Leech, Dennis and Aziz, Haris (2007) The double majority voting rule of the EU Reform Treaty as a democratic ideal for an enlarging union: an appraisal using voting power analysis. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. (Warwick economic research papers).

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Abstract

The Double Majority rule in the Treaty is claimed to be simpler, more transparent and more democratic than the existing rule. We examine these questions against the democratic ideal that the votes of all citizens in whatever member country should be of equal value using voting power analysis considering possible future enlargements involving candidate countries and then to a number of hypothetical future enlargements. We find the Double Majority rule to fails to measure up to the democratic ideal in all cases. We find the Jagiellonian compromise to be very close to this ideal.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	J Political Science > JN Political institutions (Europe)
Divisions:	Faculty of Science > Computer Science Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	European Union, Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (2004), Voting research, Power (Social sciences)
Series Name:	Warwick economic research papers
Publisher:	University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Date:	2007
Number:	No.824
Number of Pages:	22
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
Funder:	Leverhulme Trust (LT), National ICT R&D Fund (Pakistan)
Grant number:	CPNSS/VPP (LP)
References:	Algaba, E. , J. M. Bilbao, J. R. Fernandez, J. J. Lopez. (2003), “Computing power indices in weighted multiple majority games”, Mathematical Social Sciences, 46, 63-80. Aziz, Haris, Mike Paterson and Dennis Leech (2007), “Combinatorial and computational aspects of multiple weighted voting games”, Warwick Economic Research Papers number 823. Coleman, James S.(1971), “Control of Collectivities and the Power of a Collectivity to Act,” in B. Lieberman, (ed.), Social Choice, pp 277-287; New York, Gordon and Breach. Dubey, P. and L.S.Shapley (1979), “The Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Index”, Mathematics of Operations Research, vol 4, 99-131. EU (2001), Treaty of Nice Amending the Treaty of the European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, EU Document CONFER 4820/00 28 February. Feller, William, An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications, Vol. 1, 3rd ed. New York: Wiley, 1968. Felsenthal, Dan S. and M. Machover (1998), The Measurement of Voting Power: Theory and Practice, Problems and Paradoxes; Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. ---------------------------(2001), “The Treaty of Nice and Qualified Majority Voting”, Social Choice and Welfare, 18, 431-64. ---------------------------(2007), “Analysis of QM Rule Adopted by the Council of the European Union, 23 June 2007”, Project Report, Voting Power and Procedures Project, CPNSS, LSE. Leech, Dennis (2002), "Designing the Voting System for the Council of the European Union”, Public Choice, 113, 437-464. ----------------- (2003),”The Utility of Voting Power Analysis”, European Union Politics, 4(4), 479-486. ----------------- and Robert Leech (2004), "Algorithms for Computing Voting Power Indices” website: www.warwick.ac.uk/~ecaae/ Penrose, L.S. (1946), "The Elementary Statistics of Majority Voting", Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 109, 53-57. ------------------- (1952), On the Objective Study of Crowd Behaviour, London: H.K Lewis. Slomczynski, W and Zyczkowski, K (2007), “Jagiellonian Compromise: An Alternative Voting System for the Council of the European Union”, http://chaos.if.uj.edu.pl/~karol/pdf/JagCom07.pdf. Wallace, Helen and Fiona Hayes-Renshaw (2006), The Council of Ministers, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/1392

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