UNSPECIFIED (2000) Sovereign liquidity crises: The strategic case for a payments standstill. In: Conference on the Origins and Management of Financial Crises, BANK ENGLAND, LONDON, ENGLAND, JUL 11-14, 1997BLACKWELL PUBL LTD.

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Abstract

Is sovereign borrowing so different from corporate debt that there is no need for bankruptcy style procedures to protect debtors? With the waiver of immunity, sovereign debtors who already face severe disruption from short-term creditors grabbing their currency reserves are also exposed to litigious creditors trying to seize what assets they can in a 'race of the vultures'. The lack of an orderly procedure for resolving sovereign liquidity crises means that the IMF is de facto forced to bail out countries in trouble. The strategic case for legalising standstills is to rescue the international financial system from this 'time consistency' trap.

Item Type:	Conference Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Journal or Publication Title:	ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Publisher:	BLACKWELL PUBL LTD
ISSN:	0013-0133
Date:	January 2000
Volume:	110
Number:	460
Number of Pages:	28
Page Range:	pp. 335-362
Publication Status:	Published
Title of Event:	Conference on the Origins and Management of Financial Crises
Location of Event:	BANK ENGLAND, LONDON, ENGLAND
Date(s) of Event:	JUL 11-14, 1997
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/13749

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