How much control is enough? Monitoring and enforcement under Stalin
Markevich, Andreĭ, 1976- (2007) How much control is enough? Monitoring and enforcement under Stalin. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.829).
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Given wide scope for asymmetric information in huge hierarchies agents have a large capacity for opportunistic behaviour. Hidden actions increase transactions costs and cause the demand for monitoring and enforcement. Once the latter are costly, this raises questions about their scope, logistics and type. Using historical records, this paper examines the Stalin’s answers to them. We find that Stalin maximised efficiency of the Soviet system of control but had to mitigate with the problems of the loyalty of inspectors themselves and the necessity to lessen the risk of a “chaos of orders” arising from parallel centres of power.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
D History General and Old World > DK Russia. Soviet Union. Former Soviet Republics
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Stalin, Joseph, 1879-1953, Information asymmetry, Hierarchies -- Soviet Union, Transaction costs, Soviet Union -- Politics and government -- 1936-1953|
|Series Name:||Warwick economic research papers|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick, Department of Economics|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Official Date:||7 December 2007|
|Number of Pages:||38|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
|Funder:||Fifth Framework Programme (European Commission) (FP5)|
Alchian, A. & Demsetz H. (1972). Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization. American Economic Review, 62, 777 – 95.
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