UNSPECIFIED (2000) Why are tax expenditures for giving embodied in fiscal constitutions? In: International Seminar in Public Economics Conference on Political Economy of Tax Structure and the Relationship of Taxes to Benefits, DEC 11-14, 1997, ST CATHERINES COLL, OXFORD, ENGLAND.

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Abstract

This paper asks whether there can be unanimous support for a fiscal constitution that includes tax expenditures for giving among the set of available fiscal instruments. We describe a political economy model of fiscal choices where individuals with different incomes vote over levels of proportional income taxation and over tax incentives for giving, and investigate how the availability of such incentives affects political equilibrium outcomes and welfare for different income groups. We find that unanimous support for the use of tax incentives for giving can indeed arise, and is more likely the more unequal is the distribution of income. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved. JEL classification: H2; H4.

Item Type:	Conference Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Journal or Publication Title:	JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
Publisher:	ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
ISSN:	0047-2727
Date:	March 2000
Volume:	75
Number:	3
Number of Pages:	23
Page Range:	pp. 365-387
Publication Status:	Published
Title of Event:	International Seminar in Public Economics Conference on Political Economy of Tax Structure and the Relationship of Taxes to Benefits
Location of Event:	ST CATHERINES COLL, OXFORD, ENGLAND
Date(s) of Event:	DEC 11-14, 1997
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/13683

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