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Expectations, network centrality, and public good contributions : Experimental evidence from India

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Caria, A. Stefano and Fafchamps, Marcel (2019) Expectations, network centrality, and public good contributions : Experimental evidence from India. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 167 . pp. 391-408. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2017.07.024 ISSN 0167-2681.

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2017.07.024

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Abstract

Do individuals in a position of social influence contribute more to public goods than their less connected partners? Can we motivate these influential individuals by disclosing how others expect them to act? To answer these questions, we play a public good game on a star network. The experimental design is such that efficiency and equality considerations should motivate central players to contribute more than others. Using a subject population familiar with contributions to public goods on social networks, we find that central players contribute just as much as the average of other players, leading to a large loss of efficiency. When we disclose the expectations of other players, we find that central players often adjust their contributions to meet the expectations of the group. Expectations disclosure leads to higher contributions in groups that have weak social ties outside of the experiment. In groups where ties are strong, it has no significant effect. This evidence casts doubt on the idea that individuals who, by their social position, can contribute more effectively to the public good rise to the challenge by contributing more than others. In some, but not all social groups, these individuals can be motivated to increase contributions by disclosing the expectations of others.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Public goods, Economics -- Psychological aspects, Social networks -- India, Online social networks -- India, Guilt, Disclosure of information -- Economic aspects -- India
Journal or Publication Title: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Publisher: Elsevier BV * North-Holland
ISSN: 0167-2681
Official Date: November 2019
Dates:
DateEvent
November 2019Published
12 August 2017Available
18 July 2017Accepted
Volume: 167
Page Range: pp. 391-408
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.07.024
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access
Date of first compliant deposit: 26 May 2020
Date of first compliant Open Access: 27 May 2020
RIOXX Funder/Project Grant:
Project/Grant IDRIOXX Funder NameFunder ID
UNSPECIFIEDDepartment for International Developmenthttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100000278
UNSPECIFIED[ESRC] Economic and Social Research Councilhttp://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100000269

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