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Beyond normal form invariance: first mover advantage in twostage games with or without predictable cheap talk
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Hammond, Peter J., 1945 (2008) Beyond normal form invariance: first mover advantage in twostage games with or without predictable cheap talk. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. (Warwick economic research papers).

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Abstract
Von Neumann (1928) not only introduced a fairly general version of the extensive form game concept. He also hypothesized that only the normal form was relevant to rational play. Yet even in Battle of the Sexes, this hypothesis seems contradicted by players' actual behaviour in experiments. Here a refined Nash equilibrium is proposed for games where one player moves first, and the only other player moves second without knowing the first move. The refinement relies on a tacit understanding of the only credible and straightforward perfect Bayesian equilibrium in a corresponding game allowing a predictable direct form of cheap talk.
Item Type:  Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper) 

Subjects:  H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory 
Divisions:  Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics 
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):  Von Neumann, John, 19031957, Game theory, Equilibrium (Economics), Bayesian statistical decision theory 
Series Name:  Warwick economic research papers 
Publisher:  University of Warwick, Department of Economics 
Place of Publication:  Coventry 
Date:  10 January 2008 
Number:  No.835 
Number of Pages:  24 
Status:  Not Peer Reviewed 
Access rights to Published version:  Open Access 
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URI:  http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/1379 
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