The Aesthetics of a Phenomenologist:

Mikel Enfrange's "La Phénoménologie de l'expérience esthétique."

by

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1. Synopsis.

This thesis aims to give an exposition of, and discuss, the aesthetics propounded by Michel Dufrenne, in the *Phénoménologie de l'expérience esthétique*. It is not the intention here to cover the total aesthetic output of Dufrenne, presented in other works such as *Le poétique*, and a number of articles.

One of the principle features of Dufrenne's work - his notion of the a priori in art - is discussed generally in the first two chapters, leading up to a detailed critique in the third. In Chapter One the main question is of the nature of art, and whether it is 'quasi-pour-soi', and the distinction of 'work of art' and 'aesthetic object'. In Chapter Two I have taken Dufrenne's ideas on the status of art - its creation, perception and self-sufficiency. All these topics relate in some way to the a priori, which is fully dealt with subsequently - in its relation to Kant and aesthetics, in particular the affective a priori.

In each chapter I have dealt with subjects which can be discussed in their own right. The first three chapters are taken with the idea of the a priori very much to the fore - although each topic is treated as of value in itself - but the fourth and fifth chapters are less tied to the a priori. Here I have taken three of the most important topics in aesthetics, the aesthetic attitude, expression and meaning, and laid more emphasis on Dufrenne's ability to note particular objective features of art. These topics, particularly the former two, are not only much discussed in analytic aesthetics, but are also subjects which Dufrenne considers of primary importance.
I conclude that Dufrenne is mistaken in his view of the a priori in art, but contributes to aesthetics—though less than often supposed—especially with regard to noting its objective features.
Introduction.

Ever since its publication in 1952, Dufrenne's Phénoménologie de l'expérience esthétique has been accepted as the paradigm of a phenomenological account of aesthetics, and as a very valuable contribution to aesthetics, presenting thoroughly coherent and convincing opinions, and possibly being the most important work on aesthetics since that of Clive Bell.

Unfortunately phenomenology has no set of clearly defined principles, and its methods and beliefs vary vastly from person to person. For instance Husserl and Heidegger, although master and pupil, and father and son in line of descent phenomenologically, held few beliefs in common. Phenomenology is just a changing and developing philosophy. So one cannot state a number of principles of phenomenology, assume Dufrenne held these, and prove that a theory of art either can or cannot be produced from them. However, there are a number of beliefs and procedures which are shared in one way or another among phenomenologists, and it is on the basis of his holding various of these that Dufrenne may be considered a phenomenologist.

The principal idea of phenomenology is to uncover reality - i.e., to investigate objects and events in the world, and from a presuppositionless point of view, to perceive what is really, objectively true, to perceive the essence of any object. This is to be carried out by a process of reduction - reducing the object to its barest essentials, 'bracketing off' any theories or irrelevant details. ('Bracketing off' is Husserl's term for the method of reaching the core or essence of objects.) Of course, this is not a totally presuppositionless philosophy as it claims to be, it presupposes absolute truth, the existence of objects independently of the perceiver, and essences of those objects, among other things. This is not at issue here, however.
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I would agree that Dufrenne's work (the Phénoménologie that is, not everything that he has ever written about aesthetics), has to be regarded as the paradigm of a phenomenological account of aesthetics:

(a) because it is the most developed theory of aesthetics presented by accepted phenomenologists, and;

(b) because it emphasizes various of the shared tenets of phenomenology. For instance, Dufrenne believes in the importance of direct unbiased experience of an object, and holds the view that all objects are immediately meaningful, and in particular he shares the view that every object (in this case the aesthetic object) has an essential structure which it is the duty of the phenomenologist to uncover.

As I have noted, in a supposedly presuppositionless philosophy the belief in essences seems to be a sizeable presupposition. And it is a belief which Dufrenne firmly holds about art - i.e., that it is a priori expressive - without involving himself in much argument.

1. There are many other phenomenological works on aesthetics: e.g., Wilhelm Dilthey's Gesammelte Schriften (12 Vols.) pub. Stuttgart, B. G. Teubner, 1913-1958; but this is restricted to literature; Sartre's, *What is literature?* (1st. pub. Librairie Gallimard 1948), pub. Methuen, University Paperbacks 1970, which is also obviously restricted to literature and might be regarded as existentialism not phenomenology, though the dividing line is very thin; Sartre's, *Essays in aesthetics* pub. Peter Owen, London 1964 - also existentialist and devoted to specific works of art. And there are others, as well as various collections on phenomenological aesthetics, e.g., *Aesthetics and aesthetics*, ed. T. W. Strauss & R. M. Griffith, pub. Duquesne University Press 1970. None of these presents a total aesthetic theory, however, in the way Dufrenne's Phénoménologie does.
Dufrenne has certainly made a contribution to aesthetics, merely by discussing it from a phenomenological angle. And the difficulty of doing this should not be lightly dismissed. It is not easy to produce a theory of aesthetics even working with the most closely ruled philosophical methods, as e.g., Anglo-American analytical philosophy. So in a philosophical tradition where there are no strict laws, it is an even greater task to construct a theory on the nebulous subject of aesthetics. It could be compared with an attempt to form a constantly changing pattern (aesthetics) out of constantly changing colours (phenomenology).

Nevertheless, despite the enormity of the task (i.e., taking this into account), I feel that Dufrenne's contribution is somewhat limited, having a number of serious weaknesses, and that one must be very careful if one wishes to uphold it as an example of one of the most valuable contributions to the aesthetics of this century.

One of the most important of these weaknesses is the lack of argumentation for his beliefs and assertions. This is a typically phenomenological failing but that in no way absolves Dufrenne. One of the things which will become clear in this thesis is this very failure to back up claims with any decisive reasoning, and the consequences of this. In brief these are: (1) that Dufrenne lays himself wide open to having a horse and cart driven through most of his theories by anyone who can produce one argument of some sort against these, because he has left the enormous gap of not providing any sound arguments for them.1

1. I do not say that Dufrenne never argues for any of his views. Indeed he devotes some time to the question of critical analysis in the aesthetic attitude, for instance. Unfortunately, here, he is uncertain of the correct line to adopt at the beginning, and wastes time having to modify his original hard line as the facts emerge—as will be seen in Chapter Four.
Not only that, but (ii) one finds on close inspection (i.e., on working out what it is that Dufrenne is really saying and its logical conclusion), that a lot of what he says actually is unacceptable — which might have been avoided had he reasoned out his views for himself.

This represents a fundamental flaw in Dufrenne's method. What is most unfortunate about it is not that it is theoretically possible that someone might produce arguments against the validity of what he says, but that one can actually do this with many of his contentions. The problem is further exacerbated by the extreme obscurity of much of Dufrenne's language — which is a further unfortunate characteristic of phenomenology.

The thesis I would like to argue for is that the only complete phenomenology of aesthetics which we possess (i.e., the Révénelógie) does not provide the acceptable and original account of aesthetics which it is held to do. That is to say, neither Dufrenne nor phenomenology as presented by Dufrenne, gives a wholly acceptable account of aesthetics or makes so valuable a contribution as is generally supposed. I do not wish to say that what Dufrenne says is completely unacceptable, because I think he is right about certain fairly important points. However, although he is right in various areas, what he says is often not wholly original (with one useful exception), and he does not seem to have broken any appreciable area of new ground in aesthetics or presented any new solutions via the phenomenological approach — with the aforementioned exception which will be fully discussed in the course of this thesis. I would contend that there is a great deal of ambiguity within what Dufrenne

1. I would not deny that Dufrenne's work is in many ways original, but originality does not entail correctness,
says, which is only fully revealed when one threshes out his stated opinions; and that he expresses himself remarkably carelessly and loosely - i.e., what he says is not always exactly what he means, which is different from, but contributory to, ambiguity.

The method I intend to adopt is to take the salient points of Dufrenne's Phénoménologie, which are also currently debated problems of British and American analytic aesthetics, and to illustrate - from a fairly analytic point of view - how Dufrenne's approach does not solve the problems. In cases where I feel Dufrenne to be wrong, I shall as a rule attempt to present a brief alternative viewpoint (as well as indicating how and why I think Dufrenne is mistaken). I wish to make it clear from the outset that I am not making a study of Dufrenne qua phenomenologist, but discussing the theory of aesthetics which he is presenting in the Phénoménologie. Since he is giving a phenomenological aesthetic, points of phenomenology will obviously be raised, but the overall object of this thesis is to give a critique of the aesthetics of the Phénoménologie.

I shall now indicate briefly what I take to be Dufrenne's basis thesis and the advantages and disadvantages of his viewpoint as expressed in the Phénoménologie. The fundamental contention is that there is an a priori object of some kind, or work of art, or an a priori, which can be discovered by the phenomenological method of looking for the essence or eidetic properties of any object. I.e., he believes that the work of art is a priori expressive, that there are a priori affective (expressive) categories. This essentialism (a bracketing off of the existential and reaching the essence or eidos when perceiving any object), which is traceable back to Husserl, is unfortunately also the basic mistake of Dufrenne - or so I shall attempt to show.
And it is a consequence of the falsehood of the theory that in attempting to prove it, Dufrenne has to invoke Kant - not Kant's aesthetic theory but his concept of the a priori. And in an attempt to reconcile Kant and phenomenology, he tries unsuccessfully to make out a case for the existential a priori. The problems of this will become only too clear in the central chapter of this thesis (Chapter Three). Moreover, not only is Dufrenne forced to neo-Kantianism on the a priori, but he also has recourse to the Kantian concept of schemas (e.g., the musical schemas of rhythm and melody). It is a further consequence of the view that one intuits the a priori essence of art that there is so little argument provided by Dufrenne for any of his views.

This obviously gives rise to a good deal of questioning as to the validity of the thesis. For phenomenology does not arise out of Kantian views (it is more often traceable back to Cartesianism). If one has to abandon the phenomenological approach as a consequence of one's main thesis (the a priori in art), and resort to other philosophies, one is inclined to believe that phenomenology cannot be adequate to solving the problems of aesthetics, especially when one is presented with so little argument to support Dufrenne (even if this is a consequence of the nature of phenomenology).

1. albeit that the outlines of phenomenology are blurred and that Dufrenne makes a somewhat abortive attempt to make Kant fit into his own beliefs.
However, there are two important and positive features of the Phénoménologie. On the one hand Dufrenne formulates the nature of the work of art in an original and valuable way, as a quasi-pour-soi. (This will be discussed initially in the first chapter, but has to wait until the final chapter, when all the possible aspects of art as a quasi-pour-soi have been discussed and a determinate judgment can be made.) And I think that this represents the most positive and thought-provoking idea of the Phénoménologie.\footnote{This is the exception to the rule which I mentioned.} On the other hand, he draws attention to various objective features of a work of art. This comes out most clearly in the last two chapters when the aesthetic attitude, expression and meaning are discussed. And particular properties not specifically discussed qua objective features of the work, emerge throughout this thesis. In fact, these two positive aspects of Dufrenne are fairly closely linked, e.g., certain objective features of art are the grounds for the discussion of the quasi-pour-soi.

Dufrenne approaches his whole subject of art from the point of view both of the spectator and of the work of art - a quite legitimate approach either for phenomenologist or non-phenomenologist - and attempts to state and solve the problems which occur in aesthetics in terms of the work of art or aesthetic object, and its relationship with other things. This includes its relationship with ordinary objects, and with the human being as judge, performer or ordinary spectator. This in itself is a fairly normal approach, but Dufrenne lays a great deal of emphasis on the self-sufficiency of the work of art and its completeness in every way apart from man. This is all part of phenomenological beliefs about the meaningfulness of an object in itself, which is discoverable when one approaches it without bias of any kind - and as will be seen in Chapter Two, a work of art is not really like this.
In the first three chapters I shall introduce and discuss the notion of the quasi-pour-soi, and other aspects of art which Dufrenne raises - its nature, the distinction between a work of art and an aesthetic object, the status of art, its possible autonomy and its creation and perception. However, it is not until the third chapter that the fundamental question of the a priori in art is put to the test.

In the last two chapters, I have taken issues which are again central, both to Dufrenne's thesis, and to present problems of philosophy. They also serve to illustrate my thesis in various ways: (a) the way in which Dufrenne fails to argue for his position and his continual ambiguity - the latter being especially pronounced in Chapter Four on the aesthetic attitude; (b) the fact that when one has worked out an argument for Dufrenne, one finds that even if it is a reasonable viewpoint, it is often one which he shares with various other aestheticians, and is therefore not wholly original. (The combination of ideas making up a view may be original to Dufrenne, but the ideas individually are not and he must therefore share any credit due.) This can be seen in: the discussions on both the aesthetic attitude and expression, in Chapters Four and Five; (c) finally they show that what he has to say, for instance about meaning, is far from being fully acceptable - a fact which only becomes obvious as one works out Dufrenne's thesis and its implications.
CHAPTER ONE. THE NATURE OF THE WORK OF ART.

Introduction.

Probably the most fitting way of beginning is to discuss Dufrenne's usage of the terms 'work of art' (l'oeuvre d'art) and 'aesthetic object' (l'objet esthétique), as these are the fundamental terms for the subject of his work. One might expect there to be some indication of where the essence or a priori objective features Dufrenne claims for art lie, and that this might be used to indicate the distinction between the two in some way. However, there is no such discussion - though he does give an ultimately unsatisfactory account of the distinction, and talks of the distinction between a work of art and a natural object, or an ordinary man-made object.

The fourth and final section launches us into the real problem of the work - its essential objective structure - with the idea of the work as a quasi-subject. Here I shall analyze what Dufrenne means when he talks of the work as a quasi-pour-soi, and the way in which his conception of the term forces him (even if unconsciously) from the 'en-soi' and 'pour-nous', to the quasi-pour-soi image of the work. As I mentioned in the introduction to this work, Dufrenne would be going some way to establishing the work of art as an a priori object if he could prove it to be a quasi-pour-soi - i.e., an object with particular qualities analogous to those of man (the pour-soi). However, although I accept the idea conditionally, and it is informative, it does not seem to bring out any a priori features of art.
As has already been pointed out, Dufrenne is extremely unsystematic, and his references to the nature of the work of art and the aesthetic object are dispersed throughout the Phénoménologie. Since he accords no priority to any statement or set of statements, the ordering will be my own and what Dufrenne says will not as a rule be given in terms of stages to a conclusion, unless the text allows. Otherwise I shall follow the ordering of the assertions of the Phénoménologie. And in the main the same applies throughout this thesis.

Section 1.

The distinction between the work of art and the aesthetic object.

At the beginning of the Phénoménologie, Dufrenne makes a distinction which it often seems might just as well not have been made since the two terms involved are regularly used interchangeably. The distinction is that between the work of art and the aesthetic object. Some justification may be given for the arbitrary use of the terms, since there are occasions when the function may be fulfilled by either. However, Dufrenne does not restrict himself to these cases.

Dufrenne wishes to place the emphasis on the aesthetic object as of greater importance than the work of art. This obviously makes it necessary to distinguish 'l'oeuvre', and 'l'objet esthétique', from the start. In his analysis Dufrenne also uses the concept of aesthetic perception, which is itself treacherous ground, since it is possible to claim that there is no difference between an aesthetic, and an ordinary perception. However, I do not think that Dufrenne is making the more sweeping claim that perception itself differs in some way according to its object, but rather that is to say, Dufrenne often fails to distinguish, or put the distinction to good use, not that there is not a distinction - 'work of art' and 'aesthetic object' are commonly used distinctly.
the lesser one that certain objects are perceived 'aesthetically', i.e., as being works of art, beautiful objects, etc. This is uncontroversial.

In order to avoid confusion, it is important to understand that Dufrenne's use of the term 'aesthetic object', is not primarily as a reference to any object seen as aesthetic - as the normal usage of the term suggests. This is Dufrenne's subordinate or secondary use of the concept, and he does at least acknowledge the problem of allowing the term a double application. This will be dealt with in the third section of the present chapter.

Dufrenne regards the work of art as present and unquestioned. The aesthetic object is to be defined in terms of that; and the aesthetic perception, or experience, in terms of the aesthetic object. Dufrenne quite rightly realises that to define the aesthetic object in terms of the aesthetic experience would be to extend the realms of its usage to anything which was the object of an aesthetic experience. Since one can, for example, experience nature aesthetically, this line of analysis obviously widens the horizons of aesthetics beyond the works of man. Not that Dufrenne wishes to exclude natural objects from being seen as aesthetic, but within the definition of 'aesthetic object', they would come very much under the secondary application, and raise problems for the current distinction.

The aesthetic object can already be seen to be different from the work of art, by means of its inevitable connection with the idea of perception, or experience. It is regarded by Dufrenne as the work of art seen in an aesthetic perception, and, as a function of the work of art, temporally and ontologically subsequent to it. The work itself does not have to be seen aesthetically - it can be grasped (intellectually) just as a physical object.
An example would be that one can see a Barbara Hepworth sculpture just as a block of wood (or stone, or whatever it is made from), rather than as a sculpture.

The aesthetic object arises when it is seen in an aesthetic perception, i.e., as a work of art rather than a block of wood. But the aesthetic object cannot exist without the work, whereas according to Dufrenne, the work can exist without the aesthetic object. Thus it is ontologically primary.

Dufrenne also introduces an intentional distinction between the two - using 'intentional' in the phenomenological sense in which Husserl uses it. Noetically they are the same - since the aesthetic object just is the work of art perceived as one, and to perception they are the same. Noetically they differ, because in fact they differ. One can neglect the aesthetic qualities.

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1. An example of this would presumably be of, say, a Turner painting in a gallery or somewhere it has been set up as a work of art, when no-one is looking at it and therefore it is not an aesthetic object for anyone.

2. I.e., an aesthetic object is not always identical to a work of art. For an explanation of the terms 'noema' and 'noesis' see Husserl; Ideas, general introduction to pure phenomenology. Trans. W.K.Boyce Gibson, pub., Allen & Unwin, London 1958. Also Pivôević: Husserl and phenomenology, pub. Hutchinson University Library, 1970. Pivôević gives a brief account:

"we have to distinguish, for every description used, between an intentional act and its objective meaning-content as conveyed in that description ..... Husserl used the terms 'noesis' and 'noema' to designate these two aspects of an intentional experience."

(Chap. 6, p.67, my underlining.)
of a work of art, but the aesthetic object is the work of art aesthetically perceived:

"tous deux sont des noëmes qui ont le même contenu, mais qui diffèrent en ce que la noëse est différente; l'oeuvre d'art en tant qu'elle est là dans le monde, peut être saisie dans une perception qui néglige sa qualité esthétique, comme lorsqu'au spectacle je suis inattentif, ou qui cherche à la comprendre et à la justifier au lieu de l'éprouver comme peut faire le critique d'art. L'objet esthétique est, au contraire, l'objet esthétiquement perçu, c'est-à-dire perçu en tant qu'esthétique."

(Vol. 1, Part 1, Intro. p.9)

The 'noematic content' refers to the meaning of the experience, and the 'noetic content' to the different possible descriptions, and Dufrenne is concerned with the case where one may have two different references to a perception, where the meaning (sense) of the perception remains the same. Dufrenne states this, and the preceding position, in the Introduction to Volume I. of the Phénoménologie (and unless otherwise stated, references throughout will be to the Phénoménologie).

At the end of the first chapter, Dufrenne gives two further accounts of the distinction. The first may be stated in either of two ways;

i) That the work of art is what remains of the aesthetic object when it is not perceived; the aesthetic object in a state of possibility,

ii) empirically the work remains as a permanent possibility for sensation.

At this stage Dufrenne is very much inclined to the idea that the work has no 'real' existence prior to, or apart from, its manifestation as an aesthetic object.
The second account involves the spectator (who may be the artist).

1) The work is defined less in connection with the contemplation of the spectator, and more with the action of the artist or knowledge of the critic.

ii) The aesthetic object only exists properly with the collaboration of the spectator. For \( x \) to become a statue rather than a stone, it requires the regard of the audience to deliver it from being a stone. And, most importantly, it is only at the moment at which \( x \) becomes an aesthetic object that it becomes a work of art.

"...œuvre d'art et objet esthétique se renvoient l'un à l'autre et se comprennent l'un par l'autre. Car l'exécution, qui est la présentation de l'œuvre, est en même temps le moyen par lequel elle devient objet esthétique, et c'est au moment où elle devient objet esthétique que l'œuvre d'art est vraiment œuvre d'art."

(Vol. I. Part I. chap. I. p. 46.)
(My underlining.)

Dufrenne then admits to the problem of distinguishing an aesthetic object from a work of art. He regards it as possible theoretically in terms of psychology, where one would subordinate the being of the aesthetic object to a consciousness, and regard the work of art, by contrast, as a thing. However, in practice this distinction fails and consequently the aesthetic object always refers to the work of art, and is inseparable from it.

The only other important references which Dufrenne makes are (a) in his analysis of the being of the aesthetic object (Vol. I. Part I. chap. VI), and (b) in the introduction to the second part of Volume I., on the spatial and temporal arts. In the former he
states that the only difference between the aesthetic object and 
the work of art is that consciousness intervenes and makes the 
object (neutral term) pass from thing to something perceived; 
"l'objet esthétique, c'est l'oeuvre en tant que perçu" (p.297). 
There is a reciprocal comprehension of each – the aesthetic object 
keeps its being as a work and can be clarified through it, and the 
work of art has its truth in the aesthetic object, and is under-
stood through it.

In the latter, Dufrenne is justifying speaking of the aesthet-
ic object rather than the work of art when analysing any art 
form. The reason for not speaking now of the aesthetic object, is 
because it is the work of art which is created, which is a thing, 
and which 'supports' the aesthetic object; and it is that on which 
once one can make an objective study and which directs analysis and inter-
pretation. According to the argument – the origin of which 
Dufrenne does not specify – one can 'get at' the work behind the 
object by abandoning the aesthetic attitude for an objective 
attitude, and instead of considering the work as perceived, 
consider it as known. Dufrenne's response is that what is said of 
the work applies doubly to what is said of the aesthetic object. 
A grasp of the aesthetic object orientates the analysis of the 
work because this analysis can only be carried on by reference to 
the aesthetic experience, which obviously involves reference to 
the aesthetic object (under Dufrenne's definition).

This is, in essence, the sum total of Dufrenne's definition 
of the distinction, and more importantly, of his use of it. From
From the beginning he uses the terms as if they were equivalent, interchanging them arbitrarily. The main reason that one can see for his preliminary emphasis is his intention to stress perception as a primary factor in aesthetics. However, even before defining the two terms, there is a certain amount of criticism to be made of the distinction.

Firstly, if the work of art is seen non-aesthetically, does it remain a work of art? Or is it just - like a Barbara Hepworth sculpture in wood - a block of wood? I shall try to show that the work of art and the aesthetic object under Dufrenne's description are not distinct.

If one regards the term as subject-relative (and hypothesises that no-one regards this particular object as anything other than a piece of wood), then the answer will be that it ceases to be a work of art when people cease to regard it as one. Of course, one can choose a more hair-splitting example - simply that A perceives this sculpture as a block of wood, so that the intentional object for A is an ordinary piece of wood, not a work of art; whereas B does see it as a work of art, and the intentional object for him is therefore a sculpture. Thus, it is both a work of art and not one, at the same time. Maintaining a subject-relative position, however, this is untroublesome. For A the thing is art and for B it is not.

A rather fine distinction now has to be drawn between the two uses of 'perception' - as referring to present perception of or, as opposed to perception at some time of or. In the two hypotheses just cited, one is referring to the latter form, restricted to certain groups or within a certain time limit. In talking of the distinction between the

1. This question might be asked specifically in view of Dufrenne's second distinction (Vol.1. Part 1. chap.1. esp p.46), to which I have just referred, where he refers to the statue and the stone.
aesthetic object and the work of art one is referring to the former view of perception. However, in either case the conclusion is the same. If perception is a necessary condition of art, then a sculpture can exist as a physical object before it is an aesthetic object, but it is not a work of art before it is an aesthetic object. The work of art is therefore not prior to, or different from, the aesthetic object.

I think that in two ways Dufrenne claims perception and experience of art (reading, hearing, viewing, etc.) as a necessary condition of something's being art. For one thing, in justifying his use of 'aesthetic object' instead of 'work of art' when analysing an art form, he says analysis of the work of art can only be conducted by reference to aesthetic experience (which is similar to aesthetic perception). For another, he defines a work of art as becoming art under the aesthetic regard of some person, and has distinguished between seeing a work of art purely physically and seeing it as art.

In this case, he is using his own criterion for something's being an aesthetic object 1: aesthetic perception or experience of a suitable object - firstly as closely related to an art object qua work of art, and secondly as a criterion for something's becoming a work of art. Therefore he is undermining, if not destroying, his own distinction between the work of art and aesthetic object.

Indeed the end of the first chapter openly admits a good deal of this - the most important admissions being his statement that perception is required to make a stone a statue; and his allowance

1. Bearing in mind that he is not using 'aesthetic object' in its ordinary familiar usage.
that it is only when something becomes an aesthetic object that it is properly a work of art (cf. quotation, Vol.1, Part 1, Chap.1, p.46) - though I think Dufrenne is indulging in rhetoric here.

Secondly, the work of art is given the ontological priority of an unquestioned fact. Yet there is a great deal of debate about what the work of art (so-called) is, and about its status. To Dufrenne the term appears to imply physicality - yet this is attacked with justified regularity with the question, "Where is the work of art in art forms such as music and literature?" And especially with regard to the performed arts, it is quite plausible to claim that the work is the performance and not its physical basis, e.g., the score or the text. In this case the work might be defined as the 'score (text) as performed', and as a rule this will virtually amount to Dufrenne's definition of the aesthetic object - of the work as perceived, since performances are normally perceived. Thus, under this description the work is equivalent to the aesthetic object.

Finally, Dufrenne's argument for speaking of the aesthetic object instead of the work of art, is very vague. In what way does what is said of the work apply doubly to the aesthetic object? It would be ludicrous to say of a cubist painting, for example, that the aesthetic object was even more 'cubist' than the work. However, I think it is sufficient to say that whatever applies to my perception of the work of art applies to the aesthetic object, and Dufrenne is probably indulging in rhetoric again. In any event

1. See, the beginning of the second part of volume 1.
the critic he invents and sets up against himself is far from
satisfied in suggesting one can consider the work as known rather than
perceived, or abandon the aesthetic attitude in analysing art. For
works of art are known via perception in most cases - even the
study of literature involves perception. And if there is aestheti-
ic attitude at all, it is applied in the consideration of art -
otherwise it becomes a purely superfluous term - this is a straight-
forward truism.

I think this makes it apparent that the distinction is at best
very suspect, and Dufrenne's subsequent lack of use of it seems to
indicate his awareness of this. The initial criticism makes the
ground for the practical difficulty theoretical. The distinction
fails - therefore it is not vital to distinguish between the use of
either term in the further course of this work. However, one
cannot pass off the failure of the distinction as unimportant, even
if its non-existence does not make it surprising that Dufrenne does
not keep up the distinction throughout the Phenomenologie. For it
has consequences for the objectivity of the work of art.

For one thing the idea that the work of art has no real
existence apart from its manifestation as an aesthetic object, is
not immediately compatible with the basic view that there is an
essential structure to the work of art, because it makes the work

1. The element of perception is obviously a rather mundane necess-
ary condition of experiencing literature. Perception is an accept-
able description of our experience of most art - we see, hear, touch
it, etc. With literature, however, perception is not an adequate
description. One hears or reads the work, but understanding the
words is also a necessary precondition of any aesthetic appreciation.
Although less specific it might be preferable were Dufrenne to des-
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a rather nebulous entity and gives it no guarantee of continued existence after it has been created by the artist. One can overcome this particular difficulty, since the possibility that an object can cease at times does not preclude the possibility that when it does exist it has an essential structure. But it does cast doubt on its a priori nature - the objectivity of its existence - since Dufrenne is making it dependent on the perceive to make something art (and hence expressive etc.). If it were a priori art, then it would possess the a priori qualities independently of our seeing it as having them.

One may assume that Dufrenne believes that a proper perception of, e.g., a Rembrandt, would be one which saw its a priori aesthetic features. i.e., not that the perceive gives the work its aesthetic qualities, but that the person who can grasp the true qualities of the work will see it as having these a priori aesthetic features. However, this is not the impression one gains from what is said here of the work of art. Nor is it possible to use this view without presenting an acceptable account of the work of art as something different from the aesthetic object, since the aesthetic object has only been established as 'x perceived as a work of art' - i.e., as dependent on the perceive for its existence. Taking a relativistic point of view on the existence of a work of art does not knock down the theory that there are a priori (objective) features discoverable in art. Nevertheless, it does make it more difficult to show that there are. And incidentally, it is not a phenomenological viewpoint to say that an object does not possess certain qualities if one does not see it as possessing them.
Section II.
The nature and general structure of the work of art and aesthetic perception.

The value of making the prior distinction before giving a separate definition of either term seemed dubious, but I think it was permissible since it turned mainly on one difference. However, an attempt must now be made to define the central terms involved. These are obviously 'work of art', 'aesthetic object', and a subsidiary term, 'aesthetic perception', used with the term 'aesthetic experience'. Dufrenne does discriminate slightly in his use of the terms 'work of art', and 'aesthetic object', in so far as he generally prefers to apply the former when physical nature, location, or creation of the work are in question; and the latter when reference is specifically to the audience's experience of it. (There will also be a further use of the discrimination in the third section of this chapter, on the distinction between natural objects and works of art).

Since one can say either that there is no such thing as aesthetic experience without there first being a work of art which exists independently of anyone's perceiving it under this description; or that there is no such thing as a work of art until someone experiences something as one, according to whether one holds an absolutist or relativist theory, the logical priority of either remains unsettled. The first section of this chapter has shown Dufrenne's position to be relativist - by laying the emphasis on perception. I shall therefore deal with the aesthetic experience/perception first, especially in view of the fact that this is what the Phénoménologie is about. - at least on this point he has made relativistic assertions.
After recognizing the historicity of art, but denying that the difference in taste over different periods makes it in any way relative, Dufrenne claims that art has become only recently emancipated, through the recognition of specifically aesthetic experience as something other than ordinary perception. This gives us the advantage of being able to categorize art separately from, e.g., scientific or skillful productions. Thus he adopts a view of art as at least potentially an autonomous realm. His definition of aesthetic perception is very brief and announced at the beginning of the introduction to Volume I, Part I.; it is the correct or faithful perception of a work of art, and it founds the aesthetic object, but in an uncreating, non-creative, or a receptive sense. A little later he reveals certain assumptions and aims: firstly, a study of the aesthetic experience (or perception) will reveal essential features of that experience. Secondly, that a knowledge of the essence of aesthetic experience will reveal a unity, or structured identity, throughout various kinds of art.

In answer to this, there seems no initial difficulty about accepting the concept - for although it is defined in terms of true and correct perceptions of art, it does not make the controversial move (as I stated previously) of regarding perception itself as differing when one turns from 'ordinary' to 'art' objects. Dufrenne himself seems to take it for granted that the term is acceptable.

Unfortunately, there are still two unanswered questions here, as well as a historical point. To take the latter first, he has stated that aesthetic experience is only a recent idea. I have taken that to mean that art has only recently been accorded recognition on its own.
This in fact occurred in the Kantian era - the separation of notions such as 'skill' or 'craft' from 'art'. As far as this gives us a more specific understanding of where our subject begins and ends (if indeed it does end), this separation is certainly advantageous.

As to the questions, one wants to know: i) What criterion is there for something's being a correct perception? ii) If the perception does not create the art in some way, is Dufrenne excluding the audience from any part in the creation of a work of art? Is it that the spectator has the role of having to perceive x as art before it becomes art, but that the creation itself is solely that of the original artist? Or that the spectator has a creative role in respect of the aesthetic object, but not that of the work of art? I think the correct position is that the artist is the sole creator of the work of art, and the audience does not play a part in its original creation, but that the audience is required to give the work its status as a work of art. I.e., at least two people are required - an artist and an audience - as well as the work, in order to make it a work of art.

I think Dufrenne would accept this (of Vd.I, Part I, p.2, appreciation and creation as different types of activity), his fault lies in not specifically saying what he means. One can compare this view roughly with Freud speaking of tendentious jokes, except that the middle person is not required:

"Generally speaking, a tendentious joke calls for three people: in addition to the one who makes the joke, there must be a second who is taken as the object of the hostile or sexual aggressiveness, and a third in whom the joke's aim of producing pleasure is fulfilled." (op. cit. Part I, Chap 14, p.130)

Finally, rather obviously, why assume that there is an essence to aesthetic perception. (Note 1. overlaid.)
Dufrenne states (Vol.I, Part I, Chap.IV, esp. pp 168-70) that something does not become an aesthetic object until someone recognises it as art - for instance something utilitarian or for religious purposes is not an aesthetic object until someone puts it on display, or in an art gallery, (i.e., they implicitly or explicitly put it in the art realm). By this means, the object undergoes a metamorphosis - according to Dufrenne - from the ordinary to the aesthetic realm. By contrast, works of modern art are immediately seen as aesthetic objects. Here Dufrenne is referring to what he calls 'pure' visual art, by which he means abstract or non-representational, non-realistic visual art.

This then is the way in which something becomes an aesthetic object - which corresponds with Dufrenne's statement in the introduction, that works of art offer themselves to us and wait for us to do them justice. Valuing works for different reasons at different times only shows that they have various aspects. I do not think that this is particularly relativistic. Moreover, culture certainly influences our aesthetic judgments, but it is not these which reach the reality of the aesthetic object, because taste is not the organ of aesthetic perception. (Dufrenne has by this time laid claim to both relativist and absolutist views on the same topic, on which I shall comment at the end of this section.)

What then are the criteria for something's being an aesthetic object, or what merits being an aesthetic object for us? Dufrenne optimistically considers that the opinion of the best informed people is adequate - and that this will coincide with the general

opinion - what each culture reveres, i.e., an empirical criterion. 
Dufrenne here takes a truly phenomenological stand in asserting 
that the reason why well-informed (or general) opinion may be taken 
as a criterion for something being a work of art, is because the 
aesthetic object manifests its being or essence. That is, it is 
like a living thing which reveals itself and waits for recognition. 
The aesthetic judgment is made more in the object than in us. (cf 
esp. p. 22).

Dufrenne rejects the use of the criteria for something's being 
beautiful (e.g., a judgment of taste), as those which may be used in 
judging something to be art. Thus, Dufrenne is dismissing Kant's 
method of aesthetic analysis, of the *Critique of judgment*, although 
he bases his own aesthetic on the formal ideas expressed in the 
*Critique of pure reason*, as will be seen in the third chapter. Duf­
renne does, however, make a distinction between beauty as a feature 
of some art, for example classical painting or sculpture, where one 
can pick out a certain 'beautiful' content; and the 'Beautiful', as 
an aesthetic category (not as precisely definable as 'the Sublime', 
according to what Dufrenne says of Bayer, but similar). He links the 
idea of 'the Beautiful' with that of authenticity - or of the work 
being truly an aesthetic object, so that it is said to be the more 
beautiful, the more nearly it perfects, or epitomises, the notion 
of an aesthetic object. This renders the concept of beauty useless 
as a defining characteristic of the aesthetic object, however, even 

I think that in justifying his claim that well-informed opinion 
will discover what is and what is not a work of art, because the 
work manifests its being, Dufrenne is confusing judgment with object­
ivity. It may be that something can be objectively a work of art 
(this is certainly one view), but it can hardly judge itself to be
a work of art, no matter how far Dufrenne goes on to make the work a
quasi-pour-soi. (This latter will be dealt with in the last section
of this chapter.) Judgment is normally a mental act 1 which the
aesthetic object cannot perform, and to be an aesthetic object
is to be the subject of an aesthetic judgment that x is a work of
art, not to be the judge.

Before leaving the question it is necessary to take note of what
Dufrenne says of the location of a work of art/aesthetic object, esp­
pecially since this has been the subject of much current debate. The
question as to whether or not it is a physical object is least deb­
atable in the visual arts, sculpture and architecture, and most
contentious in the performed arts. Dufrenne acknowledges the prob­
lem, and puts his position in terms of the musical art form. The
work itself is neither the score nor the performance. However, the
work is complete when the last note is put to the score by the
composer, but does not exist until it is performed, i.e., the score
is insufficient and the work has to be perceived to be fulfilled.2
This appears to put the musical work into the categories of both
physical and non-physical, and Dufrenne is applying this to all
types of art. He draws a parallel between the plastic arts and the
performed - for example the sculpture is equivalent to the score of
the work, since both require an aesthetic perception to be complete.
Thus, Dufrenne's definition of an aesthetic object could briefly

1. Though not always. A physical act can register approval or dis­
approval. (Of Wittgenstein: Lectures and conversations, ed.D.C.Barett,
Basil Blackwell,1966, esp No.13 on aesthetics - wearing a suit as
approval. However, the aesthetic object cannot do this, either.)
2. 'Find its proper form' would be a better phrase for Dufrenne to
use than 'exist'.
be said to be a combination of a physical object and some well-informed person's perception of it.

If one were looking for a single specific definition for all works of art, in order to justify classifying such varying things as a piece of architecture and a song under one heading, this would seem prima facie to be very helpful. And aestheticians have been searching for some essentially similar characteristic to justify this categorisation. However, in the first place, I see no reason to worry about the vast dissimilarities within art. There is, for instance, just as much variety with the term 'science' - what has the study of the nocturnal habits of the badger, in zoology, in common with the splitting of the atom, in physical sciences? Nothing that I know of, yet few would quibble over regarding them both as scientific enquiries. I therefore find little cause for concern in in classifying a church and a song as art.

In the second place, even if one were worried, Dufrenne's answer does not provide an adequate solution. It is obviously inexplicit, failing to specify the relationship between the score, the performance and the perception, or where logical priority lies, if anywhere. Nor is there a true parallel between the plastic arts and the performed. There is a second step in the latter, of the performance (before the music/drama can be perceived aesthetically), which is lacking in the former. Nor is the performance a minor point to be overlooked lightly. Every performance of any work will differ as a matter of fact from any other, according to its performers and the complexity of the work. Not that this would be acceptable to any aesthetician adopting the viewpoint of Nelson Goodman.

on the grounds that performances of any piece of music, etc., must exactly follow the score in order to be classified as a performance of that piece. A performance with any wrong notes may be brilliant, but it is not a performance of that work:

"Since complete compliance with the score is the only requirement for a genuine instance of a work, the most miserable performance without actual mistakes does count as an instance, while the most brilliant performance with a single wrong note does not." (p.186 op cit.)

"If we allow the least deviation, all assurance of work-preservation and score-preservation is lost . . . " (p.186-7 ibid.)

However, if one does wish to make clear exactly where the work of art lies, especially in the performed arts, Dufrenne's distinction between the aesthetic object and the work of art cannot be the solution - despite the fact that 'work of art' seemed intended to refer to physical objects, and 'aesthetic object' to the object as perceived. The obvious classification would then be to regard the work of art as, e.g., the score or painting, and the aesthetic object as the performance or perception. This would still be problematic, but may be ruled out on account of the demonstrated failure of the distinction (cf. Section I.).

Various arguments show that the work is neither the score on its own, nor the performance. E.g., if the score 1 is destroyed, the work remains as long as there is one score, or the work is remembered. Nor is any one copy of the score favoured. Nor does the work cease to exist if it is not performed. Therefore, Dufrenne's present proposal that the work is both score and performance also

1. All scores and the manuscript copy, that is.
fails, since it gives these as necessary conditions, and it seems from what I have said that neither is a necessary, but either a sufficient, condition for the existence of a work. Dufrenne affirms this when referring to the destructibility of works of art. He says that as long as a score/copy of the work remains, or it is remembered, the work is not destroyed. (Vol.I, PartI, Chap.V, pp.214-6.)

I think one might reasonably say that in the performed arts, the work was incomplete or unfulfilled without a performance, but not that it did not exist. The most acceptable basis for art forms such as literature and the performed arts, is to take up a kind of type-token distinction between the work and its 'copies', and give two senses to 'work of art'. One then says that it is a class term when applied, for example, to the fifth symphony of Mahler, and a term for an instance when applied to a copy of the score, or a performance. With regard to the performance, I think it is not unreasonable to move to Dufrenne's viewpoint (or towards it), and regard the score as an unaccomplished instance of the work (unless, as Dufrenne suggests, one reads music and can 'perform' the work in one's head), and a performance as an accomplished instance of the work. The quality of the performance, and whether one allows a very bad rendering of Mahler's fifth as an instance of it, remains a separate issue.

(iii) General Structure.

The final analysis of the present section is in the broader terms of the general structure of the work of art. Dufrenne spends the whole of the final chapter of Volume I. on this issue. As I have already stated, I am doubtful as to either the existence or value of an overall similarity in the work of art. I shall therefore not elaborate on what the Phénoménologie has to say - which is in any case often rhetorical and couched in phenomenological terminology.
Dufrenne spends the first three of four chapters of the second part of Volume I. in a study of painting and music. That is, examples of what he calls the 'spatial' and 'temporal' arts. Both have been analysed in terms of harmony, rhythm and melody, and on the strength of seeing certain affinities between the two, he feels authorised to look for general conditions of art, under which the work can, (a) assume formal determinations, and (b) show its aptitude to express explicit meanings. The three aspects under which these conditions may be found, are matter, subject and expression. As representative of what Dufrenne has to say, the most comprehensible aspect, and that in which he bears structure in mind, I shall discuss the first - matter. (Vol.I. Part II, Chap.IV, Section I, esp. pp. 377-8.)

Were Dufrenne able to substantiate his claims for common features in art, one might begin to accept his phenomenological viewpoint of an object which is a work of art, with common features. However, these three are far too general to provide any worthwhile grip on the work of art. Nor are they individuating - a lot of things which are not art can have matter, subject or expression. For example, 'matter' is ambiguous, and if one includes in it sound, as Dufrenne does, then practically everything has matter of one sort or another.

Matter is defined as the sensible aspect of any work, such as the sound of the instruments; it is the way in which the material (e.g., the instruments) appears, or what it reveals itself as. In some art forms, such as sculpture, matter and material are inseparable - i.e., the sensible qualities and the material of which it is produced, are not physically differentiable. Aesthetically, the material exists as a support for the sensible. In the arts using, e.g., stone, such as sculpture and architecture, differentiation of
the sensible qualities of the stone was sometimes only achieved by lavish styles, such as the rococo, which drew attention away from the object qua stone. In these two arts only continuous affirmation of the sensible qualities (matter), maintains their distinction from geometry. This is achieved by such things as the fantasy of the artist, perspective overthrowing regularity, geometric proportions, etc.

In all arts, the sensible qualities must be composed so as to be perceived unequivocally. The argument here is that matter (sensible qualities), is one of the structural elements of art. Dufrenne recognises that the two above arts (and I should imagine the same would apply to the other plastic arts - ceramics, etc.), present problems, and thus concentrates on separating matter from material.

Dufrenne goes on to say that the work is above all of rhythmic and harmonic schemes, which assume a double function:
(i) To define and classify the elements of aesthetic language, in terms of scales - scales of colour for painting, vocabulary in the literary arts, sound in music, line in architecture, etc. According to the use made of the scale and his emphasis on certain aspects of it, the language of the artist appears.
(ii) The second function - which Dufrenne specifies as being of harmonic structures, is to establish the tone which gives the work its particular allure, e.g., tonic and dominant in the musical scale, particular principle tones making up a painting, or dominant words in a play. That is to say, each work has a foundation, and a dominant part to which it contrasts.

Thus, the work of art now has a first basic structure of a 'sensible matter', which is divided into rhythmic and harmonic schemes, having a double function.

1. It would also draw attention away from the sensuous qualities of the stone. For instance, in a rococo decoration the feel or sensuality of the stucco - its stucconess - is not obvious because of the formalism of the decoration.
This is problematic, however. In the overall plan Dufrenne gives no reason for relating sensible matter to rhythmic and harmonic schemes, or for referring to their double function as being that of rhythm or harmony. Regarding the latter relation, I think one can deduce the connection, though it is certainly not spelled out by Dufrenne. For instance, in music, tonal quality comes under the heading of harmony (cf., function (ii)); and though it is true that scale belongs more to melody, and only emphasis - a sub-division of function (i) - to rhythm (cf., function (i)), in Dufrenne's analysis emphasis and selection from the scale are of as much importance as the existence of the scale itself. This is a matter of conventional musical terminology, yet in the examples just cited, which Dufrenne provides, one can see that it seems prima facie applicable to the other art forms. It remains to be seen whether it is true that the double function given is borne out by them.

With regard to the primary analysis of matter, one can immediately see why Dufrenne chose painting and music as his examples - because they fit his theory of sensible qualities best - at least to the extent that the sound of an instrument can easily be distinguished from the instrument itself, and in representational painting at least, the sensible qualities of the representation from the canvas and paints.

More positively, 'sensible qualities' is insufficient to present a differentiation of art works from non-art. The idea that all art projects a sensible nature (expressive or whatever), over and above that of its ordinary matter (in the Aristotelian sense of matter as the basis of form), is fairly uncontentious. For example, that a carved stone qua sculpture has a sensible nature over and above that of its being as a stone qua stone. It derives from the idea that
art makes use of a particular type of material - sound, language, stone, pigment, wood, etc., and forms something to be seen as possessing different qualities from the original material.

Though this would seem to be one way of distinguishing art from natural objects, I am not sure that it distinguishes art from ordinary utilitarian man-made objects - such as kitchen tables - at least not without a further argument. For these also project a nature different from that of their material. If the table is wood, it is not seen as a piece of wood when being used as a table, but as a kitchen table. If I said it was 'just a piece of wood', I should be accused of making a category mistake.

Thus in all things fashioned by man there is a distinction between their original and their finished states. The further argument required is to show that aesthetic objects are not only seen as something distinct from the original material, but have certain distinct sensible qualities of being - for instance, expression. This would at least serve to distinguish them from kitchen tables.

There is also a more complicated argument needed for the performed arts - since, for example, the sensible qualities of sound do not stand in the same relation to the instruments which produce them, as the painting to the canvas and paint, or sculpture to the stone out of which it is fashioned. The proper relation would be of the music to the notes producing it.

As to the double function of the rhythmic and harmonic schemes - the first of these two is the more credible, and the fact that aesthetic language appears classifiable indicates that it has a communal general structure. My only doubt regards its generality; and when one analyses further, the classification and structure seem different for all types of art. All that the argument comes down to in the end, is that out of a given material - which Dufrenne refers to as being a scale (and most sense experience is as a matter of fact on a scale or spectrum) - the artist selects and emphasises certain
elements. Moreover, this in no way distinguishes art from any other activity of man - for even in ordinary perception one selects and emphasises.

The second function is also prima facie applicable, but there are two questions to be asked. The first is - is it just or correct to draw a line a priori in this fashion between what Dufrenne is in effect calling 'important', and 'subordinate', aspects of the work? Or, if one builds up to a climax in Tristan und Isolde, then at what stage does the secondary give way to the primary aspect of the work? The build-up is an integral part of the climax, and it seems that the possibility of dividing a work in this way only indicates that we are confronted with an inferior work. The second question is, 'is this actually borne out by art?', i.e., empirically, and the answer seems to be 'no'. I think Dufrenne is arguing from convention, rather than essential structure. It is conventional to have climactic moments in a work of art, or more important features, but (a) in a work such as 'Lessness' I do not think that this occurs, and (b) I see no reason why any one or more feature(s) of an abstract painting, piece of sculpture, etc., should take priority over the rest.

The further argumentation for this sense of matter as a structure of the work of art is not provided by the second part of Dufrenne's thesis on matter. Even the connection is very tenuous, and unfortunately the general structure given appears too general where correct, so that it fails to provide a distinguishing general structure for art.

To conclude with Dufrenne's relativist/absolutist position, since he takes both attitudes to the same question. As I noted, he states that the work of art/aesthetic object, only becomes one when it is seen as one, or perceived by someone as one. This would entail that there is no such thing as a work of art in an objective, non-relative sense, that nothing could exist as a work unless someone saw it as one.
A consensus of opinion among best-informed people determines what shall or shall not count. Although Dufranne does not say so, presumably the object would also cease to be a work of art if no-one, or none of the right people, perceived or considered it to be one.1

However, he has also claimed that the work waits for us to do it justice; that variations in taste over certain periods does not alter the fact that something is art; that it is not our aesthetic evaluative judgments which finally grasp the reality of the aesthetic object; and that the work of art has a quasi-subjective nature (something which I shall discuss in the last section of this chapter).

This last involves amongst other things, that the work is expressive and has a specific autonomous being. This would involve its remaining a work of art even if nobody sees it as one, and thus, an absolutist view on the part of Dufranne.

This makes his position apparently inconsistent. Since his view of the work of art as a quasi-pour-soi, autonomous, etc., figures prominently throughout the Phénoménologie, and since he specifically attacks relativism whenever it arises, I shall assume that Dufranne would declare himself on the side of absolutism, if pressed.

In order to make sense of the relativist statements about the work of art, one might suggest that it does not require the perception of the audience in order to become art qua work of art, but it is a quasi-pour-soi, and awaits our recognition of it as art; whereas the aesthetic object is distinguished from the work of art by requiring perception to make it an aesthetic object.2

1. I.e., if everyone ceases to perceive it.
2. I.e., the (physical or other) object becomes an aesthetic object by being looked at in a certain way; or, it is the object of an object's being perceived in a certain way.
That is, place the former in the absolute-art category, and the latter in the relative-art category (in the sense of relative in which a work of art is dependent on being regarded as art by some set of people, before it becomes art). Nonetheless, I think this is only a very unsatisfactory attempt to aid Dufrenne, and I do not think it makes much sense.

It should be pointed out, anyway, that Dufrenne says nothing of this, and as I have said before, uses the two terms as if they were equivalent. In addition, the distinction has been seen to fail, and it would therefore not seem permissible to use it to help clarify Dufrenne.

A relativist position here is in any case not properly compatible with Dufrenne's idea of there being an object or work of art, which he can reveal by a phenomenological process. I.e., this form of relativism makes the existence of the work dependent on the subject regarding it as art - which does not comply with the idea that the work exists a priori.

Section III.
The Work of Art and the 'Ordinary' Object.

The distinction between works of art or aesthetic objects, and ordinary objects, either natural or man-made, requires some analysis here; because this chapter is concerned with definitions and distinctions of which Dufrenne makes use, and because he says a great deal about the relationship.

At the beginning of the Phénoménologie, as I noted, Dufrenne takes 'aesthetic object' to have a different meaning from its ordinary language usage - i.e., it is not a term to refer to any sort of being (spatial, temporal or both), which is seen as art. Nevertheless
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he does recognise at the same time that natural objects can be aesthetic, i.e., one can see a sunset or telephone pole aesthetically - not just as sunsets, but as beautiful phenomena of various hues, etc. In various chapters - on the aesthetic object in the world, its relationship to the public and amongst others, Dufrenne uses the term in his own sense - which, as has been seen - comes down to the same thing as work of art.

There is at least one section, where he is discussing the aesthetic object in contrast to ordinary objects, when he recognises the possibility of confusion, since literally the term can apply to any, or almost any, object. (This is at the beginning of chapter IV. of Volume I. part I. pp.112 ff.) Here Dufrenne prefers to allow paradigm and peripheral cases of aesthetic objects - the paradigm being works of art in the normal sense (Goya, Degas, Mozart, etc.), the peripheral ones being ordinary objects which can be seen as aesthetic, but remain ordinary objects underneath being seen as, or intentionally aesthetic. What he actually says is that it has been agreed that the work of art is the aesthetic object 'par excellence', so that if we identify the aesthetic object with the work of art, we can oppose it to other objects which are only really peripherally or additionally aesthetic. One can only gain a meaning of the word 'aesthetic', by taking the work of art as a privileged example:

"Mais nous avons convenu aussi que l'œuvre d'art est l'objet esthétique par excellence, en sorte que si nous identifions l'objet esthétique à l'œuvre d'art, nous avons le droit de l'opposer à d'autres objets que ne sont esthétiques qu'en puissance et par surcroît." (p.112 ibid.)

Dufrenne is more assured as to his position at the beginning than at the end of the discussion. Here (Vol.I. Part I. chap IV. intro. and sections1-2), he would say that the possibility of seeing what
he would call an ordinary object, a tree or bottle of ink, etc., as aesthetic, does not make it an aesthetic object proper. Here he makes the distinction in order to oppose aesthetic objects to man-made and natural objects, and to what he calls the 'living' (vivant), which usually ranges from plant to human life.1

Yet it is also required later on in chapter V. of Volume I. part I., in the opposition of the aesthetic object to the ordinary world, and the distinction of various worlds within that. This is because he wishes to make out a case for the work of art as having a world of its own — which would obviously be equivalent to regarding it as autonomous. And the use of this notion of the world of art is used to make a further distinction between the aesthetic object and the ordinary object, namely that the ordinary object has to be understood in terms of the world of external objects, while the aesthetic object does not, being self-sufficient and constituting a world. (Vol. II. Part I. chap. II. section II. pp. 450-1.)

In talking of the living (Vol. I. Part I. chap. IV. section I.), Dufrenne makes three points. (i) That perceiving objects as aesthetic does not change them, but they are metamorphosised in themselves (this is of ordinary objects, p. 111). (ii) One has no difficulty in distinguishing something living from an aesthetic object. The suggestion that one might, arises from the fact that (a) Dufrenne regards both the living and art as expressive, and (b) persons enacting a ballet might be confused with the actual work of art which requires, but is not, these persons (pp. 115-6). The expressiveness of the work of art does not efface the distinction with the living (p. 113). (iii) A landscaped garden can be an aesthetic

1 Although he defines it originally as animated and having a reflective consciousness, thus excluding the vegetable world — cf. bottom page 112.
object - the ordinary garden is like an unexecuted work, but it is the structuring, not the life of the garden which makes it an aesthetic object (p.119). In connection with this, the aesthetic object neither jars with, nor disavows, nature, and it is difficult to say when nature, altered by art, becomes art - or even if it does. Even when nature is combined with art, it retains its natural character (pp.125-6). (Vol.I. Part I. chap.IV. sec.ii. - on the aesthetic object among natural objects.)

In discussing the categories of paradigm cases of art, peripheral cases of art and non-art, Dufrenne's position is somewhat ambivalent. I think the main point of contention is around the middle of the road cases, about which one is not sure as to whether or not to call them art. Dufrenne is using aesthetic object mainly to refer to works of art, but allowing its extension over the realm of all objects in cases of aesthetic perception of these objects. That is, he is really accepting the normal usage of the term, but modifying it a little. This seems to obviate somewhat the previous distinction of the work of art and aesthetic object, discussed in the first section of this chapter. He does not make clear whether or not the peripheral cases (Wedgwood coffee pots, Meissen ware, etc.) become aesthetic objects or not.

He specifically allows such things as landscaped gardens to be aesthetic objects - when these are regarded as designed works of art, and contrasted with an ordinary garden as the unexecuted work. Yet, only seven pages after (p.126), he is puzzling over

1. There is no argument to support this rather odd assertion.
2. In the sense of things like plants and gardens gone wild, etc.
3. E.g., a piece of ground not professionally landscaped, or an untended garden, etc.
when nature changes to art — which seems to indicate that nature (i.e., the ordinary field or garden), is not in the relation of the potential to the actual work, which he suggested earlier, but is in a rather different class, i.e., nature is nature and it would be a category mistake to call it potential art. In view of this latter part of his third point, landscape gardens must be peripheral art.

In this case, into what category would the kind of things which are normally classed as non-paradigmatic cases of art come? That is, a skilfully made piece of furniture or a Wedgwood coffee pot. Presumably both these, and such things as a sunset viewed aesthetically, and structured natural objects, are additionally aesthetic. Thus, for Dufrenne, their primary nature is, e.g., utilitarian (chair or coffee pot), and they can be seen as aesthetic, but are at most secondarily so.

As it happens, there are three categories of object here — the utilitarian/art, the natural seen as aesthetic, and the natural/art (that avowed by Dufrenne as non-paradigmatically art). That is, the Wedgwood coffee pot, the sunset and the landscape garden. Only one of these three is brought up by Dufrenne as on the periphery of art. He does not say whether such different cases of the aesthetic are equivalent in their aesthetic character or not. He merely states that it is difficult to say when nature becomes art, if at all — which indicates some uncertainty as to what he would decide if pressed.

He is obviously dubious about allowing too much into the realm of art, since he wants a clear-cut world of art (as he states in Vol.I. Part I. chap.V.), whose effects act like the rays of the sun on the ordinary objects around them, and aestheticise them. Unfortunately, the whole realm of ordinary objects is in a kind of semi-light in which they can be seen as aesthetic under certain circumstances.
What is possibly of most consequence is that the peripheral cases of art are unlimited, not circumscribed, as Dufrenne would like. The fact that anything can be seen as aesthetic may not be too important, since being aesthetic does not make something art. I think he is right in saying that there are central cases of art objects and non-central ones, but that the field is not as limited as he would wish, nor of one type, for the latter category. Nor is it the case that there is a clear-cut distinction between what is art and what is not. And this lack of an ability to produce a clear-cut distinction within the world of art and aesthetic objects, once more goes against Dufrenne's idea of the work of art as an objective structure with a given essence, or x, y and z qualities. For if this were the nature of art, would it not begin to reveal itself under Dufrenne's scrutiny?

Finally there are some minor points. Firstly, the main point of the section on the living and art seems correct. That is to say, the distinction between a work of art (paradigm case), and a living creature, is not effaced by the fact that they are both expressive. For, always supposing that art is expressive, it is possible for 'expressive' to be instantiated differently in two different things. A person's expression of an emotion involves feelings, behaviour and consciousness; while a work of art's expressiveness might be instantiated in various ways - having an emotive effect, being effective as Dufrenne says, or by expressing certain qualities by symbolic/conventional methods, or using methods which, for some psychological or cultural reason, do usually produce in us the effect of, e.g., sadness or sublimity.
Secondly (and these further points are in criticism of Dufrenne), I see no reason for the conclusion that a metamorphosis takes place in something perceived as aesthetic, and it changes. Possibly it arises from Dufrenne's claim that art is autonomous and self-sufficient. It would seem a more reasonable hypothesis to say that one's attitude towards the object changed when one saw it as aesthetic.

Thirdly, since he is using the ordinary language meaning of aesthetic object when talking of the living and the aesthetic, would not something like a graceful panther count as both? 2.

Fourthly, it is rather sweeping to say that the aesthetic object neither jars with, nor disavows nature (p.125). Even if one were restricting this to natural objects arranged by man, the formality of an eighteenth century landscaped garden might easily jar with its surroundings, supposing them to be rough pasture or woodland. And much modern architecture may be art in itself, but in the context of natural surroundings would seem to jar, and might well be said to lose some of its aesthetic value for that reason.

But I think it might be fairer to interpret Dufrenne as meaning that if the work of art is to complete its aesthetic function fully, it will not jar with its surroundings. One could say that the work is context free as far as its evaluation goes, but it would be fairly simple to show that this is false, either by (a) demonstration, or (b) theory. Regarding (a), if one placed Liverpool Cathedral in St. Peter's Square, most people would agree that it was aesthetically inappropriate, and that the modern and classical detracted from one another here. Regarding (b), theoretically. To state that the work of art is context free, one must have strictly defined limits for the My use of these terms is intended to denote a capacity which Dufrenne believes art has, to be fairly detached from the rest of the world. It may also appear different, i.e., some aspects may be more prominent.

1. Dufrenne's inclination to distinguish the living from the aesthetic object would seem to indicate that no one thing can be both.
work. For example, is the frame part of, or relevant to, the aesthetic evaluation of the painting? John Cage disallows that one may put strict limits to the musical work, and feels that any part of the production—off-stage or audience noise, etc., is part of the work of art. (Silence, pub. M.I.T.). Or, one might take the theory to the extreme of stating that each passage of a piece of music, each shape in a picture, etc., should be evaluated on its own merit, irrespective of the rest of the work—so that in the end one has a set of elements of the work, and no work as a whole.

N.B. With regard to the former point, one should distinguish between the inappropriateness of placing, e.g., a work of architecture, in a situation which is in itself aesthetically evaluable (e.g., St. Peter's Square, fine woodlands), and one which is not (e.g., the ruins of Munich after the war). It is debatable as to whether placing a work of art in surroundings which are at present non-aesthetic and therefore possibly neutral, could be said to set off or accentuate the aesthetic value of the work, rather than detract from it. This is probably settled by a study of the individual case.

Section IV.

The Work of Art as a Quasi-pour-soi.

One of Dufrenne's most frequently used and important definitions of the work of art is as a Quasi-subject. This is a notion whose terminology is taken from Sartre. It is therefore important to understand the original meanings, especially since these terms are not used by Sartre to refer to the work of art.

1. This is used interchangeably as quasi-pour-soi. There are also several variations—Dufrenne calls the work of art a pour-nous, an en-soi, or a combination of these two, and a quasi-pour-soi.
In the simplest terms, the en-soi (or in-itself) is a non-conscious, static, non-reflective object; whereas the pour-soi (or for-itself) is man—a conscious being having relationships with others and whose nature develops, etc. Of the former, Sartre says:

"The in-itself is full of itself, and no more total plenitude can be imagined, no more perfect equivalence of content to container. There is not the slightest emptiness in being, not the tiniest crack through which nothingness might slip in."

(Being and Nothingness. Trans. Hazel Barnes, Methuen. Part II, chap. I, p. 74.)

Of the latter, he says:

"The for-itself is the being which determines itself inasmuch as it cannot coincide with itself... The Being of consciousness qua consciousness is to exist at a distance from itself as a presence to itself."

(ibid, p.78.)

(Not coinciding means having consciousness.) Simplistically it is a distinction between men and objects—including man-made or natural (vegetable or mineral). The pour-nous is much more Heideggerian, where objects are 'for us' in either of two ways—suhanden or vorhanden—either ready-to-hand or present-at-hand, dependent upon their immediate readiness for our use. Dufrenne does not regard the work of art as fully 'pour-nous' or 'en-soi'—they may be so in certain respects and to a certain degree only. He is most at home with the notion of the work as a quasi-pour-soi, and as such it forwards his view of the autonomy of art; whereas the idea of a work of art as simply an object (en-soi), or there for our purposes (pour-nous) makes it incapable of, and not designed for, acting or existing self-sufficiently.
Dufrenne mostly refers to the pour-nous and en-soi, when he is not regarding the work as a quasi-subject, and only once does he refer to it solely as an en-soi. This is still linked in definition to the pour-nous. He says "(l'objet esthétique) est en-soi parce qu'il s'oppose à nous." (Vol. I. Part I. chap. VI p. 287.) The first mention of art as pour-nous/en soi is in reference to the relationship of the work to the public (Vol. I Part I. chap. III. p. 110). Here Dufrenne says that the aesthetic object brings no less to the public than it receives from it, and mention of the public makes us more aware of the ambiguity of the status of the aesthetic object, which is at once pour-nous and en-soi. Other important references are in Volume I. Part I. chap. VI.

Firstly, from the ideas (a) that the aesthetic object is essentially perceived - or at least requires a public to see it as aesthetic, and (b) an anti-idealism - that the work is not just a subjective being; there emerge two propositions about the aesthetic object, developing the idea of the 'en-soi-pour-nous'. On the one hand, the aesthetic object has a being which cannot be reduced to the being of a perception, and on the other, this being is suspended at the perceptual level and completed there. Furthermore, a gauge of the strength of 'being' of the aesthetic object, is the demand it exercises over us - especially our perception. In so far as it can make demands of us, far from being for-us, it is we who are for it; and it is en-soi because it opposes itself to us. (p. 287, of., my reference to the en-soi, above.)

Lastly (this is the third important reference, a little later in the chapter), in speaking of the in-itself of the aesthetic object, we oppose it to the for-us, rather than the for-itself. And the form of the aesthetic object forbids us to disqualify the in-itself, in favour of the for-us. This is because the aesthetic object has the initiative, and one is only the occasion for its appearance, despite
the fact that it needs one in order to appear. He also refers to the
in-itself as the essence of the aesthetic object.

The meaning of all this is not immediately obvious. At first
Dufrenne emphasises the aspect of the work as pour-nous. The pres-
ence of a public to a work is necessary, therefore the work must be
"perceived" in order to be fully realised. This emphasises the
relationship between 'us' and the work, and the idea that a work of
art is created in order to be perceived, or for a public, i.e., for us.
This is obviously correct. The artist does not just create a work,
irrespective of its public, or potential public. In this respect it
resembles a 'tool' (Heideggerian term), or any object which is manufac-
tured in order to be used in some way, rather than a tree for inst-
ance, which does not grow for our benefit. Other points which
Dufrenne has made - such as that the work awaits our recognition of it,

1. I allow all works of art as being perceived, for the present. This
factor will be contended nonetheless. Dufrenne takes it for granted
that all art is perceived.

2. On reflection, I am not certain of the relationship between, and
necessity for, a public (qua normal audience) for a work. All the same
I think: (a) certainly artists usually expect their work to be seen,
heard or read - though they may or may not know exactly who the audi-
ence will be; (b) a creation will only count as art if it is, amongst
other things, the sort of thing which could have an audience (i.e., it
is not a private language), and; (c) if one wishes to see the audience
in terms of their causal status in creation, then they may be the final
cause if they commissioned the work, but the artist will be the effi-
cient cause. The final cause is not a necessary condition of creation
however - for instance Mozart is reputed often simply to have 'heard'
music in his head, and written it down. In this case then the audience
as final cause would not be relevant to the creation (though they may
still be there).
All the same, this is not a sufficient description of the work. It does not only exist for us, but also in-itself, as an en-soi. Dufrenne's usage of this term deviates somewhat from Sartre's. For one thing, he does not regard the for-itself-in-itself as an impossible (contradictory) concept, as Sartre does. The in-itself of Sartre is more restrictive than that of Dufrenne - it is the idea of an object complete in itself, about which everything can be known, and which cannot enter into any sort of relationship with another thing. It also implies a lack as well as a limitation. But when Dufrenne refers to the work of art as an en-soi, he has already allowed that it has a relationship with its audience - of giving and receiving. And the fact that he calls the work an en-soi because it opposes itself to us, implies an active rather than a passive en-soi (as Sartre had in mind). The en-soi of Sartre could be acted on by, but could not act on, a subject.

However, this latter also implies, as Dufrenne says, that the work of art is not simply pour-nous. The idea of the work as en-soi is principally the idea of it as being in its own right. It not only needs, it demands, our perception. It is also en-soi in that it cannot, as I said, be reduced to the being of a perception - by which he means it is not a subjective or ideal phenomenon. It is an object (in the broad sense) which sets itself up against us and has the initiative in its relationship with its audience, which Dufrenne has ended up as calling only the occasion for its appearance.

This implies a great deal of independence on the part of the aesthetic object, and a very active role, which does not make it surprising that not only is it insufficient for Dufrenne to say that it is pour-nous, it is also insufficient to say that it is en-soi. The aesthetic object is by now assuming very much the part of the subject, or pour-soi.
Possibly Dufrenne is stretching the point a little in saying that the audience is only the occasion for the appearance of the work, since he has previously specified a high degree of reciprocity between the work and its public. For example, he says:

"Si l'objet esthétique attend du public non seulement sa consécration, mais son accomplissement, inversement le public attend de l'œuvre sa promotion à l'humanité. L'objet esthétique n'apporte donc pas moins au public qu'il ne reçoit de lui . . . . . ."


There are in fact two ways in which one can see the relationship between the terms in Dufrenne's analysis pour-nous/en-soi/quasi-pour-soi. Either (a) that in saying the work is an en-soi, he is opposing the work as a thing complete in itself, to the idea of it as dependent in some way upon us, i.e., a pour-nous. On this account the work of art can be a quasi-pour-soi without bringing up any incompatibility between en-soi and pour-soi can incorporate most of the qualities/attributes of a pour-soi. Or (b) that his thesis develops as it goes along, and from the idea of the work as a pour-nous, and from there to an en-soi (in the Sartrian sense of an object complete in itself yet immobile), he arrives eventually at the notion of it as a quasi-pour-soi, because it is capable of, e.g., expressing, demanding things of its audience, being affective, etc.

In the light of what has just emerged of the description of the work of art as an en-soi — that it will not comfortably contain what Dufrenne wishes to ascribe to the work of art, one must take the latter view. In this way one can trace the progression to Dufrenne's classification of the work as a quasi-pour-soi — though he himself

1 At least he is, to assert it himself, although in fact it is a perfectly plausible hypothesis.
makes no mention of the classification as the conclusion of a train of thought, nor does he present any systematic approach to the notion.

The work of art as a quasi-pour-soi.

As I stated in the introduction, this idea of Dufrenne's is one of his most original notions. And as will be seen from the nature of the quasi-pour-soi, it is one of the concepts most capable of forwarding Dufrenne's basic idea of the work as an object, of there being an a priori. Basically this is because one can formulate a fairly accurate objective a priori notion of the concept 'man' (or pour-soi). And if one can show that art is like man - a quasi-pour-soi as Dufrenne calls it - in the relevant respects, one may say that it is also a priori. Also, the comparison of art and man suggests an objectivity in terms of independence for the work of art. I.e., man does not depend on being seen as a man in order to be one, and if the work of art is comparable, then its existence is not subjective either. This latter is not a strong case, since one requires substantial evidence that art is comparable to man in this way, and one cannot make the assumption just from the (possible) fact that it is comparable in other ways. (An ash tray and a horse trough are similar in that they are both containers - but it does not follow from this that one can carry a horse trough about, as one could an ash tray, etc.).

And, as it happens, I do not think the former comparison of art and man is satisfactory in proving that art is a priori, because I do not think it shows similarities in the relevant respects. For example, Dufrenne does not discuss the necessary and sufficient conditions of being a man, nor go on to consider what might be the necessary and sufficient conditions of being art - he bases his idea of the quasi-pour-soi on various other aspects. Along with this, he
does not seem to consider that it is a necessary condition of any concept that it has certain qualities which apply across the board before one can even consider its having an a priori nature.

Nevertheless, Dufrenne does provide a valuable source of discussion. He gives various reasons for calling the work of art a quasi-pour-soi. He continues to refer to it under this description throughout the Phenomenology, and I shall attempt to elucidate the reasons that he has in mind for some of these references. The primary underlying ones (and others will emerge in the course of the analysis) are Dufrene’s view that the work is (a) expressive, (b) meaningful, (c) self-sufficient, (d) has profundity.

(a) The work is expressive in the same way that a person can be, although more consistently, i.e., its expressivity arises from its own capacity to express, not from an anthropomorphic imposition — as one might say that a forest at night was expressive, but in the sense that one was transferring one’s own moods to the forest, or using one’s imagination. An object’s being expressive in this way — in its own right — is one reason for calling it a pour-soi (because it can transcend its own being just as an object, and affect other things — convey meanings and have relationships with them). This leads on to:

(b) That anything which can express can also be said to have meaning, or that its existence has some significance. Dufrenne obviously does not restrict the idea of meaning to statements or propositions; it implies value or significance. And this is another reason for referring to the work of art as a quasi-subject, since one attributes meaning primarily to subjects, who in turn give meaning to objects.
(c) Self-sufficiency in a work of art is also analogous to the pour-soi, in that a pour-soi does not depend on anything else for the continuation of its existence as it is — nor is it the means to an end external to it, as objects are means to our ends.

(d) One of the main reasons for calling the work a quasi-subject is in order to attribute to it the profundity of a conscious being — which is finally indefinable and irreducible (necessarily, not just in the way that an ordinary object may be indefinable because it has not so far been fully defined). For Dufrenne therefore the aesthetic object has a necessary indefinability, whereas that of an ordinary object, or en-soi, is a contingent, empirical indefinability, where one cannot take in every aspect at a glance.1

This is a brief account of what Dufrenne says. His emphasis on meaning and expression in particular, is apparent especially in six of the nine examples I shall give.

Firstly (Vol.I. Part I. chap V. p.249), he states that the work is a thing which goes beyond itself in meaning, and is in this way a quasi-subject. This conclusion derives from two things. A. A comparison of expression and representation in the aesthetic object — the expressive quality takes primacy because it gives atmosphere and transfigures what is represented, and; B. A comparison between Dasein and expression — Dasein has a transcendent quality which makes it possible for Being to realise itself in the world, and to express is to transcend oneself towards a meaning, i.e., expression gives the aesthetic object some of the transcendent quality of Dasein. Thus

the expressive and meaningful qualities of an aesthetic object

1. This reason is rather the inverse of the others — calling the work a quasi-subject in order to call it profound, instead of e.g., calling it expressive in order to call it a quasi-subject.
combine in giving it attributes of a pour-soi.

Secondly. (Vol. I Part I. chap. IV. p. 197.) He states that the work of art is like a for-itself since it does not rely on other things to give it meaning, and it can therefore be called a quasi-subject. He is here comparing the aesthetic with the ordinary object, and concludes that it is unlike the latter in the sense that it is animated by meaning which is interior to it.

Thirdly. (Vol. I. Part II. Intro. esp. pp. 301-2.) In terms of the supposed structure of the work of art, it has an expression which gives it a unity apart from its material cohesion, and which gives it a temporality, i.e., a pour-soi. According to Dufrenne, the various aspects of a work may be distinguished, but do not exist in isolation, and all the elements of a work move towards the unity of a quasi-pour-soi.

Fourthly. (Vol. I. Part II. chap IV. sect. IIIb. pp. 408-9) The work of art is endowed with an interiority which makes it capable of expression, and the ability to express confers a quasi-subjectivity on the work. Dufrenne adds (mainly as a leader into the second volume of the work, on perception) that the aesthetic object is only a quasi-subject for the authentic subject, i.e., the perceptive spectator.

Fifthly. (Vol II. Part I. chap. IV sect. IV pp. 525-6.) This chapter is concerned with the profundity of the aesthetic object, and the section with reflection and feeling in aesthetic perception. Here Dufrenne states that the perfection of the aesthetic object is to be quasi-subject, but it can only attain this expressive subjectivity by the rigour and surety of its objective being.

1. The first and second points have been inadvertently transposed, which simply results in their not following Dufrenne's ordering.
2. It is a straightforward phenomenological assertion to say that the work is meaningful, and rather dubious, as is the view that the latter state follows the former.
Sixthly. (Vol.II. Part I. chap.III. sect.III, esp.p.473.) Dufrenne adds to the first two points on meaning and expression when making a distinction between object and subject. The former is, whereas the latter makes a sign. A thing cannot make a sign (even signposts do not signal, or have meaning, of their accord), because it is only what it is, and everything about it can be known, is unhidden. Dufrenne is here classifying the aesthetic object in the category of subject, as quasi-subject.

While emphasising expression and meaning as reasons for referring to the aesthetic object as a quasi-pour-soi, these six examples have brought up four related points; (i) temporality, (ii) interiority, (iii) unity, and (iv) that the work of art is only a quasi-subject for the perceptive spectator. In three further references to the aesthetic object as a quasi-pour-soi, Dufrenne elaborates on the notion of temporality as a definitive attribute, and contradicts both Sartre (fairly radically), and himself (more mildly).

Seventhly. (Vol I. Part I. chap. VI, sect.IIb, esp. p.292) He takes an Anti-Sartrian point of view in saying that the character of the for-itself in the aesthetic object does not exclude the in-itself any more than it does in a human person. This contradicts Sartre, for whom the in-itself-for-itself was an impossible concept, and appears to contradict the point that Dufrenne has just made, placing the quasi-subject in the category of the subject, as capable of making a sign, going beyond itself. All the same, I do not think he is contradicting himself, since he is not saying that the aesthetic object is both in-itself and for-itself at the same time. It seems to be more of a distinction between the perfect and imperfect realisation of the aesthetic object. There can be an imperfect or potential realisation, where the aesthetic object either has no audience, or is in a society where art as a category is not recognised, and the aesthetic object as such disappears. In this case what remains is an in-itself or ordinary object. The aesthetic
object is only perfectly realised when it enters into a relationship with another, and is perceived as an aesthetic object. This is perfectly analogous to the in-itself and the for-itself as designated by Sartre. (The only real contradiction of Sartre by Dufrenne is in saying that this combination is perfectly possible in the human being.)

Eightly. (Vol. I. Part II. chap. I. esp. pp. 305-7.) Space and time as central concepts in art are important for two reasons, the second of which is that they can clarify the quasi-subject part played by the aesthetic object. Dufrenne really simply makes a comparison between the aesthetic object as he sees it, and a living being as Kant conceptualises that, in terms of internal temporality. He differentiates between objective time and a subjective time-structure. Kant regards the time which is proper to a living thing as expressing the interiority of a life, which he calls its internal finality. Dufrenne regards the aesthetic object as also having this internal finality - it is living, both in entering into history and being animated by a form of internal movement.

Ninthly. (Vol. II. Part I. chap. IV. sect. I. esp. pp. 492-3.) Finally, in relation to the profundity and ultimate indefinability of the work of art, Dufrenne refers to two aspects of the work which he thinks make it a quasi-subject. These are that it has (a) organic coherence, and (b) proximity to consciousness.

From these nine analyses of the role of the aesthetic object as a quasi-pour-soi, it is obvious that Dufrenne has concrete reasons for defining it as such, rather than the negative one that it oversteps the limits of the en-soi and the pour-nous, when one tries to categorise it as either one or both of these.

The point raised in the fourth account of the work of art as a quasi-subject - that it is only one for the perceptive reader, is similar to part of the seventh account, that the aesthetic object is only a quasi-pour-soi if it is seen as one, perceived by someone as one. It is no more radical than this, since the seventh account
also requires that one enter into a relationship with the work, as opposed to accepting passively that it is one.

The two notions of, (i) unity, and (ii) interiority, can be explained quite briefly. Unity means simply that the elements of the work of art are designed in order to form a meaningful whole, both in terms of form and content. It is the idea of a designed, purposive structure, as opposed to the ordinary object which just is as it is. Interiority seems to be intended to convey the idea that a work has the power to do something, e.g., express, rather than its expression being gained vicariously or anthropomorphically from someone's seeing it as if it expressed.

One's acceptance of the work of art as a quasi-subject naturally depends upon one's prior acceptance of the qualities that Dufrenne attributes to the work, since these are the bases for defining it as a quasi-pour-soi. They are now not only, (a) expression, (b) meaning, (c) self-sufficiency, and (d) profundity; but also (e) temporality, (f) having a relationship with its audience, (g) unity, (h) interiority (which can be placed under the heading of expression), and (i) proximity to consciousness.

Since (a) - and hence (h) -, (b), (c) and (d) will be discussed at greater length, especially in Chapter Five, the final decision as to whether or not to accept Dufrenne's classification of the work as a quasi-subject must be deferred until then. Nevertheless, one may come to a provisional decision from a discussion of (e), (f), (g) and (i), conditionally allowing that the work of art is expressive, meaningful and self-sufficient.

1. (e) is discussed in Chapter 2, and (f) also indirectly discussed in Chapter 4.
All the same, I think that it is necessary to point out that Dufrenne's assertions here about why art is meaningful are, at the most, questionable. For instance, the second statement he makes (Vol.I, Part I, chap IV, p.197), includes two assertions which are, as I noted, dubious. Firstly, that the work does not rely on other things to give it meaning. This is a phenomenological commonplace, but that does not make it correct. For example, there is the artist to be considered.

Secondly, that it follows, from the fact just disputed, that the work does not rely on anything else to give it meaning; that it can be called a quasi-subject. In the first place, the phenomenological theory is that everything is meaningful of its own accord, in which case it would follow that everything can be called a quasi-subject. In the second place, those who are not phenomenologists would say that ordinary objects of any kind do not rely on anything more than that on which the work of art does, to give them meaning (man's purpose for them, etc.), in which case the same conclusion follows as before. Everything is let in.

All the same, it should be noted that this does not militate against art as meaningful, and being a quasi-pour-soi partly on that account.

To return to the points at hand, there is first of all (e), temporality. This is the least easy quality to justify, especially since Dufrenne simply transfers Kant's notion of internal finality from man, to works of art. Dufrenne seems to think that entering into history and having some form of internal movement is sufficient justification. However, the former may be dismissed quickly, since it is by no means the prerogative of man or works of art to be historically locatable. The latter is more promising - that the time-structure of a work of art is not simply part of the objective time-structure. This seems correct in many ways. For example, a representational work may depict
an action taking a certain length of time, to which the 'objective'
time spent studying the work bears no relation. One recognises that a
depiction of Tantalus represents an eternity quite unrelated to object-
ive time; or that a symphony has its own internal time-structure, which
is worked out in terms of the relationship between passages and move-
ments, and phraseology, e.g., the fast passage of time in the gallop-
ing horse of Schubert's 'Erlkönig', set against the apparent dragging
of time of 'Der Neugierige' (from 'Die schöne Mullerin'). Both take
about the same objective length of time, but there is a feeling - or
subjective time structure - of speed in one, and hanging in the other.
Additional examples are the usage of objective time to organise the
time taken by a dramatic work, which may stretch over minutes or years,
whilst objectively lasting an hour; a Gothic tower stretching 'to
infinity', without actually taking any length of time, simply occup-
ying a certain area of space. Only the performed arts are temporal as
well as spatial, and of these only music ('pure' music, that is), is
purely temporal.

It would therefore appear that Dufrenne was right in attributing
this quality to the work of art, and that it has a temporal power of
its own, which is comparable with man's internal time structure (though
not his consciousness of it), and which has no parallel in ordinary
objects, i.e., the work has analogies with the pour-soi here.

That the work has a relationship with its audience (f). Here, I
think that this is intended to convey a more one-way idea of relation-
ship than that between persons. Obviously not legal, blood, spatial
or temporal, it is rather a personal, immediate connection resulting
from the work's becoming fully realised as a result of A's perceiving
it as a work of art. If one accepts that the term is subject-relative,
and honorific, and like many other terms, as, for example, ink bottle,
an x is not an x unless designated by somebody as one, then one is
accepting Dufrenne's position. This appears reasonable enough in the
case of the term 'work of art', since its meaning seems to involve 'an object seen by someone in a certain light and evaluated according to certain criteria', which entails that the thing in question be studied by someone and classified as a work of art before it becomes one.

Hence perceiving x as a work of art causes it to be fully realised and enter into a relationship with its audience - that of perceiver with perceived. This is not exactly the capacity for a relationship which Sartre invoked as part of his definition of the pour-soi - which involves a much more active role than simply being the object perceived. Nevertheless, Dufrenne is not committed to draw any exact parallels between the concept of a work of art and the concept of a person, and, so far as it goes, the idea put forward by Dufrenne is acceptable. But it needs reinforcing, since one can have a similar relationship simply of perceiver and perceived, with any object - which entails that the perceived object need be no more than an en-soi (a tree, a box, etc.). Again the question can only be resolved in terms of the qualities of the perceived work of art - in particular whether it is expressive, meaningful, or affective. So this point also cannot be properly resolved before the latter question is.

Unity (g)\(^1\) is a fairly common and uncontroversial criterion of evaluation in a work of art. But the outline which I have given is not sufficient for Dufrenne's purposes. Firstly, one must establish whether a work of art has unity in the sense he gives, and secondly, if it does, whether that is a criterion for calling it a quasi-subject.

\(^1\) which may be taken as equivalent to *organic coherence*, cf., ninth point.
Firstly (and again unity depends on expression, at least Dufrenne thinks that it does). Certainly, if a work is said to be expressive, then if it is determined that the various thoughts, moods, feelings, sensations, etc., expressed, form a coherent unity, it is said to be a good work of art. There are, of course, other factors involved in judging the unity of a work of art - that of its form, content and subject matter. It is unclear whether Dufrenne is relying on the factor of expression giving the work of art unity (and thus ultimately again on expression) to designate the work as a quasi-subject, or on the concept of unity itself as the criterion. If the latter, and I think it is this, then he would appear to be on fairly safe ground.

Secondly (as I said), unity of its elements is a general criterion of evaluation of a work of art. This does not mean that works of art must be harmonious, but that their elements should form a logically coherent whole. The question is - whether this is the sort of unity which is analogous to what one might call the unity of a pour-soi or whether unity has anything to do with the concept of a subject.

It would be useless to credit man with unity of design and structure, i.e., to invoke teleology, since if this applies at all, it applies also to things not in the pour-soi bracket. Thus unity in this sense would not align the work of art solely with the pour-soi. But one can take the concept in terms of unity of action, purpose, or being. In this sense, the work of art is an intentional, designed creation, and the actions of men are purposive, designed and intentional. Unity can therefore be attributed to both, and the work of art can be said to be a quasi-subject.

Proximity to consciousness (1) presumably refers to three points:
1) Dufrenne's previous claim that the author is one with the work in its construction, and in thinking of him, we think of him as part of it.
2) The fact that works of art are constructed for consciousness (conscious subjects).

3) What is metaphorically termed 'life' in a work of art, as for example, when a critic says good works of art come alive, etc. This also refers retrospectively to the other aspects of a work which make it a quasi-subject, which by definition gives it a proximity to consciousness.

But these three criteria attribute the pour-soi to a work of art only vicariously and metaphorically. The proximity to consciousness is not qualitative, which is what is required to use this as a basic reason for calling the work of art a quasi-subject. This particular point can only be used to give support to the notion, but not as sufficient - even jointly with the other features.

To arrive at this justification of Dufrenne, one has to move some way from his original standpoint (a), since the latter features are basic criteria for something's being a work of art at all, while the former (unity of expression, etc.), are rather second order criteria for something's being a good work of art. (b) because when Dufrenne refers to the unity of a quasi-pour-soi, he is talking in terms of these second order criteria - which apply only to art.

I think, therefore, that unity as a criterion for art is quite uncontroversial, but as a criterion for art as a quasi-subject, it is rather dubious. Of the four criteria with which it is possible to deal at present, temporality definitely promotes the idea of art as quasi-pour-soi; as does proximity to consciousness, as a support; unity requires a good deal of juggling with - and is still dubious;

1. Even if the term is honorific, one can still distinguish between degrees of value of works of art.
and the concept of the work as having a relationship with its audience remains unresolved, until the exact nature of the work of art (as expressive, etc.), is resolved.

Finally, Dufrenne can call the aesthetic object only a quasi-pour-soi, rather than a pour-soi, for several reasons. (a) Because no matter how many of the qualities of a subject an aesthetic object possesses, it is still dependent on the subject for its existence. (b) Because it is dependent on the subject for being seen as an aesthetic object. (c) Because it does not possess the vital quality of the pour-soi, its consciousness, either of itself or others. Thus, it cannot perceive its freedom, or lack of it, nor its failures or achievements or ambitions. In fact it can have none of these things because they are restricted to conscious and rational beings - and Dufrenne is not claiming that the aesthetic object is rational.

It therefore lies between the realms of the in-itself and the for-itself. On the grounds which have just been discussed for calling art quasi-pour-soi, I think one can allow that Dufrenne has an important and original hold on the concept of a work of art, even if it requires further backing (as it would seem to do).

1. I think one might say that the use of the term quasi-pour-soi indicated that Dufrenne is applying the idea of the pour-soi metaphorically to the work of art.
Conclusion.

The most positive, and (fortunately) the most important part of this chapter is the final section. Before this, Dufrenne has failed to provide a satisfactory distinction between the work of art and the aesthetic object — although one may allow the minor points that:

(a) his discussion rather tortuously illustrates that perception (qua listening, reading, viewing) is of major importance to art;

and (b) there remains the ordinary language distinction. But it is no thanks to Dufrenne that this distinction does remain, since it is almost the converse of the one which he propounds, i.e., making the class of aesthetic objects greater than that of works of art.

The lack of a satisfactory distinction unfortunately fogs the issue on the a priori. It makes it difficult to see where the features Dufrenne regards as the essence of art lie, and whether they — and therefore the work of art — exist objectively, or are dependent on the subject for their existence. For the work of art qua aesthetic object is dependent on the subject for its existence, and if the essential features belong to the work qua aesthetic object then they are subject relative to that extent.

The section on the nature and general structure of art has also been shown to have severe weaknesses — especially with regard to the latter part. And his ideas of the distinction between the aesthetic and the ordinary object are both bizarre and rather vague. One never finds out exactly what counts as a clear case of each class, nor exactly what belongs to the list of borderline cases and how these would eventually be classed. This and the third section therefore encounter similar problems of ambiguity and a failure to clarify concepts in order to come to any determinate conclusion.
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The idea of the quasi-pour-sol is much more promising though. It provides a genuinely original idea about the work, which will find its completion only by the end of the fifth chapter, since the concepts involved continue to be discussed and worked out through chapters two, three, four and five. And it is not only extremely interesting, but it also demonstrates sufficient similarities between the work of art and the pour-sol, to warrant the work's being provisionally nominated a quasi-pour-sol. However, this is not for the reasons which make the concept 'man' an a priori concept. The concepts with which it deals — unity, meaning, etc., are not the uniquely individuating necessary and sufficient conditions which make x a man — or altogether which make x art.

(a) They are points of similarity between art and man; (b) they are not discussed in sufficient detail to be individuating of art; (c) Dufrenne does not enter into any discussion on whether they are either necessary or sufficient or both.

It is important to bear in mind that although he has brought to prominence various important aspects of art, by the end of this chapter, Dufrenne has not provided an a priori nature of art which one could go on to use as a guide rule for something's being art.
CHAPTER TWO. THE STATUS OF THE WORK OF ART: ITS CREATION, PERCEPTION AND AUTONOMY.

Introduction.

In this chapter, I intend to discuss something of the creation of a work of art, its performers (if any) and audience, its perception, and finally the way in which Dufrenne regards it as independent of any of these — i.e., autonomous or self-sufficient. Dufrenne does not make much use of the term 'autonomous', but I use it as a 'blanket' term for various things Dufrenne says about the work which amount to a view of it as autonomous.¹

There has been much debate over the actual creation of a work of art — where it is created and when, and whether an idea in the mind of the artist counts as a creation. Croce² and Collingwood³ discussed this (amongst others), and aroused much criticism in so doing. Dufrenne unfortunately reveals a great lack of clarity on the topic, and one must interpret him as best one can. This is also the case with a sub-section of Section I, which deals with the idea that all works of art are in some way performed.

The question of perception is less familiar, but requires some discussion, since Dufrenne makes the unusual claim that all art is perceived, and often makes use of the term in ways which require some explanation — usually in relation to feeling and aesthetic experience.

¹. This topic is discussed when he talks of the aesthetic object and the world (Vol.I, Part I, Chap.V.), and representation and imagination (Vol.II, Part I, Chap.II.).
The final topic of the self-sufficiency or autonomy of art has been dealt with by others, intermittently and rather indirectly, e.g., in discussions on the relevance of historical contexts, moral viewpoints, the possibility that the work may be informative, etc. Dufrenne wishes to sever all connection between the work and the rest of the world, but I think that in the end it becomes clear that it is not possible to do this.

As far as the interpretation of his views on the creation of art goes, one has some foreknowledge of the tenor of Dufrenne's views. For his belief that there is an a priori object which is the work of art would be incompatible with any such thesis as that the work is an idea in the artist's mind, or some such similar nebulous entity. Obviously one can attribute an a priori nature and qualities to an idea, but both the idea and the existence of its qualities is questionable and unverifiable. This is an example of one of the fortunate consequences of the belief in the a priori nature of art - e.g., the belief that the work possesses certain objective features, not least of which is an objective existence (external to the mind of the artist). The only dubious factor here is that Dufrenne is once again frustratingly hesitant about taking the appropriate stance. He hedges, and suggests ways in which the work pre-exists its sensible emanation - although he declares a belief that the work is not a true work of art until it is an objective existent.

1. The idea of tackling this aspect of Dufrenne's work was given to me by Cyril Barrett, and I must acknowledge at least a methodological influence, and probably an influence on the general tenor of my thoughts.
It is worth noting that what he says is perfectly consistent with the thesis of the a priori, as will be seen in chapter three. The idea of the work of art as independent of all external influences lends credibility to the idea that it has a natural significance or immediate meaningfulness. And being a priori (if, that is, he could prove that it was) it would be natural for art to have no need of externally experienced features in order to explain itself.

The points raised in this chapter bring out some interesting questions for the status of art, in terms of creation, performance, independence, etc.

(I) Creation. Section I.

Dufrenne's views here are concerned with the relationship between the artist, the work, its performers and performance, and its audience. He purports to be anti-idealistic, and views the work as having mastery over its creator, rather than vice versa. Nevertheless, intuitionism brings him close to an idealism which he would deny. It is apparent that he regards the work of art as being in many ways autonomous of its creator.

Despite rejecting idealism, i.e., such views as Croce and Collingwood propound—of the existence of the work as an idea in the artist's imagination—Dufrenne does not accept that the work of art exists only when it has a sensible emanation. According to him, there is a sense in which it does exist prior to its creation. It is not an idea of an aesthetic object, because this is too subjective, and 'the idea of an aesthetic object' exists only for the artist.

1. Though this is not, as I suggested in the introduction, a very sensible line for him to take.
The nature of the pre-sensible object is (a), a certainty in the artist of being equal to a task, responding to a call (b), an existent thing, but not a blue print for the artist, which he can see and imitate (c), a certain internal logical form. Thus, what is produced by the artist is the expression of this internal logical form, that of a certain technical development. Before the work is created in a sensible form it is only a demand for existence. It is an idea, but not a conceptualisable one (by the artist or anyone else - the 'being' of the work is just as inaccessible to the artist as to the public, before its external emanation). When it is created, intuition tells the artist whether or not the work agrees with the idea.

There are also two sorts of artist - he who is not aware exactly of what he is doing, and in this case the work seems to be in command, and he who knows that, and what, he is creating, and uses the products of extremely conscious work to produce the work of art, i.e., work by means of which he has acquired a metier, taste, and consciousness of aesthetic problems; the tools of aesthetic creation, as Dufrenne calls them. However, the work of art is not completely in the control even of the latter artist - there is a sense in which he is the vehicle for its production. (Cf. Vol.I. Part I. Chap.II. section II. esp. pp.63-6.)

Despite a certain amount of ambiguity in what Dufrenne says, I think that what he is claiming is (a) that there is a sense in which a work of art pre-exists its sensible emanation (b) this is not the work itself, as idealists would claim (c.f., his statement that before the work is externally manifested, "il se peut que l'artiste entende un appel . . . mais cela atteste encore mieux qu'à ce stade l'œuvre l'") This is obviously very unclear - e.g., saying that the work of art can be an idea seems to contradict what he has just said. I shall comment on this shortly.
n'est qu'exigence . . . Tout reste à faire, et l'exécution est vraiment création." p.65.) And his reason for regarding the work as pre-existing in some way, derives from the fact that the work often appears to be independent of the artist, and it would therefore seem logical to assume that the artist was not the sole efficient cause of its existence.

Secondly, there is the role of the performer, i.e., when the work is distinct from its execution, e.g., drama, ballet, music (c.f., Vol. I, Part I. Chap.II, section I). He includes architecture in this class—and as that which exemplifies the greatest distinction between artist and performer.1.

According to Dufrenne, the performer has a fairly heavy task—that of bringing the work to life and interpreting it. In this he specifies that he disagrees with Aristotle's view of the performer as a slave to the wishes of the work. Conventionally enough, he feels that the work is incomplete without its performance, since its function is to be performed. The work is not inert however; it demands a great deal of its performers, and one may measure the depth or greatness of the work by the degree to which it is performable with apparent felicity. Grace, apparent spontaneity and ease are essential to a performer. He must also be faithful to the work—it demands his obedience (p.60), virtuosity, intelligence, initiative, and subjugation of his own self in the work. The performer therefore has a range of possibilities, but must stay within the limits of these—otherwise what Gautier calls

1. As a matter of fact, this does not seem to be a very good example, since the architect leaves little or no initiative to the builder. So the builder is hardly a performer—though certainly in architecture the artist is very much distinct from the builder.
This also raises the question of the location of the work. Dufrenne rightly says that we judge an interpretation in terms of the work, but that it is less necessary to know what the work is, prior to its execution, than to know that the interpretation complies with the work. Thus it is a question of truth (or fidelity), and the true being of the work, rather than one of its reality. This is handy, because reality presupposes a work pre-existent to its performance, whereas truth does not. We see the truth of the work through the execution, and this orients our judgment. Dufrenne advises caution here though, since different interpretations alter our judgment, and a supposedly brilliant interpretation is liable to bias us towards regarding that as the exemplification of the work. We should not allow such performances to cause us to anticipate how a work should be. Many interpretations are legitimate, and thus the nature of the work is not pre-ordained.

Supposing himself to be faced with relativism, Dufrenne asserts a relative-absolutist viewpoint, which is that a work has a trans-historical existence. It is differently interpreted by different cultures, and ignored by certain others. The work retains its value nonetheless, and its status as a work of art.

Dufrenne mentions intentionality with regard to interpretation, but makes short work of it. Consistently with his belief that the work of art is self-sufficient, and should be understood without reference to historical location, author, style, etc., he feels that

1. This viewpoint is another indicator of his belief in the a priori in art - that a work remains art, i.e., retains its given aesthetic qualities, even where no-one considers it to be art, despite public opinion.
whatever intentions the author had, and which are relevant, will be
discernable in the work. I.e., if Faure's Requiem was intended to
sound religious, this factor is only discerned by reference to the
work - e.g., if it "sounds wrong" given a non-religious interpret-
atation. This view is supported by various people, notably Professor
Kemp (B.J.A., '64).

Having spoken of those works where creation and execution are
obviously distinct, Dufranne makes the more unconventional move of
saying that all works of art are performed in some way, and where
execution and creation are not distinct, the artist is the performer
(p.62). However, he also says that strictly speaking the spectator
is a performer (p.80). To exist properly the work needs the spect-
ator.

1. Though various people also reject the idea, or have other inter-
pretations as to the relevance of the artist's intentions; e.g., Red-
path; 'The meaning of a poem', and Caffee; 'Intention and interpret-
atation in criticism', both in: Collected papers in aesthetics, ed.,

2. Presumably this is only a slightly different way of saying that
the work needs to be performed in order to complete its function, and
assuming a performance will have an audience, in view of the fact that
he goes on to say that the reality of the work exists only in the sens-
ible. This also supports the case for saying he does not believe the
work exists until it has an objective, external, being. Dufranne
expresses himself rather confusedly though. It would be clearer if
he stated explicitly that strictly speaking, everyone is a performer.
With regard to the idea of the spectator as a performer, he states that this is unquestionably true in the so-called performed arts, and even in the arts (e.g., literature) where the work is not separately executed, the audience (reader) still has the task of bringing the work out of its abstract existence as written words, to a concrete existence. (C.f., esp. pp.87-91.) Thus the spectator is a performer. Dufrenne states that the spectator co-operates in the execution of the work - and if the work is of the nature of a religious procession, then the spectator is an actor at the same time. But he is cautious later that as a spectator one is forbidden to add anything to the work, though one can interpret in the effort to understand. (p.96.)

Dufrenne refers also to the public of a work of art. The public is held to be en bloc rather than a number of individuals. Its extension is indeterminate but is often somewhat elitist - a sect. By public, Dufrenne presumably means that set of people who supposedly understand art, and does not regard it as objectionable that there should be such a set. The public, he says, is different from the mass - it is the public of a work of art, not the public as a whole. In front of a work of art, man is held to transcend his singularity, and be part of an aesthetic community - this refers back to the concept of the public as being en bloc. As the work ages, its public extends in two directions, (i) vertically - gaining a new audience with each new generation, and (ii) horizontally - since time gives the work prestige, and more people come to accept in each generation (c.f., esp. pp.91-9). Dufrenne's description of the procession where everyone joins in does not sound very much like anything aesthetic, and I rather doubt that a religious procession could be called art unless it was very well organised, with a high degree of conventional ceremony, though presumably he intends it to be taken as aesthetic (c.f. p.84 ibid.).
As to the performance itself (where it is separate from the creation of the work), Dufrenne calls it a move from demand to accomplishment, or from abstract to concrete. The work qua score or text, already has form (p. 71). 1.

Reproductions.
For some reason Dufrenne says that the existence of a reproduction is somewhere between the abstract and concrete existence of the original. This is confusing because he has just used abstract and concrete to refer to the transition from score or text to performed work. It is always of less value than the original - for one thing, not being an aesthetic object, it can only give a diminished presence of the original, except in the case of e.g., ceramics, where the reproduction actually is a work of art.

I do not have much criticism to make of the majority of this. The only points of contention seem to be about the pre-existence of the work, performers and reproductions (and this is questionable mainly because it is confused).

1. It is probably less ambiguous to omit the idea of the unperformed work as a demand - since Dufrenne has used this term previously to refer to the nature of the uncreated work.
There are two difficulties with the claim for a sense in which the work of art pre-exists its objective manifestation. (i) Regarding (a), the certainty of being equal to a task. This certainty in no way guarantees either the existence of the task, or the equality of the artist to performing it. Wittgenstein demonstrates this adequately when he talks of our understanding something — that it is not the feeling of, "Ah, now I know" — but for one thing the demonstration that one does, by carrying on a sequence correctly, for example.1 The ability to carry on the sequence is not the only criterion of knowing the technique, but the feeling of knowing how is no criterion at all, since one may think one has understood, and yet not have done. Thus, the inner state of the artist is as unreliable as the idealist statement that the work exists in his mind — without the subsequent external appearance of a work.2 (ii) What Dufrenne says of the work as an 'idea' is very unclear and inconsistent. He says on the one hand that it is not an 'idea of an aesthetic object', not something which can be imitated by the artist, and on the other hand that it is an 'idea', but not conceptualisable, and finally that on completion of the work the artist knows intuitively whether the work agrees with the 'idea'. To make this coherent one must appeal to his view of the artist as inspired to create something which is nevertheless independent of him once it is created. The work may


2. And any supposed a priori features are in the same position, as indicated earlier.
then be referred to as an 'idea' qua independent object rather than qua ideal object.¹

It seems as if the problem really is that if the work is supposed to correspond to an idea, then prior to its creation, there is only one way in which e.g., the Verdi Requiem, may turn out, which will be correct (i.e., correspond to the idea). And one may well know that Verdi originally had something very different in mind from the finished product. However, this is not problematic, since it is confusing Verdi’s original intention or vision, with the idea as something independent of Verdi. But the problem is far more simple. It is that there is no independent verification for suggesting an ‘idea’ of the latter type, nor any necessity for suggesting it.

Apart from this, I think Dufrenne is correct to divide artists into two sorts – those who are aware of exactly what they are doing, and those who are not. As examples one might cite Dylan Thomas in the first category, since he is reputed to have said that he did not know what his poetry meant, he left it to the critics to say; and Leonardo da Vinci in the other. Not that the distinction makes any real aesthetic difference. It has no particular affect on the resulting work – so there is really no good reason why Dufrenne should divide artists into these two categories.

With regard to performances it seems as if Dufrenne is right in regarding the performer’s task as much more than someone executing certain dictates. David Warner’s version of Hamlet is quite different from that of Olivier; Solti’s Tristan is quite different from Furtwängler, and both from von Bülow.

¹ Nevertheless, I think that Dufrenne cannot escape the accusation of being either very careless or very unclear as to exactly when he thinks the work of art is created, and what sense we should give to the idea of the work of art.
The idea that felicity of performance is necessary is also uncontroversial if one bears in mind the dictum that a measure of an artist's greatness is the degree to which he can make his performance appear effortless (though the question usually arises with regard to the performer's rather than the work's greatness). The distinction between truth and reality, to avoid the irritating question of the location of the work, is quite ingenious. It refers one back to the work's performance as that which is definitive. The argument is in one way circular, since it reduces to saying one refers to the execution of the work (the truth of a work being found in an execution of it), in order to judge some execution/performance. Moreover, he deems a prior ideal as to how the work ought to be.1 But I think it is perfectly legitimate to say that one should judge one's interpretation in relation to other interpretations, and to accept differing performances. This is normal practice. I would agree also that a work is illuminated rather than confused, by the various trans-historical interpretations it receives.

The idea of a trans-historical existence for a work of art might suggest it exists separately from its interpretations, as X, variously interpreted. In fact I do not think that Dufrenne would wish to deny that there was some point of reference for a play or a piece of music, apart from its performances, i.e., the score or text. The existence of the score or text deals with both 'bad performances' and the possibility of there being as many works of art as there are performances. I.e., one has only to say that one must not deviate too far from the text or score, otherwise one either has a bad performance or something which is not a performance at all. (I readily admit that the degree to which one may deviate will be somewhat

1. C.f., Kant; Critique of Judgment, published Hafner, 1972, first and third moments. That is, he deems ideals as to the particulars of performance in a work.
arbitrary - a matter of general consensus - and will differ from work to work.) But although this may be the basic form of existence for the work, for Dufrenne it is not the important form - and here again I am inclined to agree with him. It is not a sufficient condition for the fulfilment of the work.

The idea that all works are in some way performed is illuminating to the extent that it demonstrates that painting, sculpture, literature, etc., lack some part of their nature if they are left unread or unseen - since it is their function (or part of it) to have an audience. To say that the audience acts as a performer seems to be a little extreme though. As audience, one's role seems to be mainly receptive, and possibly analytic, and even if one's action fulfills the purpose of the work (or confers the status of a work of art on it), it hardly seems to assume the proportions of a performer - it seems more passive than that. I do not, therefore, agree with Dufrenne that the fact that an audience is necessary to the work, entails that he has the active role of performer.

I think also that one has to make some distinction between the audience's performances of works not normally regarded as performed, e.g., painting, and those which are normally regarded as performed, e.g., music. Possibly it is not so much that in the former cases the audience is passive - in looking at a painting for instance - as that one cannot see something different 1 or do anything different each time one looks at it, or alter the work - whereas with that are usually called the performed arts, each performance can and will be different.

Nevertheless, one must be careful not to confuse the ordinary audience of performed arts, and the characters normally seen as the

1. By which I mean the same factors are there to be seen, not that one always sees the same ones,
performers, i.e., actors or musicians. The former will hear or see a different performance each time, as I said, but that does not necessarily make his role any more active than that of someone looking at a painting - and it is he, not the musician or actor, who corresponds to the person looking at the painting.

Having made these distinctions, one is still left with the fact that there does not seem to be any good reason for saying that the audience of a work performs it in any way. Certainly he confers upon it the status of art, and is necessary for its existence; and the artist creates the work, but I think that in the end one is justified only in regarding those people normally seen as performers (musicians, actors, etc.), as performers. For, to perform a work one must have a quasi-creative role - not in the original creation, but in being instrumental in taking a score, say a score of a piece of music and transforming it and transmitting it to a public in its ultimate intended aesthetic form of sound patterns. The performer is the mediator who brings the work as he sees it before the public.

The idea of the work as always performed is one of Dufrenne's fairly original views, though there is also John Cage, who counts everything which takes place during the performance as part of the work, which is a similar view to that of Dufrenne, although not identical. Dufrenne does not argue from the fact that all works are performed by their audience, to the view that all the audience's actions count as part of the performance. However, I think Dufrenne is correct in the rest of what he says of the public as a work. It is a contingent fact that art is not comprehensible to the public in toto - even if this is only due to their not being in possession of the relevant facts. This is not to say that this is a good or bad thing. Tolstoy regarded it as bad. However, under this theory

1. op. cit.
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1. op. cit.
Beethoven and Shakespeare are less good art than folk music, which is highly contentious. In 'transcending his singularity' when contemplating a work, man puts aside his egoistic 'everydayness', and distances himself from himself - thus becoming part of an aesthetic community. As to the dimension of the public, it is a simple psychological fact that the less one is contemporaneous with the creation of a work, the more reverence one is likely to feel for it - or the more likely one is to accord it the status of art.

Dufranne has made short work of intentionality. He is being self-consistent as I pointed out, and I see no necessity to go all over the relevance or decisiveness of the intentions of the artist. The ground has been well ploughed, but the results are inconclusive. Wimsatt and Beardsley affect to disallow intentions, but effectively bring them in under cover of what they regard as legitimate material for interpretation - such as biographical information, under the heading of additional notes. Cioffi regards intentions as relevant but not decisive, but has no definitive criterion for when they are relevant - his suggested criterion for ignoring the artist's stated intention being:

"when an important, deep-meaning, long-lasting effect or meaning seems to result from the work, and the artist just denies that he means this" (p.173).

But how does one judge when Cioffi's criterion is satisfied? It would seem to be a fairly arbitrary decision. Redpath is generally against taking the artist's intentions into account, and suggests, with regard to poetry:

"Perhaps the meaning of a poem is a class of similar experiences, one or other of which those words in that order and arranged in that form, ought to evoke in a reader familiar with the language in which the poem is written." (p. 154.)

This is again too general, and none of the accounts takes into consideration original and ultimate intentions, which may differ radically. Moreover, what the artist says is notoriously unreliable, and what he intends, equally inaccessible; and there is again the distinction between what the author intended a work to mean, and whether he intended to put a certain word or brush stroke, where he did - i.e., between an intentional meaning and an intentional action, a distinction which is often unnoticed.

It seems altogether safer to take the work itself as authoritative, as Dufrenne does. There is only one drawback to what he says - namely that it is somewhat subjective to say that one has to judge a work in terms of whether it 'feels right'. I think that one should bear in mind the period in which the artist lived, in order to know whether a certain effect could have been intended. For instance, Mozart would not have intended his music to sound atonal, not his resolutions unresolved. Nevertheless, important as this may be, it is also true that Dufrenne is keeping to the right lines in stressing reference to the actual performance, whereas what the author says he intended is a biographical fact, and not necessarily an aesthetic one.

2. By this I mean the author's notes on the meaning of his works, or what he tells someone he intended, not what is gained from the work and its spatio-temporal context. And the former can always be called
To take up Dufrenne's point again; I may know that Mahler's symphonies should not sound tranquil, not because I have access to what he said, but because they will 'sound wrong' if they sound tranquil. Admittedly a lot more detail is needed about 'sounding wrong'. I might say that given a tranquil rendering by Colin Davis, Mahler sounded formless and confused, its themes lacked unity and coherence; it was meaningless and achieved no expressive power. Given certain things, I think that one might accept this criticism. For one thing, that I was not confusing Mahler with Schoenberg; for another, that other people who were also not confusing Mahler with Schoenberg, or anyone else for that matter, agreed with me, and finally, I would need reasons for the suggested elaboration on 'sounding wrong', which did not include anything about the artist's supposed intentions. One could easily end where one began, by saying that the music 'sounded wrong' - formless and confused, etc., because one thought one knew that the author intended it to sound other than it did. (In this case one might not hear it as it actually sounded, because of one's psychological bias.) Maybe one

2. (continued) biographical data about the author, but may well be not aesthetically important data - for the simple reason that what the author says he intended I to mean does not entail that this is what I means. This is not to say that what the author says he intended is never of any aesthetic value. It can well throw a great deal of light on the work in question - for instance if a poet has used some symbolism private to himself, then only he can explain what the symbols stand for, and 'decode' the poem.
could say that these themes, harmonies, rhythms, key signatures, tempo markings, etc., in this order, as a matter of fact have such and such an expression and form if played in a particular way, and that this particular expression, form, unity, etc., is acceptable. A different interpretation might also be acceptable, but the relevant point is that one does not have recourse to the artist's intentions. 1-

In this case, I think one can accept Dufrenne's viewpoint that a work may often be judged without reference to the externally known (i.e., from something other than the work) intentions of the artist. All the same, it is fairly obvious that without a good deal of elaboration, what Dufrenne says about the work 'sounding right' is insufficient.

The final brief mention which Dufrenne gives to reproductions represents the least coherent part of the section. For one thing, it seems to give the reproduction the status of a work of art, half way to concrete realisation. This probably stems from the idea that the audience is necessary to bring a work to its full realisation - and reproductions, in the sense of the film of the opera, or something analogous, do not have the factor of 'audience presence'. However, this does not apply to a reproduction of a painting for instance, because this can have an audience just as much as the original.

Unfortunately, Dufrenne does not make it clear whether or not he is including copies, forgeries, fakes, etc., in the meaning of 'reproduction'. His usage is unclear, with the result that his meaning is unclear. He seems mainly to be referring to different ways of presenting a work other than in its original form, rather

1. At least, not those external to the work.
than to copies. If he is including copies as of less value than the original, then I think he is mistaken. It is perfectly possible that, e.g., Césanne, should copy a still life by some other artist, and produce a work as aesthetically valuable as, if not more valuable than, the original. The same thing applies to a forgery or fake or a copy by an artist of one of his own works. These things can be as good works of art as (or better than) the originals, always provided that the artist is sufficient to the task. A forgery may have less market value but not necessarily less aesthetic value, nor do I think the moral overtones of an attempt to deceive impinge on the aesthetic value of a work.

It seems rather as if Dufrenne is misled by linguistics into classifying ceramics and works made from casts, in the same category, as reproduced. These latter seem more analogous to architecture — where the plan seems analogous to the cast for pottery. I.e., this sort of reproduction is not a reproduction at all. This again can apply to a replica of an architectural work depending on how skilful its production is. It is another production of a work, as are ceramics and works from casts, rather than a reproduction.

Finally, there are things like prints which do seem to fall into Dufrenne's grouping and present a 'diminished presence of the original'. But as I have said above (print = e.g., a reproduction of a painting), it is not any less a work of art for lack of 'audience presence'. Far more people see prints of masterpieces than see the actual masterpiece. I would conclude by reversing the status of reproductions qua film of the opera, and those qua print of a painting. I think the former has far more opportunity to retain the characteristics which make the object art — its expressive features, its formal power and balance, etc., — whereas
a print will inevitably blur and misrepresent to some degree, presenting a work as flat, two dimensional and lacking the detail of brushwork and sense of immediacy given in the original.

One way in which Dufrenne could possibly prove that reproductions were less works of art than the originals - at least to his own satisfaction - would be if he could show that for some reason they lacked the a priori nature which he thinks belongs to art. He does not, however, attempt or suggest this.

Section II.

The perception of the work of art.

When Dufrenne talks of the aesthetic experience, he always talks of it in terms of perception. The aesthetic object is necessarily a perceived object - the work of art under an aesthetic perception. This may be queried prima facie - we do not, it is said, perceive literature; we read it and understand it, we do not sit back and contemplate a book. However, there are three answers to this - the first is that Dufrenne is not referring purely to sense-experience, in referring to perception - he includes intellectual action. Nor is it even the case that sense-experience is omitted from the aesthetic experience of literature - it is a pre-condition at least. We see the printed page, and possibly have an inner aural experience of the words, as if someone were reading or speaking to us. The third fact is that if aesthetic judgment is performed in retrospect, then it may be a contemplative judgment on the sense-experiences we have encountered in reading the work. The third point is not of interest to Dufrenne in the case of aesthetic perception, since for him it is concerned with the immediate experience of the aesthetic object, not the delayed judgment.
What is of importance is that Dufrenne uses the term 'perception', to refer to the factor of direct contact with the aesthetic object, which he regards as necessary to its fulfilment as an aesthetic object.

He gives various reasons for the use of the concept of perception, and for its necessity as an explanatory feature of aesthetics.

A. He says (Vol.I. Part I. Chap.WI. sect.II. pp.284-3), for phenomenology the aesthetic object is essentially perceived - it requires a witness or public, and is not complete without perception.

B. The idea of perception is important because it suggests something about the nature of its object and he who perceives. It suggests that the object is not the product of a constituting activity, i.e., it is not an imaginary or subjective thing, and yet it also exists only for a consciousness capable of recognising and understanding it.

C. Further, the necessity for perception can be used to emphasise the non-ideal nature of the aesthetic object. (p.287, op cit.)

D. The aesthetic object can only be realised by a true perception of it - unlike ordinary objects which are indifferent to being well or badly perceived (though the aesthetic object is not reducible to its appearances). By this Dufrenne is referring to the fact that if one sees a table under bad lighting, one does not complain, but a painting has to be seen under the correct lighting, because the perception of the latter is very important, whereas the perception of the former is of only minimal importance (so that one may know what it is, avoid tripping over it, etc.).

E. The aesthetic merit of an object can be measured by how much it can exalt the perceiving aspect. A monument which talks instead of singing is aesthetically imperfect (p.290 op cit). By this
Dufrenne means that the greater and more impressive is our perception of the aesthetic object, the greater will be the object itself. The illustration of talking instead of singing may appear strange taken at face value, but is used on the assumption that an aesthetic object can express certain a priori qualities, and therefore communicate with its audience, and singing is a more exalted and impressive mode of perceptual communication than talking.\(^2\)

As to the status of this perceived object, Dufrenne says that it is ambiguous.

(i) It is an object I perceive because it is before me.

(ii) It is a reality which cannot be fully encompassed by perception:

"Ainsi l'objet perçu a un statut ambigu: il est cet objet que je perçois parce qu'il m'est présent, mais en même temps il est autre chose; il est cette réalité étrangère que la perception n'épuise pas qui fait appel à un savoir qui voudrait ne rien devoir à la perception."


It is worth noting that Dufrenne is aware that in a strict sense one does not perceive all works of art. He mentions this once, in passing, in respect of literature:

"En même temps qu'il perçoit, ou à la rigueur, pour le roman, qu'il imagine, le témoin pénètre dans le monde de l'œuvre..."

(Vol.I. Part I. Chap III. p.96, my underlining.)

This is not absolutely accurate, because one understands, rather than imagines, a literary work. Nevertheless, I think this is sufficient to show that Dufrenne has reason for speaking of the aesthetic experience in terms of perception, and that he does not mean just sense-data experience when he talks of perception.

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1. greater = better work of art.

2. The terms are possibly too florid, however.
The question of aesthetic perception and the aesthetic attitude will be dealt with in Chapter Four. For the present there are only two other important remarks on aesthetic perception, made by Dufrenne. These are:

(a) that the highest form of aesthetic perception is the feeling which reveals the expression of the work. This is to be found in one form, according to Dufrenne, in the sort of human emotion of a theatre audience. (p. 84.)

(b) that in the relationship of work and spectator, the work has the initiative rather than the spectator. The meaning of the work varies slightly according to the perspective of each spectator - indicating that there are an infinite number of possible points of view on the work (pp. 96-7).

I can see very little that is remarkable in what Dufrenne says on perception. It is, however, wholly consistent with his views on expression, and the variety of a work of art.1 Three examples make this fairly plain.

Firstly, Dufrenne's last reason for the use of the term perception involves him in saying that the aesthetic merit of an object can be measured by how much it can exalt the perceiving aspect. This amounts to saying that aesthetic judgments are based on the ability of the work to communicate - to sing rather than speak - i.e.,

1. Also it suggests a solid, objectively grounded existence for the art work as a priori - as a perceivable structure of some unspecified form.
to be expressive. This is therefore consistent with the import of the next chapter on the a priori affective categories - that the affective qualities in a work are its necessary/essential features. Secondly, I see no ambiguity in the status of the perceived object. Rather that what he says is consistent with, and illuminated by, his final point (b), in this section - that there are an infinite number of possible points of view on a work. That is, it may be the case that the object is present for our perception, but it does not follow from this that we can comprehend every aspect, at any one historical/temporal point. The state of knowledge, the attitudes of society, their sensitivity to different things at different times, and their whole moral, political, psychological and social state, orientates what they will see, and how they will judge what they see, at any one time. The same thing applies horizontally as well as vertically - i.e., across a number of people at one time as well as across a number of people at different times. People see what they (a), want to see (b), are trained to see, or (c), anticipate they will see, etc. There is sufficient lack of uniformity in attitudes to art, to make it wholly unsurprising that (i), perception copes differently with a work at different times (ii), perception cannot fully encompass the work because there are too many aspects of it, affording an infinite number of points of view.

What Dufrenne claims to find strange is that the work of art is perceived and yet perception cannot fully cope with it - one needs to look further, e.g., to a certain sort of knowledge, to understand the work. I.e., the emphasis is on the work being perceived rather than on its being fully encompassed. However, it seems hardly surprising that it is not simply something I perceive but also something constructed, real, which requires knowledge of a certain kind, and understanding and thought.
Thirdly, he says in the penultimate point (a), that the highest form of aesthetic perception is the feeling which reveals the expression of the work. This is certainly consistent, but one has to be very careful as to how one can relate perceiving and feeling. In order to make sense of the idea that a feeling reveals an expression of, e.g., sadness, one must take it that by 'feeling' Dufrenne means either (i) an 'immediate comprehension' which involves (a) the senses (sense (ii) of 'feeling', see note 1) and (b) our concept of 'sensing', which is a form of intuition — i.e., sense-perception and intuition; or (ii) 'emotional experience'. If it is the latter, then Dufrenne must think that one experiences (personally) every expressive quality of a work. But, he nowhere states that he believes this, and if he does then he cannot cover the range of things expressed by art — since art can express thoughts, and one cannot feel a thought (at least not in the emotional sense of feeling). Therefore I take it he does not mean that one feels — emotionally — what is expressed by the work. So he must mean something like (1).

1. There are three possible senses of 'feeling', strictly speaking. (i) emotional (ii), concerned with all the senses (iii), concerned with one of the senses (tactile). The last two are also related to perception, and are therefore the most likely candidates for use in Dufrenne's sense of 'feeling'. Of these, the third sense is too restrictive and can be discounted, and the second is that which is closest to the French 'sentir', which Dufrenne uses. In this sense one can perceive that someone feels something (c.f., Chap. 3. sect. 1).

In the present instance one may take sense (ii) and also admit an extended sense of 'feeling', in order to make sense of what Dufrenne says.

2. Dufrenne's strong concern with feeling, immediate comprehension and meaning, will come to the fore in Chapters four and five, regarding the aesthetic attitude and meaning.
In this case the highest form of aesthetic perception is a certain type of comprehension by means of which one can grasp what is expressed by a work. This is a sort of 'having a sense of' the work, which is discussed in Chapter four. This is probably correct, but what Dufrenne actually says is highly ambiguous, and 'feeling' might mean anything from a sudden flash of intuition to the feeling of an emotion.

**Section III.**

**The autonomy of a work of art.**

It would require a book in itself to discuss this topic fully. In order to do so one would have to take separately each topic with which art dealt, and discuss whether it could work outside the ordinary fields of reference. It would involve the purpose of art - whether it was a means to an end - informative, prescriptive, moralistic, ideological, psychological, etc., or an end in itself; whether a painting was intrinsically different from a bottle of ink; whether it was legitimate to ask for information about, say, the human condition, and if so, what difference there was between a Henry James' novel, and a work on psychiatry by R. D. Laing. And so on.

As it is, I shall restrict this section to dealing with what Dufrenne has to say about the autonomy of the work of art. This will involve his ideas (which he mentions rather briefly), about whether, e.g., a work of art should moralise, the distinction between ordinary and aesthetic objects, and the self-sufficiency of the work of art, and its relationship to its surroundings.

Firstly, there are two aspects of his theory which are relevant to what he says. (1) He regards the work as a quasi-subject, as has been seen in the first chapter. This view is not sufficiently proved, but even assuming its truth (a), it does not follow that the work of art is autonomous, and (b) the idea of the
autonomy of art is used to establish that the work is a quasi-subject, therefore one cannot use the idea that the work is a quasi-subject, to establish that it is autonomous. One requires some independent verification of one of the two, otherwise the argument is hopelessly circular.

The quasi-subject nature of art is of little use to the idea of art as an autonomous realm. This is immediately apparent if one considers the nature of a 'subject' or 'pour-soi'. Persons are in no way distinct or separated from, the real world of ordinary objects and other living things. If anything they are the core, the nucleus or the epitomy of being and reality. This is emphasized if one thinks of Heidegger's term for man - 'Dasein', Being-there, Being-in-the-world, and that around which other things revolved, for which objects were.1

Thus a subject is self-sufficient to the extent that he is not dependent on others for his existence, that he gives meaning to objects, etc. - but he is in no way autonomous to the extent of being on a different logical level, or comprehensible apart from and without referring to, the ordinary goings-on of the world, i.e., in the sense of being distinct from reality. Therefore the quasi-subject will not help Dufrenne to establish that a work of art has an independence of ordinary existence, in the latter sense.

(II.) As will be seen in the third chapter, Dufrenne regards works of art as affective, and thus expressive. This sense of expressive is not the narrow one of expressing emotions - i.e., the sense in which it is normally taken, but the wider one of expressing qualities such as 'the beautiful', or 'the heroic'. Presumably Dufrenne would also allow that the affective categories could include

thoughts and ideas as well as moods and qualities of spatio-temporal existents. In this case the work is not restricted to expressing emotions - it can express human thoughts and ideologies. At least, there is no empirical barrier to its doing so, even if Dufrenne would dismiss the work as art if it did express thoughts or ideas, etc.

Thus, Dufrenne cannot dismiss an informative work as non-art on the grounds that it does not conform to the notion of a priori affective categories. Just before going on to what Dufrenne says, I think it is important to be clear that the realms of art may be distinct from certain other categories - e.g., nature or science, without its being autonomous, i.e., independent. And I think some definition of art as independent is required here.

If art is self-sufficient, then, strictly speaking, it does not draw material from ordinary life. That is to say, it may take the material from life, but once this is placed in the context of art, it ceases to have any connection with its ordinary being. (E.g., a drawing of my cat, Caesar, is not related to the real life Caesar.) Also, it does not give ideas or conclusions of any sort about ordinary life. It does not give us information about human nature, psychology, the human condition, nor make truth-functional statements about the world, its history or its inhabitants. And it does not require any information external to the work - as, e.g., the artist's stated intention or the aesthetic or historical context of a work - in order to be properly intelligible.¹

¹ And, strictly speaking, if a work is autonomous and treated as such, it will have no overflow onto its audience - i.e., no affection for good or evil. This, incidentally, can also be true of art without its being totally independent of the ordinary world - for instance if one makes the simple assumption that the purpose of art is not to make judgments or influence action.
This means that one treats, for example, the painting totally differently from the way in which one would treat an ordinary object—not just taking the sort of aesthetic attitude to be discussed in Chapter four, but taking an attitude which is as unrelated to the ordinary world as it is possible to be. Dufrenne would add that one need bring no knowledge of spatio-temporal structuring, and that art has a certain independence of ordinary concepts—but this would be impossible, as will be seen. Finally, art would not draw conclusions or make moral judgments, nor would it express an ideology approved by an author or condemn one which he disapproves.¹

Dufrenne discusses certain of these points, in particular one's attitude to the object, its relation to the ordinary world, the possibility of its being informative, its relation to its spatio-temporal and historical context, and in general whether it can be regarded as independent of the rest of the world—especially in terms of space and time. And I think he suggests ways in which art is a distinct category, and is 'sufficient unto itself' in some ways, but that he does not show that it is independent (autonomous), as he thinks it is.

¹ If certain of these conditions obtain, taken individually, this does not entail that the work is autonomous. For example, if the work is truth-functional or gives information on the human condition. Nevertheless, taken as a whole, they provide sufficient conditions for saying that the work of art is autonomous, self-sufficient, or self-contained. This does not provide an exhaustive definition, however.
(1) The aesthetic object and the ordinary object.

In the context of discussing the world as a whole, and the 'world for me', i.e., my Weltanschauung, Dufrenne decides that in the same way that we can refer to our own world as distinct from the world (Weltanschauung V. Welt), we can refer to the world of the aesthetic object. So one sees that the aesthetic object is not in the world like other objects. The aesthetic object stands out against the ordinary world and refuses to let itself be integrated with it. (Vol. I. Part I. chap. V. pp. 200-2.) This is repeated a little later in terms of the fundamental project. The fundamental project reveals a world - the singular world of the subject. Thus, according to Dufrenne, one can talk of the world of a subject and the world of the aesthetic object. a), because the work is a quasi-subject and therefore capable of expression, and b), because it is the work of an author.

This world of the aesthetic object is emphasized in our attitude to art. Visual art is housed in galleries, poetry is not read on the railway, etc. There is a zone of space or time, and of silence, e.g., the silence before a concert, in libraries and museums. All

1. It is fairly obvious that Dufrenne has come to this conclusion very rapidly. It is also not obvious that there is any parallel between 'my world' - which is like a Weltanschauung - and the 'world of the aesthetic object' - which is not like a Weltanschauung. It is a realm, not a world-view, if anything.


Dufrenne seems to be taking this Teutonic attitude.
this is required by the aesthetic object (pp. 201 & 3). Furthermore, the work aestheticises its environment, and in integrating its public into its world, brings them under its control. The relationship between the aesthetic object and its environment is reciprocal. The aesthetic object aestheticises the environment and makes the aesthetic object part of the natural world. Exactly how far these aesthetic frontiers go is difficult to say, because they are not objectifiable, according to Dufrenne. As examples, he cites the Chateau of Versailles as giving the park, sky and town around it an aesthetic quality, and a painting affecting the wall upon which it is hung. The aestheticising influence stops where one's glance or 'regard' stops; the aesthetic object goes as far as, and no farther than, that.

Dufrenne regards this exercise of aesthetic supremacy over its surroundings as one of the best ways of affirming the autonomy of the work of art.

(ii) The autonomy of the aesthetic object.

Dufrenne later turns from the previous broad view of the effect of the aesthetic object on its surroundings, to the supposed self-sufficiency of the aesthetic object itself (Vol. II. Part I. chap. II. section II. pp. 453-67 esp.). He maintains (a), the purity of our attitude to works of art, i.e., in attending to a work of art, we attend to the work of art alone (b); the non-necessity to relate the work to actual events (c); the non-necessity to 'add' anything to the work, i.e., to fill in outlines where a painting presents a blurred image (d); the acceptability of the artist's re-arrangement of the ordinary space-time structure, and (e), that the ordinary temporal course is irrelevant to the temporal structure of a work - e.g., the time it takes objectively to watch Hamlet is aesthetically irrelevant. His general idea is that the aesthetic object (e.g., a painting) is in the world as a painting, but is separated as designating another world (e.g., above). The nature of that world, and the attitude we take to it, demonstrate its autonomy. Some of what Dufrenne says is
correct, and I shall now go on to elaborate on points (a) - (g).

Regarding (a): aesthetic perceptions are totally pure in the sense that the spectator does not use the art object as he would an ordinary object - if he enters the Sistine Chapel to worship, he ceases to have aesthetic perceptions of it, because it is no longer an art object for him - rather a place of worship.

Regarding (b): the actual events of the world need not impinge on a work. For example, Dufrenne cites a portrait of Charles VIII, and regards it as unnecessary that this portrait should possess any of Charles' characteristics, i.e., it need not resemble him in the least. As far as Dufrenne is concerned a representation of any historical character is not an allusion to that character. Here it is unclear as to whether Dufrenne would accept any painting entitled 'Charles VIII as a painting of the king.' He does regard it as necessary for understanding the portrait that it is known to be of Charles, therefore he must regard the work as being in some sort of relationship to the historical character.

Regarding (c): art is seen differently from the ordinary objects in the world. (This follows fairly closely from (b)). For example, (pp. 458-9), given an impressionist painting, one does not attempt to work out and fix the outlines of blurred figures, as one might with an ordinary landscape. For instance, one might say that one does not regard an impressionist landscape as having the purpose of informing one about where to find a certain footpath, as one might use the ordnance survey map. One regards it as complete in itself, as the artist designates it as complete:

"... l'oeuvre d'art véritable nous épargne des frais d'imagination parce qu'il suffit, pour comprendre et suivre, de l'avoir présente à l'esprit et aux sens sans qu'il soit nécessaire de la compléter comme nous complétons une perception obscure ou ambiguë." (p.457.)
To the objection that this may make a work difficult to comprehend, he answers:

"soit, mais nous n'avons pas alors à le (un tableau) déchiffrer, c'est-à-dire à chercher la représentation exacte en lui d'un objet comme nous cherchons le mouton ou le bergère dans une devinette; ... nous n'avons à percevoir que ce que nous percevoir." (p.458.)

Regarding (d): the ordinary space-time structure can be manipulated by the artist according to the demands of his art. Thus if an author omits periods of time and employs rapid changes of location - as with the cinema, or if one hears breaks in some abrupt modulations in music, one does not complain - at least not on the grounds that this is impossible in the normal spatio-temporal course of events.

To the objection against elliptical works which leave things to the imagination, he replies that all art requires sacrifice, but art is concerned with the essential, not trivial details:

"L'essentiel, c'est que l'artiste veut dire, et c'est cela qui juge du détail et l'exclut ... Mais ces sacrifices ne nous imposent aucun sacrifice car ce qui est éliminé ne nous est d'aucun secours. Et l'on ne peut regretter ces sacrifices que si l'on prétend faire de l'art le procès-verbal de la réalité, comme si la valeur du portrait se mesurait à la fidélité avec laquelle il reproduit les rides ou les poils d'un visage, ou la valeur dans la multiplicité des gestes humaines. Ce que l'artiste sacrifie n'est pas le réel, ce sont les parasites qui encombrent sa vision et altèrent la pureté de sa création." (p.459.)

Dufrenne is, however, careful to distinguish between those works in which it is necessary to know what occurs during the periods of time
which are omitted—and those in which it is not. But in the latter
works the necessary information is provided within what is given.
There is also the distinction between works in which omissions are
necessary since the author wishes to present the most important and
interesting factors and is bound by the necessity to keep the work
moving; and those in which the omissions are voluntary but justified
stylistically—i.e., for instance, the author is using them to express a
particular vision of the world. So he rejects Sartre's accusation of
laziness against Faulkner, but would allow the objection if it were
made against a detective novel, where the breaks were used to bait or
confuse the reader. (C.f., esp. pp. 459-461.)

Regarding (e): as to the relation of the temporal structure of
a work and the continuing temporal succession, Dufrenne's position is
fairly uncontentious. The time involved in studying a painting,
watching a play, listening to a symphony, etc., has only to be int­
ernally coherent and structured. Objective time has no relevance to
it. This is sound enough. What Dufrenne means is that one is
unconcerned with the 'clock time' if one is absorbed by the art. One
discounts the passage of time—one does not time the duration spent
studying the painting. Thus with Hamlet, one concerns oneself with
the time lag, and with music, with the particular tempi chosen by the
conductor, and the overall sense of duration given by the music itself:

... en musique nous ne comprenons et ne goûtons telle
phrase que si son contexte lui est imméant ... (Le) temps,
même s'il doit être logiquement ordonné, ne peut pas pleinement
vrai et n'interfère donc avec notre temps ... (le) temps

1.e., we do not need to know what occurs in the fifteen years
omitted in Sentimental education.

2. The question of time in music is actually more complicated than
this, involving both retention and remembrance of what has passed, and
anticipation of what is to come. (See, The phenomenology of internal
time-consciousness, E. Husserl, passim, for an elaborate account of
this theory of retention and anticipation.)
"objectif s'évanouit avec le monde objectif; je suis à l'oeuvre."
"Si l'imagination transporte le contenu de l'oeuvre dans l'univers et le temps communs, au lieu de rester fidèle au monde et au temps propre de l'oeuvre, nous manquons l'objet esthétique."

(pp. 456-7.) (This applies to all arts.)

(iii) The autonomy of the aesthetic object in history.
Dufrenne's only other point on the autonomy of the work of art returns to the distinction between the ordinary and the aesthetic object, this time in reference to their respective comprehensibility. He states at the beginning of the section just expounded (Vol. II. Part I. Chap. II. pp. 450-1), that the ordinary object has to be understood in terms of the external world, whilst the aesthetic object does not, being self-sufficient and constituting a world. The previous pages have dealt with the difference in nature between art and ordinary objects, but Dufrenne also holds the broader view that the aesthetic object is relatively independent of history. He accepts that it is situated in history — by what man perceives in it, and reads into it — by what it says of men, and man of it. It can be dated, and historians often attempt to explain it in relation to its epoch, in the same way that people try to explain a work in relation to its author. But Dufrenne believes that this explanation is external, meaningless, and does not get to grips with the real aesthetic object. The historical location of the work is important in terms of external features about the work, and for its existence, but not for explaining its meaning.

Thus, the historical location governs the fortunes of the work, the attitude towards it (contemporaneous with its creation), and the ability of its audience to understand it. According to civilisations the work dies or is reborn, and the public can enrich or impoverish the work (presumably through their comprehension or lack of it).
However, according to Dufranne, the work has to free itself of its successive guardians, since they cannot always be faithful to it. And within its history the aesthetic object succeeds in leading a relatively autonomous life. Its creation cannot be explained by the circumstances surrounding it, by the psychology of the author, nor by its historical context. (The first and last differ in that the first refers to the aesthetic, and the last to the historical context.)

(C.f., Vol I Part I, chap. V, pp. 207-9)

"Il convient d'observer que dans cette histoire qui l'emporte, l'objet esthétique parvient du moins à mener une vie relativement autonome: pas plus que sa création ne s'explique entièrement par les circonstances qui l'entourent (ni même par la psychologie de son auteur), son avenir ne s'explique entièrement par le contexte historique." (p. 209 ibid.)

Dufranne finally turns autonomy on its head by stating that the work of art is historical because it expresses history - although the variety of aesthetic productions in any one era means that a civilization cannot be reliably judged by its great works of art. According to Dufranne the work tells us of its time in the ways it tells of its author - in generalized terms (pp. 210-1).

All this would be most convenient for the idea of art as a priori immediately meaningful and comprehended, were it all acceptable. For (to elaborate on what I said in the introduction) it would mean that we could have intuitive knowledge of works of art (a): irrespective of any further knowledge of, e.g., history, or the ordinary events of the world (b); by extraordinary manipulations of our spatio-temporal intuition, and (c), that aesthetic perception is disconnected from other forms of perception - and similarly that aesthetic perception is pure (not a part of any other mode of perception).
And all this would indicate that the works of art could be known and understood almost in a vacuum. So, just as one can know that $2 + 2 = 4$ is an a priori truth without reference to any further knowledge, one would be able to say whether "X is a work of art", was a priori true without reference to any further knowledge — other than the nature of X of course.

Dufrenne is continually pushing further and further along the line to isolating art as a priori, though until the subject of the a priori is actually discussed (e.g., the following chapter) he makes little specific reference to his line of thought. There is simply the continual setting up of art as a distinct category, e.g., as the quasi-subject, the entity demanding performance and so on. However, Dufrenne does not sufficiently distinguish the ordinary and the aesthetic object, nor does he sufficiently prove his case for the autonomy of art, for one to say either that the a priori nature of art distinguishes it from other entities or that its independence lends support to the view that it is a priori.

With regard to (1) — on ordinary and aesthetic objects (a), Dufrenne makes the first move far too quickly, and (b) he has not distinguished the ordinary from the aesthetic object, because he says that certain ordinary objects also detach themselves and lay claim to autonomy (p.201) and that living things as well as aesthetic objects refuse to be integrated with the ordinary world (p.202). Moreover, he has not specified that what he says applies only to aesthetic objects qua works of art — and this is necessary, since he has himself allowed that anything can be aesthetic and therefore all he may be saying is that objects seen aesthetically are different from those seen non-aesthetically. I.e., he has not separated anything off. Nor has he provided any reason in the first place, for accepting that the aesthetic object has a world of its own and is in the world in a different way from ordinary objects.
Then what Dufrenne says of the aestheticising of the ordinary aesthetic object shows mainly that the work of art is influential, unique and a distinct sphere - as a natural object is distinct from an artefact. But it does not show that it is self-sufficient. It seems that Dufrenne often fails to distinguish between demonstrating that the work of art is distinct from the ordinary object, and demonstrates its autonomy.

This section is most interesting for the idea of art aestheticising its environment, although it is somewhat imprecise.

(i) One has to be careful to make the distinction between what is perceived as aesthetic, and what is just non-aesthetic as a matter of fact.

(ii) Dufrenne has not made it clear enough that the surroundings of a work of art which becomes aesthetic under our gaze, depend on our glance, or regard, to a greater extent than does the work of art, for once the picture has been given the status of a work of art, it remains so until it ceases to be called one, irrespective of being perceived. However, the surroundings of a work of a work of art are only aesthetic for the period that they are regarded as such, and in the presence of the work of art, which is the other necessary condition for making ordinary objects aesthetic in this sense. I.e., there are two necessary conditions, i) the presence of a work of art, and ii) our regard - and we have to see it as aesthetic - it is no good seeing the wall around the painting as if the painting was not there.

(iii) The limits of making the surroundings aesthetic are unclear - but as far as the minimum extension of the aesthetic object goes, this does not depend on my regard here and now. Only the maximum extension does.

1. Dufrenne would go further than this (cf., his view, noted previously, that the object remains art even if no-one regards it as art - see the beginning of Section I. on the creation of the work). This does not alter the position here, however.
(iv) Does this apply to the rest of the arts, for example, literature? One can see it applying to the theatre and the visual arts, but does one aestheticise one's surroundings in reading a novel? I think not. Music might also be problematic — for it is temporal — do we therefore count other concurrent events as being aestheticised, or do we extend the allowance only to the spatial features of the non-musical events? For instance, is the duration of the hum of the ventilating system aestheticised? And if so, is the system itself also aestheticised? If Dufrenne thinks so, he is in agreement with John Cage but with very few others.

The second set of comments (ii), (a)-(e), and his final remarks (iii), lead one to more interesting ideas on the autonomy of art, each taking it from a slightly different viewpoint.

The first two remarks (a) and (b), are generally inconclusive. With regard to the first, I have indicated before that I can agree only partially with Dufrenne. Obviously, in contemplating the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel, I am doing something different from praying and contemplating the glory of God. But I think that the two cases could combine if I felt that the greatness of God was exemplified or revealed to me by the work of Michelangelo. I.e., I do not consider the two activities incompatible, nor that they cannot take place concurrently, nor that the contemplation of the work of art could not bring me to a greater understanding of God.

And it is also the case that although contemplating art and contemplating the glory of God are (intentionally) different, they are not different in kind or logically different — at least they are no different than praying in the Sistine Chapel is from kneeling to polish the floor.

Yet one would not say that the activity of cleaning the chapel was 'autonomous'. Thus I see no reason to say that of contemplating the work is autonomous (or that the work is, at any rate) - both for the latter reason, and the former one, that contemplating the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel as art, could reveal the greatness of God, or bring one to a better understanding of Him - i.e., that the aesthetic and the religious activities are interrelated, and in this case not separable.

The second comment (b) is too ambiguous to be of any great aid, though it indicates Dufrenne's total dissociation of art and life. Certainly he is correct in saying that we do not regard a painting of Charles VIII as really Charles, but he appears to be adopting the view that historical works have no connection with the characters of whom they purport to tell. (Thus one cannot make any truth-functional statement about, say, characters in novels, unless one's remark was preceded by a qualification such as, "In this novel . . .") He appears also to be saying that a picture of Charles VIII requires no portrayal of any of the characteristics of the historical figure, and that in thinking of the picture, we ought not to bring in any external knowledge of the king. It follows that one cannot regard works of art which make reference to historical characters or events, as providing information on these characters and events - it would be a total misuse of these works to regard them in this light.

As this leads to the large area of truth in art, I shall restrict myself to one suggestion which might prove awkward to Dufrenne. It is that of a documentary or an historical work which refers say to Charles VIII, and his whole coterie, and accurately to the events of his time, and develops a completely plausible theory purporting to be of Charles' psychology. Dufrenne might say that this is completely fictitious - including the characters - whose names just happen to
agree with those of some historical period. But an historian (all historians, in fact) might agree that the work threw a completely new light on the period. Unless one says that by definition this work is not art unless it is regarded as fictitious - which seems unreasonable - then one cannot rule the work out as being possibly historically informative. In this case, art and history would be inseparable and we would have a second way in which art was not autonomous. 1

The tenor of Dufrenne's justification of omissions and rearrangements is similar in both (c) and (d). It is that a work of art is not intended, nor is it supposed, to be an imitation or photograph of the ordinary spatio-temporal structure. It is not an historical narrative intended as an exact or one-one correlate of actual events.

1. Dufrenne could possibly escape the problem of the work's being historically/psychologically accurate by saying that viewing it from the historian's standpoint was not viewing it aesthetically - though even this is open to question, since the historico-psychological points are inevitably a part of the work - they represent a major part of its content. However, this escape would not obviate the point that the work was not autonomous, precisely because the historico-psychological aspects are apparently inextricable parts of the work, and because one can consider the work from the angle of its accuracy to the period with which it deals - and if it were independent of 'reality' in the way Dufrenne suggests, this would not be possible. And simply to deny that it is possible, or to say, "but qua art it is autonomous", is insufficient. That is merely to state an opinion, not to give evidence for it.
This is perfectly correct, and what he says is illuminating as to the nature, purpose and methods of art. It is true that we do not regard an impressionist painting as requiring detailed outline - we do not make use of it to discern exact shapes. Moreover, we allow 'poetic licence' and respect the idea of, or necessity for, 'suspension of disbelief' - which takes us into the realms of occurrences and actions which would be regarded as implausible if met with in the ordinary course of events (a factor which Dufrenne omits in this discussion).

This does not prove the autonomy of art (provide a sufficient condition for regarding art as independent). It distinguishes a work of art, e.g., an impressionist painting, from an ordinary object, e.g., a map - at least it does so in many cases. But it patently fails to show that art does not make use of the material of ordinary events, landscapes, thoughts, actions, etc. If anything, it makes it more clear than art does. For instance, if there were not an original landscape, building, etc., from which an impressionist painting resulted, the question about its validity if undetailed, would not arise. At least, the painting must be in some sort of relation to ordinary objects for one to query its worth if dissimilar from them, in its representation. I.e., there has to be some ordinary object set up against the impressionist work, in order for the possibility of a contrast and question to arise.

Nor has Dufrenne shown that one cannot legitimately make use of a work of art to gain information of any sort, about, for example, the human condition.

As it happens, Dufrenne would probably not dispute the former point - that art makes use of the ordinary events etc., - he would agree that such things were the basis of works of art. But he must also remember this is no gain for Dufrenne - it merely means that he is tacitly accepting the dependence of art on 'reality'.
certainly disagrees with the latter viewpoint. He would not accept
that one could use a work of art to gain information — for one thing
because he states that we do not use a painting as we would an ordi­
mary perception of something represented (I take 'representation' to
cover abstract works, since even here something is represented, no
matter how formal — shape and colours are presented to us in a cer­
tain form). We should not fill in temporal gaps in a work, imagin­
avely.

But it seems to me that an impressionist painting can inform on
about visual perception, for one thing. For example, whereas ini­
tially we see the Houses of Parliament as an ordinary three-dimension­
al form, the building in which acts are passes, and eminent men
quarrel like schoolchildren, Monet can change or enlarge our visual
range and show how the building can be seen in terms of the play of
light and colour, and can be seen differently from one hour to the
next. And in defending authors who admit temporal gaps in their works
on the grounds that they may be adopting this procedure in order to
express a certain vision of the world, or Weltanschauung, is he not
himself putting forward a reason which suggests that works of art ar
not autonomous? — i.e., the Weltanschauung which the author exp­
resses is informative about the ways in which one can see the world.
Camus and Sartre express existentialist viewpoints in _A happy death
The stranger and Nausea_. These are ways of seeing the world what
might not occur to a German, for example, who takes a different out­
look. It is irrelevant whether or not he accepts this view. It is
the fact that he discovers a different attitude — one which it is
possible to apply to the world. Is he not thereby informed? I think
the answer is obviously 'Yes'.

The world of art may take leave of actual spatio-temporal struc­
tures, but it returns to being part of the ordinary world in its
results.
There is a further point which is raised by what Dufrenne says, and it is more basic than the objection that playing with spatio-temporal structures does not remove art to an isolated position, and can in fact be illuminating. It is an objection which is encountered also by Clive Bell's theory of Significant Form, i.e., that although art may not be restricted to an ordinarily spatio-temporally structured world, our understanding of it is parasitic upon, and therefore not independent of, our understanding of the ordinary world and its spatio-temporal structures. Dufrenne has a lot in common with Clive Bell, in that both regard art as being an autonomous realm, though Bell is inclined to go further in dissociating the emotions of life, from the 'aesthetic emotion' of art. He says:

"For, to appreciate a work of art, we need bring with us nothing from life, no knowledge of its ideas and affairs, no familiarity with its emotions."

(p.36 op. cit.)

And:

"To appreciate a work of art we need bring with us nothing but a sense of form and colour, and a knowledge of three-dimensional space."

(p.37 ibid.)

These are fairly familiar sayings of Bell.¹

The two are saying something different, but which is refutable in the same way. While Bell claims that one need bring no knowledge,¹ See Bell, Arrow books, 1961.

¹. This latter claim - that a knowledge of three-dimensional space is necessary to an understanding of art - is not backed up, whereas Bell continually stresses the non-necessity for a knowledge of the ideas of life. It is probable, therefore, that Bell recognises the truth of the former claim and adds it to prevent objections, but mentions it no further, since it does nothing to further the dissociation of art and life.
of the ideas, etc., of life to our understanding of art, Dufrenne claims that it is not constructed in the same regular spatio-temporal scheme, quite often. Their conclusion is that it is therefore different. However, the trouble with these ideas is that one could not make sense of art and its ideas and forms, if one was not familiar with the ordinary emotions, temporal and three-dimensional structures of life. One would not understand the rearrangements and alterations, both temporal and spatial, made by artists such as Faulkner and Muriel Spark (temporal) and the surrealist painters, such as Salvador Dali, and Magritte (spatial). One would not understand that such practices were non-normal if one did not bring the normal concepts of life and its spatio-temporal structure, to one's recognition and understanding of art. And it is an important factor in such art, to recognize the difference between what is the norm and what is not, used for stylistic reasons, emphasis, etc.

Thus, even if it is the case that art has radically different qualities from ordinary events or objects, it is not the case that one can dissociate oneself and one's knowledge of ordinary life. So art is not independent in the sense of being intelligible regardless of one's ordinary understanding. (The understanding of art is parasitic upon this latter.)

Dufrenne's last point (e), adds little to the idea of autonomy. Certainly, the ordinary course of time is forgotten in listening to music or watching a drama, etc. These things have their own internal time-structure, and as I said, one is concerned with the time-lag in Hamlet or the apparent swift movement or slow dragging of a symphony. However, the same thing may occur in reading a history book, or watching a non-art documentary. I.e., any book or programme may involve its own time-structure. A programme may involve one in its own time-structure, for example, a programme simply presenting films
of events occurring throughout World War II, can take one from 1939-1945 in three hours, but it is not a work of art because it does so, nor is it detached from reality. A film of the bombing of Munich is only back-dated news - and in the sense that it actually took place it is as close to reality as it is possible to get. Therefore, to be removed from the consciousness of the objective passage of time is not to be removed from the ordinary world, out of reality and into something else labelled 'art'.

Finally, regarding (iii), Dufrenne has recognised that the work of art can legitimately be discussed in terms of its historical context, but not that its creation can be entirely explained in this way, and most certainly that it cannot give a meaningful explanation of the real essence of the aesthetic object. Most originally, he claims that history is not independent of its art, which can at least give a generalised view of its period. The latter point is probably true, but not relevant to this discussion. I think that he is correct in (i) his theory that the historical location and successive periods have a certain authority over the work, in the way he describes, and (ii) in the view that the historical and aesthetic location cannot entirely explain the creation of the work - i.e., one can explain partially how a work originates by means of an analysis of the development and progression of aesthetic techniques and technical knowledge up to, and in, the era of the work. However, it does not necessarily follow that, for example, Beethoven would compose his late quartets, from the fact that Haydn (and Mozart to some extent) and he himself, had developed the form to the stage at which he could. Nor from that, plus the technical developments of the instruments (violin, viola, 'cello and bass) so that they had the capacity to play what he composed. As a matter of fact, Beethoven composed piano music which could not be rendered completely and successfully on the pianofortes of his time.
However, even if one accepts the validity of this, and I see no reason why one should not, Dufrenne is really letting his argument go here. For he simply says that history cannot fully explain a work of art and cannot give a meaningful explanation of the real essence of the aesthetic object. And since I do not think one would wish to claim that art was fully explainable in terms of its historical context, one would probably be satisfied with what Dufrenne allows without actually saying so - that it can be partially explained in this way. It is worth noting that obviously he is not being completely consistent here - because he is admitting that the work of art is not autonomous in at least this one aspect. And if the work is dependent on some external factors (in this case the historical context) then I do not think one can legitimately claim that it is self-sufficient at all - because this is the sort of claim which does not allow of exceptions and qualifications. Either the work is or is not an independent entity, and Dufrenne should admit that it is not, because he has admitted this in one instance (and also because I think he is disproved in much of the rest that he claims - as will be summarised in the conclusion).

Conclusion.
So it seems to be the case that, 1. The aesthetic attitude or activity is not autonomous (from (a)) 2. An historical work of art may provide information of an historical nature, and is therefore not autonomous of either history or ordinary knowledge (from b). A work may also give information about any amount of other things, e.g., perception, the human condition, a certain Weltanschauung, etc. (from (c) & (d)).
3. Rearranging the spatio-temporal structure does not make the work of art autonomous of this schema. It rather emphasises that our understanding of art is parasitic upon our understanding of this structure (from (d)).
4. Involvement in the subjective time-structure of art does not make it autonomous, since this involvement is not restricted to aesthetic occurrences (from (a)).

5. The work of art is not autonomous of its historical context (from iii)).

There are two relevant questions left. Dufrenne does not discuss either much, but I shall give them a brief mention here in order to suggest that and how, they should not affect the above conclusion on the autonomy of art.

(i) Whether a work which is, as a matter of fact, informative, moralistic, ideological, erotic, etc., is a work of art value in virtue of these facts, or in spite of them.

(ii) Whether a work of art should or can, be created with the explicit intention of being informative, erotic, etc. Dufrenne thinks not. He states categorically that a putative work fails to be art if it seeks a certain effect, or to impress, or to put forward some case - as with erotic or moralising paintings. (C f., Vol.I. Chap III. p.100, where he is referring to the ability to distinguish between what is art and what is not.)

I think that if the sole intention of some putative work is to be erotic or informative, etc., then (a) success in carrying out the intention does not entail that the thing in question will be art, and (b), in spite of carrying out the intention, the work will fail to be art unless it has various other qualities - for example, making use of certain stylistic methods (concise form, balance, etc.); and/or contains certain expressive qualities (expresses beauty, grace, sublimity, joy, etc.); and/or expresses original thoughts . . . . . . . . . .

1. This is moving dangerously closely to the non-autonomous realm.
Whether it does this by design or accident is probably irrelevant, since one judges X as art in virtue of the resultant product, not the intention. (In any case, anyone can intend to produce a work of art, without succeeding. The intention does not produce the work as cause and effect.)

So the second question does not really seem to be troublesome, but it throws one back on the first. And it is more difficult to decide whether the informative, erotic, etc., content of a work is part of the reason for calling it art or not. I should not be so foolish as to be dogmatic on this point, but it is probably the case that a work is art neither in virtue nor in spite of, non-autonomous features; that they are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions of something's being art.

Of them all, the feature of 'being informative' seems to be the least contentious. I should say that if a work had certain of the qualities mentioned above, and was informative, then it would be a better work than if it were not informative. However, it would depend entirely on one's particular point of view as to whether one regarded other non-autonomous qualities as either necessary or sufficient conditions of art (the erotic, the moralistic, the ideological, etc.). Arent? and many Soviet writers would regard it as a necessary, if not a sufficient, condition of something being literature, that it was ideological. Others would say that the ideology was a non-aesthetic feature and capable of distracting one from the aesthetic features, and therefore ideology in a work made it less good art.2 The more powerfully a quality can act upon one's consciousness, the more plausible it is to say this. Thus, it is said most of the erotic.

1. See, What is literature? pub. Methuen, U.P.
2. Dufranne would probably agree - he does say (p.100) that putting forward a case (ideology) causes an object to fail to be art.
In spite of the ambivalence on this point, of subject matter, it is clear that as long as it is true that an artefact which is informative, etc., can be called a work of art, then the realm of art is not an autonomous one. This is partly because one cannot dissociate those factors which are relevant to life, from the work of art. Also, even if one does not regard it as art because, for example, it provides information, this factor obviously cannot be removed from the work without altering it greatly, and since this element, i.e., that which prevents the autonomy of X, is an essential part of the work, then one must conclude that works of art are not autonomous. (The rest of the reason is summed up in points 4, 4, 4 and 4. It is to do with (a) the construction of the work - that no matter how one creates a work of art, one cannot dissociate it from life (in its formal arrangement (e.g., 4-5)), and (b) the aesthetic attitude being non-autonomous (e.g., 1.)

**General Conclusion**

The general conclusion from all this is fairly simple. The work of art proper is an externally manifested object or occurrence (in the case of temporal arts) about whose exact nature Dufrenne is imprecise. A part of it in some way pre-exists its external manifestation, according to him. This idea seems to be the result of some unconscious disinclination to regard the external manifestation as the work in toto rather than the result of any specific idea about the nature of this pre-sensible object. Since Dufrenne specifically rejects idealism, there does not seem to be any reason to see him as setting up some sort of Collingwoodian thesis.

The work is also performed in some way, no matter to what art form it belongs. Dufrenne has specified various uncontentious qualities appropriate to an 'executant' in the 'performed arts', whereas the idea of the other arts being performed has been seen to be somewhat dubious. However, his views on the relevance of a
knowledge of the intentions of the artist seem perfectly acceptable under the interpretation of them which I have given. When not expanded upon, they remain stubbornly inconclusive.

In the third place, the work is always perceived. What Dufrenne says is largely uncontroversial. However, this idea, and the opinion that all works of art are performed, shows the underlying desire on the part of Dufrenne for uniformity among both the arts themselves, and in our attitude to them, which is all related to his belief in essences in art, and its a priori nature. The fact that despite his reasons, the idea of one concept to cover our reception of all works of art, and the idea that they are all performed, seems superfluous, inclines me to be very dubious about the idea of uniformity among the arts. It also seems artificial and forced, in the latter case. If all works are performed, this activity is very different in the case of what are normally called the 'performed arts', from what it is in that of, for example, the visual arts.

It is not the object of Dufrenne’s thesis on perception to point this out, and apart from this, what he does say has been seen to be relatively acceptable; but the idea that there is a great deal of uniformity within the arts, such that they are all seen in the same way — all 'perceived', and all performed, is in itself another reason for regarding art as autonomous.

And it is this section of his theory, on the autonomy of the work, which is not acceptable.

1 Nor do I think it legitimate to object that even among the so-called 'performed arts', the mode of performance is very different, therefore why should it not be different again in what are normally regarded as non-performed arts? The relevant point is that what are usually called performances all have some active role, which is missing in a 'performance' of, say, visual art.
Since I have pointed this out at some length already, I shall not
labour the point. It is, however, worth noting finally that Dufrenne
is not alone in this view of art as independent. It is one which is
most eloquently held by Oscar Wilde\(^1\); A. C. Bradley\(^2\) and Gautier\(^3\),
among others. Wilde says such things as that, "to art's subject
matter we should be more or less indifferent", that art expresses
itself rather than the temper, moral or social conditions of its age,
"the highest art rejects the burden of the human spirit" (D.of L. p.94.
Previous quote, D.of L. pp.299-300); that "art finds her own perfe-
tion within and not outside of, herself. She is not to be judged by
any external standards of resemblance. She is a veil rather than a
mirror" (D.of L. p.306). Also, "through art and through art only, we
can shield ourselves from the sordid perils of actual existence"
(C. as A. p.380). And so on. So Dufrenne finds support among the
aesthetes - who were on the whole reacting against a certain air of
puritanism in aesthetics.

The ideas expressed by Dufrenne, and discussed in this chapter,
on autonomy, perception and performance, are all consistent with his
fundamental thesis, with which I shall deal in the following chapter.
All three would afford some degree of similarity in the nature of the
work of art, which would in turn make it easier to talk of an a priori
for art - as would the view that the creation of a work of art is the
creation of something objective. It is strange, therefore, that Duf-
renne is so ambivalent on the objectivity of the created work. And as
I stated in the introduction and elaborated slightly in the third

\(^1\) See Intention, 'The decay of lying', and The critic as artist' in
The artist as critic: critical writings of Oscar Wilde. W.H. Allen,1970,
ed. R. Ellman. Also, Preface to, The picture of Dorian Gray, in Ellman.

\(^2\) See 'Poetry for Poetry's sake', in Oxford lectures on poetry.

\(^3\) See, Preface to Mademoiselle de Maupin, ed. Georges Matringe, Paris,
1946.
section, the idea of the work as self-sufficient would provide further benefits for the idea of a total objectivity in art.

It is unfortunate that Dufrenne fails to provide any very convincing arguments for many of the points which have been discussed in this and the preceding chapter. For they are both important aesthetic notions in their own right, and comprise a good part of the whole notion of the a priori. I.e., they do not serve merely to back up the theory, but would give it content and meaning. As it is, only the idea of the quasi-pour-soi seems to have been given sufficient credibility by Dufrenne — and certain aspects of that remain to be discussed at greater length later in to substantiate the notion properly.

I shall now discuss the theory of the affective a priori categories in art, in which Dufrenne believes so strongly.

1. See chapters four and five.
CHAPTER THREE. **THE NOTION OF A PRIORI AFFECTIVE CATEGORIES.**

Introduction.

Dufrenne waits until half-way through the second volume of the *Phénoménologie* before he announces the view that there are affective categories in art, and that these are a priori. This would seem to imply either that he assumes this is perfectly clear implicitly in the preceding parts of the work, or that it is not of any great importance, or that it has not so far been required since the aesthetics with which he has been dealing has not been concerned with the formal nature of the qualities possessed by a work of art.

The most reasonable explanation is this latter, mainly because the idea of a priori categories is not clear from what precedes; and if it is of no great importance there seems no reason to mention it at all - especially since it radically alters the normally accepted Kantian notion of the a priori. Also, he must regard it as important (a), because he devotes a whole book to the subject - applying the notion occasionally to aesthetics, and (b) because the theory of affective a prioris is all part of Dufrenne's essentialism. In fact it is the kingpin of his aesthetics, and the notion on which everything else is based. And if a quality such as the 'sublime' or the 'tragic' is a priori in a work of art, then he has succeeded in finding an essence - since the material a priori (to which the affective categories belong) is held to be the essence of that in which it inheres. Unfortunately problems arise for essentialism with the notion of the affective categories as general, as will be seen. One has to be extremely explicit as to what one means by essentialism in order to make it compatible with the generality of the affective categories.

As this chapter will show, Dufrenne makes some radical moves. Firstly, he is compelled to use Kantian theory, which makes one suspicious, coming in the work of a phenomenologist. But he could hardly start anywhere else, if he wants to prove art is a priori - it is a consequence of the fundamental viewpoint. Secondly, he goes beyond Kant, and eventually combined Kant's a priori with Sartre's existentialism, combining rationalist philosophy with existentialism and thereby making a vast historical and philosophical jump.

He does, however, have another reason for going back to Kant, than that he wishes to use the notion of the a priori. It is that he regards phenomenology as involved in similar problems to those of Kant - of avoiding psychology - and that its task is, like Kant's, to distinguish, "the transcendental from the psychological, the self-principle from the self-phenomenon" (intro. p.21. op.cit. i.e., The notion of the a priori). The major difference between Kant and the phenomenologist is that Kant did not consider the phenomenological reduction - i.e., the idea of 'bracketing off', getting away from the ordinary attitude to the world, or some theory laden attitude, and attempting to see it as it is. (C f., p.25. op cit.).

Dufrenne reaffirms the view of affective categories as necessary conditions of art in Le poétique(though published in 1963), when he refers to them as aesthetic categories (Le poétique, Book III. Chap.III, pp.182-194). He also makes it plain here that the affective(aesthetic) 1. Though his view of the a priori brings it dangerously close to the a posteriori, Dufrenne's expressed reason for not rejecting the concept and adopting empiricism is that empiricism cannot explain the transcendal (c.f., The notion of the a priori, Chap.I.p.49), and the method is to contend that perception requires the notion of the a priori to explain its meaning (c.f., ibid.). (He states that he accepts the Gestalt theory that perception is a form of knowledge, c.f.,p.51 ibid.)

categories are not to be confused with the classification of art into different styles - i.e., 'the tragic' is not equivalent to 'tragedy', nor the 'poetic' to 'poetry' as a classification:

"les catégories esthétiques ne se distribuent pas exactement selon la classification des arts: la tragédie peut être tragico-sonique, et le gracieux ou le grotesque peuvent être évoqués par n'importe quel art."

(Book III. Chap. III. p. 182. op. cit.)

In this chapter one comes face to face with what I maintain to be the underlying essential aspect of Dufrenne's aesthetic - the idea of the work of art as an object, as a priori and as having immediate meaningfulness. In Chapters I & 2, it was clear that in particular instances this theory does not work out, and I think that in this chapter it will become fairly transparent that the theory runs into such serious difficulties as to be brought to a halt. So without further very substantial evidence one cannot regard art as a priori.

Section 1.

Dufrenne's theory of the aspects of the a priori - in particular the affective a priori: Kant's theory as developed upon by Dufrenne.

The majority of Dufrenne's theory is to be found in la notion d'a priori and what is discussed here will be mainly taken from this work. It was written after the Phénoménologie (the latter being first published in 1953, and being Dufrenne's doctoral thesis. The former was published in 1959.), but is necessary for a proper understanding of what Dufrenne means when he talks of the a priori affective categories and qualities, and represents an expansion of what is meant in the Phénoménologie, not a differing opinion.
Dufrenne interprets Kant as seeing the a priori as anterior to experience and a condition of it, and not something experienced. What is a priori about objects is not to be seen (experientially); and the form of things presupposes a formal intuition which makes them possible - i.e., our intuitions of space and time. Dufrenne's objection lies mainly in the Kantian idea of a dichotomy between the a priori and experience. He wishes to put forward an empirical view of the a priori because if Kant allows (as he does) that experience has to be referred to, then Dufrenne feels that he should allow that it is a source (e.g., The notion of the a priori, trans. Casey, intro. pp. 6-10). He thinks that Kant presupposes or uses experience, in his notion of the a priori:

"Does not aiming at experience (even if the a priori grounds the a posteriori it aims at or intends the latter), even if it be to ground it, presuppose experience? ... Must we not admit that the a priori, the principle of experience, has its principle in experience since it is given by it?"

(C.f.p.7 ibid)

"Even if the a priori is anterior to experience - since it is only valid in relation to it - may one not say that it is discerned in it?"

(C.f.p.10 ibid.)

So, while allowing the a priori to be a condition of experience, Dufrenne wishes to apply a reciprocal relation between the two; i.e., oppose Kant's views that the a priori is not grounded in experience, and that it is limited to grounding it.

The ultimate intention is to bring the empirical to the a priori - to involve subjectivity, experience and existentialism in it. Dufrenne's view as expressed in The notion of the a priori really entails accusing Kant of making a fundamental error in the Critique of pure reason, in regard to his understanding of the term 'a priori.'
To substantiate this would take many volumes, and move far from
aesthetics. I shall therefore restrict this section to outlining
Dufrenne's own notion of the a priori, and the relevance of this whole
body of thought to his aesthetics.

According to Dufrenne, the a priori cannot detach itself from
subjectivity for the further reason that the a priori "expresses the
nature of the subject" (c.f., p.15 ibid). And by subject he presumably
means the universal nature of the mind, not the individual subject.

After rejecting Hegelian and Husserlian views of Kant's a priori,
Dufrenne raises a question which creates the form of the a priori
which he thinks is found in aesthetics, i.e., the existential a priori.
He says, "will there be some way to understand the psychological as
determined by the transcendental, . . . will it be possible to inter-
pret the psychological as itself a priori - as an existential a priori . . . ?" (c.f., intro. p.42 op.cit.). To this his own answer is
"yes".

His position on the a priori now is that it is, "given in ex-
erience, rather than imposed by the mind on experience" (c.f. chap.I.
p.46. op.cit.). The a priori ceases to be restricted to the formal
conditions of objectivity:

"As a presupposition from now on, we shall say that values,
affective qualities and mythical meanings - understood as
categories of feeling and imagination - are just as much
a priori as forms of sensibility and categories of under-
standing."

(c.f., p.46 ibid.)

And he suggests a definition for the a priori as:

"The immediate for which there is no empirical genesis
or learning process. . . . the a priori is revealed as
a necessary structure of the object perceived; an imme-
diacy already logical . . . and this immediacy implies that
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“The immediate for which there is no empirical genesis or learning process: . . . the a priori is revealed as a necessary structure of the object perceived; an immediacy already logical . . . and this immediacy implies that
I previously possess an immediate comprehension of the a priori.

(See Chap. I, p. 53 op. cit.)

As examples of his ease he cites things which he thinks one experiences as necessarily the ease before one learns that, and how, they are - spatiality before one learns of geometry and the tragic before one develops a theory of affective qualities (See Chap. 2, p. 59 op. cit.).

The affective a priori now needs to be put into context. Dufrenne differentiates between three forms of necessity, and the affective a priori belongs to that of material necessity. This is the form of necessity concerned with the essence of things, and is also contingent in a certain sense:

"It is quite possible that certain a priori are imposed only with reservations and sometimes without gaining unanimity. For example, if one admits that aesthetic values or categories are a priori, one must also admit that those a priori are not universally recognised and that their appearance is historically bound."

(See Chap. II, p. 63 ibid.)

Dufrenne is here allowing that his version of the a priori extends beyond that of Kant. He would seem to be applying a twentieth century metaphysical view - that the world is differently divided by people with different forms of life - to the Kantian a priori.

He admits to a difficulty in distinguishing between the empirical and the a priori material essences of a substance - even admitting that they tend to overlap. Briefly, however, the empirical essence is that which, "proceeds from observation and intuition", whereas the a priori material essence is reached "when it manifests itself as the essence of something as neither general nor formal. Then the essence
identifiable with the a priori is the idea immanent in the thing, the idea." (s.f., Chap.II. ibid.)

The theory of the material a priori becomes less contingent and more Kantian at times, regarding the a prioris as pre-given essences:

"When I discern . . . grace in a dancer's movement . . . I immediately discover the essence of the gracious. These essences do not serve as examples but as motions by which my implicit knowledge is awakened or re-animated. Such essences are a priori because they are immediately given by experience and not learned from experience, I already possess them in a certain sense."

(Cf., Chap III. pp.81-2, op.cit.) 1.

Dufrenne now attributes the further quality of generality to the a priori - which will allow its application to the affective qualities of aesthetics and means that a priori concepts belong to the family resemblance category:

"The a priori possesses the generality of a meaning which may belong to very dissimilar objects, and which introduces a special relationship between them . . . .
The diversity of examples . . . e.g., grace . . . . attests that these examples are not species of a genus . . . . i.e., objects subsumable under one and the same definition. They are rather objects animated by the same meaning." (C.f., Chap IV. p.93 op.cit.)

1. There is also a formal a priori closely related to the material. The difference is one of degree - the material a priori is more concrete and closely related to particular objects, and therefore more diversified.
The idea of generality is developed in chapter four where Dufrenne is talking of the universality of the a priori. He makes the point that the material a priori is in some way distinct from the objects in which it is found, since widely varying things are held to express the same thing. Examples given are of such differing things as Van Gogh's olive trees and a particular Beethoven scherzo both expressing the 'tragic'. This means - according to Dufrenne - the a priori affective qualities are not simply generalisations of common properties in different works. Dufrenne's conclusion is that the a priori is a universal. (C f., p.115 esp.)

Throughout 'The notion of the a priori', Dufrenne reiterates the view that one experiences the a priori. One may fail to grasp it in something, however, in which case the object in question will not be understood. Dufrenne puts his case in an irrefutable way by presupposing the correctness of his own theory that there are a pri oris in any meaningful object. For instance, he claims that one may fail to grasp the a priori in a piece of music. If one does, it remains formless and confused - in fact the fact that it does remain formless and confused indicates that one has not perceived what is a priori in it (its affective qualities or quality). In listening to a concert, even if one understands the music, it is firstly on an a posteriori level, "although I may be in contact with a form, what is given to me is the form of a content" (c f. Chap IV. p.102 ibid). I

i. His distinction between the a priori and a posteriori is, a) between form and content/matter, "The matter is the a posteriori element" (c f. Chap. IV. p.101 ibid.) and, b) between meaningfulness and meaninglessness, "The a posteriori is the meaningless matter; the sensory which calls for and immediately finds, meaning." (C f. ibid.)
Also, one may never understand the music, "the world of the incoherent into which I sometimes drift is not the world of Mozart" (cf. ibid). If one does discover the a priori, one has succeeded in discovering (i.e., understanding, or beginning to understand) the object itself; and discovering is achieved through understanding and habit.

Reasonably enough, Dufrenne does not elaborate on the latter - the method - since it is not the business of The notion of the a priori to explain the aesthetic. What he does expand upon is the nature of the a priori as constitutive - which applies to the affective categories. Here he diverges from Kant, in regarding the a priori as constitutive in the sense of being the object of knowledge rather than of being the instrument of thought, or a condition of knowledge. This is mentioned in the Phénoménologie (pp.543ff), but here he says: "Thus joyfulness constitutes a Bach fugue, and the tragic pervades Van Gogh's paintings." These things are what are actually expressed, and, "the spectator fails to perceive the real aesthetic object if he is insensitive to this expression." The material a priori is constitutive in a different way from the formal. The material a priori constitutes the meaning which animates an object. "The formal a priori represents a matter only in the formal order. And, conversely, the material a priori represents a higher form; it is meaning which is more authentic" (cf., p.107 ibid). At first Dufrenne holds the latter to be uniquely individuating - material signifies the essence or uniqueness of a thing (cf., beginning of section) - though he retreats from this position two pages later (p.109) to the weaker and more uninformative view that the material a priori "determines the object more specifically than the formal a priori".

There is also a distinction between those essences which are a priori and those which are not, though this is rather unsuasioning. It is that certain essences are simply abstract truths about an object
e.g., equinity of a horse, and others (a priori essences) are constitutive—they represent the truth of an object.

His position on whether there may be more than one a priori affective quality is left ambivalent in The notion of the a priori. The question is only raised indirectly when he says "everything is subordinated to a certain effect in a work of art" (of., Chap. V. p. 112 op. cit.) and refers to a dominant trait in things. All the same, this question does arise, and is only partially solved by Dufrenne's statement (of., p. 115 ibid.) that no one a priori can define the meaning of an object sufficiently to monopolize or forbid others. This does not provide a full solution because Dufrenne is here specifically referring to meaning. He may wish to say that one a priori can dominate in general, but in terms of understanding the meaning of the work of art all a prioris are of equal importance.

I shall comment on the theory of the a priori just given, before going on to the expansion of the view of the affective categories, given in the Phenomenologie.

Firstly, the reason which Dufrenne gives that "the a priori always refers to experience in order to ground it" (Chap. IV. p. 89 op. cit.) does not prove it is always experienced, or is itself material or existential. What he says is correct, but a) that does not mean that actual experience is presupposed by the a priori—i.e., what is said is that the a priori categories refer to experience, and thus if there are a priori categories, then there is possible experience. b) Also, there is the distinction between the fact that one must experience in order to talk of anything, even something non-experiential, and the fact that the idea of the a priori
involves the idea of experience. The former may be disregarded - one accepts that one is in a world in talking of anything, but this does not mean that the argument for the a priori categories involves or presupposes (the idea of) actual experiences. It seems that either Dufrenne is wrong in saying that the a priori refers to experience in grounding it - it refers to the idea of experience; or if it does refer to experience, that this is not a good reason for saying it is itself experiential/empirical.

It is true that one experiences a priori categories - unity, quantity, the comic, etc., but Dufrenne does not want merely to say this - he wants to say that one's knowledge of the a priori is gained from experience, not from the understanding alone. (This further step is required for the view that one has immediate knowledge of the material a priori categories. This is a point of view which phenomenology has in common with Aristotle - that all knowledge is gained from sense-experience.) And Dufrenne wishes to take his case a step further, and to say that the a priori can itself be existential. And it is this in particular which does not seem to be proved, particularly in view of the fact that referring to experience does not make the a priori itself existential.

As has been stated (cf., b) above), one thing which presumably encourages Dufrenne is the idea that perception is required even when discovering what Kant would regard as non-empirical analytic truths, i.e., one is in the world, it provides ideas, the truths apply in and to the world. But it is wrong to conflate being in the world, etc., which is a necessary condition of discerning an a priori truth, and the idea that perception is the mode of recognition of the truth of the a priori statement. It goes entirely against the whole idea of the a priori to say it is experienced since its aim is to show (at least for Kant) that we can have knowledge and understanding of
certain facts about the world (the categories) purely by means of rational thought.1

Secondly (and this is one of the most important and fundamental questions, since it queries the possibility of the affective categories being a priori), there is nothing wrong in asserting that one intuits and/or immediately comprehends the a priori, since it is probably true that one intuits what is a priori true of something.

Dufrenne asserts this several times (cf., Chap.III, pp.81-2, quoted) and says the a priori is the object of, "a pure and immediate experience". (Chap.III, p.73 op.cit.) I think that one has to accept intuition and self-evidence for some things, as there has to be some point at which one stops giving reasons for things, and just sees that, e.g., "it is the case that X". This seems to be so not only in the case of analytic truths like, "2+2=4", but also with basic fundamental ideas like negation, possibility, unity, etc., - the Kantian categories.

As a matter of fact, I think it may be the case that one intuits the 'comic', 'tragic', 'grotesque', etc. (the affective categories) in art - but at a fairly low level, and not in such a way as to make them a priori. That is to say, if one can call the final stage of recognition that something is X, intuition, then one probably intuits the 'tragic' (and other affective categories). But this allows for a great deal of experience of other works as 'tragic', and knowing what features to expect - or what sort of features - and then regarding the final stage of recognition of the work as 'tragic' as intuitive. The affective qualities may be intuited at this level, but this does not make them necessarily a priori, as I wish to emphasise, as it is not sufficiently strict.

1. See, Kant: Critique of pure reason, esp. paragraph 10, pp.112-4 (B105, A80 B106).
Both Descartes and Leibniz gave similar accounts to Kant's a priori, of our potential pure understanding of certain factors, when talking about innate ideas. From Copleston: I give two examples of this. Of Descartes' innate ideas, he says:

"the mind produces them, as it were, out of its own potentialities on the occasion of experience of some sort. It does not derive them from sense-experience."

(p.93 op.cit.)

And of Leibniz, that ideas are derived from the mind rather than external senses:

"They are, moreover, presupposed (and here Leibniz approaches the position of Kant) by sense-knowledge."

(p.321 op.cit.)

However, they both allow much more into the idea of innate ideas than Kant into that of the a priori, and therefore make it problematic - Descartes eventually thinks that all ideas are innate, and Leibniz allows such things as cause reason, squareness, circularity and substance. And this is the problem with which Dufrenne presents us. To wit, whether the affective qualities are the sorts of things one intuits or immediately comprehends, and can be said to be a priori or not into the class of the a priori.

Unfortunately, there does not seem to be any logical (or in the end any empirical) necessity that they should be a priori. For, in Kant's favour, one might agree that the categories (those things which are understood a priori) are conditions of the possibility of conceptualising as we do; but the 'tragic' or 'comic' are not conditions of conceptualising about art. Moreover, if one accepts that

say 'quantity' exists in the world prior to our using the concept 'quantity' (it need not exist qua 'quantity' but qua, e.g., 1+1+1, etc.). I think that one can argue against the affective qualities as a priori for terms such as 'tragic', 'comic', (the) 'novel', etc., come into existence gradually, for example when one wishes to classify a number of works. The work can be acknowledged as art and thus exist before its classification as 'tragic', and it is not 'tragic' or 'a novel' until someone classifies it as such. This seems to indicate that it is not the affective qualities in a work which constitute it as art, or which are properly a priori features.¹

And, taking a priori in a fairly strict sense, they are not a priori in being part of the world's make-up which we can get to via the understanding before we can understand the world. They are conventional terms for qualities which often differ totally from work to work, as Dufrenne himself allows. So it seems to be very difficult to find any way in which the term 'a priori' is applicable to the affective categories. It is all very well for Dufrenne to allow such things as the total variability of the nature of the qualities from work to work and still claim them as a priori, but in reality each such allowance weakens his right to talk of the categories as a priori. Possibly the fact that a set of aesthetic terms now exists encouraged Dufrenne to think it is the qualities which these designate which are the essence of the work.

I am quite prepared to admit that this does make up a watertight case against affective qualities as necessarily a priori. For one can argue against my view in two ways - either saying that the

¹. The idea of this came out of a discussion with Cyril Barrett, whom I should like to acknowledge.
qualities the categories designate only came into existence when they were designated as they were, and therefore the affective categories are just as much or as little a priori as they; or one can say that the terms 'tragic', etc., may not have come into being with the work, but the tragic quality did, and therefore only awaited a suitable denotation, just as quantity (or the quality 'quantity') pre-existed the term 'quantity' and only awaited suitable denotation. That is, Kant's a prioris are just as non-existent before, or pre-existent to, their designation as, e.g., 'unity', 'quantity', etc.

However, I can only repeat that I do not think Dufrenne has presented anything like a sound case for regarding the affective categories as a priori (or for regarding the a priori as being as he claims), and add a few points, first repeating: (a) that the affective qualities do not seem to be in any way conditions of the possibility of conceptualising about art. It is also true that: (b) the classification of works into certain groups is fairly arbitrary, for example, those works called 'tragic' now, might well have been classified under different names if one concentrated on different qualities or interpreted them differently. (Thus immediately comprehending such a work as 'tragic' is more like a happy coincidence than intuition.) (c) One could not immediately comprehend a work as 'tragic' if the idea of the tragic had not been conceived - and since 'being immediately comprehensible as X' is a necessary condition (for Dufrenne) of X being the a priori essence of a work, it seems as if X cannot be that. Lastly (d) recognising the affective quality in something is not a necessary condition of recognising it as art - one can recognise 'Hamlet' as art without recognising its various 'tragic', 'sublime', 'grotesque', 'comic', etc., affective qualities. Therefore,
the affective qualities do not seem to be a priori in this way.

Thus, under a slightly stricter notion of the a priori than Dufrenne had in mind, it would seem that the affective categories are not very promising candidates for being a priori or immediately comprehensible in any strict sense. N.B. Incidentally, Dufrenne assumes a similar position to that of Descartes and Leibniz on knowledge, when he says,

"for one can, and must, grant the a priori the privilege of always being already known - thus the privilege of always being related to subjectivity and of appearing as an immediately comprehensible meaning." (Chap.IV p.85 op.cit.)

For, both Descartes and Leibniz - especially Leibniz - regard the innate ideas one has as potential knowledge, which will be made explicit only when one's need for the knowledge arises. I think that Dufrenne is not saying anything more controversial than this - (a) that the potential knowledge is there, and (b) possibly that one may know quite a lot without knowing that one knows it (pace Haemrahi), which is correct, I think.

However, there are further points to discuss - several bearing on the liberality of Dufrenne's notion of the a priori.

Thirdly, one reason for Dufrenne's saying that the a priori is immediately given in experience/perception, is that it enables him to avoid saying that the subject constitutes the world - or more Kantially - that the subject has to impose formal matter. Dufrenne considers that this metaphysics would be proposing subjectivity, whereas, as a phenomenologist, he regards the world as the object for all subjects, and objectively the same for all subjects. (cf., pp.99-100 op.cit.) The subject builds upon what is given, either in the construction of a pure a priori or an a posteriori science. He reiterates the givenness and meaningfulness of the world for the

1. or unity,
subject - perceptual meaning is "given and not created", it is "for
me and not made by me". (cf., Chap.IV. p.100 op.cit.)

As it stands this is not incompatible with the tendency towards
allowing different ways of conceptualising or breaking up the world,
which will be pointed out next. It becomes so only if one regards
the world as objectively constituted in such a determinate way that
only one conceptualisation is correct, and Dufrenne does not assert
this.

Fourthly, Dufrenne takes a much more fluid metaphysical view than
Kant, regarding the world as constituted as it is - in the phenomen-
ological tradition that one can discern the objective nature of things
if one clears one's mind of theory - but leaning also towards current
Anglo-American (and Quinian) views that there is not just one way of
conceptualising, common to all persons and by means of which we agree
and communicate. This is apparent from his statement that certain
a prioris "are not universally recognised and that their appearance is
historically bound" (cf., Chap.II. p.43 op.cit.).

The only problem is that it is not entirely consistent with what
Dufrenne says about the a priori being "immediately comprehended". If
\( \omega \) is a priori \( X \) at time \( t^1 \), is it possible for it to be the case
either: that it is not universally recognised as a priori \( X \), or
(regarding its being historically bound): that it is not a priori \( X 
\) at time \( t^2 \)?

The latter contingency seems to be possible, and one may illus-
trate this in terms of art. If one changed one's concept of what
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with being immediately comprehended. The former contingency is also compatible, since to say that \( \varphi \) is immediately comprehended as a priori is not to say that everyone does recognise it as a priori. It is difficult to be decisive, since Dufrenne does say the thing can be immediately comprehended, and also that the a priori is already known, but one can reconcile this with its not being universally recognised, by appeal either to differences in cultures making art not understood by all, i.e., cross-culturally, or the view that at least a certain amount of general art knowledge is required before one understands art.

1. For this to be properly consistent with what Dufrenne says in the Phénoménologie - that changes in attitudes to art over different historical periods indicates that the nature of a work of art is fairly broad and open to different interpretations (rather than implying relativism) - one would say that the work is both 'grotesque' and 'tragic'/'melodramatic' at the same time, but seen differently according to temporally differing aesthetic attitudes and theories. (I shall discuss the problem of contradictory interpretations in the next section.)

2. This depends upon Dufrenne's meaning that the a priori is not necessarily immediately comprehensible/accessible to anyone (of whatever culture) who is cognisant with the concept 'art', rather than restricting it to one culture and/or the set of people familiar with the type of art in question. I do not think he is limiting what he says to one culture or elite, however, and therefore I think one can allow both the appeal to cross-cultural lack of understanding (seeing what is not there, missing what is there, etc.) and to the necessity for a certain amount of knowledge.
In this case, one has a deferred immediate comprehension - consequent upon one's knowledge or education in aesthetics in one's own culture. Given this, Dufrenne can be said to be being consistent.

Fifthly, Dufrenne seems to have made out a plausible case for the universality of the a priori - at least with regard to those of art. Yet what he says of how one knows, e.g., how to apply any a priori concept, is uninformative:

"The word has a content that we experience quite vividly and clearly; even if we cannot make this content explicit, we do know it in some sense."

This is not problematic in theory (cf. second comment above), but in practice makes the fact that X is a priori somewhat unhelpful if it means that although I may know that there are certain a priori affective qualities in Hamlet, I am not aided by the fact that they are a priori, in knowing what they are. This casts some doubt on what practical aesthetic problem could be solved by asserting a priori affective categories. It is true, however, that the assertion does at least reject the theories of subjectivity and relativism.

This leads on to the sixth point, on the fact that one may fail to grasp what is a priori in something - for instance a piece of music, and the practical problems to which this gives rise. Since Dufrenne does not elaborate on this in the Phénoménologie, and it does concern the concept of the a priori, I shall illustrate the problem here, and suggest how Dufrenne might settle it.

(i) He is presupposing his own conclusion - that there is an a priori in any object or work of art. If one does not assume this, then the fact that the work remains formless and confused in some instance might be attributed to one's failing to discern some other key
factors which would make the work coherent to its audience, e.g., Significant Form or the Aesthetic Emotion.

(ii) The statement that a work may remain formless and confused (if one fails to discern the a priori in it) makes it impossible to distinguish on these grounds alone, between pieces of music which actually have form and meaning, i.e., are good music, but which one has not yet come to understand, and those which do not, i.e., are bad music (if music at all) - since for both types one may find them formless and confused, and continue to do so. One cannot tell whether the fault is in the work or one's comprehension of it.

(iii) Related to (ii), one may think that a piece is meaningful, and therefore that one has discovered what is a priori in it, when one has in fact misunderstood it, and it is either a poor work, or good, but a work to which one has attributed some other meaning from that which it has.

Presumably Dufrenne's answer to this would be that (a) one will not see the work as meaningful unless one has discovered the a priori qualities of it, and (b) that since one immediately comprehends the a priori by intuition, then one will necessarily be right if one finds the work meaningful, since one cannot have a false intuition. However, this is not good enough. (a) is unsubstantiated, and (b) depends upon his being correct about intuition - maybe one can have a false intuition (mistakenly think one has intuited something).

(iv) One must therefore know before one listens to a work, whether it is good or bad - which a) precludes one's own valuation of it, and b) is not a solution, since everyone is initially in the same position.

2. See also, Susanne Langer; Feeling and form, published Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1953, and Philosophy in a new key, published Mentor, 1951, for other possible key factors.
with regard to a new work of art, and there are no other criteria than actually listening, reading, etc., for evaluation. (One may discuss a piece of music ad infinitum, but unless one hears it in some form or another, one cannot properly evaluate it.) Most certainly one cannot say, "because this is by A it is good, and because that is by B it will be bad", i.e., prejudge on the basis of the artist. This is the method of those who refuse to form their own judgments. In any case, it presupposes what Dufranne fails to allow for - the possibility of someone else's prior judgment of the artist (which will be through the work).

The only apparent solution would be to provide for learning and instruction in the subject in question - here art - in order for the a priori affective categories to be only one criterion in judging the work. As it stands, Dufranne has not allowed for this by presupposing a necessary connection between knowledge of the a priori, and understanding of the form and meaning (in a piece of music - cf. above and Chap.IV. p.102 op.cit.).

There are three final more minor points.

Seventhly, Dufranne regards objects as having immediate meaning. This is a phenomenological viewpoint, but not a very definite one. He says:

"The a priori would then (under the right viewpoint) be seen as the immediate meaning grasped in experience and instantly recognised. . . . . The a priori constitutes the object as meaningful and it lies in our pre-given comprehension of the meaning given in the object."

(Chap.I. p.59. op.cit.)

Meaning is not at issue here, but the idea requires some comment as it underpins much phenomenology and in any case it seems strange (at the least) to say that an object has meaning independently of persons.

*  I.e., by hearing it performed or 'hearing' it mentally if one can read music sufficiently well (e.g., 'hear' the music as one reads the score).
(a) The meaning of 'meaning' requires clarification, since normally one would not say that, e.g., a tree, had any specific meaning per se. (It might have significance in being where it is, or it might be a sign, but in this case the meaning is given it by someone's using it for a certain purpose.)

(b) It is usually regarded as the case that meaning is imposed upon things by persons, and that in a strict sense, only statements or human intercourse of some kind - verbal or otherwise - had meaning.

(c) Furthermore, an object can mean different things in different contexts, or according to the attitude one takes to it. For example, a tree may mean water to someone in a desert, or a source of fire to someone camping, or a source of beauty to someone simply walking in the country. Some of these things it may never have occasion to mean, and I do not think it means them in abstracto, since:

(d) A tree can hardly mean, e.g., 'beauty' without there being a subject to predicate beauty of it.

I do not think objects have meaning unless someone gives them meaning. And if it can, how does one decide which of all the possible meanings that an object can have (regarding (c)) are part of its immediate meaningfulness? The list of possible meanings could go on for pages - but surely no object can have that amount of immediate meaningfulness? It will mean only one thing, according to context, otherwise total confusion would reign. So are all the other potential meanings held in abeyance, or what?

I think it fairly obvious that the idea of immediate meaningfulness is fraught with problems, and also important to note this, because if it were a reliable support, one could move from the idea of objects being meaningful of their own accord, to the idea that objects have a priori affective qualities. For example, one could say that any part of the object's meaning is its affective quality, which must therefore be a priori since the object possesses it prior to our
experiencing it, or giving it meaning - i.e., immediate meaning being a priori.

Eighthly, regarding essences, 1. the fact that a term such as 'heroic' can have an entirely different empirical description for a piece of music from that which it has for a piece of poetry might indicate that Dufrenne is right in saying the essence is immediately grasped, or intuited. I.e., one might conclude that since there was nothing common this is the only way one can account for giving two things the same affective quality. But the lack of common properties would mean that the essence is non-material, therefore it must be formal in some sense, as, for example, the way the features are combined. Nor does this in any way prove the existence of an essence - one might just as well conclude from the lack of common features that certain differing qualities - which one could enumerate - go to make up a particular affective quality, in each type of art.

Ninth - and finally (Chap. IV, pp.94-5 op.cit.) Dufrenne is hardly very convincing in his attempt to show that the affective qualities are perceived, when he says that the affective categories are categories of feeling, and feeling is part of perceiving. For feeling is not part of perceiving. One does not perceive a feeling, one feels a feeling. One may perceive that someone is feeling X, but one does not perceive the feeling. Moreover, the affective categories extend over far more than feeling, or emotive qualities. For example, the 'beautiful' is an affective quality, but it is not a feeling.

N.B. Not that Dufrenne's argument in any way goes to show that the affective categories are a priori, even if it had shown that they were perceived.

This covers at least the six key factors Dufrenne attributes to the a priori which are relevant here: (1) that the a priori can be experienced.

1a Cf. Chap. IV. pp.82-83 op.cit.
(ii) that the affective categories are immediately comprehended or a priori.

(iii) that material a prioris are not universally recognised.

(iv) as regards meaning, the a priori is a general concept.

(v) that one may fail to discover the a priori.

(vi) that it is constitutive in the reverse sense to the Kantian.

Of these, the first and fifth are not adequately demonstrated, and rather dubious, and the third, fourth and sixth are less controversial, but rely upon one's acceptance of Dufrenne's very extended and liberal concept of the a priori. The second is one of the most important, since it makes a straightforward attack on the possibility of the affective qualities being a priori in any strict sense of the term. It is probably the case that one could allow the affective categories to be a priori if one accepted the generality of the a priori, the fact that it is not universally recognised, that it is experiential, and that one may fail to discover it, etc. However, by adding these characteristics to it Dufrenne has made the concept so extended as to make one dubious about its usefulness for any practical application. We have to accept that the case for a priori categories remains unproven, and move on to Dufrenne's use of the idea in the Phénoménologie.

Section II. The a priori and aesthetics.

I shall now discuss Dufrenne's concept of the affective categories, dividing this into three parts:

(i) The demonstration of the affective a priori.

The a priori affective categories are now defined (cf. Phénoménologie de l'expérience esthétique, Vol.II. Part IV. intro., p.539) as the

1. An understanding of the first five is necessary also for an understanding and judgment of what Dufrenne says of the affective a priori categories in the Phénoménologie.
conditions under which a world may be felt – just as Kant's a priori categories are the conditions under which an object is given or thought.

However, there is an important qualification to be made aesthetically – namely that not all affective qualities are aesthetic (cf. p. 541 ibid) and only those which are aesthetic constitute the object. That is to say, the affective qualities only constitute the object when used in an aesthetic context. This is repeated (cf. Vol. II. Part II. Chap. I. sec. II. p. 549 op. cit.) when Dufrenne says:

"Nous dirons d'un qualité affective qu'elle est un a priori lorsque, exprimée par un oeuvre, elle est constitutante du monde de l'objet esthétique . . . ." though this adds the world of the aesthetic object, whereas previously he spoke of the a priori as constitutive of the aesthetic object.

1. The affective categories are to the affective qualities as the class is to an instance of it. I.e., there are affective categories such as the 'tragie', which are individually instantiated in works of art. Dufrenne actually says:

"les catégories affectives . . . . . sont aux qualités affectives ce que le général est au singulier, et aussi ce que la connaissance de l'a priori est à l'a priori".

(Vol. II. Part II. Chap. II. p. 572.)

2. This restriction on the affective qualities as constitutive is not mentioned in The notion of the a priori.
What Dufrenne is saying about the aesthetic nature of the affective qualities is ambiguous. He could mean that one can discriminate those which are aesthetic from those which are not, or that affective qualities can have a non-aesthetic application (are not necessarily aesthetic). In view of his statement that they are only constitutive in an aesthetic context:

"spéandant, pas plus que tout objet ne porte un monde, toute qualité affective ne peut avoir (la) vertu constitutive: c'est encore un privilège de l'esthétique." ¹

(Vol II, Part II, Chap.I, p.541.)

and the fact that affective qualities, for example, the 'tragédie' the 'beautiful', etc., are applicable beyond the realm of art (even if it is debatable whether they are applicable beyond that of the aesthetic), I think that one should assume he is making the latter point.²

¹ Though this is still ambiguous, since "l'esthétique" might be an adjective qualifying "qualité affective", or a noun, and in the former case this would mean only the aesthetic affective qualities are constitutive, and in the latter case, it would mean the affective qualities are constitutive only in an aesthetic context.

² To complicate matters, Dufrenne makes a different subdivision in The notion of the a priori: (p.114). This is a distinction between artistic a prioris, subdivided into affective categories, for example, 'joy'; and values, for example, 'beauty'. These are apparently distinguished "by the knowledge which isolates them". This is unhelpful, and Dufrenne makes no attempt to enlighten us - which seems strange in view of the facts, a) that in the Phenomenologie, 'beauty' is used as an affective category, i.e., there is
Note 2. continued from previous page.
no such distinction made, and b) this introduces a new notion that affective categories are not the only a prioris in art. (The only thing Dufrenne adds is that one knows an a priori, and which it is, "by experiencing a meaning" (The notion of the a priori. Chap.V. p.114).


"Experiencing a meaning and experiencing a mental image. 'In both cases', we should like to say, 'we are experiencing something, only something different . . . . ' What is the content of the experience of imagination? The answer is a picture, or a description. And what is the content of the experience of meaning? I don't know what I am supposed to say to this."

(Part II. ii. pp.175-6. op.cit.)

and:

"... there is a close kinship with 'experiencing the meaning of a word.' "

in, for example, feeling the seriousness of a tune, or in seeing an arbitrary cipher as a letter of some foreign alphabet or a faultily written letter,

"And I can see it in various aspects according to the fiction I surround it with."

(Part II, xi, p.210 op.cit.)

This is not, however, particularly conclusive.
By 'constitutive', Dufrenne means 'essence' and that the affective quality is the a priori constituting feature of aesthetic objects, but not of other objects.

He then goes on to state that what is a priori in art is by nature (necessarily) affective, just as the a priori of understanding is by nature rational. Affectivity is the structure of the object, but it also designates an attitude of the subject. (cf. Vol.II. Part II. chap.I. pp543-4.) Thus, structure and attitude are complementary.1 Thus, structure and attitude are complementary.1 (cf. Vol.II. Part II. chap I. pp544-9).

Taking Kant as his basis, Dufrenne now undertakes to show how the affective is a priori. Firstly, Kant's a prioris are logical and anterior to experience. Thus, transcendental knowledge is what is a priori for Kant. But secondly, Dufrenne suggests one can say that the object to which this knowledge pertains is itself a priori in so far as it founds the possibility of the empirical object. 'A priori' means 'constituting', in so far as it is at the basis of reality or is the principle of reality. He backs up the second point by the claim that Kant understood the a priori in the same way - as a) determining our relation to objects, and b) determining the nature of this object as an object of possible experience. Thirdly, according to Dufrenne, for Kant the subject constitutes what is constitutive in the object.

Dufrenne then suggests a combination of the second move (his own), and the first (Kant's), taking the a priori as a characteristic of the object of knowledge, rather than of knowledge itself, from which he deduces a three part meaning for the a priori.

1. It is constituting - of the object.

2. It is existential - in the subject, as a way of constituting the subject as subject.

1a This leads on to our knowledge of the affective qualities, which will be dealt with in the third part of this section.
iii) It can become the object of knowledge (a knowledge which is itself a priori). Further to this, since the a priori qualifies both subject and object, it can be determined from three aspects of the relation of the two: (i) presence, (ii) representation, and (iii), feeling. Each of these corresponds to one aspect of the object and to one attitude of the subject: to the 1) lived, 2) represented, and 3) felt (in the object), and to the 1) living, 2) thinking, and 3) feeling (in the subject).

Dufrenne recognises that he is going beyond Kant now, since Kant restricted the a priori to being constitutive of the object (cf. Prolegomena p.91). Dufrenne wants to define the a priori as constituting in a wider sense - to include the subjective without ceasing to be objective.

One reason for this wish is that judgments about works of art could be said to be subjective. However, there is a great difference (as he says) between a judgment of the sort, “this room is hot”, and of the sort “the music of Bach is serene”. The difference is that whereas my judgment about the room may be totally subjective, if, for instance, I have been out in the cold for some time, the judgment about Bach is not. It may be true not only for me. In fact aesthetic judgments are of this nature, they are refutable, and objectively true to the extent that if the music of Bach is serene, it is said to be so because of agreement by a number of people, not only myself.1

Another related reason is that Dufrenne is presumably trying to justify making an a priori category out of feeling/affectivity, which seems prima facie very much subjective.

1. At least, this is true for the normal sense of ‘work of art’ - what could be called the asquiescent sense. Actually Dufrenne is
Feeling is obviously the most important of the three aspects of the relation of subject and object which the a priori can qualify, according to Dufrenne's theory, because of its relation to the affective. His conclusion is that the subject is constituting on the third level, of feeling, by means of the affective a prioris, "qui ouvrent un monde vécu et senti en première personne par le moi profond", (p. 548 ibid.), and that what is a priori in the object comes out in the affective a priori and is revealed by aesthetic experience.

This is the sum total of Dufrenne's demonstration of the possibility and existence of affective a prioris.

Continuation of note 1, on previous page.

using the two statements differently. ("This room is hot", and "The music of Bach is serene"). The second can be just as subjective as the first, and the first as objective as the second. Bach's music could just seem serene to me if I had been listening to something very energetic, when in fact the piece was not at all serene, just as the room could seem hot when the thermometer registered a fairly low temperature. Conversely the judgment about the room could be perfectly objective.

One would be using the statements similarly if, for example, one looked at a thermometer and said, "this room is hot" if it registered that the room was 90°F; and if one took a piece by Bach with moderate metronome markings, no sudden variation of tempo or key, and an even rhythm, and said, "this piece of music of Bach is serene". I.e., if one made use of objective external factors in one's judgment.

However, it is a good idea for Dufrenne to point out that aesthetic judgments can be objective, to save them from sliding into, or being accused of subjectivity.
There are four rather dubious points in Dufrenne's argument, and one more attractive feature.

Firstly, Dufrenne refers somewhat ambiguously to the aesthetic nature of affective categories. It is debatable, as a matter of fact, as to whether some affective qualities can be used non-aesthetically.

Taking as examples, the 'sad', the 'beautiful' and the 'heroic', when one talks of a beautiful day, one is making an aesthetic evaluation - when one talks of anything as beautiful, it is still an aesthetic evaluation, as long as one is not using the term metaphorically. However, if one says of someone that he performed a heroic action, one is making a moral rather than an aesthetic judgment, just as 'sad' may be a judgment of someone's mood, not an aesthetic judgment.

Maybe it is the case that the use of certain affective terms always results in an aesthetic statement or evaluation, whereas the use of others does not.1 The conclusion with regard to the constitutive nature of affective qualities would be that the affective quality would be constitutive only when the use of any one resulted in an aesthetic statement or evaluation. It would of course be easier if one could divide the affective qualities into aesthetic and non-aesthetic, but it does not seem to affect his case about their being constitutive - it simply means that instead of saying

1. I think it is the case that some aesthetic terms such as 'beautiful' ('tragic'? and 'comic' are purely aesthetic and cannot be used without some aesthetic connotation, or when they are not being used straightforwardly aesthetically they are being used metaphorically. I also think there are other terms which belong to the affective group - such as 'sad' or 'heroic' which can be used both aesthetically and non-aesthetically.
only the aesthetic affective qualities are constitutive of the
object, one must say that the affective qualities are constitutive
of the object only when used in an aesthetic context. Thus, it
depends upon the context as well as the affective quality as to whe­
ther it is constitutive.

Secondly, on a similar line, why should the affective quality be
constitutive of an aesthetic object and not of an ordinary object?
There are at least two possible answers:
i) A sad person can become happy and it is therefore not an a priori
   feature of the person to be sad, but a sad poem cannot become a happy
   poem.

ii) Because Dufrenne holds it to be a criterion, or one necessary
   condition of α being art, that it 'contains' some affective quality,
   and not a necessary condition of anything non-aesthetic that it is
   affective.\(^1\) These seem to be valid answers, but the latter has the
   disadvantage of presupposing affectivity as a necessary condition of
   α being art - which has yet to be proved.

Thirdly, with regard to the comparison with Kant and the under­
standing, it has yet to be proved that there is anything in the
nature of art which makes it affective. This will not stand up
without some further backing to the effect that the two are analogous.
However, the point made directly after this - that affectivity
designates an attitude of the subject - would seem to be appealing
to the fairly common and acceptable view that the work is not
affective (and therefore under the present terms, not a work of art,
since affectivity is being used as a necessary condition) unless it

\(^1\) Though there is no reason why anything should not have affective
qualities and it might well be a criterion for being Achilles that
one had the affective quality 'heroism', or of religion, that it
involved the 'sublime'.
is seen as such by some subject or audience. He does not specify what sort of audience can confer the status on a work. This also raises the question of where affectivity lies and how far it extends — i.e., whether a work can be a priori affective if no one finds it so, and various expressionist views, which will be dealt with fully in chapter five.

Fourthly, the argument to show how the affective categories are a priori, is not convincing — and this is the most important factor in this part of the section. If the argument is not satisfactory, one has to rely on self-evidence, and the thesis that there are a priori affective qualities, is most certainly not self-evident.

1) Dufrenne's second point that an object can be a priori because it founds the possibility of the empirical object comes down to saying that the object to which knowledge pertains is a priori, either because it is the essence of the empirical object and therefore a priori, or because this object is the idea of the empirical object and therefore a priori,

Either way, he is distinguishing between what he terms the a priori object, and the empirical object, and determining whether it is part of the empirical object — as in the former alternative, or distinct from it, as in the latter:

"Mais en peut dire en second lieu que l'objet sur lequel porte cette connaissance est lui-même a priori, en tant qu'il fonde la possibilité de l'objet empirique."

(Vol.II. Part II. Chap.I. p.545 ibid.)

It is unclear which he wishes to state. However, it would seem to be the former alternative since he backs up his claim by saying, Kant understood the a priori in two ways — the second of which was

1. The term 'object' is used by Dufrenne, though I assume that he is using it as equivalent to 'concept', since objects are not actually a priori.
that it determined the nature of an object as an object of possible experience - nature suggests to one a quality or essence, rather than some sort of pre-determined or Platonic idea. 1. In any case, since he wishes to make qualities and not ideas, a priori, I take it that he meant the former.

But this is to equate being an essence with being a priori, and although one may have a priori knowledge of the essence of X, this does not make the essence of X a priori. He seems to be transferring the a priori from the truth about something, to its being an empirical factor in that object. 2. Moreover, his appeal to Kant is invalid - since, 'determining the nature of an object . . . . ' (cf. above) does not involve the object in being a priori.

ii) As to the deduction of a three part meaning of the a priori, the first and second points have been discussed in the comments on The notion of the a priori (cf. the final part of the exposition on the a priori as constitutive, and comment I. section I. of the present chapter, on existentialism in the a priori). However, it is important to remember that they have not been proved - the comment on the existential nature of the a priori is intended rather to refute the assertion - and are assertions contra Kant.

The first is a phenomenological viewpoint - that the objects in the world are already constituted (and meaningful) prior to our

1. He does refer to what Kant meant by an 'idea' in this context (p.545 ibid), but this is very different from a Platonic idea.

2. Dufrenne is being consistent with what he says in The notion of the a priori (cf. present chapter, Section I, end of exposition), though he does not distinguish between the two types of essences here - those which he regards as a priori, and those which he does not.
conceptualisation, and Dufrenne develops this to the idea that the a priori aspect constitutes the object.\(^1\) The second is spelled out in two quite different ways - the first arising here and in The notion of the a priori, as the a priori being existential because it is a quality of an object, and the second arising when Dufrenne refers to the cosmological and existential (Vol. II. Part II. Chap. I. sect. II. passim, of the Phénoménologie) where the a priori is held to be existential somewhat vicariously through the artist. These two reasons bear no relation to one another.\(^2\) The third point is the assertion referred to above (present comment, four (i)), and which does not appear to be satisfactorily proved.

Lastly, Dufrenne has claimed that the a priori may be determined in three aspects of the relation between subject and object. The important one of these with regard to the aesthetic object, is feeling, and I think Dufrenne has made out some case for not regarding feeling and the affective as subjective, at least in respect of art.

However, owing to the fact that Dufrenne not yet proved either that essence is equivalent to a priori, or that affective qualities are either of the two (or one if they are equivalent), affective qualities emerge as respectable non-subjective candidates for

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1. Though it would seem that one could construe the phenomenological attitude differently - if objects in the world are already constituted and meaningful, they are therefore all a priori in the sense of having meaning and being, prior or anterior to our experience of them. In this case anything would count as a priori, and essences would have no special claim.

2. The second will be discussed in the following part of this section.
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\(^2\) The second will be discussed in the following part of this section.
aesthetic evaluation, but not (necessarily) a priori.1.

(ii) The nature of the affective qualities.

Cosmological and existential.

Dufrenne refers to the relation of the cosmological and existential to the affective qualities (Vol. II, Part II, Chap. I, sect. II, passim, op. cit.), seeing them as aspects of the affective a priori. Briefly, the cosmological aspect is the world of the work, and the existential aspect is the author or spectator. Prima facie, these are relational qualities, not inherent in the affective a priori, but Dufrenne broadens the scope of the aesthetic object to include them as part of it.

The existential. Dufrenne thinks that in order to justify talking of the a priori of an object which is indefinitely diverse, the a priori of a work of art has to be assigned to something concrete - a subject, but not an impersonal Kantian one, one who is related to his own world. This subject is the artist. However, it is not just a question of the artist's world, but of the spectator and his affinity to the work. The affective a priori constitutes a consistent coherent world, and there is a sense in which the work only exists through the audience, and the audience through it.

1 This should be qualified slightly. What Dufrenne has not demonstrated so far is that the a priori is as he states: but it is necessary to redefine the term on something like Dufrenne's lines, if one is to allow a priori affective categories, since Kant's categories are necessary conditions for conceptualisation, which is not true of affective categories. I.e., one has to modify the concept greatly (though as I have said, I am dubious about Dufrenne's concept of the a priori).
"qu'il (le spectateur) soit requis par l'œuvre . . . . .
 cela signifie qu'en sens l'œuvre n'existe que par le public qui la concretise et la reconnaît, mais aussi qu'elle s'impose à la perception, et que le public n'existe que par elle. De même que le racinien crée Racine,
de même l'œuvre de Racine, c'est-à-dire encore le racinien, crée son public". (cf. p.559, ibid.)

Quite uncontrovertially, Dufrenne means by this that the work can only be called a work of art if it is given this status by a public, and conversely, one cannot have a public for a work, without there being some work of art.\(^{1}\) I think that he is being slightly rhetorical in saying that the work of Racine creates its public.

The Cosmological. This has been referred to briefly above, and not a lot more needs to be added. Dufrenne holds that each artist creates his own world. The affective quality, as for example, the 'comic' in Molière, is an atmosphere which gives meaning to what we see and hear. It is a singular world created by Moliere. The artist expresses his Weltanschauung by the profundity of the qualities of his work.\(^{2}\)

Dufrenne regards the cosmological and existential aspects of the affective qualities as of equal significance, and thinks one must grasp the affective quality as anterior to the specification of either - it has immediate meaning.\(^{3}\) (cf. pp.560-1 ibid.)

\(^{1}\) It would be more accurate, therefore, though less grandiose, if Dufrenne said that the work was given status only by the public, rather than saying it existed through it - since it exists as something, if not a work of art, irrespective of its being seen as a work of art.

\(^{2}\) This will be dealt with further in the chapter on expression.

\(^{3}\) This has been commented on with regard to The notion of the a priori. (cf. comment seven.)
General and singular. (Vol. II. Part II. Chap. II. sect. II. passim.)

Dufrenne takes up the problem which arises in the notion of the a priori of the a priori and art in terms of general and singular. However, he is not here concerned to prove that the a priori is a general term, but that the notion of generality is applicable to art. Generality arises because the categories are general (as Dufrenne pointed out in the notion of the a priori, cf. notes on this, previous section). He recognises the individual nature and uniqueness of a work of art, and states that the relation of general to singular is no problem normally, but this is not the case with the aesthetic object, where the individual is not subsumeable under a genre. A work of art is unique and has no related universal, or general set. He agrees that there is a genre or general term by which one can refer to the work, but considers that it is not this to which he is referring. What he means is that there is, for example, the 'tragie' in Beethoven and in Mahler, but these qualities are not the same in each. The problem lies in classifying them both as 'tragie'. (Part of the uniqueness of the work resides in the fact that it is the expression of the artist, according to Dufrenne.)

He thinks that one must seek the generality in the singular - the singular being the known quality, the aesthetic object. An example of this is seeking joy in a singular work of Mozart. But it is not only by means of the quality of joy that we discover the singular, but because Mozart expresses also the quality of humanity.\(^1\)

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\(^1\) According to Dufrenne humanity is the essence of man. He holds that humanity and art have much in common. The universal 'humanity' is held to be in the same relation to man individually, as the universal 'art' is to each work of art.
Four further assertions which Dufrenne makes are:

(i) that the indeterminacy of the categories makes them applicable to the singular. (Presumably by singular he means individual instances of the use of the category.)

(ii) the work is that singular essence which attains universality.¹

(iii) that individual works of art and the spectator are linked by the general category of humanity.²

(iv) the affective category is a capacity to discern values through the apprehension - this presupposes in us a certain sense of these values.³ (cf. Vol.II. Part II. Chap.III.)

What exactly are affective qualities?

According to Dufrenne the categories go under different names - essences, categories, aesthetic values, etc. As regards values, he only allows the 'beautiful' to qualify as a value, and defines value as the essence of being in so far as being is reciprocal to an evaluating subject. Examples of affective qualities are, the 'beautiful', the 'sublime', the 'gracious', etc. The 'et cetera' is intended to indicate the difficulty of enumerating all the affective qualities. The scale which Souriau gives, and Dufrenne quotes, is regarded as good but not adequate.⁴ It has the merit of not placing the 'beautiful' at the top of a scale of qualities - which others normally do. (cf. Vol.II. Part I. Chap.II. pp.573-6)

This difficulty in enumerating is turned into an impossibility (Vol.II. Part II. Chap.II. sect.III. pp594-8) when Dufrenne talks of the possibility of a pure aesthetic. The reasons he gives are that the categories are not easily objectifiable - while one can specify the zero point of quality, one cannot know if there is a zero point ¹. This is vague and highly uninformative.

2. This is irrelevant because it has nothing to do with the affective categories.

3. This is reminiscent of the Leibnian Cartesian tene adopted at one stage in The notion of the a priori. (cf. Present chapter, section I. comment 2.)

4. The table of 'reflexive essences' from Souriau (p.575) is taken from L'avenir de l'esthétique. p.406, and is also to be found in the article, Art et Vérité, Revue Philosophique, March, 1933.
of quality, one cannot know if there is a zero point of passion', and so on. They are also of indefinite number and are not listed because they are given in non-limitable modes of feeling. This is re-stated in Le Poétique, when Dufrenne says:

"(les) catégories ne peuvent pas faire l'objet d'une esthétique pure aussi rigoureuse que la métaphysique ou la physique pure. Étant justiciables du sentiment, elles ne peuvent être conceptualisées qu'approximativement; étant manifestées par des œuvres dont la création est imprévisible, elles ne peuvent être définitivement recensées." (cf. Part III, Chap. III, p. 182 op. cit.)

Also, they are human categories, and since one cannot give a determinate a priori of man because he is not determined according to elementary dimensions, but a multiplicity of situations, it follows that this applies to art as well. In any case, Dufrenne thinks that if one looked at a priori knowledge one is dissuaded from attempting to sort out a definitive table.

He also holds that subjectivity and historicity get in the way of giving a list of the a priori affective categories. He puts relativity under the heading of subjectivity, and attacks it. (Relativity in the sense of historical relativity, i.e., the view that since different cultures adopt different things as works of art, and abandon things previously held to be art, something's being art must be dependent on, or relative to, its historical/cultural, etc., location.) According to Dufrenne, relativity is a warped viewpoint deriving from the limits of the audience's social, cultural and personal horizons, from which he should break away. It restricts understanding, and precludes objectivity, because either consciously or unconsciously, the audience ignores some aspects of the art. Historicity, or the placing of art in an historical context in order to understand it, is prohibited by Dufrenne, since it places limits on the art, and surrounds it with a certain period. (Cf. Vol. II, Chap. II. pp. 600-7, esp. Phénoménologie.)
This part of Section II will be commented on in the three divisions into which it has fallen. (I.) There are only two points I have to make about the cosmological and existential in the a priori. For one thing, there is no obvious reason to assign the a priori to a concrete subject — for the a priori is not necessarily diverse simply because those things in which it inheres are diverse. In any case, Dufrenne could explain the a priori in terms of generality as he does in The notion of the a priori, and subsequently in the Phénoménologie. Otherwise he would seem to be removing the quasi-subject nature from the work of art, if he assigns its essence to its author. Moreover, he has given an explanation of the existential nature of the a priori, to his own satisfaction, in both The notion of the a priori, and the Phénoménologie (Vol.II. Part II. Chap.I. sect.I.), and to remove the existential from the work is to abandon much of what he has said of the a priori.

I think it should be assumed that Dufrenne is overstating his case in saying he assigns the a priori to the artist, or else that he means that the a priori nature of the work is derived in some unspecified way from the artist (and possibly even from the audience). I.e., the affective quality of the 'horrific' in Bosch only exists because the artist made the work 'horrific', and/or the audience sees it as horrific.

In the second place, the cosmological/existential notion of the work of art does not appear to further the view that a work of art is a priori affective. It may be true that Moliere creates a 'comic' world, but this means only that his work is affective. I think that if anything were needed, Dufrenne's discussion of the cosmological/existential, and general/singular, are ideal examples of aspects of the affective categories which seem to have very little to do with being a priori. The former certainly does not seem to forward the idea of art as a priori, and prima facie, neither does the latter.
However (II), there does seem to be a problem about the general- 
ity of the affective categories - or so Dufrenne imagines. His solu-
tion is perfectly acceptable apart from the invocation of humanity,
but I think that when the problem is spelled out, it disappears.

(a) With regard to art alone, the whole work is certainly unique,
and in this sense is not subsumable under any genre. However, Duf-
renne is talking of affective qualities within each work, and surely
the 'tragic' in each or any individual work can have the same rela-
tionship to the 'tragic' as a general category? I.e., the 'tragic'
in Beethoven and that in Mahler have the status of individual insti-
tances of the 'tragic', subsumable under the species or category
'tragic'. Indeed, it is precisely because the affective category is
general, that it allows of such diverse examples. And since works of
art are so completely different (not only, for example, literature
from music, class from class, but instances within a class), it is
necessary to use general terms to define them - otherwise one could
never make comparisons or categorise works together.

(b) If one takes Kantian theories, these also are general, for
example, 'shape' in a square is completely different from that in
a rhomboid (even though the generality may derive from emptiness of
content). Thus, a difference in content or description of instances
of a category, does not in any way prevent there being categories,
certainly not aesthetic ones, with possibly a formal definition.

To take up Dufrenne's reference to humanity as analogous to any
affective quality (cf. p. 588 op. cit.), he has said that there is
something within each individual which is humanity. This is where
the problem occurs for Dufrenne, because if he holds humanity to be
analogous to an affective quality, then the question arises of what
it is within each e.g., 'tragic' work, which is the same in all. It
seems that he might solve the problem by adopting a position some-
thing akin to that of Abelard on universals - that an affective
category is a concept which nevertheless has or is an essence. The
difference would be that this essence was not a single factor common
to all those things sharing in the affective category. The essence
of the 'tragic' could therefore differ between works of art — the
important thing being that the essence of the work was the 'tragic'.
Thus, a general category can serve as an essence or a priori feat­
ure albeit that its description differs between works.

It would have been simpler had Dufrenne not invoked humanity.It
is clearer to explain the relation of general a prioris to indivi­
dual works of art in terms of the affective qualities rather than
other universals such as humanity.

(III) What is said of 'value' sounds confusing. However, it is
understandable why Dufrenne regards the 'beautiful' as the only
value, since (a), the 'beautiful' is sometimes equated with 'work of
art', (cf. Kant, Critique of Judgment); (b) it could therefore be
called the essence of a work, which is defined by Dufrenne as value;
and, (c) to say something is beautiful is in any case to make a
value judgment, as a rule (whilst some other aesthetic terms/
affective qualities, are non-evaluative).

The attack he makes on relativistic judgments is itself perf­
ectly sound, but provides no real reason for not being able to
specify the affective categories.

Moments.

2. It could be used purely descriptively — if for example one were
being taught to differentiate qualities of certain periods one
might be told that Neo-Classicist painting was beautiful rather
than realistic. However, it is normally an evaluative term.

3. At least, no further than assigning the status of art to some­
thing.
Finally, Dufrenne’s conclusion that there is a pure aesthetic, which can never be actualised fully would not be so problematic if it were not for the fact that he refers to it as a pure aesthetic, i.e., if it were just stated that there is an indefinite number of affective categories which—possibly because they are added to all the time by new forms of art—can never be fully enumerated (just contingently, not as a logical necessity). However, it is contentious to state boldly that there is a pure aesthetic that can never be actualised. This will be explained further in the following and final part of the section.

(iii) Our knowledge of the affective a priori.

Dufrenne outlines this in terms of (a) feeling1, and (b) intuition. Feeling, according to him is only a disinterested way of getting to know an affective quality as the structure of an object. This statement, which comes at the beginning of the section on the a priori affective qualities, sounds strange—since feeling is obviously not something disinterested. However, what Dufrenne seems actually to be saying is that (i) the feeling of an affective quality is distinct from that quality in any work (ii) some work may possess a certain affective quality, but our recognition of the quality does not entail our feeling it.

What he says is more confused because he uses the example of desirability in a woman—and does not make it clear whether he takes ‘desirable’ in the sense of ‘the sort of thing which could be the object of desire’, or, ‘actually desired by someone’. (cf. Vol.II. Part II. Chap.I. pp.543-4.)

Dufrenne later turns to our immediate, or intuitive knowledge of the affective categories (Vol.II. Part II. chap II. pp.571584 esp.). Pure intuition (in the sense of being the possibility of intuition) is ungraspable. He compares the act of understanding—which is the

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1. The French term used by Dufrenne is 'sentiment'.

foundation of all judgment - with the affective a prioris. We have a knowledge of them even before feeling reveals them to us. This is a knowledge of the affective categories - which, as I said (cf. note 1, page 1 of section I, present chapter) - are to the affective qualities as class to instance. As an example, he states that if one can feel the 'tragie' in a work of Racine, or the 'serenity' in a work by Bach, we have some idea of 'tragedy' or 'serenity' anterior to all feeling, i.e., of what one must call (according to Dufrenne) the affective categories:

"Si nous pouvons sentir le tragique de Racine ou le pathétique de Beethoven ou la sérénité de Bach, c'est que nous avons quelque idée, antérieure à tout sentiment, du tragique, du pathétique ou du sérain, c'est-à-dire de ce qu'il nous faut appeler désormais les catégories affectives . . . . . . . . . ." (Vol.II.Part II. Chap.II.pp.571-2.)

He specifies a difference in the affective categories and then adds three points to substantiate the rather bold claim just made. Firstly, the categories in aesthetics cannot give a pure aesthetic as rigorous as, for instance, physics. Secondly, however, though it may be difficult to discover what is a priori in aesthetics, this empirical problem does not preclude the a priori, just as one's ignorance of geometry, does not preclude its having a priori qualities. Thirdly, our knowledge of necessity in any field may be implicit, but it is none the less present. Fourthly (and here he acknowledges that he is going beyond Kant), one may never have complete knowledge of any a priori science. The implication of the last point is that if this is the case, then a lack of complete knowledge of the affective categories of aesthetics is no evidence against their existence.
The conclusion Dufrenne makes from this is that we are authorized to think that there is pure aesthetic to which we implicitly refer, but which can never be definitively actualised. According to him, our knowledge of the affective qualities is a recognition or recollection. Just as one only knows that an object is spatio-temporal if space and time are given a priori, one can only know an expression if one's knowledge is a priori:

"Et en effet, la connaissance de la qualité affective que livre le sentiment est toujours une reconnaissance. Devant ce monde ..., il me semble que je sais déjà ce que je lis dans l'expression; si le signe est immédiatement significant, c'est que la signification est connue avant d'avoir été apprise en sorte que tout apprentissage ne fait que confirmer un savoir préalable. Le fait même que nous puissions expliciter le sentiment, ..., atteste la présence de ce savoir."

and:

"Car comment puis-je exprimer la qualité affective sans recourir à une catégorie affective, et si cette catégorie affective ne m'est pas déjà connue de quelque façon ..., comment percevrais-je des objets spatio-temporals, dit Kant ... si l'espace et le temps n'étaient données a priori?"

(Vol.II ibid pp.377-8)

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1. He uses the word 'quality' here, presumably because he is referring to our aesthetic experience of the specific work.
The other relevant assertions Dufrenne makes (pp. 579–584, ibid.), are:
firstly that knowledge of the effective category does not add anything
to it, and being general cannot specify the unique quality of any part-
icular expression. It gives the fundamental note of the feeling.
Secondly, the categories each express a certain meaning which one can
give to the world, for example, 'tragic' quality. The feelings express-
ning the effective categories are a priori existentials in the
sense that they are known a priori and designate fundamental human
attitudes.

There are several minor points to be made initially before taking
Dufrenne's argument that one has foreknowledge, or immediate knowledge,
of the categories.

Firstly, I think that he is importantly correct in making the distinc-
tion between feeling as it exists in us, and as it exists (as an
affective quality), in a work of art. It is essential to be clear
that Dufrenne is not making the simplistic (though true) point, that
an audience is affected by works of art. It is not a matter of emo-
tional reaction on the part of the audience, but of a certain type of
quality which Dufrenne wishes to attribute to these works - namely
an affective quality. Of course, since it is an affective quality,
it is entailed that there is an effect on the audience, but Dufrenne
is not concerned to explain this here. His theory bears a marked
resemblance to one of three possible expressionist theories, i.e.,
that the work of art expresses some quality (rather than (a) the
artist expresses himself through the work, cf. Wordsworth or Tolstoy 2,
or (b) the audience has some emotional reaction to a work, where the
work is the efficient cause of this cf., also empathy theories, where
the quality is anthropomorphically attributed to the work, by
1a. This has been dealt with in the previous section on the general
and singular in the affective categories.

transference from the human emotion felt). This will be developed further in chapter five.

Secondly, it is a dubious interpretation of Kant to say that we have knowledge of the a prioris prior to experience. I should prefer to say that Kant regards them as conditions of conceptualisation. Nor do I think Dufrenne would normally read Kant in this way, especially since he says (p. 168 op. cit.),

"sans doute ces a priori n'ont pas sur l'expérience une antériorité chronologique, mais ils en sont la condition ..."

Thirdly, there are three points in the quotation cited, which are suspect.

(a) The presupposition that given a work, one can define the feeling or affective quality in it (cf., "le fait même que nous puissions expliciter le sentiment . . . ."), and that this confirms one's foreknowledge of the affective quality. It is not the case that one can do this, and Dufrenne provides no evidence to suppose that one can.

(b) He makes the incorrect presupposition that unless one already knows the answer to one's question, one will not recognise the answer when one finds it. (Cf. "Comment puis-je exprimer la qualité affective . . . . si (la) catégorie ne m'est pas déjà connue . . . . .")

(c) It is not legitimate to use space and time as analogous to affective a prioris, since these are Kant's two internal forms of intuition - conditions of any conceptualisation and pre-given, according to Kant, rather than the ordinary Kantian categories.

Fourthly, Dufrenne is taking his usual essentialist line in saying that the affective category provides the fundamental note of the feeling in a work. This is not in itself objectionable, merely uninformative - since it does not help one to discover whether Dufrenne thinks there is some essence of, e.g., the 'tragic', which is the same in all tragic works, or whether it may differ between works. (Cf. present chapter, section VI (1) comment (ii).)
Fifthly, the explanation of the a priori as existential - because it designates fundamental human attitudes - is not the same as that given in The notion of the a priori, where it is regarded as existential because it is experienced (supposedly). The present explanation is less controversial. It gives 'existential' the sense of 'referring to existents' - namely human attitudes, and there is a very wide gap between something referring to an existent and its being one. This makes far more sense, since 'a priori' is by definition prior to experience, and if one takes 'existential' in the sense of 'being experienced', one ends up with the existential a priori as a contradiction in terms (the experienced prior to experience). (Cf. present chapter, section I, comment I.)

There are two fundamental problems with what Dufranne says, however. These return us to the problem of immediate recognition of the a priori, discussed in the first section of this chapter (comment 2). A. It is simply dogma to say that one has an idea of any affective quality or feeling, prior to feeling it. This view is derived partly from the presupposition I have just criticised, that a thing (here a feeling) could not be identified if one was unaware what it would be like before feeling it. On the whole it is the idea of immediate recognition or recollection, using this incorrect idea to support it.

One way to solve the problem of recognising a quality in a work of art is to say that one does have an idea of the concept, but in the sense that one knows its non-aesthetic use by virtue of experience and instruction and language, and applies it then to aesthetics. There is of course no necessity to learn the non-aesthetic usage first - one could just as well learn the meaning of 'serenity' from
certain music, and then apply it to persons secondarily. Either way, however; experience, instruction, repetition, etc., provide the means of learning the meaning of the affective categories, and there is no need to claim the knowledge as innate or anterior to experience.

The trouble with this explanation, from Dufrenne's point of view, is that it weakens the case for calling affective qualities, a priori categories, since they now become ordinarily learnt terms and no longer conditions of understanding works of art. However, I see no reason to accept Dufrenne's case, since (a) there is no reason to suppose one has foreknowledge or immediate recognition of the categories (b), his claims backing this have been seen to be invalid (cf. comment above (third) (a), (b) and (c)); and (c), one can give a perfectly good explanation for understanding what he calls the affective qualities, in terms of learning - as I have outlined above.

B. The argument seems to rest on a presupposition that one can never reach or specify a pure aesthetic, and then saying there is nevertheless an implicit, pure aesthetic - which is one way of avoiding the question of why it is never actualised. But this does not explain why one should accept the existence of a pure aesthetic, or aesthetic categories as a priori. Dufrenne has made no firm attempt to give a complete specification of the aesthetic categories. What he has done is to give various reasons why it cannot be done - from the nature of aesthetic categories (cf. Chapter 3, section II. (II) final part) which only inclines one to suppose that there really is no pure aesthetic. If Dufrenne were to make an attempt at a positive specification, it would boost the claim for the pure aesthetic, since as well as presenting one with the fait accompli, he could go on to argue that any one or set of the affective categories was a necessary condition for X being a work of art.

1. On reflection, I see no reason why being learnt should be incompatible with being a condition of understanding art, but it is incompatible with being an a priori category - by definition if one means "acquired" by "learnt".
certain music, and then apply it to persons secondarily. Either way, however; experience, instruction, repetition, etc., provide the means of learning the meaning of the affective categories, and there is no need to claim the knowledge as innate or anterior to experience.

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One can see why Dufrenne requires this theory of immediately and intuitively recognising an expression or affective quality in a work. If it were valid he could dispense with all the analysis and art theory etc., which is normally considered necessary to one's understanding of a work of art. Then the aesthetic experience could be the purely contemplative, non-analytic, no-theory laden experience which Dufrenne sometimes supposes it to be, as will be seen in the fourth chapter. One could contemplate a work of art and understand it immediately. Unfortunately, one cannot just accept what he says without further argumentation.

Appendix.
The Affective Categories and Expression.
Dufrenne often refers to expressiveness in association with the affective categories. Basically his view is that the affective categories are expressive. Not every a priori is expressive, the more formal it is, the less expressive. But the material a prioris (and the affective categories fall into this class) are. He says that the a priori "is to be found above all in what is expressed". (Cf. Notion of the a priori. Part I. Chap. V. p.111,.) This is supposedly derived from the assertion that the object expresses the a priori meaning. And from the idea that the object expresses itself, he goes on to the conclusion that "what expresses itself is worthy of being termed a self; it expresses itself because it is a self . . . ." (p.112 ibid.) Whether the work is a quasi-subject, self, or not, is not at question here.

The importance of this is that it places expression in the work of art. In an aesthetic context the object is the work of art, which is expressive, and the affective quality is the thing which makes the work expressive, i.e., it is the expression itself (Phénoménologie p.549, that the affective quality is a priori when, expressed by a work, it is constitutive of the work of the aesthetic object.
However, in the Phénoménologie he broadens the idea to extend to both artist and spectator - the a priori affectives are the conditions under which a world may be felt, either by the artist expressing himself by his own world, or the spectator who associates himself with the artist by reading the expression (cf. Vol. II. Part IV. Intro. p. 539).

This implies a different idea of expression in a work of art - i.e., that the artist expresses himself, not the work which is expressive. This is similar either to the view of Tolstoy1 where the artist communicates feelings via the work, making art the means to this communicative end, or that of Wordsworth, whereby the artist simply expresses himself in his work ('emotion recollected in tranquillity'). The intention here is not necessarily to communicate, simply to be self-expressive.

Nevertheless, since Dufrenne immediately returns to referring to the work of art as the expressive object (p. 540 ibid.) I think it is safe to assume that he regards the work as expressive, and that when he refers to the artist expressing himself he is equating the artist with his work. This is totally different from either Tolstoy or Wordsworth, for whom the work is always distinct from the artist, and provides the medium for the artist's self-expression.

This leaves the claim that the work of art is self-expressive (and thus a quasi-subject), intact. It is a presupposition throughout the theory of affective categories that they are expressive, and that it is a function of a work of art to express. I shall deal with the question of whether art is necessarily expressive, in Chapter five.

All that remains to be asked here is whether every affective category is expressive. Since Dufrenne denies the possibility of providing a complete set of affective categories one can either deal with these rather sweepingly by stipulating that if it is not expressive it is, by definition, not an affective category, or by taking any of the

effective categories which he does accept (those of Souriau, cf. Vol.II. P.575 ibid), and querying whether it is expressive; or by analysing the meaning of 'affective category'. The first possibility rules out the problem by definition. The second leaves the view intact, since any of Souriau's values or aesthetic categories can be expressive, e.g., 'heroism', 'sublimity', 'spirituality', etc. The third settles the issue fairly effectively. Whatever is effective must express something otherwise it could not 'affect'. (To be linguistically exact, the affective quality in a work is the quality which expresses, e.g., the 'gracious', and it is the work itself which is expressive, because it expresses grace/graciousness. This is grammatical pedantry, however.)

Thus it is safe to accept that the affective categories are equivalent to expressive categories.

Conclusion.

Even if it were the case that Dufrenne had successfully established the affective categories as a priori, there would still remain questions to be answered. Fortunately at least the second of these can be countered.

Firstly, if there are objectively in any work of art, certain affective a priori qualities which are intuitable, immediately known, and recognisable, then why are there disagreements as to the qualities any work possesses? Presumably because X intuits correctly, and Y does not. But intuitionist theories are unverifiable, so that one cannot decide on their grounds, who is correct. Here I think the arguments of this chapter, section 1, comment six, effectively show what problems are raised when one leaves so much to the intuition.

Secondly, different eras change in their assessment of styles of art. Thus, a certain work may be regarded as 'art' (and possessing, e.g., the affective quality of the 'heroic') at t¹, and not art at t².
Is it the case that the work loses its a priori affective category when it ceases to be regarded as art? Dufrinne could try to answer this relativist viewpoint, by saying the question of losing and regaining a priori categories does not arise for him, since he does not agree with this relativism. Unfortunately, he does believe in at least this form of relativism — that a work can be art at $t_1$ and not at $t_2$; because it requires the perception of someone of it as art, before it becomes art properly.¹

As a matter of fact, this particular instance is not really a problem for Dufrinne. If X is a priori at $t_1$ but ceases to be X at $t_2$, then it may also cease to be X. But to be a priori does not entail that X cannot cease to be a priori, as long as X ceases to be X. I.e., a table is an a priori spatial body, but if it is burnt and thus ceases to be a table, then what was a priori true of it ceases to have any significance. Prima facie the occasion on which a problem would arise would be that on which X remained X but ceased to be a priori. I.e., if a work of art remains one, but instead of being regarded as 'tragic', is regarded as possessing some affective quality incompatible with being 'tragic' — e.g., being 'comic'.²

It is of course open to someone to reply that although there is only one 'work' as such, e.g., Hamlet, the different interpretations resulting in contrary evaluations entail that there are two works of art. The problem with this is knowing where to draw the line regarding the number of works of art one play, for instance, can provide. 

And it is not usual to assert that there is anything like a one-one.¹ This is one of his more unstable positions since he also believes that a work awaits our perception or recognition of it as art, and therefore that it is in some way art prior to our perception of it as such. (And not just a 'potential work of art', either.)

² In order to be problematic the affective categories must be incompatible otherwise Dufrinne can, and will, reply that the work remains 'tragic', but it is also, e.g., 'heroic', and the wide-ranging set of affective categories predicaceous of the work only serve to demonstrate its scope.
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correlation between interpretations and works of art. Nor is it a step which Dufrenne ever takes — he regards it as true that there is one work open to a number of interpretations.

This brings us back to the problem of incompatible a priori affective qualities. And since it is self-contradictory to say that something is \( p \rightarrow \neg p \), the only solution seems to be to say that though the a priori affective qualities of a work may be added to, or seen differently, within a certain range in degree, they cannot be different in kind — as are the 'tragic' and the 'comic'.

There is of course no logical impossibility in a work being regarded as 'comic' at \( t^1 \), and 'tragic' at \( t^2 \) — but the latter point would entail one's concept of the 'tragic' and the 'comic' changing, if the same qualities are to constitute both, in one work. If one does not stipulate that the same qualities, viewed in the same way, are held to constitute the work as a priori both 'tragic' and 'comic', Dufrenne can get around the problem. That is, he can say one is taking different aspects of the work into account in calling it 'tragic' and 'comic', and it is perfectly compatible for aspects \( a \rightarrow b \) to be 'tragic' and \( a \rightarrow b \) to be 'comic'. The work is thus both 'tragic' and 'comic' without contradiction.

With regard to the a priori as Dufrenne conceives it, it may not be essential for Dufrenne's theory of affective a prioris that one makes as radical a change in the concept as he proposes in The notion of the a priori. To accept the idea of affective categories as a priori one needs firstly to accept the material a priori (since the affective categories come into this class), and secondly that there are at least some a prioris that one experiences, namely those which come under the heading of affective categories. But this latter does not go towards proving that these categories are a priori (in Dufrenne or anyone else's sense of the term) i.e., immediately comprehended and intuited. And if one weakens the notion to the extent of saying that there is an existential a priori which may not be universally
recognised (in the case of the material a priori), which one may fail to discover - then even allowing for its being knowable via the understanding alone (which one should not, because this has not been proved) it loses much of its force. And it does so without gaining anything, as it remains to be proved that the aesthetic categories are a priori (as I have just noted).

The whole of this chapter shows that in his attempt to show that art is a priori, Dufrenne is invariably struggling, and usually treading a rather dubious path. He wants to alter Kant's notion in order to be able to start showing that art can be a priori, but I think Section I shows that this is not a simple procedure. In his inclination to make the a priori a workable aesthetic concept, he overloads it to a great extent. He also lets so many possibilities enter that the notion may easily become so vague as to be meaningless for all practical purposes.

The first section of this chapter has illustrated both Dufrenne's concept of the a priori, and various drawbacks which this has, and which may apply to the concept of the a priori affective categories. The fundamental problem in the notion of affective categories is that Dufrenne has not proved them to be a priori (and thus necessary conditions of X being art) of. Section I. Comment ii and Section II (i), of this chapter. Nor has he satisfactorily explained our knowledge of them - cf. Section II (ii); and rather than attempting to outline the pure aesthetic which he claims to exist, he has given reasons for the impossibility of doing so, which rather casts doubt on its existence - cf. Section II (ii), final part. I.e., such a weak case for a pure aesthetic tends to undermine rather than uphold it.

His opinion is also undermined by the fact that discussions of the affective categories and the cosmological/existential or general/singular, seem to have very little bearing on the question of whether art is or is not a priori. Dufrenne gives us examples of qualities predicable of various works of art (some of which seem classificatory -
e. g., the 'tragic' — but are not intended to be seen as denoting art types). But these terms are prevalent in any practical aesthetic work, and the proof that he wants and which is lacking, is that these qualities, and works of art as a whole, can conclusively be regarded as a priori.

The present chapter does show that there is no logical barrier to the theory, i.e., the idea of the a priori affective categories is not contradictory. However, this is patently insufficient and negative. What is required is some firm reason for accepting them. The only positive conclusions that seem to have been reached are (i) that the affective categories are not subjective, and (ii) that the categories can be general, i.e., that although aesthetic concepts such as 'joy' have completely different instantiations, there is no barrier to classifying them under the same aesthetic a priori category. Unfortunately, it is only too obvious that this is a rather lame conclusion.

I think this whole chapter makes it fairly plain that it is virtually impossible to accord art a priori status. It is a result of Dufrenne's mistaken belief that art is a priori that he finds he is compelled to invoke Kant to demonstrate his point. Yet he has to reject much of the Kantian view in order to apply the a priori to art. And when one analyses this, one realises the magnitude of the task he is setting himself — namely making Kant a phenomenologist in order to clothe art in something it will not wear — the a priori.

Thus, this chapter is inevitably the most negative. Nevertheless I have attempted to discuss any points of interest which have arisen, and in the following chapters — four and five — I shall discuss aspects of aesthetic theory where I can agree more with what Dufrenne has to say.
CHAPTER FOUR.  THE AESTHETIC ATTITUDE.

Introduction.
Sufficient attention has now been given to the a priori per se. I think it is now time to take three major topics of Dufrenne's work - (i) the aesthetic attitude (ii), expression and (iii) meaning - and see how they work out in his system, for it is in these fields that much of his positive and valuable work lies, and where Dufrenne can be said to have made a contribution to aesthetics in his discussion of the objective features both of the work and our attitude toward it. But, before beginning, I should point out that I am not drawing a line between what has been discussed in the previous chapters, and what is about to be discussed, and accounting the former negative, and the latter positive. It should have been fairly clear in the last three chapters that much of what Dufrenne said on the quasi-pour-soi, the status of art, and the a priori was positive; and that, especially with regard to the first chapter, he correctly cited various objective features of the work. In part, the two following chapters are elaborations on the quasi-pour-soi notion (especially the fifth). In part, they are self-contained discussions - and they should be regarded as such until it comes to tying up the loose ends on the quasi-pour-soi at the end of chapter five. At present I shall deal with the aesthetic attitude.

As Morris Weitz points out discussions about the aesthetic attitude often fail to distinguish between the descriptive and the normative. I shall attempt to avoid this, or point it out as it occurs, in order to prevent confusion. Weitz presents one of the most comprehensive coverages of the aesthetic attitude, and concludes that the contemplative is the correct one (though contemplation is a loose

word and requires stricter definition than it normally receives). This is also the conclusion of Hosapers 1. and Bullough 2, and that of Dufrenne, although he reaches his conclusion independently of any other views.

The idea of an aesthetic attitude is ill-defined, and it is often used without the user considering what he means. The camps can be roughly divided into two - those who regard it as contemplative in some way, and those who do not. Bullough is one of the few who gives a specific attitude to be adopted to art, whereas most other views see the question as one of experiencing something - partaking of the emotions of the work, wish-fulfilment, etc.

In an unpublished paper entitled "The critic and the lover of art", k. K. Elliot discusses the aesthetic attitude in terms of aesthetic evaluation. But the evaluative attitude concerns itself with what criteria one uses in deciding whether or not something is art, and makes a final judgment, whereas the aesthetic attitude is more concerned with the way in which one does (descriptive), or should (normative), look at the work and its aesthetic properties. It involves evaluation but not, I think, the final judgment (see Section III (i) re. understanding a work). Thus, there is a fair possibility of confusion over the content of the concept, 'aesthetic attitude'. Nor should one be misled by Elliot's request for freedom of evaluation (as opposed to the acceptance of some aesthetic norm, as, for example, Significant Form 3), into thinking that there can be no single aesthetic attitude. Nor does the acceptance of this latter preclude its having different instantiations - e.g., that it is

1. See, John Hosapers; Meaning and truth in the arts, Chapel Hill, 1946.
3. See, Clive Bell, op. cit.
contemplative, but varying in degree according to the type of work in question. I do not know whether Elliot would accept this, but it seems plausible enough. Indeed Bullough actually deals with this, going over what he considers to be the normal degree of distance provided by any art class.¹

I think it fairly clear, or will become so, that it is not necessary for Dufrenne's theory that art is a priori to be correct, in order for it to be possible for him to be correct about the aesthetic attitude. Obviously the aesthetic attitude is in some relation to its object and the nature of that object. However, just as one may have an aesthetic attitude to something purely aural and something purely visual, alike, one may take the same attitude to something a priori or not a priori. And whether or not the affective categories are a priori or not, one may assume an aesthetic attitude to them – simply as expressive qualities in the work, e.g., sublimity, sadness, etc. It is fortunate that this is so since it allows one to take a totally unprejudiced view of Dufrenne's theory. If it were not the case, one would have always to bear in mind that Dufrenne has not given any satisfactory evidence for art as a priori.

Nevertheless, the fact that this topic is not dependent on the basic thesis does not mean that it is not necessary to discuss it. For it is (a): currently much argued (b); one of the concepts which Dufrenne uses and discusses most. He spends a great deal of time attempting to work out what he considers to be its nature, and is in fact rather confused in his opinion; and (c), as his work sets out to deal with the aesthetic experience, i.e., the subject's viewpoint of the work, it is obviously essential to discuss the kind of attitude the subject takes to the aesthetic object. Also, although he is rather confused, one can eventually deduce a definite opinion.

¹. See Section V. of this chapter, on Bullough.
Unfortunately, as I mentioned in the introduction, in connection with the whole work, this theory is not wholly original. One can discover it in the combination of theories of certain other aestheticians. But I do not think this detracts seriously from the value of Dufrenne's work, especially since no one person has previously presented the same theory.

I shall take Dufrenne's theory before examining any others and drawing a conclusion. I should make it plain at the outset that I believe that there is such a thing as the aesthetic attitude, which is different from the ordinary attitude to entities in the world—despite its being elusive and ill-defined. I hope that the following chapter will help to make plain the nature and existence of this concept.

N.B. Descriptive theories have the disadvantage of being unable to claim correctness or exclusiveness, unless one holds that the meaning of 'aesthetic attitude' is, 'that attitude which anyone perceiving a work of art takes to it, and is right in taking to it'. They allow also of other theories, since not everyone automatically takes the same attitude.

Section I:
The nature of the aesthetic object and aesthetic attitude.

According to Dufrenne (Vol.II, Part III, chap.IV. sect.3. pp.504-5), the aesthetic object is profound, though not in the sense of being distant (lointain) in time, or of being hidden in some way. The work may be antique, but this in itself is no reason for regarding it as profound, i.e., evaluating it highly and assuming an attitude of reverence to it. The historicity of the object is important only for purposes of strictly critical reflection—not for the aesthetic experience.

1. The latter is held to follow from the former—i.e., since the distant (A), is only one stage from the hidden (B), then if the profound aesthetic object is not A, it is not B either.
Unfortunately, as I mentioned in the introduction, in connection with the whole work, this theory is not wholly original. One can discover it in the combination of theories of certain other aestheticians. But I do not think this detracts seriously from the value of Dufrenne's work, especially since no one person has previously presented the same theory.

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Section I:

The nature of the aesthetic object and aesthetic attitude.

According to Dufrenne (Vol.II, Part III, chap.IV. sect.3. pp.504-5), the aesthetic object is profound, though not in the sense of being distant (lointain) in time, or of being hidden in some way. The work may be antique, but this in itself is no reason for regarding it as profound, i.e., evaluating it highly and assuming an attitude of reverence to it. The historicity of the object is important only for purposes of strictly critical reflection - not for the aesthetic experience.

1. The latter is held to follow from the former - i.e., since the distant (A), is only one stage from the hidden (B), then if the profound aesthetic object is not A, it is not B either.
This gives an indication of Dufrenne's initial position, which is to separate critical reflection and the aesthetic attitude as far as possible. The aesthetic attitude is contemplative. This is consistent with what he has already said, as will be seen shortly. Here, critical analysis and in particular historical analysis, are seen as non-aesthetic.

He goes on to invoke disinterestedness in the audience (though not in specifically Kantian senses of disinterest). This enters in the first stage of authentic art, which is the will to surprise (op. cit, p.507). The will to surprise is indispensable in purging perception and gaining a disinterested attitude in us. The aesthetic element in the surprise is that it provokes reflection in order to dismiss it. I.e., it does not arouse the problem-solving reflection which explains the question away as part of the ordinary world. Art is not the sort of problem which can be dealt with in this way. Nor is aesthetic surprise effaced so long as we retain the aesthetic attitude.

The dichotomy between critical reflection and the (supposed) true aesthetic attitude is further illustrated as Dufrenne goes deeper into the idea of the strangeness or 'difficulty' of the aesthetic object. This element adds to the profundity of the work. But identification and rational comprehension of the subject are not the true end of aesthetic experience. We should not assume the kind of analytic attitude of demanding literal meanings, or objective significance, but one whose end is understanding via feeling, in a way we should succumb to a kind of enchantment by the work. This does not entail an undistanced attitude (though Dufrenne does not make that clear here). Finally, he says that in essence we confront all art in the way we confront music - music arouses feeling without...
provoking reflection. In some way, which will be explained later, Dufrenne claims that feeling can 'know' the object expressed.

This is a very brief introduction to what Dufrenne has to say about the aesthetic attitude, and can be misleading because of the emphasis on a dissociation between critical reflection and the aesthetic attitude. It requires a certain amount of elucidation before going on to a fuller explanation of his theory.

Firstly, it is typical of Dufrenne to say that to understand art is not to explain it, but to feel, but this requires expansion. For one thing, we do ask the question "what exactly does X mean?" whereas Dufrenne says we do not, with the qualification, "while we are in the poetical state". In order to justify this, one has to say that being in the poetical state = adopting an aesthetic attitude of simply listening to, e.g., the poem, and that as a matter of fact it is only after we have ceased to adopt this attitude that we become critical and analyse the meaning.

However, I do not think Dufrenne can escape criticism on this count. What he is doing in saying we understand the most difficult literary work by acceding to feeling, and do not ask what exactly it means, is stating his own view without any argument for it. The best explanation seems to be that just given, that during the work our attitude may be one of semi-absorption in the work such that our comprehension is not conceptualised. This is not to say that it is not conceptualisable, or that we can legitimately claim to have understood a work, unless we can give some rational interpretation of it.

1. The final part of section III.

2. I am indebted to Cyril Barrett for pointing out that criticism, interpretation and evaluation need not occur concurrently with our perception of the work of art.

3. G.E. Wittgenstein, Philosophical investigations, pp. 151-2. 179, saying that one has understood is not evidence that one has. The evidence is in some objective proof.
Nor do I believe, or think Dufranne eventually believes, that we have an unconceptualised comprehension of an aesthetic object when we adopt the aesthetic attitude. This will be developed in Section III of this chapter. I think that the fault lies mainly in that Dufranne is involving criticism, interpretation, and evaluation in the concept of critical reflection, and while the latter two may very well be omitted from the aesthetic attitude, the former becomes an important part of his theory of the aesthetic attitude.

Also, understanding via feeling requires explanation. I would suggest that what Dufranne means here is that understanding the work of art is not a matter of rational comprehension but one of psychological attuning to its expressive power, i.e., of feeling; and thus one has a kind of intuitive knowledge that one understands, on the occasion of experiencing this type of feeling. Experiencing the feeling would therefore be sufficient evidence of having understood. As noted, these ideas will be developed later.

A minor point to note is Dufranne’s idea of the will to surprise. I think that this is really only a rather rather extravagant way of saying that he believes that there is always something new to be found in a work of art. Nor does this idea of surprise arise in anything else Dufranne says of the aesthetic attitude. The idea that music arouses feeling without provoking reflection is refuted by Dufranne himself, for example when he mentions questions we ask in relation to Franck’s symphony (see p. 491).

The general criticism is that what Dufranne says is very ambiguous. And although it may not seem so from what has been said, it will become apparent that Dufranne does not wish to advocate a totally non-analytic, unconceptualised aesthetic attitude.

The following sections subdivide aspects of Dufranne’s theory of the aesthetic attitude, but are highly interwoven. Dufranne himself provides no such subdivision.
Section II:

Aesthetic contemplation.

Dufrenne states throughout, wherever contemplation is in question, that the aesthetic attitude is contemplative. I shall mention six references which he makes to aesthetic contemplation, and it will be seen that he makes no attempt here to explain his own definition of contemplation. This will be decided in terms of analytic reflection as against aesthetic feeling, in the following section.

(1) In a preliminary to a comparison of the ordinary (usual), and the aesthetic object, Dufrenne states (Vol. I, Part I, chap. III, pp. 134-5) that the aesthetic cannot be completely identified with the ordinary man-made object, because it does not appeal to be used, but for a perception which contemplates it. This is all it demands. In relation to ordinary needs it appears superfluous, to add nothing; it simply exercises a certain attraction over me:

"Il n'en appelle pas au geste qui l'utilise, mais à la perception qui le contemple." (p. 134.)

When art was the preserve of the leisure classes, the idea was:

"Voir, entendre, lire, deviennent par lui des conduites d'esintéressées qui semblent vouées à la plus grand soin de la perception, sans qu'aucun résultat ne suive." (p. 135 ibid.)

Dufrenne retains this attitude to a large extent, without acceding to the idea of art as the domain of the leisure classes.

(2) Later, when Dufrenne is talking about 'presence' (Vol. II, Part III, chap. I, pp. 419-431) - that is to say, our presence in front of the work, he distinguishes between bodily and spiritual attitudes to a work of art. This is more or less parallel to distinguishing between emotional and cognitive-contemplative. He states that one of the dangers of art is for it to become the occasion for the 1. For the present 'perception' will be taken as equivalent in meaning to 'attitude'.
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arousal of some emotion. Music in particular can over-involve the emotions. But one should be capable of discernment and objectification, so that the spirit responds to the work rather than, or as well as, the body (emotions). Dufrenne thinks that the reason one may adopt the wrong attitude to an aesthetic object is because it is different from that which we adopt to ordinary objects. One sees the latter as useful or else unrelated to one's own activities, and probably categorises them as either one or the other. Aesthetic objects are different, and the appropriate attitude is one of contemplation. But this is not the natural attitude to adopt to anything, according to Dufrenne, and because of this, and the fact that we are more accustomed to working and utilising than to contemplating, we often fail to grasp the aesthetic experience. The aesthetic attitude is not indispensable - as various other attitudes in our everyday work may be. This explains why, even if works of art are made by man for man, they may appear confusing at first, and why one has to be educated to 'give oneself' to the aesthetic experience - it is not the result of an instinctive, or an everyday attitude.

One can see in what Dufrenne is saying, the often repeated criticism of man, that he refuses to take time to study objects for themselves alone, pausing only long enough to question an object's utility, and moving swiftly past the beauty which surrounds him.

(3) The only other unadorned statement of the aesthetic attitude as contemplative is given at the beginning of the chapter specifically devoted to the aesthetic attitude 2. (Vol.II. Part III. chap.V. p.527). Dufrenne asserts (rather peremptorily, since he considers that he has discussed the matter sufficiently), that the attitude to

1. See Section V. present chapter, on Bullough and under-distancing.

2. He is here concerned to discuss possible variations in attitude to the aesthetic object.
to the aesthetic object is contemplative, as opposed to the attitude to ordinary objects. As it happens, the proposition is assumed rather than asserted:

"L'opposition des attitudes devant l'objet esthétique et devant l'objet usuel, nous ne l'évoquerons pas: nos analyses ont assez opposé la contemplation à la praxie. (p.527 ibid.)

He also makes a few slightly more specific remarks about aspects of aesthetic contemplation.

(4) The first of these is with regard to modern art - by which he means principally abstract or non-representational painting (Vol.I. Part I. chap IV. p.469). This type of art is immediately seen as in the class of aesthetic objects, without having first to capture the attention by representation, and primarily because it demands pure contemplation, "... mais en sollicitant aussitôt une contemplation pure" (p.169 ibid.). It is a 'pure art' - not bound by religious or any other strictures:

"Au même moment que la perception découvre l'objet esthétique là où il n'avait pas encore été perçu, l'Art Moderne... s'applique à produire des ouvrages qui se proposant immédiatement comme objets esthétiques, ... en sollicitant aussitôt une contemplation pure." 1. (p.169 ibid.)

1. Pure contemplation is not explained. However, the fact that its object is non-representational, non-symbolic art, and 'pure', suggest that there is some other possible sort; some attitude to art, in which the aspects of the work are more fully articulated, i.e., some degree of conceptualisation is involved. The object of the attitude connotes that 'pure' is closely related to 'unconceptualised'. Stuhr's mind seems to be moving on lines analogous to, "given a pure red patch, there is little about it to conceptualise, therefore pure contemplation is possible." Since he makes no further claims about the pure and the less pure, I would hesitate to speculate that he means anything more than this.
(5) While discussing the time-structure of aesthetic perception (Vol. II, Part III, chap. II), he refers to the time taken in perceiving the aesthetic object as like a present of contemplation, "le present de la contemplation" (p. 457 ibid). The temporal aspect of aesthetic perception has already been discussed 1. It is sufficient to say that Dufrenne must mean either: a) that aesthetic perception is carried on in a continuous present since it is contemplative; and because contemplation, like meditation, is not directly related to an objective time-structure, so aesthetic perception is in the contemplative present, or more simply, b) that aesthetic perception is not objectively timed, and it is contemplative. I.e., he is either assuming (regarding a), or stating (regarding b), that the aesthetic attitude is contemplative. The former is the more probable.

(6) Finally, Dufrenne makes a reference to the aesthetic attitude, which is both obscure and illuminating (Vol. I, Part I, chap. V, p. 199). He is here discussing aesthetic perception in a way analogous to that in which Bullough 2 would refer to the work of art. He asserts that the world is the measure of reality, but that the world of aesthetic perception is neither physical nor imaginary. Aesthetic contemplation is neither involvement in a real 3 -situation, nor is it imagination or a dream:

"La contemplation esthétique n'est pas exactement la perception par laquelle le corps pense se lancer dans quelque aventure; mais elle n'est pas non plus imagination ou rêverie, et son objet exige d'être perçu." (p. 199 ibid.)

1. See previous chapter, Section III, on autonomy.
2. See, Bullough, op. cit.
3. In referring to reality, I do not mean to suggest that, e.g., the play itself is not real or part of our experience, but that within the context, the actors are pretending.
This is the only time that Dufrenne mentions the work-audience relation when discussing aesthetic contemplation simpliciter. (As I have said, above, he has asserted that the attitude to works of art is different from that to ordinary objects, but so far this has not been explained further than by saying it is contemplative.) The idea is further developed when he refers to the aesthetic attitude as distanced. This will be dealt with in Section IV. However, he is here claiming that the attitude to a work of art is different from that either to ordinary objects or events, or to something imaginary. This sounds obscure because it appears to be excluding both of two mutually exclusive possibilities - the real and the unreal. In fact, what he is saying is perfectly legitimate. A work of art is real in the sense that it exists as an entity in the world and an object of our sense-perception, but it is also non-real (using 'non-real' because 'unreal' implies that what is denoted does not exist), in that a painting of my dog is not my dog, and a play about former President Nixon does not include this man, and portrays events which are not happening to him in this spatio-temporal location. (That they may be happening somewhere else, or may have taken place is not relevant to the reality of those events in the play.) If Nixon is being threatened in the play, republicans do not rush to save him.

There are few comments to be made on this preliminary discussion of the aesthetic attitude. As a minor point, I think Dufrenne makes too much use of the idea of a demand. For instance, he says, "Ainsi l'objet esthétique est là, tout simplement, et n'attend de moi l'hommage d'une perception" (p.135). Though not exactly the same as the idea of the work as a demand qua 'exigence' prior to its creation, or of the performance as a move from demand qua 'exigence', to

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1. See Bullough op.cit. re Othello, and a further discussion in Section V of this chapter, with reference to Bullough and aesthetic distance.
accomplishment, it has the same connotation. This makes for confusion over the status of the work of art.

In the same section (Vol. I, Part I, chap IV, p. 133-5) Dufrenne's distinction of the ordinary and the aesthetic object is consistent with his dissociation of art and life, though not with current views maintaining that art is a key to greater knowledge and understanding of life, and widens our outlook and sensibility.

Altogether this section seems to be free from any particularly controversial points. To its credit, the second assertion on contemplation shows a good deal of psychological insight on Dufrenne's part. It is perfectly correct to say that the most obvious and probably the normal reaction to an object is to question its purpose or utility rather than to contemplate it. This is one good reason why art is not immediately 'available' or comprehensible to its audience. It may or may not be the case that certain works are beyond the comprehension of many (I should hesitate to claim that I understood fully any art work, no matter how simple it appeared), but it is certainly the case that they remain inaccessible until one adopts a non-normal, possibly contemplative, attitude to them. The fact that people often fail to understand a work of art is good evidence for the claim that there is a particular attitude which one needs to take to a work before one can understand it. I.e., the lack of comprehension of any sort indicates that the observer is looking at/listening to, the work, in the wrong way. (This is to be distinguished from a partial comprehension, where the observer may have adopted the simplest attitude and still failed to appreciate the work fully.)

1. See also Aristotle on Catharsis (Poetics, esp. vi.2 & Politics esp. v. (viii) 7.1342a 11), where Catharsis is understood as purification of our ideas, such that art can increase our sensibility. On this, see also Butcher: Aristotle's theory of poetry and fine art, Chap. VI, esp. pp. 252-6. "The Katharsis implies not only an emotional relief, but a refining or clarifying of emotion" (p.xxxiii). Dover, 1951. When Dufrenne dissociates art and life he does not mean he thinks art is not a part...
since adopting the "aesthetic attitude" does not entail a subsequent appreciation of the work.)

Having seen that Dufrenne regards the aesthetic attitude (or as he often terms it, perception) as contemplative, it remains to discover what exactly he means by aesthetic contemplation.

Section III.

Aesthetic reflection and feeling in the aesthetic attitude.

Dufrenne does not state that he is here working out a definition of aesthetic contemplation, but since he regards the aesthetic attitude as contemplative, and he is here analysing the nature of the aesthetic attitude, or aesthetic perception, one deduces that the result will be his definition of the contemplative, aesthetic attitude.

His opinion has been discerned from a number of fairly widespread references, and it is a dialectic between analytic reflection and feeling. Nor is it easy to draw one conclusion from what he says. One can take his discussion as the assertion of three different positions since what he says at the beginning is not the same as his final statements, but it seems fairer on Dufrenne to regard it as a gradual development and alteration of his view as he realises the implications of what he asserts.

The difference lies mainly in the degree of analytical reflection which Dufrenne is prepared to allow in aesthetic contemplation. At first, he draws a sharp distinction between analysis and feeling (sentiment) and precludes the former to a large degree; but as the Phénoménologie progresses, considerably more analysis is included. The exposition is divided into three stages, with a preliminary explanatory section.

1. (continued from previous page, 188) of life, but that he wishes to separate them to the extent of precluding art's giving a greater knowledge of life, etc. (cf. Chapter 2, sect. III, on autonomy.)

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(1) Aesthetic representation, perception and feeling.

Three terms require an initial definition - representation, perception and feeling. Dufrenne discusses the first two in chapter I of the second volume of the Phénoménologie. He regards representation as both a useful and dangerous notion - it implies for him a fair degree of conceptualisation and mental processing. He takes it in the sense of re-presenting. This implies that there is a screen between the perceiver and the object in question, a screen which clothes the object in notions of memory or the unconscious, etc., biasing our perception - as if it were theory-laden by the time it is 'presented' to the perceiver. (This is obviously anathema to any phenomenologist, since phenomenology aims to grasp things immediately, as they are, bracketing off all theory as far as possible.) The object is 're-presented', it does not come to us direct. This is dangerous, according to Dufrenne, for he thinks one perceives things directly. In perception, objects are present to us, not 're-presented' (cf. Vol. II, Part III, chap. I p. 423). At the basis of representation, he sees a separation and subsequent rejoining (presumably an uncalled for interruption in perception), and quotes Marcel in his support. (cf. Vol. II, Part III, chap. II, pp. 468-9.)

Perception veers towards the idea of experience, because it is based in direct experience - experience of presence (ibid). To perceive is not just passively to register meaningless appearances, it always has some meaning.

Feeling (sentiment) and perception are related terms, and are both directly connected with experience. Feeling is not a simple concept in Dufrenne's vocabulary, it is not just presence, i.e., not just direct experience, although it is generally immediate (immediate) (pp. 469-472). Nor is it to be regarded as pure.

I assume one would normally accept that perception is meaningful since it is always perception of something which can be given a meaning. Dufrenne would go further, to say that objects are meaningful in themselves, rather than requiring to be given meaning. Cf. Chapter 2 on immediate meaningfulness.
Feeling is seen as a kind of knowledge, involving understanding of something. Although Dufrenne allows some ambiguity between feeling as sense-experience (re. sentir), emotion (re. sentiment), and meaning + "having a sense of . . ." (re. sens), it is possible to extract the way he intends to use the term. It is principally in the latter mode, i.e., "having a sense of", or a feeling for, which derives from the term "sens" in conjunction with "sentiment" deprived of much of its emotive connection. One other difficulty in explaining feeling comes from the fact that there is no exact English parallel for "sentiment" - for which Dufrenne can hardly be blamed.

I shall attempt to explain this notion of feeling in more detail. Dufrenne's assertions are not entirely descriptive of ordinary language usage, i.e., they involve his own theoretical assertions. He describes feeling in terms of perception, emotion, knowledge and aesthetic experience; firstly explaining that the sense of feeling with which he is concerned is that which is related to perception. This sort of feeling is knowledge rather than emotion. For example, the emotion of fear is a certain way of reacting to something - he suggests the 'horrible' - and gaiety is the way one penetrates the world of the comic. However, it is only one type of knowledge. The understanding involved in knowledge enters when one sees feeling in aesthetic experience, as immediate, i.e., the subject's immediate understanding of the object of feeling - as "having a sense of the tragie". One is engaged in the world in terms of feeling rather

1. He spells out emotion in behavioural terms.
2. Though of course an emotion always involves some knowledge or belief (which, e.g., causes the emotion), and it is not Dufrenne's intention to exclude knowledge, but rather to emphasise another aspect of emotion.
3. I do not think he means to suggest that emotion is purely behavioural, but that these behavioural properties of emotion do not belong to feeling in aesthetic appreciation, and are therefore a means of distinguishing the two.
than thought. It entails a certain way of being, or attitude, of the subject, which can be seen most clearly in the artist. Dufrenne gives the example of Racine having a sense of the tragic, Daumier of the grotesque, etc. Feeling thus reveals a world (that of the tragic, grotesque, etc.), whereas emotion is a reaction to a world which is already given (a frightening world, causing fear, etc.) (cf. pp.47-2 ibid).

Aesthetic experience preserves the purity of this sense of feeling. By this he means that aesthetic experience is not feeling combined with emotion. He gives the example of seeing anguish and fear in Le Veneur by Rouault, and experiencing feelings, but not responding as one would to seeing these in ordinary experience. He suggests that laughing at a comedy does not mean that one is gay, but that one has a feeling of the comic. The feeling is a sensibility to a certain world (ibid.). Without this sense, the spectator cannot have a complete aesthetic experience:

"lorsque le spectateur en est radicalement dépourvu, comme certains individus sont insensibles à telle valeur ......... l'expérience esthétique est manquée, et l'objet esthétique n'est pas vraiment connu." (p.472 ibid).

It seems prima facie that Dufrenne is being rather radical in suggesting that feeling is knowledge, but this has the advantage of distinguishing it clearly from simple emotion, and of allowing him to involve intuition, i.e., feeling now becomes a form of intuitive knowledge, which provides a sounder basis for using a feeling for something as evidence of being correct about it, and gives a certain concreteness to the idea of "having a sense of ... ."

Dufrenne is rather careless here and is using his terminology loosely. He should not use 'gay' and 'comic' as if they were interchangeable. To be more accurate, he could say, "laughing at a comedy does not mean that one is happy, but that one understands the concept of happiness which is expressed."
Since he intends to use the idea of feeling to show that one has certain capacities to understand art, rather than to show that one knows something about it, it is slightly dubious as to how useful it is to invoke knowledge. But he is probably justified, since knowledge involves understanding, as does this sense of feeling; and, "having a sense of...", implies both (a) "having a capacity to understand art", and (b) more positively, actually knowing something about art.

Although we now have an idea of what Dufrenne means by 'feeling' - in his own special sense - he should make it plain that in ordinary usage, feeling is distinct from knowledge, whereas emotion is not. (For instance, our emotion of fear ceases when we are not, for example, confronted by a bull, as we had thought, but the physiological feelings may continue, since they are not under our control.)

Once more, we find Dufrenne presenting us with a valid concept, but marring it slightly by the obscurity with which he presents it, and the ambiguities to which its interpretation is open. One has to hope that one's interpretation is correct - since this thesis is intended to centre upon Dufrenne's theories, and not (at least primarily) to present arguments - whether they are valid or not - to which he would not ally himself. In fact, I think that he would accept the interpretation, and that it helps to make sense of the rest of his discussion on the aesthetic attitude. I think also that it is a worthwhile and sound insight into the aesthetic experience and perception of the work of art.
The only other dubious factor in his discussion is his presupposition that aesthetic experience is a recognition of the expression of something, and does not include an emotional reaction to, or sharing of, whatever is expressed. Leaving aside the question of whether art is expressive, it is by no means certain that one does not become involved in the emotions expressed (supposing for example that the emotion of fear is expressed in a work). Of course one may do both - i.e., recognise the emotion and experience it. For the sake of the purity of the feeling, Dufrenne asserts that one recognises rather than experiences. What he says implies a rather extreme theory of aesthetic distance, as will be seen when the thesis of psychical distance is discussed.

(ii) Reflection and feeling.

A. In Part III, chapter IV (Vol.II. pp.481 ff), Dufrenne moves on to discussing the role of critical analysis in the aesthetic experience, and I think that the fact that he discusses the nature of aesthetic analysis and regards it as necessary to the understanding of art, shows that he does not at any stage wish to exclude the critical from the aesthetic attitude.

1. This will be dealt with further in Section VI. However, it should be noted here that (a), recognising is an experience, and Dufrenne would not deny this, but (b), what Dufrenne means is that, for example, in watching a tragedy, one has the experience of recognising the fear expressed, rather than (having the experience of) experiencing the fear. Once more, one has a feeling of frustration at Dufrenne's tendency to put obscurly what could be said in more simple terms.

2. See, Bulloch op.cit., and Section V of this chapter. Dufrenne's case is extreme, since Bulloch (the originator of the theory) regards the ideal aesthetic attitude to be that involving the minimum of 'Distance'.
He discusses the subject in terms of reflection, which he regards as the next mental stage to perception (this being a non-reflective activity according to him). The structure and meaning of the work of art are revealed by means of reflection. There are two forms of this (i) that on the structure of the aesthetic object, e.g., composition, syntax, form, modes of expression, and (ii) that on the meaning of the represented object, e.g., the climate of the work:

"Il y a une réflexion sur la structure de l'objet esthétique, et une réflexion sur le sens de l'objet représenté." (p.482 ibid.)

The former is seen as having four advantages:

(a) Reflection on the structure of the aesthetic object is a necessary condition of clarifying the object, turning it from a confused totality, by an analytic perception.

(b) Reflection on form leads to an understanding of meaning. For example, a certain musical modulation indicates a particular feeling in the work, to understand which is to understand at least part of the work.

(c) Reflection on the creative activity of the artist indicates what he is attempting to express. Dufrenne give the example of the individuality of Van Gogh's brush strokes conveying part of the meaning of his work.

1. Hereafter - i.e., in the subsequent parts of this section, and following sections of this chapter - 'reflection' will be taken as referring to critical analysis as opposed to feeling (sentiment). That is, to the first mode of reflection given here. At present, Dufrenne is using the term to refer to both aspects of the aesthetic attitude.
Hence reflection on the structure leads eventually to an understanding of the aesthetic object. (pp. 483-4 ibid.)

However, according to Dufrenne, this reflection means submitting the object to a critical analysis which creates a barrier between oneself and the work, "elle définit l'objet en le détachant de moi pour le soumettre à un examen critique ..." (p. 483 ibid.) This means that one inspects the way it is constructed rather than investigating the object as such. It is taking it apart rather than penetrating the object as a whole, and having a sense of its affective quality.

"cette réflexion ... tend à perdre son objet dans la mesure même où elle est fidèle à son propos, qui est de passer de l'apparence à la chose ..., et par conséquent, de transcrire dans le langage de la prose ce que l'œuvre dit dans son propre langage: entreprise finalement vaine..." (pp. 485-6 ibid.)

Thus, the critical reflection may crush our ability freely to appreciate the meaning of the work as a whole. It has the added disadvantage that it may be over-indulged. One can go into too great detail of the work, in effect taking it to pieces, or lose it in what Dufrenne refers to as an 'explaining reflection' - details about the author, milieu, tradition, history, genesis, etc. (pp. 486-7 ibid.) For Dufrenne

1. In fact, I do not think these can be seen as four separate factors. The first (a) is an overall specification of the advantage of a consideration of form or structure; (b) and (c) are hypothetical examples of reflection on specific structural aspects of a given work; and (d) is the conclusion which Dufrenne draws. But this is a minor point of division, and does not affect any subsequent or final argument.

2. The phrase, "penetrating the object as a whole", does not mean taking it to pieces analytically, but something more like "gaining a general impression of the object in toto".
this latter is worse than losing the work by going into too great
detail about it, and of course distinct from it. I.E., by an 'expla-
laining reflection' Dufrenne means an analysis of factors surrounding
and external to, the work. One can argue that such elements are nec-
essary to a full appreciation of the aesthetic object, but I think one
would agree that they are not part of the aesthetic attitude, since
this is the attitude one takes while listening to, watching, etc., and
it is in any case empirically impossible to go into such details and
listen, watch, etc. (assume the aesthetic attitude) concurrently.
Prior investigation of the circumstances of the creation of the work
may enhance the aesthetic attitude - but it is another question as to
whether or not this is so.

Dufrenne claims that if we stop at the level of analysis, we
have not understood the aesthetic object. The proper aesthetic atti-
ude is not that which makes it submit to the critic, but one in which
I, as perceiver, submit myself to the work. In effect he is saying
that rather than forcing an explanation on the work, I allow it to
explain itself to me.1* A sympathetic reflection culminates in
feeling:

"Mais il y a une autre forme de réflexion qui nous ramènera
au contact de l'objet esthétique... on peut distinguer
une réflexion qui sépare et une réflexion qui adhère...
Par la réflexion qui adhère, je me soumets à l'œuvre au lieu
de la soumettre à moi, je la laisse déposer son sens en moi."

(p.487-8 ibid.)

1. Phenomenologists, including Dufrenne, rather incline to think that
objects of all kinds are self-explanatory. It may appear to be the case
that, e.g., an abstract painting 'explains itself' - but in fact one
usually has a wealth of background knowledge of this type of art if one
truly understands the work immediately. As this whole section shows,
Dufrenne does not make this supposition. I am grateful to Cyril Barrett
for this example of works which appear to be, but are not, self-
explanatory.
One sees the work as directly meaningful:

"Et c'est parce qu'elle se réfère ainsi en sous-main à l'expression que nous verrons la réflexion sympathique submerger dans le sentiment." (P.488 ibid.)

Dufrenne discusses feeling in greater detail as part of the aesthetic attitude when discussing the profundity of the work (Vol.II, Part III, Chap.IV, section 2 pp.501-3). Here he states that aesthetic feeling implies a total presence of the subject to the work. One becomes deeply involved in it - Dufrenne regards it as participating in the work. A merely superficial perception usually results in misunderstanding. This is contrasted to the attitude which exercises judgment on something and is detached and impersonal. One must be involved in the sense of being completely absorbed by the work and it alone. A capacity to read the expression of the aesthetic object (i.e., understand it) is a guarantee of the profundity of the feeling.

However, Dufrenne does not wish to claim that analysis is not necessary, and therefore adopts a middle course by saying that ultimate access to the work is via feeling, but one can only engage oneself fully in this after the use of the first mode of reflection (cf. pp.484-5 ibid).

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1. Although the idea of letting a work explain itself has just been noted to be untenable on the whole, there is one interpretation which justifies it - though it turns it into a rather shallow assertion. That is, although one does need the foreknowledge previously noted, one should not impose preconceived theories on a work, but approach it from an unbiased standpoint, in order to see it on its own merits, rather than through coloured glasses.

2. A further explanation of participation, and the way in which one identifies with the work, according to Dufrenne, is given in the final part of the following section (IV), on distance.
In this first discussion, Dufrenne over-separates the two factors involved in the aesthetic attitude - the critical and the intuitive. I.e., his explanation appears to require that the audience see or hear any work twice. It is the strangeness of the order of these two which is most questionable. For one has to see or hear firstly in order to make a critical appraisal, and secondly in order to gain a true aesthetic perception via feeling. Dufrenne does not spell out how these two attitudes relate to one another. It is difficult to see how one can assume the latter attitude of submitting oneself to the work, and gain an understanding of it via feeling (having a sense of the work) if the critical analysis has to be performed prior to this. The knowledge one gains by means of the latter analysis must bear upon one's ultimate attitude to, and understanding of, the work; a) because it would be empirically almost impossible to block it from one's mind, and b) because otherwise there would be no point in performing the analysis in the first place (i.e., at all).

Dufrenne's position subsequently alters somewhat. On this occasion, (Vol.II, Part III, Chap.IV, section 4, pp.514-5), he is wavering between critical reflection and feeling. The reason for the wavering is that an external/objective knowledge of the objective being of the aesthetic object is needed, as well as an internal knowledge - via the sensible. Since the critical attitude is the means to the former, and the feeling attitude a means to the latter, the aesthetic attitude oscillates between the two:

"Et c'est pourquoi l'attitude esthétique n'est pas simple, elle ne peut exclure le jugement au profit du sentiment, elle est une sorte d'oscillation perpétuelle entre ce qu'on pourrait appeler l'attitude critique et l'attitude sentimentale."

(p.514.4-5d)

Some part of the aesthetic object always escapes the reflective attitude, because reflection considers the object from a distance - "La réflexion... considère l'objet du dehors, ... elle le tient à distance...." (p.515).
Feeling is also limited, but in the opposite way, because it is likely to get lost, or lose itself, in the aesthetic object.

Thus, aspects of both attitudes appear to be required in the aesthetic attitude. Dufrenne feels that the use of the idea of reflection signifies that the aesthetic object has to be known in order to be felt - but he also feels that one is tempted to say that the expression of the object leaps to the eye (or that the feeling of a work leaps to one's eye) - is immediate and spontaneous. Then the inclination is to go further and ask whether a knowledge of, for example, harmony, counterpoint, etc., is necessary to the understanding of Bach, and then conclude that reflection paralyses feeling rather than encouraging it. But he realises that this would be to reach a conclusion with indecent and unconsidered haste.

So, at the moment, Dufrenne wishes to retain both critical reflection and feeling, as neither is totally satisfactory on its own. Reflection appears to remove one from direct contact with the work, and this is unsatisfactory, but he will not go to the other extreme either, and say that one immediately grasps the work through feeling.

I think that Dufrenne is still working on the same lines as previously, since he does not wish to reject either reflection or feeling, but now thinks that the aesthetic attitude oscillates between the two. Being strict on Dufrenne, one might say he has realised that the two are not properly compatible - at least in the way he has outlined them - and saying that the aesthetic attitude oscillates only amounts to saying that he has so far failed to work out the exact nature of the relationship between the two.

He goes on to discuss the aesthetic attitude in terms of understanding, and while I think one would usually agree that it is the mode most likely to afford an understanding of a work of art, I do not think one would claim that understanding followed necessarily from one's adopting it. That is, one can only properly understand a work if one's attitude to it is sympathetic and one takes it as an object of
aesthetic interest (these are preconditions of an aesthetic attitude), and if one adopts whatever is involved in the aesthetic attitude - for instance a critical approach which both 'distances' and participates or involves itself in the work, possibly with a certain intuitive appraisal. (These aspects of the aesthetic attitude will be appraised fully by the end of this chapter.) Given this attitude of taking the work in the correct context so to speak, one will be in the position from which a proper understanding of the work can result. It is not only the position from which one is most likely to be able to understand a work of art, but also the position one would adopt in order to understand it. That is, the aesthetic attitude is that which one assumes so as to be able to appreciate, evaluate and generally understand (a necessary condition of understanding).

But I do not think that it is a sufficient condition - it may be sufficient in certain cases, but one cannot assume that it holds 'across the board'. Given the correct attitude to a work, it is still perfectly possible to misinterpret, or else to gain an incomplete understanding - through some lack in one's own capacity to comprehend. (Any number of emotional or psychological determinants may 'block' one's understanding - but then this amounts to an incapacity to adopt the aesthetic attitude proper.) And I would not suggest that the aesthetic attitude was always (if at all) all one needed to understand a work. It does not include a knowledge of the artist, his milieu, genre, intentions, the progressive or regressive nature of his work, etc. - and any of these may, I think, be needed for comprehension. Dufrenne goes on (ef.b) below to allow a necessity for knowledge of external factors in order to understand a work. This is quite correct, but as I have said, everything involved in understanding is not necessarily attributable to the aesthetic
attitude - although Dufrenne would have it so - and since he is still
dubious as to the legitimacy of external factors, it remains uncertain
as to how far he would allow them to be part of the aesthetic attitude,
or understanding, or both, and his position remains frustratingly
ambiguous.

Nevertheless, for Dufrenne, the aesthetic attitude provides the
true perception of the work, and if one attains this, one will under-
stand the work. He seems to assume a relation of entailment exists
between the aesthetic attitude and comprehension. As I have suggested,
I think that this reasoning is faulty (i), because of the possibility
of misinterpretation, and (ii) because the aesthetic attitude itself
may easily be insufficient. There seems to be a wide gap between the
two states where Dufrenne assumes entailment.

However, Dufrenne has two main points (and it is here that he is
most in line with convention): a) that the part of the aesthetic
attitude which is feeling, is not grasped immediately; it requires
experience (p.517); b), that we can grasp the aesthetic object by
means of certain scholarly activities of analysis (presumably this is
not intended to cut out feeling).

Regarding a): feeling arises at first contact with the object, but
this does not mean that it is immediately intelligible. We have the
capacity to understand the expression of a work of art via feeling,
but we require a familiarity with means of expression, and what can
be expressed, before we can recognise what the work expresses (even
though, from a preliminary perception of the work, one may very well
gain a feeling/sense, of the predominant affective quality).

Regarding b): in order to grasp the aesthetic object, one should
have much information about the structure of it, the way that the
themes of a piece of music are put together (gained from a study of
the work):
"Pour que le corps s'habitue à l'objet, pour qu'il s'y reconnaîsse, il faut bien lui en ouvrir les avenues: d'époser cet objet, y chercher les points de repère, en distinguer les thèmes et les articulations . . . en d'autre termes, montrer comment l'œuvre est faite." (p.519 Ibid.)

All this gives us easier access to the work (cf. also p.520 Ibid).

Also, anyone who can understand a work immediately has a whole background of cultural knowledge and experience:

"Il y a un commencement de la perception, un premier contact avec l'objet, et tel que parfois l'objet semble se livrer du premier coup. Mais ce commencement n'est pas absolu: nous allons à l'objet avec tout un équipement d'expériences passées qui sont proprement notre culture;" (p.517 Ibid).

So Dufrenne is saying that normally one either has need of a direct knowledge of the specific work with which one is dealing, or a knowledge of the genre and culture in general (or both), in order to understand a work.1. But he rejects what one might call 'hard-line' critical analysis:

"par exemple lors qu'elle fait l'histoire de l'œuvre, de sa genèse, des influences qui ce sont exercées sur elle ou qu'elle a à son tour exercées . . . ." (p.518)

In this case, the criticism is not aimed at an aesthetic analysis.2.

1. Remembering that here understanding follows from the aesthetic attitude, the appropriate combination of critical analysis and feeling. But this perfectly correct assumption of the necessity for background cultural knowledge in order to understand the work, is really only confusing the issue of what is involved in the aesthetic attitude - since these are preconditions rather than characteristics of it.

2. Presumably he regards hard-line criticism as aimed at historical rather than aesthetic analysis, though I see no reason why historical information whilst being by definition historical, cannot also be aesthetically relevant.
There appears to be another turn in Dufrenne's position here. For it seems now that this critical analysis is in the service of feeling, rather than being something quite separate, as he previously held it to be. As a matter of fact, what he says is ambiguous, and it may be that Dufrenne is using feeling to mean "having a sense of" and thus, "having an understanding of" and simply not differentiating between critical analysis and feeling, in the aesthetic attitude. I.e., the very ambiguous nature of the term 'feeling' is mainly at fault.

Because of the obvious necessity of some analysis, Dufrenne's position has moved in the direction of regarding both critical reflection and feeling as directly aesthetic. However, this intermediate stage leaves the relationship of the two unexplained — unless one does interpret him as meaning that analysis is in the service of feeling.

Dufrenne's final remarks on the relationship of the feeling and the critical attitudes indicate a further development in his position. He continues to explain the meaning of the terms (although in a slightly different context), and their relationship the way he sees it now, and function. In fact, these last remarks mark a less radical change from his initial to his second positions.

Dufrenne now moves into a discussion in the context of the expressive nature of a work, its uniqueness and meaning (our understanding of it), and our attention to the work. The main points are:

i) Reflection takes a further turn in seeking less to explain what is expressed, than to name it (p.522).

ii) Reflection is subordinated to feeling and understanding a work (pp. 522-3).

iii) If reflection manifests itself through the attention of the audience, it is an attention turned towards feeling, and the aesthetic object in so far as it arouses feeling (p.523).

iv) There is a transition from the critical to the feeling attitude.

v) Reflection prepares and clarifies feeling, and therefore should not be suppressed (p. 524).

vi) The aesthetic object demands both reflection and feeling at the same time (p. 525).

Reflection and feeling now become interwoven in the aesthetic attitude. Paying attention to the work — by which he means adopting the aesthetic attitude — is nothing more than reflection upon it; an attentive reflection allows the audience to derive the meaning of the aesthetic object. Attention is not purely intellectual, i.e., not purely critical. It involves a familiarity with its object which will result in the audience feeling at ease with the work.

However, Dufrenne does now seem to be presupposing that there will be a lot of clarificatory work (i.e., critical analysis) going into the understanding of the aesthetic object. He says:

"La présence de l'objet au corps supposse parfois une représentation lucide, de la même façon que le libre jeu des habitudes supposse pour leur acquisition un effort méthodique et conscient ... nous ne percevons bien que ce que nous connaissons déjà de quelque façon, et c'est ainsi que la réflexion peut préparer la perception..." (p. 521 ibid).

Obviously, one can distinguish between making some sort of critical analysis on a work of art prior to perceiving it in the frame of mind referred to as the aesthetic attitude, and taking that analysis to be part of the aesthetic attitude; but since Dufrenne regards the aesthetic attitude as one of paying attention, and paying attention as involving the critical attitude, it follows that he is allowing some degree of critical analysis to be part of the aesthetic attitude. Of course, the distinction remains between i) critical analysis and aesthetic knowledge and familiarity prior to experiencing a work, and ii) critical analysis as a part of the aesthetic experience/attitude. Nevertheless, it does seem that Dufrenne is becoming more reconciled to accepting the latter.
This represents a decided advance on his initial, rather confused separation of 'critical' and 'feeling' attitudes.

Dufrenne now moves his discussion into a slightly different sphere, in saying that reflection seeks further - to name rather than to explain what is expressed (cf. i) above). I.e., naming the expression of the world of the work, rather than explaining the work itself. For example, once one has elucidated the affective quality of the world of Mallarme, one returns to the knowledge gained from the critical reflection, but this knowledge will be clarified by the feeling which reveals the affective quality.

He seems to be advocating a policy of:

a) critical analysis to gain a general understanding of the work in question.

b) gaining a sense of the particular unique affective qualities of the work via the feeling attitude.

e) a combination of the two, resulting in an understanding of both the work and the world created by the artist. (cf. p. 522 ibid)

The position is one of involving critical reflection but subordinating it in importance to feeling (cf. ii above):

"Tout ce que l'attitude critique avait découvert reste valable, mais est affecté d'un changement de signe. La réflexion est désormais aux ordres du sentiment et inspirée par lui ..."

(p. 523 ibid).

1. Dufrenne invariably presupposes that there is one 'world' of each artist, Mallarme, Mozart, Debussy, etc., as if the creations of any artist invariably expressed or reflected certain unchanging qualities, unique to him. Although one often identifies a work as being 'in the style of X', or says 'that sounds like, e.g., Mozart', it is also true that the methods and style of an artist may change completely in the course of his creative lifetime, so that it is premature to say that any artist has one particular 'world' - if one means something like a recognisable style, or use of certain unchanging expressive methods.
The true aesthetic reflection is bound up with the other more important attitude, which is one of feeling, not critical analysis of the aesthetic object (cf. iii) above):

"Si la réflexion se manifeste encore par l'attention, ce n'est plus une attention tournée vers l'objet . . . . , c'est une attention tournée vers le sentiment . . . ." (p.523 ibid).

The last three points (i.e., iv)-vi) illustrate strongly Dufrenne's inclination to incorporate analytic reflection and feeling in the aesthetic attitude, and the view that he has now discovered their relationship. He says:

"On voit donc que le passage de l'attitude critique à l'attitude sentimentale n'est pas simplement une oscillation: la réflexion prépare le sentiment, puis elle l'éclaire; et inversement le sentiment en appelle d'abord à la réflexion, puis la dirige. L'alternance de la réflexion et du sentiment dessine un progrès dialectique vers une compréhension de plus en plus pleine de l'objet esthétique." (p.523-4 ibid.)

The object itself necessitates both (a) reflection - because it appears coherent enough to warrant objective knowledge, and (b) feeling - because this objective knowledge does not explain it completely, and it requires this further, more intimate relation (of feeling). Finally:

"L'expérience esthétique s'insine donc dans le sentiment sans pouvoir se passer de la réflexion; elle se situe à l'interférence des deux." (525 ibid.)

Before concluding this section, some comment is necessary on all three parts. In the first (A) the advantages of critical reflection which Dufrenne proposes are all variations on one theme - that it leads to an understanding of the work, by studying the formal
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"L'expérience esthétique culmine donc dans le sentiment sans pouvoir se passer de la réflexion; elle se situe à l'interférence des deux." (525 ibid.)

Before concluding this section, some comment is necessary on all three parts. In the first (A) the advantages of critical reflection which Dufrenne proposes are all variations on one theme - that it leads to an understanding of the work, by studying the formal
aspects (cf. a) & b)), and the expressive aspects (cf. c). He thus makes out a good case for the necessity of critical reflection. His problem is that he believes that such minute attention as this requires, prevents one from seeing the work as a whole, and thus understanding it by gaining a sense of the work. He therefore attempts to separate this attitude from what he regards as the aesthetic attitude proper.

One thing which seems to encourage Dufrenne in regarding critical analysis as sidetracking one from the work of art, is the fact that he includes an examination of the technical aspects, or social and material conditions surrounding the work, as part of the critical analysis. Certainly this sort of enquiry is not contemplation of the actual work of art. However, he is now confusing an analysis of the work's environment, and technical analysis of the work as an ordinary object (such as the pigments used in making up some colour, or the type of brush the artist used) with an analysis of the work as a work of art. (cf. p. 484.) While the former is undoubtedly not part of aesthetic contemplation, there is no obvious reason why the latter should not be.

Also, Dufrenne fallaciously makes it appear that there is a distinction between critical analysis and aesthetic contemplation, by referring to the former as reflection on the structure of the work, as if this were not reflection about the work. However, to take an example outside art, an analysis of the bricks and mortar, slates and glass (i.e., structure) of a house, is also an analysis of the house. It would be a category mistake to say - "these are the components of this house, but this is not the house, where is the house?"

The main problem which the first analysis leaves is the question of the relation of the analytical reflection to the reflection of feeling and submitting oneself to the work. It seems that his position here is thoroughly indeterminate, since the aesthetic attitude

appears to require first a critical analysing attitude and then a non-judging attitude of feeling which involves submitting oneself to the work without any preconceptions. These two are obviously not jointly compatible.

Dufrenne seems to have put the previous analysis slightly more into perspective, in Section (A). Although he is still unclear as to the relationship of reflection and feeling, he does seem to be saying one thing which is fairly simple, at tortuous length. Namely that the sort of knowledge derived from analysing a work is necessary to our understanding of it, and thus to the aesthetic attitude.

In this part, Dufrenne is obviously more inclined to include analysis of the work as part of the aesthetic attitude. He also acknowledges the necessity for a good deal of cultural background knowledge and experience, and familiarity with the techniques of art as a pre-requisite to appreciating the work before one - though this actually serves to confuse the issue, since this is not part of the aesthetic attitude.

In the final section, Dufrenne makes out a perfectly plausible case for analysis in the aesthetic attitude, since he now sees it as required by feeling (which he regards as the more important aspect of the aesthetic attitude). Since he has made out a good case for the necessity of analysis, and provided no real barriers to its acceptance, I see no reason to exclude it from the aesthetic attitude. As will be seen in the final section, it does in fact seem to be necessary in order to give content to the whole concept of the aesthetic attitude. Nor do I see any reason for rejecting this theory of aesthetic contemplation.
appears to require first a critical analysing attitude and then a non-judging attitude of feeling which involves submitting oneself to the work without any preconceptions. These two are obviously not jointly compatible.

Dufrenne seems to have put the previous analysis slightly more into perspective, in Section (B). Although he is still unclear as to the relationship of reflection and feeling, he does seem to be saying one thing which is fairly simple, at tortuous length. Namely that the sort of knowledge derived from analysing a work is necessary to our understanding of it, and thus to the aesthetic attitude.

In this part, Dufrenne is obviously more inclined to include analysis of the work as part of the aesthetic attitude. He also acknowledges the necessity for a good deal of cultural background knowledge and experience, and familiarity with the techniques of art as a pre-requisite to appreciating the work before one - though this actually serves to confuse the issue, since this is not part of the aesthetic attitude.

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Conclusion.
At no stage in his discussion does Dufrenne suggest that some form of critical analysis of the aesthetic object can be omitted from an understanding of it. However, it is not really obvious until the third set of remarks on the aesthetic attitude, that reflection (critical analysis) and feeling, are to be regarded as parts of the whole. They remain distinct parts, but together with a certain distancing (which will be dealt with in Section V), they go to make up the contemplative aesthetic attitude as Dufrenne sees it.

He is unfortunately handicapped from the outset by two connected aspects of phenomenology (i); the distaste for an analytical attitude to any study, and (ii) the inclination to regard understanding as immediately intuited. Thus, throughout his discussion there is an obvious conflict between the ideas (a), that critical analysis is necessary to understanding the work of art, and (b) that the affective quality is immediately known via our capacity for feeling, or having a sense of what is expressed. And he has the further problem of knowing what the aesthetic attitude comprises, i.e., whether critical reflection is admissible in the first place.

He reaches what he regards as a satisfactory conclusion by incorporating reflection and feeling, and regarding them as inseparable. Reflection becomes a necessary preliminary step towards feeling. He thus avoids the previous conclusions (a); that critical analysis neutralizes the aesthetic experience, and (b) that there is an oscillation between reflection and feeling (a conclusion which left one totally ignorant of the relationship between the two, and the degree to which critical analysis might be regarded as part of the aesthetic attitude).

It is also possible to overcome the problem of immediacy by delaying immediate comprehension of the aesthetic object until after the critical reflection. Immediate intuition does not preclude some
form of preliminary analysis, i.e., one does not have to understand
the object as soon as one first perceives it, in order for one’s
understanding to be immediate/intuitive (cf. p. 521 ibid).

I think it is clear that the discussion of reflection and feeling
does not form one coherent whole, and that it is more satisfac­tory
to divide the analysis into three sections, as I have done.
There is a continuous lack of clarity in what Dufrenne says, and at
the conclusion, he has still not given a completely lucid account of
the aesthetic attitude. However, he does eradicate the sharp distri­bution between reflection and feeling, and with it the apparent
necessity to perceive any work of art twice - once by means of a
critical attitude and once by means of feeling - although in doing
so he seems to involve himself in holding that the aesthetic atti­
itude which results in the true aesthetic experience is achieved through
a third perception which combines reflection and feeling.

But one cannot condemn his thesis simply because it seems
unconventional. It is neither irrational nor illogical to claim
that three perceptions of a work are necessary to complete the
aesthetic attitude. As a matter of fact, one can probably eradicate
the idea of two preliminary perceptions and see the theory as
involving only one - an attitude to the work which uses critical
analysis as one of the means of gaining a sense of, or feeling for,
the work.

The final aspect of Dufrenne’s theory of the aesthetic attitude
is distance, to which I shall now turn. ‘Distancing’ may be held to
be that part of contemplation where the subject is to some degree
detached from the object of his study, and from the ordinary world.
Dufrenne does not discuss the latter form in his discussion of
distance.
At one stage, Dufrenne makes a distinction between knowledge and feeling in the aesthetic attitude (Vol. II, Part III, Chap. V, pp. 530-2). He states that (a), aesthetic feeling cannot survive the disappearance of its object, whereas, by implication, knowledge can,

(b) knowledge is anonymous whereas the aesthetic object is not, it 'reaches one'.

Whilst both these points may be correct,1 they would appear to make little difference to the question of the aesthetic attitude. I therefore note what Dufrenne says, for the sake of completeness, and because he has asserted that feeling is a form of knowledge.

Section IV.

Aesthetic distance.

The final part of Dufrenne's notion of the aesthetic attitude discusses the psychological aspect of the attitude in terms of the concept of distance.2 Because of Edward Bullough's influential work, *Aesthetics* - in particular that section on 'Psychical Distance' - this has often been accepted as an important aspect of the aesthetic attitude, in twentieth century philosophy of art. As it happens, Dufrenne does not acknowledge Bullough, and may never have read his theory. However, his own idea of distance is not entirely dissimilar from that of Bullough, although it is by no means so thoroughly explained or defined.

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1. Though the idea that aesthetic feeling cannot survive the disappearance of its object is probably incorrect, since there is no reason to suppose that whatever feelings one has throughout the duration of a piece of music will cease as soon as the work ceases.

2. Dufrenne does not use the upper case for 'distance', whereas Bullough does. I shall follow the usage of each, which does not imply that I think Dufrenne necessarily means something different by this term.
Though Dufrenne does not discuss distance systematically, one can take what he says in four stages:

i) The world of art is non-real/different from that of the ordinary object.

ii) The aesthetic attitude is distanced.

iii) His illustration of the way distance operates.

iv) Two final ideas that should not be taken as contradicting the theory - on paying attention, and identification with the work.

Firstly, concerning i), Dufrenne regards the world of aesthetics as different from that of the ordinary object. He states this occasionally - for example when he is discussing the presence of the work to its audience, he says that aesthetics takes us into a non-work world - which is one of the reasons that one is not suspicious or wary of art, whereas one is wary of people or objects of the ordinary world. (Vol.II, Part III, Chap.I. pp426-7.)

A similar view is expressed when he is discussing the profundity of art (cf.Vol.II, Part III, Chap.IV, pp.505-6). According to Dufrenne, there is a certain strangeness in the profundity of the work of art, deriving from the fact that art confronts us with a new attitude (regard). If we treat the work as an ordinary object, we finish with it when we have fitted it into the context of ordinary action. By implication, he is saying that this is the wrong attitude.

Dufrenne describes really the way the aesthetic object can be both real and unreal:

"Si l'objet esthétique en tant que chose est bien dans le monde - tel tableau exposé dans telle galerie, telle pièce jouée dans tel théâtre - nous savons qu'il tend à s'en
separer pour constituer comme un îlot, et que ce qui l'isole
est précisément le fait qu'il désigne un autre monde. . . . "

If the work of art is different from the ordinary object, we may
take a different attitude to it (regarding ii ). This is not only
contemplative (in the combination of analysis and feeling just
described), it is also distanced:

"L'objet esthétique, lui aussi, lui surtout, doit être perçu
à distance d'objet . . . . . " (p.447 ibid).

We do not respond to a work of art as we do to other objects. For
instance, one sees emotions depicted but does not respond as one
would to seeing them in ordinary experience:

"le monde de l'art est un monde inoffensif que nous n'avons
pas à prendre entièrement au sérieux, la participation n'y
va point jusqu'à l'émotion. Devant Le Pendu de Rouault,
j'éprouve la misère du monde sans éprouver l'angoisse ou la
 crainte qui, dans le monde réel, amorcerait une entreprise
pour fuir ou conjurer cette misère. À la comédie, il n'est
pas nécessaire que le spectateur soit gai comme s'il était en
situation dans le monde représenté . . . . " (Chap.III, p.472 ibid).

1. He also says (p.426-7) that the passions work themselves out on
the unreal forms of art, i.e., that art has a cathartic effect. This
is somewhat strange in view of the fact that he maintains that although
art can express emotions, it is not necessary to feel any emotion in
order to understand the work - one should rather recognise it. Since
Dufrenne's idea of the aesthetic attitude seems to be a fairly
disciplined one - and certainly not that art is a safety valve for
our emotions - I take this to be a strange inconsistency on his part.
Dufrenne elaborates only slightly on the bare statement of distance. He says (regarding iii)), that certain activities in the aesthetic experience both co-ordinate us with the aesthetic object and detach us from it; that we both contemplate and participate in the aesthetic object, sufficiently involved to follow the work but not to be deceived by it; and that the principle for our capacity for detachment derives from what he calls the transcendental imagination:

"mesurer, nombrer, qualifier le temps en ordonnant l'espace, ces activités... nous embrayent sur cet objet (l'esthétique) et nous mettent en quelque sorte en synchronisme avec lui, et en même temps nous détachent de lui..." (p.448 op.cit).

"nous contemplons, et nous participons, mais cette participation, qui d'ailleurs se comprendre mieux au plan du sentiment, n'est jamais totale."

"Partout la perception esthétique requiert un certain détachement... donc le principe est sans doute dans l'imagination en tant que pouvoir transcendental de prendre ses distances." (p.448)

I think that Dufrenne is using 'transcendental' in order to forestall ideas that ordinary imagination is required in aesthetic perception, in order to complete it, i.e., that we need to imagine something further than is given. He is using imagination to mean the ability to recognise the aesthetic object as in the world, but separated in certain ways (e.g., in drama by pretence) - i.e., as distanced. It is an activity required by the aesthetic attitude, but not by ordinary attitudes to objects.

He also makes an interesting and apt comparison of the aesthetic

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1. Transcendental and empirical imagination are, for present purposes, distinguished only by the nature of their object - for the former, the aesthetic, and for the latter, the ordinary object.

(af. p.446.)
attitude with the correct attitude to someone one loves. This is in the short chapter actually entitled 'The aesthetic attitude', but which is mainly a comparison of the aesthetic and other attitudes (Vol.II, Part III, Chap.V, esp. pp.532-6). Similarities lie in the recognition of the aesthetic object as something we should not attempt to alter, and the loved one as someone with whom we should not interfere. They both have rights in their own way. One should not regard either as to be used or to be abused. If one does think principally of oneself, then one misses both the aesthetic and the loving experience - by mistakenly using the other thing/person for one’s own ends (p.532 ibid)

One of the differences between the loving and the aesthetic attitude, however, is that love requires a union which the aesthetic object does not. The reciprocity and involvement of love are notably absent from the aesthetic attitude, which holds one at a distance (p.533-4). The latter is also a happier relationship between subject and object, because it naturally maintains a distance between the two, whereas love involves an insoluble antinomy between a desire for union.

1. It should be made clear that Dufrenne is making a comparison between the aesthetic attitude, and the ideal loving attitude. There is a difference in that there are degrees within the latter and not within the former. One can love someone without assuming the ideal stance which Dufrenne pre-supposes. Elements of the non-ideal love creep in when he mentions, "le désir d'une possession qu'il faudrait ensuite reprim­ser," (p.536) involved in love. As it is, he concludes by thinking there is an insoluble antinomy in love, between the wish to be united with the other, and the recognition of their freedom. (The idea that one is free is especially involved in existentialism.) The two are incompatible, since the former involves imposing a restriction on the freedom of the other.
and a recognition of the rights of the other as a distinct being (p.535-6):

"l'amour requiert une union que l'objet esthétique ne demande point parce que, tout en agissant sur moi, il me tient à distance . . ." (p.535).

Two clauses in what Dufrenne has so far said about distance imply something of what he feels is involved in the notion. As it is, he only actually explains it by comparisons.

A. Of participation; "Cette participation, qui d’ailleurs se comprend mieux au plan du sentiment" (p.448 op.cit.), indicates that it is on the level of feeling that one ‘participates in’ the aesthetic object. Feeling, as I have described it 1, is different from emotion – it involves a form of knowledge, ‘having a sense of’ the work of art. It is clear therefore, that Dufrenne does not regard our involvement as any kind of emotional or close attachment. We are by no means ‘carried away’ by the expressive properties of the work. 2 So he is consistently maintaining that the audience is psychologically distanced.

B. Further to the psychological state of the audience (cf.p.536 op.cit) when comparing the loving and aesthetic attitudes, Dufrenne says that the subject maintains a distance from the object. This indicates once more that the audience is not emotionally involved and does not identify with the work.

He does not mention at any stage in his account of the aesthetic attitude, that the audience should be distanced from himself, or from the ordinary affairs of everyday life. All the same, this idea implies

1. See Section II, present chapter.
2. By contrast one might consider the ‘method’ school of drama, in which the actors attempt to identify completely with their roles.
that one should perceive the work of art as contextually distinct from the rest of the world, and since he regards art as self-sufficient, I think it is safe to assume that he would regard this form of distancing as part of the distanced aesthetic attitude. One has to be careful here, however. If one claims that the aesthetic attitude is totally dissociated from the ordinary world, all ideas of the relevance of art to life, all ideas of a reciprocal mode of understanding between life and art, and art and life, are automatically denied. I have already expressed my disinclination to accept this kind of dissociation, and even Dufrenne - though he regards the work of art as self-sufficient - does not claim that it exists in a void. Admittedly what he says has a grudging ring to it, as if he would very much prefer to exclude the world outside the aesthetic object, but finds that he cannot. He says:

"il ne peut nous engager dans son monde qu'en détournant du monde, même si nous ne le quittons pas tout à fait et si l'environnement est toujours 'mitgernent'; car, d'un part, il ne faut pas que la perception sombre dans le rêve, et il n'y a de perception que si nous sommes au monde."

(Vol.I, part I, Chap.V, p224.)

As will be seen in the following section, Dickie has said that what Bullough calls the aesthetic attitude is nothing more than

1. See Chapter 2, Section III, on autonomy.

2. This element of distance will be further explained in the following section, when Bullough's theory is discussed.

3. See Chapter 2, Section III, on autonomy.

paying attention to the work. Dufrenne also mentions attention, but not in order to substitute it for distance. For him, attention is a peripheral but not additional concept in the aesthetic attitude. It means more or less exactly what one would expect, and is quite uncontroversial. It is nothing more than reflection on the work, and the result of an attentive reflection is that one understands the meaning of the work. Paying attention is more or less equated with adopting the aesthetic attitude as he sees it (cf. Vol. II, Part III, Chap. IV, pp. 520-1 esp).

Finally (regarding iv), Dufrenne sometimes refers to the idea of identification with the work, which might be construed as contradicting the concept of the audience as distanced. Two examples will be sufficient to show that it does not.

A. (Vol. I, Part I, Chap. III, pp. 91-6.) The spectator is both inside and outside the work with regard to the sensible aspects, and its meaning. In the case of the first, one is both, for example, both in the music as well as facing the orchestra:

"au concert je suis en face de l'orchestre, mais je suis dans le symphonie, . . la symphonie est en moi . . ."

(p. 92 ibid).

And with painting, one penetrates the space of the work as well as just viewing it. In the case of the second (meaning), it is possible for the spectator to get to the meaning of a work by allowing himself to be taken over by the sensible (p. 94 ibid). The audience is engaged in the work:

"le témoin n'est pas un spectateur pur, mais un spectateur engagé - dans l'oeuvre même." (p. 93.)

But this is hardly a threat to distance. For one thing, Dufrenne is principally contrasting the physical and the psychological.

1. See also previous section, part II.
perspective of the audience. Being both in the music and facing the orchestra is an assertion that whilst the audience is physically distanced from the music, they are nevertheless psychologically engaged by it. And to be engaged in the work is to be properly attentive to it, not to be undistanced. For another thing, saying as he does that the body submits to the object and lets itself be moved by it, amounts more to an assertion that it is wrong for the audience either to dominate the work, i.e., impose its own theories on it, or to give it a superficial 'external' reading, than to a denial of distance.

B. (Vol.II, Part III, Chap.IV, pp490-1.) Here again, Dufrenne shows that he is disinclined to allow that one can understand a work of art without identifying with it in some way. He says that questions about a work, such as, "why this melodic line?, this trait?", etc., are answered by a feeling of necessity interior to the work. The sympathetic reflection which reaches this answer, is held to be very similar to feeling. This sympathetic reflection:

"n'est rien qu'une attention fidèle et passionnée, par quoi je m'imprègne de l'objet en me faisant consubstantiel à lui, . . . . et ma connaissance s'approfondit parce qu'elle s'incorpore plus profondément à moi. Les questions que nous posons: pourquoi ce trait ... elles reçoivent maintenant une réponse ... par le sentiment d'une nécessité intérieure à l'œuvre." (p.490.)

This is actually more helpful than hindering. For it provides an insight into the way Dufrenne's notion of feeling works. It is indeed a form of intuition. Becoming consubstantial with the work may be taken as one way of saying one takes the work on its own level, or in its own framework. E.g., in listening to Schoenberg
I do not criticise it in the way I should criticise Beethoven. I listen without preconceptions of perfection, and I listen to the work and allow its mood, tempo, etc., to surround me. I identify with the work to an unspecified extent. This does not mean that I am carried away by it, and lose distance. If this were the case, I should not remain in the frame of mind in which I question aspects of the work — and Dufrenne is specifically using this as an example of an attitude which asks questions and gets answers. This is the reflection similar to feeling whereby I gain a sense of the work by becoming incorporated in it, or it in me, and am able to say:

"Pourquoi cette irruption du majeur dans le dernier mouvement de la symphonie de Franck? Pour nous introduire dans la lumière." (p.491.)

By 'entering into the work' I am able to intuit the reasons why certain aspects are as they are.

Dufrenne adds that the aesthetic reflection cannot go on indefinitely asking questions — in the end it must accept the necessity interior to the work. To understand is to be assured that it cannot be other than it is: "Comprendre l'œuvre, s'est s'assurer qu'elle ne peut être autre qu'elle est . . ." (p.491). This is intended as an assertion that the idea of asking questions about the work does not mean that there is no end to the reflection, and that at

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1. I think that it would be false to say that Dufrenne's argument was wrong if one happened to disagree with the answers he gives to his own questions here. The answer may be wrong but this does not falsify the method — of intuition and identification. His intuition may be incorrect.
some stage one can say that one understands.\footnote{1}

The question of understanding does not conflict with anything Dufrenne says about distance, and it seems clear that ideas of identification with the work do not either, as long as one does not allow identification to reduce into deep personal involvement. However, I shall comment on both of these, especially understanding, since that has arisen on the discussion on the meaning of contemplation.\footnote{2} Prior to this, it is necessary to provide a brief explanatory note on a), the non-reality of the work, and b), what exactly the aesthetic object requires of its audience in their relationship.

(a) The idea of the work of art as non-real sounds prima facie like another assertion of autonomy. But one does not have to accept the self-sufficient, quasi-subject nature of art, in accepting this mode of non-reality, for the simple reason that the latter entails only that the aesthetic object is different from the ordinary object, not that it is not related to it. One can allow that the aesthetic object requires a different attitude, etc., and still deny that it is a completely self-sufficient, autonomous object, i.e., maintain that it is related to ordinary objects and events of the world.\footnote{3}

(b) In his illustration of the way distance operates, Dufrenne compares the loving and aesthetic attitudes. Here, he regards the aesthetic object as not affected by the aesthetic attitude, although the aesthetic attitude requires that the audience be affected in so far as being influenced by the aesthetic object. He says also that

\footnote{1} Cf. Wittgenstein, op.cit. no.217 (& 485) - who says that one must cease justifying and questioning at some stage; "If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say 'this is simply what I do" .
\footnote{2} Cf. previous section, present chapter.
\footnote{3} This is also discussed in the final part of section VI.
it does not require the homage of the audience:

"devant le beau, je ma fais docile à son influence sans
qu'il en soit en lui-même affecté . . . il n'a pas besoin
de mon hommage." (p. 534 op. cit.)

He is possibly at fault in not making clear exactly what he
thinks the aesthetic object does require of its audience. For the
idea, that the work of art qua aesthetic object necessitates that I
perceive it as an aesthetic object, is not strictly in line with the
idea that it is independent of me in not requiring my homage. The
solution to this lies in the fact that while it is necessary to
perceive an aesthetic object in order for it to be one, it is not
part of the definition of perception that one pays homage to the
work. 1

Although it does not make any formal difference to Dufrenne's
theory on the aesthetic attitude, I think one should take note of
the idea that understanding the work is being satisfied that it
cannot be other than it is - if only because this is relevant to the
question of what it means to understand a work, which enters into
the discussion on reflection and feeling. In so far as he is saying
that, for example, one may understand a work when one sees that phrase
B is formally, materially, or expressively a coherent part of the
passage comprising A-B, then he is correct. One of the ways in
which one comes to comprehend a work is by seeing the relationship
of each of its parts to the whole.

1. As it happens, what he says about the work's being dissociated
from the audience is not consistent with what he has said previously
about the audience as performing the work. Cf. Chapter 2, Section
II.
However, that is not to say that the work could not be structured (not only with regard to form, but expression and subject matter also) other than it is. Just in the way that in ethics, although action X is good, actions Y and Z would have been equally good or better, under the same circumstances; so in art the (aesthetically good) phrase B may be replaceable by another phrase as good or better. To cite an example, Vaughan Williams replaced a whole movement of one symphony without detriment to the work, just to show the critics who said it could not be other than it was, that it could be altered and remain as good. (Whether it remained the same work is another question.)

Also, there are minor works which could have been greater had a greater artist undertaken them. For example, Mozart could no doubt have improved a composition by Spohr — which shows that a work can be other than it is. But one can still understand the original, and possibly more easily since it will be less complex.

Furthermore, the idea that to understand a work is to see it as unalterable, conflicts with Dufrenne’s statement (Vol.I, Part I, chap.II, sect. 2) that there are works of art which are less than perfect, and that there is a possible perfect form for all works of art. While I see no justification for the latter, it is true that there are works which are less than perfect. And if it were true that these could always be made perfect, then they would not be unalterable.

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1. This does not mean that all minor works can be improved, since there is not necessarily any way of perfecting what is less than perfect. All I wish to claim is that some works would be improved, and therefore be other than they are.

2. This latter remark could be questioned, since a minor work may be more tortuously or loosely constructed than a great one, thus being more difficult to follow.
Therefore it cannot be the case that to understand a work of art is to realise that it cannot be other than it is. The idea can also be made absurd. For someone could see the national anthem as necessarily as it is, and thus understand it, according to Dufrenne. But Beethoven would see the same piece as capable of alteration for the better - which he did, writing variations which are indubitably musically better than the original - and on Dufrenne's criterion, he would not have understood the national anthem. This is obviously an implausible conclusion.

Dufrenne's assertion is only tenable if one restricts oneself to taking the idea that one understands a work when one sees that it cannot be other than it is, as meaning that one understands the work in that form, when one sees the coherence of its parts (cf. the first example). Though this is correct, as I have indicated, it does not seem to be what Dufrenne means.

Finally, there is a slight problem regarding identification with the work. As I have interpreted it, Dufrenne does not regard this as entailing personal emotional involvement, but if one is not careful, it can reduce to this. For example, Dufrenne says:

"Pourquoi Isée se dresse-t-elle devant Nésa: je suis Isée ...?" (p.490).

It is essential not to regard this simplistically. Otherwise one may become totally involved with some one character in any work, and become insensible to the feelings of the others. One is carried away. What is required is that one sees how it would be if one were in the same position as, for example, Isée, and understand how she acts, as a result. This is a perfectly plausible distanced attitude (though it will be seen in the final section that I do not regard this degree of detachment as necessary), and in view of what Dufrenne
says about not needing to feel what is expressed, it must be his position if he is to remain consistent. This completes a fairly comprehensive study of Dufrenne's theory of the aesthetic attitude. In brief, it is that one assumes a contemplative attitude, which does not mean taking a superficial view of works of art, but a 'reflective' (analytic) and 'feeling' attitude, and also involves a certain psychological stance, i.e., distanced. Dufrenne's chief stumbling blocks in this have been seen to be the relationship of analysis and feeling, and the degree of analysis permissible. There have also been seen not to be insuperable.

There are various other views of the aesthetic attitude, some of which I shall compare with those of Dufrenne. By far the most comprehensive is that of Edward Bullough. Nevertheless, there are others to be considered, in order to show the diversification of ideas even amongst theories which claim to be contemplative.

Section V.

Dufrenne's theory in comparison.

There are both contemplative and non-contemplative ideas of the aesthetic attitude. I shall confine myself mainly to those which are contemplative and relevant to Dufrenne. This confines the field to two essentially relevant views - those of D. W. Prall1 and Bullough - and some peripheral cases, for example, Dugasse and Bell.

(i) D. W. Prall. There is an interesting similarity in the terminology and thought of Prall - a prominent American philosopher of the 1930's - and Dufrenne. Like Dufrenne, he does not regard the work of art as serving some end. The work is an end in itself. He also agrees that it is expressive (cf. p.176 op. cit.), and that works of art have an affective content. His view that, "aesthetic experience 1. See D.W.Prall: Aesthetic Judgment. (First pub. New York Crowell,1929.) Rep. New York Apollo editions,1967.

rests upon what immediately appears" (p. 6 op. cit.), and that aesthetic surface 1 is what one directly experiences, has two points of similarity with Dufrenne (i), on the basic level of phenomenology — phenomenologists regard the correct way of understanding objects as being gained from a direct apprehension of the object in question and the qualities it presents. Dufrenne would start from this standpoint. (ii) on the level of the aesthetic attitude — that one contemplates, or takes notice of, that which one immediately experiences in a work, and understands it on this level. (This is analogous to Dufrenne’s idea of 'feeling' in contemplation.)

The parallel also extends to Dufrenne’s further requirement of analysis. Prall believes that although the aesthetic surface — that which is immediately felt — is the important factor in aesthetics, we cannot immediately understand the surface. What is required is a thorough analysis, and thus knowledge of, the factors immediately felt, before one understands the work. He adds, which Dufrenne does not, that one analyses each class of art separately before one can be said to understand any work (cf. Chap. VI, op. cit.). Analysis assists one in a better apprehension of the surface.

(ii) Bullough.2 This is, I think one of the most important, original and valuable theories of the aesthetic attitude which has been produced. Bullough believes that one is detached to a certain extent, from both the aesthetic object and from one’s personal context. But this does not mean either that the attitude is impersonal or that it goes to the other extreme of being totally involved — indulging oneself in the emotions of the work.

1. Aesthetic surface is not intended to connote anything superficial or just the outer surface of a work. It is what is directly and immediately experienced.

2. See Bullough, op. cit. Chapter 2, on psychical distance.

4. Bullough also thinks that distance makes the characters in a drama seem fictitious, not vice versa, as normally supposed.
Distance arises when one puts oneself out of context with personal needs and ends, and looks only at the so-called 'objective' features of the object/experience. This applies also to experience of things not ordinarily seen as works of art, for example, a fog:

"Thereby the contemplation of the object becomes alone possible. But it does not mean that the relation between the self and the subject is broken to the extent of becoming 'impersonal'? (p.96 op.cit.)

I.e., the relation is by no means purely intellectual, but it is non-ordinary in that the thoughts, moods, etc., of the spectator — his ordinary historical context has been 'filtered'. It is not desirable that the audience should feel himself dissociated from the work, any more than it is absolutely necessary, to allow for appreciation:

"What is therefore, both in appreciation and production, most desirable is the utmost decrease of Distance without its disappearance." (p.100 ibid. my underlining, italicised by Bullough)

This is what we call the 'antinomy of Distance'. He regards distance as a useful term because it admits of degrees, and individuals differ in their capacity for maintaining it:

"Distance may be said to be variable both according to the distancing-power of the individual, and according to the character of the object." (p.100 ibid.)

Bullough regards it as a psychological characteristic of man that certain people can become very involved in a work and still remain sufficiently detached to appreciate its qualities. Others must maintain a greater degree of non-involvement, otherwise they lose any sense of distance at all, and become so involved as to be

* For note 1, see previous page (p.227, numbered 3).
unable to appreciate it as aesthetic - or even distinguish it from reality qua an event now occurring (perhaps their neighbour at a play rustling a programme). An example of this is someone rushing to save Desdemona.

There are two ways of losing distance: a), by under-distancing and b), by over-distancing. If one is under-distanced one is too involved to appreciate, and if one is over-distanced, one is too detached to appreciate, the work. Different art forms encourage different degrees of distance. For example, painting encourages greater distance than sculpture because of framing, the fact that its space and lighting does not coincide with our own, etc. Also, different styles create different degrees. For example, Russian Bakon work is highly distanced. Form - i.e., symmetry, opposition, balance, rhythm, etc., aid one to distance. Bullough also believes that most people fail to distance colours because they see them as personal effects - soothing, cold, etc., instead of seeing them as having their own personality, being energetic, serious, pensive, etc.

In conclusion, he says:

"distance represents in aesthetic appreciation as well as artistic production, a quality inherent in the . . . relation which the human being entertains with art." (p.129 ibid.)

and it:

"renders questions of origin, of influence or of purpose almost as meaningless . . . even as moral importance, since it lifts the work of art out of the realms of practical systems and ends." (p.129 ibid.)

iii) Of other views of the aesthetic object as contemplative, I
shall mention only Ducasse ¹ and Bell ² mainly because what Ducasse says hinders the idea of the aesthetic attitude as contemplative rather than furthering it, and Bell's view has a rather negative value.

Ducasse believes that the only correct attitude to art is contemplative - any other neither sees, nor responds to the essential properties of the work of art. Contemplation is:

"A listening for the feeling impact - for the emotional reverberations - of the object attended to. Aesthetic response to a colour, for example, does not consist in recognising or classifying it, but in savouring it . . . " ²

Whatever is ugly and prevents this sort of contemplation, should not be seen as art. Bell believes that one should contemplate the essence or significant form, of any object. Through contemplation, we shall feel the aesthetic emotion. It is necessary to be contemplative, because this is to be detached, and one must be detached to appreciate everything which is expressed:

"The contemplation of pure form leads to a state of extraordinary exaltation and complete detachment from the concerns of life." (p.68.) ¹

Each of these views employs its own idea of contemplation in the aesthetic attitude. But Prall's theory (i) contains no obvious flaws, and I have noted already its close similarity to Dufrenne's ideas of contemplation in terms of analysis and feeling (feeling,

¹ See Ducasse: *Art, the critics, and you*, New York, Oscar Piest, 1944.
³ See Ducasse, *Art, the critics, and you*, (p.73.)
⁴ See Bell, *Art* (p.68.)

and comprehending the aesthetic surface being similar experiences). There is also a similarity in the way they relate the two. Both regard analysis as a pre-requisite for the true aesthetic experience—attitude—in Dufrenne that of feeling and in Prall that of comprehending the aesthetic surface. Prall omits only the consideration of distance.

Regarding (i), Bullough's theory requires defence, and clarification on one point. To clarify, there is an important distinction in the idea of 'filtering', which it would appear that he does not see. Someone can leave behind himself his own 'reality' or personal feelings—his moods, etc.—without having to see the work of art as unrelated to reality. I.e., the filtering does not preclude seeing the work as informative—psychologically, historically, etc.—even though one 'brackets off' one's problems and moods, etc. One can still see a Henry James' work as providing insights into degrees of sensibility, self-awareness, and the ways in which people may subtly influence one another.

Possibly Bullough demands total dissociation from one's personal affections, where only a degree of detachment is required. For it seems to me that, given a work depicting an event analogous to one in which the spectator actually found himself, the knowledge about that actual situation might enable the spectator better to recognise the qualities and insight of the work. For example, given that X's wife is unfaithful, he might understand the reactions of Othello, and Shakespeare's insight, where they seem implausible to someone not in this position. Personal knowledge of a situation similar to the present artistic situation does not entail that one devolves into a melancholy state, reflecting on one's own problem. Given that one's thoughts remain with the work, external non-artistic knowledge may assist in appreciation in much the same way that external artistic
knowledge does. I think that Bullough's final sweeping remark about
the work being lifted out of the realm of practical systems and ends
by distance, show that he does not realise the possibility of 'filtr­
ering' and still relating art to reality.

George Dickie 1 takes up this question of relevance to life.
But he thinks that distance precludes relating the work to life,
which is not entirely surprising since Bullough himself gives this
impression. Dickie believes concern with things external to the
work is barred because distance is a special mental state so delicate
that the least external pressure can destroy it. But just as he
thinks that relating the work to something external does not necess­
arily interfere with appreciation, I think that it does not prevent
distancing, and that distance is not so delicate as to be easily
destroyed. (If it were, it seems unlikely that Bullough should
require, 'the utmost decrease of Distance without its disappearance'
(p.100 ibid.) with regard to one's attitude to the work.) One can be
psychically distanced from the work of art and so not see it as real,
etc., yet still be capable of relating it to actual events, social,
moral, psychological, and so on.

I think that Bullough is actually at fault and does lay himself
open to the criticisms levelled at him by Dickie. And in this last
case, Bullough leaves the concept of distance open to being inter­
preted as both unrelated to reality, and as a delicate mental state.
What I have suggested is a more disciplined concept where a), one
discriminates what is to be filtered, and b), distance is not such
a delicate mental state.

Nevertheless, whilst I believe that distance is not quite so
easily destroyed as Dickie suggests, I see no reason why it should

1. See, George Dickie: 'The myth of the aesthetic attitude', A.P.Q.,
not be fragile to a certain degree. I.e., part of an attitude (the aesthetic) which is not automatically attained when one is confronted with a work of art, and not certain to be sustained. If this were not so, and the appropriate attitude to art were guaranteed, one would not be annoyed if somebody began rustling sweet paper or drumming out the rhythm, at a concert, or if one were asked irrelevant questions, or confronted with communist petitioners, just before going into an art gallery. These factors disturb one's equilibrium and make it the more difficult to maintain an aesthetic attitude - attain the appropriate degree of distance - of being at one with the music or picture, etc., but sufficiently detached to appreciate critically.

Moreover, I think the aesthetic attitude as I see it in toto - not just the concept of distance - is relatively easily disturbed. But I do not think that debars it from being concerned with things external to the work so long as one can see some relevance between the latter and the work of art and therefore not be entirely away from the work of art and the aesthetic attitude.

Apart from this, Dickie presents various other criticisms of the idea of distance, all of which are perfectly legitimate, but which can, I think, be answered. His main criticisms are (a) that there is in fact no psychological act of distancing performed by the audience of a work of art (b), that Bullough has to use atypical examples to make out any case - e.g., the person in the audience rushing to save Desdemona (c), the so-called aesthetic attitude is really only a matter of paying attention to the work in question, and obeying the conventions applicable to whatever type of art it is with which one is confronted.
Regarding (a), distance is not (intended to be) an act one performs suddenly—though it is deliberate—it is the natural state of mind for anyone familiar with works of art. Dickie appears to think one should notice it—as one would 'notice' striking a particular stance. But I see no reason why this should be so. One does not notice the majority of physical acts which one performs—the very routine acts, or nervous habits of biting one's lip—let alone one's mental or psychological states. It is a state which one maintains while one is audience to a work of art. And as such, one could analyse its symptoms if one wishes—e.g., that one ceases to notice the hum of the fan in the concert hall, that one does not believe that the characters of a drama are really the characters they affect to be; that one puts from one's mind the things over which one has been puzzling all day and drifts into the atmosphere of the art, but not so deeply as to prevent critical appraisal. And so on. Distancing is not a quickly performed psychological act which one just switches on. It is a state of mind attained more or less slowly, according to one's power of putting oneself at one remove from one's everyday affairs—and at a lesser remove from the work itself. It is a kind of limbo which one endeavours to attain, and thus 'distancing' is an achievement term, not just the description of a simple act.

So Dickie is correct to object to a sudden psychological act of distancing, but the fact that Bullough was rather misleading in suggesting that distancing was like this does not in any way harm the concept itself, as I think the description given above shows.

Regarding (b), Bullough does use atypical examples, but these really serve more to emphasise his case than to make out a case at all. A more moderate example of a loss of distance would be of someone who identifies with Isolde in 'Tristan und Isolde',' and
weeps at her misfortunes, or is gripped by sexual desire throughout the Liebestod - but continues to pay attention (if she were not attending, nothing would arise to cause her to react in this way) and does remain in her seat, thus obeying the conventions.

One problem is that the exact degree of distance which has to be taken, varies from person to person, as Bullough says (and also from work to work). So one might cite a moderate case of underdistancing and participation in the work for one person, which might be the appropriate degree for someone else - i.e., someone who could maintain the ability to evaluate and appreciate a work whilst being very much involved in it. Thus, Bullough is safest in using a fairly exaggerated example, because this would count as underdistancing for anyone - the involvement which mistakes something acted for reality is a truly under-distanced or undistanced reaction.

Regarding (o), I think that Dickie is again right in saying distance and the aesthetic attitude involves both paying attention and obeying the appropriate conventions, but I think that there is more to be said. For instance, one can do both these things without adopting the aesthetic attitude - I can pay attention to a piece of music which is atonal, and remain seated, but have a prejudice against atonal music and be able to hear it only as a dreadful sound. In this case, Dickie cannot correct my fault, but distancing to a lesser extent can. For I have over-distanced from the work, and thus debarred myself from feeling any affinity towards it, or any sympathy to its mood or purpose (if any). At the other extreme, I might be the composer and pay attention and obey convention by not shouting 'hooray!', etc., but be so inwardly moved by what I felt I expressed in the music, or so confident as to believe it the greatest music since the St. Matthew Passion, as to be unable to feel objective towards it in any way. In such a case I would be under-distancing.
and Dickie cannot say in either case that I am paying the wrong sort of attention because he has dismissed different types of attention is (interested versus disinterested, transitive and intransitive). Nor can he say that I am paying attention to the wrong thing - I am attending to the object as a work of art (in the first case I hypothesize that I try to hear the work as art, but fail).

Paying attention is really only a precondition of adopting a distanced aesthetic attitude. One cannot have any sort of rational attitude to anything unless one pays some attention to it. Moreover, I think in the case of obeying conventions the conventions are decided by the reaction of an audience, i.e., the degree to which they distance; and the convention will change in accordance with any change in the degree of distancing considered appropriate. Conversely, one can fail to obey the conventions without failing to distance, for example, if one is first in a movement to lessen the audience-work distance.

It might be conventional not to laugh at the amusing incidents in, say, Mozart's Figaro, these conventions having been established by persons who felt a strictly unemotional, respectful, highly distanced attitude was the only appropriate attitude to a work of art. But there is no reason why someone should not maintain less distance, and laugh (thus disobeying convention) and yet maintain a still-distanced aesthetic attitude, i.e., appreciate and be capable of evaluating the worth of the work, not assume that the events depicted are really taking place, etc. Such a person might either be the forerunner in a move to lessen the distance felt by the audience towards operatic or all art works.

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1. See, Dickie, 1964 article.

2. In fact, this feeling that a high degree of distance should be maintained is still prevalent. For example, in a recent letter to the Times, it was maintained that Figaro should not be sung in English, as the audience might actually understand what was happening, and that it was amusing, and the opera might have its audience "rolling in the aisles".
or someone who was capable of minimising the degree of distance he felt, without losing distance altogether (the sort of person Bullough considers most capable of art appreciation).

Dickie's attempt to account for failure to appreciate some work, seems a little too simplistic. To say, "they did not pay attention to the right things", or, "they paid insufficient attention, or, "they reacted in the wrong way", is not to say very much. One wants to know what, 'not paying attention to the right things' comprises, and what is the mental and psychological state of the person who reacts in the wrong way, or pays insufficient attention? It seems to me that the account requires filling out, and that when this is done, and the various phrases are 'washed out', the idea of distance will probably have reappeared under some guise - not least in cases of obeying convention, as I have suggested above.

I think therefore that Bullough's idea of distance is basically sound, even if it does require a certain amount of tightening up.\(^1\) (And not only does he describe exactly what it involves, but he details its application to art forms, art periods, and such things as form, colour and the lower senses.) The view that distance varies from person to person is, I think empirically verifiable. The ability can be developed with a fair amount of experience of works of art.

Since Dufrenne's account of distance involves both detachment and participation, I conclude that he could largely agree

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\(^1\) And bearing in mind that Bullough regards distance as accounting for the whole of the aesthetic attitude, which Dufrenne does not (and that I concur with Dufrenne).
with Bullough (except about emotional involvement) - or with
some such similar theory. However, as I have said (note 12
above), he also thinks that there is more to the aesthetic atti-
dtude than distance. There is also analysis or reflection and
intuitionistic feeling of the kind described by D. W. Prall.

Before going on to the final discussion of Dufrenne, it is
necessary to comment on the views of Duccasse and Bell, which I
sketched briefly. Regarding (iii), what Duccasse says has
several flaws and seems to be the very type of contemplative
theory which makes one suspicious of the idea of contemplation
as an aesthetic attitude:

(a) It precludes the use of any sort of conceptual apparatus,
e.g., recognizing and classifying aspects of the work. The
sole reason seems to be that this (classifying, etc.) is an
ordinary response to an object so it cannot be the aesthetic one.
But there is no reason why one should not regard an 'ordinary'
response as also aesthetic, some sort of analysis as part of
the aesthetic attitude.

(b) What does the idea of 'savouring' tell us, which is of
any importance, or is not empty? It seems to involve absorbing
the work and thinking how pleasant it is, but this rapt gaze
seems rather futile at the end of the day.

(c) Moreover, how does one decide what is ugly and to be
precluded? For someone might successfully 'savour' anything which means
nothing can be ruled out. And those things which might ordi-
arily be accounted ugly, for example, the later works of Goya,

I think that this elaboration and defense of Bullough's account
of distance is justified since Dufrenne implies that he agrees with
a theory of this kind, but again fails to elaborate on the
details.
are not as a rule, aesthetically so called.

Both these points (b) and (c), emphasize the impression that the sort of contemplation involved is a rapt, vacant gaze, gently absorbing the work without any particular ideas and guarded from whatever is unpleasant in the world - being too high-minded for it. Duseasse should rule out these ordinary language overtones of passivity and gentleness which cause one to be wary of the idea of contemplation.

Bell's theory has a somewhat negative value. It says nothing to cause one to reject the idea of contemplation - principally because:
(i) he does not derive the theory from the controversial ideas of Significant Form, etc., so that one does not have to object to contemplation even if one objects to the former (ii), although he regards "detachment from the concerns of life" (p.68 op.cit.) as necessary to aesthetic experience, and detachment is one part of the concept of contemplation in most theories, one can reject Bell's view that one is detached from the concerns of life, without condemning detachment. For example, one can direct it toward the art object instead of life, and one can moderate the degree of detachment from life, which it requires.

While the theory of Prall introduced the concept of analysis and immediate feeling into the aesthetic attitude, Bullock and Bell introduce that of detachment. So Dufrenne's three features of aesthetic contemplation have now been proposed separately by Prall, Bullock and Bell. I think that this and the previous section have shown the value of Dufrenne's account of the aesthetic attitude (i), by working out
thoroughly what he says on analysis and feeling, and (ii), by elaborating a theory of distance which one hopes he would consider acceptable. And even if Dufrenne is not original in the sense that others have said jointly, what he now says singly, he is original (i) in that there is no reason to believe he is plagiarizing - one can see the theory worked out as the Phenomenology progresses, and, as far as I am aware, he always acknowledges any sources; and (ii) in that his theory has not previously been stated by any single person. It is only to be found in a combination of views.

Taken as a whole, I think that, while lacking in clarity and often in depth of discussion, I think what Dufrenne says of the aesthetic attitude is nevertheless valuable.

Appendix.

In order to keep a balance, I should mention that there are various other views of the aesthetic attitude which do not regard it as contemplative. For example, Bergson presents a theory from the point of view mainly of the artist rather than the spectator. This distinguishes it from Dufrenne (and most other theories) since Dufrenne speaks from the point of view of the spectator - although he does not say that the artist either cannot or does not adopt the aesthetic attitude. To state it simply, the aesthetic attitude according to Bergson is an innate ability in the artist to see the world as it is. Whereas the ordinary person sees it in terms of

stock types and conventions, there are certain people born with the
ability to see what is there. These people are artists, and by an
original use of language they can communicate to us Bergson's idea of
the aesthetic emotion, which T. E. Hulme describes as:

"a kind of instinctive feeling which is conveyed over to one,
that the poet is describing something which is actually present
to him, which he realises visually at first hand." (p.167 op. cit.)

The attitude of the audience is presumably intelligently receptive.
In contrast to most theories of an aesthetic attitude (which see the
aesthetic object as if it were non-real, or at least non-ordinary)
this reverses the order, so that the aesthetic attitude is something
rather esoteric, and the artist the only one in contact with reality,
while others are removed from it by a veil of conventionality. Other
theories are given by play theorists, Lange and Croce,2 Parker and
Freud,3 and emotionalist theorists, e.g. Tolstoy4 and Hirn. But
it would be moving too far from Dufrenne to go any further into
alternative theories.

3. K. Lange: *Art as play*, reprinted in K. E. Radek (ed.): *A modern
4. See S. Freud: *Psychoanalytische Studien an Werken der Richtung
und Kunst*, Leipzig Wien, Zürich, Internationaler Psychoanalytischer
Vorlag, 1924.
(Also on this: Richard Sterba: 'The problem of art in Freud's writing'
Psychoanalytic quarterly ix no.2. April, 1940.)

5. See Tolstoy: op. cit.

* 1. Also T. E. Hulme: *Further speculations*, Minnesota University
Section VI.

An evaluation of aesthetic attitudes.

(1) Why an aesthetic attitude and which? Introduction.

Any theory which hopes to make out a case for the aesthetic attitude must show that it has some function in a theory of aesthetics. It is not enough to claim that it must exist because works of art are different from ordinary entities and therefore require a different attitude. For there is very little reason to suppose, as a matter of fact, that a work of art is intrinsically very different from, say, a table. A painting seen as something simply with which to fill a space on a wall—which a set of plaster ducks would do equally well—does not seem to put it into the class of 'works of art'. On the other hand, if one can make out a case for the aesthetic attitude, one may very well be able to differentiate certain sets of objects (including in this music) from certain others, and thus have a reason for maintaining the aesthetic attitude. And if one emerges only with the idea that one must study certain aspects of some existents, namely those held to be works of art, in a particular way, then one is claiming that an aesthetic attitude exists.

A theory of contemplation seems to provide a way of appreciating art, and to give content to the concept of an aesthetic attitude. In this case, one is not upholding the attitude as entirely fundamental—the way one decides whether there is such a thing as art—but maintaining that it is the way in which one appreciates art objects, and evaluates something as art. This latter is the more usual task one sets for the aesthetic attitude, and the way in which I have approached it in this chapter. This is obviously not entirely different from the former idea, but distinct in that the use of the aesthetic attitude is normally a preliminary to evaluation—deciding what is and what is not art (or good art)—
rather than a way in which one decides whether or not there is such a thing as a work of art.

As I have already briefly mentioned, Ducasse gives an ordinary language account of contemplation. This causes one to reject contemplation as the aesthetic attitude, since it is supposed to be the appreciation of a work of art, which provides one with sufficient knowledge (of its form, content, etc.) to be able to make an evaluation of it. If it was correct simply to savour the work of art, as Ducasse suggests, then it would be necessary already to have made the evaluation as to what was, and what was not, a work of art, in order to savour it. The evaluation is presupposed because Ducasse takes it that one knows the sorts of things to 'savor' prior to adopting the aesthetic attitude, or savouring them. But surely the aesthetic attitude is not posterior to aesthetic judgment - as this makes it?

Nor can one dismiss discussion of contemplation in terms of analysis and feeling in favour of an ordinary language view, e.g., on the grounds that contemplation is by definition simply looking at/listening to, something, without involving any conceptualisation. This is merely one of the ordinary uses of the term, found mainly in religious contexts allied to the activity of meditation, when the mind is emptied completely of thought. If this were the only meaning one could attach to the concept, then it would be completely empty of content for aesthetics, it would provide the aesthetic attitude with no purpose or useful result.

Fortunately, there is no inconsistency in maintaining that certain concepts (here contemplation) may have different meanings in different contexts. As a matter of fact the religious and aesthetic contexts are not entirely divorced, since both involve the

1. See Section V, my comments on Ducasse.
idea of detachment. In connection with this, Bell has provided a
good general reason for contemplation as the aesthetic attitude -
to be contemplative is to be detached, and one must be detached in
order to be able to appreciate everything about a work of art (though
Bell takes the idea of detachment to its extreme).

The remaining question is, "how does contemplation differ from
other forms of studying which are not aesthetic?" I think that the
answer to this has been given at various points in this chapter, and
one has just to bring these together here.

Both the nature of contemplation, and to some extent, its object,
distinguish the contemplative aesthetic attitude from a scientific or
ordinary one. (i), it is a distanced mental state (cf. Sections
IV and V). This involves a certain degree of psychological detach­
ment from its object and from the world - e.g., 'putting oneself out
of gear', together with an even greater degree of psychological
involvement and participation, e.g., identification with a char­
acter in a play. The detachment is partly accomplished by regard­
ing the 'object' as not-an-event-taking-place-now (if its object is
a work of literature, especially drama, or representational painting
and music), or 'unreal' in various ways (disconnected from the
majority of one's everyday affairs or something for which the
ordinary temporal sequence is irrelevant, etc. cf. Chapter 2).
(ii) It is also an attitude which maintains and exercises the
ability for critical analysis and evaluation of its object - cf.
Section II - looking for particular qualities according to what
theory of art one holds, e.g., for beauty under some description,
and/or formal qualities of balance, positioning, counterpoint, etc.,
and/or expressive qualities of joy, sublimity, anguish, etc.
(iii) Despite being critical the contemplative attitude is also sympathetic and sensitive to its object, approaching it, as Dufrenne claims (cf. also Section III) on its own level, 'having a sense of' the work or an intuitive understanding of it.

(iv) I think it is also the case that when one sees an object as aesthetic, or contemplates it aesthetically, that one contemplates it for its own sake; not seeing it as a useful object for some further purpose (i.e., as a means to an end), but as an end in itself. One has an attitude which Osborne calls 'disinterested interest'. By contrast, if one were taking a non-contemplative attitude, one would possibly see the object as indicative of something or a means to an end, or as of some use for a particular purpose.

Thus, this attitude is a decidedly active frame of mind directed towards all putative and established works of art, carrying with it a certain set of beliefs such that it may discard anything to which it cannot maintain its attitude and anything which does not conform to its standards. I think that this is sufficient to distinguish it as a non-ordinary attitude.

As a general rule, the aesthetic attitude is either a standard for something's being an aesthetic object or work of art or the standpoint from which one can judge something as art. It is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for something's being aesthetic. I.e., it is a necessary condition of being aesthetic that (i) one can adopt this attitude to it, and (ii), one does adopt it - because the aesthetic attitude is the means to evaluating whether the object is aesthetic in the first place. But it is not a sufficient condition since the adoption (or attempted adoption) of


2. See Osborne op. cit. (p.26) quoting Haesrabi, 'The contemplative activity', 1954, who suggests a falling leaf could be seen non-aesthetically as an indication of rain, or that the tree had something wrong with it.
the attitude does not automatically make X aesthetic. If it did, one could never exclude anything as aesthetic—there would always be the possibility of someone (possibly with a strange theory of art) adopting an aesthetic attitude to it. And it seems to me that it just is the case that some things exclude themselves from being aesthetic objects. If it were not so, and everything could be aesthetic, then to say X is an aesthetic object would be to say very little, and distinguish nothing.

Thus, both the character of the attitude and the nature of its object distinguish the contemplative from other non-aesthetic attitudes. I should also add if this is not already obvious, that I am giving a normative rather than a descriptive account of contemplation.

(ii) A summary of Dufrenne's theory.

This theory has been explained in the first four sections of this chapter, and I shall summarise it, and then see how defensible it can be. Dufrenne asserts that the attitude of the subject is one of contemplation, which involves both critical analysis and feeling, or 'having a sense of' the work, and a psychologically distanced stance.

In the final analysis, criticism is seen as being in the service of feeling, where feeling is the ultimate means of understanding or appreciating, the work. It is not entirely clear how much analysis (reflection) Dufrenne wishes to admit in the aesthetic experience. But he realises that one cannot immediately appreciate a work via feeling. Reflection is necessary to gain sufficient knowledge of the work of art, and familiarity with it, to have a feeling for it in our aesthetic perception, "... la réflexion peut préparer la perception ..." (p.521). Reflection is ultimately subordinate to feeling as the highest mode of access to the work:

"Tout ce que l'attitude critique avait découvert reste valable, mais est affecté d'une changement de signe. La réflexion est désormais aux ordres du sentiment et inspirée par lui ..." (p.523 ibid.)
"On voit donc le passage de l'attitude critique à l'attitude sentimentale n'est pas simplement une oscillation: la réflexion prépare le sentiment, puis elle l'éclair" (p. 523 ibid).

However, analysis and feeling are regarded as mutually complementary, even though one is subordinated to the other.

What Dufrenne says of distance is less detailed. Mainly, though, he feels that the subject understands and recognizes the emotions, etc., expressed by a work, but that he remains detached from them. It is not necessary to feel the sadness of a tragedy, i.e., to feel actually sad, in order to appreciate it. Rather, one must have a sense of, for example, the tragic. As a rule he does not say that it would be wrong to become emotionally involved as long as it did not prevent appreciation — in fact, he maintains that one should participate in the work, he engaged in it (p. 93 ibid), and identify with it to a certain degree (p. 490 ibid). However, at one point, he debars emotional involvement — "... la participation n'y va point jusqu'à l'émotion." (p. 472).

The problems relating to analysis and feeling have been discussed already, and Dufrenne's final position seems to involve no major difficulties. The idea of distance, which is closely related to Bullegh, seems also to be acceptable. It therefore remains only to point out certain advantages in this doctrine of the aesthetic attitude, and elucidate two aspects of degree in aesthetic distance.

(iii) A defence of the theory of contemplation.

A. It seems that this sort of theory comes into its own when one asks the very important question which arose in the introductory part of the section — why an aesthetic attitude?, or, what is the aim or purpose of the aesthetic attitude? If it has none, it can be rejected as a superfluous part of the machinery. In non-contemplative theories, it seems to be just a kind of corollary, derivative
from the particular aesthetic theory. In a theory of contemplation, such as that proposed by Dussouci, it becomes an empty concept, and an easy target for the critics to destroy.

However, when one involves critical analysis, as Dufrenne does, one provides a theory whereby the aesthetic attitude (as well as possessing a psychological side), leads to appreciating a work of art - thus avoiding vacuity and making it a necessary stage in an aesthetic.

The capacity for appreciating a work of art seems to be the most obvious and useful end of an aesthetic attitude. And, if appreciation is not immediate, and it is empirically verifiable that it is not, then (a) a certain mental activity is required from the observer. This mental activity is the reflective/conceptualised analysis, as, for example proposed by Dufrenne. It also seems perfectly reasonable to suppose that the reflective activity will provide the means for a feeling or sense of the work, as Dufrenne further suggests. This feeling attitude is that on which one is on a level with the work; the attitude from which one can see what qualities the work contains by means of a sympathetic and unbiased awareness, i.e., appreciate it.

However, I think Dufrenne is correct in thinking that this is not the whole of what is involved in the aesthetic attitude. It does not yet include the concept of detachment which, as I mentioned at the end of the introductory part of this section, is an important reason for regarding contemplation as the appropriate aesthetic attitude. The concept of distance (as understood by Dufrenne, and more expansively by Bullough) satisfactorily completes the aesthetic attitude without necessitating any break or disjointed transition. For it appears that one, nor is it a good idea to say that the aesthetic attitude is a prerequisite of critical analysis and appreciation, for this renders it an empty concept again (until one includes distancing, that is) - simply an open-mindedness to the work. And since this, i.e., open-mindedness is a prerequisite of an unbiased analysis of anything - not just art, one would then be left with some attitude, not only rather vacuous, but not exclusive to so
can link it with the concept of feeling. Though Dufrenne does not specifically associate the two, one can see that the distanced attitude may be held to be the psychological position from which one can put one's sense of the work to best advantage. As Bullough points out, the degree of distance or detachment will depend on the capacity of the subject to become involved without losing his grasp of the work as a formally satisfactory whole, or the ability to see it as art at all. Dufrenne notes the necessity to be engaged in the work and identify to a certain extent, but does not take into account this subjective psychological trait.

Distance also has the advantage of showing that the aesthetic attitude is not just 'the attitude one takes to art objects', which could be the same as that taken to any object (if just described as critical and gaining a feeling for the object), but that its objects are exclusively aesthetic. For it maintains that one has to be detached in some way — which is not the case with ordinary objects.

It remains only to clarify two aspects of distancing. (1) The degree of emotional involvement permissible or necessary (ii) the dissociation of art and life which it appeared to entail in Bullough's theory.

(1) Weits criticises Bullough on the grounds that one cannot indulge in all the emotions of any one work of art (which he feels that Bullough demands). This criticism is justified to a certain extent - certainly we cannot be overcome by pity/fear/joy/jealousy, etc. all at once. Nor can we appreciate a work if we are overcome by emotional response. However, there is a degree to which one can become involved emotionally without this impairing one's judgment. There are various possible emotive responses which do not seem in any way harmful. Having an emotional involvement does not entail that one takes sides (e.g., of one character against another in a play), and because one recognises the distinction between the work of art and events occurring in it.

1. See, Morris Weits; Philosophy of the arts, Russell & Russell 1964, especially Chapter 9.
ordinary world, one has the opportunity of making detached judgments.

There are numerous examples of non-harmful responses in which one indulges in the work of art, or in some way identifies with it, as Dufrenne suggests. In general, one might have a non-particularised unnamed affective response of excitement towards a work. In this case, the feeling may well induce one to pay greater attention than would a purely detached attitude. Thus, the attitude encourages the aesthetic response, rather than hindering it.

Or, in the case of more conceptualised responses, one may feel a sense of strife or finality, or futility, or that one ultimately aspires to something unattainable, when listening to a Mahler symphony; or feel a sense of power, or that the great can achieve greatness, in listening to Beethoven's Emperor concerto. What evidence is there to show that participation to this extent - namely that of experiencing what is expressed - interferes with one's capacity to appreciate?

I think that the case is rather the reverse, i.e., that emotional involvement (possibly to the extent of the utmost decrease of distance without its loss, as Bullough advocates) in the aesthetic attitude will enhance aesthetic appreciation by giving a sense of continuity with the work and a sympathy with what is expressed. 1

1. I.e., Great persons can perform great or supreme acts - actions beyond the capacities of ordinary persons.
2. Which is not necessarily an emotion.
3. Although Dufrenne does advocate participation in the work and identification (cf. pp. 471-2 op. cit. and quotation Section IV of this chapter), and having a sense of the work, I do not think that he would allow the emotional involvement I am suggesting here, since this could be held to cloud the purity of the feeling. He says, "la participation n'y va point jusqu'à l'émotion." (p. 472.)
I advocate this with the proviso that one does not merely experience something expressed in the work, and then move on to some extra-artistic thought, e.g., of meditating on the correctness of the ideas expressed or becoming stricken by feelings of futility, thereby moving out of the realm of the work of art and missing the rest of what is presented in it,\(^1\) appreciating its formal structure, etc. Those who advocate complete detachment seem to make the psychological error of denying the capacity of the audience to become involved without falling into this trap.

(ii) I have already discussed this fairly satisfactorily, I think. Only a little remains to be said. As I said\(^2\), Dufrenne's assertion that the work of art is unreal does not entail that it is unrelated to reality, and\(^3\) Bullough's assertion that distance "lifts the work of art out of the realm of practical systems and ends" (p. 129 op. cit.) does not mean he is right in thinking that his theory dissociates art and life.

One can take a different attitude to the aesthetic from the ordinary object without involving oneself in maintaining that the aesthetic object is autonomous or dissociated from life. I.e., one can distance oneself from the external world during the perception of a work, and still derive information, etc., relevant to one's ordinary activities. I think the point is that the aesthetic attitude itself, i.e., the thoughts, etc. of the subject through the

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1. "Missing the rest" being the operative words.
2. See my first comment on Section IV of this chapter.
3. See my first comment on Bullough, Section V of this chapter.
duration of the work, 'cut out' personal feelings and problems, but that one can still take note of the fact that the work makes some point about the world in general, or oneself in particular. These points are subsequently utilised.\(^1\) Or, as I have previously maintained, personal knowledge of a situation similar to that given in a work of art may enhance one's understanding of the psychology in the work - and as long as one pays attention to the work rather than to oneself, the aesthetic attitude can be maintained.

**Conclusion.**

This seems to present fairly substantial evidence for the existence of an aesthetic attitude, and for one of contemplation, in particular that of Dufrenne, as that which gives it most value in a theory of aesthetics. As noted, I think that Dufrenne would not disagree with Bullough's theory of distance, though I think he would baulk at the idea of emotional involvement, as failing to preserve the purity of feeling in the aesthetic experience. In this, I would obviously disagree with him, since I have suggested that emotional involvement may enhance the ability for aesthetic appreciation, rather than obscuring the appreciation.

As I pointed out, Dufrenne's theory is very much like a combination of Prall and Bullough. Though presented in descriptive terms (like Bullough's) as if this were the attitude one does take to a work of art, it is obviously prescriptive - or normative, i.e., the model - since it is a claim that this is the correct attitude, aesthetically, and not just an assertion that this is the attitude observers will take to art.

1. For instance, in one's understanding of ordinary life, - of one's own and others' acts.
Although I have attempted to defend Dufrenne in this chapter, and to give oredenoe to his theories, I think this has highlighted the unfortunate fact that Dufrenne never discusses his theories fully enough or with sufficient clarity, nor does he provide anything like sufficient justification for what he says. This is especially obvious in his bare statements on contemplation and distance. And as I have indicated, much of what he says is obscure and inconclusive. So the real conclusion to the theory of the aesthetic attitude as given by Dufrenne, is that he provides implications, statements and indications of a theory which one has to fill out and interpret as best one can. I think one can say at least, however, that he provides sufficient guidelines for one to feel fairly assured that one is interpreting him correctly.

Appendix.

I would like to add a brief qualification to the idea of the aesthetic attitude given here. I do not regard it as static. For one thing, I do not think one necessarily takes the same attitude to a particular work each time one comes into contact with it. One may be more or less critical - and less criticism is probably involved as one grows more familiar with the work, i.e., one does not have to reappraise a work on each occasion; and in the case of the performed arts one will appraise the performance rather than the work, once one has established a view of the work's value (though this of course is always open to reappraisal). And some people will be able to appreciate a work more than others. Also, the intuitive understanding of the work, proposed by Dufrenne, will depend entirely on the subject. And with works of natural beauty one may suspend the critical appraisal, since there is no deliberate structure or meaning in these objects.
CHAPTER FIVE. MEANING AND EXPRESSION.

Introduction.
This final chapter is intended to cover the other two important topics of the Phénoménologie - expression and its related topic, meaning. Expression is not entirely 'another' topic, since it was the a priori nature of affective/expressive qualities, as the essence or being of a work of art, which was in contention in Chapter Three. However, in that case it was the relation of the a priori to art, rather than expression per se, which was being questioned. Unfortunately, this key point of Dufrenne's theory - that art is a priori - turned out to be not established.

I therefore do not intend to assume in this chapter that the expressive or affective qualities of a work are a priori. However, as with the previous chapter, this does not impede discussion of the work as expressive. Whether the expressive in art is a priori or the essence of art, can be taken as a separate issue from whether art is expressive, and in what way. The questions pertaining to the former have been dealt with, and the latter must now be discussed. In conjunction with meaning, it rounds off the outstanding question on the nature of art as a quasi-subject.

Fortunately, this theory - which is another important feature of Dufrenne's thesis - fares better than the a priori. And as with the aesthetic attitude, Dufrenne discusses the subject from a new point of view - that of the phenomenologist - and makes a worthwhile contribution to the aesthetics of the objective features of art. For example, he regards the meaning of art as eventually ungraspable - which is a different angle from the norm - where meaning may be untranslatable into words, but is always eventually comprehensible. And while Dufrenne's argument may lack support, he is at least breaking from conventional attitudes and testing out new ground.
Dufrenne's theory of the work of art is, as I said, that it is a necessary condition, its essence, to be expressive. This has been seen in the account of the affective a priori of art.\(^1\) The affective qualities (quality) of a work are its expressive qualities - the tragic, the sad, etc. And they are its essence. As such, the meaning of the work must be derived from these qualities, at least in part. Thus, expression and meaning in the theory of Dufrenne, can be studied together. However, Dufrenne adds that there are also formal qualities to be considered in giving meaning to the sensible.

But by 'formal qualities', he does not always mean something opposed to 'expressive qualities' - in the sense that one might oppose formalist and expressionist theories. When Dufrenne refers to form one can subtly take it to mean the sensible formed into some expressive/affective quality, by the understanding, rather than the form taken in a purely structural sense - the way parts of a work are spatially and temporally co-ordinated, irrespective of the expressive qualities of the work - so as not to separate form and expression. For Dufrenne is supposedly an expressionist rather than a formalist, and to say that the form alone gives meaning to the work, rather than its expressive qualities, would be rather to obviate the point of its expressive nature, and to contradict the idea that the expression is the essence of the work.\(^2\)

To take the formal aspects of a work as those which give it meaning, or make it art, is to adopt a formalist approach, and

1. See Chapter Three.
2. That is, always supposing it is one of the aims of a work of art to be meaningful. Meaning must be assumed to be a necessary condition of art (and Dufrenne does assume this). Otherwise, i.e., if it were purely contingent that a work was meaningful and it was possible for \(A\) to be art and not meaningful, then it would not matter if form alone gave the work its meaning.
surely Dufrenne does not want to do this. It must be admitted, however, that Dufrenne does say on occasion that the form of a work gives it its meaning. But having formalist views is not necessarily incompatible with having expressionist ones.

The possibility which I do not think Dufrenne takes into account, is that it is quite legitimate to allow that formal properties by themselves can provide for calling a work art. Although I would not like to say at this point that it is a rule that formal properties are either necessary or sufficient conditions for calling X art, I would suggest that in certain cases - for example, some Bach fugues, formal properties are sufficient conditions for regarding something as art.

Section I. Meaning, part 1.

I. Meaning.

To begin with, one can point out a few of the things which meaning, aesthetically, is not. For one thing, to say that a work of art is meaningful is not the same thing as saying that it has a message (e.g., is symbolic, as one might say a cross was symbolic), or is meaningful in the sense one might somebody's look was meaningful. Nor is it the same as the meaning of a person, where this is his intention. These ideas of meaning use it in terms of pointing towards, or indicating, something further, beyond the thing which is given. And this applies to words. Although the meaning of a word is not an object (as Strawson pointed out, under the impression that Russell thought it was), words nevertheless act as indicators in some way - they give instructions or describe things, or explain, and in general are only mediating factors.

1. I.e., when used in the context of art.
A fairly important fact about the work of art, is that in being meaningful it does not point to something else. Dufrenne notes this twice - firstly (Vol.I, Part I, Chap. IV, p.171), when he distinguishes the aesthetic object from what he calls the ordinary meaningful object. For instance natural objects, he says, refer outside themselves in space and time, but with aesthetic objects, the sign and what is signified are one. Thus while ordinary perception seeks a meaning of the given beyond what is given, perception of the aesthetic object finds meaning within what is given - the aesthetic object:

"Le rapport du signifié au signifiant dans l'objet esthétique n'est pas le même que pour les objets naturels qui rembient toujours hors d'eux-mêmes, . . . . ou pour les objets signifiants dans lesquels le signe s'efface devant la signification qu'il apporte . . . . Alors que la perception ordinaire cherche le sens du donné au delà du donné, l'objet esthétique ne livre son sens qu'à la condition qu'au lieu de traverser le donné, la perception s'arrête à lui . . . . . . . ." (p.171 ibid.)

Secondly (Vol.I, Part I, cono. pp.196-7), he mentions it briefly again to say that the meaning of the aesthetic object is contained within it, and it is understood only by reference to itself:

"il porte en lui son sens, il est à lui-même son propre monde, et nous ne pouvons le comprendre qu'en demeurant auprès de lui, et revenant toujours à lui." (pp.196-7.)

I think this is one of the most important points which Dufrenne makes here about meaning. Otherwise in this section, he discusses understanding the meaning, from the point of view both of audience and author, and the survival of the work under certain circumstances.
The first discussion is with respect to a possible subject in art work (Vol. I, Part II, pp. 387 ff). Here Dufrenne is arguing against strict formalism as proposed by Bell¹ or Fry² giving reasons for the existence and usefulness of a subject in works of art. Dufrenne sees one rather pragmatic reason for the formalist viewpoint. It is that representational art is open to much abuse and misinterpretation by concentrating on the wrong things - namely the subject. He cites the example of someone thinking they have understood a work simply because they recognise its subject (for instance that it depicts a mountain scene). This is as bad as using a portrait to evoke some memory, according to him. In these cases the audience loses the aesthetic experience and uses the work as a means to an end, or like a puzzle which, when the subject is comprehended, is solved. In this case one will not carry on contemplating the work once the subject has been discovered, just as one does not carry on 'contemplating' a crossword puzzle, or come back to it again, once it is finished. It is also a trap for the artist, who may find it easier to be realistic than abstract in his work, and may satisfy tastes more easily that way.

However, Dufrenne defends the necessity of a subject for two reasons related to the understanding of the work of art. Firstly, the subject satisfies the tendency of perception to see the sensible object as being of something, i.e., to see the object as having form and order and thus being more readily comprehensible. Secondly, and relatedly, the sensible has to attach itself to something in order for the work to 'get itself noticed' as something in particular - an aesthetic object. And, according to Dufrenne, the represented object gives the sensible the unity of meaning, which unity he

1. See Clive Bell, op. cit.
3. Chap. IV.
regards as appealing to reflection because it is the unity of a concept or concepts.

Dufrenne adds that a representational subject is also meaningful for the artist - he does not choose his subject arbitrarily, but because it arouses a certain emotion in him (pp.393-4). But this is by the way, since the artist's reasons for choosing some subject are quite possibly non-aesthetic, I would imagine. And Dufrenne adds that the artist does not give any clue as to how we are to understand what he creates - so even if the meaning the subject has for him is particularly relevant, it is not divulged. (p.403 ibid.)

Moving from the idea of a representational subject, but again on the negative side (pp.401-3), Dufrenne warns against the spectator's taking any philosophy put forward in a work as a key to that work. Indeed he considers that any systematised philosophy in a work of art would kill the work, by using it as a means to the expression of the system, rather than an end in itself. To make understanding more difficult, Dufrenne insists on the work of art as being opaque and inexhaustible. He considers ordinary objects to be opaque to a certain extent, but when represented, in art, they are doubly so. He cites a countryside by Cézanne as being even less easily grasped (intellectually), than an actual piece of countryside:

"Un paysage de Cézanne est insaisissable comme un paysage du monde naturel, et mieux que lui . . . . ."

"les individus représentés par l'art conservent dans l'oeuvre le caractère insaisissable et secret qui est le propre d'une liberté." (p.403 ibid.)

1. Though not intentionally so.
This is apparently because of the change from the uncertainty of ordinary existence to the superior state of art — though Dufrenne does not explain why a refinement of existence should make for greater unintelligibility.

Dufrenne concludes this rather brief examination of the understanding of a work of art with an outline of 'bodily' understanding of the work (Vol.II, Part I, Chap.I pp.429-431). He thinks one cannot understand, e.g., a poem, until one is 'lulled by the rhythm', and generally held by its sensuous qualities. And the rhythm can only be grasped in so far as the words are understood; and inversely the sense of the words can only be understood through, for example, the movement it arouses in us. Thus he holds that the rhythm (sensuous character) of a work, and the meaning, are in a symmetrical relationship.

At a more preliminary stage, Dufrenne asserts that on first contact of the body with an aesthetic object, the only meaning the body can discern is a meaning for the body. This is not so far-fetched as it sounds, since Dufrenne is using 'body' to mean 'whole self - mind and body', rather than to differentiate it from mind. But what he says still requires some elucidation. It is really a fairly simple statement that at first glance one cannot find the real meaning of a work, but one can feel or sense its nature, in a simple way, and may feel some sort of affinity with the work.1

Dufrenne does give the impression of being about to explain the meaning and understanding of meaning in Section IV of the fourth chapter (Vol.I, Part I) as it is entitled 'L'objet esthétique et l'objet signifiant', (which does not mean that he regards the aesthetic object as distinct from the meaningful object; just meaningful in a different way from that of the ordinary object). However

1. See Chapter IV regarding feeling, and 'having a sense of' the work of art.
although he makes some sort of preliminary distinctions, he does not give any straightforward description of aesthetic meaning. Much of his discussion concerns truth (le vrai and la verite) in art, and the implicit dissociation between a work's having meaning, and its being true or false. That is, he claims that works of literature do not purport to present the truth in the way that scientific works do. (p.162 ff. ibid.)

He appears to be led into this attitude to meaning by the reflection that although works of art are not primarily information-giving objects, and thus not meaningful because of this aspect (unlike books providing information of some sort), if these latter objects were lost, information about cultures would be given by their arts.¹

After this, he poses two questions, which may be taken as rhetorical (at any rate they are never specifically answered):

"l'objet esthetique n'est-il pas en premier signifiant? Et par consequent n'est-ce pas la lecture de cette signification qu'il attend de nous en premier?" (p.162 ibid.)

This requires a certain amount of comment. For example, a much simpler solution seems to exist for aiding the audience to understand the meaning of art, whether with or without a subject. That is, to educate the audience not to see the subject as supplying the whole of the meaning of the work, such that it is fully comprehended and may be

1. In the same vein of the relationship between survival and meaning, Dufrenne later (Vol.I, Part I, Chap.VI, p.292) refers to a possible society of vandals. In this situation, aesthetic objects as such would disappear; the object would survive without its meaning. The aesthetic object, Dufrenne asserts, demands perception as an aesthetic object, by means of which it gains meaning. This implies the belief that if anything is an aesthetic object it has meaning, by the assertion that it would lose meaning, if and because it ceased to be an aesthetic object.
regarded as finished with, once the subject has been established. The solution would therefore be not one of circumventing the problem by abandoning realism, but of making people use the right criteria for appreciating art.

Both arguments in favour of a subject are particularly weak. It is, after all, only a matter of training that causes people to look for recognisable forms in what they see. The existence or otherwise of these latter has no real relation to their having meaning. And this being so, an inability to find any representation should be no bar to finding a meaning in the object, if it has any.

Nor is it necessary for a work of art to have a subject as such, e.g., represent something - for it to have form and order. Abstract works, non-representational music, architecture, etc., do not have 'subjects' and still have order if they are works of art (and necessarily have some form). And any entity is of something, just as consciousness is always consciousness of something. A work of art always has a content, and therefore satisfies the necessity to be of something.

Following on from this, Dufrenne seems happy to forget the amount even of painting, let alone music, which has no subject. He says (p.393) that one has to take account of the meaning of the words and their subject(s) in order to understand - yet even this may not be true of 'impressionist' types of work such as Beckett's Lessness. I think he is making use illegitimately, of an ambiguity in the term 'subject' - between a representational subject - which all art does not have, and content-subject - which all art does have (for this is merely the material of the work and may be as abstract and non-representational as the artist chooses).

There are two final queries.

(i) As to the subject having a meaning for the artist, Dufrenne is being at least historically inaccurate - for the choice of subject is often out of the hands of the artist and in the hands of the wealthy,
(ii) And the idea of bodily understanding I find somewhat pointless. For instance, the first description of this is such that understanding would never get started, since understanding depends on rhythm, and vice versa. Nor does it in fact seem to be the case that understanding of the words of a literary work depends on gaining a sense of their rhythm (movement) - although this may be true of some poetry. The second assertion is more simple and less controversial.

Dufrenne is correct, I think, in saying (a), that art is unlike language in the sense that it does not point to anything outside itself, and (b), that the meaning of a work is to be sought from the work and not from external factors. In both these references one sees a marked similarity to Dufrenne's (and others) views on the location of the artist's intentions (of Chapter Two) i.e., that one can discern the intentions of the author only from his work. Meaning and intention are in any case closely linked - e.g., in the claims that the meaning of a work and the intended meaning of the author are, or should be, the same thing.

He now moves on to two related aspects of aesthetic meaning (i) its verbal untranslatability, and (ii) its ultimate ungraspability. (Not that the latter is held to derive from the former. It is rather the case that both are held to derive from the limitless character of the aesthetic object.)

(ii) Meaning and language.

Dufrenne stresses on at least three separate occasions, that what the work of art says (and even this much carries the implication that it does say something meaningful), cannot be said other than by itself. He twice uses music as his example. On the first occasion (VoII, Part I, Chap.IV, p.172) he says that whatever explanation or exposition of
the work one gives, it will always be slightly unfaithful to it, and 
is most apparent in music.1

"Je puis bien dire, après Beethoven lui-même, que l’andante du 
XVe quator dit la prière à Dieu d’une malade reconnaissant: ai-
je exprimé par là ce que disent ces longs étirements d’accords 
sur des tonalités toujours changeantes? Ce que dit la musique 
ne peut être dit que par elle." (p.172 ibid.)

Secondly (Vol.II, Part III, Chap. IV, p.486), regarding the aesthetic 
attitude, he says that the attempt to translate the work into ordinary prose is ultimately 
vain:

"puisque ce que dit l’œuvre ne peut être dit autrement 
que par elle" (p.486 ibid.)

The last statement of this view is implicit rather than explicit.
This is still in the context of the aesthetic attitude (Vol.II, Part 
III, Chap.IV, p.509) and has been mentioned in the previous chapter. 
Dufrenne asserts that identification and rational comprehension are 
not the proper end of aesthetic perception. We do not ask exactly 
what a literary work means, and should not regard obscurity in a 
work as making it inaccessible to us. The most difficult texts are 
understood by acceding to feeling (to a non-definable world). I.e., 
even if it were possible to give an exact account (verbalisation) of 
what a work means, that attempt would be misguided.

Having given every indication that he does not regard art as 
really a language (as I think my comments on this section will show), 
it is a little disconcerting to find that Dufrenne launches into a 
discussion of 'expression in language', in the middle of a chapter 
on the aesthetic, and the meaningful, object. (Vol.I, Part I, Chap.IV, 
pp.173-184.) However, language is one of the major media of artists, 
and a lot of what Dufrenne says centres on the capacity of language

1. Nevertheless, whatever he says of music and our appreciation of 
art, he presumably intends to apply to all arts, since he says 
(p.509) that our attitude to music is a paradigm case of our att-
itude to all art. It contains all the essential qualities.
to become aesthetic, and the degree to which it already is (by being already expressive, as well as a rational, ordered, means of signifying). Because he is concerned with its usage as an art form - and not as that into which one translates an aesthetic object - Dufrenne plays down the differences between objects and language. However, there is no denying that language and objects are different, in that language uniquely exists in a two term relationship, of sign and thing signified, where language occupies the former place. Also, according to Dufrenne, a word (non-aesthetic) has a definite sense which it holds by convention, and an object, if it has a meaning, can be understood in a whole variety of ways.

There is quite a lot to be said about this, especially with regard to interpretations.

Dufrenne makes no effort to support his supposition that all arts are the same in not having a possible verbal translation, nor does he have any strong grounds for saying that this is the case for any art, for that matter. All he does is to give examples of the inadequacy of certain verbal explanations of some works. It is possible that there are other and more detailed explanations of, say, Beethoven's Fifteenth quartet, which could be given after a fairly long study of the work, and which would be closer to the real meaning. I.e., an explanation of the form of each movement, how they were related, the tonal structure, the relation of each expressive quality (in terms of harmony, rhythm, melody, etc.) what was expressed and how.

This would certainly explain something about the work. Nevertheless, I think it would have been more accurate of Dufrenne had he said at the outset, that works of art are not exactly language, and therefore not the sort of things which are open to translation. Each part

1 And all phenomenologists would agree that objects have meaning.
is not like a word in a foreign language, so it is really making a category mistake to say that works cannot be translated verbally. The point is that one would not try. This is more or less what Dufrenne means when he says identification is not the proper end of aesthetic perception.

But in saying that I do not think (or think Dufrenne thinks) that works of art are languages, I am not saying that detailed discussion and analysis, as suggested above on Beethoven’s quartet, are no longer required. It is simply that whatever one says about a work is in explanation of it, it is not an attempt to translate it.

This allows for any number of varying explanations, all of which may be correct in some way, or throw some light on the meaning of the work: also if works of art were languages, each bit would mean one thing, and one thing only, and the work of art would be rather like a jigsaw puzzle. In this case one would have finished appreciating the work for good once the puzzle was finished. But it is generally agreed that one can go on learning about works of art for a very long time, and moreover, that they are not finished with, even if it is the case that one thinks one understands them. A Shakespeare scholar does not wash his hands of Shakespeare once he has explained the words to his own satisfaction. Also, one can take a broad approach (to the work as a whole) or a more detached one, or look at a sixteenth century painting from the viewpoint of its contemporaries, or any successive era. This makes any number of viewpoints equally good, and regards no particular one as the correct one: whereas this would not be the case were art a language. In that case each work would have one translation, from one point of view. The more flexible attitude of allowing various explanations also seems to agree with what actually occurs - that is - for any work of art of importance, there will always be a variety of explanations, from a variety of viewpoints, all of which (or many of which), have a
certain amount in their favour.

Since Dufrenne advocates critical analysis as a part of the aesthetic attitude, I think he would, in the end, agree that analysis of the work of art was necessary for an understanding of it. And it is not because it is untranslatable that he considers one can never completely understand a work, but because it has an unlimited or unending nature, which causes it to be ungraspable.

To allow that various interpretations of any work are legitimate or necessary is to take a relativist line — and this is what I am now attributing to Dufrenne. However, despite the attacks he makes on relativism, and his avowed absolutist ideas, it is possible to take a relativist line on one topic in aesthetics, while disagreeing with relativist solutions to other problems in the same subject. For instance, one could maintain this line while disagreeing with the view that the existence of an object qua work of art is subject-relative, without contradiction. I think that this is what Dufrenne is doing, without actually allowing himself to label anything he says as 'relativist'. What is suggested here, — and in relativist ideas of the same sort, which are apparent in the third section — does not dash with any absolutist principle Dufrenne upholds.

N.B.
Dufrenne does not aid the idea that art is not parallel to a language, and should therefore not be open to translation by such remarks as:

"l'artiste est interprète; il fournit un langage à l'objet, il l'aide à dire ce qu'il veut dire." (Vol.I, Part II, Chap IV, p.395.)

by which he means that the artist provides a medium (art) for the expression of something, some fact about reality, which scientific study omits.

1. See Chapter four.
iii) The ungraspability of the meaning of the work.
Dufrenne puts his view in a variety of ways, but the message is generally the same: one can never totally exhaust the meaning of the work of art. He tends to use the term 'inexpressible' to refer to the work's ability to escape all attempts to pin it down, and our failure in these attempts. I shall mention three places where he specifically refers to, and explains, the idea of arts' 'ungraspsability'.

Firstly, while discussing the work and the public (Vol.I, Part I, Chap.III, p.102), he says that what a work expresses is inexhaustible much in the way a person's meaning might be. Like a human face, it always appears expressive, and yet what it expresses appears ungraspable. And because it is inexhaustible, it gains from a number of interpretations:

"C'est plutôt à la façon d'une personne que l'oeuvre s'avère inépuisable."

"Ce qu'elle représente ne se livre qu'à travers ce qu'elle exprime, l'expression, même immédiatement saisie, est encore insaisissable."

"parce que le sens de l'oeuvre est inépuisable, l'objet esthétique gagne à une pluralité d'interprétations." (p.102 ibid)

Secondly (Vol.I, Part II, Chap.IV, pp.398-404), while discussing the general structure of the work of art, and in particular, expression, Dufrenne makes several thematically similar comments. These are to the effect that the work of art has a multiplicity of meanings and that ultimately it remains undefined. This is not intended to suggest that one cannot understand the work at all, but that there are always more possible meanings further to those one can discover.

1. Actually, as will be seen, he does not believe the human face is always expressive.
Dufrenne asserts that it is a characteristic of the work of art that it presents a plurality of meanings, which appear to form a sort of hierarchy. This plurality is another indication of the profundity of the aesthetic object. The most authentic works have a certain ambiguity—what Dufrenne calls the ambiguity of excess, which derives from the vast degree of meaning. Contrary to appearance, the attribution of ambiguity of excess is a means of praising, not denigrating, and this mode of ambiguity is in contrast to that of confusion or obscurity of meaning. In the example he gives of an evangelical parade, he suggests that the true meaning of a work escapes explication (p. 198 ibid).\(^1\)

He goes on to say that all interpretations of a work can seem correct at the same time, but this is not a flaw, and occurs also with non-aesthetic situations. For instance, one can describe a war as being at the same time, a) a capitalist ruse, b) a conflict of cultures, c) an irruption of the natural into the artificial, or d) 'man becoming intuition'.\(^2\) These are all correct, they simply designate different dimensions of human nature. However, the aesthetic object is ultimately undefined (p. 400 ibid).

He concludes these remarks with a distinction between people whom one fails to 'grasp', simply because there was nothing there to grasp, and objects (works of art), where this mystery does not...
derive from vacuity, but "the expression of a freedom which refuses all determination". 1

"expression d'une liberté qui refuse toute determination: leur réalité débordante échappe nos prises par excès plutôt que par défaut." (p.404 ibid.)

The third point serves mainly to emphasize the idea of profundity in the inexhaustibility of meaning (Vol.II, Part III, Chap.IV, pp.491-4). The gist of this is that the inexpressibility of the aesthetic object does not derive from incompleteness (a lack of imagination), nor an inexpressibility of the ordinary en-soi object (the ontic). It is a third, excessive inexpressibility, of the sort which demonstrates the object's profundity, and the aesthetic object is inexpressible (i.e., ungraspable in its entirety) because of its profundity. For it is not like an object whose every aspect can be assimilated at a glance, but like a consciousness whose essence one cannot reach. (The aesthetic object is profound because it obliges us to transform it in order to grasp it.)

There may be a clue as to why art's meaning should necessarily be ungraspable - not only because of its profundity, etc., in what Dufrenne says of the sources the artist uses (Vol.I, Part II, Chap.IV, p.394), and that he is interested in the "ungraspable dimension of

1. Dufrenne does not mention the possibility of people whom one cannot 'grasp' because of their very complex and profound nature (though he does mention an ungraspable dimension of reality), or of works of art where there is very little to grasp - possibilities suggested by Cyril Barrett. As a matter of fact, I do not see any great parallel in Dufrenne's system, between man's 'ungraspability' and that of art. For art is held to be logically ungraspable for some reason, whereas certain men are held only to be empirically so. Moreover, he would not accept the possibility of there being very little to grasp in any work of art.
reality which only shows itself to affectivity", i.e., the expressive properties of art.

"Au vrai, ce qui intéresse et stimule l'artiste, . . . c'est cette insaisissable dimension du réel qui ne se manifeste qu'à l'aff-activité, et que l'art seul peut fixer et communiquer."

(p. 394 ibid.)

This, then, is Dufrenne's idea of meaning in art. However, it is not without its problems, and firstly requires some discussion on the same topic which took up much of the discussion of the previous part of this section, i.e., on interpretation.

In two out of three remarks on the inexhaustibility of the meaning of a work of art, Dufrenne suggests that more than one interpretation is pretty well inescapable because of the depth of meaning of any worthwhile work of art. I have said previously^ that Dufrenne allows this. What is noteworthy is the fact that he is being relativist - in fact he is adopting the line I suggested above that he would accept. As I pointed out however, the relativist approach does not necessarily clash with other absolutist ideas in aesthetics.

What Dufrenne says is, on the whole, inconclusive. He makes various distinctions - between types of ambiguity, between obscurity and profundity, ungraspability because of vacuity, and because of freedom - but fails to draw the strings together. What one would probably conclude from what is said is that the work of art has an infinite number of meanings which derive from, a) ambiguity of excess, b), profundity (not obscurity), and c) freedom (not vacuity). Because of the infinity of meanings the work is ultimately undefinable or inexhaustible. That is, it can be defined within limits - one can

1. See Chapter 3, on the a priori affective qualities.
2. See comments on the previous section of this chapter.
provide a-n interpretations, and go on providing them, but one will never provide sufficient interpretations wholly to encompass the meaning of the work.

Nevertheless, when one investigates this, there are at least two difficulties: i) relating to the idea of a variety of interpretations and ii) relating to the conclusion - that the work of art is never wholly defined.

i) The idea that one may allow a variety of interpretations of any work is in itself quite sound (as I have already indicated in this chapter). Different theories may all be able to bring sufficient evidence from one work, to merit credence.

It is worth bearing in mind though, that whilst different people may proffer various theories on any one work of art, the normal practice of critics is to regard these as alternatives - not as all being a part of the meaning of the work as a whole, which is what Dufrenne advocates, and with which I agree. The usual practice is to say works are differently interpreted but the interpreters fall into disagreeing camps, determined that only one theory (their own) is correct. Or one can say, with Kant\(^1\) that the correct interpretation will be understood by anyone adopting the right aesthetic attitude, and there can be no real argument over interpretation. As I have said, I prefer to allow merit to more than one theory.

There is, though, an important difficulty with regard to incompatible views - i.e., interpretations which disagree radically. There are two ways round the problem, but the first is not especially strong. The question arises in his analogy with descriptions of a war, and when he says all interpretations may seem correct at one time. I do not think that the analogy is quite parallel with what he is saying about art. For the interpretations of one work might be incompatible, whereas one could say these different views of war were either: (a) intentionally different but compatible ways of seeing one objective

\(^1\) See Kant; *Critique of Judgment*, pub. Hafner, New York, 1972.
phenomenon, or (b) not all correct - that is different interpretations of which one is correct (this would be saying that one should look at things like war in what I have called the critic's way of looking at art).

This brings up the question of whether, in the event of incompatible theories of art, one is to allow that all theories are correct at the same time. It may appear obvious that if there are two conflicting theories, one cannot say both are correct at the same time - but I do not think this is so obvious. For one theory (A), might say Hamlet acted as he did because he loved his mother, while another (B), says it is because he hated her - and both bring passages of the play, interpreted in their way, as evidence. In this hypothetical case, I am inclined to say that neither rules out the other, and both are equally acceptable, each supposedly having as much in his favour as the other. Of course, it would be difficult to claim that one could believe both at once, but I think that it might be a fairly arbitrary decision as to which one did accept.

The problem with this hypothetical case is that each theory may well be taking different passages of the play to prove its case. If so, the interpretation is incomplete, and one is not getting an overall picture. However, many works of art can be differently and incompatibly interpreted as a whole, and this is where the second answer to the problem comes in. That is, one should not use the language of truth-functionality, i.e., refer to the correctness of an interpretation and whether it is right or wrong, but to its admissonability as a plausible view, on the grounds of a number of examples taken from the work. One can then say without any inconsistency that incompatible interpretations X and Y are both acceptable - and it will rest with
the audience as to which he agrees with, from the reasons given, or his own preference.

As it is, in practice, new acceptable views about any work will probably include at least something of previous acceptable interpretations. To take an example from the performed arts, if Toscanini took Mozart's 41st symphony in one way, it would not be necessary for Beecham to take every phrase or passage of the same work differently, in order for the interpretation to be different. Toscanini might, in all probability, have taken certain passages at a quicker tempo, with different phrasing from Beecham's. But even such conductors as these would probably have agreed about much of the interpretation. This incidentally reinforces the claim that incompatible and disagreeing views can be perfectly acceptable and that truth-functional terms are misclassifications. I for one would not wish to dismiss an interpretation by Toscanini because it disagreed with, or differed from, one by Beecham, or say that one must be incorrect.

N.B. It is also true that new views may become increasingly trivial in their novelty. One might think this of a recent updated staging of "A midsummer night's dream", involving the use of swings (though I am not saying one should). The trap is to avoid novelty for its own sake.1

1) The second difficulty is very simple - why should the meaning of the work be inexhaustible? Why should it be ultimately undefined? Certainly there may be a number of possible interpretations, and for example, at time t, all interpretations of X may not have been given, in which case it is not fully defined. But at t, all

1. I am grateful to Cyril Barrett for the suggestion that novelty can introduce triviality.
interpretations may be available, in which case X is fully defined. It may not necessarily be the case that we know that the meaning of the work has been exhausted, but that does not mean that it has not been, nor that it cannot be. Dufrenne's stipulation that works of art are necessarily undefinable seems far too radical. Even saying they are like man - with too many facets ever to be wholly defined, i.e., that they are empirically inexhaustible, seems too radical. I think that granted that it may take centuries to give all possible interpretations of a major work, e.g., Hamlet, and granted that we may not even know when the task is complete, despite the work of art's profundity and abundance of meaning, it remains the case that works of art are definable, and sometimes fully defined.

There are two final points. (A) Dufrenne is not completely consistent in what he says about meaning. He asserts both that there are an innumerable number of meanings, not all of which can be grasped, and that there is only one meaning (by asserting that the true meaning of a work escapes explication (p.398 ibid.)).

Since the emphasis in the latter is on explication (i.e. that meaning is grasped by feeling rather than analysis) rather than on the one-ness of meaning, I think one can take it that he really believes there are any number of meanings - especially since he emphasises this latter point.

(B) Dufrenne elaborates at length on the notion of profundity. It is not the place to go into it at length here, but some idea is required as to what he means by the idea. Firstly, aesthetic feeling is held to be profound if one lives within the world of the work, so to speak, i.e., contrives to see things from the point of view of the work. In other words, the profundity of aesthetic feeling lies in its power to contrive to put the subject in a position to understand the work - what it means, what it expresses, etc. (cf. pp.502-4).
On the other hand, profundity in the aesthetic object derives from various things. For one thing, the aesthetic object arouses aesthetic feeling, which is itself profound. In this context Dufrenne refers (p. 511) to the necessity of the aesthetic object to be perceived and thus related to consciousness. The sea also has a certain profundity:

"Mais il faut chercher ailleurs le réalité de la profondeur: c'est avec le vivant et la conscience qu'il faudrait ici confronter l'objet esthétique." (p. 511 ibid.)

Here the profundity of the aesthetic object derives: (a) from being related to consciousness (which he holds to be profound in being vastly complex and not immediately comprehensible, etc.) by its necessity to be perceived; and (b) from being similar to the conscious being or pour soi, in being a quasi-pour-soi. That is, it has the complexity of the pour-soi without itself being conscious.

For another it is not part of the everyday world and not something with which we can be very familiar (cf. an awesome person). It is 'strange' to use Dufrenne's term (p. 507-8). For another, there is a lot to be discovered in the aesthetic object, and it provokes and demands thorough reflection. It has an infinite fund of meaning, a complex internal nature, which one never finishes divining: there is always something new to be understood (its opposite would be a simple object whose whole meaning or significance can be grasped at a glance - a superficial or shallow entity):

"Il est essentiel à l'objet esthétique d'avoir déjà ... cette densité d'être par laquelle il est nature." (p. 511 ibid.)

And it has an ability to communicate with us (or power of expression) which, "apparaît toujours comme un miracle" (p. 511.) Moreover, its means of expression are normally regarded as profound in themselves—
sublimity, beauty, sagacity etc. The world of the aesthetic object
is that in which it expresses the depth of meaning (i.e., profundity)
which makes the object inexhaustible (p.512)^1.

I think that this selection of points provides a general picture
of what Dufrenne means by profundity. And in some ways I think one
would agree with him. We do not treat art with too great familiar*
ity,^2 and with most works of art a good deal of time has to be spent
in understanding them, and they possess many facets, all of which
cannot be seen at a glance. Many works of art are profound - some
seem like bottomless pits which one feels one will never fully comp­
prehend. One has only to look at, say, Beethoven's opus 132 (string
quartet) or any da Vinci work, to see examples of profundity, and see
the depth and penetration of vision of the artist.

Nevertheless, although we may agree with the basic thesis, and
and see how Dufrenne highlights the objective quality of profundity
in art, it is impossible to let his claims pass without criticism.
Firstly - and this is not apparent from the precis I have given, it
has to be admitted that Dufrenne's discussion is loose, obscure and
rather florid. The whole of Chapter IV (Vol.II, Part III) is dev­
oted to profundity and cannot really be regarded as very good phil­
osophy as it wanders off at a tangent so often. Secondly, the rel­
ation of profundity to consciousness makes the profundity of art at
best vicarious, and at worst non-existent, unless one is willing to
assume that art inherits profundity as a quasi-pour-soi - which I am
not, and which reverses the correct order of things, I think. (i.e.,
the notion of the quasi-pour-soi requires a good deal of evidence,
and if one could prove art to be profound independently of the use
of that notion, this would be useful. But it expects rather a
lot to ask the quasi-pour-soi-concept to act as evidence for art's
profundity.)

See following page (278) for notes 1. and 2.
Thirdly, the so-called 'strangeness' of art is no evidence of profundity. The Yeti (if it exists) is not part of everyday life, it is 'strange' and awesome - but one would hardly see that as a reason for regarding it as profound. Finally Dufrenne thoroughly confuses any argument that the aesthetic object is inexhaustible because it is profound, by saying (a) (pp.510-11) that the aesthetic object has (a) "densité d'être", which always causes there to be something left to be understood (implying an inexhaustibility of meaning), and using this as proof of its profundity, and then (b) that the great meaningfulness or profundity of the work is what makes it inexhaustible - the world of the aesthetic object expresses, "Je s'aurait de sens qui fait l'objet esthétique inépuisable." (p.512.) So, although he does not say it in so many words, he more than implies that inexhaustibility is a contributory factor to profundity, and profundity is what makes the work inexhaustible. This would present us with the logically impossible situation of A causing effect B, and B causing effect A.

This raises the question as to what it is in any work of art which is meaningful. What is it which cannot be said other than by the work, and which can never be grasped in its entirety? Dufrenne's answer is, the expressive (affective) qualities in any work. It is the function of art to express - sublimity, tragedy, beauty, melancholy, etc. And, to a lesser extent, the meaning of the work is derived from its form.

However, before expression and meaning are discussed, it is necessary to elucidate the idea of expression per se.

Notes 1. and 2. from preceding page (277).

1. It is clear, I think, that I would challenge any assertion of the unfathomibility or inexhaustibility of the aesthetic object - of my comments on this, above.

2. Though one wonders whether a more familiar and less conventionally awestruck treatment might be more appropriate and more helpful in getting to terms with the work.
Section II. Expression, part 1.

Introduction.

The concept of expression in art is probably one of the most regularly tackled problems in aesthetics (along with truth and meaning). I shall restrict myself to the types of theories with which Dufrenne concerns himself. But it is worth mentioning the different camps, and their proponents. (A) Those who regard works of art as literally expressive - including Wittgenstein, Tomas, and Bouwsma. (B) Those who are just as certain it cannot be, and that the use of expressive terminology is probably metaphorical - such as Reid. (C) Those who regard 'expression' as referring to self-expression on the part of the author - such as Dewey and Carritt. (D) Those who think on rather anthropomorphic lines, subdividing into i) the idea that expressive properties are attributable by means of associations of moods and ideas, etc. - such as Santayana and John Hospers; ii) Empathy theorists such as Vernon Lee and Lipps. (E) Those who presuppose the literal nature of expression, and either, i) think the expressive properties are inherent - like Deryck Cooke and Arnheim, or ii) think they are context dependent, like Eduard Hanslick. Finally (F) Those who regard expression as the emotive response of the audience to the emotion of the artist communicated via the work - such as Tolstoy.

These different views are not all incompatible - for instance the artist may express himself in a work (C), which is nevertheless itself expressive (E), and which, by communication of feeling, causes an emotive response in the audience (F) - and furthermore these literally held expressive properties may be inherent (Ei), or context dependent (Eii). As it happens, Dufrenne holds a view which is something of this order, with the exception of (Ei).

Before embarking on an analysis of this theory, however, I propose to deal with the proposition that art is expressive, and Dufrenne's concept of the relationship of expression to man, representation and language.
i) The work of art as expressive.

Several times Dufrenne makes the bare statement that the work of art is expressive, and of these I shall mention just three. Firstly, while discussing the audience as executor of the work (Vol.I, Part I, Chap.III, p.84), he states that the highest form of aesthetic perception is the feeling which reveals the expression - and if this is so then one can find it in one form in the sort of human emotion of a theatre audience. Secondly (Vol.I, Part I, Chap.IV, p.170) in the general context of expression in art, he states that the aesthetic object is undoubtedly expressive (unlike ordinary objects) - and that one immediately senses something of the meaning of the thing, i.e., what it expresses:

"Car il n'est pas douteux que l'objet esthétique, à la différence des objets signifiants ordinaires, sont encore expressif..." (p.170 ibid.)

"Si je ne sais point que le Yei-Be-Chei implore dans le corps du malade l'esprit du mal qui y siège, je me sens pourtant associé par ses pas et ses oris étranges à quelque tragédie secrète où s'entrouvrent les portes de la mort." (p.171 ibid.)

Thirdly, in the introduction to the final part of the Phénoménologie (Vol.II, Part IV, pp.539-41), Dufrenne again attributes expressiveness directly to art objects. He says the sort of feeling (sentiment) required in the aesthetic experience is that which is given over to an expressive function - which occurs naturally in man, but only with the aid of art, in objects. It is the vocation of aesthetic objects to be expressive, and even man is not always as expressive

1. The general assertion is that imagination is insufficient to inspire understanding of the work and its expressive qualities, and that feeling (sentiment) is required. Imagination can open up the world of the aesthetic object to us, but it is not specific, and leads one away from the aesthetic object, "et si l'imagination s'exerce encore sur eux c'est lorsque le sentiment l'a declenchée, et par réaliser le sens de l'expression." (p.340 ibid.)
as the aesthetic object (i.e., profound enough for the expression to develop into a world):

"Tout objet n'est donc pas expressive, comme l'est par vocation l'objet esthétique. Nous pourrions ajouter: l'homme même n'est pas toujours expressif, du moins à la façon de l'objet esthétique, c'est-à-dire assez profondément pour que l'expression se dilate en un monde." (p.540 ibid.)

Man's mode of expression is more immediate, and he is most expressive when he is most himself. (p.540-1 ibid.)

In referring to expression developed into a world as the fullest state of expressiveness, Dufrenne is referring to the idea of the work of art as being a world - a common notion of his, which has arisen previously. The premises are that the work of art is expressive, and when most fully a work of art, its expression is its total being, i.e., its whole world. Its expressiveness is so pervasive as to constitute its whole being, its world. Thus when anything, for example, man, is most expressive, this quality pervades his being, and he is simply expression.

There is not much in this which is particularly controversial. The first statement of art as expressive links it with Dufrenne's previously given view of the aesthetic attitude - that feeling is the highest form of aesthetic perception, and the highest form of feeling is that which reveals what is expressed. The conclusion that it is to be found in a theatre audience rather presupposes that the audience will be taking the correct attitude. (N.B. when he refers to emotion, he does not mean that the audience will be overcome by emotion.)

Only the last mentioned statement of art as expressive could really be construed as controversial. For Dufrenne is not only making the statement that a work of art is expressive (i.e., not that the audience or author performs the expressive function, but the work itself), which is really the basically arguable point - but
asserting that art is more expressive, and more consistently expressive, than man. And, as it happens, man is normally regarded as the paradigm, if not the only, example of expression.

However, I think that this statement about man is true (leaving aside the comparison of man and the aesthetic object, for the moment) - and fairly evidently so. For although man is capable of any range of expression possible, he is also capable of change - unlike a work of art which, if it is expressive at all, is always expressive (so long as it remains a work of art). But man can become static - he can at will remove all symptoms of expression from his behaviour. Or it may occur without an act of will - for example people who do not possess or use their mental capacities, decline towards an expressionless state. Thus man is least expressive when least 'himself' - or, when least man.

I shall deal with the basic assumption in this - that the work of art is expressive - in the course of considering all the aspects of Dufrenne's thesis on expression. And I shall discuss the question in the light of other similar and dissimilar doctrines which go into the question of exactly how a work can be expressive; if it is, or alternatively, what else expression refers to.

ii) Elaboration on the notion of expression.
Before launching into any detailed analysis of the nature of expression, there are certain ideas of the relation of expression to other aesthetic features, to be dealt with. Some of these are contained in the last section of part II, volume I, of the Phenomenologie, on the general structure of the work of art - of which expression is obviously an important part for Dufrenne. There is firstly a general comment on expressiveness, which would apply to any possible expressive entity; that the eloquence (expressiveness) of a work of art is not in direct relation to the intensity of its pathetic quality. For example, a discreet, cold, or delicate work can be just as expressive as a violent one. (p.495.) This is, I think, fairly uncontroversial,
Then, in the same section (pp.407-9), Dufrenne discusses the work of art and its expressive powers in comparison with human activity (he wishes to emphasize the quasi-subject nature of the work of art, as well as its expression). What he says is that true expression cannot be pretended or even wished, in the way that the waiter in Sartre's example of mauvais foi is not a true waiter because he is acting. I.e., expression must always be genuine, not artificial or forced. And it is extremely important, according to Dufrenne, for two reasons in particular (a), because the aesthetic object finds its highest form of being in its expressive qualities and (b), because the ability to express confers a quasi-subjectivity on the work. Finally in this section, he asserts that the work is endowed with a sort of interiority, because of which it is capable of expression.

The last of these minor - though informative - references, relates again to profundity (Vol.II, Part III, Chap.IV, pp.510-1). Having decided that profundity in art is not to be discovered in the idea of distance (lointain) or obscurity, he decides it is to be found in the ability of art to express - an ability which it has, he repeats - by virtue of its interiority. The relation is therefore (a) interiority, which gives (b) the power to express, which accounts for (c) profundity. This moreover relates expression and meaning, in Dufrenne's doctrine - for the work which is profound is that which has meaning, and it gains its profundity from the power to express.

Interiority is a notion which requires explanation. Dufrenne uses it in a comparison of art and man. According to him, not all men have an 'interior' existence - some can be read totally from their outward appearance. Others, however, have a certain depth by means of which they have some meaning (or their existence does). The same applies to objects, but amongst these, art does have an interior existence. Works of art are more than merely paint on canvas, or a succession of sounds, etc., they have a meaningful form, amongst

other things, and certain rules governing their composition (whereas superficial things, "ne répondent a aucun besoin, elles n'appellent aucun geste, elles ne sollicitent pas même la curiosité." (p. 510.)), and are therefore not superficial. This is their interiority, and by virtue of this, they have the ability to express, according to Dufrenne:

"les schémes qui président à sa composition, en même temps qu'ils informent le sensible et lui donnent un poids de nature suscitent en lui un invincible mouvement qui se déploie dans une temporalité secrète; et c'est parce qu'il est ainsi doué d'une sorte d'intériorité qu'il est capable d'expression."

(PP. 408-9 ibid.)

There are one or two dubious points in this. For one thing, the idea of art's 'pretending' to express something does not make sense really. There is no comparison with man here, because there is no question of art's either pretending or not pretending to express something. One does not say "X looks as if it expresses sadness, but maybe it does not mean it." The ability to pretend is something one attributes only to a conscious being, and even then it does not arise as a question about expression — for one cannot pretend to express something (one either expresses or does not express, X). 1

Here Dufrenne is using the idea of expression to support his claim that the work of art is a quasi-pour-soi, and making use of comparisons with human activity wherever possible. As a matter of fact, I think that this can easily confuse rather than clarify the issue, for the simple reason that it is by thinking of expressive

1. The only way in which pretense figures in art is in forms of drama, such as satire of 'send up' comedy (if one calls this art) where the artist ridicules normally serious situations, etc. In this case he may pretend to take the situation seriously, but make fun of it by what he says or does (e.g., by 'overplaying' a part) or by the context in which it is placed.
properties as instantiated in all paradigm cases by man, that one is at a loss when one attempts to apply them to art. One takes the definition of 'expression' bodily from the meaning it has when applied to human expression, finds it involves mental activity and feelings, and decides that art cannot possibly express literally, because it cannot feel. The mistake lies in supposing that the meaning of a term is in no way influenced by its object. I shall illustrate this slightly further in the final part of this section.

This is not to say that I think Dufrenne is wrong to relate art and man via expression. For I would accept provisionally that conscious beings (including animals) and aesthetic objects (in the broad sense which includes sunsets as well as man-made works of art) were the primary candidates for expressiveness. It may seem that anything is capable of expression for the simple reason that one can sometimes use the same terminology in predicating something potentially expressive, of man, aesthetic objects and ordinary objects, and thus give the impression that the same relationship holds between all three. For example (i) 'John looks sad' (ii) 'lunch's "The scream" looks horror-struck', and (iii) 'that sofa looks comfortable'. But the form of words merely disguises what is actually being said and is meant. I think the following expansion and elucidation of the three statements would be generally accepted.

(i) is literally true. If John looks sad, then John expresses sadness; and (ii) "The scream" similarly expresses horror; and in saying, as in (iii), 'that sofa looks comfortable', one is stating an opinion that it gives an impression of being comfortable if sitting on it - not that it expresses comfortableness. To highlight the i, however, I am not saying that if A expresses X then A is X - this will be explained shortly in the distinction between 'expression' and 'expressive'; nor does it entail that the audience will be affected by what is expressed (though some theories on expression hold that a description of a work as expressive is a reference to the audience's response). Thus lunch's work may express horror but is not necessarily horrifying.
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distinction one could give further examples in the third category. For example, 'that object looks square' means that it has the appearance of something square, or of being square - not that it expresses squareness.

So it seems that the form of words can obscure the fact that persons - or conscious beings - and aesthetic objects are expressive, whilst ordinary objects are not. And to say 'looks X' does not entail that X expresses X. If the former contention is correct, then we are another step nearer to accepting Dufrenne's assertion that art is a quasi-pour-soi, since he used the expressiveness of art as one justification for the claim (cf. Chapter I, Section IV). The final decision on this must wait until the end of the chapter, however.

The idea of interiority also relates art to man, but one has to be careful not to take the parallel too far. The work of art is capable of being expressive (according to Dufrenne) because it has an 'interior being' in the way indicated (cf. above). And likewise man is not just a physical object, a superficial entity. But this is about as far as one can safely take the comparison - if indeed one can even take it as far as this, since according to Dufrenne, some persons are merely superficial and do not have any worthwhile interior being.

iii) Expression and representation.

Dufrenne briefly discusses the connection between expression and representation (Vol. I, Part I, Chap. V, pp. 224-7). There is an ambiguity in Dufrenne's use of the term representation; for he uses it both to refer to all art, as he did with 'subject' (i.e., all art is representational in the same way that all art has some content - it represents something), and he uses it to distinguish different arts in the normal way (i.e., painting as representational as against painting as abstract).
The gist of Dufrenne's discussion is that the represented world has no need of, and is secondary to, the expressed. He calls the represented the reality of the expressed, i.e., the material being of the expressive qualities. In representational arts (in the second sense), what is represented expresses the world of the author. The representative features have more or less the role of a part of the whole expressive world of the work. The representation needs the expressive world in order to supply it with a unity, according to Dufrenne.

The reasoning behind this is presumably that any work of art is given unity and meaning mainly by its expressive/affective qualities, and without these qualities any representation lacks significance.

He then adds that in non-representational arts, as for example, music, we understand the atmosphere by means of a certain representational quality to which the expression gives rise, whereas in representational arts, as for example, drama, we understand the represented object by means of the atmosphere and certain expressive qualities aroused in us by the work. So expression in part gives rise to the represented world - in conjuring up objects from reality. It is also primary because it gives meaning to what is represented.¹

The rest of what Dufrenne has to say about representation and expression is on much the same lines. For example (Vol.I, Part II, Chap.IV, pp.392-5), he says that expression and representation are related, and the former goes beyond the latter. However, he does make one or two

¹. Dufrenne also carries on to give a comparison between expression and Dasein, i.e., a further association of art and man. He asserts that the transcendent quality of Dasein makes it possible for Being to realise itself in the world, and something parallel happens to the represented object to give the aesthetic object something of the transcendent quality of Dasein. (p.247 ibid.)
new points, for example about the variety of expression as against
the unity (singularity) of representation. An instance he gives of
this is that the same thing can be represented in a variety of dif­
ferent paintings, yet the expression will be totally different, acc­
ording to the artist's technique, or that which he wishes to express.
For example (Dufrenne's example) a Byzantine crucifixion has a dif­
ferent expression from a Rubens - the latter being sumptuous and
theatrical, and the former, austere. (Here he is using 'represent­
ation' in the usual sense.)

From this Dufrenne moves on to more treacherous ground - using
the terms 'subject' and 'representation'. As I have said, both are
used ambiguously. He now asserts that most arts, with the exception
of music, are representational and have a subject - that the artist
expresses himself through a subject which is representational. Even
supposedly abstract paintings admit that they have a subject because
they bear a title. The artist always represents his object: "il le
représente toujours..." (p.395 ibid).

On the other hand, music should not attempt to be representat­
ional. A title or a programme is an indication of the motives insp­
iring the music, or the image presented to the artist by the piece of
music. The danger of such things is that they may lead us to think
of representations totally unconnected with the music.

Finally, Dufrenne repeats the previous assertion that the
objects represented in a work serve and are subordinate to, the
expression of the work (Vol.I, Part II, Chap.IV, p.405):

"Ainsi les objets représentés, mis au service de l'expression
totale, s'immolent à un sens qui les dépasse... ils peuvent
servir l'expression."

The discussion of representation may seem a little digressionary,

1. He ought also to include architecture as non-representation.
but it is necessary because Dufrenne discusses it in connection with expression. It is unfortunate that what he says is rather ambiguous. To start with, he is again making an unwarranted assumption of constancy. Previously he assumed that the world of the artist remained the same (showing all the same traits), and here he supposes that the atmosphere remains the same. This is not so - there may not be one atmosphere which pervades the whole work, thus feeling an atmosphere at the beginning of a work is not a sufficient guide to the work as a whole.

That different representations of the same thing should be expressive of very different things is quite uncontroversial, and that what is represented is of less importance than what is expressed is also reasonable enough - e.g., a representational subject such as a landscape, may just be the means to a certain expression (and representation could in no way be regarded as a necessary condition of art, simply because there is much which art and which is not representational in the normal sense). But it is misleading to say that what is represented needs the expressive qualities to give unity, since it implies that the two are distinct, whereas in fact what is represented will be one of the media for expression, i.e., part of it.

Then, when Dufrenne says that art has a subject and is representational, with the exception of music, on the whole, he is moving into ambiguity. There are two basic criticisms - (1) giving a work a title in no way admits that it represents something. For example, calling a painting 'Study in grey and white' does not prove that what it entitles represents something. Nor does an abstract work represent (qua 'look like') a dormouse just because it is called, 'The dormouse' (although it may characterise some dormouse-like aspects).1.

1. It could only represent if one used the term to mean 'symbolise or 'stand in place of'.
(ii) Why should the means of expression of a work be representational? Dufrenne allows that music is better off if it is not, so why should this capacity for non-representation not be extended? As a matter of fact there is something to be said for representation in that it may very well help one to identify what it is which is expressive, and of what, i.e., it gives specificity. This is not to say that the means of expression should always be representational.

Moreover, Dufrenne is an anti-naturalist, and not in favour of the sort of representationalism Bell and Fry attacked. Thus one has to make some sort of distinction within what he means when he claims that so much is representational. The only reasonable suggestion is to say that he means there is always some kind of subject qua describable content - no matter how abstract it may be. However, this makes the claim about representation somewhat vacuous - since few people would dispute the latter suggestion. Also, it means that when Dufrenne is talking about representation qua the visual arts, he is using it in its widest meaning, and when he is talking about it respecting music, he is using the normal, narrower sense. Since the two are different, it is a fault in Dufrenne that he should not make the distinction.

Also, Dufrenne (a) makes incompatible assertions about music and representation, and (b) is unreasonably critical of representation in music. Regarding (a) he firstly states that what music expresses gives rise to a certain representational quality, which implies that it is permissible to think of objects related to a piece of music when listening to it. Then he denounces music which is representational, i.e., where the composer intends one to imagine incidents or objects.

Regarding (b) Dufrenne is quite dogmatic in his opinion that programme and/or representational music does not exist as an art form (of Vol. II, Part IV, Chap. III, esp. pp. 631-8 for the development of his view). Music should be 'pure' - free from any conceptualisation.
A lengthy discussion on Programme music is not in place here, but it is necessary to make some criticism. For one thing, Dufrenne is illegitimately trying to avoid the question of representation in music by simply denying its existence. But these ostrich-like tactics will not do. However difficult it may be to assess the relationship of what is represented, to the music, such music does exist. Liszt, Richard Strauss, Haydn, Handel, Debussy, etc. all wrote music representing events or places. Nor does the title, programme or anything else indicate what the composer felt. Its function is to further our understanding of the music and what it expresses – in Strauss’s Don Juan or Debussy’s Cathedrale engloutie. One would not know nearly so much about the music if one did not have the title or programme.

There are three criticisms regarding the idea that a title or a programme distracts one from the music.

(i) If a title is seen as indicating what the composer felt, it would be far more distracting from the actual music than if it were seen as an integral part of the music, intended to enlighten the listener as to the meaning of the work (in which case it logically cannot be regarded as distracting one from the work, since it is a part of that work).

(ii) Moreover most people (though unfortunately not Dufrenne) would accept that the words in opera were important in understanding it, and an integral part of it. And if one can mix music with drama without ruining the music and without ceasing to pay attention to it, it is not a long step to accepting representations.

(iii) There is no more reason to suppose that giving a programme or title to music will take one’s mind off the work than there is to suppose the title of a painting will cause one to think of other ideas unconnected with the work. Obviously it is quite easy to allow one’s mind to wander from the point with any work of art – and it is much more likely that a painting, say, of the place of
one's childhood, would evoke non-aesthetic associations than that
what is represented in a piece of music will distract one from the
work. And the possibility of distraction only makes the task for
the audience greater rather than making the work inferior.

iv) Expression and language.
As I have already mentioned, in the first section of this chapter,
Dufrenne discusses the degree of expressiveness in language, in the
first volume (Part I, Chap.IV, pp.173-184), of the Phenomenologie.
He asserts that language lies between being expressive and being
rational (p.174) — signifying:

"Le mot est à la fois signifiant et expressif, signifiant
en ce qu'il recèle une signification objective qui est en
quelque sorte extérieure à lui et requiert l'usage le l'ent-
endemant, expressif en ce qu'il porte en lui une signifi-
ation immanente et qui dépasse le sens objectif saisi par
l'entendement." (pp.174-5 ibid.)

He does not state what this immediate meaningfulness is which
makes language expressive. However, he holds it to be meaning which
the language carries with it, and the same as that which Merleau-Ponty
calls 'originary speech'.¹ He presumably thinks that language can
have some degree of inherent or 'natural' meaning. The only kind of
examples I can think of are onomatopoeic words, i.e., words which
sound like the thing or action they signify — though there are others.

Dufrenne suggests other ways in which language is expressive.
Firstly, and I think quite rightly, he points out the idiosynoratic
ways individuals use language, both in speech and in writing — ways
which are expressive of the person speaking or writing. Secondly,
he includes intonation and gesture as part of a language — both of

¹. See Merleau-Ponty, The phenomenology of perception.
which certainly are expressive, but only part of language if it is taken in a broader sense than the verbal. (pp.177-179.)

In becoming aesthetic, Dufrenne declares, language undergoes a radical change – but he does not say in what way. Presumably it is in an emphasis of the expressive as against the conventionally signifying, "ainsi le verbe poétique est doté de cette puissance incantatoire que les poètes ont saluée." (p.177 ibid.)

What Dufrenne eventually leads up to, in a very veiled manner, is the opinion that whatever expresses something, some sense, as a rule expresses clearly. If it is not understood this is because the audience is unfamiliar with the means of expression, or is perceiving confusedly, rather than that the expression is confused. And this applies both to language and to art.¹ In order for the artist to be understood, the observer must be familiar with his means of expression – his 'world'.

Expression is thus an extremely important feature in Dufrenne's aesthetics, entering into most artistic questions. So far, however, we have not seen if, and in what way, art is expressive, or affective. As a matter of fact, Dufrenne does not expand upon some of this as much as one might hope. Nevertheless, there are four points to discuss:

i) whether expression is literal,
ii) the idea of self-expression by the author (the point on which Dufrenne says most),
iii) the different possible affective affects, of the same aesthetic material,
iv) what affect Dufrenne supposes an affective property has on its audience.

¹. By which I mean that unless one is familiar with the language and possibly the context, one will not understand what is being said at any one time – not that language is naturally expressive.
Section III. Expression. part 2.

1) Literal expression.

As I mentioned at the beginning of the second section, it is not impossible to combine different views of expression - and this is what Dufrenne does, to a certain extent. Although, on this point - of whether the expression is literal or not - he never states plainly that he believes it to be literal rather than metaphorical, or attributed by association, or Empathic. It seems rather to be the underlying assumption. I think that the closest he comes to stating his position is in what is almost an aside (Vol.I, Part I, Chap.IV,p.177). Here he says that the artist's materials (colours, sounds, words, etc.) actually produce that which they signify:

"le son du poème symphonique n'est plus le bruit de la mer, il est la mer même . . . Si l'objet esthétique semble conjurer la chose qu'il désigne, c'est que la chose est présente en lui, . . . avec ce qu'il y a en elle de plus profond, d'invisible, avec cette essence qu'il l'art seul peut saisir et exprimer . . . ." (p.177 ibid.)

Though this is somewhat strangely put, I take it to be an assertion that whatever art expresses, it expresses literally. It is neither metaphorical nor via conventional means of representing something (as someone might shake a sheet of metal to represent the noise of thunder). That is, it is not that the work, (A) uses means X, Y, Z, to represent mood ω, rather that ' (A) expresses ω ' - a direct and literal case of expression. (Or 'ω is expressed in (A)' as Bouwsma would prefer it, as will be seen shortly.)

I think that Dufrenne is correct in not making an issue out of this. I have already mentioned one of the reasons why aestheticians
are unhappy about the use of expressive terminology. It is because one thinks of 'expressive' as only properly instantiated by man, and therefore involving mental activity and feelings as well as behaviour.

I have said that the meaning of many terms is not determined by their object. Probably I should say that the meaning is not determined by one of the uses of any term. The connotations of some concept can be very different in one use, from another, without either being regarded as metaphorical. A further example of a term whose object has a bearing on its meaning would be saying, a) "the climber fell down the mountain", and b) "the stone fell down the mountain". In the former instance there is an implication (or, legally, an entailment) of inadvertancy, in "fell", and in the latter, none - in fact it would be nonsense to say that the stone did not mean to fall. In both cases the use of "fell" is quite literal. The fact that the intention not to act in the way mentioned is not involved in the latter meaning does not make it any less literal. In the same way there is no reason to involve all that is meant in one use of 'expressive' (aesthetic) in another (human).

I think that this is a case where the use of a term has a close bearing on its meaning, but does not fully determine it - and I think this is what was meant by Wittgenstein when he talked about use and meaning (and not the simple idea that the use of a word is its meaning - full stop). I think my point is also emphasised by Wittgenstein when he compares language to a tool chest, saying that its parts are

1. See present chapter, section II, i) and II).
2. Incidentally, it is also often the case that someone is incorrectly referred to as expressing a certain emotion when one should say that they are discharging or giving vent to, this feeling. This has the advantage of making the term 'express' all the more available to art, for art cannot discharge emotions; and making one wary of using it too freely to refer to persons.
3. Unless the term is used metaphorically to imply that the stone lost its balance, as a person might.
very different and used in a variety of ways. Also "There is a constant surprise at the new tricks language plays on us when we get into a new field."

A further example of how art can be expressive may be found in the fact that one can learn the meaning of expressive terms primarily from the study of certain works of art, and apply them secondarily non-aesthetically. For example, anguish and horror are expressed in Munch's 'The scream', sensitivity in a Henry James' novel (e.g., a bleak loneliness in 'The altar of the dead'), the pain of unrequited love in Mozart's aria 'Porgi amor' (Figaro), deep serenity in sections of Beethoven's final piano sonatas, sublimity in the second movement of Schubert's 'Death and the maiden' quartet— and so on. The meaning of all these qualities may be learnt by someone who has never seen them expressed by any person, and never felt them themselves, to know what they are. Yet if one grasps what is expressed by these works, one is capable of using the terms non-aesthetically, subsequently. I think this implies that whatever is expressed in a work is expressed literally. One does have to be careful as to the use of the two terms 'expressive' and 'expression', for the former is used literally and the latter metaphorically. To say, 'This music is peaceful', is to use 'peaceful' metaphorically, because in a literal sense or ordinary usage of the term, 'peaceful' means being at ease, not agitated, calm, in addition to possible outward signs of the mood. And as a work of art cannot feel, think or act, these qualities are not appropriate to it. It cannot literally


2. An expressive quality may be acted out in, e.g., a play, but this is distinct from its acting peacefully, for example.
either be at ease or not at ease, calm or restless. It can only reveal the outward signs.

Using a term of expression by saying, for example, 'X is happy', is implying both more and less than that X is expressive of happiness. More, in that it entails that X is in a particular frame of mind, his consciousness is involved. And this is beyond the capacity of a work of art. Less, in that X does not need to behave happily or sound happy for it to be the case that 'X is happy'. For example, if X had won £200,000, we should probably believe that he was happy (if we knew for instance that this was the kind of thing which would please him - make him happy), without requiring him to express happiness - behave happily or give some outward indication. This is not true of a work of art. The behaviouristic characteristics, or more accurately, outward signs, are just what are required for it to be expressive of e.g. happiness. The outward indications, i.e., what is entailed in the literal meaning of, 'This person is happy', are what make the statement, 'this work is happy', true. (Indeed, behaving happily is not always a sufficient condition for the statement to be true of a person - he may be pretending. But the outward signs are both necessary and sufficient conditions of its being true of a work.)

On the other hand, one can literally say, 'this music sounds peaceful', since this is saying that it is expressive of peacefulness - and one can gain a knowledge of the meaning of 'peaceful' through listening to the music, etc. And one can still say quite legitimately, 'these works are anguished/serene/sensitive/sad . . .', but what one means is not that they literally are any of these things, rather that they are literally expressive of them.

In all this I am not denying the fact that terms predicated of art can have a slightly different meaning from when they are predicated of people. For example, aesthetic sadness is revealed through .

Though saying 'X is happy' includes the possibility that he can and may express this feeling outwardly. His saying that he is happy is an expression of it, if he is telling the truth.
formal and/or expressive qualities, and subject matter (if any), whereas human sadness is revealed through feelings and possibly behaviour. If one says a picture looks sad, one does not expect to be able to say it feels sad, nor does one sympathise with it or try to comfort it. Yet one still means that it literally looks sad. Indeed it is really because of the difference in meaning, that one use is said to be literal and the other metaphorical.1

When one has clarified the issue, it becomes far less convincing when other theorists such as Reid,2 say that obviously works of art cannot be literally expressive. Briefly, his theory is that expressive terms, which he calls 'values', are imputed to the work of art and are qualities which they inherently appear to express (cf. pp. 60-3 op. cit.). We mistakenly see works of art as expressing values rather than being "causes of the occurrence in us of values" (p. 79 ibid.), which we put there by imagination. The qualities of the work are divided into sense and forms, both of which Reid supposes to be expressive, and both always expressing particular things, by imputation.3

However, even if we dismiss this theory as being too timid and confused, there are others which, while believing that the work of art is expressive, still puzzle over exactly how it is expressive. O. K. Bouwsma4 is a good example — thinking it insufficient just to say that art is expressive in a different way from man. His conclusion

1. I am grateful to Cyril Barrett for clarification of this distinction.
3. The idea of inherent expression is given its fullest exposition in Deryck Cooke; The language of music, O. U. P. 1968 (see also further on in this section), and is held by Rudolph Arnheim; Art and visual perception, Faber and Faber, London, 1969 (1st pub. in England 1956).
is that man expresses emotions which are describable as distinct from
the person, and sentences express meanings which are also distinct
from the sentences, but works of art are simply expressive, i.e.
there is no set of features in the work which are describable as what
is expressed, distinct from the work itself. Art is expressive in
the sense that something has character, and the character is not
translatable, though one may be able to give a description of the work
of art in terms of expression. What one should not do is say 'X exp-
resses Y', because this implies that Y is detachable from X - whereas
the expressiveness is like the redness of an apple.

Although I have indicated that it seems a little over-cautious
to query literal expression, and whether art can express, I think
Bouwsma makes a worthwhile contribution to understanding the nature
of aesthetic expression. It would be to Dufrenne's advantage were
he to have given some such account of the nature of expression per se.
As it is, he devotes more time to the idea of self-expression of the
artist. Coincidentally, Bouwsma also believes that the artist exp-
resses himself in his work.

ii) Self-expression of the artist.

Dufrenne several times asserts that, as well as being itself exp-
ressive, and affective (which would seem to connote an emotive response
in the audience), the work of art is the self-expression of the art-
ist. However, this is discussed mainly in terms of the world of the
artist and the world of the work as being one, rather than the assert-
tion that the artist translates his own emotions into the work. This is
most readily seen as the idea that in the composition of a work, the

Vincent Tomas holds a view very similar to Bouwsma - believing in
the literal expression of the work of art, and the identity of 'the
expressive thing' A), and 'the thing expressed' B). Cf. Bouwsma, the
apple A), and the redness of the apple B). See V. Tomas, 'The
concept of expression in art', coll. ed. Margolis, Philosophy looks at
artist and the work are fused. Thus whatever is expressed in the work may be seen as expressing the author as well. This is very different from saying that the artist uses a work as a means to express his own thoughts, etc.

In at least seven places Dufrenne says roughly the same thing. For instance (Vol.I, Part I, Chap.IV, p.159), he says that the artist chooses a subjective existence in the work rather than in the world and history:

"la vérité de l'auteur n'est point la vérité historique de l'individu réel qui est l'objet de la biographie, elle est la vérité de l'homme présent à l'oeuvre et que je ne connais que par l'oeuvre." (p.159 ibid.)

This idea that work and author are one is repeated when Dufrenne discusses expression and representation as combining to form the world of the work (Vol.I, Part I, Chap.V, p.248-9). For instance, the worlds of Balsao or Cezanne are the worlds - or types of material - with which they work. And these materials express a certain Weltanschauung. Thus Dufrenne appears to be saying that whatever the artist feels, shows itself through the way he produces his work.

Again (Vol.I, Part II, Chap.IV, p.405), work and artist are identified - of the work:

"On la nomme le plus souvent du nom de l'auteur de l'oeuvre, parce que cette qualité caractéristique de l'oeuvre paraît en même temps désigner l'auteur; elle est commune à l'oeuvre et à l'auteur, et comme leur lien vivant;" (p.405 ibid.)

This is slightly developed upon in terms of expression both of the work and the author - not surprisingly, since all discussion of the world of the work and artist is given in the context of the aesthetic object as expressive. The world of the author is expressed (p.223 op.cit.). He also modifies the idea of a world of the author to that of an atmosphere of a world - but goes on to say that the atmosphere only refers back to the aesthetic object (in which case he is not making any significant alteration to what has been said).
Dufrenne also makes an actual assertion that the author expresses himself in this world. Thus he moves on from saying that the author identifies with the work and thus that the work is self-expressive of the author in that he is consubstantial with it. However, he maintains the terminology of a world of work or artist.

For instance (Vol.I, Part I, Chap.IV, pp.182-3), in the first main discussion of expression, he says that the aesthetic object is expressive because the author expresses himself there, and brings about a world of his own:

"L'objet esthétique est expressif parce que l'auteur s'y exprime. Non qu'il s'exhibe ou se prostitue, mais il s'exprime à sa tour en exprimant . . . il fait surgir un monde . . ., qui est le sien." (p.182 ibid.)

The same idea is implicit in the discussion of the subject and of expression (Vol.I, Part II, Chap.IV, p.393-4 and 399), in the general structure of the work of art, when Dufrenne says that the artist chooses a particular subject for a reason:

"L'artiste choisit tel sujet parce qu'il lui est consubstantial, parce que ce sujet éveille en lui une certain émotion. . . ." (p.393 ibid.)

And: "Rouault ne peint pas un Christ, mais à travers le Christ un équivalent pictural de ce que le Christ signifie pour lui." (p.394 ibid.)

And finally:

"La vérité du conte, c'est le témoignage qu'il porte. Sur quoi? Sur l'homme qui, en le racontant, se raconte, exprime ses angoisses, ses désirs, ses joies, les travaux et les jours . . . . . " (p.399 ibid.)

These quotations show that Dufrenne retains the idea of a 'world' and of consubstantiality with the work. Only in the final quote is there any implication that he thinks the artist expresses his emotions, self, etc. in the work of art. And I think this is a
continuation of the assertion that the world of the artist is the same as that of his works— with the addition of something of what this means— i.e., that the artist is not unbiased towards his creations, that they have a certain significance for him, and their construction is unique and individuating of the artist.1 Dufrenne feels, I think, that certain methods of working, or subjects upon which to work, are more congenial for the artist than others, and provide more scope. I do not think that he wishes to over-involve the artist—especially in view of the fact that he has said at one stage that such things as the expression of an ideology of the artist will distract from the work itself.

The idea that the world of author and work are one has a certain justification. I think, for example, that it is true to say that the artist is engaged in his work, and at least mentally, not involved with the world during the creative periods. The work can be identified with the author in that it derives its expression, form, etc., totally from the author. Therefore, to the extent that a work of art can be seen as an extension of its creator and belonging to the 'world' of objects which are made by, or belong to, the author, it may be called the self-expression of the artist.

Nevertheless, as I have said, it is unwise to think of a 'world' of author or works of art, because the creative style of an author can change to such an extent that there may be nothing about his early works to connect them with his later ones. Also, this type of self-expression fairly obviously has little to do with the meaning it usually has— i.e., that of expressing or passing on, emotions or thoughts of the artist.

Therefore, although he wishes to make a certain identification I refer to their mode of construction rather than the thing actually constructed, since, as I said previously (cf. present chapter), the choice of subject is not always left to the artist.
between the artist and his work, and to involve the artist in terms of concern and feeling for what he creates; I think he has no intention of claiming that the work of art is the expression of the moods, thoughts, beliefs, etc. of the artist, and not expressive of itself; nor that it is expressive itself, but that what it expresses is restricted to what the author is capable of feeling, thinking, believing, etc. and translating into the work.

There are other, more positive, theories of self-expression. Tolstoy
\footnote{Tolstoy, op.cit.} and Wordsworth\footnote{See Wordsworth; Prelude \\footnote{Prelude \textit{\textendash} \textit{Poetry is\textquoteright emotion recollected in tranquillity.}}} are classic examples, and Dewey\footnote{See John Dewey; \textit{Art as experience}, pub.Capricorn books N.Y. 1958 (1st pub. 1934). esp. chps. IV and V.} and Carritt\footnote{See K.F. Carritt, \textit{What is beauty?} pub.Oxford Clarendon Press,1932 (esp.chapVI.).} more modern philosophic ones.

For example, Dewey's theory is much more directly connected with the emotions of the artist and the audience (as with many theorists, he restricts expression to that of emotions). He seems to think that the indirect expression of emotion in any circumstances, is aesthetic, and to be indirect in the demonstration of one's emotion is to express, whereas to be direct would be to discharge. He gives the example of an irritated person tidying his room (and thus expressing, instead of raging, and thus discharging).\footnote{Although I think the distinction between discharging and expressing emotion certainly exists, I do not think too much can be said to hang on it. The rather arbitrary factor of the degree of intensity of activity seems to determine the distinction between one and the other. And if the person who tidies his room would not have done it had he not been irritated, then the action is as much the discharge of his emotion as raging, only less obviously so. Also, does a person running from an angry bull express or discharge fear? (Dewey gives little support for this claim about the person tidying his room.)} He makes a great deal of this distinction, and art of course presents itself as an ideal means of
expressing an emotion - because it involves deliberate, thought-out, intentional activity on the part of the subject.1

According to Dewey, a good work of art is the controlled expression of emotion, and although, for example, a poem is not just the occasion for the expression of some emotion:2

"The emotion of the artist and that aroused in us are occasioned by scenes in the world and they blend with subject matter." (p.68 ibid.)

"emotion is essential to that act of expression which produces a work of art." (p.69 ibid. By underlining.)

"Insufficient emotion shows itself in a oddly 'correct' product. Excessive emotion obstructs the necessary elaboration and definition of parts." (p.70 ibid.)

"In formal definition, emotion is esthetic when it adheres to an object formed by an expressive act." (p.76 ibid.)

It is partly a presupposition of Dewey's that expression in art is a property of the artist (and, on the receptive side, of the audience) and he takes it as accepted that a work of art is a means of expression rather than the possessor of expressive powers. For example, he says, "only where material is employed as media is there expression and art." (p.63 ibid.) Carritt makes much the same presupposition - that the work of art is the self-expression of the artist.

As I have already said, the idea that art is the expression of the artist's moods, thoughts, etc. is not incompatible with that of art as being itself expressive. However, it has certain disadvantages. (A) It confuses the location of what is expressed - if the artist is expressing X then the position regarding art is: "A (the artist) feels X, and B (the work) is the medium of its expression".

1. op.cit. pp.76-7.

2. The quotation given second should come first possibly.

It can be seen from what I am saying of Dewey, that he regards the audience as participating in the act of expression.
and B has a relation to X only via A. As Dewey points out—any purpo-
seful act may be the means of expressing X, whereas if art is itself
expressive then the proposition is more simple: "X is in B", or "B is
expressive"—and X is accepted as an inseparable part of B and not a
factor with the accidental or arbitrary connection with B, of being
the intentional object of A to express.

(B) It also has the consequence that the artist must have person-
al experience of whatever is expressed by the work—and I see no
reason for the claim that, for example, Wagner experienced everything
he expressed in his music, or Henry James in his novels. It is perf-
ectly logical and more economical to suppose that an artist may be
simply a sensitive and imaginative person, without this welter of
experience.

iii) The inherent nature of expression.

Dufrenne makes only one reference to the question of whether express-
ive qualities inherently express what they do (Vol.I, Part II, Chap.IV,
p.407), and I think what he says is perfectly correct. Much discuss-
ion has centred around this, but I think it will be sufficient to cite
Dufrenne's case and to say that Eduard Hanslick1 said very much the
same in the late nineteenth century, and by doing so effectively
refuted Deryck Cooke2 and John Dewey3 some fifty years later.

Dufrenne foresees the danger that in looking at particular works
of art it may seem that certain shapes, patterns, rhythms, etc.
inherently possess certain expressive properties. But he combats
the temptation by saying that particular expressive traits may be
seen to express X or Y because we have already discovered the general

Bobbs Merrill, The Liberal Arts Prss (1st pub. 1854), 1957.
2. See Cooke, op.cit.
3. See Dewey op.cit. I am indebted to Cyril Barrett for this
particular point.
expression of the total work. Parts are expressive in relation to the whole. In a different context the same thing may express something entirely different. (Of expressive traits):

"ils ne sont pas expressifs que par leur rapport à l'ensemble isolés, le seraient-ils encore et de la même façon? Ou bien s'ils étaient insérés dans un autre contexte? Un développement peut moduler du mineur en majeur sans produire l'effet que dégage le choral de Franck, une syntaxe musicale peut être décousue, au moins apparemment relâchée, sans produire l'effet des Preludes de Debussy. Un même trait d'écriture peut avoir des expressions bien différentes, en sorte qu'aucun trait n'est vraiment expressif à soi seul; et inversement, tous les éléments de l'oeuvre peuvent indifféremment concourir à l'expression. Cela signifie que c'est l'oeuvre qui porte l'expression." (p.407 ibid.)

I think a little study of one's own proves Dufrenne correct, although it is also perfectly true to say that there are particular aesthetic 'moves' which conventionally express some one thing, and which are used by artists, expecting the audience to recognise the convention. For instance, G minor was Mozart's 'tragic' key, but this does not mean that there is anything inherently tragic about G minor.

iv) The affect of expressive qualities.

There remains the question of the affect of these expressive qualities on their audience. Considering that Dufrenne calls them affective qualities, one might suppose he thought they would have some specific affect - in the way Tolstoy thought that whatever is expressed should be communicated, and that this would be the primary function of a work of art. However, this is not the case. To be affective is to
be expressive, for Dufrenne, and in his discussion of the aesthetic attitude\(^1\) he specifically warns against too full a participation in the expressive qualities of the work. One should participate and identify to the extent that one may understand, for complete isolation would result in a lack of comprehension. But this does not mean that one should attempt to be affected by every emotion or thought expressed by a work.\(^2\) And more positively Dufrenne nowhere suggests or intends, that the primary function of expression in art is to bring about an emotional response on the part of the audience.

Appendix.

What are the expressive qualities of a work, and what do they express?

It is useful to be clear on the fact that Dufrenne does not regard expression as restricted to feelings — on which point I think he is correct. Unfortunately, many aestheticians restrict their examples to emotive terms, for example Bouwma. Dufrenne, on the other hand, involves the 'spiritual', the 'beautiful', the 'lyric', the 'pyrrhic', etc. using the example of Souriau (Vol. II, Part IV, Chap. II, p. 575). These are certainly not emotions, but are still possible expressive qualities of a work of art.

Dufrenne wishes to go further than Souriau and to find other things which are expressive, though he is uncertain as to how to

1. See chapter four.
2. As I have said in chapter four, and above, this would in any case be impossible in many instances.
continue. In this desire I think that he is correct. Reid, for example, provides the suggestion that the form of a work is expressive. So do Cook and Hanslick when describing the expressive power of musical form (harmonies and rhythms - including especially intervals).

However, I think that the formal qualities of a work possess a double function. That is to say, in music, a particular phrase may express nothing, but be a purely architectural form, and in visual art a circle may express nothing - it may simply possess a formal relationship to other forms in the same work, unless one wishes to say that it expresses circularity, in which case I would argue that there is really nothing expressed in circularity beyond being a circle, and that this is merely a rather misleading form of words - and less plausible if one thought of trying to say a polygon expressed polygon-ness.

Or (second function), a musical phrase may express joy, power, etc., just as a visual form such as a circle might be considered to express completeness or fulfilment. Reid agrees with this to the extent of saying that forms do not express their form, but some 'value' - e.g., a circle, completeness (cf. pp. 83-5, op. cit.) - but he moves out of line with my viewpoint because he thinks forms are always expressive of something.

Thus there are forms and there are expressive qualities, and they are not mutually exclusive. A form may or may not be an expressive quality, dependent upon its context. A Bach fugue, for example, is more likely to be regarded as a study in the interrelation of forms than in the expressiveness of these forms. So I can agree with neither Santayana, who says forms are not expressive, nor (second function), a musical phrase may express joy, power, etc., just as a visual form such as a circle might be considered to express completeness or fulfilment. Reid agrees with this to the extent of saying that forms do not express their form, but some 'value' - e.g., a circle, completeness (cf. pp. 83-5, op. cit.) - but he moves out of line with my viewpoint because he thinks forms are always expressive of something.

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1. op. cit.
2. op. cit.
3. op. cit.
because they only express their own form, which is not expression, nor Reid, who thinks that all forms are expressive of something other than their own form.

I hesitate to go further, at this stage. But I believe that this view should be perfectly acceptable, and that at this basic level at least, it upholds the claim which Reid makes for his own position - that there is "no antithesis between 'formalism' and 'expressionism' as theories" (p.67 op.cit.). It will be seen in the next section that Dufrenne does allow for forms to have a certain value in their own right.

N.B. As to the question of what non-formal expressive qualities express, I think that the answer is themselves, i.e., the spiritual exemplifies spirituality, the beautiful, beauty; the lyric, lyricism, etc.

Conclusion.
This discussion of expression is, of necessity, somewhat abbreviated. This is mainly for the sake of relevance to Dufrenne, to enable me to relate it to meaning, and for lack of space. I think it is fairly obvious that my sympathies lie with Dufrenne, that the work of art is literally expressive. It is now necessary to bring the discussion back to meaning and its relation to expression.

Section IV. Meaning, part 2.

1) Meaning and Form.
In the final part of the previous section I suggested that the formal qualities of a work of art were on occasions expressive - depending upon their context, i.e. that they can be either purely formal, or expressive - form expressing a certain quality. And in the introduction to this chapter, I indicated that Dufrenne takes up the latter view of the formal qualities of a work of art - that they have value as expressive properties, in giving meaning to the
work. However, he also gives space to the aforementioned view that formal properties per se can have value (be meaningful). In fact, much of what he says about form and meaning omits the value of expressive properties as meaningful.

This section will be devoted to the value attached to form - or as Dufranne usually terms it, the formal properties of the sensible - and its function. The terms are fairly uniformly ordered. For example, the *sensible* qualities of a work of art are not directly expressive, rather, they possess a certain *form* which provides order and unity and thus, meaning. Unfortunately then, Dufranne becomes somewhat non-committal. One of the main things he means by form, is an underlying factor of the sensible. It is also, sometimes, form in its ordinary meaning, i.e., spatial or temporal outline and structure of entities. But whether he means that form gives a work its meaning (irrespective of expression being the essence of the work of art), or more simply that it gives *coherence* (and that it is the essential properties formed by the unification of the sensible, which provide meaning through being expressive), is left ambivalent. This latter idea specifically places form in second place to expression, which is in any case its position in Dufranne's theory, expression always being the principal factor in art.

What is notably absent from Dufranne's discussion as yet, is a clear indication of the relationship between meaning and expression. One can interpret what he says of form, as meaning (in three parts), a) the sensible qualities of a work of art are unified by their form, b) having form is one way of having meaning, c) the form of the sensible is that which provides expressive qualities. Form is really a means of giving the sensible qualities expressive power, and is entirely subordinate to expression. But one can also interpret him as saying that a work of art has both formal and expressive properties, and it is these (along with
representational subject matter, if any) which go together to provide the work with a meaning. However, this gives meaning a priority it does not in fact possess.

I think it is wisest to try to elucidate in terms of necessary conditions. Dufrenne has said that the affective a prioris are the essence of art and therefore they are necessary conditions of it. He has not indicated that form is a necessary condition of art, therefore expression must be assumed to take primacy. And even if form is the major factor in giving meaning to art, it must be given a lesser position as it has not been assigned the status of a necessary condition. (That is, in Dufrenne's theory.) All works of art may be assumed to be expressive - and here meaning makes up some ground, because although Dufrenne does not regard it as the essence of art, he must in some way regard it as essential - and therefore a necessary condition, because he has asserted that works of art are meaningful (cf. section I). Of course, all art will have some form - but this is just a necessary condition of any object, not in any way confined to art - and whether the form is a part of making the work art is another question.

Dufrenne is basically an expressionist, but he adopts both a formalist and expressionist line in discussing the meaning of a work of art. There is, however, nothing inconsistent about this. Form is involved both in discussions of expression and of meaning, and is here restricted to its relevance to meaning (although expression somehow inevitably appears in the end).

This brings us finally to what Dufrenne actually says. Firstly (Vol. I, Part I, Chap. I, pp. 41-4), he asserts that the sensible elements, i.e., sound colour etc., of a work of art are not grasped as disorder because it is given a meaning which is

1. Where form is form per se and not formally expressive qualities.
2. I.e., whether it gives it unity.
its organisation - the sounds are not just noises, the speeches not just cries, the colours not just patches of sensa. (And the work itself presents the meaning, not anything external such as programme notes, etc.) There is unity of decor, scene, etc. There is also a unity of the whole work from an alliance of all its parts. The work as a whole is meaningful in four ways, according to Dufrenne, i) by what it represents, ii) by the rigour of its development, iii) by the way it is arranged in the representation (if representative), iv) by what it expresses. (p.44 ibid.)

This is notably the only occasion on which, in Dufrenne's discussion of form and meaning, he gives more than a formal account of meaning. I interpret it as dividing meaning into three sections - re, i) subject matter, re ii) and iii) form, and re iv) expression. He then concentrates on form.

Secondly (Vol.I, Part I, Chap.IV, pp.131-3), after some slight digression, he claims that there is always a meaning in the sensible and this is primarily the form. The meaning comes in identifying the form of the sensible:

"Mais en identifiant ici la forme du sensible à la signification... nous gagnerons peut-être de comprendre qu'en retour la signification comme sens (explicite ou presenti, intelligible ou affectif) puisse être forme..." (pp.131-2 ibid.)

Meaning now appears to have been definitely located in form (i.e., restricted from the previous assertions, above).

Thirdly (Vol.I, Part I, Chap.IV, conc.pp.188-200), he turns to form as the unifying factor. The Dufrenne asserts (p.188) that the

\[\text{This is not the same as meaning, since something can be unified or a unity, without being meaningful. For instance, a tree or house may be said to have unity, or to be well-structured, without being meaningful. However, in art meaning is closely related to unity, both formal and expressive.}\]
The highest significance of the aesthetic object is its true form:

"Le plus haut de la signification devient ici la forme véritable, l'âme de l'objet enfin ornée." (p.188 Ibid.)

This derives from the view that it is our perception of the work of art as a totality, a completely unified whole, which is the most important perception - barring presumably, that of its expressive qualities. He then elaborates on the idea of form as form of the sensible. The aesthetic object is unified by its forms (p.189 Ibid.), and in representative arts at least, the form is of central importance. Only in representative arts should the form be defined in terms of the outline - but the outline is not of primary importance - and obviously in many types of art such as impressionist painting or music, it is simply not present. In effect the form is always the form of the sensible:

"Et en effet la forme est toujours forme du sensible; par quoi elle s'engage dans la matière dont le sensible est l'effet; la forme du ballet, c'est d'abord le mouvement . . . de la peinture, c'est cet accord des couleurs . . . Cette forme est déjà sens." (pp.191-2.)

Here Dufrenne moves on to include expression in the idea of form, stating that Guillaume has recognised the fact that a theory of form admits of expressive qualities (the strange, the frightening, the calm, the gracious, etc.). Since Dufrenne regards expression as giving unity to the sensible, he presumably regards expression and form as performing the same functions on occasions - that of providing unity and possibly meaning (cf. first assertion of Dufrenne, previous page).

Finally (p.199-200), in discussing the aesthetic object and the he talks of sign and meaning. The sign (the aesthetic object) is,

1. See Guillaume, _La psychologie de la forme_, p.190.
and is the bearer of, meaning. This gives it a status of its own, but this is not the point here. The point is that Dufrenne is laying claim to meaningfulness in the work of art - apparently without exception.

From what he says, it would appear that Dufrenne does not wish to make any strict distinction between formal and sensible qualities in the work of art. But however slight the distinction, he does stress that the form is meaningful, indeed the highest form of meaning. He indicates as I mentioned at the beginning of the work, that form may be expressive (of. his reference to Guillaume) of grace, fear etc., though he seems to have no opinion as to whether forms may be expressive of themselves.

Some of what he says is problematic, especially the question of meaning and the idea that the sign is a meaning. One assumes that an object cannot be a meaning - therefore either the sign, i.e., the aesthetic object, must be non-physical and Dufrenne does not make this claim - or else the relationship of sign and meaning must be differently explained. This could possibly be by saying that meaning here, is the idea that the work is self-contained, and therefore does not point to anything else as that signified by the sign. That is to say, meaning and the sign which means, are jointly in the work. I.e., the meaning of art does not point to anything outside itself, unlike language, where the words are signs signifying beyond the language.

That is to say, we learn that words are used to refer to something, and, e.g., give orders, state some proposition etc. To explain the meaning of an order, Wittgenstein suggests:

"we translate it at one time into a proposition, at another into a demonstration, and at another into an action." (P.I. 459.)

The sense does not go beyond an understanding of the words, explainable in various ways. However, the words also refer and in this way
they are signs. For they do not refer to themselves. For instance, "I shall have the Jew exterminated to-morrow", refers (i) to a person, (ii) to a proposed state of affairs, (iii) to another set of people and (iv), to a future date.

All meaning - aesthetic as well as linguistic - is learnt, but non-aesthetic meaning is less yielding than aesthetic and less intuitable. As Dufrenne has said (cf. Chapter Four), one can intuitively 'have a sense of' at least part of the meaning of a work of art. With language and other symbols this is not the case, as Wittgenstein says:

"The arrow points only in the application that a living being makes of it." (P.I. § 454.)

Without human intervention the arrow shape does not point.

And, as I said, aesthetic meaning is not like linguistic meaning. The true statement that the meaning of a word is not an object does not apply so readily to aesthetics. The meaning of an aesthetic object may not actually be an object, i.e., itself, but it may be said to be contained in the object. And the totality which signifies is the aesthetic object. The factors which signify are presumably, (i) the unity and particular structure of forms, (ii) whatever the work expresses, and (iii) the way the subject matter is used formally and expressively - i.e., the factors mentioned previously as Dufrenne's idea of how the work is meaningful. Thus, meaning in art is introspective, or self-referencing. So when one sees the aesthetic object - qua sign - one stays with it to find its reference in (i), (ii) and (iii) aspects of that object. So I think Dufrenne is correct to state that the sign both is, and is the bearer of, meaning. For where else can an aesthetic object find its meaning as an aesthetic object (not, for example, as a part of history), except from within itself?
This is another example of Dufrenne's making a reasonably important assertion about art, and then making no attempt to back it up. In this case it is about the location of an objective property of art - i.e., meaning and what is meant. As I have said before, Dufrenne has the merit of pointing out such aesthetic properties - and I think this, and the previous chapter especially, bear this out. However, although Dufrenne did discuss the aesthetic attitude in the previous chapter, and work out a case for it, certain lapses - as for example any argumentation for the concept of distance - re-emphasized the tendency to assume the truth of what is asserted rather than argue for it. The present chapter confirms the tendency. For, all along, Dufrenne assumes that art has the objective properties of being (a) expressive, and (b) meaningful.¹.

To conclude the subject at present under discussion, there is the fact that Dufrenne hardly mentions the idea of expression in its own right, as being the location of meaning. Surely he would believe that the essence of the work - what it expresses - was its meaning? If the essence of the work is its expression of, say, grace, then I would assume that the formal properties and their relations were either of minor importance, or more probably, contributed to the capacity of the work to express grace. One may put this down to the fact that the subject under discussion is form and its function, rather than meaning. However, since it is the case that he regards all art as meaningful, then I think that he most certainly should assign the highest form of meaning to the expressiveness of the work.

I shall now deal finally with the question of expression and meaning.

¹. The former is excusable to a certain extent since Dufrenne would assume that the expressive nature of art was proved in the discussion of the a priori in art (cf. Chapter Three) - though as a matter of fact this provided insufficient proof.
ii) Expression and meaning.
Contrarily enough, Dufrenne a) says very little about the relationship of meaning and expression, and b) contradicts his previous assertion that form is the highest mode of meaning. However, we are in the position of knowing that both meaning and expression are necessary conditions of art - although it would appear that Dufrenne wishes to retain the primacy of expression, and to say that even if it is a necessary condition of art that it be meaningful, it is of its essence to be expressive. If pressed, I think he would say it was an accident of art that it was meaningful, but the essence of art, and the means of discovering whether something was art, was expression. Or: the proposition, "Art is expressive" is analytic, and the proposition, "Art is meaningful" is synthetic.

What Dufrenne says is based mainly on the expressive nature of the sensible qualities of a work. Immediately prior to the claim that the true form has the highest significance (Vol. I, Part I, Chap. IV, p. 188), he asserts (as a part of a claim for form) that the sensible has a meaning to which it gives its own order, and which becomes expression:

"Si le sensible est ainsi porteur d'une signification à laquelle il donne un tour propre et qui devient expression . . ." (p. 188 ibid.)

This implies that the expressive qualities of the sensible properties of a work of art, explain it, or are its meaning.

He then says, more moderately (Vol. I, Part II, Chap. IV, pp. 387-8), that the meaning of a work of art is divided into that of the subject and that of the expression:

"dans ce sens, il faut distinguer entre la signification énoncée par le 'sujet', et l'expression qui émane de l'oeuvre en tant que totalité." (p. 387 ibid.)

And of the sensible qualities of a work, they are, a) expressive, and b) have their own meaning:
"Le sensible est assez solidalement structuré par l'opération esthétique pour avoir par lui-même une consistance d'objet et, partant, être doué d'expression. En sorte qu'à la rigueur il peut se suffire à lui-même, porter en lui son propre sens . . ." (p.387 ibid.)

This simply moves the pieces round a little, reaffirming the meaningfulness of expressive qualities (since the sensible is, Dufrenne says, meaningful).

As regards the means of understanding what is expressed, Dufrenne says (Vol.I, Part I, Chap.IV, pp.178-82), that expression gives its sense directly once we understand the context - the terminology, etc., of the work of art. The meaning is there - waiting our finding the 'code' to the work of art. This is in contrast to a person's expression of something - which can be either intentionally or unintentionally deceptive. Works of art do not have the capacity to try to deceive the audience as to what they express.

Finally (Vol.I, Part II, Chap.IV, p.406), Dufrenne gives the conflicting opinion that expression gives the object its highest meaning:

"C'est elle (expression) qui confère à l'objet sa forme la plus haute parce qu'elle est sa plus haute signification."

(p.406 ibid.)

The work has a certain quality (expression) which animates it.

From what Dufrenne says of form and expression and their relation to meaning, one can only reasonably conclude that both contribute to the meaning, and that since expression is the essence
of a work of art it takes primacy. In neither part of this section does he mention that the meaning of the work is, in the end, ungraspable. This may be taken as an assumed part of his thesis.

I do not think that Dufrenne allows the formal qualities of a work of art the position they hold in relation to art. He subordinates form to expression, and nowhere considers the time which those contemplating art, devote to the formal relations of parts of a work, and to each formal property itself (irrespective of the possibly expressive powers of form). And I think it is undoubtedly the case that the form of a work in many cases justifies as much consideration as its expression, and in some cases, more, dependent on the type of art under consideration.

Conclusion.
As regards meaning, I have already discussed everything which I find dubious about Dufrenne's theory - which is basically, that the meaning of a work of art is inexhaustible, untranslatable and ungraspable, though more accessible if it has a subject. There is never any doubt that he regards art as meaningful.

However, I do not see why a work of art should necessarily be expressive, despite Dufrenne's absolute certainty that the affective a priori's are the essence of a work of art. The only way in which I would accept this would be if one used the term in an extremely broad sense, to include both the representational and 'presentative' - which I will explain. If a work gives the impression of moving water (e.g. Schubert, Die Schöne Müllerin), it represents the movement of water. And if a work is purely formal (e.g., certain Bach fugues, some Stravinsky), then it presents'
certain forms.

However, although the former seems acceptable, the latter is, I think, only a vain attempt to include form in expression. Presenting a form has little if anything to do with expressing. Besides, there is really no necessity to include (purely) formal qualities in the act of expression (unless one is presented with a formal work which does not express, and one's thesis is that it is a necessary condition of art that it is expressive - as is Dufrenne's thesis, in which case one ought to recant one's view). I fail to see why Dufrenne maintains the necessity of expression when it is perfectly clear that there are works of art which are purely formal, and when he has admitted the existence of formal qualities in a work of art,

1. I regard this as acceptable because representation and expression can I think be used to mean much the same thing. They may be two ends of a scale, where one is related to emotions, feelings, thoughts, etc. (expression), and the other to forms and activities (representation). On occasions they would seem to coincide - for example, one could say that the piano part of a Schubert song either represented, or expressed, the movement of water; and there seems to be no difference in the meaning of the two terms here.

N.B. I use 'represent' here without the connotation that there is something else to which the representation points (i.e., acts as a sign). Certainly what is represented is not literally in the work, but the representation itself is - just as I hold that the expression of a work is literally in it. It must also be admitted that there is another meaning of representation where it is completely different from expression. For example, if one represents the Schonbrunn, then there would be a difference if one substituted 'represented' by 'expressed'.


as distinct from expressive qualities, and as possible contributory factors to the meaningfulness of a work. It is also requisite to maintain a distinction of form and expression here, in order not to confuse the distinction within form - i.e., form as purely formal, and form as expressive.

Finally, with regard to possible types of expressive theory, I have indicated that I agree with Dufrenne that works of art are literally expressive. I do not find convincing, arguments for self-expression of the type which claim that the artist expresses only that which he has experienced or is experiencing. I have pointed out two disadvantages to this\(^1\)- that it confuses or makes for ambiguity, and that it is restrictive. Moreover it appears to have no particular advantages except that the knowledge whether or not artist has experienced what he describes, will very probably make a difference to our aesthetic appreciation. However, this being so, it is not logically necessary for the artist to experience what he expresses. Therefore the only thing one might stipulate is that if the work is expressive of something experienced by the artist, then it would be informative for the audience to know this - for the aesthetic attitude.

As for the idea that expressive properties are inherently expressive of certain qualities, I think that what Dufrenne says is sufficient argument against this. (Manslick adds a good deal more, if one wishes to substantiate the argument.) I have already dealt with Dufrenne's view of audience reaction and found his opinion convincing enough to place audience participation at a fairly moderate level.\(^2\) To say a work is expressive is not to say it

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1. See Section III, ii) present chapter.

2. See Chapter Four, Section IV. - audience participation may vary according to the capacity of the subject to distance successfully - cf. same section and Bullough.
causes a certain emotive response in the audience, although obviously it requires the audience, in order for it to be said to be expressive. For it is they who attribute the expressive qualities to art, and without them it could not be said to be expressive.

One of the main omissions which Dufrenne makes, however, is to make it clear whether he thinks a work has one affective/expressive quality, or many equally powerful ones, or one predominant quality which characterizes the 'mood' of the work. He gives no indication of what he thinks. As it happens, I do not think one can generalize about the whole area of art, i.e., all its types or classes and all objects belonging to that type or class - especially in view of the fact that art is a developing subject and what applies now may not apply in a few years' time. Nevertheless, I think Dufrenne could commit himself to the idea for example, that works of art usually have more than one affective quality. An instance of this is opera - Die Zauberflöte is expressive of a variety of things, from Papageno's aria, 'Der Vogelfänger', full of gaiety, to the sublimity of Tamino's 'Dies Bildnis' aria, to the reverence of Sarastro's aria, 'O Isis und Osiris', and so on. (An exception might be the very compressed works of Webern, which have little time to express anything.) Also, in most works there will be one predominant expressive quality which can be regarded as the 'mood', which does not have to be expressed explicitly anywhere, but which is set by the artist. I.e., by shape for a sculptor; shade and colour and formation by a painter; the main key, tempi, rhythm, harmony and melody by a composer; setting, period, style of speech etc., in literature.

It is very remiss of Dufrenne not to make his position clear in view of the fact that he is discussing his central, supposedly a priori subject. Thus there is a large blank spot in the theory, relating to how the affective a priori works. If he could have
attempted some examples of how the expressive qualities function, and how being a priori is valuable to their functioning (if it were), then he might conceivably convert one towards his point of view. As it stands, one may very well agree that art is expressive - either sometimes or necessarily - in the way Dufrenne thinks it is, without in the least committing oneself to agreeing that these affective/expressive qualities are a priori, or that the work of art as a whole is a priori.

Since I have emphasised the value of Dufrenne's pointing out certain objective aesthetic features, I shall conclude by mentioning the most notable of these which have arisen in this chapter, and which I have not so far pointed out. For instance (a) the untranslatability of the work of art - which is not universally art recognised. Some people would regard as nebulous and treacherous if they thought for instance, they could not take a picture to pieces (mentally) and explain why each piece had to be as it was and what it meant or symbolised, etc., that is, translate it completely into ordinary language. (This is not to say that I agree with Dufrenne's idea that the work is necessarily ungraspable, but that it emerges in the course of the discussion, that literal translation of art is not possible.) This particular question is still debated, and therefore Dufrenne is not pointing out any indisputable fact; but in reminding us of the number of facets and possible interpretations with which any work presents its audience, he is indicating how difficult it would be to give a complete verbal translation of any work, - and it also seems as if this is not the sort of activity one ought to attempt (as I said in the first section).
Also (b) a representational subject is not a necessary part of any of the arts, and where it occurs its function is to further the expressive powers of the work. One can give Dufrenne little credit for the former assertion, since his discussion has been seen to be highly ambiguous - but the latter gives one a possible means of distinguishing a representational painting from say, a photograph. According to Dufrenne then, a photograph of a cow would presumably do exactly what it was intended to do, that is, to represent a cow. But the painting of a cow goes further than this - the cow is the medium for expressing something - sadness, beauty, placidity, melancholia, etc. Others might wish to go further and assert, for example, that the form was as important as the expression, etc. But this still accepts Dufrenne's point - that there is something further in representing in art than just depicting the subject (and thus presenting us with the distinction between art and photography in cases of representation).

Apart from these, there are the two major and general properties of art, expression and meaning, which Dufrenne discusses from numerous angles, as has been seen. And even if his claims require substantiation, it cannot be said that Dufrenne fails to bring the problems of their existence in art to our attention.

1. I am referring here to a straightforward 'snapshot' -like photograph, for example, of a cow - one which makes no claim to be aesthetic; for quite a lot of photography can, with justification, claim to be art.

2. In these two cases I have elaborated somewhat on what Dufrenne says, since he only gives the bare assertion - e.g., that representation is secondary to expression, and leaves us to clarify the point and assess its value.
Appendix.

I stated in Chapter One (p.42) that the final decision as to whether the work of art was a quasi-subject must wait until I had discussed self-sufficiency, expression and meaning in the work - as Dufrenne regards these qualities as going towards making the work a quasi-pour-soi. In Chapter Two, I disagreed with the idea of the work as self-sufficient, but in the present chapter I have allowed that it is meaningful and as a rule, expressive, though not necessarily so.¹

In the absence of any suggestion by Dufrenne as to which of the qualities he mentions should be regarded as either necessary or sufficient or both, we are still without any firm conclusion. However, in favour of art as quasi-pour-soi, there is (from Chapter One) (i), temporality (ii), proximity to consciousness and (iii), having a relationship with the audience. (I think Chapter Four provided the substantiation needed, of affectivity and audience participation, which shows the relationship of the work to its audience to be stronger than a simple passive one of perceived to perceiver.) There is also (iv) expression and (v)

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¹. The qualification that art is not necessarily expressive is not a significant problem. It is not a necessary condition of man that he is expressive of anything at some stage in his existence. Obviously, it is very unlikely that he will never express a thought or emotion, but it is conceivable that such a person should exist - and still be regarded as a person.
meaning (from the present chapter). This leaves only (vi) unity, as dubious, and therefore not exactly antagonistic to the theory, and (vii) autonomy or self-sufficiency as incorrectly applied to art (and therefore antipathetic to Dufrenne's theory).

I think, on balance, that this provides enough of the qualities Dufrenne specifies as giving the work a quasi-pour-soi being, to allow that his theory is correct. All the same, one has to be satisfied with the properties which make an object a quasi-pour-soi. In one sense one cannot dispute the notion as such, since Dufrenne originated it and his definition is the only one there is, that is, what 'quasi-pour-soi' means is what Dufrenne means by it. But one must consider whether its properties are those which one could regard as sufficient conditions for saying the work of art resembles, or is analogous to, man - which is after all, what Dufrenne wants to show when he claims that it is quasi-pour-soi. I have already suggested that Dufrenne does not present these properties as necessary and sufficient conditions of art, which together make art an a priori concept. The present question regards the former consideration.

Fortunately, I think Dufrenne has succeeded here. Regarding (i), temporality, only man and art share the distinction of having their own temporal structure. Of course, man imposes his idea of time upon the whole world of objects, including art, and art's temporality within the objective time-structure uses the same

1. There is also the concept of profundity. However (a), Dufrenne's discussion of this has been seen to be unconvincing (cf. present chapter, Section I, iii); (b) he uses the idea of the quasi-pour-soi to claim profundity for the work, and therefore cannot also use profundity as a criterion for being quasi-pour-soi; and (c) the concept is in any case subsumed under the question of meaning, and as such need not be dealt with separately.
concept of time as its audience — but it could not very well do otherwise since it is an artefact. (Natural objects function in the same way as ordinary works of art with regard to their internal time-structure.)

This seems to be the essence of all the properties of the quasi-pour-soi, i.e., they approximate to human properties which are not possessed by non-conscious entities. (ii) 'Proximity to consciousness' speaks for itself and is similar both to the idea of 'having a relationship with the audience' (iii), and being expressive (iv), — both of which are outwardly human properties actually relating to consciousness. Meaning (v), in art also approximates to meaning in man though it does not bear any specific relationship to consciousness. Thus the work of art qua quasi-pour-soi seems to possess sufficient conditions for being analogous to man (in a way other objects are not).

N.B. Autonomy, the antipathetic property, has been temporarily shelved, but it is in any case not of great importance in this context. It would not make the work more nearly a pour-soi, since the pour-soi itself is not unaffected by, or independent of, other beings. Its consciousness both creates and uses the ordinary spatio-temporal structure, and man is more than historically locatable and related to actual events — he determines the course of the majority. (At least, one will accept this if one does not prescribe to a theory of determinism.) This excludes events which are termed 'acts of God', e.g., earthquakes. Art and man do have it in common however, that each is an end in itself — an attribute which Dufrenne uses to maintain the self-sufficiency of art (cf. Chapter One).

I stated in the introduction to this work that although I do not agree with Dufrenne's basic thesis of art as a priori, I did think that he made a valuable contribution to aesthetics in his
discussions of the objective properties of art. The idea of art as quasi-pour-soi seems to me to be one of the most original theories (as I said in the conclusion to Chapter One). And having scrutinised it thoroughly, and found it apparently correct, it becomes all the more valuable. Individually of course, the assertions of expression and meaning, etc. have been made by others and therefore are not unique to Dufrenne. But this factor seems to be unimportant for two reasons. (a) No one has put these particular properties together in this way previously - nor has anyone stressed the first three points as Dufrenne does, and (b) most significantly, no one has drawn a significant conclusion. It is one thing to be aware of the premises of a syllogism. It is another to be able to draw the conclusion. Physicists may have had all the necessary data for splitting the atom, in some random sequence along with other data - but it required someone to take the appropriate data and realise that with x, y and z processes one arrived at the method for splitting the atom.

I am not saying that Dufrenne has done anything comparable in significance to splitting the atom, but he has gone one step further than most theories, and categorized art. By putting together properties belonging to the aesthetic object he has caused it to assume an ontological status only below that of man. This is a reasonably significant conclusion. Art is thus not just to be seen as a dependent of man created by him, but as a class in its own right. (The natural object aestheticized (sunsets, etc.) seems capable of being categorized with art qua man-made object, on the same ontological level.)
Conclusion

A brief summary of the conclusions drawn in this thesis and the value of Dufrenne's most certainly inspired work is now required. And as anyone who reads his later works will see, the Phenomenologie does not consist of casual assertions about art - that is, without conviction or which he might abandon lightly. For he often reaffirms points which are made in the Phenomenologie in later works, for example, Le poétique, Esthétique et philosophie and La notion de l'a priori. I pointed out in the introduction that on the whole Dufrenne's work has been accepted too uncritically, and that it needed to be brought into perspective and evaluated on its own merits. However, having examined and appraised his thesis in the Phenomenologie, I think one must emphasize that his work is of positive value - otherwise one is merely looking at the disadvantages, and probably weighting the scales unfairly against Dufrenne. And this is not what is called for, nor is it what I have attempted in this thesis. What I have aimed to do is to present a balanced picture, with both the advantages and disadvantages of Dufrenne's thesis.

One of the basic contributions which Dufrenne makes to art, and which becomes immediately apparent on reading the Phenomenologie, consists in the new angle from which he approaches his subject matter - for example the world of the artist and the work, or the ungraspability of the aesthetic object. Also, many of the questions to which his work gives rise - for example, whether all art has a subject or is representational - have not been taken up previously.

I think it has been shown that Dufrenne is mistaken about much of what he says. As I indicated at the beginning, my intention has been to rectify many false beliefs about his work, including the one that his assertions are merely good and correct, yet represent
an extremely important contribution to aesthetics; rather than that they are more interestingly contentious, difficult and often wrong. All the same, falsehood does not render a work of philosophy irrelevant. If it did, Descartes would not be studied as he is - yet he is considered invaluable in terms of his contribution to the development of philosophy. In much the same way (without suggesting that Dufrenne's contribution to philosophy is comparable to that of Descartes), the lack of proof and often straightforward incorrectness of some of Dufrenne's work does not make it irrelevant.

To give an example of this, I have concluded that Dufrenne's central thesis of art as a priori is not proven, but from this whole thesis and the above, one may gather that I do not consider this renders it valueless. The question itself of the a priori related to art had not been dealt with before in anything like the depth that Dufrenne deals with it. Yet this is a perfectly reasonable and ingenious angle and one to which I have therefore accorded serious and lengthy discussion.

As claimed, the Phénoménologie is the paradigm case of a phenomenological aesthetic, and this and the originality of approach which it presents give it an important place in aesthetics. In investigating modern philosophy of art, one finds Dufrenne's work invaluable if only for its uniqueness and the fact that it presents a refreshing phenomenological angle on the mass of Anglo-American analytic aesthetics of recent years. However, as will have been clear throughout this work from the amount of criticism I have levelled at Dufrenne, one has to accept that Dufrenne makes a limited contribution in terms of answering current questions in aesthetics. And the fact that one must treat his work with respect does not mean that it is to be automatically accepted as correct, coherent and convincing.
Since this thesis is a thesis and not a commentary, I have taken it from the angle of discussing important aspects of aesthetics which are dealt with in some way at various stages throughout the Phénoménologie — rather than taking the work apart chapter by chapter. And I think this method best reveals all the important aspects and basic thesis of Dufrenne — that is, the notion of the a priori in art. It seems preferable to take an overall view rather than risk losing the import of the whole by taking a microscope to each chapter.

Those themes which I have discussed do not by any means exhaust the possibilities of the Phénoménologie. It is remarkably full of possible topics of discussion. For instance, there is the idea of truth in art, and specific themes, e.g., music and painting. In this context one should point out that one of Dufrenne’s merits is that he is prepared to discuss individual art types as well as making claims for ‘the work of art’ in general. Most works on aesthetics restrict themselves to one or the other — possibly in case the theory will not work out in practice.

This thesis does not set out to cover every aspect of the Phénoménologie, being as I said, a thesis not a commentary. But one may note that what Dufrenne says of music, and the method he employs, supports the view expressed in this work, that Dufrenne is forced to place too much reliance on Kant. This reliance on Kant has been seen to put Dufrenne’s theory in doubt, since it provides an example of the need for his phenomenological theory to make use of non-phenomenology — and his turning to Kantian notions of schemas to explain music reaffirms the doubt.

This latter point brings us to a more specific notation of the areas of Dufrenne’s thesis which are unacceptable or unproven. The principle of these is the idea that art has some form of a priori
nature or 'is an a priori', or has an unspecified number of a priori affective categories. As presented by Dufrenne, this theory emerged as almost wholly untenable. It tore the Kantian notion of the a priori to ribbons, only to replace it with an unsatisfactory concept including an existential and a material a priori. The attempt to broaden the a priori to include art only destroyed the notion itself by presenting it as something quite unacceptable - as I think the arguments of Chapter Three show (and to a lesser extent the two preceding chapters). The theory also suffered from the malaise of most phenomenological philosophies - a lack of argumentation.

The failure of a central topic also has the inevitable unfortunate consequence of giving rise to further error, and in this case the primary example is of the invocation of Kant (and certain quasi-Kantian ideas). And the adoption of Kantian theory is obvious from the start in the attempt to show that art has a priori affective categories. The somewhat ironic result is that Dufrenne is making use of the worst of two worlds, i.e., the obscure Kantian principles of categories and schemes made no less obscure by Dufrenne, and some of the less attractive aspects of phenomenology - for example its disinclination to present arguments and inclination to rely on self-evidence.

Apart from this it is not possible, from a purely internal angle, that is, not consequently upon the failure of the basic theory, to accept certain arguments. The more important of these are the distinction between the work of art and the aesthetic object as Dufrenne sees it; and his claims for the status of art, in particular its independence or autonomy.

1. At least the worst in terms of helping him to come to grips with the problems of aesthetics.
On the other hand Dufrenne responds positively to such aesthetic challenges as providing a definition of the nature of art, its objective features and the nature of the aesthetic experience. With regard to the latter he links analysis, intuition and distance to provide a contemplative theory of the aesthetic attitude, thus presenting a new if not individually original concept of contemplation, and one which allows plenty of scope for discussion. It is true that Dufrenne is himself often confused about the nature of the aesthetic attitude, but this does not make the view I have attributed to him any less valuable.

The former two can be taken together as one, and his concept of the quasi-pour-soi is, on balance, an extremely good summary of the nature of the work, and of many of the features it possesses objectively. And ultimately one sees that it unobtrusively demands and receives a good deal of discussion, in two separate ways. Firstly in terms of the concept as a whole - the quasi-pour-soi and the relationship of the en-spi and pour-nous to the work of art, and secondly in terms of its component parts, especially expression and meaning, as well as temporality, duration and structure (qualities appropriate to consciousness or approximating to those of a conscious being).

Thus, although there is undoubtedly a good deal which may be queried in the Phénoménologie, there is also much which is attractive, positive and thought-provoking. And whilst I have been concerned with revealing the faults within Dufrenne's thesis, and thereby dispelling over-enthusiastic attitudes, I hope that I have also been successful in pointing out where credit is due to him. Finally, I trust that I have not appeared to be biased either against Dufrenne or phenomenology as a whole - in fact I have a great deal of sympathy for both.
Bibliography.

Quite a lot of Dufrene's work is not directly related to aesthetics. In this bibliography I have listed most of Dufrene's books, but have restricted the articles mentioned to those which have a connection with art. Other works mentioned are either directly referred to in this thesis, or are relevant to the Phénoménologie and the topics discussed.

Works by Dufrene.


La notion d'a priori: Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1959, translated as:


Language and Philosophy: Bloomington, University of Indiana Press, 1963 (not a translation - originally published in English).

Collections of papers by Dufrene.


Works by Dufrenne in conjunction with others.


Selected articles by Dufrenne.

None of these is contained in the collections mentioned above.


Works on Dufrenne.


There are various other studies of Dufrenne's work, most of which are noted in the bibliography to Edward Casey's translation of *La notion d'a priori* (cited above). Those given here have been used in the preparation of this thesis, and give only a sketch of Dufrenne's work.
Works referred to.


Bergson, Henri: Laughter, an essay on the meaning of the comic: N.Y. 1911.

Bradley, A. C.: Oxford lectures on poetry: Macmillan, 1965 (see esp. essay, 'Poetry for poetry's sake')


Duusse, Curt John: Art, the critics and you: N.Y. Oscar Piest, 1944.


Fry, Roger: Vision and design: Chatto and Windus, 1923.


Guillaume, R.: La psychologie de la forme:


Hospers, John: Meaning and truth in the arts; Chapel Hill, 1946.
Lee, Vernon: The beautiful; C.U.P. 1913.
Lipps, Theodor: Raumästhetik und Geometrisch-Optische Tauschungen; trans. H. S.
Margolis, Joseph: Philosophy looks at the arts; Charles Scribner's Sons, N.Y., 1962 (anthology).


**Articles referred to.**

Bouwsma, O.K.: 'The expression theory of art', in Elton anthology, see above.

Cioffi, Frank: 'Intention and interpretation in criticism', in Barrett anthology, see above.


Redpath, T.: 'The meaning of a poem', in Barrett anthology, see above.


Tomas, Vincent: 'The concept of expression in art', in collection ed. Margolis, see above.

Wilde, Oscar Fingal O'Flahertie Wills: 'The decay of lying', in Ellman, see above.

Wilde, Oscar Fingal O'Flahertie Wills: 'The critic as artist', in Ellman, see above.

Additional relevant works (books and articles).
The following are some of the works used in the compilation of this thesis.


Articles from the J.A.A.C. containing translation of, 'objet esthétique et objet technique' (originally in the J.A.A.C. 1964, Vol. XXIII, number 1).


\textbf{Abbreviations used.}

A.P.Q. American Philosophical Quarterly.

B.J.A. British Journal of Aesthetics.

C.U.P. Cambridge University Press.

E.U. 'Edition Used' - when alternative date (usually first publication) is given.

J.A.A.C. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism.

M.I.T. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

N.U.P. Northwestern University Press.

N.Y. New York.

O.U.P. Oxford University Press.

S.C.M. Student Christian Movement.