ASPECTS OF VIOLENCE IN THE DRAMA OF

FERNANDO ARRABAL

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For Priscilla
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SUMMARY

This thesis is structured in two parts and aims to contribute to our understanding of the drama of Fernando Arrabal by the elaboration and comparison of two interpretations of the role and significance of violence in that drama.

In Part One it is shown that the fundamental opposition between individual and authority which stands at the heart of Arrabal's œuvre reflects the terms of the main concerns of the author's biography. The meaning of that opposition is then elucidated by a comparison which is made between the terms of its expression in the form of violence, and the description given by Freud of the sub-conscious facets of the individual psyche. It is shown that Arrabal's use of violence reflects exactly Freud's elaboration of the psychological notions id and super-ego and it is thus concluded that Arrabal's plays express the plight of the individual caught between the demands of the id and those of the super-ego.

While the interpretation developed in Part One depends upon a single comparison which is made between Arrabal's drama and the schema set out by Freud, the interpretation developed in Part Two depends upon comparisons which are drawn between Arrabal's drama and three separate schemas. Part Two therefore contains three sections which elucidate the content, form, and theatrical structure of Arrabal's plays respectively.

In Section 1 of Part Two it is shown that the opposition which characterizes Arrabal's plays reflects not only the biographical concerns of the author, but equally the fundamental tenets of his 'panique' philosophy. It is argued that philosophy and plays alike may be interpreted in the light of the 'religious' theories elaborated by Caillois, Durkheim and Bataille and it is shown that the concept of 'la confusion' central to Arrabal's 'panique' philosophy, and denoting the nature of total reality, may be understood in the light of the concept of violence, as defined by Bataille. It is thus concluded that Arrabal's plays may he seen as an attempt to portray violence in this sense.

Section 2 of Part Two assesses the validity of the symbols used by Arrabal to portray 'la confusion' (and hence violence in the sense defined by Bataille) on the basis of a parallel which is drawn between the notion of violence and the concept of the Collective Unconscious as defined by Jung. The archetypes of the Collective Unconscious identified by Jung are used as a yardstick for the evaluation of Arrabal's symbols, and the assertions made in Section 1 of Part Two are effectively substantiated, in as much as it is demonstrated that those symbols adequately express what is connoted by the term violence.

In Section 3 of Part Two the method adopted by Arrabal to portray violence as theatre is discussed in detail. It is noted that Arrabal's philosophy is supported by a well-developed dramatic methodology which indicates the means of presenting the irrational notion of 'la confusion' (or violence as defined by Bataille) to a rational audience. The appropriateness of this methodology to Arrabal's stated philosophical objective is assessed, and the methodology itself is explained as a reflection and extension of the principles of drama, which, it is noted, performs a similar function in uniting the imaginary world of the illusion with the real world of the spectator.

In the conclusion the findings of each part of the thesis are restated and the relationship between the two interpretations is examined and found to suggest, firstly the existence of a relationship between all the various, apparently unrelated systems referred to in their formulation, and secondly the terms of a final assessment of the nature of the achievement of Arrabal's drama.
PREFACE

In his article "Essayons de parler calmement d'Arrabal"¹

Pierre Marcabru opens with the words:

Ne crions pas au scandale. Le scandale est dans l'incompréhension.

Significantly, the elements which, particularly during the latter part of the sixties, made the work of Fernando Arrabal into a national scandal of extraordinary proportions also form the basis of the means of dispelling incomprehension of that author's work. For Arrabal's opponents proceeded from the correct realization that the most consistent feature of an otherwise apparently dislocated and incoherent dramatic output was an irrepressible proclivity towards violence. A putatively obsessional fascination with violence, which in his plays took the form of repeated torture and murder, unbridled sadism and masochism, all salted with disturbing indications of blasphemy and anarchy, was cited, however, as a clear testimony of the depravity of the author and of his work, by critics who were either unable or unwilling to discern any positive significance behind its use. This thesis proceeds from the contention, however, that Arrabal's consistent use of violence is an indication of the validity rather than of the inadequacy of his plays. Accordingly, what follows constitutes a precise elaboration of the significance of the notion of violence in Arrabal's theatre, the aim of which is to add to our comprehension, and to replace scandal by understanding and appreciation.

The thesis is deliberately structured in two parts. Arrabal's work is considered in the first part as the product of the influence of the author's biography, and in the second part as the product of the influence of the author's philosophy. In each part an interpretation of Arrabal's work is developed in the light of the
particular influence under consideration and in the conclusion to
the thesis these two interpretations are compared and the relationship between them assessed in an effort to provide a final, concise
indication of the achievement of Arrabal's drama. The method of
approach, moreover, is similar in each part of the thesis. In
either case it is shown that the nature of the influence is reflected
in the drama by the presence of violence, which term is used in two
slightly different but related senses defined in the text, and by
the existence of an underlying pattern of construction, which, though
not necessarily present in its entirety in each individual play is
nevertheless discernible throughout Arrabal's oeuvre. That pattern
is then compared in either case to similarly structured patterns in
other disciplines in an attempt to provide an assessment of the
significance of violence, and hence an interpretation of Arrabal's
work as a whole.

In the formulation of each interpretation the widest possible
use is made of primary sources. Secondary sources are referred to
only in order to elucidate specific aspects of the argument. All
plays by Arrabal published before 1978 are taken into account and
while not all figure with equal prominence in our considerations
those held to be most significant are treated in considerable detail.
In addition to plays, other writings of Arrabal have been considered
where relevant, particularly Baal Babylone [1959] and Lettre au
Général Franco [1971] as sources of biographical data, and the volume
entitled Le Panique [1973] of which Arrabal was the editor, as a
statement of philosophy. Close consideration has also been given
to statements made by Arrabal, both in personal conversation with the
writer of the thesis, and in published interviews. In the latter
context the aid afforded by the important volume entitled Entretiens
Avec Arrabal (1969) by Alain Schifres should particularly be acknowledged. In compiling this thesis, and particularly in writing the third section of Part II, which evaluates Arrabal's work as theatre, it has been indispensable to see plays in performance, and the writer of the thesis has been fortunate in having had the opportunity of seeing performances of a significant number of Arrabal's plays, including productions directed by Garcia, Lavelli and Arrabal himself. Whilst working on this thesis the writer also directed an amateur group in the performance of Le Labyrinthe and in the only known performance ever of Le Ciel et la verdure: the importance of this experience in gaining an insight into Arrabal's work cannot be overstated.

We have stated that the aim of this thesis is to add to our comprehension of Arrabal's drama and it will seek to achieve this aim by the provision of rational interpretations based on ordered argument. From the outset, however, the reader should be aware of the limitations of such an undertaking. Ultimately the power and originality of Arrabal's work can in no way be adequately conveyed in the terms of an academic exercise. We use rational argument here with the immediate purpose, above all, of making Arrabal's work more accessible, but we would stress that the essence of Arrabal's achievement and the intrinsic value of his drama may be perceived only in an experience of the plays themselves. This thesis is thus not an end in itself: it cannot and does not seek to provide definitive answers, but to furnish a framework of comprehension for that experience. Its value is in all respects dependent upon its ability to instil in the reader the desire to return to the texts upon which it comments.
Notes to Preface


2 Arrabal, of course, was not alone in arousing outrage among French theatre-goers during this period. Between 1966 and 1968 particularly, French theatre was characterized by the theme of scandal.

3 Vole-moi un petit Milliard, Le Pastage des Loufs ou Ouverture, Cranz-outang and Funk et Funk et Colégram, which three plays appear in Théâtre XII (Théâtre Bouffe), published by Christian Bourgois in 1978, when this thesis was in the final stages of preparation, are not taken into account.
# PART ONE

## A FREUDIAN INTERPRETATION OF THE NOTION OF VIOLENCE IN ARRASAL’S DRAMA

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Arrabal gives an important insight into the terms of his artistic creation when in *Entretiens avec Arrabal*, he declares to Alain Schifres:

Il faut bien avouer—mais vous l'avez sans doute deviné?—que je suis presque toujours le personnage principal de mes pièces, ou, dans les autres cas, qu'il s'agit de quelqu'un de très proche de moi.

The author appears, in this 'admission', to provide us with a clear indication of the direction from which to approach the dazzling, yet potentially also puzzling corpus of his drama. For, as we shall see, it is in the fertile soil of 'une riche biographie' that lie the roots of Arrabal's provocative and fascinating creative writing. The themes which emerge from Arrabal's plays have a clear basis in the considerations which haunt his existence: the problems explored by Arrabal's characters are related to those which mark the biography of their creator. The complexity of the author's personal experience acts as a stimulus, in other words, to a dramatic creation characterised by the notion of violence. Accordingly, the prelude to our formulation of an interpretation lies in a consideration of the nature of the stimulus; in an elaboration of the author's biography, followed by a precise definition of the relationship between that biography and the drama it inspires.

Arrabal was born in Melilla, in Spanish Morocco, on 11 August 1932, some sixteen months after the overthrow of the monarchy in Spain, to Fernando Arrabal Ruiz, an army officer and a Republican, "un homme de gauche mais non un militant" and Carmen Teran Gonzalez, described as "conservatrice, issue d'une famille de petits commerçants". His sister, Carmen, had been born in September of the previous year, and the family was further augmented in August.
1934 by the birth of a second boy, Julio. Arrabal was less than four years old when there occurred the most dramatic and significant single event of what was to prove an altogether eventful life. On 17 July 1936 Arrabal's father was arrested by nationalist troops:

Le coup d'Etat devait bien éclater le 18, mais à Melilla, un des rebelles avait dénoncé ses complices aux autorités de la République. Les franquistes l'ont su, dès le 17, un petit groupe d'officiers a pris le pouvoir dans la ville, arrêtant les personnalités dites de gauche. Parmi elles, figurait mon père qui fut surpris dans son lit.

Fernando Arrabal Ruiz was straightway condemned to death for 'rebellion'. He was later transferred from Melilla to the El Hacho prison in Ceuta, where, it is reported, he attempted to commit suicide, and subsequently, his sentence having been commuted to 30 years imprisonment, to Ciudad Rodrigo and Burgos. Françoise Raymond-Mundschau records that Arrabal's father was not alone among members of the family arrested during the coup. The same fate befell two of Arrabal's uncles, one of whom was executed within a short time, while the other, likewise condemned to death, but subsequently pardoned, survived to see liberty again and to become the owner of a factory in Toledo.

Before the end of 1936 the truncated family unit had moved from Melilla to Ciudad Rodrigo, which town figures in Arrabal's autobiographical novel Baal Babylon under the name Villa Ramiro. Before leaving Melilla, Arrabal's mother had gone with her family to the prison, but had refused her husband's request (he was at the time still condemned to death) to kiss his children goodbye "parce qu'il n'en était pas digne, parce qu'il était un homme de gauche". This proved to be the first move in a concerted campaign on the mother's part to erase all memory of her husband:

pour le jeune Arrabal en 1936 le père est mort.

The family was dressed in mourning clothes, Arrabal's father's face was sedulously removed from all photographs, the inscription
"Souviens-toi de ton père" on presents which arrived one Christmas from prison was carefully painted over; all reference to Fernando Arrabal Ruiz was strictly forbidden. The young Arrabal was thus left with but a single memory of the man who was his father:

A l’époque je n’avais même pas quatre ans. Je ne me rappelle que ses mains enterrant mes jambes dans le sable de la plage, à Melilla. Pour moi c’est un personnage mythique. Des années durant, ce mythe a tenu une place considérable dans ma vie.  

Ciudad Rodrigo was the Teran family home. Arrabal’s grandfather, a shadowy figure in his memory, died shortly after the family’s arrival; the death is recalled in Baal Babylone. The playwright’s other recollections of his mother’s family centre around the bizarre character of his aunt, Mercedes. The latter combined the demonstration of an ostensibly passionate and rigid religious piety with sporadic outbursts of a lurid sensuality, to which her young nephew was periodically made party:

Elle arborait un catholicisme extrémiste et aberrant. En même temps, quand j’ouvrais une porte de la maison, je la trouvais souvent nue, alors qu’elle savait que j’allais ouvrir cette porte.

Mercedes thus incarnated a paradox, the ambiguity of which did not pass unnoticed by the young boy. At the centre of the family group, and indeed at the centre of Arrabal’s universe, however, was his mother. In fact Carmen Teran was absent for much of the time, since she had taken a job in an office in Burgos and returned only at weekends. The eagerness with which that return was awaited, however, may be imagined from the beautifully naïve and spontaneous descriptions given in Baal Babylone of the unequivocal feelings that Arrabal had for his mother during this period:

Aucune, maman, mais aucune n’était comme toi. Aucune n’avait la langue humide ni les genoux blancs comme toi, maman. Aucune.
There is indeed no doubt that, as the novel serves to suggest, the years spent in the Teran household at Ciudad Rodrigo were memorable above all for the uninhibited tenderness of the child's feelings for his mother, a tenderness which we may suppose was exacerbated both by the absence of a father and by the puzzling nature of the immediate surroundings.

Outside the home were born further memories, though arguably more haphazard and less striking. In 1937 Arrabal began to attend the Catholic school at which his elder sister was already a pupil. The atmosphere at school, like that at home, had a strong religious flavour, respite from which occurred only during the passage from one to the other when Arrabal would break his journey to play 'bulls and matadors', or to explore the castle moats and ramparts with his school-fellows. The war, meanwhile, continued until May 1939 when Arrabal, in company with the other inhabitants of Ciudad Rodrigo, was present in the main square to hear the declaration of the end of the war and to usher in the new epoch. The war seems to have impinged on the schoolboy's consciousness less in the form of distinct and dramatic memories than as the ever-present, sinister and inexplicable accompaniment to the daily round:

Un jour que nous jouions dans les meurtrières proches du pénitencier nous avons demandé à l'un des gardiens
«Pourquoi les prisonniers crient-ils?»....
En ce temps-là on criait dans toutes les prisons. Et ces hurlements étaient le sourd tam-tam des occupations quotidiennes.14

In 1940 the family moved again, to Madrid. By dint of consistent hard work and considerable self-sacrifice on the part of Carmen Teran, and with the aid of a grant won by Arrabal in competition with pupils of his age throughout Spain, Arrabal and his brother were both able to attend the prestigious and renowned Catholic schools run by the Escolapian order, first at San Anton and
subsequently (194?) at Gastepe. Arrabal's memories of his schooldays are characterised by the same curious mixture of religious severity and sensuality already remarked in the person of his aunt.\textsuperscript{15} the harshness and intransigent religiosity of his educators vied with and yet paradoxically also supported the growing awareness of the playwright as he passed through puberty and into adolescence. It was whilst at his devotions that Arrabal first became aware of his own sexuality, for example, realising that he had an erection.\textsuperscript{16} He vividly recalls the tireless efforts of one particular teacher to instil into him the evils (and dangers) of masturbation, and yet in the execution of penances imposed upon him by the chaplain, he was involuntarily to experience "une excitation terrible"\textsuperscript{17} and even, if the testimony of Baal Babylone is to be credited, seminal emission. Education at school was supplemented by membership of one of the paramilitary children's groups set up by the nationalists. Here Arrabal was taught allegiance to the régime, disdain for its opponents, and the importance of the part he could play in denouncing to the authorities anyone whom he suspected of harbouring anti-Francist sentiments. There were cruel punishments for those boys who had the misfortune to grin during official ceremonies, beatings for those who failed to raise their arm with sufficient conviction, and automatic imprisonment for 'more serious offences'.\textsuperscript{18} In later years Arrabal was to realise the full implications of an educational system erected on the twin pillars of nationalism and catholicism:

\begin{quote}
L'enseignement avait une double mission —
- ne pas nous informer
- condamner
Ainsi s'est forgée une génération d'étudiants, la mienne
\end{quote}

but whilst actually living through these crucial formative years, he was, like his fellows, a good and ardent Catholic\textsuperscript{20} as well as a
good Spaniard, his attitude characterized less by rebellion than by perplexity and nascent disquiet.

Two years before the completion of his secondary education (1947) Arrabal was made by his mother to leave school and to embark on a course at the Military Academy. The incident is interesting primarily as a further illustration of the terms of the playwright's relationship with his mother. For Arrabal's description is at once a striking reminder of the ingenuous adoration that had marked his younger years and which persisted into his adolescence, and also the first hint of the dramatic rupture that was to ensue some two years later:

Tu m'as dit, maman, que c'était ton rêve et que tu serais très fière de marcher à mon côté. Alors moi, maman, je t'ai dit oui.

Quelques jours plus tard, maman, je t'ai dit non. Toi, maman, tu m'as dit que tu me mettrais à la porte et tu m'as appelé poule mouillée. Alors, maman, je t'ai dit "oui", maman. Et toi, maman, tu m'as embrassé.

Carmen Teran's dream of seeing her younger son follow his brother into a career as a military pilot was not to be realized, however. The unwilling and bored student, whose achievements at the Military Academy were summed up by his instructors in the description of an "esprit militaire nul" cut his classes in favour of repeated secret visits to the cinema, nurturing a growing interest in, and awareness of, a wider cultural spectrum than that which had been available to him in school. Arrabal's lack of zeal and enthusiasm for the career that had been chosen for him led to mounting tension in the home and a marked deterioration in the relationship between mother and son which came to a head when in 1949 Arrabal finally refused to pursue his course at the Academy any further.

The event which provoked Arrabal's open rebellion against the authority of his mother and which marked an irreversible development in their relationship was the young man's chance discovery
of a packet of letters, documents and photographs (which had been hidden by his mother) relating to his father. Not only was Arrabai able to gaze on the image of his father for the first time since 1936 but he was also able to reconstruct the history of the prisoner whom he had, of course, presumed long since dead. He learned that his father had spent six years in prison, for the majority of the time within easy distance of his family's home. In December 1941 he had supposedly become mad and had been transferred from the prison in Burgos to a psychiatric hospital in the same town. At the end of the next month, on 28 January 1942, Fernando Arrabal Ruiz had escaped, clad only in his pyjamas and without any personal papers, as three feet of snow covered the Castile region.

These were the facts. Perhaps even more significant for the 17 year old Arrabal, however, were the implications which lay behind the facts revealed by his discovery. He became obsessed with the notion that his father was possibly still alive and at the same time tormented by suspicions regarding the possible rôle of his mother in the arrest of his father:

Sus craintes, ses idées, l'ont-elles poussé à commettre des actes irréparables envers mon père? Ces conflits demeurent nébuleux.

Arrabal was later to make extensive enquiries aimed at gaining further information about the fate of his father, before finally abandoning all hope of seeing him again. His immediate reaction, however, took the form of a silent rebellion against his mother:


These were indeed altogether troubled times for Arrabal. His physical health was poor, since he suffered from some as yet
unidentified disorder of the lungs; he believed himself
abnormally small; he thought his head was disproportionately large;
he suspected that he smelt and that he was the butt of other people's
ridicule. He was struggling to come to terms with his developing
sexuality in a climate where even to speak of sexual matters was
pronounced sinful. He suffered from depression and lived within the
shell of his own silence, suspicions, fears and resentment. It is
thus perhaps little wonder that he decided to kill himself,
seriously believing that this could be achieved by 'excessive sinning':

J'ai tout prévu, j'ai beaucoup péché toute une journée,
presque jusqu'au sang. Ensuite, j'ai été me confesser de tous
ces péchés et j'ai cru que j'allais mourir le soir même.25

Temporary relief, at least from the intolerable atmosphere
that pervaded the home,26 came when Arrabal's mother, accepting the
failure of her original plan, sent him to Tolosa as an apprentice
in the paper industry.27 Arrabal recalls, however, that no relief
was afforded from an awareness of the double-headed repression that
had marked his schooldays:

Pour toute chose il fallait deux certificats:
- l'un de loyauté envers le régime qui était décerné
  par les fonctionnaires de la Phalange
- l'autre de bonne conduite - c’est à dire prouvant que
l'on était catholique et pratiquant - délivré par
le curé de la paroisse ... 

... En 1949 quand je voulus entrer comme employé dans
une entreprise privée (la Papelera Española) les deux
certificats me furent exigés, comme à tous les Espagnols
qui essayaient simplement de se nourrir à la sueur
de leur front.28

Arrabal profited from the absence from Madrid to complete
his interrupted secondary education in his own time, and in 1951
he passed the Bachillerato in Valencia.29 At the same time
he began to write plays for the first time, many of which he still
possesses, but which are unpublished. His physical health, meanwhile,
continued to deteriorate.
Having obtained the Bachillerato, Arrabal contemplated a religious vocation, and decided to become a Jesuit. This decision, however, was quickly revoked, and Arrabal returned to Madrid to live once more at home, and to pursue his career in the paper industry. He continued to study on his own and in the three years that followed, Arrabal all but completed a university course (the normal duration of which was five years) in law. During those years Arrabal also spent much time at the "Ateneo científico, literario y artístico" where he discovered that the bewilderment, suspicion and resentment that were the legacy of the conditions of his childhood were not peculiar to himself. A group of friends which included the poet Arroyo formed an 'Academia', and introduced each other to the unsuspected vistas of foreign literature. Arrabal read furiously, discussed avidly, paid frequent visits to the theatre, and continued to write himself, completing Los Soldados (Pique-nique en Campagne) towards the end of 1952, and Los Hombres del Triciclo (Le Tricycle) the following year. His interest in literature and theatre developed into a passion:

Avant de venir en France, j'ai lu Beckett, puis j'ai vu la Cantatrice Chauve, la Leçon, En Attendant Godot. Ce fut pour moi une immense surprise, comparable à ce qui s'était passé avec Kafka. Je me suis dit: voici un langage libre et exaltant qui est accepté! Liberté sera reconnue un jour! Cette confiance m'a permis de pousser encore plus loin mes expériences et de me laisser envouter toujours davantage par le théâtre.

In 1954 Arrabal entered Los Hombres del Triciclo in a drama competition in Barcelona. The production, directed by a friend, obtained second place and failed to win the competition only because one of the judges considered that the play was a plagiarism of Beckett. Second place was enough, however, to win for Arrabal in the following year a grant to study theatre in Paris for three months, which he took up in December 1955. Arrabal had meanwhile
already visited Paris, hitchhiking from Spain in 1954 specifically to see a production of Mother Courage by the Berliner Ensemble and, being penniless and ill, having to get back to Madrid as best he could, dodging ticket inspectors on the Paris-Marseille train and hitchhiking the rest of the way. It was during this first brief visit to Paris that Arrabal met Luce Moreau, at the time a student and later to become his wife.

Returning to Paris in December 1955, Arrabal had little time to familiarise himself with his new surroundings. Shortly after his arrival at the Cité Universitaire (where he took a room in the Maison d’Espagne) his by now long-standing illness was diagnosed as tuberculosis, and he was admitted to hospital. In February 1956 he was moved from the hospital in the cité to the sanatorium at Bouffémont, and in November of the same year he was operated on at the Hopital Foch (Suresnes) returning to Bouffémont for a convalescence which lasted until April 1957. Arrabal stresses that this period of unexpected internment constituted an extraordinary stroke of good fortune. It enabled him to settle definitively in Paris, removing, or at least postponing, the problem of what to do after the expiry of the three months for which his Spanish grant made provision. And more specifically the period in hospital afforded Arrabal the opportunity to write at leisure, an opportunity which he gratefully accepted, bringing away from Bouffémont with him at least five newly completed plays.

The period at Bouffémont indeed provided a solid foundation for a career which blossomed rapidly in the months which followed. Shortly after returning to the Maison d’Espagne, Arrabal was introduced to Jean-Marie Serreau, who borrowed a number of an ever-growing pile of manuscripts to show to his wife Geneviève Serreau, who in turn presented them to the publisher Juillard with the result
that in October 1957 a contract was concluded between Arrabal and Juillard, which ensured the author both publication and a modest monthly income. 1958 saw both the first public performance of a play by Arrabal (Los Hombres del Triciclo), presented in a single performance in Madrid by the 'Dido Pequeño Teatro' group under the direction of Josefina Sanchez Pedreño on January 29th and, in October, the publication by Juillard of the first volume of his plays. On February 1st, moreover, Arrabal and Luce Moreau were married in Paris, and during the summer of 1958 Arrabal participated as an actor in a tour of Italy and Spain with a theatre group under the direction of Jean-Marie Serreau. This tour provided Arrabal with the opportunity of seeing his mother once more, and, apparently much affected by their encounter in Madrid, he launched into the writing of Baal Babylone which was quickly completed and published on January 21st, 1959. On 25 April, 1959 a play by Arrabal was seen for the first time in France, when Serreau directed Pique-Nique en Campagne at the Théâtre de Lutèce, and a period of striking richness in both activity and creation culminated in the award to Arrabal of a Scholarship from the Ford Foundation enabling him to depart, on November 4th, for a six-month stay in the United States.

If Arrabal's hospitalisation ushered in a period of efflorescence and fecundity, however, his trip to America had rather the opposite effect. His time in America was mostly spent travelling, rather than working, and Arrabal's return to Paris was followed by a difficult period during which he wrote little apart from the novel l'Enterrement de la Sardine [1960]. His plays, however, were being performed (though rather less in France than elsewhere) and the second volume of Arrabal's plays was published by Juillard in November 1961.

In 1962, however, the temporarily interrupted momentum of Arrabal's career was regained through the playwright's association
with Jodorowski, Sternberg and Topor. Out of the frequent meetings of these four in the Café de la Paix, a few yards from the main entrance to the Opéra, grew the 'mouvement panique', adherence to which was to form the basis of Arrabal's activity in the five years which followed, during the most flamboyant and provocative period of his career. The creation of this movement reflected Arrabal's preoccupation at the time with philosophy, and was born of his realisation of the restrictive nature of philosophical and other systems which, he claimed, obscured or ignored the fundamental nature of reality. The 'mouvement panique' suggested that reality could not be reduced to the neatly explicable and comfortingly ordered categories that are the legacy of civilization, and propounded instead that its true nature lay in the unclassifiable, the unexpected, the arbitrary and above all in the key 'panique' notion of 'la confusion':

Le Panique serait alors «l'anti-loi» philosophique, le monde de la confusion où prédé l'irrationnel. Le présent et l'avenir sont le fruit du hasard. Le passé se résume en la mémoire. Hasard et mémoire sont les clés de l'univers panique, aussi énigmatiques l'une que l'autre, et qui se fondent en la confusion.  

The first 'panique' texts to be published appeared in the Surrealist review La Brèche, later in the same year, following Arrabal's introduction to André Breton, and in August of the following year, having accepted an invitation to see Fando et Lis and Les Deux Bourreaux performed in Sydney, Arrabal delivered his now famous lecture 'L'Homme Panique' in which 'panique' theories were fully, though somewhat enigmatically, expounded to a bemused audience at the University of Sydney. There followed a period of febrile activity which saw the writing of a number of new plays, clearly influenced by 'panique' ideas (including in 1966 L'Architecte et l'Empeur d'Assyrie), the writing of the screenplay for two films for J.P. Arroyo, and continued collaboration with the 'mouvement
panique', particularly in the creation of the so-called «éphémères paniques». Arrabal also began during this period to collaborate with three Spanish painters, Pelez, Arnaiz and Crespo, in the production of a series of paintings, executed by the latter in accordance with precise indications and sketches provided by Arrabal. Like his plays, these paintings have as a starting point the personal fears and dreams of the playwright:

il eut un jour l'idée de faire exécuter par des peintres académiques espagnols, selon des instructions très précises, la représentation de ses fantasmes dont il est toujours l'acteur principal et triomphant.42

Meaningwhile Arrabal's work was being regularly performed in Paris, meeting invariably with hostile and outraged criticism from all but a small knot of enthusiasts. The author's association with the so-called 'Latin-American School' of directors (Lavelli, Garcia and Savary)43 lent to the performance of his plays a new dimension which was arguably most strikingly in evidence in the creation of L'Architecte et l'Empereur d'Assyrie which opened on 15 March 1967 at the Théâtre Montparnasse Gaston-Baty under the direction of Jorge Lavelli. It was indeed this play which finally established the name of Arrabal in the minds of Parisian theatre-goers, and which thus marks the climax of the steady process of growth in the playwright's career, which had begun with his first modest success in Barcelona some thirteen years earlier:

La pièce qui soulève des admirations enthousiastes ou des refus écœurés achève d'imposer le nom de son auteur.44

Before the end of 1967, however, Arrabal's name was to become familiar to a yet wider public. In July the playwright departed, as he had done the previous summer, for his native Spain, where, during the course of his stay he accepted an invitation to sign copies of the Spanish translation of his book Fête et Rite de la Confusion at a department store (Galerias Preciados) in
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Madrid. Asked for a 'panic dedication' by one of those attending the event, Arrabal wrote "Me cago en Dios, en la patria y en todo lo demás" (I shit on God, the fatherland, and on all the rest). He was subsequently arrested in the middle of the night (20/21 July) in his hotel bed in La Mansa, where he had travelled from Madrid, and taken to prison at La Murcie. The next day he was taken back to Madrid, where, for the first time, he was told the charges against him - he was accused of writing an anti-patriotic and sacrilegious dedication - before being led to an underground cell of the Las Salesas prison. Arrabal spent five days in solitary confinement at Las Salesas, and was then moved to the renowned Carabanchel jail. Within twenty four hours of his arrival at Carabanchel, however, Arrabal had fainted and he had to be moved yet again, this time to the prison hospital where he remained until August 14th, on which date he was released on bail pending the trial which took place in September.

Meanwhile the Spanish press had launched a vitriolic campaign against Arrabal, suggesting, among other suitable punishments, that he should be castrated to preclude the possibility of his producing children who might also insult the fatherland. Much to the authorities' surprise, however, there ensued an equally vigorous campaign mounted, apparently spontaneously, on Arrabal's behalf:

Pueblo (a trade union newspaper) printed a full page of pro-Arrabal testimonials from Spanish intellectuals and noted French writers - including Beckett, Ionesco, Anouilh, Rostand, Mauriac and Achard. From Germany Peter Weiss and Günter Grass joined over 20 writers in protesting.

The affair had attracted international interest, making the headlines throughout Europe, and had thus assumed a significance which far outweighed that foreseen by the Spanish Authorities. There is little doubt, moreover, that it was this factor, rather than any evidence brought forward during the trial, which saved Arrabal from
In the event the trial lasted four and a half hours, arriving finally at the conclusion that the writer had been suffering from temporary mental derangement and fining him for his irresponsible behaviour.

Shortly after his return to Paris, Arrabal was appointed the editor of a new theatre magazine published by Christian Bourgois, the first edition of which, *Le Théâtre 1968-1*, appeared in April 1968. At the same time Christian Bourgois undertook to produce a new edition of Arrabal's plays, the first two volumes of which were published in 1968 in addition to *Théâtre Panique* (subsequently to become *Théâtre V*) which had already appeared in an edition by Bourgois in 1967. Volumes 3, 4, 6 and 7 in the Bourgois series followed in 1969. Meanwhile the experience of the summer of 1967 had given a new spur to Arrabal's writing, which was reinforced by his enthusiastic participation in the events of May 1968. It was not only the Spanish authorities that Arrabal fell foul of during this period, moreover; in December 1969 the production of *Et ils passèrent des Menottes aux Fleurs* (directed by the author himself) at the Théâtre de l'Espée-de-Bois was forced to close prematurely after the intervention of the police following complaints by spectators, who alleged that while being conducted to their seats in total darkness before the beginning of the play, they had been assaulted, molested and even bitten by the author, the actors and others connected with the production. In 1970 it was the turn of the German press to attack Arrabal when a book entitled...
Selbstdarstellung in Wort und Bild (first seen at the Frankfurt Book Fair in 1969, published by the Joseph Melzer Verlag, Darmstadt), which had been prepared by Arrabal and Jodorowski, and which included full frontal nude photographs of them, caused an outrage and was banned.

The most recent period of Arrabal's biography is rapidly recounted. On 14 January 1970 his daughter Lelia was born, and the following year a second child, Samuel (in honour of Beckett) was added to the Arrabal household, giving Arrabal the opportunity to stress that he is now, above all, a family man. That fact, however, has not interrupted the continuation of a now firmly established career: new plays have continued to appear at regular intervals, and both these and older plays have been performed with increasing frequency throughout the world. In addition, Arrabal has made three films, and with a mixture of satisfaction and amusement he has watched the predictions made in the early sixties, at the foundation of the 'mouvement panique':

Nous nous sommes réunis un après-midi Topor, Jodorowski et moi, et nous avons dit maintenant personne ne nous connaît, mais nous sommes sûrs d'être connus un jour. Nous allons créer le Panique ... d'ici à vingt ans il y aura des thèses, des livres très sérieux là-dessus. 51

come true ahead of schedule. The once reviled playwright now accepts invitations to lecture in universities, to attend debates, and to write for literary and academic journals. Only indeed in his native Spain does he remain persona non grata. Following the death of Franco in 1975 the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared an amnesty, allowing political exiles to return freely to Spain. There were, however, six Spaniards in exile to whom pardon did not extend: the six exceptions were Rafael Alberti, La Pasionaria, Lister, Santiago Carrillo, el Camesino and Fernando Arrabal. 52
It will be recalled that we proceeded from the contention that the biography which has been outlined above provided a stimulus to the terms of Arrabal's dramatic creation. It is not the case, however, that the playwright translates his personal experiences unmodified into the form of drama. Nor should it be presumed that an awareness of the events of Arrabal's life furnishes us with a ready-made interpretation of his work. They provide rather, as has been stated, the indication of a means of approaching the drama, they are significant as a source rather than as an immediate explanation of Arrabal's work. The notion of a stimulus, indeed, needs to be stressed, and at the same time to be clearly defined. The next step towards the formulation of an interpretation lies, as has been indicated, in a precise elaboration of the relationship between biography and drama, which clearly sets out the nature of the influence exerted by the former upon the form of the latter, and thus indicates, on the one hand, the terms and scope of the validity of our original contention while, at the same time, pointing forwards to the criteria of our subsequent interpretation.

The direct reproduction of biographical details as aspects of dramatic composition, however, does provide the most immediate and most accessible indication of the existence of such a relationship. In *Le Grand Cérémonial* [1963] for example, Cavanosa's mother tells her son, who, it is stated elsewhere in the play, is 23 years old:

Tu es si délicat du poumon.  

Arrabal himself suffered, as we have seen, for some years with pulmonary disorders, being finally admitted to hospital in Paris suffering from tuberculosis in 1955, when he was 23 years old. A particularly horrific aspect of Arrabal's school days in Madrid,
recounted in conversation with Schifres:

voici le cilice que le curé m'avait donné. Je devrais le porter au haut de la cuisse, en sérénité, pendant toute la durée de la messe.

is recalled by the words of Lais, speaking to Téloc in Le Jardin des Délices /1967/56:

Le matin, je mets un cilice et je me rends du dortoir à l'église avec mon cilice garni de pointes en fil de fer autour de ma cuisse, et j'éprouve une grande douleur et, pendant la messe, je comprends que je fais cela pour Dieu.57

Similarly, in Sur le Fil /1974/58 Tharsis tells Wichita:

On vient d'écrire qu'il faudrait me châtrer, pour m'empêcher d'avoir des enfants qui, comme moi...59

alluding unmistakably to the words of a newspaper article which appeared in Arriba whilst Arrabal was awaiting trial in Madrid in 1967.

The significance of such incidents, a list of which might be expanded without difficulty, is at first not fully apparent. Clearly they serve to suggest a parallel between the central characters of the plays from which they are taken and the author who created them, but presented in the form of individual and ostensibly insignificant details, that parallel seems neither relevant nor helpful to an understanding of the plays. Such at least is the case until one considers the context of the individual incidents cited. For each of the specific details mentioned serves not only to establish a momentary parallel between character and author, but also to indicate a concern central to the character in the play which may be allied to the terms of the author's biography. Cavanosa's mother's derisory reference to her son's ill-health is symptomatic of the mother-son relationship, an exploration of which forms the backbone of Le Grand Cerémonial. Lais' words in
Le Jardin des Délices are indicative of the criteria of a religious upbringing, the terms and effects of which are crucial to the whole of that play. Tharsis' words to Ichita are a striking pointer to the themes of exile and political oppression which are debated in Sur le Fil. Each of these three concerns, moreover, has an incontestable basis in the author's biography. For, as we have elsewhere tried to underline, and as Arrabal's two public letters convincingly confirm, the author's education was mounted on the twin pillars of his mother's authority, and the authority of the state, and directed by the intransigent religiosity common to both.

The relationship between biography and drama may thus be extended to embrace a number of dominant and indeed recurrent themes. Under the headings of mother, religion and state a significant amount of extra dramatic material may be traced to the personal concerns of the author. Arrabal's relationship with his mother, marked as it was by doubts concerning her role in the fate which befall his father, is clearly reflected, as Schifres suggests in Entretiens avec Arrabal, in Les Deux Bourreaux. The play depicts Françoise vigorously defending herself against her son Maurice's claims that she has betrayed his father to an unnamed authority, representatives of which may be heard torturing and finally killing the father, Jean, behind the scenes. Oraison meanwhile, reflects the full ambiguity and perplexity engendered by a religious education, by depicting a discussion between Fidio and Lilbé, who determine henceforth to be 'good and pure' but cannot work out how to go about it. Arrabal himself confirms the source of the play:

A l'époque, je crois que mon acharnement contre l'opposition du Bien et du Mal répondait à une sorte de fanatisme de ma part : je réagissais violemment contre une éducation.
And it was clearly the brutal reminder of the political oppression of his native Spain provided by his sojourn in Carabanchel in 1967 which gave rise to the composition, during a trip to America some two years later, of *Et ils cassèrent des Manottes aux Fleurs*.

The personal experiences of the author, then, are not only reproduced in individual incidents within his plays, but also throw light upon the composition of a number of plays and upon the genesis of the themes which emerge from those plays. The point is not original, but neither is it exhaustive. Gille, Mundschau and Daetwyler have all been quick to indicate the basis of the recurrent themes of mother, state and religion in Arrabal's biography. They have, however, failed to build upon this ultimately rather unremarkable observation in an attempt to consider and elucidate the corpus of Arrabal's drama as a whole in terms of biographical influence.

A reconsideration of the three themes hitherto identified, moreover, suggests the possibility of precisely such a step. For though Arrabal's relationship with his mother, his relationship with Catholicism and his relationship with his homeland constitute three separate and distinct facets of the formation of the individual, they are nevertheless bound together by striking similarities which suggest that they may equally be viewed as three manifestations of a common basic situation.

It is apparent, for example, that each of these three facets presented a dual aspect to the author. Arrabal's mother was first and foremost a loving and benevolent figure, whose dedication to the welfare of her children Arrabal has himself remarked. It is clear, however, that she was also authoritarian and severe, and, with regard to her husband at least, anything but benevolent. The Catholic Church preached a creed of love, yet practised an extraordinary cruelty, witnessed at first hand by Arrabal in the schools he attended. The Spanish state proclaimed that "L'Espagne est le meilleur pays
du monde" but owed its existence to a catalogue of atrocities (then) unparalleled in the history of the world. Arrabal's perception of each of the three dominant influences of his formative years was thus characterised by the awareness of an extraordinary ambiguity. For each presented two distinct and opposite faces, maternal and protective on the one hand, authoritarian and repressive on the other; each manifested itself to the author as a curious mixture of self-appointed benevolence and barely-concealed malevolence.

The author, moreover, as a consequence of his awareness of this duality, was bound to each of these three facets in a striking and singular relationship. As is made abundantly clear in Psal Babylon, Arrabal was, like any son, instinctively dependent upon the approbation of his mother, whose weekend visits he awaited with such fervour, and whom he sought to please in any manner possible. His attempt to commit suicide through excessive sinning during his teens suggests the extent and terms of the author's relationship with Catholicism, while his accounts in Lettre au Général Franco of the fate which befell some of his more unfortunate young colleagues in the nationalist paramilitary children's groups indicate the power of the hold exerted over the individual by the state. Each of the three influences, indeed, ruled the author by instilling fear into him: each thus represented an all-embracing and inescapable authority, acceptance of which was a sine qua non of Arrabal's continued well-being. On the other hand, each appeared at the same time to undermine that very well-being by the exercise of the cruelty which we have noted above. For all that mother, religion and state were ineluctable and undeniable powers, their authority was, in the light of the author's apperception of their duality, nevertheless incomprehensible and repressive. The terms of the relationship which evolved in each case were thus as ambiguous as the terms of the author's
perception of the powers themselves. Each offered the possibility of a well-being, which courted acceptance, yet each also inflicted a malaise which suggested some form of protest or rejection. Either course of action, moreover, was as impossible as the other: for while awareness precluded acceptance, dependence and the need for protection precluded rejection.  

In a number of cases throughout Arrabal's drama, moreover, it is not one or other of these specific influences which is reproduced, but rather the author's perception of the ambiguity common to all three, and his similarly ambivalent position in the relationships they engender. It is that perception, for example, which conditions the creation of certain of Arrabal's female main characters, as is illustrated by a consideration of one of the most complex of these, Tasla in *La Bicyclette du Condamné* (1952). Tasla divides her time between expressing her love and affection to Viloro and making lascivious advances to Paso, the leader of Viloro's tormentors. The ambiguity she thus demonstrates is compounded still further, as she also appears towing Paso off in a cage to be tortured, before subsequently renewing her advances, only directing them this time at Paso's two colleagues while Paso himself brutally murders her (still) beloved Viloro. At first sight the source of the creation of the figure of Tasla (although she is not specifically a mother-figure) appears most clearly to be the author's mother; this is suggested particularly by the tenderness and naivety of Viloro's reactions to her, by his consistent desire to please her, and by the child-like pride with which he demonstrates the progress he is making (in his piano-playing), all of which are echoes of certain facets of the relationship between Arrabal and his mother, as described in *Baal Babylone*. Tasla, however, also encompasses a certain moral ambiguity
which seems to reflect the terms of the author's Catholic education despite throwing herself shamelessly at Paso and his colleagues, she is bashful and embarrassed when Viloro asks for a kiss. Equally, the influence of the political climate of the author's youth may also be perceived in the creation of Tasla: despite her over-friendly advances to Paso, she is the representative of some cruel and barbaric social or political authority, in accordance with whose directives she is charged with delivering Paso to torture and death. The point, then, seems clear: the creation of Tasla does not depend on any single one of the main categories which we have identified as central to Arrabal's personal concerns, but borrows elements from each, and, more pertinently, is moulded by the author's perception of the enigmatic ambiguity common to all three.

A further striking illustration of the same point is furnished by Bella Ciao If the character of Tasla in La Bicyclette du Condamné seems most strongly to reflect the terms of the author's relationship with his mother, the composition of Bella Ciao seems clearly to derive from the political climate of his upbringing. Arrabal appears to extend his appreciation of the ambiguities surrounding the régime which pertained in his native Spain in order to raise a question mark against a whole culture. The presentation of that culture, however, is revealing. For at the beginning of the play culture appears in the guise of an old woman, an unmistakable mother figure who barks orders at her 'agents' with a ferocious and matriarchal severity. Once again, the individual biographical influences are shown to be interchangeable: as with the creation of Tasla, it is the ambiguity which is the point, it is from the stimulus of the author's perception of the duality common to all three influences that the play evolves.
The notion of ambiguity, which is central to Arrabal's drama, may thus be said to evolve from the terms of the author's biography. This observation, moreover, allows us to extend the scope of the influence of that biography to embrace certain aspects of plays which ostensibly have no basis whatsoever in the author's personal experience. *Jeunes Barbares d'Aujourd'hui* [1975] for example, was written in 1975 following Arrabal's meeting with a journalist from the sporting newspaper L'Équipe who, in the course of conversation, related to the playwright the circumstances surrounding the death of the British cyclist Tom Simpson. The composition of the play was suggested, therefore, not by personal experience, but by an incidental conversation. *Jeunes Barbares d'Aujourd'hui* nevertheless does reflect the influence of the author's biography as closely as any of the plays we have looked at, in as much as it is dominated by the unseen figure of Snarck. For the view of Snarck (whom we know only through the descriptions of Chester, Tenniel and Lumpy) that is presented in the play is characterised by precisely the same duality which we have noted in previous examples, and which, as we have shown, reflects the author's perception of influences in his own life. Similarly, the cyclists' position in the relationship with Snarck reflects exactly Arrabal's own position in the relationships we have examined above. For the nebulous figure of Snarck exudes a familiar cruelty and tyranny:

*Tout ce qu'il possède, il l'a obtenu à nos démens.
C'est nous qui nous tasons le plus dur, nous qui mordons la douleur et le joug jusqu'à la moelle du sang*

and yet he is also in a very real sense a protective figure, upon whom the three cyclists depend for their very existence:

*S'il abandonne, Snarck le met à la porte ... Et s'il le renvoie, que deviendrait Chester? Je suis sûr qu'il se suiciderait. Que peut-il faire dans la vie?*
A consideration of *Jeunes Barbares d'Aujourd'hui* thus suggests that the influence exerted by the biography of the author extends beyond the immediately apparent: the depiction of Snarck is moulded by Arrabal's perception of the dual aspect of protection and cruelty inherent in the three figures which dominated his formative years and which we have discussed: the relationship between the three cyclists and Snarck reflects exactly the author's cognizance of the terms of his own relationships with his mother, religion and the state, and of the impossible nature of his position within those relationships. For as the quotations above illustrate, while acceptance of Snarck engenders misery and suffering, rejection of Snarck means privation and death.

It is indeed ultimately evident that Arrabal's perception of the duality inherent within those figures, and of the ambiguity of the relationships which bound him to them forms the basis of a fundamental situation which dominates his plays, and to which the corpus of his work as a whole may be allied. For at the heart of Arrabal's drama lies the opposition between the individual and some form of ambiguous authority which he can neither ignore nor understand, upon which he is dependent and whose approval is essential, and yet which causes him suffering. Plays like *Le Labyrinthe* [1956], *Le Lai de Barabbas* [1964] and *La Bicyclette du Condamné*, for example, depict the harshness and cruelty of a bewildering authority which causes suffering. The view they present is neatly complemented by works such as *Le Tricycle* [1957] and *Cérémonie pour un Noir Assassiné* [1956] in which the accent is shifted on to the behaviour of the individual, portrayed as a transgression of the dictates of authority and thus shown to be incompatible with the individual's need to find approbation. The synthesis of these two preparatory steps, i.e. the complete portrayal of the dramatic clash
between the individual and the authority which opposes him, moreover, forms the basis not only of Jeunes Barbares d'aujourd'hui but also of other recent plays, notably Et ils passèrent des Menottes aux Fleurs and Le Ciel et la Merde \(1970\). Different plays, in other words, have different emphases, but nevertheless each of those referred to proceeds from the fundamental situation which we have identified, from the opposition between individual and authority. In addition each examines that opposition from the point of view of the individual, that is to say the author's perception of the opposition in his own life becomes the determining factor of the terms of its depiction as drama. Thus, not only do Arrabal's relationships with his mother, with Catholicism, and with the state give rise to the basic opposition which dominates his theatre and endows it with consistency of theme, but his perception of those relationships provides the basis of their depiction as drama, hence engendering also consistency of perspective.

It is, moreover, only in the light of the above considerations that the full extent and nature of the stimulus provided by the events of Arrabal's life may be ascertained, and that assertions such as that made by Daetwyler:

\[
\text{Arrabal tire de sa riche biographie la substance qui nourrit son travail créateur.}
\]

may properly be justified. For the stimulus takes the form not merely of the provision of individual details which may be reproduced in the plays, nor even of the suggestion of concerns which recur throughout the plays, but of the furnishing both of a single basic theme which lends to Arrabal's work a haunting though oft-ignored consistency and also of a constant perspective through which that theme is examined.
Daetwyler adds an important rider to the assertion quoted above:

Mais si la biographie explique les motivations, si elle éclaire les liens entre l’auteur et son œuvre, elle ne dit rien sur les pièces elles-mêmes which may serve to remind us that, despite the significance of the foregoing considerations, we are still some way from the formulation of an interpretation. Those considerations have served to suggest that the viewpoint of the individual constitutes a constant factor in Arrabal’s drama, and also to establish a correlation between the nature of the concerns of that individual and those of the author. We have also learnt, however, that the complementary aspect of the basic situation which the plays appear to reflect, i.e. the authority which stands in opposition to the individual, evolves not from a single source, but as a synthesis of a number of influences which may be discerned in the author’s biography. The overall significance of figures of authority as portrayed in the plays thus remains obscure, as does the precise nature of the situation of which they form a part. We cannot, in other words, say that Arrabal’s drama is about the relationship between mother and son, that it is about Catholicism, religion or even morality, that it is about Franco’s Spain, or political oppression in general any more than we can say it is about professional cycling. We know only that Arrabal’s drama proceeds from a basic situation, the stimulus to which we have indicated, but the exact meaning of which remains to be defined. Before the form of an interpretation which will produce that definition may be established it is necessary to examine the terms of the expression as drama of the situation we have identified. Having shown at length that that situation lies at the heart of the plays, the accent of our investigation must be shifted to consider the guise in which it appears. It is necessary, in other words, to re-introduce the
element which was the starting point of our study. For while it is true that the opposition between authority and individual lends the play unity of theme, and that the viewpoint of the latter endows them with consistency of perspective, it is upon the ever-present notion of violence that they depend for coherence of expression. It is, moreover, in a precise elaboration of the role of violence that lies the key to an understanding of the situation we have identified, and hence of Arrabal’s drama as a whole.

It is immediately apparent that the use of violence is not confined to one element only of the opposition: both the individual and the authority which confronts him are prone to the practice of violence as a means of self-expression. In Le Labyrinthe, for example, violence is witnessed in the person of Justin, who beats his daughter, and in the person of the judge who condemns Etienne to death. In Le Tricycle, meanwhile, we see violence emanating from the other side of the opposition, as Apal and Climando execute the brutal murder of the man who attempts to buy Mita’s favours. Not only do both the individual and authority employ violence, moreover, but, highly significantly and somewhat unexpectedly, the violence of the one is, as presented by Arrabal, effectively indistinguishable from the violence of the other. In Le Grand Cérémonial, for example, the cruelty of which Cavanosa accuses his mother is reflected exactly in his own dealings with Sil. The point is even more strikingly illustrated in Le Ciel et la Merde: Arrabal paints a repulsive picture of the cruelty of the society from which Frasme and company have sought refuge, as is exemplified in his description of the relationship between Grouchanka and her Russian master:

...mon maître assassina son épouse en lui écrasant la nuque à coups de talon. Il m’enchaîna à un banc de pierre dans un cachot et toutes les nuits il m’offrait à ses plus vils amis et je devais leur faire tout ce que m’ordonnait mon maître et je devais me plier à leurs caprices ainsi qu’aux désirs de leurs animaux.
but even this is surely no more repulsive than the subsequent
description of the actions of Grouchanka and the others themselves.
As is made clear in the grotesque ceremony performed after the
assassination of unknown victims, the terms of their behaviour at
least match the cruelty and horror of the society whose authority
they oppose:

**CLEAVER:** Ce sont les entrailles des morts. Je m’en fais
une cravate pour la noce de l’ange et de
l’hélicoptère.

**GROUCHENKA:** La femme a un fœtus à l’intérieur, regarde, on
dirait une poupée sale: je le garde pour m’en
torchérer le cul.

**ERASME:** Du sang, du sang et ses racines d’épée.
Ils dansent en se baignant de sang et des morceaux d’intestin
et de viscères.⁶

While fundamentally opposed in situation, therefore, these
examples suggest that individual and authority are nevertheless linked
in Arrabal’s drama by the violence common to both. This observation
has important implications since it engenders the suspicion that the
relationship between authority and individual is possibly not as
clear-cut as has hitherto been implied. This suspicion, moreover,
is substantiated by the consideration of a play like _Fando et Lis
1956_. In this play there is no exterior social or political
authority which stands in opposition to the individual, but never­
theless _Fando et Lis_ reflects as clearly as any of the examples we
have hitherto examined the terms of the situation which we have
posited as being central to Arrabal’s work. For each of the familiar
elements of that situation: tenderness mingled with cruelty, incompre­
hension and suffering vying with dependence and the need for approbation,
is present in the relationship between the two central (individual)
characters themselves. Neither of those individuals, however, is
constant: each displays both the characteristics which we have
hitherto associated with the individual and also those discerned in
the depiction of authority. Thus, in this play both aspects of the
fundamental opposition are expressed through the violence of the
individual - indeed not only does the violence of the individual
appear in the same terms as the cruelty of authority, but they are
one and the same thing - the behaviour of the individual, as
exemplified by Fando's maltreatment of LIs, is at the same time
also an exercise in Fando's own brand of cruel authority. It is
perceived as the exercise of authority by Lis, and, as Gille points
out, "elle aussi...rèvèle un double cruel," her own individual
behaviour matches the authority of Fando not with violence as such
(for she is paralysed) but with a silent disdain which is every bit
as cruel, and equally authoritarian.

A consideration of Fando et LIs, as of other plays, such
as Une Orange sur le Mont de Vénus [2], in which the basic opposition
between individual and authority is reflected in a relationship between
individuals, each of whom, like Fando and LIs alternately adopt the
characteristics of oppressor and oppressed, not only confirms the
inference drawn from our study of Le Ciel et le Verda, namely that
the violence of authority is indistinguishable from that of the
individual, but advances our investigation a step further by suggesting
that in both cases violence may reasonably be viewed as a facet of
the individual's self-expression. This in turn is confirmed by the
consideration of the play which remains Arrabal's best-known work,
L'Architecte et L'Empereur d'Assyrie [2]. Once again the basic
opposition between authority and individual is reflected in the terms
of the relationship between the two central characters. As with
Fando and LIs each is bound to the other in a relationship characterised
by a mixture of total mutual dependence and extreme mutual disdain.
and ill-treatment: like Fando and Lis each is master and slave in turn, and each wields his own authority as a means of countering the dominance of the other. In this instance, however, it is revealed as the play progresses that the notion of authority in either case is totally spurious. The power of the Emperor derives from his position and rank, which turn out to be a figment of his imagination: the authority of the Architect emerges only when the two are playing, i.e., in a series of games which are avowedly unreal. Nevertheless each character remains convinced of the validity of the authority of the other i.e., though the Emperor knows his power to be based on a fictitious premise it is nonetheless real to the Architect: though the Architect knows he is only playing, whilst conducting the trial for instance, his partner takes the 'game' seriously. In either case, therefore, though objectively illusory, the notion of authority remains real to the character who is not at the time exercising it, who, in other words, occupies the position of the individual in the schema we have elaborated. Authority in L'Architecte et l'Empereur d'Assyrie thus real only in so far as the individual perceives it to be so, its validity depends upon the perception of the individual: the violence of authority, in fact, as much as the violence of the individual himself, emanates not from outside, but from within the individual.

This finding, moreover, should be considered in conjunction with our earlier observation, namely that the fundamental opposition between authority and individual which animates the whole of Arrabal's work is depicted consistently from the viewpoint of the individual. The implication is that we may justifiably view all manifestations of authority as being as 'symbolic' as that presented in L'Architecte et
l'Empereur d'Assyrie in the form of the Emperor's false persona. Both aspects of that fundamental opposition, indeed, may be taken as expressions of something within the individual. Such an assertion is of course clearly supported by the finding which emerged from our consideration of Pando et Lia, which shows that both are expressed by the terms of a relationship between individuals. The observation made as a result of our consideration of Le Ciel et La Verde, moreover, namely that the two aspects of the opposition share a common form of expression in violence, not only lends further support to the assertion, but also suggests the criteria upon which our interpretation will be based. For the interpretation which follows proceeds from the assumption that violence in the plays of Arrabal constitutes a form of self-expression of the individual. Accordingly the psychological significance of violence will be examined and assessed in an attempt not only to interpret the precise nature of the opposition which lies at the heart of Arrabal's work, but further to elaborate a pattern which lends coherence to the use of violence throughout the plays.
The psychological views of violence which have emerged in the course of this century, and which, to a great extent, still dominate thinking on the subject, may be divided into two main categories. One view of the nature of aggression may be traced back to the notion of behaviourism first elaborated by J. B. Watson in 1914, which has as its fundamental premise the assertion that man's behaviour is moulded by the influence of his environment. For the behaviourists, who eschew the consideration of possible subjective influences on behaviour, aggression, like all other human behaviour, is a response learned by the individual, and adduced in the pursuit of his own optimal advantage. The most coherent and substantial theory of the origin and nature of violence engendered by behaviourist thinking was undoubtedly the so-called Frustration/Aggression hypothesis elaborated by a group of psychologists based at Yale University and led by J. Dollard. In a paper entitled Frustration and Aggression (1939), which, it has been suggested, may be seen as a characteristically Anglo-Saxon view of the notion of aggression, Dollard et al. claimed to have found the cause of all aggression. Their theory was based on the comparatively simple assertion that "the occurrence of aggressive behavior always presupposes the existence of frustration" and thus contended that aggression was a response to the interference with, or the prevention of, any pleasure-inducing or rewarding activity; the interference or prevention induced a state of frustration, which in turn promoted anger or aggression.

Criticism of the Frustration/Aggression theory is adequately exemplified by the words of Erich Fromm:

The simplicity of the original formulation of the theory is greatly marred by the ambiguity of what is understood by frustration.
The important point he makes has been echoed in a recent article by John Archer, who adds the observation that aggression can occur in situations which even the broadest possible definition of frustration does not cover:

Sudden pain, for example, is well known to produce feelings of aggression ... Another major exception to the frustration theory occurs when people are specifically trained to commit violent acts, as in the army. 95

We are here, however, less concerned to formulate a value judgment of the hypothesis, or to criticise it on psychological grounds, than to indicate its inapplicability to the specific topic of our study. For even the most cursory consideration of the notion of violence in Arrabal's drama is sufficient to demonstrate that violence is not depicted primarily or consistently as a response to frustration.

The sole violent episode in Oraison for example, the prolicide which takes place before the play opens, is in no way a response to the frustration implied by Fidio and Lilbé's lack of comprehension, but, on the contrary, gives rise to their bewilderment. Similarly in Le Tricycle the appearance of the policeman (i.e. the agent of prevention of rewarding activity) ensues in response to the violence of Climendo and the others, and not vice-versa. An even more decisive factor in rejecting (for our purposes) the Frustration/Aggression theory is the violence displayed by such figures of authority themselves. We have elsewhere indicated that the violence of authority is effectively indistinguishable from the violence of the individual in Arrabal's work; even if we were to elaborate the proposition (which itself seems untenable in the light of the examples just quoted) that the latter may be seen as a response to the frustration imposed by the former, one half of the total picture is left unaccounted for. An elucidation of the violence of authoritarian figures in Arrabal's drama in the terms of Dollard's hypothesis is inconceivable.
An alternative current of thought is based on instinctivist premises which date back to Darwin and which revolve round the view that men's behaviour is moulded not by the influence of his environment, but by the existence within men of a number of fundamental drives or instincts, each of which motivates a corresponding form of behaviour. For the instinctivists, then, violence is an innate predisposition in man, and their view has influenced most importantly the conception of violence and aggression developed by Freud in the last period of his life, as well as the more recent views put forward by Konrad Lorenz in his book *On Aggression* in 1963. We have here suggested that the Frustration/Aggression hypothesis is inapplicable to the explanation of the violence of the individual in such plays as *Caisson* and *Le Tricycle* because the violence of the individual is a cause of, rather than a reaction against, the appearance of 'frustration'. For precisely the same reason these instances also suggest the desirability of a close consideration of the instinctivist theories of violence, and in particular of the view of aggression developed in the works produced by Freud in the last two decades of his life. The interpretation which follows, indeed, is based upon the demonstration of a close parallel between Arrabal's use of violence and Freud's view of aggression. It is of fundamental importance to stress from the outset, however, that we do not thereby mean to suggest that Arrabal sought to illustrate Freud's theories or to work out an application of his ideas in his plays. For while, as we shall later have cause to remark, it is the plays in the first part of Arrabal's drama which particularly suggest the possibility of a Freudian interpretation, it is in fact highly unlikely that, at least until he left Bouffémont in 1957, Arrabal had any but the very vaguest notion of Freud's views, since these did not have the popularity and currency in Spain.
which they enjoyed in other European countries in the forties and fifties. Even in the years which followed Arrabal's recovery from illness there is no indication whatsoever that he was interested in, or even cognizant of Freud's work, and it is only in 1952, as a result of his meeting with the Surrealists, that we can suggest with any reasonable degree of confidence that Arrabal would have become familiar with the psychologist's ideas. Our proposition in what follows, therefore, is that violence in Arrabal's plays may be rendered more comprehensible in the light of an awareness of Freud's theories on the part of the reader/spectator (such as we shall here aim to furnish) and not that its use was prompted or influenced by an awareness of Freud's theories on the part of the author.

The elaboration of Freud's later view of aggression, which constitutes a fundamental revision of his previous conception of the notion, dates most clearly from the publication in 1920 of the paper entitled Beyond the Pleasure Principle, and leads to the essential assertion, articulated in Civilization and its Discontents ten years later, that aggression is an integral facet of the instinctual constitution of man, the significance of which at least equals that previously ascribed to sexuality:

I adopt the standpoint, therefore, that the inclination to aggression is an original, self-subsisting instinctual disposition in man.

As suggested by the title of the paper in which it was first introduced, this view of aggression evolved out of, and was closely related to, Freud's previous views on the instincts and behavioural composition, some brief account of which is thus indispensable to its understanding. From clinical observation and analysis, the details of which are not our present concern, Freud had deduced that the behaviour of man was to a large degree dictated by instinctual
impulses of a predominantly sexual nature which arose from within him and impinged upon his ego, where they were experienced as tension or unpleasure; such instinctual impulses strove for satisfaction, which would replace unpleasure by pleasure in accordance with the Pleasure Principle (which principle suggested that man's behaviour was directed at the ultimate goal of the achievement of maximum possible pleasure). Between these impulses and the final form of their expression, however, there intervened a modifying process, carried out by the ego at the behest of agencies variously referred to by Freud as the ego-instincts or the self-preservation instincts, and aimed at moulding them to a form compatible with the dictates of reality. The ego, in other words, weighed the demands of the sexual instinct against those of reality, or submitted them to a process of 'reality testing' in accordance with what Freud called the 'Reality Principle', with the aim of enabling them to find the most beneficial form of outlet. Where the demands of the sexual instinct were incompatible with the dictates of reality, and thus likely ultimately to produce unpleasure instead of pleasure, the instinct could be diverted and modified by the action of the ego in accordance with the Pleasure Principle. As Freud pointed out on more than one occasion, the sexual instinct could be arrested short of its instinctual aim (i.e., coitus or orgasm) and its energy diverted into a more realistically acceptable channel, such as tenderness.

Freud initially conceived of the relationship between the sexual instincts and the ego instincts or self-preservation instincts as one of antagonism. The function of the latter, as described above, engendered regression and so led to illness. Later, however, in the paper entitled On Narcissism, written in 1914, he put forward
the notion that the direction of sexual instincts on to external objects was preceded in the course of individual development by a stage during which that instinct was directed inwards, towards the self. The original home of the sexual instinct or libido was the ego itself:

The decisive step forward was the introduction of the concept of narcissism, that is to say the discovery that the ego itself is cathexed with libido; the ego indeed is the libido's original home, and remains to some extent its headquarters. This discovery faced Freud with a two-fold problem which threatened to undermine the very structure of his theory. Firstly it made the position of the ego wholly unclear, since the ego was now considered to be the original object of the sexual instinct, and could not therefore be seen as the agency which controlled the sexual instinct.

Secondly, if the real object of the libido was the ego, then the action of the self-preservative instincts had to be seen not as working against libido, but rather hand in hand with it. Indeed the self-preservative instincts themselves appeared to be libidinal in origin. The notion of repression, upon which Freud's whole theory of psychology was built, however, depended, as we have seen, firstly upon the functioning of the ego as an agent of control or adaptation, and secondly upon the idea of a conflict between the two classes of instinct. As Wollheim points out, without that essential duality the viability of Freud's description of the mechanism of repression, and hence of his theory in general, seemed to be called into question:

Freud's distinction between two types of instinct...was also required by his general psychological theory, in that repression depended upon a duality of instinct: if not, (as Freud sometimes suggested,) to provide the motive for repression, then at any rate to account for its mechanism. Remove the duality and the whole theory of the psychoneurosis would surely crumble. And it was precisely this duality that the discovery of primary narcissism appeared to threaten.

Freud postponed giving an answer to the problems which emerged from On Narcissism. As Fromm suggests, however, the views
developed in Beyond the Pleasure Principle \[1920\] seem to be
determined in part by the need to find an answer, as well as by
Freud's growing inability to relate all behaviour to the Pleasure
Principle:

the concept of the death instinct was determined by two main
requisites: first, by the need to accommodate Freud's new
conviction of the power of human aggression; second, by the
need to stick to a dualistic concept of instincts.\[112\]

For Freud had recognised that in a significant number of instances
the idea of a reduction of tension and the production of a state of
pleasure simply did not fit the facts. Among other examples Freud
cited the case of the dreams of war veterans, in which traumatic
situations from the past were re-enacted; he also noted the tendency
in children deliberately to repeat in play situations from which they
evidently derived no pleasure.\[113\] Building on these observations,
Freud put forward the idea that the instincts were subject to a
compulsion to repeat which was not in all cases allied to the
Pleasure Principle:

the compulsion to repeat also recalls from the past experiences
which can, never, even long ago, have brought satisfaction.\[114\]

The postulation of a 'repetition-compulsion' led Freud, later in the
same paper, to a new definition of instinct:

an instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to restore
an earlier state of things.\[115\]

This definition, moreover, provided Freud in turn with a justification
for the major innovation contained in Beyond the Pleasure Principle,
the introduction of the concept of the death instinct. For Freud
surmised that the 'earlier state of things' which instinct strove
to restore could ultimately be taken to be the inorganic state which
preceded life: thus, where repetition was obviously not geared
towards the production of pleasure it was operating in the service of
an instinctual urge to self-destruction, which sought to restore,
in death, the state which preceded life. In short, beside the
sexual instincts (which were now assumed to include the self-
preservative or ego-instincts and the libido under the new generic
title of Eros instincts) there existed a fundamental drive to self-
destruction, a death instinct, to which Freud later gave the name
Thanatos.

A dualistic concept of instincts had thus been preserved,
or, more exactly, had been reinstated, and with its reinstatement
there reappeared also the possibility of viewing repression as the
consequence of a conflict between opposing instinctual drives.
Freud now conceived, however, of an opposition not between the libido
and the self-preservative instincts, but between Eros and the
instinct of self-destruction:

I have contained the instincts for self-preservation and for
the preservation of the species under the concept of Eros
and have contrasted it with an instinct of death or destruction. 116

It was, moreover, from a consideration of the relationship between
Eros and the death instinct that Freud inferred the existence of a
basic aggressive drive. He reasoned as follows: given the predominant
tendency of the death instinct towards self-destruction, it enters
into conflict with the Eros instinct or life instinct, the objectives
of which are, of course, directly opposed to those of the death
instinct. Its engagement in this conflict arrests it short of the
ultimate goal of self-destruction, and robs it of the greater part of
its potency according to the process described by Freud in The
Economic Problem of Masochism, 117 written in 1924:

The libido has the task of making the destroying instinct
innocuous and it fulfills the task by diverting that instinct
to a great extent outwards - soon with the help of a special
organic system, the muscular apparatus - towards objects in
the external world. 118
The death instinct, in other words, is diverted (at least in part)\textsuperscript{119} from the self and may be observed, as Freud states in \textit{Civilization and its Discontents} \textsuperscript{1930}, as an instinct of aggression directed towards external objects:

A portion of the instinct is diverted towards the external world and comes to light as an instinct of aggressiveness and destructiveness.\textsuperscript{120}

It was by these stages that Freud arrived at the postulation of a fundamental instinct of aggression in man. His further assertion that sadism constituted the most obvious example of the exteriorisation of that instinct, moreover, is easily comprehensible in the light of the considerations set out above. For sadism may be perceived as a simple alloy of \textit{Eros} and \textit{Thanatos} which becomes manifest as a consequence of the conflict between the two classes of instinct which we have described. It is interesting to note, moreover, that on at least one significant occasion the violence in Arrabal's work which it is our business here to interpret takes the form of sadism. In \textit{Le Grand Cérémonial} Cavanosa's brutal mistreatment of Sil forms the basis of a relationship which culminates in the murderous ceremony interrupted only by the timely intervention of Sil's lover. The violence which Cavanosa demonstrates, moreover, is clearly linked to a sexual purpose; indeed when he first meets Sil he explicitly declares:

\textit{N'avez-vous pas compris que ... je ne pourrais jouir avec vous qu'en vous torturant?} \textsuperscript{121}

Cavanosa's behaviour, in other words, reflects precisely the alloy of sexuality and destructiveness which characterises sadism for Freud. As such, moreover, we have in our consideration of the violence of Cavanosa in \textit{Le Grand Cérémonial} the first and also the most accessible suggestion of the validity of the assertion which is central to our interpretation of violence. For, as it will be our aim to
demonstrate in what follows, it is our contention that the violence of the individual in Arrabal's work may be viewed, not in this single instance alone, but throughout the plays, as an expression of instinct.

We have noted above that the discovery of a death instinct facilitated Freud's return to the dualistic concept of the instincts which was necessary to his account of repression. The assertion of the existence of the death instinct thus appeared to provide the answer to one half of the problem raised by the findings set out in On Narcissism. It remained, however, for Freud to clarify the position and function of the ego, and this he did with the introduction of the theory of topicality \(^{122}\) in *The Ego and the Id* \(^{123}\) in 1913.

In this paper Freud combined the conflicting tendencies of Eros and Thanatos under the new term 'id', which word was borrowed from the writings of the German physician Georg Groddeck, and was used by Freud to denote the seat of the instincts:

> It contains everything that is inherited, that is present at birth, that is fixed in constitution - above all, therefore, the instincts.\(^{124}\)

Freud also stated that the ego was originally a part of the id, specifically that part of the id which came into contact with the influences of the external world, an outer layer, as it were, adapted for the reception of, and acting as a protection against, the stimuli deriving from the external world. At an early stage of development, moreover, the ego, modified by its proximity to the external world, had split off from the rest of the id to form a separate psychical entity, and had subsequently taken on the function, suggested by its position, of mediating between the demands of the id and the claims of the external world.\(^{125}\)

> It is the task of the ego ... to mediate between the claims of the id and the objections of the external world. It carries on its activity in two directions. On the one
hand it observes the external world with the help of its sense organ, the system of consciousness, so as to catch the favourable moment for harmless satisfaction; and on the other hand it influences the id, bridle its passions, induces its instincts to postpone their satisfaction, and indeed, if the necessity is recognized, to modify its aims, or, in return for some compensation, to give them up.\textsuperscript{176}

The relationship between the ego and the id in Freud's new schema is thus comparable, as he pointed out on several occasions, to that between a rider and his horse:

The ego's relation to the id might be compared to that of a rider to his horse. The horse supplies the locomotive energy, while the rider has the privilege of deciding the goal, and guiding the powerful animal's movement.\textsuperscript{177}

There is much in all this, of course, which strikes us as familiar. With the introduction of topicality, indeed, Freud ascribed once more to the ego, in effect, the very same function which he had considered it to perform prior to the discovery of narcissism. He now saw the ego again as an agent of adaptation and modification, only in his new schema the task of the ego was to weigh the demands not only of the libido as previously, but of the id as a whole against the dictates of reality.\textsuperscript{178, 179} When we previously discussed the position of the ego in Freud's original schema we noted that the sexual instinct could be diverted by the ego, acting in accordance with the Reality Principle, from the attainment of its ultimate goal, and, in deference to the claims of reality, deflected into the form of (say) tenderness. In the light of the theories subsequently put forward (particularly in Beyond the Pleasure Principle and The Ego and the Id) it is now clear that the aggressive instinct is subject to precisely the same intervention, since aggression is a component of the id (or more exactly an instinct whose existence is a product of the conflict between the two components of the id) and the task of the ego is precisely to mould the demands of the id to a form commensurate with the exigences of
reality. A clear distinction is thus implied between the aggressive instinct in its unrefined form, as it exists in the id, and the expression of the same instinct after the modifications imposed by the ego. From Freud's description it appears that a virtually limitless number of forms of external behaviour may, in fact, be driven by the motor of the aggressive instinct, or to state the same principle in another way, what in crude form is aggression may, after the process of refinement carried out by the 'reasonable' ego, be observed as any one of a number of aspects of behaviour.

It is this point, moreover, which provides one of the strongest indications of the validity of our view of violence as an expression of instinct. For in a number of plays Arrabal seems at pains to make precisely the same distinction by presenting the completed or 'realistically acceptable' form of behaviour alongside a depiction of the same thing in unrefined, instinctual form. A clear example of this seems to be provided by the short play *La Communion Solennelle* [1953]. A young girl is being dressed for her first communion by her grandmother, who takes the opportunity to beleaguer her granddaughter with interminable pieces of wise counsel concerning the best way to run a house and family. She is preparing her, in short, for adult life. This scene is interrupted from time to time, however, by the appearance of a necrophile who, in an ever-increasing state of sexual arousal, is in pursuit of two men carrying a coffin which contains a naked and dead girl. He finally attains his goal as the young girl is fully prepared for her first communion. The idea of initiation common to both these incidents, as well as their ultimate coalescence at the end of the play when the young girl stabs the necrophile, staining her communion dress with his blood, are enough to suggest that they are in fact two versions of the same thing: the external,
socially acceptable form (i.e. the form which takes the dictates of reality into account) of the communion preparation is matched and contrasted against the inadmissible fusion of sexuality and aggression which constitutes its instinctual motivation. In Freudian terms, La Communion Solennelle depicts the persistent intrusion of the id, and its final mastery by the distracted ego.132

A further example of the same technique is apparent in another short play entitled Les Amours Impossibles.133 Here, a striking distinction is made between the pure and unrequited love of the princess for Médor, "le prince à tête de chien":

Mon cœur est transparent et je sais que vous connaissez mon secret. Vous n'ignorez pas que je vous aime, que je vous ai toujours aimé, que j'ai toujours rêvé de vous, que vous êtes en tous points ressemblant au prince qui m'aimait dans mes rêves.134

and her instinctual behaviour with Médor's rival, "le prince à tête de taureau", whom she professes not to love, but to whom she is attracted with an ever-increasing ardour manifest in violent and overtly sexual terms:

La princesse caresse furieusement le prince à tête de taureau. Elle commence par lui caresser la poitrine. Puis, les yeux fermés, elle lui caresse le dos de sa main gauche et étreint nerveusement de sa main droite la corne du prince.135

Once again Arrabal presents us with two versions of the same thing: what appears, after the intervention of the Reality Principle, in the form of a pure love for "le prince à tête de chien", is clearly shown to derive from the impulses of the princess's instinct, the workings of which animates her relationship with "le prince à tête de taureau".

A similar distinction, also related to the notion of love may be perceived in Bestialité Erotique.136 In the first half of the play Alima's 'love' for Asan is shown to be founded on her instinctive attraction to his (conventionally) repulsive smell:

une sorte de mélange de saleté, d'urine séchée, de cadavre.137
The instinctual nature of the attraction is underlined, moreover, by the parallel drawn between Alima and Asan and the 'relationship' of the horses seen and heard rutting in the background. In contrast to this picture, however, in the second half of the play the scene is transformed by rose petals and music (which seem to symbolise the exertion of a positive modifying influence on the instincts by the ego in accordance with the Reality Principle) and the lovers cover their eyes in order to ignore the symbol of the instinctual basis of their attraction, now significantly transformed to a heap of bones which falls from above.

The process which appears to be illustrated in each of these examples, i.e. the modification of instinctual impulses and their diversion into conventionally acceptable forms in accordance with the Reality Principle is referred to by Freud as the technique of sublimation:

A certain kind of modification of the aim and change of the object in which our social valuation is taken into account is described by us as sublimation.¹³⁸

Sublimation, indeed, is one of the most common, as well as possibly the most easily observable mechanism employed by the ego in defending itself against the intrusion of the id. The armoury of the ego's defences, however, comprises a number of other, and often more subtle weapons which might be put to the same purpose, i.e. that of deflecting the instinct from the attainment of its goal. Two of these were discussed in the paper entitled Instincts and their Vicissitudes,¹³⁹ under the headings of reversal and introjection. Freud observed that in certain cases, instead of redirecting instinctual energy by the process of sublimation, the ego could deal with the demands of instinct either, on the one hand, by replacing its active aim by a passive aim, or alternatively, by
replacing its external object by an internal object. Freud himself pointed out that reversal and introjection were closely related:

_We cannot fail to notice, however, that ... the turning round upon the subject's self and the transformation from activity to passivity converge or coincide._

and it was this close relationship which allowed him to cite the phenomenon of masochism as an example of both. For masochism exemplifies reversal in that the active aim of the instinct from which it derives (the desire to inflict torture) is replaced by a passive aim (the desire to be tortured) and also introjection, in that the external object of the instinct is replaced by an internal object, the instinct in other words is re-directed back on to the self. Although the concepts of reversal and introjection were first introduced some time before Freud's discovery of a death instinct, the concept of masochism was clearly related to that discovery in a later paper entitled _The Economic Problem of Masochism_ [1924]:

_We shall not be surprised to hear that in certain circumstances the sadism, or instinct of destruction, which has been directed outwards, can once more be introjected, turned inwards, and in this way regress to its earlier situation. If this happens a secondary masochism is produced which is added to the original masochism._

Freud contends, therefore, that masochism is an expression of the aggressive instinct following the intervention of ego defences in the form of reversal or introjection. As such, moreover, the appearance of masochistic tendencies in certain of Arrabal's characters lends further support to our assertion that the violence of the individual may be interpreted as an expression of the instincts. In _Le Jardin des Délices_, for example, Lais' attraction to Téloc is expressed in masochistic terms, in the desire that he should mistreat her:

_Raparde, je me couche sur cette table et tu peux fendre ma voûtrine, t'arracher des lambeaux de chair, puis répandre de la cire brillante sur mes plaies ouvertes._

---

*Note: The text contains a French phrase that is not translated, as it is meant to be read naturally.
Similarly, in *Le Ciel et la Merde*, Ribla entreats Judas:

\[
\text{Coupe-moi avec ce couteau ou approche de moi ce tison ardent; tu verras que je ne sentirai rien. Allons, fais-la, fais-la!}^{143}
\]

and in the short 'panique' play *La Jeunesse Illustrée* \(^{144}\)

the old woman beseeches the old man at the end of the play to tie her to a tree and thus to repeat the experience which had meant so much to her sixty years previously. In each of these cases we may perceive, following Freud's contentions as to the origins of masochism, an expression of the instincts of the individual, or more specifically an expression of the instinctual basis of the attraction which binds Lais to Téléc, Ribla to Judas, and which bound the old woman to her lover when young. Our attempts here to assert that Arrabal's use of masochism may be seen as an expression of instinct, i.e. that it reflects Freud's definition, seem, interestingly, to be further justified by the fact that, in each of the cases cited, the subject is a woman. For as we have stated, masochism is an expression of aggression characterised by the adoption of a passive attitude. Passivity, for Freud, however, was equated with femininity, as is clear from an amendment made to his *Three Essays on Sexuality* in 1924, \(^{145}\) and thus, as he contends in *The Economic Problem of Masochism*, not only is masochism a characteristically passive expression of the instincts, but it is also a characteristically female expression:

if one has an opportunity of studying cases in which the masochistic fantasies have been especially richly elaborated, one quickly discovers that they place the subject in a characteristically female situation; they signify, that is, being castrated, or copulated with, or giving birth to a baby.\(^{146}\)

Our thesis that the violence of the individual in Arrabal's plays may be viewed as an expression of the id is thus based on the following observations: in a number of plays violence appears in the unmistakable
guise of either sadism, or masochism, both of which phenomena Freud shows to be derivative from the instinctual motor of the id. Elsewhere Arrabal presents us with two alternative views of a single situation or theme, contrasting the 'completed' or socially acceptable form of the behaviour of the individual with a picture, characterised by violence, or more exactly by an alloy of violence and sexuality, of the instinctual basis which underlies it, and out of which it has evolved as a result of sublimation.

The same assertion appears to find confirmation, moreover, on two further counts. Firstly, Freud's descriptions of the nature of the id underline the fact that it is characterised by a complete lack of coherence and organisation; the id is oblivious to logic, impervious to the concept of time and obeys laws which defy all rational explanation:

The logical laws of thought do not apply in the id and this is above all true of the law of contradiction. Contrary impulses exist side by side without cancelling each other out.147

The absence of coherence and lack of rationality by which Freud defines the nature of the id are also the predominant characteristics of those individuals in Arrabal's plays who are prone to violence. The universe of Cimamdo, Apal, Mita and the old flute player, whose brutal murder of the rich man forms the focal point of Le Tricycle, is precisely a universe where rationality, logic and cause and effect are absent, as is amply illustrated by the nonsensical nature of the arguments to which Apal and the old flute player evidently attach such importance. Fando and Lisa live in a similar world, as becomes clear when Fando encounters the three men with an umbrella, who represent a logical world which he can neither enter nor comprehend. Nowhere, moreover, are the terms of Freud's definition quoted above more strikingly brought to mind than in an
incident in *Le Ciel et la Terre*, to which we will later have
cause to refer in greater detail, where, in the course of his
self-justification before the authorities Erasme draws an unlikely
comparison between the apparently irreconcilably opposed (in nature)
figures of the Marquis de Sade and Theresa of Avila, and declares,
quite simply:

*Ces deux êtres ne font qu'un.*

Each of these examples strongly suggests that the seat of
violence, or the universe from which the violence of the individual
emanates in Arrabal's drama is strikingly similar in nature to the id
as Freud describes it. In addition, it may be noted that, Erasme
apart, the behaviour of each of the characters referred to above
is unmistakably akin to that of a child. The childishness of
Arrabal's characters has indeed been frequently remarked, and
characters who, though existing in the adult world, continue to
behave as young children are a feature of Arrabal's dramatic
creation, particularly in his early plays. In the first years
of life, moreover, before the development of the emergent ego,
the individual is dominated by the processes of the id. The
behaviour of a child, as Freud points out, is thus governed by and
reflects the nature of the id:

In young children for instance, ambivalent emotional
attitudes ... exist side by side for a long time,
without either of them interferring with the expression
of the other and opposite one.

That the violent individual in Arrabal's drama should also behave
like a child is thus eminently consistent with the view which we are
seeking to support. Indeed not only the irrationality of the universe
which they inhabit but also the childishness of the behaviour of
those individuals whose violence it has here been our task to
interpret lend considerable credence to our assertion that the violence of the individual in Arrabal's plays may be viewed as an expression of the id.
5 VIOLENCE AS AN EXPRESSION OF THE SUPER-EGO AND THE
QUESTION OF GUILT

We have noted, in what has gone before, the part played
by the notion of introjection in dealing with the instinctual
impulses which arise from the id. We have further demonstrated
how, in certain circumstances, the instinct may be expressed in
the form of masochism as a result of introjection. In Freud's
later writings, however, it becomes apparent that a more important
consequence of the process of introjection consists in the
evolution of what is referred to by Freud as the super-ego. It
is to the functioning of the super-ego that Freud ascribes the
phenomenon to which we normally give the name conscience; for the
super-ego is above all a critical agency differentiated from the
ego and set up within the unconscious to watch over and make
judgments on the behaviour of the ego in its attempts to reconcile
the demands of the id and those of reality. It functions, as we
shall see, with the help of aggression which is diverted from
external goals back on to the self, i.e. as the result of a process
effectively indistinguishable from that which leads to masochism.
Indeed the close link between masochism and the workings of the
super-ego is confirmed by Freud in The Economic Problem of Masoch-
ism where he treats the latter as a special category of masochism,
as so-called moral masochism.

The nature of the super-ego may best be understood, and
in Freud's writings is consistently described by reference to
its etiology. The model of the super-ego, and its precursor
in the development of the individual, is the notion of parental
authority:

The long period of childhood, during which the growing
human being lives in dependence upon his parents, leaves
behind it a precipitate in which this parental influence is prolonged. It has received the name of super-ego.\footnote{150}

The ultimate relationship between ego and super-ego indeed reflects exactly that between child and parent:

The details of the relation between the ego and super-ego become entirely intelligible if they are carried back to the child's attitude towards his parents.\footnote{151}

The details furnished by Freud of the development of the super-ego from these origins, moreover, are highly revealing and particularly significant in the context of our discussion of Arrabal's drama. Freud proceeds from the notion of identification: he had observed that a common consequence of the necessity to give up an object cathexis (i.e. to arrest the processes of the instinct short of the attainment of its goal) was the incorporation of that object into the ego:

When it happens that a person has to give up a sexual object, there quite often ensues an alteration of the ego, which can only be described as a setting up of the object inside the ego ... the process, especially in the early phases of development, is a frequent one, and it makes it possible to suppose that the character of the ego is a precipitate of abandoned object cathexes.\footnote{152}

Freud notes that this process is akin to sublimation of the sexual instinct, in as much as object libido is 'desexualised' as is the case with sublimation, only in the case of identification it is transformed into narcissistic libido rather than being given an alternative aim. The first identifications of the individual, and those which exert the most lasting influence, are those made with the parents in early childhood. The original object cathexis of a boy is his mother: as the sexual wishes directed at his mother grow in intensity, moreover, the boy's father is perceived as an obstacle to their fulfilment, and thus becomes an object of his aggressive impulses; the boy is jealous of and hates his father. In this situation we recognise the
existence of the Oedipus complex. Freud stressed, however, that a true and complete picture of the Oedipus complex could be drawn only by taking into account the bisexuality constitutionally inherent in young children. The complete Oedipus complex was indeed an altogether more complex proposition:

Closer study usually discloses the more complete Oedipus complex, which is twofold, positive and negative, and is due to the bisexuality originally present in children: that is to say a boy has not merely an ambivalent attitude towards his father and an affectionate object choice towards his mother, but at the same time he also behaves like a girl and displays an affectionate feminine attitude towards his father and a corresponding jealousy and hostility towards his mother.

Both father and mother are therefore object choices of the libido; at the same time both are also perceived as obstacles and each is thus equally the object of aggression. Not unnaturally this double ambivalence becomes intolerable to the ego on two counts, firstly on account of the tension it creates and secondly, and far more significantly, because it involves the individual in the danger of losing the love of his parents. Accordingly there arises the necessity to dissolve the Oedipus complex which is done by desexualising the object choices of the libido and incorporating them into the ego (which allows them to be retained) through the process of identification. Since there are two object choices moreover, the dissolution of the Oedipus complex may be viewed as the fruit of a double identification:

The broad general outcome of the sexual phase dominated by the Oedipus complex may, therefore, be taken to be the forming of a precipitate in the ego consisting of these two identifications in some way united with one another.

The 'precipitate' to which Freud refers, splits from the rest of the ego to form the super-ego. Each of the identifications,
however, retains and reflects the full ambivalence of the object choices when incorporated into the ego. The preservation of the father as an object choice through incorporation into the ego does not rid him of his second aspect: i.e., an obstacle to the attainment of the alternative object choice, the mother, for this too is preserved. Thus the 'precipitate' and hence the super-ego itself displays the very same ambivalence: as Freud puts it:

"The super-ego is ... not simply a residue of the earliest object choices of the id; it also represents an energetic reaction formation against those choices."

The super-ego is perceived as an object of love and hate, just as the parents were before it, and like their authority, the dominance of the super-ego is assured by the individual's fear of the loss of love:

"The part which is later taken on by the super-ego is played to begin with by an external power, by parental authority. Parental influence governs the child by offering proofs of love and by threatening punishments which are signs to the child of loss of love and are bound to be feared on their own account."

There is much in Freud's account of the relationship between the ego and the super-ego, compared as it is to the relationship between the individual and his parents in the earliest years of life, which recalls the terms of our earlier discussion of Arrabal's biography. We noted that in the course of the playwright's formative years, his life was dominated by the influence of three central authoritarian figures - his mother, religion and the state. It will be recollected, moreover, that it was stated that each of these three influences was perceived by Arrabal as being characterised above all by ambivalence: each in other words reflected precisely the quality which Freud attributes to his notion of super-ego. The relationships between Arrabal and his mother, the church and the state, moreover, similarly reflected
exactly Freud's assessment of the relationship between the super-ego and the ego. For, like that of the super-ego, the rule of each of the influences we identified was a rule of terror; as was stated, the approbation of each was a necessary condition of the author's well-being. Again like the super-ego, however, mother, church and state were critical and repressive agents who at the same time undermined that well-being. Like the ego's view of the super-ego, in short, Arrabal's view of his mother, of the church, and of the state was characterised by a perplexing bewilderment engendered by the need to be 'loved' on the one hand, and a growing resentment of repression on the other.

We further noted, moreover, that these three influences in Arrabal's life provided the basis for the similarly ambivalent figures of authority which appear in his plays. The individual in Arrabal's plays, it was shown, is bound to figures of authority in relationships which reflect exactly the terms of the relationships which had so great an influence on the author's life. We have here demonstrated, moreover, a correlation between the terms of these latter and the terms used by Freud to describe the relationship between the ego and the super-ego. Our thesis now, therefore, is that the figures of authority in Arrabal's plays, which form one half of the opposition identified at the heart of those plays, may be viewed as an expression of the Freudian concept of super-ego.

This proposition, moreover, appears to be strikingly confirmed in the light of other aspects of our previous considerations. We discovered that, while fundamentally opposed in situation, the figures of the individual, on the one hand, and of authority on the other were in fact closely linked by the violence common
to both. Subsequently, moreover, we showed that violence in the individual could be viewed as an expression of the id. It is thus highly pertinent to our present considerations to discover that Freud postulates a close relationship between the id and the super-ego, and, what is more, that he states that aggression is the factor common to both. For the super-ego expresses itself through a redirection of the aggressive instinctual impulses of the id:

There is no doubt that when the super-ego was first instituted, in equipping that agency use was made of that piece of the child's aggressiveness towards his parents for which he was unable to effect a discharge outwards . . . It is very possible that, when there are later occasions for suppressing aggressiveness, the instinct may take the same path that was opened to it at that decisive point in time.157

The super-ego functions, as was previously suggested, as a result of introjection, i.e. as a result of arresting the aggressive instincts short of their goal and directing them back inwards against the self:

Every piece of aggression whose satisfaction the subject gives up is taken over by the super-ego and increases the latter's aggressiveness.158

The id, therefore, is the provider of the energy of the super-ego, and that energy takes the form of aggressiveness or violence. Consequently, although, as is the case with the individual and authoritarian figures in Arrabal's plays, their aims are diametrically opposed, the nature of the expression of id and super-ego, as again is the case with the individual and authoritarian figures in Arrabal's work, are indistinguishable. For aggression characterises not only the id, but in as much as the super-ego constitutes a redirection of the impulses of the id, the super-ego as well.
The super-ego is thus characterised in nature by an ambivalence which derives from the dissolution of the Oedipus complex, and in expression by a violence which is effectively indistinguishable from that of the aggressive instinct. Our previous considerations of figures of authority in Arrabal's drama have established that the latter too display precisely the same characteristics: in our discussion of 

*Jeunes Barbares d'Aujourd'hui*, for example, we noted the ambivalence of authority in the person of Snarck, on whom the three cyclists depended absolutely, but by whose hand they were subject to relentless cruelty and mistreatment, while our discussion of *Le Ciel et la Verde* clearly demonstrated that the expression of authority took a form which matched exactly the violence of its opponents. It is thus primarily upon these two factors that rests our assertion that the violence of authority in Arrabal's plays may be taken as an expression of the super-ego.

This contention receives further support, however, by virtue of the fact that it is apparent that Arrabal portrays not just these two characteristics themselves in his figures of authority, but in addition he depicts the origins of each (i.e. of ambivalence and of violence) in terms which closely reflect the account given by Freud and outlined above. We have seen, for example, that the origins of the violence of the super-ego lie in the id. And it is precisely this point which seems to be illustrated in *Le Labyrinthe*. For, as is suggested by the fact that they are chained together at the beginning of the play, it seems clear that in Bruno and Stienne, Arrabal is depicting a single person. They are, indeed, respectively id and ego. The rational and coherent Stienne demonstrates precisely the common-sense which we know to characterise the ego, while the ill-kept Bruno is ruled
exclusively by the unrefined passions which we know to characterise the id - his only words indeed are directed towards the satisfaction of his thirst, while his only actions, before hanging himself, are directed towards hindering Etienne in the most violent manner possible:

Bruno lui donne des coups de pied de plus en plus violents, ce qui gène beaucoup Etienne.¹⁵⁹

If Bruno represents the id, we may see his death and subsequent burial by Etienne and Vicaela, in psychological terms, as the repression of the id, or instincts. Accordingly it is significant that the appearance of the judge follows that burial almost immediately: for the judge is clearly a figure of authority and may thus be taken to represent the super-ego. Consequently the pattern of events on stage adheres exactly to the terms of Freud's account: the repression of the id is followed by the emergence of the super-ego.¹⁶⁰ Once the judge has arrived, moreover, the notion of a correspondence between him and Bruno seems to be deliberately reinforced by the details of Arrabal's description: for the judge's main preoccupation is more than coincidentally akin to that of Bruno noted above:

... il tire une bouteille de vin d'une autre poche et la pose sur le sol près de sa chaise. Enfin, il exhibe un grand sandwich au saucisson enveloppé dans du papier journal. Pendant toute l'audience, il mangera son sandwich très lentement et d'une façon monotone.¹⁶¹

In Le Labyrinthe, therefore, Arrabal presents the origins of the violence of the super-ego. In another early play he presents the origins of its ambivalence. As we have seen, these lie, according to Freud, in the two conflicting attitudes of the individual (of which the super-ego is a precipitate) towards his parents during that phase of development dominated by the Oedipus complex, when each parent is perceived as the object
of both love and hate. It is precisely this situation that is depicted in Les Deux Bourreaux. Maurice and Benoît each reflect one side of the conflict described by Freud. For Benoît, Françoise is an object of unequivocal love and affection, while his father does not even merit respect:

**FRANÇOISE:** D'ailleurs, bien que ton père soit fautif, et même très fautif, tu n'en dois pas moins le respecter.

**BENOÎT:** Le respecter, lui?¹⁶²

For Maurice, on the other hand, Françoise is the object of an equally unequivocal hatred, and all affection is directed at Jean. The conflict between the two brothers in this play is thus very much the forerunner of the ambivalent attitudes felt by individuals towards figures of authority in later plays. The play as a whole may be seen as a detailed description of the conflicts out of which the super-ego arises, and which lend it its own peculiar ambivalence. As such it constitutes an explanation of, or a background to, the appearance in other plays of the mother (and indeed other figures of authority for whom the individual feels a similar mixture of emotions)¹⁶³ as representatives of the super-ego.

Our awareness of the precise nature of the conflicting attitudes out of which the ambivalence of the super-ego evolves, moreover, is instructive from a further, unsuspected point of view. For we can witness these attitudes in Arrabal’s plays not only in the individual’s view of obviously authoritarian figures, but also, in certain circumstances, in his apperception of the figure of the lover. The attitudes portrayed by Maurice and Benoît in the example studied above are, for instance, the precise constituents of Fando’s view of Lis in Fando et Lis. On the one hand, Lis clearly represents an ‘object-choice’ for Fando: he is drawn to her with an appealing devotion which is similar to that demonstrated by Benoît with regard to his mother, particu-
larly in the naivety which characterises so many of the relationships portrayed in Arrabal's work: 164

Je m'achèterai une barque quand nous serons arrivés
à Tar et je t'emmènerai voir la rivière. Tu veux, Lis? 165

At the same time, however, his attitude also reflects the hatred expressed (with regard to his mother) by Maurice in Les Deux Bourreaux: he chains Lis to the pram, puts handcuffs on her, beats her mercilessly and finally kills her in an astonishing demonstration of cruelty. There is thus a parallel between the two plays which suggests that the lover, as exemplified by Lis, is, as clearly as the mother in the person of Françoise, a forerunner of later super-ego figures: for both may be seen as the butt of the two conflicting attitudes out of which that figure emerges.

It is certainly the case, moreover, that in a number of subsequent plays the lover appears as the symbol of the super-ego. An outstanding example is provided by "Le Prince à tête de Chien" in the play entitled Les Amours Impossibles, to which we have already referred. In keeping with previous super-ego figures which we have identified, the relationship between him and the princess is marked by ambivalence: his approbation is the sine qua non of her well-being and felicity, and yet he is the actual cause of her suffering. The terms of the relationship are succinctly illustrated as the princess seeks to prevent the departure of her loved one:

Le prince à tête de chien se lève pour partir. La princesse tente de l'en empêcher. Le prince à tête de chien la repousse avec violence et sort à droite. La princesse reste assise sur le banc et pleure. On entend qu'elle dit: "Médoc, Médoc, mon bien-aimé." 166

The same terms, moreover, mark the relationship between Sigur and Sylva in Le Lei de Barakhum: again the latter, though the object
of Giafar’s love, reciprocates that love in a disturbing and
unmistakably authoritarian fashion: she chains him up, leaves him
alone and obliges him to study philosophical treatises in her
absence.

Arrabal’s portrayal of the origins of the super-ego in
terms which reflect the schema put forward by Freud thus enables
us to postulate the existence of the lover, in certain instances
at least, as a symbol of the super-ego: a phenomenon which we have
here illustrated by reference to “Le Prince à tête de chien” in
Les Amours Impossibles and Sylda in Le Lai de Barabas. The corres-
pondence between the figures of mother and lover which is thus
implied, however, is perhaps one of the least immediately compre-
sensible facets of our interpretation and calls for some form of
substantiation in psychological terms. In fact an explanation is
quite simply furnished by an understanding of the psychological
notion of displacement. The latter is defined by Laplanche and
Pontalis in their Vocabulaire de la Psychanalyse in the following
manner:

Fait que l’accent, l’intérêt, l’intensité d’une
représentation est susceptible de se détacher d’elle
pour passer à d’autres représentations originellement
peu intenses reliées à la première par une chaîne
associative.

In other words the affect attached to a given object or circumstance
may be re-awakened by a second object or circumstance, ostensibly
neutral and unrelated to the first (though a link does in fact exist through the association of ideas) but acting as a substitute
for the first. As Freud points out in a paper entitled The Claims
of Psychoanalysis to Scientific Interest written in 1913,
In another form of the same disorder the victim suffers from tormenting ideas (obsessions) which force themselves upon him and are accompanied by affects whose character and intensity are often only quite inadequately accounted for by the terms of the obsessive ideas themselves. Analytic investigation has shown in their case that the affects are entirely justified since they correspond to self-reproaches which are based on something that is at least psychically real. But the ideas to which these affects are attached are not the original ones but have found their way into their present position by a process of displacement - by being substituted for something that has been repressed. 169

In the light of these considerations we would suggest that the link between the figures of mother and lover implied in Arrabal’s drama by the appearance of the lover as an agent of the super-ego may be seen quite simply as a consequence of the displacement of the affects originally attached to the mother. These affects, as we know from our previous considerations, take the form, during the Oedipal stage of the development of the individual, of the conflicting attitudes of love and hate. Unable to reconcile the conflict thus denoted by the affects attached to the mother, therefore, the individual (in the plays with which we are here concerned) has subjected those affects to the process of repression, only for them to reappear, attached this time, however, not to the original ‘idea’ but, by displacement, to the substitute and ostensibly illogical ‘idea’ of the lover. 170

We have repeatedly stressed that Freud’s account of the origins of the super-ego appears to be reflected in the terms of Arrabal’s dramatic creation; the latter, moreover, seem also to reflect the psychologist’s statement of the affects and function of the super-ego, once established in the individual. We have previously stated that the super-ego is an agency set up to watch over, criticise and make judgments on the activities of the ego. More specifically, its job is to deal with the demands of the I,
or to help the ego deal with those demands through the exercise of repression:

Since we have come to assume a special agency in the ego, the super-ego, which represents demands of a restrictive and rejecting character, we may say that repression is the work of the super-ego, and that it is carried out either by itself or by the ego in obedience to its orders.

As, according to Freud, the function of the super-ego is repression, moreover, so, in Arrabal’s plays, the function of figures of authority is consistently to restrict and to inhibit. Perhaps the clearest example in Arrabal’s early work occurs at the end of Le Tricycle [1953] where the arrest and subsequent imprisonment of Apal and Climando signify the repression of the id, the processes of which are clearly discernible in the irrationality and (in the murder) brutality of preceding events. Sixteen years later in Et ils passèrent des Manettes aux Fleurs, moreover, the function of authority has changed not at all; the extent and indeed the cruelty of the repression and restriction exerted by 'Les Autorités' is summed up in one of Arrabal’s most striking images:

Mais comment est-il possible qu’au moment où l’homme foule le sol de la lune et qu’il s’apprête à s’élancer vers des plus lointaines galaxies, il y ait des hommes qui ne voient pas l’horizon?

The repressive function of the super-ego, however, has an unsuspected, and, in many ways, paradoxical consequence, in as much as, according to the theories developed by Freud in Civilization and its Discontents [1930], it leads to the emergence and reinforcement of guilt. As we have just demonstrated the function of figures of authority in Arrabal’s work reflects Freud’s definition of the function of the super-ego. The effects of the repression of those figures of authority as presented by Arrabal, moreover, equally reflects Freud’s statement of the effects of the repression instigated by the super-ego: Arrabal’s
presentation of guilt, indeed, recalls precisely the terms of
Freud's discussion of it, and as such provides one further and
final justification of the hypothesis of a parallel between figures
of authority in Arrabal's work and the psychological notion of the
super-ego upon which this part of our interpretation rests.

To understand Freud's view of guilt fully we have to
retrace our steps. For, according to Freud, the forerunner of
guilt is the fear of the loss of love experienced by the individual
during the period prior to the emergence of the super-ego. As
we saw, the individual was then beset by aggressive feelings
towards his parents which contradicted both his love for them and
his dependence on, and need to be protected by them. This contra­
diction created a tension which was experienced as the fear of the
loss of love; and, as previously stated, it was this fear, in turn,
which motivated the dissolution of the Oedipus complex. We further
noted, moreover, that the subsequent relationship between ego and
super-ego was exactly parallel to that just described, between the
individual and his parents: like the latter the super-ego is
perceived as a figure of authority whose approbation is essential,
and, more pertinently, is an object of both love and hatred. Once
again, then, there is tension, this time between the ego and the
super-ego, and experienced as a feeling of guilt:

The tension between the harsh super-ego and the
ego is called by us the sense of guilt.174

The evolution of guilt in this circumstance is easily compre­
hensible in the light of the fact that, as stated, the super-ego
watches over the ego in a critical capacity. At the risk of
over-simplifying the case, we may say that the ego experiences
guilt as a result of its acknowledgement of the aggression which
emerges from the id and is directed against the super-ego.
Accordingly there arises once again the need to reduce tension, which may, in this case, most logically be achieved by a renunciation or repression of that aggressive impulse. As we have seen, moreover, this need corresponds exactly to the function of the super-ego which is precisely to keep the id in check. Thus, at the behest of the super-ego (or, we may also say, following the dictates of conscience), the ego represses the aggressive instinct in the hope of achieving a reduction of tension. But this process does not have the desired effect. For not only does the super-ego, on the one hand, call for a renunciation of the aggressive instinct, but it also, as we have noted elsewhere, exists by, and as a result of, a renunciation of that instinct. For the energy of the super-ego derives from the id. Thus, just as the original reduction of tension brought the harsh super-ego in its wake, so this subsequent attempt to meet the demands of the super-ego leads paradoxically to a reinforcement of the strength of the super-ego. Freud himself acknowledges the difficulty of this procedure as a prelude to his clearest statement of it:

And here at last an idea comes in which belongs entirely to psychoanalysis and which is foreign to people's ordinary way of thinking. This idea is of a sort which enables us to understand why the subject matter was bound to seem as confused and obscure to us. For it tells us that conscience (or more correctly the anxiety which later becomes conscience) is indeed the cause of instinctual renunciation to begin with, but that later the relationship is reversed. Every renunciation of instinct now becomes a dynamic source of conscience and every fresh renunciation increases the latter's severity and intolerance. If we could only bring it better into harmony with what we already know about the history of the origin of conscience, we should be tempted to defend the paradoxical statement that conscience is the result of instinctual renunciation, or that instinctual renunciation (imposed on us from without) creates conscience which then demands further instinctual renunciation.
Guilt, in short, arising originally as a consequence of the ambivalence of the super-ego, not only engenders the need for repression but is also a consequence of repression. As Freud points out, moreover, a significant effect of this state of affairs is to endow those individuals who have most successfully repressed the instinctual demands of the id (i.e., those who apparently have least cause to experience guilt) with the most heightened awareness of guilt:

It is remarkable that the more a man checks his aggressiveness towards the exterior the more severe— that is aggressive—he becomes in his ego-ideal. The ordinary view sees the situation the other way round: the standard set up by the ego-ideal seems to be the motive for the suppression of aggressiveness. The fact remains however, as we have stated it: the more a man controls his aggressiveness, the more intense becomes his ideal's inclination to aggressiveness against his ego.175

Guilt indeed may be seen as a consequence of innocence, since the sense of guilt increases with the success of repression, rather than diminishing as one might logically expect, the sense of guilt being fortified dynamically by repression. As Ernest Jones succinctly put it, Freud's innovatory ideas on the subject of guilt culminated in the contention that "the sense of guilt is specifically the response to repressed aggressiveness."177

Two important factors thus characterise Freud's discussion of guilt: firstly that the sense of guilt is preceded by, and corresponds exactly to, the fear of the loss of love, and secondly that guilt is experienced not only in spite of innocence but even because of innocence, since guilt is a response to the repression of the aggressive instinct. And both these factors are echoed in Arrabal's plays. Symbols of guilt in the plays are frequent and largely lacking in subtlety—manacles, chains, handcuffs and police sirens or whistles serve as the indications of the guilt
of the individual hopelessly caught between the demands of the id and the draconian authority of the super-ego. In *Le Grand Cerémonial*, however, the repeated sound of police sirens, which denotes the sense of guilt experienced by the central character Cavanosa, is interestingly linked to, and indeed literally echoed by, Cavanosa's beseeching and desperate cries of "Maman! Maman!" throughout the play. There is a deliberate association made by the playwright of these two *leitmotives*, which unmistakably recalls the terms of Freud's discussion of guilt, and the parallel he draws between the sense of guilt and the fear of the loss of love which preceded it:

> The torments caused by the reproaches of conscience correspond precisely to a child's dread of losing his parents' love, a dread which has been replaced in him by a moral agency.\(^{178}\)

And the second fundamental factor of Freud's theories of guilt is also echoed in Arrabal's work, as may be established by pursuing our interpretation of *Le Labyrinthe*. For we have shown that the character of Bruno in this play represents the instinctual side, or id, of Etienne. At the beginning of the play Bruno is bound to Etienne (or in psychological terms the id is bound to the ego) by the chain which joins the manacles that each character wears. Etienne, however, saws through the chain, which action may be seen as an attempt to free himself from the demands of the id. But at the same time, as is established by repeated references, the manacle which remains on Etienne's ankle constitutes a clear indication of his guilt throughout the play. A link is thus established between the notion of guilt and the rejection of the demands of the id. This link, moreover, is powerfully reinforced by Bruno's death. For, as we have indicated, that death represents the definitive repression of the id. It also constitutes a definitive indication of Etienne's guilt, however, for it is as a
consequence of his supposed murder of Bruno that he is finally condemned, that his guilt is established by the judges:

La culpabilité de l'accusé ne fait aucun doute ...

Thus, not only is Stienne found guilty despite his innocence, (for Bruno, in fact, committed suicide and was not murdered by Stienne) but in psychological terms, and in keeping with the notions proposed by Freud, the establishment of his guilt depends upon and is consequential to the repression of his instincts.

The same fundamental point and indeed a number of the other considerations upon which our interpretation has so far been based are further illustrated by the enigmatic piece La Bicyclette du Condamné. The play depicts Viloro seated at the piano struggling to master a simple scale. From time to time he is interrupted by the appearance of his lover, Tasla, as well as by the more violent incursions of the three men who ridicule his efforts from behind a wall (where they appear to live) and then emerge to torment and torture him and to make his task the more difficult by binding him in chains. Tasla meanwhile has highly ambiguous dealings with the three men: she first attempts, by running through a veritable repertoire of provocative and lascivious gestures, to attract Paso (apparently the leader of the trio) but fails, and is dragged behind the wall instead by Paso's two excited companions. In a second comparable scene, however, she specifically rejects Paso and deliberately invites the willing attentions of his two colleagues. Between these two scenes, moreover, she also appears in the rôle of Paso's captor, evidently charged with the mission of delivering him for torture to some
unnamed authority. Tasla thus holds a key position in the play, albeit a highly puzzling one, consideration of which suggests that, according to a technique which we have already discussed, Arrabal is presenting in *La Bicyclette du Condamné* two versions of a central theme, namely the love of Viloro for Tasla. There is, on the one hand, a pure "realistically" acceptable version of that love, expressed by Viloro in the lyrical terms in which he addresses Tasla and symbolised by his appealing and naive desire to be a great musician in order to please her:

**VILORO:** (Avec fierté) Tu verras comme je serai un grand pianiste ... J'arriverai même à composer.

**TASLA:** Tu veux composer aussi?

**VILORO:** Par ici! Je vais faire une chanson pour toi... Je suis sûr qu'elle te plaira beaucoup.\(^\text{181}\)

Against this, however, is contrasted an attraction based on instinct, exemplified by the behaviour of the three men with Tasla in the scenes described above.\(^\text{182}\) The purity of Viloro's love thus depends on the repression of this instinctual basis: and it is that repression which seems to be clearly indicated by Viloro's preoccupation with music, which, as we have seen, provides Viloro with a means of expressing his love, and is surely an obvious example of the process of sublimation, previously discussed. The repression is further portrayed, moreover, in the image of Paso being wheeled around in a cage: indeed Arrabal seems to stress the point by making it quite clear that, for Viloro, the fate that is about to befall Paso (which in psychological terms denotes the process of repression of the id) is closely bound up with the attainment and expression of the pure love which exists between him and Tasla:

\[^\text{183}\] A chaque coup de fouet, qu'on donne au condamné, envoie-moi un baiser.
The same image also serves to highlight the distinction that must be made, and which was already apparent from our description of the dealings between Tesla and the three men, between Paso and his fellows. For while the three collectively represent the id, and while much of Paso's behaviour is clearly in line with his role in this context (his advances on Tesla for example) Paso individually also represents specifically that portion of the id which has been subjected to repression. Accordingly, in keeping with the psychological principles with which we are familiar, his energy (i.e. the energy of the id following repression) is itself channelled into the service of the super-ego and is used subsequently to effect the process of repression. Thus Paso also appears as a restricting and restraining influence, as is quite clear when he seeks to prevent his colleagues responding to Tesla's provocation:

Le derrière le mur apparaît le bras nu et insinuant qui agite le ballon. Les deux hommes regardent. Ils vont se lever. Paso les retient. Le jeu insinuant du bras nu continue.  

In his dealings with Viloro Paso appears exclusively as an unambiguous figure of authority, whose behaviour represents the action of the super-ego, watching over and ruthlessly criticising the performance of the ego. Paso tortures Viloro (the super-ego mistreats the ego), moreover, significantly, not on account of anything he has done wrong, nor even as a result of the 'misdemeanours' of his id, but precisely because of the success of his sublimation — playing the piano is Viloro's crime:

PASO, à Viloro: Tu sais bien que tu n'as pas le droit de jouer du piano.

Indeed the more successful that sublimation becomes — the better Viloro plays his scale — the more harshly he is treated by Paso.
and the more the indications of his guilt (the fetters by which he is bound) multiply. The whole process, which culminates in Paso's brutal assassination of Viloro, (or, in psychological terms, the death of the ego at the hands of the super-ego) thus strongly recalls Freud's words in *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety*: 186

The ego, which, on the one hand, knows that it is innocent, is obliged, on the other hand, to be aware of a sense of guilt and to carry a responsibility which it cannot account for 187 and indeed seems to provide a dramatic illustration of the terms of Freud's discussion of the sense of guilt and the role of the super-ego in the evolution of guilt. That discussion in turn, as we have here explained, constitutes the last of a number of factors, (which we have considered at length) which support our central contention that the figures of authority in Arrabal's drama may be seen as expressions of the psychological notion of the super-ego.
Taken in conjunction with our previous findings, which established that the violence of the individual in Arrabal's plays may be seen as the expression of instinct, or the id, our present discussion of the super-ego lays the foundation of our interpretation of the playwright's work. For it now becomes apparent that the fundamental opposition which we identified at the heart of that work may be seen in terms of the conflict between the instinctual impulses of the id, striving for satisfaction, and the harsh, violent, critical agency of the super-ego. Arrabal's plays, in short, depict the plight of the helpless ego, and its attempts to reconcile the conflicting demands of its two hostile masters.

It is precisely such an undertaking which we see set out in *Concert dans un Œuf* (1958). The play is deliberately constructed to depict two parallel, but ostensibly unrelated courses of action. Scenes 1, 3, 5 and 7 in each act portray the ultimately fruitless, but appealingly naive love of Filloso for Li, the vacillation of the latter between the attentions of Filloso and those of his rival, referred to as 'l'homme' and her final desertion of Filloso in favour of 'l'homme'. Scenes 2, 4 and 6 of each act, meanwhile, portray the disruption and ultimate destruction of the relationship between two young people by an older couple. It seems clear that these two conflicts, presented side by side, may be interpreted as a depiction of the battle waged on two fronts by the ego, according to the considerations set out above. In the first set of scenes, for example, a distinction is immediately made between the purity of Filloso's love for Li, and the relationship between 'l'homme' and Li, which is characterised
by violence and overt sexuality. This distinction is apparent in the first scene: 'l'homme' brutally mistreats Li:

Elle se jette aux pieds de l'homme. Elle lui baise les pieds. L'homme l'écarte d'un coup de pied. Tendue sur le sol, Li ne bouge plus.

whereas Filtos lavishes compassion and affection on her:

Il lui essuie le visage avec son mouchoir ... Il pose des fleurs dans les cheveux de Li.

and it suggests that the behaviour of 'l'homme' may be viewed in terms of the instinctual impulses of the id, whilst Filtos' behaviour constitutes the refined and modified version of the same basic circumstance (i.e., attraction to Li), refined and modified, that is, by the ego in accordance with the Reality Principle. Arrabal demonstrates (and not by any means for the first time) the simple psychological tenet that what we call love or tenderness is motivated by the instinctual alloy of sexuality and aggression.

This view, moreover, is supported in the next scene (Act 1, sc.3) by the fact that the success of Filtos' courtship of Li, (which is characterised by a belief in the undesirability of instincts:

"Celui qui fait ça est sûr, pour commencer, de ne pas aller au paradis") is achieved at the expense of his rival. For, while Filtos is making progress with Li, 'l'homme' is being brutally mistreated by the two women, whose appearance has punctuated the action from the outset:


And this humiliation of 'l'homme' would seem to denote the repression of the id which is, of course, a prerequisite in psychological terms of Filtos' tender love for Li. The repression, however, is neither complete nor wholly effective: in Scene 7 of Act 1
Filtos himself chains up his lover and drags her forcibly away, recalling the actions of 'l'homme' in Scene 1. This scene, which prefigures the last scene of the second act, denotes the first step of the submission of the ego to the demands of the id: for Filtos' actions represent the involuntary invasion of the ego by the unconscious forces of the id. This is announced in the previous scene by the physical intrusion of 'l'homme' whilst Filtos and Li are sleeping, and indicated here by the fact that Arrabal stresses that the actions performed by Filtos in Scene 7 are executed mechanically, just after he has woken, and as if he were still asleep:

Il saisit comme un automate, à demi endormi, son pot de chambre et le met dans la barque. Il prend sa couverture et, à demi endormi, il la met dans la barque. Toujours à demi endormi, il prend son oreiller et la met dans la barque.193

The themes established in Act 1 are developed in the second act of the play. Act II Scenes 3 and 5, for instance, depict the climax of each of the central relationships, that of Li with 'l'homme' and with Filtos respectively. They serve at once to re-emphasise the instinctual basis of the former:

L'homme émerge de la barque, l'air las. La main de Li tente de le retenir. L'homme la frappe violemment194.

and to maintain the distinction between the two, contrasting Li's willing and obscene participation in Scene 3 with the relative disinterest of her involvement with Filtos in Scene 5. The latter scene, moreover, denotes a further stage in the triumph of the id over the ego: Filtos tries unsuccessfully to reconcile the demands of the instincts with the terms dictated by the ego, submitting to the former in the form of the temptations offered by Li. This, however, only serves to
illustrate the gulf that separates Li from Filtos:

VOIX DE FILTOS: Tu as fini?
Long silence.

VOIX DE LI: Quoi?

VOIX DE FILTOS: Je te demande si tu as fini.
Long silence.

VOIX DE LI: Quoi?
Long silence.

VOIX DE FILTOS: Merde!

— a gulf already implied by her preference for 'l'homme' and giving rise to Li's definitive rejection of Filtos in favour of 'l'homme' in the last scene of the play. This scene in turn signifies final victory for the id; the ego is not merely involuntarily invaded by the demands of the id, as in the final scene of Act 1, but is here forced to a conscious recognition of the id's supremacy. After pleading pitifully with his lover, Filtos is forced to acquiesce and departs in despair, leaving behind him the final indications of a pure and tender love which came to nothing:

Il revient à droite avec un bouquet de fleurs, qu'il pose entre l'homme et Li. Ni l'homme ni Li, qui se bercent, les yeux fermés, ne font attention aux gestes de Filtos.196

The other series of scenes (Scenes 2, 4 and 6 of each act) are ostensibly far less coherent than the story of Filtos, Li and 'l'homme' here depicted. Nevertheless these parallel scenes do possess a definite thematic consistency. And, as Bernard Gille's description makes quite clear, that consistency is provided by the concept of cruel and relentless authority, embodied by the older of the two couples whose uneasy relationship they trace:

La jeune fille et le jeune homme des tableaux 2, 4, 6 sont martyrisés par un homme et une femme. L'amour enfantin est saconsé, épousé, souillé ou massacreé par la
As we have previously established, moreover, such a concept may be viewed in the light of the psychological notion of the super-ego. Indeed, while scenes 1, 3, 5 and 7 of each act of *Concert dans un Coq* appear to depict the tension between ego and id, the remaining scenes appear to portray the complementary battle between ego and super-ego. The two young people represent the ego: as Gille stresses they are united by a pure and tender love reminiscent of that felt by Piltos for Li, and with the symbol of the coffin carried on by the couple at the beginning of Act 1 scene 2 Arrabal appears to suggest that the purity of their love is dependent upon repression. Despite that purity, however, the young couple incur the criticism and wrath of their older counterparts: the tension of the relationship between the two couples is clearly portrayed in Act 1 scene 4, while the cruelty of the super-ego is recalled in the next scene (Act 1 scene 6) in which the young girl is brutally mistreated by the older woman:

La femme tire violemment la jeune fille par les cheveux jusqu'à ce qu'elle baisse la tête sur son travail.

The traits of the super-ego are again strongly recalled in the second act, where the cruel domination of the older couple persists (they cry on the young couple in Scene 2 and interrupt their love-making in scene 4 to call the young man to perform his duties in a war which brings total devastation to both couples) and culminates, in scene 6, in the brutal assassination of the young girl. The series of scenes thus ends with the image with which it began, that of a coffin. On this occasion, however, it seems clear that the coffin signifies not the repression of the id by the ego, but the subsequent annihilation of the ego itself.
by a harsh and merciless super-ego.

An even more complete picture of the considerations which have occupied our attentions than that provided by Concert dans un Coeur, however, is given in the earlier Le Cimetière des Voitures (1957). This play may be analysed on two levels, for, as Berenguer points out in the interesting examination of the structure of Le Cimetière des Voitures which he carries out in L'Exil et la Céramonie, the play presents three distinct universes which may be viewed both individually and in their intercourse one with another. It is our contention, moreover, that on each of these levels of interpretation may be discerned an illustration of the psychological notions, and the relationships between them, which we have previously discussed at length.

The first universe identified by Berenguer is that of the three musicians, Emanou, Podère and Toso. Here it seems clear that the central figure of the leader, Emanou, may be taken to represent the ego, and that his music, like that of Vilaro, in the example considered earlier, represents or is a result of a sublimation of the instincts. Sublimation, as we know, incorporates repression, and thus this contention is borne out by the presence of Podère, personification of the id, and significantly mute, since the id has been repressed. Despite, or possibly because of this repression, Emanou has to endure the criticisms of Toso, who from the outset is unconvinced of the validity of the project upon which the three are engaged, and criticises Emanou's preoccupation with music (i.e. the behaviour of the ego), not on aesthetic but on moral grounds, again, significantly, by invoking a standard of behaviour, and by pointing out that it is wrong.
Topô thus completes the trio by appearing as a representative of the super-ego, the agency which sits in judgment over the performance of the ego, a role which he assumes even more fully after Emnou has made love to Dila, when he allies himself to Lasca and Tossido and is instrumental in Emnou's ultimate capture (i.e. in the punishment of the ego).

A similar organisation may be discerned in the world of the car cemetery itself. For Dila is here caught between the demands of the cars' occupants, whose whims it is her job to satisfy, and the orders of Milos, by whom her actions are directed. In this universe, then, Dila personifies the ego, while the occupants of the cars collectively constitute the id, and Milos represents the super-ego. And this interpretation is supported on two counts: firstly, as Berenguer points out, the occupants of the cars are totally irrational, largely incoherent and exclusively concerned with the satisfaction of basic appetites:

Les seules préoccupations qui apparaissent dans cet univers clos sont d'ordre matériel.202

They embody, in short, all we know of the id. Secondly, the relationship between Milos and the occupants of the cars reflects exactly the details of the relationship between super-ego and id expounded by Freud. On the one hand we know that the energy of the id may be put at the service of, and perform the function of, the super-ego, and this is precisely what happens in the episode in which Milos ushers his 'guests' out of their cars to spy on his wife making love with Emnou. In addition we know that the repression of the id, though dictated by the super-ego, is effected
by the ego at the super-ego's behest. This point too is reflected in the play. For as Berenguer again points out, Milos' ability to manipulate his 'guests' (as in the previous example) depends not so much upon the fact that he dominates them, as upon the fact that he obliges his wife to dominate them for him:

Milos ne se dresse jamais contre eux si ce n'est pas l'intermédiaire de Dila.

The third universe portrayed in the play, that of Lasca and Tiossido, is arguably less developed and certainly less consistent than the other two: the terms of their relationship vary as the play progresses. Nevertheless one may still discern in the depiction of the relationship between Lasca and Tiossido a certain adherence to the psychological principles under consideration. Initially Lasca appears as a super-ego figure: she is a dominating matriarch who relentlessly drives Tiossido (who thus here represents the ego) on to greater athletic feats. The latter's athleticism, moreover, represents a sublimation of instinct, as is powerfully suggested by the parallel established in the scene where his breathless "un, deux, un, deux, ça vient, ça vient" accompanies the love-making of Emanou and Dila. In addition there is a clear reference to what we know of the origins of the super-ego (i.e. the conflict between the opposing instincts of love and hate directed at the same object) centred on the visit of Lasca and Tiossido to the car cemetery, which may be taken as a regression to the stage of development which preceded the emergence of the super ego. On the one hand that visit is made because Lasca is an object of Tiossido's libido:

aujourd'hui je compte faire quelque chose de mieux ...
On peut aller dans une voiture ... Pour une fois seulement. Personne ne s'en apercevra.
When the two leave the car cemetery, however, we see that Tiossido not only loves Lasca but hates her as well. Indeed he mistreats and dominates her (much as she had previously dominated him) thus complementing his earlier outlook by demonstrating the second of the two attitudes inherent in the origin of the super-ego.

Viewed individually, then, each of the three universes identified by Benner portrays relationships which may be interpreted in the light of the psychological principles postulated by Freud. It is our contention, moreover, that these principles are also reflected in the relationships between these universes, that is, in the structure of the play as a whole. The three universes identified: that of the musicians, that of the car cemetery itself, and that of Lasca and Tiossido, indeed, appear to represent, respectively, the ego, the id and the super-ego. For just as the function of the ego is to satisfy the demands of the id, so it is the musicians’ role to serve the insistent demands of the occupants of the cars. In satisfying the desires of the id, however, the ego has to take into account the dictates of reality: thus the musicians serve the cars’ occupants with music, which, as previously noted, represents a sublimation. Satisfactory of the instincts through sublimation, however, does not exonerate the ego from the criticism of the super-ego: indeed, since sublimation depends upon repression, it is a direct cause of guilt. Thus, in the play the musicians are pursued relentlessly by the police because of their music (it is forbidden to play in the open air.) The sound of police-whistles punctuates the action as a constant reminder of their guilt. And just as the concomitant of guilt in psychological terms is punishment by the super-ego, so
Emanou is finally confronted and captured by Lasca and Tiessido, bound to the handlebars of a bicycle and wheeled away. Finally, the cruelty and energy of the super-ego in the execution of this punishment has its roots in the violence of the id; it constitutes in fact a re-direction of the energies of the id. That Lasca and Tiessido may be viewed as agents of the super-ego is thus confirmed by the fact that their quest for Emanou, and adoption of the rôle of figures of authority dates from the moment they emerge from 'voiture 2', having spent part of the night savouring the delights of the car cemetery.

Le Cimetière des Voitures thus appears, on two levels, to present the interplay of the psychological notions of ego, id and super-ego according to the principles set out by Freud and discussed earlier. As such the play is the most sustained and persuasive indication of the validity of the interpretation which we have developed, namely that Arrabal's plays portray the attempts of the ego (represented in many cases by the individual, otherwise by a central group of characters in some way closely united) to reconcile the conflicting demands of the id and the super-ego (both represented through the use of violence).
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle Freud summed up the aim of mental life in the following terms:

The dominating tendency of mental life and perhaps of nervous life in general is the effort to reduce, to keep constant, or to remove internal tension due to stimuli (the Nirvana Principle to borrow a term from Barbara Low).206

A new concept, the Nirvana Principle, was thus introduced to supplement the picture of the regulatory processes of mental life previously expressed in the terms of the Pleasure and Reality Principles. The definition of the Nirvana Principle depended on the one hand upon Freud's identification of the tension engendered (particularly in the form of guilt) by the relationship between the ego and the super-ego in the manner we have traced, but on the other hand upon a re-statement of the terms of the Pleasure Principle itself. We have previously said that in accordance with the Pleasure Principle the impulses of the id strive for satisfaction. Freud noted that this striving could be seen as the creation of tension, experienced as displeasure, and that the satisfaction of instinctual demands (carried out by the ego in the light of the exigencies of reality and of the super-ego) amounted to a reduction of tension.207 In the light of these considerations it is clear that the internal tension due to stimuli referred to by Freud in the definition cited above derives from two familiar sources - from the judgments delivered by the super-ego and from the strivings of the instinctual impulses of the id. The Nirvana Principle sums up, in other words, the efforts of the ego in the precise situation which we have outlined at the end of the previous section (in its attempts to reconcile the conflicting demands of id and super-ego) and states that these efforts are directed
towards a specific objective.

Accordingly it is interesting to note that the individual in Arrabal's plays, like the ego in Freud's schema, is charged with the execution of a specific mission, the final objective of which is expressed in terms more than coincidentally akin to the objective of mental life, as defined by the psychologist. This latter, as we have here seen, consists in a reduction of tension or the attainment of a state of Nirvana, Nirvana being defined by Laplanche and Pontalis as "une état de quitude et de bonheur". And the ultimate objective of the individual in Arrabal's plays, caught as we have seen in a situation which appears to reflect that of the ego in mental life, is expressed in exactly the same terms. In Fando et Lis, for example, that objective is symbolised by the town of Tar, towards which the couple tirelessly proceed without ever making any real progress, and Tar for Fando and Lis means only one thing:

nous nous mettrons en route pour Tar et nous serons très heureux.

Fando's words here, moreover, are echoed by Viloro in La Bicyclette du Condamné. For Viloro the objective is escape from his present circumstances - this, however, denotes to him exactly what Tar signifies for Fando:

Quand nous pourrons partir d'ici, nous serons heureux.

Indeed, throughout Arrabal's plays, the individual may be seen progressing towards an objective expressed in terms easily reconcilable with the notion of the Nirvana Principle. There is a clear parallel to be drawn between the aims which motivate Arrabal's individuals and the aim of mental life as stated by Freud, a parallel, moreover, which lends further support to the terms of our interpretation.

For the most part, however, the attainment of the
goal towards which they are progressing (or, in psychological
terms the attainment of a 'state of Nirvana') remains a distant
and unfulfilled impossibility. Fando and Lis, for example, get no
nearer to Tar than the cemetery where Fando buries Lis after having
killed her in a fit of rage, while Viloro, as we have seen, is
overcome by Paso and himself dies at the end of La Bicyclette du
Condamné. The seeming inevitability of the failure of the
individual in Arrabal's drama to attain his objective may best be
understood by further reference to, and indeed is summed up in, the
rôles played by the figures of the mother and the lover in the plays.

Our previous discussion of the psychological significance of the
mother revealed that, in the course of individual development, she
holds two fundamentally important but seemingly contradictory
positions. On the one hand we elaborated the evolution and
significance of the mother, charged with the education of the child
and thus necessarily perceived as an authoritarian figure, as a fore­
runner of the super-ego. In the course of that elaboration,
however, it became clear that the mother is also an important and
indeed the original object-choice of the libido:

the persons who are concerned with a child's feeding, care
and protection become his earliest sexual objects, that is to
say in the first instance his mother or a substitute for her.212

The duality revealed in our psychological examination of the
mother is reflected exactly in Arrabal's use of the mother figure.
In Le Grand Cérémonial, for instance, on the one hand Cavanosa's
notion of happiness, or the objective towards which he is progressing
is clearly identified with a previous state of bliss in which his
mother played a fundamental rôle:213

Je sais qu'avec toi j'ai été aussi heureux qu'on peut
l'être. Tu m'as rappelé certaines choses à nous et je
pourrais t'en conter d'autres que tu ignores. Je me
souviens, j'étais jaloux de tout le monde. Lorsque
The trip around the world, which is the symbol of that objective, moreover, was originally envisaged as an undertaking to be carried out in company with his mother. Cavanosa's mother in short is clearly an object of the impulses of his id. As is the case with a number of Arrabal's characters, however, Cavanosa's infantile attempts to realise these aspirations are incompatible with the adult world in which he lives. The representative of that adult world, and of the restriction it imposes, moreover, is once again none other than his mother. It is she who rails against Cavanosa's attempts to reduce the tension created by the strivings of his instinct, firstly with his dolls, and subsequently with the succession of women he finds in the park.

The psychological duality of the mother, who is both the original object choice of the libido and the forerunner of the super-ego is thus reproduced in Le Grand Cérémonial. Cavanosa's mother is both the object of the impulses of his id, and a symbol of the super-ego; she is at once an integral part of the objective sought by Cavanosa and the obstacle to the attainment of that objective. The mother figure (in this play at least) thus appears, as it were, to embody the impossibility of the ego's task, playing contradictory roles on either side of the psychological schema.

We have further discovered, moreover, that in Arrabal's plays a similar position is held by the figure of the lover. The lover, as was demonstrated by our brief examination of "le prince à tete de chien" in Les Images Impossible and of Cylda in La Loi de Dragonne, both of whom were at once objects of the impulses of the instinct of the individual and symbols of the individual's super-ego,
is, like the mother, an embodiment of the impossibility of the situation facing the ego.

Further recollection of the terms of our psychological discussion points out, moreover, that the roots of this impossibility may be traced to the fundamental duality of the instincts. It is indeed precisely because the mother is the object-choice of the libido of the individual that she is also the forerunner of the super-ego. For if an object-choice of the erotic impulses of the instinct, she is the object of the strivings of the impulses of the id as a whole, of the aggressive as well as of the erotic components of the id. She is, in short, an object of hatred as well as of love. It is, moreover, as a result of the individual's attempts to reduce the tension produced by this intolerable ambivalence that the super-ego emerges. According to the process which we have elsewhere outlined in detail, the individual deals with the ambivalent attitude felt towards the object by identifying with that object, thus allowing the latter to be retained as an object of the libido, but also directing the aggression felt towards the object (as a result of its authoritarian function) back on to the self, in consequence of the formulation of the super-ego. We have said, moreover, that in a number of plays the position held by the lover is a result of the displacement of attitudes originally felt towards the mother. Thus in Arrabal's drama the process which, in psychology, revolves around the mother, is centred on both the mother and the lover.

Thus the lover is first and foremost, as the name suggests, an object choice of the impulses of the id and a sine qua non of the reduction of the tensions created by the strivings of those impulses. He or she is seen as an essential factor in the notion of 'happiness' which characterizes the objective towards which the
individual is progressing: Pando will be happy in Tar with Lin; Viloro will attain happiness when he can escape from his present circumstances with Tasla. If she is the object of the libido, however, the lover is also the object of the aggressive instinct, the object of hatred as well as of love. This situation is clearly illustrated, as we have seen, in Pando et Lin where Pando's tender affection for Lin vies with an ever-increasing cruelty which finally causes her death. Where 'love' does not cause the death of the lover (in which case of course the quest of the individual has clearly failed) we may say, in psychological terms, that some measure of reduction of the primary tension caused by the conflict which derives from the duality of the instincts has been achieved. This, however, is a hollow victory. For the reduction is effected through the identification referred to above whereby the lover may, on the one hand, be retained as the object of libido, but whereby the aggression felt towards the lover is directed back on to the self, and the lover becomes also a symbol of the resultant super-ego. The lover, in short, as a result of the duality of the instincts, emerges as a repressive and restrictive figure who reacts with violence against the very process in which (in the guise of object-choice of the impulses of the id) she plays such a fundamental rôle. Such is the substance of, and the explanation of the paradox of the short play entitled Une Orange sur le Pont de Vénus. Throughout this play Goya mistreats Lois, whom he keeps in a cage and subjects to the most horrific of humiliations, which culminate in his branding his name between her breasts with a red hot poker:

Je t'enfermerai pour toujours dans la cage! Jo ne te donnerai rien à manger et je te battrai toutes les nuits pendant des heures. Putain! Putain! Goya la marque au fer rouge (qu'il a retiré du feu) entre les deux seins.
Arrabal stresses, however, that so much violence is no more than an expression of, or at least an inevitable concomitant of, Goya's love for Lois:

Il la regarde longuement et lui dit avec lenteur après une longue pause, avec un amour infini:

Je t'aime.217

Lois, therefore, is the object of the impulses of Goya's id, and the actions of the latter reflect the full duality of those impulses. In contrast to Fando et Lis, however, the play does not end with the death of the lover, but with the alternative though hardly more satisfactory 'solution'. Lois is completely transformed: she adopts the characteristics of, and becomes a symbol of, the super-ego and (significantly in the light of our previous finding that the aggression of the id provides the impetus to the actions of the super-ego) directs against Goya the very violence suffered at his hand.

Both the lover and the mother in Arrabal's plays, then, appear in two distinct and conflicting guises. Each is primarily the object choice of the id, the means by which the tension produced by the strivings of the impulses of the id may be reduced, but each also appears as a symbol of the super-ego, the figure who prevents or punishes the satisfaction of those strivings and who counters any reduction of the tension deriving from the id with an increase of the tension deriving from the super-ego. Each thus embodies in the plays the impossibility of the situation facing the individual. As we have established, however, the appearance of the lover and the mother in these two opposing roles, and thus the impossibility of the situation itself, may be traced back to, and may be seen as a result of, the duality of the instincts. The awareness of this point, moreover, is fundamental to an understanding of the two plays in the first
half\textsuperscript{218} of Arrabal's work in which that impossibility does appear, at least partially, to be overcome, in which the individual does achieve some measure of success in the quest for 'Nirvana'. For that success, illustrated in \textit{Le Grand Cérémonial} and \textit{Le Jardin des Délices}, both of which plays end on a note of qualified optimism, is achieved as a result of the utilisation of violence in a third\textsuperscript{219} context, which may be interpreted psychologically as the expression of rebellion against the super-ego. And that rebellion depends in turn upon what appears, in psychological terms, to be a displacement of one of the opposing attitudes, the conflict between which lies, as we have shown, at the root of the problem facing the individual and outlined above.

The process of rebellion depicted in the plays may best be understood by further reference to Freud's description of the psychological situation which precedes the emergence of the super-ego in the course of individual development. The attitude of the individual towards the mother at this stage is characterised by a mixture of love and hatred which reflects the duality of the instincts. In a lecture entitled \textit{Femininity} Freud makes the following interesting statement with regard to this relationship:

\begin{quote}

even the mildest upbringing cannot avoid using compulsion and introducing restrictions, and any such intervention in the child's liberty must provoke as a reaction an inclination to rebellion and aggressiveness.\textsuperscript{220}
\end{quote}

The psychologist seems to be saying that while the aggression felt towards the parent is essentially motivated by instinct, it can take the specific form of, and find a specific outlet in, the terms of revolt against the authoritarian function of the parent.\textsuperscript{221} Rebellion against the parent is out of the question, however, or apparently so, since the parent is also the object of love, and any
expression of the aggression felt towards the parent involves the individual in the intolerable fear of the loss of love. A measure of rebellion, however, is possible, as a result of displacement. Now we have already encountered the notion of displacement in an earlier context, but Freud makes it clear that displacement does not always have the effect of compounding the difficulties faced by the ego and reinforcing the tension which assails it, but may equally be used to reduce that tension. Speaking precisely of the ambivalent emotional attitudes prevalent in the early stages of the child’s development, Freud states:

If eventually a conflict breaks out between the two, it is often settled by the child making a change of object and displacing one of the ambivalent emotions on to a substitute. A reduction of the tension caused by the opposition of love and hatred is effected, in other words, by transferring one or other of those emotions from the parent to a substitute, rather than, as in our previous example, transferring the whole affect in its full ambivalence. Indeed the former course, the transfer of love to a substitute object, is stated by Flügel to be a prerequisite for, or an essential factor in, the normal development of the individual:

In all the more favourable cases of development, however, it is probable that even from the first the conflict between the primitive elements of love and hate and the newly unfolding ethical tendencies results to a great extent in the displacement and gradual sublimation of the former, and not merely in their repression or return to a latent state. The process of displacement here takes the form of a dissociation of the more erotic aspects of the child’s affection from the loved parent, these aspects being thus set free for bestowal upon other persons.

We have clearly established that the impossibility of the situation confronting the individual in Arrabal’s plays has its roots in the duality of the instincts. And just as rebellion seems impossible
in the psychological situation outlined in the first part of the previous paragraph because it faces the individual with the unbearable possibility of the loss of love (since the object of any possible rebellion is also the object of love) so, in the plays, rebellion against the super-ego seems to be precluded for the individual precisely because the symbol of the super-ego is also the object of love, and thus an indispensable factor in the objective he is pursuing. There is a clear analogy to be drawn, moreover, not only between these two situations but equally between the psychological solution outlined in the second part of the previous paragraph and the solution tentatively worked out by the individual in the two plays here under consideration. For in each of these plays violence is used as an expression of rebellion, of rebellion consequent, moreover, to the displacement of either the erotic or the aggressive component of the id on to a substitute object.

We have already insisted upon the double rôle played by Cavanosa's mother in Le Grand Cérémonial: she is at once a symbol of his happiness, of the objective he is pursuing, and the power that forbids that happiness and prevents that pursuit. The hatred engendered in Cavanosa by the second of these rôles is fully recognised by the mother:

LA MERE: N'est-il pas vrai que tu voulais me tuer?
CAVANOSA: (comme en rêve) Oui, je le désire de toute mon âme.

and yet, initially, it can find no concrete expression precisely because the mother occupies the first rôle as well. Thus, even when his mother openly invites him to kill her, Cavanosa cannot and does not act:

LA MERE: avec frénésie! Frappe! Frappe! Frappe! Frappe!

La mère présente son dos «au sacrifice». Il lève encore le couteau mais n'ose pas frapper.
LA MERE: avec frénésie: Vas-y. Vas-y! Lâche, tue-moi une bonne fois, lâche!

De nouveau il tente de le faire, mais n'ose pas. La mère se laisse tomber, haletante, dans un fauteuil au bord de la crise de nerfs.

The nearest Cavanosa can come to an expression of the hatred he feels for his mother and to a demonstration of the rebellion directed against her authoritarian domination is to pretend, pathetically, that he has killed her. A way out of the situation is provided, however, first by his dolls and subsequently by Sil, both of which provide convenient substitute objects for the aggression felt towards his mother. Cavanosa brutally mutilates his dolls and the fact that this action represents a displacement remains in no doubt in the light of the following conversation:

CAVANOSA: Elles sont à moi, ces poupées.

LA MERE: Et tu as oublié aussi que tu gardes enchaînée celle-ci.
(Elle la montre)

CAVANOSA: Non.

LA MERE: Quel crime a-t-elle commis? Elle n'en a commis aucun. Tu veux seulement la voir souffrir comme tu souffrais.

CAVANOSA: Parce que toi, tu me torturais.

LA MERE: Mais je te torturais pour ton bien! Et parce que je t'aimais!

CAVANOSA: Elle aussi, je l'aimais.

LA MERE: Et moi aussi tu m'aimais n'est-ce pas?

CAVANOSA: Oui.

LA MERE: Et pourtant, tu ne m'as jamais enchaînée, ni battue.

CAVANOSA: Je n'ai pas osé.

LA MERE: Avec elle, tu as osé.

Similarly Cavanosa cruelly mistreats Sil, and Arrabal makes it equally clear that this too is a displacement of the aggression originally directed at his mother:

The last of these questions is only too easy to answer - for like the dolls, Sil is a substitute object upon which the hatred Cavanosa feels for his mother may be worked out, through which Cavanosa’s rebellion against the domination of his mother may be affected.

Through the displacement of aggression in these relationships, moreover, Cavanosa does appear to achieve a reduction in the tension which derives from the duality of his instincts. This is expressed in the scene in which Cavanosa ‘offers’ Sil (the replacement object of his aggression) to his mother (the object of his libido), a gesture which we may interpret psychologically as at least a provisional reconciliation between the opposing forces of love and hate. This in turn facilitates the guarded optimism of the final scene of the play, where the vision of ‘Nirvana’, in which his mother was originally a central feature:

tu disais que lorsque tu serais grand, tu m’emmènerais dans une voiture d’enfant pour que je ne me fatigue pas, et que tu me ferais parcourir le monde 228

is realised, though his mother is replaced by a further substitute in the person of Lys. Arrabal makes it quite clear, moreover, that Cavanosa’s objective is able to be realised in this scene precisely because the contradictions which have previously precluded its realisation have been resolved. For aggression is no longer in conflict with libido, but rather complements it; the mixture of violence and eroticism is no longer the cause of tension, but a totally acceptable expression of love:

CAVAÑOSA: Je vous tuerai, vous.

LYS: Pourquoi?
CAVANOSA: Par amour.

LYS: Alors, ce serait très beau.\footnote{229}

The individual in \textit{Le Grand Cerémonial} thus achieves some form of rebellion against a figure of authority by directing aggression from its original object, who is also the object of love, and on to a substitute. \textit{Le Jardin des Délices} also appears to depict the notion of rebellion through the use of violence, but in this instance as a result of the displacement of love rather than aggression, i.e. of the other component of the conflict which derives from the duality of the instincts. Interpretation of this play is complicated by the two time levels involved: Arrabal supplements his presentation of Lais' present circumstances with flashback scenes depicting her early youth. From the latter, however, we learn that Lais had neither father nor mother. The first object choice of her libido was not therefore her parents, but Miharca, a companion in the convent where she was brought up, as is confirmed by the overtly erotic terms of their relationship:

\begin{quote}
Miharca retrousse ses jupes et montre son derrière
\end{quote}

\textit{Miharca: Si tu m'aimes tant, baise mon cul.}\footnote{230}

The complementary function normally fulfilled by the parents, i.e. that of affording care, protection and education to the individual, is carried out, meanwhile by the nuns. As is normally the case with parents, moreover, the fulfilment of this function brings with it a restriction of the liberty of the individual, as is specifically illustrated in the scene where Lais is put in solitary confinement 'to teach her a lesson'. Significantly though, from the point of view of the interpretation here developed, Miharca plays the part of a nun in a number of the flashback scenes: it is in this guise, indeed that she rails at Lais' ingratitude:
Miharca, in other words, plays both parental roles: she is in short (as much as Cavanosa's mother in the previous example) both an object of love, being the object choice of Lais' libido, and an object of hate, being also (when a nun) a repressive figure of authority, a symbol of the super-ego.

Lais' attitude to Miharca is, then, fundamentally ambivalent. Accordingly, as in the previous example, one of the two components of that attitude is transferred to a substitute. In this case, however, it is the erotic component which is displaced on to Téloc, whom Lais meets when she temporarily deserts the school for a walk in the country. Téloc is thus Miharca's replacement, as is indicated by the fact that, when Lais takes Miharca to meet Téloc, the latter appears only after Miharca has left. As a replacement for Miharca, moreover, Téloc is the object of Lais' libido, as is confirmed by her adoption of the characteristic, masochistic position identified previously.

The effects of this displacement, however, are not instantaneous. Even after the separation of the erotic and aggressive components of her instinct, Lais' id is subject to repression, in the form of sublimation. For Lais has become an actress and her present situation appears clearly to reflect a sublimation of the instinctual impulses of which Miharca and Téloc were formerly the objects. She now lives cut off from the world in the company of the semi-human, inarticulate Téloc, a symbol of her repressed desires. Téloc and Miharca, meanwhile, have lived together in a relationship the terms of which reflect exactly their respective roles as representatives of the id and super-ego: just as the function of the super-ego is to repress the impulses of the
lo? id, so Téloc avows that his supernatural abilities have been wrested from him as a result of Miharca's domination:

Tu te souviens comme j'étais capable d'accomplir toutes sortes de merveilles; eh bien! aujourd'hui elle m'a privé de presque toutes mes facultés.234

The reappearance of Téloc and 'Miharca in Lais' life signifies the rekindling of the conflict which led to the displacement of love on to Téloc. Because of that displacement, because Miharca is no longer the object of Lais' love, however, Lais is now free to revolt against the domination of the super-ego.235 It is precisely such a rebellion which we see acted out at the end of the play. And significantly her revolt is brought to a successful conclusion as a result of the re-mobilisation of the instinctual energies that have been subjected to repression; for it is Zénon who finally vanquishes Miharca. The result of the rebellion, moreover, is the attainment of 'a state of Nirvana', symbolised by Téloc's trumpet playing, and characterised by the absence of tension deriving either from the super-ego (the police clear Lais of all guilt relating to the death of Miharca) or from the id (Zénon's desires are satisfied and he is united with Lais in the giant egg).

Le Grand Cérémonial and Le Jardin des Délices are primarily interesting as examples of Arrabal's use of violence in a third psychological context, that of rebellion. It should be noted, however, that even in these plays the apparent optimism expressed is by no means unequivocal. In Le Jardin des Délices the sense of hope conveyed by Zénon's ability, at the end of the play, to speak normally, is attenuated by the fact that it costs Lais her own ability to articulate; she lapses into the mode of speech which has previously characterised Zénon. A similar question
mark is raised against the 'happy end' of *Le Grand Cérémonial* by the fact that even as Cavanosa and Lys depart joyfully on their trip around the world the familiar and foreboding sound of a police siren is heard in the background. What optimism there is expressed by the endings to these two plays is thus a guarded optimism which seems to be lacking in complete conviction. Despite the apparent success of rebellion in *Le Grand Cérémonial* and *Le Jardin des Délices*, therefore, the overriding impression left by Arrabal's plays is that of the insurmountable impossibility of the task, which consistently ends in tragedy, either (in psychological terms) with the definitive repression of the id (as in *Le Tricycle*) or more frequently, as we have seen, with the death of the ego at the hands of a merciless super-ego (*Le Labyrinthe*, *Le Cimetière des Voitures*, *La Bicyclette du Condamné* etc.).
The interpretation of the notion of violence in Arrabal's drama which we have here formulated seems clearly to counter the more harsh and possibly less carefully considered accusations which were raised by commentators against the playwright's work, particularly in the late sixties. We have shown that Arrabal uses violence not indiscriminately and to shock, as has been suggested, but coherently and consistently in the creation of a composite picture of the psyche of the individual, the terms of which closely reflect the findings as to the nature and structure of personality which emerge from the psychological writings of Freud. Violence is used in Arrabal's plays to express the workings of the psychological concepts of id and super-ego (and, in the last two plays considered, of rebellion): the opposition which lies at the heart of the author's oeuvre reflects the conflicting demands made upon the ego, and the torment of the individual in the plays suggests the plight of that ego in its attempts to meet the claims of its two relentless and ruthless subconscious masters.

Such an interpretation, however, brings us face to face with a second more carefully considered and thus more serious category of criticism which has been levelled at Arrabal's work. In *The Theatre of the Absurd* Esselin, for instance, writes of Arrabal's plays:

> All these are wild and extravagant inventions, full of obsessive cruelties ... they lack a general human concern. These inventions serve rather the compulsion rituals of a private neurosis.

In a similar vein, Suicharnaud, though politely conceding that "Arrabal shows great promise", claims that:

> he fails...to transfigure unhappiness and personal fantasies into contemporary and universal situations.
Both critics thus put forward the view, which has been echoed by others, that Arrabal's work derives too closely from the terms of his personal experience to be generally accessible or universally significant. The interpretation which we have given above, moreover, does little to gainsay such an affirmation; indeed it appears rather to lend weight to the view put forward by Guicharneaud and Baslin. Not only have we viewed violence as a means of individual self-expression, as the expression of forces, in other words, which, though not necessarily exclusive to the author himself, remain essentially personal, but, far more significantly in the light of the claims of Guicharneaud and Baslin, we have specifically based our interpretation upon an indication of the impetus provided to Arrabal's creative writing by an unusually rich biography. From the outset we have suggested that a consideration of the personal concerns of the author provides the key to an understanding of his plays. Our interpretation indeed has evolved out of an identification of the personal concerns of Arrabal's life and depends upon the contention that these determine the nature of the fundamental situation depicted in his drama.

In what follows, however, it is our aim to provide a refutation of this second important category of criticism. The second part of our thesis indeed comprises an attempt to counter the charges put forward by Baslin and Guicharneaud by demonstrating that violence in Arrabal's drama may be viewed not only as the expression of the personal subconscious, but in addition, and at the same time, as the expression of a force which transcends individual and personal concerns, which possesses universal significance and relevance, and which, most significantly since we are dealing in the field of drama, is made generally accessible by the terms of its
expression. While we propose an alternative interpretation based, in effect, upon a redefinition of the concept of violence, it should be stressed that this does not constitute a retraction of the proposals already made, the validity of which remains, in our opinion, certain, but rather an expansion of those proposals, justified as we shall see by a further parallel which may be drawn between Freud and Arrabal.

As we have repeatedly stressed, Freud was primarily concerned to construct a picture of the psyche of the individual. In what has gone before we have expounded in detail the observations upon which that picture was based, and indeed those observations in turn have provided the basis of the interpretation of Arrabal's work which we have here formulated. Central to Freud's schema, as we have noted, was the notion that the incessant striving for pleasure (according to the Pleasure Principle) or, in his later writings the incessant striving for a reduction of tension (according to the Nirvana principle) which motivates the instinctual behaviour of the individual is inhibited and interrupted by the restrictive demands both of reality and more significantly of the super-ego, which is thus an active source of displeasure (or of tension) in the individual.

In Civilization and its Discontents, however, Freud put forward the notion that a similar source of displeasure on a collective level was the set of rules which man has made for himself, and to which, with what Freud suggests is a misplaced sense of achievement, he has proudly given the name civilization. This observation led Freud to posit and to discuss at some length the similarity between the educative process of the individual and that of mankind as a whole.
When ... we look at the relation between the process of human civilization and the developmental or educative process of individual human beings, we shall conclude without much hesitation that the two are very similar in nature, if not the very same process applied to different kinds of object. 242

For in the history of mankind civilization has a function exactly similar to that of the super-ego in the history of the individual: both are forces of repression and restriction and both reign by instilling guilt:

the price we pay for our advance in civilization is a loss of happiness through the heightening of the sense of guilt 243 and by inhibiting aggression, the most dangerous threat to the stability of civilization:

Civilization has to use its utmost efforts in order to set limits to man's aggressive instincts.

The parallel drawn between the role of the super-ego in the development of the individual and that of civilization in the development of mankind is supported, in the light of this last assertion, by a similar parallel which Freud draws between the id of the individual and mankind's desire for liberty and freedom. The super-ego is the agency which creates displeasure for the individual through repression, civilization is the agency which creates displeasure for mankind through repression. In the individual it is the instinct (or id) which is repressed by the super-ego; for mankind civilization denotes an inhibition of liberty. And just as in the course of individual development the existence of the id preceded the erection of the super-ego, so in the course of the development of mankind, the freedom of man was an original state which preceded the emergence of civilization:

The liberty of the individual is no gift of civilization. It was greatest before there was any civilization... The development of civilization imposes restrictions upon it... what makes itself felt in a human community as desire for freedom... may spring from the remains of their original personality which is still untamed by civilization. 245
In Civilization and its Discontents we may perceive an attempt by Freud to expand the knowledge of the individual gained through observation into a universally valid philosophy of mankind. The terms of that expansion suggest, moreover, that those factors in Arrabal's drama which we have hitherto viewed as symbols of the personal concept of the super-ego may also be viewed as symbols of the universal concept of civilization. Similarly, if we accept Freud's contentions, what we have previously seen as an expression of the id may equally be viewed as what Freud calls the 'liberty' which preceded civilization and was restricted by civilization.

There is, moreover, every justification for proceeding along precisely these lines. For just as Freud expanded his observations of the psyche of the individual into a philosophy of mankind, so Arrabal expanded his awareness of the concerns which emerged from his individual and personal biography into a philosophy. As we have previously stated, one of the most fecund periods of Arrabal's career was marked and stimulated by his preoccupation with 'panique' philosophy and by his involvement, together with Jodorowsky, Sternberg and Topor in the 'movement panique'. There is, moreover, a marked resemblance, as we shall see, between the 'panique' notions propounded by Arrabal et al. during this period, and the ideas adumbrated by Freud in Civilization and its Discontents. For both revolve around the central notion of civilization as a repressive and restrictive force.

While the first part of our thesis has demonstrated the coherence of Arrabal's use of violence by viewing his work as the product of the stimulus provided by a biography, the second part will show the universal validity of the theme by viewing his work as the product of the stimulus provided by a philosophy. It will be
shown that violence may be viewed as having not only personal but collective significance. From the second and complementary interpretation which follows, it will become evident that Arrabal's plays are the fruit not merely of a private neurosis, but of a universal condition, that they present not only the conflicts which assailed one man but also those which assail mankind.
NOTES TO PART ONE

All references to Arrabal's plays in this thesis are to the edition published by Christian Bourgois (Paris). Dates in square brackets refer to the composition of plays. The following plays, however, were originally published by Juillard:


Le Lai de Barabas (under the original title of Le Couronnement, see Note 76 to Part 1 of this thesis), Le Grand Cerémonial, Concert dans un Ouf, Ceremonie pour un Noir Assassiné in Théâtre 3-4, Juillard, Paris 1962.

All entries under FREUD, Sigmund refer to the Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Freud (24 Volumes, abbreviated as S.E), translated from the German under the general editorship of James Strachey, in collaboration with Anna Freud and assisted by Alix Strachey and Alan Tyson, published by the Hogarth Press and The Institute of Psychoanalysis, London. Dates of composition given in square brackets. Dates of publication of S.E, given in the Bibliography (pp.385-386).


2 "Je crois avoir un tort pour un écrivain : celui de posséder une biographie riche en phénomènes bizarres, en événements marquants", in SCHIFRES, Alain, op.cit., p.111.

3 SCHIFRES, Alain op.cit., p.113.


5 SCHIFRES, Alain op.cit., p.113.

6 RAYMOND-MUNESCHAU, Françoise; loc.cit.

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<td>SCHIFRES, Alain</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>ARRABAL, Fernando</td>
<td>Baal Babylone, pp. 49-50.</td>
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Mercedes figures in *Baal Babylone* as Aunt Clara, and the young child's enforced involvement in the production of erotic pleasure for his aunt is repeatedly alluded to in the novel. See for instance pp. 72-3:

Elle m'appelait et j'allais dans sa chambre. Avant, c'était elle qui venait dans la mienne, puis c'est moi qui suis allé dans la sienne. Dans sa chambre des images qui représentaient les stations du calvaire étaient fixées au mur. Mais nous ne récitions plus les prières du matin et elle ne me lavait plus la figure avec le gant de crin. Tante Clara m'attendait, nue, à plat ventre sous les draps blancs...

and the more explicit descriptions on pp. 63/4:

Je devais frapper tante Clara très fort et elle ne se plaignait pas. On n'entendait que son halètement... Elle se mettait à genoux et se cachait les yeux de ses mains... Tante Clara, ensuite, partait dans sa chambre sans m'avoir lavé la figure ni avoir récité avec moi les prières du matin...

and p.126:

Tante Clara m'a frappé avec la ceinture. Pour qu'on ne nous entende pas, je n'ai pas crié. Puis elle les a pris tous les deux dans ses mains froides. Je lui ai dit que ça non. Tante Clara a dit que le Christ n'avait pas hésité à souffrir pour nous sauver. Elle me les a serrés petit à petit. Alors, j'ai crié. Tante Clara respirait comme lorsque je la fouettais.

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<td>13</td>
<td>ARRABAL, Fernando</td>
<td>Baal Babylone, p.133.</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>ARRABAL, Fernando</td>
<td>Lettre au Général Franco, Collection 10/18 Union Générale d'Éditions, Paris 1972, p.34.</td>
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<td>cf. also ibid., p.30;</td>
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<td>&quot;Je n'étais qu'un enfant témoin d'un brasier et d'une frénésie de mort que je ne pouvais analyser et qui s'imprimait dans ma chair et dans mon òmo comme un fer rouge.&quot;</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>cf. SCHIFRES, Alain</td>
<td>op. cit., p.72;</td>
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|     |          | "Chez elle le mélange du sexe et de la religion s'est réalisé dans toute sa «pureté», hors de toute connaissance."

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<td>16</td>
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<td>The incident is recorded in <em>Baal Babylone</em>, pp.25-6.</td>
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19. An account of these children's groups is given in *Lettre au Général Franco*, pp.37-9.

20. Arrabal took great pride in his duties as an altar-boy, for example, as is evident from *Baal Babylon*, pp.63-9.


22. In 1949 Arrabal returned to Burgos in an attempt to gather information which would help him piece together the history of his father.

23. SCHIFRES, Alain, op.cit., p.12.

24. SCHIFRES, Alain, op.cit., p.16.

25. Ibid., p.28.

26. He still returned home for holidays, however.

27. Once again Arrabal fell under the jurisdiction of the Escolapián order, responsible for the direction of the college in Toulouse in which his apprenticeship was carried out.


29. He had been sent to Valencia by the paper company.

30. At school, of course, the reading material available was closely monitored and heavily censored, as Arrabal explains in *Schifres*, Alain, op.cit., p.20.

31. See SCHIFRES, Alain, op.cit., pp.31-3.


"Sans un sou il arrive à se faufiler dans les théâtres qu'il fréquente assidûment. 'En Espagne il existe quelque chose que l'on appelle la claque. Vous assistez à la première sans payer, mais en ayant l'obligation d'applaudir.' A côté des morceaux traditionnels... Il a l'occasion de voir, montés par des troupes étudiantes, des pièces intéressantes. On commence à parler de Brecht et des auteurs modernes."
"On est très bien en sana, on peut lire, écrire... Ce séjour m'a été très utile. Ma vie est un vrai conte de fées. Si un jour je n'ai plus de quoi manger, je redéviendrai tuberculeux, j'irai dans un sana. Je serai bien. Mon avenir est assuré."

He played the title rôle in a rare production of Kafka's The Garden of the Tamb.

Arrabal, Coll. Théâtre de tous les temps Seheras. Paris 1970, p. 71:
"L'humour préside à la naissance du mouvement panique. Les circonstances de sa formation n'ont pas une simple valeur anecdotique. La théorie de la confusion est née au Café de la Paix, à Paris. Le hasard, déjà, y avait réuni Arrabal, Topor, Sternberg, Jodorowsky en un colloque mi-sérieux, mi-farceur."

This association is examined in Section 3 of Part II of this thesis.

RAYMOND-MUNESCÜAU, Françoise: op.cit., p.25.

Arrabal's defence included the contention that he had written not 'la patria', but 'la Patra', short for Cleopatra, the name of his cat.

Arrabal gives a detailed description of his arrest, imprisonment, and trial in SCHIFRES, Alain: Entretiens avec Arrabal, pp.45-54.


SCHIFRES, Alain Entretiens avec Arrabal, pp.48-9.


Quoted by RAYMOND-MUNESCÜAU, Françoise: op.cit., p.22-3.

While Arrabal himself continues to live in Paris, his work, at least, has come out of exile. Since the death of Franco Arrabal's plays have been freely staged in Madrid and elsewhere in Spain. See the article entitled "L'Autre joue d'Arrabal" by Ernesto Gonzales PERMEJO in Politique Hebdo, no.258, 21-27 February 1977, pp.37-39.


ibid., p.66.

SCHIFRES, Alain Entretiens avec Arrabal, p.29.


ibid., p.50.


ibid., p.21.

i.e. Paol Babylone and Lettre au Général Franco.

SCHIFRES, Alain Entretiens avec Arrabal, p.15.
66. It is interesting to note that the ambivalence felt by Arrabal for his mother, for religion and for Spain persisted even after the author had ostensibly made a deliberate choice of the latter course of action, by removing himself to Paris. It emerges very clearly from Baal Babylone, for instance, that despite everything Arrabal remained instinctively drawn to his mother. Though he has rejected the type of organised religion which marked his childhood, Arrabal is quoted by Charles Marowitz in an article entitled "Theater of Panic" (New York Times Magazine, December 3rd 1972, pp.40 ff) as saying:

"Although I am considered to be very revolutionary, people ignore the fact that I believe in God - even though I admit I find the face of religion horrible. Nevertheless in my feelings I am still very religious - by which I mean that I am linked to God."

Similarly, though resident in France since 1955, Arrabal has steadfastly refused to contemplate giving up his Spanish nationality. While Arrabal has apparently turned his back on each of the three major influences of his youth, therefore, it is clear that the author's feelings are far less unambiguous than his actions. To a certain extent, at least, the uncertainty of each of these factors has followed him in his exile. Despite Arrabal's conscious rejection of his mother, of religion and of his homeland, each continues to exert a significant hold over him. With respect to the second of these influences, moreover, it is interesting to find an identical 'dualism' of attitude towards religion reflected in the writings of both Ionesco and Genet.

67. ARRABAL, Fernando

68. She also recalls the person of Aunt Mercedes, or the Aunt Clara of Baal Babylone in this context.

69. ARRABAL, Fernando

70. ARRABAL, Fernando
71 Simpson died during the Tour de France in 1967 as a result of drug abuse. According to colleagues he had been persuaded to take stimulants largely against his will. A law was promulgated in France in 1966 forbidding the use of stimulants and other drugs in pursuit of better achievements in sport.

72 ARABAL, Fernando Jeunes Barbares d'aujourd'hui, p.11.

73 ibid., p.14.

74 The focal point of a large proportion of Arrabal's plays is the actions and concerns of a single central character, such as Étienne in Le Labyrinthe, Viloro in La Bicyclette du Condamné, Cavanosa in Le Grand Ceremonial, etc. In other plays, however, the same central role is played by a pair (Cérémonie pour un Noir Assassiné) or group of characters (Le Tricycle, Jeunes Barbares d'aujourd'hui) assailed as we shall see by problems exactly similar to those which normally confront the single individual. In what follows, therefore, the term 'individual' when applied to Arrabal's plays, is used to denote not only a single central character, but also a central pair or group of characters, as appropriate.


76 ARABAL, Fernando Le Lei de Parabbas [1964] in Théâtre IV, Christian Bourgois, Paris 1969, pp.21-166. When originally published in Théâtre 3-4, Editions Juillard, Paris 1965, this play bore the title Le Couronnement. The play was slightly altered and the new title adopted when it was reprinted in the series published by Bourgois in 1969. All references in this thesis are to the Bourgois edition but we have retained the original date of composition (1964) since the play clearly reflects the stage of development reached by the author at the time of its original composition (rather than that reached at the time of its subsequent revision).


80 i.e. the depiction of authority in the plays reflects the ambiguity and harshness of the authoritarian/protective figures in Arrabal's own life, as perceived by the author. The presentation of the behaviour of the individual in the plays similarly reflects the bewilderment and perplexity engendered in the author by the figures of authority which dominated his life, as well as the author's naive subjective assessment of his own behaviour measured against the (objectively unreasonable) standards dictated by those figures.

81 DAUTVYLER, Jean Jacques op. cit., p.27.

82 ibid.
Certain plays may of course be individually interpreted along these lines, but we are here concerned to indicate the overall coherence of the whole of Arrabal's work.

ARRABAL, Fernando
Le Ciel et la Merde, p.37
ibid., p.91

ARRABAL, Fernando
Fondo et Líne (1956) in Théâtre I, pp.61-122.

GILDE, Bernard

ARRABAL, Fernando

WATSON, J.P.
See also WATSON, J.P. Behaviorism Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago 1958.

DOLLARD, J., MILLER, N.F., MURDER, O.F., DOBB, L.W., and SEARS, R.R.

cf. MANNONI, Octave

"Anglo-Saxon analysts, influenced by a biological philosophy founded on the struggle for survival, have found it quite natural to make aggression a reaction to frustration."

DOLLARD et al.
op. cit., p.1

FROMM, Erich

ARCHER, John

ARRABAL, Fernando
Oraison (1957) in Théâtre I, pp.19-34.
The views expressed by Lorenz in *On Aggression* aroused considerable discussion, an interesting side-effect of which was a resurgence of interest in, and a reconsideration of the significance of, Freud's own instinctivist theories of aggression, which had received but scant attention from many of his followers for so long after their formulation. For criticism of Lorenz's views see the important collection of essays entitled *Man and Aggression*, ed. K.F.A. Montagu, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1966, and also the section on Lorenz in Fromm, Erich, op.cit., pp. 44-61, where Fromm questions the validity of Lorenz's tendency to make pronouncements on human behaviour on the basis of his observation of animals. For a study of aggression which defends Lorenz's views, on the other hand, see Storr, Anthony, *Human Aggression*, Pelican Books, Harmondsworth 1970.

The evolution of Freud's theory of aggression is discussed in Fromm, Erich, op.cit., pp. 301 et seq. and summarized by James Strachey in the editor's introduction to *Civilization and its Discontents* in Freud, Sigmund, S.E. Vol. XXI, pp. 61-3.

Until the publication of *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* in 1920, Freud's view of aggression seems to have been vague and confused. He seems indeed to have pursued two separate lines of thought simultaneously, suggesting in *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (1905), for instance, on the one hand, that aggression was a component factor of the sexual instinct, and on the other hand, later in the same paper, that aggression arose from a source which was in fact independent of sexuality. Though Freud rejected the latter hypothesis in *Analysis of a Five year old Boy* (1900), both notions again appear in the same paper when *Instincts and their Vicissitudes* is published in 1915.

The possibility of a Freudian influence on the composition of Pique Éclat en Carabanne, Le Tricycle, Fondo et Líir, Cérémonie pour un Noir Assassiné, Les Deux Bourreaux, Le Labyrinthe, Traison (and effectively also of *Le Cimetiére des Voitures*, which Arrabal wrote immediately after leaving Bouffemont) can be discounted therefore.

100 i.e. after the composition of Orchestration Théátrale, Les Amours Immémorial, Concert dans un Oeuf, Guernica, La Bicyclette du Condé and La Communion Solennelle (in addition to the plays composed before leaving Bouffemont and listed above.) Subsequently, of course, Freud actually 'appears' in Arrabal's drama as a character in the 1971 play *Le Grande Revue du XXème Siécle* (in Théátre IX, pp. 97-180).

101 Freud, Sigmund *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920) in S.E. Vol. VIII, pp. 1-64.

102 Freud, Sigmund *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930) in S.E. Vol. XVI, pp. 57-145.

103 *ibid.*, p. 102.
104 The area of the mental apparatus, part conscious and part unconscious, which acts as an intermediary between internal stimuli and the external world. Because it includes all that is conscious it is the only part of the entire psychic structure with which another human being can make contact. An examination of Freud's use of the term is made by James STRACHEY in the editor's introduction to The Ego and the Id (1923) S.E. Vol. IX, pp.3-11. As Robert FISCHER points out in Basic Theory of Psychoanalysis, Schocken Books, New York 1964, p.169, however, the ego is essentially a teleological concept, defined by Freud by reference to its function, description of which is given below.

105 Freud effectively suggested the same process in different words in his formulation of the Constancy Principle, which stated that Man's behaviour was directed at the achievement of a state of minimum possible tension. An awareness of the Constancy Principle, in turn, is necessary to an understanding of the later Nirvana Principle, which is discussed on pp. 88-9.

"the normal human being may change the speed, the manner, the frequency or the object of his gratifications as he grows up. These changes are greatly influenced by the ego, usually in accordance with the Reality Principle. He learns that certain ways of getting satisfaction often lead to greater dissatisfaction in the long run, so he tries to be more sensible about it."

107 Repression: pushing something into the unconscious, or a flight from awareness of instinctual impulses. See also, however, note 139.


110 cf. MANNONI, Octave op.cit., p.134.
"Now the ego became an "object" an image, a vestige of past identifications; the ego of narcissism could not coincide with the ego of the inhibition of drives and of the control of motility ... [Freud] presented an aspect of the ego which was completely unexpected and confusing for the analysts of the period." (emphasis in original).


112 FROMM, Erich op.cit., p.600.
Freud describes his own grandson's persistent re-enactment of the departure of his mother, for instance, in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* S.E.Vol.XIII, p.14-16.

FREUD, Sigmund

*Beyond the Pleasure Principle* S.E.Vol.XIII, p.20.

ibid., p.36.

FREUD, Sigmund

*An Autobiographical Study* S.E.Vol.XV, p.57.

FREUD, Sigmund


ibid., p.163.

Some obscurity surrounds the relationship, in Freud's writing, between the death instinct and aggression. In some instances he appears to view aggression and the death instinct as synonymous. Elsewhere, as here, however, aggression seems to hold a secondary position being the direction outwards of a part of the death instinct, the remainder of which continues to operate within the personality as primary masochism. Freud fails to explain, however, either how the death instinct is harnessed and directed outwards in the form of aggression or indeed why it should be that a portion of the death instinct escapes this process.

FREUD, Sigmund

*Civilization and its Discontents* S.E.Vol.XV, p.113.

ARRABAL, Fernando

*Le Grand Ceremonial*, p.34.

"Topicality is the theory which distinguishes the parts of the psychical apparatus and permits them to be represented as if in space, without that representation having any relation to a real anatomical disposition."

MANNHEIM, Octave

op.cit., p.152.

FREUD, Sigmund

*The Pro and the Id* S.E.Vol.XIX, pp.1-63.

FREUD, Sigmund


cf. BERNE, Eric

"Thus the Pro is the 'organ of mastery'. The energy for this function is obtained from part of the libido and mortido energy which is gradually split off in infancy and becomes separated from, and actually in many ways an opponent of, the primitive libido and mortido energy."

FREUD, Sigmund

*The Question of Lay Analysis* S.E.Vol.XX, p.201.
The ego develops from the instincts by controlling them... we might say that the ego stands for reason and good sense while the id stands for the untamed passions. 

Ibid., p. 77:  
"The ego must on the whole carry out the id's intentions: it fulfills its task by finding out the circumstances in which these intentions can best be achieved."
adequately how the two fit together (and such clarification in this instance is essential). He does not, in other words succeed in elucidating the complex relationships whose evidence is implied by his attempt on the one hand to maintain the Eros/Thanatos conflict as the cause of repression while at the same time reinstating the ego (which acts upon the id) as the agent of repression. Such attempts as these are to deal with these complexities, indeed, only serve to reinforce the suspicion that, in his desire to fit new wine into old bottles, Freud has, in some measure at least, sacrificed accuracy and clear thinking for the sake of neatness:

"Towards the two classes of instincts [the libido and the death drives] the ego's attitude is not impartial. Through its work of identification and sublimation it gives the death instincts in the id assistance in gaining control over the libido, but in so doing it runs the risk of becoming the object of the death instincts and of itself perishing. In order to be able to help in this way it has had itself to become filled with libido; it thus itself becomes the representative of Eros...."

FREUD, Sigmund: The Eros and the Id. S.E.Vol.XIX. p.56.

130 Or, more precisely, by an alloy of the two component instincts of the id.


132 For the distinction indicated by the two parallel courses of action in the play is, in psychological terms, the distinction between the behaviour of the ego (the preparation for communion) and that of the id (actions of the necrophile). To our central assertion that the violence of the individual in Arrabal's plays may be seen as an expression of the id, should thus be added at this point the complementary proposition, which, as we shall see is equally important in the formulation of an overall interpretation of the author's work, namely that the non-violent individual in Arrabal's work may be taken to represent the ego, or more precisely that the behaviour of the individual when not violent represents the performance of the ego.

133 ARRABAL, Fernando Les Amours Impossibles [1957] in Théâtre V (Théâtre Panique) op.29-50.

134 ibid., p.31.

135 ibid., p.34.


137 ibid., p.135.

The Defence Mechanisms dealt with in this paper were sublimation, introjection, reversal and repression. Freud thus seems to imply that repression, which he here defines as "turning something away and keeping it at a distance, from the conscious" (p.147) is a separate type of defence mechanism from which sublimation, etc. may be distinguished. This, however, rather misconstrues the position of repression in the catalogue of the ego's defences.

For, while it is true that repression may operate in isolation, it is a universal mechanism (as is apparent from Freud's other writings on the subject) which is present in the operation of all other defence mechanisms. Sublimation, for example, involves repression (plus an additional process); the object of the instinctual impulse is banished to the subconscious and additionally replaced in the conscious mind by an alternative. Repression therefore has a far more widespread significance than one might rather from Instincts and their Vicissitudes. It is moreover in this more general sense i.e. as a defence mechanism and as the condition sine qua non of the operation of all other defence mechanisms that the term repression is used in the present thesis.


140 FREUD, Sigmund
Instincts and their Vicissitudes

141 FREUD, Sigmund
The Economic Problem of Masochism

Freud here further complicates the issue referred to in note 119, without providing sufficient elucidation or justification of his assertions. The death instinct is first directed upon the self, then directed in part outwards by the libido as aggression, leaving another portion operative in the interior (primary masochism). We now find that the first portion i.e. that which has been directed outwards can "in certain circumstances" (but it is not clear what these circumstances are) be re-directed inwards where it constitutes secondary masochism.

142 ARRABAL, Fernando
Le Jardin des Délices, p.89.

143 ARRABAL, Fernando
Le Ciel et la Merde, p.31

144 ARRABAL, Fernando
La Jeunesse Illustrée /1966/ in Théâtre V (Théâtre Panique), pp.47-54.
"We should rather be inclined to connect the simultaneous presence of these opposites [sadism and masochism] with the opposing masculinity and femininity which are combined in bi-sexuality - a contrast which often has to be replaced in psychoanalysis by that between activity and passivity."

...the child's early conative tendencies are able, to a relatively large extent, to work themselves out without any serious opposition, hindrance or modification caused by the presence of other conflicting tendencies within the mind. The child's mind is a relatively dissociated one; incompatible thoughts, emotions, feelings and desires may successively invade the seat of consciousness, lead to their appropriate reactions and be but little modified or checked by one another."
157 FREUND, Sigmund New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis  S.E.Vol.XII, p.109
158 FREUND, Sigmund Civilization and its Discontents  S.E.Vol.XII, p.129.
159 ARRABAL, Fernando Le Labyrinthe, p.48. One might also point to the childishness of Bruno's behaviour which is evident particularly from Micaela's description of the 'games' she and Bruno used to play together (p.64).
160 The same sequence of events is depicted in Cérémonie pour un Noir Assassiné. The black François d'Assise (the id...) is murdered by Jérôme and Vincent, because he has vilified their love for Luce by sleeping with her (... is repressed by the ego) and Jérôme and Vincent are arrested (...and the ego is punished by the super-ego which emerges after the repression of the id).
161 ARRABAL, Fernando Le Labyrinthe, p.89.
162 ARRABAL, Fernando Les Feux Bourreaux, p.42.
163 Because, as we have seen, the influence of the parents extends beyond their individual personalities into further areas (see n.156) from which, significantly, many of Arrabal's symbols are drawn.
164 And which has its root, of course, in the author's relationship with his own mother.
165 ARRABAL, Fernando Fando et Lis, p.67.
166 ARRABAL, Fernando Les Amours Impossible, p.32
168 FREUND, Sigmund The Claims of Psychoanalysis to Scientific Interest (1913) in S.E.Vol.XIII, p.165.
169 ibid., p.173.
170 Illogical because the displacement of both opposing affects, originally attached to the mother, on to the lover, precludes the possibility of the normal development of the individual, which, as we shall later have cause to explain, depends upon the displacement of one only of those affects on to a substitute.
171 FREUND, Sigmund New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis  S.E.Vol.XII, p.69.
172 Which reminds us of the origins of the super-ego in the violence of the id.
173 ARRABAL, Fernando Et ils passèrent des Menottes aux Fleurs, p.20.
175 ibid., pp.198-9.
176 FREUD, Sigmund The Ego and the Id, S.E.,Vol.XIX, p.54
178 FREUD, Sigmund An Outline of Psychoanalysis S.E.Vol. XVIII, p.296.
179 ARRABAL, Fernando Le Labyrinthe, p.100.
180 Arrabal describes this piece as "...ma vie d'alors représentée telle quelle. Avec une fidélité absolue." SCHIFRES, Alain: Entretiens avec Arrabal, p.173
181 ARRABAL, Fernando Le Bicyclette du Condamné, pp.212-3
182 Note that Paso and his colleagues live behind a wall, out of sight. The symbol (the barrier between the subconscious and the conscious is commonly symbolized by a wall) seems to support the terms of our interpretation.
183 ARRABAL, Fernando Le Bicyclette du Condamné, p.214.
184 ibid., p.220.
185 ibid., p.209.
186 FREUD, Sigmund Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety S.E.,Vol.XI, pp.75-175.
187 ibid., p.117.
188 ARRABAL, Fernando Concert dans un Oeuf in Théâtre IV, pp.167-261.
189 ibid., p.176.
190 ibid., p.178
191 ibid., p.188.
192 ibid., p.190-1.
193 ibid., p.216.
194 ibid., p.237.
195 ibid., p.245.
196 ibid., p.260.
197 GILLET, Bernard op.cit., p.55.
198 ARRABAL, Fernando Concert dans un Oeuf, p.209.
199 ARRABAL, Fernando  
Le Cimetière des Voitures [1957] in
Théâtre 1, pp. 193-215.

200 BERNAGHIN, Angel  
I'Évil et le Cérémonie. Le Premier
Théâtre d’Arrabal. Collection 10/19
Union Générale d’Éditions. Paris 1977,
307 pp.

201 ARRABAL, Fernando  
Le Cimetière des voitures. p.141.

202 BERNAGHIN, Angel  
op.cit., p. 297.

203  
ibid., p. 290.

204 ARRABAL, Fernando  
Le Cimetière des Voitures. p.165.

205 The idea of Emanou’s music as a sublimation is reinforced
by a parallel which appears to be drawn between this activity
and his love-making with Ilia. The latter indeed seems to
be an ‘unrefined’ version of the former, as is suggested
when Ilia points out that the latter has been carried on
at the expense of the former, to the detriment, in other
words, of Emanou’s duty in fulfilling his rôle as a musician:

"Mais Emanou, il faut que tu ailles au bal jouer de la
trompette" (p.140).

206 FREUD, Sigmund  
Beyond the Pleasure Principle S.F.
Vol.VIII, p.126.

207 The Constancy Principle. See note 105.

208 LAFLANCHE, Jean and
FONTALIS, J.P.  
op.cit., p.331

209 ARRABAL, Fernando  
Fando et Lis, p.109.

210 ARRABAL, Fernando  
Le Piquelette du Condamné, p.215

211 We use the term 'Nirvana' here and in what follows, of
course, still in the sense defined by Freud.

212 FREUD, Sigmund  
On Narcissism, an Introduction
S.F. Vol.VIII, p.57.

of an Outline of Psychoanalysis S.F. Vol.XVIII, p.169:

"This first object [the mother's breast] subsequently becomes
complete into the whole person of the child's mother, who
not only feeds him but also looks after him and thus arouses
in him many other physical sensations pleasant and unpleasant.
By her care of the child’s body she becomes his first
seducer. In these two relations lies the root of a
mother’s importance, unique, without parallel, laid down
unalterably for a whole life-time, as the first and strongest
love-object, and as the prototype of all later love-relations".

213 This of course is totally logical, since, as we have seen, in
the earliest period of childhood the Id reigns supreme.
Instinctual impulses, in other words, are freely satisfied
and tension absent.
In addition, that is, to its use as an expression of the id of the super-ego respectively.

Freud appears to be saying that, in addition to being primarily an expression of instinct, aggression may, in certain circumstances, be viewed as a conditioned reaction. He thus seems to add a rider to his central instinctivist theory of aggression, a rider, moreover, which constitutes, in effect, a statement of the frustration/aggression hypothesis later elaborated by the Yale psychologists. Freud does not, however, unfortunately, furnish any suggestion as to the distinctions which might be made between these two types of expression.

There is no doubt that the rôle played by Mihrarca is for Lois (originally) the same as that played by Tesla in Viloro's eyes, i.e., both are lovers, in whose company the individual may attain Nirvana, or with whom the individual will be "happy".
The possibility of revolt, moreover, is suggested, significantly by Téloc, by the figure on to whom her love has been displaced. (p.113): "Tu devrais te révolter contre elle." And it is Téloc who enables Luis to foresee that her revolt will be brought to a successful conclusion: "tu assisteras maintenant à ce qui va se produire dans deux heures" (pp.113-4). In more than one sense, therefore, Téloc makes Luis' rebellion possible.

The punishment and even death of the ego at the hands of the merciless super-ego is a classic symptom of clinical melancholia (or depression) of FREUD, Sigmund The Ego and the Id S.E. Vol. XIX, p.53:

"If we turn to melancholia first, we find that the excessively strong super-ego, which has obtained a hold upon consciousness raises against the ego with merciless violence, as if it had taken possession of the whole of the sadism available in the person concerned. Following our view of sadism, we should say that the destructive component had entrenched itself in the super-ego, and turned against the ego. That is now holding sway in the super-ego is, as it were, a pure culture of the death instinct, and in fact it often enough succeeds in driving the ego into death, if the latter does not fend off its tyrant in time by the change round into mania."

The tragic outcome of plays like La Bicyclette du Condamné or Le Labyrinthe thus in no way exceeds the bounds of psychological feasibility.

We have elsewhere intentionally indicated, however, that Le Grand Cérémonial and Le Jardin des Désécrés are the only examples of plays which end optimistically in the first part of Arrabal's drama. It should be noted that a number of other plays (Elles Passeront des Menottes aux Fleurs, Le Ciel et la Merde and Le Tour de Babel [1976] for example) also end with a deliberate suggestion of optimism. In these cases, however, that optimism is derived, paradoxically, from the death of the individual, or central group, at the hands of authority, from an outcome, in other words, which, we have suggested, elsewhere serves to underline the impossibility of the task which faces the ego. The alliance of tragedy and optimism in such plays is indeed difficult to understand in the light of the interpretation we have here formulated. We may, it is true, postulate a theoretical explanation by suggesting that the death of the ego signifies the return to a former state which, we will recall, is the objective of the strivings of the id, or that the death of the ego signifies simply the removal of the tensions which have assailed the ego. Any such theoretical 'advantages' inherent in the situation are, however, naturally outweighed by realistic considerations: if the ego dies then any theoretical benefits which might accrue from its death are simply irrelevant. There is no realistic (see also note 241) cause for optimism, nor
is the pessimistic impression of tragedy conveyed by earlier works modified in any real sense, and Arrabal’s ability to distill optimism from the depth of the individual remains a puzzle. We would however suggest that these plays may only be fully understood in the light of the expansion of our present interpretation given in the second half of our thesis, from which it will become apparent indeed, how the tragic death of the individual may be aligned with the sense of triumph ascribed to it in certain plays by the author.


And are expressed in the plays with the aid of the use of symbols, the choice of which largely reflects, as we have seen, the personal experiences of the author.

We have hitherto been concerned primarily with the elucidation of the complexities of Arrabal’s vision rather than with a consideration of the expression of that vision as theatre. If we attempt briefly to remedy this omission, moreover, an important and disturbing paradox becomes apparent. For we have shown that the violence of the individual may be seen as an expression of the workings of the id, prior to the intervention of the ego, whose job it is to modify the instinctual strivings which derive from the id in accordance with the dictates of reality. Only in the light of expression of this factor, moreover, does Arrabal’s use of violence in a second context become fully comprehensible, for the harshness of the super-ego depends upon, and is only intelligible if one is aware of, the instinctual basis underlying the behaviour of the ego. An understanding of Arrabal’s use of violence thus depends upon a depiction of behaviour (in the violence of the individual) which specifically ignores or leaves out of account the demands of reality. In a theatrical context, however, it is precisely these demands which are embodied by the spectator. As a result of his own development and education the spectator arrives at
the theatre armed with precisely that set of standards to which the ego makes reference when dealing with the impulses of the id. The spectator’s assessment of events is made from a position subsequent to the intervention of the ego, from beyond precisely the process which Arrabal’s depiction rejects. For the spectator has been conditioned to rationalise his own instincts, and it is difficult to see how he can fail to be alienated by a presentation of those instincts in raw, unrationa-

lised form. Indeed the stability of his own personality depends on the necessity to defend himself against the intrusions of the id, and that is precisely what he will continue to do.

Such considerations, moreover, seem to support critics’ contention that Arrabal’s drama is inaccessible or, to use Corvin’s term “impenetrable”. As such they increase the urgency of the expansion of our interpretation which follows, in the course of which are elucidated the precise means by which Arrabal conveys the significance of violence to the spectator in the theatre.


243 ibid., p.134.

244 ibid., p.112.

245 ibid., p.95-6.

246 Freud does not expand upon exactly what is connoted by the term liberty in this context. The starting point of the second part of our thesis, however, is an attempt to provide a definition or elucidation of the concept in terms which clearly situate Arrabal’s work in the current of French thought which, it is suggested, influenced its conception.
PART TWO
SECTION 1

THEORIES OF RELIGION IN ARRA'BAL'S DRAMA

1 Affinity between Violence, Chaos and 'panique' 133
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It was in an effort to dissociate his work from previous literary schools and movements that Arrabal founded the 'mouvement panique' in 1967. Together with Topor, Jodorowsky and Sternberg he developed the theory of 'art panique', which was motivated most importantly by a profound dissatisfaction with the criteria by which human reality is ordered. The members of the 'mouvement panique' asserted that man was assailed by an overwhelming dread of instability and formlessness:

ne pas avoir de forme est le symbole de l'horrible, de la perte de soi-même

in response to which he had developed, through the process of civilization, a series of systems or formulae designed to reduce reality to neatly ordered and easily comprehensible categories. Arrabal and his colleagues further claimed, however, that those formulae were no more than meaningless stereotypes, giving rise to categories which were wholly spurious and thoroughly misleading. Civilization, indeed, in the view of the 'mouvement panique', had served not to elucidate reality, but, on the contrary, to obscure and to repress the true nature of reality.

For Arrabal and his colleagues, therefore, as for Freud in *Civilization and its Discontents*, civilization was an essentially restricting influence. The antipathy shown by the 'mouvement panique' towards the notion of civilization was complemented in the theory of 'art panique', moreover, by the declaration of an ardent desire to counteract that influence, specifically by expressing the true nature of reality, by revealing, in other words, the totality of human experience, which lay obscured beneath the shackles which civilization had imposed. Indeed the movement derived its name
from the Greek 'pan' signifying 'all' or 'totality', and from the Greek god of the same name, who fascinated Arrabal by virtue of the fact that he personified the totality of the universe, and united diametrically opposed contradictions within a single being:

Il était bouffon dans son enfance, plus tard épouvantait les hommes par ses brusques apparitions.

The significance of Pan became translated into the playwright's fundamental belief that the true order of reality was expressed in terms of 'la confusion':

tout ce qui est humain est confus.

It was by the term 'la confusion' that Arrabal sought to express the realm of indefinite possibility, comprising the subconscious, the 'unreal', the supernatural and all that is not comprehensible to the human intellect. The key 'panique' notion of 'la confusion', in short, stood in total opposition to the concept of a rational categorisation of reality, such as was implied by the terms of civilization.

For Arrabal, moreover, 'la confusion' included two essential factors, namely 'la mémoire', and 'le hasard', the former representing the past, and the latter the future and present. The playwright further recognized that what is now 'past' was once 'future' and that 'la mémoire' was thus the product of 'le hasard'. Conversely, 'la mémoire' existed as much in the future as in the past, since what is now future will one day be past. From this proceeds a unity of the two factors in 'confusion' which for the 'panique' artist has the dual function of liberating 'la mémoire' from sterility, by recognizing it as a mixture of known and unknown, and prefiguring the enigma of the future by expressing it in the images of 'la mémoire':

Puisqu'il utilise le hasard dans son oeuvre, l'artiste est le seul homme sur la terre qui éclaire, malgré lui, l'imprévisible, le futur, tout ce qui sera demain. L'artiste a toujours créé à partir des deux problèmes essentiels de la vie: trouver les mécanismes de la mémoire et les règles du hasard.
As we have already suggested there is a clear-cut opposition in all the theoretical statements of the 'mouvement panique' between the 'confusion' by which it sought to express human experience and the structures of the ordered rationality imposed upon reality as the inheritance of civilization. Arribal himself underlines the fundamental importance of this distinction when in Entretiens avec Arrabal, he declares to Alain Schifres:

J'imagine combien il serait difficile de faire accepter ma modeste théorie aux hommes qui désignent l'univers sous le nom de cosmos. C'est à dire d'«ordre» en grec.

The distinction between 'la confusion' and cosmos is supported, moreover, by a similar distinction drawn by the 'mouvement panique' between 'personne' and 'personnage'. As the 'confusion' of reality was inhibited by the restrictions of an interpretation based on the notion of cosmos, so the true 'personne' of man lay obscured beneath the 'personnage' which civilization had invested him with. Thus, in addition to the philosophical obligation of creating 'la confusion' the 'panique' dramatist also sought to represent what he saw as the true nature of man - the 'personne' rather than the 'personnage':

le panique essaie d'arriver du personnage qu'il est (par l'éducation anti-panique implantée par les augustes) à la personne qu'il renferme.

Consequently the aim of 'panique' art may be expressed as two complementary facets. By creation of 'l'inattendu' the artist seeks to liberate humanity from the false concepts imposed by a civilization based on a notion of order:

L'homme panique...tente de se libérer de cette éducation conditionnée et cherche l'euphorie comme un moyen de sortir de la prison où l'ont enfermé ses parents.

with the purpose of uncovering the true 'chaotic' nature of reality as well as the true complexity of humanity:
It is the same sustained distinction in 'panique' theory between 'la confusion' on the one hand, and cosmos or civilization on the other which points the way to a more easily comprehensible evaluation of the development which is here referred to. In her commentary on Le Lai de Barabbas (1967), which Arrabal completed less than a year after his lecture entitled 'L'Homme Panique' was delivered to the University of Sydney (August 1963), Fréncoise Raymond-Munckethau indicates the link suggested to her between the ritual which accompanies Giafar's initiation into 'La Connaissance' and the chaos of a primordial age described in mythology. Consideration of the latter, moreover, reveals affinities with Arrabal's notion of 'la confusion' which place his work firmly in a quasi-religious domain. For the process of development which Arrabal and the 'mouvement panique' postulate as the objective of their art is precisely the reverse of the process by which civilization evolved from the chaos of a primordial age. In L'Homme et le Sacré Roger Caillois describes the mythical Urzeit in the following terms:

L'âge primordial est décrit avec une singulière unanimité dans les contrées les plus diverses. C'est le lieu idéal des métamorphoses et des miracles. Rien n'était encore stabilisé, aucune règle encore édictée, aucune forme encore fixée. Ce qui depuis lors est devenu impossible était alors faisable. This description seems more than coincidentally akin not only to the 'panique' insistence on 'la confusion', but also to the universe created by Arrabal in his plays. In addition Caillois goes on to make a clear opposition between the state of chaos which he has described and the order of civilization which succeeded it;
Now this is precisely the same distinction that we have quoted Jodorowsky as making in his statement of the aims of the "mouvement panique". Both Caillois and the "mouvement panique" then are dealing in exactly the same terms, merely the former is concerned to trace the development of civilization out of chaos, while the latter seeks to promote chaos by liberation from civilization, to lift the bondage of order and find again the 'ère originelle éminemment créatrice' which was the mythological Urzeit.

The author's justification for undertaking this quest is a simple one and should be understood in the light of the same terms which we have seen him apply to the basic criteria of 'la mémoire' and 'le hasard'. For just as we have seen that 'la mémoire' evolves out of, and therefore incorporates the properties of 'le hasard', so, if civilization evolves out of chaos, it may reasonably be expected to contain its properties in some form. Conversely, as 'la mémoire' can provide the mainspring to 'le hasard' when liberated from immobility by actualisation, so a parallel liberation of the forces inherent in civilization may lead back to chaos. Indeed, in *L'Erotisme*, Bataille shows explicitly how the forces of chaos come to remain present in the order of civilization. Caillois' opposition of the general terms chaos and civilization is replaced by the more precise "monde de la violence" and "monde du travail ou de la raison" in Bataille's writing, but the schema is the same, since Bataille too states that the two cannot exist simultaneously and that the latter succeeded the former in response to a need for stability. For Bataille, however, not only does man belong to both domains:

l'homme appartient à l'un et l'autre de ces deux mondes entre lesquels sa vie, quoi qu'il veuille, est déchirée
but he also shows that the latter state consists merely in a re-channelling of those same forces which characterised the "monde de la Violence" into the repository of work. Not only does the latter state contain the essential component of the former in modified form, moreover, but Bataille further states that the attempts of reason to banish violence from everyday life are only partially successful and that there subsists an excess of violence in man which is never totally sublimated. Thus the ambiguity of the two states becomes virtually complete and as such throws further light on what Arrabal sought to express by the term 'la confusion'. More important though, it also substantiates the validity of the playwright's desire to express one in terms of the other. The strictly parallel logic, moreover, between Arrabal's system of 'la mémoire' and 'le hasard' and Caillois' opposition of chaos and civilization, or Bataille's distinction between violence and reason also allows us to explain the playwright's work with reference to the quasi-religious criteria which encompass these latter. 19

This, however, does not mean that each of Arrabal's plays can be seen as a direct attempt to proceed from civilization to chaos, nor even as a simple revelation of the central character's 'personne' by destruction of his 'personnage'. Throughout his work the relationship between opposite poles is highly complex and ambiguous. In Fando et Lis [1956], for instance, Fendo's naivety and more particularly his dual attitude towards Lis whom he at once adores and maltreats, seem to place him firmly in the realms of 'chaos'. He has even developed systems of evaluation which specifically replace logical reasoning by chance:

Alors, je me suis dit: le premier qui dira
le mot 'ou' aura raison, et comme c'est vous
qui l'avez dit avant lui j'ai su qu'il avait tort.
and which are envied by Kamar, who with his friends is bound by a necessity to find explanations:

C'est ce que nous aurions dû faire, et non perdre notre temps comme nous l'avons perdu.

Climando in Le Tricycle (1953) displays a similar naivety and unawareness of reason when faced with a social order he cannot comprehend, as personified by the policeman and his strange utterances, but of course neither Fando nor Climando benefit by standing outside the limits of civilization and in the realms of chaos; neither have they transferred from one to the other, nor has one state been shown to be the product of the other, or in any way related, save by total opposition.

In Le Labyrinthe (1954) the central character Etienne has his feet in the opposite camp - it is he who tries to interpret rationally the irrational universe in which he has somehow arrived, and in which, truly, anything seems possible. Again, however, all that is shown is that the two realms are in opposition, and Etienne is certainly no better (nor particularly worse) off for being on the other side of the fence. Indeed, just as Calliope and Bataille start from the fundamental idea of irreconcilable opposites, so it is polarity rather than affinity that these early plays express - it is the polarity which is the point, and not any implied preference for either one of the poles. Thus, while Pasolini views Arrabal's heroes as children lost in an adult world they are also to some extent adults lost in a child's world. They are not exclusively 'rational', nor exclusively 'violent' in Bataille's sense of the word, but they are in opposition to their surroundings.
The establishment of order out of chaos was characterized by two important modifications of the previous era. Firstly, death was introduced:

«...avec la mort...le cosmos est sorti du chaos»

and secondly, a system of strict rules or 'interdits' was set up to preserve the stability of civilization:

«Tout se trouva immobilisé et les interdits furent établis afin que l'organisation, la légalité nouvelles ne fussent pas troublées.»

As has been implied earlier neither of these considerations had the effect of abolishing the violence of the previous age, but the prime function of the 'interdits' was to maintain the new era apart from the old, by repressing that violence, to maintain its order by the exclusion or re-direction of those forces capable of upsetting it:

«ce que le monde du travail exclut par des interdits, c'est la violence»

while at the same time death provided an ultimate expression of that violence which, as we have shown, remained an inherent part of the new order, but an expression which in no way threatened its stability. In other words, the opposition of which we have spoken at length depends for its existence on the presence of death and 'interdits' which keep the two poles separate.

Nowhere in Arrabal's work, moreover, is the idea of civilization's dependence on death and 'interdits' made more abundantly obvious than in one of the author's more recent plays Le Ciel et La terre [1970], which deals directly with the subject. Here the five characters have deliberately cut themselves off from the repressive strictures of civilization, in pursuit of some kind of absolute which leads them into realms of violence and assassination. Not only does Arrabal make it clear that their Manson-like murderous
rituals are a necessary expression of the violence which lies at the basis of their being:

Il nous fallait participer à cet acte irrémédiable, irréparable.  

but he also implies strongly that the real nature of their crime is to have threatened the stability of the order they have rejected:

Vous avez attaqué les fondements de la société, c'est pourquoi vous êtes condamné à mort.  

Society’s answer to this threat is to execute the assassins, but their death is far from being a glorious victory for the forces of law and order. At the moment of death, Ribla gives birth to the child who throughout the play has symbolised the onset of a new era (or more precisely the return to an old one) thus not only proving her previous assertion as to the affinity between life and death:

L'existence est faite de vie et de mort.  

but also testifying to the highly ambiguous nature of death, being at once the means by which society seeks to preserve its stability, and also the ultimate expression of that violence which the lifestyle of the five assassins has embraced, charged with all the creative energy of the chaos they have sought to re-discover.

These considerations make of Le Ciel et la Merde possibly one of the most explicit exemplifications of the rôle of death and ‘interdits’ in separating the opposite poles of chaos and civilization, but the presence of both these factors is apparent in earlier plays also. We have said that in early pieces like Le Labyrinthe it is this polarity which is expressed, and in this play too it is death and ‘interdits’ which testify to the inexplicable nature of the guilt which separates Etienne from the world which surrounds him.
As is often the case with Arrabal, Etienne's guilt (and thus his separation) is first indicated by some form of fetter - here a manacle:

l'anneau que vous portez à la cheville vous rend particulièrement suspect

which symbolises the presence of an 'interdit'. Later, this guilt is proven by virtue of the death of Bruno, or in other words (whether one takes Bruno to be Etienne's alter ego or not) the presence of death fixes Etienne's separation in a universe apart from that of the Judge, Justin and Vicaela.

Elsewhere the 'interdit' is symbolised by a mother figure (or in the case of Le Jardin des Plénées [1967] by the associated symbol of the church and its representative in the play, Mharca) and the logic behind this choice is easy to grasp. For in the case of the individual the restrictions of civilization are passed on from mother to child, and the former thus comes to represent civilization itself. By extension the naivety which precedes that form of instruction stands for the individual in as stark a contrast to the consequent period of restraint as chaos to civilization itself. This is supported by the fact that, as Caillois states, it is clear that in primitive societies the individual was submitted around puberty to a ritual by which he was initiated into the framework of society, having hitherto stood outside its order:

l'activité du jeune être ne se trouve pas soumise aux interdits qui limitent celle de l'homme mûr.

Thus it is that Guicharauud states:

The childishness of Arrabal's characters and their lack of any moral conscience evoke a kind of paradise lost for ever. Responsibility for the fall is generally put on the mother image.
for that paradise is chaos, symbolised by the innocence of childhood, and the 'interdit' which separates those characters from their paradise is symbolised by the mother who has initiated them into the unwanted discipline of civilization. This schema is amply illustrated in Le Grand Cérémonial (1963), in which Arrabal weaves a complex pattern of symbols round the central theme of Cavanosa's attempted re-entry into childish naivety by the annihilation of the 'civilized' restrictions imposed by his mother and maintained by Sil. That naivety is represented by Cavanosa's preoccupation with dolls, and his desire to travel the world in a pram, but his mother has wrested him from that infantile world by the cruellest means possible:

Je te torturais pour ton bien.

and now seeks to maintain that separation by a mixture of authority, persuasion and sentimental blackmail, all of which reflect the power of interdiction which she personifies.

The symbolic nature of the mother figure in this play is supplemented by the intermittent sound of police sirens in the background which give further indication of the impossibility of Cavanosa's desire to return to a former era. Arrabal's frequent use of police, judges, bars, etc. is a further obvious (in many cases possibly rather too obvious) representation of the 'interdits' which separate order from chaos. He also portrays the sexual 'interdits', on which Bataille lays great stress by pointing to the irreconcilability between the violence of sexual activity and the rationality of a work-based society:

Nous pouvons dire seulement qu'en opposition au travail, l'activité sexuelle est une violence, qu'en tant qu'imulsion immédiate, elle pourrait déranger le travail.
Thus in Arrabal's plays sexual intercourse again represents a chaotic state and as such is seen as undesirable by those who uphold order; against it is posited the desirability of a relationship based on respect, such as that which Giafar at one stage desires to with Sylvie in *Le Lii de Parabas*:

> Je me figurais que je vivrais avec elle toute ma vie...Cui toute la vie, sans la toucher, en la respectant.

or that which Jerôme and Vincent enter into with Luce in *Cérémonie pour un Noir Assassiné* [1956]:

> on ne fera rien à toi. On t'aime avec le coeur.

When sexual intercourse is portrayed, moreover, it is the 'violent' or childish aspects of the act which are accentuated. Giafar and Arlys, like Emanou and Iila, are watched by childish voyeurs, while in the case of the former, sexual union is accompanied by the symbolic toy arrows fired by Karéo and Malderic.

In other words sex belongs to the realms of the violent, the chaotic and the childish. As both the disillusion which Giafar suffers and the play *Festialith Érotique* [1969] show, any rationalization of its violent impulse is a deception; it cannot be assimilated into the 'civilized' world based on rationality. Thus, like the others we have considered, the 'interdits' on sexual behaviour serve to separate, and while 'interdits' in Arrabal's plays have justly been criticized as superficial in their presentation, their function in his universe, as in the religious domain dealt with by Caillois and Bataille, is to keep opposite poles apart, to maintain the one by repression of the violence of the other, out of which it evolved.
This fundamental idea of the separating function of the 'interdits' is one which clearly reflects the influence of Durkheim's theories of religion, consideration of which adds an important new dimension to the notions of chaos and civilization (and hence violence and rationality) which we have so far dealt with. For at the basis of Durkheim's theories of religion we find the underlying belief of the division of the totality of existence into two distinct and opposed groups, designated by the terms sacred and profane. He states quite categorically:

La division du monde en deux domaines comprenant, l'un tout ce qui est sacré, l'autre tout ce qui est profane, tel est le trait distinctif de la pensée religieuse.

and with this assertion Durkheim clearly extends the concept of what is religious from the limitations imposed by the notions of divinity hitherto used to categorise it. When dealing with the notion of sacredness, moreover, he uncovers a further bipartite division, to which he gives the names pure and impure and which he posits as an essential characteristic of all that is sacred:

Le pur et l'impur ne sont donc pas deux genres séparés, mais deux variétés d'un même genre qui comprend toutes les choses sacrées.

For Durkheim then, the function of 'interdits' is to separate, firstly the sacred from the profane, and secondly the 'purely sacred' from the 'impurely sacred'.

Following Durkheim's schema we may proceed to an equation of the terms we have so far used and those which Durkheim himself employs. For if Durkheim, Caillois and Bataille all agree on the fundamental principle of two opposed and distinct domains and further concur that 'interdits' separate one domain from another then it is at least true to say that the notion of sacredness is implied in the
ideas of chaos and violence, the latter two like the former being set apart, and preserved in their separation by 'interdits'.

This assertion is supported precisely by the ambiguity of sacredness on which both Durkheim and Caillois agree, for the essential duality of sacredness:

«la vérité permanente du sacré réside ... simultanément dans la fascination du brasier et l'horreur de la pourriture»

is reflected both in the description of the nature of the mythological Urzeit:

«L'absence de barrière séduit autant que repousse le défaut d'ordre et de stabilité»

and in the constitution of Bataille's violence:

«Disons sans plus attendre que la violence et la mort qui la stimule ont un sens double: d'un côté l'horreur nous éloigne, liée à l'attachement qu'inspire la vie, de l'autre un élément solennel, en même temps terrifiant, nous fascine, qui introduit un trouble souverain»

Indeed in a footnote to L'Erotisme Bataille states exactly the same equation (together with its corollary that rational = profane) but discounts the need to prove it, by virtue of the irrational nature of the terms profane and sacred.

We have so far noted the affinities between the system on which Arrabal's 'panique' theories are based, and the oppositions of chaos to civilization, or violence to rationality. By establishing the sacred nature of violence, however, and its consequent ambiguity, we not only place Arrabal's work far more firmly in a religious domain than has hitherto been possible, but also may proceed towards an explanation of the means by which the author seeks to unite those factors, which we have hitherto considered only as polarised opposites, under the single heading of 'la confusion':

«Je parvins donc à cette conclusion: dans la vie deux grandes forces agissent qui se résument en la confusion»
and it is with this aim in view that it is necessary to consider more minutely the ambiguity of sacredness and its implications.

This ambiguity is most simply explained by the fact that the sacred world is made up of forces rather than substance and thus any religious phenomenon is potentially both pure and impure, and depends for the terms of its final expression on the end to which it is directed rather than any inherent qualities of its composition. Caillois expresses this idea in the following way:

"une force ... peut apporter des biens ou des maux suivant les circonstances particulières de ses manifestations successives."

Caillois' treatment of 'le sacré' here is incidentally highly reminiscent of La Rochefoucauld's discussion of the nature of virtue in Les Maximes, for just as the letter demonstrates that any action is potentially virtuous or vicious according to circumstance so the inference of Turkheim and Caillois' schema seems to be that any religious phenomenon is both potentially pure and impure, sacred and profane, depending on criteria which are never really adequately defined. Indeed, Evans-Pritchard justly takes exception to Turkheim's study of religion, which depends, as we have said, so heavily on the concepts of sacred and profane but in which there is a highly disturbing lack of consideration given to the central question of what makes one thing sacred and another profane, or even more pertinently, what makes the same thing either sacred or profane, according to circumstance. Turkheim glibly tries to sustain his insistence on ambiguity by pointing to such examples as the corpse, which begins by inspiring terror and aversion, but which is later regarded as a venerated relic, or to the totemic animal, pre-eminent in sacred thing, but the cause of death for anyone who eats it, but neither he nor his disciples ever attempt to explain why this is
the case. This being so, and in the absence of other feasible
criteria, one is left with the inference that the ideas of sacrality
and duality themselves are the criteria of sacredness and
precisely this notion is suggested by Collot himself when he extends
the idea of sacrality to cover the whole spectrum of religious
experience:

le sacré développe une action faste ou néfaste
et reçoit les qualifications opposées de pur et
d'impur, de saint et de sacrilège qui définissent
avec ses limites propres les frontières mêmes
de l'extension du monde religieux.

This duality becomes clearly transposed into Arrabal's
drama: and while the playwright, like Lurkheim, fails to justify
completely the terms of its expression, it remains one of the
most striking aspects of his work. Nowhere is the idea of the pure
and impure aspects of a single force more readily apparent than in
Bestialité Érotique, which is neatly structured in two antithetical
parts, the first being a pungent parody of the poetic lyricism of the
second. This piece, moreover, demonstrates both the advantages and
the disadvantages of Arrabal's adoption of the Lurkheimian system.
For the excellence of the play lies in its striking assertion that
the traditionally 'acceptable' and 'desirable' portrayal of the
young people's love in the second part of the play is merely
a 'civilized' modification of the 'unacceptable' bestiality which
symbolizes their mutual attraction in the first part. The power
of this message, however, is largely undermined by Arrabal's failure
even to attempt an adequate explanation of why the couple should
be attracted to each other in the first place on the basis of the
conditions stated in the first part of the play.

Elsewhere Arrabal uses complementary pairs of characters
as a means of expressing duality: Lais and "Ibérica,\textsuperscript{57} Lis and Sil,\textsuperscript{58}
and even the Architect and the Emperor are all opposed yet complementary facets of a single idea. An even clearer example, moreover, is presented in Le Lai de Parabhas where Sylda and Arlys are explicitly stated to be one and the same person. Here it may be noted that Arrabal does not use this device with the same objective as Brecht in Der Gute Mensch von Sezuan, for instance. In the latter Brecht establishes a dialectic between Shen Te and Shui Ta (who are likewise one and the same) each of whom embodies a separate point of view, and who, as that play makes extremely clear, cannot coexist. Sylda and Arlys, on the other hand can and must coexist; their significance lies precisely in the fact that they are complementary and not (as in the case of Shen Te and Shui Ta) mutually exclusive. It is further interesting to note that both Sylda and Arlys incorporate their own duality. Sylda, for instance, uses Giafar's attraction to her beauty and purity for her own ostensibly cruel purposes. Indeed Giafar's attitude towards her at the beginning of the play:

Vous voyez: elle vient de me mettre une chaîne et cependant je l'aime de plus en plus.

is more than coincidentally reminiscent of Caillois' description of the nature of 'le sacré':

on en a peur et on veut s'en servir.

and its ambiguity which he subsequently describes with the allegory of the butterfly's fascination with the naked flame which will burn it. Similarly Arlys later uses Giafar's conviction of her own purity to seduce him, and at this point even the author's stage directions indicate a deliberate desire to convey Arlys' inherent duality:

GIAFAR: Lorsque j'avais quatorze ans je rêvais d'une femme comme vous

ARLYS: Comme moi?

GIAFAR: Oui, aussi pure, en qui je pourrais avoir confiance.

Arlys rit (satisfaite? ironique?)
Throughout Le Lai de Zarabba, Arrabal draws heavily on a notion of ambiguity similar to that inherent in Durkheim's assessment of sacredness, and by and large it is extraordinarily well sustained. Like Durkheim, however, Arrabal seems to fall short of any true justification of his insistence on ambiguity. In other words, with respect to Giafar's above-mentioned view of Syl Da, it is easy enough to perceive the duality it expresses, but no explanation is given as to exactly what it is, in psychological terms, that makes Giafar persist in his love for a woman who is so manifestly cruel to him.

With Le Ciel et La Verde, however, Arrabal does come closer to a justification, and this play, more than any other, sums up the religious nature of the ambiguity which recurs throughout the playwright's drama. Here the five 'assassins' are brought to trial shortly before their execution and their leader Eraste is called upon to defend the actions of his followers and himself. This he does by drawing a comparison between Therese of Avila:

Si j'étais Therese d'Avile, je vous galvaniserais par mes paroles ... Seuls croient des êtres de cette trempe,

and the Marquis de Sade:

Seul le Marquis de Sade peut lui être comparé dans l'histoire des êtres qui voulaient l'absolu jusqu'au fond de leur âme,

whom, as the following interchange clearly shows, he considers not (as do the authorities) as opposites, but as complementary manifestations of a single force:

VOIX: Et dans cette communauté, qui suivait - on le plus, Therese d'Avila ou le Marquis de Sade?

ERASME: Ces deux êtres ne sont qu'un.

In this case the ambiguity of the comparison is much more clearly justified in the light of a common base underlying each of the
examples. Not only can it now be recognised (as we have seen Caillois suggest) that a single impulse can produce opposed effects according to circumstance but it is also apparent that that impulse is in the nature of violence itself. Only in the light of Durkheim’s religious theories, moreover, can the deliberate ambiguity of Fréme’s remark be resolved.

If this was the kind of synthesis aimed at by Arrabal, however, as has been indicated, he seldom avoided the pitfalls implied by the vagueness of the terms used by Durkheim and Caillois. Mostly he appears to use ambiguity for its own sake, and thus we have cited Durkheim and Caillois, not as a means of explaining the ambiguities themselves but as a point of reference for the notions which lay behind them. There is, however, one important consequence arising from Durkheim’s adherence to a belief in the dual nature of every religious phenomenon. Since he believed that each of these was potentially both pure and impure, sacred and profane, he also logically claimed that any object could pass from one realm to the other without perceptible change:

non seulement entre les deux formes opposées il n’y a pas de solution de continuité, mais un même objet peut passer de l’une à l’autre sans changer de nature.  

Now, as has previously been stated, the averred objective of ‘art panique’ was to discover the true nature of existence beneath the forms imposed by civilization. Given the demonstrated affinity between the object of this quest and the violence of a former era of chaos, and given also the sacred nature of that violence, we may say that Arrabal is trying precisely to ‘pass from one realm to the other’. It is, moreover, in this context that his imitation of Durkheim’s system of duality becomes truly significant, for, as we
shall see, it is by the assumption of that belief in duality that
Armand's demonstration of the progress 'from one realm to another'
is facilitated. In other words this belief is precisely the
means by which 'deux grandes forces...se résument en la
confusion'.
We have demonstrated previously that the function of 'interdits' was to separate opposite domains, and we have also noted Arrabal's desire to pass from one domain to the other. It is therefore tempting to assume that the achievement of his goal lies simply in the removal of the 'interdits', that the transition from order to chaos, indeed, consists in the violation or transgression of the barriers erected by the system of 'interdits' to keep the two apart. There is, moreover, a precise religious parallel to just such a process in the system of 'la fête'. For 'la fête' is described by Calilhac as a veritable re-creation of the precivilized state of chaos:

Il importe d'abord d'actualiser l'âge primordial: la fête est le Chaos retrouvé et façonné à nouveau.70

And that re-creation took the form precisely of a deliberate and systematic violation of the 'interdits' which had been adduced to obscure chaos and to ensure the stability of civilization:

toutes les prescriptions qui protègent la bonne ordonnance naturelle et sociale sont alors systématiquement violées.71

Curiously, however, the purpose of the 'fête' was far from similar to Arrabal's expressed intentions. It sought, by liberating at certain predetermined moments those creative forces out of which civilization first evolved, to rejuvenate and reinforce the stability of society:

elle assure la fonction de régénérer le monde72

Now it is clear that the 'mouvement panique' was in no way concerned with the reinforcement of an existing order, and thus it appears, paradoxically, that a system of transgression has the opposite effect to the one which they are seeking. If we look more closely at the rôle of transgression in 'la fête', moreover, it becomes clear why, contrary to superficial appearance, transgression
is not only inappropriate to the objectives of 'art panique' but also has the effect of strengthening the stability of the order which Arpabel and his followers sought to move away from.

The explanation of the paradox is, in fact, relatively simple one which centres on the nature of transgression itself. For, as we have already implied, the concept of transgression necessarily incorporates the idea of the presence of barriers. For there to be transgression, in other words, there must also be something which is transgressed. As we have made clear, in the case of 'la fête' it is the barriers which divide order from chaos which are transgressed. The very notion of barriers, and the division which they imply, however, was born only with the emergence of order or civilization out of chaos. The presence of barriers, indeed, is a fundamental condition of the existence and stability of order, but conversely has no part in the nature of chaos, for chaos was precisely that state which preceded barriers and division alike. The equation between transgression and chaos which appears to be implied by the function of 'la fête' is therefore an impossible one: transgression assumes the presence of barriers whilst chaos is defined by the absence of barriers. For this reason, moreover, transgression cannot and does not in fact re-create chaos. That transgression does create, and what is present in 'la fête', however, is a portrayal or depiction of chaos, but it is a portrayal (again because it takes for granted the presence of barriers, the fundamental condition of the existence of order) made in the very terms which govern the existence of order. Such a portrayal reveals nothing of the essence of chaos, but presents chaos from the point of view of order, whereby chaos appears merely as the opposite of, or as a negation of order. And by
stressing the opposition between order and chaos in this way, the effect of transgression, far from facilitating the transition from one domain to the other, is rather to underline the impossibility of such a move. Indeed, as is claimed in Bataille's basic postulation as to the nature of transgression, the ultimate effect of transgression is to reinforce the function of the 'interdits' which it appears to negate:

le transgression n'est pas la négation de l'interdit, mais il le dépasse et le complète.

For transgression serves to reaffirm the opposition between the two domains, which from the outset the 'interdits' have been charged to keep apart.

The point which emerges from our consideration of the rôle of transgression in 'la fête', namely that the effect of the transgression of the barriers which separate one domain from another is to stress the opposition between the two domains, is clearly reflected on numerous occasions in Arrabal's drama. Indeed, while the separation of one domain from the other depends, as we have previously explained, upon the presence of 'interdits', that separation is reinforced at every turn precisely by incidents which depict the transgression of those same 'interdits'. The separation of Climendo and his colleagues from society in Le Tricycle, for instance, is never more apparent than when they have transgressed one of society's fundamental laws. Only when he has committed murder, in fact, does Climendo himself really become aware of the opposition between his own 'universe' and the society which surrounds him, for it is only as a result of this 'transgression' that the policeman appears. A similar fate befalls Jerome and Vincent at the end of Cérémonie pour un Noir Assassiné: again their separation from society is reinforced and underlined as a direct result of their
transgression of its laws. Perhaps the most pertinent example, moreover, is provided by Le Grand Cérémonial, where, as we have already suggested, Savinose's attempts to re-enter the 'chaotic' world of his early childhood by a determined annihilation of the 'civilized' restrictions imposed by his mother and maintained by his merely serves, in the main body of the play at least, to accentuate the impossibility of his quest.

In Arrabal's plays, then, as in the system of a fêté, the effect of transgression is to reinforce the separation of opposite domains. It is thus clear that transgression is ineffective as a means of moving from one realm to the other. It is so, basically because, while it violates the 'interdits' which separate one domain from the other, it does not deny their function of separation, but rather strengthens it. At the outset we expressed Arrabal's objectives in the terms of a desire to rediscover the chaos inherent in existence by liberating the latter from the restrictions imposed upon it by civilization. It is now apparent that this liberation cannot be achieved by a destruction of the restrictions themselves, since this only reinforces their function (which is the separation of civilization from chaos), by virtue of which the former exists in the first place. To rediscover chaos, on the contrary, it is that function itself which must be negated, or in other words, the notion of separation must be replaced by unity of the two opposing poles, for only when some means of contiguity is established is the transformation from one to the other possible.
It is in this context, moreover, that Arrabal's adherence to Lurckheim's system of dualities is most strikingly revealing. We will remember that Lurckheim believed that each religious phenomenon was potentially both sacred and profane, and could, in addition, move from one realm to the other, and we further noted that this, in effect, was what Arrabal sought to do. Arrabal's acceptance of these two fundamental ideas, moreover, provoked his subsequent imitation of the system by which the two worlds were united, the system by which an object passed from one to the other. That system was sacrifice. The procedure of sacrifice is defined by Hubert and Mauss in their classic study of the subject in the following terms:

*This procedure consists in establishing a means of communication between the sacred and profane worlds through the mediation of a victim.*

Elsewhere they describe the function of that procedure in terms of the benefits which accrue to the 'sacrifier' (i.e., the beneficiary of the sacrifice) as a result of the sacrifice:

He has acquired a religious character which he did not have before, or has rid himself of an unfavourable character with which he was affected; he has raised himself to a state of grace or emerged from a state of sin. In either case he has been religiously transformed—a definition which Bataille echoes precisely in *La Ferté Vaudite*:

*Le sacrifice restitue au monde sacré ce que l'usage servile a dégradé, rendu profane.*

In other words, by a juxtaposition of terms which we have already justified, the objectives of sacrifice and the objectives of the *mouvement panique* are exactly parallel. It is, moreover, by means of sacrifice that Arrabal finally arrives at some reconciliation of the two domains previously considered as opposites, and as such, the possibility of this reconciliation depends precisely
on his belief in the duality of each of the opposing poles.

As Hubert and Mauss testify, the process of the sacrificial system hinges around two important features. Firstly, the 'sacrifier' has to be carefully and fully prepared for the transformation which he is about to undergo. This is achieved by a systematic denial of the terms of his old life:

"The priests will progressively strip him of the temporal being that he possessed in order to cause him to be reborn in a new form."

Precisely such a denial is witnessed in the case of Giafar in Le Lai de Barabas in the action which precedes the sacrifice of Arlys/Sylde, which in turn facilitates Giafar's initiation into 'La Connaissance'. Giafar is stripped of the terms of reference of the world of reason in which he exists so that he may enter the world of violence - his belief in logic is totally undermined, firstly by the baffling disappearance of the wounds on Kardo's and Malderic's bodies and secondly by the discovery that the door of his room opens no more on to the stairs, but on to open air. He has wrested from him the very touchstones of civilization that he may enter the realms of chaos - his attempts to find rational explanations in the study of philosophy only serve to underline his captivity in a fairy-tale world where cause and effect are unrelated and logic is unknown. Finally, even his belief in emotion is denied when the pure Sylde, for whom he has such respect, and the lascivious Arlys, who seduces him, turn out to be one and the same person. This then is the process which Giafar must go through before his initiation and it reflects faithfully the process undergone by the 'sacrifier' prior to his transformation. The parallel is further reinforced, moreover, by a detail of the description of initiation rites which Hubert and Mauss give. Speaking again of the 'sacrifier' they say:
he dons a brand new linen garment, thereby indicating that a new existence is about to begin for him. A detail which is parodied by Arabal in Le Livre de Barabas when Arlys hides Siafar change into his pyjamas prior to the commencement of the ritual.

Once the 'sacrifier' has reached this point, and his preparation is complete, the purpose of the sacrifice itself is to confer upon the 'sacrifier' the sacred nature of the victim by its liberation from the latter at the moment of death:

the characteristic whose transmission is the very aim of sacrifice passes from the victim to the sacrificer.80

It is important, moreover, to realise that sacredness is not an inherent and perfected characteristic of the victim before the moment of death, for it is the violence of death itself that establishes the victim's sacred nature:

the victim does not necessarily come to the sacrifice with a religious nature already perfected and clearly defined; it is the sacrifice itself that confers this on it.81

In other words the victim of the sacrifice incorporates not only the sacred state craved by the 'sacrifier' but also the consequences of the reduction of the separation by which he is excluded from that state. Thus the position of the victim prior to the point of death reflects the same ambiguity that we have previously discussed - the victim has, as it were, a foot in each camp, for its progressive movement towards the sacred world must be paralleled by an equally necessary maintenance of contact with the profane. Indeed, its function of intermediary points to the necessity of its incorporation of both elements within a single being. Furthermore, if the sacred nature of the victim is to be passed to the 'sacrifier', then that contact between the two worlds must persist even after the moment of death. This brings us to the climax of the sacrificial procedure.
the assimilation by the 'sacrificer' of the characteristics that
the victim had attained by sacrifice, the moment of entry into the
sacred realm, his consumption of the sacrificial victim:

the most perfect way of effecting communication
was to hand over to the sacrificer a portion of
the victim, which he consumed. By eating a portion
of it, he assimilated to himself the characteristics
of the whole. In the religious sense, then, this 'communion' represents
the liberation of the individual from his profanity, his entry
into the sacred sphere, his awareness of the possibility of life,
by means of the death of another. For Bataille it represents a
veritable fulcrum of existence:

C'est la vie mêlée à la mort, mais en lui, dans le
même moment, la mort est signe de la vie,
ouverture à l'illimité.

For Arrabal also it is an opening on to 'l'illimité', it is the means
whereby 'la confusion' becomes apparent and the culmination of the
procedure we have discussed, as a result of which man is finally
liberated from the strictures of civilization, and is able to contem-
plate "la totalité de son être" by his assimilation of the unity
of opposite poles. It is, moreover, in L'Architecte et L'Empereur
d'Assyrie [1966], the play in which this culminating point is
most clearly portrayed, firstly that the system as a whole is
most exactly illustrated and secondly that the comparison between
the 'système punique' and the religious system upon which it draws is
most explicitly justified.

The play opens with the bold assertion of opposition -
the 'civilized' Emperor arrives on the island inhabited by the
barbaric 'Architect'. Two years later, however, the contact
necessary to the imminent sacrifice has already been established -
the Architect can speak and has been 'civilized' to the extent of
recognizing the Emperor's supposed superiority. The ambiguity of the
Emperor's position, however, is manifested in a series of games
which prefigure the eventual collapse of the world of reason in which
he believes his existence is founded. In these games the apparent
roles of Emperor and Architect are reversed - the Emperor is the
Architect's horse, the Architect plays the part of the Emperor's
mother. These 'transgressions', however, only serve to highlight
the separation between the two characters - a separation on which
the Emperor insists, as it is the raison d'être of his superiority
and the justification of his rationality:

Nous ne nous comprenons pas. Nous appartenons à
deux mondes différents.

All the while, however, the gap is decreasing and the characters' ambiguity becoming more evident. The Architect, with his well
rehearsed formulae, is a parody of the sterile forms of the Emperor's
civilization:

Les surnoms secrétaires - toujours-nues-qui-
écrivent-les-chefs-les-œuvres-que-tu-leurs-tiens.

Two subsequent chance utterances by the Architect, moreover,
("Maman, maman" and "combien tu l'as tuée?") strike a kindred chord
within the Emperor and confront him with the reality of the violence
his civilization has helped to suppress. After a period of medi­
tation he emerges naked, stripped of the reference points of his
civilization, before a scarecrow adorned in his own clothes. The
Architect is no longer present to confirm his superiority; before the
symbolic representation of his own rationality he is forced to realise
the violence inherent in his own nature. His empire and his civi­
lization are revealed to be a sham, an imperfect fabrication that the
chance of a pinball machine would not quite justify, even at reduced
costs. His true nature is that of the artisan, whom he cannot under­
stand, but whose rôle he acts out in front of the Emperor/Scarecrow.
When the Architect returns, all proceeds ostensibly as before. There is, however, one important exception. The ambiguity of the Emperor's nature can no longer be ignored - his previous reality is now a game, while the game which he and the Architect act out progressively reveals the reality behind the façade he has used as a shield. He is finally brought to the assimilation of the violence inherent in his being by the admission that he has killed his mother; the barriers between game and reality are definitively broken down:

Ce n'était qu'une farce de plus; ton jugement, ton procès, mais il semble que tu le prends au sérieux.

likewise the barriers between chaos and civilization, and at this point the Emperor is prepared for the sacrifice. The Emperor's death, moreover, heralds the return to chaos of the Architect who eats him - he becomes the Emperor, the two opposite forces are briefly united until the ambiguous reappearance of the Architect, whereupon the process begins anew.

If this process, moreover, can thus be traced in the terms of the religious system we have described, it also contains clear reference to the terms of 'panique' art. Within the framework of the play, the process consists in fact of a "jogging of the Emperor's memory". The terms of the Emperor's 'civilization' are expressed by a series of embellished memories, whose sterility, as we have seen, is attested by the Architect's psittacine repetition. Behind this disfiguration of the past is concealed its reality.

Now we have said that the games played by the Architect and the Emperor have the effect of reducing the separation between them. It can be seen that they are also, however, as his admissions to the scarecrow indicate, a manifestation in the present of the Emperor's
past, an actualisation of his memories. When he is left alone with the scarecrow, the falsity of the Emperor's memories becomes clear - he is not for instance an Emperor, but a minor employee, the power which he purports to wield over others is a product of the cruelty he himself has suffered. From this moment the 'past' which his game actualise, and the 'present' in which that actualisation is effected, approach each other with increasing rapidity - their fusion is completed in the final 'game' in which he acts out the murder of his mother, finally liberating it from the past. Thus the Emperor's sacrifice and the Architect's subsequent communion represent not only the passage of civilization into chaos and the passage of rationality into violence, but also the passage from past to present, from 'la mémoire' to 'le hasard'. Indeed the play follows precisely Arrabal's dictum to revitalise 'la mémoire' by abstracting 'le hasard' inherent in it, and as such the Architect/Emperor enters not only into the realms of violence but into the realms of 'la confusion', the point where 'la mémoire' and 'le hasard' meet.

In so doing he incidentally demonstrates a strict parallel between the two systems and thereby vindicates our attempts to elaborate the 'système panique' by reference to a religious system which it seems so clearly to reflect.
It should be noted that the 'panique' view of civilization as a repressive force is strikingly reflected also in Arrabal's plays, notably in Les Leux Bourreaux (1956), La Grande Revue du XVe Siècle (1971) and Bella Ciao (1972). Les Leux Bourreaux is a biting parody of conventional morality, while La Grande Revue du XVe Siècle presents a horrifying catalogue of the evils perpetrated in the name of civilization in the course of this century, and Bella Ciao examines the various institutions which characterize western civilization. These plays are not examined in detail in what follows, however, since the topic of our present study is violence, which concept we shall shortly have cause to equate with the 'panique' notion of 'la confusion', and Arrabal's primary concern in Les Leux Bourreaux, La Grande Revue du XVe Siècle and Bella Ciao (atypically) is to convey the nature of civilization alone (i.e. the nature of the force which opposes 'la confusion' in 'panique' theory) rather than to elucidate the nature of, or indeed to tell us anything about, 'la confusion' itself. See, however, note 8 Part Two, Section 3.

3 Pan: Son of Hermes and Dryops, a follower of Dionysus.

4 ARRABAL, Fernando: "L' Homme Panique" in Le Panique, p.52.

5 ibid., p.43.

6 ibid., p.48.

7 The theme of the opposition between confusion and ordered reality has a long history in anti-cartesian thought and is reflected most importantly, perhaps, in the work of Henri Bergson.


9 We have elsewhere (Part One, note 40) suggested the possibility of a link between 'panique' philosophy and the science of 'pata-physics'. The terminology used by Jodorowski here suggests a further possible influence on the formulation of 'panique' theories.
In the work of Emmanuel Mounier (1905-1950), Mounier was the founder of the philosophy of 'le personnalisme' as well as of the journal Espirit, in which that philosophy was expounded, and his ideas enjoyed considerable popularity in France in the decade following his death. Though it is difficult to compare directly Mounier's use of the term 'personne' with Jodorowski's (because on the one hand Mounier's notion of 'personne' was a highly complex proposition developed over the period of a quarter of a century, while on the other hand Jodorowski defines 'personne' only summiarily, and apparently only in terms of its opposite, 'personnage') it is clear that 'personne' philosophy and 'le personnalisme' share a certain amount of common ground. Each is concerned with the pursuit of some general notion of 'absolute totality', and, on a more specific level, each suggests that the function of art is to portray that totality.


"Le soi-disant «réel» complaisant et vulgarisé, est un compromis, généralement bar, destiné à nous rassurer sur la réalité plus qu'à la révéler. L'art est précisément une protestation contre son mensonge, au nom de la réalité totale qu'apporte dans ses expériences marginales.

Mounier's words prefigure exactly the 'panic' definition of art elaborated by Jodorowski and outlined below.

10 JODOROWSKI, Alexandre "Vers L'échecère Panique ou Sortir le Théâtre du Théâtre" in Le Panique, pp.94-5.


13 In Entretiens avec Arrabal, Arrabal acknowledges the influence of his theories of 'le théâtre panique' on the composition of Le Lai de Barabbas, pp.98-9.


"Après une cérémonie rituelle où des danses grotesques et frénétiques symbolisent peut-être le chaos primordial, le jeune homme est initié."


16 Caillios, in fact, at one stage actually describes chaos as "l'époque de la fluidité et de la confusion", ibid., p.156.

17 ibid., p.132.

To have here arrived at the redefinition of the concept of violence which was announced on p.106, and which will serve us in the second part of our thesis. The term 'violence' is employed henceforth, not with its ordinary familiar meaning, but in the specialised philosophical sense in which Bataille uses it. Following the arguments already put forward above, therefore, 'violence' is equated with Caillois' 'chaos' and, most importantly, with Arrabal's own notion of 'la confusion'. Wherever, it is true, does Arrabal specifically refer to the work of Caillois and Bataille, nor does he acknowledge any influence which their writings may have had upon the formulation of his own philosophy. Nevertheless the theories of Caillois and Bataille are representative of the current of French thought in which Arrabal was working and it is suggested that this factor in itself is adequate justification for our attempt to elucidate Arrabal's philosophy in the light of those theories.


ibid., p.97.


CAILLOIS, Roger op.cit., p.133.

ibid.

PATAILLE, Georges op.cit., p.47.


ibid., p.49.

ibid., p.90.

ARRABAL, Fernando Le Labyrinthe, p.75.

In a majority of cases it appears that religious and social instruction in primitive society was the responsibility of the mother and her family. Cf. Murdock: Our Primitive Contemporaries, Macmillan, New York, 1934:

"The maternal uncle, rather than the father assumes responsibility for a child's religious, ceremonial and ethical instruction."

This assertion is confirmed in JAMES, E.O. Comparative Religion (1932) University Paperbacks, Methuen, London 1961, p.82:

"Real paternal authority is exercised by the mother's brother as patates, while kinship is strictly matrilineal."
33 CAILLOIS, Roger op. cit., p.135.


36 ibid., p.67.

37 The affinity between death and sexuality, and the violence inherent in the latter have been studied at length by Bataille in L'Erotisme and by Caillois in Le Mythe et L'Homme [1939], Collection Trés, Gallimard, Paris 1972, 189pp.

38 BATAILLE, Georges op. cit., p.56.


41 ibid., p.197.


43 ARRABAL, Fernando Le Le Lai de Barabbas, p.140. This symbol seems to reinforce the idea of an affinity between childishness and violence, being a simultaneous expression of both.


46 ibid., pp.50-1.

47 Cf. FRAZER, Sir James G. The Golden Pouch [1892], Macmillan, London 1949, p.50. "By religion, I understand a propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to man, which are believed to direct and control the course of nature and of human life. Thus defined, religion consists of two elements, a theoretical and a practical, namely a belief in powers higher than men and an attempt to propitiate or please them."
Les expressions de monde profane (= monde du travail ou de la raison) et de monde sacré (= monde de la violence) sont néanmoins très anciennes. Mais profane, mais sacré sont des mots du langage irrationnel. 

...
toute énergie apparaît tour à tour pure et impure, susceptible d'être orientée dans un sens ou dans l'autre sans qu'il soit possible de lui attribuer en permanence une qualification univoque."

69 DURKHEIM, Émile op. cit., p. 580.
70 CAILOIS, Roger L'Homme et le Sacré, p. 143.
71 ibid., p. 146.
72 ibid., p. 137.
73 BATAILLÉ, Georges op. cit., p. 70.

74 It should be noted that each of the pairs of opposites so far considered, i.e. Sacred/Profane, Violence/Reason, Chaos/Civilization are reconciled by the single notion of sacrifice, thereby justifying the equation we have made between these several systems.


76 ibid., p. 9-10.

78 HUBERT, H. and MAUSS, M. op. cit., p. 70.
79 ibid.
80 ibid., p. 52.
81 ibid., p. 97.
82 ibid., p. 40.

84 He is not, of course, an architect, nor does he know the first principles of architecture. His adoption of this name occurs only after the arrival of the Emperor and is the first step in his assumption of the restrictions of civilization.

85 ARRAÑAL, Fernando L'Architecte et l'Empereur d'Assyrie, p. 111.
86 ibid., p. 100.
87 ibid., p. 104.

88 The play ends on a pessimistic note. Arrabal seems to acknowledge that permanent reconciliation is impossible.
# PART TWO
# SECTION 2

**ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND SYMBOLS OF VIOLENCE**

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Our previous considerations served to establish the clear parallel between the 'système panique', based on the notions of 'la mémoire' and 'le hasard', as elaborated by Arrabal and his followers, and the religious system dealt with by Caillols, Durkheim et al., with its insistence on the fundamental opposition of civilization and chaos. Having posited an equation between chaos and Bataille's notion of violence, and having shown the sacred nature of that violence, we were able to elucidate the aims of the 'mouvement panique' in terms of a desire to penetrate behind the restrictive barriers which were the legacy of a civilization dependent for its stability on order and rationality, and thus to liberate the sacred violence out of which that civilization evolved, and which was therefore still inherent in it in some form. It was shown that Arrabal, in effect, sought within the framework of his drama to re-create the chaos of a mythological 'Urzeit', which was so closely akin to his own notion of 'la confusion', the name which he used to describe the true nature of human reality. In the process it was naturally necessary to indicate the appearance of violence in the dramatist's work and, broadly speaking, because of the nature of the argument, it was possible to identify chaos and violence solely as a result of their total opposition to order, rationality or what is commonly accepted (because of our familiarity with it) as 'normality'. Indeed, as the idea of opposition was the mainspring of the argument, once this had been established it was easy enough to see on which side of the fence the violence lay. Gislar and Etienne, for instance, were both obviously in opposition to their surroundings, and because of the unfamiliarity of those surroundings we were able to deduce that it was in the strange universe into which they had somehow stumbled that the manifestation of violence was to be found. In Le Tricycle
...on the other hand, it was in the central characters that violence was portrayed, while the world which surrounded them was that of cause and effect with which we are familiar. In both cases, however, it was the notion of opposition which led us to our identification of violence. It was thus not necessary to give a detailed description of the symbols used by Arrabal in his portrayal of violence to identify them as such. Essential to our considerations was only the fact that such and such a situation, person, action, etc. expressed violence; we were not concerned to point out the origin or nature of the symbols used, nor to trace the influences which provoked their use (save in as much as these related to the wider framework of the system in which Arrabal seemed to be working).

While the idea of opposition may be adduced to identify symbols of violence, however, it cannot ultimately be allowed to justify them. In other words, we may easily say, for example, that the universe in which Etienne is captive is a symbol of violence simply because it is 'the opposite of logical or normal', and in the context of the argument put forward previously such reasoning is perfectly admissible as a means of identification. It tells us little or nothing, however, about the validity or power of the symbol as an expression of the complex totality which we have claimed to be denoted by the idea of violence in the sense in which we have used it. Thus, in addition to a method of identification, some yardstick of evaluation is needed, for such a symbol must clearly have some significance beyond the mere fact of opposition if it is to be at all meaningful; without further substance the symbols of violence must necessarily be subject to the same criticism of superficiality which we have already levelled against the symbolism used by Arrabal to signify civilization (horns, whips, manacles, etc.) Indeed, the
assumptions of critics such as Taslin and Guichard, which we quoted at the end of the first section of our thesis, and which this second section of our thesis aims to refute, constitute just such a criticism. For they claim precisely that Arrabal's portrayal of chaos and violence is haphazard, extravagant, scatalogical, and the product of a private fantasy world that lacks universal application.

Retaining the terms of the parallel we have established then, it is now necessary to proceed beyond a mere affirmation of the existence of violence and description of its role in the religious system imitated by Arrabal, to a close consideration of the symbols of its expression. By tracing the origins and contents of these symbols, together with the influences they appear to reflect, we shall seek to formulate a means of justifying the specific terms in which Arrabal portrays violence. This will enable us to discover whether their significance is limited, as Taslin would have it, to the portrayal of a 'private neurosis' or whether, in fact, they do have the import that our previous arguments have assured for them, this being that they adequately represent a totality which civilization has obscured, a sacred violence, a primeval chaos, 'la confusion'.

It is with this end in mind that we briefly recall the principles of the religious system by which we sought to elaborate the ideas of the 'mouvement panique'. Starting from the essential premise, put forward by Castillo in L'Honneur et le Sacré, that civilization evolved out of chaos, we noted that civilization might therefore be expected to retain elements of chaos in some form (just as for Arrabal 'la mémoire' evolved out of and incorporated the properties of 'le hasard'). We then showed that any attempt to liberate the latent forces of chaos (such as we claimed was implied in Arrabal's desire to create 'la confusion') and to rediscover
the true reality which lay behind the stereotyped forms of civilization should consist not in the mere transgression of the terms of civilization, but in a unity of the polarised opposites of chaos and civilization (violence and reason, sacred and profane) and a transcendence of their opposition such as is exemplified in the religious sphere by the notion of sacrifice. We proposed that this, in effect, was the pattern in the light of which the notions of the ‘mouvement panique’ might be understood; their ideas were of the same mould and followed the same basic principles, merely the names were changed.

If we now take the liberty of changing the names once more we find precisely the same pattern reflected yet again in a third field, that of Analytical Psychology, or more precisely in the work of its founder, C.G. Jung. For Jung, like Arrabal, was of the opinion that the totality of human existence lay obscured behind certain stereotyped forms, in this case the forms lent to it by consciousness and expressed by the ego, the centre of consciousness:

- It is generally assumed that consciousness is the whole of the psychological individual. But knowledge of the phenomena that can only be explained on the hypothesis of unconscious psychic processes makes it doubtful whether the ego and its contents are in fact identical with the whole. If unconscious processes exist at all they must surely belong to the totality of the individual, even though they are not components of the conscious ego.

Thus, according to Jung, the true reality of human existence comprised both conscious and unconscious elements. His justification for this proposition, moreover, was expressed in terms exactly parallel to those from which we previously deduced the relationship between chaos and civilization:

- Consciousness grows out of an unconscious psyche which is older than it and which goes on functioning together with it or even in spite of it.

Once again there is outlined the familiar pattern of a totality comprising two opposed elements, one concealing, the other concealed,
The self is an expression of human wholeness, of the totality of man, that is to say of both his conscious and unconscious contents. To achieve wholeness in man the opposites are cancelled out; good and evil, conscious and unconscious, masculine and feminine, dark and light are raised to a synthesis symbolically expressed by the coniunctio oppositorum.

Such a necessarily brief exposition of the principles governing the system of Analytical Psychology does scant justice to the depth and range of Jung's thought. Nevertheless, leaving aside the specific concepts used, which will be discussed presently, we have at least given the idea of an underlying pattern which bears so close a resemblance to that of the religious system discussed earlier as to enable us now to view Arrabal's work in a "psychological light". Indeed Jung and the "mouvement panique" are at one in both aim and method: both seek the rediscovery of totality by the liberation of concealed forces.

L'euphorie de l'éphémère panique conduit à la totalité, à la liberation des forces supérieures and it is, moreover, in the principles of Jung's writing that may be found a telling means of justification for the symbols used by
Fundamentally our task consists in a consideration and comparison of the concealed part of the totality, on the one hand as conceived by Jung in the form of the unconscious, and on the other as expressed by Arrabal in symbols of violence, since, in the pattern which we have shown to be common to both systems, the unconscious and violence occupy equivalent positions. In his description of the unconscious, Jung made an important distinction between its personal and transpersonal or collective aspects. Unlike Freud, Jung did not believe that the unconscious was a merely personal affair, a repository of the repressed tendencies of the individual. Instead, he claimed that in addition to what he called the personal unconscious, the unconscious mind comport ed elements that did not derive from individual criteria, but had universal significance and were the product of a collective heritage, common to the whole of mankind:

The collective unconscious is a part of the psyche which can be negatively distinguished from a personal unconscious by the fact that it does not like the latter owe its existence to personal experience ... This collective unconscious does not develop individually, but is inherited. In other words, just as man is an individual and has a personal history, of which much has fallen from the level of consciousness into the personal unconscious, so also he is a representative of his species, and incorporated in his make-up are all those aspects of humanity that have been laid aside, and which have dropped from consciousness in the course of man's evolution to the present state:

The collective unconscious contains the whole spiritual heritage of mankind's evolution born anew in the brain structure of every individual.
Jung clarified the concept further in *Approaching the Unconscious* by likening the development of the mind to that of the body. He pointed out that the body was a 'museum of organs' each with a long evolutionary history behind it, and each retaining traces of the earlier stages of development clearly discernible to the trained eye of the anatomist or biologist. Similarly the mind might equally be presumed to possess an evolutionary history and to retain vestiges of a previous stage of development, a pre-conscious era in fact, which according to Jung might be identified in the collective unconscious by the trained eye of the psychologist.

The collective unconscious, then, is a deeper stratum of the unconscious than the personal unconscious, a universal pre-conscious basis out of which consciousness evolved, and which became obscured by that evolution. As such, Jung inferred that the collective unconscious was constituted of universal tendencies which lay beneath the categories of all human behaviour, characterising it as specifically human, but which were modified in our conscious perception by the circumstances (epoch, culture, etc.) in which they appeared. In other words, in much the same way as we have here perceived a single pattern underlying systems proposed by two different disciplines, so Jung claimed that the behaviour of all peoples at all times, no matter how widely the forms of that behaviour varied from time to time and place to place, could be traced back to a number of constant and common bases which together comprised the collective unconscious. To these universal tendencies Jung gave the name of archetypes and they occupy a position of fundamental importance both in Jung's schema, and in our considerations.

The prime source of this importance resides in the fact that the archetype acts as an intermediary between present consciousness in its various forms and the common base (i.e., the collective unconscious) from which those forms have evolved. For while on
the one hand the archetype points back to the source of humanity itself:

It represents or personifies certain instructive data of the dark, primitive psyche, the real but invisible roots of consciousness 15

on the other hand it is also manifested in symbolic form in the conscious mind.16 In other words it is through the archetype that the conscious mind can perceive the nature of the collective unconscious out of which it has evolved, and this is, of course, the first step towards the realisation of the goal of totality.

Indeed, as one might expect17, it was through their manifestation in symbolic form in consciousness that Jung first conceived and subsequently found empirical justification for his notion of archetypes. Observing and comparing the symbols of various cultures and various epochs as manifested particularly in myths and fairy tales18 Jung noted that beneath all the differing forms which the symbols took, there lay a marked uniformity in the notions they seemed to express. All local variants, however diverse, were evolved from a number of common bases which Jung categorised, personifying them in the form of archetypes to which he gave names.19 A simple example of the process is given by Storr20 who explains that the symbols of Sir Galahad and Odysseus are two very different manifestations of a common notion, the archetype of the hero. On a rather more complicated level Jane Pratt in Consciousness and Sacrifice21 traces the common archetypal pattern which lies beneath various flood stories which she compares from the most diverse (and often the most unlikely) sources, but both these examples make a little clearer both the means by which Jung arrived at the notion of the archetype and also what he meant by it.

Having thus inferred the existence of archetypes from his study of mythology, Jung added the important corollary that archetypes
could consequently be regarded as the underlying to myths, a set of determining principles from which myths were evolved, and embodiments of the fundamental truths which myths expressed:

The archetype is a kind of readiness to reproduce over and over again the same or similar mythical ideas. This lends to the archetypes an important quality suggested by their function as intermediaries:

Not only are archetypes apparently impressions of over-repeated typical experiences, but at the same time they behave empirically like agents that tend towards the repetition of the same experiences.

and in as much as the archetypes together constitute the collective unconscious, it also identifies the latter as a repository for the universal realities from which myths originate:

Jung concluded that there was a myth creating level of mind common to people of different times and cultures. This level of mind he named the Collective Unconscious.

If, in the light of this conclusion, we now briefly pass back to the sphere of religion, however, it is interesting to note that in Mircea Eliade's *Myth and Reality* we find the function of myth assessed in the following terms:

Myths describe the various and sometimes dramatic break-throughs of the sacred into the world for this definition already seems to lend support to our suggestion of a parallel between the religious system studied earlier and the psychological system which presently occupies our attention. In each case the primordial 'concealed' facet of the essential opposition upon which the system pivots reveals itself in the sequent 'concealing' stage through the agency of myth. For Jung myths reveal the collective unconscious, for Eliade they reveal the sacred or, by a juxtaposition of terms which we have previously justified, violence.
Indeed, the similarity of the two systems is widely indicated in the works of religious historians and psychologists alike. Eliade, in *The History of Religions* [1952] for example, pointed out that a comparable methodology was used in both fields, each being concerned to study symbols with a view to establishing an underlying synthesis of universal variants. In *The Sacred and the Profane* [1957], moreover, he gave a detailed description of the religious nature of the unconscious, the terms of which correspond significantly to those we have already seen Jung use, while in *Myth and Reality* he went so far as to state:

> It can even be said that modern man's only real contact with cosmic sacrality is effected by the unconscious. 

On the other side of the fence, meanwhile, Jung repeatedly stressed the numinous quality of the archetypes and devoted a large portion of his work to a demonstration of the religious nature of his own psychological ideas. While it is not our concern here to study this part of Jung's work in detail, its proposals are succinctly summed up by Erich Fromm when he says:

> It is a necessary consequence of his definition of religion and of the unconscious that Jung arrives at the conclusion that, in view of the nature of the unconscious mind, the influence of the unconscious upon us is a basic religious phenomenon.

In addition to this statement of the religious nature of the unconscious, there is further support for the proposed parallel in the fact that Jung clearly viewed the development of consciousness and the process of civilization as one and the same thing:

> Man has developed consciousness slowly and laboriously in a process that took untold ages to reach the civilized state.

It is precisely the process of civilization, based as we have previously remarked, on notions of order and rationality which has determined the status of the collective unconscious:
the rationalism of modern life, by desacralising everything irrational precipitated the function of the irrational into the unconscious.

For these aspects rejected by civilization were also repressed by consciousness and fell below the threshold of consciousness into the collective unconscious. Consequently, in the collective unconscious which preceded consciousness is to be found the chaos which preceded civilization, and as Jung says, it is this chaos which re-appears when the barrier of consciousness is lifted:

A collapse of the conscious attitude is no small matter. It always feels like the end of the world, as though everything had tumbled back into original chaos.

There can be no doubt then, that not only is there a parallel to be drawn between the two systems, but that on the one hand the collective unconscious and on the other sacredness, chaos or violence are equivalent concepts. If the archetypes are categorisations of the collective unconscious, moreover, the principles determining its manifestation in symbolic form in the conscious mind, then they are also categorisations of what we have previously called violence, and the bases governing the manifestation of violence in civilization. As such they provide precisely the yardstick we are seeking in order to evaluate the symbolism used by Arrabal to express violence in his drama.

In the light of the above considerations we may now view Arrabal's objectives not only in terms of a desire to lift the barriers of civilization and rediscover chaos, but also in terms of a desire to penetrate the restrictions of consciousness and rediscover the archetypes of the unconscious. Such a statement might conceivably give rise to the objection that we have no evidence that Arrabal was familiar with Jung's work or the ideas it expressed. This objection cannot be admitted as an invalidation of our attempt to
assess the playwright's symbolism in the light of the psychologist's elaboration of the archetypes, however. For, as has been indicated, much of the significance of the archetypes resides in the fact that they are manifested universally or spontaneously. As such they are just as likely to influence the symbolism employed by a writer who has never heard of the concept, as that used by someone with an intimate knowledge of Jung's theories. Thus the whole question of whether Arrabal was acquainted with Jung's work, though fascinating, is irrelevant to our considerations. If, as we have seen, the collective unconscious is the universal heritage of mankind's psychic evolution, moreover, it is not difficult to ally the notion of its rediscovery with the 'panique' objective to "trouver les mécanismes de la mémoire". Discovery of the unconscious in the form of archetypes, however, also leads the way to an understanding of the complementary 'panique' desire to "trouver les règles du hasard". For we have stated that the archetypes possess an important duality. Not only do they point back to the existence of an original preconscious era, but conjointly, in as much as that era forms a basis for all subsequent development, they can be reduced to divine the nature of the development.

The unconscious has a Janus-face: on one side its contents point back to a preconscious, prehistoric world of instinct, while on the other side it potentially anticipates the future — precisely because of the instinctive readiness for action of the factors that determine man's fate. If we had complete knowledge of the ground plan lying dormant in an individual from the beginning his fate would be in a large measure predictable.

To use Arrabal's terms, then, we may, by liberating the forces of past 'mémoire' from sterility, discover an underlying pattern which in turn prefigures the enigma of future 'hasard'.

Jung, of course, was not concerned to predict the future, but he realized that it was in this fundamental duality inherent in
the collective unconscious (and thus in the archetypes) that lay
the means of transcending the opposition of conscious and
unconscious. The archetypes were not only the means of looking
back and discovering the forgotten nature of a previous era, but
they were also a means of looking forward, providing the basis for
a realization of totality. For through the archetypes the
unconscious could be assimilated into the conscious mind and the
opposition transcended. The individuation process was precisely
a deliberate confrontation with, an assimilation of the forces of
the unconscious in the form of archetypes, the efficacy of
which derived from the duality of these latter:

it is necessary to give special attention to the images
of the Collective Unconscious, because they are the source
from which hints may be drawn for the solution of the
problem of opposites. From the conscious elaboration of
this material the transcendent function (individuation process)
reveals itself as a mode of apprehension mediated by the
archetypes and capable of uniting the opposites.

It comprised a 'conscious' re-creation of the chaotic violent
realm of the unconscious and thus aimed at a transcendence of the
polarised opposites of conscious and unconscious, expressing unity
and totality (symbolised by the 'Self'). As such it reflects
exactly the aims of the 'mouvement panique':

le panique cherche l'unité en employant le manque d'unité,
le déséquilibre, la contradiction volontaire, la
discontinuité de rythme.

This fundamental concept of the duality of the archetypes
is most clearly exemplified by the archetype of the child, the nature
of which, in turn, may be readily perceived in the child figure
which symbolises it. For the child figure itself has an inherent
duality which clearly reflects the position and function of the
notion of 'archetype' in the wider framework of the individuation
process. On the one hand the child, as an undeveloped human
individual, points back to the inchoate pre-civilized state of mankind
The child motif represents the unconscious childhood aspect of the collective psyche. At the same time, however, since there is contained in the child the germ of the fully mature and developed adult which he will one day become, the child motif also suggests the possibility of future development:

The occurrence of the child motif ... signifies as a rule an anticipation of future developments even though, at first sight it may seem like a retrospective configuration and as such is even a forerunner of the Self, the symbol of totality which lies at the end of the individuation process.

Having grasped the essential significance of the duality of the archetype, as exemplified in the figure of the child, it is interesting to note that Arrabal's own widespread use of child motifs expresses a corresponding duality. This may clearly be seen if we contrast two strikingly related images, to be found in vastly different phases of the playwright's work. In *Craion* ([1957] *Piojo* and *Lilet* stand on the threshold of a new and 'civilised' life:

*A partir d'aujourd'hui nous sommes bons et purs.*

They themselves are children about to enter the adult world. Beside them lies the corpse of their new born child, symbolising the world of chaos and violence that they are putting behind them, the child which, significantly, they killed in a final act of violence before deciding to be 'good'. The child motif in this case clearly points back into the past; its appearance has confronted *Piojo* and *Lilet* with a picture of their own pre-civilized, chaotic stage of development. That stage is now past, however, and the child has been murdered as a prelude to a 'better' life. In *Le Ciel et le Verdo* ([1970] a similar symbol is used to a very different end. This time it is not the death but the birth of a child which is
portrayed. And in this case the symbol points not back but forwards, since Hibs’s child (born at the end of the play) is held up throughout as a symbol of belief in a new potentiety:

Co voir plus une fille, elle sera petite comme un cafard, ilade comme un cafard et dorée comme un scarabée doré. Ce sera la Messe de

and the onset of a new era, achieved (as we indicated in our previous considerations) by the transcendence of opposites.

This striking adherence by Arrabal to the terms by which Jung denotes the child archetype points the way to a means of justifying the symbolism used by the playwright to express violence. For, as we have said, Jung’s system of archetypes provides us in effect with a categorization of violence. It is, as we shall see, a categorization followed by Arrabal, not only in his use of the child figure, but in his representation of a whole pattern of symbols bearing a more than coincidental resemblance to the terms used by Jung to elaborate the individuation process. We have already pointed out the similarity between Arrabal’s aims and methods and those of the individuation process and thus our undertaking now consists in following precisely and in detail the steps which for Jung constituted the path of individuation, thereby discovering the nature of the unconscious, and the forms in which it is manifested. We may then compare these forms with the symbols used by Arrabal to express a concept which we have already shown to be equivalent.
It must immediately be recognised that any attempt to examine the nature of the collective unconscious necessarily involves a preliminary consideration of the personal unconscious, which lies between the deeper stratum and consciousness. We cannot hope to (any more than Jung or his patients could hope to) assimilate the terms by which the collective unconscious manifests itself, except through a process which begins with consciousness and subsequently takes the personal unconscious into account as a 'point de départ' for entry into the deeper collective level. Indeed the individuation process approaches the collective unconscious through differentiation first of the conscious ego and then the personal unconscious, and this is the path that we shall follow. Having said this, the rôle of the personal unconscious in our present considerations should be made perfectly clear. We are not here concerned to interpret the whole gamut of Arrabal's symbols as manifestations of the personal unconscious, but to arrive at an objective elucidation of those symbols in the light of a system which reflects Arrabal's own. As we shall see, moreover, Jung's system is echoed in its entirety in the playwright's symbolism, which is not confined merely to the limited field of the personal unconscious. Thus, while we must begin with a study of this latter element, it is not an end in itself, but rather the necessary prelude to the achievement of our present aims, a means of entry into the deeper level of the collective unconscious, where are to be found the archetypes against which we may justly evaluate the full range of Arrabal's symbolism.

Indeed the members of the 'mouvement panique' themselves, as is attested by their statements in Le Panique, seemed to approach their goal by a comparable process. In other words their first steps in uncovering the 'concealed' aspects of the totality for
which they aimed, consisted precisely in enumerating the nature
of the 'concealing' aspects which opposed them. It will be recalled
for instance that Jodorowski, in the course of his statement of the
aims of the 'mouvement panique', expressed the belief that the true
nature of man (to which he gave the name 'personne') lay obscured
beneath a shroud (personnage) cast over it in the name of
civilization. The 'mouvement panique' had as one of its fundamental
aims to lift that shroud, and to lead man to a rediscovery of his
true nature in all its complexity:

Le panique pense que dans la vie quotidienne tous les
custodes cheminent déguisés en jouant un personnage,
et que la tâche du théâtre est de faire en sorte que
l'homme cesse de jouer un personnage devant d'autres
personnages, qu'il finisse par l'éligner pour s'approcher
peu à peu de la personne.3

The notion of 'personnage' adopted here by Jodorowski would seem to
be exactly equivalent to Jung's own concept of the 'persona', for it
was under this name that Jung designated the rôle played by the
individual in accordance with the expectations of society, a rôle,
moreover, behind which the true personality tended to become obscured:

The persona is a complicated system of relations between
the individual consciousness and society, fittingly enough
a kind of mask, designed on the one hand to make a definite
impression upon others, and on the other, to conceal the
ture nature of the individual.4

Jung made it clear that the adoption of the mask of which he spoke
was a necessary and inevitable facet of the education (or civilizing
process) of the individual, and that the 'persona' itself evolved
as a kind of compromise between the true nature of the individual
and the function which society expected him to perform:

the persona ... is a compromise between individual and
society as to what a man should appear to be.5

Thus it would seem not at all presumptuous to suggest that Jung
and Jodorowski are not only using similar terms, but are in fact
talking about exactly the same thing. This is incontrovertibly
borne out by Arrabal himself, when, speaking to Schifres about his
theatre, he states:

Il révèle que nous sommes au fond très différents de
notre apparence sociale, très loin de nos gestes. 55

For both are concerned with the pursuit of totality, to which
'persona' for Jung and 'personnage' for Jodorowski and Arrabal,
stand as a barrier. Hence, while the artist's desire 'de développer
la totalité de son être', as we shall see, is not simply a matter
of breaking down the barrier imposed on the individual by his
'persona', Jodorowski nevertheless appears to propose the necessity
of penetrating behind this mask as a preliminary move at least.
Indeed the uncovering of the mysteries concealed by the persona is
a sine qua non of the aims of psychologist and 'panique' artist
alike.

It is essential immediately to grasp the idea of the
'persona' as a barrier between the conscious and the unconscious.

As such, of course, it is not itself an archetype of the unconscious
although its significance resides in the fact that it is a collective
phenomenon:

The persona is a collective phenomenon, a facet of the
personality that might equally well belong to somebody
else, but it is often mistaken for individuality. 57

The effect of the adoption of a persona then is precisely to immerse
the individual and unconscious aspects of the personality in a
conscious and collective form of expression, compatible with the
exigences of society. Consequently, the more rigid the persona
presented, the more neglected and undeveloped the life of the
unconscious. Jung expresses this idea emphatically in Concerning
Rebirth 58 when he says:
One could say, with a little exaggeration, that the persona is that which in reality one is not, but which oneself as well as others think one is.

In other words the persona effects a separation, it exercises a function essentially similar to that of the 'interdits' in the religious system dealt with previously, it is the barrier between two domains, one conscious, the other unconscious. We have previously stated the existence of two opposing realms in Arrabal's plays, and it is now interesting to note that the border which separates these two territories is relentlessly patrolled by a series of persona figures. The policeman in *Le Triomph* 1955 with his mysterious incomprehensible utterances, the judge in *Le Labyrinthe* 1955 with his equally baffling application of judicial procedure, and the voice of the authorities in *Le Ciel et La Merde* are all significantly impersonal and nameless, existing solely in terms of the function indicated by their title, and serving precisely to emphasize the incompatibility of the two domains. We have previously shown, while dealing in the religious sphere, that such figures exist to protect the civilization or order which they represent from the threat of the reality of chaos or violence, which preceded it, and which must be suppressed to ensure its continuing stability. From the psychological point of view, however, we are now in a position to witness that these same figures are also representatives of a collective consciousness and that as such they have an exactly parallel function, to suppress and conceal (the totality of the personality) in order to protect that consciousness from the threat of the unconscious. Thus Arrabal's repeated use of such figures in his plays would appear further to justify the equation we have proposed between on the one hand, the opposites of civilization and chaos dealt with previously, and on the other
those of conscious and unconscious which presently occupy our attention.

The conscious adoption of a 'persona', as we have indicated, is effected by the deliberate cultivation of certain tendencies, and a consequent neglect of others. So it is that we can speak of the concealing properties of the persona, and Jung himself states:

The persona is always identical with a typical attitude dominated by a single psychological function ... Consequently its exclusive character causes the relative repression of the other functions. For this reason the persona is harmful to the individual's development. 22

As Frieda Fordham makes clear, however, the tendencies thus repressed do not simply disappear but live on as a significant aspect of the personality:

These repressed tendencies belong to what Jung calls the personal unconscious, and far from withering away, as one might hope, they seem to be like neglected weeds that flourish in any forgotten corner of the garden. 23

These tendencies, moreover, are personified in Jung's schema by the archetype of the shadow, who represents precisely the dark or inferior side of the individual, that which has been discarded in favour of the 'ideal' of the persona:

The shadow personifies everything that the subject refuses to acknowledge about himself and yet is always thrusting itself upon him directly or indirectly. 24

As such the shadow incorporates all that Freud denoted by subconscious which, as we have stated, is a rough equivalent of Jung's concept of the personal unconscious. Jung is at pains, however, to point out that the shadow is not a purely personal phenomenon:

We are no longer aware that in carnival customs and the like, there are remnants of a collective shadow figure which prove that the personal shadow is in part descended from a numinous collective figure. 25

The significance of this notion of the shadow possessing a collective aspect resides primarily in the fact that it marks the shadow as
the point at which personal and collective unconscious meet. It
is thus the most accessible facet of the unconscious and consequently
the starting point for any examination of its full range:

since the shadow is the figure nearest to consciousness
and the least explosive one, it is also the first
component of personality to come up in an analysis of
the unconscious. 66

In the psychologist’s own words it is “the gateway to the
unconscious” and as such should, on no account, be understood to
represent the full extent of the unconscious, of which it is but
a part. Thus we should not fall into the convenient trap of
equating directly Jodorowski’s concept of ‘personne’ with Jung’s
idea of ‘shadow’, for the totality to which Jodorowski gives the
name ‘personne’ includes not only the shadow, but a whole lot more
besides. 67 Nor should we, as might appear tempting, cite

L’Architecte et L’Empereur d’Assyrie 68 as an outstanding
example of the problems of the shadow, 69 for such an interpretation
would be a serious understatement of the full range of associations
evoked by the play’s imagery. Certainly the Emperor is led to an
exploration of, and confrontation with, his shadow, but this is only
one of the figures that lurk behind his rigid and self-imposed
personas.

The shadow, then, is a starting-point. From what has
already been said about the persona, it is evident that the repressed
tendencies, which subsequently comprise the personal aspect of the
shadow are those which, on moral, social or ethical grounds, because
of their primitive, chaotic or violent nature, 70 are rejected as
incompatible with the demands of civilization. 71 It is equally
plain that, as stated previously, their repression in no way either
denies their existence or divests them of their inherent danger.
The shadow is a living part of the personality and therefore wants to live with it in some form. It cannot be argued out of existence or rationalized into harmlessness. The shadow lives on below the surface of consciousness ready, as Antonio Moreno puts it "to burst forth suddenly in a moment of awareness upsetting the ego and breeding neurosis." Thus, any consideration of the personal aspect of the shadow must necessarily take into account the existence of the 'persona', by exclusion from which it has evolved and the stability of which it permanently threatens. Indeed Joseph Henderson tells us:

The ego ... is in conflict with the shadow in what Dr. Jung once called 'the battle for deliverance'.

and, as Jung himself points out, it is just such a battle which forms the basis of the Faust/Mephistopheles relationship depicted by Goethe. Hesse too gives an unmistakable account of the battle within a single man, between the forces of persona and shadow, cosmos and chaos, conscious and unconscious in his description of Harry the wolf-man in Steppenwolf:

For example, if Harry, as a man, had a beautiful thought, felt a fine and noble emotion, or performed a so-called good act, then the wolf bared his teeth at him and laughed and showed him with bitter scorn how laughable this whole noble show was in the eyes of a beast, of a wolf who knew well enough in his heart what suited him, namely, to trot alone over the Steppes, and now and then to gorge himself with blood or to pursue a female wolf.

Indeed the proliferation of similar examples, in literature, history and above all mythology, establishes the persona/shadow struggle as an archetypal source of violence in the psychological sense.

The clearest use of the concepts of persona and shadow in Arrabal's work occurs in Caractère pour un Noir Assassine [1956].
definitions is almost so clear as to be laughable, and even allowing for the use of a different medium, the symbolism of his treatment of this fundamental psychological problem is naive in the extreme, when compared (say) to that of Brecht. Arrabal portrays two actors 'manqués', Vincent and Jerome, who seek to hide their insufficiency behind a series of theatrical costumes, the mere donning of which, they believe, will ensure their success and importance in the (theatrical) world:

_Avec ces costumes-là, nous deviendrons les meilleurs acteurs du monde entier._

It is made quite clear that their deliberate assumption of the correct persona is carried out at the expense of any other consideration which might occupy their attention:

_Pour l'instant on fait quelque chose d'extraordinaire, on ne doit pas s'occuper d'autre chose._

and the process is completed when, in a transparently symbolic gesture, they incarcerate the corpse of Luce's father in one of the clothes chests. The repression thus effected enables them to conceive a pure and idealized love for Luce, unsullied by the contamination of instinctive sexuality:

_Notre amour est sincère et on ne peut rien faire de mal avec elle._

It also ensures, however, the appearance of the shadow in the form of the black François d'Assise who gives expression to those repressed tendencies by sleeping with Luce. This action serves as a catalyst, allowing the violent and repressed side of Vincent and Jerome to erupt into consciousness. They brutally murder François d'Assise, and, though they attempt to reconcile this act with the terms of their personas by equating it with a scene from _Cibello_, they are nevertheless brought to an unpalatable confrontation with the darker side of themselves. The incompatibility of this
unconscious violent element and the conscious persona they have sought to hide it under is underlined, moreover, by our first actual glimpse of the outside world whose admiration Vincent and Jerôme had hoped so keenly to win. This takes the form of the police (again a persona-type representation of the collective consciousness) who, despite the fact that Vincent and Jerôme are more enraptured than ever by their own acting ability, seem altogether unimpressed and enter to arrest them.

Cérémonie pour un Noir Assasinné deals then, albeit in rather crude terms, with the discovery of the personal aspect of the shadow. Jerôme and Vincent are brought forcibly to a realisation that their personality is not bounded by the limits imposed by their costumes. It is the appearance of their darker, unconscious side, moreover, which is their real crime, and which heralds both the battle of conscious and unconscious and the subsequent arrival of the police. We have said, however, that the shadow is not exclusively a personal figure such as is represented here, but that it is descended from, and often appears as, the manifestation of a collective archetype situated firmly in the realm of the collective unconscious. The significance of this, as stated earlier, is tremendous, for it facilitates entry into the collective unconscious by means of a personal approach, or as Antonio Moreno expresses it:

... the contents of the personal unconscious merge indistinguishably with the archetypal contents of the collective unconscious and drag the latter with them when the shadow is brought into consciousness.

Thus it is that we have been able to speak of the shadow as 'the gateway of the unconscious'. Unlike those of the personal shadow, the representations of the archetype of the collective shadow are diffuse and difficult to comprehend. Jung, however, states emphatically that what he calls 'the trickster figure' is one such
representation:

The trickster is a collective shadow figure, a summation of all the inferior traits of character in individuals and it is in this form that we can perceive the appearance of the collective shadow in Arrabal's drama.

Now we have said that the personal shadow conveys those 'inferior' aspects of the individual which, in the process of his education, were rejected as being incompatible with the demands of society. If we translate this on to a collective level, moreover, we are interestingly enough brought fairly and squarely back into the realms of chaos and civilization. For the process of individual education on a collective level equals precisely the civilization of mankind, while the repressed elements, which for the individual are instinctive anti-social tendencies, become on the collective level the chaotic or violent aspects of inchoate human existence which were rejected as part of the civilizing process, but which linger on (according to Jung and apparently also to Arrabal) in the collective unconscious. These inferences are clearly supported in Jung's commentary on the trickster figure, when, for example, in explaining the appearances of the trickster in modern man he states simply:

Outwardly people are more or less civilized but inwardly they are still primitives.

or, perhaps even more pertinently, when he gives a detailed description of the role of the trickster figure in religious festivals, which consisted in recalling by his buffoonery the wildness of a previous era.

Essentially then, the trickster is a personification of the chaos of a previous consciousness, which has been displaced but not lost in the course of civilization. As such, the prime
traits of the trickster, as described by Jung, revolve round his reflection of a totally undifferentiated consciousness. He is a primitive daemonic figure, whose behaviour is completely unpredictable and incomprehensible to the conscious mind. He is, as it were, capable of anything, fond of mischievous trickery and prone to playing childish senseless pranks. Though irrational, cruel and cynical in his treatment of others, the trickster himself is given to great suffering, both as a result of self-inflicted ills and of the vengeance of those he has wronged. On the other hand, he is not an exclusively negative or maleficient figure since he is as superhuman as subhuman, as divine as bestial, and the possessor of extraordinary powers which mark him as a forerunner of the saviour.

The trickster is a primitive 'cosmic' being of divine-animal nature, on the one hand superior to man because of his superhuman qualities, and on the other hand inferior to him because of his unreason and unconsciousness.

Henderson makes an important addition to Jung's own examination of the characteristics of the trickster figure when he states:

Trickster is a figure whose physical appetites dominate his behaviour: he has the mentality of an infant and indeed it is only logical that the personification of an undeveloped consciousness should be an essentially puerile and childlike figure. Jung, meanwhile, cites Hans Thurst, Tom Thumb and clowns of the modern circus as examples of the trickster figure, and also states that his machinations have been assimilated into modern man's cause-and-effect-based world under such rationalised names as jinx and hoodoo.

Bearing these descriptions and examples in mind, we find the trickster figure more or less faithfully represented in
Arrabal's plays. In **Arrabal** [1968] for example, Fridigan's awareness of the bizarre nature of the world into which he has stumbled is awoken first by his perplexed dealings with the roguish Pana and Any, whose childish and irrational behaviour repeatedly belies the claim that their purpose is to help Fridigan. Many of the characteristics of the trickster figure are apparent in this pair; they are not of fixed form in that they adopt a series of masks (mostly of animals) to modify their appearance; they maintain a childlike and dependent devotion to Lys, and yet claim to Fridigan that she tortures them mercilessly. They behave as children throughout, and the prominence of their physical appetites is also demonstrated by such episodes as that where they urinate over Fridigan, or become sexually aroused by an advertisement for Omo. In addition, their inability to speak subtly symbolises at once both their inferiority and their superiority to the unfortunate Fridigan. On the one hand they themselves are aware that the stammer which impedes their speech points to a certain inferiority:

> les pauvres sont si susceptibles, que lorsqu'ils entendent parler en leur présence, ils se figurent que l'on veut se moquer de leur bégaiement.

but on the other hand the use of song as an alternative means of expression insinuates a level higher rather than lower than that of 'normal' speech.

Pana and Any recall vividly the figures of Kardo and Malderic in the earlier play **La Lai de Parabbas [1964]**. Once again their behaviour contradicts their purpose, as is shown in their relationship with Glifer:

> Malderic et Kardo, qui doivent faciliter son initiation, se comportent au contraire de façon très bizarre et on dirait qu'ils sont contre lui.
and they conform exactly to Henderson's description of the trickster figure, as the following episode shows:

**KARDO:** Madame, pouvez-vous nous donner un sandwich?

**ARLYS:** Toujours manger, toujours manger. Vous êtes deux incorrigibles gloutons!...Vous ne pouvez pas vous plaindre, vous vous gobergez comme des coqs en pâte!

**KARDO:** Oui madame.

**ARLYS:** Quel genre de sandwich voulez-vous?

**MALD.:** Moi, au saucisson ..., mais avec du beurre.

**KARDO:** Moi au caviar.

**ARLYS (à Giafar):** Donnez-le-leur, ce sont de vrais enfants:

Kardo and Malderic too suffer cruelly at the hands of their protectress, but, as in the case of Bana and Ang, the presence of the wounds thus sustained cannot be verified. Meanwhile their confusing trickery tantalises Giafar almost beyond endurance, the culminating point of his ordeal coming when they fire toy arrows at the bed in which he and Arlys are making love. Even then, though, Arlys prevents Giafar from remonstrating with them as he wishes and gradually it becomes clear that there is a method, however annoying, in their madness. For the effect of that madness, though ostensibly negative, is progressively to strip Giafar of the touchstones of logic and rationality on which his consciousness is based, and thus to facilitate his entry into the realms of chaos at the end of the play. Their diabolic trickery, in other words, is directed to divine ends, and it is fitting that the other, more positive side of the trickster figure becomes fully apparent in the final scene when Kardo and Malderic assume the rôle of priests in attendance on Giafar’s initiation rite, accompanying it with a frenetic dance which reflects the world of unconscious chaos in which their origins lie, and into which, as the final gesture in a process in which they have played a significant part, they now symbolically transport him:
Kardo et Walderic emportent Giafar sur sa sède
gestatoria jusqu’au fond, derrière le paravent, où
ils disparaissent suivis du père et de la mère.96

It is clear from this description that the figures of
trickster and child are closely related, since the child too,
in one of its aspects represents the preconscious aspect of the
psyche. We have already studied two images used by Arrabal which
reflect the full duality of the child archetype, but it should now
be further noted that he makes frequent use of this single aspect,
particularly to establish the opposition which characterizes much
of the earlier work. Indeed there is no shortage of commentators
who make deprecatory references to the childish nature of many of
Arrabal’s characters. What they fail to add, however, is that the
child in this context is a meaningful and poignant symbol totally
in keeping with the dramatist’s aims. It is the naive childishness
of the characters in Le Tricycle who on one hand are blissfully
unaware of the import of the crime they have committed but who on
the other hand know it is wrong to tell lies, which marks them
as representatives of a chaotic and violent universe, opposed to the
‘normal’ world which surrounds them (and which as we have seen is
represented by the policeman). That chaos is symbolized precisely
by the fact that they are children and thus their childishness is
not at all at variance with the fact that they commit a brutal
murder. Indeed, in as much as we have said the archetypes constitute
a universal basis for behaviour, they murder because they are chil-
dren - the murder clearly enough symbolises violence and if as we
now know the child motif also symbolises violence, then the two are
in perfect harmony.

It is in this light then, that the repeated appearance
of child-like figures in Arrabal’s plays should be viewed. Indeed
the very uniformity with which the motif is employed by the playwright
would seem to vindicate its use. For, as we have already indicated, even in the early plays it is not inevitably, as Esslin's account in The Theatre of the Absurd would seem to imply, the central character who is childlike, opposed to the adult world which surrounds him and which he cannot understand. In Le Labyrinthe, for example, it is Etienne who is the central character and who lacks comprehension, but Micaela who is the child:

Au début, je venais ici tous les matins et je faisais ceci devant lui pour lui faire plaisir. Il me regardait tout joyeux. Ensuite nous jouions, j'apportais du sable dans les seaux et il m'enterrait les pieds.

because, of course, it is she who represents an unfamiliar chaotic universe which Etienne stands outside. Arrabal's use of the child motif reveals considerably more understanding of its origin than Esslin's interpretation of it. If he were indiscriminately to make the hero a child, we might indeed be able to infer that the hero always embodied the author's personal unconscious, and thus to level against Arrabal the charge of portraying some kind of private neurosis. But such is not the case, for the child, whether the hero or a representative of the order which opposes the hero, always, in keeping with the origin of the symbol, represents the irrational, chaotic element of the duality in Arrabal's universe. His central characters certainly view the human situation with "uncomprehending eyes", but because of the nature of the totality of that situation these are not exclusively "the uncomprehending eyes of childlike simplicity", they are just as often the uncomprehending eyes of adult consciousness. For the child is uniformly a chaotic element, and as such, in company with the trickster, the child is a valid and meaningful symbol of that aspect of chaos, seen by Jung as the archetype of the shadow.
Our study of the archetype of the shadow has led us firmly into the realm of the collective unconscious. It has also revealed the essential characteristic of the archetypes which is their duality. We noted that the trickster figure is at once divinity and demon, that the child figure pointed on the one hand back to a preconscious era and on the other forward to the possibility of future development, and indeed the duality thus indicated is a basic feature of all the archetypes:

Just as all archetypes have a positive, favourable bright side that points upwards, so also they have one that points downwards.99

This duality derives from Jung's central belief in the notion of the opposition inherent in all things and it is reflected in the fundamental polarity of conscious and unconscious which constitutes the totality of the human psyche, and as such is itself an archetypal exemplar of human behaviour:

How else could it have occurred to man to divide the cosmos, on the analogy of day and night, summer and winter into a bright day-world and a dark night-world peopled with fabulous monsters, unless he had the prototype of such a division in himself, in the polarity between conscious and the invisible and unknowable unconscious.100

The belief is elucidated by the notion of syzygies "the paired opposites where the One is never separated from the Other, its antithesis"101 significantly common, as Jung points out,102 to the fields of both psychology and comparative religion. Indeed, while it is not here our concern to expand further on the notion of syzygies nor to show how Jung justifies his use of the term, it is interesting to note in passing the correspondence between the idea of the duality of the archetypes, and that of the 'pure' and 'impure' aspects of sacredness put forward by Durkheim.
We saw before that the function of the archetype (to link past, present and future) was represented in the archetype of the child. We can now say that what we have established as the form of the archetype - the essential polarity which is a formal structure of all experience, as well as a distinguishing feature of the collective unconscious reflected in the archetypes themselves - is represented in the archetype of the mother. Jung supports this idea when he says:

The structure is something given, the precondition that is found to be present in every case. And this is the mother, the matrix - the form into which all experience is poured.

The mother archetype is further essential to our considerations, moreover, in that it is in the representations of this archetype that we also find the first projection of the archetype of the anima, the central and predominant feature of the collective unconscious. The mother acts, as it were, as a link between the shadow and the anima. An understanding of the mother leads to the possibility of assimilating the nature of the central anima archetype, and this in turn leads directly to the development of the self, the goal of individuation:

If the encounter with the shadow is the "apprentice piece" in the individual's development then that with the anima is the master-piece.

The duality of the mother archetype, as represented by the mother figure, is first discernible in the notions of dual descent and dual birth. Jung noted the appearance in art and myth of the idea that man was both human and divine by nature, and thus possessed two mothers. Indeed this notion of dual motherhood is reflected to the present day in the person of the godmother, who looks after the spiritual needs of the child while the 'real'
mother takes care of his temporal needs. The regularity with which this motif was repeated led Jung to infer that it pointed to the expression of a fundamental human situation, the full import of which had fallen from consciousness in the course of civilization, but which nevertheless yet impinged on the conscious mind in the form of the figure of "the loving and terrible mother." As will readily be perceived, this formula, coined by Jung to elucidate the nature of the mother archetype, is accurately represented by Arrabal in Les Deux Bourreaux in the person of Françoise, who has her husband cruelly tortured and finally killed, but does so, paradoxically, out of pure love of her family and a desire for peace and harmony:

Tandis que votre père compromettait allègrement votre avenir, j'ai veillé sur toi, et je n'ai eu qu'un but, te rendre heureux, te donner tout le bonheur que je n'ai pas connu. Parce que pour moi la seule chose qui compte, c'est que ton frère et toi, vous soyez satisfaits, tout le reste n'a aucune importance.

Bearing in mind the origins of the mother archetype discussed above, we can elucidate the 'loving and terrible' duality in the following manner, thus discovering in what it consists. We have said that the duality derives from the original notion that man had two mothers, one spiritual, one temporal. The notion of a 'spiritual' mother is conserved in the image of the personal mother, moreover, by the fact that the latter is, first and foremost, a representation of the unconscious, of chaos. For the mother has given birth to the child according to the same archetypal pattern by which unconsciousness begat consciousness:

In actual psychic experience, the mother corresponds to the collective unconscious and the son to consciousness.

It is this aspect of the mother, moreover, which is first perceived by the child, and indeed, since the child itself possesses a
completely undifferentiated consciousness in its early years, it identifies and forms strong links with this 'chaotic' side of the mother. Furthermore, since one half of the duality comprising the mother represents the pre-civilized state, the mother becomes an object of longing: the man desirous of rediscovering the mysteries of the unconscious will often believe that they are to be found in a re-creation of the terms of his earliest childhood under which he was at one with the chaotic nature of his mother, or better still in a return to the womb which, by the analogy we have already indicated, signifies a state which existed before the birth of consciousness. It is precisely this desire to rediscover the totality of the unconscious (or chaos), to return to the source whence consciousness evolved, that is depicted in Une Tortue Nommée Dostoievski. For not only does the playwright make it quite clear that Malik's entry into the tortoise's belly signifies a return to the maternal womb:

J'ai l'impression d'y être depuis neuf mois

but the terms in which are presented the marvellous discoveries he makes there leave one in little doubt that he has, as we might surmise from our knowledge of the archetype, rediscovered something equivalent both to the psychological notion of the collective unconscious:

VOIX DE MALIK: A l'intérieur, j'aperçois des choses encore plus merveilleuses. Comme si j'avais de nouveaux yeux, comme si j'étais drogué, comme si mille mondes se concentraient dans mon cerveau et mille plaisirs dans ma poitrine.

LISKA: Je te crois.

VOIX DE MALIK: Je relis l'histoire depuis le premier instant

and equally to the religious notion of the formless chaos of a previous era:

quand j'ordonne aux montagnes de marcher, elles marchent, quand je demande aux fleuves de remonter leurs cours, ils m'obéissent, quand je demande aux poissons de voler, ils sortent de l'eau et viennent vers moi.
In the first of her aspects, then, the mother figure represents the collective unconscious. But she also has a foot in the opposite camp. Although, as a spiritual mother, she represents the unconscious and is the central protective figure with which the child identifies in the state of undifferentiated consciousness which characterizes his early years, it is nonetheless also she who, as a temporal mother, is responsible for the development by the child of a 'matured' conscious attitude. Thus the conflicting aspects of the notion of dual motherhood reveal themselves in the figure which is at once a personification of chaos, and also a representative of civilization. In fact, as a civilizing influence the mother is a veritable 'persona' figure, who underlines the child's separation from the chaos of the unconscious, a separation which she has effected and persists in maintaining. It is precisely this bewildering state of affairs which confronts Cavanosa in Le Grand Cérémonial for he too has, in effect, two mothers, in keeping with the nature of the archetype. The first is identified with the idyllic happiness of his early years and Cavanosa still calls to her in his dreams:

LA MERE: Oui, je t'ai entendu m'appeler, comme en rêve.
CAVANOSA: Il ne faut pas prendre cela au pied de la lettre.
LA MERE: Mais ces appels me sont destinés.
CAVANOSA: Ils sont pour la mère que j'avais lorsque j'étais enfant.

The other, however, represents precisely the figure that through her cruelty and harshness (which again betray her origins) makes the re-attainment of the first an impossibility. On the one hand Cavanosa desires to kill his mother in order to annihilate the barrier that separates him from the goal he wishes to attain; on the other hand by annihilating the barrier he disposes of the goal as well.
The encounter with the mother archetype, however, prefigures the advent of the final major figure to emerge from the obscurity of the unconscious on the road to transcendence; the archetype of the anima. Jung pointed out that the gender of the individual is determined by a predominance of male or female genes. No man, however, is constituted solely of male genes, and thus no man can be said to be exclusively masculine. In deference to the demands of society and civilization, however, the conscious development of each individual is dictated by the nature of the predominance of genes in him which makes him either male or female. In other words a man develops conscious male attitudes and a woman conscious female attitudes, leaving one part of the totality in each case undeveloped and neglected, though still very much in existence. A man, for instance, develops his masculine consciousness at the expense of his feminine side, which nevertheless remains a part of him, and is ever present in the unconscious:

In psychological terms we say that life's demands and the increasing development of consciousness destroy or mar the original wholeness of the child. For example in the development of masculine ego consciousness the feminine side is left behind and so remains in a "natural state."

The undeveloped feminine side thus described, moreover, manifests itself to consciousness in the form of symbols of the 'anima' archetype. For the anima is a universal distillation of the sum of man's apperception of woman since the beginning of time, by means of which it becomes possible for the individual to grasp the nature of the undeveloped female side of himself:

Every man carries with him the 'eternal image of woman, not the image of this or that particular woman, but a definitive feminine image. This image is fundamentally unconscious, an hereditary factor of primordial origin engraved in the living organic system of the man, an imprint or "archetype" of all the ancestral experience of the female, a deposit, as it were of all the impressions ever made by woman.
It can now be seen that the anima occupies a very special position in the structure of the psyche. For although it is a universal and archetypal image, its existence is only apparent as a consequence of individual development. As distinct from the collective shadow, which was a collective image repressed in the course of universal development, the anima is a collective image repressed in the course of individual development. In short, it is a universal symbol of the neglected part of an individual. Thus it is through the anima, which is a representation of the collective unconscious in his individual make up, that man as an individual can regulate his relationship with the unconscious. In fact the rôle of the anima is analogous to that of the persona. For while the anima is a collective image repressed in the course of individual development, the persona is a collective image deliberately adopted in the course of individual development. As such its function is to mediate between the ego and the conscious exterior world, while the function of the anima, conversely, is to mediate between the ego and the unconscious inner world. Jung made the parallel quite explicitly when he stated:

The place between the individual and the collective unconscious, corresponding to the persona's position between the individual and external reality, appears to be empty. Experience has taught me, however, that there too a kind of persona exists, but a persona of a compensatory nature which (in a man) could be called the anima. 122

Indeed, the fundamental importance of the anima concept lies in its rôle as a mediator. For in encountering his feminine undeveloped side the individual for the first time becomes aware of a manifestation of the collective unconscious which relates to and exists within himself as an individual.
Because the anima, as the feminine aspect of man, possesses the receptivity and absence of prejudice toward the irrational, she is designated as the mediator between consciousness and the unconscious.

In other words, while the anima has as many forms as there are (male) individuals, it is at the same time representative of the collective level of the unconscious common to all, and can thus mediate between that level and the individual, once it has been recognised. Thus, while assimilating a figure that is ostensibly peculiar to himself, the individual also possesses in the form of the anima the means of assimilating the collective heritage of the unconscious into the terms of his own personality. The anima is the figure which leads him to recognition of the totality of his psyche.

Not only does the anima incorporate the function of the archetype, which we have already witnessed in the trickster and child figures, moreover, but it also exemplifies the form of the archetype - the ambiguity we have seen in the mother figure. It is thus the archetype 'par excellence', summing up the very notion of archetype, and for this reason is designated by Jung as the "archetype of life itself". If the anima is a distillation of the sum of man's dealings with woman, it is logical that the anima's qualities should first become apparent in the mother figure, the first woman with whom the individual comes into contact. This is precisely the case - the anima figure is projected first on to the mother and subsequently on to the other female figures with which the individual comes into contact and who appear suitable "back-cloths" for the adoption of its characteristics:

The first bearer of the soul image (anima) is always the mother, later it is borne by those women who arouse the man's feelings, whether in a positive or negative sense.
So it is that Cavanosa in *Le Grand Cérémonial* finds temporary solace in his life-size dolls, anima figures who, as his mother points out, have replaced her in her son's affections:

Tu les embrasses avec plus d'amour que si c'était ta mère. Et tu leur parles aussi, et tu leur fais tes confidences.

and on whom Cavanosa can act out the paradox proposed by the dual nature of his mother, lavishing affection on them one moment and lopping their heads off the next! Later Cavanosa finds a tenable solution to the problem with which we saw him faced with the help of two further anima figures. One aspect of his mother is done away with in the symbolic sacrifice of Sil, while the other aspect joins him in the reattainment of the paradise of his childhood, symbolised by the long-awaited journey round the world in a pram pushed by Lys.

Since the mother is the 'first bearer of the soul-image' it is natural that we should find that the form of the anima is denoted by the same impressive duality which characterised the mother:

the anima is bipolar and can therefore appear positive one moment and negative the next; now young now old; now mother, now maiden; now a good fairy, now a witch, now a saint, now a whore.

In respect of her function as mediator, moreover, the anima has, in addition, mystical, redemptive qualities which indicate the unconscious world to which she holds the key. It is characteristic of her positive aspects that she appears as a cryptic guide, an oracular saviour and the possessor of superior wisdom and power:

the anima also has 'occult' connections with 'mysteries', with the world of darkness in general and for that reason she often has a religious tinge.

To elucidate further the complex and almost indefinable characteristics displayed by the anima, Jung referred his readers to the description by H. Rider Haggard in *She* of Ayesha, the mystical
and compelling queen of the Armhaager tribe of Central Africa.

Haggard himself was forced to acknowledge the poverty of the terms by which he sought to portray "She-who-must-be-obeyed":

I have heard of the beauty of celestial beings, now I saw it; only this beauty, with all its awful loveliness and purity was evil... How am I to describe it... The man does not live whose pen could convey a sense of what I saw.

but her agelessness, as well as the irrepressible power and fascination she exerts over all those she comes into contact with make of Haggard's portrayal a striking and oft-cited example of a manifestation of the anima archetype, and one in which its characteristics may readily be apprehended. A comparable and possibly even more striking subsequent description occurs (as if to underline the universality of the archetype) in Sadegh Hedayat's The Blind Owl where, in the course of an uncommonly clear and arresting description of the woman whose image haunts him, the author sums up the very essence of the anima archetype and its function in the individuation process by stating:

To me she was a woman, and at the same time had within her something that transcended humanity.

Arrabal's work too abounds with female figures who seem to betray the essential duality and fascination of the 'anima'. Indeed it was the dramatist's stated objective to reproduce the very substance of the female in his feminine characters and he further recognized that this substance had to do with the notion of duality:

SCHIFRES: Ce sont pour vous les deux versants de la femme: la poésie et la cruauté.

ARRABAL: Oui, le mystère, la bonté, la fascination, la cruauté des femmes. Pas seulement des femmes...

Thus we see the repeated appearance in his plays of the half saint, half whore female figure. Le Cimetière des Voitures for
instance is presided over by the obliging Dila, who pursues an ambition 'to be good' by lavishing her favours indiscriminately:

DILA: Moi aussi, je veux être bonne Emanou.

EMANOU: Toi, tu l'as déjà. Tu laisses tout le monde coucher avec toi.137

In Le Labyrinthe the desperation of Etienne's plight leads him to put trust in the bewildering Micaela, who promises to do all she can to help him. Her help, however, consists in calling her father, to whom she maliciously denounces Etienne:

Maintenant il veut s'échapper du parc à tout prix, et pour y réussir il a essayé de me souder de mille manières 138 before turning her attentions to her 'fiancé' Bruno, whom she proceeds to fondle with ever increasing passion. Similarly in La Bicyclette du Condamné 1959 Tasla changes abruptly from the naïve and timid lover of Viloro, embarrassed when he kisses her, to the shameless seductress who on two occasions engages in explicit erotic rituals with the three men. In all these figures we can clearly witness the duality on which Jung's description of the 'anima' depends. In the descriptions of Micaela and Tasla, moreover, the notion of superiority or 'other worldliness' is also implied. Micaela, for instance, suffers from the same mysteriously disappearing wounds which we have already noted in Kardo and Malderic, Bana and Ang, and she also purports to know the secret of the labyrinth, while Tasla wields an extraordinary power over Pasco, whose captor she is, and whose torture she witnesses and reports.

Perhaps the most impressive example of the anima figure in Arrabal's plays 139, however, is the portrayal of the 'heroine' of Le Lai de Barabbas 1964, who appears first in the guise of Sylda, and subsequently as Arlys. At the beginning of the play Giafar wakes Sylda from apparent death with a kiss; here are symbolised
the first stirrings of the anima, which, as we have said, is a neglected, dormant side of the individual. Straight away, moreover, Sylda gives Giafar an apple, the gesture recalling that of Eve, historically the figure in whom man first perceived the nature of woman, and a figure whose evil fascination set the type of future anima representations. From this moment Giafar is bound to Sylda by a fascination which he conceives as pure love and which no amount of cruelty on her part will dissipate. Subsequently, appearing as Arlys, she exposes the full range of her dual personality, cynically exploiting Giafar's belief in her purity to seduce him:

VOIX D'ARLYS: Et maintenant je vous plais?
VOIX DE GIAFAR: Oh oui.
VOIX D'ARLYS: Plus ou moins?
VOIX DE GIAFAR: Plutôt plus.
VOIX D'ARLYS: Je suis si pure, si bonne, si blonde...

(Elle rit)

If she thus represents what we have seen to be the form of the anima, moreover, this is no facile or gratuitous description by Arrabal, for the above quoted incident is one part of the carefully executed process by which she also reveals the function of the anima, to bring Giafar to awareness and assimilation of his unconscious, chaotic side and to lead him to the discovery of 'himself'. With the help of Kardo and Malderic, in the manner we have discussed, Arlys/Sylda is the mystical priestess who, using the fascination which binds him so closely to her, removes seriatim from Giafar the encumbrances of a conscious attitude based on cause and effect. In keeping with the 'occult connections' of the anima figure, Arlys/Sylda is the possessor of superior magical powers pertaining to a universe beyond Giafar's ken - she gives Kardo and Malderic their sight back, she uses a magic key, she walks through a magic mirror and disappears. At the same time, however, she is a very present...
reality whose existence Giafar cannot deny. Consequently she is the mediating force who leads him to an assimilation of the unconscious world he has already encountered in the form of Kardo and Malderic (as shown in our previous argument) and to a recognition of the latent aspects of his psyche which this unfamiliar universe represents. The final goal for Giafar, moreover, is a discovery of "le secret de la connaissance":

Il faut trouver le secret ... Celui des rapports entre le hasard, c'est à dire le futur ou si vous préférez la confusion, et la mémoire, c'est à dire le passé.  

Following the equation we have made between the 'panique' system, as expressed in the terms of 'la mémoire' and 'le hasard' and Jung's individuation process, we may render the 'secret' here referred to in psychological terms as an attainment of the self by the transcendence of opposites. Giafar, having been confronted with the unconscious world represented by the trickster archetype (Kardo and Malderic) and having assimilated the nature of that world to his conscious mind with the aid of the anima (Arlys/Syl) stands on the threshold of attainment of the self. At this point, moreover, Arlys/Syl, her mediating work accomplished, is sacrificed. Again, this is in accordance with Jung's observation that the anima disappears as the self is approached:

The dissolution of the anima means that we have gained insight into the driving forces of the unconscious and it leaves Giafar to face the final hurdle alone. For, to attain the "secret de la connaissance" which is his quest, Giafar must first read and understand the "parchemin de la Suprême Violence", he must take part in the mysterious, primitive ritual which occurs at the end of the play, and which marks the culminating point of the path we have seen him follow. In psychological terms, that culminating point is
the attainment of the self, achieved according to the archetypal
pattern of rebirth.
The self is a symbol of totality which evolves from the transcendence of the tension of opposing forces:

The concept of psychic wholeness necessarily implies an element of transcendence on account of the existence of unconscious components and which presents itself as the culminating point of the individuation process, the various stages of which we have discussed. Man's consciousness is first faced with the contents of the personal unconscious and subsequently with the deeper layer of the collective unconscious which is a part of his universal heritage. The nature of the latter is perceived through the representations of the archetypes and assimilated into the conscious mind through the mediation of the anima, processes we have traced in the case of Giafar and his various dealings with Kardo, Malderic, Arlys and Sylda. In this way, moreover, the opposites are united and the totality of the psyche may be perceived in the symbolic form of the self:

This totality comprises consciousness first of all, then the personal unconscious and finally an indefinitely large segment of the collective unconscious whose archetypes are common to all mankind which for Jung represents the goal of life and the most complete expression of individuality. Thus the appearance of the self heralds a broadened awareness, a new perception in which the personality is no longer bounded by the restrictions of consciousness, nor regulated by the dictates of the ego, the centre of that consciousness. As Bennet puts it:

there is a shift in the centre of gravity of the personality and the ego is superseded by a less ego-centred, that is a non personal or not exclusively personal centre - the self. In other words the centre of the personality is recast in a new form or born anew. Indeed, Jung showed that the ultimate emergence of the self (the process that Bennet called "the shift") was expressed
in symbols relating to the mythical notion of rebirth. Rebirth is a universal, archetypal pattern which is reflected in the attainment of the goal of the individuation process:

As individuation proceeds to its goal, man undergoes a change of personality, in Jung's terms a "rebirth", which naturally does not presuppose the alteration of the original disposition, but a transformation of man's general attitude.148

It is in this sense, moreover, that we may understand the final ceremony in which Giafar takes part in Le Lai de Barabbas. Having been made aware of the chaos of the unconscious and having been guided to its assimilation by the anima figure of Arlys/Sylida, Giafar is 'born anew' in a ritual which, as we have indicated, recalls primitive initiation rites, and which completes his transformation from the previous limitations of the conscious world of the ego, to the totality of the self.149

The notion of rebirth further underlines the parallel which we have drawn between two systems, one religious, the other psychological. Rebirth is the climactic point of both: for the psychologist it marks the transcendence of the opposing forces of conscious and unconscious, for the religious historian the transcendence of the opposing forces of chaos and civilization, violence and reason, sacred and profane:

It is impossible to attain a higher mode of being, it is impossible to participate in a new irruption of sanctity into the world or into history, except by dying to profane unenlightened existence and being reborn to a new rejuvenated life.150

Indeed in a footnote to Birth and Rebirth Mircea Eliade explicitly reiterates the fact that the concerns of the two disciplines are underlain by a single pattern.151 Thus on the one hand it is far from being an anomaly that Giafar's initiation, which we have
explained in psychological terms, should be expressed as "Le parchemin de la Suprême Violence" (terminology which relates to a quasi religious field) and on the other hand the scene where the Emperor is eaten by the Architect in L'Architecte et L'Empereur d'Assyrie, which we have previously elucidated as the transcendence of the opposition of sacred and profane may also justifiably be cited as a manifestation of the archetype of rebirth in the psychological sense.

These are only two of many symbols of rebirth which are to be found in Arrabal's drama. Perhaps the most obvious is the birth of Ribla's child at the end of Le Ciel et La Merde, which we have already discussed in another context. The same archetypal idea is expressed, however, at the end of Le Jardin des Dôlices [1967] 152: firstly Lais's lambs are literally resurrected, and then Zénon eats Lais's 'soul' from a jam jar and becomes for the first time a "human being" capable of normal speech. Lais meanwhile adopts the animal characteristics which Zénon had previously, but both are finally united in the giant egg which is hoisted up to the skies, to the tuneful accompaniment of Téloc's trumpet. We witness rebirth again in the transformation of Fridigan, who, at the end of Ars Amandi rejoins the rest of humanity as an insect crawling about the giant body of Syl 153, while at the end of Sur le Fil [1974] 154 the virtuosity of Tharsis on the tightrope denotes the rebirth of a former age of glory in the now deserted New Mexico city of Madrid.

In pointing out the archetypal notion of rebirth inherent in these images used by the playwright, we arrive at confirmation of our primary proposition that Jung and Arrabal had analogous goals in view. We can now see, however, that the similarity of
those goals is not merely a hypothetical conjecture based on the vague notion of totality which governs both spheres, but that it is a deduction confirmed by the terms of expression and mode of attainment proposed in each case. Indeed the culminating point of Arrabal's 'panique' system, of the religious system studied earlier and of the psychological system elaborated by Jung, are no more than three differing expressions of a single 'archetypal' notion. Furthermore, we have now said enough to show that the three systems themselves are representations, in different fields and put to different specific ends, of a single pattern, which starts with the fundamental notion of opposition and proceeds towards a concept of totality by the transcendence of that opposition. What Jung has done is to analyse and categorise the underlying pattern, or more particularly, with his notion of archetypes, to describe the terms in which the first (concealed) part of the opposition is manifested in the second (concealing) part. Having previously elaborated Arrabal's objective in terms of a desire to liberate the sacred nature of violence from the restrictive straitjacket of order and civilization, then, we have now been able to compare the symbols which he uses to portray that violence with the forms in which Jung claimed that the equivalent notion of the unconscious was manifested in the conscious mind. By following the steps of the psychological process of individuation, moreover, we have shown that Arrabal's symbols of violence accurately and strikingly reflect the universal and archetypal bases identified by Jung. This being so, we may now reasonably conclude that those symbols not only have meaning and power as representations of the notions they are employed to convey, but that they also possess a universal validity far outweighing that popularly ascribed to them.
NOTES TO PART TWO, SECTION 2


1 See p. 104.

2 It is essential to make this important statement of our intentions absolutely clear by recalling the two different senses in which we have used the term violence, and by elucidating exactly the position of violence, in each of those senses, in the symbolism employed by Arrabal. In the first part of our thesis we considered violence in the normal everyday sense of the word, and showed that violence in this sense could be interpreted as an expression of various facets of the personal subconscious, as described by Freud (specifically the id and the super-ego). As we noted at the time, that interpretation in no way contests the assertion made by Esslin, since the symbols identified by Freud, with which we aligned the symbols used by Arrabal, though claimed by the psychologist to be common to all men, constitute nevertheless a classification of personal factors, of the psyche of the individual, and Esslin's claim is precisely that the symbols used by Arrabal derive from and express factors of personal significance only. Subsequently, however, in Section 1 of Part Two of our thesis, we have redefined violence (in the light of the tenets of 'panique' philosophy) as a universal philosophical notion akin to that of chaos. We now seek to prove that violence in this second sense is also adequately expressed by the various symbols which Arrabal uses, and which we will here re-examine. The basis of our re-examination, moreover, is an attempt to expand on the previous parallel drawn between Freud and Arrabal, by aligning Arrabal's symbols with a further set of symbols (identified as we shall see by Jung) which constitute a classification not of personal, but of trans-personal or universal factors, and thereby to show that the symbols used by the playwright have a wider significance than that allowed them by Esslin.


Much of Jung's writing on the concept of the unconscious and the notion of archetypes precedes chronologically the writings of Caillois and Bataille quoted in the previous chapter. Consideration of the latter precedes consideration of Jung's work in the construction of our argument, however, since it represents the direct philosophical atmosphere in which Arrabal was working.

4 ibid., p. 281.


7 JODOROWSKI, Alexandre op.cit., p.85.

8 We do not pretend to be dealing with the whole of Jung's vast and varied work, but merely with that part of it in which he elaborates his innovatory concept of the Collective Unconscious. It is for this and for his work on psychological typology that he is probably best known, but his writings cover an enormous range of topics, particularly in the related fields of religion, mythology and alchemy.

9 Jung's concept of the 'personal unconscious' was roughly equivalent to Freud's concept of the unconscious as a whole. cf. JUNG, Carl G. Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious (1934) in C.W. Vol.9, part 1, p.3.

10 The argument by which Jung sought to substantiate these assertions is to be found in JUNG, Carl G. The Relations between the Ego and the Unconscious (1928) in C.W. Vol.7, pp.124-135.


14 Essentially, the nature of the archetypes may only be gradually perceived by careful consideration of their manifestation in symbolic form and in terms of the important function they perform in the regulation of the psyche.

Presumably because they felt it necessary to sum up concisely the notion which lies at the heart of the theory of the 'Collective Unconscious' both Jung and his commentators are guilty of either unhelpfully vague or even downright misleading definitions of the Archetypes. A case in point is Moreno's elegant but unenlightening description in Jung, Gods & Modern Man:

"The archetypes are typical and universal forms of apprehension which appear as primordial images charged with great meaning and power, images that impart a crucial influence upon our collective pattern of behavior, bringing us protection and salvation." (op.cit., p.4)
In all of what follows it is of fundamental importance to
distinguish between the symbols or images through which an
archetype is manifested in consciousness and the archetype
itself (i.e. the essential /unconscious/ notion which is common
to all the images). Many commentators have unhelpfully
muddled the two, using the term archetype to denote also what
is in fact the representation of an archetype, or the motif,
figure, image etc. that expresses an archetype in consciousness.

It is clearly only possible to identify and evaluate the
archetypes from a conscious standpoint and subsequently to
deduce their unconscious function.

Dreams, of course, were also an important source of the symbolic
manifestation of archetypes but from a practical point of view
the material available for Jung to study was necessarily more
limited in range than that provided by myths and fairy tales.
The genesis of his theories was therefore based primarily on
observation of the latter considerations, though once the
theories had been evolved their chief practical and therapeutic
use lay in their application to the observation of dreams.

This practice makes the distinction between archetype and
image/figure/motif upon which we have insisted (see note 16)
all the more difficult to sustain. Firstly the business of
personification confers an image on to the archetype itself:
it represents the archetype, indeed, in the form of a collective
image. Secondly the name chosen to designate the archetype
often also describes an image of that archetype in consciousness.
Thus we are faced with the confusing situation whereby (for
instance):
a) the mother figure or mother image is a common symbol
(though not the only symbol – see note 103) through which
is expressed in consciousness the mother archetype.
b) the mother archetype is the basic quality common to all
mother images.
c) the mother is a collective image denoting that basic
quality and a common individual image whereby the same
quality is represented in consciousness.

In STORR, Anthony

PRATT, Jane

JUNG, Carl G.
Moreno seems to consider this idea logically inadmissable and embarks upon an extraordinary and absurd chicken-and-egg-type argument in which he ties himself and his readers into knots by trying to establish whether archetypes originally preceded myth or vice versa. His inability to extricate himself successfully from the resultant confusion only serves to underline the neatness of Jung's conception of the relationship between the two ideas (op.cit., pp.18-19).


STORR, Anthony op.cit., p.35.

Eliade is cited here, and in what immediately follows, not to support Jung's contention, of course, but to support our own contention of a parallel between the 'religious' system of sacred/profane or civilization/chaos and Jung's system of unconscious/conscious. We seek to suggest that 'the sacred' or 'chaos' and 'unconscious' are equivalent notions, and hence to justify our examination of Arrabal's concept of 'la confusion' (which we have already elsewhere equated with Calliols' 'chaos') in the light of Jung's analysis of the unconscious.

The works of Eliade are here quoted in translation, owing to the difficulty of gaining access to French editions.


ELIADE, Mircea Myth and Reality, p.77n.


See particularly JUNG, Carl G. Psychology and Religion [1938/40], C.W. Vol.11.

One such detailed study is to be found in SCHAER, Hans, Religion and the Cure of Souls in Jung's Psychology, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1951, 276 pp.


JUNG, Carl G. Approaching the Unconscious [1960-17], p.23.

"Historically as well as individually, our consciousness has developed out of the darkness and somnolence of primordial unconsciousness."
36 JUNG, Carl G. On the Psychology of the Unconscious /1917/ C.W. Vol.7, p.92

37 JUNG, Carl G. The Relations between the Ego and the Unconscious /1928/, C.W. Vol.7, p.161

38 As is implied by Jung’s repeated descriptions of the irrationality of the Collective Unconscious.

39 It is particularly interesting to note that Jung specifically states that violence itself is a necessary catalyst in the process of rediscovery of the unconscious:

"The more violent an effect, the closer it comes...to a situation where ego-consciousness is thrust aside by autonomous contents that were unconscious before." (Conscious, Unconscious and Individuation /1939/ C.W. Vol.9, part 1, p.275.

40 ARRABAL, Fernando "L'Homme Panique" in Le Panique, p.48.

41 JUNG, Carl G. Conscious, Unconscious and Individuation /1939/, C.W. Vol.9, part 1, p.279

42 Jung’s own views on the concept of chance, and more pertinently the relationship between the archetypes and chance, are explored in the fascinating papers entitled On Synchronicity /1951/ and Synchronicity, an Acausal Connecting Principle /1952/, both to be found in C.W. Vol.8. The notion of synchronicity was evolved by Jung in an attempt to explain various phenomena, which could not be accounted for in terms of physical causality, as manifestations of the unconscious mind deriving from the activation of archetypal processes. Space unfortunately does not allow a detailed exposition of the principles of synchronicity, but there is an interesting commentary on Jung’s principle of synchronicity in KOESTLER, Arthur: The Roots of Coincidence, pub. Hutchinson, London 1972.

43 Jung called this process "the union of opposites through the middle path". The notion of the union of opposites by means of transcendence was suggested to Jung by his study of the Chinese Concept of Tao in which a single symbol united the opposing aspects of Yin and Yang. It is also fundamental to certain alchemical processes with which Jung was thoroughly familiar and which he dealt with at length in the papers collected in JUNG, Carl G., Collected Works, Volumes 12 and 13.


45 JUNG, Carl G. Conscious, Unconscious and Individuation /1939/ C.W. Vol.9, part 1, p.279. "I use the term 'individuation' to denote the process by which a person becomes a psychological 'in-dividual', that is, a separate, indivisible unity or 'whole'."

46 JODOROWSKI, Alexandro op.cit., p.80.

48 ibid., p.164.


50 As are many of Arrabal's dramatic characters. The significance of the use of child-like figures is treated on pp.199-202.


52 Given the equivalence of Jung's notion of the personal unconscious and Freud's notion of the unconscious as a whole (see note 9) we may say that this, in essence, is what we have already done in the first part of our thesis. As previously stressed, however, our purposes in this second part are different (see note 2) and centre on the desire to show that the symbols used by Arrabal have not only personal but also universal significance.

53 JODOROWSKI, Alejandro op.cit., p.84.

It will be recalled that we noted previously (Section Two, part 1, note 9) the fact that Jodorowski's terminology suggests the possible influence of Mounier and of the philosophy of 'le personnalisme'. Our contention here is therefore not that Jodorowski was directly influenced by an awareness of Jung's concept of 'persona' (indeed, Jung's term 'persona' has the opposite meaning to the term 'personne' as used by either Mounier or Jodorowski) but that our understanding of what Jung meant by 'persona' may throw light on one particular aspect at least of 'panique' philosophy.

54 JUNG, Carl G. The Relations between the Ego and the Unconscious \[1928\]. C.W. Vol.7, p.190.

55 JUNG, Carl G. ibid, p.156.


58 JUNG, Carl G. Concerning Rebirth \[1940\]. C.W. Vol.9, part 1, p.123.


60 ARRABAL, Fernando Le Labyrinthe \[1956\] in Théâtre II, pp.44-102.

61 The figure of the mother also frequently appears in this guise but as is fully explained below (pp.202-306) she is not exclusively a representation of the persona.
62 JUNG, Carl G. The Structure of the Unconscious 1916/ C.W. Vol.7, p.284
63 FORDHAM, Frieda op.cit., p.47.
64 JUNG, Carl G. Conscious, Unconscious and Individuation 1939/ C.W. Vol.9, part 1, pp.284-5.
65 JUNG, Carl G. On the Psychology of the Trickster Figure 1954/ C.W. Vol.9, part 1, p.262.
66 ibid., p.271
67 See previous argument p.186
71 cf. FORDHAM, Frieda op.cit., p.70:
"/the shadow/ is all those uncivilized desires and emotions that are incompatible with social standards."
73 MORENO, Antonio op.cit., p.43.
74 HENDERSON, Joseph Ancient Myths and Modern Man in Man and His Symbols (ed. JUNG, Carl G.) p.118.
76 A number of these are listed by Jolande Jacobi in The Psychology of G.C. Jung, p.122.
77 Arrabal's symbolism in this play cannot escape harsh criticism, but it should not be allowed to detract from the overall impression made by the playwright's depiction of violence in the form of the collective unconscious. For while we might echo the criticisms mentioned earlier, if we were to take this play in isolation, the symbolism used here, as we have indicated, is only a starting point, restricted to the personal sphere, of our consideration of the full range of symbolism which the playwright employs.
79 ibid., p.152.
80 ibid., p.204.
81 MORENO, Antonio  op.cit., p.40.
82 JUNG, Carl G.  On the Psychology of the Trickster Figure  \cite{1954} C.W. Vol.9, part 1, p.270.
83 ibid, p.269.

84 As we have previously stated, many religious festivals took
the form of a deliberate re-creation of chaos with a view to
giving new impetus to the existing order (see pp. 153-156
of previous section). It is thus fitting to our argument
that Jung should cite the participants in such festivals as
manifestations of the trickster archetype.

85 cf. JUNG, Carl G.  On the Psychology of the Trickster Figure
\cite{1954} C.W. Vol.9, part 1, p.261.
"One simply cannot shake off the memory-image of things as
they were, and drag it along like a senseless appendage."

86 cf. ARRABAL in SCHIFRES, Alain, op.cit., p.105;
"en fait, nous sommes tous capables de tout."

87 JUNG, Carl G.  On the Psychology of the Trickster Figure
\cite{1954} C.W. Vol.9, part 1, p.264.
88 HENDERSON, Joseph  op.cit., p.112.
89 It is therefore closely related to the archetype of the child
which will be dealt with below.

90 ARRABAL, Fernando  Ars Amandi \cite{1968} in Théâtre VIII,
91 Henderson attests that the trickster "at the outset assumes the
form of an animal".  op.cit., p.112.

92 ARRABAL, Fernando  Ars Amandi, p.30.
93 ARRABAL, Fernando  Le Lai de Barabbas \cite{1964} in Théâtre IV,
94 SCHIFRES, Alain  op.cit., p.100.
95 ARRABAL, Fernando  Le Lai de Barabbas, pp.77-8.
Kardo and Malderic in turn (in this incident particularly)
prefigure the later trickster figures of the three beggars who
take up residence in Latidia's castle in La Tour de Babel
\cite{1976}. Like Kardo and Malderic they combine the performance
of a 'divine' function with an astonishing manifestation of
'devilish' behaviour characterized by the unrestrained satis-
faction of their physical appetites.

96 ibid, p.166.
97 ESSLIN, Martin  The Theatre of the Absurd, Revised and
"his characters see the human situation with uncomprehending
eyes of childlike simplicity."
The mother archetype does not only appear in the form of the personal mother. A list of the principal aspects in which the mother archetype is represented is given by Jung in Psychological Aspects of the Mother Archetype \(1938\) in \textit{C.W. Vol.9, part 1}, p.81. One important such representation is the Church (see also On the Psychology of the Unconscious \(1917\), \textit{C.W. Vol.7}, p.103), which appears in this context in Arrabal's \textit{Le Labyrinthe des Désirs}.

The full argument used by Jung to justify the concept of the 'dual mother' may be found in The Concept of the Collective Unconscious \(1933\) \textit{C.W. Vol.9, part 1}, pp.44-46.

Fully described and documented in Symbols of Transformation \(1912\) \textit{C.W. Vol.5}. See esp. pp.306-393.

This play clearly recalls the story of Jonah and it is thus interesting to compare an analysis of the play's symbolism with Jung's own analysis of the symbolism of the biblical story, which may be found in Symbols of Transformation \(1912\) \textit{C.W. Vol.5}, p.330.
ibid., p.181. Malik's failure (in contrast to Jonah) to re-emerge from the belly of the tortoise means that in psychological terms he has fallen short of the goal of individuation. Though he has attained full recognition of the hitherto 'hidden' aspect of the conscious/unconscious opposition, he has failed to transcend that opposition and thus attain totality. The submergence of the personality in the unconscious is a common and dangerous psychological phenomenon, archetypally represented in various monster myths. cf. JUNG, Carl G. The Relations between the Ego and the Unconscious /1928/, C.W. Vol.7, p.168:

"Anyone who identifies with the Collective Psyche - or in mythological terms, lets himself be devoured by the monster - and vanishes in it, attains the treasure that the dragon guards, but he does so in spite of himself and to his own great harm."

It is essential to recognize that "the mother" in Le Grand Cérémonial is not only Cavanosa's personal mother, but a symbolic representation of the mother archetype, with all that it connotes.

i.e. at a time when the unconscious is nearer than usual to the surface.


This formulation of Cavanosa's predicament underlines the fact that the observation which we had cause to make when dealing in the religious sphere; namely that negation of one half of the opposition is no substitute for the goal of transcendence as a solution to the problem of opposites, is valid in a psychological sense as well.

The full argument surrounding these assertions may be found in JUNG, Carl G. The Relations between the Ego and the Unconscious, C.W. Vol.7, pp.187 ff.

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The full argument surrounding these assertions may be found in JUNG, Carl G. The Relations between the Ego and the Unconscious, C.W. Vol.7, pp.187 ff.


The masculine equivalent of the anima is the animus, and is represented in the person of Téloc in Le Jardin des Délires.


cf. JACOBI, Jolande, op.cit., p.119, for further clarification of the point.
123 JUNG, Emma op.cit., p.56.
126 ARRABAL, Fernando Le Grand Cérémonial, p.65.
127 As Arrabal asserts, the play is fundamentally optimistic. cf. SCHIFRES, Alain, op.cit., p.129; "C'est le plus beau happy-end de tout mon théâtre."
128 cf. our previous argument in which the two aspects of the dual mother were specified.
129 JUNG, Carl G. The Psychological Aspects of the Kore /1941/, C.W. Vol.9, part 1, p.199.
130 ibid.
133 It is interesting to note in this context that on page 196 of She, Haggard declares: "we could no more have left her than a moth can leave the light that destroys it" thus describing Ayesha (or a manifestation of the anima archetype) in exactly the same terms as Caillois was later to use to convey the essential nature of 'le sacré'. cf. CAILLOTS, Roger, L'Homme et le Sacré /1932/, Collection Idées, Gallimard, Paris 1972, p.41.
135 ibid., p.17.
136 SCHIFRES, Alain op.cit., p.100.
137 ARRABAL, Fernando Le Cimetière des Voitures /1957/, in Théâtre 1, p.152.
138 ARRABAL, Fernando Le Labyrinthe, p.67.
139 Though in Mariangela Melato's portrayal of the heroine of Arrabal's 1975 film L'Arbre de Guernica, we are given possibly an even more arresting depiction of the anima archetype.
"The anima... makes us believe incredible things, that life may be lived. She is full of snares and traps, in order that man should fall... as Eve in the garden of Eden could not rest content until she had convinced Adam of the goodness of the forbidden apple."

ARRABAL, Fernando
Le Lai de Barabbas, p. 139.

ibid., p. 127.

JUNG, Carl G.

JUNG, Carl G.

ibid., p. 337:
"The psychic totality, the self, is a combination of opposites."

JUNG, Carl G.
Concerning Mandala Symbolism /1950/, C.W. Vol. 9, part 1, p. 357.

BENNET, E.A.

MORON, Antonio
op. cit., p. 38.

It should be noted that even in the earlier plays where the point of transformation is not reached, the concept of the Self is alluded to, in the form of an object of longing, such as escape for Etienne, or the city of Tar towards which Fando and Lis believe themselves to be progressing.

ELIADE, Mircea

"From a certain point of view, psychoanalysis can be regarded as a secularized form of initiation, that is, an initiation accessible to a desacralized world. But the pattern is still recognizable: the descent into the depths of the psyche, peopled with monsters, is equivalent to a descent to the underworld, the real danger implied by such a descent could be connected, for example, with the typical ordeals of traditional societies. The result of a successful analysis is the integration of the personality, a psychic process not without resemblance to the spiritual transformation accomplished by genuine initiations." (Birth and Rebirth, p. 165, n. 57.)

ARRABAL, Fernando

cf. Von FRANZ, M-L.
The Process of Individuation in Man & His Symbols (ed. JUNG, Carl G.) p. 200:
"The self manifests itself as a gigantic, symbolic human being who embraces and contains the whole cosmos."

ARRABAL, Fernando
The final and perhaps most conclusive justification of our attempt to relate Jung's notions of archetypes and the collective unconscious to the work of the 'mouvement panique' lies in Arrabal's own account of the genesis of that movement (given in L'Homme Panique) "Au commencement" he tells us, "il y avait un texte". The text referred to is the 34th labyrinth of Fête et Rite de la Confusion which, as the author confirms, was a spontaneous eruption of his own unconscious. The text Feu de St. Jean strongly reflects the ideas we have discussed and is expressed in images which clearly suggest the archetypal pattern of the individuation process. To Arrabal, however, those same images suggested the ideas which were subsequently to become 'le panique'. (See Le Panique, pp.37 ff. and Fête et Rite de la Confusion, Editions "Le Terrain Vague", Paris 1967, pp.169-171).
PART TWO
SECTION 3

THE THEATRICAL EXPRESSION OF VIOLENCE:
LE THEATRE BAROQUE

1 'Panique' and 'Cruelty' 233
2 'La Fête' 246
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In identifying the nature of violence in Arrabal's work, and subsequently in justifying the symbols used to express the violence thus identified, we have made extensive reference to the statements of the 'mouvement panique', particularly as adumbrated in the volume entitled *Le Panique* which Arrabal himself edited at the beginning of 1973. It is clear, however, that while a study of *Le Panique* and of other incidental statements made by adherents of the movement paves the way for a clearer understanding of the ideas which underlie Arrabal's work, it does not furnish us with a complete elucidation of the means adopted by the dramatist to give those ideas theatrical expression. For *Le Panique* is primarily a statement of philosophical intent, and not a manifesto of dramatic methodology. Indeed, in explaining to Monique Bouyer his fascination with the concept of 'le panique' Arrabal clearly indicates its philosophical basis:

Il y a une philosophie de l'ambiguïté contenue dans ce mot qui coïncide avec quelques-unes de mes préoccupations philosophiques.

The point is further borne out by the fact that while Arrabal and Jodorowski were both principally concerned with drama, albeit in differing capacities, the 'mouvement panique' could count among its number artists, sculptors, a novelist and even a bull-fighter. A collection of sketches such as Topor's fascinating booklet *Panic*, moreover, is no less faithful a reflection of 'panique' theory than an Arrabal play, merely it employs an alternative vehicle of expression. Statements which fall under the heading 'panique' then, are neither exclusively nor necessarily concerned with drama. Nevertheless articles such as "Le Théâtre comme Cérémonie Panique" and "Vers l'Ephémère Panique ou Sortir le Théâtre du Théâtre" do
reflect an attempt to translate ideas with a philosophical basis to the domain of the theatre, and while Le Panique cannot be seen as a theory of drama, it is at least a theory applied to drama (as well as to other art-forms). When thus applied to drama, moreover, 'panique' theory constitutes an important facet of the dramatic theory which Arrabal's plays appear to reflect. For, not unnaturally, the dramatist's work in the theatre is designed specifically to express his philosophical beliefs; as Jodorowski contends the former may only be understood in the light of the latter:

Pour comprendre les fins de l'«éphémère»panique, il faut connaître la philosophie panique

and thus those factors which, as has been suggested, provide a statement of philosophical intent in pure form, may now be seen, in applied form, as an exposition of dramatic objective.

This is a simple point, but nevertheless one of vital importance. For a dramatic theory does not expound an objective alone, but also, and often far more significantly, the means by which that objective may be realised. Thus it is essential to bear in mind that indications of Arrabal's dramatic objectives are indissolubly linked to his philosophical preoccupations (i.e. to 'panique' theories). As such, moreover, they must be clearly distinguished from the complementary aspect of the playwright's total dramatic theory, this being made up of indications of dramatic methodology, which, as has already been stressed, are in no way covered by 'panique' (and thus philosophical) theories, but which it will be our concern here to examine. The assertion made in a 1967 interview with Colette Godard, for example:

Une composition parfaitement minutieuse est indispensable pour exprimer dans tous les détours de sa démarche le chaos, la confusion de la vie
is ostensibly self-contradictory. The paradox is resolved, however, by the realisation that as a statement of dramatic theory it contains two elements. The sentence is divided by the use of the word 'pour' which makes it quite clear that the latter part is a statement of objective while the first part of the sentence provides a complementary indication of the means to achieve it. The pattern is repeated throughout Arrabal's writings on the theatre. In "Le Théâtre comme Cérémonie Panique" for instance, the terms of our previous philosophically-based discussion are recalled when he declares:

Je rêve d'un théâtre où humour et poésie, panique et amour ne feraient qu'un...

but this statement is supplemented at the beginning of the next paragraph by the further assertion:

Mais pour atteindre ce but le spectacle doit être régi par une idée théâtrale rigoureuse

the wording of which again clearly demonstrates not only that the first relates to objective and the second to methodology, but also that there is a clear distinction to be made between the two.

Much unwarranted obscurity has been lent to Arrabal's work by the failure of commentators to make precisely this distinction and by their unwillingness to take account of the fact that the 'panique' theories which clarify his philosophical and dramatic objectives are complemented by a sustained theatrical methodology which elucidates the means by which those objectives may be realized. Arrabal's work in the theatre, for example, has consistently been measured against the guidelines laid down by Artaud in Le Théâtre et son Double in which points of similarity have been noted and repeatedly emphasized. In an article entitled "Arrabal and Panic Theatre" Francis Donahue writes in explanation of the latter concept:
Arrabal has become associated with the Theatre of Cruelty, whose major source of guidance is a series of theatrical principles laid down by Antonin Artaud\(^{11}\) and he goes on to assert that 'Panic Theatre' is in fact a variant title for 'Theatre of Cruelty'. Donahue's view is widely echoed and it is commonplace to find the view expressed that Arrabal is a direct descendant of Artaud. A close examination of the evidence which generates the suspicion of a link between Artaud and Arrabal, however, reveals that the assertion that \textit{Le Théâtre et son Double} may be seen as a handbook of Arrabal's dramatic theories, as well as an elucidation of his dramatic practice is only partially accurate and, if taken at face value, downright misleading. It imputes to Artaud's theories a coherence and consistency which they do not have, while denying Arrabal's drama an originality which, in certain plays at least, it achieves. For such a view constitutes a misunderstanding, born of a confusion suggested by the terms which Artaud uses, but not reproduced by Arrabal. An elucidation of that confusion in Artaud's writings, moreover, not only re-emphasises the need to distinguish clearly in Arrabal's work between a philosophically-based objective and the means employed to fulfil it, but also opens the way to a comprehension of those factors in the light of which the nature and suitability of the latter may be assessed.

There is indeed a large amount of evidence, both factual and conjectural, which suggests a link between Arrabal and the Surrealists. It is well known that the dramatist was introduced to Breton in 1962 by Jean Benoît and that he subsequently became a close friend. In his 'Entretiens' with Alain Schifres\(^{12}\) Arrabal indicates the profound influence which his association with Breton exerted on him, and while his wariness of the dogmatism of established literary schools dissuaded him from a formal-alliance
with the Surrealists, he freely admits:

J'étais considéré comme un sympathisant.\(^{13}\)

As a result of the meeting with Breton, moreover, the first texts to bear the heading 'panique', which the 'mouvement panique' published after its formation appeared in September 1962 in the first issue of the surrealist review \textit{La Brèche}.\(^{14}\) In February of the following year \textit{La Communion Solennelle}.\(^{15}\) was published in \textit{La Brèche} no. 4 and in 1968 when the \textit{Magazine Littéraire} was preparing its "Dossier sur le Surréalisme" Arrabal accepted an invitation to contribute a short article.\(^{16}\)

A piece in \textit{Modern Drama} by John Killinger suggests that such historical evidence of Arrabal's sympathy with Surrealism is echoed in the nature of much of his work. In support of this claim he powerfully establishes a number of points of contiguity which clearly indicate a similarity between the concerns expressed in Arrabal's work, and those of Surrealism. Perhaps the most striking of these is his identification of a preoccupation with 'la totalité' common to both parties; and his assessment of the aims of Surrealism:

The primary emphasis of all the surrealists was on the recovery of man's wholeness through a denial of all traditional systems and methods of logic.\(^{17}\)

shows how exactly these prefigured the concerns expressed by members of the 'mouvement panique'. Thus there is a clear parallel between the ideas expressed by the two groups and for all that Arrabal disclaims any interest in surrealist theories,\(^{18}\) one cannot but support Killinger's thesis that, on this important point at least, they announced many of Arrabal's own.

Little consideration is needed, however, to realise that the parallel here is of a philosophical rather than an aesthetic nature. The establishment of this point is perhaps unimportant to
the concerns of Killinger's article, though in the light of his later attempt to extend the parallel to cover a similarity between Arrabal and the Surrealists in the nature of their conception of art his omission of it is open to question. For our purposes, however, the philosophical nature of the parallel between Arrabal's concerns and those of Surrealism is of fundamental significance. For it was out of the philosophical background of Surrealism that evolved Artaud's theories of the theatre. Artaud was a member of the Surrealist group until 1927, and as Bettina Knapp suggests in her book on Artaud, his dramatic theories have their roots in the philosophies of that group. Miss Knapp's statement of the philosophical aims of Surrealism matches that of Killinger exactly:

The Surrealists wanted to expand man's conception of reality to make it express or reflect the totality of the universe and, as she shows, this aim is later echoed as a touchstone of Artaud's theories. For the objective of theatre, according to Artaud, is precisely to

Rejeter les limitations habituelles de l'homme et rendre infinies les frontières de ce qu'on appelle la réalité.

Having demonstrated a parallel between the philosophical concerns of Surrealism and those of the 'mouvement panique', and having further shown that it was out of the former preoccupations that the formulation of Artaud's dramatic objective developed, we may reasonably conclude that Arrabal's dramatic aims and those expressed in Le Théâtre et son Double are similar. This is confirmed by a comparison between the above citation from Le Théâtre et son Double and statements made by Arrabal himself. It should again be stressed, however, that the field of dramatic technique has not yet been touched upon; the similarity here
demonstrated is engendered solely by the affinity of the philo-
sophical backgrounds in either case. Artaud, as Arrabal was later
to do, realised the restrictive nature of the structures imposed by
civilization:

bour tout le monde un civilisé cultivé est un homme renseigné
sur des systèmes, et qui pense en systèmes, en formes, en signes,
en représentations

and both sought, through the medium of theatre, to arrive at a more
complete portrayal of reality, thus implying the setting aside of
the restrictive barriers adduced to categorise it.

It is on moving into the complementary field of dramatic
technique that the possibility of confusion arises. For any
assessment of the directives given by Artaud as to exactly how 'les
frontières de ce qu'on appelle la réalité' should be extended
dramatically must be made carefully in the light of his peculiar
view of the theatre as a 'double'. Brustein states that:

Artaud's ideas about the theatre are inseparable from
his feelings about the world in which he lives

and from the beginning of Le Théâtre et son Double it is apparent
that the attack upon civilization which his philosophical preoccup-
pations stimulate is indistinguishable from an uncompromising attack
on the theatre itself. In "Le Théâtre et la Culture" Artaud protests
that the theatre has become petrified by the subjection of culture
to the restrictive forms of civilization, thus opening the way to a
direct equation between civilization and what theatre has become
(Western Theatre). For just as, according to the philosophical
theories which we have discussed at length, civilization is a formal
structure which obscures the true nature of life, so all that is truly
theatrical has become subjected to the dramatic forms which charac-
terise Western Theatre. The parallelism in essence and function of
the two elements allow Artaud to assert that Western theatre is therefore the double of an everyday or 'civilized' reality whereas it should be the double of a more complete and indeed limitless reality:

le théâtre aussi doit être considéré comme le Double non pas de cette réalité quotidienne et directe dont il s'est peu à peu réduit à n'être que l'inerte copie, aussi vaine qu'édulcorée, mais d'une autre réalité dangereuse et typique où les Principes, comme les dauphins, quand ils ont montré leur tête, s'empressent de rentrer dans l'obscurité des eaux.24

The equation between Western Theatre and the civilization which is its context is thus complemented by a similar parallel drawn here between the theatre which Artaud proposes and the reality he seeks to recover. The theatre is then not viewed solely as the means to an end, but is also treated as a quasi-philosophical concept and transposed into a philosophical schema exactly analogous to that of the opposition between chaos and civilization by which we have elucidated the principles of 'panique' theory. For as in the latter chaos preceded and remains latent beneath the formal structure of civilization, so the theatre which Artaud proposes is an original and archetypal theatre, the power of which has been sacrificed to the limitations of:

cette sorte de théâtre...où les idées qui animaient à l'origine le théâtre ne se retrouvent plus que dans des caricatures de gestes, méconnaissables à force d'avoir changé de sens.25

The view of the theatre as a double is thus extended to imply a coalescence between the objective of the dramatic process and the nature of the vehicle itself. It is inaccurate to view these ideas as a statement of methodology per se, since they clearly have a philosophical basis, and constitute rather a re-statement of Artaud's philosophical objectives which employs an alternative terminology. At the same time, however, no distinction is made between the philosophical view of theatre and its dramatic rôle,
and thus the former conditions the nature and function of the latter. The notion of the theatre as a double of what Artaud calls 'la vie', for example, strongly suggests a formless and inchoate dramatic structure as the means of expressing a formless and inchoate reality. This is confirmed by the fact that, as Tonelli points out in his lucid commentary on Le Théâtre et son Double, if one accepts Artaud's primary equation (between the limitations which characterise civilization and those which characterise Western theatre) then the fulfilment of his objective (whether one views this as the extension of the frontiers of reality, or as total theatre) depends on the dissolution of the strictures of dramatic form:

quand Artaud insiste sur le fait que le théâtre devrait opérer d'après la structure de la peste, en respectant le caractère gratuit de ce phénomène, il demande au théâtre de dépasser les limites imposées par sa forme même.

The formlessness of the theatre as a dramatic vehicle is certainly a part of the methodology which may be discerned from Artaud’s theories. The concern to remove, or rather to transcend the limitations of dramatic form, however, carries its own implications. For, as Artaud was aware, the most fundamental and possibly the most repressive barrier to exist in the Western theatre was that which separated the spectators from the spectacle:

l'écran formel que nous interposons entre nous et la foule.

Central to his proposals for removing the barriers that inhibited the true nature of theatre is thus the following proposition concerning the auditorium:

Nous supprimons la scène et la salle qui sont remplacées par une sorte de lieu unique, sans cloisonnement, ni barrière d'aucune sorte, et qui deviendra le théâtre même de l'action. Une communication directe sera rétablie entre le spectateur et le spectacle, entre l'acteur et le spectateur, du fait que le spectateur placé au milieu de l'action est enveloppé et sillonné par elle.
The audience thus becomes a part of the spectacle, rather than remaining apart from it - the spectator himself has a rôle to play in the portrayal of a new reality. This consideration confers a second fundamental dramatic function on the action. For while reflecting in its formlessness the characteristics of the chaos of which it is a double, the drama must at the same time absorb the spectators into the spectacle by provoking in them a reaction, or a liberation commensurate with their rôle in that portrayal, i.e. by exteriorising the elements of chaos latent within themselves.

Le théâtre ne pourra redevenir lui-même, c'est à dire constituer un moyen d'illusion vraie, qu'en fournissant au spectateur des précipités véridiques de rêves, où son goût du crime, ses obsessions érotiques, sa sauvagerie, ses chimères, son sens utopique de la vie et des choses, son cannibalisme même se débordent sur un plan non pas supposé et illusoire, mais intérieur.29

It is to this end, moreover, that Artaud's concept of 'poésie d'espace' is directed. Though the indications given in Le Théâtre et son Double in this context are more the product of confused intuition than of a well-defined programme, and are further, as even such self-confessed disciples of Artaud as Brook and Grotowski point out,30 impossible to implement to the letter, there is nevertheless a constant thread which reveals clearly the function and intended effect of the proposals. Central to the idea of 'poésie d'espace' is the desire to mount a relentless assault on the spectator's sensibilities (via his senses) using all available theatrical means:

Je propose donc un théâtre où des images physiques violentes broient et hypnotisent la sensibilité du spectateur pris dans le théâtre comme dans un tourbillon de forces supérieures.31

By depicting 'des crimes atroces, de surhumains dévouements'32 and by extracting the inherent force which underlies them, this assault will adopt violence and violation as a means of penetrating the shell lent to the spectator by civilization: it will constitute "un théâtre qui nous réveille: nerfs et cœur ... bousculant toutes
In other words it will be a form of theatre which, like the plague to which Artaud compares it, effects the instantaneous removal of restrictions by 'shock tactics':

l'action du théâtre, comme celle de la peste est bienfaisante, car, poussant les hommes à se voir tels qu'ils sont, elle fait tomber le masque, elle découvre le mensonge, la veulerie, la bassesse, la tartuferie.

which, in short, not only reflects chaos, but also provokes it.

The concept of theatre which evolves from *Le Théâtre et son Double* is thus curiously multivocal. It is at one and the same time a philosophical notion analogous to the objective to which it is directed, and a dramatic notion, the means by which that objective may be fulfilled. In the latter capacity, moreover, it has two simultaneous functions: to reflect the nature of the objective by its formlessness, and to absorb the spectator into the spectacle by a violation which undermines his preconceived ideas and liberates in him the 'chaotic' elements which are a necessary concomitant of his participation. It may now clearly be appreciated, then, that while Artaud's philosophical and dramatic objectives were similar to Arrabal's the methodology that has here been discussed differs fundamentally to that later proposed by Arrabal. For while Artaud's theories imply a blurring of the distinction between objective and methodology, statements on the theatre made by Arrabal, as our earlier examples have indicated, tend rather to throw that distinction into relief. And while Arrabal's objective of "un théâtre où humour et poésie, panique et amour ne seraient qu'un ..." resembles Artaud's own objectives closely, the methodological adjunct of "une idée théâtrale rigoureuse" contrasts sharply with Artaud's assertion that:

*Il semble bien que là où règnent la simplicité et l'ordre il ne puisse y avoir de théâtre.*
The second function of violation, which derives from this insistence by Artaud that the dramatic vehicle should reflect exactly the nature of the objective, moreover, is consequently also absent from Arrabal's methodology. Not only are his plays written texts in which part at least of the message is conveyed by language (Artaud explicitly rejected the notion of the supremacy of language) but when interviewing himself on behalf of The Drama Review, Arrabal further asserts:

"This does not mean that I either defend or provoke confusion. I simply declare that such a state exists."

The purpose of what follows is a precise scrutiny and elucidation of what is referred to by Arrabal as "une idée théâtrale rigoureuse". This idea was later crystallised as the notion of 'Le Théâtre Baroque' and thus we shall examine, assess and subsequently attempt to justify the elements of 'Le Théâtre Baroque' from two standpoints. An indication of their appropriateness to the philosophical objectives they are designed to achieve will be complemented by an evaluation of their dramatic effectiveness. Such an undertaking, however, necessarily implies a comparison with the methods proposed by Artaud, since, as has been shown, while these are different to those put forward by Arrabal they have analogous objectives in view. It is thus not at all inappropriate that our examination should commence with a consideration of the 'éphémère panique'. For such was the name coined by the 'panique' group to denote each of a number of theatrical experiments conducted chiefly in the mid-sixties, and which, in as much as they reflect the most direct attempt to transpose 'panique' ideas into the domain of drama, also resemble a close application of Artaud's theories.
Arrabal's involvement in these experiments, moreover, constitutes a significant facet of his work at a time when, though his writings already betrayed elements of "une idée théâtrale rigoureuse" these had yet to be consolidated in a coherent methodology. The dominant influence in Arrabal's work still lay in his preoccupations with the philosophical notions of 'panique' and it was not until the latter part of the decade that his extensive collaboration with directors such as Garcia, Savary and Lavelli, furnished him with an equally important complementary theatrical influence from which evolved the concept of 'Le Théâtre Baroque'. Meanwhile, though it is clear that Arrabal recognised the necessity for a coherent methodology, he could still write "Je n'ai aucune théorie sur le théâtre" for such a methodology was present only intuitively in his written drama and absent altogether from the experimental 'éphémères'. A study of the latter will thus not only reveal the limitations of Artaud's ideas in practice, but will also underline the necessity for, and indicate the nature of the problems in answer to which evolved, a coherent dramatic technique such as the concept of 'Le Théâtre Baroque' was later to provide.
On 24 May 1965, at the American Center in Paris, Jodorowski presented an item entitled *Mélodrame Sacramental* as part of the 'Deuxième Festival de la Libre Expression'. Jodorowski was responsible not only for the conception of *Mélodrame Sacramental* but he also directed it and played the central rôle. The performance opened with the decapitation of two live geese, and this brutal assault on the spectators' sensibilities set the tone for the subsequent action, in which the protagonists included forty live tortoises, four live snakes, an expiring fish, a decomposing chicken, an ox's head, a pair of bull's testicles and 250 loaves of bread. The action included explicit nudity and flagellation, repeated acts of deliberate sacrilege and the simulation of birth, death and sex; it was executed by Jodorowski, supported by actors and actresses in costumes ranging from nothing at all to a rabbi's habit, and two uncomprehending models who, like the expensive dresses they wore, had been hired for the occasion. The whole performance was backed by a six-piece rock band whose music sustained the action in its attempt to promote a frenzy verging on hysteria, while the props (with the merciful exception of the snakes) were thrown either into or at the audience once they had been used on the stage. In his 'Entretiens' with Alain Schifres, Arrabal commented:

> Ce fut une soirée exaltante.41

Jodorowski's unpublished description of *Mélodrame Sacramental* constitutes the only surviving authentic account of an 'éphémère panique' as it was actually performed and it is therefore the most reliable evidence by which the nature of the 'éphémère panique' may be assessed. It is immediately apparent that the 'éphémère panique' is closely related, in both aim and form, to the happening.44 The
notion that the true nature of reality has become obscured by the prohibitions of civilization, which we know to be a fundamental tenet of 'panique' philosophy, is also adopted by theoreticians of the happening:

We owe to Freud the elucidation of the displacement, substitution and repression mechanisms which act on the human personality by the means of laws and social restraint.

This view, in each case, conditions a definition of the function of art. There is a clear parallel between Jodorowski's own assertion:

l'éphémère panique a pour but de libérer l'homme de ses moules quotidiens afin qu'il puisse, par l'improvisation, développer la totalité de son être.

and Lebel's statement:

In the light of this [Freud's] pitiless theory, the function of art in relation to society becomes clear - it must express, at all costs, what is hidden behind the wall.

This parallel, moreover, is reinforced later in Lebel's article, when he expands upon the concept of a 'wall', for his idea that:

This art gives us the means to pass through the wall which isolates our collective subconscious clearly situates his objective in a realm which our previous considerations have served to establish as being akin to that of 'la confusion'.

If the aim of the happening suggests 'la confusion', moreover, so, as does that of the 'éphémère', does its structure. In both cases there is implied an acceptance of Artaud's proposals concerning the close relationship between the theatre and life itself. The limitations imposed upon life (or upon reality) by the evolution of civilization are seen as analogous to the limitations imposed upon the nature of theatre by the criteria of dramatic structure. In his introduction to the working texts of a collection
of happenings performed in the United States, Michael Kirby writes of the development of the happening:

a very important formative factor deriving from theater was the publication in 1958 of an English translation of The Theater and Its Double by Antonin Artaud. The spectacle that is described (The Conquest of Mexico) is not a Happening but the general theory propounded in the book is almost a text for Happenings.49

For, as Artaud proposed, the happening resorts to an inchoate or formless drama to express an inchoate or formless reality. As with the 'éphémère' the absence of prohibition which characterises the essence of what is portrayed is reflected in an absence of prohibition characterising the vehicle through which it is portrayed:

\[
\text{\textquotedblleft le happening\textquotedblright\ va beaucoup plus loin en détruisant la notion de pièce et de spectacle...il n'y a plus de pièce écrite, ni de mise en scène réglée dans un théâtre institutionnalisé.}^{50}
\]

In Label's words "the marriage between theory and praxis is consummated",51 for, as is clearly the case with a piece like Mélodrame Sacramental, the dramatic vehicle adopted in the happening resembles exactly the nature of the 'confusion' it portrays.

The 'éphémère' resembles the happening, then, in both objective and structure. Indeed Corvin's description of the happening:

\[
\text{Il veut en dépassant les interdits de toute nature... redonner à l\'homme sa plénitude d\'être: le vécu et l'hallucinatoire, le réel et l'imaginaire sont réconciliés par le choc théâtral pur d\'\textquoteright événements\textquoteright\ non dirigés.}^{52}
\]

could be applied equally to the 'éphémère panique'. Corvin's use of the term 'non dirigés', however, calls for some qualification. For we discovered that the formlessness of structure proposed by Artaud implied that the theatre should simultaneously perform two functions, not only reflecting 'chaos' as a double, but also facilitating the spectator's participation in the portrayal by revealing the disorder latent within him. To this end the element
of violation suggested by Artaud's desire to assault the spectator's sensibilities is retained in the theory of the happenings:

It is easy to see that battle is decisively joined round exactly those prohibitions whose violation for present day art has become a matter of life and death.53

Thus, while individually not pre-determined, nor subjected to the limitations of dramatic structure, and thus 'non dirigés' in the sense that their form(lessness) reflects that of the goal of totality, the «événements» of the happening (at the same time) are collectively and deliberately directed in their performance of a second and explicitly stated dramatic function, that of violation. To retain the terms of Lebel's metaphor, the happening expresses 'what is behind the wall' but at the same time it 'dismantles the wall as well'.

Mélodrame Sacramental performs the same dual function, the effects of which are clearly illustrated by consideration of an incident during the performance recalled by Arrabal to Schifres:

Jodorowski a arraché brutalement le slip d'une fille, ce qui a créé un choc et toutes les autres filles se sont déshabillées avec un grand naturel.54

From the terms of Jodorowski's own account of this incident it is evident that he sees it as a portrayal of freedom and purity, a portrayal which reflects, in other words, the essence of the totality which is his objective:

Le tissu glissait sur les cuisses pleines de miel. Présence des abeilles. Son pubis noir! La soumission de la femme. Ses yeux fendus! Son acceptation naturelle de la nudité. Pureté. Elle s'agenouille près de moi.55

At the same time, however, in his description of the action itself, he makes no attempt to disguise the fact that this constitutes a violation:

 Sa petite culotte me semble résumer toute l'hypocrisie sociale. Sans avis préalable, je la lui enlève.56
A single dramatic gesture manifests both objective and methodology. From this incident we see, then, not only that the notion of violation upon which the happening pivots is also a central feature of the 'éphémère', but also, and far more significantly, that the function of violation which happening and 'éphémère' alike fulfil is coexistent with, and dramatically indistinguishable from their wider philosophical objective, the portrayal of totality. The formlessness of the happening and 'éphémère' serves both purposes. Indeed *Mélodrame Sacramental* as a whole is at once a depiction of 'la confusion' and a destruction of the restrictions adduced to order it.

The demonstration of this point indicates the means of assessing the limitations of the 'éphémère' as a portrayal of 'la confusion'. For it enables us to see both happening and 'éphémère' in the light of the 'fête'. The 'fête' is not only, as previously indicated, a portrayal of the religious notion of chaos: *la fête est le Chaos retrouvé et façonné à nouveau* but, as Caillois makes quite explicit, it is also an essentially dramatic portrayal:

*On recourt parfois à une véritable représentation dramatique.*

As in the case of 'éphémère' and happening, moreover, the nature of the concept portrayed is reflected in the formlessness of its expression:

*La fête, en effet, ne comporte pas seulement des débauches de consommation, de la bouche et du sexe, mais aussi des débauches d'expression, du verbe et du geste.*

The 'fête', in short, is a dramatic vehicle for the depiction of Chaos, the nature of which is reflected in its structure. More important even than the resemblance between the 'éphémère' and the 'fête' suggested by a similarity in subject matter and structure,
however, is the fact that, as in the case of 'éphémère' and happening, Chaos in the 'fête' is portrayed by a series of dramatic gestures whose immediate purpose is violation. We will recall that Caillois states quite categorically that in the 'fête' Chaos is presented precisely through a systematic destruction of the barriers which have been imposed upon it, and which constitute the means by which the stability of civilization is assured:

toutes les prescriptions qui protègent la bonne ordonnance naturelle et sociale sont alors systématiquement violées.61

Once again, moreover, the two functions are simultaneous: the aspect of violation and the portrayal of Chaos are indistinguishable.

Thus we may say that in the 'fête', or in the 'éphémère', Chaos or 'la confusion' is represented by gestures or acts which perform the dramatic function of violation. Chaos, in short, is portrayed as violation or transgression. As Georges Bataille points out in Théorie de la Religion62 this consideration implies a severe restriction in the efficacy of the 'fête' as a vehicle for the representation of Chaos. We have already, in an earlier section of this thesis, stressed the inappropriateness of the notion of transgression to Arrabal's philosophical purposes, and our argument at that point was based precisely on an observation of the rôle of transgression in 'la fête'. That argument is thus worth recalling here briefly, and it may serve to substantiate Bataille's assertion. We pointed out that the concept of transgression necessarily incorporates the idea of the presence of barriers, but that the very notion of barriers was born only with the emergence of order or civilization out of Chaos. The presence of barriers, it was stated, is a fundamental condition of the existence and stability of order, but conversely has no part in the nature of Chaos, which pre-existed order and barriers alike.63
Now a portrayal of Chaos which depicts Chaos as violation or transgression (as does 'la fête') is therefore a portrayal which also assumes the presence of barriers and even depends on them. As such it is a portrayal which tells us nothing of the essence of Chaos, but merely depicts Chaos in terms whose relevance is limited to the nature of order. Chaos in 'la fête', in fact, appears merely as the opposite of, or a negation of order.

Hence Bataille's conclusion that:

Ainsi le déchaînement de la fête est-il en définitive, sinon enchâiné, borné du moins aux limites d'une réalité dont il est la négation.  

The same reasoning may be applied to the 'éphémère' and the happening. For as has been demonstrated, those actions in a performance such as Mélodrame Sacramental whose formlessness and gratuity reflect the nature of 'la confusion', also perform the dramatic function of violation. The spectator's perception of the nature of 'la confusion' is consequently conditioned and severely restricted by the fact that it is portrayed solely as the negation of normality. Thus, despite an ostensible suitability, the 'éphémère', resembling, as it does, the 'fête', must ultimately be adjudged an inadequate dramatic vehicle for the expression of the philosophical ideas underlying 'panique' theory.  

The above discussion reveals not only this primary philosophical objection, but also a disturbing paradox whereby the dramatic efficacy of the 'éphémère' may be questioned. For, as implied, if the depiction of Chaos is bounded by the limits which characterise the notion of order, then it depends for recognition upon the spectator's familiarity with, and existence within, a framework of order. In other words, to understand what is being portrayed the spectator must needs be familiar with the terms of its portrayal,
which in this case are the terms by which order exists. Thus there is implicit in the terms by which 'la confusion' is depicted an assumption of the rationality of the spectator. We have also seen, however, that while the depiction does not transcend the limits of order, 'la confusion' is here presented specifically as the opposite of, or a negation of order. Such a portrayal, therefore, while assuming the rationality of the audience on the one hand, at the same time specifically underlines the separation of 'la confusion' (as represented by the events 'on stage') from that rationality. If separate from rationality, moreover, the 'confusion' of the events depicted in no way challenges or modifies the position of the spectator, nor conversely, does that 'confusion' make the concession to his rationality necessary for the establishment of a point of contact or identification between the two domains. In short, stage and audience are related only through total opposition. The rationality of the spectators, while a sine qua non of their perception of 'la confusion' also conditions their reaction to it. And in as much as the essence of order (or rationality) lies in the rejection of those elements whose 'confusion' threatens its stability, that reaction is largely predictable and even inevitable. In "Une Prise de Conscience" Ariane Mnouchkine sums up her reservations about a certain category of contemporary drama in the following terms, which seem eminently fitting to our present discussion of the limitations of Mélodrame Sacramental:

Je n'adhère pas à sa forme aggressive... Je pense que les spectateurs répondent à l'agression en la refusant, en retrouvant leur fauteuil.

For ultimately the dependence upon the notion of violation which derives from the coalescence of objective and the means used to
realise it suggested in Artaud's theories, and which characterises the 'éphémère panique' is responsible not only for the philosophical shortcomings of the 'éphémère' but also (since in form and content it emphasises the factor of separation) for its dramatic deficiency.
The foregoing discussion has traced the failure of the 'éphémère' to the consequences of the coalescence between objective and method suggested by certain of the equations proposed in Le Théâtre et son Double. The most significant of these consequences, and a decisive factor contributing to the dramatic inefficacy of the 'éphémère' is constituted by the ambiguous situation of the spectator: on the one hand the proposal to incorporate him into the spectacle gives rise to the introduction of an element of violation which assumes his rationality, while, on the other hand, that same rationality conditions the terms of his reaction to, and determines his rejection of, a portrayal which presents violation as synonymous with the 'confusion' of reality. Thus the central dramatic problem disclosed by the failure of the 'éphémère', and the problem to which the complex notion of 'Le Théâtre Baroque' was effectively proposed as a solution, is that of how to express a formless reality without thereby effecting the alienation of the spectator.

From what has already been said, we may deduce that the problem outlined above hinges principally upon the apparent incompatibility between the nature of the message that is to be conveyed (i.e. the notion of violence as previously defined) and the position of the spectator to whom it is to be conveyed (for it may reasonably be assumed that he exists within a framework of rationality, the nature of which is opposed to that of violence). However adept a presentation of his philosophical ideas, an Arrabal play may be adjudged dramatically effective only in so far as it resolves this incompatibility and bridges the gap between the 'confusion' of the message and the rationality of the spectator.
The formulation of the problem in this manner, moreover, suggests an instructive parallel, for ultimately all drama functions as a resolution of a strikingly similar problem. Drama indeed consists in the deliberate presentation of an imaginary world to a real audience, and the essence of the dramatic process is the provocation of an identification between audience and the situation depicted through a reduction of the gap which separates real and imaginary:

toute l'essence du théâtre est contenue dans le rapport qui s'établit entre le personnage et l'acteur, entre le spectateur et l'acteur, et par la médiation de ce dernier entre le personnage imaginaire et le spectateur réel.

While the terms of our inquiry must needs be somewhat more generalized than those of 'personnage' and 'acteur' used here by Alfred Simon, and while the notions of 'réel' and 'imaginaire' need the most careful qualification when applied to Arrabal's drama, it is nevertheless evident that there is a significant similarity between the problem which faces Arrabal in his desire to establish some form of identification between the rationality of the spectator's universe and the irrationality of the universe, characterized by the notion of 'la confusion', presented on stage, and that which faces any dramatist, who has to bridge a similar gap between the reality of the spectator's immediate surroundings, and the imaginary nature of the illusion presented on stage. Central to our present discussion, moreover, is the fundamental contention that there is a parallel to be drawn not only between the two problems themselves, but also between the solutions adopted in either case. For, as will be confirmed by what follows, 'Le Théâtre Baroque', i.e. the process employed by Arrabal to provoke an identification between the rational spectator and an illusion characterized by 'la confusion'.
is built on principles exactly analogous to those implicit in
the dramatic process, i.e. in the process adopted by any dramatist
to provoke an identification between the 'real' universe of the
spectator and the imaginary world of the stage.

A brief consideration of the dramatic process in its most
straightforward context thus furnishes an insight into the principles
which underlie 'Le Théâtre Baroque'. Central to that process, as
suggested by Simon's definition, is the position of the actor who
mediates between the real and the imaginary through the creation
of an illusion. The terms of that illusion, moreover, are crucial:
to be valid it must differ from the terms of the spectator's immediate
reality sufficiently to provoke a recognition of its imaginary
nature, yet at the same time to be believable it must reflect the
terms of the spectator's existence in some way. Styan sums up
this eurhythmy as follows:

it is indispensable to have a measure of departure from,
yet a likeness to, a real standard of behaviour that we,
the contemporary audience set 70

and he incidentally lays correct emphasis upon the fact that both
criteria of the terms of the illusion are dictated by the nature of
the spectator. The illusion, then, is imaginary and is seen to be
so, but reflects reality, and is taken to be so by the spectator.

The terms of the illusion thus lend to the actor a certain
duality already implied by his function as a mediator. He exists,
as it were, on two levels; he is both real and imaginary. As
Alfred Simon points out later in his article, however, this duality
does not affect the actor alone, but is also reflected in the attitude
of the spectator:

la conscience spectatrice s'accompagne d'un sentiment
complex de réalité et d'irréalité.
For though on the one hand the familiarity of the terms of the illusion promotes in the spectator the belief that the illusion is real, its deviation from his own immediate reality at the same time confirms his belief that the illusion is not real. The concept of the spectator's belief thus calls for some qualification, for it is not an absolute belief, or at least his belief in the illusion is achieved only at the expense of his belief in a more immediate reality. In fact, he can believe in either level, but only through a denial of his belief in the other level, there is no way in which he can believe in both levels at once. In other words, the illusion commands belief only in a context of unbelief.

Thus, on even the simplest level, in provoking the spectator's acceptance of an illusion, the dramatic process occasions in the spectator the coexistence of two opposed and mutually exclusive attitudes. 'La conscience spectatrice' comprises, as it were, two distinct and warring factions, one of which believes in the illusion, and the other in the spectator's immediate reality. Their opposition, moreover, is highlighted by the fact that while either level of belief may effectively be suspended to allow the dominance of the other, it is impossible for the spectator to believe in both levels at once. These, however, are theoretical considerations, which rarely impinge upon the spectator's awareness in practice. For while the best realistic drama contrives to dissolve any distinction between the two processes, the spectator's acceptance of the illusion is in fact only a prelude to, and one facet of, his interpretation of the events depicted on stage. Having once accepted the illusion the spectator subsequently orientates himself and formulates some kind of stance vis à vis
the illusion, through the process which Styan describes as follows:

The audience is continuously busy, whether consciously or not, making personal comparisons with what it sees and hears on the stage.

Thus, having courted the spectator's acceptance through its likeness to his own 'standard of behaviour' the illusion facilitates an interpretation through bringing into play the second necessary criterion of its formulation noted previously, i.e. through its departures from that standard. In a realistic play, however, they are 'departures' in a limited sense only. For, as implied by the suggestion of comparison put forward by Styan, there must exist some yardstick of measurement common both to the world of the illusion and the world of the spectator, against which that comparison may be made. And in the normal course of events the yardstick is, of course, that of rationality which governs both domains alike, and therefore allows the spectator to take up a position in the illusion according to the same criteria whereby his immediate reality is ordered. While the duality of the spectator can never be wholly expunged, it is, in effect, thus rendered unobtrusive: it is reflected in practice only in the initial dramatic choice which confronts the spectator, who, quite simply, either accepts the illusion or does not. In the former case, however, the common convention which governs both the spectator's own reality and that of the illusion precludes any further intrusion of his duality upon the process of his philosophical interpretation. Indeed, in the spectator who 'believes', the possibility of rational philosophical interpretation acts as a bulwark against the effects of the duality implied by his dramatic leap of faith.

The dramatic process according to which the bulk of
realistic or naturalistic drama functions may thus be reduced to two complementary stages which normally go hand in hand. There are produced in 'la conscience spectatrice' two distinct and opposed attitudes which are subsequently reduced to a point of contiguity by virtue of the convention common to both illusion and spectator. A central concern of Arrabal's methodology in early plays, however, is to accentuate rather than to attenuate an awareness of the duality of 'la conscience spectatrice' which constitutes the first stage of this process. For, as has previously been demonstrated, the objective of those early plays is the expression of an opposition of coexistent contingencies almost exactly analogous to that embodied, albeit unwittingly, by the spectator in this first stage of the dramatic process. We have seen that the stuff of the illusion in early plays is the philosophical opposition between rational and irrational, and, as will now be demonstrated, it is apparent that this compounds the dramatic opposition of real and imaginary in such a way as to effect an emphasis and reproduction of the duality of the spectator's attitude, and the opposition it reflects, not on the level of the spectator's immediate reality (i.e. in the theatre, as in the dramatic process per se) but on a 'higher' level, as part of his belief in the illusion. In other words, while the primary opposition of belief and unbelief remains unresolved as in any realistic play (the spectator has, as always, the choice of believing, or disbelieving the illusion) the effect of the construction of Arrabal's early plays is actively to foster a like opposition in the attitude of the spectator who does believe the illusion, and thereby to give rise in the spectator to a reaction exactly commensurate with the message of the plays.
This seemingly complex proposition is amply illustrated in early works by Arrabal which ostensibly reflect little variation from the formlessness of a piece like Mélodrame Sacramental. The hallmarks of the universe in which *Le Labyrinthe* ([1956]74) is set, for example, are the absurd actions, nonsensical logic and apparently gratuitous malevolence of Micaela, Justin and the judge, which seem to suggest that this play, like the 'éphémère', transposes 'la confusion' directly onto the stage. This, however, is not the case, for the constant presence of Etienne in *Le Labyrinthe* provides precisely the sort of concession to the spectator's own 'standard of behaviour' which was absent from *Mélodrame Sacramental*. For the spectator's bewilderment at the 'confusion' portrayed in the actions of Micaela, Justin and the judge is echoed as part of the illusion, and indeed is personified by Etienne, with whose plaintive protests:

*Cet homme m'a conduit sans motif dans ce parc et m'a fait enfermer au milieu du labyrinthe dans ces cabinets immondes et auprès d'une espèce de cadavre vivant. Et tout cela sans aucun motif*.

the spectator can identify exactly. The character of Etienne thus furnishes the spectator with a point of entry into the illusory world which *Le Labyrinthe* depicts.76 The 'normality' of his reactions, in other words, and the parallelism between these and the spectator's own assessment of the situation constitute a persuasive incitement to believe in the illusion.

Etienne's 'normality', however, is more than just a convenient foothold in the play for the spectator. It also forms an important aspect of the philosophical opposition which the play presents, and as such an accessible basis for the spectator's interpretation of, and orientation within, the illusion. Thus the
spectator, having once accepted the illusion on the strength of Etienne's normality, will further surmise not only that Etienne is rational, but as has already been suggested, that the others are irrational, or at least extraordinary. Because of his familiarity with the system upon which they are based, the spectator accepts the rational arguments put forward by Etienne in answer to the accusations of guilt raised against him. Part of Etienne's defence, for example, lies in trying to establish the cruelty of Justin by referring to the marks on Micaela's back, and this is only one of several attempts by Etienne to substantiate his innocence, which, being a product of his own rationality, conform exactly to the spectator's own view and thereby not only reinforce his belief that the illusion is 'real' but also underline his participation in that illusion and confirm the likely interpretation that points to Etienne's innocence.

This, however, is only half the story. The illusion depicts not only the rational Etienne, whose normality makes him 'real' to the spectator, but equally the irrational world of 'la confusion' into which he has somehow stumbled and which is just as 'real' to him. As previously implied, the spectator's interpretation of the illusion initially classifies that part of the illusion constituted by Micaela, Justin and the judge neatly under the rubric 'irrational', much as if dealing with the appearance of a lunatic in a naturalistic play. As Le Labyrinthe progresses, however, it becomes increasingly apparent that, for all that the spectator has accepted the illusion, that illusion (or the world it depicts) is not governed by the same terms of reference as those which rule his immediate reality. Etienne's rationality, for example, while a comforting indication of his reality, has another and more sinister
aspect as a facet of the plot. In the world which the illusion depicts his rationality is simply no good to him. Indeed, not only does his rationality turn out to be a useless form of defence (the marks on Micaela's back for example, show scant regard for the apparent good sense of his arguments and mysteriously disappear at the crucial moment - for the spectator who believes in the illusion, moreover, it must be stressed, those marks do not merely seem to disappear, they 'really' vanish) but it even constitutes a prime criterion of his guilt. For, ultimately, having first made clear the irrelevance of Etienne's rational explanations:

Votre système ne vous avance rien?

the judge states quite categorically that Etienne is convicted not only for what he has (or has not) done, but also by the nature of his defence:

Il n'est pas nécessaire d'en savoir davantage: vos attaques et vos insultes dirigées contre lui suffisent à prouver votre culpabilité.

Thus, not only is the judge oblivious to Etienne's supposed rationality, but he even seems to suggest that in the world over which he, the judge, presides, it constitutes some form of violent malfeasance.

These considerations highlight a fundamental problem which emerges from the interpretation of Etienne's rôle in Le Labyrinthe and which underlines the opposition between the two warring factions of 'la conscience spectatrice'. In the first place, of course, as in any other play, the spectator is open to believe or not to believe in the illusion. In this case, however, a pursual of the first course does not lead to a dispersal of the duality which that choice implies. For if, as through the mediation of Etienne is highly probable, the spectator accepts the illusion presented by
Le Labyrinthe, then he accepts not only the single character of Etienne, but also the terms of reference which govern the world which the illusion depicts. These latter, however, seem in direct contradiction to the terms of reference which govern the world of the spectator's immediate reality. By the latter criteria Etienne is clearly reasonable and presumably innocent; by the criteria of the world of the illusion, however, he is unreasonable and unequivocally guilty. And for the spectator who believes the illusion there is no possibility of rejecting one interpretation in favour of the other. For that spectator exists, as we have already explained, on two levels; he exists in both worlds and thus both explanations are equally true. While on an 'absolute' level of reality Etienne is easily categorised as 'rational', it is clear that on the level of the illusion he is in fact 'irrational' in his protestations of innocence (for the facts do not bear out his arguments) and for the spectator who believes in the illusion, that illusion is as 'real' as reality.

Arrabal gives some indication in this play of the extraordinarily rigid structure to be developed in later works by taking pains to suggest that the corollary to the above findings is also true. The actions of Micaela, Justin and the judge are extraordinary or irrational, but their irrationality, like Etienne's rationality, is discernible on one level only. From outside the illusion (i.e. in the view of that aspect of 'la conscience spectatrice' which clings to immediate reality) both they and the world they inhabit must certainly be judged absurd and chaotic. In the equally 'real' terms of the illusion, however, there are indications of a definite method in their madness: when Micaela rings a bell, for example, a servant appears; the judges, according to Justin, hear their cases in strict chronological order. Indeed ultimately it is clear that, though seemingly chaotic from
without, the labyrinth is in fact (in the terms of the illusion) governed by a minutely ordered system instigated by Justin. Thus, once again, an interpretation according to the terms of the spectator's immediate reality, which would categorise Micaela, Justin and their labyrinthine universe as irrational, is at loggerheads with his acceptance of the illusion, in accordance with which the order of that universe must be admitted. While the order of 'la confusion', moreover, is perhaps less strikingly portrayed in dramatic terms than the 'irrationality' of Etienne's rationality, it is nonetheless clear that Arrabal is at pains to stress that this half of the philosophical content of the illusion also serves to emphasise the duality and opposition in 'la conscience spectatrice'. 

In this context the terms put into Micaela's mouth to describe the order of her father's system are a masterly summation of the means by which Arrabal has produced in the spectator a reaction exactly commensurate with the message of the play, for while, on one level they sum up Etienne's situation within the illusion of the play, they seem equally to be aimed directly at the spectator and to sum up his own situation vis à vis the 'confusion' which that illusion portrays:

voilà pourquoi les choses ici peuvent offrir l'apparence du désordre, ce qui ne fait que mettre en relief l'existence d'un ordre supérieur beaucoup plus complexe et exigeant que celui que nous pouvons imaginer. 79

In many ways this statement is also a pertinent comment on Arrabal's construction of the play and as such may be viewed as an early definition of 'Le Théâtre Baroque'. 80 The structure of Le Labyrinthe is indeed 'complexe et exigeante' but it is equally deliberately ordered and rigid. The illusion imposes the philosophical opposition of rational and irrational upon the dramatic opposition of real and illusory with mathematical symmetry.
The illusion depicts Etienne as rational, but where the illusion is real, his rationality is illusory: on the other side the reality of the illusion is suggested by the irrationality of Justin and Co., but in the 'real' world of the illusion that irrationality reflects a minutely ordered system of organisation. The two facets of the illusion are perfectly matched, for either way the effect is the same: the opposition which the play expresses is reflected exactly in the attitude of the spectator.

This necessarily intricate explanation may be extended to embrace other early works. *Le Tricycle* (1953) for example, reflects a construction similar to that of *Le Labyrinthe* and is probably the most successful of Arrabal's early plays. For nowhere in the first phase of Arrabal's work is the opposition which his illusions depict more emphatically reproduced in the attitude of the spectator. Basically *Le Tricycle*, like *Le Labyrinthe*, expresses the philosophical opposition of rational and irrational, order and confusion, though this central issue is deliberately clouded by the questions of morality, justice and social organisation, which the play also raises. On to the bare bones of a simple plot - a group of down-and-outs murder a wealthy businessman and are subsequently apprehended by the police - Arrabal grafts the same ambiguities as discerned in the previous example. According to the terms of his own immediate reality, the spectator categorises Climando, Apal, Mita and the old flute player as irrational and violent, while the logical outcome of their actions is the arrival of the police, representatives of order. The spectator's belief in the illusion, however, provides also an opposite interpretation: for in the world that the illusion depicts, the apparent incoherence of the existence of Climando and the others is, in
are in fact conducted according to a set of rules which reflect a stringent order based on rationality. Climando 'wins' these arguments for no other reason than that he is better able to reason than his elderly opponent:

"tu raisonges mieux que moi et la raison triomphe toujours."\(^{64}\)

While this 'disorder' is (in the terms of the illusion) supremely rational, moreover, the corollary is also true. For when the policeman arrives in act two as the logical consequence of the crime committed at the end of act one, nobody (despite the fact that he is supposedly the representative of a rational order) can understand a single word he says.

There is, then, once again, a rigid construction, the terms of which throw into relief the opposition inherent within the spectator's attitude in each of the philosophical domains which the illusion depicts. Le Tricycle, however, differs strikingly from the example already considered in the strength with which the
spectator is brought to accent the unfamiliar reality of the world of the illusion. In *Le Labyrinthe* the spectator is wooed to an acceptance of the reality of the order of 'la confusion' (in other words of the order which governs the existence of Justin, Micaela and the judge) because events within the illusion prove the reality of that order to Etienne, and he, in turn, is inescapably 'real' to the spectator. In *Le Tricycle*, on the other hand, it is not through such an intermediary that the spectator is made aware of the validity of the terms of reference that govern Climando and the others, but by the sheer dramatic power of the constituent elements of Arrabal's depiction. In the first place Climando, Apal, Mita and the old flute player exist not solely (as do Justin, Micaela and the judge) as the representatives of an unfamiliar order, but are carefully-drawn dramatic characters in their own right. They exude a consistently appealing naivety and straightforwardness, which is strongly supported by the simple lyricism of the play's language, and which goes a long way towards reducing the gap between themselves and the spectator which their irrationality implies, by eliciting in the latter a sympathy which at times borders almost upon collusion. This is particularly apparent at the end of the play when, prior to being led away to their death, Climando and Apal distribute the few possessions they have between Mita and the old man. Apal's final action, moreover, has a truly tragic dimension that even the policemen acknowledge:

MITA: Donne-moi la veste, allez.
APAL: Ma veste?
MITA: Oui.
APAL: Je vais avoir froid. C'est l'hiver.
MITA: Bah! Il te reste si peu de temps à vivre.
APAL: Bon.

Il enlève sa veste et la donne à Mita. Les agents cessent de parler.
The careful drawing of the characters of the four down-and-outs also has a bearing on the moral questions which their actions raise and which edge the central philosophical opposition throughout the play. Although, on one level of interpretation their arrest and the ultimate death of Climando and Apal may be seen as a fitting and logical consequence of the crime they commit, the circumstances and implications of that crime are far from unambiguous. The victim of the murder (who significantly never appears) loses the sympathy of the spectator, as well as his life, as the direct result of his attempts to buy Mita's favours. At the same time it is made quite clear that Climando and the others perform the murder not for any unequivocally reprehensible reasons, but solely to provide a solution to immediate problems and to allow the continuance of their own impoverished existence:

CLIMANDO: On lui prendra ce qu'il faut pour payer l'échéance du triporteur.
MITA: Seulement?
CLIMANDO: On peut aussi prendre quelque chose pour acheter quatre sandwiches, un pour Apal, un pour le vieux, un pour toi et un pour moi.°

Thus while their crime is apparently an indication of their 'violent' nature (and thus implies their separation from the spectator's own immediate reality) this philosophical violence is contradicted by a 'lack of violence' on the moral level. Indeed, while ostensibly alienated from the spectator by their crime, the circumstances of the crime produce in the latter some measure at least of equivocation, and arguably also a sympathy or understanding which throws the supposed logicality of the final outcome open to question.

Thus there are at least two clear indications of the way in which the dramatic force of the illusion in *Le Tricycle* induces in the spectator a firm conviction of the validity and reality of an unfamiliar universe. In this context it might further be
indicated that there is a sense in which the 'rules' which govern
the arguments between Climando and the old flute player are com-
prehensible not only within the terms of the illusion (i.e. to the
old man and Climando themselves) but also to the spectator. For
while these arguments have, of course, no absolute meaning, there
is nonetheless a discernible pattern which underlies them and which
is governed by an order that is at least rigid enough to provoke
one critic to attempt a rational analysis:

\[
\text{Les jeux de langage utilisent une formule fixe dans}
\]
\[
\text{laquelle on change systématiquement un mot, généralement}
\]
\[
\text{sans se soucier du sens.}^{27}
\]

While the information conveyed in this analysis is unremarkable,
the use of the word 'systématiquement' to describe the operation
of 'la confusion' seems nonetheless a fitting measure of the
success of \textit{Le Tricycle}. For this play underlines, perhaps more
strikingly than any other early work, the opposition inherent in
'la conscience spectatrice' simply because it convinces the spectator
more completely than any other early play of the reality of 'la
confusion'. In \textit{Le Tricycle} that reality is not merely spelt out
to the spectator (as in \textit{Le Labyrinthe}) but is directly experienced
through the sheer dramatic power of the illusion.\textit{^28}
The philosophical objective of early plays by Arrabal has elsewhere been defined as the portrayal of the opposition between order and chaos, rationality and irrationality. The examples here studied, moreover, give a clear indication of the methodology adopted by the playwright to convey this opposition to the spectator, and since one half of the opposition is constituted by the irrationality of 'la confusion' they also indicate the first step in the process of 'Le Théâtre Baroque' which seeks to convey an irrational reality to a rational audience. Although the depiction of 'la confusion' in these plays appears initially to differ little from the formlessness of the 'éphémère', the alienation of the spectator, to which the latter gave rise, is here counteracted by a modification of the dramatic structure. Accordingly the portrayal of 'la confusion' constitutes one part only of the illusion which the drama creates, and is complemented by an element of rationality which courts the spectator's acceptance of that illusion, which convinces him, in short, that the illusion is 'real'. The 'reality' that the spectator thus accepts, however, is governed not by the rational element which has prompted his acceptance, but by the irrational element to which it is opposed, and as such his attempts at orientation within, and interpretation of, the illusion are confounded. An interpretation based on the criteria governing the spectator's acceptance of the illusion (i.e. on the terms which govern his everyday familiar reality) stands in stark contrast to an interpretation based on the terms which govern the illusion he has accepted. As has been demonstrated, the latter reveal that 'la confusion' is not, as initially assumed, irrational and chaotic, but that it has an inherent logic of its own, while the supposed
rationality of the former is belied at every turn by the evidence of the illusion.

Both elements of the philosophical opposition which the illusion presents, in other words, contain a duality which reflects the admixture of real and unreal inherent within what Simon has called 'la conscience spectatrice' in the first stage of the dramatic process. They are so contrived as to effect a divorce of the criteria which determine the spectator's acceptance of the illusion from the criteria which govern his interpretation of the illusion, considerations which, in the normal course of events, go hand in hand. Hence, not only is the spectator faced with the straightforward choice of either accepting or rejecting the illusion, but the opposition inherent in either course of action, being reflected in the construction of the illusion, is reproduced and accentuated in the complementary business of interpretation of the illusion.

We have suggested, for example, that the spectator at *Le Labyrinthe* is likely to accept the illusion presented as a result of his identification with the 'rationality' of the central character, Etienne. The criteria which govern this choice, however, (i.e. Etienne's rationality) are contradicted by the criteria of the interpretation which that choice implies, since, quite simply, if the illusion is 'real' then Etienne is irrational, as the illusion demonstrates. The spectator's interpretation of the illusion in *Le Labyrinthe* thus confounds, rather than, as in a naturalistic play, confirms the terms of his acceptance of that illusion.

Indeed, the business of interpretation, far from substantiating the choice which engenders it, throws up instead a further choice which reproduces exactly in the spectator's attitude the opposition which the play expresses: either Etienne (and the illusion as a whole)
is 'real', in which case his irrationality is invalid or Etienne
is rational, in which case the illusion (including Etienne) is
invalid.

Both these levels of interpretation are equally 'true'.

At the same time, however, they are mutually exclusive. The
spectator at _Le Labyrinthe_ cannot believe both at once any more
than the spectator at any play can believe that what he sees is
simultaneously both real and illusory. Indeed it is fundamental
to the success of the plays we have considered in conveying the notion
of opposition that there exists no point of contact between the two
levels of interpretation we have identified. Thus Etienne, for
example, is 'irrational' only according to the terms which govern
the illusion: there is nothing whatsoever to suggest that he is
irrational according to the terms which govern the spectator's
immediate reality i.e. according to the terms upon which his accep-
tance of the illusion is based. Correspondingly the terms of
Justin's 'rationality' are confined solely to the limits of the
illusion, and there is nothing in either him, his daughter or the
judge which would suggest rationality according to an objective
assessment. Following the opposition in early plays, however,
the philosophical objective of Arrabal's subsequent works lay, as
previously explained, in the reduction and ultimate transcendence
of the opposition. The conveyance of this to the spectator,
moreover, implies a similar reduction of the opposition between the
two levels of interpretation identified in the course of our
previous considerations. Indeed, having here shown how there is
reproduced in early plays an opposition in the spectators attitude
analogous to that which constitutes the first stage of the dramatic
process, the parallel drawn between 'Le Théâtre Baroque' and the
dramatic process may now be extended and confirmed by demonstrating how the second stage of the former process reduces the opposing elements to a point of contiguity analogous to that effected by the second stage of the latter. For just as the second stage of the dramatic process effectively annuls the spectator's awareness of the duality of his own attitude by depicting the 'imaginary' illusion in terms commensurate with those of reality as the spectator knows it, so the conveyance of the contiguity of the two sides of the philosophical opposition is achieved by the further modification of the dramatic structure so as to provoke two coexistent levels of interpretation, belief in one of which does not negate (as in the earlier plays which express opposition) but remains commensurate with the terms governing the other.

In essence this implies a presentation of 'la confusion' which demonstrates not only that it is 'rational' in the terms which govern the illusion, but whereby it appears also in a form which may be reconciled with the rationality of the spectator's immediate reality. It will be recalled that in his assessment of Le Tricycle Daetwyler referred to the apparently nonsensical arguments between Climando and the old flute player as 'jeux de langage'; it was indeed upon the convenient rationalisation of their presumptive incoherence provided by notion of 'jeux' that his subsequent identification of their inherent logicality was based. As such, moreover, his terminology also suggests the means of approaching the device adopted by Arrabal further to modify the structure of his drama in an attempt to reproduce the contiguity of philosophical opposites within the attitude of the spectator. For the second stage of 'Le Théâtre Baroque' is characterised by the insertion into the illusion which Arrabal's plays create, of a ludic element aimed at
reducing the gap between the two levels of interpretation which early plays accentuated, by the depiction of 'la confusion' in a 'rationalised' form which reflects the terms of a reality familiar to the spectator.

In Homo Ludens, Johan Huizinga defines the game as a free activity standing quite consciously outside 'ordinary' life as being 'not serious', but at the same time absorbing the player intensely and utterly. It is an activity connected with no material interest, and no profit can be gained by it. It proceeds within its own proper boundaries of time and space according to fixed rules and in an orderly manner. It promotes the formation of social groupings which tend to surround themselves with secrecy and to stress their difference from the common world by disguise or other means.

From this formulation of the characteristics of the game, Huizinga cogently argues the parallel in nature which exists between the 'field of play' and the site of sacred activity. He points out that both are areas which exist within the 'ordinary' world, but which are deliberately marked off to set them apart from that world. Within the area thus delineated in each case are acted out according to a preordained but apparently arbitrary order a series of symbolic gestures which express a mystical or at least 'extra-ordinary' reality. These observations in turn lead Huizinga to the fundamental premise upon which his thesis is based, the equivalence between the notions 'ludic' and 'sacred', an equivalence, moreover, which he supports by reference to the sacred practices of primitive cultures and modern religious creeds alike.

Whether one accepts Huizinga's equation wholesale or takes issue (as do Roger Caillois and Adolf Jensen for example) with the intransigent objectivity which it appears to reflect, Homo Ludens presents a summation of the characteristics of play which remains without serious challenge. While, in other words, some of the inferences which Huizinga draws are open to criticism, the observations upon which his assertions are based remain valid.
As suggested above, moreover, the premises upon which his argument is built lie in his recognition of the two essential features of play. Play is first and foremost irrational:

We play and we know that we play, so we must be more than merely rational beings, for play is irrational but this irrationality is complemented by the propensity to create order:

Inside the play-ground an absolute and peculiar order reigns...play creates order, is order. Huizinga expands on both sides of this duality, firstly by his assertion, according to the criteria enumerated above, that the irrationality expressed in play is of a nature fundamentally analogous to the sacred, and secondly by proposing that the order which play creates is reflected in the order which characterises the civilization within which it exists. Indeed, the body of Homo Ludens comprises a minute examination of virtually all aspects of civilization, aimed precisely at demonstrating the ludic element inherent within them, and leading to the conclusion that:

real civilization cannot exist in the absence of a certain play-element, for civilization presupposes limitation and mastery of the self, the ability not to confuse its own tendencies with the ultimate and highest goal, but to understand that it is enclosed within certain bounds freely accepted.

Even if one modifies the definition to make allowance for the objections raised by Caillois and Jensen, the game thus emerges from Homo Ludens as an expression of some extraordinary reality (or the 'sacred' as Huizinga would have it) in terms which reflect (or which, according to Huizinga are reflected in) the order of the civilization in which it exists. Recalling the terms of our previous discussion, it may now be seen, then, how exactly the notion of play corresponds to Arrabal's philosophical objectives, and in particular to the necessity of presenting the irrationality of
'la confusion' in terms commensurate with those of a 'reality' familiar to the spectator. There is moreover every indication that Arrabal's fascination, both in personal life and in his drama with the concept of play was more than merely coincidental.97

For as Daetwyler points out elsewhere in his informative chapter entitled "Le jeu - ou la spontanéité structurée" it is with precisely these connotations, i.e. as the expression of violence in the context and terms of 'reality' that the game appears as an element of 'Le Théâtre Baroque':

Il ne faut pas perdre de vue que le contexte dans lequel ces jeux s'insèrent est celui du «réalisme de la confusion».98

While these considerations, and the indication of the philosophical purport underlying the concept of play which they provide, are highly significant as a demonstration of the applicability of the game to Arrabal's objectives, we are nevertheless here primarily concerned to examine the game as an aspect of the playwright's methodology. We need, therefore, as has already been indicated, to complement our discussion of the philosophical bases of play with a consideration of the formal properties of the game, as used in the plays by Arrabal, and in particular, of its function and effect vis à vis the spectator in modifying the structure of the drama. The phrase "as used in the plays by Arrabal" is important in this context, moreover. For while the philosophical significance of the notion 'game' may be gauged by reference to the characteristics of game outlined by Huizinga, and accepted by subsequent commentators to be common to all forms of game, Caillois has justly criticized Huizinga for failing to analyse sufficiently the various different concepts which are included under the word 'game', and has pointed out that the formal characteristics of game vary from one type of game to another. Caillois' own most significant contribution to the theory of games, indeed, was his attempt to classify games into four categories99 which, though
interrelated (precisely by their common possession of the philosophical characteristics discussed above) were nonetheless distinct.

The formal characteristics of game in Arrabal's plays may thus be established only in the light of an identification of the type of game used by the author. Though of vital importance, however, such an identification is not difficult to make. For it is immediately apparent that the game most consistently played by Arrabal's characters, and the game which is repeatedly used by the author to modify the dramatic structure of his plays is that of rôle-playing. Throughout Arrabal's work, the characters he has created display a consistent and often bewildering propensity to play-act, to adopt rôles other than 'their own', and to pretend that they are 'someone else'. Rôle-playing, moreover, is a clear example of the category of games designated by Caillois by the term 'mimicry':

On se trouve alors en face d'une série variée de manifestations qui ont pour caractère commun de reposer sur le fait que le sujet joue à croire, à se faire croire, ou à faire croire aux autres qu'il est un autre que lui-même. Il oublie, déguise, dépouille passagèrement sa personnalité pour en feindre une autre. Je choisis désigner ces manifestations par le terme de mimicry ... and, as Caillois specifies at the end of his section on mimicry, the most significant feature which distinguishes this category of games from others is the fact that mimicry is ordered not, as are other categories of game, by the adherence of the participants to a predetermined and obligatory set of rules which differ from those of reality, but by the adherence of the participants to an artificially created illusion which reflects the terms and order of reality though it is not, in fact, real.
The notion of illusion is thus fundamental to mimicry. And the effect of the game, as used by Arrabal (as an aspect of Arrabal's dramatic methodology) is precisely to compound the levels of illusion which his plays present. It was noted that in early plays the illusion was divided into two philosophical domains. While this division is retained in subsequent works, the use of the game imposes a further modification dividing the illusion also into the categories of 'real' and 'illusory'. The game, in other words, denotes the creation of a second level of illusion aimed at making the distinction between real and imaginary fluid within the play.

This process is most amply illustrated by reference to *L'Architecte et l'Empereur d'Assyrie* [1966]. In this play, as in the others previously considered, the spectator is presented with the illusion of a world divided into the two domains of a familiar philosophical opposition. Once again the rationality of the spectator provokes in him the assumption of a definite stance vis à vis the illusion. According to the terms of his own immediate reality he categorises the Emperor as 'civilized' and the Architect, who at the outset cannot even speak, as barbaric or 'chaotic'. The mark of the Emperor's civilization in the play, moreover, is the supreme power which his position confers upon
him and which he wields mercilessly over the hapless Architect. It is this very element, however, which points to the fact that belief in the illusion implies an alternative and contradictory level of interpretation. For in the terms which govern the illusion and which pertain on the Architect's island, it is he who possesses absolute power and not the Emperor. The Architect is able to command nature, to govern daybreak and nightfall, to command the birds to run errands, and even to move mountains. The Emperor, by contrast, cannot even get the ants to work for him, and as is repeatedly demonstrated, his supposed omnipotence is in reality impotence in the world which the illusion creates and into which his aircraft has crashed. Indeed the reality of this ostensibly extraordinary situation is confirmed (to the spectator who believes in the illusion) by the fact that the Emperor (who is the spectator's point of access into this unfamiliar universe) is himself only too painfully aware of its implications:

L'EMPEREUR: Majestueusement, tandis qu'il s'assied sur son trône:— Oiseau! Oui toi, celui qui se tient sur cette branche, va me quêter sur-le-champ un cuissot de chevreuil. M'entends-tu? Je suis l'Empereur d'Assyrie.

Il attend dans une pose de grand seigneur. Inquisite: Comment? Tu ose te révolter contre mon pouvoir illimité, contre ma science et mon éloquence souveraine, contre mon verbe et ma superbe?105

Thus, according to initial appearances the play seems to promote an opposition within the spectator's attitude similar to that effected by Arrabal's earlier work. The Emperor has unlimited power according to one level of interpretation, but is powerless in the reality of the illusion. This, however, is only a beginning. Within this universe divided into two there exists another imaginary world, a second level of illusion carefully contrived to effect a
reduction in the opposition between these two conflicting points of view. Even according to the terms which govern the spectator's immediate reality the rationality and power of the Emperor are by no means consistent. For he repeatedly lends himself to the wilful creation of illusions within the illusion, the function of which is to act out a series of situations in which not he but the Architect enjoys the dominant rôle. The two characters, in other words, play a series of 'games' in which the nature of the Architect's rôle puts him in a position of superiority which reflects exactly that of the Emperor in 'real life'. The point is strikingly conveyed by the following words:

A présent il faut servir Monsieur sur l'heure.
Aussi dit, aussi fait.

which, significantly are spoken not by the Architect, but by the Emperor in the course of one of their games. At certain points then the Emperor is seen to be without power, not only according to the 'unfamiliar' terms which govern the Architect's world, but also, in a sense at least, according to the familiar terms which govern the spectator's world and which the Emperor 'normally' reflects. Such interludes are, however, at the same time, avowedly 'unreal'. They are the result of deliberate and undisguised 'play-acting' by the two protagonists, and as such their content does not seriously challenge the interpretation (i.e. that the Emperor is powerful, rational) which they seem to contradict if taken at face value. Such games actualise the order of things in an unfamiliar universe, but in as much as this actualisation is effected through the creation of a second level of illusion, it remains reconcilable with the order of things in the universe which the spectator inhabits. The Emperor's impotence in no way undermines his power as long as he is 'only playing'.
Thus the creation of a second level of illusion portrays the reality of the Architect's world ('la confusion') in terms commensurate with the reality of the spectator. Certainly this effects a reduction in the opposition between contrasting levels of interpretation but they are thereby rendered contiguous in a limited sense only. For, though commensurate with the terms of the spectator's reality (by virtue of the very fact that they are games), the games played by the Architect and the Emperor in the first part of the play in no way reflect the terms of the spectator's reality, save by total opposition. Their effect is thus limited by the fact that there is neither rhyme nor reason to the games, nor any logical connection between them save the constant factor of the Architect's superiority. Though their insertion into a wider and ostensibly rational dramatic framework obviates the likelihood of their rejection by the spectator, the early games played by the Architect and the Emperor are essentially similar in nature to the 'fête' discussed earlier: they are representations of 'la confusion' which convey its formless nature through the vehicle of formless drama.

Accordingly this second level of illusion comes to a turning point which brings the terms of its games closer to the rationality of the spectator. Midway through Act 1 the Architect carries out his threat to disappear, and the Emperor is left to play alone. The position he adopts is consistent with the subservience he has shown in previous games, but since he can demonstrate subservience only in relation to another, he dresses a scarecrow in his own clothes to replace the absent Architect. In what follows the Emperor again assumes a number of differing roles, but
the performance as a whole revolves around one central figure whom he depicts and whose life story he relates in the first person. The Emperor 'plays' a minor and insignificant office worker:

Et bien, les derniers temps, j'avais un bon salaire, il ne faut pas croire. Comme ma femme a été contente quand on a fini par m'augmenter! Si j'avais continué j'aurais pu monter dans l'ascenseur principal...107

who once dreamed he would become the Emperor of Assyria, and whose subservience to the Emperor/Scarecrow is more than coincidentally reminiscent of the Architect's relationship with him in 'real life':

Humblement à l'épouvantail:
Ne me gronde pas, je sais bien que cela fait un an que tu m'apprends à parler et je ne sais pas encore prononcer le 's' convenablement.

Essentially this is just another game which actualises the order of things on the Architect's island: the Emperor's power is as unreal as the obstinately mute scarecrow who here wears his clothes, the Emperor is really as powerless as the office worker he here portrays. As a game, moreover, it is all unreal: indeed the Emperor sporadically reverts to his 'normal' persona:

quel salaud, avec sa petite pirogue à la con... Que sait-il de la vie?109

For all its unreality, on the other hand, the creation of this character and the story he recounts lends to this game an air of reality, and to the second level of illusion a coherence which brings it a significant step closer to the terms of the spectator's reality. It is an unfamiliar universe reduced to familiar terms, a representation of 'la confusion' where 'la confusion' displays a distinguishable and disturbing order.

The suspicion of order and rationality in the second level of illusion thus engendered is crystallised in the second act of the play. Once again the reality that pertains in this 'unfamiliar'
universe (i.e. the Architect's power and the Emperor's lack of it) is 'acted out' in one long but oft interrupted 'game', in which, as is consistent with previous 'games', the Architect occupies the dominant position. This 'game' moreover, reflects the terms of the spectator's reality exactly. Far from the frenetic incoherence of the characters' earliest games, this 'game' is logical in the extreme, even to the point of having an identifiable plot:

Le jeu de la justice enferme les deux hommes qui ne retrouveront jamais la liberté d'improvisation dont ils jouissaient à l'acte précédent.

Indeed the wheel has turned full circle, for the 'unfamiliar' order of 'la confusion' is here presented with more than a semblance of familiarity. The Architect plays a judge, the representative and upholder of order, the exact rôle held by the Emperor in 'real life'. On trial before him is the office worker played, as in the previous game by the Emperor, accused of the most horrible matricide and exuding precisely the irrationality and violence which the spectator connects with the Architect in 'real life'. The world, as depicted by the second level of illusion is divided into two opposing philosophical domains, a rational interpretation of which (i.e. an interpretation based on the same premises as that which promoted the view, held hitherto, that the Emperor is rational and the Architect irrational) actually endorses the terms of reference which belief in the first level of illusion implies (i.e. the superiority of the Architect) by readily categorising the judge/Architect as rational and the defendant/Emperor as chaotic.

Thus, by depicting 'la confusion' (i.e. the order of things in the Architect's world, exemplified by the Architect's superiority) in
the logical and rational terms which characterise the world of the spectator, the final game allows the rational spectator an identification and acknowledgment of that order which not only exists within but is based upon his own terms of reference. As such, moreover, the differing levels of interpretation, the opposition between which was our starting point, are reduced to a point of contiguity. For while it will be recalled that the Emperor appeared powerless or irrational and the Architect omnipotent according to one level only of interpretation, i.e. according to the terms governing the world created by the (first level of) illusion, they are now also demonstrated to be so (rather than vice-versa as originally) according to the terms governing the spectator's immediate reality.

The latter interpretation is valid, at least, as long as the Emperor is a murderer and the Architect his judge, where both exist in other words on the second level of illusion. The contiguity which the game achieves is thus subject to an important condition. For in the final analysis, despite the air of reality lent by its logical construction the trial is still 'only a game'. In as much as the Architect and the Emperor are, and are seen by the spectator to be, playing (they make use of deliberate disguise and changes of voice) there is still a sense in which the second level of illusion is logically 'unreal'. In other words, while the opposition between conflicting levels of interpretation is reduced to a point of contiguity, the ultimate aim of transcendence remains as yet unfulfilled, since they depend upon different premises. According to one level, the Emperor may be interpreted as irrational only in light of the belief that he is, in fact, the Emperor, while on the second level he may be interpreted as irrational only on the basis of the assumption that he is not the Emperor at all.
We have attempted to demonstrate how, by the creation of a second level of illusion within the play, the game was adopted by Arrabal as a dramatic vehicle which facilitated the expression of 'la confusion' both in the context of, and in the terms which governed, the 'rational' reality of the spectator. The possibility of seeing the terms of 'la confusion' portrayed, through the game, in a fashion reconcilable to his own assessment of reality thus provided a further safeguard against the spectator's rejection of its formlessness and unfamiliarity. As was suggested towards the end of our consideration of L'Architecte et l'Empereur d'Assyrie, however, there is one significant limitation attached to the use of the game as an expression of 'la confusion', in as much as while it provokes in the spectator an acknowledgment of the 'order' of 'la confusion' which accords with the terms of his own reality, that acknowledgment is only partially supported by belief. For, as was exemplified by the incidents in L'Architecte et l'Empereur d'Assyrie at which we looked, the game (in a dramatic sense) exists only as the result of a deliberate creation of illusion, the process of which is admitted both by the participants and by the spectator. Even in the trial scene, as was indicated, the spectator is a witness to this procedure, as the Architect and the Emperor perform the business of dressing up and changing rôles; however convincing their execution of those rôles, in other words, the spectator is continually reminded that they are 'only playing'. There is, moreover, only a limited sense in which one can believe in what one knows to be an illusion. It was previously stated that the illusion created by a naturalistic play commands the spectator's belief only in the context of unbelief. Similarly, in this case,
for the spectator who believes in the first level of illusion, belief in the Emperor as a criminal and the Architect as judge (i.e. belief in the second level of illusion, which expresses the order which governs the first level) is achieved only in a context of unbelief.

Consequently, whilst the primary significance of the game lies in its promotion, according to the process we have traced, of contiguity between ostensibly opposed levels of interpretation, its ultimate importance resides in preparing the way for a further modification of the dramatic structure which aims at effecting the subsequent transcendence of that opposition through the definitive annulment of the distinction between real and imaginary. In this context it is significant that no play by Arrabal expresses contiguity alone, but that contiguity (as expressed through the game) is consistently linked to the wider objective of transcendence. As was suggested in a previous chapter which examined theories of religion in relation to Arrabal’s work, transcendence in a philosophical sense is achieved through ritual, the climax of the philosophical process which his plays embody. Ritual may be viewed, however, not only as the expression of a philosophical concept, but also as the dramatic structure through which that expression is effected, as a facet of the playwright’s methodology as well as of his objective. Indeed ritual not only expresses the transcendence of philosophical opposites, but equally furnishes a dramatic vehicle for that expression which effects the analogous transcendence of the opposition inherent within ‘la conscience spectatrice’.

As such, moreover, it constitutes not only a culminating point in the ‘panique’ system elaborated previously, but also a third stage of ‘Le Théâtre Baroque’.
An important part of Huizinga’s attempt to establish an equation between the notions of ludic and sacred in the early part of *Homo Ludens* lies in his indication of the similarities between game and ritual:

The ritual act has all the formal and essential characteristics of play which we enumerated above, particularly in so far as it transports the protagonists into another world. He even cites the authority of Plato in support of this assertion, claiming that the latter unreservedly recognised "the identity of ritual and play ... as a given fact." Huizinga’s attempt to demonstrate the sacredness of play, in other words, depends upon the fundamental assumption that ritual is a sacred activity. While, as has been indicated, reservations have been expressed as to the validity of Huizinga’s final thesis, nowhere do we find challenged the assumption from which it proceeds. The sacred properties which Huizinga seeks to claim for play are freely admitted to be characteristic of ritual. For ritual, like game, provides a formal structure whereby the expression of something that is essentially irrational (be it sacred or not) may be effected in the context of everyday reality:

Rituals...provide the formal structure for freedom and fantasy, and the organ by which fantasy can feed back into the ‘fact world’. Ritual, in short, corresponds as closely as does game to Arrabal’s objective to express a formless and chaotic reality in terms commensurate with the order of a rational audience. Indeed, as S.H. Hooke points out, it is in trying to solve precisely such a problem that the roots of ritual as a philosophical concept lie:

... the origin of such actions as may be classed as ritual lies in the attempt to deal with or control the unpredictable element in human experience.
Viewed as an aspect of dramatic structure, moreover, the formal properties of ritual display striking affinities with those of mimicry (i.e. of that category of game used by Arrabal in his plays.) For like the latter, ritual is characterised in this context by the notion of acting:

Ritual thus becomes a vent of pent-up emotions and activity, the desire to act discharging itself on the efficacious symbol with which the performers identify themselves. To complete this identification they disguise themselves as the thing represented and behave as though they were actually that which they impersonate and the deliberate creation of a second level of existence within the normal world. There is, however, one fundamental formal difference between ritual and 'mimicry', which is highly significant to our present study of Arrabal's use of each to modify the dramatic structure of his plays. It is indeed upon the perception of just such a difference that a number of Caillois' and Jensen's criticisms of Huizinga's contentions are based. As Jensen points out, Huizinga himself hints at the existence of an essential difference between game and ritual when he says:

Passing now from children's games to the sacred performances in archaic culture, we find that there is more of a mental element 'at play' in the latter, though it is excessively difficult to define

but he fails to follow up the idea of a 'mental element'. Jensen's own attempt to elaborate by stating that "there is a deeper and more fundamental relationship to reality" in sacred performances is only marginally more helpful perhaps, but it does at least point in the right direction. For the creation of a second level of existence in the ritual does not depend upon representation, as in the game or, more specifically, as in 'mimicry', but upon metamorphosis:
L'acteur primitif ne porte pas le masque pour se déguiser c'est à dire changer d'apparence mais pour se métamorphoser, c'est à dire changer de nature.

The participant in the ritual thus does not play a rôle, but becomes a rôle. The ritual works not by the creation of a network of illusion, which commands partial belief only, as does the game, but by the elevation of illusory elements to the status of a network of symbols which command absolute belief. While such symbols express an 'otherworldly' or 'higher' reality, however, they are valid as such only in so far as they exist, and are acknowledged to exist, in the 'real' world. The necessary total identification of the performer with the rôle he incarnates must therefore be balanced against an unceasing awareness of himself as an individual. Indeed the efficacy of ritual is entirely dependent upon the promotion in both participants and spectators of an absolute belief in the reality of two levels of existence simultaneously. For the participant in the ritual is at once both individual and symbol, exists at once in both this world and another, and has (as does the spectator who believes) equal faith in the significance of both.

It is, moreover, in the light of precisely this characteristic that the relevance of the ritual as a dramatic form to the desire to achieve the transcendence of conflicting attitudes within 'la conscience spectatrice' may be assessed. Our consideration of L'Architecte et l'Empereur d'Assyrie began with the identification of opposing levels of interpretation within the spectator's attitude: according to the terms of reference of the spectator's immediate reality the Emperor was categorised as rational, the Architect as irrational; according to the terms of reference in operation on the Architect's island, and thus governing the (first level of) illusion, the opposite was the case. We subsequently traced the reduction of that opposition through the creation of a second level
of illusion allowing the spectator to infer the Architect's supremacy or rationality (i.e. the 'order' of 'la confusion') according to the rational laws of his own immediate reality. The 'rational' depiction of 'la confusion' in the form of games thus produces two identical interpretations. As was also indicated, however, each of these interpretations is based upon a different premise: an identification of the Emperor's irrationality according to the rational terms of the spectator's immediate reality depends upon an assumption of the reality of the second level of illusion, while an identification of the Emperor's irrationality according to the terms of the (first level of) illusion naturally depends upon an assumption of the reality of the first level of illusion. Belief in either level of illusion thus inevitably invalidates that level of interpretation which depends upon the other level of illusion being real. Only, indeed, where both levels of illusion are real at the same time, may the transcendence of the conflicting levels of interpretation within 'la conscience spectatrice' be successfully effected.

The possibility of transcendence, in other words, depends upon the assumption by the drama of exactly those formal properties which characterise the ritual: the simultaneous embodiment of two levels of existence, both of which are unquestionably real, and in the significance of both of which the spectator has equal faith. And as has already been suggested, the principal import of the game, as exemplified in our consideration of L'Architect et l'Empereur d'Assyrie lies in its preparation for the ultimate achievement of that goal by a process which aims at the definitive annulment of the distinction between real and imaginary. The game gives rise in the spectator to a growing inability to distinguish with
certainty between real and imaginary, particularly in the trial scene, where, of course the 'part played' by the Emperor seemseminently more plausible than his supposed reality. The games played by the Architect and the Emperor thus pave the way for the final step in the process, which has yet to be considered, this being the further modification of the dramatic structure by the revelation that the two protagonists themselves are divided on the question of what is real and what is illusion. This revelation occurs only at the end of their final 'game', when the Architect, having already passed sentence (in his rôle of judge) on the Emperor at last begins to suspect that for the Emperor the trial is not the 'game' which he, the Architect, assumes it to be. His suspicion is confirmed when his desperate protestation:

Ce n'était qu'une farce de plus: ton jugement, ton procès...

is met by the Emperor's unequivocal denial;

Mais aujourd'hui nous ne jouions pas;\textsuperscript{123}

The importance of the implications of this exchange is attested by the author himself, when, in his conversations with Alain Schifres, he urges:

... mais n'oubliez pas qu'à certains moments l'Architecte croit que l'Empereur joue alors qu'il ne joue pas, et vice versa.\textsuperscript{124}

It reveals that the second level of illusion is both real and unreal: it is real to the Emperor, who believes in it; it is unreal to the Architect who assumes it to be a game. If this is so, moreover, the first level of illusion (as suggested by Arrabal's addition of the phrase 'et vice versa') reflects a similar admixture of reality and illusion. For if the Emperor believes himself to be the murderer whom he incarnates during the trial, he must equally know his imperial persona to be a sham, while the Architect, on
the other hand, assuming that the Emperor is 'only playing' during the trial, believes still that his companion really is the Emperor of Assyria. It thus now becomes clear that the play is so structured as to present not two levels of illusion, one of which is more real than the other, but, in fact, two alternative and equally valid assessments of reality. For the Emperor the dealings between the accused and the judge are reality; for the Architect the dealings between the Architect and the Emperor are reality. As such, moreover, each of these views incorporates one half of the belief necessary to effect the transcendence of opposing interpretations inherent within the spectator's attitude. While each of these views is equally 'true' however, at no point up until the revelation made by the Emperor and cited above do the two coincide, for there is always one of the two characters who is 'only playing'. There is, in other words, no incident which expresses both realities simultaneously, which both the Architect and the Emperor believe to be real. The ritual death of the Emperor and his subsequent consumption by the Architect, however, represents the fusion not only of opposing philosophical ideas (as was discovered in a previous chapter) but also of the two levels of reality here identified. For the first time in the play this action is real to both protagonists at once. Arrabal is indeed at pains to underline the essential fact that neither party is, nor believes himself to be, playing: 

Mais mourir n'est pas un jeu comme les autres; c'est irreparable.

and further, that each party participates in the ritual on his own terms, as a result of his own assessment of what is real and what imaginary. For the Emperor, who believes himself to be a murderer, views his death as the logical consequence of his crime:
while the Architect, who, in line with his own view of reality, is used to carrying out the Emperor's orders, kills the latter not because he isn't the Emperor (i.e. to execute the dictates of justice) but precisely because he is the Emperor, and has so commanded.

The process of the reduction of the gap separating reality from illusion culminates, therefore, in the ritual death and consumption of the Emperor/murderer by the Architect/judge, which is unequivocally real to both parties. The two views of reality, represented in the structure of the play by differing levels of illusion, belief in each of which is the necessary condition of the transcendence of the opposition inherent within the spectator's attitude thus coalesce in this single action which unites the two levels of interpretation identified at the outset of our consideration of the play. On the one hand the Emperor's death is the logical outcome of a rational interpretation of the play based on the terms of the spectator's own reality: the Emperor dies as the direct and merited outcome of the awful crime he has committed. At the same time, however, his death is also the culminating point of an interpretation based on the terms of the (first level of) illusion: the Architect kills the Emperor as the ultimate expression of the order of things on the Architect's island, of his (the Architect's) supremacy, of 'la confusion'.

In short, the ritual death of the Emperor expresses 'la confusion' in the terms which govern the rationality of the spectator.

In a play in which, as is true of all the works so far considered, the illusion is divided into the opposing philosophical domains of rational and irrational, an interpretation based upon
the rational terms which govern the spectator's reality clearly
depends upon a measure of identification by the spectator with the
rational element within the illusion. An interpretation based on
the terms governing the illusion (where the illusion depicts an
irrational universe) however, depends upon a measure of identifica-
tion by the spectator with the irrational element of the illusion.

Following our detailed analysis of *L'Architecte et l'Empereur d'Assyrie*
we may summarise the achievement of the dramatic construction of
the play as a production of the transcendence of these opposing
levels of interpretation through the simultaneous solution of both
aspects of the essential problem facing the author in his desire to
express the irrationality of 'la confusion' to the rational spectator.

On the one hand, the spectator's identification with the rational
element of the illusion engenders the necessity for some form of
logical justification for the ultimate participation of that
rational element in the irrational act through which 'la confusion'
is expressed. On the other hand, the spectator's acceptance of
the reality of the irrational element of the illusion engenders
the necessity for some form of justification for the participation
of that irrational element in the rational structure through which
'la confusion' is expressed. The modifications of structure which
are brought to the play through games, and which lead to the ritual
death of the Emperor fulfil both these conditions, moreover, since
on the one hand they provide a logical explanation of the (osten-
sibly) rational Emperor's willingness to lend himself to an irrational
act, while, on the other hand, they allow the spectator to infer the
symbolic (or 'confused') significance of the irrational Architect's
'rational' action.

It is indeed these considerations which make of *L'Architecte
et l'Empereur d'Assyrie* the most outstanding example of the fulfilment
of Arrabal's desire to achieve rigidity of structure. It is not, however, the only play which presents the climax of the philosophical process of transcendence through the medium of ritual. The climax of Le Lai de Barabbas [1967], for example, is the ritual which effects the passage of the central character Giafar from order to 'la confusion'. The construction of this play is largely reminiscent of Le Labyrinthe, the illusion being divided, as in Le Labyrinthe, into the opposing realms of rational and irrational. As in the earlier play, moreover, according to the terms of the spectator's immediate reality, the hero is categorised as rational, in contrast with all those with whom he comes into contact. Like Etienne, however, Giafar suffers a series of unnerving challenges to his rationality (at one point Giafar attempts to demonstrate Sylda's cruelty to Arlys by reference to the marks on Kardo and Malderic's backs, just as, in Le Labyrinthe, Etienne attempts to demonstrate Justin's cruelty to the judge by asking him to look at the marks on Micaela's back. As in the earlier play, moreover, the marks have mysteriously disappeared when Arlys comes to verify his assertion) which demonstrate that, in the unfamiliar world which surrounds him, and according to the terms which govern the illusion, his rationality is illusory. As suggested, however, Le Lai de Barabbas proceeds beyond the opposition depicted in Le Labyrinthe to a point where philosophical opposites are transcended in the ritual of Giafar's initiation. As demonstrated in a previous section of this thesis, the process by which this transcendence is achieved is perfectly viable from a philosophical point of view, but from a dramatic point of view it lacks the careful preparation effected by the modifications of structure in L'Architecte.
et l'Empereur d'Assyrie. At the climax of Le Lai de Barabbas the ostensibly rational Giafar lends himself (apparently quite willingly) to an irrational action in exactly the same way as the ostensibly rational Emperor in L'Architecte et l'Empereur d'Assyrie. In this case, however, there is no preparatory modification, such as is provided by the Emperor's games, of the spectator's view of Giafar's rationality: there is nothing, in other words, to suggest that he is anything but wholly rational. Right up to the moment when he falls asleep shortly before the ritual Giafar acts in a consistently logical fashion, reacting precisely as the rational spectator himself would react to the absurdities which surround him. There is subsequently, it is true, one attempt by the author to justify Giafar's ultimate participation in the chaotic ritual of his initiation, which, interestingly, seems to announce the methodology later to be successfully adopted in L'Architecte et l'Empereur d'Assyrie. Whilst Giafar is asleep, Sylda's mother disguises herself as Giafar's mother, appearing at his bedside when he awakens and instructing him to participate in the ritual being prepared for him:

LA MERE: Fais ce que l'on te dira, sans résistance, sans arrière-pensée. Je te délivrerai ensuite.

GIAFAR: Que va-t-on me faire?

LA MERE: Rien de mal. C'est ta mère qui te l'affirme. There are thus introduced two of the ingredients identified in L'Architecte et l'Empereur d'Assyrie: a second level of illusion is created by Sylda's mother dressing up, and Giafar takes the appearance of his mother to be reality when it is, in fact, illusion. In Le Lai de Barabbas, however, this almost self-conscious attempt to justify Giafar's disturbingly sudden change of attitude is wholly unsuccessful. Quite apart from the fact that the
spectator is exceedingly unlikely to endorse Giafar's blind adherence to his mother's extraordinary advice anyway, the spectator is a witness to the deliberate artifice which precedes the appearance of 'Giafar's mother' and thus does not, for a moment, take her to be real. The spectator is, in other words, at a crucial moment divorced from his identification with Giafar, which throughout the play, has been the condition of his acceptance of 'la confusion'. Not only is the only logical justification of the rational Giafar's participation in an irrational action the particularly flimsy pretext that his mother has advised him of the sagacity of the action, but even that putative vindication of his unwonted behaviour is based on an assumption seen by the spectator to be erroneous.

Arrabal's failure to provide any acceptable logical justification of the participation of the rational element (Giafar) in the irrational action which expresses 'la confusion' places a severe limitation upon the dramatic efficacy of Le Lai de Barabbas. In a later play Et ils passèrent des Menottes aux Fleurs [1967] (written three years after L'Architecte et l'Empereur d'Assyrie) on the other hand, it is the complementary aspect of the problem which proves a stumbling block. The play makes copious use of the devices employed to modify the structure of L'Architecte et l'Empereur d'Assyrie and, through a series of games which contain elements both of reality and illusion, seeks like that play to present two interpretations of reality. A rational interpretation of the events of the play suggests that it depicts the arrival of Tosan in a (presumably) Spanish jail and his subsequent condemnation and execution at the hands of the Authorities, while on a symbolic (or 'confused') level, and according to the prisoners' own interpretation of what is real, the play depicts the advent,
derisory trial and death of a Christ-like figure, the Messiah of an oppressed race and harbinger of a new era of liberty. It is clearly Arrabal's intention, moreover, to suggest that these two interpretations are equally real, and that the two levels of reality they represent coalesce in the ritual death of Tosan/Christ which constitutes the climax of the play. The author, however, fails to provide any rational demonstration of the reality of the terms of the second interpretation: Christ appears only as the result of a deliberate artifice on the part both of Tosan, who embodies Christ, and of the other prisoners who embody the people with whom Christ comes into contact. There is, in other words, no element within the episodes depicting the appearance of Christ, which is real according to the rational view of the spectator. Equally, there is no attempt by the author to suggest that the reality of the first interpretation is, in fact, illusory. Although the irrationality of the laws of the Authorities is convincingly brought home to the spectator, it is nevertheless those laws which govern the world in which the play is set. The effect of both these omissions, moreover, is clearly to suggest that the only reality of the play is that of prison. Despite various levels of illusion and reality at work in the play, Arrabal fails on these two complementary counts definitively to annul the distinction between real and imaginary as he had done in L'Architecte et l'Empereur d'Assyrie. He consequently also fails in Et ils passerent des Menottes aux Fleurs to engender in the rational spectator the belief in the second symbolic interpretation of the events of the play, necessary to effect his total identification with the prisoners it depicts. The death of Tosan, indeed, is real on one level only, and the symbolic significance of his subsequent resurrection all too likely
to be lost beneath the spectator's justifiable assumption that this, in common with "le commencement d'un époque nouvelle" which it heralds, is merely a figment of the prisoners' fertile fantasy. 138

An arguably more effective treatment of a similar theme is to be found in Le Ciel et la Merde, a rational interpretation of which suggests that it depicts the execution by the Authorities of a band of assassins and their leader Erasme. Through a series of games acted out by Erasme and his disciples in the course of the play, however, it becomes clear that the assassins themselves interpret events differently. For them, their imminent death (like that of Tosan in Et ils passèrent des Menottes aux Fleurs) signifies the onset of a new era, embodied by the child whose advent is eagerly awaited throughout the play, and to whom Ribla gives birth at the moment of her own death. The execution in this play, however, is preceded by a crucial scene which provides precisely the indications of the reality of Erasme's terms of reference that were lacking in Et ils passèrent des Menottes aux Fleurs. Erasme and his followers are brought to a situation of direct confrontation with the Authorities by whose hand they are condemned. In this scene, moreover, there is no element of disguise or play: neither party is 'acting', the situation is presented to the spectator as unequivocally real. Nevertheless, there is here reproduced in reality the same confused 'order' hitherto witnessed by the spectator on an illusory level in the various situations acted out by the five assassins. The supposed rationality of the Authorities is revealed to be illusory, as indeed it was previously depicted in games, while the 'miracles' hitherto performed by Erasme et al. on an illusory level are here repeated in reality.
ERASME: Votre civilisation fait des choses, qui ne nous intéressent pas; nous, nous pouvons en faire d'autres ... je peux dire au dossier qu'il vole dans les airs.

Le dossier vole dans les airs.
Tous les cinq le suivent du regard, fort amusés.

It is thus demonstrated that the universe depicted in *Le Ciel et la Merde* is governed not by the terms of a familiar rationality such as is represented by the Authorities, but by the terms of an unfamiliar order such as that of the 'confusion' expressed by Erasme. As such, moreover, this scene engages the spectator's credence both in the 'games' which have gone before, and, more importantly, in the symbolic significance of the ritual which follows.

While the degree of dramatic efficacy achieved by Arrabal in *Le Ciel et la Merde* is thus greater than that of *Et ils passèrent des Menottes aux Fleurs*, both these plays remain interesting and instructive examples of the technique adopted by the playwright to express the irrationality of 'la confusion' to the rational spectator in the most recent phase of his work. A significant number of later plays are characterised by the creation, through a manipulation of differing levels of illusion and reality, of two coexistent assessments of reality, one of which accords with the rational terms governing the spectator's immediate reality, and the other of which reflects the 'confused' terms of reference which pertain in the universe in which the plays are set. These are subsequently united at the climax of the plays by a single action which expresses the reality of both interpretations simultaneously, being at once logically justifiable and symbolically significant in light of the events which give rise to it.

The point is clearly illustrated by a consideration of one of the most extraordinary and effective of these later plays,
La Tour de Babel, written by Arrabal in 1976 and performed for the first time in Brussels, in October of that year, under the direction of the author. La Tour de Babel may usefully be analysed along the same lines as L'Architecte et L'Empereur d'Assyrie and, like the latter, it proceeds from the presentation of an illusion clearly divided into two domains. The central character of the play is Latidia, the blind inhabitant of the majestic, isolated castle of Villa Ramiro, torn between the golden memories of a former age of glory, whose reinstatement she craves, and the growing desperation engendered by what she feels are the unpalatable realities of the age in which she lives:

``Nous chanterons le fameux couplet

<<Du passé, faisons table rase
Foule esclave, debout, debout!
Le monde tremble sur sa base
Nous ne sommes rien, soyons tout.>>
``

In the second scene of the play Latidia is confronted by the Marquis de Cerralbo, who has come to tell her that she must leave her home, since the castle is to pass into the hands of the Count and Countess of Ecija as payment for debts owed to them by Latidia. The latter's response is to appeal (through the window of the castle) for assistance in defending the castle, and in the fifth scene each side of the opposition depicted in scene 2 is augmented by the arrival, on the one hand, of the Count and Countess of Ecija themselves and, on the other hand, of three down-and-out beggars who come in answer to Latidia's appeal.

As is the case with L'Architecte et L'Empereur d'Assyrie the rationality of the spectator determines his initial assessment of the illusion presented and divided into two domains in the manner outlined above. The two domains indeed represent the familiar philosophical opposition of rational and irrational.
Latidia herself is a bizarre character who is seen in the first scene of the play conducting a conversation with a donkey from Mars, who, we learn, carries out nightly ceremonies with a doll and a glass of blood, and who has a disturbing habit of eating small insects, while the behaviour of her three new-found assistants immediately suggests that of the trickster figure discussed (as a symbol of 'la confusion') in a previous section of this thesis. According to the terms which govern the immediate reality of the spectator, then, the four are readily categorised as irrational or 'chaotic', while, according to the same terms, the Marquis, the Count and the Countess, whose behaviour is clearly determined by a more familiar set of rules with which the spectator may identify, are equally readily categorised as rational or 'civilized'. As is the case with the Emperor in the earlier play, moreover, the mark of their civilization is the power which they hold in the situation depicted and which they wield over Latidia and the three beggars. It is indeed, as Arrabal significantly points out, a power invested in them by one representative of civilization:

Voici le document légal officiel. Pour payer les dettes envers les comtes d'Ecija, le Tribunal a décidé que, dorénavant, le château ne t'appartient plus, mais qu'il est leur propriété

and supported by others:

Que ces messieurs et cette dame ne nous obligent pas à prendre une mesure aussi radicale que celle d'appeler la police.

Again, however, the notion of power which is a mark of the 'civilization' of the Marquis, the Count and the Countess according to an interpretation based on the terms which govern the spectator's immediate reality indicates the fact that belief in the
illusion implies an alternative and contradictory level of interpretation. For, like _L'Architecte et l'Empereur d'Assyrie_, _La Tour de Babel_ is set in an unfamiliar universe which bears little resemblance to the comfortable and rational world inhabited by the spectator. And, according to the terms of the world of the illusion, the potential power possessed by Latidia, aided as she is by the limitless capabilities offered by the martian donkey, far outweighs that which may be mustered by her opponents. The world of the illusion is, indeed, a 'confused' world of miracles and wonderment, in which Latidia can move from one century to another merely by walking up and down the stairs: according to the terms which govern the illusion it is she, and not the Marquis, the Count or the Countess who holds the upper hand.

_La Tour de Babel_, therefore, promotes an opposition within the attitude of the spectator in exactly the same way as _L'Architecte et l'Empereur d'Assyrie_. According to one level of interpretation power lies with the Count and his associates, and yet within the reality of the illusion Latidia possesses potentially boundless power. Again in common with the technique employed in _L'Architecte et l'Empereur d'Assyrie_ the 'order' of the second of these interpretations is subsequently presented in terms which reflect those which determined the first, through the creation of a second level of illusion. On a second level of illusion, in other words, Latidia's power is depicted rationally. In her blindness Latidia mistakes each of her 'guests' for someone else: she thinks for instance that the Count is Goya, that his wife is Doña Chimēne, that the legless cripple is Cid Campeador, and so on. Each, moreover, has his or her own reasons for temporarily
not wishing to point out the mistake and all thus lend them­selves voluntarily to the game implied by that mistake, by acting out the rôles assigned to them by Latidia. And, as already suggested, the game actualizes the order of things in Latidia's unfamiliar universe, for not only does it secure complete control for Latidia herself, but it also gives the three beggars the opportunity to dominate the Marquis, the Count and the Countess, reversing the order which previously pertained. Indeed the blind man's words to the Count and Countess in an exchange in scene 7, which illustrates that domination, are more than coincidentally reminiscent of the words spoken by the Count himself in scene 5, and quoted above:

BORGNE: emphatique et concluant: Si monsieur et madame la Comtesse refusent de prendre part à la défense du château, qu'ils s'en aillent.

COMTE: effrayé par la tournure que prennent les événements: Non, non, absolument pas, nous sommes avec vous.  

Not only does the game actualize the order of things in Latidia's universe, moreover, but in as much as each of the players has a constant and recognizable character, and (when playing) acts consistently in accordance with that character, the game also possesses a strong element of rationality. Like the 'game' of judge and accused played by the Architect and the Emperor, indeed, it constitutes a representation of the order of things in an unfamiliar universe in familiar terms, which are commensurate with and, to some extent at least, reflect the order of things in the spectator's universe.

Hence, through the game, the opposing facets of the interpretation of the spectator are rendered contiguous. Latidia is seen to possess ultimate power both according to the terms which govern the illusion, and (on a second level of illusion) according to the terms which govern the spectator's immediate reality. As
we learnt from our study of *L'Architecte et l'Empereur d'Assyrie*, however, one further step is necessary before the opposition within 'la conscience spectatrice' may be transcended, before, in other words, the spectator may be effectively convinced of the reality of 'la confusion'. For the second level of illusion, despite its air of rationality, remains logically unreal to all concerned (with the exception of Latidia). To achieve transcendence of the opposition inherent within 'la conscience spectatrice', the spectator needs not only to recognize the rationality or order of 'la confusion' as presented on the second level of illusion, but also to believe in that second level of illusion, to be convinced that it is no less 'real' than the first.

It is in fulfilling this requirement that Arrabal deviates most noticeably in *La Tour de Babel* from the technique used in *L'Architecte et l'Empereur d'Assyrie*. As we have said, the game provides the beggars with the opportunity to dominate the Marquis, the Count and the Countess, and an important facet of the presentation of that domination is a series of scenes which in their (conventionally) repulsive nature vividly recall the striking and 'shocking' depictions of 'la confusion' in other, earlier plays.

In scene 9, for example, the blind man (playing the part of Che Guevara) makes homosexual advances to the Count (Goya), while in the following scene the legless cripple takes advantage of his rôle as Cid Campeador to force the Countess (Doña Chimène) to make love to him. This enforced descent to the depths of depravity, moreover, proves strangely fascinating to the Count and his associates, as scene 10, in particular, illustrates:

*CUL-DE-JATTE, gifle - Dis-moi des mots tendres... toujours.*

*(il cogne)*

*COMTESSE, après une longue pause - Mon cœur! (Elle semble convaincue) Je suis folle d'amour pour toi!*  
*CUL-DE-JATTE - Chienne! Continue!*
COMTESSE, fascinée - Tu me bouleverses! Tu me rends folle! C'est la première fois de ma vie que je me sens femme! Tu me plaises! Je t'aime à la folie.

For all that she may be acting a part, the Countess becomes subjected to the power of the cripple in a very real sense, and not just as a result of the terms of the illusion which is being created. Indeed when the Marquis, the Count and the Countess revert temporarily to their original personae in order to discuss how the control of the situation, which is gradually slipping away from them, may best be regained, they find that the power of the three beggars, which began as a game, has acquired an unsuspected dimension of reality, and pertains even when they are not playing:

MARQUIS: Il faut aussi éliminer les trois mendients.
COMTE: Le Borgne, pourquoi? C'est un violent, mais au fond je suis sûr qu'il a un coeur d'or.
COMTESSE: Le Cul-de-jatte est un homme qui a souffert, qui dans sa vie n'a connu que des déboires.
MARQUIS: Je vois, chacun veut garder son mec.151

Game has thus begun to turn into reality, and the two continue to merge until Latidia's guests finally cease to play the rôles she has ascribed to them, and actually become those rôles:

Le Comte (Goya), la Comtesse (Chimène), Le cul-de-jatte (Le Cid), le Borgne (Che Guevara), le Marquis (Velle Inclan) Mareda (Thérèse d'Avila), le Tueur à gages (Zapata), la Pocharde (Don Juan) se sont déjà complètement identifiés au personnage que Latidia leur a attribué.152

It thus appears that Arrabal seeks to convince the spectator of the reality of the second level of illusion by building on the primary identification made by the spectator with the civilized element of the first level of the illusion. The Marquis, the Count and the Countess shift position, as it were, from adherence to their own assessment of what is real, and ultimately come to share Latidia's (i.e. the 'chaotic' element of the first level of illusion) assessment of what is real. In so doing they also,
incidentally, change from being the representatives of civilization and join the representatives of 'la confusion'. And the implication is that because the Marquis, the Count and the Countess are the spectator's original point of reference in the play the spectator will shift position with them, coming to a belief in the reality of the second level of illusion himself, because they believe in it. At the same time, however, Arrabal skilfully maintains the spectator's awareness of the reality of the first level of illusion by the introduction of a new element, the voices from outside which, through a loudspeaker, urge the inhabitants of the castle to surrender their position, and which are first heard, significantly, at the moment of the definitive assumption by those within of the rôles Latidia has attributed to them.

In this way, through the manipulation of differing levels of illusion and reality, Arrabal establishes and maintains two coexistent views of reality. On one level La Tour de Babel depicts the siege of the crumbling castle of Villa Ramiro; such is the initial assessment of the Marquis, the Count and the Countess, and the reality of which the voices from the outside are a part. On a second level La Tour de Babel depicts a band of revolutionary and other heroes concerned to re-establish a former age of glory, and in the words of their leader Latidia, which link the play most strongly to the author's philosophical purposes, to "racheter le sepulcre de la déraison". Such is Latidia's belief all along, and the reality of which the Marquis, the Count and his wife ultimately become convinced. These two views of reality, simultaneous belief in both of which is necessary to effect the transcendence of the opposition inherent in 'la conscience spectatrice' merge, moreover, at the climax of the play, when the old castle crumbles in ruins. On one level this is the logical
conclusion of a process which has been apparent throughout
(from the beginning we have heard the termites gnawing at the main
buttress), it marks the end of the siege, and, as the voice from
outside informs us, a victory for the forces of civilization:

En un sens c'est un dénouement heureux. Il va y avoir un
terrain idéal pour les promoteurs immobiliers. La chaîne
Hilton veut construire un magnifique motel cinq étoiles.
Enfin, grâce à la collaboration internationale, cette région
va sortir de son isolement ancestral pour entrer dans notre
siècle de progrès et d'efficacité.

At the same time, however, on another level, the same event denotes
a victory for Latidia and the realisation of her desire to
re-establish a former era. For the devastation of the castle
provides the inhabitants with the important discovery of the plans
for the Tower of Babel, as well as with the materials and workforce
(the termites turn their talents to construction rather than
destruction) with which to erect a magnificent monument to 'la
confusion'. Both levels of reality are united in a triumphant
conclusion which is, indeed, both logically justifiable and
symbolically significant in the light of the events which precede
it.

La Tour de Babel, then, is an instructive example of the
technique adopted by Arrabal to present 'la confusion' to the
rational spectator in his later plays. As has been suggested,
the ingredients of this technique, exemplified also in Le Ciel et
la Merde and Et ils passèrent des Menottes aux Fleurs, as well
as in other recent plays which have a similar 'two tier' structure,
are the methodological devices identified in L'Architecte et
l'Empereur d'Assyrie which may be seen as a blueprint of the
methodology of 'Le Théâtre Baroque', and it is perhaps in La Tour
de Babel that Arrabal comes closest to repeating the achievements
of L'Architecte et l'Empereur d'Assyrie. Even against La Tour
de Babel, however, certain question marks remain: whether the spectator can in fact be convinced by the rather too fluent seduction of his points of reference, the Marquis, the Count and the Countess, into an acceptance of the reality of the second level of illusion is particularly open to debate, and there lingers also the suspicion that, in his manipulation of the rôles of the three beggars for example, Arrabal here replaces with a certain amount of jiggery-pokery the perfect balance and dextrous management of opposing philosophical (rational and irrational) and dramatic (real and illusory) elements in evidence in 'L'Architecte et l'Empereur d'Assyrie, which play indeed remains the most outstanding example in Arrabal's work of the successful marriage of philosophical and dramatic theories.
Central to the instructive elaboration of the principles of Baroque art given by Eugenio d'Ors in _Le Baroque_ is a consideration of the opposition between the Baroque and Classicism. D'Ors demonstrates how the stability and regularity of form which characterised the latter were superseded by the morphology and dynamism of a Baroque style characterised in turn by the adoption and proliferation of what he calls "les formes qui s'envolent". He goes on to claim, moreover, that the contrasts thus identified derive from and reflect the opposition between the respective origins of the two movements:

... si le précurseur du Classique se nomme Antiquité, celui du Baroque s'appelle Préhistoire. Le rationalisme, l'étatisme, le cercle, le triangle, le contrepoint, la colonne, les procédés de l'esprit qui imite l'Esprit, tout ceci appartenait déjà, certainement, à la civilisation de la Grèce et de Rome. Mais le panthéisme, le dynamisme, l'ellipse, la fugue, l'arbre, l'esprit soumis aux lois de la nature, se retrouvent intégralement dans le monde primitif et préhistorique.

The stability of Classicism, in other words, is based on the model of civilization itself, while the fluidity of form demonstrated in Baroque style has its roots in the inconstancy of a prehistoric era:

Le style de la civilisation se nomme classicisme. Au style de la barbarie, persistant, permanant dessous de la culture, ne donnerons-nous pas le nom de baroque?

The terms of d'Ors' discussion thus revolve around the familiar opposition between civilization and chaos which also lies at the heart of 'panique' theory. As such, moreover, they underline the applicability of the term 'baroque' to the nature of Arrabal's objectives and may indeed be cited as a justification of the adoption by the dramatist of the label 'Le Théâtre Baroque' to describe his work. For, just as we know the objective of
Arrabal's plays to be an expression of 'la confusion', the chaotic reality latent beneath the restrictive forms of civilization, so, in d'Ors' words 'le baroque est secrètement animé par la nostalgie du Paradis Perdu', and seeks through an exuberance, which stands in stark contrast to the sobriety and regularity of Classicism, to re-create the reality of a former era.

There is thus a clear parallel between the philosophical concerns of Arrabal's work, as discernible from the theoretical writings of the 'panique' movement, and the philosophical background of the notions upon which is based the concept of 'Le Théâtre Baroque' which constitutes the playwright's dramatic methodology. We have here, moreover, attempted to provide some amplification of the often laconic and invariably enigmatic indications of dramatic technique given by Arrabal, by means of a detailed analysis of the function and stages of development of 'Le Théâtre Baroque'. The failure of the 'éphémère panique' which, apparently following the equation between 'le théâtre' and 'la vie' proposed by Artaud in Le Théâtre et son Double, sought to transpose Arrabal's philosophical ideas directly on to the stage, expressing the formless reality of 'la confusion' through the medium of a formless drama, threw into relief the fundamental methodological problem facing the dramatist in his desire to convey the philosophical concerns adumbrated in 'panique' theories through the vehicle of theatre. And it is as the solution to the central problem of how to present the irrational and chaotic reality of 'la confusion' to the spectator who exists within the rational framework of civilization, without provoking the alienation of the latter, that the various facets of Arrabal's methodology have here been considered. The function of 'Le Théâtre Baroque' may, indeed, be summed up as the achievement
of a reconciliation of the opposition between the irrationality of the illusion constructed on stage and the rationality of the spectator to whom that illusion is presented.

Our analysis of 'Le Théâtre Baroque', moreover, was based upon an identification of the similarity between its function, as summarised above, and the function of the drama itself, the effect of which depends upon the reconciliation of an analogous opposition between real and imaginary. The dramatic process consists of two complementary and, in the normal course of events synonymous, stages; it proceeds from an opposition of real and imaginary (the spectator is 'real' and the world on stage is imaginary) to a point where real and imaginary are contiguous (the events on stage are imaginary but purport to be real and are accepted as such by the spectator). The reduction of the opposition and the achievement of contiguity, moreover, depends upon the presentation of the imaginary world through the medium of a game (or drama) the form and terms of which reflect, or may at least be assimilated to, the form and terms of the spectator's reality. There thus exists in the theatre a convention common to both sides of the footlights, adherence to which lends a certain reality to the illusion created on stage, or allows the drama to exist as it were on two levels, being actually imaginary and yet in a sense also real. This in turn promotes in the spectator's attitude an effective reduction of the opposition between real and imaginary or a 'suspension of disbelief'.

The nature of the illusion (the objective of which is to express the 'panique' notion of 'la confusion') in plays by Arrabal, however, is such that it clearly falls outside the scope of the convention which covers both audience and illusion in the case of a naturalistic or realistic drama. With such plays, therefore, the
second stage of the dramatic process (i.e. contiguity between real and imaginary) may be achieved only as the result of the internal modifications of dramatic structure which we have considered, and which together constitute 'Le Théâtre Baroque'. This second process, which effects a reduction of the opposition between the rationality of the spectator and the irrationality of the illusion may best be understood, moreover, as has been suggested, in the light of the dramatic process itself as we have outlined it above, which, in the manner shown, effects a reduction of the analogous opposition between the reality of the spectator and the unreality of the illusion. For Arrabal's plays reproduce as part of the illusion itself an opposition between rational and irrational exactly analogous to the opposition between real and imaginary which exists in the theatre during the performance of a naturalistic drama. Through the division of the universe of the illusion in his plays into these opposing philosophical domains, moreover, the playwright actively fosters in the spectator who accepts the illusion the awareness of an opposition between conflicting views inherent in his attitude: that part of the illusion that is rational in his own terms is irrational according to the terms of reference the validity of which is implied as a result of his acceptance of the illusion. Following the dramatic process exactly, the second stage of 'Le Théâtre Baroque' consists in a reduction of these opposing views to a point of contiguity by the presentation of the irrational element through the medium of a game (or here, of play within the drama) the terms and form of which reflect the terms and form of reality according to the spectator's own rational assessment. The illusion thus exists on two levels: 'la confusion'
is presented in its own (irrational) terms and in the rational terms of the spectator.

The first two stages of 'Le Théâtre Baroque' are thus exactly analogous to the two stages of the dramatic process outlined above. Even at this point, however, there remains in Arrabal's plays a significant limitation upon the rational spectator's acceptance of, and belief in, 'la confusion'. For if the spectator accepts the first level of illusion, as has been our assumption, then the 'rational' presentation of 'la confusion' (i.e. 'la confusion' in his own terms) is itself an illusion. For Arrabal's plays to reach the second stage of the dramatic process (i.e. contiguity between real and imaginary) in the theatre it is therefore necessary to extend the analogous process of 'Le Théâtre Baroque' within the play one further stage beyond that of contiguity. 'La confusion' must be seen by the spectator, in other words, not only to be rational but also to be 'real'. Accordingly the effect of the third stage of 'Le Théâtre Baroque' is to unite the two levels of illusion previously identified in a single action which expresses the reality of both simultaneously. 'La confusion' is expressed through the medium of ritual which exists on two levels at once, lending it not only a rational form but also an undeniable reality.

Our examination of Arrabal's methodology depends heavily, as is here reiterated, upon an assumption of the essential affinity between the terms 'baroque' and 'dramatic'. Accordingly, it is interesting to find that a similar parallel is proposed by Jean Rousset in *La Littérature de l'Age Baroque en France*.

Rousset sums up the message of the baroque age in the following terms:
Circe et ses semblables ... proclament ... que tout est mobilité, inconstance et illusion dans un monde qui n'est que théâtre et décor.

and points out how closely this 'message' is linked to the function of drama itself:

C'est un message analogue qu* diffuse la tragi-comédie où tout le monde est masqué, où personne n'est ce qu'il paraît, où se joue d'un bout à l'autre le jeu des transformations et des fausses apparences.

In light of this equation, moreover, he goes on to comment not only that the theatre is the obvious and perfect medium for baroque art, but further, and more significantly, that the very basis of the latter lies in an extension to their ultimate extremes of the principles of the theatre:

Il est naturel qua cette époque qui s'exprime par le théâtre et qui exprime tout, jusqu'à son angoisse et à ses interrogations, en termes de théâtre, achemine à ses extrêmes conséquences le principe de tout théâtre: le masque et le décor, et en vienne à faire du théâtre lui-même l'objet de son théâtre en multipliant le théâtre sur le théâtre et la pièce sur la pièce.

There may thus be found in the words of Rousset a firm justification of the terms of our own analysis of Arrabal's dramatic methodology. For it is precisely as a technique animated by the fundamental principles of the theatre that we have here sought to elaborate what is meant by 'Le Théâtre Baroque'.
It should be stressed that the three stages of *Le Théâtre Baroque* which we have here considered are directed only towards the goal of bringing Arrabal's drama to the second stage of the dramatic process, as outlined above. There are two levels of existence in the theatre, one real and the other imaginary, both of which are made equally believable by the structural modifications which we have examined. The effect of the latter is to present the imaginary and intrinsically irrational world of 'la confusion' in the terms which govern the spectator's existence, whereby it appears commensurate with the spectator's rationality and thus real. But, of course, at the same time it is not real; the reality of the situation consists in a group of actors, each of whom plays a part and who together deliberately construct a network of credible illusion, just as in any realistic play. In the course of our earlier consideration of the dramatic process, moreover, it was indicated that while the drama exists on two levels either of which is believable (a situation brought about in the case of Arrabal's plays as a consequence of the successful functioning of the internal process of *Le Théâtre Baroque*) belief in either level is achieved only at the expense of belief in the other. It was indeed stressed that the simultaneous belief in both levels is an impossibility. Nevertheless the third stage of *Le Théâtre Baroque* itself consists in the achievement of just such an impossibility. The promotion of contiguity between the two levels of reality in the theatre (achieved by the process of *Le Théâtre Baroque* as a whole) depends in Arrabal's work upon the unity of the two levels of reality within the illusion (achieved by the third stage of the process). To bring his drama to the second stage of the
dramatic process, in other words, Arrabal 'performs the impossible' within the play, proceeding from a point where opposing views are contiguous (i.e. from a point analogous to the second stage of the dramatic process) to a point where the opposition is transcended, and where both levels of existence are simultaneously real. There thus exists in the third stage of 'Le Théâtre Baroque' at least the basis of a suspicion that the dramatic process itself may be extended beyond a point of contiguity and into the realms of the 'impossible'. Accordingly it is perhaps of little surprise to discover that, following the criteria which have enabled him to achieve transcendence within the illusion, by a modification of the internal structure of his plays, Arrabal also brings to bear upon his work a number of devices designed to modify their external structure, and clearly directed at the effectuation of an analogous transcendence within the wider framework of the theatre.

Recalling the terms and function of the third stage of 'Le Théâtre Baroque' it may be ascertained that the achievement of this aim depends upon the promotion in the spectator of an equal faith in the simultaneous reality of both levels of existence obtaining in the theatre. The spectator must therefore believe that the actor is the character he depicts, but at the same time believe that he is 'really' A the actor. He must believe that he is (say) in a Spanish jail, but at the same time believe that he is in such and such a theatre. And not least he must believe not only that he is a spectator at a play, but that as such he is at the same time also playing a part in that play. In short, both spectators and actors must participate in the spectacle, on a completely equal footing: the two levels of reality they represent
must coalesce in actions which express the reality of the world depicted on stage and the world represented in the auditorium simultaneously. The drama in other words must be elevated to the status of ceremony.169

The means by which Arrabal seeks to transcend the opposition between real and illusory in this wider context, however, are for the most part neither original or convincing. In Cérémonie pour un Noir Assassiné /1956/170 and Le Jardin des Délices /1967/171, for instance, the central characters, Jérôme and Vincent in the former play and Lais in the latter, are all actors. In Le Ciel et la Vérole the actors are introduced to the audience by name, prior to assuming the rôles they are to fulfil in the illusion. In Et ils passèrent des Ménottes aux Fleurs the spectators are guided to their seats by the actors in character before the performance begins, and are subsequently twice invited to improvise scenes with the actors/characters as part of the illusion. These almost self-conscious devices may be seen as an attempt by the author to suggest to the spectator that the people before him are in the illusion exactly what they are in reality, that the rôle they play on stage is exactly that which they fulfil off it. A similar device is employed, and a similar suggestion implied in Jeunes Barbares d'Aujourd'hui /1975/.172

The setting is a theatre and the action opens with the curtain still down:

Ecila chante d'une façon étrange et prodigieuse devant le rideau d'un théâtre... [elle] continue à chanter pendant que les spectateurs emplissent la salle. C'est une salle de théâtre sans aucun luxe.173

The stage is thus a stage in reality, and also a stage in the world of the illusion. By extension the spectator not only is a spectator
(at a play by Arrabal) but also plays a spectator within the illusion (at whatever performance ensues when the curtain does go up).

These devices, and others like them, are strongly reminiscent of certain experimental plays by Pirandello, though Arrabal's use of them is far more tentative and arbitrary than the Italian's. They may, however, be criticised on the same grounds as those adduced to assess the limitations of Pirandello's experiments. By making his central characters into actors, by establishing direct contact between his characters and the spectators ostensibly before the commencement of the performance, or by setting a play in a theatre, Arrabal is clearly trying to lend reality to the illusion which his plays present by equating the terms of the illusion with the terms of reality. The equation, however, is wholly false. For, even if we can accept that they are not pretending to be characters, the actors (in *Ceremonie pour un Noir Assassiné*, for example) ARE pretending to be actors. The fact that we encounter the characters in *Et ils passèrent des Menottes aux Fleurs* as soon as we set foot in the theatre does not hide the fact that they are actors, nor does it convince us that we are really entering a Spanish jail, and not a theatre at all.

Similarly, though the stage in *Jeunes Barbares d'aujourd'hui* is in all senses and on both levels a stage, it still retains both a real and an illusionistic aspect: either it is the stage of a disused theatre in which the three cyclists seek refuge for the night, or it is the stage of the Théâtre Mouffetard in Paris upon which a play by Arrabal is being performed, but it is not both at once. Indeed, far from transcending the opposition between
real and imaginary which exists in the theatre, such devices
seem rather to underline it. For in attempting to provide an
external framework of reality, Arrabal in fact stresses precisely
those criteria according to which we ascertain that what we see
is illusory. We know that drama is unreal because it is acted;
its unreality is confirmed for as long as we remember we are in a
theatre, and as we have seen, it is of these very considerations
that Arrabal's devices serve to remind us.

An alternative modification of the external structure
is effected by the construction of certain plays according to a
deliberately circular pattern. *Le Lai de Barabbas* and *L'Architecte
et l'Empereur d'Assyrie*, for example, not only contain elements
of ritual but are themselves constructed like a ritual, ending
exactly as they begin. This may be seen as a further attempt
to promote the spectator's total belief in the illusion by suggesting
that what he sees is but a part of an endlessly repetitive and thus
symbolic process. Again, however, the playwright fails to take
full account of the implications of the convention within which he
is working, for, rather than raising the illusion to the status
of symbol, this technique merely serves to underline a further
indication of the illusory nature of the drama. We know that
drama is an illusion because it is acted, and because we are in a
theatre, but its illusory nature is further attested by the fact
that it returns repeatedly to the same point, that tomorrow's
performance will be the same as today's.

There is, nevertheless, at least one example of Arrabal's
successful achievement of 'the impossible', and of the effective
destruction of the gap separating real from imaginary, actor from
part acted, in his work. It arises, moreover, not as the result
of the type of self-conscious device the limitations of which we have assessed above, but in a moment of sheer theatricality, the mechanics of which defy explanation, but invite description. It occurs at the climax of Sur le Fil, which play was first read in public during the Avignon Festival in 1974, and subsequently performed in Paris in October of the following year with Pierre Constant in the rôle of Tharsis, an erstwhile juggler, who arrives with his companion, the Duc de Gaza, in the deserted New Mexico mining town of Madrid, after twenty years of exile from his native city, Madrid in Spain. There he encounters the sole surviving inhabitant of the New Mexico town, Wichita, from whom he learns that, though now a ghost town, Madrid, New Mexico was previously a centre of glory, prosperity and international renown.

Madrid était la plus extraordinaire, la plus belle, la plus captivante ville du monde, c'était un cité pour princes mineurs, pour marquis de scories, pour chevaliers de charbon.

Wichita in fact attempts a re-creation of the golden age of Madrid, by trying to walk the tightrope, as he had done to widespread acclaim so often in that bygone era. The attempt fails, for Wichita is now too old to perform the tricks of his youth, but nevertheless his enthusiastic reminiscences serve to provoke in Tharsis a deliberation of the terms of his own exile. His own Madrid too is, in a sense, a ghost town "qui pour le moment vit bâillonné comme un peuple fantôme", and he has left it, as is attested in the 'game' in which Tharsis takes on the rôle of Theresa of Avila, with the sense of embarking on some form of mystical mission:

nous avons grandi avec la seule idée de quitter Madrid, l'Espagne, comme Sainte Thérèse d'Avila, pour conquérir la gloire.

In Wichita, moreover, he recognizes the possibility of giving substance to that mission, which has hitherto existed only as a vague notion
in his imagination. For in the art of the tightrope-walker lie the qualities of which he has always dreamed:

THARSIS: J'ai toujours rêvé d'être funambule.
WICHITA: Pour être funambule il faut avoir des yeux qui regardent l'infini et l'univers enclos là, au bout du fil.

In the same manner as Wichita has attempted to re-create the former age of glory of Madrid, New Mexico, Tharsis will himself re-create the former golden age of liberty in Madrid, Spain, returning in triumph to liberate his people from their present bondage. The achievement of this goal is eventually facilitated as the result of the sacrifice of Wichita and the assumption by Tharsis of the tightrope-walker's former powers. The final scene of the play thus unites all the levels of illusion developed throughout the play. Tharsis walks the tightrope, high above the Puerta del Sol in Madrid, Spain, returning his beloved homeland to its former liberty. At the same time, however, he is also in Madrid, New Mexico, re-creating "Madrid tel que l'aimait Wichita", and on a third level he is Saint Theresa of Avila fulfilling the promise to "conquérir la gloire".

At the moment when Pierre Constant mounted the wire in the execution of this final scene, moreover, there was a very real sense in which he was no longer acting. In fact he was acting, for his only reason for mounting the wire in the first place was that he was 'playing' Tharsis, but he could only 'act' Tharsis walking the tightrope by performing the considerable feat of walking it himself. The successful execution of the final scene of Sur le Fil, in other words, as well as the liberty of Spain, the re-creation of the splendour of Madrid, New Mexico, and the mystical conquest of glory all depend not upon Tharsis, nor even on the power which is his legacy from Wichita, but solely upon the virtuosity of the actor. The actor and the rôle he plays, in
short, are united. As such, moreover, the last scene of Sur le Fil not only unites the various levels of illusion within the play, but also effectively achieves 'the impossible' for a moment at least, annulling the opposition between real and illusory in the theatre by putting reality and illusion both literally and metaphorically in the balance.
NOTES TO PART TWO, SECTION 3


3 A series of portraits of adherents of the movement, by Dominique Sevrain, appears under the title "Les Paniques" in Le Panique, pp.18-33.


6 JODOROWSKI, Alejandro "Vers l'Éphémère panique ou Sortir le Théâtre du Théâtre", Le Panique, pp.74-93.

7 ibid., p.78.


9 ARRABAL, Fernando "Le Théâtre comme Cérémonie Panique", p.98.


13 ibid., p.90.


16 ARRABAL, Fernando (and others) "Quatre Jeunes Écrivains jugent le Surréalisme". Magazine Littéraire no.16. March 1968, p.22. Issue includes special feature entitled "Dossier sur le Surréalisme".

18 In his article in Magazine Littéraire, for example, Arrabal writes:
"Pour moi qui n'ai jamais été surréaliste, quel intérêt peuvent avoir les théories qui n'éclipsent pas la rose renversée, ni la lumière surprise?" (p.?2)


20 ARTAUD, Antonin  op.cit., p.18.

21 cf. AUDOUIN, Jean  "Avec Fernando Arrabal pour un Théâtre Libre". Pourquoi no.43, March 1968, in which article Arrabal is quoted as saying:
"Je veux un théâtre aux limites de l'insupportable...nous recherchons un théâtre infiniment libre et j'espère meilleur".

22 ARTAUD, Antonin  op.cit., p.11.

23 BRUSTEIN, Robert  The Theatre of Revolt, University Paperbacks, Methuen, London 1965, p.367.


25 ibid., p.74.


27 ARTAUD, Antonin  op.cit., p.115.

28 ibid., p.146.

29 ibid., p.139.

"Artaud never achieved his own theatre; maybe the power of his vision is that it is the carrot in front of our nose, never to be reached".

31 ARTAUD, Antonin  op.cit., p.126.
32 ibid., p.131.

33 ibid., pp.129-130.

34 As Brustein points out (op.cit., p.368), "for Artaud, the beauty of the plague is its destruction of repressive social forms".

35 ARTAUD, Antonin op.cit., p.44.

36 This is a significant aspect of Artaud's proposals concerning the theatre, the effects of which will be examined in detail presently.

37 ARTAUD, Antonin op.cit., p.75.


cf. also ANTEBI, Elisabeth. "69 L'Année Arrabal". Magazine Littéraire no.23, November 1968, pp.40-41, in which Arrabal is quoted as saying:

"Je ne veux pas provoquer la confusion mais quand elle naît, je me retrouve dans la réalité". (p.41).

39 Victor Garcia, Jerôme Savary and Jorge Lavelli are three of the leading names connected with the so-called "Latin-American" group of directors, all of whom hail originally from South America and who were working in the theatre in Paris in the sixties. The group (which also included Copi) brought to Parisian theatre a distinctive and innovatory style of direction, the terms of which eminently suited Arrabal's desire for "une idée théâtrale rigoureuse".

The most notable achievement of Arrabal's collaboration with Savary was the production of Le Labyrinthe which opened in Paris in January 1967 and subsequently toured to London. A description of the London production may be found in Experimental Theatre by James Roose-Evans, Studio Vista Books, London 1970, pp.58-9. The production was presented by the "Grand Théâtre Panique", an experimental troupe run by Arrabal and Savary (who also jointly wrote a play entitled Les Boîtes during this period) which was a forerunner of Savary's own "Grand Magic Circus" (see Theater Heute, Vol. XIII no.4, April 1972, the article entitled "Unterhaltung mit Jerôme Savary"). It was, moreover, for the Grand Magic Circus that Arrabal's play La Marche Royale was written in 1973, as is attested by a note in the manuscript. (La Marche Royale is published in ARRABAL, Fernando, Théâtre XI, Christian Bourgois, Paris 1976, pp.75-88.)

The highlights of Arrabal's collaboration with Garcia were without question the productions of Le Cimetière des Voitures which opened in Dijon in June 1966 and in Paris (Théâtre des Arts) in December of the following year, and L'Architecte et l'Empereur d'Assyrie at the Old Vic in London which opened on 28th December 1970.

It was, however, Lavelli who first directed L'Architecte et l'Empereur d'Assyrie at the Théâtre Montparnasse - Gaston Baty
in March 1967 and the author's association with the latter, always more sustained than with Garcia or Savary, continues to the present day. It dates from 1966 in which year Lavelli directed Pique-Nique en Campagne and La Communion Solennelle and has most recently produced Sur le Fil (Avignon, August 1974, Paris 1975, London, March 1976). The work of Lavelli is minutely examined in Jorge Lavelli by Colette Godard and Dominique Nores (Christian Bourgois, Paris, 1971) while a general article dealing with the work of the 'Latin American Group' by Nicole Zand may be found in Le Théâtre 1968-1 ed. Arrabal, pub. Christian Bourgois, Paris 1968, pp.53-60.


41 SCHIFRES, Alain op.cit., p.84.

42 JODOROWSKI, Alejandro Mélodrame Sacramental (la vision personnelle de l'auteur de l'éphémère) 1965, unpublished MS in Arrabal's possession, 9pp.

43 There is, however, the outline of a proposed 'éphémère' involving a corpse, which remains an unfulfilled dream, on page 78 of Entretiens avec Arrabal, and newspaper accounts of the events which led to the premature closure of Et ils passèrent des Menottes aux Fleurs at the Théâtre de l'Epée-de-Bois in 1969 might also be taken as the description of an 'éphémère panique'. Cf. BOUVARD, Phillippe "Les Mordus du Théâtre" Le Figaro, 18th December 1969.

44 Arrabal maintains in conversation with Schifres that there is a difference between the happening and the 'éphémère' (Entretiens avec Arrabal, pp.81-2). Elsewhere, however, he himself uses the two terms interchangeably.


46 JODOROWSKI, Alejandro "Vers l'Ephémère Panique ou Sortir le Théâtre du Théâtre", p.89.

47 LEBEL, Jean-Jacques loc.cit.

48 ibid., p.21.

49 KIRBY, Michael Happenings, Dutton, New York 1966, p.34.


51 LEBEL, Jean-Jacques op.cit., p.33.
The definition of the happening given by Colette Godard and Dominique Nores in Jorge Lavelli (p.149) likewise stresses the function of violation inherent in the nature of the happening:

"Le but du happening est de libérer des énergies refoulées dans un éclatement qui dénonce et viole en même temps les structures policières de la société et de sa culture".

In the light of Artaud's desire to re-introduce an original and archetypal theatre it is interesting to recall that, as Simon states in "Le Théâtre, le Mythe et la Psyche" (Esprit, Vol.XXXIII, May 1965, pp.818-823) it is in the nature of the religious festival that the roots of theatre lies:

"D'origine divine, le théâtre est fondé comme fête et comme savoir"

He expands upon this assertion, moreover, in a recent book entitled Les Signes et les Songes (Editions du Seuil, Paris 1976, 285 pp) which constitutes a minute analysis of the survival or re-emergence of 'la fête' in modern French drama.

"L'ordre, en effet, ne s'accommode pas de l'existence simultanée de toutes les possibilités, de l'absence de toute règle; le monde connut alors les limitations infranchissables qui confinrent chaque espèce dans son être propre et qui l'empêchent d'en sortir. Tout se trouva immobilisé et les interdits furent établis afin que l'organisation, la légalité nouvelles ne fussent pas troublées".
This argument should not be taken as an out-of-band denial of the potential of the 'fête' form in the theatre. It is unsuitable to the philosophical objectives of Arrabal's work, as we have attempted to demonstrate, because the ultimate aim of the author is not the portrayal of the dismantling per se of restrictive barriers, but rather the depiction of the situation which preceded their erection, of a reality from which such barriers are absent. By the same token, however, the 'fête' is suited to the achievement of more directly political objectives in the theatre, where it is precisely the removal of repressive social and political structures that is the point to be conveyed rather than the usually ill-defined and vaguely utopian state which, it is hoped, such an action will bring about. In this context the 'fête' has indeed been successfully adopted as a theatrical form, most notably by the 'Living Theatre' group under the leadership of Julian Beck, whose conversation with Jean Andouin confirms this subtle difference in emphasis between the objectives of his own politically orientated group and those of the 'mouvement panique' which we have elsewhere expounded at length.

"J.A. Vous ne criez pourtant pas au public "vous êtes de sales bourgeois" car vous ne voyez dans le public qu'un palier pour atteindre et détruire une structure.

J.B. Avec notre théâtre nous prenons très au sérieux la possibilité de contribuer à préparer la révolution. Naturellement quand je dis révolution je pense à une révolution contre la violence, contre la société dominée par l'argent, par l'Etat ..."


66 cf. Bataille's assessment of the limitations of 'la fête' (op.cit., pp.76-7):

"La vertu de la fête n'est pas intégrée dans sa nature et réciproquement le déchaînement de la fête n'a été possible qu'en raison de cette impuissance de la conscience à le prendre pour ce qu'il est. Le problème fondamental de la religion est donné dans cette fatale méconnaissance de la fête. L'homme est l'autre qui a perdu, et même rejeté, ce qu'il est obscurement, intimité indistincte. La conscience n'aurait pu devenir claire à la longue si elle ne s'était détournée de ses contenu gênants, mais la conscience claire est elle-même à la recherche de ce qu'elle a elle-même égaré, et qu'à mesure qu'elle en rapproche elle doit égarer à nouveau. Bien entendu ce qu'elle a égaré n'est pas en dehors d'elle, c'est de l'obscurce intimité de la conscience elle-même que la conscience claire des objets se détourne. La religion dont l'essence est la recherche de l'intimité perdue se ramène à l'effort de la conscience claire qui veut être en entier conscience de soi; mais cet effort est vain, puisque la conscience de l'intimité n'est pas possible qu'au niveau où la conscience n'est plus une opération dont le résultat implique la durée, c'est à dire, au niveau où la clarté, qui est l'effet de l'opération, n'est plus donnée."
As a 'panique' dramatist, of course, Arrabal in fact has to face both these problems together. Indeed his resolution of the problem implied by his desire to portray 'la confusion' is a necessary prerequisite to the successful resolution of the problem which confronts him as a dramatist. For as a dramatist he can only bridge the gap between the real spectator and the imaginary illusion in the immediate context of the theatre, in as much as he also and at the same time creates, on a higher level within the illusion, an identification between the rationality of the spectator and the irrationality of the universe on stage. The spectator can only accept what he sees as real, in other words, in as much as he also accepts it as rational, in as much as he accepts first that it could feasibly be real. The relationship between the dramatic process itself and 'Le Théâtre Baroque' in Arrabal’s work is thus a highly complex one but the fundamental point should immediately be grasped that the three stages of the latter, as described and discussed below are together (in Arrabal’s case) subordinate to and indeed geared towards the successful functioning of the former.

We have here identified two stages of the dramatic process, stating that "there are produced in 'la conscience spectatrice' two distinct and opposed attitudes which are subsequently reduced to a point of contiguity", and we have also noted that the dramatic process contains one important limitation implicit in the notion of contiguity: the opposition between the two attitudes produced cannot be transcended, nor can the duality of 'la conscience spectatrice' be unconditionally annulled, since the spectator cannot hold both attitudes at once; he believes either in the reality of his immediate surroundings or in the reality of the illusion. This elaboration of the dramatic process, i.e. of the solution normally adopted by playwrights confronted by the problem of bridging the gap between real and imaginary, enables us to amplify our previous important assertion of a parallel between the dramatic process and 'Le Théâtre Baroque' (i.e. the solution adopted by Arrabal, confronted by the analogous problem of bridging the gap between rationality and irrationality) as well as to indicate the terms in which our attempt to explain the latter by reference to the former may be justified. For 'Le Théâtre Baroque' may be considered in three separately identifiable stages, and in what follows it will be demonstrated;
a) that the first of these stages consists in a production and emphasis of an opposition in the spectator's attitude exactly analogous to that inherent in the first stage of the dramatic process.

b) that the modifications to dramatic structure occasioned by the second stage of 'Le Théâtre Baroque' subsequently reduce the conflicting elements of that opposition to a point of contiguity similarly analogous to the contiguity inherent in the second stage of the dramatic process.

c) that the effect of the third stage of 'Le Théâtre Baroque' is to surmount a limitation, implicit in the notion of contiguity which characterizes the second stage (of 'Le Théâtre Baroque') and exactly analogous to the limitation which we have noted in the dramatic process, since, through the modifications of dramatic structure occasioned by the third stage of 'Le Théâtre Baroque', the conflicting elements within the spectator's attitude are not merely rendered contiguous, but the opposition between them is transcended.

We shall show, in other words, not only that the first two stages of each process are exactly similar, but also that 'Le Théâtre Baroque' goes one significant step further in bridging the gap between rational and irrational than does the dramatic process in bridging the gap between real and imaginary. The third stage of 'Le Théâtre Baroque' indeed facilitates a coexistence of opposing attitudes analogous to that which we have previously (in our discussion of the dramatic process p. 258) suggested is impossible.


75 ibid., p. 96.

76 The same technique is used by Ionesco, in Tueur Sans Gages (1957), for example. Here the spectator identifies with the bewilderment of Bérenger, who, like Etienne, is at a loss to understand the peculiar universe which surrounds him, the "cité radieuse" into which he has strayed by chance.

(IONESCO, Eugène, Tueur sans Gages in Théâtre II, Gallimard, Paris 1958, pp. 59-172.)

77 ARRABAL, Fernando, Le Labyrinthe, p. 92

78 ibid., p. 99.

79 ibid., p. 56.

80 cf. the definition given by Arrabal in Entretiens avec Arrabal, p. 60; "pour moi baroque veut dire très exactement une profusion qui cache une ordonnance très rigoureuse."


82 ibid., p. 153.

83 ibid., p. 134.
The 'rationality' of these arguments is reminiscent of Ionesco's technique of 'anti-logic', as apparent, for example, in the celebrated episode of the doorbell in *La Cantatrice Chauve* (IONESCO, Eugène, *Theatre I*, Gallimard, Paris 1954, pp.35-40).

ARRABAL, Fernando *Le Tricycle*, p.168

ibid., p.126.


It is interesting to note the similarity between the technique which we have discussed here and that employed by Arrabal in those plays which seek not to elucidate the nature of 'la confusion' nor to represent the opposition between 'la confusion' and civilization, but to convey the repressive nature of civilization itself. For such plays present civilization in heavily ironical terms, and thereby also provoke the simultaneous existence of conflicting attitudes within the spectator. This is most clearly illustrated in *Les Deux Bourreaux* (1956), where the central character Françoise is motivated by the desire to preserve at all costs the stability of the family unit and to do always what is best for her children. As such, moreover, Françoise is presented as the upholder of an order which is familiar to the spectator: its terms closely reflect the terms which govern the spectator's existence and, indeed, on the basis of her stated aims at least, the spectator can readily identify with Françoise.

Whether or not the statement of these aims represents conscious hypocrisy on Françoise's part, however, her words are certainly contradicted by her actions. "To maintain the stability of her family" she has her husband arrested, tortured and cruelly put to death. Now we have said that, in the light of the criteria which govern his own (rational) existence, the spectator identifies with the order which Françoise represents, or purports to represent. In the light of precisely the same criteria, however, when it comes to the business of interpreting the events of the play the spectator readily endorses Maurice's outraged protestations against the cruelty of Françoise, and lines up, as it were, on the opposite side of the fence. The stance assumed by the spectator as a result of his interpretation of the play (a stance, of course, into which Arrabal has deliberately pushed him) contradicts the stance implied by his identification with the order which the play depicts. And it is in the contrast between these two attitudes, which coexist within 'la conscience spectatrice' that the message of the play is made manifest to the spectator. Just as in *Le Labyrinthe* and *Le Tricycle* the opposition which is conveyed is reflected in 'la conscience spectatrice', so in *Les Deux Bourreaux* the message of the play is reflected in the equation between 'civilization' and 'repression' which is provoked in 'la conscience spectatrice' through the use of irony.

Two later plays, *Bella Ciao* (1972) and *La Grande Revue du XXe Siècle* (1971) also seek to convey the repressive nature of civilization, and though these plays are arguably less subtle and
ultimately less powerful than Les Deux Bourreaux, they operate according to broadly the same principles. In either case is presented an order which, through its familiarity, evokes some measure of identification by the spectator, but which at the same time, through the specific terms of its expression also elicits his disdain. Each, therefore, again uses the deliberate promotion of conflicting attitudes within 'la conscience spectatrice' as a means of conveying its philosophical message.

89 Such a statement might seem to be contradicted by the terms of our examination of Le Tricycle. While in the course of the latter, however, it was demonstrated how the power of the illusion brought the spectator to an acceptance of the reality of 'la confusion' by promoting in him a sympathy with and understanding of the 'chaotic' element of the illusion, such considerations do not in any way modify the essential irrationality of that element. The spectator's sympathy for the irrational does not, in other words, render it rational.

90 Arrabal uses the game as a dramatic vehicle for the expression of a specific philosophical idea. In dealing with the notion of game, therefore, it is essential to maintain the distinction insisted upon at the outset of our consideration of 'Le Théâtre Baroque', between philosophical significance on the one hand, and dramatic significance on the other. It will be recalled that we have undertaken to examine the elements of 'Le Théâtre Baroque' (and hence to examine game) from two points of view, showing first their appropriateness to Arrabal's philosophical objectives, and subsequently assessing their dramatic effectiveness. Accordingly, we shall here first consider the philosophical essence of the concept 'game' in order to show that it is a valid vehicle for the portrayal of 'la confusion', before evaluating the formal properties of game, as used in the plays by Arrabal, in order to indicate its value and effect as a facet of dramatic structure.


93 This is acknowledged by both Caillois and Jensen. cf. CAILLOIS, Roger, "Jeu et Sacré", in L'Homme et le Sacré, p.206:

"On voit que je suis le premier à reconnaître les connexions qu'il est possible d'établir entre le ludique et le sacré."

JENSEN, Adolf E. op.cit., p.49:

"I believe that ethnology can accept Huizinga's ideas without the slightest reservation. The most sacred acts are play. Play is a contest for something or a representation of
something. These are the two basic aspects under which we may describe cultic acts in terms of play.

94 HUIZINGA, Johan op.cit., p.22.

95 ibid., p.29.

96 ibid., p.239.

97 It is interesting, and, in the light of our précis of Huizinga's ideas, significant, that play as a philosophical concept is repeatedly connected in Arrabal's work with the notion of repression and the restrictive forms of civilization. Lasca and Tiossido, the athlete and trainer in Le Cimetière des Voitures /1957/, for example, appear as policemen at the end of the play, to effect the arrest of Emanou. The subjection of sport to commercial interests is dealt with in Bella Ciao /1972/, the repressive aspect of the French national sport is exposed in Jeunes Barbares d'Aujourd'hui /1975/, and in La Grande Revue du XX° Siècle the Olympic Games provides the setting for the arrest of Landru.


99 The four categories identified by Caillois were:

a) agon: games involving competition or contest, carried out under artificial conditions specifically designed to reduce the element of chance to a minimum, e.g. particularly all sporting competitions.

b) alea: games of chance, e.g. dice, raffles, etc.

c) mimicry: games involving pretence and/or imitation, e.g. cowboys and indians, games with dolls, etc.

d) ilinx: games designed to provoke pleasure through the experience of (often vertiginous) physical sensation, e.g. tobogganing, fairground rides, etc.

100 As already mentioned (in note 97), other types of game may be found in Arrabal's drama. As suggested, however, their appearance is of primary philosophical significance. It is only in the form of rôle-playing that the games played by Arrabal's characters are designed to modify, and have the effect of modifying the dramatic structure of the plays. It is only this type of game, in other words, which may be seen as an aspect of 'Le Théâtre Baroque'.


Drama itself is also an obvious example of mimicry. Of course, indeed our identification of mimicry as the specific type of game which constitutes the second stage of 'Le Théâtre Baroque' further reinforces the parallel we have drawn between this process and the dramatic process. For just as in the second stage of the dramatic process the opposing elements of real and imaginary are brought to a point of contiguity as a result of the presentation of the imaginary world through the medium of a game (the play) the terms of which reflect those of the real world, so in the second stage of 'Le Théâtre Baroque' the opposing elements of rational and irrational are brought to a point of contiguity
as a result of the presentation of the irrational world through the medium of a game (rôle-playing within the play) the terms of which reflect those of the rational world.

102 The idea of unreality is implicit in the notion of illusion. Caillois correctly stresses the very important fact that the participant in games which fall under the heading of mimicry retains throughout (as does the spectator) full awareness of the fact that he is playing, and the ability to distinguish between reality and the illusion which he seeks to create:

"Le plaisir est d'être autre ou de se faire passer pour un autre. Mais comme il s'agit d'un jeu, il n'est pas essentiellement question de tromper le spectateur ... L'acteur ... ne cherche pas à faire croire qu'il est «pour de vrai» Lear ou Charles Quint. Ce sont l'espion et le fugitif qui se déguisent pour tromper réellement, parce que eux ne jouent pas."

CAILLOIS, Roger Les Jeux et les Hommes, pp.64/5.

103 ibid., p.67.


The creation of a second level of illusion within the play is also, of course, an important characteristic of the drama of Genet. There is, indeed, much in our present discussion of Arrabal's methodology which recalls Genet. The creation of two levels of 'reality' in Genet's plays, however, is not designed as the means of conveying a specific philosophy but as the basis of the drama itself. Genet, in other words, does not seek to convince the spectator that one level is 'more real than' or 'as real as' the other, but insists instead that each is both 'real' and (at the same time) 'unreal' and uses the dynamic conflict between the two as the source of what he calls 'poetry'.

105 ibid., p.102.

There is in fact only one instance in the whole play of the Emperor having a measure of real power over his companion. This occurs when the Emperor disappears into the hut for a period of mediation, and the Architect is left believing, with mounting anxiety, that he has been abandoned (pp.114-117). Significantly, in the light of what is to follow in our considerations, the success of this move (from the Emperor's point of view) lies in his having convinced the Architect that in this instance he is not playing:

L'ARCHITECTE: C'est un nouveau jeu.
L'EMPEREUR: Non, c'est la vérité. (p.114)

The deception misfires badly, however, for eventually the Architect responds by walking out himself, countering his companion's play-acting with a reality that the latter finds totally unpalatable:

L'EMPEREUR: Architecte! Architecte! Viens, ne me laisse pas seul. Je suis trop seul. Architecte! Archi... (p.118)

106 ibid., p.97.

107 ibid., p.120
It is also noticeable in the second part of the play, that as the 'games' become more ordered, the interludes in the trial (i.e. the moments when the Architect and the Emperor are ostensibly 'not playing') take on a more frenetic aspect.

The ritual of sacrifice in particular.

As was the case with game, we shall consider ritual from two points of view, following a brief discussion of ritual as a philosophical concept (designed to show the applicability of the concept to Arrabal's philosophical objectives) with an evaluation of the formal properties of ritual, as used by Arrabal as an aspect of dramatic structure.

It should not be inferred that we are here suggesting that game and ritual are philosophically identical concepts. There are, indeed, important philosophical differences between game and ritual, but a discussion of these falls outside the scope of our present considerations, since we seek here to show only that each is a philosophically viable vehicle for the presentation of 'la confusion'. And, as we have seen, this may be done by reference to those broad philosophical properties which game and ritual do possess in common, i.e. in effect by showing that each constitutes a formal structure for the expression of something which is essentially irrational within the context of an everyday rational reality.
Essential because, of course, it is this factor which distinguishes this action (the 'ritual') from previous 'games'. Here both levels of existence created within the play are simultaneously real. In the previous 'games' one of those levels was always perceived as, and acknowledged to be, illusory by each of the participants.

As is indicated by the Architect's somewhat resentful attitude as he carries out these orders:

"Le tuer ... le manger ... Et moi, ici, tout seul" (p.187)

Or at least an acknowledgment of the reality of that element and some measure of understanding of the terms of its existence.

Such is also the case with Etienne in Le Labyrinthe but in the latter instance this is consistent with the more limited nature of the play's message.

For, as was the case with Etienne in Le Labyrinthe, the reality of 'la confusion' is suggested to the spectator through the mediation of the central character, who in either case is undeniably 'normal'.

In as much as in the majority of the games in this play at least one of the characters involved 'plays' himself, while the others take on adopted rôles.

The play was written as a result of the author's first-hand experience of a Spanish jail in 1967, the circumstances of which are described by Bettina L. Knapp and Kelly Morris in The Drama Review, Vol.XIII, no.1, January-March 1968, article entitled "L'Affaire Arrabal Español" (pp.87-9). This article also gives the text (in translation) of a letter, which, prompted by his experiences, the author sent to Le Monde, and which was published in that newspaper on October 31st, 1967.
Such an element is essential to the dramatic efficacy of the play, at least as long as one accepts that the religious climate of our society is such that Christianity no longer has the inherent power necessary to inspire intense irrational belief, and thus to transcend the dictates of the spectators' rationality. It is our view, however, that Arrabal does come close to provoking that kind of irrational belief in this play by the depiction of deliberate sacrilege. Even in a period when Christianity has unquestionably lost the influence it once possessed, it is considered unlikely that such scenes as that in which Falidia is portrayed performing fellatio with Christ will leave audiences unmoved. And such a scene, of course, only shocks the spectator in as much as he believes (at least momentarily) that the character before him is 'really' Christ.

It may be objected that Ét ils passèrent des Menottes aux Fleurs does promote a very real measure of identification between the spectator and the prisoners therein portrayed. This is undeniable, but it should be clearly understood that such an observation cannot be adduced as an indication of the success of the play in conveying the philosophical notion of 'la confusion' but is rather a confirmation of the play's failure in this respect. For the spectator's identification with the prisoners is provoked not by the function of the latter as the embodiment of the philosophical notion of 'la confusion' but by their position in the realistic socio-political situation which Arrabal portrays in the play, and which he seeks to use as a vehicle for his philosophical ideas. In other words the author here uses a framework of realistic images to express a philosophical message, but the spectator's identification is made only with the reality of the imagery, rather than with the philosophical notion which that imagery is designed to express. It is an identification based upon an exclusively socio-political interpretation of the play.

Ét ils passèrent des Menottes aux Fleurs indeed, is interesting as an illustration of the dangers and shortcomings inherent in the practice adopted by Arrabal in certain plays of trying to combine social or political comment with an expression of the philosophical notion of 'la confusion', or more precisely of trying to put the former in the service of the latter. Such dangers stem from the fact that the fundamental opposition around which such plays revolve has a clearly identifiable political or social significance, and is set, moreover, in an equally identifiable and specific political or social context. In this play, then, the familiar opposition between irrational and rational appears to have been replaced by an opposition between oppressed and oppressor. The setting is not, as usual, some secluded corner of a puzzling and unfamiliar universe but a recognizable area of a familiar world, a specific location within the aegis of a particular kind of political administration. These alterations, however, engender an important modification of the position of the spectator vis-à-vis the illusion. Where, as in the previous cases considered, the opposition presented is that between irrational and rational, the identification of the spectator is made, as we have seen, with the rational element
of the illusion, precisely because the spectator is, himself, rational. It is through this predictable and largely predetermined identification, moreover, that the spectator is brought into contact with the 'confusion' of the universe within which the illusion is set, and more importantly still, it is upon the basis of this primary identification that he is ultimately led, through the modifications engendered by the various stages of 'Le Théâtre Baroque' which we have traced, to an acceptance of, and belief in, the reality of 'la confusion'. In this case, however, the primary identification made by the spectator depends upon different criteria altogether. For a French or British audience et ils passèrent des Menottes aux Fleurs presents a specific political situation in which they have no predetermined or inevitable involvement. With regard to that specific situation, in other words, the spectator is neither necessarily oppressed nor necessarily oppressor. For all that the situation is realistically identifiable, it lies essentially outside the scope of the spectator's immediate political experience. The spectator is thus in a position to make a completely objective assessment of the opposition which the play depicts, rather than (as is the case where the opposition depicted is that between rational and irrational) being motivated by his own inherent rationality. It is highly likely, moreover, as we have already implied, that in such a position, the (French or British) spectator will be convinced by the strength of the author's political polemic, recognizing the injustice of the Authorities as portrayed in the play and conceiving an unequivocal sympathy with the prisoners.

It is indeed on this basis that the strong measure of identification between the spectator and the prisoners to which we have referred arises. And this is all very well, as long as the only message of the play is a political one. Indeed, as an attack on the injustices of a particular political system et ils passèrent des Menottes aux Fleurs is both a powerful and a persuasive piece. It is clear, however, that each element of the opposition portrayed in the play has not only a political significance but is also an image for the conveyance of a particular and familiar philosophical notion. Arrabal seeks as it were to superimpose the fundamental philosophical opposition of civilization and chaos, or order and violence on to the socio-political opposition of oppressor and oppressed which his imagery implies. The prisoners, for example, are not only oppressed but are also seen (by the author) as the embodiment of the philosophical concept of 'la confusion'. The authorities, likewise, have a philosophical as well as a political significance: not only are they politically oppressive, but in a philosophical sense they are designed to represent the notion of civilization, whose repressive and restrictive characteristics they share.

Arrabal's attempt to put socio-political imagery to a philosophical end thus implies an equation between civilization and the oppressors on the one hand, and between chaos and the (politically) oppressed on the other. These equations are untenable, however, from the point of view of the spectator who is on the one hand
(politically) antagonistic towards the specific type of political régime portrayed, and on the other hand, (philosophically) a rational being. The identification which has been made with the prisoners has been made specifically on account of their political reality, because they are oppressed. It leaves out of account the philosophical position ascribed to them by the author and is made irrespective of their significance in the philosophical schema. Such, moreover, must be the case, for the philosophical qualities ascribed to the prisoners, as representatives of 'la confusion', precludes the possibility of immediate philosophical identification between them and the 'rational' spectator.

The achievement of such an identification (i.e. between the rational spectator and between the irrational element of the illusion, here the prisoners) depends as we have learnt from previous examples upon the modifications of structure effected by the process of 'Le Théâtre Baroque'. These in turn depend, as we also know, upon a primary identification which is made between the rational spectator and the rational element of the illusion (bringing the former into contact with and ultimately to a belief in the reality of the irrationality of 'la confusion'). This fundamental step too is precluded in *Et ils passèrent des Menottes aux Fleurs* by the nature of Arrabal's imagery. For the philosophically rational element of the 'illusion' is precisely the element of the political opposition which the spectator has rejected. The spectator cannot, in other words, make the necessary identification with the implied philosophical rationality of the Authorities where he is completely and utterly opposed to the Authorities on a socio-political level. The achievement of Arrabal's philosophical objective is stymied at the first step (of the process of 'Le Théâtre Baroque') by the nature of the imagery employed.

It thus emerges that the attempt to combine social or political comment with a portrayal of 'la confusion', as Arrabal tries to do in *Et ils passèrent des Menottes aux Fleurs* leads only to a confusion of objectives. The terms of the imagery used by Arrabal in this play are simply inappropriate to the philosophical uses to which he attempts to put them. It is indeed impossible, as we have seen, for the spectator to make the transition from the easily identifiable political reality which those images depict, to the philosophical reality of the message which purportedly lies behind them. Where that transition cannot be made, moreover, the philosophical import of the play is lost and the play can be interpreted only on a socio-political level. We arrive again at the conclusion that the only reality of the play is that of prison. Indeed, as has been shown it is the very success of the play in powerfully presenting this immediate political reality, which marks its failure to convince us of the reality of the alternative philosophical interpretation.

John Frazer's comments seem to sum up the irony of a play which failed to convey violence in a philosophical sense, by being perhaps too masterly a depiction of violence in a political sense:

"the real shocks in it come from the accounts of tortures and defilements that had actually occurred in
Franco's prisons, and from the harangues by dignitaries in which one heard authentic Falangist or Spanish-clerical rhetoric about the Nation, Duty, Obedience, etc. The nudity and artificial blood on the other hand were wholly undisturbing, and the context made clear why." FRAZER, John, Violence in the Arts, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1974, p.46.

As we have already implied Et ils passèrent des Menottes aux Fleurs is not the only play in which the presentation of 'la confusion', clearly intended by the author, is obscured by his use of imagery which suggests the possibility of a socio-political interpretation. The comments we have here made may be applied also to Guernica /1952/ and to Jeunes Barbares d'Aujourd'hui /1975/. In either case the central characters are subjected to cruel and unjust suffering which leads the spectator to a close identification with them on a social or political level. In either case, however, the same characters are also intended as representatives of 'la confusion' (the old couple in Guernica have all the familiar hall-marks of Arrabal's presentation of 'la confusion' in early plays, while the optimism with which Jeunes Barbares d'Aujourd'hui closes is only comprehensible if the cyclists in that play too represent 'la confusion'). And in either case the identification of the spectator on a social or political level precludes the possibility of his achievement (through the process of 'le théâtre baroque') of an identification on a 'higher' philosophical level.


140 ibid., pp.88-9.

141 This assertion might be expressed in the terms of our discussion of L'Architecte et l'Empereur d'Assyrie by saying that the first level of illusion is belatedly introduced at this point.


143 ibid., p.21.

144 Behaviour reminiscent of the conduct of Cavanosa in the earlier play Le Grand Cérémonial /1963/.

145 ARRABAL, Fernando La Tour de Babel, p.27.

146 ibid., p.40.

147 The Marquis, the Count and the Countess are anxious to avoid a scandal: "ici la seule solution pour le moment, c'est de garder le statu quo. Je ne veux pas de scandale, que dirait la noblesse" (ibid, p.38), whilst the three beggars, of course, realize how they can profit from the situation by complying with Latidia's wishes.

148 ARRABAL, Fernando La Tour de Babel, p.46.
This is illustrated particularly in the conversation involving Latidia, the Marquis and the hired killer he brings to the castle with him, in the third scene of the play.

ARRABAL, Fernando  
La Tour de Babel, p.58.

ibid., p.56.

cf. the distinction we have earlier drawn between the formal properties of 'mimicry' and those of ritual (p. 289f.)

ARRABAL, Fernando  
La Tour de Babel, p.71.

ibid., p.64.

ibid., p.72.

Such a description is reminiscent of many of the more successful works of Expressionist dramatists in Germany, which also function on two levels; cf. STEFFENS, Wilhelm Expressionistische Dramatik, Friedrich Verlag, Velber bei Hannover, Germany 1968, p.70:

"Sein Held ist in vielen Fällen ein Monologist, der mit dem Bauch im fetten Schlamm der Erde steckt, während der Oberleib mit Flügeln durch den Kosmos rauscht".

(The hero is, in many cases, a monologist stuck fast up to his belly in the cloying mire of the earth, and from the waist up soencing on wings through the cosmos)

The suspicion of a possible comparison between Expressionism and 'Le Théâtre Baroque' is strengthened by reference to Samuel and Hinton-Thomas' study Expressionism in German Life, Literature and the Theatre (pub. Heffer, Cambridge 1939) in which it is stated: (p.23)

"The problem that faces the Expressionist is two-fold; he must not merely define the true nature of life as infinite, but he must also find the means of expressing it in finite terms"

and again later in the same work where we read: (p.134)

"Baroque literature has been described as the embodiment of antithetical experience, and it is precisely this ability to pass from one extreme of experience to another that constitutes one of the fundamental features of Expressionism".

While there is certainly a comparison to be made, however, the essential difference between Expressionist dramatic technique and 'Le Théâtre Baroque' lies in the setting of the illusion in either case. Expressionist drama seems to make less of the theatrical medium by presenting illusions firmly rooted in an easily recognisable reality; their starting point at least is the world in which we live. Arrabal's work, however, (with the exception of those plays discussed in note 136, which do have a recognizable political or social dimension) presents illusions set not in our world, as we have seen, but in an irrational universe, the reality of which is conveyed to the spectator not by its familiarity but through the power of the dramatic devices we have here examined.

158 The link between the terms 'panique' and 'Baroque' is made plain by d'Ors' declaration (p.112):

"Pan, dieu des champs, dieu de la nature, preside a toute oeuvre baroque authentique".

159 d'ORS, Eugenio *du Baroque, p.131.*

160 ibid., p.18.

161 ibid., p.35

162 cf. Arrabal's own description of baroque art in SCHIFRES, Alain, *op.cit., p.65:*

"Face a un art froid, coherent, repressif, se dresse l'art baroque, expression du 'prinzip de plaisir', base de la contestation de toute societe alienante".

163 See note 69 to this section.


165 ibid., p.229.

166 ibid., p.230.

167 ibid.

168 See page 258.

169 Arrabal himself claims that his plays should most accurately be described as ceremonies. We use the term here without implying a desire to comment on the debate as to the differences in nature between ritual and ceremony. (See for example GLUCKMAN, Max (ed.) *The Ritual of Social Relations, Manchester University Press, Manchester 1962, pp.20-23*). Space does not permit us here to question the validity of Arrabal's preferred terminology, but neither do we vouch for its appropriateness, save to suggest that the term is relevant to our present considerations in as much as ceremony is, of essence, a public performance and thus implies a greater emphasis upon the position of the spectator than either game or ritual, neither of which is rendered less effective by being carried on in isolation. Cf. GORMAN, Clem *The Book of Ceremony* *pub. Whole Earth Tools, Cambridge 1972:*

(p.11) "A ceremony may be devised by one person, but it can only be realised by a community".

(p.15) "The ceremony must be passed through publicly, i.e. ceremonially, so that the community can bear witness that the subject has indeed passed to the higher state".
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170 ARRABAL, Fernando

Cérémonie pour un Noir Assassiné [1956]

171 ARRABAL, Fernando

Le Jardin des Délices [1967] in Théâtre VI

172 ARRABAL, Fernando

Jeunes Barbare d'Aujourd'hui [1975]

173 ibid, p.7.

174 ARRABAL, Fernando

Sur le Fil ou la Ballade du Train Fantôme

175 ibid, p.16.

176 ibid, p.21.

177 ibid, p.31.

178 ibid, p.10.

179 ibid, p.58.
CONCLUSION

This thesis has presented two parallel interpretations of the drama of Fernando Arrabal. In Part One it was shown that the fundamental opposition identified at the heart of Arrabal's oeuvre, i.e. the opposition between the individual and some form of authority which confronts him, reflects the terms of the author's perception of the most significant influences of his own biography. The meaning of that opposition was then elucidated by a comparison of the terms of its presentation, in the form of violence, with the description, given by Freud, of the subconscious facets of the individual psyche. It was demonstrated that Arrabal's work might be understood in the light of Freud's elaboration of the opposition between the psychological notions id and super-ego, and the implicit conclusion of our investigations was that Arrabal's plays express the nature of the individual.

In Section 1 of Part Two it was shown that the same central opposition discernible in Arrabal's work is a reflection not only of the terms of the author's biography, but equally of the fundamental tenets of his 'panique' philosophy. The formulation of the second and complementary interpretation of Arrabal's drama given in Part Two of the thesis thus proceeded from an examination of 'panique' philosophy, which was elucidated in the light of a comparison made with the various 'religious' systems elaborated by Caillois, Durkheim and Bataille. It was shown that the central 'panique' notion of 'la confusion' corresponds to Caillois' concept of 'chaos', Durkheim's 'le sacré' or Bataille's 'violence', each of which terms is used to denote some form of 'total reality'. In as much as Arrabal's averred objective is to portray 'la confusion' in his drama, moreover, it was concluded that Arrabal's plays seek to represent totality by a liberation of
From the outline given above it may be discerned that the two conclusions reached reflect two slightly different perspectives from which our examination of Arrabal's work has been made in either case. Indeed the difference of perspective is summed up succinctly in our use of the term violence. In the first part of the thesis violence was considered as a form of expression; violence was studied as "the expression of something". Or, to state the same process in different words, we gauged "what was expressed" by laying the accent of our investigation on the form in which it was expressed in the drama. The nature of the individual was expressed, in short, in the form of violence. In the first section of the second part of the thesis, however, violence was considered not as "the expression of something", but, itself, as "what is expressed". The focus of attention, therefore, was clearly shifted to the content of the drama. As such neither of the interpretations can be held to be properly complete in itself, and this much was indicated in the body of the thesis. Firstly, at the end of Part One we noted the difficulty of understanding the endings of a number of Arrabal's later plays in the light of the Freudian interpretation developed up to that point. Secondly, at the beginning of Section 2 of the second part of our thesis, we underlined the fact that in Section 1 of that second part violence had been treated solely as an abstract philosophical concept, and that its position in Arrabal's drama had merely been identified on the limited basis of its opposition to reason, rather than elaborated and evaluated in the light of the terms of its manifestation in the drama.

The relationship between the two interpretations is indeed highly complex. In one sense they appear, as it were, complementary,
for the weakness (as outlined above) of each one seems to indicate the strength of the other. The plays which fail to fit neatly into the first interpretation, for instance, do so because their endings indicate a content beyond the notion of the individual. Violence is treated in the second interpretation as an abstract concept only precisely because the essential characteristic of violence is the absence of form. In another sense, however, the interpretations are opposites: according to the first Arrabal's plays express something which is individual and finite, according to the second they express something which is collective and infinite. And against this suggestion of opposition must be weighed in turn the fact that both interpretations are reached, of course, as the result of the consideration of a single oeuvre. In yet another sense, then, the two are similar: there is at least a pattern common to both, the pattern which characterizes the construction of the plays themselves.

The complexity of the relationship, moreover, is most informative, for, interestingly, it suggests the existence and terms of a similar relationship between the apparently unrelated theories against which Arrabal's work was measured in reaching the conclusions upon which the two interpretations are based. Like those interpretations, indeed, the theories of Freud on the one hand, and of Caillois, Durkheim and Bataille on the other are underlaid by a common pattern (which is, of course, reflected in the construction of Arrabal's plays). Each first postulates an antithesis and subsequently traces the procedure from that antithesis towards the transcendence of its opposing factors in the pursuit of a specific goal (Nirvana in Freud's schema and the rediscovery of totality, or entry into the sacred in the 'religious' schema). In each case, moreover, one factor of the original antithesis is characterized by the absence of restraint, and the other is said to have developed out of it as a result of the
re-channelling of its 'unrestrained' energy. Thus, for Freud the super-ego evolves as a redirection of the 'violence' which characterizes the id, whilst for Caillois civilization evolves through the redirection of the violence which characterizes chaos. There is therefore a marked and fundamental similarity between the two theories, as the terms of our inquiry (i.e. the assertion that Arrabal's drama reflects both) imply. Like the difference between the two interpretations we have given, moreover, the difference between Freud's theories and the 'religious' theories of Caillois, Durkheim and Bataille is a difference of emphasis. Though the former have a collective implication in as much as Freud claims that his findings are applicable to all individuals, the focus of the psychologist's investigations is the single and of course finite individual. Caillois, on the other hand, deals in collective terms and is concerned to elucidate the nature of an infinite totality. Unlike Freud, Caillois considers the individual only in as much as he constitutes a facet of the collectivity, only, in other words, as a representative of his species. Here again, moreover, the specific emphasis of each of the theories effectively renders each incomplete. For Freud, the transcendence of opposing factors is attainable in theory only, precisely because he is dealing in finite terms: Nirvana, or the absence of tension brings with it the destruction of the individual, the destruction of the very object of his study. Equally, for Caillois, the primary antithesis is only theoretically valid: because Caillois is dealing in infinite terms one half of his fundamental opposition is not and cannot be defined, except, that is, in the theoretical terms of its opposite.

Consideration of the terms of the relationship between the two interpretations we have given, therefore, informs us of the possibly largely unsuspected affinity between the two theories in the light of which were reached the conclusions upon which those two interpretations
were based. Consideration of this latter relationship, moreover, in

turn points the way to a yet more significant inference which may be
drawn from our study for it suggests that on the one hand the object

of Freud's concerns, i.e. the individual, and on the other hand the

object of the concerns of Caillois et al., i.e. totality, are also,

while remaining, as we have indicated, in one sense opposites, in

another and very real sense closely related. For Freud defines the

ego (i.e. the finite individual as perceived by others) as the

product of two opposing forces, one characterized by the notion of

freedom, the other by the notion of restrain. Caillois postulates

an exactly similar opposition as the basis of his realization of an

infinite totality; he states that totality is a consequence of the

crascendence of two opposing forces, one characterized by the

notion of freedom, the other by the notion of restrain. The two

concepts, the finite individual and an infinite totality thus have

a common base: the former is a product of the opposition of those

factors whose transcendence effects the realization of totality.

It appears then that the individual, though a finite entity, in some

way 'contains' totality, or denotes at least the potentiality of the

realization of totality. The essence of totality is reflected in

the make-up of the individual. The latter may be seen as a manifes-

tation, in finite form, of the infinite content of the former.

It is, moreover, precisely this relationship, between the

individual and totality, which lies at the heart of the third theory

against which we measured Arrabal's drama, the theory of Analytical

Psychology expounded in the works of C.G. Jung. Once again it is

interesting to note that Jung's theories reflect the same basic

pattern that is common both to Freud's theories and those of Caillois,

Durkheim and Bataille. He posits a fundamental antithesis between
conscious and unconscious, and traces the path from that antithesis towards the goal of Individuation, which denotes a realization of totality through the transcendence of the opposition of conscious and unconscious. Jung's theories, however, reflect not only the basic pattern common to Freud and Caillois but also both the emphases which separate them. Jung was, like Freud, first and foremost a doctor, dealing with individual patients, and his theories, like those of Freud, are geared specifically to the cure of individuals. Like Caillois, on the other hand, Jung couched his theories in collective terms and he differed most radically from Freud in his statement of the view that the unconscious was a collective phenomenon. Jung's theories thus seem to combine the theories of the other two. Indeed, Jung's schema not only traces the transcendence of the opposition common both to the theories of Freud and those of Caillois but also provides, as it were, a synthesis of the opposition between them. He not only unites conscious and unconscious, but in so doing also unites personal and collective, finite and infinite. For in Jung's schema the conscious is essentially a personal or individual phenomenon (though significantly it can be represented collectively in the persona terms which reflect exactly Caillois' description of civilization) whilst the unconscious is essentially a collective phenomenon (though significantly it also has a personal manifestation in the personal shadow exactly reminiscent of Freud's description of the id). The transcendence of the opposition between conscious and unconscious, moreover, is effected through the mediation of the archetypes. And the archetypes are defined as collective trends which are essentially unconscious, but which also determine the nature of individual behaviour and, most importantly, are manifested in individual consciousness in symbolic form.
The symbols of the archetypes are therefore representations in finite form of collective and infinite trends, and in as much as those trends together constitute the collective unconscious, or totality, we may say that totality itself finds finite representation in individual consciousness. The concept, in other words, which denotes man's individual and finite nature also reflects the infinite nature of totality. Thus, for Jung, not only are the concepts individuality and totality closely related, but man is very definitely a manifestation of both. Man is indeed the finite form in which is expressed an infinite essence. The point is perhaps difficult to elaborate conceptually, but it is most strikingly summed up in Jung's archetype of the Self, attainment of which is the goal of the Individuation Process. The Self denotes the realization of totality, through the transcendence of the opposition between conscious and unconscious. Significantly, however, it is a 'personalized' representation of totality: totality appears in individual guise. In the Self, indeed, are united not only conscious and unconscious, but also the finite and the infinite, the personal and the collective, form and content.

Within Jung's schema, then, there appears to be contained a synthesis of the differences between, on the one hand, the psychological theories of Freud, and, on the other hand the 'religious' theories of Caillois, Durkheim and Bataille. Jung fills in the gaps inherent in Freud's schema and in Caillois' schema respectively, by indicating the intimate relationship between the finite nature of the individual and the infinite nature of totality. It is, moreover, in the light of Jung's theories that we may fill in the gaps inherent in each of the interpretations we have formulated. Just as Jung's schema reflects, as we have indicated, both the emphases which appear to separate Freud from Caillois, so the consideration of Arrabal's drama made in the
light of that schema in the second section of the second part of our thesis reflected both the emphases which separate the two interpretations we have made. The accent of that consideration, in other words, was neither on form nor on content, but it sought to combine the two factors by assessing the validity of form as an expression of content. This exercise, in effect, constituted a re-examination of the form of Arrabal's drama, which had already been the focus of our attention in the first part of the thesis. And from that re-examination we learnt that a given image expressed not only the Freudian notion of id or super-ego, as had previously been suggested, but that it also adequately symbolised a Jungian archetype, i.e. that it also adequately represented 'a part of totality'. The images used by Arrabal, having previously been shown to be expressions of the constituent elements of individual consciousness, or of the ego, were shown to be also symbolic representations of an infinite totality. The sum of those images, therefore, i.e. the plays as a whole, not only expressed those factors which together determine the finite nature of the individual but also expressed the infinite nature of totality. Throughout the present study, indeed, we have sought to suggest that the two interpretations which we have formulated are not mutually exclusive, but that both are valid. And this is precisely the point. Arrabal's drama should not be viewed either as an expression of the individual or as an expression of totality, but it is an expression both of the individual and of totality.

In the light of this duality, moreover, it appears that there is discernible in Arrabal's work an answer to, or development of, the ideas which characterized the earlier "Theatre of the Absurd" in France. For it was on the basis of an identification of those factors which determined the finite nature of the individual that the assertion of
meaninglessness, fundamental to "The Theatre of the Absurd" was substantiated. Man's existence was absurd, ultimately, precisely because it was finite. A number of Arrabal's characters, moreover, particularly in the early part of his work, faced with the indications of their own finite nature, or, in the terms of our interpretation, caught between the conflicting demands of id and super-ego, seem to reflect the 'angoisse' of earlier 'absurd' heroes. For Arrabal, however, those same factors, as we have demonstrated, also indicate the nature of totality: thus the 'angoisse' of earlier plays is replaced by, or more exactly evolves into, exaltation in later works. Arrabal seems, as it were, to go along with "The Theatre of the Absurd" in the identification of meaninglessness, but does so, in fact, only as a way of indicating the existence of meaning. Thus death for instance, which for "The Theatre of the Absurd" was the ultimate and most powerful indication of the absurdity of existence, signifies for Arrabal not only a testimony to man's finite form, but also an expression of his infinite essence. Death, indeed, is but a necessary prelude to rebirth, to transcendence, and to the realization of totality.

We have stated that Arrabal's plays express the nature of the individual and of totality. As we have seen, moreover, it is in the light of Jung's theories that such a statement may be most fully understood: it is indeed as a dramatic reflection of Jung's schema that the philosophical achievement of Arrabal's theatre may be most concisely summed up. To a statement of this philosophical achievement, however, must be added, in any final evaluation of Arrabal's work, a reminder of the playwright's considerable theatrical achievement in successfully presenting (in a number of plays at least) an irrational and indeed 'infinite' message to a rational and 'finite' audience in the theatre. This achievement was primarily the fruit of Arrabal's
elaboration of a 'system' of his own, that of "le Théâtre Baroque" which, we would suggest, constitutes the most original facet of his work, and which we have explained and discussed in considerable detail in the last section of this thesis. We would here add, however, that this achievement too may be concisely summed up by reference to Jung's theories. "Le Théâtre Baroque", through which are united simultaneously real and imaginary, rational and irrational, may itself be seen as the application to a specific context of the fundamental principles of Jung's schema, in which are simultaneously united personal and collective, conscious and unconscious. For at the heart of Jung's theories, as has been demonstrated, lies the essential notion of the representation of the infinite in finite form. And the formulation of the theory of "le Théâtre Baroque" is motivated precisely by a belief in the necessity and possibility of representing the infinite in finite form. "Le Théâtre Baroque", indeed, informs us how the infinite may be represented in the specific finite form of dramatic structure.

The philosophical achievement of Arrabal's drama, which may be summed up as a dramatic reflection of Jung's schema, is complemented, therefore, by a theatrical achievement, which may be summed up as a methodological application of Jung's schema. While the form of Arrabal's plays is characterized by the notion of violence and suggests the expression of the nature of the finite individual, and while the content of Arrabal's plays may be defined as violence and suggests the expression of the nature of an infinite totality, the plays themselves are an expression of the intimate relationship between the finite individual and an infinite totality, which exploits the affinity between finite and infinite in the creation of 'panique' theatre.
NOTES TO CONCLUSION

1 In Section 2 of Part Two, we examined the form in which 'la confusion' appeared in Arrabal's drama, by measuring that drama against a further 'philosophical' schema, that of Jung. In Section 3 of Part Two we demonstrated the theatrical structure of 'la confusion' by elaborating Arrabal's own schema of 'Le Théâtre Baroque'. The interpretation of Arrabal's drama given in Part Two of the thesis, therefore, depends upon a comparison of that drama with, in all, three different systems (as opposed to the interpretation given in Part One, which compares the drama to one system only) which elucidate content, form and theatrical structure respectively. The considerations of Sections 2 and 3, however, are clearly dependent on the findings of Section 1, and, indeed, serve to confirm those findings. They are subordinate to the 'conclusion' of the investigation carried out in Part Two of the thesis, which is reached in the course of Section 1, namely that Arrabal's drama expresses 'violence' or the nature of totality.

2 See note 237 to Part One (p.129).

3 See pp.171-173.

4 Each, in other words, reflects the fundamental Hegelian dialectic of thesis, antithesis, synthesis.

5 Cf. Part Two, Section 2, note 2.
As a result of Arrabal's generosity in allowing the author of this thesis free access to his personal collection of files and documents the latter is fortunate to be in possession of a large amount of bibliographical material in addition to that reproduced here. It has been decided, however, to list here selected material only, in the light of the impending publication of the volume entitled Arrabal by Joan and Angel BERENGUER, in the collection Espiral/Figuras, published by Ediciones Fundamentos, Madrid. According to information received this volume is due to appear in January or February 1979 and contains the most complete bibliography of Arrabal's work, and of criticism and comment pertaining to that work yet to be compiled.
1 Arrabal's Works

a) Plays


Plays are listed here in chronological order of first performance. Where first performance was in a language other than French, details of first performance in French are given separately.

The dates of composition given here differ in some cases from those given in the Bourgois edition of Arrabal's plays, but are based on information supplied by Arrabal himself.

Le Tricycle

First performed publicly as Los Hombres del Triciclo, 29 January 1958, Madrid, Teatro Bellas Artes, by the company Dido Pequeño Teatro, directed by Josefina Sanchez Pedreno.

First performed in French 15 February 1961, Paris, Théâtre de Poche, Montparnasse, directed by Olivier Hussenot.

Written 1953.


Pique Nicue en Campagne

First performed 25 April 1959, Paris. Théâtre de Lutèce, directed by Jean-Marie Serreau.

Written 1952.


Fando et Lis

First performed 21 September 1959, Liège, Théâtre expérimental de la Cambre, directed by Paul Andrieu.

(First performed in France 4 March 1964, Paris, Théâtre de Lutèce, directed by Claude Cyriaque.)

Written 1955-6.
In Le Cimetière des Voitures Collection 10/18 (Bourgois) no.735.

Filmed as Fando y Lis Producciones Pánicas (Mexico) 1969, directed by Alejandro Jodorowski.

Les Deux Bourreaux

First performed as The Two Hangmen 15 May 1960, New York, Jazz Gallery, directed by Lawrence Arrick.
First performed in French as part of the programme entitled Le Cimetière des Voitures 15 June 1966, Dijon, Nouvelle Salle du Palais des Congrès, directed by Victor Garcia.

Written 1956.

In Le Cimetière des Voitures Collection 10/18 (Bourgois) no.735.
Union Générale d'Éditions, Paris 1972, pp.25-44.

Guernica

First performed May 1960, Celle, West Germany, Schlosstheater, directed by Hannes Razun. The same production opened in Paris, Théâtre du Vieux Colombier, 16 June 1961.
First performed in French, 21 April 1967, Paris, Théâtre Espagnol de la Sorbonne (Institut Hispanique) directed by Carmen Compte.

Written 1959.

In Théâtre II Christian Bourgois, Paris 1968, pp.7-42.

Dieu Tenté par les Mathématiques (Orchestration Théâtrale)

First performed as Orchestration Théâtrale October 1960, Paris, Alliance Française, directed by Jacques Polieri.

Written 1957, as Orchestration Théâtrale.

Revised 1968-9, in conjunction with Jean-Yves Bosseur.

Le Cimetière des Voitures

First performed as The Automobile Graveyard 13 November 1961, New York, 41 Street Theater, directed by Herbert Machiz.
First performed in French 15 June 1966, Dijon, Nouvelle Salle du Palais des Congrès, directed by Victor Garcia.

Written 1957.

In Le Cimetière des Voitures Collection 10/18 (Bourgois), no.735.
Strip-Tease de la Jalousie (Ballet en un acte)

First performed 10 October 1964, Paris, Centre Américain directed by Jacques Seiler.

Written 1963.

Le Lai de Barabbas (Le Couronnement)

First performed as Le Couronnement 10 January 1965, Paris, Théâtre Mouffetard, directed by Ivan Henrques.

Written 1964.
First published as Le Couronnement in Théâtre III/IV, Juillard, Paris 1965, pp.5-172.
Published (slightly revised) as Le Lai de Barabbas in Théâtre IV, Christian Bourgois, Paris 1969, pp.21-166.

Les Amours Impossibles

First performed 24 May 1965, Paris, Centre Américain in the programme entitled Le Groupe Panique International présente sa Troupe d'Eléphants, directed by Alexandre Jodorowski.

Written 1957.

Oraison

First performed as Das Gebet July 1965, Berlin, Galerie Diogenes, directed by Günter Meisner.
First performed in French in the programme entitled Le Cimetière des Voitures, 15 June 1966, Dijon, Nouvelle Salle du Palais des Congrès, directed by Victor Garcia.

Written 1957.

Le Grand Cérémonial


Written 1963.
Filmed as Le Grand Cérémonial. Productions Alcinter 1968, directed by Pierre Alain Jolivet.
Cérémonie pour un Noir Assassine

First performed May 1966, by students, Festival de Nancy, directed by Angel Facio.

Written 1956.


La Communion Solennelle

First performed in the programme entitled Le Cimetière des Voitures, 15 June 1966, Dijon, Nouvelle Salle du Palais des Congrès, directed by Victor Garcia.

Written 1958.


Une Chèvre sur un Nuage


Written 1966(?).


La Bicyclette du Condamné

First performed in Japan. No details.
First performed in French, September 1966, Paris, Place de la Contrescarpe (as part of the "Festival de l’U.N.E.F.") directed by Robert Onhigian.

Written 1959.

In Théâtre II Christian Bourgois, Paris 1968, pp. 197-238.

Concert dans un Oeuf

First performed 19 November 1966, Bordeaux, Théâtre Français, directed by Georges Payrou.

Written 1958.

Le Labyrinthe

First performed 15 January 1967, Vincennes, Théâtre Daniel-Sorano, directed by Jerôme Savary.

Written 1956.


La Jeunesse Illustrée

First performed 11 February 1967, Vincennes, Théâtre Daniel-Sorano (Séances «Théâtre à la Carte») directed by Pierre Payrou.

Written 1966.

Published in Théâtre Panique (Théâtre V) Christian Bourgois, Paris 1967, pp.47-54.

L'Architecte et l'Empereur d'Assyrie


Written 1966.


Bestialité Erotique

First performed March 1968, Paris, Théâtre Alpha, directed by Ramon Lameda.

Written 1968.

Published in Théâtre VI Christian Bourgois, Paris 1969, pp.129-146.

Une Tortue Nommée Dostoievski

First performed March 1968, Paris, Théâtre Alpha, directed by Ramon Lameda.

Written 1968.

Published in Théâtre VI Christian Bourgois, Paris 1969, pp.147-184.
L'Aurore Rouge et Noire

First performed 26 December 1968, Brussels, Théâtre de Poche, directed by Pierre Alain Jolivet.

Written 1968.


Le Jardin des Délites

First performed 5 March 1969, Amsterdam "De Bakke Grond" Theatre, directed by Lodewijk de Boer.
First performed in French 30 October 1969, Paris, Théâtre Antoine, directed by Claude Regy.

Written 1967.


Et ils passèrent des Menottes aux Fleurs

First performed 26 September 1969, Paris, Théâtre de l'Epée-de-Bois, directed by Arrabal.

Written 1969.


Bella Ciao. La Guerre de Mille Ans


Written 1972.


La Marche Royale

First performed in the programme entitled En Hommage aux Prisonniers Politiques Espagnols, 14 April 1973, Paris, Palais des Sports, directed by Jérôme Savary.


Sur le Fil ou La Ballade du Train Fantôme

Read publicly during the Avignon Festival (Théâtre Ouvert) 3 August 1974 under the direction of Pierre Constant.
First performed October 1975, Paris, Théâtre de l'Atelier, directed by Jorge Lavelli.

Written 1974.

Le Ciel et la Merde

First performed as Celestial Crap, November 1974, by students, Arts Centre, University of Warwick, Coventry, directed by Mick Martin. No known performance in French.

Written 1970?
Published in Théâtre IX Christian Bourgois, Paris 1972, pp.19-96.

Jeunes Barbares d'Aujourd'hui

First performed 23 May 1975, Paris, Théâtre Mouffetard, directed by Arrabal.

Written 1975.
Published by Christian Bourgois, Paris 1975, 46 pp.

La Gloire en Images (Ballet chanté)

First performed as Bilder des Rüehms 11 January 1976, Bremen, Stadtoper, directed by Peter Stoltzenberg and Hans Kresnik. No known performance in French.

Written 1975.

La Tour de Babel

First performed 20 October 1976, Brussels, Théâtre de Poche (Théâtre Expérimental de Belgique), directed by Arrabal.

Written 1975-6.

Vole-moi un petit Milliard

First performed 30 January 1977, Paris, directed by Michel Berto.

Written 1976.
Published in Théâtre Bouffe (Théâtre XII) Christian Bourgois, Paris 1978, pp.3-84.
Les Quatre Cubes

No known performance.

Written 1960?


Dieu, est-il devenu Fou?

No known performance.

Written 1966.

Published in Théâtre Panique (Théâtre V) Christian Bourgois, Paris 1967, 54-56.

Ars Amandi (Opéra Panique)

No known performance.

Written 1967-8.


La Grande Revue du XXe Siècle

No known performance.

Written 1971.


Une Orange sur le Mont de Vénus

No known performance.

Date of composition unknown but given as 1968 in Théâtre XI.


Le Pastaga des Loufs ou Ouverture Orang-outang

No known performance.

Written 1977?

Published in Théâtre Bouffe (Théâtre XII) Christian Bourgois, Paris 1978, pp.85-165.

Punk et Punk et Colégram

No known performance.

Written 1977?

b) Films

Listed in chronological order.

Viva la Muerte 1971.


L'Arbre de Guernica 1975.

c) Publications edited by Arrabal

Listed in chronological order of publication.


d) Non-dramatic works published in book form

Listed in chronological order of publication. Includes Spanish editions.

Baal Babylone (novel)


Published as Viva la Muerte Collection 10/18 (Bourgois) no.439. Union Générale d'Éditions, Paris 1969, 192 pp.


L'Enterrement de la Sardine (novel)

Published in Collection 10/18 (Bourgois) no.734.

Le Pierre de la Folie (livre panique)

First published as Textes Paniques in La Brèche no.1.,
Published in Collection 10/18 (Bourgois) no.1162. Union

Fête(s) et Rite(s) de la Confusion (Collected texts)

First published as Arrabal celebrando la Ceremonia de la Confusión,
Alfaguara, Madrid 1966.
Published as Fête et Rite de la Confusion, Editions Le Terrain
Published as Fêtes et Rites de la Confusion, Collection 10/18

Selbstverwaltung in Wort und Bild (with Alejandro Jodorowski)
Joseph Melzer Verlag, Darmstadt, W. Germany 1970.
Sale and display of this book was banned shortly after
publication.

Lettre au Général Franco (written 1971)

Collection 10/18 (Bourgois) no.703 (bilingual edition, contains

Le New York d'Arrabal (Collection of photographs with written

Arrabal sur Fischer: Initiation aux Echecs

Lettre aux Militantes Communistes Espagnoles

Published by Christian Bourgois (bilingual edition includes
Spanish edition published by Actuales S.A. Barcelona (as

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