Sovereign liquidity crises: The strategic case for a payments standstill
UNSPECIFIED (2000) Sovereign liquidity crises: The strategic case for a payments standstill. In: Conference on the Origins and Management of Financial Crises, BANK ENGLAND, LONDON, ENGLAND, JUL 11-14, 1997. Published in: ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 110 (460). pp. 335-362.Full text not available from this repository.
Is sovereign borrowing so different from corporate debt that there is no need for bankruptcy style procedures to protect debtors? With the waiver of immunity, sovereign debtors who already face severe disruption from short-term creditors grabbing their currency reserves are also exposed to litigious creditors trying to seize what assets they can in a 'race of the vultures'.
The lack of an orderly procedure for resolving sovereign liquidity crises means that the IMF is de facto forced to bail out countries in trouble. The strategic case for legalising standstills is to rescue the international financial system from this 'time consistency' trap.
|Item Type:||Conference Item (UNSPECIFIED)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions|
|Journal or Publication Title:||ECONOMIC JOURNAL|
|Publisher:||BLACKWELL PUBL LTD|
|Official Date:||January 2000|
|Number of Pages:||28|
|Page Range:||pp. 335-362|
|Title of Event:||Conference on the Origins and Management of Financial Crises|
|Location of Event:||BANK ENGLAND, LONDON, ENGLAND|
|Date(s) of Event:||JUL 11-14, 1997|
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