Leech, Dennis and Aziz, Haris (2007) The double majority voting rule of the EU Reform Treaty as a democratic ideal for an enlarging union: an appraisal using voting power analysis. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.824).

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Abstract

The Double Majority rule in the Treaty is claimed to be simpler, more transparent and more democratic than the existing rule. We examine these questions against the democratic ideal that the votes of all citizens in whatever member country should be of equal value using voting power analysis considering possible future enlargements involving candidate countries and then to a number of hypothetical future enlargements. We find the Double Majority rule to fails to measure up to the democratic ideal in all cases. We find the Jagiellonian compromise to be very close to this ideal.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	J Political Science > JN Political institutions (Europe)
Divisions:	Faculty of Science > Computer Science Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	European Union, Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (2004), Voting research, Power (Social sciences)
Series Name:	Warwick economic research papers
Publisher:	University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Official Date:	2007
Dates:	Date Event 2007 Published
Number:	No.824
Number of Pages:	22
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
Funder:	Leverhulme Trust (LT), National ICT R&D Fund (Pakistan)
Grant number:	CPNSS/VPP (LP)

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