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A behavioral power index
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Kaniovski, Serguei and Leech, Dennis (2009) A behavioral power index. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. (Warwick economic research papers).
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Official URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/resear...
Abstract
We propose an empirically relevant measure of voting power that uses the information about real or assumed voting patterns conveyed by a joint probability distribution on the set of voting outcomes, and apply it to the voting data of the Supreme Court of the United States.
| Item Type: | Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics |
| Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | United States. Supreme Court, Decision making, Choice (Psychology), Voting research |
| Series Name: | Warwick economic research papers |
| Publisher: | University of Warwick, Department of Economics |
| Place of Publication: | Coventry |
| Date: | 11 March 2009 |
| Number: | No.831 |
| Number of Pages: | 22 |
| Status: | Not Peer Reviewed |
| Access rights to Published version: | Open Access |
| Description: | Original version published in 2007, this version updated March 11, 2009. |
| Funder: | Leverhulme Trust (LT) |
| Grant number: | F/07 004/AJ (LT) |
| References: | Banzhaf, J. F. (1965). Weighted voting does not work: a mathematical analysis. Rutgers Law Review 19: 317–343. Braham, M. and Holler, M. (2005a). The impossibility of a preference-based power index. Journal of Theoretical Politics 17: 137–157. Braham, M. and Holler, M. (2005b). Power and preferences again. A reply to Napel and Widgr´en. Journal of Theoretical Politics 17: 389–395. Coleman, J. S. (1973). Loss of power. American Sociological Review 38: 1–17. Dowding, K. (1996). Power. Open University Press. Dubey, P. and Shapley, L. S. (1979). Mathematical properties of the Banzhaf power index. Mathematics of Operations Research 4: 99–131. Edelman, P. H. (2004). The dimension of the Supreme Court. Constitutional Commentary 20: 557–570. Edelman, P. H. and Chen, J. (1996). The most dangerous Justice: the Supreme Court at the bar of mathematics. Southern California Law Review 70: 63–111. Everitt, B. S. (1992). The analysis of contingency tables. Chapman & Hall. Felsenthal, D. S. and Machover, M. (2004). A priori voting power: what is it all about? Political Studies Review 2: 1–23. Garrett, G. and Tsebelis, G. (1999). Why resist the temptation of power indices in the European Union? Journal of Theoretical Politics 11: 291–308. Gelman, A., Katz, J. N., and Bafumi, J. (2004). Standard voting power indices don’t work: an empirical analysis. British Journal of Political Science 34: 657–674. Hayes-Renshaw, F., van Aken, W., and Wallace, H. (2006). When and why the EU council of ministers votes explicitly. Journal of Common Market Studies 44: 161–194. Heard, A. and Swartz, T. (1998). Empirical Banzhaf indices. Public Choice 97: 701–707. Laruelle, A. and Valenciano, F. (2005). Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations. Social Choice and Welfare 24: 171–197. Morriss, P. (2002). Power: a philosophical analysis. Manchester University Press. Napel, S. and Widgr´en, M. (2004). Power measurement as sensitivity analysis: a unified approach. Journal of Theoretical Politics 16: 517 – 538. Napel, S. and Widgr´en, M. (2005). The possibility of a preference-based power index. Journal of Theoretical Politics 17: 377–387. Newcombe, H., Ross, M., and Newcombe, A. G. (1970). United Nations voting patterns. International Organization 24: 100–121. Penrose, L. S. (1946). The elementary statistics of majority voting. Journal of Royal Statistical Society 109: 53–57. Sirovich, L. (2003). A pattern analysis of the Second Rehnquist US Supreme Court. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 100: 7432–7437. Steunenberg, B., Schmidtchen, D., and Koboldt, C. (1999). Strategic power in the European Union: evaluating the distribution of power in policy games. Journal of Theoretical Politics 11: 339–366. Straffin, P. D. (1978). Probability models for power indices. In P. C. Ordeshook (Ed.), Game Theory and Political Science. New York University Press. |
| URI: | http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/1383 |
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