Framing principles and solving problems in memory research
UNSPECIFIED. (1999) Framing principles and solving problems in memory research. SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, 40 (4 Suppl. S). pp. 51-53. ISSN 0036-5564Full text not available from this repository.
Is the goal of psychology the formulation of a set of principles? Professor Smedslund appears to assume that it is, and furthermore seeks to show that "many psychological principles are logical rather than empirical" (Smedslund, 1999). But if the goal of psychology is not the framing of a set of principles, then it may be less pressing to investigate whether those principles which have been proposed are logical or empirical.
The pursuit, independently of experiment, of a set of principles of psychology has a considerable history to it. "Principles of Psychology" was of course the name of the most celebrated of all texts in Psychology, that of William James (1890). However, James was an advocate of what was, at that time, the new world of psychology experiments. The kind of principles explored by Smedslund resonate more strongly with the products of the associative philosophy which underlay the earlier "Principles of Psychology" of Herbert Spencer (1870-1872)-as Brett (1912-1921, Vol. 3, p. 218) observed of Spencer's volumes, "From biology in general we are thus led to neurology and to psychology. Having in this way prepared a place for psychology, Spencer does little more than drop into it the traditional Associationism". Smedslund himself is not an advocate of traditional associationism. Nevertheless, it is possible to see a degree of continuity between his "psychologic" principles of similarity, ambiguity, salience and attention and, for example, the "logic" laws of similarity, contiguity and intensity proposed by John Stuart Mill (1843).
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology|
|Journal or Publication Title:||SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY|
|Publisher:||SCANDINAVIAN UNIVERSITY PRESS|
|Official Date:||December 1999|
|Number:||4 Suppl. S|
|Number of Pages:||3|
|Page Range:||pp. 51-53|
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