epistemic access to mind-independent reality (knowledge of things as they “really are”) carries normative implications. As Henry Allison shows, the fear that human cognition is inadequate to knowing the objects “out there” requires the postulation of divine knowledge as the normative standard for human knowledge. For the rationalist, conceptual proofs clarify the confusions of sensuous affection, and the normative model for this process of clarification is God’s knowing. If our rational deduction from first principles were as perfect as God’s, we could deduce the determinacy of individual objects without sensory data, because reason and sense are only different in degree. For the empiricist, the problem with the rationalist position is not the continuity of intelligible and sensible worlds, but, to quote Locke, the rationalist tendency to “begin at the wrong end.”46 Rather than clarify sense with concept, a phenomenological investigation of sense-impressions clarifies which of our ideas are legitimate. The normative model for this alternative process is again a certain conception of God’s knowledge, but approached from the “other end,” as it were, in sensory terms: God’s knowledge is characterised by his ability to “see” what is immediately with his “microscopical eyes.” The empiricist seeks a clarity that God’s immediate cognition of particulars provides the model for.47 In short, Allison argues that Kant recognises and then seeks to correct a shared “metaphilosophical” or “met-epistemological” norm in both Lockean empiricism and Leibnizian rationalism.48 Sense-knowledge and reason are on a continuum, and the only question is what end of that continuum we place God. Or differently put: whether our knowledge is confused because it is too sensuous or not sensuous enough. The normative aspect of the latter formulation should be clear.

Kant even goes so far as to suggest that philosophy as a whole was indeterminate before the critique of reason: “until the critical philosophy all philosophies are not distinguished in their essentials.”49 For Kant the only way to properly adjudicate the competing claims of Locke and Leibniz is to (1) expose their shared realist assumption and its sceptical implications and (2) undo the sense-reason continuum taken to ground this realism. Kant achieves these goals through the innovation of a series of related conceptual distinctions – analytic/synthetic judgments; formal logic/transcendental logic; and concept/intuition. In other words, the Kantian response is to construct or produce a real difference in philosophy, the difference between rationalism and empiricism as species of transcendental realism on the one hand, and transcendental idealism on the other. Before this

45 Perhaps the more economic way to present these points is via explanation of the relation of objectivity and logical determination. As Robert Hanna points out, neither Descartes nor Leibniz can explain the connection of a priori truth with objective experience except through a “question-begging deus ex machina” (Descartes “god is not a deceiver” and Leibniz’s pre-established harmony). “Kant, Hegel, and the Fate of Non-Conceptual Content,” 11. Kant himself refers to Plato, Malebranche and Leibniz as introducing a “deus ex machina” to explain the correspondence of a priori truth and real existence in the 1772 Letter to Herz. Immanuel Kant, Correspondence, ed. and trans. Arnulf Zweig (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 134/10:131. On the other side, classical empiricism can only explain a posteriori knowledge, but not the objective purport of concepts not experientially traceable.
47 As we will see in Chapter 4.1, this is one sense of Kant’s “Intuitive Intellect.”
48 Allison, Transcendental Idealism, 35.
49 Quoted in Allison, Transcendental Idealism, 24.
differentiation there is only a difference (rationalism/empiricism) that, in the last analysis, should not count as one.

The first Critique famously puts this intervention as a “Copernican revolution” in philosophy:

Up to now it has been assumed that all or cognition must conform [richten] to the objects; but all attempts to find out something about them a priori through concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition... (Bxvi).

“Come to nothing” suggests the indifferentism to metaphysics of the practical Enlightenment above. Indeed, Kant’s treatment of the shared ground of rationalist and empiricist epistemologies, if irresolvable, would justify indifferentism: both alternatives end in an impracticable scepticism. But Kant claims in the famous passage above that a reversal along the object-subject axis overcomes the sceptical results of transcendental realism. The level on which the transcendental idealist revolution or reversal operates is decisive. Kant does not propose another reversal along the sensible-intelligible axis (beginning again at the “other end”). To privilege one or the other without undoing their grounding realist assumption would not be an intervention but a repetition. Kant proposes a reversal or revolution on the level of the priority of the object and subject, reinventing the intellectual-sensible relation on that basis.

1.2. Kant and Rationalist Indifference

In his pre-Critical work, Kant shows 18th Century German school metaphysics to unreflectively and illegitimately extend logical determination to empirically real objects and their relations. Kant argues that the indifference of rationalist “logicism” to the difference between logical and “real” objectivity results in objective indeterminacy. Indeterminacy here means not being able to know whether one’s judgments have empirical objective purport, i.e. whether one is making a judgment about some really existing thing or nothing at all. Non-contradictory predicative judgments remain logically determinate, but indeterminate from the point of view of knowledge of empirical objectivity.50

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50 From a contemporary perspective the indeterminacy Kant diagnoses in rationalism’s merely logical determination has epistemic, semantic, and intentional elements. Epistemically, something more than logical determination is required for knowledge of contingent matters of fact – this may seem obvious, but the rationalist placing of “confused” sensory and “distinct” intellectual representations on a continuum leads to an in principle privileged epistemic function for thought operating alone. Semantically, something more than logical determination is required to secure the existential content of the subject concept of a judgment, i.e. the “something,” the singular “this,” about which and on which logical determination operates (by predicating concepts of that something in judgment). Kenneth Westphal refers to this condition as “singular cognitive reference,” “Hegel’s Pragmatic Critique and Reconstruction of Kant’s System of Principles in the Logic and Encyclopedia.” Dialogue 15: 1-37, 6. The conceptual content of the “this” will be discussed in more detail in the consideration of Kantian intuitional form in Chapter 2.1. As a question of reference or aboutness, these epistemic and semantic issues clearly go to intentionality. As Robert Hanna makes clear, the problematic of intentionality in Brentano and Husserl is traceable to Kant’s concern with intuitional content. Hanna, “Trancendental Idealism, Phenomenology, and Intentionality” in The Impact of Idealism, ed. Karl Ameriks (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2013), 191-225. “Epistemic,” “semantic,” and “intentionality” however are not Kant’s terms, and all three come together in his account of objective determination: “cognition” for him is a contentful judgment (semantic) about (intentionality) a possible object, assessable as knowledge of a contingent “states of affairs” (epistemic).
The concept/intuition distinction can and has been understood as a reinvention of the intellectual-sensible relation as conceived under transcendental realism. For the Critical Kant, neither the senses nor the intellect has privileged foundational access to “things in themselves.” Both concepts and sensible intuitions are “representations.” Concepts are discursive or mediate representations, intuitions are immediately related to singular objects but representations nonetheless. The corollary here is that senses and the intellect are distinct sources of knowledge. They are different in kind: one is not a confused version of the other. As a result, these two “faculties” of representation – or two “capacities” [Vermögen] for two different forms of representation – must work together. In the quote from the “Appendix on the amphiboly” above, Kant holds that only in the “conjunction” of sensible and intellectual representations can we “judge about things with objective validity.” But what “objective validity” could possibly mean in the absence of sensory or intellectual access to “things in themselves” will have to be completely reconceptualised. In short, Kant breaks the continuum of sensibility and intellect that ostensibly connects us to the world and then differently connects our cognitive capacity to objectivity. As Longuenesse puts it:

Kant’s primary tool for his twofold enterprise - first prying apart logic and ontology, but then finding new grounds for the grip our intellect has on the world - is the distinction between two kinds of access that we have to reality: our being affected by it or being ‘receptive’ to it, and our thinking it or forming concepts of it.

This “twofold enterprise” actually comes in two stages in Kant’s career: the “prying apart” of the rationalist assumption of logic and ontology is a consistent feature; the second (reconnecting thought and world) comes on the scene quite late, and its emergence necessitates the first Critique. The “prying” starts in Kant’s 1755 New Elucidation, continues throughout the 1760s, and is finally named in terms of the concept/intuition distinction in the 1770 Inaugural Dissertation (though the representational capacity of concepts there still provides grounds for epistemic realism; determinate knowledge of “things-in-themselves” will only be fully abandoned in the first Critique).

Now, although Kant does not want to start at either “end” of the intellectual-sensible continuum but rather break it, he has to start somewhere. Kant’s self-presentation in the Prolegomena makes it sound as if the Critical philosophy is devised as a response to Humean scepticism. But this is perhaps only an opportune self-characterisation: Kant’s pre-Critical writing is a sustained attempt to correct Leibnizian metaphysics. It is as a part of this corrective effort that the logic-ontology identification comes under attack. In other words, the intellectual-sensible continuum is pulled apart from the rationalist rather than the empiricist direction, i.e. the real is pulled away from the possibility of its purely logical determination. This overriding emphasis in Kant’s pre-critical work on what will come to ultimately be presented as the “dogmatic” opponent is legible in the title of the Critique of Pure Reason. As Paul Redding puts it: “...reasoning from concepts alone can result in no substantial

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51 Lumsden, “Satisfying the Demands of Reason,” 42. In his account, Lumsden opposes empiricism to transcendental realism – in fact the former is a species of the latter genus. Lumsden’s essay is extremely helpful otherwise.
52 Longuenesse, “Kant on a priori concepts,” 136.
53 Pro 7/4:257.
54 Ameriks for one claims that Kant could have reached a substantially similar transcendental idealism without the Humean provocation. Ameriks, “On Reconciling the Transcendental Turn with Kant’s Idealism” in The Transcendental Turn, ed. Sebastian Gardner and Matthew Grist (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2013), 38.
knowledge at all. It is in this sense that it is a “critique” of “pure reason” (reasoning from concepts alone)."\

From the perspective adopted in this thesis, Kant’s shift from transcendental realism to idealism determines philosophically what in metaphysics remains indifferent and has licensed indifferentism to it. We have seen that the advocate of practical Enlightenment acts as if extant philosophies are the same, but with nothing but anecdotal proof of this identity. In contrast, Kant accounts for their indifference philosophically: the reason why, for all their differences, they “count” as the same in tacitly committing to an epistemic paradigm that gives rise to scepticism.

The pre-Critical pulling apart of logical and real determination and the Critical claim for independent intuitional representations will be dealt with in this section. Kant’s “putting back together” – his legitimisation for the grip of a priori concepts on the world as conditions for determinate experience of that world – in Chapter 2.

But why exactly for Kant must the rationalist identification of logic and ontology be “pried apart”? The pre-Critical Kant approaches the deficiency of purely logical determination in a number of ways. Here I will focus on two of Kant’s early arguments for rationalist indeterminacy, as unable to (1) prove by predication (however non-contradictory) the existence of the subject of a categorical judgment and (2) account for the status and structure of extra-logical relation. As we saw in 1.1 above, Wolff and his followers take formal logic to have a privileged epistemic function. Here I argue that the epistemic limitations of this position are traceable to the limitations of formal logic itself. What counts for logic, in Kant’s view, is that its terms – whatever their existential status – are related in judgments according to the law of non-contradiction. Formal logic is (1) structurally indifferent to whether its terms are empirically-given or merely thought; and (2) structurally indifferent to extra-logical forms of relation.

**Indifference to Existence**

Kant consistently argues – from his pre-Critical to his Critical work – that ontological arguments for God confuse logical determination with existence (“real determination” or “real predication”). We cannot know by thinking alone if our judgments are about something really existent or about nothing. No amount of logical consistency between subject and predicate and between predicates of a subject can prove the existence of that subject. As Guyer and Wood put it, Kant’s early claim “that a genuine or ‘real possibility’ is not established just by demonstrating that a concept is free from contradiction but must have some sort of affirmative ground in actual existence, was remarkably deep-seated in Kant’s thought…”\(^{56}\) In *The Only Possible Argument [Beweisgrund] in Support of the Demonstration of the Existence of God* (1763). Kant follows the claim that “Existence is not a predicate or determination [Determination] of a thing” with the following lines:

This proposition [Satz] seems strange and absurd [widersinnig], but it is indubitably certain. Take any subject you please, for example, Julius Caeser. Draw up a list of all the predicates which may be thought to belong to him, not excepting even those of space and time. You will quickly see that he can either exist [existieren] with all these determinations [Bestimmungen], or not exist at all. (TP 117/2:72).

\(^{55}\) Redding, *Continental Idealism: Leibniz to Nietzsche*, 50.

\(^{56}\) “Introduction,” 30
Note that Kant in the above quote uses “predicate” [Prädicat] and determination [Determination in the title, Bestimmung in the body] as synonymous. As I mentioned in the Introduction, for the pre-Critical Kant, to determine something is to predicate a property of it in judgment. Now, Kant argues here that nothing in the act of predication itself bestows existence on the subject. We can check to ensure that none of the predicates attributed to the subject contradict any other attributed predicate. But non-contradiction gets us no closer to real existence. Merely logical judgment leaves the distinction between possible and real existence undecided. It does not have the resources to posit this difference, such that any distinction between possibility and actuality must come from outside logical form. Kant of course recognises that in everyday speech we deploy existence as a predicate. In Kant’s example, we say that the sea-unicorn [Seeieinhorn, the narwal] is (existence belongs to it), but the “land-unicorn,” that is, the mythical unicorn, is not (existence does not belong to it). For Kant, that such a proposition only establishes the possibility and not the existence of the subject is evidenced by the way in which we set about verifying the truth of such a proposition:

... one does not examine the concept of the subject in order to demonstrate the correctness of the proposition about the existence of such a thing. The concept of the subject only contains predicates of possibility. If one wishes to demonstrate the correctness of such a proposition, one examines the source of one’s cognition of the object. One says: ‘I have seen it’ or ‘I have heard about it from those who have seen it.’ The expression ‘A sea-unicorn (or narwal) is an existent animal’ is not, therefore, entirely correct. The expression ought to be formulated the other way round to read ‘The predicates, which I think collectively when I think of a sea-unicorn (or narwal), attach to [zukommen] a certain existent sea-animal. (TP 118/2:72-73).

This is an extremely important passage for an understanding of Kant’s account of logical indeterminacy and objective determination, and the development of concept/intuition as a means to account for the latter. To verify existence, we must – and in fact do – go to the empirically-given, to a “certain existent” particular to which the set of non-contradictory predicates “attach.” Here we have a nascent version of Kant’s mature argument for the “sensible condition” of any determinate cognition of any object – that such an object be given in intuition – though here without the transcendental understanding of the constitutive role of concepts in the determination of objects of experience in general (see 2.2). Indeed, Kant says in the first section of the Doctrine of Method of the Critique, “If one is to judge synthetically about a concept, then must go beyond this concept to the intuition in which it is given” (A721/B749).

As Kant’s example of the “sea” and “land” unicorns shows, the criterion of non-contradiction is indifferent to the content of the terms placed in non-contradictory relation – that is, whether the terms have some empirical ground or not. Kant explicitly uses the word indifference to characterise formal logic (there “general logic”) in the Critique: “[General logic] teaches us nothing at all about the content of cognition, but only the formal conditions of agreement with the understanding, which are entirely indifferent with regard to the objects [welche übrigens in Ansehung der Gegenstände gänzlich gleichgültig sein]...” (A62/B87). More specifically, formal logic does not distinguish its terms along the possibility/actuality axis; that is, it is indifferent to the existential status of its terms. This indifference gives rise to the constant possibility of epistemic emptiness, in which one claims knowledge of a merely possible being. We can begin to see this by turning from the empirical example to proofs of God’s existence. In the above, Kant suggests there is nothing irreparably wrong with the predication of existence in the representation of empirical concepts [Erfahrungsbeigiff] such as the sea-unicorn –
such empirical concepts can be reorganised in such a way that the distinction between logical possibility and existence is maintained (“The predicates, which I think collectively when I think of a sea-unicorn (or narwal), attach to a certain existent sea-animal”). The irreparable problem emerges, however, when the predication of existence is carried over into “reflection of a subtler and deeper kind” (119/2:73) – i.e. to claims of necessary existence. Kant has in mind here what he in the Critique dubs the “ontological proof” of God’s existence – a name that has stuck. For Kant, this proof is characterised by “deriving existence from merely possible concepts, as one is accustomed to do when one wants to prove absolutely necessary existence. For then one seeks in vain among the predicates of such a possible being; existence is certainly not to be found among them.” (118/2:72). Existence is, in other words, not a predicate: predicate concepts mark out only possible existence (above: “The concept of the subject only contains predicates of possibility”). Actual existence is furnished, as in the example of the sea-unicorn, by going to experience for verification.

Indifferent Relations
Relating logical terms in accordance with the law of non-contradiction does not for Kant account for certain forms of real relation. In the 1763 paper Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy (hereafter Negative Magnitudes), Kant argues that the result of modelling “real opposition” between two magnitudes on contradiction results in saying “nothing at all” [gar nichts] when some content is empirically demanded. As well as further linking logicist indifference and epistemic emptiness, Negative Magnitudes also has the benefit of introducing us to the mature Kantian problematic of “analytic” and “synthetic” judgments as well as to the deep entanglement of the Kantian project with the problem of cause and effect.57 Negative Magnitudes works through a series of relations that are not reducible to logical contradiction but must be considered as “real” opposition. As Allison notes, this position is continued into the first Critique (A272-73/B328-39).58 In Negative Magnitudes, Kant argues:

Two things are opposed to each other [Einander entgegengesetzt ist] if one thing cancels [aufhebt] that which is posited by the other. This opposition [Entgegengesetztung] is twofold: it is either logical [logisch] through contradiction [Widerspruch], or it is real [real], that is to say, without [ohne] contradiction.

The first opposition [Opposition], namely logical opposition, is that upon which attention has been exclusively and uniquely concentrated until now. (TP 211/2:171).

Logic thinks opposition as contradiction, while the “real” is characterised by opposition without contradiction. Kant’s example of the former is as follows. A body in motion is something [Etwas], a body not in motion is also something. Kant calls such somethings “cogitable” [cogitabile],” i.e. “capable

57 Kant’s account of causal relation – let alone its relation to Hegel’s own account of causality – is a thesis of its own. However, the category of causality is so central to Kant’s account of objective determination (in the Analogies it appears as if only substance, cause, and reciprocal cause are the only categories that necessarily condition objectivity) that it is impossible not to discuss it in passing; moreover, Hegel’s account in the “Objectivity” section of the Begriffslogik determines the object in a way that directly contests Kant’s account of the logical content of causality.

58 “Kant’s anti-Leibnizian claim in the Amphiboly [is] that, quite apart from any logical contradiction, realities might conflict with one another, that is, exhibit a ‘real opposition’…” Allison, Transcendental Idealism, 403.
of being thought.” In other words: “A body is in motion” and “A body is not in motion” are contentful judgments – if predicated of different subjects.\(^{59}\) However, a body both in motion and “in the very same sense” [Verstande] or “simultaneously” [zugleich] not in motion is “nothing at all” [gar nichts] or “nihil negativum irrepraesentabile,” glossed in the Cambridge edition as “a negative nothing which is incapable of being represented.” The content of the judgment “S is P and not P” is an empty, unrepresentable nothing, i.e. no content at all.

Real opposition – opposition without contradiction – also opposes two predicates of a thing. These predicates also “cancel” [aufhebt] each other, but the consequence is “something (cogitabile)” rather than nothing. The predicates, though directly opposed, do not contradict each other but are “simultaneously possible in one body.” The consequence [Folge] of such a real relation (continuing the example of motion from the above) is rest, which is “something (repraesentabile).” The content of real opposition can be both thought and represented. Or – and Kant alters his terminology slightly within the same paragraph – the content of real opposition is “also nothing, but nothing in another sense.” Kant shifts his characterisation here I think because he wants to emphasise the specific form of cancellation that occurs in real opposition. “The motive forces of one and the same body which tend in exactly the opposite direction; and here the grounds cancel their reciprocal consequences, namely the motions” (2:193). Kant throughout has a ship in mind: “The passage of the ship westwards is just as much a positive motion as its passage eastwards; but if we are dealing with one and the same ship, the distances thus covered cancel [aufheben] each other out, either completely or in part.” (TP 216/2:176). The result of this real opposition – wind driving westward and sea-current flowing eastward – is not something unthinkable and unrepresentable but a nothing that can be thought as “a lack of motion,” i.e. rest. The cancelling of the opposed predicates (this same body is in motion and not in motion) in this case results not in an empty nothing but “nothing” as a determinate state of affairs.

Kant notes another form of the indifference to content operative at the logical level: “In the case of logical repugnancy, no attention is paid to which of the two predicates is truly affirmative (realitas), and which truly negative (negation).” (TP 211/2:172). In keeping with the Enlightenment metaphor discussed in 1.1 above, Kant takes dark and being not-dark as an example. “The first predicate is logically affirmative, the other logically negative, although in the metaphysical sense, the former is a negation.” The rule of contradiction and judgments determined by it are indifferent to the “metaphysical” determination of darkness as the absence of light. In saying “metaphysical,” Kant is referring to the rationalist principle in which all predicable properties are either affirmations or privations logically dependent on the affirmations they negate. As such, if we were to represent the terms light and dark with respect to their content, it would only be possible to present, say, a disjunctive judgment as “either light or not-light.” Logical relation in terms of the law of non-contradiction however, is indifferent to metaphysical affirmation or negation, and can present a negation (non-light) as logically affirmative (dark), and an affirmative property (light) as privative (not-dark).

Against this characterisation of logic as indifferent to whether its terms are positive or merely privative, Kant then introduces the affirmative status of both predicates in real opposition. In contradiction, P and not-P are opposed in S (without however being able to say which is actually

\[^{59}\text{There is another kind of indeterminacy in this judgment, insofar as its subject is indefinite, “a body” – but which body? As we will see at the end of 2.2, intuition in its presentation of spatio-temporal individuals gives furnishes judgment with the demonstrative this body, which is then thought by being synthesized through the concept “body.”}\]
positive), in reality a P and a Q come into a reciprocal relation of opposition in S. Kant does later use the example of two really existing different balls in motion. But here he wants to note and consider that the P and Q, so to speak, in their relation, are necessarily presented in terms of negation – in determining the difference of this negation over against logical negation Kant draws on mathematics. In maths, the minus as the cancelling of an equal positive magnitude results in nothing determined as zero. Kant uses the example of the active and passive debt of a 100 thalers.\(^{60}\) In short, being owed 100 thalers minus owing 100 thalers equals 0 thalers, but this result is not a logical contradiction: the nihil negativum, the *gar nichts*, cannot Kant says be “expressed” by zero = 0, because no contradiction obtains in this expression (TP 211/2:172). The mathematical zero is a non-contradictory nothing, a nothing that is thinkable, that passes the “test” of the logical law of contradiction (this “test” will for Kant remain important, as the *sine qua non* of truth) but that also says something “certain” about a really existing relation.

To this extent, the mathematical minus cannot be understood as the negation of the existence of the plus in the same sense that not P negates the existence of P. In logic on Kant’s understanding coexistence of opposed determinations in the same subject is unthinkable. Kant then emphasises the constitutive relationality of the + and -, such that their meaning is only determinate when taken together; this is quite the opposite of what happens when we take “P” and “not P” together at the same time, which results in indeterminacy.

Of course, in the mathematical relation of + and -, indifference emerges again, but only at the level of symbolisation: “one would arrive at the same result if the ship’s course with the east wind had been indicated by ‘‐’ and its course with the west wind by ‘+’: The only difference is that the final balance would have been designated by ‘‐’” (TP 213/2:174). But this symbolic indifference does not cancel the content being represented: a determinate magnitude. In short, Kant is trying to show that there are two negations (two processes of cancellation) and two nothings (as results of that process) that must be distinguished. The logical negation (“not”) is different from the mathematical negation (“‐”), which symbolises relation between “affirmative” terms. Similarly, the “nothing” that results from the logical and real opposition is distinct. In saying 0, I am saying something certain: I have, for example, equal grounds for giving as for receiving money (I am “flat broke”); the ship moves as much eastward as westward (it is at rest). “On the other hand,” Kant continues, “in the case of cancellation through contradiction it is absolutely nothing [schlechtin Nichts] which exists.” Again, while logical opposition produces an empty nothing – a nothing about which absolutely nothing can be said – real opposition, even in the reciprocal instances of equal positive and negative magnitude, has a determinate outcome.

To sum up. The law of non-contradiction, when applied to a proposition that asserts contradictory predicates of the same subject, results in non-representable nothing: the proposition is emptied of representable content. This is unsatisfactory in cases of real opposition. Obviously, more than “gar nichts” must be said about an object determinable in terms of really existing opposition. From the perspective of this thesis, Kant is here pointing out a particular indifference in the sense we have suggested in our reading of his introductory *Kampfplatz* above: there is here a difference – between a non-representable nothing and a real magnitude of 0 – that doesn’t, on the rationalist set of presuppositions, count as one. The logical mode of determination is, in its application to really existing states, completely indeterminate: it says nothing of them, and does not have the resources in

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\(^{60}\) The 100 thalers will recur significantly in Kant’s distinction between real and logical predication in general in the *Critique’s* famous refutation of the ontological proof of God – and again in the first chapter of the *Logic*. 
itself to mark that indeterminacy.

**Real Causation and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction**

Kant in *Negative Magnitudes* presents some cases of real opposition as “grounds” cancelling their “consequences.” However, *Negative Magnitudes* concludes by putting this logical relation (if ground, then consequent) into question concerning the possibility of its “real use,” that is, when applied to cases of cause and effect. Kant’s criticism of ground-consequent runs along formally similar lines to the questioning of logical opposition: “The distinction between logical opposition and real opposition, which we drew above, is parallel to the distinction between the logical ground and the real ground” (Ak 2:203). Causation is, like opposition, a real relation: it cannot be posited by conceptual analysis conducted according to the law of contradiction. The inability of conceptual analysis to provide a determination of really existing states is perhaps clearer in the case of the ground-consequent/cause-effect distinction – in fact Kant’s account of the limitations of ground-consequent to explain real relations clarifies the treatment of real opposition with which he began, by allowing him to straightforwardly state it in terms of what the *Critique* will call “analyticity.”

Kant’s demand for an explanation that does not illegitimately superimpose ground and consequent onto cause and effect is particularly helpful in understanding the overhauling of determinacy undertaken in the *Critique*, and deserves quoting at length:

I fully understand how a consequence [Folge] is posited by a ground [Grund] in accordance with the rule of identity: analysis [Zergliederung] of the concepts shows that the consequence is contained in the ground. It is in this way that necessity is a ground of immutability; that composition is a ground of divisibility; that infinity is a ground of omniscience, etc., etc. And I can clearly understand the connection [Verknüpfung] of the ground with the consequence, for the consequence is really identical with part of the concept of the ground (TP 239/2:202).

This is precisely what the *Critique* describes as analytic judgment: “Analytic judgments... are thus those in which the connection of the predicate is thought through identity...” (A7/B10). Kant also puts it as follows: in an analytic judgment, “the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something that is (covertly) contained in this concept A...” (A6/B10). These two definitions show that, for Kant, analyticity has both logical and epistemological elements. On the one hand, the criterion of truth for an analytic judgment is the law of contradiction (thinking “through identity”). As George Dicker puts it, “There is an important relationship between analyticity and contradiction: the negation (denial) of an analytic statement is always a contradiction, and conversely the negation of a contradiction is always an analytic statement.”

On the other hand, analytic judgments imply knowledge in the judging subject: in such a judgment we do not need to go beyond what we already (covertly) know, but simply clarify – or “draw out” – what is already present. Hence Kant’s claim that “through analytic judgments our knowledge is not in any way extended... the concept which I already have is merely set forth and made intelligible to me” (A10/B14). There is of course much to worry about in Kant’s definition(s) of analyticity, in particular the cognitive status of the “clarification” or “extension” of knowledge at stake in the second limb.

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62 I leave the tenability of the analytic-synthetic distinction in general to one side, content here to track its motivation and purported value. But see Dicker, *Kant’s Theory of Knowledge*, 225.
Kant in any case – in both Negative Magnitudes and the Critique – does not take this linking of logical criteria to states of knowledge to be controversial. It is rather central to Kant’s contestation of rationalism: what Kant wants to draw attention to is that certain judgments cannot be determined to be true or false solely according to logical criteria, and it just these types of judgments in which our knowledge is “extended” or “amplified.” In such “synthetic judgments” the predicate “B lies entirely outside the concept A, though to be sure it stands in connection [Verknüpfung] with it.” The point is that this connection cannot be thought in terms of identity or contradiction – in a synthetic judgment, P is neither synonymous with nor a component of the concept S. Logic here is not determinative of the truth or falsity of a proposition; rather, to quote Dicker again, “the way the world is determines whether the proposition is true or false.” In synthetic judgments, knowledge requires an extra-logical criterion of truth and falsity: experience. In the pre-Critical work, Kant’s attempt to supplement the limitations of logical analysis for the verification of certain propositions again remains no more than a plea. Moreover, it is still submerged in a particular (however crucial and continuously relevant) example, i.e. causality:

But what I should dearly like to have explained to me, however, is how one thing issues from another thing, though not by means of the law of identity. The first kind of ground I call the logical ground, for the relation of the ground to its consequence can be understood logically. In other words, it can be clearly understood by appeal to the law of identity. The second kind of ground, however, I call the real ground [Realgrund], for this relation [Beziehung] belongs, presumably, to my true concepts, but the manner of the relating can in no wise be judged.

As for this real ground and its relation to its consequence my question presents itself in the following simple form: How am I to understand the fact that, because something is, something else is? (TP 239/2:202).

No amount of conceptual analysis will explain how two completely different things come to be causally related. To close this discussion of Negative Magnitudes, I should note that Kant’s treatment of logical ground and real cause in terms of logical identity and real difference (analyticity and syntheticity) enables him to clarify the example of negative magnitudes with which he began:

The former distinction, that between logical and real opposition, is clearly understood by means of the law of contradiction. And I understand how, if I posit the infinity of God, the predicate of mortality is cancelled by it, and it is cancelled because mortality contradicts infinity. But how the motion of one body is cancelled by the motion of another body – that is another question, for the motion of the second body does not stand in contradiction to the motion of the first body. (TP 241/2:203).

That both forms of relation under consideration in this pre-Critical work can be reduced to the presence or absence of subject-predicate identity helps to explain the centrality that the analytic-synthetic distinction assumes in the Critique. Also indicative of Kant’s project in the first Critique is Negative Magnitudes closing with a challenge, one addressed as much to Kant’s colleagues still “dogmatically slumbering” in the indifference of logical and real relation as to Kant himself, unable at this point in his work to explain real relation: “Now, let the attempt be made to see whether real...

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63 Dicker, Kant’s Theory of Knowledge, 13.
opposition in general can be explained... those philosophers who lay claim to the possession of an understanding which knows no limitations will test the methods of their philosophy to see how far they can advance in a question such as this present one.” (2:203-4; emphasis mine). In this closing challenge it is significant that Kant already suggests that a limitation of the understanding (in its purely logical use) would be required for its legitimate extension to real relation – that the unlimited faith in the power of the understanding on its own to clarify everything as it really is will need to be curtailed in order to “advance in a question” like real relation. That project of limitation will be presented in the Critique of Pure Reason, which draws the boundaries on the legitimate usage of “concepts operating alone” by distinguishing between conceptual and intuitional forms of representation.

In a pithy line that can be taken to summarise the above account of rationalist indifference, the Kant of the Critique puts the inability of logic to issue in objective knowledge in this way: “For although cognition may be in complete accord with logical form, yet it can always contradict the object” (A59/B84). That is, we may always make a logically non-contradictory judgment that bears no relation to the really existing thing that it is taken to predicate (really determine) properties of. In the language developed above, logical determination is indifferent to the existential status and relation of its terms (in the following Chapter we will see the Critique use the word Gleichgültig in just this way). As a result of this indifference, logical determinacy is insufficient on its own for “real determination” or “real predication” of extra-logical objects (A598/B626). It cannot make legitimate knowledge claims about those objects: we cannot claim to know what could always be merely thought. Without a means to mark the difference between empirically-drawn and merely thought contents, it is possible to represent nothing when one means to represent something, a determinate state of affairs.

Chapter 2. Intuitions and Concepts

In the first chapter, we saw Kant diagnose the indifference of logical and real endemic to German rationalism, and the epistemic indeterminacy that results. In this chapter, we consider the Critique’s distinction between conceptual and intuitional representation as a response to rationalist indifference. As is well known, the Critical Kant holds that the pure concepts of the understanding (the “categories” [Kategorien]) and the pure forms of sensible intuition (space and time) together constitute the a priori conditions for objectively determinate cognition [Erkenntnis]. Put in terms of our discussion of existential indifference above, sensible intuition for Kant is that which provides logical determination with an empirically real “something” [Etwas] to be determined as the subject of a possible judgment. How exactly sensibility gives an individual something that is logically undetermined (i.e. merely logically determinable), and how such an undetermined something relates to or enters into logical determination, however, is a difficult matter. To provide an answer, Chapter 2.1 reads closely the account of intuition in the Transcendental Aesthetic section of the Critique, while 2.2. works through the Critique’s account of concepts (and their a priori relation to intuitional form) in the Transcendental Analytic and the Transcendental Deduction section of that Analytic.

2.1. Intuitions in the Aesthetic

In the pre-Critical work, Kant takes “objective” or “real” determination to go to really existing objects in their really existing relation to one another. Taking Chapters 1.1 and 1.2 together (in their respective treatments of the realism/idealism and logical/real distinctions), there is something at least immediately confusing about Kant’s choice of terminology in the Critique. Why would an open demand for an account of real relation issue in a transcendental idealism? As we saw in 1.2, Kant claims that the assumption that our cognition conforms to objects constitutes transcendental realism, which in turn gives rise to empirical idealism; on the contrary, it is Kant’s revolutionary transcendental idealism that guarantees epistemic realism.

The status of intuitions is decisive in Kant’s characterisation of his Critical project as transcendental idealism. The intuitional forms that organise sensibly-given content are transcendental because they are necessary conditions of experience; they are “ideal” in the sense that they are, to borrow Paul Franks’ phrase, “orders of relations” not obtaining between real objects but specific to human sensibility. Taking these two limbs together, Kant seeks to establish that our empirical cognition cannot be judged on the basis of conformity to objects as they really are (in abstraction from our cognition), because any objective cognition is about sensibly-given content necessarily conditioned by the a priori relational forms of our sensibility.

With this move, Kant’s Critical formulation of intuitional representation jettisons the rationalist understanding of sensibly-given contents as “confused” versions of “clear” ideas: intuitions are our only access to objectivity, and so cannot be meaningfully considered an “inferior” form of representation. Insofar as all determinate empirical cognitions are conditioned by intuitional form, the subjective universality of this form – its universality for finite human knowers – guarantees the objectivity of empirical determinations. Thus, what remains constant in Kant’s pre-Critical and Critical periods is the claim for the indeterminacy of merely logical form when contrasted with “objectivity,” but the existential status of that objectivity undergoes a shift with the introduction of intuitional representations. Empirical objects are determinations of appearance [Erscheinung] – sensible contents

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65 Franks steps through the Leibnizian origin of Kant’s understanding of space and time. For Leibniz, space and time are “orders of relations,” “nothing more than imaginary relations that enable us, with our finite minds... to represent in a confused way the harmoniousness of the world.” All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2005), 24.
organised by the forms of space and time – not of “things in themselves” [Dinge-an-sich]. The latter for Kant are not the intrinsic properties of objects thought “clearly” through conceptual predication alone, but rather the logically necessary but epistemically “empty” thought of objectivity in general in abstraction from intuitional form. The thought of things-in-themselves, though necessary, does not undermine or problematise objective knowledge of appearances, insofar as such knowledge is the only kind possessed by creatures with our sensible conditioning.

The distinction between appearances and things in themselves is of course notorious in the reception of Kant’s philosophy, and Hegel’s often misplaced criticisms of the Kantian thing-in-itself will be considered briefly in Chapter 3. In short: Kant scholars take Hegel to relapse into rationalism by considering intuitionally-conditioned determination to be inferior, i.e. “appearance” in Hegel is ostensibly taken to be a pejorative term, a “second-best” option that falls short of a purely conceptual determination of “really real” thing in themselves. This misrepresentation of Kant’s position has some basis in Hegel’s text, but is only part of the story. In order to prepare for what I think are Hegel’s more successful critiques of Kant on the basis of the logical structure of intuitional and conceptual representation and their relation, I here step through Kant’s definition of intuitional representation at the start of the Transcendental Aesthetic. That will fill out the Kantian picture, i.e. the way in which Kant holds pure and empirical intuitions to have the logical characteristics of singularity and immediacy turns ultimately on intuitional form understood as external relation. We can then ask how contentful the Aesthetic holds singular immediacy to be in abstraction from determination by concepts in judgments. “Intuitions without concepts are blind” – but what kind of blindness do they exhibit at this stage of the Critique’s argument?

Defining intuition
Kant defines “Intuition” [Anschauung] as the means through which cognition relates immediately to objects. “In whatever way and through whatever means [Mittel] a cognition [Erkenntnis] may relate [beziehen] to objects [Gegenstände], that through which it relates immediately [unmittelbar] to them, and at which all thought is directed as an end [und worauf alles Denken als Mittel abzweckt], is intuition [Anschauung]” (A19/B33). Intuitions are immediately related to objects and relate thought and objects. Note that because intuitions are immediately related to objects, they themselves do not require a mediator between themselves and objects. There is thus no infinite regress of mediation: thought is related to intuitions as an end or “aim,” and, in so aiming, have a relation to objectivity.

“Sensibility” [Sinnlichkeit] is the receptive faculty/capacity to acquire intuitions. “The capacity (receptivity) [Fähigkeit (Rezeptivität)] to acquire representations [Vorstellungen] through the way in which we are affected [affiziert] by objects is called sensibility [Sinnlichkeit]. Objects are therefore given [gegeben] to us by means of sensibility, and it alone affords us intuitions...” (A19/B33). Kant is claiming that immediate representation of objects is possible “at least for us humans” [uns Menschens wenigstens] (A19/B33) – the phrase is a B edition addition – only if that object is given to us sensibly. This is reinforced at the start of the Transcendental Logic: “It comes along with our nature that intuition can never be other than sensible, i.e. that it contains only the way in which we are affected by objects” (A51/B75). As we will see in Chapter 4, this constitutive reference to us and our nature – a nature that
is given to us such that we are affected by objects as given – will for Hegel, following Fichte, be extremely problematic.66

The next two short paragraphs of Kant’s Aesthetic move through five key definitions and their interrelation very quickly. (1) “Sensation” is the effect of an object on our sensibility as a capacity for immediate representation, “insofar as we are affected” by that object. (2) “Empirical intuitions” are those intuitions related to objects through sensation, through the effect of that object on sensibility as our capacity to be affected by objects. What empirical intuitions give us is (3) an “appearance” [Erscheinung] “the undetermined object [der unbestimmte Gegenstand] of an empirical intuition” (A20/B34). To understand that claim, we have to move to the next two definitions, given in short order. “I call that in the appearance which corresponds to sensation its [4] matter [Materie], but that which allows the manifold of appearance to be ordered in certain relations I call [5] the form [Form] of appearance.” “Matter” in an appearance corresponds to sensation, but as an appearance, that sensation has been “ordered into certain relations.” Matter is sensation that has been informed by form, such that matter and sensation are not “identical” but only “correspond.” Kant then gives a very brief version of the argument for the a priority (the non-empirical origin) of the form of intuitions, the longer version of which will occupy the remainder of the Aesthetic. Kant’s introductory version of the argument runs:

Since that within which the sensations can alone be ordered and placed in a certain form cannot itself be in turn sensation, the matter of all appearance is only given to us a posteriori, but its form must all lie ready for it in the mind a priori, and can therefore be considered separately from all sensation (A20/B34).

So, bringing all of Kant’s definitional work together, empirical intuitions are sensations organised into relations and so turned into matter by the forms of intuition. These forms are not themselves the affect of an object on our capacity for representation (“themselves a sensation”) but are the organisation of that capacity for representation. These forms are thus pure forms, i.e. not empirically-derived.

To sum up our progress thus far: that which is represented in an empirical intuition is the object as appearance, i.e. a conceptually undetermined object. An appearance is conceptually undetermined, but already intuitionally individuated by being “ordered and placed” in the forms of pure intuition. We are, however, yet to uncover what that order and placement is.

The Transcendental Aesthetics’ longer argument for the structure and a priority of intuitional form begins with a double abstraction. Even though intuitions are defined as the means of conceptual thought’s relation to objects, the first step here is to “isolate” [isolieren] empirical intuition by “separating off” [absondern] all understanding through concepts. The second step is then to detach all sensation, all the “matter” in the appearance, so we are left only with form (A22/B36). Note however, that we do not abstract from our capacity to be affected by objects, just any particular affection (sensations). For us humans at least, these forms are space (the form of “outer sense”) and time (the form of “inner sense”), which individuate appearances (conceptually undetermined objects). I have thus far attempted to retain “determination” and its cognates for conceptually determined objects only, and not for conceptually undetermined objects “ordered and placed” in the forms of intuition. I have opted for “individuation” to describe the operation of the latter structure because “individual”

66 This “for us” is important, both for Hegel’s subjectivist critique of Kant, and for Kant’s account of the necessary thought of a divine “Intuitive Intellect,” which Hegel think provides the resources to overcome the deficiencies in Kant’s model of objective determination (treated in Part II and Part III respectively).
[der Einzelne] is linked to “singular” [der Einzahl] in German, intuitional representations are for Kant logically singular, and “singularisation” is awkward in English. But note that Kant himself uses “determination” in his description of intuitional form: “In space [the objects’] shape, magnitude, and relation to one another is determined or determinable [bestimmt oder bestimmbar]” (A22/B37). In the case of time, “everything that belongs to the inner determinations [Bestimmungen] is represented in relations of time.” (This latter will be central to the argument of the Deduction and the Analogies, as will see). No argument in this thesis directly hangs on this use of “determination” for both intuitional and conceptual form. The terminological ambiguity only buttresses the post-Kantian conceptualist position raised via Pippin in the Introduction, namely, that Kant’s distinction between intuitional and conceptual form is not a clean one – a point that I will approach in detail in terms of the A Deduction in section 2.2.

After defining space as outer sense and form as inner sense, Kant makes an argument for their a priori status. Note that as Kant’s argument for time closely follows the argument for space, I will only rehearse what he says about space. Kant argues:

“Space is not an empirical concept [empirischer Begriff] that has been drawn from experiences [außereren Erfahrungen]. For in order for certain sensations to be related to [auf etwas bezogen] something outside me (i.e., to something in another place in space from that in which I find myself), thus in order for to represent them as outside <and next to> one another [außer <und neben> einander], thus not merely as different but in different places [mitten nicht bloss verschieden, sondern als in verschiedenen Orten], the representation of space must already be their ground” (A20/B34).

Two crucial points here. Firstly, and most crucially for the trajectory of this thesis, we have the structure of spatial form set out, as “outside <and next to> one another” (the “next to” is added in the B edition). Time is similarly understood as external placement of appearances, though temporal placement is “successive” (“after” [nach]) rather than contiguous (“next to” [neben]). I accordingly refer to the “order of relation” instantiated by intuitional form as “external relation,” insofar as each term is represented as being outside of other such representations. As such, when we come in Chapter 3 to Hegel’s definition of sensations in Kant as “outside-one-another-being” [ausseineranderseinde] in an empirical intuition, and when in Chapter 6 we see “existence” in Hegel’s Logic presented as “that-which-exists-outside-itself” [Ausser-sich-Seiende] we can understand the externality component of Hegel’s formulations to be an explicit reference to the structure of Kantian intuition. With that said, the consequences of this understanding of intuitionally-given individuals as external to one another for Kant’s account of objective determination will only be clear once we treat the Transcendental Deduction in the following 2.2.

Secondly, the success of the above quote as argument for a priority has been debated. Kant elaborates a little later in the Aesthetic, saying:

For in order that certain sensations be referred to something outside me (i.e. to something in another place in space from that in which I find myself) and similarly in order that I may be able to represent them as outside <and next to> one another, thus not merely as different but in different places, the representation of space must be presupposed. (A23/B38).
It is clear that Kant holds the account of spatial relation as external to ground the claim for its a priority: the representation of space as external relation is logically prior to my experience of empirical objects as in different places, and in a different place to me. I could not experience objects outside of myself were I not already in possession of the form of spatial intuition characterised as the “outside and next to” placement of appearances. The problem is that this argument appears tautological. Kant seems to be saying: “In order to perceive anything as existing spatially (outside of myself or outside of other things), I must perceive it as being in space.” Is Kant saying anything more than “in order to represent space I must represent space”? Allison in *Transcendental Idealism* thinks Kant is not tautological here. For Allison, when Kant says “outside of,” he actually means “distinct from” in an ontological as well as a spatial sense. On this view, Kant is really saying that in order to represent objects as ontologically distinct individuals, I must represent space, i.e., “somethings” being outside of other such somethings. It is understandable why one would want to read Kant’s argument in this way. Not only does it avoid tautology, it dovetails neatly with Kant’s general anti-rationalist strategy (insisting that concepts must be given intuitional content in order to be determinate), and in particular with his critique of Leibniz’s principle of the “identity of indiscernibles” or “non-discernibility.” For Leibniz, because concepts operating in isolation from sense-experience are epistemically privileged (as we saw in 1.2), and because concepts cannot distinguish between qualitatively identical objects, such objects are held to be actually identical, regardless of their spatio-temporal position. Reading spatial representation as an individuating condition allows us to get around Leibniz’s conflation of logical and real: space allows us to distinguish objects even if they are logically indistinct. For Allison this kind of guaranteed distinction via spatiality means that the representation of space is “a necessary condition of the possibility of distinguishing objects from one another.”

Daniel Warren in “Kant and the Apriority of Space” however contests Allison’s reading, arguing that taking spatial representation to go to individuation doesn’t by itself amount to an argument for the apriority of space. The a priori is distinguished from the a posteriori by its necessity; an a priori principle of experience must be presupposed (i.e., taken as necessary) in order for experience to be the kind of experience (more on this “transcendental” form of argument in the next section). Warren argues that the strong sense of necessity is lacking in Allison’s argument. For Allison, it is necessary to distinguish objects spatially only because qualitative difference in certain situations may prove insufficient. But what this in fact means for Warren is that two objects A and B can be distinguished by qualitative difference (A has quality X and B does not) rather than spatial difference; the need to distinguish via spatial representation for Warren at most amounts to a pragmatic need to distinguish quickly between qualitatively very similar objects, but this is not a strong enough sense of necessity for Allison’s would-be transcendental argument.

In making this argument Warren suggests that there may be no qualitatively identical logical “indiscernibles” in our experience, but his argument does not need to commit to this denial of qualitative identity. To show this, Warren formulates a possible counter-argument from Allison’s camp: Allison could suggest that spatial relations have a “special place when it comes to distinguishing objects.” That is, qualitative properties may or may not help in identifying numerically distinct

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67 P.F. Strawson I think very broadly supports this kind of reading in *The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason* (London: Methuen, 1966), 49.
68 This is at least Kant’s gloss in the Amphiboly section of the *Critique* (A263-4/B319-20).
69 Allison, *Transcendental Idealism*, 83.
71 Warren, 189.
objects, but spatial outsideness is “guaranteed” to distinguish them, no matter what properties they have, and even in the limit case of qualitative identity (regardless of whether qualitative identity is taken to exist or not). But again, Warren asks, “is this capacity really a condition of having any experience at all?” All it says is that we must have the capacity for spatial representation to distinguish objects even if we never use that capacity.

Warren’s own position returns fairly squarely to Kant’s own formulation. “The representation of space is presupposed by the representation of objects as spatially related (as spatially outside me or outside one another).” But this for Warren is not tautological because “spatial relation” is not synonymous with “representation of space.” Rather, “representation of space” should be taken to mean specifically “a representation of the occupation of places in space.” To represent objects as spatially related, we need (in the strong, transcendental sense) a representation of space in terms of spatial place in order to ground those relations. Again, Leibniz provides the contrast. Leibniz holds that our idea of a unified, singular space in which objects find a place is abstracted from our experience of particular relations between objects. As such we can move from the representation of relations to a representation of space without spatial representation being presupposed. So our representation of space is abstracted from our experience of relations between objects, and is not a priori. For Kant, no amount of abstraction from experiences of relation gets one to a representation of space required for specifically spatial relation. “When we represent objects as bearing a spatial relation to one another (for example, being outside of one another), we presuppose a representation of the space these objects are in.” Warren conducts a thought experiment to prove the Kantian argument against Leibniz’s narrative. Consider a simple non-spatial relation, A being “brighter than” B. This “brighter than” relation as conceptual is independent of any representation of space. But to put A and B into specifically spatial relation, as points along a “brightness-line” or occupying a “brightness-space,” we “presuppose a representation of that space that these objects are in,” in the sense of occupying place. No amount of experience of relational terms will provide us with the space in which to place the objects in (spatial) relation. Space in the sense of places in space is thus presupposed in experience, or is a priori.72 So Warren’s full formulation runs: “When we represent objects as spatially related (namely, as outside me or outside one another), we presuppose the representation of space (the space of which these places or spaces are parts).”73 This formulation neatly accounts for Kant’s account of the distinction of conceptual and intuitional representation as turning on the difference between subsumptive and part/whole relations, which I will discuss next.

Kant argues that space is, like the appearances placed in it, an immediate and singular intuition—just an a priori one. That space is itself immediate and singular is established by its difference from conceptual generality, as follows:

Space is not a discursive or, as is said, a general concept of relations of things in general, but a pure intuition. For, first, one can only represent a single space, and if one speaks of many spaces, one understands by that only parts of one and the same unique space. Secondly, these parts cannot precede the one all-embracing space, as being, as it were, constituents out of

72 “For, given that the representation of ‘brighter than’ relations does not presuppose the representation of brightness space, we can form the latter representation from the former. By contrast, in the case of spatial (or temporal) relations, we cannot proceed in an analogous fashion, forming the representation of space (or of time) from a concept of spatial (or temporal) relations which has been independently acquired... from experience.” Warren, 204.

which it can be composed; on the contrary, they can be thought only as in it. It is essentially single; the manifold in it, thus also the general concept of spaces in general, rests merely on limitations... Space is represented as an infinite given magnitude. Now one must, to be sure, think of every concept as a representation that is contained in an infinite set of different possible representations (as their common mark), which thus contains these under itself; but no concept, as such, can be thought as if it contained an infinite set of representations within itself. Nevertheless space is so thought (for all the parts of space, even to infinity, are simultaneous). Therefore the original representation of space is an a priori intuition, not a concept. (A24-25/B39-40).

The forms of intuition are not logical determinations; they are not a more general concept to be predicated of a less general subject concept. While Kant will only give a detailed account of conceptual functions in the Analytic, for Kant concepts are (in the first of their two functions at least) “subsumptive,” in the sense that we represent as “under” a concept those other representations that have that concept “as their common mark.” Under the concept “red” are all things which have red as a predicate, but they cannot be coherently represented as being “in” red insofar as those representations will have other conceptual determinations. Conceptually determined objects potentially belong in multiple conceptual “places,” as it were, e.g., under the empirical concepts “red” and “flag.” As Frederick Beiser puts it: “when a particular is subsumed under a universal there are other universals true of it, and there are other particulars that instantiate this universal.” In contrast, intuitionally determinate objects belong within the one “all-embracing space,” whose singularity we immediately intuit as the field in which spatial objects are placed. Kant repeats the argument for time at A32/B48: “The infinitude of time signifies nothing more than that every determinate magnitude of time is only possible through limitations of a single time grounding it.” All objects – we are still talking here of conceptually undetermined objects, appearances – take place in one space and one time, take up parts of that one space and time, or limit it. As we will see in a little more detail in treating Kant’s account of Intellectual Intuition in Chapter 4, the singularity of space and time for Kant is defined as totality, i.e. one unlimited whole. “Unlimited” is appropriate here because no other time or space can be conceived outside of and so limiting the time and space of which we are immediately aware. Rather, appearances in space and time are external to one another, and in that externality exclude one another, i.e. set limits within the totality. Representation of an individual as a part limiting a whole cannot for Kant be conceptual, insofar as concepts in their generality are only (here Kant’s choice of words is confusing) a “partial” representations the objects they subsume (A32/B38). In our example above, the empirical concept “red” does not represent the red flag as an individual occupying a certain place within the totality of space, but only one of its marks common to other neither spatially or temporally contiguous objects.

This understanding of appearances as limitations of totality has implications for Hegel’s account of determination in the Logic. As Paul Franks’ has shown, Kantian idealism is distinguished from post-Kantianism idealism by an attempt to extend the relational individuation characteristic of intuitional form to a derivation of a priori conceptuality. The historical link is F.H. Jacobi, who draws Kant into the Pantheismusstreit by linking the Critique’s account of intuitions with Spinoza’s account.

74 Beiser, German Idealism, 581.
of “determination by negation.” In Franks rendition, Jacobi “seems to think that... just as Kant thinks of regions of space and spans of time as limitations of infinite wholes, so Spinoza thinks of what we ordinarily call things as possessing determinacy only insofar as they are limitations of a prior, infinite whole.” Now, as Robert Stern has recently shown, Hegel’s account of determination is not Spinoza’s, despite his repeated invocations of the Spinozist formula “omnis determination est negatio.” But it is nonetheless possible to trace Fichte’s and Hegel’s respective attempts at a “unitary derivation” – what Franks calls “Derivation Monism” – to Jacobi’s comparison. As we will see in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5, Hegel seeks to demonstrate that the conceptual conditions for determinacy are related to one another as limitations within an immediately intuitable but non-sensible “space” (“Intellectual Intuition”), culminating in an understanding of each such conceptual condition as a logical (not temporal) moment of an exhaustive or total set of such conditions — all a priori concepts would have a “place” within that totality, such that no other conceptual space would be cognisable as an external limit to that developed within the Logic. However – and this is crucial – intellectual intuition is non-sensible; it is not limited to the external relationality that characterises sensible intuition. It rather furnishes the ground from which the logical structure of external relationality (and the degree of determinacy it affords) can be derived. This link can only be substantiated by working through the doctrine(s) of Intellectual Intuition, which I endeavour to do in the latter stages of this thesis.

I began this section with the question of the “blindness” of intuitions in abstraction from conceptual form. Our definitional work above is helpful here in two ways. Firstly, at this point in the Critique’s account of cognitive conditions it appears that intuitions are not blind at all. Rather they are the representation of externally-related somethings excluding one another as limitations of the totalities of space and time. Secondly, as we will see in the following section, it is possible to make good on Kant’s claim for intuitional blindness by confusing intuitions with sensations. Sensations in abstraction from the external relations provided by spatio-temporal form would be blind, an indistinguishable mass, lacking external relation and so collapsed on one another. To understand how Kant can claim intuitions without concepts to be blind, however, we need to follow Conant’s lead and read on, rather than taking Kant to be producing independently intelligible accounts of separate cognitive conditions. As we will see in treating the Transcendental Deduction in the next section, on the conceptualist reading of Kant followed in this thesis, intuitional form is not sufficient for differences between appearances to be discriminated. Despite the seeming independence of intuitional form established in the Aesthetic, Kant thinks that to cognise an immediate something here and now, “ordered and placed” outside of other such somethings, some minimal form of conceptual spontaneity must be involved. In short: the relational individuation of singulars in intuition is dependent upon conceptuality understood not merely as subsumption via predication but as the synthesis or combination of intuitionally-given individuals.

75 For a detailed historical and philosophical account of the Pantheismusstreit, see Chapter 2 of Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).
76 Franks, All or Nothing, 89.
77 Robert Stern, “‘Determination is Negation: The Adventures of a Doctrine from Spinoza to Hegel to the British Idealists,” Hegel Bulletin, 37:1 (2016), 29–52. Stern authoritatively demonstrates that Hegel and Spinoza conceive of negation and determination very differently. In my understanding, while Hegel thinks that negation (in the sense of opposition) is necessary for a thought or being to have content, Spinoza thinks of each determinate being as a negation (in the sense of privation) of substance. Franks hits on the core of this way of distinguishing Hegel and Spinoza in the following characterisation of Jacobi’s account of Spinozism: “since only the infinite whole may properly be called a real being, what we ordinarily call things are... neither beings nor ‘ideas of things’ but rather ‘Nonbeings.’” All or Nothing, 89.
2.2. Concepts in the Analytic

In order to introduce the way Kant takes conceptual representation to determine appearances given in sensibility, I want to look at his first articulation of the concept/intuition distinction in *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World* (the Inaugural Dissertation of 1770). Kant there for the first time delimits two distinct representational faculties:

Cognition, in so far as it is subject to the laws of sensibility, is sensitive, and, in so far as it is subject to the laws of intelligence, it is intellectual or rational.

In the schools of the ancients, the former was called a phenomenon and the latter a noumenon.

It is thus clear that things which are thought sensitively are representations of things as they appear, while things which are intellectual are representations of things as they are. (384/2:392)

Readers of the *Critique* will only find the last clause of the last quote above strange: in the *Critique*, the status of intellectual representations will indeed be “noumena,” but their ontological and epistemic status will be deflated. The Aesthetic establishes that intellectual representations in abstraction from sensibility are not of substantial things as they are, but only things as they must be thought – this thought in its epistemic emptiness is for Kant not damaging to empirical realism.

The *Inaugural Dissertation* is thus a clear “transition” document. On the one hand, it makes the important claim that concepts and intuitions have different forms. As such, to provide a full account of the conditions of cognition, we need an account of the non-empirical “laws of sensibility” and “laws of intelligence.” This is not available in either rationalism or empiricism (at least in Kant’s reconstruction of these traditions), in which one is a confusion of the other. On the other hand, the Dissertation comes down on the side of rationalism in its affording really real knowledge of things to transcendent metaphysics. While intuitions are limited to appearance, concepts have access to the world as it really is.

This further entails that, on the Dissertation’s transitional model, concept and intuition are independent in their operation: Kant does not in 1770 feel the need to give an account of the relation between concepts and intuitions. As such, the second limb of Kant’s critical “twofold enterprise” – Longuenesse’s “finding new grounds for the grip our intellect has on the world” – is not yet present as a problem: concepts have an independent grip on the world as it in itself; intuitions have an independent grip on the world as it appears. Once conceptual grip on the world as it is in itself is relinquished – as the argument of the Aesthetic ostensibly forces us to do – the problem of conceptual grip on appearances as immediate objectivity emerges as central.78 This is not immediately a problem in the case of empirical concepts (where the concept is generated in experience). It is however a problem in cases of a priori conceptual form where that apriority is taken to have a relationship to objectivity.

Experience for Kant must be “in agreement” with such concepts, yet such concepts cannot be derived from experience. How is this agreement to be conceived? The Analytic provides the answer in essentially four stages: (1) to conceive of a logic that would, like formal logic, be a priori but, unlike formal logic, be related to objectivity (“Transcendental Logic”) – a possibility secured by the isolation

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78 The force and difficulty of this problem is recognised by Kant in the famous 1772 Letter to Herz. See Longuenesse’s discussion in *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, 18-20.
of pure forms of sensibility in the Aesthetic; (2) to nonetheless draw the functions of transcendental logic from formal logic, namely the forms of judgment ("the Metaphysical Deduction"); (3) to ground conceptual determination of objects given in intuition by those logical forms as functions of the transcendental unity of the subject ("the Transcendental Deduction"); and (4) to demonstrate that three key a priori categories (substance, cause, and reciprocal causality or "community") are conditions of the possibility of the experience of objectivity in general ("the Analogies of Experience"). I do not intend a complete account of the Deduction or the Analytic that houses it, but only those elements salient to Hegel's reading of Kant's concept/intuition distinction. Stage (4) will be left out almost completely – though causality will be discussed in more detail when we look at Hegel's grouping together of Kant and Hume in the Encyclopedia Logic in Chapter 3.

Vis-à-vis Hegel, the most important moments of the Analytic is are (1) Transcendental Logic understood as a non-formal but a priori logic of objective determination; (2) the maintenance of formal logic, both its principle of non-contradiction and its understanding of concepts as predicates of possible judgments; and most importantly (3) this account of conceptuality and its apperceptive ground in the Transcendental Deduction in terms of "synthesis" of the singulars immediately given in the forms of sensible intuition. (1) and (3) together can be seen to constitute a revolutionary understanding of conceptual determination, not immediately compatible with the predication model borrowed from rationalism and maintained in (2). In my view, elements (1) and (3) are taken up and elaborated by Hegel's Logic. But seeing this clearly means understanding Hegel's way of lifting the Critique from its cognitive context. Kant's Analytic as a whole constitutes an argument for the non-empirical conditions of possibility for conceptual determination of empirically real objects for beings with our sensibly-conditioned cognition. From the Hegelian perspective, however, what is most crucial is that Kant's argumentation proceeds through a logic of relations. It is Transcendental Logic understood as a typology of the relations that condition determinate objectivity – not logic simply or immediately exhausted by judgment and syllogism – that clearly links Kant's Critique to Hegel's Logic, and the Doctrine of Being in particular. For Hegel, thoroughly answering the question "What brings indeterminacy to determinacy?" means abstracting (at least at first) from questions of the conditions of empirical knowledge for our sensibly-conditioned cognition and providing a coherent logical account of the relation between the "intuitional" form of relation (singular immediate objects given external to one another) and the synthesis of intuitions afforded by conceptual mediation as a function of unity.

**Transcendental Logic**

Kant begins the Analytic with a section entitled "The Idea of a Transcendental Logic." To introduce this novel idea, Kant starts with a definition of the faculty of the understanding [der Verstand] symmetrical to the definition of sensibility as receptivity to receive representations: "on the contrary the faculty [Vermögen] for bringing forth representations itself, or the spontaneity of cognition, is the understanding" (A51/B75). The representations of the understanding are concepts [Begriffe]. In keeping with this symmetry, we also get the Kantian "togetherness principle" in its context, in fact in three versions:

Intuition and concepts therefore constitute the elements of all our cognition, so that neither concepts without intuitions corresponding to them in some way nor intuition without concepts can yield a cognition (A50/B74).
Without sensibility no object would be given to us, and without understanding none would be thought.

And the next (infamous) sentence:

Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind [Gedanken ohne \textit{Inhalt sind leer}, Anschauungen ohne \textit{Begriffe sind blind}]. It is thus just as necessary to make the mind’s concepts sensible [\textit{sinnlich zu machen}] (i.e., to bring them under concepts) as it is to make its intuitions understandable [\textit{verständlich zu machen}] (i.e., to bring them under concepts) (A51/B75).

As should be clear, Kant’s stated position in the \textit{Critique} is that neither conceptual representations nor intuitional representation (as above, an immediate relation to a conceptually undetermined object) constitute a cognition [\textit{Erkenntnis}] in isolation. The symmetry continues in Kant’s next determination of the understanding: just as we saw intuitions divided into pure and empirical forms, so too with concepts: concepts are empirical if sensation is “mixed” into the representation, pure if no sensation is mixed in. Sensation is the “matter of sensible cognition,” but the Aesthetic and now the Analytic are concerned with the non-empirical form of representations: “Thus pure intuition contains merely the form under which [he should say, \textit{in} which] something is intuited, and pure concepts only the form of thinking an object in general.” The crucial question to be addressed in the Analytic and in particular its Deduction – the question missing from the concept/intuition distinction as it is presented in the 1770 \textit{Dissertation} – is how the pure (i.e. a priori, i.e. necessary) sensible and conceptual conditions relate to one another so as to produce determinate thought of an object.

To answer this question, Kant draws a distinction between “general” and a new “transcendental” logic. The former has two subdivisions, pure and applied. A general pure logic is what we have been calling “formal logic,” a convenient designation that is justified by Kant’s definition below:

\begin{quote}
A general but pure logic therefore has to do with strictly a priori principles, and is a canon of the understanding and reason, but only in regard to what is formal in their use, be the content what it may (empirical or transcendental) (A59/B84).
\end{quote}

“Be the content what it may” – in other words, indifferent to that content. Nonetheless, Kant maintains that such a logic is \textit{prescriptive}, a “canon” (in the sense of a body of rules) of the understanding and reason. It contains the “absolutely necessary rules of thinking, without which no use of the understanding takes place.” The first rule is, as we have seen, non-contradiction, “thought’s agreement with itself,” which remains for Kant the \textit{conditio sine qua non} and thus the negative condition of all truth” (A59/B84). On this basis pure general logic is distinguished from applied general logic, which is \textit{descriptive} of thought “under the subjective empirical conditions that psychology teaches us” (A53/B77). The latter provides not how we \textit{must} think, but how we do under certain empirical conditions.\footnote{For an incisive Hegelian account of the prescriptive/descriptive and formal/transcendental distinctions, see the first chapter of Richard Winfield, \textit{From Concept to Objectivity: Thinking Through Hegel’s Subjective Logic} (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2006).} It has been argued that Kant’s account of the ostensibly non-empirical conditions for
objective experience is in fact only valid under our given psychological conditions. Part of what I want to show in Chapter 3 is that Hegel’s critique of Kant’s philosophy as “subjectivist” is not entirely reducible to a psychologist charge, but goes rather to Kant’s account of the concept/intuition relation.

In any case, a prescriptive general logic, as a negative condition of all truth, is only ever a limit. For both the pre-Critical and the Critical Kant, this limit is unrecognised and so overstepped in rationalism. The Critical Kant puts this overstepping in terms of canon and “organon” (tool). In German rationalism, what is merely a canon for the self-consistency of logical determinations “has been used as if it were an organon for the production of at least the semblance of objective assertions, and thus in fact it has been misused” (A61/B85). As I indicated in 1.2 above, Kant explicitly links this illegitimate extension of logical determination to objectivity to indifference. The full quote:

For since it [pure general logic] teaches us nothing at all about the content of cognition, but only the formal conditions of agreement with the understanding, which are entirely indifferent with regard to the objects [welche übrigens in Ansehung der Gegenstände gänzlich gleichgültig sein], the effrontery [Zumutung] of using it as a tool (organon) for an expansion or extension of its information, or at least the pretension of so doing, comes down to nothing but idle chatter [Geschwätzigkeit], asserting or impeaching whatever one wants with some plausibility (A62/B87).

Its canon is self-agreement, non-contradiction, which does not go to the content of the terms so related. The nothingness of this idle chatter might lead us to take to the “togetherness principle” at face value: thinking alone, even in self-agreement, is empty in the sense of “meaningless.” But the emptiness Kant is drawing our attention to here only arises once logical determination is considered from the standpoint of objective determination, “with regard to the objects.” Thought without the immediate relation to objects provided by intuitions – without the “matter of cognition” provided by that intuitional relation – is empty in the sense of lacking demonstrable objective purport. But to say that thought without intuitions is entirely meaningless cannot be a correct reading of Kant, as is clear from Kant’s novel claim for the possibility of a new kind of logic, i.e. transcendental logic, which makes the pure forms of thought conditions of objectivity in general. Such a re-tooling of formal logic’s objective purport will depend on a demonstration of its objective content, its a priori contribution to objective knowledge (that is, its status as synthetic a priori). This content would be different in kind to the empirical content of intuitions (sensations, the “matter of sensible cognition”), and different in its form to the equally pure forms of intuition (externality).

In other words, we are here concerned with a pure but contentful logic, whose content goes not to sensation, matter in appearances, but the relations that order that content – or rather, the relations that order the matter already “ordered and placed” in appearances by the pure forms of intuitions. The relationships that concepts have to the empirical matter of appearances cannot by

80 Longuenesse provides a brief but comprehensive outline of the history of this psychologist charge against Kant’s strategy in the Transcendental Deduction (namely in Gottlob Frege, Hermann Cohen, and Martin Heidegger) in Kant on the Human Standpoint (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005), 109-116. This material is an expansion of introductory remarks in Kant and the Capacity to Judge (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1998), 4-7.

81 Longuenesse explains this difficult picture and its key “in general” locution as follows. With the distinction between concepts and intuition in place, Kant has made possible “a logic that is just as pure as formal logic, because it does not derive its rules from empirical-psychological considerations... but that is not as general as formal logic, in that the rules it considers are specified by the content of thought they are relevant for. They are the rules for combining representations given in sensibility, whatever the empirical (sensory) content of these representations may be. Those rules are thus not merely formal (concerning only the forms of thought in
definition be determined a priori, but the way they combine the pure forms of intuition can be. In Kant’s words:

Transcendental Logic... has a manifold of sensibility that lies before it a priori, which the transcendental aesthetic has offered to it, in order to provide the pure concepts of the understanding with a matter, without which they would be without any content, and thus completely empty. Now space and time contain a manifold of pure a priori intuition... (A76-77/B102).

Transcendental Logic is objective because it limits itself to that which is given in intuition; it is pure because it goes to pure intuitions, not the empirically-given matter in intuitions (sensation). So again, if general logic “abstracts from all content” (A76/B102) or treats that content “without distinction” (A57/B81-82) between empirical and non-empirical contents, Transcendental Logic has an a priori content in virtue of having pure intuitions as its “matter.” Kant has now cleared the site for a novel, transcendental form of logic: on the one hand, it is distinguished from pure general logic because it is not indifferent to objectivity; on the other hand, it is distinguished from applied general logic (and empirical thinking in general) because it concerns only the pure form of objectivity in general, in abstraction from the empirically-given content of any particular objective cognition.

The Metaphysical Deduction: the “dual function” of conceptuality

Thus far, Kant says, “The understanding has above been explained only negatively, as a non-sensible faculty of cognition” (A67/B92). To explain the understanding positively, Kant in the next section of the Analytic (entitled “On the Clue [Leitfaden] to the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the Understanding,” §§8-12) makes two crucial moves. Firstly, he identifies the understanding as a faculty of judgment which unifies representations (§8) and outlines the logical forms of judgments (§9). But unification of representation can be either the unification of subject and predicate concepts in a judgment (synthesis intellectualis) or the unification of intuitional representation (synthesis speciosa). As such, Kant’s second claim is that these a priori forms as “pure concepts of the understanding” or “categories” effect a kind of unification or connection (a “synthesis”) of intuitions (§10). Kant thus advances a dual-function account of conceptuality. Most importantly, the second conceptual function will turn out to be the condition of the first function being about empirical objects: in effecting the synthesis of intuitions, the categories constitute the a priori conceptual conditions for the kinds of conceptual determination (judgments) treated in §§8-9 being about intuitionally-given objectivity, because conceptuality now has a hand in the constitution of that objectivity itself. The Transcendental Deduction then has the difficult task of proving this claim, which will ground both conceptual unification in judgments and intuitional synthesis in the unity of the subject, with the categories the means by which that unity is achieved.

Note that as the relevance to Hegel’s Logic here is primarily synthesis in its second function (synthesis of externally related terms), I will not at this point be providing a full account of the table of the logical forms of judgment and its corresponding category in §§9 and 10 (though some of Kant’s combining concepts and judgment for arriving at valid inferences), but they concern the way a content for thought is formed by ordering manifolds in intuition (multiplicities of qualitatively determined spatial and temporal parts). These rules are the rules of ‘transcendental logic.’” Beatrice Longunesse, “Kant on a priori Concepts: The Metaphysical Deduction of the Categories,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006), 137-38.
account of the categories of quality will be considered in comparison to Hegel’s Seinslogik account in Chapter 6).

Kant begins his characterisation of the faculty and forms of the understanding with the position established in the Aesthetic: “we cannot partake of intuition independently of sensibility.” Because sensibility and understanding are distinct, “the understanding is therefore not a faculty of intuition.” Now because for Kant the sphere of “cognition” (Kant uses it here in the broad sense, rather than the technical sense of objective determination) is exhausted by being either intuitive or conceptual, Kant concludes: “thus the cognition of every, at least human, understanding is a cognition through concepts, not intuitive but discursive [discursiv]” (A68/B93). If intuitions rest on “affections,” discursivity is a matter of “functions,” and that means judging, “ordering different representations under a common one [my emphasis],” distinct from the “ordering and placing” within intuition. Kant then uses an example judgment to illustrate the ordering under characteristic of judgments, as well as the way in which judgments establish unity among our representations. It is important here to understand the way in which judgments for Kant effect unity among representations in order to later understand the Deduction’s identification of a priori conceptual activity, the synthesis of intuitions, and the unity of the subject.

In every judgment there is a concept that holds of many, and that among this many also comprehends a given representation which is then related immediately to the object. So in the judgment, e.g., “All bodies are divisible,” the concept of the divisible... is here particularly related to the concept of body, and this in turn is related to certain appearances that come before us. These objects are therefore mediately represented by the concept of divisibility (A68-69/B93-94).

The predicate “divisible” through this judgment “holds of many” subject concepts, i.e. any “body.” The immediate relation of this subject concept to objects is, per Kant’s pre-Critical anti-rationalist desideratum, supplied not by any further conceptual representations but by “certain appearances that come before us.” Given an appearance conceptually determined as an object subsumable under the concept “body” (Kant will not until the Deduction explain how this step happens), it follows from the judgment that that object will have the predicate “divisibility.” That is, that which is determined as a body is through the judgment – or “mediately represented” by the judgment – also determined by the concept of divisibility. In other words, the concepts of body and divisibility are brought together into a unity, such that the determination of an appearance as a body necessarily (in the sense of “inescapably demands”) that it also be determined as divisible. This necessary relation between a subject and its predicate properties (and between its predicate properties) in conceptually determinate objects will be crucial when we come to the Deduction. But at this point what I want to emphasise is that the conceptual determination of judgment extends the sensibly-given immediacy of any singular object beyond the “place” of that object in space and time. Rather than merely encounter this object “outside of <and next to>” that object, concepts enable this object to be conceptually related to objects not spatially or temporally contiguous with it. In being able to refer a spatio-temporally present object to a spatio-temporally absent object nonetheless conceptually united by shared properties, conceptual form in some sense “frees” us from the point in time and space in which we presently are, and the

82 The helpful phrase “inescapably demands” is Longuenesse’s. Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 49.

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singularity of each intuitional encounter in that time and space.\textsuperscript{83} Indeed, if we could not so mediate our spatio-temporal moment with thought of absent but conceptually related objects, we would not be able to experience difference in our spatio-temporal moment itself. That is – and again this is a conceptualist reading – the differentiation of this object from that object next to and outside of it is itself the minimal form of conceptual achievement, a Kantian insight that will loom large in the Deduction. In any case, Kant’s above account of judgement fills out what Kant means in his definition of concepts as mediated and general representations: the function of concepts is to represent generic identity across multiple episodes of sensible immediacy.

Having demonstrated with an example the generality and mediation provided by judgment, Kant then outlines the minimal possible forms of judgment, by “abstract[ing] from all content of a judgement in general, and attend[ing] to the mere form of the understanding in it....” (A70/B95). These yield four “titles” – quantity, quality, relation and modality – each with three moments. This is as yet however only a re-presentation of formal logic – Kant claims the forms are “readily found” in the work of the logicians – though Kant makes two key amendments.\textsuperscript{84}

However, as I indicated above, the grip of an empirical concept on an appearance is still unexplained. “Concepts, however as predicates of possible judgments, are related to some representation of a still undetermined object.” (A69/B94) – but what is this relation? Empiricism has a story here, running in terms of psychological association of sense-impressions and words. But we have seen in 1.1 that, contra transcendental realism, Kant thinks that if our representational powers have to accord with an already constituted object, some form of sceptical gap will obtain, and that empiricism in particular cannot explain the relation between a priori conceptuality and objects – only the a posteriori content of concepts. We have seen in 2.1 in the Aesthetic that the immediate representation of a (conceptually) undetermined object is an appearance. Now in §8 of the Analytic we have an account of the subsumptive, unifying, and mediating function of concepts operative in and through the logical forms of judgments. So we are at the problem of the Deduction: how are logical forms to relate to empirical objects?

To connect this problem up with the consideration of Kant’s pre-Critical work in 1.2. Kant characterised logical determination in terms of content indifference. In the Analytic, we saw this indifference emphasised in the argument for the necessity of Transcendental Logic. It is taken up again in a different way at the opening of the Transcendental Deduction (§14), this time in terms of “determinate” and “indeterminate” judgments. Kant seeks to show “the same categorical form of judgment (‘S is P’) can be employed in two different ways, viz., indeterminately and determinately.”\textsuperscript{85}

\textsuperscript{83} Paul Redding makes a similar point in one of his discussions of Kant’s concept/intuition distinction. “Separating out intuitive and conceptual forms of representation, Kant could identify the influence of spatiotemporal location with the contribution of sensory intuition... But to the extent that the content of thought is conceptual, its content is neither spatial nor temporal... This facet of logical space is reflected in the idea that if a proposition is true, it is eternally true—genuine propositional contents must be free from tethering to any particular place and time” \textit{Continental Idealism}, 59. Redding notes the Platonic and Neoplatonist heritage of the idea that conceptual thought enables “indifference to spatiotemporal location” and Kant’s deflation of such a God’s eye view of things insofar as “purely conceptual knowledge must be ‘empty,’” \textit{Continental Idealism}, 58-59. The “Indifference to spatiotemporal location” of conceptual form is another point of entry into the content indifference discussed in 1.2 above.

\textsuperscript{84} Kant’s distinguishes singular from universal judgments and infinite judgments from affirmative ones, whereas these judgments are treated as identical in predicate logic. The latter pair we will have an opportunity to consider in Hegel’s alternative account of qualitative determination in the \textit{Logic}.

\textsuperscript{85} Lee, “The Determine-Indeterminate Distinction in Kant’s Theory of Judgment,” 205.
...the function of the categorical judgment was that of the relationship of the subject to the predicate, e.g., “All bodies are divisible.” Yet in regard to the merely logical use of the understanding, it would remain undetermined [blieb es unbestimmt] which of these two concepts will be given the function of the subject and which will be given that of the predicate. For one can also say: “Something divisible is a body” (B128-9).

Because formal or “general” logic is content-indifferent, the content of S can be exchanged with the content of P without compromising the truth-value of the statement from the perspective of and within the resources of formal logic. The criterion of non-contradiction is still met. Given that criterion alone, it is impossible to tell which content should be in the position of S in the categorical judgment, and which in the position of P. Bringing this reversibility problem into contact with the first use of the “All bodies are divisible” example treated above, the question is: what constrains the judging agent to relate this immediately given object as appearance to the subject concept of body, such that divisibility would be predicated of and necessarily entailed by bodiliness?

Kant’s answer is the dual-function discussed above:

The same function that gives unity to the different representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representations in an intuition, which, expressed generally, is called the pure concept of understanding (A79/B104-105).

So Kant claims – and at this point it is only a claim – that the logical functions of judgment are responsible for unification of representations on two levels. Firstly, there is unification of conceptual representations via the logical forms of judgments. But this activity of unification does not go only to the logical relation of thought contents (indifferent to their either empirical or a priori origin). Those logical forms as “pure concepts of the understanding” or categories are also responsible for synthesising different representations “in an intuition” – or effecting “synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition” (A79/B105). It is because they are so responsible that Kant can solve the problem first formulated in the letter to Herz: in synthesising intuitions, the categories “then are related necessarily and a priori to objects of experience, since only by means of them can any object of experience be thought at all” (A93/B126). In other words, empirical concept application (e.g. the predication of the concept “body” of a singular and immediate appearance, “that is a body”) will be dependent on the categories insofar as these are responsible for synthesising intuitions such that individual objects can be cognised at all.

The Transcendental Deduction

Conceptual and Non-Conceptual Interpretations
I must pause to directly address the ongoing interpretive debate about the aims and intended results of the Deduction. For the conceptualist reader, the togetherness principle secures not only conceptual determination of an object, but objectivity in general. Per Longuenesse: “these functions [of the

Another way to put the problem might be: Kant claims that all judgments are potentially the major premise of a syllogism. This is clear in the above example: All bodies are divisible; this object is a divisible; therefore, it is a body. But in this syllogism, the second step contains not a general and mediated representation, but a singular and immediate one: this object here and now (i.e. the object as appearance). How is it to be conceptually determined, such that it can be subsumed under the concept of body, and so brought together with necessity in thought with other objects so subsumed?
understanding] are not only conditions of the subordination of concepts according to logical use, but conditions of the very presentation of appearances in sensible intuition." On this view, the dual function thesis means that, without certain conceptual conditions obtaining, intuition does not give us appearances (conceptually undetermined objects) at all, and thus the stakes of the Deduction are so high as to risk loss of the representation of objects all together. The opposed non-conceptualist reading is that intuitions unmediated by concepts nonetheless give us a non-conceptual objectivity. As such, Allais is right to more concretely characterise the Deduction as attempting to show the conceptual conditions “for representing intuitions as connected with necessity and universality and that without this we would have perceptual particulars but no objects of thought.” On this view, the Deduction is not about securing determinate representation of spatio-temporal objects, but only the thinkability of intuitionally-given objects as instances of more general kinds, i.e. the transcendental conditions for concept predication. Using the terminology worked through in 2.1, we can say: the goal of the Deduction for non-conceptualist readers is to demonstrate that spatio-temporally organised but conceptually undetermined objects (appearances) are in principle conceptually determinable; for the conceptualist, the Deduction seeks to show that a priori conceptuality is a condition of there being cognition of objects at all.

There is textual support in the Critique for both interpretations. Indeed, the non-conceptualist Kantian Robert Hanna does admit that Kant’s Critique, and the togetherness principle in particular, is the origin of contemporary non-conceptualist and conceptualist views – going so far as to call Kant a “conflicted conceptualist.” Kant himself explicitly reinforces the non-conceptualist intuitional

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87 Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 28. Another example of the conceptualist reading, and perhaps the key representative of that position in Lucy Allais’ non-conceptualist account, is Lorne Falkenstein, Kant’s Intuitionism: A Commentary on the Transcendental Aesthetic (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1995). As Falkenstein puts it like this in his more recent summary account of the Transcendental Aesthetic, “For Kant, our sense are insufficient for the perception of particular objects. Perception occurs only when the information acquired by the senses is recognised by us as an instance of an object of a particular kind.” Lorne Falkenstein, “Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic,” in A Companion to Kant, ed. Graham Bird (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 141.

88 In his long defence of a Kantian non-conceptualism, Robert Hanna defines conceptualism as the claim “that all mental concepts are strictly determined by minded animals’ conceptual capacities.” And then a little later: conceptualism “says that our cognitive access to the targets of our intentionality is always and necessarily mediated by concepts.” This then leads to the “fundamental philosophical issue: can and do we sometimes cognitively encounter things directly and pre-discursively (Non-Conceptualism), or must we always cognitively encounter them only with the framework of discursive rationality (Conceptualism)?” Robert Hanna, “Beyond the Myth of the Myth: A Kantian Theory of Non-Conceptual Content,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies (2011) 19(3): 325-6.

89 Lucy Allais, Manifest Reality: Kant’s Idealism and His Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 275.

90 Here some differences in the non-conceptualist camp open up. Robert Hanna thinks Kant is “conflicted” about his conceptualism because the foundational transcendental idealist commitment – as a thesis about space and time – means that he is unable in the Deduction to bring spatio-temporal appearances under the categories without remainder (the possibility of “essentially rogue objects” is not foreclosed), while Allais argues that the Deduction is successful in accounting for concept predication of empirical objects. Hanna, “Kant, Hegel, and the Fate of Non-Conceptual Content,” 21-22. See also Hanna’s more closer working through of this argument in “Kant’s Non-Conceptualism, Rogue Objects, and The Gap in the B Deduction,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies (2011) 19(3): 399-415. Allais in contrast claims that the Deduction “vindicates” the categories, Manifest Reality, 260.

independence in the following passage at the start of the Deduction, which can be read as a kind of “mission statement” for the Deduction as a whole:

“The categories of the understanding, on the contrary, do not represent to us the conditions under which objects are given in intuition at all, and hence objects can indeed appear to us without necessarily having to be related to functions of the understanding, and therefore without the understanding containing their a priori conditions. Thus a difficulty is revealed here that we did not encounter in the field of sensibility, namely how subjective conditions of thinking should have objective validity, i.e. yield conditions of the possibility of all cognition of objects; for appearances can certainly be given in intuition without the functions of the understanding” (A90/B122).

This quote suggests that the Aesthetic has demonstrated that the pure forms of sensibility are necessary and sufficient conditions for objects as appearance, and it is because the pure forms of sensibility are independent of the similarly pure “functions of the understanding” that the problem of the Deduction arises. In other words, the question to be addressed in the Deduction, i.e. how the non-empirically-drawn forms of judgment (the “subjective conditions of thinking” above) can relate to appearances, is both separate to and dependent on the question treated in the Aesthetic, i.e. how the forms of our sensibility place and order sensation such that objects can be immediately given to us as appearances. Further textual support for the non-conceptualist reading can be found in Kant’s approach to his favourite category. For Kant, causality is an a priori “rule of synthesis” – a concept - “in which given something A something entirely different B is posited according to a rule.” As objects given in intuition are not structured according to this conceptual rule – but merely placed side-by-side and after one another – it is a priori possible that “such a concept is perhaps entirely empty and finds no object anywhere among the appearances” (A90/B122). But even if this Humean conclusion were correct, Kant claims that “Appearance would nonetheless offer objects to our intuition, for intuition by no means requires the functions of thinking” (A91/B123).

With these textual resources, the non-conceptualist can charge the conceptualist with conflating intuitions and sensation, because such a reading neglects the immediate spatio-temporal objectivity we have seen afforded by intuitional form. As I said in concluding 2.1 above, if intuitions were just sensation, then intuitions would be radically or completely “blind,” because sensations

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92 Robert Hanna and Lucy Allais quote this passage as direct textual evidence in defense of their non-conceptualist reading. Allais, Manifest Reality, 162. Hanna, “Kant, Hegel, and the Fate of Non-Conceptual Content,” 2.

93 Both Hanna and Allais argue that the problem of the Deduction presupposes independent non-conceptual content, and that failing to see this misses the distinctiveness of the Aesthetic and Analytic. As Allais says, “By seeing the concern of both the Deduction and Aesthetic as being with perceptual particulars, the conceptualist reading, in my view, fails to see what is distinctive in both sections.” Manifest Reality, 268. Hanna similarly argues that given Kant’s commitment to non-Conceptual content, “as a consequence, there is a prima facie difficulty for him about how to demonstrate the a priori necessity and objective validity of the categories,” i.e. because he has to show that non-conceptual contents (appearances) are in principle determinable by the categories, despite being organised themselves in an irreducibly non-conceptual way. Furthermore, as the Aesthetic’s demonstration of the a priority of intuitional form (from the possibility of geometry) “will not work for pure concepts, therefore there must be a logically distinct argument for the a priori necessity and validity of pure concepts...” Hanna, “Kant, Hegel, and the Fate of Non-Conceptual Content,” 13-14.
without intuitional form are indeed without individuation. Unfortunately, as we will see in 3.1 below, this conflation is present in certain Hegelian readers of Kant, which has enabled Kantians to argue that Hegel himself is guilty of misreading Kant. However, I argue against both non-conceptualism and reductive “Hegelian” conceptualism that one can recognise the distinction between intuional form in distinction and the sensible matter it organises and still hold that concepts are required for that intuitional form to function as it does for creatures with our conceptual capacities.

In my view, Kant’s explicit non-conceptualist statements are trumped by the argumentative movement of the Critique itself. Again, I agree with Conant’s argument that Kant’s Critique demonstrates the constitutive inter-dependence of intuitional and conceptual form. As Conant shows, recognising this inter-dependence requires attention not only to Kant’s immediate definitions of such forms in the Aesthetic and the start of the Analytic, but to the “dialectical” argumentative movement that undermines an understanding of their function based on immediate definitions alone. Conant’s reading clearly has Hegelian methodological resonance, something I discuss in more detail in Chapter 5. Here, however, what is important to this dissertation’s comparative analysis is the picture of the concept/intuition distinction in Kant that emerges from taking up and elaborating Conant’s line of approach.

To provide this picture in advance: Kant does not think – and begins the Deduction by denying – that intuional form can provide on its own cognition of any kind of relation between singular and immediate representations, not even external relations. The definitional work of the Aesthetic makes it sound as if intuional form on its own furnishes cognition of relationally-determined individuals, i.e. appearances as mutually exclusive limitations of one space and one time. But once we read on to the “synthesis of apprehension in an intuition” in the A Deduction, and the synthetic activity of the faculty of imagination in both A and B Deductions, it becomes clear that intuitions provide us with immediate cognition of individuals, but not cognition of the relations that individuate them. Cognition of the “relational” aspect of intuitional form turns out to be dependent on Kant’s second function of conceptuality, i.e. his novel characterisation of conceptual spontaneity not only or immediately as concept predication, but as the “grip” or “grasp” of immediately indifferent singulars in the “construction” of relations between terms. (The etymology of “Concept” in English is to “take together” likewise, the German equivalent Begriff is from greifen, “to grab,” and Kant suggests the etymological relevance at A103). For Kant, I will argue, an immediate singular representation requires conceptuality to articulate its relations with the other singular objects that it excludes from a particular place in space and time. In other words, conceptuality is required to represent the form of relation specific to intuitions, i.e. external relationality; conceptuality is required to think singular representations in relation to one another such that they can be cognised as “outside one another,”

94 For Allais, the conceptualist idea that intuitions require concepts to present us with particulars attributes in turn to Kant the view that “without concepts we would merely have a mass of sensory input, an unorganised sensory mush, rather than any awareness of distinct, discrete individuals” Manifest Reality, 148. Allais cites Lorne Falkenstein, and references McDowell’s Mind and World and Longuenesse’s Kant and the Capacity to Judge as evidence of the “dominance” of the conceptualist view, as well as two more recent commentators: Hannah Ginsborg, “Empirical Concepts and the Content of Experience,” European Journal of Philosophy (2006) 14(3): 349-72 and Aaron Griffith, “Perception and the Categories: A Conceptualist Reading of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason,” European Journal of Philosophy 20, no. 2 (2010): 193-222. Ginsborg’s 2008 paper “Was Kant a Conceptualist?” Philosophical Studies 137(1): 65-77 in focussing on the problematic status of imagination in the Deduction does highlight the non-binary character of Kant’s concept/intuition distinction, as we will be see below. Mind and World and the impact of its particular conceptualist reading of Kantian idealism on the Kant-Hegel debate will be treated in detail in 3.1.
i.e. so that we can be conscious of the specifically intuitional mode of difference as difference in place. On my reading, intuitional representations without conceptual mediation are “blind” in the sense that they are blind to – have no reference to – other such representations.

My version of Kantian conceptualism does not mean that intuitional form as relational individuation is jettisoned as Allais fears. It is rather that conceptual work is required for the relational component of that individuation to show up. Intuitional form is successful in the sense that it provides us with individuals. But intuional form is, if one can put it like this, too successful: each individual is represented as excluding all other such individuals from its place in space and time, such that those excluded are not represented at all. We have in an intuition one object, not the others outside of it. To cognise that individual as in relation to those it excludes, conceptual spontaneity must connect singular representation up with other such representations. Put slightly differently: individuals are the “after-effects” of relations, but in their immediacy individuals appear without those relations explicit.95

Immediacy just means “without mediation,” without connection to another, such that mediation is required for the relational structure of intuitional form to be cognised – or, to put it closer to the language of Hegel’s post-Kantian, non-cognitive account of determination in the Logic – for that structure to be posited or made explicit.

Note that this interpretation can take on board some of Allais’ most central claims. In Allais’ phrase, repeated at least twice in Manifest Reality: conceptual syntheses are “primarily something that is done to intuition, not something that produces intuition.”96 I do not take conceptualism to mean that all the work is done by conceptual form, but rather that conceptual form is required to represent and so cognise the relational component of intuitional form. In other words, I can agree with Allais’ non-conceptualism up to the point at which relationality is ascribed to our sensibility: As Allais puts it, because the Aesthetic argues that “intuitions are singular and immediate representations which give us objects… [t]his means that a manifold of outer intuition is an immediately presented array of distinct, spatio-temporally located and related particulars.”97 Intuition does give us distinct, spatio-temporally located objects one by one, outside and after one another. But because it gives us objects one by one, outside and after one another, the cognising subject must actively bring them into relation.

My version of Kantian conceptualism is I think reflected in Hegel’s treatment of “outside-one-another-being” in the Encyclopedia Logic and Logic. In my view, Hegel is attentive to the necessity that intuitional form – understood logically as singular immediacy – be mediated in order to be determinate, and he understands mediation in a way suggested Kant himself: namely, conceptual determination is minimally understood to be the activity of introducing relations into the “outside-one-another-being” that characterises singular immediacies.

95 The language of singulars as an “after-effect” of constitutive relationality is Andrew Benjamin’s. Towards a Relational Ontology (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2015), 3. Benjamin in that work and its follow-up Virtue in Being (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2016) considers the history of philosophy as an “effacement” of relations, instead erroneously affording singularity a foundational role. See my review of Virtue in Being in The Oxford Literary Review 40.1 (2018): 124–136. This thesis obviously contests that such a historical characterisation is appropriate to either Kant or Hegel. It also provides an alternative explanation as to why that relationality is “effaced,” namely, because relations do not appear immediately, and immediacy is logically bound up with singularity as such.
96 Manifest Reality, 150. And later: “the syntheses are something that is done to intuitions…”, 169.
97 Manifest Reality, 170.
Synthesis and Spontaneity

Kant presents “synthesis” in this way: “Only the spontaneity of our thought requires that this manifold first be gone through, taken up, and combined in a certain way in order for a cognition to be made out of it. I call this action synthesis [synthesis]” (A77/B103). This “only” is important. Both A and B Deductions makes it clear that the comparison and connection required for cognition is not available in sensibility in any way. Connection is neither present a posteriori in sensations (because any such connection would not be a connection for us, would not be a representation, would merely be sensory modification), nor is this connection present in the pure forms of intuition. At the start of the A Deduction: “receptivity can make cognitions possible only if combined with spontaneity” (A97). The “with” here is ambiguous, but the opening of the B Deduction clarifies Kant’s position: “the combination [Verbindung] (conjunctio) of a manifold in general can never come to us through the senses, and therefore cannot already be contained in the pure form of sensible intuition; for it is an act of the spontaneity of the power of representation” (B129-30). And therefore: “we can present nothing as combined in the object without having previously combined it ourselves, and that among all representations combination is the only one that is not given through objects...” (B130). Synthesis or combination, then, is not an operation or function of our receptivity – the faculty of sensibility through which objects are given to us – but is a function of the spontaneity that characterises the faculty of the understanding. So concepts will in some way be said to be doing the combining, as already announced by the dual function thesis above.

In line with this thesis, Kant in both versions of the Transcendental Deduction does not present a priori concepts (the categories) understood per the Metaphysical Deduction as “logical forms of judgment” as immediately responsible for synthesis the manifold of intuition. The categories are the transcendental ground of activities of synthesis of the manifold, i.e. conceptuality in its second, non-predicative function. Kant in the “Transition” section to both A and B Deductions distinguishes: “... 1) the synopsis of the manifold a priori through sense; 2) the synthesis of this manifold through the imagination; finally 3) the unity of this synthesis through original apperception” (A94/B127). This threefold move toward categorial applicability to empirical objects is clear in the A Deduction, whose “Second Section” “prepare[s] rather than instruct[s]” the reader by working four numbered sections corresponding to these three combinatorial functions plus (4) the synthetic activity of the categories in and through which apperception obtains (A98-A115). The A Deduction then repeats these steps in a more integrated way in its “Third Section” (A115-A128). In the A Deduction, then, a consideration of the empirical and pure syntheses of intuition and imagination turn out to be conditioned by the “transcendental unity of apperception.” In short: representations to be synthesised must necessarily belong together in the unity of one subject. The categories are then introduced as the functions by which this necessary unity is obtained, and therefore, synthesis of intuition is grounded in the categories.

In contrast, The B Deduction begins by effectively summarising the treatment of synthesis in intuition from the A Deduction under the formula “synthesis of the manifold” (B130), but considers in detail its condition in the unity of apperception (B131-142, §§15-19), so that §20 can claim “All sensible intuitions stand under the categories, as conditions under which alone their manifold can come together in one consciousness” (B143). This leads Longuenesse in her close reading of the Deduction...
to suggest that the two versions are complementary – with one beginning where the other left off.\footnote{Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 34. Longuenesse there points out that Kant make a similar point at Bxlii.}

In short, in both A and B versions it is only after the argument that synthesis in intuition and imagination is grounded in apperceptive unity is established that the objective purport of the categories established as functions of that unity.

It is important to see that this line of approach (through synthesis of the manifold to the objective purport of the categories) is made necessary by Kant’s commitment to the form of intuitional representation as that of discrete individuals:

“If every individual representation were entirely foreign to the other, as it were isolated and separated from it, then there would never arise anything like cognition, which is a whole of compared and connected representations” (A97).

This is an extremely important statement. Firstly, this way of setting up the problem – how “foreign” and “isolated” intuitional representations come to be combined by our spontaneity so as to constitute thinkable objects – follows necessarily from the Aesthetic’s characterisation of intuitional form as we have discussed it above, i.e. as representing individuals as excluding other such individuals from their place within space or time. Robert Stern emphasises this point in Hegel, Kant and the Structure of the Object: “Kant’s atomistic picture of intuitions, his conception of unity as the relating together of pre-existing elements, and his account of synthesis through the categories are therefore really all of a piece.”\footnote{Robert Stern, Structure of the Object, 20.}

Even before the detail is filled in, Kant’s claim that “combination does not lie in the objects” either in themselves or as they are given in intuition means that objectivity will be understood as “the result a synthesizing activity, while the material our which the object is composed is taken to be an intrinsically unrelated plurality.”\footnote{Structure of the Object, 21. Stern quotes a passage from the Bounds of Sense in making this point, which I reproduce here: “Belief in the occurrence of the process of synthesis as an antecedent condition of experience and belief in the antecedent occurrence of disconnected impressions as materials for the process to work on are beliefs which support each other and are necessary to each other.” P.F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense, 32. Strawson’s characterisation of the manifold of intuition as “impressions” is imprecise and indicates a conceptualist reading, in which conceptuality is required for sensations to constitute individuals (which on a non-conceptualist reading is already constituted by the ordering of intuitional form).}

As Kant himself puts it, to say that “appearance contains a manifold” means that “different perceptions by themselves are encountered dispersed and separate in the mind” thus “a combination of them, which they cannot have in sense itself, is therefore necessary” (A120). So the “placing and ordering” of intuition turns out to be, from the perspective of cognition – of objective determination – to be inadequate: Intuition gives us one thing after and next to one another, but in so doing, it provides us with representations of individuals without reference or connection to those individuals after or next to them. Although Hegel does not quite explicitly say it, Hegel’s Logic will be shown to argue that Kant’s way of getting from intuitional non-relation to the relation characteristic of spontaneity and required for generality cannot consistently overcome the arbitrariness that Kant is worried about.

Central to the Deduction’s argument for the necessity of conceptual synthesis of the intuitional manifold is Kant’s drawing attention to what would happen to empirical cognition if the transcendental grounds of synthesis did not obtain, if intuitions were left in their atomistic “side-by-side.” George Dicker characterizes the transcendental argument as “the attempt to account for the kinds of experience that we indisputedly have.”\footnote{George Dicker, Kant’s Theory of Knowledge: An Analytic Introduction (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004), 13.}
as starting “from premises that are so rudimentary and indisputable that the interlocutor, presumably the sceptic, cannot fail to accept them, and then by a series of valid moves they yield a conclusion that is precisely of the sort that [the interlocutor] did question.” We can parse this structure as follows: transcendental arguments have the form: “Our experience has a certain feature F. Experience with feature F would not be possible if it were not true that p. Therefore p.” Filling this in with some of Kant’s content: because our experience is indisputably one of “compared and connected representations,” and this would not be possible without the synthesis of the manifold whose ultimate ground is the categories, therefore the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience. This way of characterising transcendental argument, as becomes clear on both Dicker’s and Sacks’ account, is a way of explaining the synthetic a priori content they purport to contain. That is, the indisputable experience from which we begin leads to conclusions not contained or entailed in the propositional content by which that experience is designated.

What is neglected in this characterisation of Kantian argument is that, in the Deduction, this argument’s first step includes a negation. Kant’s begins in fact with the claim that our experience has a certain feature F because it indisputably does not have feature X. The accent – the “indisputable” – falls on the negation. Putting Kant’s content into this revised form: “Our experience has the feature of comparison and connection, because it indisputably is not one of confusion, blindness, etc. Our experience as a “whole of compared and connected representations” would not be possible if it were not true that certain conceptual conditions hold. Therefore they hold.” So my commenting on this reference to indeterminacy in the Deduction is not the result of the peculiar trajectory of this comparative work, but is essential to understanding the argumentative strategy of the Deduction as a whole.

Apprehension, Reproduction and Apperception
Again, the second section of the A Deduction provides an account of three spontaneous syntheses: (1) the synthesis of apprehension in the intuition; (2) the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination; and (3) the synthesis of recognition in the concept (which will turn out to be apperception). Each of these, at a different level of complexity, holds representations together as conditions of the possibility of propositional concept use, i.e. properties being picked out by predicate concepts. So while the three syntheses go to work on different representative strata (more detail in a moment) they belong to the same act, which Kant late in the A Deduction calls transcendental imagination, and in the B Deduction figurative synthesis or “synthesis speciosa” to distinguish it from the synthesis effected by logical forms

104 I draw this formalization from Johannes Roessler’s graduate seminar on Kant at the University of Warwick.
105 Sacks’ worry is not so much with the initial, “empirically established” premise, which is “so basic that it cannot be denied.” He is rather concerned with the “nature of the moves that come later,” en route to the “ampliative” claim that characterises synthetic a priori content. “Sacks, “The Nature of Transcendental Arguments,” 439-441.
106 Now, on this reconstruction, we can begin understand Hegel’s problems with Kant’s position – and his motivation for re-doing determinacy via an ontological rather than transcendental Logic. Firstly, in order to get transcendental argument running, we have to determine our experience as being one of determinacy, by opposing it to indeterminacy. Determinacy is then already assumed here to be of the form this and not that, F and not X. We thus slip in the logical form of determination via negation or contrastive comparison without accounting for this form. Now, this is not a problem for Kant, who has already taken the forms of judgment – including negative judgments – to be the minimal units of sense. As we will see in Chapter 6, the “quality” section of the *Science of Logic* provides an alternative derivation of negation, and then of negation as determinative of qualitative contrast.
in abstraction from intuition, “synthesis intellectualis.” In other words, the Metaphysical Deduction’s presentation of conceptuality in terms of logical forms of judgment gives way via the dual-function thesis to an account of a more primary spontaneous activity, indicated by the etymology of the word itself – concepts [Begriffe] as grasping or grabbing – and whose faculty is the transcendental imagination.

The dual-function thesis falls out in such a way that conceptuality in this sense is the condition for the unification of empirical concepts of objects in judgments. To say that this activity is “more primary” and “conditions” empirical concept application is licensed by Kant’s text: Kant in the A Deduction describes at each level a synthesis of empirical intuitions and then that synthesis as it operates on purely formal intuition alone, with this latter the transcendental condition for any empirical synthesis. This is summarised when he turns to the third section of the A version:

“The possibility of an experience in general and cognition of its objects rest on three subjective sources: sense, imagination, and apperception; each of these can be considered empirically, namely in application to given appearances, but they are also elements or foundations a priori that make this empirical use itself possible.” (A115)

Kant then spells out the transcendental content of the three syntheses:

“But pure intuition (with regard to it as representation, time, the form of inner intuition) grounds the totality of perception a priori; the pure synthesis of the imagination grounds association a priori; and pure apperception, i.e. the thoroughgoing identity of oneself in all possible representations, grounds empirical consciousness a priori.” (A115-116).

I want to pay attention very carefully to the way in which the pure forms of intuitions are connected by spontaneity in these steps.

“1. On the synthesis of apprehension in the intuition” (A98-100). In the Aesthetic Kant has shown that all our representations belong to “inner sense,” whose form is time. Kant now holds that it is in the “one thing after another” structure of time in which synthesis must be effected. As he puts it, all our representations belong to inner sense, “and as such all of our cognitions are in the end subjected to the formal conditions of inner sense, namely time, as that in which they must all be ordered, connected and brought into relations [Verhältnisse].” He then remarks: “This is a general remark on which must ground everything that follows” (A99), which should be taken seriously. The pure forms of sensibility “place and order” sensations after one another in appearances in the form of inner sense, but do not without some contribution of our own spontaneity bring them into cognised relations. Unrelated – that is, aconceptual – appearances would for Kant issue in the first form of “blindness” or indeterminacy we encounter in the account of the syntheses:

Every intuition contains a manifold in itself, which however would not be represented as such if the mind did not distinguish the time in the succession of impressions on one another; for

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107 A118, B151. See Longuenesse’s spelling this unity of synthetic activity out in Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 35-36.

108 Note that I raise imagination here not to link to a later discussion of Hegel’s claims in the Differenzschrift and Faith and Knowledge that Kant’s “imagination” unbeknownst to Kant represents the unity of subject and the objective world, which Kant’s limitation of knowledge to appearances has divided. That early way of putting the critique has been treated in detail by Sally Sedgwick, Hegel’s Critique of Kant (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2012), 108-118. Rather, I consider synthesis here to provide a basis in Kant’s text for Hegel’s mature critique and transformation of Kant’s cognitive model of determination in the Logic. I discuss Sedgwick’s work at some length in 3.1.
as contained in one moment no representation can ever be anything other absolute unity. Now in order for unity of intuition to come from this manifold (as, say, in the representation of space), it is necessary first to run through and then take together this manifoldness, whose action I call the synthesis of apprehension… (A99).

This is a difficult paragraph because it begins by saying that we need the synthesis of apprehension in order to have a manifold and not an “absolute unity”; and then that we need that same synthesis “for unity of intuition to come from this manifold.” This sounds contradictory until it is recognised that both identity (here “unity”) and difference (here the “manifold”) is required for there to be a determinate difference. In other words: distinction requires relation and vice-versa. If we had no way of relating one appearance in inner sense (in time) from the appearance that comes after or before it, each appearance would be identical to the next in the sense that we would have no way of telling the difference between them. A phenomenological mode best draws out the threat of indeterminacy here: were no relation between intuitions in place, each temporal representation would completely fill our consciousness, before being replaced by the successive appearance that would completely fill consciousness in turn. Without another representation to compare the present one to, each moment would be a self-contained whole, collapsed on itself, as it were, “an absolute unity” in which there is no determinateness that could be picked out before the next representation swallowed it whole. Note that the “before” of the phenomenological mode might confuse the logical point, because it could be read as: if one only had more time, one could pick out difference in the present determination of inner sense. But time is here exactly what we have more of – the next moment is coming – and it is precisely because we have more of it that we cannot pick out any “manifold” in the absolute unity filling consciousness. My point here is that if our cognition were saturated by mutually exclusive, sequentially ordered representations of inner sense, appearances would be indifferent to one another; they would be unrelated and therefore in absolute unity with one another. So, for Kant, some conceptual spontaneity has to go to work on the manifold of intuitions to relate and so distinguish them.

“2. On the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination” (A100). Kant thinks that synthesis as apprehension, while necessary for apprehending relation and therefore distinction between the manifold of spatio-temporal objects, is only a moment of the synthetic activity of our spontaneity. That activity also contains reproduction of representations in inner sense; this spontaneous capacity for reproduction is a non-empirical condition for us having the kind of empirical associations that we do, and Kant’s strategy for proving this is to show that reproduction is also a condition of a priori representations (geometric constructions). The empiricist explanation of association, as we will see in some detail in section 3.2, is that experiences of constant conjunction enable us to move from one representation to another. Kant does not dispute this: in both the empiricist and Kantian accounts, there must be a given regularity of representations in order for association to obtain. In Kant’s example, “if cinnabar were now red, now black, now light, now heavy… then my empirical imagination would never even get the opportunity to think of heavy cinnabar on the occasion of the representation of the colour red” (A101). Here is another instance of the reference to indeterminacy constitutive of Kant’s argumentative strategy in the Deduction. If there were no regularity in that which is given to me (no “affinity of the manifold”), then I would not have the kind of experience I indisputably have (empirical associations), namely not an experience of empirical objects inexplicably altering their properties. But against empiricism, Kant thinks that association is conditioned by a spontaneous capacity to reproduce representations not immediately present in the representation of the present
time. Kant’s proof of the spontaneity and so non-empirically-given character of this activity of reproduction is to demonstrate that it is also operative in a priori representations:

Now it is obvious that if I draw a line in thought, or think of the time from one noon to the next, or even want to represent a certain number to myself, I must necessarily first grasp [fassen] one of these manifold representations after another in my thoughts. But if I were always to lose the preceding representations (the first parts of the line, the preceding parts of time, the successively represented units) from my thoughts and not reproduce them when I proceed to the following ones, then no whole representation... could arise (A102).

Three points here. The first reinforces the above discussion: apprehension is explicitly presented as “grasp[ing] one of these manifold representations after another in my thought” – that is, apprehension relates individuals in external relations, i.e. it enables us to cognise the difference constituted by intuitional form rather than collapse each sequentially-given intuition into an “absolute unity.” Secondly, Kant thinks that in order to grasp one representation after another in apprehension, the prior representation needs to be reproduced “when I proceed to the following one” in order for a relation between those representations to arise. As this reproduction cannot be provided by the receptivity of our sensibility – either a posteriori in its matter or a priori in intuitional form – an a priori spontaneous activity must condition the achieved unity of representations. Thirdly, in Kant’s examples of a priori reproductive synthesis, we have yet another version of the conditional modality of transcendental argument: if I didn’t reproduce prior representations, I would not have an experience of the kind of “whole representations” that I indisputably have. Unlike the previous threat of radically indeterminate “absolute unity,” the indeterminacy here is an empirically possible one: one can fail to reproduce prior representations, that is, forget them, but this exception only speaks to the capacity for reproduction that is exercised whenever either an empirical or an a priori connection between a current and a previous singular representation in inner sense is made. Kant summarises the synthesis of reproduction at the beginning of “3. On the synthesis of recognition in the concept,” making clear his understanding of conceptuality as holding together or grasping:

If, in counting I forget that the units that now hover before my senses were successively added to each other by me, then I would not cognise the generation of the multitude through successive addition of one to the other, and consequently, I would not cognize the number; for this concept consists solely in the consciousness of this unity of the synthesis.

The word “concept” itself could already lead us to this remark (A103).

As is already implicit in this recapitulation, Kant’s next step is to argue that the unity of the manifold achieved in the synthetic moments of apprehension and recognition are themselves possible only if contained in one consciousness. The next sentence is “for it is this one consciousness that unifies the manifold that has been successively intuited, then also reproduced, into one representation” (A103). So in Kant’s thinking the ground of conceptual activity understood as grasping together intuitionally-given individuals is the unity of consciousness.

In first introducing apperception in the A Deduction Kant blurs empirical and transcendental registers by discussing our consciousness of the unity of consciousness as “often” “weak,” as if the belonging of all representations to one subject as the condition of possibility of their apprehensive and
reproductive synthesis were somehow dependent on reflexive recognition of that fact. Later the A Deduction (A107) and the start of the B Deduction very clearly distinguishes empirical consciousness from “pure apperception,” distinguishing the latter via the purely formal possibility of appending “I think” to any one representation, and so bringing it into possible relations with other representations themselves to which the “I think” also attaches (B132).

In the A Deduction, Kant argues for the necessity of the unity of consciousness as ground of synthesis of the manifold by indicating with a metaphor what it would be like were this condition not to obtain. Such an experience totally lacking synthesis is a possibility we can only imagine (in the non-technical non-Kantian sense), given that we are constituted by that possibility not obtaining:

Unity of synthesis... were it not grounded on a transcendental ground of unity [apperception], it would be possible for a swarm of appearances to fill up our soul without experience ever being able to arise from it. But in that case all relation of cognition to objects would also disappear, since the appearances would lack connection in accordance with universal and necessary laws, and would thus be intuition without thought, but never cognition, and would therefore be as good as nothing for us (A111).

There are two points to make here. “The swarm” that would obtain without apperceptive unity reinforces apperception as the ground of the first synthetic moments: the swarm is here equivalent to the “absolute unity” that would “fill up” our consciousness were immediate temporal representations not related to temporal representations before and after it; and, as we saw, this relation is only possible if those other representations are reproduced. But Kant adds here the insight that if our consciousness were so filled by a succession of immediacies without mediation to one another, we would not only not have the kind of spatio-temporally distinct individual objects before us that we do, but also no unity of self. This is clear in the B edition: it is “only because I can comprehend [the] manifold in a consciousness do I call them all together my representations; for otherwise I would have as multicolored, diverse a self as I have representations of which I am conscious” (B134). A new self would arise with each self-contained singular representation excluding all other such representations. What this means is that the processes of syntheses, from the intuitional manifold to its reproduction and finally its belonging together to one (transcendentally conceived) subject are mutually conditioning: “Synthetic unity of the manifold of intuitions, as given a priori, is thus the ground of the identity of apperception itself, which precedes a priori all my determinate thinking” (B134). The synthesis in and between intuitions is dependent upon those intuitional representations belonging to one consciousness, and if consciousness did not produce that unity in and between intuitions (i.e. unity in the sense of relation and so distinction) unity of consciousness itself would not obtain.

Secondly, Kant says that were this loss of synthetic unity to occur, appearances would be “as good as nothing for us.” If we did not relate intuitional representations in inner sense via spontaneous syntheses, spatio-temporal individuals would be nothing for us, i.e. for rational agents. In line with the conceptuialist reading advanced here, Kant reaffirms intuitions do provide us with individuals in abstraction from conceptual spontaneity, just that, per the togetherness principle, intuitions without thought do not constitute cognition, i.e. determinate objective knowledge. Now, what distinguishes cognition is the “connection in accordance with universal and necessary laws.” The necessity of an objective determination we first encountered in the “Bodies are divisible” example from the

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109 See Pippin’s discussion of the untenability of a “conflationist” theory of apperception, in which reflexive recognition of apperceptive unity is a condition of that unity obtaining, in Hegel’s Idealism, 20-23.
Metaphysical Deduction has not yet been accounted for – we have in apprehension and reproduction the transcendental condition for empirical association (this representation is connected to that representation on the basis of repeated but nonetheless contingent experience) but not for connections involving necessity. We have since seen, however, that the apprehensive and reproductive synthoses of intuition were found to have their ground in the unity of consciousness, and the unity of consciousness in those synthoses of intuition. Now that we have the mutual conditioning of objective and subjective synthoses, the necessity that characterises cognition – i.e. objective determination – can be understood:

“We find, however, that our thought of the relation of all cognition to its object carries something of necessity with it, since namely the latter is regarded as that which is opposed to our cognitions being determined at pleasure or arbitrarily rather than being determined a priori, since insofar as they are to relate to an object our cognitions must also necessarily agree with each other in relation to it, i.e., they must have that unity that constitutes the concept of an object.” (A105).

So for our thinking to have relation to an object, our thoughts must necessarily agree with one another, i.e. must be thoroughly related or unified. Necessary connection in the object (say, between an object thought as a body and divisible) is in fact a function of the necessary agreement of representations about the object in the form of the judgment (in the case of our example, a categorical judgment). Kant can so connect empirical objects and concept use in the sense of predicative judgments without a sceptical gap for two reasons. (1) the Aesthetic has shown that our concepts “have only to do with the manifold of our representations” and that the object thought in abstraction from our forms of sensible representation is “nothing for us” (A105) (that formula again, but here meaning the cognitive emptiness of the thing-in-itself, not intuitions “as good as nothing for us” if not brought into relations via synthesis). (2) The above account of synthesis has argued that the unity of the subject in which representations are brought into relation is the condition for synthesis of the manifold, and vice-versa. As such, given that any reference to objects outside the forms of our sensibility (other than objects as appearance) would be empty of content (for theoretical cognition), synthesis of the manifold of appearances under the unity of apperception brings logical form “down” to empirical objectivity because the synthesis of the manifold under the unity of apperception is achieved through the categories understood as rules for effecting that unity in intuition: “Hence we say that we cognise the object if we have effected synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition. But this is impossible if the intuition could not have been produced through a function of synthesis in accordance with a rule” (A105).

Kant’s first example is again geometrical construction, after which he modulates to empirical objectivity. We think a triangle “by being conscious of the composition of three straight lines” – i.e. apprehending and reproducing those lines as related and distinct in that relation – “in accordance with a rule according to which such an intuition can always be exhibited” (A105). This is very neat: apprehension and recognition are necessary conditions to relate and so distinguish those moments of the construction of a triangle, but obviously insufficient. Synthesis must also be “recognition in a concept.” That is, we must relate and reproduce lines in accordance with the concept “triangle,” which governs, as it were, that relation and reproduction. As such “unity of rule determines every manifold, and limits it to conditions that make the unity of apperception possible.” The empirical conceptual example is again the concept “Body,” but now its grip on appearances is explicable via the worked out understanding of conceptuality as synthesis: “Thus the concept of body serves as the rule for our
cognition of outer appearances by means of the unity of the manifold that is thought through it” (A106). Kant immediately notes, however, that this concept is a rule only insofar as it “represents the necessary reproduction of the manifold of given intuitions, hence the synthetic unity in the consciousness of them.” That is, the rule “inescapably demands” that we reproduce certain representations in determining an appearance as a body: “thus in the case of the perception of something outside of us the concept of body makes necessary the representation of extension, and with it that of impenetrability, of shape, etc.” (A106) – and, of course, divisibility. As Longuenesse makes clear, the synthesis of recognition in the concept moves from subjective association to necessity, in the sense of a rule for synthesis. Constant conjunction between impenetrability and extension can lead, on the condition of our spontaneous capacity for apprehensive and reproductive synthesis, to association of these representations, “But to have made a concept of body out of this conjunction is more than the expression of this merely subjective habit. My apprehension of empirically given spatial multiplicities is henceforth guided by the concept.” Importantly, however, such concepts are revisable – if something with extension turns out not to be impenetrable, either I have mistaken it for a body, or I will need to revise my concept of body.

However, Kant holds that some concepts are not revisable, but are a priori rules for effecting the synthesis of the manifold and so the unity of self-consciousness. These categories are the functions through which “thoroughgoing unity of self-consciousness” stands, “that in which alone apperception can demonstrate a priori its thoroughgoing and necessary identity.” At the start of the B Deduction Kant offers this definition of the categories, again through the same example judgment:

I will merely precede this with the explanation of the categories. They are concepts of an object in general, by means of which its intuition is regarded as determined with regard to one of the logical functions for judgments [Sie sind Begriffe von einem Gegenstande überhaupt, dadurch dessen Anschauung in Ansehung einer der logischen Funktionen zu Urteilen als Bestimmt angesehen wird]... Through the category of the substance... if I bring the concept of a body under it, it is determined [wird es bestimmt] that its empirical intuition in experience must always be considered as a subject, never as a mere predicate, and likewise with all the other categories (B128).

To make sense of this, let us apply the definition of categories to the content of the category “cause” rather than body. Cause is a concept of an object in general, by which an intuition is regarded as determined with regard to the “ground” (the “if” clause) in a hypothetical judgment. If I synthesise the manifold in an intuition in accordance with the rule given by the concept of cause, and through that synthesis I effect thoroughgoing unity of self-consciousness (it must necessarily agree with my other representations), then that object cannot be indifferently put in the position of ground or consequent. So the function of conceptuality as the activity of synthesis of the manifold of intuition – and ultimately as the a priori rules for that synthesis—solves the indeterminacy of merely logical judgment, and at the

110 This is directly mirrored in a passage from the B Deduction: “... an object is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united. Now all unification of representations demands unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them. Consequently it is the unity of consciousness that alone constitutes the relation of representation to an object, and therefore their objective validity...” (B137).
111 Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 50.
112 Ibid.
same time connects the forms of logical judgment to appearance, “which is just what we really wanted to know” (A111).

I would like to conclude this analysis of the Deduction by pointing to its salience for the comparison with Hegel. As briefly noted in the Introduction, Pippin in Hegel’s Idealism is right to point out the centrality of the theme of apperception in Hegel’s critical transformation of the Kantian concept/intuition distinction. The Logic can be read as a series of syntheses, in which one holds or grips both poles of an opposition (say, being and nothing, or something and other) together in order for a determinate thought-determination to obtain. For example, if we hold being and let go of nothing, or vice-versa, both will remain indeterminate; what is required is a concept – in this case, becoming – which makes explicit or posits the necessary relation of being and nothing. But equally important in Hegel’s account of determinacy in the Seinslogik is the logical structure of intuition, because what characterises being and nothing in (a) immediacy and (b) their indifference to one another, in the sense that they in their immediacy have not been brought into relation and therefore are indistinguishable. However, Hegel takes indifferent immediacy to constitute a component of thought itself – rather than sensibility – and he takes the movement from indifferent immediacies to determinate differences to characterise not just our cognition but being itself. To understand and to motivate Hegel’s account of determination as an ontological generalisation of Kant’s togetherness principle, we need an account of Hegel’s critique of Kant’s cognitive model of determination as “subjectivist” (Chapter 3), and an account of Hegel’s appropriation of Fichte’s appropriation of Kant’s doctrine of Intellectual Intuition (Chapter 4).
Chapter 3. Hegel’s Critique of Kant

This chapter aims to explicate Hegel’s critical relation to Kant in terms of the concept/intuition distinction reconstructed above. I hope to show the way in which Hegel’s criticism of Kant’s concept/intuition distinction motivates his reworking of the logical content of that distinction into an alternative account of determination. Put briefly, Hegel’s criticism is that Kant’s framing of the logical content of concepts and intuitions solely in terms of empirical cognition distorts the togetherness principle, insofar as this framing makes concepts and intuitions external to one another in the manner of intuitional form. As such, Hegel’s reworking of determination is directed not at the conditions for empirical cognition – i.e. the synthesis and subsumption of sensible intuitions by and under concepts – but at an ontological account of determination in general. However, I argue that Hegel motivates the ontological program of the Logic through a critical transformation of the concept/intuition distinction, not by straightforwardly misreading that distinction, or by a reductive conceptualism that would disregard Kant’s account of intuition in the Aesthetic altogether. Hegel is rather attempting to vindicate the togetherness principle with maximum generality.

To begin again with another military metaphor:

The system knows how to resolve and assimilate the determinations in which these assumptions conflict with it, so that they re-emerge in it, but duly modified accordingly...

Effective refutation must infiltrate the opponent’s stronghold and meet him on his own ground; there is no point in attacking outside his territory where he is not (SL 512/12.15).

This quote refers to Hegel’s claim to have presented in the “Actuality” section of the Wesenslogik “the one and only true refutation of Spinozism.” However, the cited passage also raises in nuce some of the problems of Hegel’s critique of Kant to be addressed in this chapter. Above all there is the accuracy of Hegel’s critique of Kant, and the concept/intuition in particular. Does Hegel meet Kant on his “own ground”? Or does Hegel attack Kant “where he is not,” where only a straw-man is? I want in this chapter to understand to what extent Hegel’s critical interpretation of Kant is successful by his own criteria, i.e. whether it successfully constitutes what is now called “immanent critique.” To understand the “immanence” or otherwise of Hegel’s critique of Kant’s cognitive model of determination, we need above all to understand the way in which Hegel’s system attempts to “resolve and assimilate” Kant’s problematic, i.e. the way in which Kant’s concept/intuition “re-emerges… duly modified” in Hegel’s Logic, and the system more generally. That means attending to the way in which Hegel “translates” key Kantian terms into his own vocabulary and way of thinking. As we will see in 3.2, Hegel abstracts the logical content of intuitions and concepts (singularity or individuality and immediacy on the one hand, and mediation or relation and generality or universality on the other)

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113 For an overview of the repeated charges of Hegel’s lax relation to the letter of Kant’s text, see John McCumber, Understanding Hegel’s Mature Critique of Kant (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2014), 25-26. I treat the more substantial issue of reductive conceptualism at length below.

114 The familiar formula “immanent critique” is not, to the extent of my reading at least, actually present in Hegel’s writing. That phrase, while Hegelian in inspiration, is foundational for the Critical Theory tradition and has entered academic vocabulary in the humanities in that manner. James Gordon Finlayson has recently argued that a claim for continuity between Hegel and 20th Century critical theory on this point should be rejected. “Hegel, Adorno, and the Origins of Immanent Criticism,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22, no. 6 (2015): 1-25. Robert J. Antonio’s much earlier paper can be taken as an example of the continuity claim: “Immanent Critique as the Core of Critical Theory: Its Origins and Developments in Hegel, Marx and Contemporary Thought” The British Journal of Sociology 32, no. 3 (1981): 330-345.
from Kant’s cognitive model. Most importantly, Hegel considers the singularity and immediacy of Kantian intuitional representation to give rise to a problematic of “indifference” [Gleichgültigkeit], in a sense related to but distinct from that discussed with regard to Kant’s critique of rationalism above.

Interestingly, Hegel’s call for internal critical refutation and systematic appropriation is, in the case of his reading of Kant, in a way doubly immanent, insofar as immanent critique is itself legible in Kant. As we saw in Chapter 1, Kant takes the Critical philosophy to integrate rather than merely dismiss the apparently opposed perspectives of rationalism, empiricism, and indifferentism. Hegel does Kant the honour of turning his principle of systematic integration back onto Kant himself.  

3.1. McDowell and After
In order to advance my claim that Hegel generalises Kant’s togetherness principle, I need first to treat the view in which Hegel reductively misreads the concept/intuition distinction in Kant. That is the purpose of this section. I mentioned in the Introduction that prominent Kantians consider Hegel to neglect Kantian intuitional form entirely, reducing it to conceptual form. This charge of reductive conceptualism is I think in part traceable to – or at least reinforced by – the way in which Hegel’s reception of Kant’s concept/intuition distinction is set up in John McDowell’s 1994 *Mind and World*. In my view, McDowell’s book is importantly right in that he holds both Kant and Hegel to be concerned to account for the *thinkability* of the objective world: thought sets the terms for what it is to be an object as such; there is thus no ineffability or inaccessibility of objects to knowledge of the kind that would legitimate scepticism. As I suggested in my reading of Kant above, that we can think of objectivity in abstraction from our thinking (as things-in-themselves) does not in any way undermine epistemic realism, and Hegel’s version of this argument will be treated later in this chapter. McDowell however takes the Kantian commitment to things-in-themselves to undermine Kant’s commitment to thinkability, and characterises Hegel as a corrected and consolidated Kant. According to McDowell, Hegel drops the commitment to things-in-themselves, so that our concepts determine sensibility without remainder. However, McDowell’s account of thinkable contents does not explicitly make a place for intuitional form (the external relationality elaborated above), thus effecting the reduction of intuitions to concepts. As we will see, Kantians have conveniently taken McDowell’s reading of Kant to be Hegel’s.

As is well known, *Mind and World* begins with the diagnosis of what McDowell takes to be a binary oscillation in late 20th Century analytic epistemology: between an unsatisfactory Davidsonian “coherentism” on the one hand, and an equally unsatisfactory empiricist foundationalism on the other. McDowell takes the Kantian concept/intuition framework to arrest this oscillation, on the proviso that it is corrected in what he takes to be a Hegelian way. For McDowell, the oscillation between coherentism and a renewed foundationalism is begun by Sellars’ famous diagnosis of the “Myth of the Given” in *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* (1956). What is “mythical” for Sellars is the widespread foundationalist belief that data “given” to cognition from outside cognition can play a justificatory role for epistemic commitment. Here the classical empiricist program is exemplary, in which knowledge claims are justified (or found to lack justification) by tracing their contents back to

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115 This stance of “rational reconciliationism” is traceable in fact to Leibniz, as Redding shows in his synoptic *Continental Idealism*, 3.

perceptual episodes (more on that in 3.2). Sellars shows that such sensible givenness, if taken as epistemically foundational, has to be contradictorily conceived as both related to propositional claims (insofar as it justifies them) and outside of that relation at the same time (insofar as it connects conceptual content to a non-conceptual foundation). The given either enters into relations with what it is intended to justify – other cognitions – and thereby loses its status as “given,” or it preserves its status as “given” at the cost of remaining outside of inferential patterns of justification. While this myth is at least operative in classical empiricism, Sellars more proximate targets are Russell’s “knowledge by acquaintance” and logical positivism’s verifiability theory of meaning.

Davidson’s coherentism, at least in McDowell’s reconstruction, recognises the force of Sellars’ diagnosis of givenness by maintaining that “only a belief can justify another belief.” For Davidson, given sense data is causally relevant to conceptual content, but cannot play a justificatory role. From McDowell’s perspective, Davidson avoids the Myth of the Given only by failing to account for our desire that beliefs be constrained by the world in some way. If what constrains a belief is only ever another belief, mind loses touch with the world in a “frictionless spinning in the void” – a line almost as over-quoted as the togetherness principle. “Davidson recoils from the Myth of the Given all the way to denying experience any justificatory role, and the coherentist upshot is a version of the conception of spontaneity as frictionless, the very thing that makes the idea of the Given attractive.” McDowell detects this reaction to coherentism, this attraction to the given, in Gareth Evans’ account of essentially nonconceptual content. So for McDowell neither Davidson’s coherentism nor Evans’ non-conceptualism will do.

From McDowell’s perspective, when treating the legitimacy of an epistemic claim, we are not asking for an exculpation, a causal history in which agency is irrelevant, but a rational justification from an agent. “I believe that X because I was caused to do so by brute fact Y” would be on this model an exculpation, in the sense that no responsibility for belief is here entailed. In contrast, a justification would have the form: “I believe that X because it is rational for me to do so” where rational means “consistent with my beliefs that Y, Z, etc.” But in our expectation that our interlocutor’s beliefs are self-consistent, we are also asking that they be consistent with the way the world in fact is. As McDowell puts it: “The world itself must exercise a rational constraint on our thinking.” We have seen this answerability to self-consistency in one’s judgments of the world in Kant’s account of apperception above, and so it is understandable that McDowell looks to Kant to break the coherentism v. empiricist foundationalism deadlock.

117 Here I rely on Willem de Vries’ excellent reconstruction of Sellars’ argumentation: “To have efficacy, a basic cognition must be capable of participating in inferential relations with other cognitions; it must possess propositional form and be truth-evaluable. However, to satisfy the criterion of givenness, such a propositionally structured cognition must possess its epistemic status independently of inferential connections to other cognitions. No cognitive states satisfy both requirements.” Willem de Vries, Wilfrid Sellars (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 45.


119 Mind and World, 14.

120 Evans’ non-conceptualism is not straightforwardly a variant of the Kantian non-conceptualism discussed above below. For that reason I leave out any detailed account. See however Paul Redding, Return of Hegelian Thought, 34-55.

121 Mind and World, 42.
Incipit Kant’s togetherness principle, with which McDowell’s book beings. As Allais says, and as I have repeated, the togetherness principle as *metaphorical* must be interpreted. Further proof of the necessity of its interpretation is that McDowell’s reading is at odds with the one I have presented above. Taking the first limb, “Thoughts without content are empty,” McDowell suggests that for a thought to be empty “would be for there to be nothing that one thinks when one thinks it, that is, for it to lack what I am calling ‘representational content.’” Representational content he glosses as that which follows a “that” clause in a belief statement. McDowell says that on this model an “empty” thought would be an unfinished statement, “I think that...,” lacking the representation that we expect to follow. Because for McDowell such an unfinished statement “would be for it not really to be a thought at all,” a lack of content understood in this way is not what Kant is driving at: “he is not, absurdly, drawing our attention to a special kind of thoughts, the empty ones.” McDowell interprets Kant’s “empty” here literally or at face value, as having no content whatsoever. As Chapter 1 shows, Kant is in fact drawing our attention to a special kind of thoughts, undiagnosed in rationalism, that do not meet the conditions for empirical knowledge or cognition, and are empty in that sense – though *only* in that sense. Such *objectively* empty thoughts nonetheless have content for both logical determination and for practical purposes. It is indicative that, in presenting his interpretation of Kantian “emptiness,” McDowell considers the “unfinished” “I think...” to be empty of content. But for Kant, the “I think,” whether abstracted from any representational content or not yet appended to a content, is *not* empty in the radical sense of “not being a thought” at all, as McDowell puts it. It has, as we have seen in 2.2., transcendental content as index the unity of apperception, the transcendental condition of syntheses of the manifold and so for objective determinacy. McDowell’s interpretation disregards the a priori content of thought.

This is made clear when McDowell turns to the second limb of the togetherness principle:

> Thoughts without content—which would not really be thoughts at all—would be a play of concepts without any connection with intuitions, that is, bits of experiential intake. It is their connection with experiential intake that supplies the content, the substance, that thoughts would otherwise lack.  

For McDowell, thought without sensible intuition is entirely without content – or at least McDowell does not note the non-empirical contexts in which pure thought *does* have content for Kant, i.e. pure concepts as a transcendental condition of empirical knowledge, and the thought of the unconditioned as transcendental condition of free agency. McDowell’s skipping Kant’s account of the a priori content of thought is followed by his skipping of the a priori form of intuition. McDowell’s definition of intuition – “bits of experiential intake” – overwrites the sensation/appearance distinction outlined in the faculty of sensibility, as set out in 2.1 above. It is worth noting that this insists in later work, in which intuition is defined as “a having in view.”  

Allais makes the same critique of McDowell’s reductive account of “empty” thought in a footnote introducing her reading of the concept/intuition distinctions. “[McDowell’s] cannot be Kant’s view. While transcendent metaphysics [i.e. thoughts without possible sensible data], for Kant, is less than cognition, he clearly thinks that it is, to some degree, understandable, and that it contains thoughts which play a crucial role in ethics. Empty thoughts are ones for which there is no possibility of our securing referents and which therefore are not, in Kant’s terms, objectively valid, and do not qualify as cognition proper.”  

*Having the World in View*, 260.
concepts and intuitions are both said to be either pure or empirical. In saying that intuition is “experiential intake” and leaving it at that, he runs the risk of skipping the Aesthetic’s argument for the a priority of intuitional form. In saying that concepts without bits of experiential intake would have no substance at all he is describing only empirical concepts – at a pinch we could say that Kant’s pure concepts (the categories) have no substance if not demonstrably applicable to the manifold of pure intuition. But because McDowell has not distinguished between pure and empirical intuitions, a distinction between the operation of pure and empirical concepts is not available to him either. We will consider the entirely appropriate Kantian criticisms of McDowell’s understanding of intuition here in a moment. We need to press on, however, in order to see how Hegel is worked into McDowell’s story.

McDowell’s next interpretive move is to fill out his account of concepts and intuitions by emphasising Kant’s description of the faculty of understanding as spontaneous and the faculty of sensibility as receptive (see Chapter 2 above). This comparative axis – activity versus passivity – is singled out, and the immediacy/mediation and singularity/generality axes that constitute the logical content of concept/intuition are ignored.

The result of McDowell’s first two interpretive moves is the following. Our passive receiving of sense data is not a merely causal affection of sense organs (the sensibly given), but the conceptual capacities operative in their receptive aspect or mode (taken as intuitions). He thus suggests at the end of the first Lecture: “in order to escape the oscillation, we need a conception of experiences as states or occurrences that are passive but reflect conceptual capacities, capacities that belong to spontaneity, in operation.” The start of the second lecture then fills in the detail of McDowell’s proposed solution:

We must not suppose that spontaneity first figures only in judgements in which we put a construction on experiences, with experiences conceived as deliverances of receptivity to whose constitution spontaneity makes no contribution. Experiences are indeed receptivity in operation; so that they can satisfy the need for an external control on our freedom in empirical thinking. But conceptual capacities, capacities that belong to spontaneity, are already at work in experiences themselves, not just in judgments based on them; so experiences can intelligibly stand in rational relations to our exercises of the freedom that is implicit in the idea of spontaneity.

The core of McDowell’s view is here. We should not conceive of our conceptual capacities as going to work on an already constituted – and then merely given – sensory input, but rather as operative in the constitution of experience itself, all the way from sensory contact to discursive thinking itself. McDowell’s understanding of this constitutive role of conceptuality in experience is put in the distinction between actualised and exercised conceptual capacities. In a sensible intuition, my conceptual capacities are in operation, are actualised in that experience, but not intentionally exercised in a judgment. The content of an experience and the content of a judgment are the same: “That things are thus and so is the content of the experience, and it can also be the content of a judgment... So it is conceptual content” (26). The content is conceptual throughout – first implicit in its actualisation in an experience and then explicitly exercised.

125 Mind and World, 23.
126 Mind and World, 24.
So the result of McDowell’s line of reading is conceptualism in the following sense: conceptual capacities are operative in our experience “all the way down,” such that there is no limit at which our mindedness might meet a non-conceptual content, i.e. merely brutely given input inadmissible to justificatory reasoning. This “unboundedness of the conceptual” does not, McDowell thinks, lead us back to the coherentism he began by rejecting. For McDowell, the conceptualist position guarantees direct realism. As he puts it:

That things are thus and so is the conceptual content of an experience, but if the subject of the experience is not misled, that very same thing, that things are thus and so, is also a perceptible fact, an aspect of the perceptible world. Thus the idea of conceptually structured operations of receptivity puts us in a position to speak of experience as openness to the layout of reality.127

Another way McDowell puts this is to say that the world must be “made up of the kind of things one can think.” This is not to say that those things are themselves thinking. There are acts of consciousness, “thinking,” and inanimate being does not “think” in this sense – does not cogitate. But being is a thinkable content. Despite McDowell’s partial reading of concept/intuition in Kant, this is certainly a broadly Kantian position: as we have seen, appearances are not conceptually indeterminate objects but merely conceptually undetermined objects. The work of the Deduction is to show that there is in principle no intuitionally-given object that escapes categorisation; objectivity is conceptually determinable through and through. Now, so far, this aligns the deflationary Kantian emphasis on empirical realism treated in Chapter 1 above. Accordingly, deflationary Kantians do not object to this outcome in McDowell, just McDowell’s following move. Namely, that Kant cannot consistently provide us with this empirical realism, and so we must move to Hegel.

Because this kind of thinkability is the goal, what McDowell takes to be Kant’s “two-worldism” emerges, at the end of Lecture II, as a kind of failure of nerve to which Hegel provides the solution. McDowell asks, “Does Kant credit receptivity with a separable contribution to its cooperation with spontaneity? It seems that the answers ‘No’ and ‘Yes’ are both correct” (41).128 The ‘No’ answer coincides with the thinkability discussed above. For Kant, “experience does not take in ultimate grounds that we could appeal to by pointing outside the sphere of thinkable content” (41). This broadly aligns with the reading of Kant given above: Kant’s empirical realism is epistemically indifferent to the empty indeterminate thought of things-in-themselves, outside of or in abstraction from intuitional representation, and to the positive noumenon that must be held to cause appearances. In empirical experience we do not need to point to positive or negative noumena in order for determinate cognition to obtain.

The ‘Yes’ answer – that receptivity does make a separable contribution – is for McDowell implicated by Kant’s “transcendental story,” in which the “space of concepts” is “circumscribed” by the supersensible, i.e. things-in-themselves. McDowell, contrary to the deflationary two-aspect reading of Kant, thinks that we cannot be epistemically indifferent to thought of the noumenal. McDowell’s primary concern here is affection by the positive noumenon: “In the transcendental perspective, receptivity figures as a susceptibility to the impact of a supersensible reality, a reality that is supposed to be independent of our conceptual reality...”, to which McDowell makes the standard

127 Mind and World, 26.
128 Mind and World, 41.
criticism: the content of sensible intuition is caused by positive noumena, but “by Kant’s own lights we are supposed to understand causation as something that operates within the empirical world.” The “transcendental story” robs us of the desired thinkability of the empirical world, by shifting the seat of “true objectivity” a step back, to the in-principle unknowable noumenal ground of appearances: “as soon as [noumenal reality] is in the picture, [it] strikes us as the seat of true objectivity.” As such, Kant’s successors (namely Hegel) were right in urging “that we must discard the supersensible in order to achieve a consistent idealism,” one in which objectivity is not ultimately ascribed to an in-principle unthinkable ground of appearances. The result of all this is to characterize Hegel as a corrected and consolidated Kant. Kant’s insight was that “the empirical structure of the world is somehow a product of subjectivity,” and Hegel completes Kant by abandoning any outside to thought and fully embracing the conceptualist implications of Kant’s position. The sticking point is that McDowell’s reference to Hegel, or way of inserting Hegel into his reading of Kant, makes Hegel the exemplary representative of conceptualism as McDowell conceives it, and this is susceptible to an immediate Kantian rejoinder.

The Kantian Rejoinder

From the perspective of Kantians and non-conceptualists, McDowell’s conceptualism ends up on the coherentist side of the divide he takes himself to be straddling. For Kantians and non-conceptualists, the Sellars-derived assumption that experience is either conceptual “all the way down” or brutally given is not adequate to Kant’s cognitive architecture: what is missed in this either/or is the idea of an independent intuitional form irreducible either to concepts or to given sensation.

This Kantian rejoinder is best represented by Michael Friedman, who in “Exorcising the Tradition” argues that maintaining the concept/intuition distinction while undoing the distinction between appearances and things-in-themselves is not possible on the Kantian account: “Indeed these are just two aspects of the same distinction, for Kant, since the idea of a thing in itself arises by abstracting the concepts of the pure understanding from their necessary application to sensibility.” It follows that “Giving up the opposition between appearances and things in themselves therefore means giving up the notion of a distinct and independent faculty of intuition as well.” So McDowell, on Friedman’s view, does not preserve the togetherness principle he so foregrounds, but in fact reduces intuitional form to conceptual form. And because McDowell does not take there to be brutally non-conceptual restraints on concept-use, he is back at the coherentism he took himself to be opposing.

The Kantian argument can be rephrased as follows. In Kant we have the following three-part distribution: (1) sensation as merely causal affection; (2) appearances as the placing and ordering of sensation in the non-conceptual but nonetheless a priori forms of sensibility; (3) determination of appearances by empirical concepts whose transcendental condition are transcendental syntheses grounded in apperception, whose “function” is the categories. In McDowell (2) is missing, such that Kant’s account of the architecture of the faculty of sensibility in the Aesthetic gets split between (1) and (3): on the one hand, intuitions are merely given sensory input (1) that cannot legitimately enter

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129 Mind and World, 42.
130 Ibid.
131 Mind and World, 44.
133 Friedman, “Exorcising the Tradition,” 34.
justificatory reasoning; on the other, intuitions are the receptive operation of conceptual capacities (3). There is in McDowell then no space for “appearance” understood as the content of sensation placed and ordered in the a priori forms specific to intuition: just greater and lesser degrees of explicitness of conceptual form.

Importantly, for Friedman as for Allison, maintaining the distinction between appearances and things-in-themselves does not implicate a two-world ontology – the deflationary position we have outlined in 2.1 above. Two-worldist readings Allison has termed the “myth of the noumenal,” in which appearances are a “pale substitute” for the “genuine knowledge” that would be provided by epistemic access to the noumenal realm. But it is important to note that both the deflationary reading of Kant and McDowell’s argument for a shift from Kant to Hegel emerge from a desire to have Kant’s empirical realism without ontologically substantial things-in-themselves. The deflationist reads noumena down to a merely thinkable aspect of empirical objects, while McDowell suggests that such a reading down is not consonant with Kant’s text. With Kant taken to be irredeemably metaphysical, McDowell tries to rehabilitate Kantian empirical realism by moving – or suggesting the validity of the move – to a Hegel that jettisons both a priori intuition and noumenal objectivity. But from the deflationary perspective, McDowell’s twofold misreading of Kant – missing the a priori contribution of intuition and consequently charging Kant with a two-worldist ontology – are the very same mistakes that Hegel makes, and so it is no wonder that McDowell enlists Hegel at this point in his ultimately coherentist argument: “It is entirely natural, then, if post-Kantian absolute idealism views the objects of rational knowledge as manifestations of an absolute rational freedom entirely unconstrained by anything outside itself.”

The Hegelian Alternative
Again, in my view, McDowell is right to link Hegel to “thinkability” as a key Kantian desideratum. Both Kant and Hegel are committed to some version of the “idealist” claim that objectivity is determined by thought. But in its broadness, this claim can be worked out in different and perhaps incompatible ways. Hegel does not get to his post-Kantian version of idealism in the way that McDowell frames it, by claiming that our conceptual capacities determine empirical experience “all the way down” and then appropriately dropping out Kant’s false transcendental bottom. Hegel rather generalises the logical content of the concept/intuition distinction such that being itself is determinate on account of the necessary togetherness of opposed terms. In my view, Hegel’s critique of Kant and alternative model of determination is not as easily susceptible to the Kantian rejoinder as McDowell’s is. We saw above that McDowell (1) does not identify an independent intuitional form; and (2) advances a two-worldist account of the appearance/thing-in-itself distinction. While it is understandable that McDowell would advance these claims as Hegelian – there is some evidence in Hegel’s text for both – in my view Hegel is subtly different on both points. Elaborating Hegel’s alternatives, however, will occupy the remainder of this thesis; here I only provide a programmatic map to be substantiated.

(1) Hegel does not reduce intuitional to conceptual form, but rather “nests” the logical form of intuitional representation as a “semi-autonomous” moment within conceptuality as it is elaborated

135 Friedman, “Exorcising the Tradition,” 34.
within the Logic. We have seen above that McDowell presents the immediate determinations of our sensibility (the immediate sensible apprehension of certain state of affairs) as only an implicit form of conceptuality understood on the model of judgments (an explicit propositional claim about such a state). Hegel’s Logic also understands conceptuality as on a continuum of greater and lesser degrees of explicitness: the concepts elaborated in the Doctrine of Being are less stable, less reflexive, and less comprehensive than those outlined in the Doctrine of Essence, less stable again than those in the Doctrine of the Concept. The crucial difference between McDowell’s reading and Hegel is that the logical form of Kantian intuition — external relationality — is included as an early, but nonetheless constitutive, moment on this continuum. As such, Hegel’s approach is conceptualist in that intuitional form is a moment of the purportedly complete conceptual scheme provided in the Logic; Hegel is not reductively conceptualist, however, insofar as intuitional form is nonetheless granted a semi-autonomy not countenanced in Mind and World. That is, while external relationality leads on to more self-consistent and comprehensive conceptual structures, it nonetheless has a relatively independent structure that organises both inorganic nature and our immediate cognition of individuals. Or, to lean on James Kreines Hegel interpretation, indifference would be the concept of physical nature, a distinct moment within the conceptuality articulated in the Logic as a whole (“The Concept”). In other words, some ontological domains are rendered determinate by external relationality, even though such relationality is an insufficient explainer, of, say, the more complex structures of organic life or of concept predication (both of which are outlined in the Doctrine of the Concept). This claim for “nested semi-autonomy” will be motivated in my reading of the Encyclopedia Logic in 3.2, and demonstrated in the Logic itself in Chapter 6.

(2) Hegel’s account of Kant’s appearance/thing-in-itself distinction shares in the ambiguity of Kant’s text and Kant scholarship. In the pre-Phenomenology work of the Differenzschrift and Faith and Knowledge, Hegel’s “two-worldist” reading of Kant’s Critique is repeatedly bound up with a claim for Kantian subjectivism. Hegel claims that, for Kant, reality in itself must really be an indeterminate or “formless lump” insofar as determination is a function of our merely subjective cognitive capacities

136 The picture of the Logic sketched in this paragraph, as providing a series of increasingly adequate explanatory schemes corresponding to distinct object domains, is drawn from James Kreines and David V. Ciavatta. Kreines’ reading has two key elements: (1) A claim that Hegel’s fundamental interest is “reason in the world,” namely, explanatory reason — “the why or because” of things — rather than merely epistemic reason, “the why or because” of belief. Reason in the World, 8. This I take to be a more sophisticated and more general version of my opposition between Kantian “cognitive” and Hegelian “ontological” accounts of objective determination. (2) Hegel’s Logic provides a systemic and hierarchical account of explanatory reason: the teleological conceptuality derived in the Doctrine of the Concept is the standard by which the concepts derived in the Doctrine and Being (qualitative and quantitative individuality) and Doctrine of Essence (lawful or universal relations between terms, ultimately causality and reciprocal causality) are judged as incomplete or insufficient forms of reason in the world. “...the laws of nature cannot possibly be anything but an extremely incomplete form of reason in the world; teleology sets the standard or measure of completeness of reason in the world, and in that sense has metaphysical priority.” Reason in the World, 4. Ciavatta comes to a similar view via a reflection on practical agency; only teleologically organised, practically purposeful individuals are genuinely individuated: Hegel conceives “of external things as inadequately individuated, as compared to living agents...” “Hegel on the Idealism of Practical Life” Hegel Bulletin 37, no. 1 (2016), 1. But nonetheless, the qualitative individuality set out in the Doctrine of Being that concerns me in this thesis is a “why or because” of things, just one inadequate to fully explaining either natural lawfulness or our activity as living, normatively-constrained agents. As we will see in Chapter 6, for Hegel, everything that exists – living agents included – must have the logical structure of something, and so are at least finite in the sense of necessarily ending. It is just that this sense of “end” does not explain our having autonomously set “ends” (in the sense of goals) as practical agents – although finitude is of course a part of the explanatory story.
This persists in the mature Encyclopedia, in which Kantian appearances are taken to be “untrue” (§45). This line of reading is problematic, insofar as it suggests that Hegel has bought into Allison’s “myth of the noumenal,” reading Kant’s account of the conceptual determination of nature as appearance as only a “pale substitute” for real determination. Stephen Houlgate admits in a recent paper that such a reading “is not entirely fair” to Kant, insofar as Kant’s concept of things-in-themselves does not entail an existential claim, but merely the necessary possibility of abstracting from our mode of sensibility (in making this concession, Houlgate clearly follows the deflationist reading of Kant). As I suggested in 2.1 above, Kant argues for a principled indifference to things-in-themselves: their merely thinkable possibility does not undermine epistemic determinacy. But Hegel does not always present Kant’s things-in-themselves as ontologically substantial in the manner of Faith and Knowledge; in his mature work, most notably in §44 of the Encyclopedia Logic and the second chapter of the Logic proper (93/21.109), Hegel recognises that for Kant things in themselves are “things of thought,” i.e. objectivity considered in abstraction from our sensibility. This more judicious reading of Kant however sets the stage for two distinct Hegelian criticisms of the Kantian position, which Houlgate outlines in The Opening of Hegel’s Logic.

(2a) Houlgate suggests that Hegel recognises the thing-in-itself as an abstraction in order to motivate a further abstraction from sensibility, arguing essentially that “Kant’s notion of the thing in itself is in fact not abstract enough.” Houlgate’s argument falls out as follows. Hegel agrees with Kant that thought is determinate of what counts as objectivity (McDowell’s “thinkability”). In Houlgate’s words, “Kant believes that the understanding itself stipulates what is to count as an object of experience and so can know a priori the necessary structure of any such objects without needing to gain ‘access’ to them” through “pure thought” (i.e. rationalism) or “perception” (i.e. empiricism). And, because pure thought provides only the conditions of determinacy for the object in general, Hegel also agrees with Kant that, contra rationalist metaphysics, pure thought cannot provide knowledge of empirical objects independent of sensibility, nor knowledge of purported objects that are in-principle independent of sensibility (God, the totality of the world, the soul). Hegel however argues that Kant’s derivation of the conceptual conditions of determinacy is marred by his failure to abstract from a “common-sense” understanding of objectivity shared by empiricism and rationalism. This “common-sense” view, taken up into early modern epistemology, is that our thinking is confronted by an

137 Karl Ameriks in a 2015 paper argues that Hegel’s charge of Kantian “subjectivism” is dependent upon mistakenly characterising Kant’s philosophy as a “short argument” to idealism. For Ameriks, such a characterisation puts too much weight on Kant’s B Introduction account of his philosophy as effecting “Copernican revolution,” as if such a revolution meant beginning from a “general subjectivist turn to the self rather than to objects, and then simply to proceed from there.” “Some Persistent Presumptions of Hegelian Anti-Subjectivism,” 44. Rather, Kant’s first step is to argue that objects are given to us (and therefore have mind-independent reality, unlike Berkleyan “subjectivism”) and then to argue that they are given to us only in the forms of space and time. “Persistent Presumptions,” 44-45. In Kant and the Fate of Autonomy, Ameriks traces the emphasis on short arguments to idealism to Kant’s immediate reception in Reinhold (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). According to Ameriks’ 2015 piece, Houlgate’s (and Sally Sedgwick’s, and Brady Bowman’s, and John McCumber’s) defence of Hegel’s critique of Kant continues this misreading of the Kantian project as a whole, in particular overlooking the doctrine of sensibility presented in the Transcendental Aesthetic. The view being argued for in this chapter is that while McDowell does so overlook Kant’s Aesthetic, Hegel does not: as we will see in 3.2, Hegel explicitly addresses and integrates intuition’s logical components (singularity and immediacy) as well as its form (external relationality); indeed Hegel’s critique of Kant is that Kant treats concepts and intuitions as external to one another, i.e. takes up the concept/intuition distinction from the perspective of intuitional form.

138 The Opening, 339.
139 The Opening, 132.
independently constituted objectivity set over against it. For Hegel, as long as we do not suspend the assumption that thought is minimally our thought about a sensibly-given something outside and opposed to thought, we will not be able to escape the thought that the “seat of true objectivity” lies in the object as it really is, not merely as it appears to our thinking in the forms peculiar to our sensible make-up.

Suspending the common-sense – but not necessarily rationally legitimate – frame in which thinking as a purely subjective activity is opposed to sensibly-given objects outside of thought necessitates for Hegel an alternative deduction of categorial function. For Hegel, a truly self-critical critique of reason would begin not from a priori determinations of the a priori sensible manifold, but simply with thought’s immediate awareness. In Houlgate’s words, Kant

... never suspends the assumption, however, that thought is essentially concerned with objects and so never sees that thought is minimally the understanding not of objects but of immediate being. Accordingly, Kant never reaches the point from which Hegel thinks a thoroughly self-critical philosophy must begin.140

So the critique of the thing-in-itself is intended to motivate an alternative beginning for category derivation: one that derives the conditions of objectivity from the thought of immediate being, rather than from the logical forms of judgment, and an assumption that thought is minimally an operation on sensibly-given objects (however transcendentally that operation is treated, i.e. in terms of the pure sensible manifold). Immediate being as alternative Hegelian beginning and its relation to intuitional immediacy will be discussed via the complex Kantian and post-Kantian doctrines of “Intellectual Intuition” in Chapters 4 and 5.

(2b) Hegel’s alternative model of and beginning for category derivation, in part motivated by the Kantian account of things-in-themselves, makes possible in the body of the Logic a new logical account of the something that Kant takes to be determined as the object of our thinking. This new logical account also constitutes a further critique of the Kantian Ding an sich. Houlgate notes that this further critique is “subtly different” from (2a) discussed above. In the “Existence” chapter of the Logic – the subject of section 6.2 – Hegel argues that having a moment of “being-in-itself” is a necessary component of any determinate something whatsoever. It is logically necessary that minimally qualitatively determinate objects of thought (Hegel’s word for such objects is “something” [Etwas]) are constituted by two distinct but necessarily related moments – “being-in-itself” and “being-for-other” – in order to be relationally determined as qualitatively distinct individuals. We are not to think of “things-in-themselves” as substantial entities somehow “behind” appearances or “beyond” thought – nor are we, with deflationary Kantians, to argue that the thinkable possibility of things-in-themselves emerges from rational reflection on our sensibility. That things have being “in-themselves” is rather a constitutive moment of determinacy in general, and this is demonstrable from within pure thought alone. To repeat: Hegel argues for the necessity of the thought of things-in-themselves not by reflecting on the kind of immediate sensible representations that we as so-constituted creatures have, but by attendance to the immediacy of thought itself. The critical upshot of Hegel’s logical account of the “in-itself” is that it must be taken together with “being-for-other” in order for the qualitative determinacy of objects to be properly accounted for. Kant has in fact abstracted the moment of in-itselfness from its necessary counterpart, by suggesting that the in-itself of things has no relation to

140 Ibid.
their being-for-other – in Kant’s case, that what something is in-itself has no relation to (neither contributes to nor undermines) what we as epistemic agents know of the object in its appearance for us.\textsuperscript{141}

So, taking Houlate’s arguments in (2a) and (2b) together, we might say that, for Hegel, Kant’s conception of the thing-in-itself is both too abstract and not abstract enough. Again, it will take the remainder of this thesis to step through Hegel’s arguments here – namely that an exhaustive and properly self-critical account of conceptuality must begin not from sensible immediacy but the immediacy of thought (Chapters 4 and 5), and that qualitative determinacy is constituted by being-in-itself and being-for-other (Chapter 6). Nonetheless, the implication vis-à-vis McDowell’s reading and its Kantian rejoinder should already be clear. Hegel’s “critique” of things-in-themselves is not a jettisoning of that concept altogether (as McDowell would have it), but rather a reformulation of its sense and significance.\textsuperscript{142}

In my view, Houlgate’s way of approaching Hegel’s account of things-in-themselves is a more promising response to the Kantian rejoinder than that adopted by Sally Sedgwick. Sedgwick in “Hegel, McDowell, and Recent Defences of Kant” argues that the above anti-McDowellian, anti-Hegelian arguments do not meet the force of the Hegelian allegation of Kantian subjectivism.\textsuperscript{143} Sedgwick notes that Friedman and Allison, in arguing that the appearance/thing-in-itself distinction does not issue in a “sceptical gap” between our objective knowledge and the “really real,” proceeds by contrasting Kant’s position with transcendental realism in its rationalist version. As we saw in 1.2 above, it is the “transcendental realist” assumption that our concepts have to “access” an already determinate object that opens the threat of a sceptical “gap” between our thinking and its intentional objects. As Sedgwick very economically shows, Friedman’s response to McDowell is effectively a reminder of the three steps Kant’s Copernican philosophy takes vis-à-vis rationalism: (1) sensibility is not reducible to or on a continuum with conceptuality, but is an independent contributor to knowledge; (2) the a priori forms of our sensibility means that we are given objects as appearances, not as things in themselves; and (3) the analytic demonstrates all appearances are thinkable only on condition of certain a priori concepts. On this account, the “gap” that Kant closes “is the gap between our a priori concepts and nature as appearance.”\textsuperscript{144} Sedgwick’s argument is that Kant’s closing this gap requires keeping a second gap open, namely concepts (determination of appearances) and intuitions (nature as appearance) as our cognitive capacities together on one side, and reality in abstraction from such capacities on the other: “the success of Kant’s Copernican alternative depends on keeping the gap open between our subjective conditions and things considered in abstraction from them.”\textsuperscript{145} The problem with questioning this second gap, however, is that Kantians, as we have seen in their critiques of McDowell, will immediately charge the Hegelian with submitting to the “myth of the noumenal,” and remind us that things considered in abstraction from sensibility do not undermine empirical knowledge. The deflationary or two-aspect Kantian would object to the language of “gap” to describe the appearance/thing-in-itself distinction: for such Kantians, there can be no gap because there is only one domain of objects; it is just that this domain can be approached in two logically distinct ways.

\textsuperscript{141} This argument is eloquently made by Houlgate, \textit{The Opening}, 338-345.
\textsuperscript{142} In Hegel’s terminology, the \textit{Logic} does not submit the Kantian \textit{Ding-an-sich} to “abstract negation,” simply \textit{cancelling} the concept as incoherent. It rather cancels and preserves \textit{[aufhebt]} the Kantian \textit{Ding-an-sich}, reconfiguring it as a moment of a determination as such. See my brief account of \textit{Aufhebung} in the Introduction.
\textsuperscript{144} Sedgwick, “Hegel, McDowell, and Recent Defences of Kant,” 56.
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid.
In my view, the problem with Sedgwick’s approach here is that, like McDowell, Hegel is considered to provide an account of determination within Kant’s cognitive frame: Sedgwick appears to think that Hegel is, like Kant, primarily concerned with the conditions for the determination of sensibly-given objects; that for Hegel determination is a question of how “far down” concepts determine an ultimately recalcitrant and alien givenness. In fact, the Hegelian system’s logical beginning abstracts from the opposition of our conceptual capacities and an externally-given world of objects entirely, in order to derive an account of determination in general.

Sedgwick’s approach to the charge of reductivism is I think more suggestive, though it ultimately suffers from a similar problem. Sedgwick suggests throughout her critical treatment of Friedman and Allison that Hegel is not guilty of reducing intuitional form to conceptuality: “contrary to what is commonly supposed, Hegel is in sympathy with Kant’s claim that our knowledge requires not one faculty but two, neither reducible to the other.” The difference between Kant and Hegel is not that between a claim for independent intuitional form and a reductive conceptualism, but rather in the way those faculties are related: in Kant they are “originally heterogeneous,” while in Hegel they are “originally identical,” without that identity meaning the reduction of one to the other. What Sedgwick means here is later drawn out in Hegel’s Critique of Kant: From Dichotomy to Identity (2012). There Sedgwick argues that Hegel’s critique of Kant’s concept/intuition is not a reduction in either direction, but results in an “identity” or “true unity.” In Hegel,

Identity or unity is achieved not because one component of cognition is either eliminated or discovered to be a mere species of the other. The concepts and intuitions of an intuitive understanding are identical in that they are separate but mutually determining components of its mode of cognition. Each component is somehow necessary for the nature and existence of the other.

Although Hegel’s remarks in Faith and Knowledge do not explain precisely how he thinks concepts and intuitions reciprocally determine or cause one another, they lend support to the conclusion that he is not committed to a reductive account of the relation between these two components of cognition.

And then on the following page: “For our mode of cognition, then, the identity of concepts and intuitions is achieved by means of reciprocal determination, rather than reduction.”

Sedgwick’s evidence for this claim for reciprocal determination is Hegel’s direct reference in Faith and Knowledge to Kant’s togetherness principle. Hegel identifies concept/intuition as the centerpiece of transcendental idealism, explicitly referencing the claim that thoughts without content are “empty” and intuitions without concepts “blind.” But while doing this, Hegel subtly but

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146 “Hegel, McDowell, and Recent Defences of Kant,” 58. Sedgwick takes this point to constitute a defence of McDowell’s approach, but on my reading McDowell has not been careful to preserve the a priori form of intuition, reducing it to an implicit propositional content.

147 Ibid.

148 Hegel’s Critique of Kant, 9.

149 Hegel’s Critique of Kant, 10.

150 Sedgwick renders the Kantian togetherness principle, following Hegel, as “concepts without intuitions” (rather than “thoughts without content”) are empty. This is the only example in the literature I have yet found of this “misquote” – if one can call it that, given it follows Hegel’s own formulation – despite Westphal’s suggestion that this misquoting is commonplace and even severely damaging to the philosophical discipline as a whole. Kenneth
nonetheless comprehensively changes the core significance of the concept-intuition model. The value
of concept and intuition for Hegel is not only or primarily that, in their relation, they secure
determinacy for the empirical objects of knowledge. It is rather that they are an instance of the
“idealist” insight that relations between opposed terms is constitutive of determinacy in general. In
other words, the real value of Kant is not the explicit doctrines of transcendental idealism as an account
of the sensible and discursive conditions of possibility for determinate knowledge, but as the working
out of a general idealist principle within the specific domain of epistemology. Quoting the passage in
full (which Sedgwick does not do) reveals this subtle but extremely important transformation of the
significance of the concept/intuition distinction in Hegel’s thinking:

“Philosophy is idealism because it does not acknowledge either one of the opposites as
existing for itself in its abstraction from the other. The Supreme Idea is indifferent [indifferent]
against both; and each of the opposites, considered singly, is nothing. The Kantian philosophy
has the merit of being idealism because it does show that neither the concept in isolation nor
intuition in isolation is anything at all [...die Kantische Philosophie hat das Verdienst, Idealismus
zu sein, insofern sie erweist, dass weder der Begriff für sich noch die Anschauung für sich allein
etwas]; that intuition by itself is blind [blind] and the concept by itself is empty [leer]; and that
what is called experience [Erfahrung], i.e. the finite identity of both in consciousness is not a
rational cognition [vernünftige Erkenntnis] either. But the Kantian philosophy declares this
finite cognition to be all that is possible.” (FK 68/302-303).

This passage effects a lifting out of the concept/intuition model as one instance of a generalised model
of determination called “idealism,” and defined by the reciprocal determination that Sedgwick
emphasises. Hegel will continue this specific sense of “idealism” into the Logic and Encyclopedia Logic.
For example, in approaching the classical question of rationalist psychology, i.e. whether the soul is
immortal or not, “idealism will say: the soul is neither wholly finite nor wholly infinite; instead it is
essentially the one as well as the other and thus neither the one nor the other; that is to say, such
determinations in their isolation are invalid...” (EL §32). Hegel’s logical enterprise is however not
content with Sedgwick’s rather vague definition of “reciprocal determination” (“each component is
somehow necessary for the nature and existence of the other”). Hegel’s Logic, as we will see,
painstakingly derives the “somehow” of determination understood as the necessity of relation
between opposed terms. Crucially, the first terms that emerge within the Logic’s derivation are the
logical constituents of the concept/intuition distinction, treated however in abstraction from their
status within Kant’s account of our cognition, and whose togetherness is constitutive of determination
as such.

Togetherness, however, is not simple identity. Hegel’s early Schelling-inspired talk of “identity
and unity” emphasised in the title and body of Sedgwick’s Hegel’s Critique of Kant: From Dichotomy to

R. Westphal, “Hegel’s Pragmatic Critique and Reconstruction of Kant’s System of Principles in the Logic and

151 Two points I think legitimate this definition of Hegel’s “idealism.” Firstly, Leibniz refers to space and time as
orders of relation as ideal representations (see note 62 above). Secondly, in the Logic, Hegel refers to that which
is “sublated” [das Aufgehobene] as the “idealised” [das Ideelle] (SL 81/21.94). I will briefly treat the structure of
“sublation” [Aufhebung] in Chapter 6. Suffice to say here that sublation is an operation in which the necessary
complementarity, togetherness, or relation between two immediately opposed terms is explicitly posited.
Identity is thus at best an approximation of Hegel’s mature alternative. The emphasis on “original identity” drawn from Schelling’s *Identitätsphilosophie* is replaced in the *Logic* by an understanding of determination as containing moments of both identity and difference. Also bound up with the Hegel-Schelling relation is Hegel’s use of “indifference” in the above quote. As we will see in Chapter 5, Schelling’s *Identitätsphilosophie* characterises the absolute beginning and end of philosophical knowledge as indifference (*Indifferenz*), in the sense that no distinction or determinacy is thinkable within it. Hegel understands indifference to be a moment of the philosophical Absolute, but contra Schelling takes it to resolve of itself into an account of determination in general. We treat Hegel’s relation to and critique of Schelling’s *Identitätsphilosophie* in Chapter 5.

3.2. Hegel’s *Vorbegriff* Critique of Kant

In the remainder of this chapter I seek to show that the “Preliminary Conception” [*Vorbegriff*] of the *Encyclopedia Logic* systematically treats Kant’s concept/intuition in the manner only announced in the *Faith and Knowledge* passage above, and that the *Vorbegriff* treatment of concept/intuition neatly aligns with and reinforces Houlgate’s defense of Hegel’s critique of Kantian subjectivism (treated under 2(a) above). In other words, the *Vorbegriff* shows that Hegel contests the Kantian thing-in-itself not by remaining within the Kantian cognitive frame, i.e. insisting that our cognition saturate sensibly-given objectivity (McDowell’s and Sedgwick’s respective approaches), but rather by attempting to justify the shift to an ontological register (Houlgate’s reading), in which determination is understood as the togetherness of the logical constituents of the concept/intuition distinction operative in being as such.

The first six sections of the *Vorbegriff* (§§19-26) introduces Hegel’s account of “pure thought” (often shortened just to “thought” or “thinking”), which constitutes the “element” of the Concept. The *Vorbegriff* makes it clear that the problem of the relation of pure thinking to objectivity – which, as we have seen in Chapter 2.2, is the problem of Kant’s Critical period – is central to Hegel’s *Logic*. §24 ends with Hegel’s initial definition of what he calls “objective thoughts.” Hegel says there that the forms of thought examined in “ordinary logic” are “usually taken to be only forms of conscious thought.” Hegel however considers his *Logic* to be an account of these forms not only as conscious thoughts – thought in the sense of our cogitation – but as thoughts that constitute objectivity as such: “Logic thus coincides with metaphysics, i.e. the science of things captured in thoughts that have counted as expressing the essentialities of things.” Prima facie this line supports the “revised metaphysical” reading of Hegel’s *Logic* supported in this thesis: again, that Hegel takes the categories of the *Logic* to directly disclose ways of being (Houlgate’s way of speaking) or that rational form is operative “in the world” (Kreines’ formula), rather than a conceptual scheme limited to or demonstrably valid only for our thinking. I submit that the doctrine of “objective thought” does indicate the *Logic’s* claim to

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152 I here agree with Pippin’s reading of Hegel’s move away from Schelling’s “identity talk” in *Hegel’s Idealism*, 70-73.

153 Recently, Robert Pippin has suggested that the past tense in the above quote (“have counted”) means that Hegel does not intend to revive rationalist logicism, but that an anti-rationalist interpretation has become “oddly controversial among some Hegel scholars.” If the target here is the “revised metaphysical” position as I have put it above, Pippin’s attack misses the mark: neither Houlgate nor Kreines nor Bowman nor Beiser suggest that Hegel is claiming that “logical reasoning… provide[s] knowledge of objects” in the manner of Krug’s pen, nor of supersensible objects (God, the Soul, the World) in the manner of Wolffian rationalism. Houlgate, to take only the line to which I am closest, only claims that the *Logic* provides a post-Kantian account of objectivity in general, without the Kantian claim that things-in-themselves may have intrinsic properties in principle separable from such an account. As I mentioned in the Introduction, the difference between Pippin and Houlgate’s respective
ontological – rather than merely epistemic – purport, and this emerges once §§26-78 have contrasted Hegel’s position with three alternative historical philosophical “Positions of Thought Toward Objectivity,” namely: (a) metaphysics (both Classical and the “old” [really “former,” vormalige] Wolffian school metaphysics); (b) empiricism and Kantianism; and (c) “immediate knowing” (F.H. Jacobi, but also Romanticism more generally).

Of these three historical positions, the empiricism-Kantian is the most contentious grouping; as we know, the Critical Kant represents himself as opposed to empiricism’s “physiological” account of conceptuality. It is also the most crucial, insofar as Kantianism is presented as a kind of fault-line between “subjective” (empiricist) and “objective” (Hegelian) understandings of thought. Hegel uses Kant’s own Critical account of objectivity to mobilise a critique of Kant’s subjectivist tendencies, which for Hegel are the result of a certain empiricist inheritance in Kantian philosophy. Indeed, Hegel’s understanding of “objective thought” is presented as a Kantian doctrine, if only Kant had consistently followed through on the logical implications of his togetherness principle.

By advancing a scheme in which empiricism and Kantianism share an underlying identity, Hegel replaces Kant’s history of philosophy, in which the Critical Philosophy mediates and integrates rationalism and empiricism (a self-presentation reinforced by Kant’s opposing Locke to Leibniz in the Critique’s “Amphibolies” and its brief concluding “History of Pure Reason” section), with a historical scheme in which empiricism and the Critical Philosophy taken together abstractly negate the metaphysical tradition. Hegel can then present his absolute idealism as the genuine synthesis of both rationalism and empiricism: synthesising the metaphysical claim for knowledge of the real (the “things captured in thoughts” of §24 above) with the outcomes of Kant’s account of determinate knowledge. The Vorbegriff, in other words, is the closest we have to Hegel’s take on Kant’s philosophical “battlefield,” in which (to soften the metaphor from war to sports) Kant is no longer the umpire but another player in the game.

I want to quote §40 in its entirety because it will be the focus of discussion for the remainder of this chapter. Hegel says:

Critical philosophy shares with empiricism the supposition that experience is the sole basis of knowledge, except that it lets that knowledge count, not for truths, but only for knowledge of appearances.

The initial point of departure is the difference between the elements that result from the analysis of experience: the sensory material and universal relations. Insofar as this is combined with the reflection cited in its preceding section (that only the individual and only what occurs is contained in perception), the fact is insisted upon at the same time that universality and necessity are to be found in what is called experience as equally essential determinations. Now, since this element does not issue from the empirical as such, it belongs to the spontaneity of thinking or is a priori. – The thought-determinations [Denkbestimmungen] or concepts of the understanding constitute the objectivity of experiential knowledge. They generally contain relationships, hence they are instrumental in the formation of synthetic judgments a priori (i.e. original relationships between opposed elements).

The fact that the determinations of universality and necessity are found in knowing is not disputed by Humean skepticism. It is also nothing but a presupposed fact in

interpretations is very fine, and lines like this from Pippin do not aid our understanding of the issues at stake. Pippin, “Hegel on Logic as Metaphysics,” 201.
Hegel here claims that empiricism and Kantianism share a “point of departure” in that both consider experience to be constituted by two elements: “sensory material” and “universal relations.” On Hegel’s reading, the former only provides “individuals” such that the latter is required to account for our cognition, in which individuals are related in terms of universality and necessity (paradigmatically in the causal relation).\footnote{In the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel similarly introduces Kant via Hume: “The general sense of the Kantian philosophy is that, as Hume has shown, categorial determinations [Bestimmungen] such as universality and necessity are not to be found in perception, and therefore they have a source other than Perceiving” (LHP, vol. 3, 170).} I will step through these elements as Hegel takes them to be presented in empiricism and Kantianism, showing that Hegel thinks the sensory in terms of indifference and – as should already be clear from the above – conceptuality as essentially relational. This will enable an understanding of the way in which Hegel takes Kant to both escape and remain within the empiricist “subjectivist” understanding of determination.

1. Indifference and Relation in Humean Empiricism\footnote{An earlier, longer, more convoluted version of the below account of Humean empiricism is presented in Gene Flenady, “A Doctrine of Unfreedom: Hegel’s Critique of Empiricist Indifference,” The Online Journal of Hegel Studies 13, no. 22 (2016).}

James Kreines in *Reason in the World* notes that Hegel’s word for external relation is “indifference” or “equal-validity” [Gleichgültigkeit]. In Kreines usage, the term means that objects organised are “indifferent” to their ordering, such that any ordering is as “equally valid” as any other. Kreines considers indifferentism to be a “humean” position and defines it as the view in which “reality is akin to a mosaic, exhausted by individual tiles whose features would have allowed them equally well to have been placed in any conceivable other arrangement.”\footnote{James Kreines, *Reason in the World*, 58.} Kreines leaves aside the question as to whether this really is Hume’s view or not (hence the lower-case “humeanism”), only citing a passage in which Hume seems to support such a view. In the *Treatise*, Hume claims that: “All events seem entirely loose and separate. One event follows another; but we never can observe any tie between them. They seem conjoined, but never connected.”\footnote{Quoted in Kreines, *Reason in the World*, 58.} Sensorily determined objects are placed and ordered next to and after one another in the relations of contiguity and succession. In the absence of a rule determining which objects are to be related to one another (as causes and effects), any so-determined object can be placed next to or after any other. Indifference in Kreines’ sense corresponds to what Ciavatta calls a “naïve realism that would take the world to consist ultimately of self-contained, self-sufficient individuals whose relations to one another are fundamentally external to their identities.”\footnote{Ciavatta, “Hegel on the Idealism of Practical Life,” 1.} In other words, there is nothing in the determination of a sensorily-given object itself – or in the nature or structure of our perception of such objects – that would necessitate it being placed next to or after any other object, and, in turn, nothing in that other object that would necessitate its being placed next to or after the first. Instead, necessary relation is dependent on a rule (causality) itself external to the externally-related terms it connects. It is this picture, in which conceptuality is itself external to the external terms it synthesises, that Hegel detects in both Hume and Kant, and seeks in the *Logic* to overcome via a generalisation of togetherness, such that externally-related terms are
themselves the result of mediation. Again, this claim is already legible in a conceptualist reading of Kant’s Deduction, insofar as mediation is a condition of intuitional individuality.

The *Vorbegriff* certainly attributes indifference in Kreines’ sense of the term to the historical Hume’s account of perception, and I hope here to show briefly that Hegel has good reason to do so.\(^{159}\) The *Vorbegriff* account drops the reference to the Protestant historical ground of empiricism argued for in *Faith and Knowledge* (57/2:289). Instead empiricism is put in its relationship to metaphysics. In §37:

What first led to *empiricism* was both the need for a *concrete* content, in contrast to the abstract theories of the understanding that is incapable of progressing from its generalities to particularisation and determination [*Bestimmung*] on its own, and the need for a *firm foothold* against the possibility of *being able to prove* [*beweisen*] everything on the plane of, and by the method of, finite determinations. Instead of looking for the true within thought itself, empiricism sets out to fetch it from *experience*, the inwardly and outwardly present (§37/78).

Hegel here tacitly traces Kant’s pre-Critical treatment of rationalist indeterminacy vis-à-vis empirically real objects and their relations to an empiricist perspective. Logical determination alone – here Hegel’s “abstract” “understanding” – cannot progress from the general to the particular, and so cannot per Leibniz determine an individual solely by predication. The “proving” [*beweisen*] in this quote refers back to the ontological proof [*Beweis*] addressed in the preceding paragraph §36, whose rebuttal is central to the Kant’s critique of logicism. As we saw in 1.2, Kant argues that existence is not a predicate: for objective or real determination of an object, we have to “fetch” that individual from experience, so to speak (recall the example of the sea-unicorn, in which we “go to” experience to verify whether a certain bundle of non-contradictory predicates attach to any real thing).

Hume’s *Treatise* begins by re-affirming the empiricist ambition to gain this “firm foothold,” i.e. to ground knowledge claims in sensuous experience. As Hume puts it: “And tho’ we must endeavour to render all our principles as universal as possible... ‘tis still certain we cannot go beyond experience... or establish any principles which are not founded on that authority” (0.8).\(^{160}\) The goal of the first book of the *Treatise* is to develop a method to determine the experiential authority of such “principles” – a kind of “Verification Empiricism.”\(^{161}\) Importantly, and in accordance with Hegel’s *Vorbegriff* account, this verification project is undertaken in terms of the contrast between individual “perceptions” and “relations,” the first distinction advanced in the Treatise.\(^{162}\)

Hume shares the assumptions of the “Modern Way of Ideas” instantiated by Descartes and carried on in Locke: that is, that the mind is only immediately aware of mental entities that represent

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\(^{159}\) My emphasis here on Hume (rather than Locke) is motivated by Kreines work, but also justified by Hegel’s text – in the last of the *Vorbegriff*’s three numbered paragraphs on empiricism, Hegel says “the preceding reflection chiefly proceeds” from Hume (§39).


\(^{161}\) Kenneth Westphal’s summary definitions of “concept,” “verification,” “meaning,” and “judgement” empiricism has been helpful here. “Verification empiricism” is only that aspect of Hume’s empiricist approach that is most salient here. Westphal’s definition will be given shortly. Westphal, Kenneth. *Hegel’s Epistemological Realism*. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989), 48.

\(^{162}\) “Perceptions and relations... are the basic features of all the philosophical relations found in the treatise.” Norton, D.F. “Introduction to *A Treatise of Human Nature*,” by David Hume (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 117.
or are in some way about objects in the world, not the world itself.\textsuperscript{163} “Perceptions” is Hume’s name for these entities, which are in turn divided into “Ideas” and “Impressions.” Ideas and impressions are different not in kind but in degree of “force,” “vivacity” and “liveliness.” Importantly, impressions are held to cause ideas.\textsuperscript{164} The net result of this definitional work is to hold simple impressions as foundational and continuous with simple ideas, and ultimately foundational in the case of complex ideas (once the mediation of the “imagination” in combining simple ideas is accounted for). This delineates a methodology for establishing the legitimacy of knowledge claims: “the examination of the impression bestows a clearness on the idea” (1.3.2.4). If such an examination is impossible or incoherent, the idea in question does not constitute legitimately grounded knowledge, but something with a non- or extra-rational status (designated by the linked terms “fiction,” “custom,” “habit,” “belief” and human “nature”).

In the \textit{Vorbegriff}, Hegel puts the empiricist verification project this way: "universal determinations (e.g. force) are to possess no other meaning and validity for themselves than that taken from perception, and that no connection \{Zusammenhang\} is to be supposed to be legitimate unless it has been exhibited in the appearances" (§38/79). Kenneth R. Westphal in Hegel’s \textit{Epistemological Realism} similarly defines verification empiricism as: “For any (non-logical) proposition that is known to be true, there is a sensory experience that confirms the proposition.”\textsuperscript{165} The problem for Hume’s project is that there are some concepts which, while lacking sensory ground, cannot be given up without losing explanatory grip on our experience. Hume will find it impossible to ground any form of \textit{necessary} relation between particulars, of which causal law is the paradigm.

For Hume, the idea of causation is a special and problematic case because it \textit{seems} to allow us to “discover the real existence of the relations of objects” (1.3.2.2), but it does so only by extending beyond or outside of the sense impressions that would ground such an existential claim. Other philosophical relations, e.g. “identity” and “relations of time and place” do not in establishing real existence and relation lead the mind “beyond what is immediately present to the senses...” (1.3.2.2). In contrast, “an assurance from the existence or action of one object, that ‘twas follow’d or preceded by any other existence or action... beyond the impressions of our senses can be founded only on the connexion of \textit{cause and effect}” (1.3.2.2). For Hume, the uniqueness of the causal claim is that it moves from something whose existence is assured by a present impression to something immediately unavailable to sense but nonetheless purportedly real and in a real relation with that which is present. As Henry E. Allison puts the problem, recalling the problem of indeterminate judgments discussed in 2.2 above, “causal connections cannot be immediately perceived, as if some objects come stamped as causes and others as effects.”\textsuperscript{166} This lack of immediacy makes it a “double-edged sword” — on the one

\textsuperscript{163} Garrett, Don. \textit{Hume} (London: Routledge, 2015), 36. This is the representationalist or “Cartesian picture of perception” that Allais calls “indirect” because the \textit{object} which causes the perceptual state is not \textit{itself} a constituent of the mental state, but requires “mental intermediaries.” Kant for Allais is opposed to such a view, and is rather a “direct realist” or has a “relational” account of perception. On the relational view, “the presence to consciousness of the object is part of what makes the mental state the state that it is.” \textit{Manifest Reality}, 12. Hegel seemingly does not take account of this difference between Kant and Hume in his argument for their shared “subjectivism.”

\textsuperscript{164} This causal connection between particular impressions and ideas is cited by Allison in \textit{Custom and Reason in Hume} as evidence of Hume’s belief in the real existence of causal powers — his scepticism only goes to our knowledge of such powers. Garrett briefly lists the positions available in the “sharp interpretive dispute” surrounding the philosophical status of Hume’s account of causation. \textit{Hume}, 172-174.

\textsuperscript{165} Westphal, \textit{Hegel’s Epistemological Realism}, 48.

\textsuperscript{166} Allison, \textit{Custom and Reason}, 90.
hand, “... it is a necessary condition of the relation serving as a principle of inference from the observed to the unobserved, whereas, on the other, it makes it problematic and in need of criteria to justify its inferential use.” In short, Hume asks if stable criteria for an exercise of causal inference can be drawn from experience.

As is well known, Hume suggests an examination of the experiential legitimacy of claims for causal relation: we are to examine two objects that we assume to be causally related, and determine whether any impression is available to ground causality (1.3.2.5). When we claim that two events are standing in a relationship of cause and effect to one another, we are in fact inferring from our impression of two distinct relations that are available to perception: contiguity and succession. Contiguity names the two events “lying” next to one another in space, while “succession” names the relation of two events as following after one another in time (1.3.12). The attempt to trace cause and effect to experience leads to two forms of relation that in themselves do not amount to a causal relation. Hume finds that his verification empiricism cannot ground the causal “connexion” between events, insofar as causation implies the necessity and universality of that relation (that something always follows from something else in all instances). Put differently, the claim that something always follows from something else in all instances is never present to us in sense-experience. Hegel in EL §39 puts it like this:

Empirical observation does indeed show many, indeed countless, perceptions that are alike. Still universality is something entirely different from a large amount [Menge]. Similarly, empirical observation indeed affords us perceptions of changes following upon one another [aufeinanderfolgenden Veränderung], or of objects lying side-by-side [nebeneinanderliegenden Gegenständen]. Now insofar as perception is to remain the foundation of what is to count as the truth, universality and necessity appear to be something unwarranted [Unberechtigtes], a subjective coincidence [Zufälligkeit], a mere habit [Gewohnheit], and its content might just as well be as it is or otherwise (§39/82).

Note here in Hegel’s thinking the link between external relations of succession and contiguity (“after” and “next to”) and indifference as emphasised by Kreines. As long as the external relationality of perception “counts as” truth, universal and necessary relations cannot be said to be objective in the sense of possessing ontological explanatory purport. Causality, for example, can be a reason for belief, but cannot legitimately be taken to be a reason for beings being as they are. Such relations are superimposed onto an indifferent perceptual material, with “indifferent” here meaning that any such imposition, if taken to be a realist claim, is ultimately equally valid. Note that this is not to say that we cannot distinguish between better and worse reasons for belief in certain causal relations. It is just that all such beliefs, regardless of their relative strength, have equal justification with regard to being, insofar as causality is held to be a determination of our thinking, not of being as such. To use the Humean example, it is better to believe that the sun will rise tomorrow rather than not, if only ultimately for practical purposes; but if we take such a belief to entail a realist claim, i.e. to predict events on the basis of some really existing causal relation, there is equal justification for the opposite view.\footnote{Kreines discusses in some detail the contemporary versions of this Humean or humean take on universality, namely that laws of nature are ultimately only generalisations or summaries of “the arrangement of indifferent}
Again, Hegel’s account here is not at a great distance from the historical Hume. As is well known, Hume finds that our belief in causality is not legitimated by experience but is in some sense a *habitual* association contributed by the psychology of the minded subject. Aping the presumed surprise of his reader at reaching his conclusion for the reducibility of seemingly objective causal determinations to psychological habits of association, Hume exclaims: “What! the efficacy of causes lie in the determination of the mind!” (1.3.14.26).

Now, from Hegel’s perspective, Kant’s transcendental philosophy substantially follows the above outlined Humean pattern. Kant similarly claims that, because sensibility is only capable of giving us singular objects lying next to and after one another, causality is a “determination of the mind.” For Hegel, Kant and Hume’s respective attributions of necessity and universality to the activity of the subject – made necessary by their arguments for the impossibility of locating necessary relations in and between objects themselves – renders both *subjectivists*, in the sense that necessary relations must be “projected” onto a sensible manifold itself taken to lack necessary relations entirely.\(^{169}\)

Clearly, Hegel’s way of framing both Kant and Hume in terms of an opposition between sensibly-given individuals and universal relations neglects crucial differences between the Humean and Kantian doctrines of sensibility and conceptuality.

Firstly, regarding the sensory, we have seen that Kant distinguishes between sensations and intuitions. For Kant, the outside-one-another placement of spatio-temporal intuitions is not given with perception as it is with Hume, but is rather an a priori contribution of our sensibility.

Secondly, this transcendental account of sensibility alters Kant’s account of conceptual determination: because a priori intuitional form can be abstracted from sensation, the Analytic can demonstrate a priori (and thus with necessity) that concepts condition the cognition of matter organised in that form. Like Hume, Kant does not take a priori concepts, like causality, to be derivable from empirical experience; unlike Hume, he is able to demonstrate the legitimacy of their relation to experience as its condition.

This leads to a third, and less obvious, point. As we have seen, Kant’s dual-function thesis understands conceptuality not only as predicative determination, but also as synthesis or connection of the sensible manifold as such. Per the conceptualist reading advanced above, it follows that a priori conceptuality conditions the cognition of specifically intuitional (i.e. external) relationality. Hegel’s treatment of the Kant-Hume relation in the *Vorbegriff* however focuses entirely on what Kant terms “synthesis in the concept” (in this case, cause) rather than the syntheses of apprehension and reproduction. This is understandable given Hume’s preoccupation with causality and Kant’s references to “Hume’s problem” in the *Prolegomena* (not to mention the discussion of causality in *Negative Magnitudes* in 1.2 above). However, it draws attention away from the link between the *Vorbegriff* critique of Kantianism and the Doctrine of Being’s account of determination in general that I am concerned to establish. In fact, leaving the above reading of the *Vorbegriff* at this point would suggest a non-conceptualist reading of Kantian determination: sensibility gives us externally individuated objects in space and time; conceptuality is *only* required for universal and necessary determinations via conceptual subsumption. In other words, conceptual synthesis as a condition of intuitional relationality itself does not figure in Hegel’s *Vorbegriff* account.

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\(^{169}\) The language of “projection” is Allison’s; he refers to Kantian and Humean philosophies as different forms of the “imposition” or “projection” of causal relations onto things. *Custom and Reason*, 204-5.
In this thesis however I am seeking to draw attention to the similarity of Kant and Hegel’s respective accounts not of causal determination (synthesis in a concept) but minimal qualitative contrast between individuals (synthesis of apprehension): in Kant the togetherness of singularity and mediation in the syntheses of apprehension and reproduction is required for cognition of qualitative difference between intuitionally-organised objects or appearances to obtain; this same togetherness, I will argue, is present in Hegel’s account of quality in the Logic. At bottom, however, both causality and quality are bound up with the opposition between sensory individuality and conceptual relationality that Hegel identifies: both synthesis intellectualis and synthesis speciosa are concerned with the bringing into relation of terms which, in their sensible immediacy, are given as without mediation.

This similarity has not been lost on commentators. Kenneth Westphal reinforces Stern’s account of Kant’s quasi-empiricist “bundle theory” (see 2.2 above). Importantly for this thesis, Hegel subsumes the problem of causality under the problem of “perceptual synthesis” — that is, the cognition of sensations as belonging together in discrete objects of thought:

The main point is that, on Hume’s view as well as Kant’s, the relata of a supposed causal relation, or analogously our sensory representations of that relation, ‘which succeed one another or [stand] next to one another’ are originally ‘of themselves altogether indifferent to each other.’ That holds of Humean ‘objects,’ which are supposed to be indifferently either outer things or sensory impressions, and it holds as well of Kantian sensations (Empfindungen): in principle they are completely independent of each other. In order to solve the problem of causal relations, as well as to solve the problem indicated here (if not named in these terms) of perceptual synthesis, Hegel already recognises their relata must be reconceived in fundamentally different terms.¹⁷⁰

This is legible in the Encyclopedia account: Hegel states the problem in terms of necessary relation, and makes this the problem of both the causal relation between objects and the perceptual synthesis of objects themselves. That is, Hegel holds on to the Kantian understanding of objective determination in terms of synthesis, but conceives individuality in such a way as to make synthesis a moment of individuality as such, not something brought to already constituted individuals. As Westphal has it above, Hegel fundamentally reconceives the relata of Kantian synthesis. That Hegel considers synthesis in the concept and synthesis in apprehension to turn on the relation between relation and individuality is indicated by his rehearsing a moment of the “Perception” chapter of the Phenomenology in the Vorbegriff. Hegel argues that a relation of unity between “simple impressions” cannot be demonstrated in observation. “Consider, for instance, a piece of sugar. It is hard, white, sweet, and so on. But now we say that all these properties are united in one object, and this unity does not exist in sensation” (§42z/87). Thinking back to Kant’s A Deduction, the form of inner sense would account for, in this example, sequentially given sensations of sweetness, hardness, and whiteness. Apprehending them as belonging together in one object distinguishable from other objects, however, requires holding together (and reproducing as a condition of holding together) these discrete sensible moments. This example of course involves predication, insofar as these properties are judged to hold of different objects regardless of their spatio-temporal placement. The comparative work of this thesis,

however, is limited to the way in which mediation is conceived as giving rise to immediate qualitative distinction between individuals.

2. Indifference and Relation in Kant

We have seen in the above the Hegel takes both Hume and Kant to oppose sensory individuals to conceptually-supplied relation. The Vorbegriff’s identification of Kantian intuional form specifically with *indifference* begins in §19. This paragraph presents prima facie evidence against my claim that intuional form is a concern of the Logic. Hegel claims that logic (in his sense of the word, as “coinciding” with metaphysics) is “the most difficult science because it has not to do with intuitions [Anschauungen] – and not even with abstract sensory representations as in geometry – but with pure abstractions” (§19/47). Now, as we saw, Kant’s deduction of the objectivity of pure concepts turns crucially on their applicability to pure intuitions, and that geometrical construction is crucial in both the Aesthetic (in arguing for the a priority of spatio-temporal form) and in the A Deduction (in introducing apprehensive synthesis). Hegel’s opening account of “objective thoughts” thus seems to begin by explicitly disregarding intuition in Kant’s sense – a vindication of the Kantian rejoinders to McDowell spelt out above. But in §20, Hegel differentiates between the “sensory dimension” [das Sinnliche], “representation” [Vorstellung], and “thoughts” [Gedanken]. For Hegel, reference to our senses is insufficient for an explanation of the sensory:

The sensory is initially explained by reference to its external origin, i.e. the senses or instruments of sensation. However, mention of the instrument does not by itself afford a determination of what is meant by it (§20/51).

A determination of the sensory requires an account of the logic of sensory relation. Hegel in the remainder of §20 distinguishes the sensory thought on the basis of the relation proper to sensoriness:

The difference between the sensory and thought is to be located in the fact that the determination of the former is its individualness [Einzelheit], and insofar as the individual (taken quite abstractly as an atom) also stands in connection [im Zusammenhang steht] with other things, whatever is sensory is outside-of-something-else [Aussereinander], the abstract forms of which are, more precisely, those of being side-by-side and after one another [das Neben- und das Nacheinander] (§20/51).

What is presented in sensoriness is “individualness,” which here translates Einzelheit, Kant’s word for the singularity of intuitions (and sometimes translated as “singularity” in Hegel also).171 So the singularity component of Kantian intuition is emphasised in Hegel from the outset of the Vorbegriff. Hegel indicates his acquaintance with Kant’s Aesthetic by claiming that these individuals are connected with other individuals in the “side-by-side” or “next to” [neben] and coming “after” [nach] that for Kant characterises spatio-temporal relation, i.e. the “placing and ordering” afforded by the pure forms of intuition. Hegel rightly takes both spatial and temporal relationality to be characterised by external relationality, which is made clear by the compound, “outside-one-another-being.” For Hegel, Kant’s intuional form articulates a way of being in which an individual is outside of its others. As we have

171 The di Giovanni translation of the Science of Logic renders Der Einzelne and Das Einzelheit as the “singular” and “singularity,” while the Miller translation has it as “individual” and “individuality.”
seen, Kant’s word for the relation that intuitions have to one another through the syntheses of apprehension and reproduction is connection [Beziehung], which is to be distinguished from the “relation” [Verhältnis] established by categorial synthesis. Hegel does not use the Beziehung or Verhältnis in the above. Rather, objects in the form of the sensory “hang together” [Zusammenhangen], which suggests the indifferences of intuitional form in Kant in Kreines sense: that externally related objects could be “hung together” or connected to one another in a different (even an opposite) way is equally conceivable.

Hegel makes the link between Kant’s Aesthetic and his own thinking in terms of “indifference” clear later in §20 by calling “being-outside-of-one-another [ausseinanderseinde] proper to space [Raum].” If we go to Hegel’s definition of space in the Philosophy of Nature, we find it described as:

The first or immediate determination [unmittelbare Bestimmung] of Nature is Space: the abstract universality of Nature’s self-externality [abstrake Allgemeinheit ihres Aussersichseins], self-externality’s mediationless indifference [vermittlungslose Gleichgültigkeit]. It is a wholly ideal side-by-sideness [Nebeneinander]... (EPN §254/28)

Note the phrase “mediationless indifference” opposes indifference to mediation. This dovetails with Hegel’s way of framing Hume and Kant’s respective accounts of objectivity: mediation or relation is not present in the sensory (regardless of whether our sensibility is physiologically or transcendentally conceived); thus the indifferences of its externally-related terms are by definition mediationless.

Hegel’s use of the word indifference to characterise spatio-temporality is continued in the Encyclopedia system, this time in terms of our sensible intuition of spatio-temporal objects. In the Psychology section of the Philosophy of Spirit, Hegel defines intuition, like Kant, as immediate apprehension of objects in space and time. And, like Kant, he sees intuitive form as the organisation of sensation. But he is concerned to emphasise the logical possibility of relations available in these forms:

Sensations are thus posited spatially and temporally by intuition. The spatial presents itself as the form of indifferent juxtaposition [gleichgültigen Nebeneinanderseins] and quiescent subsistence [ruhigens Bestehen]; the temporal, by contrast, presents itself as the form of unrest [die Form der Unruhe], of the internally negative, of successiveness, of arising and vanishing, so that that the temporal is, in that it is not, and is not, in that it is. But the forms of abstract externality are identical with one another in the sense that each is utterly discrete within itself and at the same time utterly continuous (EPM §448/181).

Three points need to be addressed here. Firstly, one might ask how space and time can be considered instances of indifferences. Space is the easier case: the “indifferent juxtaposition” of spatial determinations lines up directly with the Vorbegriff language of “Zusammenhangen” treated via Kreines above, as does its “quiescent subsistence.” Quiescence of the spatial suggests that nothing in a merely spatially determined object brings it into relation with an other so-determined object; spatial objects in some sense allow themselves to be determined from without, by a conceptuality that is not legible within or between them. Time is a more complex case: “Zusammenhangen” is a spatial metaphor, and Hegel above only explicitly characterises space as indifferent. But there is a kind of indifference operative in time. As Hegel says in the quote above, “the forms of abstract externality” - i.e. space and time - “are identical” in that they are both at the same time discrete and continuous.
This combination of discreteness and continuity is characteristic of quantitative determination in the second section of the Doctrine of Being, which I will discuss briefly in Chapter 6 after the role of indifference in qualitative determination is made out. But even with only the Kantian material covered so far, it is possible to see the sense of Hegel's claim: there is, as we saw in 2.1, one space and one time, and the forms of intuition are singular in that sense. But singularity in the sense of “totality” is a condition of the representation of discrete singulars within space and time. Space and time are thus “filled” with discrete objects, but the condition for the representation of these discrete objects (for the representation of discontinuity) is the “continuity” of one space and one time.

More complexly again, in the case of time affirmation and its negation come together and cannot be pulled apart without undoing the essential determination of time itself. If one said only that “time is” one would only be offering a one-sided account of time. It is equally important to say of each temporal moment that it is not, insofar as each moment passes in its very arising. Hegel of course directly treats time in terms of negation in the Sense-Certainty chapter of the Phenomenology. But this same structure will be treated in abstraction from temporality at the very start of the Logic in the “immediate indifference” of being and nothing: to say that being is only a one-sided determination; one must also mark or posit its identity with its negation, i.e. nothing. These two terms are then further determined as the arising and passing that constitutes being as essentially becoming.

The second point I want to make is that the linking of space to indifferent juxtaposition and time to the indifference specific to “becoming,” can make it sound as if indifference and becoming are treated in the Logic as specifically or essentially spatial and temporal. But although Hegel treats spatio-temporality and its intuition in minded creatures under the logic of indifference, for Hegel that logic is treatable in abstraction from spatio-temporality. The Logic abstracts from reference to space and time, but derives from immediate being logical forms that will later be demonstrated, in Hegel’s progression from Logic to the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit to be determinative of spatio-temporality and its intuition.

True to his characterisation of logical thinking as pure abstraction (§19), Hegel in determining the form of the sensory has followed Kant’s abstraction from concepts and particular sensations in treating intuitional form in the Aesthetic (see 2.1 above). But Hegel in the comparative arguments of the Vorbegriff prepares for the Logic by going a step further: he has abstracted again from any reference to or representation of “space” and “time,” leaving only the logical form of spatio-temporal determination and relation between individuals so determined. Hegel makes this commitment to abstraction clear a little later in §20: “Incidentally, when it was said that the determinations of the sensory are those of individuality [Einzelheit] and being-outside-of-one-another, it can also be added that the latter too, are in turn thoughts and universals themselves.” As such, the forms of indifferent relation that the Logic’s Doctrine of Being will show to necessarily hold of beings qua beings will then determine certain moments in the Realphilosophie, i.e. some natural and geistige objects, events, actions, institutions and so on. Space and time are characterised by indifferent relation, but Hegel will also suggest the same thing of atomistic individualism in modern states (EL §98/155). So in the Logic, what for Kant is introduced as and understood to be only the a priori form of our faculty of sensibility is in fact treated, but in its utmost generality, in thought. It is clear that Hegel’s movement or translation of pure intuitional form into abstract thinking is a conceptualism of a kind – albeit one in fact attendant on Kant’s own characterisation of intuitional representation as externally related individuals.

Thirdly, something briefly needs to be said here about the difference between Hegel’s realist account of our intuitional representation of spatio-temporality and Kant’s anti-realism: for Hegel, the
logical structure of indifference organises space and time in themselves, as well as our intuition of them. After treating “the sensory” in terms of indifference, Hegel then turns to “Representation [Vorstellung].” Hegel claims that representation “has such sensory material [sinnliche Stoff] for its content, but posited in the determination of being mine, i.e. the determination that such content is in me, and of universality, the relation-to-self, simplicity.” To mark Hegel’s difference to Kant regarding the realist status of intuition as a kind of representation, we need to follow these comments into Hegel’s account of intuition in the Psychology section of the Philosophy of Spirit. For Hegel, the sensory material whose form is singulars placed and ordered outside one another furnishes in turn the stuff or matter for representation. In representation, for Hegel, that sensory material determined as outside-one-another [Aussereinander] is further determined as being in me. This is not Kant’s position, because the “outside-of-one-another-being” of intuitional representation is “transcendentally” in us, not things themselves. Sensation is or “corresponds” to the a posteriori matter in an empirical intuition, but setting that matter in the forms of space and time [Neben- und nacheinander] is the result of a priori intuitional form and the conceptual activity that synthesises it, and not in or proper to that matter in itself.172 In contrast, as Hegel puts it in the Subjective Spirit, in our determinations of the form of the sensory we do empirical sensations the “honour” of representing them to and for ourselves in the forms at the same time proper to them, not as mere modifications of our sense organs.173 So an important difference between Kant and Hegel is already present in Hegel’s distribution of sensory material and representation: the sensory material is in itself organised in the form Kant identifies as belonging only to our capacity for intuitional representation.174 There is not an in-principle difference between the spatio-temporal relations extant between conceptually undetermined objects of outer sense and our representation of them, except that representation puts those relations “in us.”

The remainder of §20 is important because Hegel also translates Kant’s account of concepts and the ideas of Reason into his own thinking, namely as characterised by opposition to – or not being entirely saturated by – the external relations proper to the sensory. Alongside the form of sensoriness we have “thinking” or “thought,” with the “representation” I have discussed above as a kind of halfway house between the sensory and thinking. In §20 Hegel says that representation contains, in addition to the sensory material that it makes its own, “material that has originated from self-conscious thought.” So representation contains sensory material in the form proper to that material, but also the content of thought, whose form we can infer will not be that of the sensory. The examples

172 B34-36. Houlgate puts it as follows: For Hegel, “space is not wholly absent from [e.g.] visual sensation... For Kant, there is nothing of space or time in sensations themselves, since the latter are a posteriori, whereas space and time are the a priori forms of sensibility.” Houlgate, “Hegel, McDowell, and Perceptual Experience: A Response to McDowell” in Hegel’s Philosophical Psychology (New York: Routledge, 2016), 62.

173 When, therefore, our intuitive mind does the determinations of sensation the honour of giving them the abstract form of space and time, thereby making them into proper objects as well as assimilating them to itself, what happens here is by no means what happens in the opinion of subjective idealism, namely, that we receive only the subjective manner of our determining and not the determinations belonging to the object itself.” (§448z, 181-82/253)

174 Hegel thus follows the “neglected alternative” argument against Kant’s aesthetic, i.e. that space and time might be both forms of sensibility and properties or relations obtaining between things themselves. For a brief overview of the history of this argument and a Kantian rejoinder, see Henry E. Allison, Idealism and Freedom: Essays on Kant’s Theoretical and Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 8-11.
Hegel gives are: “what is right, ethical, religious, or even thought itself.” The right, ethical and (at least the rational moral content of) religion would be, from a Kantian perspective, examples of Ideas of Reason; indeed “virtue” as “moral worth and un-worth” is Kant’s way of introducing the Ideas of Reason at the start of the Transcendental Dialectic (A315/B372). Hegel then says that “it is not easily noticed how the difference between such representations and the thoughts of such content is to be marked.” Hegel marks the difference between representation and thought in the same way and using the same determination as earlier used to mark the difference between the sensory and thought. That is, representation presents thought materials in the form of the sensory, which is a form improper to thought – as I said, representation functions as a kind of halfway house between sensoriness and thoughts irreducible to the sensory.

Just like Kant’s Ideas of Reason, what Hegel here calls “thoughts,” are not spatio-temporal appearances:

To be sure, the right, the just, and similar determinations do not occupy the sensory [position of] being-outside-one-another proper to space. They may indeed appear to be somehow successive in time, but their content as such is not represented as being encumbered by time, as transient and alterable in it ($20/52). However, when the material that has originated from self-conscious thought is represented, it is represented in the form of sensoriness, i.e. as individuals outside and next to one another. “The distinctiveness of the representation,” what distinguishes it from thought, “is generally to be located in the fact that in it such content [of thought] at the same time remains isolated.” Hegel’s immediate example here is predicating concepts of the subject-concept “God.” This example is confusing, at least from a Kantian perspective, because Hegel has shifted from a discussion of representation as the representation of a content drawn from sensation (what Kant would call an intuition) to what for Kant is the form conceptual representation, i.e. predication. That is, Hegel has moved from receptive representations (sensibility as our capacity to be affected by objects) to spontaneous ones. From a Hegelian perspective, however, it is possible to suggest that Hegel is taking seriously Kant’s use of the term Vorstellung for both intuitions and concepts. We need to press on with Hegel’s example to see the force of this.

When, for example, the thought of God is represented in the form of judgment (is logically determined), Hegel presents two alternative manifestations of the “isolation” proper to the sensory. The first is that representation “remains at a standstill,” as in the tautologous “God is God.” Here, even the minimal conceptual representational unit, i.e. the self-consistent because tautological judgment, there is a kind of outside-one-another-being. To say “God is God” is even typographically to put the content of God – the predicate that would determine the subject-concept – outside and next to God as the subject of the judgment. The second manifestation of sensory form commingled with thought in representation is perhaps more straightforward. Representation “adds determinations, for instance, that God is the creator of the world, all wise, omnipotent, etc.” Note the continuation of the formal-logical sense of “determine” in this sentence. The uniquely Hegelian point however is that in such predication, we bring the self-relation proper to thinking and the external connection proper to sensory content together in a tenuous mixture. In predication, “several isolated simple determinations are similarly strung together, remaining outside one another, despite the bond assigned to them in the subject possessing them.”
This tells us that Hegel takes conceptual representation to be ridden with a kind of ambiguity or amphibiousness. Per the reading of Kant given in 2.2 above, we know that the logical forms of judgment constitute “the pure forms of the understanding,” i.e. the a priori concepts or categories. Hegel is thus quite close to Kant’s system when he in §20 refers to these categorial forms as the activity of the “understanding” in representation. Hegel claims that the understanding differs from representation “only in that it posits relationships of the universal and the particular or of cause and effect, etc. It thus establishes relations of necessity among the isolated determinations of representation, while representation leaves them standing side-by-side in its indeterminate space, connected only by the bare also.” So if representation – either as our putting sensory material before us as ours, or our discursive activity in judgment – inappropriately reduces thought to the form proper to sensory material, the understanding is that in representation that determines sensory material by introducing necessary relations between the terms nonetheless still standing side-by-side. So this use of the term “understanding” is in fact Hegel’s re-description of the function that the categories of the understanding have in Kant.

To sum up, in §§19-20 of the *Encyclopedia Logic* Hegel undertakes to translate the concept/intuition distinction at the core of Kant’s cognitive model of objective determination into a typology of logically distinct forms of relation: intuition is treated as presenting objects in the form of indifferent externality, while the concepts of the understanding introduce necessary and universal relations between such terms. However, insofar as this opposition between external and necessary relationality is also present within Humean philosophy, and issues there in a scepticism regarding necessity, Hegel is in a position to suggest that Kantianism does not or cannot account for objectivity in the way it takes itself to.

3. Kant’s Subjectivism

Having filled out Hegel’s opposition between sensory indifference and relationality advanced in §40, we are now in a position to articulate Hegel’s critique of Kantian subjectivism. There are two ways of understanding the subjectivity/objectivity distinction. The first is the common-sense presupposition that Hegel takes to condition empiricism: thoughts are merely subjective because “in our heads,” opposed to independent objects “out there.” The second is the sense that comes through strongly in Kant’s *Prolegomena*, particularly in the “How is natural science possible” section, as well as in Hegel’s reading of Kantian objectivity in the *Vorbegriff*. That is, objectivity is a question, not of the quality of representations, but of the quality of connection between them. As Kant puts it in the *Prolegomena*, “The difference between truth and dream, however, is not decided through the quality of the representations that are referred to objects, for they are the same in both, but through their connection according to the rules that determine the connection of representations in the concept of an object, and how far they can or cannot stand together in one experience” (*P* 4:290). As we saw in 2.2, objectivity is conditioned by spontaneous synthetic activity, the grasping together of discrete, externally related intuitions, such that they can be held together in the unity of consciousness; pure

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175 The “quality” he is referring to is the rationalist distinction between intellectual and sensible representations in terms of clarity and confusion: “After all philosophical insight into the nature of sensory cognition had previously been perverted by making sensibility into merely a confused kind of representation, through which we might still cognize things as they are but without having the ability to bring everything in this representation of ours to clear consciousness, we showed on the contrary that sensibility consists not in this logical difference of clarity or obscurity, but in the genetic difference of the origin of the cognition itself.” (4: 290). See Chapter 1.1.
conceptuality is then understood as the function of such unity insofar it furnishes rules for synthesis. Hegel thinks that Kant’s revolution is the introduction of this second sense of “objectivity,” in which objectivity is understood as synthetic, but that he then retreats to the first sense presupposed in empiricism, in which objectivity is given as already independently determined.

The second Zusatz to §41 steps through in an accessible way Hegel’s understanding of the terms “subjectivity” and “objectivity” and its ambiguity in Kantian philosophy. This account has three stages.

A. For ordinary consciousness, objectivity is “what is on hand outside of us and reaches us from the outside by means of perception.” Presumably, then, thoughts would be something inside us. Following Hume, Kant maintains this common-sense picture at the level of philosophical reflection: Kant denies that “thought-determinations” can have objectivity in the ordinary sense of the word; as thought-determinations are not given in perception but generated by the “spontaneity of thinking” they are therefore subjective in the ordinary sense.

B. “This notwithstanding,” Hegel says that Kant also reverses ordinary consciousness insofar as “Kant calls what is thought, and more specifically the universal and necessary, the objective, and what is only sensed the subjective.” We have seen in the Deduction that objectivity is to be distinguished from mere spatio-temporal association by the synthesis of intuition through universal and necessary rules.

Hegel, however, then provides his own twist on this Kantian position, by making independence the mark that distinguishes the objective from the subjective. From Hegel’s perspective, Kant’s definition of objectivity as universality and necessity reverses ordinary consciousness by claiming that, contrary to common sense’s faith in the independence of objects, “what is perceivable by way of the senses is what is genuinely dependent and secondary, and thoughts are by contrast what is truly independent and primary. It was in this sense that Kant called what belongs to thought (i.e. the universal and the necessary) the objective element, and in this he was entirely right” (EL §41z/84). The last sentence of this quote certainly reflects those moments in Kant in which objectivity is understood to be conditioned by conceptuality. However, I will not explore whether Hegel’s further ascribing objectivity dependence on conceptuality, with the latter thus determined as independent, is licensed by the Kantian language of transcendental conditions. What matters is that, for Hegel, the conceptual, understood as a certain structure of relation, is for Hegel to have explanatory primacy over sensibly-given objects in their immediacy. This primacy is clearly stated in the Logic’s Introduction, in which Hegel claims that “Logic has nothing to do with a thought about something which stands outside by itself as the base of thought... rather, the necessary forms of thinking, and its specifics determinations, are the content and the ultimate truth itself” (SL 29/21.34). Hegel then immediately notes that to get an “inkling” of this philosophical orientation, “one must put aside the notion that truth must be something tangible” (SL 29/21.34). That Hegel has in mind the common-sense presupposition of empiricism, in which objects of the senses are to ground or license truth-claims, is made clear later in the passage, where “sensuous self-externality belongs to this null side” (SL 30/21.35), i.e. that which is dependent on conceptuality. Note however, that this is not a mere dismissal of the form of self-externality, which will be itself derived as a moment nested within the Logic’s systematically derived conceptual scheme.
C. In the third moment, Kant reverses his reversal of common sense: “even the Kantian objectivity of thinking itself is in turn only subjective insofar as thoughts, despite being universal and necessary determinations, are, according to Kant, merely our thoughts and distinguished from what the thing is in itself by an insurmountable gulf” (EL §41z/85). Note that Hegel’s claim here is not that Kant’s account of objectivity as it conceived at stage B above gives rise to two-worldism and subjectivism, but that a return to or failure to abandon an empiricist presupposition or picture of thinking is responsible. As such, Hegel will claim that the way forward is to orient philosophy around Kant’s reversal at stage B, i.e. to claim that thought does not separate us from things in themselves, but that thinking discloses the logical structure that determines objectivity as such. Importantly, this disclosure will include the logical form specific to the sensory as one of its moments.

This three-step argument constitutes a *diagnosis* of – not yet the solution to – Kant’s transcendental philosophy as strung between empiricism and a new understanding of objectivity. Hume, as we saw, when faced with the idea of cause and the sensory impressions of contiguity and succession, sides with the sensory – our idea of cause cannot be verified or grounded by perception, and therefore is merely a “determination of the mind.” Despite the differences between transcendental idealism and Humean scepticism outlined above, Hegel considers Kant to have made an analogous decision. On the one hand, per the conceptualist reading of Kant presented in 2.2 above, Kant takes conceptual synthesis of the intuitional manifold to condition objectivity as such. On the other hand, Kant falls back into the empiricist position in which thought is outside of and opposed to genuine objectivity, and so merely “subjective.” For Hegel, this empiricist position amounts to treating thought and being on the model of intuitional form, i.e. as externally related and indifferent to one another.

What this means is that, despite advancing the claim that togetherness of concept/intuition is constitutive of objectivity, Kant vitiates togetherness by holding the concept/intuition pair to be legitimate only if intuitional externality characterises their relation. That is, conceptuality is presented as external to the intuitional form it determines, such that concepts and intuitions are related by the form of intuitional relation. Logically, as we have seen, Kant holds that the determining mark of conceptuality (connection or synthesis) is lacking in sensibility. Conceptuality, in other words, logically excludes sensibility. In Kant’s Critical account of cognition, this logical exclusion reinforces a certain spatial understanding of the relation between thought and objectivity, one present, as we have seen, in Kant’s pre-Critical objections to existence as a predicate: that we must go outside of thought to provide it with an existence independent of it is central to Kant’s solution to the content indifference of merely logical determination. For the Critical Kant, conceptuality is given objects from a sensibility outside it; sensible representations in lacking connection require conceptual contributions in order to be determinate, minimally as qualitatively distinguishable spatio-temporal objects and ultimately as the subject of a judgment. In other words, Kant is guilty of a tacit and unjustified privileging of intuitional form over conceptuality, insofar as the concept/intuition distinction is itself understood in terms of the externality of intuitional form.

This critique of Kantian subjectivism motivates Hegel’s attempt in the *Logic* to abstract from the assumption that thought is opposed to objects, and to derive the logical components of conceptual and intuitional representation (and the necessity of their togetherness) from a unitary ground.\(^{176}\) The

\(^{176}\) The argument of this chapter section thus constitutes an alternative framing of Houlgate’s defence of Hegel’s critique of Kantian subjectivism in terms of the concept/intuition distinction, indifference, and determination
Hegelian alternative will be to demonstrate that the logical components of intuition (singularity and immediacy, and, more concretely, the *indifference* that characterises singular immediacy) are always already conditioned by the co-presence of mediation and generality. There is, in other words, no immediacy that is not already mediated in order to be the immediacy that it is. One is not, *pace* Kant, confronted with a sensible manifold alien to mediation: the qualitatively determinate objects that immediately appear to us are already in themselves in relation to other such objects in order to appear as singular terms at all. This demonstration, however, requires abstracting from the generalisation of intuitional externality that characterises Kant’s cognitive model of determination, such that externality as a logical moment of determination can itself be derived and appropriately placed.

Given the way objectivity and Kantianism are intertwined from the beginning in the *Vorbegriff*, there is undoubtedly a sense that Hegel takes himself to be “completing” Kant’s account of objective determination – an account that only falls at the final hurdle. But there is *also* a sense in the *Vorbegriff* that Kant’s “position of thought toward objectivity” is failed from the start, insofar as it takes its leave from empiricism and never (for Hegel at least) genuinely interrogates empiricist presuppositions regarding objective knowledge. What is required to complete Kant’s philosophical revolution is not a last step but to begin all over again, this time from intellectual rather than sensible immediacy. It is to Hegel’s arguments for intellectual immediacy that we now turn.

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understood as relationality (on the model of Kantian synthesis speciosa). See argument 2(a) under “Hegelian alternatives” in 3.1 above.
Chapter 4. Intellectual Intuition

This chapter’s working through of Intellectual Intuition is intended to address the difference in register of the Critique and the Logic. As I have formulated it, Kant’s is a “cognitive model” of determination concerned with our cognitive capacities; Hegel’s alternative “ontological model” is concerned with determination understood to be operative in both thought and being. The primary difficulty in understanding the Logic’s account of determination as an alternative to the first Critique’s is not – or not immediately – mapping Hegel’s categories onto their Kantian counterparts. As Brady Bowman has recently emphasised, Hegel treats, like Kant, categories of quality, quantity, relation and modality.\footnote{Brady Bowman, “Self-Determination and Ideality in Hegel’s Logic of Being,” The Oxford Handbook of Hegel Studies, ed. Dean Moyar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 221.}

The immediate difficulty is that Hegel’s Logic does not frame objective validity or purport of those categories in the same way as Kant does in the Transcendental Logic.

In contrast to Kant’s Logic, the Logic works out the content and operation of conceptual categories without constitutive reference to conceptualuality’s propositional synthetic function (the logical forms of judgement as ground of the categories in the Metaphysical Deduction) and alters their second function as rules for synthesis of the sensible manifold (the subject of the Transcendental Deduction). Hegel’s categories are rules of synthesis (or connection or mediation) in general, not limited in their operation on sensible form. With Kant, Hegel takes the conceptual categories to be synthetic; against Kant, this synthetic activity is not minimally directed at or operative within the immediacy of the form of the sensible manifold. For Hegel, the categories are syntheses in and of the immediacy of the thought of being. Rather than function as an irreducible given for cognition, the sensible manifold – and its structure of “outside-one-another-being” – shares in the logical structure of determination that thought itself discloses. In other words, for Hegel, the necessary forms of thinking are the necessary forms of being, such that the structures of determination disclosed in thought are shared by being. Objective purport is secured by an ontologisation of the categories, i.e. an understanding of conceptual form as operative in being and the being of thought.

The goal in this chapter and the next is to show how Hegel utilises or draws on resources within the Kantian and post-Kantian doctrines of Intellectual Intuition (or “Int Int” for short) in order to effect this ontologisation. Hegel’s Logic begins by compressing or drawing the immediacy and singularity of intuitional representation into the generality of thought. Hegel wants to claim that thought shares in being because thought immediately itself is, such that the thought of being is equally the being of thought. Hegel’s Logic thus beings at a point unavailable within Kant’s approach to the togetherness of concepts and intuitions, in which two independently articulated forms (the form of intuitions argued for in the Aesthetic, and conceptual form derived in the Metaphysical Deduction) are drawn together via an account of synthesis in the Transcendental Deduction. As we have seen, Kant builds in the independence of these forms to his account – however “dialectical” that account may turn out to be – by claiming that our thought can “only think” (only mediate representations via common “marks”), and that immediacy, singularity, and existence are provided only by intuition. In contrast, Hegel claims that thought itself is immediate and that, further, the structure and functions of mediation can itself be derived from this immediacy. This enables the Logic to tackle the Kantian problem at what I take to be its highest level of generality – how does immediacy come to be determinate? – without making constitutive reference to immediacy of sensible intuition, but rather by observing the ways in which the immediacy of thought comes to determine itself. Importantly, however, Kant’s doctrine of Intellectual Intuition already points in this direction by arguing for the thinkability of a non-discursive
intellect in contrast to our own discursiveness. Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel each argue that philosophical cognition must be characterised as non-discursive in some way in order for the Kantian project to be realised. It is to this complex set of claims we now turn.

**Intellectual Intuition in the Literature**

Kant uses the formulae “Intellectual Intuition” [Intellektuelle Anschauung] and “Intuitive Understanding” [Anschauender Verstand] to mark a logically possible but existentially problematic “divine” cognitive faculty that would not be dependent on sensible intuitions in its determination of objects. Kant intends the thinkability of divine cognition to reinforce his account of the sensible limits of human dual-faculty cognition. Just because we can think the logical possibility of such a divine intellect, does not mean — for all the reasons considered in Chapters 1 and 2 above — that we can know or cognize that it exists, precisely because we could have no sensible intuition of it (even if such a divine understanding appeared to us, it would appear to us in the forms of our intuition). The idea of a divine understanding is thus a remarkably reflexive or involuted moment in Kant: Kant argues for the irreducibility of distinction between merely thinking and genuinely cognising by having us think but not cognise an intellect for which that distinction would not hold. That is, the thinking/cognising distinction foundational to the Critical Philosophy constitutes both the form and the content of the thought of intellectual intuition: intellectual intuition is the merely thinkable collapse of the distinction between thinking and cognition. In other words, “Intellectual intuition” is used by Kant to denote thinkable (logically determinate) but unknowable (epistemically indeterminate) exceptions to the thinkability/cognisability distinction that characterises the human cognitive condition.

It is well known that Fichte, Schelling, and the early Hegel affirm that our philosophical cognition is or has access to such a cognition, thereby taking up Intellectual Intuition to transgress Kant’s epistemic limits, not reinforce them. (The irony here is that the first step toward a non-cognitive model of determination is the appropriation of another capacity for our cognition). Importantly, however, the major post-Kantian idealists do so to fill what they take to be an explanatory gap in Kant’s category derivation, and thereby to “complete” the Kantian revolution.

I will substantiate these claims in detail shortly. However, I want to begin by flagging the plurality of Intellectual Intuition: the post-Kantians formulate Int Int in different ways, emphasizing different logical senses of the term in Kant himself. Moltke S. Gram has argued that Int Int in Kant is not a unified doctrine, nor does it retain a univocal meaning in post-Kantian Idealism – there is no “continuity” between Kant or his self-appointed successors. Per Gram, Kant’s phrase “Intellectual Intuition” groups together three logically distinct arguments without Kant himself acknowledging their distinction. Intellectual Intuition means: (1) a cognition that would be capable of objective knowledge without sensible intuition (knowledge of positive noumena); (2) an intellect that creates objects in thinking them (the “archetypal” intellect); and (3) an intellect that intuits the sum-total of reality (the totum realitatis of the first Critique’s “Transcendental Ideal”). Gram then distinguishes Kant’s three senses from what he takes to be (4) Fichte’s sense, which concerns the subject’s immediate awareness

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178 Eckhart Förster takes these two formulae to name distinct concepts. The Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy, trans. Brady Bowman (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2012), 250-276. I rather treat the multiple senses of Kant’s Intellectual Intuition using Moltke S. Gram’s tripartite typology.

of its own activity; Schelling’s claim that Int Int gives us immediate access to the “Absolute.” In short, the narrative pitting Kantian limits versus post-Kantian transgression does not distinguish the multiple meanings of the term in Kant and post-Kantian idealism. At the same time, however, Gram’s position is not conclusive. Yolanda Estes has recently argued for more senses of the term in Kant, and more continuity between Kant, Fichte, and Schelling than Gram allows, namely: Kant does consider Intellectual Intuition in terms of the I’s self-activity (B68) and immediate recognition of its freedom, both of which link directly to Fichte’s reflection on the activity of the I.

Neither Gram nor Estes discuss Hegel, presumably because Hegel in his mature writings (from the Phenomenology onwards) is frequently dismissive of the term. In the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel says that “Intellectual Intuition” is a “convenient” way to justify “what pops into one’s head” (LHP III 202). In the introduction to the Seinslogik, “Intellectual Intuition” is characterised as “the violent rejection of mediation” (SL 55). As such, claiming that the Kantian and post-Kantian doctrines of Int Int has anything to do with Hegel’s Science of Logic is contentious. Kenneth Westphal argues that Int Int is endorsed and understood by the early Hegel in a Schellingean way, namely as the faculty for an “aconceptual” grasp of the “Absolute” (sense 5 in Gram’s typology). This aconceptualist Schellingean version of Int Int is then decisively rejected by Hegel by the time of the 1804-5 Jena system. For Westphal, as for Longuenesse, Hegel comes to see Schelling’s conception of Int Int as question-begging. If access to the Absolute is aconceptual, that access can in no way be justified. One just asserts that one knows the Absolute, and knows precisely to the extent that one does not think, does not discursively articulate that purported knowledge. This view makes sense of three striking and important lines in the Preface and Introduction to the Jena Phenomenology: Schelling’s Intellectual Intuition is not only targeted in the “night in which all cows are black” (PhS §16/9). It is also

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180 “Fichte claims that we have a faculty of intellectual intuition. But he affirms neither an insight into things in themselves (whose existence he denies), nor the synoptic view of the totality of phenomena (which he claims to be impossible), nor the possibility of acts of cognition identical with their objects. Fichte’s problem lies elsewhere: he wants to know whether we can be immediately aware of the self.” Gram, “The Continuity Thesis,” 289

181 Although Gram does not mark it, this Schellingean sense clearly has some connection to sense 3, insofar as the Absolute can be understood as totality. I will indicate briefly their connection in 4.2.


183 “It is widely assumed that, because it is nondiscursive, an intuitive intellect is aconceptual. That is how Schelling understood it, and that is often the view of the early Hegel, too.” Westphal, “Kant, Hegel, and the Fate of The ‘Intuitive Intellect’ in The Reception of Kant’s Critical Philosophy: Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel,” ed. Sally Sedgwick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 283-305, 283. Westphal dating Hegel’s break with Schelling to the “Jena System” of 1804-5 is corroborated by H.S. Harris in “Hegel’s Intellectual Development to 1807” in The Cambridge Companion to Hegel, ed. Frederick C. Beiser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 25-51.

184 “The problem with Hegel’s [pre-1804] contention is far more serious than has been noticed. The problem is that the very model of an intuitive intellect is a model of a kind of knowledge in which there is no distinction between thinking and knowing. Because Hegel not only espoused this model, but was enthralled by it, he (mistakenly) assumed that the ability to conceive or think this model shows that the model is true and is known to be true.” Westphal, “Fate,” 287. Longuenesse is dismissive on similar grounds: “The argument seems quite lame. To imagine what a knowledge would be which escaped the limitations of our own is not to assert such a knowledge, or to determine any object by means of it.” “Point of View of Man or Knowledge of God” in The Reception of Kant’s Critical Philosophy: Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, ed. Sally Sedgwick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 253-281, 264. This dismissal fails to acknowledge that Kant does not simply imagine Int Int, he thinks it as a limit concept, and - in the Transcendental Ideal of the first Critique – actually works out how such an intellect would determine objects (“distributively” rather than “successively”).
a crucially relevant example of the “one bare assurance that is worth as much as any other” (§76/49). And, in its anti-democratic implications, Int Int means taking the criterion of truth as the “oracle within one’s breast… trampling underfoot the roots of humanity” (§69/43).

In my view, Westphal is right to argue that the mature Hegel detects the question-begging implications of Schelling’s aconceptualist understanding of Int Int. As I briefly flagged above in treating the Schellingean patterns in Sedgwick’s Hegel’s Critique of Kant, Robert Pippin is similarly right to emphasise that Hegel comes to see the Schellingean insistence on the “identity” of thought and being as one-sided and ultimately incoherent (a point I shall spend time on when considering Schelling in the next chapter). But in their attempt to distance a respectably Kantian Hegel from Schellingean romanticism, Pippin and Westphal seemingly presume that all senses of Int Int formulate non-discursivity as necessarily entailing aconceptuality. 185 Hegel’s mature account of thought is non-discursive in the technical sense that “discursivity” has for Kant and for Alison’s reconstruction of Kantianism, namely, that our thought can “only think,” i.e. mediate representations whose content is given independently in intuition. For Hegel, thinking itself can be meaningfully characterised as immediate, singular, and indeed to exist – i.e. possessing logical features that Kant ascribed to intuition and excluded from thought. But thought characterised thus by Hegel remains conceptual, because it proves to be the mediation of the immediacy that it is. Hegel understands the minimal structures of mediation to be derivable from thought’s own immediacy. As such one should not take the mature Hegel’s polemics against Int Int at face value: while Hegel does not use the words “Intellectual Intuition” or “Intuitive Intellect” in his account of the category of “being” in the Seinslogik, he defines that category as an “empty thinking” that is equally a “pure empty intuiting” (SL 59). And, in reflecting on the Logic’s course in its final chapter (“Absolute Idea”), Hegel is explicit in referring to the first category of the Logic as an “inner intuition” [innerliches Anschauen]. 186

I cannot present here a full typology of Intellectual Intuition in post-Kantianism. I am attempting only to cut a path to the Seinslogik. Intellectual Intuition plays a role in Hegel’s Logic both

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185 Westphal and Pippin’s ways of framing the Kant-Schelling-Hegel relation serves to downplay Schelling’s influence on Hegel. As Pippin puts it in Hegel’s Idealism, Schelling’s is a “indefensible metaphysics of an Absolute Subject or God in which all beings are pantheistical related” (66), and Pippin’s strategy is to argue that Hegel, even in his early writings never straightforwardly rejected Kantian “critical idealism” in favour of Schelling’s “romantic elements” (66). This narrative is certainly serviceable to the rehabilitation of Hegel as Kantian. In Westphal and in Pippin, after breaking from Schelling, Hegel’s work returns to a broadly Kantian program by defending an account of our intellects as discursive, even if Hegel seeks to extend or deepen the conceptual grasp that such intellects can have on the world as it is in itself. “Hegel’s mature epistemology built on Kant’s account of discursive judgment in articulating the possibility and defending the legitimacy of a conceptual grasp of the totality of the world.” Westphal, “Fate,” 286. This is true up to a point, but does not sit well with the anti-Kantian realism of Hegel’s concept thesis, and the corollary ontological overhaul of Kant’s epistemology at stake in this dissertation.

186 To be fair, Westphal does note the presence of intuition in the Logic. “In the Science of Logic, on those very few occasions where he mentions intellectual intuition in connection with his own views, Hegel stresses as strongly and as clearly as possible that such supposed intuitions are definite and determinate—and thus genuinely contentful or significant—only insofar as they are articulated conceptually. Hegel’s [291] mature account of absolute knowledge repudiates the aconceptual accounts of knowledge that are central to Schelling’s and Hegel’s own earlier versions of the intuitive intellect.” (290-91). But there is nothing distinguishing Westphal’s description of Hegel’s position in the Logic in the above quote from the conceptualist account of Kantian epistemology we have worked through in Chapters 1 and 2. If this is the end of the Hegelian story (from an aconceptualist Schelling back to a conceptualist Kant) then the Hegelian criticisms of Kantian epistemology we have also seen in Chapters 1 and 2 would remain unresolved (at least within Hegel’s own work). Hegel, I am suggesting here, does contest the discursivity thesis, and this needs to be accepted in order for the Logic’s derivation to function as it does.
as its point of departure, and it has direct consequences for the Logic’s strategy of category derivation. I will in 4.1. deal with Kant’s first two senses as they inform the immediacy of mediation that opens the Logic. Their presence in Hegel’s Logic comes via Fichte’s claim, contra Kant, that we can have an “immediate non-sensible awareness” in addition to sensible intuition as “an immediate sensible awareness.” 187 That immediacy is not restricted to the forms of sensibility but extends to the understanding has serious implications for category derivation, which in 4.2 we will see Fichte begin to work out. While Kant in the “Doctrine of Method” wants to keep mathematics and philosophy methodologically distinct, philosophical cognition for the Fichte of the 1790s is a “construction in intellectual intuition” analogous with the “construction in intuition” characteristic of mathematics. In a construction in intellectual intuition, we immediately grasp or “see” the necessity of a synthetic a priori knowledge claim. Angelica Nuzzo, Paul Franks, and Daniel Breazeale have each in their own ways suggested that Int Int is legible in Hegel’s mature thinking via Fichte, though only Nuzzo gets as far as the Logic, and only briefly. 188 In turn Schelling’s critique of Fichte on this score is crucially relevant to Hegel’s Logic, insofar as Schelling divorces the immediacy provided by intellectual intuition from the subject—a crucial step in the move from a cognitive to an ontological model of determination. What we are immediately aware of in Schelling is thought in general, not “our” thinking. Schelling also crucially considers Int Int to apprehend the totality, which is crucial to Hegel’s derivations in the Seinslogik.

4.1. ... in the first Critique
Gram’s first sense of intellectual intuition in Kant is a faculty that would know things independently of the conditions of sensibility. In Gram’s own words: “If space and time are what Kant says they must be—formal properties of our mind’s way of perceiving objects—then it is logically possible to conceive of an intellect that can be acquainted with the same things without those forms.” 189 This is to claim that such an intellect would know things-in-themselves. But Gram shows that we must be careful about which kind of thing-in-itself is being known: the intuitive intellect in Kant’s first sense knows “positive” rather than “negative” noumena. 190 The latter we have encountered in Chapter 2: our form of intuition gives rise to thought of the thing-in-itself as empty indeterminate thought of an object in general. This “negative” or limit concept of the thing-in-itself as object in general follows aspects of Kant’s doctrine of intuition: it is produced by an always possible act of abstraction from the conditions of our sensibility through which objects are given to us. To this we should contrast “positive” noumenon, which is the necessary thought of the ground of appearance. When something appears to us, it must be the appearance of something which affects our sensibility, which we are constrained to think as the source of the matter of intuitions—or else we get the “absurd” thought of “an appearance

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187 These formulae are Este’s. “Reconsidering Continuity,” 176.
188 Paul Franks, All or Nothing. Franks notes that “Hegel is closer to Fichte in this respect. For him, the abandonment of the claim to universal validity is intolerable, and the suggestion that the system is intelligible only to those with innate or divine gifts must be repudiated” (374). Anjelica Nuzzo, “A Question of Method.” Breazeale’s approach is treated at length below.
189 Gram 289.
190 “If by a noumenon we understand a thing insofar as it is not an object of our sensible intuition, because we abstract from the manner of our intuition of it, then this is a noumenon in the negative sense. But if we understand by that an object of a non-sensible intuition, then we assume a special kind of intuition, namely intellectual intuition, which, however, is not our own, and the possibility of which we cannot understand, and this would be the noumena in a positive sense... If therefore, we wanted to apply the categories to objects that are not considered as appearances, then we would have to ground them on an intuition other than the sensible one, and then the object would be a noumenon in a positive sense.” (B307-8).
without anything that appears” (Bxxvi-vii). As such, the positive noumenon is that which is thought as the cause of the manifold given in the forms of our intuition (though Kant’s use of “cause” is here notoriously problematic). A putative Int Int in its first sense, then, is not distinguished from our cognition because it can know objectivity “in general” (negative noumena) but because it is able rather to apply the categories to particular objects independent of sensibility (positive noumena). Thus the first sense for Gram in fact has three elements: (1) the exclusion of sensible intuition; (2) knowledge not of indeterminate objectivity in general but a particular object; and (3) the “understanding must provide the conditions of intuition.”

Gram’s second sense of “intellectual intuition” in Kant, as stated above, is that of an intellect that knows objects without the conditions of sensibility because it creates those objects. This second sense is not subsumable under the first for Gram because it supposes a different conception of the object that is known – neither negative noumena (the “empty” thing-in-itself) nor strictly speaking positive noumena. The first sense knows the positive noumenon as given without sensible conditioning, the second sense knows the object as produced. “Here the problem is not another case of using pure concepts to know positive noumena or things-in-themselves, for even if we were capable of using the categories to know things-in-themselves” – that is, capable of skipping over intuition – “we could not produce or literally create those particulars.”

This difference, however, does not make a difference to the function of Intellectual Intuition in the first Critique. Both senses are raised, though Kant does not distinguish them, in §21 of the B Deduction, as a “divine understanding, which would not represent given objects, but through whose representation the objects would themselves at the same time be given, or produced” (B145). The equivocation in this instance between “given” and “produced” goes to Kant’s logical blurring of the first and second senses that Gram draws attention to. In this passage, the co-presence of first and second senses is indicated by the ambiguity of this “or” – ambiguously signalling either the or of equivalence or the or of disjunction. Either way, the reference to “intellectual intuition” in both senses is used in the B Deduction for a unitary purpose, in support of the discursivity thesis. Kant uses the thought of an intellectual intuition in order to clarify what categories are for us: the categories “are only rules for an understanding whose entire capacity [Vermögen] consists in thinking.” Our understanding has the function of “bringing the synthesis of the manifold that is given to it in intuition from elsewhere to the unity of apperception, which therefore cognizes nothing at all by itself.” Kant’s point should by now be clear: the discursivity thesis holds that the only legitimate epistemic use of the categories is the determination of the material given in intuition. It is thus possible to argue, in contrast to Gram, that at least the first two senses of Int Int in Kant have something (rather than “nothing”) in common: they are all used as part of a Kantian argumentative strategy which attempts to determine human cognitive faculties by reference to what they are not, to the kind of experience of ourselves as knowers that we indisputedly do not have (see Chapter 2.2 above). We know our intellects to only think because we can think of an intellect that would not only think, and know that our intellects do not function in this way.

As such, Kant’s claim for the thinkability of an understanding we do not have comes very close to determining our cognitive capacities by negation. Take Kant’s reference to intellectual intuition in the B edition Aesthetic. In §8 (“General Remarks on the Transcendental Aesthetic”), in the context of

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192 Gram 290.
193 Gram 291.
a discussion of “natural theology,” Kant claims our intuition is “called sensible because it is not original, i.e. one through which the existence of the object of intuition is itself given (and that, so far only pertain to the original being); rather it is dependent on the object, thus it is possible only insofar as the representational capacity of the subject is affected through that (B72). Here sense 2 predominates in Kant’s characterisation. But note the structure of Kant’s argument: our intuition is “not original,” and therefore it is “derivative.” Now, in fairness to Kant, this determination by negation (“this because not that”) as an argumentative strategy is not Kant’s argument for the specifically spatiotemporal form of our intuition – as we have seen in 2.1., for Kant the pure forms of our intuition are introduced as the conditions of possibility for geometry.

Kant in §21 of the B Deduction goes on to explicitly consider the “peculiarity” of our intellect:

But for the peculiarity of our understanding, that it is able to bring about the unity of apperception a priori only by means of the categories and only through precisely this kind and number of them, a further may be offered just as little as one can be offered for why we have these and no other functions for judgment or for why space and time are the sole forms of our possible intuition (B145-46).

From Fichte’s and from Hegel’s perspectives, we have here Kant’s explicit acknowledgement of the explanatory deficit in the concept/intuition framework. There can be no answer to the question, “why 12 categories corresponding to just those 12 forms of judgment?” nor to “why just these 2 forms of intuition?” The answer can only be: “that is just how we are,” or less casually, “these are our given cognitive capacities.” Kant strongly suggests in the above passage that the particular form of our capacity to know is arbitrary, in the sense that no rational justification can be found for it.\footnote{\textit{It should be noted that, from a Kantian perspective, it is possible to suggest that Kant plain-facedly raises questions unanswerable within his philosophy (why 12 categories? why 2 forms of pure intuition?) because he does not take their going unanswered to be damaging: they are neither capable of nor require answers. I thus take issue with Stephen Houlgate’s characterisation of Kantian critique in Cartesian terms as “radical self-criticism” (\textit{The Opening} 24-28). Kant’s strategy is not radical doubt but the seeking of non-empirically derivable conditions for certain indubitable experiences: of geometry, of real determination, of morality, of aesthetic experience. Here a similarity to the “question” of the thing-in-itself should be suggested: on the “two aspects” reading, we can neither know things in themselves nor do we need to for epistemic success. In fact, it is the claim that there is such a distinction and, simultaneously, that this distinction is irrelevant to our empirical cognition that guards empirical realism against sceptical attack. I repeat this material because it helps us here to understand how the logical possibility of intellectual intuition is put to use by Kant – it serves to reinforce the distinction between the transcendental realist paradigm (God’s knowledge and man’s knowledge are on a spectrum), to the transcendental idealist defense of empirical realism, which effectively removes the standard of God’s knowing from the criteria for epistemic determinacy. It might be possible to think the possibility of (sense 1) access to objects independently of the conditions of our sensibility or (sense 2) an intellect that achieves this access, not in independence from the conditions of our sensibility, but via creation of those objects. But these possibilities cannot be used as a canon to judge knowledge as it must be for creatures constituted as we are. This is I think the source of the Kantian frustration with Hegel’s phenomenalist subjectivist charge – the whole point of the Kantian enterprise is to release empirical knowledge from the standard of the “really real.” Intellectual intuition serves to eliminate of things-in-themselves from the criteria for empirical knowing.}}
reason itself...” (KrV Axx). The same point is repeated in the Prolegomena’s characterisation of the first Critique, in which the reader is said to be required “to think himself little by little into a system that takes no foundation as given except reason itself and that therefore tries to develop cognition out of its own seeds without relying on any fact whatsoever” (4:274). In the above however we have reason coming up against the not merely unexplained but ostensibly inexplicable fact of its own categorial constitution, and the constitution of a sensibility it does not ground but cannot do without.

Now, what makes Intellectual Intuition interesting for post-Kantian idealism is that it ambiguously supports two opposed interpretations of the Critical Philosophy, which Paul Redding has helpfully called “weak” and “strong” versions of Transcendental Idealism or “TI.” Weak TI characterises Kant’s project as attempting to fix the limits of our knowledge at sensibility in order to guard thought against “metaphysical” extravagance. Hegel refers to this in the Preface to the first edition of the Logic as the “exoteric” doctrine of Kantianism, weaponised by the “scientific camp” in their attempt to consign rationalist metaphysics to history (7/21.5). On the other hand, Kant’s works also lend themselves to interpretation as themselves part of a project of “Strong TI.” As quoted above, Kant sometimes claims that reason relies on no given fact but itself in generating a systematic account of its content. Reason is self-determining such that its limitations are “its” in the sense of its own, generated out of its own power (the same would go for genitive in the title, Critique of Pure Reason, such that reason is understood as both the agent and patient of its own activity). On Redding’s account, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel are post-Kantians – not anti-Kantians – because they critique “weak TI” in the name of a “strong TI” also detectable in Kant’s text. Post-Kantian idealists see the explanatory deficit above as Kant’s failure to achieve the goal he himself articulated: a system of reason “brought to light by reason itself.”

Interestingly, this account of a tension between strong and weak TI clearly accords with Hegel’s Vorbegriff account above. There we saw that Kantianism for Hegel is caught between empiricism – for which independently determinate objects are given to our thought – and an idealist account of objectivity, in which conceptuality conditions determinacy as such. The latter approaches Kantianism in terms of its relation to empiricism; the former in terms of its relation to metaphysics.

To link Redding’s typology up with our discussion of Int Int above, for strong TI there would be no distinction between thinking and knowing when reason thinks itself: transcendental philosophy for Kant cannot itself be understood in terms of the distinction between thinking and knowing because it is within transcendental philosophical activity that that distinction is made. Intellectual intuition is on the fault-line between “weak” and “strong” TI: it presents the logical possibility of determination independently of the given structure of sensible intuition while at the same time reinforcing our limitation to those forms by denying that possibility any actualisation in us. Int Int in Kant thus holds out the promise of reason’s self-grounding account of its own constitution, provided a plausible claim can be made against Kant for our possessing a non-discursive cognitive faculty.

To make this case, Fichte and Hegel unequivocally drop sense 2 – our intellectual intuition does

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195 This is generally approached in terms of the seeming arbitrariness of the “thread” [Leitfaden] for the discovery of the a priori categories for objectivity in the Metaphysical Deduction, i.e. Kant’s finding the categories already substantially formed “in the labors of the logicians.” For a brief rundown of the critique of the metaphysical deduction as uncritically and unsystematically borrowing from Aristotelian logic in Hegel, Hermann Cohen, Martin Heidegger, and Gottlob Frege, see Longuenesse, Kant on the Human Standpoint, 107-116.

196 To elaborate on Redding’s distinction, it is possible to suggest that the “pessimistic” desiderata of weak TI is dependent on strong TI, i.e. from a critique whose ground is reason’s own self-determination of its limits. It is as a result of reason’s self-legislative power that it comes to know itself to be limited – for epistemic purposes – to appearances alone.
not create objects in the thinking of them (though Schelling as we will see does blur the line by sometimes presenting artistic production as the paradigm of Int Int). Sense 1 is taken up in a complex way. I claim that it is **deflated** by being rendered **reflexive**. In Fichte, Int Int as we possess it is not a faculty that would determine positive noumena without reference to sensibility. Rather, our Int Int would determine what it means to be determinate in general but without Kant’s **constitutive** reference to sensibility. So rather than a divine way of knowing individual objects, Int Int post-Kant is the faculty for specifically **philosophical cognition**, i.e. the faculty that systematically derives the meaning and structure of objectivity.

I say **constitutive** reference above to make space for an important wrinkle already flagged in Chapter 3 above. Not starting one’s account of synthetic determination from the givenness of the forms of intuition does not preclude those forms being considered. Rather, it opens the possibility that those forms themselves be rationally grounded, i.e. that the forms of intuition can themselves be deduced in their necessity. When asked “why we have these forms of intuition and not others,” Hegel’s commitment to strong TI means that an answer other than our contingent cognitive makeup should be offered. His answer, as we will see when we turn to Hegel’s derivation of the categories of quality, is that the thought of being taken in its immediacy necessarily proves to be qualitatively determinate, necessarily organises immediacy and singularity via the structure of “outside-one-another-being” that for Kant characterises intuitional representation. At this point however, we are seeking to understand how Hegel draws on the post-Kantian doctrines of Int Int to formulate the point of departure that would enable such a derivation. And here Fichte is indispensable.

4.2. ... in Fichte’s *Wissenschaftslehre*

Hegel formulates his debt to Fichte in this way: “It remains the Fichtean philosophy’s profound contribution [tiefe Verdienst] to have reminded us that the **thought-determinations** [Denkbestimmungen] must be exhibited in their necessity and that it is essential that they be **derived** [abgeleitet]” (EL §42/86). This is a constant in Hegel’s work: the Differenzschrift opens by claiming that “in the principle of the deduction of the categories Kant’s philosophy is authentic idealism; and it is this principle that Fichte extracted in a purer, stricter form…” (DS 80). When unpacked, Fichte’s contribution to or influence on Hegel’s *Logic* consists of three closely interrelated elements. Firstly, there is Fichte’s critical claim against Kant. Fichte claims that Kant “by no means proved the categories he set up to be conditions of self-consciousness, but merely said that they were so: that still less did he derive space and time as conditions thereof...”197 Kant in the Metaphysical Deduction as we have seen does “prove” the categories by deriving each from a logical form of judgment, and in the Transcendental Deduction does demonstrate them to be functions of the unity of self-consciousness. But for Fichte, as for Hegel, a successful category derivation must be **unitary**, by which I mean begun from and grounded by a single rationally legitimate principle. As Hegel says in the same section of the Encyclopedia Logic, Kant has gathered the logical forms of judgment “merely empirically,” that is, as they are **found** in an extant philosophical tradition, but the “thought-determinations” should in fact “be derived from thinking itself.”

This is the second point. The post-Kantian program for a unitary derivation shifts methodological emphasis to the problem of foundations or, in Hegel’s language, “beginning,” i.e. the

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197 J. G. Fichte, *The Science of Knowledge*. Edited and translated by Peter Heath and John Lachs. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), S1/1,478. This text will be cited parenthetically in the remainder of this Chapter.
principle from which the derivation is to proceed.\textsuperscript{198} Hegel’s opening line in the Introduction to the \textit{Seinslogik} – entitled “With What Must the Beginning of Science Be Made” – notes philosophy’s “new awareness of the difficulty of finding a beginning” (SL 45/21.53). Di Giovanni’s translation footnotes this as an “allusion” to the first part of Fichte’s 1794/5 \textit{Wissenschaftslehre} (SL 45/21.53 n1). Hegel is more explicit later in the \textit{Seinslogik} Intro: Fichte’s position is that “all that follows from the first truth must be deduced from it, and the need that this \textit{first} truth should be... something of which one is \textit{immediately certain} [\textit{ein unmittelbare Gewisses}]” (SL 53/21.62). Hegel agrees with this program, but argues as we will see that there is a \textit{more immediate} and \textit{more certain} – because \textit{more abstract} – point of departure than Fichte’s.

Thirdly, Hegel follows Fichte in his commitment to the demonstrability and replicability – the exoteric and democratic status – of this derivation. The only authority recognised by Strong TI is reason, such that each agent must rationally verify philosophical belief for themselves. This political commitment is methodologically legible in Fichte’s claims to have derived the categories “gradually before the eyes of the reader.”\textsuperscript{199}

Taking these three elements together, we might say that Hegel follows Fichte in seeking a \textit{replicable unitary category derivation}.

Stephen Houlgate has noted the influence of Fichte’s philosophical program on Hegel’s \textit{Logic}. Quoting Fichte’s line above, Houlgate claims that Hegel similarly seeks to reconstruct “for the reader the logical genesis of the categories and laws of thought from the activity of thought itself.”\textsuperscript{200} While Houlgate’s brief account of the Fichte-Hegel relation in the \textit{Opening} orients my approach, his account in its brevity does not consider the way in which Fichte’s program for a unitary derivation is linked to a critical appropriation of Kant’s doctrine(s) of Intellectual Intuition. Fichte deploys Int Int in order to frame and formulate his attempts at a replicable unitary category deduction. This facet of Fichte’s program, I suggest, is crucial to the understanding of Hegel’s \textit{Logic} presented here, i.e. as rejecting Kant’s discursivity thesis in order to derive the necessity of the togetherness of the logical components of the concept/intuition distinction from the immediacy of thought.

Fichte’s most extended reflections on his use of the term “Intellectual Intuition” come in the second of two “Introductions to the \textit{Wissenschaftslehre},” published in 1797 in the \textit{Philosophisches Journal}. Fichte there claims that “Intellectual intuition is the only firm standpoint for all philosophy” (41/1,466). He also explicitly connects his post-Kantian program for a unitary derivation with our capacity for a modified form of Int Int:

\begin{quote}

Philosophy, accordingly, would be the cognition of reason itself by means of reason itself – through intuition. The first point was Kant’s important discovery, even though he failed to carry it through to completion. The second point [“through intuition”], which expresses the condition for carrying out such a project, was added by the \textit{Wissenschaftslehre}, which, for just this reason, is a completely new science.\textsuperscript{201}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{198} Reinhold’s “elementary philosophy” is the first post-Kantian attempt to offer a “first principle” that would ground and unify Kant’s philosophy. For a brief account of Reinhold’s contribution and relation to Fichte, see Tom Rockmore, \textit{Before and After Hegel: A Historical Introduction to Hegel’s Thought} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 25-36. Rockmore, however, bizarrely attributes to Fichte the “audacious and decisive step” of constructing a “system without any foundation whatsoever... it rests on first principles whose truth is not and cannot be known,” 30-31.

\textsuperscript{199} Fichte, \textit{Introductions to the Wissenschaftslehre and Other Writings}, ed. and trans. Daniel Breazeale, 25.

\textsuperscript{200} \textit{The Opening}, 23-24.

\textsuperscript{201} Fichte, \textit{Introductions}, 193. Brackets mine.
Given the tension addressed above between strong and weak versions of TI, it is debateable whether Kant himself ever assumes the burden of demonstrating that the conditions of experience are fully rationally answerable. Nonetheless, Fichte reads Kant as committed to but failing to achieve the program of strong TI, giving rise to Fichte’s own attempted completion of Kantian idealism. For Fichte the availability of rational cognition “through intuition” is the unacknowledged condition of Kant’s idealism understood as committed to strong TI. It follows that for Fichte the completion of this idealism is dependent on its full reconstruction from intellectual intuition explicitly acknowledged as its condition. In the body of the 1796/99 version of the Wissenschaftslehre (the Wissenschaftslehre Novo Methodo) Fichte claims that “Indeed [Kant’s] entire philosophy is a product of this intuition; for he maintains that necessary representations are products of the acting of a rational being and are not passively received... such an intuition is certainly intellectual.”202 The suggestion here is that the spontaneity by which Kant distinguishes our understanding means that we have immediate but non-sensuous intuitive access to the categories (the “necessary representations”) that constitute it.

But how exactly would such a non-sensuous immediacy work? And how does Fichte’s sense of Int Int relate to Kant’s? Fichte’s attempt in the 1790s to re-ground and so complete the Critical philosophy is constantly evolving, and is not always clear or even self-consistent.203 Fichte’s publication history and various versions of the Wissenschaftslehre are a research project in themselves.204 Regarding Int Int specifically, Daniel Breazeale has argued in a number of papers that (a) the term “Intellectual Intuition” [intellektuelle Anschauung], although present from Fichte’s Zurich lectures in 1794, is increasingly emphasised in Fichte’s work after the first and still most widely read presentation of his philosophy, the Wissenschaftslehre of 1794/5; and that (b) Fichte ambiguously uses the term in

203 Christian Kolz’s commentary describes the 1794/5 WL as possessing the “characteristics of a work in progress: some unresolved ambiguity in its central terms, gaps in the argumentation and a continuous rethinking of the systematic conception that is being developed...” “Fichte’s Explanation of the Dynamic Structure of Consciousness in the 1794-5 Wissenschaftslehre,” The Cambridge Companion to Fichte (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 65-92, 67. That David Wood and Karen de Boer have convened a workshop at the University of Leuven for 27-28 April 2018 on “The Enigma of Fichte’s First Principle(s)” also indicates the difficulty of understanding Fichte’s attempted transformation of the Critical Philosophy. Pippin emphasises the complexity of the Kant-Fichte-Hegel relation in Hegel’s Idealism, 42-3.
204 The texts that concern us primarily in the below are the 1794/5 Wissenschaftslehre, the two 1797 “introductions” to the WL, and Fichte’s first abortive re-writing of the WL, the 1796/9 WL (nova methodo). The 1797 introductions were together intended to redress criticisms of the 1794/5 version, which was originally only intended as lecture notes for Fichte’s students, and whose actual title is Foundation of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre. In the first introduction Fichte addresses the general public; in the second professional philosophers already engaged with Kant and Reinhold. The two introductions were also to constitute the first part of the written serialisation of the completely revised version of Fichte’s theoretical philosophy given in the lectures of 1796-99, the WL Nova Methodo. The first chapter of the 1796/99 system appeared, following the two introductions, in the Philosophical Journal in 1798. Its full publication was abandoned by 1800, in part owing to the polemical aftermath of the atheism controversy of 1799, and replaced by a new attempt at a systematic exposition. For a brief account of Fichte’s revisions of and the reception to his system in 1790s, see the translator’s introduction to J.G. Fichte, Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy (Wissenschaftslehre) nova methodo 1796/99, ed. and trans. Daniel Breazeale (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 1-54. Here I am only interested in Fichte’s appropriation of intellectual intuition, not a full reconstruction of the differences and similarities between the 1794/5 and 1796/9 (and 1801/2 and 1804/5 etc.) systems.
two senses, not equivalent to any of the three Kantian senses so far discussed. What is of interest here is that Fichte’s ambiguous use of the term marks an unresolved tension in Fichte’s relation to the Kantian discursivity thesis and to Kantian transcendental argument. The first sense of Int Int that Breazeale identifies is used as a synonym for sustained non-empirical introspection, and is consistent with the discursivity thesis and Kant’s transcendental mode of argument. In its second sense however, it contests Kant on both points: thinking not “only thinks” but possesses a moment of immediacy, and Fichte suggests that such immediacy constitutes the foundation of and method for a unitary category derivation. “For the true nature of things, one must have recourse to intuition” (36/I, 461). It is this Fichtean usage of Int Int, I suggest, that stands behind the Hegelian debts to Fichte outlined above.

Fichte’s Sense 1

Intellectual intuition in its first sense is linked to Fichte’s methodological practice understood as attentiveness to the contents of global abstraction, that is, attentiveness to the contents that remain for thinking after all empirical content has been bracketed. Speaking on Fichte’s methodology generally, Breazeale says: “the philosopher must elevate himself, by means of a freely undertaken act of global “abstraction,” from the standpoint and concerns of ordinary life and then carefully “attend” [aufmerken] to what remains after he has abstracted from everything from which he is able to abstract...” The first pages of the 1794/5 WL puts global abstraction front and centre. Fichte’s goal as it is presented in the 1794/5 text is to “discover the primordial, absolutely unconditioned first principle of all human knowledge” (93/I, 91), the “grounding principle” [Grundsatz] from which the forms of our cognitive activity can be derived. This unconditioned first principle is glossed as “that Act [Tathandlung] which does not and cannot appear among the empirical states of our consciousness, but rather lies at the basis of all consciousness and alone makes it possible” (Ibid). We will consider this Act in a little detail shortly. But Fichte’s concern at the beginning of the WL is methodological. He is worried, not about the universality of his Grundsatz, but that his readers will fail to replicate Fichte’s thinking and so validate this universality for themselves: “In describing this Act, there is less risk that anyone will perhaps thereby fail to think what he should—the nature of our mind has already taken care of that—than that he will thereby think what he should not” (Ibid). The unconditioned ground of knowledge is always already with us. At issue is a replicable methodology for bringing it into view. In turn, “This makes it necessary to reflect on what one might at first sight take it to be, and to abstract from everything that does not really belong to it” (Ibid). Fichte exhorts his reader to abstract from all empirical thought contents and to attend to what remains over: “Let any fact of empirical consciousness be proposed; and let one empirical feature after another be detached from it, until all

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that remains is what cannot any longer be dismissed, and from which nothing further can be detached.” (94/I, 92).

Breazeale in his Cambridge Companion piece identifies Fichte’s first sense of intellectual intuition with this abstraction and attention to its contents.207 Intellectual Intuition in this sense names a “reflective self-awareness,” an “introspection” distinguished from ordinary empirical introspection by the holding at bay of any and all contingent contents.208 In Thinking Through, Breazeale suggests that intellectual intuition in this sense is “simply a synonym” for other prominent Fichtean methodological exhortations, “including ‘Observation’ [Zuschauen, Zusehen, Beobachtung], ‘attentiveness’ [Aufmerksamkeit], and ‘reflection’ [Reflexion].”209 At this innocuous or superficial level of analysis, intellectual intuition as a non-empirically-contaminated “awareness” is consonant with the broadly Kantian understanding of transcendental argument as it practiced in the first WL, and which I will work through briefly in a moment. But this very language of “observation,” when further developed by Fichte in the second 1797 Introduction, leads to a conception of categorial derivation not entirely consonant with the 1794/5 WL’s manner of proceeding. Therefore, pace Breazeale, I do not think that the two senses of the term can be rigorously distinguished: the language of observation, attentiveness, and awareness, there from the get-go in Fichte’s work, has an intuitionist sense that Fichte increasingly exploits or extends in the latter half of the 1790s. To demonstrate this however we need to consider the results of global abstraction in the 1794/5 WL and compare that with the comments on Intellectual Intuition from the 1797 Introductions.

In the 1794/5 WL global abstraction does not itself immediately uncover the putatively unconditional “Act” but rather leaves us with some transcendental arguments to make. The result of abstracting from all empirical thought contents is their minimal form, i.e. the law of identity (A = A). As the abstract form of any contentful proposition, Fichte suggests that the law of identity is universal for empirical or “ordinary” consciousness: it is “absolutely certain,” or “given with certainty in empirical consciousness” (99/I,98).210 Fichte then seeks to show that the “absolute certainty” of the law of identity is not absolute but is demonstrably conditioned by the “Act” of consciousness. As Fichte puts it: “reflection must confirm that this Act is granted as such along with the proposition [i.e. A = A].” That is, if the proposition is admitted, its transcendental condition of possibility must be too. Fichte’s argument, in brief, is as follows. The claim that A = A is dependent upon both logical moments (the A

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207 CC 106.
208 Ibid.
209 Breazeale, Thinking Through, 200. One might at this point object that such words do not delimit a singular, Fichtean (or even generally transcendental) argumentative strategy, but rather emphasise the state of mind required for philosophical activity in general. In my view, the singularity of Fichte’s emphasis on the mental attitude of his listeners and readers is explicable only by the reference to the moral and political consequences Fichte attaches to replicability.
210 There is perhaps an ambiguity already here. Fichte stresses the rigour and discipline of abstraction from all empirical contents but then treats the law of identity that follows that abstraction as merely an empirical universality, something “tacitly assumed to be familiar and established” (93/I,92), merely found to be “accepted by everyone as perfectly certain and established” (102/I,101). This sceptical take on logical form clearly dovetails with Fichte (and subsequently, Hegel’s) characterisation of the Critique’s forms of judgment as merely “gathered up.” In other words, Fichte ambiguously considers the law of identity as a kind of maximally abstract, non-empirical point of departure and as an ultimately merely historical propaedeutic that will in turn require grounding by the very principle it serves heuristically to introduce (99/I,99). This tension helps to explain the shift to immediate intuitional access to self-activity from 1796 onwards. In this vein, Breazeale argues that the 1794/5 WL’s “misleading talk about ‘single first principles’ and its appeal to logical propositions, such as that of identity,” is replaced in the 1796/9 version of a summons or challenge to abstract and so reach immediate awareness of the self. Breazeale, “Kantian Questions/Fichtean Answers,” 81.
as subject and the A as predicate) being held together or combined. In Fichte’s words, in the claim that
A = A “it is the necessary connection between the two that is posited absolutely, and without any other
ground. To this necessary connection I give the preliminary designation X.” We saw above that the
connecting of two discrete intuitions in Kant’s A Deduction constitutes a minimal understanding of
conceptual activity (begreifen as “grasping”), and that the ultimate condition of such a unifying activity
is there shown to be the transcendental unity of consciousness. Fichte’s WL begins with a modified
form of the same argument: the “truth” of the proposition A = A is X, but this X simply marks the
uniform presence of consciousness as condition for any connection whatsoever. The unity of
consciousness with itself (I = I) is thus presented as the condition of the connection (X) that constitutes
any particular propositional claim.

Most importantly, by comparing the truth criteria of the propositions A = A and I = I, Fichte
demonstrates that the status of the I’s activity as necessary condition is self-grounding. As Eckart
Förster neatly puts it: “In the case of the proposition A = A, whether something actual corresponds to
the predicate A depends on conditions which are not given with the act of judgment itself; that is the
reason why we were able to abstract from its existence. In the case of the proposition I = I, by contrast,
it is impossible for us to abstract from existence.” In other words, the judgment A = A is an act that
does not of itself produce any corresponding existence (Fichte patently does not endorse the second
sense of Int Int, creation of the objects of cognition). It is because no content is given by the act of
judgment – any content it has is contingent – that we could begin the WL by abstracting from all such
content and consider only its form. In the case of I = I, however, the activity of identifying oneself with
oneself just is what the I is. Unlike the content of a judgment, the self is a result of its activity, it is its
own Act. “The self’s own positing of itself is thus its own pure activity” (97/1, 96).

The above Fichtean argument preserves the basic Kantian argumentative strategy outlined in
Chapter 2, i.e. moving from certain indubitable facts of experience to their non-experiential conditions.
Interestingly however – and importantly in the comparison with the Logic – Fichte’s initial argument
for self-positing subjectivity contains modified forms of both Kant’s Transcendental Deduction and
Metaphysical Deduction. Firstly, the law of identity plays the role of “indubitable certainty” re: the
“compared and connected” contents of empirical cognition in Kant’s Transcendental Deduction. The
Transcendental Deduction discerns the transcendental subject not immediately, through a direct
awareness of its grounding unity, but by working backwards from its results, i.e. through a regressive
reconstruction of the conditions for the kind of experience that we do in fact have (i.e. one in which
discrete spatio-temporal objects are represented in thinkable relation). That transcendental
subjectivity must be operative as ultimate condition of experience is something we learn by thinking
through the conditions under which singular immediate appearances can become objects of thought
for us. As such, the Kantian would find a significant lacuna in Fichte’s beginning and proceeding.

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211 Twenty-Five Years, 183.
212 Stephen Houlgate, “Is Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit an Essay in Transcendental Argument?” in The
Transcendental Turn, edited by Sebastian Gardner and Matthew Grist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015),
177. Houlgate’s argument from which I draw the cited line supports my reading: “Transcendental reflection, for
Kant, thus does not involve any immediate introspection; it entails, rather, working out rationally what the
conditions of experience must be... The analytical unity of apperception is the direct consciousness of myself as
an ‘I’ that is expressed in the judgment ‘I think.’ As we know, Kant states that this judgment must be able to
accompany all our representations but does not actually have to accompany them (B131). This means that, for
Kant, I can experience objects without always being reflectively aware that I am experiencing them. The
transcendental condition of my being able to experience such objects, however, transcendental apperception or
the synthetic unity of apperception. This is a form of self-consciousness, or self-thinking, that does not involve
solely from the minimal “fact” that $A = A$. In the Transcendental Deduction, transcendental reflection proceeds not merely from the “fact” of formal logical certainty alone ($A = A$) but by reflection on the forms of intuition and the logical forms of our understanding. It is significant that the forms of intuition play no part in Fichte’s initial proof of transcendental subjectivity. It is rather that the necessity of our receptivity is derived as a further condition of the unity of that subjectivity.

This connects to my second comparative point. Insofar as it is a minimal logical certainty, $A = A$ plays the role that categorical judgement ($S$ is $P$) plays in Kant’s *Metaphysical Deduction* as logical correlate of the category of reality. Establishing that the supposed “certainty” $A = A$ is dependent on the absolute activity of the I does not render that proposition irrelevant. It is instead at the end of Part I of the *WL* grounded in the I as both a logical form and a category. To ground the logical law with which we began, we abstract the “specific content” of the $I = I$ and “thus obtain ‘$A = A$’ as the basic proposition of logic…” (99/I,99). If we then make a “further abstraction from judgment, as a specific activity, and having regard only to the general mode of action of the human mind that this presents, we obtain the category of reality.” (100/I,99). Although Fichte is very brief on this point, in my view at stake here is Fichte’s alternate formulation of Kant’s definition of a category at B128. The category of reality for Fichte would be the determining of an undetermined object (a something) with regard to the categorical function of judgment, i.e. that *something* is determined as possessing its own reality (it is what it is). This I take to be the sense of the line: “Whatever is posited in virtue of the simple positing of something (an item posited in the self) is the reality, or essence, of that thing.” (100/I,99). So Fichte thinks that from this reconstruction of this primordial Act of self-identity as condition of the law of identity, it is possible to reconstruct the necessity of the categories – first and foremost those of quality (For Kant: reality, negation, and limitation).

Fichte’s derivation of negation indicates a general structural similarity between Fichte’s *WL* (in both 1794/S and 1796/9 versions) and the *Logic* as unitary category derivations. Fichte’s *WL* does not take itself to require an independent argument for the forms of our receptivity; rather, this receptivity is entailed by the necessity of the categories of negation and limitation as functions of self-unity. In other words, that empirical consciousness is receptive to an object domain is rather derived from the self-positing I. In the language of the 1794/S *WL*, the self and that which opposes or negates it (the not-self) must be mutually limiting (122/I, 126) if “the unity of consciousness is not to be abolished” (123/I, 127) – and it is from this relationship of opposition (entailing negation and limitation) that the receptivity of the self to a distinct object domain is argued for.

Fichte’s derivation of the category of negation begins from the indubitability of the proposition that “$\neg A$ is not equal to $A$” (the “principle of opposition”). Fichte claims that logical opposition cannot be derived from the principle of identity, which at most can provide that “$\neg A = \neg A$.” Given the logical independence of the forms of identity and opposition, Fichte concludes that “there is an opposition included among the acts of the self; and this opposition is, as to it mere *form*, an absolutely possible and unconditional act based on no higher ground.” Negation is nonetheless demonstrably an act of the self insofar as it expresses or is grounded in the same self-identity that conditioned the principle of identity: In the same way that positing $A = A$ is dependent upon the identity of the self, “counterposing [opposition] is possible only through the identity of the self” (103/I,103). That is, there cannot be two selves, one which posits that $A$ and another which counterposes the $\neg A$, lest the

the direct consciousness of myself as an ‘I’… Since such apperception is the transcendental condition of experience, it is not a self-consciousness of which I can ever be explicitly aware in my ordinary experience (in the way I can be conscious of myself as an ‘I’).”.
counterpositing be disconnected from positing. Were it so disconnected, it would itself be merely another positing. As such, “opposition is possible on the assumption of a unity of the self that posits and the self that opposes” (104/I,103). Again, Kant’s Transcendental Deduction argument for conceptuality as the grasping together of disparate terms in one experience is Fichte’s central argumentative lever.

But although unconditioned as to form, the principle of opposition is “conditioned as to content.” The minimal content of that which is formally designated ¬A is a “not-I” opposed to and so conditioned by the content of the I. That is, the unconditioned act that gives rise to opposition licenses the formal claim that “I know of ¬A that it is the opposite of some A.” But in terms of content, “what that thing may or may not be, of which I know can be known to me only on the assumption that I am acquainted with A.” Fichte’s argument is then that the only content available at this point in the WL is the originary Act of the self. “Nothing is posited to begin with, except the self; and this alone is asserted absolutely (§1). Hence there can be an absolute opposition only to the self. But that which is opposed to the self = the not-self.” It follows for Fichte that, “as surely as the absolute certainty of the proposition ‘¬A is not equal to A’ is unconditionally admitted among the facts of empirical consciousness, so surely is a not-self opposed absolutely to the self” (104/I,104). Following the pattern established in §1 of the WL, Fichte claims that if we abstract from the act of judgment at stake, “and look merely to the form of the inference from counterposition to nonexistence, we obtain the category of negation” (105/I,105).

Most crucially, because the formal connection of posited and counterposited is conditioned by the unity of self-consciousness, the corollary contentful claim for the necessary existence of a not-self is itself grounded in the activity of the self that opposes it. Fichte takes it that what has been established here is the necessity of a domain of objects which are to be – in an as yet undetermined way – represented by the self.

“If I am to present anything at all, I must oppose it to the presenting self. Now within the object of presentation there can and must be an X of some sort, whereby it discloses itself as something to be presented, and not as that which presents. But that everything, wherein this X may be, is not that which presents, but an item to be presented, is something that no object can teach me; for merely in order to set up something as an object, I have to know this already; hence it must lie initially in myself, the presenter, in advance of any possible experience.” (105/I,104-5).

That we have a relationship to objects distinguishable from ourselves is not generated in empirical experience; rather, the origin of such representations is the self logically prior to the empirical experience it makes possible. Here we have the clear beginnings of a derivation of the receptivity component of our cognition and its a priori status. This will be drawn out in parts II and III of the WL, which I leave aside in this project. What is of interest for this project is that, in Fichte, the derivation of negation also constitutes a derivation of what Hegel calls the “opposition of finite consciousness,” which – at least on Hegel’s reading covered in 3.2 above – has simply been assumed in Kant’s beginning from the (empiricist) presupposition that the subject is receptive to an independently constituted domain of objects set over against the subject, however much the Aesthetic and the Analytic work to undo that presupposition by articulating the non-empirical conditions of objectivity. Fichte seeks to begin instead from the Transcendental Deduction’s unity of apperception, deriving the necessity of receptivity from it. But as we will see in the Chapter 5, from Hegel’s perspective, Fichte’s explanation
for the fact of receptivity also only presupposes it, insofar as the WL assumes the content of formal identity to be the I, of which the not-I is the logical corollary. Fichte’s second sense of Int Int, however, indicates for Hegel the possibility of a model of category derivation that does not tacitly presuppose the externality of thinking and its objects.

Fichte’s Sense 2
So far we have Breazeale’s claim that Int Int is used by Fichte to name the abstraction and attention by means of which the self-posting I is reconstructed as the condition of empirical consciousness, as well as a brief account of the opening moves in this reconstruction. In the 1797 Introductions, however, “Intellectual Intuition” is also used by Fichte as a synonym for the Act of pure self-consciousness itself. Fichte defines Intellectual intuition as the immediate awareness of the activity of the self: “The intuiting of himself that is required of the philosopher, in performing the act whereby the self arises for him, I refer to as intellectual intuition” (38/I,463). Given the transcendental status of self-active subjectivity in 1794/5 WL, Fichte is now suggesting a non-sensuous (“intellectual”) but nonetheless immediate (by Kantian definition intuitional) representation of transcendental self-consciousness as ultimate condition for cognition. The suggestion is that global abstraction provides not formal certainty for empirical consciousness but immediate access to its ground. This immediacy is emphasised by Fichte:

“We cannot prove from concepts that this power of intellectual intuition exists, nor evolve from them what it may be. Everyone must discover it immediately in himself, or he will never make its acquaintance. The demand to have it proved for one by reasoning is vastly more extraordinary than would be the demand of a person to have it explained to him what colours are, without his needing to see.” (38/I,463).

But as we have just seen, the strategy of the 1794/5 WL is to have the Act proved by (transcendental) reasoning! Just before this passage, Fichte in fact recapitulates the Kantian transcendental strategy as demonstrating the necessity of thinking the synthetic unity of self-consciousness “as preceding and conditioning all acts of consciousness.” In 1797 the earlier strategy is still presented as possessing limited validity, a kind of peace offering to the reader who sticks to the Kantian ban on intellectual intuition: “But if it has to be admitted that there is not immediate isolated consciousness of intellectual intuition” we can nonetheless present it “by the same process” that leads to an isolated presentation of sensory intuition, namely, an “inference from the obvious facts of consciousness.” (39/I,464-5). Fichte nonetheless then goes on to suggest that Int Int in its second sense is ultimately required for a systematic Kantianism: “transcendental idealism, if it is proceed systematically, cannot possibly proceed in any other way than it does in the Science of Knowledge” (38/I,463), which is a little later is defined in this way: “...the Science of Knowledge sets out from an intellectual intuition, that of the absolute self-activity of the self” (41).

This new usage of Int Int as immediate introspective access to one’s own self-positing Act puts Fichte into contradiction with Kant’s own account of pure apperception. For Kant, our immediate introspective self-awareness is only ever of empirical and not transcendental self-consciousness because we “intuit ourselves only as internally affected” (B153) by representations organised in the temporal form of inner sense. We are “given” to ourselves conditioned by the temporal form of sensibility, and it follows that we intuit ourselves not as we are but as we appear. Even though, as I have mentioned, the forms of our intuition play no role in Fichte’s proof of transcendental subjectivity,
Fichte also draws the empirical/transcendental distinction at the start of the 1794/5 WL: The self-positing “Act” “does not and cannot appear among the empirical states of our consciousness, but rather lies at the basis of all consciousness and alone makes it possible” (93/I, 91). This meant that, like Kant’s Transcendental Deduction, Fichte in the 94/95 WL had to deduce this transcendental condition by reflecting on the necessary conditions of certain indubitable facts – though as I’ve mentioned above, the candidate facts for Kant and Fichte differ.

Despite Fichte’s new claim for the immediate intuitive availability of transcendental subjectivity, Fichte does not step back from the identification of the self-positing I with Kantian apperception, but rather reinforces it. Fichte begins this explicit identification by recounting what he takes to be Int Int in Kant:

In the Kantian terminology, all intuition is directed to existence of some kind (a posited or permanent); intellectual intuition would thus be the immediate consciousness of a non-sensuous entity; the immediate consciousness of the thing-in-itself, and that by way of pure thought; hence a creation of the thing-in-itself by means of the concept (much as those who prove the existence of God from the mere concept are obliged to regard God’s existence as a mere consequence of their thinking) (45/I,472-73).

Unsurprisingly given their textual and logical proximity in Kant, Fichte has run together Gram’s first two senses of intellectual intuition – knowledge of things-in-themselves (i.e. an overleaping of the conditions of sensibility) and creation of the thing-in-itself. Fichte goes on:

The intellectual intuition alluded to in the Science of Knowledge refers, not to existence at all, but rather to action, and simply finds no mention in Kant (unless, perhaps, under the title of pure apperception) (46/I,472).

Fichte’s self-presentation here seems to support Gram’s claim that “intellectual intuition exists for Fichte, but his notion of it has nothing to do with what Kant claims does not exist.” However, Gram and Fichte are wrong to suggest that there is no mention of intellectual intuition vis-à-vis apperception in Kant. Kant uses the logical possibility of an intellectual intuition to motivate the prohibition on any immediate awareness of transcendental subjectivity. Kant acknowledges that an immediate awareness of the activity of transcendental subjectivity would be possible if the representations synthesised were not given appearances, but generated by the subject itself:

Everything that is represented though a sense is to that extent always appearance, and an inner sense must therefore either not be admitted at all or else the subject, which the object of this sense, can only be represented by its means as appearance, not as it would judge of itself if its intuition were mere self-activity, i.e., intellectual… Consciousness of itself (apperception) is the simple representation of the I, and if all of the manifold in the subject were self-actively through that alone, then the inner intuition would be intellectual (B68).

As Estes helpfully comments, if the manifold were “self-actively” given, “we would not need to presuppose a relation to something external in accounting for experience if we could connect a

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213 Gram 296.

214 As I suggested in introduction, there is thus a further fourth Kantian sense over and above Gram’s three, which Estes helpfully points out. Estes, “Revisiting,” 170.
determination of our existence with consciousness of the self through an intellectual intuition...”

That is, we would not need reference to inner sense as a form of sensible intuition to account for experience if the I can be shown to give rise of itself spontaneously to a manifold of material for synthesis. In the quote from Kant above, the auto-production of representations in the subject “self-actively” suggests intellectual intuition in its second sense as creation, though this time creation of a manifold of representations, not of objects as they are in themselves. The suggestion nonetheless is that these self-actively produced representations would be immediately related to particular objects, such that we would not need sensible intuition in distinction from our merely discursive understanding for empirical cognition.

From Fichte’s perspective, however, this self-active production of contents does happen at the transcendental level, i.e. the understanding self-actively produces the categories as transcendental conditions of possibility of empirical knowledge. Fichte can point to Kantian authority here: the “self-active” production or positing of necessary and therefore a priori representations is already admitted by Kant in the spontaneity that Kant associates with our faculty of understanding – we are in Kant spontaneously in possession of the a priori categories. So for Fichte we do have intellectual intuition of the kind described by Kant above, but the “self-active” or spontaneous representations given through the I are not representations of particular empirical objects but of those necessary for our experience of objectivity in general, i.e. the categories. This is the deflated and reflexive account of Intellectual Intuitions as immediate knowledge of objects I flagged in 4.1 above. This thought in Fichte is present as early as the 1793/4 “Personal Meditations,” in which he claims: “The forms of the faculty of representation, which are precisely what we are here discussing, will be intuited purely intellectually.” It however is not until the 1797 Introductions that the self-activity of the I is explicitly theorised as generating to the categories.

The net result of this second usage of Int Int is that Fichte – in the WL Nova Methodo at least – is committed not to the transcendental argument as we have seen it operating in Kant, but to what Breazeale has called the “descriptive” or “genetic-phenomenological” method. Rather than start with certain characterisations of our experience indubitable in their generality and then account for their non-empirical conditions, the philosopher is to observe the “self-activity” to which she has immediate intuitive access and then report those observations. As Fichte puts it in 1797: “In the Science of Knowledge there are two very different sequences of mental acts: that of the self, which the philosopher observes, and that of the philosopher’s observations.” (30/I,454).

Breazeale’s term for this method has two elements: “genetic” and “phenomenological.” Firstly, Fichte’s method is “genetic” in that the philosopher’s observations will provide an account of the isolatable acts of foundational subjectivity – the categories – in their “necessary, sequentially ordered relation to one another.” That is, this method is to provide an in-principle exhaustive set of categories linked by their sequential derivation from the immediate intuition of self-activity, i.e. the program of a unitary replicable category derivation with which I began this section. The “replicability” component of this Fichtean-Hegelian program is in my view secured by the “phenomenological” aspect of Breazeale’s definition. For Breazeale, the method is phenomenological in that “it does not fabricate its objects of reflection (the necessary acts of the I), but instead discovers and observes them...”

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216 Qtd in Breazeale, Thinking Through, 198.
218 Ibid.
Discovery suggests that that which is to be discovered is already present, but “covered” over in some way. Intellectual intuition is that which brings the activity that conditions empirical experience itself into view. But that that activity must be always already operative in empirical experience does not make Fichte’s novel method “analytic” in the standard sense – unpacking what is already contained in a concept. Each act of the self “emerges” in our inner intuition in its genetic relation to other such isolable acts, but is not logically “contained in” or reducible to any other such act. Of course, it is just this logical irreducibility that secures each category as a category, a discrete conceptual form.

“Emergence” is admittedly a vague or inadequate conceptualisation of category derivation as it is presented in Fichte’s 1797 Introduction. Visual phenomena could be said to “emerge” – as a car comes into view around a corner – but to carry this language over from sensible to intellectual intuition risks blurring their difference. Firstly, to take up the Kantian position, sensible phenomena do not carry the kind of necessity (as condition of possibility of experience in general) that characterises pure concepts of the understanding. That there is causal necessity in empirical experience is transcendentally dependent on the necessity of the category of cause as condition of possibility. Secondly, we have seen in Chapter 3 that Hegel formulates the logical structure of sensible intuition in Kant as external relation between singulars or “outside-one-another-being.” Representations produced in intellectual intuition could not be the ground of the categories – understood as forms of necessary connection – if they were limited to that form of relation alone. Representations in Int Int in so far as they are intellectual possess the form of relation lacking in Kant’s account of sensible intuitional representations (Recall that in Kant: connection or synthesis is a function of the understanding alone). As such, Intellectual Intuition in Fichte’s second sense can be understood as the immediacy of thinking: it is the immediate apprehension that we as thinking or rational beings possess a self-relation or unity. In Fichte’s 1797 Introduction, by observing the acts by which this self-relation is produced and maintained, we discover that such unity generates and so grounds all forms of connection (the categories) in our experience.
Chapter 5. Absolute Beginning

In this chapter I provide an account of the Logic’s version of the post-Kantian Grundsatz, namely, “immediacy itself” or “pure being.” Hegel justifies his version of the Grundsatz in the Logic’s General Introduction, and again in a more concerted and concentrated way in the Seinslogik Introduction, “With What Must the Beginning of Science Be Made?” Of direct relevance to the Logic’s two introductory essays is the following passage from Fichte’s first 1797 Introduction, in which he reflects on the implications on the “genetic-phenomenological” model of derivation for philosophy as such:

The system-makers I have in mind proceed from some concept or other; without caring in the least where they got it from, or whence they have concocted it, they analyse or combine it with others to whose origin they are equally indifferent, and in reasonings such as these their philosophy itself is comprised. It consists, in consequence, of their own thoughts. The Science of Knowledge is a very different matter. Its chosen topic of consideration is not a lifeless concept, passively exposed to its inquiry merely, but a living and active thing which engenders insights from and through itself, and which the philosopher merely contemplates… he would be operating directly counter to his own aim if he did not leave it to itself, and sought to intervene in the development of the phenomenon (30/1,454).

Here the rhetorical parallels with Hegel are significant. Hegel’s Phenomenology requires of the reader “simply to look on” [reine Zusehen] (PhS §85/54). “Scientific cognition… demands surrender to the life of the object, or, what amounts to the same thing, confronting and expressing its inner necessity” (PhS §53/32). The Logic’s Introductions similarly suggest this “surrender” and “observation,” claiming that the Logic remains “immanent” insofar as “setting aside every reflection” we are “simply to take up, what is there before us” [... Beiseitsetzung aller Reflexionen, aller Meinungen, die man sonst hat, nur aufzuhehmen, was vorhanden ist] (47/21.55). And, as in Fichte’s paragraph above, what is there before us is characterised by activity, requiring in turn a contemplative passivity. The reader of the Logic must “stand back from its content, allowing it to have free play and not determining it further” (50/21.59). Hegel’s own justification for a derivation grounded in immediate awareness of spontaneous conceptual self-development is the subject of this chapter.

Hegel’s arguments on this point can be introduced through the problematic of indifference. Note that in the above quoted paragraph Fichte takes previous philosophies to be “equally indifferent” to their point of departure. It is interesting that Kant, Fichte and Hegel all characterise prior philosophical positions in terms of indifference [Gleichgültigkeit], though the term carries subtly different senses for each thinker. In the quote above, Fichte uses “indifference” to mark the difference between prior, allegedly non-systematic philosophy and his own. All philosophies prior to the Fichtean are “in vain” because of their indifference to the kind of material with which philosophy is licensed to work. For Fichte, prior philosophers are “equally indifferent” to the origin of both their first principle – they begin, in Fichte’s words, from “some concept or other” – as well as to the concepts with which that principle is “combined.” Indifference in this sense recalls our discussion of Humean indifference in section 3.2, i.e. indifference in the sense that any combination or connection of individual terms is equally licensed, given that relations are understood to be external to those terms themselves. Lacking a subject matter that generates its content and the connection of those contents from within its own

For a full treatment of the “passivity,” “openness” or “letting be” required of the Logic’s reader, see Houlgate, The Opening, 60-66.
“self-activity,” philosophical coherence is dependent on the decisions of the philosopher. In other words, lacking a grounding principle immanent to philosophical thought, philosophy is not genuinely systematic. That is, it cannot claim to fulfil what Fichte takes to be the genuine Kantian program (“Strong TI”), i.e. the articulation of a complete itinerary of necessary and universal representations, but is instead ultimately “subjective,” in the sense in which Kant opposes subjectivity to the universality and necessity characteristic of objectivity.

Fichte goes so far as to suggest that previous philosophies have been indifferent to the problem of indifference: the difference between arbitrarily selected subject matters and Fichte’s self-active subject matter had yet to be determined. The latter should remind us of Kant’s own self-presentation covered in 1.2 above: Kant suggests that the discrimination of distinct sensible and conceptual forms in transcendental idealism determines all previous philosophies as transcendental realisms; Fichte suggests that his identification of a “self-active” ground of philosophical thinking relegates all previous, would-be “systematic” philosophies to equally-valid connections between indifferent thought contents. Fichte’s suggestion is, in its scope, impossible to validate or discredit here.

In any case, Hegel follows Fichte in making the history of philosophy turn on the question of philosophically legitimate first principles. In the Seinslogik Introduction, Hegel opens by claiming that philosophical beginning presents a dilemma not encountered in non-philosophical domains. The latter can legitimately begin with a set of objects falling under the historically determined purview of that domain, which Hegel also understands is subject to revision as new cases stretch or undermine previous domain classifications. In contrast, philosophy understood in the strong TI sense as reason’s self-legitimation cannot begin from anything merely historically given. But, like Fichte, Hegel notes that philosophy in its history has in fact begun arbitrarily – again, in Fichte’s words, from “some concept or other.” Hegel offers examples: philosophy begins either with a principle intended to explain all things (an “objective” principle like Thales “water” or Leibniz’s monad) or, for the moderns, with an account of our cognition as “subjective” criterion for truth. In both Ancient “objective” and modern “subjective” approaches, the beginning is considered only an “accidental way [zufälligen Art und Weise] of introducing the exposition,” “a matter of indifference [gleichgültig].” In modernity, however, the beginning is at least problematised: the moderns possess “a new awareness of the difficulty of finding a beginning” (SL 23/21.27). Again, Di Giovanni’s translation justifiably footnotes Part I of Fichte’s 1794/5 Wissenschaftslehre as Hegel’s tacit reference here – what is not footnoted is that Fichte’s shifting sense of Intellectual Intuition, and his movement from transcendental to genetic philosophical methods, further proves the difficulty of beginning.

But while Hegel follows Fichte in characterising previous philosophies as indifferent to the question of beginning, both the Logic’s general Introduction and the Seinslogik Introduction transition to a critique of Fichte’s Grundsatze, characterised as it is in both the 1794/5 and 1796/9 WLSs in terms of self-consciousness. As such, Hegel’s account of philosophical beginning is constituted by an argument with and against Fichte’s account of abstraction and immediacy. Hegel follows Schelling in arguing that Fichte’s first principle does not explain but rather uncritically presupposes the opposition of consciousness and empirical object. Fichte misrecognises the result of global abstraction by figuring immediacy in terms of self-consciousness. Nonetheless, Fichte’s placing non-sensible immediacy at

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221 “Any definition with which a science makes an absolute beginning can contain nothing else than the precise and correct expression of what is represented in one’s mind as the traditionally accepted subject matter and purpose of this science... Further still, definition is always a matter of argumentation as to what is to be included in it or excluded from it...” (SL 28/21.33).
the ground of the 1796/9 WL’s genetic derivation is legible in Hegel’s point of departure in the Logic. Hegel begins with the thought of immediacy itself, abstracted from any reference to empirical cognition whatsoever, such that categories or “thought-determinations” are understood as that which is necessitated by thought’s own immediacy, the “pure being” that is immediately or directly present to thought. In Hegel, as in Fichte, mediation is genetically derived from immediacy; they disagree on how – and how abstractly – that immediacy is to be conceived, which has implications for the ontological status and logical structure of the categories derived from it.

To substantiate these arguments, 5.1 considers Hegel’s critique of the Fichtean I in the Logic’s Introduction and the Seinslogik Introduction. As Hegel here is indebted to the critique of Fichte developed by Schelling in the latter half of the 1790s and early 1800s, I then consider and distinguish Schelling’s point of departure in his Jena “Identity Philosophy” from the beginning of Hegel’s Logic. This reading of Schelling also enables me to introduce the singularity component of intellectual intuition, important to my reading of the Logic’s opening categories in Chapter 6. In 5.2 I consider Hegel’s own argument for beginning with “immediacy itself” and its equivalent, “pure being.”

5.1. The Limits of Abstraction
The question of the limits of abstraction is a crucial one for distinguishing the major figures of German idealism. For Kant, a deduction of the objective purport of the categories must abstract from empirical intuition, but cannot abstract from the forms of intuition:

Since the categories arise independently from sensibility merely in the understanding, I must abstract from the way in which the manifold for an empirical intuition is given, in order to attend only to the unity that is added to the intuition by means of the category (B144).

That the transcendental status of Kant’s deduction would be vitiated by reference to the matter organised by the forms of our sensibility should be clear from Chapter 2 above. Kant goes on, however, to mark the point at which, for him, our abstractive power reaches a limit:

In the above proof, however, I still could not abstract from one point, namely, from the fact that the manifold for intuition must already be given prior to the synthesis of understanding and independently from it; how, however, is here left undetermined (B145).

We cannot abstract from the “fact” that the matter for cognition is given in the form of intuition, such that the account of categorial function must have reference to that a priori intuitional form. The next paragraph of the B Deduction introduces the material covered in 4.1 above, i.e. the possibility of a divine understanding whose thinkability reinforces the constitution of our “peculiar” understanding, for which no “further ground may be offered” (B146). Fichte effectively pushes the limit of abstraction one step further back than Kant: there is a content given to us in intellectual intuition – the I – from which the opposition that characterises finite empirical consciousness can itself be derived, although Fichte shifts his position, as we have seen, as to whether that content is immediately given, or must be retrieved from elementary logical form via transcendental argument. In both cases, however, self-consciousness alone is taken to be that from which derivation is to work. In the 1794/5 WL, Fichte
explicitly claims that “from your self-consciousness you can never abstract” (98/I,97).\textsuperscript{222} In the later 1790s, thought is minimally the immediate apprehension of the I’s self-posed identity, not of the sensible manifold.

Hegel agrees that philosophy begins with a global abstraction. The beginning must be “entirely abstract, entirely general” (SL 51/21.60). For Hegel, however, Fichte in maintaining a reference to the subject does not abstract far enough – or more accurately, Fichte misunderstands the results of that abstraction. Hegel argues in the Logic’s Introduction that Fichte has misrepresented the specifically logical content of the self-positing I, simply by continuing to refer to it in terms of consciousness:

If other Kantians [i.e. Fichte] have expanded on the determining of the intended object by the ‘I’ by saying that the objectifying of the ‘I’ is to be regarded as an original and necessary deed of consciousness [Tun des Bewusstseins] ... then this objectifying deed, liberated from the opposition of consciousness, is closer to what may be taken simply as thinking as such [Denken als solches]. But this deed should no longer be called consciousness; for consciousness holds within itself the opposition of the ‘I’ and its intended object which is not to be found in the original deed. The name ‘consciousness’ gives it more of a semblance of subjectivity than does the term ‘thought,’ which here, however, should be taken in the absolute sense of infinite [unendlichen] thought, not as encumbered by the finitude [Endlichkeit] of consciousness; in short, thought as such (SL 41/21-47-8; brackets mine).

Now, on our reconstructions of Fichte’s 1794/5 WL in 4.2 above, Hegel’s characterisation of the structure of the Fichtean I is, despite its brevity, broadly accurate. The logical form of opposition and corollary category of negation have their ground in an act of the self-identical I; the minimal content of that opposition – the opposition between an empirical self and not-self – is conditioned by that self-posed identity. In other words, the self-positing I is the condition of both formal opposition and the minimal content of opposition, not one term of an opposition conditioned by self-positing. Hegel’s critical point is that, given this structure, continuing to refer to the self-positing Act as a form of “consciousness” blurs conditioned and condition. Equally importantly, it forces Fichte to presuppose the minimal content of opposition as the opposition between empirical consciousness and sensibly given objectivity; for Hegel, as we will see in the next chapter, opposition can be thought as a logical structure in abstraction from human mindedness and empirical object individuation.\textsuperscript{223} With that said, Hegel’s proposed alternative, “thought,” seemingly also carries with it the connotations of the thinking subject. The final sentence of the paragraph quoted above attempts to block such a reading. Hegel’s formulation “Infinite thought” might strike one as forbidding or profound, but “infinite” in the context of the Logic should be understood here simply as that which is not finite, not endlich. That is, “infinite thought” means thought not presupposed to be limited by an object domain beyond or outside it, at

\textsuperscript{222} This is not to say that Fichte’s account of self-consciousness is not influential on Hegel’s account of the same. Hegel’s language in the Phenomenology, in which self-consciousness is constitutively “for-itself” [fuer sich] has an obvious Fichtean pedigree: “what does not exist for itself is not a self” (98/I,97). It is just that Hegel thinks embodied human self-consciousness as too concrete and complex a candidate for presuppositionless philosophical beginning.

\textsuperscript{223} Per the Philosophy of Spirit, a concrete account of the structure of human consciousness can only be provided in the context of human embodied experience. Fichte arguably has a similar understanding, insofar as Part III of the 1794/5 Wissenschaftslehre genetically tracks the generation of objective thought from our most immediate embodied encounters with the world. Nonetheless, logical opposition in Part I of WL already has for its content the opposition between empirical I and not-I.
which thought has its end or limit.\textsuperscript{224}

Hegel makes the case for the ambiguity of Fichte’s first principle as early as 1801. In the \textit{Differenzschrift} Hegel claims that, on the one hand, Fichte’s \textit{WL} has “made philosophy possible” in establishing the “pure concept of Reason” as \textit{Grundsatz} for a “stricter, purer deduction.” This positive limb remains in the \textit{Encyclopaedia Logic} account of Fichte’s “profound contribution,” used to motivate Fichte’s importance to this research project in Chapter 4.1. But “On the other hand, it has equated Reason with pure consciousness and raised Reason as apprehended in a finite shape to the status of principle” (\textit{DS} 82). For both the early and the mature Hegel, the Fichtean I is ambiguously both the ground of opposition and a term already determined by opposition.

The Fichtean can of course respond to Hegel’s critique above that the \textit{pure} subjectivity that constitutes the \textit{WL}’s ground is, in the immediacy of its self-relation, not \textit{opposed} to anything but immediately identical to itself. As such, the above Hegelian line of attack could be seen to confuse the empirical I – limited as it is by the domain of the not-I – and the pure I whose unity is the ultimate condition of the experience of any opposition whatsoever. Hegel’s \textit{Differenzschrift} critique tacitly accounts for this Fichtean rejoinder, however. Fichte presents the \textit{Tathandlung} as a unified ground of both subjectivity and objectivity; on closer inspection, however, Fichte’s \textit{Grundsatz} is merely a “subjective Subject-Object,” the unity of subjectivity and objectivity treated from one of its sides. This critique and its language however is only fully intelligible with a reading of Schelling’s Identity Philosophy, and its presentation of the \textit{Grundsatz} as “subject-object identity,” understood as “indifferenz” of subject and object.

\textbf{Schelling’s Indifferenz}

In the following I focus only on one key work of the 1801-1806 “\textit{Identitätsphilosophie}” period, \textit{Presentation of My System of Philosophy} (1801).\textsuperscript{225} Importantly this text is contemporaneous with

\textsuperscript{224} While the thought-determination of infinity is genetically derived only in the second chapter (“Existence”) of the \textit{Seinslogik}, “infinite thought” can be introduced here in terms of immediacy: the content of such thought is not mediated by an other outside of it but is itself through itself alone. Infinite thought is thus immediately also \textit{totality}, linking up with Kant’s third sense of Intellectual Intuition. This totality component of “infinite thought” in Hegel’s sense is traceable directly to Schelling’s “Identity Philosophy” account of the \textit{Grundsatz}, which we turn to shortly.

\textsuperscript{225} Key texts in the “Identity philosophy” period are \textit{Presentation of My System of Philosophy}, \textit{Further Presentation of My System of Philosophy} (1802), \textit{Bruno} (1802), and the unpublished 1804 \textit{The System of the Whole of Philosophy and of Naturphilosophie in Particular} (or Würzburg system). For an introductory overview of this period put in terms of a “Moving Beyond the I: The Break with Fichte” see Andrew Bowie, \textit{Schelling and Modern European Philosophy} (London: Routledge, 1993), 55-67. This periodisation of Schelling’s work, in which “Identity philosophy” follows on from the “\textit{Naturphilosophie}” of 1796-1799 is however problematic, as Bowie notes in introduction. Michael Vater points out that Schelling only uses the term “Identitätsp hilosophie” once, in the “extra-systematic context” of the \textit{Presentation’s} Preface, and that later Schelling considers the work from 1800-1806 as part of the broader project of \textit{Naturphilosophie}. Vater, “‘In and of Itself Nothing Is Finite’: Schelling’s Nature (or So-called Identity) Philosophy” in \textit{Kant, Fichte and the Legacy of Transcendental Idealism}, edited by Halla Kim and Steven Hoeltzel, Lanham: Lexington, 2015, 191-212, 196. I might also add that Bowie’s way of figuring the Identity philosophy as the moment of Schelling’s “break with Fichte” is slightly misleading. While Schelling and Fichte break off contact in 1802, \textit{philosophically} Schelling is never simply Fichtean. Dalia Nassar has demonstrated that Schelling’s first published work, \textit{Vom Ich} (1795), although seemingly straightforwardly Fichtean, in fact is \textit{already} non- or anti-Fichtean, insofar as it conceives the \textit{Tathandlung} in a non-subjective and quasi-Spinozist manner. Dalia Nassar, \textit{The Romantic Absolute: Being and Knowing in Early German Romantic Philosophy}, 1795-1804 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 161-186. Steven Hoeltzel, while choosing not to investigate Schelling’s Spinozism, nonetheless similarly detects in Schelling’s earliest work
Hegel’s critique of Fichte in the *Differenzschrift* mentioned above, and we will see in what follows that Hegel and Schelling’s pieces from this period share formulae.\(^{226}\) The body of Schelling’s *Presentation* begins this way:

§1. DEFINITION. I call reason absolute reason, or reason insofar as it is conceived as the total indifference [*Indifferenz*] of the subjective and the objective.\(^{227}\)

Absolute reason stands “indifferently over against” the “extremes” of subjectivity and objectivity (§1/146). In Part II of the *Further Presentations from the System of Philosophy* (1802), the standpoint which grasps the Absolute as the indifference of subject and object is explicitly referred to as “rational or Intellectual Intuition.”\(^{228}\) Like Fichte, Schelling takes the beginning of philosophy to begin with an immediate and indubitable cognition as *Grundsatz* securing the certainty of those categories derived from it. I cannot in this dissertation undertake a comprehensive account of Schelling’s changing usages of term “Intellectual Intuition” throughout his Jena work as a whole.\(^{229}\) I am concerned only to establish: (1) the way in which Schelling’s text articulates an alternative to Fichte’s understanding of the *Grundsatz* as *self-consciousness*, in order to indicate the way in which this alternative is taken up, with further alterations, in Hegel’s *Logic*; and (2) the relation between Schelling’s characterisation of the Absolute as “Indifferent” and the other appearances of that term in this dissertation. These two points are intertwined.

Paul Redding has noted that “Schelling’s ‘*Indifferenz*’ is a neologism meant to convey the idea of the non-difference (coincidence) of opposites. It should not be confused with what is conveyed by the English ‘indifference’ which is standardly translated by ‘*Gleichgültigkeit*’ (‘like-valid-ness’).”\(^{230}\)

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\(^{226}\) Though I will also leave aside any definitive consideration of how “Schellingean” Hegel’s thinking in general in this period can be taken to be. The fairest account of Schelling and Hegel’s philosophical relation in Jena (to my mind and knowledge) is Michael Vater’s translator’s introduction to Schelling’s 1802 *Bruno*. Vater rejects accounts of the Jena Hegel as Schelling’s “henchman,” instead tracking shared vocabularies and mutual influence to establish Hegel as a “co-laborer not a follower.” F. W. J. Schelling, *Bruno, or On the Natural and Divine Principle of Things*, ed. and trans. Michael Vater (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), 81-97.


\(^{229}\) Dalia Nassar’s working through of Schelling’s Jena writings in the third part of *The Romantic Absolute* tracks Schelling’s movement in the 1790s from a Spinozist to a Fichtean conception of Int Int. The primary interpretive complication is that the latter conception is used in Schelling’s *Naturphilosophie* for distinctly anti-Fichtean purposes. For Schelling, the productivity that Fichte identifies in self-intuition – the spontaneous self-positing or auto-production of the I – is in fact only an instance of nature’s self-productivity, with the I nothing more than the “highest potency” of nature’s self-activity. *The Romantic Absolute*, 198. Nassar does not however link Intellectual Intuition in Schelling to Kant’s multiple senses of the term.

saw however that in the Critique’s Introduction, Kant used the Latinate “Indifference” and the German “Gleichgültigkeit” synonymously, and that indifference in the sense of a claim for non-difference and indifference in the sense of equal-validity were argumentatively linked: all metaphysics are determined by the same concept (“usefulness”) supplied by the indifferentist’s extra-philosophical criterion; they thus carry equal validity, i.e. no validity at all. In my view, a similar linkage is detectable in Schelling’s definition of the Absolute, as it will be at the very opening of Hegel’s Doctrine of Being.

Firstly, absolute reason is indifferent to either subjectivity and objectivity because absolute reason lacks the negation required for contrastive determination, i.e. as subjective not objective or vice-versa. Understanding Schelling’s argument here requires an understanding of his account of global abstraction. Schelling makes it clear in §1 of Presentation of My System of Philosophy that he understands “Indifferenz” to result from abstraction, not only from all empirically-given objects of thought in the manner of Fichte, but also from the subject that “does the thinking.” Schelling says the standpoint of absolute reason is “foreign to everyone; to conceive it as absolute, and thus to come to the standpoint I require, one must abstract from what does the thinking” (§1/146). An abstraction that abstracts from the agent of that abstraction may sound self-contradictory, and Fichte patently does not entertain its possibility. But if we keep in mind Hegel’s critique of Fichte above, the motivation for Schelling’s line of thinking is at least comprehensible: the unconditioned first principle is to be conceived as neither subject nor object in order to block presupposing the subject-object opposition in the way that Fichte is taken to. In line with Hegel’s critique of Fichte above, the motivation for Schelling’s line of thinking is at least comprehensible: the unconditioned first principle is to be conceived as neither subject nor object in order to block presupposing the subject-object opposition in the way that Fichte is taken to. In line with Hegel’s critique of Fichte in the Differenzschrift, Schelling’s tacit argument against Fichte is that if the Grundsatz is taken to be subjectivity, then the opposition between subject and object is not explained from that Grundsatz but merely presupposed. Schelling takes himself to set aside this presupposition insofar as the principle of identity A = A is not reducible to the self-identical subjective pole (I = I) of subject-object dualism, but structures being in general, which contains both subject and object as only quantitatively different forms of being. I shall unpack this position now.

The first thing to note is that if Schelling’s “abstracting from what does the thinking” means only to abstract from contingent thought-contents, then global abstraction in Schelling’s sense does not distinguish itself from its Fichte counterpart. In stripping thought of contingent content, both Schelling and the 1794/5 WL arrive at the principle of identity or A = A as that which is necessary for thought. In §6 of My System, Schelling explicitly references “Wissenschaftslehre §1,” namely Fichte’s 1794/5 argument that the proposition A = A in its abstraction from any particular content posits only the X of “necessary connection.” Schelling’s version runs similarly, only replacing “identity” for “connection.” Because the proposition A = A abstracts from the “being of A,” the content of that proposition is not the self-identical existence of any particular A but rather “the unique being posited through this proposition is that of identity itself.” The differences between Schelling and the first WL emerge only after this point: for Schelling, I = I is not “given along with” A = A, it is rather that identity in its thinkability “stands in being.” Our abstraction from empirical particulars terminates at identity as the “sole unconditioned cognition,” which for Schelling cannot be held to be equivalent to or grounded in the self-identity of the I without surreptitiously re-introducing opposition. As Schelling says, “the sole remaining thing, from which abstraction cannot be made, which is therefore really posited in this proposition, is absolute identity itself.” (§6/147). For Fichte self-identity is “posited” in the maximally abstract proposition A = A; for Schelling what is really posited in the proposition is absolute identity itself, that is, identity as the law of being in general.

Schelling then argues that, once absolute identity is admitted as sole unconditioned cognition, subject and object must be in truth indifferent insofar as the determination of any difference by
negation is alien to absolute identity. Schelling repeatedly insists that the only content of absolute reason is identity, and that opposition belongs only to the standpoint of ordinary consciousness and “appearance.” Everything “in reason” is determined through the law of identity, and as a result “by all other laws, accordingly, if there are such, nothing is determined as it is in reason or in itself, but only as it is for reflection or in appearance” (§6/147). Redding accordingly notes that subject/object difference for Schelling is “really the result of a kind of perspectival illusion: it is only when thought from the point of view of a limited, finite consciousness that such differences become unbridgeable.”

But bound up with indifference in the above sense is the claim that the absolute is with equal-validity subject as much as object. That is, there is a quantitative equivalence of subject and object in the absolute; “outside” the absolute, that is, from the perspective of individuals, a quantitative difference between predominantly subjective domains and predominantly objective domains opens up. As Schelling puts it in the Explanation of §23, when viewed from the standpoint of the absolute, there is “no opposition between subject and object (since what is posited in the one position and in the other is the very same identity; subject and object are thus in essence one)” (§23/151-2). But to individual perspectives, this absolute identity is also presented as a coexistence in which subject and object “subsist together in such a way that they can be alternately posited as predominant” (§23/151-2). From one individual thing to the next, subject and object can increase and decrease their respective proportions without introducing a qualitative difference into absolute identity. As Michael Vater puts it: “If the absolute is the primal indifference of subjectivity and objectivity, every finite instance of it is a distortion of identity by difference, or an inflection of indifference toward relatively greater subjectivity or objectivity.”

The key steps of this argument are contained in §22-23 of the Presentation. If the “essence of absolute reason” is, per §6, “identity itself,” the “form” of absolute reason is identity between subject and object. “This is so because absolute identity’s form of being is the same as the form of the proposition A = A” (§22/151). What is posited in this form is the identity of subject and predicate, which Schelling takes to be equivalent to the identity of subject and object (§22/151). Schelling takes himself to have derived from the form of the principle of identity two elements within that identity, designated as subject and predicate or subject and object. This will be designated in the Explanation of §23 in the formula “A = B,” where A is subject and “B is adopted as a designation for objectivity” (152). The body of §23 claims that “between subject and predicate, none other than quantitative difference is possible.” The reasons for the exclusion of qualitative difference we have already seen—the Absolute in essence, and now in form, is entirely determined by the principle of identity, such that no contrastive relation of opposition is logically possible within it. With the derivation of subject and object from the principle of identity, “difference commences” (§23/152), but this difference can only be thought as quantitative.

Schelling makes this point in a number of ways before claiming that:

Expressed in the clearest way possible, our assertion is this, that if we could view everything that is in the totality, we would perceive in the whole a perfect quantitative balance of subjectivity and objectivity, hence nothing else than a pure identity in which nothing is distinguishable, however much in the perspective of the individual a preponderance might

\[231 \text{ Ibid.} \]
\[232 \text{ Vater, “Finite” 197}\]
I will treat Hegel’s famous criticism of this position as lacking explanatory force in the next section. What interests us here is the explanatory force that Schelling takes quantitative difference to have. This is most clearly presented in the “constructed line” of §46. Schelling offers a diagram: at the midpoint of a horizontal line stands the principle of identity through which the Absolute is thought (A = A); at one pole stands the formula for the predominance of subjectivity (+A = B); at the other stands the formula for the predominance of objectivity (A = +B). Redding in his discussion of Schelling’s constructed line makes two points here. Firstly, the line does not present a dichotomy of subject and object, because both poles are constituted by ”subject-objects.” Redding also shows that the +A = B pole corresponds to the ”subjective Subject-Object” of the Differenzschrift and the A = +B pole to the “objective Subject-Object.” Secondly, Schelling’s diagram is an attempt to account for the seemingly opposed domains of natural science and transcendental philosophy. Both participate in the unity of subject and object, but in the object of natural science objectivity predominates over subjectivity, and vice-versa for critical philosophy. The constructed line thus presents the logical structure of Schelling’s famous formulation from the 1797 Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature: “Nature should be Mind made visible, Mind the invisible Nature.” The natural domain as predominance of objectivity and the mindedness as predominance of subjectivity take place as quantitative differences that emerge from perspectives on the Absolute as indifference of subject and object.

So indifference as non-difference and equal-validity come together in Schelling’s identity philosophy insofar as the non-difference of subject and object in the absolute is at the same time a quantitative equilibrium between subject and object: the absolute is subject as much as object. This equilibrium licenses quantitative difference between subject and object, with either predominance equally grounded in absolute identity.

Schelling makes the extent of his re-formulation of the Kantian problematic clear in the following passage from the 1795 Lectures on Dogmatism and Criticism:

How did we ever come to judge synthetically? This is what Kant asked at the very beginning of his work, and this question lies at the base of his entire philosophy as a problem concerning the essential and common point of all philosophy. For expressed differently, the question is this: How do I ever come to egress from the absolute, and to progress toward an opposite? Synthesis comes about only through the manifold’s opposition to the original unity. For without opposition no synthesis is necessary; where there is no manifold there is absolute unity [Einheit schlechthin]. On the other hand, if the manifold were original, then again there would be no synthesis.

In my view, this question – how we come to “egress” from the Absolute and progress to opposition – is the early Schelling’s way of putting the Hegelian question with which we started, i.e. how does

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233 Redding, Hegel’s Hermeneutics, 58n17. The influence goes both ways, however: Schelling in the 1802 Further Presentations uses Hegel’s “subjective Subject-Object formula” in stating his critique of the Fichtean I as over-determining the Absolute, Further Presentations, 212.


indeterminacy come to determinacy? Both frame their questions as re-formulations of the Kantian program: we know that Hegel quickly follows his question with a remark about Kant’s provided solution (“in his way”); Schelling here explicitly takes the problem of egress to be a different expression of the Kantian question regarding a priori synthetic judgments.

Schelling’s account of the relation between the constituents of Kant’s TD is, at a high level of generality, correct. Kant’s TD begins from the “fact” we began Chapter 5.1 with, namely that, for creatures like us, the sensible manifold is given and must be synthesised through the categories as functions of the unity of apperception. In the A Deduction we saw that this synthesis minimally means the holding together of discrete temporal intuitions in one consciousness; the B Deduction puts this same thought in the claim the unity of apperception is original insofar as any act of synthesis presupposes that unity. So Schelling is right that, on Kant’s view, (1) there is no synthesis without a given manifold to synthesise (obviously), (2) that such synthesis is dependent on an original unity, and (3) that, conversely, if the manifold were instead original, we would lack the condition of its synthesis. (This third point is really just an extremely condensed argument against empiricism: we cannot account for experience with recourse to manifold sensory “ideas” alone, there must be a non-empirical ground of their connection).

What is however new in Schelling’s re-writing of the Kantian question is its ontological generalisation of the Kantian problematic, and, as a corollary of this generalisation, its thinking of determination in terms of logical opposition rather than as the synthesis of the sensible manifold. The question of the non-empirical conditions of “compared and connected representations” becomes in Schelling the ontological question of “egress” from absolute unity. As Dalia Nassar has convincingly demonstrated, the central question for Schelling is how or why the One comes to be Many such that finite knowers experience a Many susceptible to comparison and connection by our subjective unity.236 The Kantian philosophy, however, “could only presuppose the original synthesis as a fact within the cognitive faculty.”237 This reading of Kant as reducing an ontological problem to a cognitive one is consonant with Hegel’s claim in Faith and Knowledge discussed in 3.1 above: Kant’s cognitive model of determination contains the principle of idealism – determination as the synthesis of opposites – but is unable to generalise that principle’s function. It has rightly been suggested that Hegel’s “Absolute Idealism” is impossible without Schelling’s contribution.238 In any case, once determination is ontologically generalised, the logical form of determination – the way in which terms are related and distinguished in contrastive relations – again takes precedence over what now appears as the local problem of the determination of the sensible manifold. Similarly, from this post-Kantian perspective, the logical relation of a manifold of discrete “ones” to one another is in need of systematic treatment.

236 Nassar, The Romantic Absolute, 2-5.
237 Schelling, The Unconditional in Human Knowledge, 164.
238 In particular, see Beiser’s introductory comments regarding the “troublesome Hegelian legacy” in The Struggle Against Subjectivity, namely that Hegel’s debt to the Jena Romantics and to Schelling is not adequately expressed in Hegel’s history of philosophy. The value of Hegel for Beiser lies in his systematisation of Schelling’s post-Kantianism. In my view, however, Beiser’s suggestion that Schelling and Hegel agree that Nature and Spirit are grounded in the Absolute and only disagree in their respective emphases (with Schelling prioritising Nature and Hegel Spirit), does not tackle the very real differences in their respective conceptions of the relation between the philosophical Grundsatzz and the determinations grounded in it. Beiser, The Struggle Against Subjectivity, 10-11. Nassar, who indicates her agreement with Beiser on this point in introduction, similarly suggests that it is Schelling’s break with Fichte that replaces Critical with Absolute Idealism, constituting “nothing less than a fundamental restructuring of the meaning and methodology of idealism.” The Romantic Absolute, 187. I agree, but again, the claim that being is in itself organised by conceptual forms in principle derivable in a priori thought can be worked out in starkly different ways.

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before an account of the sensory manifold given to our cognition.

In this way, the mature Hegelian and early Schellingean reformulations of the Kantian question map onto one another. We have seen that by 1801 Schelling thinks the Absolute as indeterminate in the sense of “indifferent” to its determination as either subjective or objective; we also know that qualitative determination minimally involves opposition and the corollary category of negation (“this not that”). As such, we could ask the Hegelian question with which we started with its Schellingean equivalents in brackets – how does pure (Absolute) immediate indeterminacy (understood as indifference) come to determinacy (understood as opposition)?

However, the early Schelling and Hegel’s Logic answer this shared question very differently. By the time of the Presentation, Schelling’s answer is that any such egress from Absolute indifference and progress toward opposition is illusory: I do not in fact egress from the Absolute, even though it appears that I have. The locus classicus for the Hegelian criticism of Schelling on this point is the Phenomenology’s “night in which all cows are black,” a line that famously terminates Schelling and Hegel’s philosophical alliance.239 We are however in a position to put this Hegelian criticism more closely to Schelling’s 1801 text. Although perspectival, quantitative difference does have a ground in the Absolute; it is licensed by the form of the principle of identity. Schelling does not say so, but qualitative difference must be perspectival also, though without a ground in the Absolute. Schelling’s account of the Absolute in terms of indiscernibility renders derivation of qualitative determination impossible. Undoubtedly rational beings possess qualitative discriminatory capacity and the conceptual category of negation; Schelling must acknowledge the fact of that possession but cannot explain that possession nor legitimate its use. As such, the Presentation jeopardises the Strong TI program as we have formulated it. As Vater puts it: “there is simply no explaining” how “reflection see things differently than reason—evidently this is the price one has to pay for being a systematic Monist.”240 I also note that this argument against Schelling’s Identity Philosophy can and has been made without mentioning Hegel.241

There are Schellingean rejoinders of course. But embedding here a consideration of the legitimacy or otherwise of Hegel’s critique of Schelling’s early conception of the Absolute – which would have to take into account Schelling’s reformulation of the Grundsatze in the 1804 Wurzburg system, Schelling’s own post-1806 development, and Schelling’s counter-critique of Hegel in On the History of Modern of Philosophy (1833-4) – would distend this chapter beyond recognition.242

239 Hegel’s 1804-5 lectures on “Logic and Metaphysics” work from Schelling’s indifferent Grundsatze, but by 1807 Hegel has clearly abandoned the attempt. See Vater’s Introduction to Schelling’s Bruno, 84.

240 Vater’s full quote runs: “There is simply no explaining how quantitative indifference appears as quantitative difference, or how reflection see things differently than reason—evidently this is the price one has to pay for being a systematic monist.” While I agree that Schelling has a problem with the latter explanatory deficit, I do think that Schelling at least attempts a derivation of quantitative difference. Vater, “In-itself Nothing is Finite,” 197.

241 Stephen Hoeltzel compares Fichte’s and Schelling’s respective Jena conceptions of the Absolute, concluding that Schelling “seems to conceive idealism’s ultimate explanatory ground quite differently [from Fichte] in these early texts: as a necessary condition of our experience, but one whose existence or occurrence is not sufficient to entail the determinate mediations and limitations upon which our experience also depends.” “Idealism and the Ground of Explanation,” 273. It is also to Hoeltzel that I owe the suggestion of Schelling’s “detachment” of the Absolute from determinacy, 272.

242 The final chapter of Andrew Bowie’s Schelling mounts a defence of Schelling’s mature Hegel critique, framing the issue as a kind of generalised ad hominem: “the basic issue is whether the aim of German Idealism, the grounding of reason by itself, may not be a form of philosophical narcissism.” Bowie, Schelling, 128. This in my view is better formulated in Houlgate’s terms as a debate between Hegel’s commitment to presuppositionless thinking and the “quasi-transcendental” tradition inaugurated by the later Schelling and continued in Heidegger
5.2 Immediacy Itself

In what follows I provide an account of the Logic’s version of the post-Kantian Grundsatz, namely, “immediacy itself” or “pure being.” Hegel sets out his debt to and departure from Fichte in this passage from the Seinslogik intro:

The beginning must then be absolute, or, what means the same here, must be an abstract beginning; and so there is nothing that it may presuppose [nichts voraussetzen], must not be mediated by anything or have a ground, ought to be rather itself the ground of the entire science [er soll vielmehr selbst Grund der ganzen Wissenschaft sein]. It must therefore be simply an immediacy [schlechthin ein Unmittelbares], or rather only immediacy itself [nur das Unmittelbare selbst] (48/21.56).

Like Fichte, Hegel accepts that we must begin from an indubitable point, whose certainty is to ground the “entire science.” And, like Fichte, that point of departure is characterised in terms of immediacy. Per the Schellingean critique above, however, it is not the immediate self-relation or coincidence of self-consciousness’s poles (I = I), but rather “immediacy itself.” By formulating that beginning as “immediacy itself” [das Unmittelbare selbst], Hegel is here participating in and critically extending the Kantian and post-Kantian doctrines of Int Int. Hegel makes this participation clear in his clarification of the logical beginning in the Logic’s final chapter: “Because it is the beginning, its content is an immediate... But first of all it is not an immediate of sense-intuition or of representation, but of thought, which because of its immediacy can also be called a supersensuous, inner intuiting [innerliches Anschauen]” (738/12.239). This line constitutes a direct contestation of Kantian discursivity: thought for Hegel shares with sensible intuition the logical determination of immediacy; thought in its immediacy can thus legitimately be called a non-sensible kind of intuiting.

Taking Hegel’s comments at face value enables a schematic account of the Kant-Fichte-Hegel relation vis-à-vis immediacy as follows: (1) Kantian immediacy is always sensible immediacy, i.e. immediacy as it appears to and for our sensibly-conditioned empirical consciousness; (2) Fichte’s makes the non-sensible immediacy of self-consciousness in its certainty the foundation of category derivation; (3) the Logic begins from what he calls “immediacy itself,” i.e. the thought of immediacy abstracted from the reference to (Fichtean) self-consciousness and (Kantian) sensible givenness altogether.

Hegel’s programmatic statement of the Logic’s beginning, however, leaves us with two questions: (1) what is “immediacy itself”? What is its content? And (2) given that the Logic does not begin with the “immediacy itself” announced in the Seinslogik introduction, but rather the thought of “pure being,” what is the relation between these two terms? Answering these questions requires some unpacking.

Houlgate’s work in The Opening of Hegel’s Logic is the central interlocutor in what follows. Houlgate’s approach emphasises the “nichts voraussetzen” of the quote above, framing Hegel’s version of global abstraction as the setting aside of presuppositions. As Houlgate puts it: “Anyone can embark on the study of ontological logic, therefore, provided he or she is willing to suspend all and Derrida. The latter tradition holds that no self-consistent conceptual grasp of the ground of difference is possible. Bowie’s book certainly draws connections between Schelling, Derrida, and Heidegger, particularly pages 60-75. Deciding whether the quasi-transcendental stance is a self-consistent alternative to Hegelian thought is however a book length project in itself.
assumptions about thought and being, start from scratch....” 243 The felt need to suspend one’s assumptions for Houlgate is a mark of modernity: modern freedom entails self-criticism in the sense that we can take no epistemic, ontological, or practical commitment on authority, but rather must rationally legitimate them. This sense of modernity is detectable in Kant’s sapere aude, and Fichte’s Strong TI interpretation of Kantianism. Most importantly for Houlgate, the setting aside of presuppositions that opens the Logic also sets aside the historically conditioned motivation for presuppositionless philosophy. In Houlgate’s words, the enabling historical conditions of ontological logic are not “founding” ones, in the sense that they do “not determine in advance the course that philosophy will take.” 244 That is, the historical conditions that lead modern philosophy to demand a radically self-critical, and so presuppositionless, account of the necessary categories of thought do not themselves “contaminate” – illicitly supply a content or purpose to – the abstractive act and immanent deduction they motivate. In other words, the program of Strong TI is motivated by empirical conditions but not relativised to them.

Alongside the quote from the Seinslogik Introduction provided above, EL §78 provides the clearest textual warrant for Houlgate’s reading of the Logic in terms of presuppositionlessness. That section begins by setting out the Kantian opposition between “immediacy of content” (read: intuitionally-given content) and “mediation,” but then characterising their opposition as an illegitimate presupposition:

The opposition between a self-standing [selbständig, independent] immediacy of content or knowing and a mediation that is equally self-standing but incompatible with the former must be set aside, for one thing because it is a mere presupposition [Vorsetzung] and an arbitrary assurance. Similarly, all other presuppositions or prejudices [Vorurteile] must be surrendered [aufzugeben] at the entry to science... (EL §78/125).

In taking up the Logic, we surrender all presuppositions. But of these, it is indicative that Hegel singles out the Kantian – or “Kantian” – assumption that we bring conceptual mediation to bear on self-standingly intelligible immediacy. Again, referring back to our introductory discussion of Conant, it matters little whether this critique of Kantian cognitive two-stageism is fair to Kant’s text or intentions: on Conant’s reading of Kant, the Analytic has as its goal the dialectical undermining of any account of cognitive faculties as “self-standing” or independent; on my reading of Hegel, the Logic advances an explicitly dialectical account of the logical components of concept/intuition from the start. This line of reading is supported in the quote above: the presuppositionlessness emphasised by Houlgate has as its explicit target a setting aside of one assumption in particular, namely, that mediation and immediacy are logically independent.

Now, this explicit targeting of one assumption does not necessarily vitiate the presuppositionlessness of Hegel’s method or Houlgate’s presentation of it. From Houlgate’s perspective, that some presuppositions are more prominent or more entrenched than others is ultimately of no account. Once identified and abstracted from, even the most historically dominant set of presuppositions do not contaminate presuppositionless thinking by tacitly supplying it with a predetermined end (in this case, the Logic would be aiming to disprove the “opposition of finite consciousness” by demonstrating the togetherness of mediation and immediacy). But it does at least

243 The Opening, 144.
244 The Opening, 60-61.
Hegel makes it clear in the addition to EL §78 that this surrendering of presuppositions is achieved via global abstraction. Hegel emphasises “...the resolve [Entschluss] to engage in pure thinking and through the freedom that abstracts from everything and grasps its pure abstraction, the simplicity of thinking” (EL §78a). Like Fichte, Hegel understands our practical and intersubjective capacities to be engaged in abstraction: we “resolve” to globally abstract, in response to the modern “demand” that we submit all commitments to critical scrutiny. In Hegel’s global abstraction however we leave aside the Kantian limit – namely that thought is dependent on intuitional representation for singular, immediacy and actuality – as well as the Fichtean limit, that the I is the immediate and irreducible content of thought. We also leave aside the claim for any formally expressed structure of identity (Fichte’s I = I as much as Schelling’s A = A) to possess immediate certainty. Hegel is confident that the resolve to think abstractly will issue in the immediate awareness that thought simply is, equivalent to the thought of “pure being.” In what follows I want to work out the sense of these terms and their equivalence.

At the start of Chapter 5 we saw the Seinslogik Introduction tacitly reference Fichte in claiming for modernity “a new awareness of the difficulty of finding a beginning” (SL 45). In response to this “modern perplexity about a beginning,” the Seinslogik Intro then repeats a version of Kant’s Kampfplatz, centred on opposing dogmatic and sceptical versions of philosophical beginning, and adding “intellectual intuition” as a further, but equally flawed, option:

But the modern perplexity about a beginning proceeds from a further need which escapes those who are busy demonstrating their principle dogmatically or sceptically looking for a subjective criterion against dogmatic philosophizing, and [the perplexity] is outright denied by

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245 Houlgate would likely add a cautionary note that Hegel is not entitled outside of the Logic’s category derivation to commit to the togetherness of conceptual and intuitional representation. The relation between immediacy and mediation – whatever it proves to be – must be genetically derived from the immediacy of the Grundsatz alone. Although I will not develop the counter-argument here, it would be at least possible to suggest that Hegel’s singling out of what he takes to be the historically material presupposition (”the opposition of finite consciousness” present in empiricism as much as Kantianism) provides the Logic with a certain agenda. That the Logic has an agenda is implicit in those interpretations that take the dialectical progression of the Logic to be driven by its own failure to articulate a satisfactory account of determination. Rocio Zambrana, for example, takes the first two books of the Logic to constitute critiques of realism and dualism, respectively, as failing to adequately account for determination. Hegel’s Theory of Intelligibility (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 8-9. An extreme version of this view is presented by Adrian Johnston, who suggests that “The Logic in its full sweep is composed of a series of (spectacular) failed attempts to begin with thinking alone,” and that the demand for determinacy necessitates the shift to a consideration of material nature in the Philosophy of Nature. Where to Start? Robert Pippin, Slavoj Žižek, and the True Beginning(s) of Hegel’s System,” Crisis & Critique 3 (2014): 405.

246 However, that freely willing is an enabling condition of global abstraction and so systematic philosophy does not in Hegel legitimate a claim for the philosophical beginning as already containing the unity of theoretical and practical reason, as it does in Fichte. Pure being will prove to include determinations with a “practical” valence (most notable practical cognition or the “Idea of the Good” that follows theoretical cognition or “Idea of the True” in the penultimate chapter of the Begriffslogik), but cannot legitimately be taken to unify the limbs of the Kantian architectonic from the start.

247 That global abstraction leaves the I behind can also be taken as a critical appropriation of Descartes second meditation, namely, that in doubting everything one is left with the irreducible certainty that there is an I that doubts. As Nathan Brown has shown, Hegel replaces the Cartesian cogito with the more minimal “thought exists.” “Hegel’s Cogito: On the Genetic Epistemology of Critical Metaphysics.” Parrhesia 20 (2014): 49-61. Houlgate makes a similar claim in The Opening, 129.
those who begin, like a shot from a pistol, from their inner revelation, from faith, intellectual intuition, etc. and would be exempt from method and logic (45/21.53).

The dogmatist persists in the classical metaphysical assertion of an objective principle; the skeptic prioritises subjective conditions for justified belief in order to undermine any such principle; and intellectual intuition – at least as Hegel presents it here – seeks to avoid the dispute altogether. The “shot from a pistol” line is borrowed from the Preface to the Phenomenology (§27/16) and its polemic against the “empty” Schellingean Absolute briefly covered in 5.1 above. This dismissal is prima facie good evidence for the Westphal-Pippin line I raised at the start of Chapter 4, namely, that the mature Hegel has abandoned intellectual intuition altogether. While Hegel dismisses the term, the starting point of the Logic nonetheless continues to think – in line with the Schellingean critique of Fichte – the necessity of beginning from an immediately certain point that is neither subjective nor objective. This continued need to think from a unitary point from which subjectivity and objectivity (and indeed opposition in general) can be derived is suggested in the following passage. After setting out his account of the philosophical battlefield, Hegel adds his own position, the “further need” of the age not captured in dogmatism, scepticism or the immediacy of faith:

If earlier abstract thought is at first interested only in the principle as content, but is driven as philosophical culture advances to the other side to pay attention to the cognitive process, then the subjective activity has been grasped as an essential moment of objective truth, and with this there comes the need to unite the method with the content, the form with the principle. Thus the principle ought to be also the beginning, and that which has priority for thinking ought to be also the first in the process of thinking (46/21.53-54).

Against dogmatism’s ultimately arbitrary positing of an objective explainer (say, the Leibnizian God as harmonising intrinsic properties) and the relativisation of truth to subjectivity in modernity, some approach that takes account of both the objective and subjective – without being reducible to either pole – is required. So while Schelling’s 1801 characterisation of the Absolute as the indifference of subject and object has been dismissed both here and in the Phenomenology, the need for a unitary point of departure remains. Hegel’s next move in the Seinslogik introduction is indicative. The poles of the required unity that would begin the Logic are not subject and object, but the logical poles of mediation and immediacy. The ancient/modern : principle/criterion : dogmatist/sceptic : objective/subjective proportion set up in the first page of the Seinslogik Intro is collected in the distinction between “mediated” and “immediate” beginnings:

“Here we have only to consider how the logical beginning appears. The two sides from which it can be taken have already been named, namely either by way of mediation as result, or immediately as beginning proper [als eigentlicher Anfang]…” (46/21.54)

In this quote Hegel takes up philosophy’s problem of beginning – its history of beginnings – at its most abstract. Note that Hegel says that beginning “immediately” would be “beginning proper.” This identification of beginning or the start [der Anfang] with immediacy is important. The beginning cannot be something “mediated,” because that would not really be a beginning. A concrete beginning (from a “principle,” in the manner of the Ancients) presupposes “within itself a process of mediation and the transition from a first to an other... But the beginning ought not itself to be already a first and an other, for anything which is in itself a first and another implies this advance has already been made”
(52). For example, if one were to begin from the Neoplatonic “One,” one has already assumed the “Many” that gives the concept of Oneness its determinacy. In other words, a mediated beginning would presuppose not only a determinacy, but the structure of determinacy in general. Hegel notes, throwing forward to the derivation of determinacy in the Logic’s second chapter, that “a determinate something has the character of an other with respect to a first” (50).

This helps to clarify Hegel’s sense of determinacy as the mediation of otherness or synthesis of opposed contents: to be determinate is to have relation to an other, to be thought “with respect to” that other. The Logic will demonstrate that they are many different ways of being mediated by one’s other, many different forms of determination (many “thought-determinations”). To take only the first of the Seinslogik’s categories, one can vanish immediately into one’s other (the category of “becoming”), be limited by it (the category of “something”), have one’s other “within” oneself (“finitude”), be a moment of that other (“true infinity”), relate to oneself as indifferently as one does to another (“being-for-one”), and so on through the logical progression. We will cover the first two of these categories in the next chapter, as they provide a minimal account of qualitative determination, which Hegel refers to as “determinateness as such” [Bestimmtheit als solches] (56/21.66). What is at issue here is simply that the beginning as immediacy itself must be radically indeterminate, in the sense of lacking any connection to any other at all.

Hegel treats two possible objections to the above line of thought. Firstly, one might take beginning with “beginning” to satisfy the self-critical demand. But Hegel shows that it has the same structure as mediated beginning above: the concept of a beginning is of “a nothing from which something is to proceed” (52/21.62). In other words, the beginning understood as beginning is already implicitly mediated by the thought of an end. The second objection follows on Hegel’s answer to the first: it certainly appears that immediacy is determined via its oppositional pair; negation is even legible in the word itself (immediacy). This second objection is the crucial motivator for Hegel presenting “pure being” as equivalent to immediacy itself. Taken as im-mediacy, “simple immediacy is itself an expression of reflection; it refers to the distinction from what is mediated. The true expression of this simple immediacy is therefore pure being.” (47/21.55). He then glosses pure being as meaning “nothing but being in general; being, and nothing else, without further determination and filling.” In what sense, however, is “pure being” the “true expression” of “simple immediacy”? Hegel connects the two formulations in the remainder of the passage on “absolute beginning” with which we began this section. After claiming, the need for an absolute (that is, abstract) beginning, Hegel claims:

[The logical beginning] must therefore be simply an immediacy [schlechthin ein Unmittelbares], or rather only immediacy itself [nur das Unmittelbare selbst]. Just as it cannot have any determination with respect to another, so too it cannot have any within; it cannot have any content, for any content would entail distinction and the reference of distinct moments to each other, and hence a mediation. The beginning is therefore pure being (SL 48/21.56).

This quote introduces emptiness or indeterminacy of content as that element or aspect of simple immediacy which “pure being” expresses. As we saw above, immediacy as im-mediacy is not mediate, with mediation understood here in its most general (Hegelian) form as relation to another. The problem Hegel identifies with immediacy is that this not in fact is reference to another, the other to which immediacy is opposed. Immediacy is, therefore, a contradictory structure: formally, it is determined through opposition to another, but its content is the absence of opposition and otherness.
Its content, in other words, is the indeterminacy that obtains in the absence of mediation. To truly begin, then, we must abstract content from form: set aside the form of determination – a form that we at this point can only presuppose – and think the indeterminate content of immediacy. That is, we must think “immediacy itself,” not the immediacy that is “for another” – in this case, “for” the mediation that opposes it. The difficulty here is the reflexivity in play: the other to which immediacy has reference is the concept of reference to another in general, mediation. Global abstraction thus taken to a new extreme in Hegel: to begin in philosophy, we must abstract not only from contingent contents, but from any determinate content all together, insofar as determination assumes a determining relation between first and second terms. Contrast the Fichtean and Schellingean Grundsatze in which the determining relation between first and second terms is collapsed in self-relation (I = I and A = A). In both cases, that form brought with it a content: “I am” or “absolute identity.” What we have in Hegel is an abstraction that terminates in thinking of no relation, and therefore no content, whatsoever. As such, it is the sheer indeterminacy of “pure being” – its emptiness or lack of “filling” – that makes it the “true expression” of “immediacy itself.” Being marks the beginning because we have abstracted from everything and are left with the immediate certainty that there is; but, in abstracting from everything, there is no “filling” to think in it. In Hegel global abstraction leaves us with pure being as indeterminate immediacy as the ground of category derivation. It seems impossible that such an indeterminate immediate could ground any account of determination, and Hegel recognises this:

Totally for itself, being is thus the indeterminate, and has therefore no connecting reference [keine Beziehung] to any other; consequently it seems that from this beginning no further forward move is possible – that is, from that beginning itself – and that any advance can only occur by adding something foreign to it from outside (70/21.81).

It is in this quote that the uniqueness of Hegel’s formulation of the Grundsat of a post-Kantian unitary category derivation is expressed. In Schelling’s Identity Philosophy, the Grundsat was defined through reference to the logical form of categorical judgment, but any “advance” to determinate difference could only be understood as stepping outside the standpoint of “Absolute” philosophical cognition, as “adding something foreign to it” – without having the resources to explain how such an “egress” is possible. Hegel jettisons any constitutive reference to logical forms of judgments, but in so doing gives philosophy the chance of genuinely deriving the minimal structures of determinacy. Hegel risks all determinacy in order to win it back, but in the form of a system. It is to that system’s first moments we now turn.

248 I have in the above left aside a crucial complication. That is, that Hegel offers two points of entry into the Logic: (1) the “resolve” to globally abstract covered above; and (2) taking up the results of the Phenomenology. William Maker identifies these two distinct pathways in Philosophy Without Foundations: Rethinking Hegel (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994). For Maker, the difficulty is reconciling these paths: the Logic “begins without presuppositions while the Phenomenology is nonetheless the presupposition for the Logic,” Philosophy Without Foundations, 72. Maker’s solution is to present the “Absolute Knowledge” that concludes the Logic not as determinate claim about a certain structure of self-consciousness, but entirely negatively. Maker’s solution is broadly taken up by Houlgate: Hegel’s philosophy “begins from self-critical openness to being rather than from the assumption of absolute closure. Indeed, in my view, Hegelian “absolute knowing” [the final chapter of the Phenomenology] is precisely such openness to what being shows itself to be,” The Opening, 58. In my view, this tends to make the Phenomenology only necessary for those unable to immediately drop the crucial “Kantian” presupposition of an opposition between self-standing thought and self-standing being via abstraction (see my discussion of EL §78 above), but require the untenability of that opposition to be
demonstrated. In my view, it may be possible to build some content into the *Phenomenology’s* result without abrogating the *Logic’s* presuppositionlessness by casting the *Phenomenology* as staging the transition from *sensible* to *intellectual* intuition, from sensuous immediacy to the immediacy of thought. The result of the *Phenomenology* would then be that sensuous immediacy understood as the other of thought must shed its externality to thought (its sensuousness) but preserve its immediacy as specifically *logical* immediacy. This view accords with Dean Moyar’s account of the *Phenomenology* as aiming to “reduce the separation or opposition in all shapes of consciousness to a basic internal difference,” as well as Moyar’s foregrounding of Hegel’s presentation of Absolute Knowledge in *PhS* §801 as “intuition which has been conceptually grasped and is itself intuition which is comprehending [und ist begriffenes und begreifendes Anschauen].” Moyar, “Absolute Knowledge and the Ethical Conclusion to the *Phenomenology*” in *The Oxford Handbook of Hegel*, ed. Dean Moyar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 168, 192. Nonetheless, determining whether building intellectual intuition into the result of the *Phenomenology* abrogates the *Logic’s* claim to presuppositionlessness requires further treatment.
Chapter 6. Being and Existence

In this final Chapter I reconstruct Hegel’s deduction of a novel, post-Kantian account of qualitative determination. This proceeds in two steps, corresponding to the first and second chapters of the Doctrine of Being (entitled “Being” and “Existence” respectively). The “Being” chapter genetically derives the mediation of opposed terms (“being” and “nothing”) from the Hegelian Grundsatz or “absolute beginning,” namely indeterminate “immediacy itself.” The relation between being and nothing is an “immediate” difference in the sense that the difference between the terms “vanishes” at the same moment it appears. In other words, the Logic’s initial opposed terms are indifferent in a sense related to that developed in the preceding chapters of this thesis. At the beginning of Hegelian philosophy, we lack – because we have abstracted from – the conceptual resources to determine the difference between being and nothing: pure being is not pure nothing but is conceptually indistinguishable from it. The Logic demonstrates that an immediate description of being is equally valid as a description of nothing. But although we cannot say in what the difference consists, we nonetheless intuit that difference, and that intuition can be rendered conceptual (can be made explicit or posited). It will be shown that being and nothing are for intellectual intuition what Kant’s “incongruous counterparts” are for sensuous intuition: a difference that is only immediately (i.e. intuitively) discriminable, but not conceptually determinable. The Logic then genetically derives the resources for the determination of being-nothing difference from the intuitable oscillation or equal-validity of being and nothing themselves. As we will see, the thought-determination or category of “becoming” that distinguishes being and nothing arises simply by thinking through their indifferent relationality as it is immediately intuited in thought. Nonetheless, becoming is, owing to its origin in indeterminate immediacy, only the most immediate form of mediation. The “Existence” chapter takes up the category of becoming to derive determinate difference in its minimal form, namely, that operative between the categories of “something” and “other.”

This is admittedly a rapid summary, but the proceeding chapters have I hope rendered its key terms intelligible by tracing their genesis in Kant’s logical definitions of conceptual and intuitional representation and their reception in German idealism. Because Hegel’s account of immediacy and mediation has a Kantian pedigree, one’s interpretation of the Kantian concept/intuition distinction will determine how one frames Hegel’s alternative model of qualitative determination in the Doctrine of Being. If one takes Hegel’s perspective, Kant’s ostensible commitment to the thoroughgoing “togetherness” of concepts and intuitions is not borne out by the Critique’s Logic. As we have seen in Chapter 3, Hegel suggests that Kant does not follow through on his commitment to togetherness, insofar as the indifference between intuitional representations must be supplemented by a self-standingly intelligible (i.e. equally indifferent) conceptual form. That is, the relation between concepts and intuitions is treated one-sidedly, in terms of the relationality proper to intuitional form. In contrast, the Logic shows that indifference is itself a moment of determination, i.e. indifference does not require mediation by an external, independent, and separable form but rather is necessarily together with it.

One need not buy in to Hegel’s reading of Kant, however. Even if Hegel’s critique of Kant’s presentation of the concept/intuition misses the mark, and Kant does in fact adequately advance concept/intuition togetherness, the opening chapters of the Logic can nonetheless stand as an ontological generalisation of the togetherness principle. In other words, a reading of Kant that resists the imputation of “layer-cake” dualism to Kant’s cognitive model would position the comparison differently. Rather than correct Kant’s failure to adequately present concept/intuition togetherness, Hegel’s derivation of qualitative determination logically demonstrates the togetherness immediate singularity and mediation in general. That is, it vindicates Kant’s togetherness principle without
reference to sensibly-conditioned cognitive capacities, but rather as a necessary condition of determinate being as much as of determinate thought.

A final note. The Logic’s first chapter is its most well-known and most commented on, and the following draws particularly on Houlgate, Winfield, and Burbidge. The novelty or contribution in what follows is twofold. Firstly, the demonstration of “pure being” as an intellectual intuition, prepared by the work on post-Kantian idealism above, enables me to draw the comparison between being and nothing and Kant’s Incongruous Counterparts. It is thus able to argue that the “Being” chapter stages not only the inseparability of being and nothing but also the inseparability of the logical components of concepts and intuitions. Secondly, an understanding of immediate difference between being and nothing as indifference connects the Logic’s first dialectic to Kant’s critique of rationalist indifference (1.2 above); to the A Deduction’s account of discrete intuitions and their apprehensive synthesis (2.2); to Hegel’s understanding of Kantian intuitional form as indifferent externality and concomitant critique of the concept/intuition distinction as itself characterised by externality (3.2); forward to Hegel’s account of quality as the determination that conditions the appearance of indifferent individuals (6.2); and to the form of quantity (see my concluding essay below).

6.1. Being, Nothing, Indifference

Pure being is described in the first chapter of the Seinslogik in one dense paragraph. The first three sentences are:

*Being, pure being – without further determination [ohne alle weitere Bestimmung]. In its indeterminate immediacy [unbestimmten Unmittelbarkeit] it is equal only to itself and also not unequal with respect to another [ist es nur sich selbst gleich und auch nicht ungleich gegen Anderes]; it has no difference [Verschiedenheit] within it, nor any outwardly. If any determination or content were posited in it as distinct, or it were posited by this determination as distinct from another, it would thereby fail to hold fast to its purity (59/21.68-69).*

This first sentence, as Houlgate has suggested, is not a “definition,” but an “injunction.” A definition would be a determination in the rationalist sense covered in 1.1 above, namely, predicating a concept of the subject (in this case, “being”) and excluding its opposite. That understanding of the sense of Hegel’s opening description would determine being in the judgment, “being is indeterminate immediacy (and not a mediated determination).” As I covered in detail in my reading of the Seinslogik Introduction in Chapter 5.2, at the Logic’s beginning we are to think the indeterminacy that results from our decision or resolve [Entschluss] to abstract from all determinate content, and also crucially from the form of determinacy itself. We are rather called on to attend to the thought of “being, pure being – without further determination,” that is, without supplying a non-contradictory predicate concept, without determining it by opposing it to another content as its negation. We are asked, in other words, to abstract the immediate being of thought from relation or reference to another, to think the content of immediate being (“immediacy itself”) not the “im-mediacy” in which the relation of opposition between immediacy and mediation is legible. This means that we are not entitled to claim that determination takes the form of predication in judgment (rationalism), synthesis and subsumption of empirical intuitions (Kant), nor, with Spinoza, that omnis determinatio est negatio. Any determination of pure being, along with any determination of what it means to be determinate, would fail to “hold fast” or sustain the global abstraction that institutes presuppositionless logic. In the

249 The Opening, 82. Houlgate uses this language of “injunction” only once, and does not elaborate its relation to the Hegelian Entschluss as I do in the following.
Introduction we had an argument for the necessity of the abstraction from all reference to another on the basis of the logical definition of beginning; here the simple injunction to “hold fast” or sustain this abstraction assumes the reader’s acceptance of the necessity of such a beginning. I should also note here that sustained abstraction constituted Fichte’s first, “methodological” sense of Intellectual Intuition (see 4.1), and more substantial senses of Int Int will surface in the thought of pure being shortly.

What interests me here, however, are the second and third lines, in which the “indeterminate immediacy” first presented in the Seinslogik Introduction in terms of lacking reference to another is reformulated in terms of self-equality and equality to any other: indeterminate immediacy is “equal only to itself and not unequal with respect to another.” This formula marks the presence of indifference [Gleichgültigkeit] in Hegel’s Grundsatz. In thinking pure being we have abstracted from any reference to that which such being may be opposed or contrasted to; this has as its corollary the loss of any ground of difference between the thought of pure being and that which opposes it. On the one hand, as abstracted from all relation, pure being can legitimately only be said to be self-identical, “equal only to itself.” On the other hand, there is no content in the thought of pure being by which it could be distinguished from another; it can therefore also be legitimately said to be “not unequal [i.e. equal] against another [gegen Anderes].” Bringing these poles together, we might say that, in having no relation to its other, pure being is indistinguishable from or indifferent to that other. Or, to use the German word, it is with “equal-validity” [Gleichgültigkeit] self-identical as much as it is identical with its other. We are equally licensed to make either claim. This indifference is borne out in the immediate emergence of being’s other in the very description of being itself. The remainder of the first paragraph of the Doctrine of Being reads:

[Being, pure being] is pure indeterminateness and emptiness [reine Unbestimmtheit und Leere]. – There is nothing [nichts] to be intuited in it, if one can speak here of intuiting [Anschauen]; or, it is only this pure empty intuition itself [oder es ist nur dies reine, leere Anschauen selbst]. Just as little is anything to be thought in it, or it is equally only this empty thinking [ode es ist nur dies reine, leere Anschauen selbst]. Being, the indeterminate immediate, is in fact [in der Tat] nothing, and neither more nor less than nothing (59/21.69).

So, by the time we finish the Logic’s first paragraph, Hegel makes it explicit that in describing being as it appears in its immediacy for thought, he is also describing what being is not, namely nothing. That is, the opposite of being has immediately emerged because the one description is indifferently either being or nothing; the same description holds as much as for being as it does for nothing. This indifference is reinforced in the treatment of nothing in the Logic’s following paragraph, in which nothing is described in (almost) exactly the same terms as being, leading Hegel to conclude that “Nothing is therefore the same determination or rather absence of determination [Bestimmungslösigkeit], and thus altogether the same as what being is [und damit überhaupt dasselbe, was das reine Sein ist].” Nonetheless, there is a difference between them – nothing is not being, and vice-versa: “it makes a difference whether something or nothing is being intuited or thought.” Now, this structure of immediate difference between being and nothing will be articulated in the Logic’s first “thought-determination” (“becoming”), but I want to hold off on that for a moment to better secure the comparison with Kant.

I said above that nothing repeats being almost exactly. Now, in the paragraph on pure being, Hegel may appear to be vacillating in first questioning whether “intuiting” is relevant to or valid in an
ontological logic that has abstracted from all sensible epistemic conditions, but then nonetheless characterising the thought of being in its immediacy as pure “intuition itself” [Anschauen selbst]. This vacillation is absent in the symmetrical description of nothing. Hegel in describing nothing importantly shores up the identification of thinking and intuiting: “[Nothing] is the empty thinking and intuiting itself [ist es das leere Anschauen und Denken selbst], like pure being.” The explicit identification of thinking and intuiting here serves to collect the trajectory traced through German Idealism in Chapters 4 and 5 above, namely Hegel’s critical appropriation of the Kantian and post-Kantian doctrines of Intellectual Intuition. Already the first two paragraphs of the Logic’s derivation has made clear that the immediate thought of pure being, in its equivalence to nothing, is an Intellectual Intuition insofar as it possesses the logical components of both pure concepts and pure intuitions. That the thought of being is (1) pure in the Kantian sense is secured by abstraction from empirically-conditioned sensibility. Like pure intuition it is (2) immediate; (3) singular; but nonetheless, like Kantian intellectual representations, it is (4) general and (5) mediated – or rather contains within its singular immediacy the grounds for the derivation of mediation in general.

The first two points have been substantiated in Chapter 5 above, so I treat them summarily here. (1) By definition, being as it is immediately intuited in thought is pure in the Kantian sense of “non-empirical” or “a priori.” It is not conditioned by any sensibly given content. Most importantly, however, global abstraction for Hegel takes us past the Kantian limit of abstraction, namely, the pure forms of intuition, space and time. Global abstraction has bracketed sensible intuition from Hegel’s alternative category derivation in both its content or matter (“sensation”) and the form in which that content is organised (space and time). In other words, what has been abstracted from is the “outside-one-another-being” that characterises the “placing and ordering” of the matter of sensation in the forms of pure intuition (see Chapter 2.1). At the same time, however, the result of that abstraction – that thought is – shares with sensible intuition the logical characteristics of immediacy and singularity.

(2) As we have seen in detail in 5.2, the thought of pure being is equivalent to “immediacy itself.” For Hegel, thought immediately apprehends its own being, i.e. that there is thought. This constitutes a form of the Fichtean challenge to Kant’s discursivity thesis, which holds that thought is dependent on sensible intuition to supply the immediacy that constitutes a necessary component of determinate thought. While thought cannot determine empirical objects without sensible intuition – it is not a “divine” intellect in that sense – it can nonetheless derive the categories that condition any objective determination beginning from reference to itself alone, i.e. without Kant’s constitutive reference to the possibility of geometry (for intuitional form) or to the logical forms of judgment (for concepts). As we saw in Chapter 4, Fichte takes this to follow from Kant’s commitment to rational self-determination or “strong TI,” even if Kant does not consistently fulfil that commitment.

(3) Singularity. The immediacy of pure being is “singular” in the Kantian sense reserved for the pure forms of intuition. As we saw in 2.1, Kant repeatedly distinguishes the singularity of the pure forms of intuition (space and time) from the generality of pure concepts (the categories): “…one can only represent a single space, and if one speaks of many spaces, one understands by that only parts of one and the same unique space.” (A24-25/B39). The same argument is repeated for time (A31-32/B47). As we saw in 5.1, Schelling’s Int Int of “absolute reason” is singular in the sense that all particulars are understood as within it, as limitations of the one “unique being.” Although Hegel will, unlike Schelling, derive the form of qualitative difference from our immediate intuitive apprehension of being, that pure being is like Schelling’s absolute reason not a general concept under which particulars can be subsumed. The only other term that has emerged in the Logic so far is “nothing,” but this cannot be said to be subsumed under being because it is “altogether the same as what pure
being is.” Recall that concepts are defined by Kant as *partial representations* of objects (A32/B48). Kant holds that conceptual subsumption works by picking out a “mark” common to two or more particulars; at the same time, however, it leaves aside other discernible features of those particulars by which they may be distinguished. In other words, when brought together or subsumed *under* a common mark, two objects are identified; another concept, however, can pick out a feature that distinguishes one object from another. Here however, being and nothing in their immediate representation have no qualities unaccounted for; in thinking one we think *all* of the other. The spatial analogy, rather than the model of judgment, better captures their relationship. The logic of “absolute beginning” dictates that we abstract from all relations; once we so abstract, there is no “other” space “outside” of the logical beginning to be thought. As such, the thought of nothing has emerged *within* the one “space” of thought occupied by being.

I say spatial analogy above because the intellectual intuition of pure being is not spatial in the sense of Kantian *sensible* intuition. To see this, consider again the immediacy of the being-nothing relation. In thinking being we think *all* of nothing, and we think that *all* immediately, here in the sense of simultaneity. There is not being and then nothing, but rather one description that is equally valid for both. As such, the Logic’s opening thought is not a *successive* intuition in the manner of Kant’s *sensible* intuition of time, the form of “inner sense.” Kant says in the Transcendental Aesthetic that “Only in time can two contradictorily opposed predicates meet in one and the same object, namely, one after the other [nacheinander]” (A32/B49). Here we have an opposition that meets in one and the same “object” of thought (thought’s object here can be taken to be thought’s own immediacy) at one and the same moment: pure being coincides immediately with what it is *not*, with the nothing that opposes it. This is another way of putting the point put above in (1), that Hegel has abstracted from the “neben und nacheinander” (i.e. spatiotemporal) structure of Kantian sensible intuition, but retained the *logical* components of singularity and immediacy. There is no other to pure being except that which emerges immediately *within* it.

Hegel suggests this analogy in his reflections on the logical beginning in the Logic’s final chapter. I have already quoted the retrospective claim there that the logical beginning “is not an immediate of sense-intuition... but of *thought*, which because of its immediacy can also be called a supersensuous, *inner intuition*.” Hegel goes on: The immediate of sense-intuition is a *manifold* and a *singular*. Cognition, on the contrary, is a thinking that conceptualizes [*begreifendes Denken*]; its beginning, therefore, is also *only in the element of thought*, a *simple* and a *universal* [*ein Einfaches und Allgemeines*] (739/12.239). The contrast is between the *manifold* character of spatio-temporally individuated objects (“next to and after one another”), and an immediate representation that is *simple*, i.e. not complex, not constituted as an aggregate of discretely analysable parts. Like the spatio-temporal field for sensible intuition, the universal that begins the Logic is immediately given for intellectual intuition.

(4) That the logical beginning is described as a *universal* opens on to the generality component of pure being as intellectual intuition. As we saw, Hegel is explicit in his claim that being and nothing are as much intuited as they are thought. In terms of Kant’s logical definitions, an intuition that is also or equally thought would be a singular immediate apprehension that is also general and mediate. This “also” seems to predicate opposed concepts of one object, issuing in contradiction. But again, it is crucial here to recognise that the legitimacy of this form – and the illegitimacy of contradiction – has been suspended. It follows from this suspension that the generality and mediation components of conceptuality do not, for Hegel, immediately mean or entail the form of predication as they do in Kant: generality does not *at the beginning* mean a more general representation under which to subsume a
more particular representation in judgment; nor does mediation immediately mean access to the particular through another representation. The generality and mediation components of the Logic’s intellectual intuition of pure being are thought otherwise.

The generality component follows from the above discussion of singularity. In pure being we are dealing with the intellectual equivalent or analogy of the singularity of the spatio-temporal field itself, not the representation of a singular object relationally individuated space and time. The equivalent for a specifically intellectual intuition is the immediate apprehension of the totality as a universal singular, the one unique “space” of conceptual determinations in which all universal and necessary determinations of objects in general – the Hegelian equivalent to Kantian categories – participate as logical moments. In 4.1 we saw that Fichte, in arguing contra Kant that we do have a capacity of intellectual intuition, also deflated the Kantian characterisation of its powers. Rather than cognise (sense 1) or create (sense 2) real objects, our intellectual intuition spontaneously produces only the maximally general a priori conceptual framework for object individuation, i.e. the categories. Hegel’s unitary deduction from the thought/intuition of pure being clearly follows this model.

(5) The first step in the derivation of categories as universal and necessary object determinations would be the derivation of a first (or immediate) form of mediation from the immediately certain Grundsatz. Like Fichte, Hegel takes immediacy to generate of itself the structures that condition our determinate experience, which can be characterised as a mediated one (Kant’s “whole of compared and connected representations”). But unlike Fichte (and Schelling following him), Hegel does not figure the Grundsatz as in its form already possessing mediation or relation between identical terms (Fichte’s I = I; Schelling’s A = A). The Logic’s Grundsatz is empty of form and of content, but generates of itself the necessity of relation to an other, i.e. the necessity of mediation. Mediation for Hegel is generated as between immediately different terms, with this immediate difference articulated in the thought-determination of “becoming.” Becoming, as we will see, is the minimal structure of relational determination, enabling us to distinguish being from nothing only by thinking them together.

The remainder of 6.1 considers “becoming” from two Kantian angles. Firstly, it is shown that the indifference of being and nothing enables Hegel to treat both limbs of Kant’s togetherness principle (empty concepts and blind intuitions) together at the same time insofar as this indifference corresponds to that treated at the start of Kant’s A Deduction. That is, Hegel’s Logic begins from the moment in Kant in which immediate singulars are rendered cognitively discriminable through synthesis. Secondly, I elucidate the category of becoming as the relational determination of being and nothing by comparison to Kant’s Prolegomena account of “incongruent counterparts.”

The Emptiness and Blindness of Being
The thought-determination of becoming can be heuristically introduced as a solution to the problem that the indifference of being and nothing presents. The problem we have after the “Being” and “Nothing” paragraphs of the Logic is the following. How do we name or mark the difference between being and nothing, given their content – the “empty intuiting” and “empty thinking” of sheer indeterminacy – immediately holds of both? Here again I differentiate my commentary via detour through Kant. At the end of the second paragraph of the Logic, we are at a point very similar to (1) the indifferent indeterminacy of thought that Kant diagnoses in the rationalist tradition; and (2) the indifferent indeterminacy of sensible intuitions that begins Kant’s A Deduction. That Hegel takes pure being to be both thought and intuition enables him to treat both the emptiness and blindness limbs of
the togetherness principle simultaneously, within a unitary deduction. That is, he can simultaneously
treat: (1) the problem of “empty” thought, i.e. thought that is about nothing when it takes itself to be
about something; as well as (2) “blind” intuiting, i.e. an intuition that is indeterminate because not
brought into connection with another.

(1) Kant as we have seen in 1.2 demonstrates that rationalism may always be thinking or
judging of nothing when it takes itself to be judging of something. Rationalist indeterminacy could
therefore be understood as indifference, i.e. the equal-validity of judgments about some empirically
real thing and no empirically real thing under rationalist criteria for determinacy. Note the
correspondence with the Logic’s opening moves: abstract thought finds itself judging of nothing (what
is not) when it took itself to be judging of being (what is), and vice-versa. In both Kant and Hegel, pure
thought is indeterminate because it is indifferent to the existence of its object; and, in both thinkers,
intuition provides resources for determining that difference. In Kant sensible intuition gives us an
existent something about which to think; in Hegel we intellectually intuit the difference between being
and nothing even though we have abstracted from the conceptual resources that would render that
difference explicit. Hegel’s shift from sensible to intellectual immediacy here, however, means a shift
in his understanding of the minimal object of thought.

Kant thinks the minimal intentional object of judgment as something sensibly given to thought.
Accordingly, his answer to rationalist indifference is to provide a transcendental account of the
conditions under which something rather than nothing is so given. Kant claims that thought has
objective validity or purport – is about an empirically real thing – only when it synthesises a manifold
of sensible intuition. Furthermore, because this conceptual synthesis is constitutive of objectivity as
such, Kant takes the Humean sceptical gap between sense-data and the universal and necessary
determinations of our thinking to be closed. At the beginning of the Logic, however, we have seen
Hegel’s claim that thought is its own intuiting: thought immediately apprehends its own being and the
spontaneity that characterises it. Hegel thus takes the minimal object of thought not to be something,
but rather the pure being that thought itself is. In the Remark that immediately follows the “Being,”
“Nothing,” and “Becoming” paragraphs, Hegel explicitly draws attention to this. “It is customary to
oppose nothing to something [Etwas]. Something is already a determinate existent [ein bestimmtes
Seiendes] that distinguishes itself from another something; consequently, the nothing which is being
opposed to something is also the nothing of a certain something, a determinate nothing [ein bestimmtes
Nichts]” (SL 60/21.70). For Hegel, the Kantian “something” that requires determination by
conceptual form is already determinate in the sense of being relationally individuated, i.e. set against
and outside another such something via spatio-temporal form. It follows that “nothing” thought in
relation to “something” is not a pure nothing, but determined as the absence of a relationally
individuated thing. In Hegel’s version of strong TI, this constitutes a failure to derive determination
from an immediately certain ground, but rather presupposes a minimal form of determination
(relational individuation) to already be in place.

All of this means a new, broader definition of “determination” in Hegel. In the Kantian
framework, taking “something” as the minimal object of conceptual determination makes sense:
although there are some usages of “determination” in the Aesthetic (see 2.1 above), Kant in general
follows rationalism in taking “determination” to mean conceptual determination, not the relational
individuation provided by intuitional form. Intuition, in other words, gives us real but conceptually
undetermined “somethings” to be thought – though it emerges in the Analytic that the external
relationality constitutive of such immediacies is not cognisable in the absence of synthetic
apprehension. In contrast, Hegel as we have seen, suspends the presupposition that determination is
concept predication. This leads to a generalised understanding of determination as that which renders a content distinct or distinguishable from an other content. As such, “determination” for Hegel catches both concept predication and intuitional “placing and ordering.” This will become clearer when we turn to Hegel’s dialectic of something and other in 6.2., in which qualitative determination – the categories of reality, negation, and limit – are bound up with the form of “side-by-side” or “outside-one-another” placement.

(2) In this Kant nonetheless intimates the Hegelian position. Parallel to or in close correspondence with Kant’s A Deduction, the “Being” chapter of the Seinslogik demonstrates that synthesis speciosa – conceptuality understood literally as “gripping” or “holding together” two discrete immediacies – is the minimally thinkable form of mediation. Were such apprehension not to take place, each intuition would be indifferent to one another and so indeterminate or “blind,” in the same way that Hegel’s being and nothing, in the absence of their mediation in becoming, remain indifferent to one another and so indeterminate. In other words, Hegel’s category “becoming” is the “apprehension” of being and nothing in Kant’s A Deduction sense. It follows that Kant’s account of intuitional discrimination in the synthesis of apprehension is for Hegel the most immediate form of determinacy taken by being in general. Recall that in introducing the synthesis of apprehension in the A Deduction, Kant says:

If every individual representation were entirely foreign to the other, as it were isolated and separated from it, then there would never arise anything like cognition, which is a whole of compared and connected representations (A97).

In the absence of relation between individual representations, it seems to follow that we would experience one isolated representation after another. But this is not the case. Rather, there would be no way to tell whether one representation had been replaced by another, because there would be no way of comparing and so telling the difference between “entirely foreign” representations. Each representation would so fill the “space” of thought that we would experience only an absolute unity:

Every intuition contains a manifold in itself, which however would not be represented as such if the mind did not distinguish the time in the succession of impressions on one another; for as contained in one moment no representation can ever be anything other than absolute unity (A99).

As we saw in Chapter 2.2., the A Deduction solves this problem by showing that spontaneous (empirically unconditioned) syntheses of apprehension and reproduction must obtain for discrete spatio-temporal individuals to be grasped together and so discriminated from one another, and further that these syntheses are grounded on the unity of the subject (and its categories). Kant puts this in the form of transcendental argument. The skeptic must admit that connectedness characterises our experience (because its negation, a “blooming buzz” of unconnected impressions does not so characterise our experience). But, contra the skeptic, Kant proceeds to show that this experience of connectedness is dependent on certain non-empirical conceptual conditions in the immediacy of sensible representations themselves. Again, sensibility gives us externally relationally individuated singular objects; but because this relationality is external, neither the objects nor their relations are cognisable without synthesis apprehending and reproducing them.

In the indeterminate immediacy of being, Hegel has diagnosed a similar problem: abstracted from all relationality (“entirely foreign” to any other), our representation collapses into an
indeterminate unity or self-equality that cannot be told apart from its other. The correspondence of the starting point of the Logic and the A Deduction can be confirmed definitionally, so to speak, simply by considering the logical description of pure being unpacked in detail above: an indeterminate immediate but non-sensible content for thought. In Kant’s cognitive model, this logical content – an indeterminate (conceptually undetermined) immediate non-sensible content – describes the pure intuition (the form of spatio-temporal organisation) from which the A Deduction begins. That is, the indeterminate immediate with which we start the Logic has the very same logical features of unsynthesised pure intuition with which we begin the Transcendental Analytic.

Hegel however solves this problem differently. In short, as committed to the unitary derivation of post-Kantian idealism, Hegel does not have the Aesthetic and Metaphysical Deduction behind him, i.e. an independently ascertained content with which to approach the problem of synthesis. Spatio-temporal organisation (outside-one-another-being) as much as logical form must be proved within the one deduction. As such, the difference between Kant and Hegel on this point can be approached methodologically, in terms of the difference between transcendental argument and genetic derivation. Hegel does not seek to secure the relation between indubitable facts of sensibly-conditioned experience and a universal propositional form, but rather to show that there is a continuity between immediate certainty and the forms of determination. There is a family resemblance in these approaches: both move from an indubitability of some kind towards the (not immediately apparent) structure upon which that indubitability is dependent. The difference that the genetic approach makes is the relation of its components to a single ground. In Kant, regardless of one’s interpretation of the togetherness principle, the conceptual structure that determines immediacy is independently derived from the logical forms of judgment in the Metaphysical Deduction. Similarly, the pure forms of intuition on which concepts are shown in the Transcendental Deduction to necessarily operate are established by an independent transcendental argument from the indubitability of geometry.

Now, it is possible to argue with Conant that Kant holds that concept/intuition separability is never actual, but only the result of abstractive work. Hegel says something similar about being and nothing, namely that being and nothing taken as separate contents would be “only the empty figments of thought [leere Gedankendinge]” while the “truth” is the “unity of being and nothing in every actual thing or thought,” “the inseparability of the two which is everywhere before us” (61-62/21.71-72). But at best Conant can argue that Kant advances the togetherness principle from the mistaken assumption of their separateness, and that their inseparability is proved negatively from the breakdown of that assumption. In Hegel, that breakdown occurs immediately. Rather than an independent section that seems to give us discriminable items in intuition and then an Analytic that reverses this tendency, Hegel sustains separateness for one paragraph – being, pure being – that is undone in the next – nothing, pure nothing. Or more deeply: that one is actually equally reading about nothing when one took oneself to be reading about being – and vice-versa – means that the transition has in fact always already occurred, so to speak. We were never reading and thinking only of being, but in fact being and nothing together at the same time. This “at-the-same-timeness” is important in the determination of becoming: Hegel says in the second line of the “Becoming” paragraph that “the truth is neither being nor nothing, but rather that being has passed over into nothing and nothing into being – ‘has passed over,’ not passes over [nicht übergeht, sondern übergegangen ist].” That is: their togetherness is always already actual: one cannot think one without the other, even if one wants to, because in thinking one has already thought the other.
**Being and Nothing as Incongruent Counterparts**

Recall that Hegel says of pure being that “there *is* nothing to be intuited in it.” This on first glance is another assertion of the indeterminate emptiness of pure being. On second reading, however, the sentence *also* claims that, in being, there is the thought content “nothing” there to be intuited. That is, we can intuit nothing in being, and being in nothing. This intuition of “being in nothing” and “nothing in being” is not a sensible intuition, but rather a thought that shares the immediacy and singularity logically characteristic of sensible intuition. In discovering nothing in being and vice-versa, we immediately intuit a difference between being and nothing in the *one* rational “space,” but do not yet have the rationally legitimate (i.e. derived) resources to determine that difference, to *say* in what their difference consists. In other words, thought for Hegel possesses an intuitional (immediate) power of discrimination between conceptually indiscriminable terms. Insofar as this difference is intuited and not conceived, in the same moment a difference between being and nothing is intuited, so too is the difference between conceptual and intuitional representation. But, as we will see, the immediate difference between being and nothing is conceptually articulable only through an articulation of their necessary togetherness. As such, in so demonstrating the togetherness of being and nothing, Hegel is *also* demonstrating the togetherness of the logical components of conceptual and intuitional representation: the immediate difference we intuit is articulable only by the mediation or synthesis logically characteristic for Kant of conceptuality.

Now, in trying to tell the difference between being and nothing in *intellectual* intuition, we are in analogous position to that which Kant describes when trying to tell the difference between “incongruent counterparts” as they are represented in *sensible* intuition. Kant introduces his point by noting that, “if two things are fully the same (in all determinations belonging to magnitude and quality)... it should indeed then follow that one... can be put in the place of the other, without this exchange causing the least recognizable difference.” But this is not the case with incongruent counterparts, of which the paradigm example – used in both the Prologemena and the “Orientation” paper – is right and left hands:

What indeed can be more similar to, and in all parts more equal to, my hand or my ear than its image in the mirror? And yet I cannot put such a hand as is seen in the mirror in the place of its original; for if the one was a right hand, then the other in the mirror is a left, and the image of the right ear is a left one, which can never take the place of the former. Now there are no inner differences here that any understanding could merely think; and yet the differences are inner as far as the senses teach, for the left hand cannot, after all, be enclosed within the same boundaries as the right (they cannot be made congruent), despite all reciprocal equality and similarity; one hand’s glove cannot be used on the other. What then is the solution? (37-38/4:286).

Kant’s solution to the lack of an available conceptual determination is to argue as follows. Given that the difference between left and right is discriminable in our experience but not reducible to conceptual discrimination, it is explained by its being conditioned by a distinctly non-conceptual form of our cognition. As he puts it: “We can therefore make the difference between similar and equal but nonetheless incongruent things (e.g., oppositely spiralled snails) intelligible through no concept alone, but only through the relation to right-hand and left-hand, which refers immediately to intuition” (38/4:287).
Like left and right hands or oppositely spiralled snails that are “in all determinations” “fully the same,” we have seen Hegel describe being and nothing as “altogether the same [überhaupt dasselbe].” That is, our discursive description of the intellectual intuitions of being and nothing are identical: we can find no “mark” or predicate in one lacking in the other. There is however a difference between them, and this difference “refers immediately to intuition” for its justification. The difference, however, between Kant’s *sensible* (left and right) and Hegel’s *non-sensible* (being and nothing) incongruous counterparts is twofold. Firstly, being and nothing are the same “in all determinations” insofar as neither has any determination whatsoever: we find no mark in one not in the other because there are no marks in either. In other words, we do not determine (predicate concepts of) being and nothing, but rather observe in our inner intuitions the indeterminacy that they are. Another way to put this is to say that, in Kant’s account of sensible counterparts, conceptual determination has been exhausted, and no difference has been found: right and left hands have identical predicates (both are “bodies,” are “organic,” have an opposable thumb, and so on). In Hegel’s non-sensible counterparts, conceptual determination has been suspended: we *immediately* have identical descriptions of what thought apprehends in its own being, namely, sheer indeterminacy.

The second difference follows from the logic of singularity as it characterises specifically *intellectual* intuition. In Kant’s account, the relational individuation of spatio-temporal particulars is the reason why we can intuitionally discriminate left and right hands: the left cannot occupy the same space as the right; it is determined as what it is (a left) because of its spatial-temporal relation to its counterpart (the right). That is, they are distinguished not through conceptual determination but through the part/whole relations characteristic of intuitional representation: left and right hands are different because they cannot take up the *same* part within the immediately given whole of space:

“Now, space is the form of outer intuition of this sensibility, and the inner determination of any space is possible only through the determination of the outer relation to the whole space of which the space is a part (the relation to outer sense); that is, the part is possible only through the whole, which never occurs with things in themselves as objects of the understanding alone, but does occur with mere appearances” (38/4:287).

So for Kant, left and right cannot occupy the same place – that they cannot replace each other – and are distinguishable on this basis alone. They exist, in other words, outside one another, in the relationality characteristic of intuition. In contrast, incongruent counterparts in *intellectual* intuition are characterised by replaceability. This is traceable to the take up of the singularity component of intuition into pure being. We saw above that the singularity of pure being and pure nothing is not the singularity of the manifold – singular immediacies relationally individuated by spatio-temporal form – but rather the singularity of the spatio-temporal field itself. Thought is immediately one, not one against or in relation to another, such that thought would be a delimited part of the space to be thought; in its immediacy, it is the totality of that space. As such, the thought of nothing in its identity to the thought of being takes the place of being, the only “place” that there is to think. It replaces being. As I put it earlier, nothing emerges within the space of being, and as such cannot be understood as a particular to be subsumed under it. But, at the same time, nothing cannot be distinguished from being in the way that Kant takes left and right hands to be distinguished, as incapable of occupying the same part of the whole. Both occupy the same whole.

Hegel suggests this link between singularity and replaceability via a quirk of grammar in the first line of the paragraph on becoming: “Pure being and pure nothing are therefore the same [Das
reine Sein und das reine Nichts ist also dasselbe.” A literal translation would read “being and nothing is [ist] the same.” They are not two that are [sind] the same, as two discrete, pre-determined identities brought together in a comparative relation. Both completely exhaust the singular “space” in which each is immediately apprehended.

Nonetheless, in this replacement, a difference is intuitable:

But the truth is just as much that they are not without distinction; it is rather that they are not the same [sie nicht dasselbe], that they are absolutely distinct [absolut unterschieden] yet equally unseparated and inseparable [ungetrennt und untrennbar], and that each immediately vanishes into its opposite [jedes in seinem Gegenteil verschwindet]. There truth is therefore this movement [Bewegung] of the immediate vanishing of the one into the other: becoming [das Werden], a movement in which the two are distinguished, but by a distinction which has just as immediately dissolved itself (60/21.69-70).

In our “inner intuiting,” being and nothing “vanish” into one another. The moment we think one, we think the other; the one disappears as the other appears, and vice-versa. The immediate difference between the two is articulated by naming a non-sensuous movement: not that of one body moving so as to occupy a different part of space, displacing other bodies there, but between two identical indeterminacies in the one inner “space” of thought.

The problem we had after the Logic’s first two paragraphs was that of indifference: we were not able to distinguish being from its other, nor vice-versa; we were not able to say what being is without saying what nothing is, nor able to define a nothing which would not already be being. Becoming articulates the equal-validity of being and nothing in order to determine their immediate difference: the solution to the indifference of being and nothing is to say the two terms together, defining each as its transition into the other. Being is the movement or transition into nothing; nothing is its transition to being. As Hegel puts it, the “challenge” of indeterminate immediacy is to “state what, then, is being, and what is nothing.” However, “the two are equally only a transition of the one into the other…” (68/21.80). Note that this “equal” transition nonetheless expresses the moment of difference that is immediately intuited in thought: both are transitions, but different directions within that transition. The transition of being to nothing is expressible as ceasing-to-be [Vergehen]; from nothing to being as coming-to-be [Enstehen] (80/21.93). It has proved impossible to think being independently of nothing and a nothing independently of being, as if being could be distinguished as an “over here” from nothing “over there.” The two rather take each other’s place in the only place there is. As such, to think the difference of each term we have to approach their relation from two different directions, with the difference between them consisting in this bi-directionality alone. In other words, the difference between being and nothing cannot be understood as “being/nothing” but rather only as “coming-to-be/ceasing-to-be,” with the latter opposition unpacked as “being becoming nothing / nothing becoming being.” Notice that, in this formula, being is present on both sides of the opposition, as is nothing. Rather than simply being not what their opposite is, being and nothing are logical moments of their opposites. Hegel puts this as follows:

Grasped as thus distinguished, each is in their distinguishedness [Unterschiedenheit] a unity with the other [...ist jedes in derselben als Einheit mit dem anderen]. Becoming thus contains being and nothing as two such unities, each of which is itself unity of being and nothing; the one is being as immediate and as reference [Beziehung] to nothing; the other is nothing as
immediate and as reference to being; in these unities the determinations are of unequal value [die Bestimmungen sind in ungleichem Werte in diesen Einheiten]. (80/21.93).

In distinguishing between two forms of the unity of being and nothing (coming-to-be/ceasing-to-be), the determination of becoming breaks the indifference that characterised being and nothing in their immediacy. In other words, the immediate difference of being and nothing – their indifference – is now determined in the Hegelian sense: one can be distinguished from its other, and vice-versa.

Crucially, this determination is achieved through a presentation of the relation or connection [Beziehung] between being and nothing. In other words, in becoming being and nothing are relationally determined, determined as distinct by being brought into relation. What has occurred in the determination of becoming, then, is a first articulation of mediation: being is what it is, is distinguishable from nothing, only through its relation to nothing, and vice-versa. Or, to use the Kantian language, becoming is a category in the sense that it is a rule of synthesis that enables being and nothing to be thought together and so distinguished from one another – rather than simply interminably replacing one another. Becoming is however only the first or immediate form of mediation, from which qualitative determination (“determinateness as such”) is derived in the following chapter, “Existence.”

To summarise the above trajectory as simply as possible, Hegel can be seen to be conducting a thought experiment in which we attempt to hold the minimally thinkable thought-content – that thought is – in abstraction from its other or any otherness, that is, we attempt to vitiate a generalised form of the togetherness principle. Abstracting from contingent content and from all relation to otherness, however, renders the being of thought (that thought is) completely indeterminate. For Hegel, the experiment demonstrates that thinking this indeterminate content proves to be immediately a thinking of its other (thought is not, is nothing). That Hegel takes this experiment to be a proof of the togetherness principle’s logical content is clear from the following equivalence: “the same must be said of being and nothing as was said above of immediacy and mediation (which contain a reference to each other and hence negation), that nowhere on heaven or on earth is there anything which does not contain both being and nothing in itself.” (61/21.171). That is, Hegel has generalised the togetherness principle in two related ways. Firstly, as the logical relation between being and nothing is primary and paradigmatic, mediation is minimally understood as relational determination, in which something is what it is – is determinate in the sense of distinguishable from its other – only by thinking it in relation to its other; secondly, this logical relation is held to be true of being in general, insofar as the thought in which this structure demonstrably is or has being. That is, the togetherness principle in Hegel is logicised – reformulated as holding of opposed contents in general – and ontologicised, holding true for being in general.

6.2. Determinateness and Determination
The “Existence” chapter derives a minimal form of qualitative “determinateness” or “determinacy as such” [Bestimmtheit als solche] and further the category of “determination” [Bestimmung]. Put as simply as possible, “determinateness” is the moment of negation that renders pure being a stable “existent” [Dasein], while “determination” develops negation in such a way to as to inter-articulate the contrastive relation between such existents (having this quality not that quality) and the self-relation or self-identity of individual existents that emerges through this contrast. As we will see, this inter-articulation is developed through the indifference that emerges between a self-relating “something” and an “other” such something: Hegel treats the relation between something and other in terms of
the indifferent “outside-one-another-being” that he takes to logically characterise Kantian intuitional form. Determination for Hegel therefore contains a logical moment of indifference between somethings, just as in Kant’s cognitive model determination takes up the singular immediacies (indeterminate “somethings”) given in sensible intuition. In Hegel’s case, however, the relation of indifference between something and other is shown in intellectual intuition to logically entail of itself the determination – the qualitative distinguishability – of its terms, without reference to independently articulable conceptual form.

It is in the Existence chapter that we start to see the results of Hegel’s ontological generalisation of togetherness emerge as a substantive alternative to Kant’s cognitive model. In its account of determinacy and determination, the Logic’s second chapter derives Kant’s categories of quality (reality, negation, and limit). These categories are not forms of judgment but rather the logical structure of determinacy and determination as forms of relational individuation. These relational forms, as noted in Chapter 3.2, come in Hegel’s Realphilosophie to characterise spatiotemporal nature and its intuition in minded [geistige] animals. In other words, the outside-one-another-being of intuitional givenness that for Kant requires mediation by the categories of quality is for Hegel logically itself a qualitative determination, one manifest or actualised in both natural and spiritual domains. The side-by-side or external relation that determines something as not another such something, and that in turn gives that something a qualitative determination “for itself” as an individual, is for Hegel a mediating structure that conditions immediate somethings in general, regardless of the ontological domain of their appearance.

That determination for Hegel emerges from the derivation of “something” – a self-relating existent – is important in the comparison with Kant. As we saw in Chapter 2, and again discussed in 6.1 above, in Kant’s account a relationally individuated spatio-temporal singular immediacy, when taken as the subject of a judgment, is a “something” [Etwas]. The categorial forms determine this something as determinate with regard to one of the logical functions of judgment. In Hegel’s alternative, the mediation that determines the quality of a something is conceptually articulable – reality, negation, and limit are constitutive – but these concepts cannot be understood as predicates of possible judgment subsuming an intuitionally-given “something” itself distinct from that conceptual operation. Rather, that something is already the result of the categories mediating work, logically prior to the forms of judgment. Perhaps a better way to put this is to say that for Hegel "something" already is a qualitative determination: to be something means to possess a quality; a something does not require qualitative determination to be brought to it. When in intellectual intuition we think reality, negation, and limit, we are thinking a structure that determines qualitative “something-ness” in general.

To reconstruct Hegel’s derivation or proof of determination understood in the above way we must begin by recalling that for Hegel beginning is logically immediate. “Being” as the “absolute beginning” began with “immediacy itself” and generated the thought-determination of becoming as immediate mediation. “Existence” insofar as it begins must also begin with an immediacy, and the only immediacy legitimately available to it is that which has been genetically derived from immediacy itself. As such, Existence begins from becoming taken in its immediacy, i.e. the immediacy of immediate mediation; its ground is the “first truth” (62/21.72) named in the category of becoming, that is, that being is distinguishable from nothing only by reference to it, and vice-versa. In other words, the Existence chapter takes the identity-and-difference of being and nothing as articulated in the mediating structure of becoming as its beginning. What this means is that “Existence” plays out the relation between immediacy and mediation articulated in “Being” at one remove; it concerns the
relation not between sheer immediacy and mediation but between minimally mediated immediacy and further mediation.

“Existence” is split into three sections: “A. Existence as such,” “B. Finitude,” and “C. Infinity.” I will only take us as far as the definition of “determination” as it is provided in B, as that provides us with enough resources to justify the comparison of Kant’s cognitive model of determination with Hegel’s ontological alternative as sketched above.

A. Existence as such

Section A is in turn divided into three sub-sections: a. Existence in general; b. Quality; and c. Something. While brief – and difficult on account of their brevity – these sub-sections are absolutely crucial. Sub-section a. points back to the Being chapter in order to characterise becoming’s immediacy as its own point of departure. In doing so, it very quickly derives a definition of “determinateness” or “determinacy as such” [Bestimmtheit als solches]: the dialectic of being has shown that nothing must be thought with being in order to think being with any determinacy; it follows for Hegel that determinateness as such is the moment of non-being [Nichtsein] in any determinate being [bestimmtes Sein]. To this determinate being Hegel gives the name “existence” [Dasein]. Sub-section b. draws from this understanding of determinateness the first form of qualitative determinateness as contrastive relation: having the quality of “reality” because not having the quality of “negation.” Thirdly, in c. Hegel argues that an understanding of existent beings in contrastive relations logically entails a form of self-relation. Existents are not simply not their opposite or negation, but rather a self-relating “something” through that negation.

While contrastive relation and self-relation are announced in section A, they will be expanded and then thought together – as the determinate relational contrast between self-relating singulars – in the dialectic of “something” and “other” in the following section, “B. Finitude.” In Section B their unity is expressed under the category of “determination” [Bestimmung]. Determination for Hegel, then, is the form that inter-articulates other-relatedness and self-relatedness as constitutive of qualitatively determinate existents.

Hegel begins section A by defining “existence” as “determinate being [bestimmtes Sein]” (83/21.96). Put as simply as possible, existence is the indeterminate being with which the Logic began but rendered determinate through the necessary reference to nothing that the category of becoming articulates. Hegel puts existence’s relation to becoming in this way:

> “Existence [Dasein] proceeds from becoming. It is the simple oneness of being and nothing. On account of this simplicity, it has the form of an immediate. Its mediation, the becoming, lies behind it; it has sublated itself, and existence therefore appears as a first from which the forward move is made. It is at first in the one-sided determination of being; the other determination which it contains, nothing, will likewise come up in it, in contrast to the first” (83/21.97).

Existence’s genesis in becoming requires some unpacking. We need to understand how becoming has “sublated itself” [sich aufgehoben]. Hegel describes this sublation as becoming’s necessary “collapse” into Dasein’s “quiescent unity” in the final body paragraph of “Being,” “3. Sublation of Becoming.” This dense derivation is challenging. On first pass, Hegel at the end of the Being chapter seems to force becoming – a ontological category he explicitly takes to be equivalent to Heraclitean flux (60/21.70) –
into the consideration of stable (or relatively stable) objects that the Existence chapter will, in its second section, set “side-by-side.” Houlgate’s *Opening* does, however, mount a convincing defence, which I will rehearse briefly here. Becoming we saw above is constituted by the “vanishing” of being into nothing and vice-versa: being just is its vanishing into nothing; nothing is its vanishing into being; becoming articulates what being and nothing are by saying them together, that is, by articulating their relation to one another. But once becoming so results, vanishing turns out to entail the vanishing of vanishing itself. Vanishing was dependent upon the immediate difference between being and nothing, but becoming articulates their difference and identity, saying both at once. In Houlgate’s words:

Being and nothing start out by vanishing, but precisely by virtue of vanishing into one another they show themselves to be indistinguishable and so no longer to be purely other than one another at all. This means that there can no longer be any vanishing or transition of one into the other. That in turn means that there can no longer be any becoming.\(^{250}\)

Though Houlgate does not put it like this, this means that becoming, like the being and nothing that it articulates, vanishes the moment it appears. As soon as being and nothing are no longer absolutely opposed but understood as their necessary relationship to one another, the vanishing of becoming – the disappearance of one into its opposed term or negation – itself vanishes. What remains over, however, is the thought that being must be in relation to nothing in order to be the very being that it is. At the end of the Being chapter, Hegel refers to this “quiescent result” \([ruhiges Resultat]\) of becoming as “vanishedness” \([Verschwundensein]\). This vanishedness, however, is not a return to abstract or empty nothing. This, Hegel remarks, “would be only a relapse \([ein Rückfall]\) into one of the already sublated determinations and not the result of nothing and of being.” (SL 81/21.94). “And of *being*” is italicised in Hegel’s text to highlight that, were vanishedness to be taken as nothing the moment of *being* that equally constitutes becoming would be lost sight of. Put differently, in order to link up with the language of conceptuality as grasping \([begreifen]\), we would lose our *grip* on one of the two moments that becoming articulates. Rather, the “quiescent result” of becoming, the name for the vanishing of its vanishing in its “vanishedness,” is *existence* \([Dasein]\), which Hegel takes to preserve in an immediate representation the opposed poles that becoming had mediated, i.e. being and nothing.

Hegel puts this at the end of “3. Sublation of becoming.” “Becoming, as transition into the unity of being and nothing, which is as existent or has the shape of the one-sided *immediate* unity of these moments, is existence” (81/21.94). *Immediacy* for Hegel, then, is not only present at the beginning of presuppositionless category derivation. We have moved past “absolute” beginning as *sheer* immediacy onto further derivations which begin with a prior mediation taken in its immediacy. We are thus dealing with what I might call a “derived immediacy.” As derived, derived immediacy contains the mediation from which it results (the mediation that “lies behind it”). But as immediate, derived immediacy prioritises on one term (“one side”) of that prior mediation. That is, a derived immediacy is immediate by prioritising one of its two moments, by taking one of its two moments first. In other words, it takes up both terms in their unity *through* one of them. The second term, however, is not lacking but rather implicitly present – were it lacking entirely, we would regress to the beginning of the preceding derivation.

\(^{250}\) *The Opening*, 290.
a. Existence in general

We are now in a position to return to Hegel’s definition of existence from the Existence chapter itself: “Existence [Dasein] proceeds from becoming. It is the simple oneness of being and nothing. On account of this simplicity, it has the form of an immediate… It is at first in the one-sided determination of being; the other determination which it contains, nothing, will likewise come up in it, in contrast to the first” (83/21.97). Existence is, in other words, the inseparability of being and nothing posited in one content for thought, but with the moment of being taking priority there. It is bestimmtes Sein not bestimmtes Nichts. The “nichts,” however, we will see is concealed in the determinacy – the “bestimmte” – that differentiates Dasein from the reines Sein with which we began.

Before I continue with the structure of existence, I should note the complication that emerges with Hegel’s choice of terminology. “Existence” translates “Dasein,” “There-being,” “being in a certain place” [Sein an einem gewissen Ort] (SL 83/21.97). Hegel notes at the very beginning of sub-section a. that “the representation of space does not belong here.” Hegel takes himself only to be making a claim about that which logically follows from becoming, in which no reference to sensibly intuited spatiality is present. Such a reference would vitiate the purity of the logical deduction. However, once the sweep of Hegel’s critique of Kant’s concept/intuition distinction is in view, it is clear that what is at issue in the Existence chapter is a derivation of a logical form that will prove to organise spatial relations in the Philosophy of Nature (see Chapter 3.2). So Hegel’s warning against spatial representation is methodologically necessary, but does not tell the whole story. It rather needs to be supplemented in order to indicate the relation between logical existence and spatio-temporal natural existence within the Hegelian system: the representation of space does not belong at this stage of a presuppositionless category deduction; nonetheless, the forms of thought and being so deduced will – insofar as they are forms of being – be in play in the being of nature and its sensible intuition in minded [geistige] creatures. Again, the relation between “something” and other” that emerges in “B. Finitude” is constituted by outside-one-another-being, which we have seen for Hegel is the logical form of spatio-temporal relation. To understand the something-other relation, however, we must return to unpacking the simple immediacy of being and nothing, or Dasein.

After warning against inferring spatiality in the “da” of Dasein, Hegel reiterates the derivation of existence outlined above: “As it follows upon becoming, existence is in general being with a non-being [Sein mit einem Nichtsein], so that this non-being is taken up into simple unity with being.” Hegel then adds the following definition, crucial in what follows: “Non-being thus taken up into being with the result that the concrete whole is in the form of being, of immediacy, constitutes determinateness as such [macht die Bestimmtheit als solche aus]” (84/21.97). The term “non-being” [Nichtsein] is new here, and its novelty is indicative. In defining Dasein, Hegel no longer speaks of “nothing” [Nichts] but rather “non-being” [Nichtsein]. This new locution follows from the unity of being and nothing that was articulated in becoming: nothing can no longer be understood as pure and empty nothing, but rather as a nothing containing a moment of being, i.e. a non-being. This moment of non-being in any being for Hegel just is determinateness or determinacy as such, a point that is clarified in the following subsection (“b. Quality”), in which Hegel claims “… to the extent that existence is existent, to that extent it is non-being; it is determined” (84/21.98). Existence is the unity of being and non-being, but the moment of non-being is the determinateness of that existence. To illustrate this we only need pay attention to the definition of existence as “bestimmtes Sein.” In this definition, being is explicitly represented (Sein is actually said); non-being however is implicitly present as that which renders that being determinate (the bestimmtes that qualifies being). As non-being is the moment of determinacy,
it follows that existence can be alternatively formulated as “being-that-is-non-being,” i.e. a being that is determinate on account of not being.

This formulation sounds contradictory. Or, at the very least it seems to call for another term to save it from contradiction: to the claim that “a determinate being is what it is on account of not being,” one is tempted to add, “another determinate being.” However, the contradictory formula is licensed by the progress of the Logic thus far. Recall that in the Being chapter, the reference or mediation to another was not posited in being’s indeterminate immediacy. Its immediacy rather turned out to entail the necessity of mediation. Existence follows from becoming as the articulation of the necessity of mediation. Existence is determinate being rather than the indeterminate being with which the Logic began because it contains the moment of non-being as a part of what it immediately is. Unlike immediate indeterminate being, the immediate but determinate being of existence contains a reference or mediation to what it is not as a part of what it immediately is.

Secondly, one might be tempted at this point to extend Hegel’s argument here into a more explicit account of contrastive determinacy between particulars, i.e. to claim that an existent is what it is insofar as it not another such existent. Hegel will hold off on this move until after the derivation of something in sub-section c. For Hegel, the category of “something” as self-relating existent must be derived before articulating the relation between distinct somethings in section B. What we have at this point is not a relational contrast between particular beings, but rather – to use another phrase of Houlgate’s – a general “way of being.” Determinate being is a way of being distinguished from sheer indeterminate being by the co-presence of non-being. In other words, we have at the beginning of the Existence chapter only one object of thought: Dasein as the immediate unity of being and nothing.

b. Quality

What then is quality? Hegel says: “determinateness thus isolated by itself, as existent determinateness [seiende Bestimmtheit], is quality – something totally simple, immediate... on account of this simplicity, there is nothing further to say about quality as such” (85/21.98). So quality for Hegel has a kind of perplexing redundancy: to exist is to be determinate, and to exist determinately is to have quality. The overlap of existence, determinateness, and quality is also stated at the very start of the chapter: “Existence is determinate being; its determinateness is existent determinateness, quality” (81/21.96). The key here is the immediacy component: existence as an immediate unity of being and nothing is the immediacy of quality; quality is at first just that unity that makes existence what it is. But that is only quality in its immediacy, as it first appears. Hegel as a part of his opening precis goes on: “Through its quality, something is opposed to an other.” The quality of existence in general, Hegel suggests, bifurcates in such a way in order to license talk not only of stable, singular existence, but as particular existents in opposition to one another.

As such, the link between the categories of “existence” and “something” is the derivation in sub-section b. of two distinct forms of quality. This introduces a minimal form of contrastive relation into existence; not yet that between particular and distinct existents, but rather between two ways of being determinate. These ways are “reality” and “negation.” Hegel says: “Quality, in the distinct value of existent, is reality; when affected by a negating, it is negation in general, still a quality but one that counts as lack and is further determined as limit, restriction” (85/21.99). “Further determined” here points forward to the account of determination proper [Bestimmung] in section B. We need only at this point understand the contrast between “reality” (being-that-is-not) and what it is not, i.e. “negation” (non-being-that-is). The difference between reality and negation is derived by distinguishing between existence in its immediacy, which places the emphasis on being (bestimmtes
Sein, being-that-is-not) and existence with the “accent” [Akzente] on its other moment, non-being (non-being-that-is). Again, this follows from the resources generated within the Logic so far. What is opposed to determinate being as the unity of being and non-being cannot be the abstract indeterminate nothing of the Being chapter: we have learnt in becoming that being and nothing are inseparable. As a result, what determinate being is not at this stage of the logical development must be a nothing determined by its reference to being, i.e. non-being-that-is. In other words, we are constrained by the results of becoming to think being and nothing together: this togetherness can be read in two ways, with the priority falling to either being or nothing – reality and negation (85/21.99).

Hegel brings all this together in introducing the third subsection: “Reality itself contains negation; it is existence, not indeterminate or abstract being. Negation is for its part equally existence, not the supposed abstract nothing but posited here as it is in itself, as existent, as belonging to existence” (88/21.102). We do not, then, have the immediate difference that characterised being and nothing. We rather, following from the determinacy introduced by becoming, have a determinate difference in which both terms are explicitly one side of the unity they compose. Reality is the unity of being and nothing in which being is taken first; negation is that unity in which nothing is taken first. This difference is “determinate difference” in two senses. Firstly, it is a difference between two terms that are themselves determinate in Hegel’s technical sense of determinateness, that is, they contain non-being as a moment within themselves; secondly, in contrasting with what they are not they also reference the moment of otherness that constitutes them as the determinate existents that they are. The other-relatedness – the reference to non-being – that rendered being determinate existence is present both in reality and negation and between them. Reality is being-that-is-not; it is opposed to what it is not within itself and to another term against it, i.e. negation. But the term set against reality contains a moment of reality itself, because negation is non-being-that-is. Negation, for its part, is opposed to what it is not within itself (because it also is) and to the reality against it. But the reality set against negation contains a moment of negation, insofar as it is being-that-is-not.

c. Something

The transition to something is generated by thinking through the second sense of determinate difference. That is, determinate difference means relating to another insofar as one contains a moment of that other within oneself. The thought here is quite simple. Reality is quality (existent determinateness) with the accent on being rather than non-being. When reality is set against negation – existent determinateness or quality with the accent on non-being rather than being – reality relates to itself insofar as negation contains a moment of being. And vice-versa: negation in relating to reality relates to itself insofar as reality is the existent determinateness or quality it is only through non-being. This moment of self-relation in other-relation does not collapse the difference between reality and negation as it did in the Being chapter: there we found ourselves thinking the other of being at the moment being itself was thought; in the Existence chapter reality can be thought without collapsing into negation because both are grounded in the determinateness that characterises existence. Again: their difference is a determinate not an immediate one. Rather than collapsing into immediate unity, the opposition between reality and negation means that quality comes to exhibit both determinate difference and self-relation. Through the distinction between reality and negation, existence relates to itself.

Hegel reinforces that self-relation does not mean the cancelling or loss of qualitative distinction between reality and negation: “The distinction cannot be left out, for it is.” Hegel then puts
the emergence of self-relation in a dialectical triad, with each moment mapping on to the sub-sections of section A:

“Therefore, what is de facto at hand is this: [a] existence in general, [b] distinction in it; and [c] the sublation of this distinction; the existence, not void of distinctions as at the beginning, but as again self-equal through the sublation of the distinction, the simplicity of existence mediated through this sublation. This state of sublation of the distinction is existence’s own determinateness; existence is thus being-in-itself [Insichsein]; it is existent [Daseiendes], something [Etwas].

Something is the first negation of negation, as simple existent self-reference [einfache seiende Beziehung auf sich]” (89/21.103; my brackets for a, b, and c).

I want here to focus on the derivation of self-reference or “connection to oneself” [Beziehung auf sich] as constitutive of a qualitatively determinate individual. Self-reference is important because it establishes existence as a singular existent not in the sense of totality but in the logical sense of singular intuitions in Kant: a something that is what it is via relational determination. In keeping with Kant’s logical schema, however, both singularity-as-totality and singularity-as-something are characterised by immediacy. To work through the three moments of “Existence as such” from this perspective:

a. Existence in general in its immediacy lacks the logical resources for self-relation. Existence in general is the mediation of becoming taken in its immediacy: being as existent determinateness is only quality as such, and non-being or otherness is “submerged” in the moment of determinacy. There is in its immediacy no other quality but stable determinacy: being is determined “on the whole,” as it were, as quality; that is the what that existence is. There is, in other words, nothing other to which existence might be opposed: existence in general is singularity in the sense of totality, and not in the sense of an existent, a something.

b. The progressive unfolding of the moment of determinacy, however, gives rise to quality understood as negation, i.e. non-being as itself existent determinateness. This introduces opposition or mediation, but within quality itself. Recall that reality and negation are not distinct existents but ways of being determinate, ways in which the one quality is. The immediacy of singularity-as-totality has come to be internally differentiated, and so no longer immediate.

c. In the third moment, the immediacy of existence is returned to but as a self-relation that requires the moment of mediation be made explicit: a something is “simple existent self-reference” “but the something is thereby equally the mediation of itself with itself.” Again, quality proves to be the opposition within itself of reality and negation, an opposition that enables existence to be understood as the relation between its own two moments, i.e. as self-relation. In Hegel’s language something has being-in-itself [Insichsein], a something that has in it a quality of its own. It has an inside, however, and so an outside. It is one thing, not the entirety of the logical space. This outsideness will be worked out in section B.
In Houlgate’s understanding, this makes something the emergence of a sense of “interiority.” The interiority of “being-in-itself” is established in the “gap” between reality and its reference to itself (the moment of being) in negation. There is, in other words, a “space” inside the something in which distinct properties can inhere. In other words, with the emergence of something, existence is no longer the whole “space” of thought, but rather distinguishes the interiority of self-relation from what is outside it – though this outside remains at this point only implicit. Also, at this point, the logical structure of properties that inhere in something has yet to be developed from quality. At this point only two ways of being qualitative have been derived, as either reality or negation. The qualitative determinateness of the something does not yet entail property-bearing. Hegel makes this explicit: “Quality specifically is a property only when, in an external connection, it manifests itself as an immanent determination.” (88/21.102). “Determination” as I have noted above is distinct from “determinateness.” Both it and the “external connection” mentioned here form the subject of B. Finitude, to which we are underway.

**B. Finitude**

What has been derived thus far within the logical progression are the following forms of relation: indeterminate difference (that between being and nothing, articulated in becoming); determinate difference (between reality and negation as two ways of being qualitative); and the self-relation characteristic of a singular existent (something). Note again that we are still lacking relation between existents: in Hegel’s language, between “something” and “other.”

I said just above that quality is understood at this point as either reality or negation. However, this or has not yet been expressed or made explicit in the category of something. The something is only the self-relation of quality considered from the side of reality (accent on being) not from the side of negation (accent on non-being). In treating becoming in its immediacy above, it was claimed that a “derived immediacy” is immediate by prioritising – taking first – one side of the mediation it contains, namely that side equivalent to “being” and its further determinations, rather than non-being. Like existence in general, the immediacy of an existent is one in which the moment of being is prioritised: existence in its immediacy was determinate being not the being of determinateness as such (non-being); something in its immediacy is first of all the return of determinate being to itself through its relation to negation, not negation’s return through reality. In a move that we should be accustomed to by now, the “other” to which the something is opposed is generated by focussing on the moment of nothing – further developed now as non-being and negation – that has been demonstrated to be constitutive of any determinate being:

> “Something is, and is therefore also an existent... One of these moments, being, is now existence and further an existent. The other moment is equally an existent, but determined as the negative of something – an other [ein Anderes].” (89-90/21.104).

By taking up negation’s self-relation we derive the second of two self-relating existents: “something” is self-relating reality, quality as reality that comes to itself through negation; the “other” is self-relating negation, quality as negation that comes to itself through reality. As the “negative of something,” the “other” is that self-relating existent that is not something.

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251 This is not emphasised by Houlgate in *The Opening*. I rather draw it from attendance at Houlgate’s autumn term MA Seminar on the *Logic* at the University of Warwick in 2016.
Most important here is that the relation between something and other in its first appearance cannot be understood as the determinate difference characteristic of reality and negation. Reality and negation were two sides of determinate being. They were the singularity-as-totality of “existence in general” approached from either of its poles. Something and other, however, are themselves two distinct self-relating singulars. The emergence of existents complicates determinate difference, because we have to account for the moment of self-relation that characterises them.

To put it in Houlgate’s terms, Hegel in section B has shifted from an account of being different to being other, with the latter entailing the former but irreducible to it. Difference as we have seen is a contrastive determination, in which one’s determinacy is constituted by reference to what one is not; otherness, however, means that what one is not sustains an independence of its own. As such, being other has two components: being other than (contrastive relation) as well as being other in itself (self-relation). In the course of a few short and difficult passages, Hegel develops these two moments as “being-for-other” and “being-in-itself” respectively, which provide the logical matrix for the categories of determination, constitution, and limit.

Hegel’s development again advances via indifference. That is, the relation between something and other in its immediacy presents a further developed form of the indeterminate difference that characterised being and nothing. In his opening gloss on section B as a whole, Hegel says: “Something and other; at first they are indifferent [gleichgültig] to one another; an other is also an immediate existent, a something; the negation thus falls outside both [die Negation fällt so ausser beiden]” (90/21.104). And again when beginning sub-section B.a: “Something and other are, first, both existents or something. Secondly, each is equally an other. It is indifferent [gleichgültig] which is named first...” (90/21.105). Hegel’s point is this: something and other as two independent spheres of self-relation are indifferent in that we intend their difference but cannot distinguish them. Something is not its other, but at this level of abstraction, something at the same time is itself other, namely, other than its other.

By way of demonstration, consider two independent self-relating existents, A and B. We can start from something A and determine its other as B, but at the same time, that A is the other of B itself understood as something: “If of two beings we call the one A and the other B, the B is the one which is first determined as other. But the A is just as much the other of B. Both are other in the same way” (91/21.105). We can put this same point in terms of the logical content of something and other in their immediacy. The description “self-relating existent” holds as much for one as it does the other, such something and other are both something and at the same time both other. Each are equally identical with one another, such that designating one as something and the other as “other” can only be arbitrary (more on arbitrariness in a moment). Hegel’s unitary derivation has arrived at an explicit formulation of indifference as the logical incapacity to “tell the difference” between two individuals. Or rather, his unitary derivation has isolated that level of abstraction at which indifference as incapacity to tell the difference between individuals emerges as a necessary corollary of the conception of individuality in play.

Indifference understood as immediate difference was crucial to our reading of the Being chapter above. In treating something and other in the Existence chapter, Hegel takes the opportunity to rehearse the distinction between merely intending a difference and articulating or positing a

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252 The Opening, 322.
253 The Opening, 326.
254 The Opening, 324.
difference that we saw characterise the category of becoming. In the Being chapter, the description of being in intellectual intuition immediately holds for nothing and vice-versa; their difference is an immediate one. We intend or “mean” [meinen] to think pure being and not pure nothing or vice-versa, but immediately discover their indifference. In the Existence chapter, one intends [man meint] to establish a contrastive relation, to fix this as something in distinction from that other, and so “express something completely determinate” [etwas vollkommen Bestimmtes auszudrücken]. But again, this intention has as its result indifference: the failure to “tell the difference” between “somethings.”

Despite this similarity between being/nothing and something/other, however, we are in the Existence chapter not beginning from immediacy as such but rather a derived immediacy. Rather than the immediate indifference of being and nothing, we have here an indifference mediated by the self-relating determinacy that has come to characterise existence as existents. This means a kind of inversion in the structure of indifference: in Being we immediately think two opposed contents alternating in the singular “space” of pure thought; in Existence we think two singulars but with only one content available to think in them, with the result that we think them as identical. We have moved from one “space” alternating between two opposed contents to two self-enclosed “spaces” whose content is the same – that is, self-enclosed existence as such, without further determination.

Hegel does not explicitly mark the novelty of something/other indifference vis-à-vis being/nothing. However, that we are no longer dealing with the singular space of being or of existence in general but rather two singulars is I think tacitly indicated by Hegel’s introduction in section B.a of the language of externality, i.e. “outside” [ausser] and “apart” [ausserhalb]. I want to follow this externality component through in detail not only because it contains the germ of Hegel’s solution to indifference, but also because it speaks to the Kantian account of intuitional form.

Externality is operative in the dialectic of something and other in two related ways: the externality of something and other and the externality of the negation that relates them. Firstly, there is the externality of something and other that follows from existents understood as self-relating and so, as we saw in section A.c above, possessing “being-within-self” [insichsein]. Once there is a within, there is a without. The “without” or outside of the something is minimally determined as the site of the other: given that the something is its self-relation and attendant being-within-self, the other, as that which is not something, cannot coincide with the being-within-self of the something, but must be outside it. Rather than being and nothing replacing one another, we have with something and other a non-sensible account of the exclusion characteristic of Kant’s incongruent counterparts. With something and other thus determined as outside one another, Hegel also elaborates the logic of external relation in the following sense. The something is not the other, but there is no content in the something that refers or connects to the other or vice-versa. The “not” or negation that contrasts something and other is external to both terms – the second sense of externality in play. In the context of something and other, the “not” is what we might call an “external connector,” insofar as it is not immediately present or apparent in the self-enclosed totalities of something or other. Hegel’s way of putting this is to say that “the negation falls outside of both” [die Negation fällt sich ausser beiden]: the something is not the other, and the contrastive “not” belongs to the space between them, not to either term in its immediacy. The “not” that distinguishes something from other marks their externality to one another and is itself external to both. So we have two externalities operative: the outside-one-another being of the two terms, and the contrastive “not” outside of them both.

It is this second externality as a logical consequence of the something/other structure that introduces the possibility of merely intending a difference as discussed above. Hegel says that the “privileging” of one term over the other – taking something to be something and not other – is only a
“subjective designation, that falls outside the something itself” [dies Unterschieden oder Herausheben des einen Etwas ein subjektives, ausserhalb des Etwas selbst fallendes Bezeichnen ist] (91/21.105). We have seen Hegel repeatedly warning the reader against the importation of “external” contents not licensed by the immanent derivation of the Logic itself. Hegel’s point here is subtly different: the “subjective designation” that “falls outside” the something is made possible by the logical structure of something itself, insofar as something, taken in its immediacy as an independent, self-enclosed singular, lacks connection to another in itself. If we conceive the something minimally, i.e. as an independent singular existent, then any comparative relation to another must take the form of an externally imposed connector.255 Hegel is not licensed to talk of abstracted properties as that “external connector” which would distinguish one item from another, e.g. this is hot, that is not. Again rehearsing the argument of the Sense-certainty chapter of the Phenomenology, he instead uses the act of giving something a proper name – an “individual name” [individuelle Name] of a “singular object” [eines einzelnen Gegenstandes]. At an extreme, this act would be insisting that This is the proper name for this, not that. In using this example, Hegel repeats “arbitrary” [willkürlich] and its cognates four times. To distinguish something in its immediacy from its other is arbitrary in the sense that it is not licensed by the logical structure shared by something and other, but must be supplied from without. If something and other do not shed their immediacy, if they are not further developed or capable of further development – that is, if they are not understood as more than the immediacy of self-relation and “being-within-self” – then arbitrariness of distinction would be generalised.

In the Being chapter, the solution to immediate indifference was to articulate being and nothing together: one cannot say being without saying nothing at the same time. Here it is otherness that possesses in itself the resources that will enable a determinate account of the relation between existents.256 Above I said that something and other in their indifference are both something and both other. Indifference in its derived immediacy however has tacitly relied on taking something and other, but must be supplied from without. If something and other do not shed their immediacy, if they are not further developed or capable or further development – that is, if they are not understood as more than the immediacy of self-relation and “being-within-self” – then arbitrariness of distinction would be generalised.

Hegel turns to an emphasis on the logical character of otherness in this way:

...even for ordinary thinking [die Vorstellung] every existence equally determines itself as an other existence, so that there is no existence that remains determined simply as an existence, none which is not outside an existence and therefore is not itself an other (91/21.105).

Note that the generalisation of otherness reinforces the externality component: all somethings are others insofar as they are outside of one another. What however is logically entailed by this picture in which all are others? What is to be other? Hegel isolates two moments: “the other, as posited at first,

255 “Another way of putting the point is to say that every something is intrinsically vulnerable to being externally compared with another by a third party.” Houlgate, The Opening, 325.
256 “The other is more explicitly relational and negative since it consists precisely in not-being-something.” The Opening, 326.
though an other with reference to something [in Beziehung auf das Etwas], is other also for itself apart from the something [aber auch für sich ausserhalb desselben]” (91/21.106). The determination of the other, put more literally, is first of all to be other than or outside something. That was its immediate appearance, and which gave rise to the indifference detailed above. But to be other is also to itself be this otherness or outsideness itself, “the other by its own determination” (91/21.106). Hegel elaborates on “otherness itself” in this way: “thus the other, taken solely as such, is not the other of something, but is the other within, that is, the other of itself [das Andere an ihm selbst, d.i. das Andere seiner selbst]” (91/21.106). It is not immediately apparent that the formulations “other within” and “other of itself” are equivalent. Hegel unfortunately only spends one more sentence establishing this move, before deriving from the latter a logical account of alteration or change:

The other which is such for itself is the other within it, hence the other of itself and so the other of the other – therefore, the absolutely unequal in itself [in sich schlechthin Ungleiiche], that which negates itself [sich Negierende], alters [Verändernde] itself (92/21.106).

To be other is to be “other than” something, but also to have this otherness as one’s own determination. As we are considering something and other as both other, being “other than” as one’s “own determination” can only mean being other than the other that oneself is. 257 Hegel’s sudden claim for self-difference is perhaps surprising, but is only the unpacking of the indifference which begins section B. We began by saying that something in its immediacy is also itself other, insofar as it is the other of its other. Something is in this formulation already implicitly the other of itself insofar as it is designated a “something” but proves to have the same determination as its other, that is, to be the other that opposes it. To make this self-difference explicit we had only to draw out what “otherness itself” entailed by taking up the something/other relation from the perspective of otherness or externality.

Hegel makes two quick moves here, which result in a new understanding of the co-presence of other-relatedness and self-relation. Firstly, as we have seen in the quote above, Hegel has derived the logical necessity of change in abstraction from temporality. To be something is to be an other and this further entails being the other of oneself, becoming other to what one is. Secondly, to alter – to become other – is only for the other to reunite with itself insofar as, at this level of abstraction, the other that the other becomes has no further determination than otherness itself:

But [the other] equally remains identical with itself, for that into which it alters is the other; and this other has no additional determination; but that which alters itself is not determined in any other way than this, to be an other; in going over [geht daher] to this other, it only unites with itself [nur mit isch zusammen] (92/21.107).

This move reinstalls the triadic pattern established in section A in the derivation of something. We saw there that reality establishes self-relation through negation; here the self-relation characteristic of something is preserved in its alteration. The triad specific to section B is: (1) something proves to be

257 I rely again on Houlgate’s parsing: “... something and other must also be ‘other than...’ in their separate, quite unrelated otherness. They must be ‘other-than...’ purely within themselves. Logically, Hegel concludes, this can only mean that each is other than itself.” The Opening, 327. The biggest difference in our respective analyses here is that I characterise the shift from immediacy to mediation in this context from being both something to being both other in order to highlight Hegel’s generalisation of outside-one-another-being at this stage of the logical development.
the other of its other; (2) as the other of its own designation as something the something proves to be becoming other than itself or altering; (3) in altering it reunites with itself, insofar as it becomes only another other indistinguishable from it. Note that this third moment of “reuniting” is characterised by indifference – the other self-others into another logically indistinguishable other – except that we now have developed from the necessity of reference or transition between terms, not immediately apparent in something and other understood as independent self-relating existents.

There is an important similarity here with becoming as the solution to being/nothing indifference: to say what being is, we must articulate its inseparability from nothing; to say what something is, we cannot simply say “something” because that will prove indistinguishable from its other. We instead have to think a something that is “going over” to its other, in the process of becoming other. Something and other are no longer self-enclosed spheres, but rather understood as transitions into each other. Alteration is, however, determinate in a way that becoming was not: something and other do not “vanish” into one another as pure being and pure nothing; something retains the self-relation that determinate being proved to entail, even as that self-relation is now shown to entail other-relatedness. Hegel tries to make the co-presence of relation and self-relation clear in this sentence:

The something preserves itself in its non-being; it is essentially one with it and essentially not one with it. It therefore stands in reference to an otherness without being just this otherness [Es steht also in Beziehung auf sein Anderssein; es ist nicht rein sein Anderssein] (92/21.106). The other stands in a necessary connection to the other it becomes; on account of its own self-relation, however, it is not just this otherness. An other alters into an other, but in so doing retains its singularity and externality to other others. Indeed, there could be no account of alteration if otherness were not understood to entail its own self-relation and “being-within-self” – it is by consideration of the independence of the other that alteration is derived.

Hegel’s way of putting this new understanding of an existent as the co-presence of other-relation and self-relation is in terms of being-for-other [Sein-für-Anderes] and being-in-itself [Ansichsein].258 “Being-for-other and being-in-itself constitute the two moments of something” (92/21.107). The former names an existent as other than itself; the latter its preservation as an existent, i.e. characterised by self-relation. With these formulations, the externality characteristic of something and other is not simply abandoned, rather externality is taken to entail relation.

This sublation of externality is accomplished by shifting other-relatedness inside the logical determination of each existent. Hegel compares the something/other pair with being-for-other/being-in-itself along an external/internal axis:

“There are here two pairs of determinations: (1) something and other; (2) being-for-other and being-in-itself. The former contain the non-connectedness of their determinateness [Beziehunglosigkeit ihrer Bestimmtheit]; something and other fall apart [fallen auseinander]. But their truth is their connection; being-for-other and being-in-itself are therefore the same

258 Not to be confused with the earlier Insichsein, which characterised the interiority or “being-within-self” of the something. Ansichsein, as we will see when discussing the category of determination shortly, enables an articulation of the quality of an existent manifest through its other-relatedness. Insichsein simply expresses a moment of interiority that gives rise to the other as independent and unrelated.
determinations posited as moments of one and the same unity... Each [existent] thus contains within it, at the same time, also the moment diverse from it” (92/21.107).

Being-for-other is a necessary moment within an existent, but it appeared immediately as an other outside of it. In the indifference that begins section B, the necessity of standing in relation to another appears immediately as an external independent existence confronting the something. But this independent externality emerged with necessity: once the internality [insichsein] of a self-relating something is derived, a self-relation that is not the something necessarily emerges outside it, in line with the inseparability of being and nothing established as “first truth” in the Being chapter. All that the term “being-for-other” accomplishes is making explicit of the necessary relation between something and other, i.e. that to be something necessarily entails otherness, such that part of what it is to be something is to “refer” to that other. As Hegel puts it, “something behaves in this way in relation to the other through itself; since otherness is posited in it as its own moment” [Etwas verhält sich so aus sich selbst zum Anderen, weil das Anderssein als sein eigenes Moment in him gesetzt ist] (97/21.113). A more accurate and succinct translation of the first clause here would be: “something relates itself through its own self to the other.” 259 This formula contains – at least for the comparative project of this thesis – the key result of the Logic thus far. Namely, that something is in relation with or connected to its other is entailed by the structure of the something itself. It is no coincidence that, with this result, Hegel announces his version of determination [Bestimmung]. “Determination” for Hegel names the quality an existent retains in-itself in the face of its other-relatedness, and that is expressed or exhibited in its other-relatedness. Hegel says that determination is “affirmative determinateness” – that is, the quality of something – “…by which a something abides in its existence while involved with an other that would determine it, by which it preserves itself in its self-equality, holding on to it in its being-for-other” (95/21.110-11).

Determination and the System

Hegel helpfully provides an example to demonstrate this definition of determination. Three levels are present in this example. Firstly, Hegel’s example demonstrates the difference between “simple” determinateness and determination. Secondly, his example plays on the bivalence, mentioned in this dissertation’s introduction, of Bestimmung as both determination and “vocation,” one already employed in Fichte’s 1799 The Vocation of Man [Die Bestimmung des Menschen]. Thirdly, in using the category of determination to characterise humanity as “rational” and in relation to its other – at first “brute animality,” but then “natural and sensuous being” in general – Hegel also tells us something about the relation between nature and human mindedness or “spirit” in his system. 260 Obviously following Fichte, Hegel claims:


260 In what follows I follow Terry Pinkard’s deflationary understanding of spirit as “mindedness.” For Pinkard, our mindedness as geistige creatures is “non-naturalness,” but this negation does not express “a metaphysical difference (as that, say, between spiritual and physical “stuff”) or the exercise of a special form of causality.” Rather our rationality emerges as a further development or “complication” of the teleological structure of animal life. Pinkard, Hegel’s Naturalism: Mind, Nature, and the Final Ends of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 18, 30. This position I take to be already intimated by the determination of the human being as Hegel puts it at this early moment of the Logic: humanity relates to itself as rational through or across the animality that constitutes it.
The determination of the human being, its vocation, is rational thought [Die Bestimmung des Menschen ist die denkende Vernunft]: thinking in general is his simple determinateness; by it the human being is distinguished from the brute; he is thinking in himself, in so far as this thinking is distinguished also from his being-for-other, from his own natural and sensuous being that brings him in immediate association with the other (96/21.112).

At the level of determinateness as such, the rational human is not the “brute.” The human has the quality of rationality, while the animal is a way of being that is not rational. This kind of relegation of non-human others to the simple negation of rationality is today a subject of critique, but Hegel’s category of determination complicates the hierarchical picture somewhat. Determination understood as a certain configuration of being-in-itself and being-for-other allows for a more concrete elaboration of the relation of two qualitatively distinguished domains, i.e. the rationality of the human and “natural and sensuous being.” Humanity is not just one side of a difference; it is not explained simply through the negation that contrasts it with its other. Human rationality is also something for itself; it possesses a moment of self-identity through self-relation. As we saw in the derivation of the category of something above, the self-relation that constitutes the quality of an individual is sustained through the moment of otherness within: one can “connect to oneself” only insofar as one’s determinacy is the mediation of two distinct moments, i.e. of being and of not-being. As such, humanity must relate to itself as the rationality that it is through a moment of not being that rationality. Once we move from the indifference of self-relating somethings and others to an account of their necessary relation in determination, the determination of the human would mean to have a moment of its other within: rationality as the in-itself of the human is distinguished from natural sensuous being as humanity’s moment of being-for-other. In Hegel’s example above, it is through this moment of the other within that the human comes to exhibit the quality of thinking in its dealing with the natural world. Sensuous nature as our moment of being-for-other puts us into necessary relation with the sensuous nature “outside us.” Determination then is “vocation” in the sense that we bring thinking reason to nature, both epistemically and practically.

Determination is not simply the “not” of determinateness. Determination grasps the other as a moment of the quality of an existent, while still granting that otherness an existence of its own. Determination thus thinks two terms together, accounting for both the necessity of their relation and their separateness. This is not to say that an explanation of human rational thinking is provided by the

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261 If one finds that it does not complicate the picture enough, one can always read what follows as a merely formal illustration of the structure of determination.

262 In keeping with Hegel’s appropriation of Fichte’s thought here, thinking in its relation to that which is not thinking is characterised by the ought. We ought to submit nature to reason: both epistemically, by making natural processes transparent to us, and practically, by effective control over these processes. This sense of die Bestimmung des Menschen as an imperious striving is put most forcefully in Fichte’s Vocation of the Scholar, trans. Peter Preuss (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987). Hegel’s however predictably mounts a critical appropriation, shifting almost immediately to a critique of Fichte’s (and in Hegel’s view, Kant’s) one-sided emphasis on the ought. The ought for Hegel is reducible to two equally-valid formulae: “You can because you ought” and “You cannot, even though you ought” (SL 105/21.121) The ought, in other words, reduces determination to determinateness, to a simple opposition between rationality and the recalcitrant nature that will always oppose it; as a logic of mere determinateness, recognition that the opposed poles already contain a moment of their other is not available. This is not to say, of course, that the ought has no validity – it is characteristic of the practical – but Hegel’s reconciliation of the practical and epistemic stances is not fully articulated until the last chapter of the Logic.
category of determination alone – far from it – just that it provides a more adequate explanatory framework than determinateness. 263

In the above account, that determination grants otherness an existence of its own is not elucidated: what is developed in Hegel’s Bestimmung des Menschen passage is determination on the side of being, of humanity with the affirmative quality of rationality, not the sensuous nature determinate by its lack. Developing the determination of nature from its determinateness as that-which-rationality-is-not suggests something important about the relation between indifference and determination as it plays out in Hegel’s distinction between the philosophies of nature and spirit. That is, the being-for-other of the human that relates us to natural being is being-for-other in the most general possible sense: nature in its immediacy as “physical” (i.e. non-organic) for Hegel just is generalised otherness, so our being-for-other is really being-for-otherness-in-general. Indicatively, at the point of generalised “outside-one-another-being” discussed above – i.e. at the moment when something and other are both conceived as others of each other – Hegel explicitly raises “physical nature” as space, time, and matter:

Thus the other, taken solely as such, is not the other of something, but is the other within, that is, the other of itself. – Such an other, which is the other by its own determination, is physical nature; nature is the other of spirit; this, its determination, is at first a mere relativity expressing not a quality of nature itself but only a reference external to it... taken for itself the quality of nature is just this, to be the other within, that which-exists-outside-itself [Ausser-sich-Seiende] (in the determinations of space, time, matter) (91-92/21.106).

Although the two are not explicitly linked by Hegel, this paragraph is the other side of “the determination of the human being” passage discussed above, allowing us to step through the levels of determinateness and determination for the non-rationality opposed to humanity. At the level of simple determinateness – a “mere relativity” lacking the moment of self-relation – physical nature is not human mindedness or the “spiritual.” Once we move to the more concrete account of relation expressed by the being-for-other/being-in-itself distinction, however, the being-in-itself of nature, what it is within itself, is generalised externality, the indifference of each other to its other that begins Hegel’s account of space and time in the Realphilosophie. Indifference is the determination of physical nature in the Logic’s sense: it “abides” in its indifference in face of the other, i.e. to the thinking reason that characterises spirit. Indifference and externality – which will be fully developed by Hegel in the “Quantity” section of the Seinslogik – is the concept of physical nature, a distinct moment within the conceptuality articulated in the Logic as a whole (“The Concept”). When we as rational agents encounter physical nature, we encounter the indifference of its objects in their external relation to one another (and for Hegel, per 3.2 above, our mindedness does such objects the “honour” of representing them in the external relations proper to them). However, if indifference is the being-in-itself of nature, its moment of being-for-other, then, must contain a reference to it other. There must then be a moment within “physical nature” that is not the generalised externality of its being-within-self, but rather is for thinking reason.

263 The next stages of the Logic’s development – the logic of infinity and its immediacy in the category of being-for-itself that begins Chapter 3 – provides a more thoroughgoing account the self-relation characteristic of human mindedness. Hegel says being-for-itself intimates self-consciousness (127/21.145). Per Kreines and Ciavatta, a complete explanation would demand the teleological resources developed in the Logic’s third book. See note 136 above.
This might raise the spectre of the “spirit monist” reading of Hegel, an emergence story in which a “divine mind” inhabits and directs nature towards mindedness. The logical derivation of determination outlined above means that it need not, however. Generalised otherness, we have seen, contains within it a moment of relationality: individuals other to one another are individuated in and through their externality. Relationality can be taken, with Kant, as the distinguishing mark of our cognition (recall that, for Kant, conceptuality is distinguished from intuitional representation by synthesis, and that our consciousness is characterised as “a whole of compared and connected representations”). In logically demonstrating that indifference resolves itself into determination, Hegel demonstrates that the generalised externality of physical nature has within itself a moment of the relationality that characterises its other, “thinking reason.” That physical nature has as part of its own determination a moment of “being-for-thought” is not a “spirit monist” claim, but simply a logical one about the structure of indifference itself. Were nature to be indifference in itself without any moment of the relationality characteristic of thought, it would be unthinkable.

This point is made in a cognitive register in Kant’s argument for the impossibility of a “blooming buzz” of unsynthesised empirical intuitions. Indifference without synthesis issues in no determinacy. But insofar as synthesis is in Kant’s account dependent upon our conceptual capacities, Kant leaves open the possibility that natural objects really are entirely indifferent in themselves. As I noted in 2.1, Kant – at least on the deflationist reading – makes no substantial realist claims, and Hegel (per 3.1) goes too far whenever he suggests that Kant is committed to an in-itself radically indeterminate reality (the “formless lump” view). The Kantian cognitive framework only leaves that possibility open, as merely thinkable. But, as also noted in 3.1, Houlgate has argued that Hegel’s logic of determination nonetheless articulates a critique of Kant’s things-in-themselves not as ontologically substantial, but as “things of thought.” We are now in a better position to appreciate the force of this critique. In the “Existence” chapter, Hegel has elaborated the structure of the something as necessarily entailing relation to another: in order for a something to be distinguished from its other, that something must be understood as necessarily in relation to otherness. The determination of something, in other words, entails the co-presence of the logical components of being-in-itself and being-for-other. Kant suggests that the in-itself of something in abstraction from its being-for-other may be determinate. That is, we can think such a possibility because it satisfies the logical criterion of non-contradiction, though are constitutively unable to know whether or not it really obtains. Hegel in contrast argues that such a thought is itself incoherent: the self-relation that constitutes the logical structure of something in abstraction from its relation to otherness issues in the indifference of something and other; this indifference undermines or undoes the presumed individuality of the something that we are

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264 As I footnoted in introduction, Charles Taylor reads Hegel as committed to a cosmologically inflated super-subject in *Hegel* (1975). Regarding emergence, Gregory Moss, for example, claims that the *Logic* tells the story of God’s awakening from his dormancy in Nature. Gregory S. Moss, “Hegel’s Free Mechanism: The Resurrection of the Concept,” International Philosophical Quarterly 53, no. 1 (2013): 73-85. I have some sympathy for this picture, but it is a picture – it belongs in Hegel’s thinking to the “picture-thinking” characteristic of religion, not to the rationality of the philosophical domain.

265 One can unpack the significance of Hegel’s reference to physical nature within the *Logic* without immediate reliance on the Hegelian assertion that “nature is self-alienated spirit.” Carlson, *A Commentary to Hegel’s Science of Logic* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 72. In principle, I think that the categories of the *Logic* should be used to explicate the logical basis for bold claims of this kind in Hegel, not such claims the *Logic*.

266 Kant produces the idea of things-in-themselves by abstraction from two forms of being-for-other: being-for-our-mindedness and being-for-other-somethings. The former is emphasised by Houlgate in *The Opening*, 338-345; the latter by Franks, *All or Nothing*, 30-36.
immediately presented with. Or, to put this in Conant’s language, it turns out that we are not entitled to individual somethings unless the relational conditions of individuation are also committed to.

The Logic, of course, does not stop with Hegel’s account of human rationality in terms of determination. Determination gives rise to the category of “Constitution” [Beschaffenheit]. Constitution reverses the direction of constitutive being-for-other, articulating the vulnerability of an existent to become other than what it is in itself through the moment of its other-relatedness. To use again the “thinking reason” example above, our other-relatedness connects us to the brute, but also entails the possibility that our reason is overrun by brutishness, that we alter into a self-relating something not characterised by the quality of thought, but by its other or negation. The framework of determination, although minimal, dovetails with common sense: in ordinary human interpersonal relationships, one can be oneself in one’s relation to the other, or one can have oneself altered in relation to the other. As such, determination and constitution can be seen as accounts of relational individuation that unpack and relate the content of both sides of that formulation: determination is the minimal logical structure of an individual in relation; constitution that of an individual in relation.

The external opposition between something and other has developed into the opposition between being-in-itself and being-for-other characteristic of each something, and again into determination and constitution as two opposed ways in which being-in-itself and being-for-other can be arranged. The determination/constitution opposition will itself be taken together or mediated by the category of limit, which marks first the reciprocity of influence between existents, but further entails their necessary end or finitude. However, I will stop the logical progression here in order to make some broader claims about Kant and Hegel’s alternative derivations and conceptions of determination.
Conclusion
This thesis has analysed Kant and Hegel’s respective accounts of determination. I have argued that these accounts respond to different forms of indifferent indeterminacy. We can summarise this analysis in three stages: Kant’s critique of rationalist indifference, which issues in an account of determinacy as the togetherness of concept and intuition as distinct representational forms; Hegel’s critique of Kantianism as partially remaining within an empiricist epistemic frame that opposes in themselves indifferent sensibly-given objects to our conceptualisation of them; and Hegel’s attempt to ontologically generalise the togetherness principle as constitutive of determinacy in general.

Kant diagnoses existential indifference in rationalism’s understanding of determination as logical predication: on the criterion of non-contradiction alone, one could always find oneself speaking of nothing rather than something, and unable to tell the difference. Kant develops the concept/intuition model of determination in order to redress this problem: the togetherness of concept and intuition guarantees that logical determination has objective purport, i.e. constitutes cognition of an empirically real object. The first limb of Kant’s togetherness principle, “thoughts without content are empty,” then, addresses the always possible indeterminacy of rationalist logicism in its failure to articulate an independent intuitional form of representation as a condition of determinate cognition.

But from the Hegelian perspective, if Kant is successful against rationalist indifference, the concept/intuition distinction in its independent articulation of sensible and conceptual forms maintains another form of indifference, this time traceable to empiricism. On the conceptualist reading of Kant followed in this thesis, intuitions are understood to provide externally relationally individuated objects to cognition, but in their immediacy – that is, without conceptual mediation – intuitions so understood are indifferent to one another in the sense that they cannot be qualitatively discriminated. Hence, for Hegel, the second limb of the togetherness principle, that “intuitions without concepts are blind,” generalises the external relationality characteristic of intuitional form to the concept/intuition framework as a whole, tacitly repeating the empiricist view in which conceptual form must be applied or “projected” onto an independent sensible manifold in itself lacking the relationality that characterises our conceptual capacities.

Hegel nonetheless takes Kant’s concept/intuition distinction to be an instance of the “idealist” principle in which opposed poles taken in “isolation” from one another issue in no determinacy (FK 68/302-303). What is required for Hegel, then, is not a retreat from or abstract “overcoming” of Kant’s concept/intuition model, but a generalisation of that model such that determinacy in general – of thought as much as of being – is characterised by the togetherness of the logical components of concept and intuition.

Hegel’s program begins by critically re-deploying post-Kantian doctrines of Intellectual Intuition in order to alter the Kantian account of categorial purport as concerning the applicability of concepts to sensible appearance. Kant’s discursivity thesis – that thought can only think, can only mediate representations given from sensibility – does not account for thought’s own immediate, singular being. For Hegel, insofar as thought possesses immediate being, it is able to determine the logical structures of determinacy as such without reference to sensible intuition, and without constitutive reference to the forms of judgment.

In the first chapter of the Doctrine of Being, Hegel demonstrates the necessary togetherness of the logical components of concept and intuition. The thought of pure being in abstraction from all determinacy of itself immediately generates necessity of relation to what it is not, i.e. the necessity of mediation. The distinguishability of being and nothing within the singular “space” of thought is
dependent upon an articulation of their necessary togetherness in the category of becoming. Undertaken as it is at a maximally conceivable level of abstraction, Hegel takes himself to have demonstrated togetherness or the “inseparability of the two” with utmost generality, the “first truth” of the Logic’s unitary derivation as “foundation” [Grund] and “element of all that follows” (62/21.72).

In the second chapter of the Seinslogik, Hegel takes up becoming in its immediacy in order to derive the logical structure of relational individuation as constitutive of qualitative determination. That is, the Existence chapter articulates the relational individuation characteristic of intuitional form and the categories of quality – in Kant separately derived in the Aesthetic and the Metaphysical Deduction – in one derivation. For Hegel, the categories of “reality” and “negation” that Kant derives from the categorical judgment and its negation in fact articulate the minimal determinacy that issues from the necessary togetherness or immediate mediation of being and nothing in becoming. This self-relation that emerges from the presence of negation in reality and vice-versa issues in the category of “something,” enabling Hegel to provide a logical account of the structure of the minimal object of thought in Kantian idealism. The “something” in Kant is individuated by its being placed and ordered outside of other such somethings in the forms of our sensibility, but a contribution of conceptuality is required in order for such somethings to be distinguished from one another. In Hegel, the necessary togetherness of these two moments for qualitative determination to obtain is built-in to the structure of something. Something in its immediacy is indifferent or indistinguishable from its others, and this immediate indifference is a logical corollary of the externality of their relation. That something, however, logically entails reference to otherness; in distinguishing something and other, we render explicit the form of relationality individuation determinative of something in its immediacy, rather than bring an independent conceptual function to relational individuation.

In relation to current scholarship in German Idealism, this analysis makes four contributions, all of which are susceptible to further treatment in independent papers.

1. It draws attention to the centrality of Kant’s A Deduction account of the syntheses of apprehension and reproduction for the opening moves of Hegel’s Logic. Hegelian conceptuality is minimally the grasping together of discrete moments in order that they be distinguished. After Pippin’s Hegel’s Idealism, such a reading is not contentious, though I follow Houlgate in suggesting that the Logic’s post-Kantian account of synthesis is bound up with an ontological commitment.

2. My account provides one line of answer to the Kantian argument that Hegel does not treat Kantian intuitional form, and thus undoes Kant’s critique of rationalism. Rather, Hegel is attentive to the specificity of intuitional form, and indeed his critique of Kant’s account of the concept/intuition distinction is that Kant illegitimately models the relation between concepts and intuitions on the external relationality specific to intuitions. Furthermore, Hegel’s appropriation of Fichte’s post-Kantian unitary derivation program seeks to derive and so rationally legitimate intuitional form as a way of being in general, not just our so-constituted sensibility. How this kind of conceptualism – with intuitional form “nested” as a semi-autonomous moment with conceptuality as such – distinguishes itself from rationalism requires further treatment.

3. It acknowledges the continued relevance of the post-Kantian doctrine of Intellectual Intuition for Hegel’s mature project, denied in Pippin, Westphal, and Longuenesse. Globally, without a challenge to the discursivity thesis, the Logic could neither begin nor progress, insofar as each category derivation begins from the previous category itself taken in its immediacy. More
locally, failure to read the *Logic* as conducted within intellectual intuition obscures the correspondence between Kant’s account of incongruent counterparts and Hegel’s dialectic of Being.

4. It allows us to nuance James Conant’s otherwise convincing account of Kant’s first *Critique* as “dialectical.” I will spend a little time on this fourth point here, because it helps to differentiate the Kant and Hegel’s respective understandings of “togetherness.”

Putting the Kant-Hegel comparison as broadly as possible, what is methodologically at stake in Kant’s and Hegel’s respective accounts of togetherness is whether one starts from two only *seemingly* independent terms, or one generates opposed terms and their necessary relation from *one* immediately given term. I agree with Conant that the desideratum of the Aesthetic and Analytic – when read together – is the “togetherness principle,” *not* a layer-cake interpretation (pushed to its extreme in Kantian nonconceptualism). But against Conant, I do not think there’s a way of reading Kant’s text that makes the question unaskable: the “layer-cake” conception is built into the *Critique*’s two-stage argument, and Kant’s “dialectical” undermining of that conception takes exegetical work to uncover.

I say “dialectical” because Conant’s understanding of “dialectic” does not catch the specific Hegelian sense that interests us in accounting for the togetherness of mediation and immediacy as it emerges in the *Logic* from immediacy itself. Conant takes the word to mean a structure in which two elements have necessary reference to one another, such that taking either element in abstraction from that structure cannot account for that element’s conditions of possibility. Now, dialectic does have this function in Hegel: “representation” in the Vorbegriff sense, insofar as it follows “the sensory” in presenting elements in “isolation” from one another, takes such discrete elements as primary and *then* attempts to account for the relation that in fact individuates them. We might call the corrective to this error a critical dialectic: showing how two things which are taken to be separate (say, concepts and intuitions) in fact mutually condition one another. The *Phenomenology* often functions this way: the master takes himself to be independent, but has abstracted from the relation that conditions the possibility of there being “masters” at all (i.e. that there are slaves constituted in a certain way, and so constituted because of their relation to mastery). Or, Sense-certainty takes the “This” to be to the most certain knowledge, but has abstracted from the relational individuation that conditions the possibility of there being immediate items for sense in the first place. The *Phenomenology* takes up dialectic in this way because it begins from sensuous immediacy, which is structured by externality, such that terms *appear* in their immediacy without the relation that in fact determines them. While I would need to elaborate this claim in a treatment of the *Phenomenology*, the Kantian analogue is nonetheless clear: intuitions in their singular immediacy appear without the relations that individuate and distinguish them being *immediately* cognised.

Dialectic in the *Logic*, however, comes at necessary relations from the other direction. It is not critical of an opposition between two terms (truth and certainty, master and slave) that counts as given in a particular domain of experience. It rather seeks to prove the necessity of the relation between opposed terms by generating the opposition itself. Dialectic in Hegel’s *Logic* means that something, simply in being what it is, turns out to be the other of what it was immediately taken to be. So the *Logic*’s dialectical argument for the mediation-immediacy relation is not that we reconstruct their forms independently in abstraction from one another and *then* demonstrate the necessity of their relation. It is rather that their necessary relation is proven insofar as thinking one term genetically gives rise to the second. So, again, in the *Logic* “dialectical” means that we start with one term in its immediacy
and, simply by thinking that one term through, we get its negation (and then a third term as articulating the necessity of their relation); in Conant’s understanding it means the mutual conditioning of a given two.

I want to finish by addressing two key omissions, which I also hope to redress in further research. The account summarised above truncates both the Critique and the Logic, excluding or underplaying concepts I now see to be crucial for Kant and Hegel’s respective understandings of determination. Including those moments may well alter the tenor of my analysis on some points.

Firstly, I do not treat Kant’s Transcendental Dialectic. It would be possible to treat Kant’s argumentative strategy there, from a Hegelian point of view, as a sustained abrogation of the generalised togetherness characteristic of idealism as such. As Hegel puts it in the “Quantity” chapter, “the Kantian antinomies contain nothing more that the wholly simple categorical assertion of each of the two opposed moments of a determination, each on its own, isolated from the other” (158/21.181) The continuity between Hegel’s thinking here and the crucial Faith and Knowledge passage addressed in 3.1 is obvious.

The centrality of the Kantian dialectic was brought to my attention by two texts read after the central contentions and analyses of this thesis were framed and underway. Paul Franks in All or Nothing is able to economically present post-Kantianism’s central motivations by foregrounding Jacobi’s Spinozist reading of Kant’s Aesthetic, that is, in terms of the difference between Spinoza’s understanding of determination as limitations of a real ground of being and Kant’s account of limitation as individuating spatio-temporal appearance. Now, Kant’s treats the possibility of a real ground of being in the Transcendental Ideal section of the Transcendental Dialectic by suggesting that thoroughgoing determination – the complete determination of an object by selecting one from every pair of possible predicates – leads reason to presuppose a “sum total of reality” (totum realitatis) as a pool of all possible predicate pairs, further hypostatised as a being containing all affirmative determinations (ens realissimum, the most real being).267 It is in this context that Kant’s third sense of Intellectual Intuition – immediate apprehension of totality as the real ground of being, discussed in §§76-77 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment – must be interpreted. Most importantly for the Kant-Hegel comparison, this third sense directly links to the account of relational individuation in Hegel’s Doctrine of Being in a way that Intellectual Intuition as it is framed by Fichte does not. That is, Intellectual Intuition as providing an indubitably certain Grundsatz à la Fichte is important for Hegel, but my emphasis on it in the above is one-sided and so misleading. Hegel’s claim in the Phenomenology that “the whole is the true” is well known; in the case of the Logic, this claim means that on Hegel’s version the foundational principle of a unitary category derivation is only the “poorest” truth, i.e. truth in its immediacy. “Being, pure being” counts as true only when it is fully developed into a whole of compared and connected necessary representations, i.e. the totality of conceptual forms that comprise the Logic (The Concept). Comparing Kant’s understanding of the totum realitatis as a predicate pool presupposed by any empirical determination and Hegel’s Concept as itself a condition of any determinacy would I now think give a better picture of the core of the Kant-Hegel relation, rather than proceeding through the question of sensibility.

267 This already complicated material is further complicated by its status as an autocritique: Kant deflates his pre-Critical argument for the existence of God (The Only Possible Proof in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God, 1763) by arguing that reason is led to this idea by its attempt to provide complete determinations, but that such an idea constitutes only a reification of the activity of determination. See Allison, Transcendental Idealism, 397-400.
On this point, James Kreines in *Reason in the World* has convincingly argued against what he calls “epistemology-first” readings of the Kant-Hegel relation, instead suggesting that it is Hegel’s appropriation of the Transcendental Dialectic that constitutes the singularity of the Hegelian system. In Kreines’ view, Hegel’s response to Kant is not or not primarily to characterise Kant’s “Copernican” turn to our cognitive conditions as leaving things-in-themselves indeterminate and then either: (a) “to give an anti-Kantian answer to the Copernican question”; (b) “to borrow and extend Kant’s answer”; or (c) “to somehow combine both answers.” 268 My approach clearly attempts (c): Hegel extends Kantian togetherness only by shedding the Copernican frame in which our cognition is determinative, instead advancing a realism in which conceptuality is operative in being and in thought. From Kreines’ perspective, my criticisms of McDowell and Sedgwick in 3.1 would essentially amount to the claim that they attempt (b) without properly providing (a). Kreines’ position instead suggests that Hegel’s project is not best understood as an immediate contestation of the relation of the faculties of understanding and sensibility, but rather as a critical appropriation of Kant’s account of the faculty of *reason* as necessarily pursuing the “unconditioned” or, in Kreines’ reformulation, “completeness of explanation.” 269 This approach dovetails with that of Franks, and Franks indicatively approaches post-Kantian idealism through a similar framework, as motivated by the challenge of negotiating explanatory arbitrariness, regress, and circularity (the “Agrippan Trilemma”). 270 Approaching the Kant-Hegel relation from their respective accounts of completeness of explanation and totality would better draw the project of the *Logic* as a whole into view, rather than my above focus on Hegel’s account of only the most immediate forms of objectivity. The shift to a vocabulary of explanation has the benefit of side-stepping the perhaps unresolvable – and perhaps uninteresting – question of ontological categorial purport.

The idea of the *whole* of the *Logic* leads me to problems raised by my focus on only its opening categories. If the general lineaments of the above story were to be substantiated, at least three further moments of the *Logic* would need to be considered: the *Seinslogik*’s second section (“Quantity”); the dialectic of mechanism that references it in the second section of the *Begriffslogik*; and the derivation of the object from the syllogism in the first section of the *Begriffslogik* that mechanism presupposes. Quantitative determination for Hegel follows from the derivation of many self-relating individuals in the third chapter of the “Quality” section (“Being-for-self”). Quantity is a model of determination characterised by “continuity” and “discreteness” of self-relating ones indifferent to any qualitative distinction between them: each one is outside every other one (and is therefore a discrete unit); each one is qualitatively identical to every other (and is therefore continuous with it) (154/21.176). This picture of continuity and discreteness is picked up in the *Begriffslogik*, in which a mechanistic model of determination collapses into indifference insofar as every mechanical object is to be explained by reference to another such object, and so on. Hegel’s claim is that with the resources of mechanism alone we either terminate explanation arbitrarily or offer an infinitely regressive one (633/12.135). Hegel’s solution, which corresponds closely to the emergence of qualitative determination from the indifference of something and other in the “Existence” chapter and with the emergence of “Measure” as the dialectical unity of quantity and quality in the third section of the *Seinslogik*, is that each mechanical object must be understood to have *in its concept* a necessary relation to its others. In the Mechanism chapter, this relation is the logical form of gravitational relation: each mechanical object

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268 *Reason in the World*, 16.
270 *All or Nothing*, 18.
is determinate only with reference to the “central body” [Zentralkörper] (12.143/641). Now, while this raises the problem of how Newtonian physics finds its way into an a priori category derivation,\textsuperscript{271} it does help us bring the abstract derivation of determination in the \textit{Seinslogik} into more direct relation with contemporary questions of scientific and liberal naturalism, a project I have begun in two 2017 conference papers.\textsuperscript{272} Insofar as the mechanical object is for Hegel the most immediate form of objectivity, this line of thinking also brings into view Hegel’s derivation of the object as such in the “Syllogism” chapter of the first section of the \textit{Begriffslogik} (“Subjectivity”). Given that the “Subjectivity” section treats the relation between the singular (or the individual \textit{Das Einzelne}) and universality and their mediation in particularity, and then derives the mechanical object as the immediacy of the most integrated – most fully mediated – form of singularity/particularity/universality relation (the disjunctive syllogism), a complete comparative reading of the logical components of Kant’s concept/intuition distinction in Hegel’s \textit{Logic} would need to consider the Doctrine of the Concept.\textsuperscript{273}

Nonetheless, one cannot reproduce the entirety of the \textit{Critique} and the \textit{Logic}; one has to decide on an interpretive frame and see what it catches – and what it misses. I am confident that the account of the Kant-Hegel relation presented in this thesis is accurate and robust enough to be integrated into, rather than overturned by, future treatments of the concept of determination in Kant’s and Hegel’s respective \textit{oeuvres}.


\textsuperscript{272} Gene Flenady, “Normativity in Nature,” German Classical Philosophy and Naturalism, Georgetown University, Washington D.C., 14-16 December 2017 and “Striving toward the Centre: Determinism, Indifference, and Normativity in Hegel’s Mechanism,” \textit{Kausalität bei Hegel}, LMU Munich, 20-21 May 2017. My understanding of scientific naturalism as committed to the reductive or eliminativist claim that the world consists of nothing but the entities to which mechanistic explanation commit us is drawn from the editors’ introduction to \textit{Naturalism and Normativity}, ed. Mario de Caro and David Macarthur (New York: Columbia UP, 2010), 72.

\textsuperscript{273} Stern’s \textit{Hegel, Kant and the Structure of the Object} motivates the Hegelian account of objectivity by drawing attention to the indifference of intuitions in abstraction from conceptual synthesis, a line I broadly follow (see 3.2 above). Stern then treats Hegel’s \textit{Begriffslogik} as providing an account of determination not reducible to the subsumption of individuals under more general concepts; objects are rather determinate on account of their own immanent conceptuality as instances of a “substance-kind.” The above dissertation can be read as filling in a gap between Stern’s account of Kant’s bundle theory and Hegel’s account of universality in \textit{Begriffslogik}, but the precise relation between Hegelian immanent conceptuality advanced in Stern’s “substance kinds” (and Kreines’ “concept thesis”) and the account of qualitative determination as relational individuation advanced here would need to be worked out.
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