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THE FRENCH OCCUPATION OF TURINGIA, 1945–1947:
FRENCH POLICIES AND GERMAN REACTIONS
IN THE IMMEDIATE POST-WAR PERIOD

by

ANGUS A. D. HUNNOK, M.A., M.A.

being a thesis in two volumes submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Politics, the University of Warwick
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It is the intention of this thesis to make a contribution to the history of the French occupation of South-West Germany after the Second World War by presenting an empirical case study of French occupation policy in operation within a single community, i.e. Tübingen, during the period, 1945-1947. Little has as yet been written on French government policy toward Germany in the immediate post-war years - known as the "French thesis" - it concentrated chiefly on effecting the dismemberment of Germany into a confederation of individual states - despite the fact that the Allied occupation of Germany is a period of cardinal importance to historical research as a causal prelude to the establishment of the two post-war German states and of the Common Market.

The microstudy model of research has been selected in order to provide a method of analysis to trace developments within one community which were symptomatic of French occupation policy and of the "French thesis" on Germany. To this end this microstudy will pursue two objectives: to describe Tübingen as a post-war community under French occupation; and to provide a series of comments on the "French thesis" during its period of predominance in the years, 1945-1947.

The conclusions of this thesis are determined by these objectives. The main characteristics of the post-war occupation of Tübingen in the period, 1945-1947, are summarized with specific emphasis on the effects of the emergence of the community as the regional capital of Württemberg-Hohenzollern. The central exercise of this thesis remains, however, the examination of French government policy toward Germany. Consequently the latter section of the concluding chapter aims at isolating specific features of this policy and commenting on their significance.
It is a disquieting fact of post-war European studies that very little research has been undertaken to date in the field of French occupation policy in Germany and French government policies toward Germany prior to the formulation of the Marshall Plan. Of the three Western Allies the French presented the most radical solution by far to the German question with their thesis of the dismemberment of the German Reich and the creation of a confederation of German states along the lines of the Treaty of Westphalia (1648).

It is hoped that this thesis will go some way to widening the subject under examination for further academic research by providing a more detailed "Quotidokument" of French occupation policy and the "French thesis" than has hitherto been available.

In view of the rigid policy of denying access to occupation archives which is pursued by French administrative bodies, it was considered necessary to establish an alternative bank of reliable information. Consequently it was decided to make extensive use of new primary documentation culled from German archival sources in place of the contentious evidence offered by newspaper articles and French government publications, both of which were subject to bias and censorship. The extensive use of archival documentation has considerably augmented the size of this thesis. It is felt, however, that this is compensated for by the insights and perspectives afforded by this documentation.

A concomitant consequence of the extensive use of documentation is the fact that reference sections are placed at the end of chapter subsections rather than at the end of each chapter. This was done in order to prevent an unwieldy accumulation of sequential reference sections.

Special consideration has been given to the problem of translation. German phrases and quotations have been translated with the exception of German phrases and quotations have been translated with the exception of German
terms which are assumed to be generally known. The German texts remain, however, the primary sources of interpretation since in many instances there are no adequate English equivalents for German technical expressions and only paraphrased approximations can be offered. French quotations have not been translated as it was felt that this bordered on pedantry and would have caused in addition unnecessary overloading of the thesis.
INTRODUCTION

1) The "French thesis" on Germany

2) The themes of separatism and particularism which underpinned the "French thesis" on Germany

3) The role and importance of Tübingen during the initial years of French occupation

4) The function, aims and methodology of this case study of post-war Tübingen
SECTION ONE: The "French thesis" on Germany
The Allied occupation and military government of post-war Germany was essentially a quadripartite system operating on a shaky federative basis within the framework of the Allied Control Council in Berlin, which, by dint of the members' individual right of veto, had no means of imposing a majority or central will on a dissident member. In the case of a lack of common agreement on any particular issue, the power of decision-making within that area remained in the hands of the respective military commanders-in-chief who were autonomous within their allotted zones. Consequently, each of the military commanders could legally and unreservedly implement his government's policy within his zone whenever so instructed by his government. If conflict arose between his government's directives and Allied Control Council policy, the military commander could veto the particular policy at an Allied Control Council meeting, thereby returning the right of decision on the matter to himself (i.e. to his government) within the bounds of his zone of occupation. This open-ended system of constant stalemate proved a major impediment to the definition of a common Allied policy of occupation and subsequently the establishment of a central German government. In essence, the system allowed the individual Allied Control Council member, if he so desired, to avoid political compromise with his fellow members on German and occupation matters and to implement to the letter the specific wishes of his government or his military administration at the expense of the group or of German interests.

In this respect France was the starkest example in the years 1945–1947, of an occupying power determined to implement its policies in Germany at all costs, even in the face of Allied opposition. It is, therefore, imperative whenever considering in detail aspects of the role of France as an occupying power in Germany, especially in the years 1945–1947, to define the official policy on Germany of the post-war governments of France. This policy tended to remain static during the initial post-war period and has often been described as the "French thesis" on Germany.\(^{(1)}\) For the sake of convenience, the phrase will be used in this context throughout this doctoral thesis.

As a consequence of the importance of French government policy on post-war affairs in Germany, this introductory chapter is subdivided into four sections. The first of these will provide an historical overview of the main development
This first subsection does not purport to be entirely original research since it has borrowed rather heavily from already existing works; its function is to provide a frame of reference for this case study of Tübingen under French occupation. On the other hand, the opinions and accentuations developed in the course of this overview are those of the author. The second subsection will introduce and elucidate upon the related themes of separation and particularism which underpin the "French thesis" on Germany. The third subsection will indicate the role and importance of Tübingen under French military government in the years, 1945–1947. Finally, the fourth subsection will outline the specific function of this case study, define its aims and explain the choice of methodology.
The crushing defeat of France in June, 1940 had created widespread distrust both of France's capabilities and of her reliability. None was this distrust acuter than in Washington. Harry Hopkins frankly defined the American attitude toward France in a meeting with de Gaulle in 1944: "The reason (i.e., for American policy) is above all the stupefying disappointment which France inflicted upon us in 1940 when we saw her collapse in disaster and then in capitulation. The idea we had always had of her value and her energy was overturned in an instant — judging that France was no longer what she had been we could not trust her to play a great part. But we recognize what you have accomplished and we are happy to see France reappear. But how can we forget what in fact we have experienced? — Are we not justified in using caution in what we expect of her in bearing with us the weight of tomorrow's peace?"(2)

De Gaulle had envisaged this very situation when as Under-Secretary of Defence in the Reynaud Government he flew to London on June 17, 1940, to open a second and, in legal terms, dubious French front. "Pour moi ce qu'il s'agissait de servir et de sauver, c'était la Nation et l'Etat — Je pensais, en effet, que c'en serait fini de l'honneur, de l'unité, de l'indépendance, s'il devait être entendu que dans cette guerre mondiale, seule la France aurait capitulé et qu'elle en aurait restée là."

De Gaulle's decision proved to be the correct one. As F. Roy Willis points out in his book, France, Germany and the New Europe, 1944-1952, "the greatness of de Gaulle lay in his determination to remedy the error of the legal government in seeking an armistice with the enemy. De Gaulle perceived that only by resistance could France hope to regain her status as a great power. On June 18, 1940, he appealed to the BBC to all French soldiers and workers to join him on British soil. For resistance implied the continued existence of a true France with the right to inherit the powers sold away by Vichy, to share in the occupation of Germany and to shape the post-war settlement of Europe."

De Gaulle's prime aim was to restore France to its pre-war international position and to win for her the "grandeur" which she saw as the sien que non
of French political and cultural survival: "le côté positif de son esprit ne convainc que la France n'est réellement elle-même qu'au premier rang; que, seules, de vastes entreprises sont susceptibles de compenser les forces de dispersion que son peuple porte en lui-même, que notre pays, tel qu'il est, parmi les autres, s'il veut, doit, sous peine de danger mortel, viser haut et se tenir droit. Bref, à mon sens, la France ne peut être la France sans la grandeur."

This was the fundamental criterion of de Gaulle's political philosophy throughout the 1940's and he pursued it tenaciously and single-mindedly, with little regard for other people's or other nations' views and with enormous confidence in his own historical mission. In order to implement his policy of "grandeur" in terms of French foreign policy, especially with regard to Germany, de Gaulle faced from 1940 on a series of interrelated problems.

Firstly, he had to establish himself as the undisputed head of Fighting France and involve the Free French forces in the military struggle with Germany. He also had to achieve international recognition and legitimacy as the representative government of France, in particular from the Big Three. Furthermore, as de Gaulle constantly emphasised from 1940 onwards, his government had to win from the Allies the right of re-admission to the councils of the Great Powers which possessed the ultimate authority for making peace. Finally, France had to obtain from the Big Three acceptance of her ideas (which even as late as 1944 were still loosely formulated) on the European peace settlements, in particular the ones relating to Germany and Austria.

By the winter of 1943 de Gaulle had achieved many of his objectives. He had won a sharp tussle with the only other important figure of the metropolitan French fight against Germany and Vichy, General Giraud, who from his power base in Algiers and with the support of the Americans had refused to recognize the existing legal authority of de Gaulle's "Comité National Français". Furthermore, the Resistance movement within metropolitan France had been persuaded in May, 1943, by Jean Moulin, de Gaulle's representative of the "Délégation Générale de General de Gaulle en France", to unite itself in the "Conseil National de la Résistance" under Moulin's chairmanship. Moulin was subsequently arrested and executed by the German secret police, but his successor, Georges Bidault, maintained close liaison with de Gaulle.
With regard to Fighting France's participation in the liberation of France and the military defeat of the Third Reich, the French First Army, created by the fusion of the Free French forces with Giraud’s North African army, numbered over a quarter of a million men. It was to play an important role in the liberation of Southern France and a symbolic role in the liberation of Paris and Strasbourg. Finally, the French First Army contributed to a considerable extent to the military occupation and subsequent military government of South-West Germany.

Achieving recognition and legitimacy from the Big Three for himself and his political organisation was a more difficult and more taxing process. On June 22, 1940, the British Government recognised de Gaulle as the “Chef des Français libres”. De Gaulle continued, however, to have serious difficulties with the Americans. They distrusted his motives and his potential and, besides, until November 1942 they entertained diplomatic relations with the Vichy government. Consequently the French were excluded from the Newfoundland meeting between Roosevelt and Churchill which resulted in the Atlantic Charts (August 14, 1941); the apparent intention behind this exclusion was to avoid the impression of granting de Gaulle’s movement international status and de facto legality.

Nevertheless, de Gaulle was remarkably successful in achieving recognition and legitimacy by 1944. Even after the invasion of France in June 1944 the American government had still been unwilling to hand over control of liberated France to de Gaulle. Finally, however, the American government recognised de Gaulle’s “Comité Français de la Libération Nationale” as the de facto authority for the administration of France. The following month, on July 11, de Gaulle’s administration assumed control. On June 3 de Gaulle had already issued an ordinance whereby the “Comité Français de la Libération Nationale” assumed the title of the Provisional Government of the French Republic in order to strengthen its position in negotiations with the Allies. The Provisional Government was inaugurated in Paris in August 1944, but it was not until October 24 that the USA, Great Britain and the USSR simultaneously announced their recognition of the Paris regime as the Provisional Government of France.
On August 25, 1944, de Gaulle entered Paris in triumph. By this time the Vichy government had already been installed in the castle of Sigmaringen in Hohenzollern-Württemberg. Once the first hectic weeks were over, de Gaulle obviously reckoned that the moment was right for reasserting France's claims to "grandeur" and primacy. He held a speech in the Palais de Chaillot on September 12 during a rally organised by the "Conseil National de la Résistance" (CNR). The main theme of the speech was the future of Germany.

De Gaulle had already indicated in a press conference in Washington on July 10, 1944, what his thoughts were on the future of Germany. When asked whether he foresaw French demands on territories over which the French flag had not flown before the war, he replied that this would not be the case with overseas territories, but added "pour l'Europe, c'est une question très différente, non pas que nous voulions annexer un territoire qui n'est pas français, mais je crois, et tout le monde croit, que pour la sécurité internationale et particulièrement la sécurité française et celle des voisins à l'Ouest, il y aura des dispositions pratiques à prendre dans certaines terri­toires de l'Europe et sur ces territoires je crois bien que flottera le drapeau de l'armée française." De Gaulle then indicated that he was referring to Western Germany in particular.

Speaking at the CNR rally on September 12, de Gaulle demanded a place for France in the future settlement of the German question "parce qu'il se trouve qu'aucune puissance n'est plus intéressée que la France à ce qui touche au voisin dont elle a eu, depuis plus de deux mille ans, à s'occuper plus que quiconque et qu'il serait bien aléatoire de vouloir édifier quelque chose en dehors du principal intéressé." Two days later the Provisional Government officially asked for admission to the European Advisory Commission in a Note addressed to the American, British and Soviet governments.

On October 25 the Provisional Government was formally recognised by the governments of the USA, Great Britain, the USSR, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Brazil and Columbia. On October 25 de Gaulle, strengthened by this new status, gave a press conference in Paris, in the course of which he outlined the specific demands which formed the basis of what later came to be known as the "French thesis."
In reply to questions de Gaulle stated that he intended the French army to participate in the occupation of Germany, indeed that "les troupes françaises occuperont le territoire allemand qu'elles auront pris aux armées allemandes", but he conceded that "les conditions politiques de l'occupation de l'Allemagne par les troupes françaises ne peuvent absolument pas être réglées sinon par accord entre le Gouvernement français et les Gouvernements alliés".

When asked to express his opinion on the future of the Rhineland, de Gaulle riposted, "Vous parlez des pays rhénans, c'est-à-dire des pays qui bordent le Rhin." This was the first official hint of de Gaulle's philosophy of the historical necessity for a confederated or federalist Germany as opposed to a centralized Reich.

In an interview for the Sunday Times on November 11, 1944 — the day on which France was invited to become the fourth member of the European Advisory Commission — the French Foreign Minister, Georges Bidault, presented a systematic policy on Germany, thus indicating that agreement had been reached within the French cabinet on the general lines of French policy toward Germany. The main points of his interview were that Germany would have to be controlled for an indefinite period, that the early establishment of a central German authority could impede the natural desire of parts of Germany to disassociate themselves from Prussian influence, that France's chief concern lay in the control of the Rhineland and in the Allied supervision of the German industries and that France would have to be given a full share in the control of Germany.

Furthermore, with specific reference to the Morgenthau Plan, Bidault rejected both the conversion of Germany into an agricultural country and the total dismemberment of Germany. The French had suffered enormous financial and material damage under the German occupation and they were determined to make good their losses, as best they could, by the means of three levies: factor dismantling, financial reparations and coal levies. The latter two levies depended, however, upon the continued existence of German industry and mines to pay for the reparations and to supply the coal.
The French answer to their economic and industrial problems therefore did not envisage the destruction, but rather the re-allocation and control of German mines and industries by the Allies. The two-point plan which the French government submitted on the theme of Germany's mines and industries involved the internationalisation of the Ruhr district and the enforced inclusion of the Saarland in an economic and monetary union with France.

A second factor which contributed to Bidault's rejection of the Morgenthau Plan was no doubt the fact that France did not as yet participate in Allied policy-making, nor was she consulted to any great extent. This was the case with the Morgenthau Plan (and the Quebec Conference, September 11-19, 1944, for which Morgenthau's proposals were used as a basis of discussion). In accordance with de Gaulle's long-term aim of involving France on a basis of equality with the Big Three in the settlement of the status of post-war Germany, the French government in 1944 was bound to oppose agreements to which it had not been a party. This is borne out by the fact that, although Bidault formally rejected Morgenthau's proposals for the dismemberment of Germany, France later revived the dismemberment thesis.

Bidault's interview represents the public birth of the "French thesis" on Germany. The interview emphasised the same points which de Gaulle, with the wisdom of hindsight, expounded in his memoirs as the central issues of post-war French policy on Germany. They were: "plus de Reich centralisé. C'était, à mon sens, la première condition pour empêcher que l'Allemagne retournât à ses mauvais penchants. Chaque fois qu'un État dominateur et ambitieux s'était saisi des pays allemands en contraincant leur diversité, l'impérialisme avait jailli. On ne l'avait que trop vu sous Guillaume II et Hitler. Au contraire, que chacun des États appartenant au corps germanique pût exister par lui-même, se gouverner à sa manière, traiter de ses propres intérêts, il y aurait beaucoup de chance pour que l'ensemble fédéral ne fût porté à subjuguer ses voisins. Il y en aurait plus encore si la Ruhr, arsenal de matières stratégiques, recevait un statut spécial sous contrôle international. D'autre part, les territoires rhenans seraient, certes, occupés par les armées française, britannique, belge et hollandaise — Tout commandait enfin que la Sarre, gardant son caractère allemand, s'érigât elle-même en État et s'unît à la France dans le domaine économique, ce qui, grâce au charbon, réglerait la question de ses réparations. Ainsi, le monde germanique, retrouvant sa diversité et tourné vers l'Ouest, perdrait les moyens de la guerre mais non ceux de son développement."
In November 1944, however, de Gaulle had not yet expressed his formula on Germany in any precise form. So far he had only been explicit on the subject of a French zone of occupation. In July 1944, during his visit to Washington, de Gaulle requested French participation in the occupation of the Rhineland and on August 12 he demanded a zone of occupation stretching from Konstanz on the Swiss border up to and including Cologne. In December 1944 de Gaulle told Stalin in Moscow that the Rhine represented the natural frontier of France and that he wished to have French troops placed there permanently.

One important development occurred before de Gaulle came out in early 1945 with his formulation of the French thesis on Germany. De Gaulle signed an alliance with the USSR on December 10, 1944. Article Three of the Franco-Soviet Pact stated that at the end of the war the contracting parties would take by common agreement all measures necessary to prevent any new German aggression.

The corollary to the Soviet agreement to act in concert with France on the post-war settlement for Germany was that the USSR regarded France as a major power to be consulted in the making of that settlement. This was the implication behind the pact which elicited the most interest in France, in the words of La Monde, "a dazzling sign of her renaissance and her reappearance in the ranks of the great powers". In the ensuing debate on the pact in the Consultative Assembly on December 21 Georges Bidault expounded his government's motives. He stated that the French and Soviet governments had acted in concert to deprive Germany of the ability to do harm in the future. To this end the French government had raised no objections to the tracing of new frontiers in the East as envisaged by the Soviet government. As for the French government, Bidault went on, it had clearly indicated to the Russians its intention to deprive Germany of the territories which had served her as an arsenal of war and as a source of attack on the West, namely the Rhineland, including the Ruhr and Westphalian basin, and to put these under French and Allied control. Furthermore, the manufactures and industries of the Rhine valley and the Ruhr district were to go towards the reparation of damages caused by German aggression. Bidault in effect propagated a system of entente whereby the Russians would have a free hand in settling the future of Germany's eastern territories while the French enjoyed the same freedom on Germany's western borders.
De Gaulle's speech at the same debate was much more general and ambiguous than that of his Foreign Minister. It appears as if de Gaulle was still testing the temperature of the German question before taking the plunge himself by definitively stating his formula for the German settlement. On the face of things it might have appeared that de Gaulle, now strengthened by a pact which appeared to indicate that the USSR accepted France as a full partner on the German question, could have judged the time opportune for publicly specifying his goals.

In fact de Gaulle was acting, not from a position of strength, but from one of weakness. For whatever hopes the French government may have actually placed in the Soviet government to strengthen their diplomatic bargaining position, they were disillusioned by the news that the Big Three were arranging another Allied conference without France's participation. Even before France was invited to join the European Advisory Commission the three major Allies had been making plans for a top-level conference and by mid-January 1945 it was common knowledge that they would meet again within a few weeks and that de Gaulle was not invited to join them.

The European Advisory Commission was itself a source of worry to the French. The principal task of the Commission was the delimitation of the future Allied zones of occupation. This topic engaged the Commission from January till November, 1944, and work was speeded up dramatically when the Big Three decided to include France. The decision to include France on the Commission was made on November 11 and within a matter of days the protocol on the zones was signed, weeks before the French representative, René Maenzigli, assumed his seat on the Commission on November 27.

The "joint recommendations" produced by the European Advisory Commission were generally approved in detail in advance by the three participant governments before the delegates consulted together and discussed them in an ambassadorial capacity. These recommendations were treaty texts with all the attendant legal obligations and were to be regarded as full international agreements. The European Advisory Commission established three Allied zones of occupation and the tripartite occupation of Berlin in the protocol of September 12, 1944. The zones proposed by the Commission were subsequently ratified by the participant governments. Thus the delimitation of the zones of occupation was initially settled without France's participation and, equally significant, without the prospect of a French zone of occupation.
In an additional treaty of November 14, 1944, again without France’s involvement, the European Advisory Commission settled and signed the treaty regulating the Allies’ “controlling authority” in post-war occupied Germany, to be composed of the Allied Control Council, the Co-ordinating Committee, the Staff Committee and the common Allied administration of Berlin.

De Gaulle reacted in his customary fashion to the snub implicit in France’s exclusion from the forthcoming Allied conference and in the Allies’ lack of concern for France’s interests in a zone of occupation. He resorted to public rhetoric and hyperbole, whilst at the same time restating his demands in ever priciser terms.

At a press conference on January 22, 1945, de Gaulle formulated a policy of French occupation in answer to a specific question regarding France’s demands on the Rhineland: “La France n’entend pas finir cette guerre sans être assurée que la force française sera installée en permanence d’un bout à l’autre du Rhin.”

In a radio speech on February 5, the opening day of the Yalta Conference, de Gaulle reinforced his demands for French participation in the occupation of Germany. He preceded this with an ominous warning to the Allies about France’s attitude on Allied agreements made without her consent: “Quant au règlement de la paix future ou à toute autre disposition qui s’y rapporterait, nous avons fait connaître à nos alliés et nous avons dit publiquement que la France ne serait, bien entendu, engagée pour absolument rien qu’elle n’aurait été à même de disputer et d’approuver au même titre que les autres. A fortiori, n’acceptera-t-elle que ce qui sera conforme aux buts qu’elle s’est fixés pour s’assurer qu’aucune agression de l’Allemagne ne sera possible dans l’avvenir, soit contre elle-même soit tout État auquel elle se trouve ou se trouverait liée.” This warning was destined to become a familiar theme during de Gaulle’s term of office as head of the Provisional Government; indeed, the threat became political reality and a major feature of France’s dealings with the Big Three over the German settlement.

The Yalta Conference, convened on February 4, 1945, marked the high point of Big Three cooperation on the subject of Germany. The Potsdam Conference, which was held five months later, set in a completely different atmosphere. By then Roosevelt had died (April 12) and his successor, Truman, was determined on following a much less conciliatory policy toward the USSR. In February, however,
things had not yet taken this turn. The Yalta Conference was called essentially to deal with questions and tensions left unsolved by the Teheran Conference. Three separate themes were treated: the assurance of world peace through the creation of a United Nations organisation; the successful termination of war in the Far East; and the establishment of post-war Europe's political structures, with particular emphasis on the future of Germany.

The question of the partition of Germany, which had already been discussed at Teheran, was reopened at Yalta. Stalin pressed for a quick decision, but Churchill regarded the issue as too complicated to be dealt with adequately in a short period of time. Roosevelt felt that Germany ought to be partitioned and proposed that the Big Three first agree in principle to the partition of Germany, the plan of which would in turn be presented to the Germans at the capitulation. No detailed discussion of partition arose, however, and in the protocol of the Yalta Conference a single paragraph was devoted to partition, stating that the Allies would undertake all steps in the execution of their supreme authority with regard to Germany, including the total demilitarisation, disarmament and partition of Germany. Thus in this vague formulation the question of partition was referred to a special committee comprising Anthony Eden (GB), George Winant (USA) and Theodor Ossew (USSR). This committee was also directed to decide whether it was necessary to include a representative of France.

The details of the occupation of Germany, including the final delimitation of the three zones of occupation, had already been fixed in the European Advisory Commission protocol of November 14, 1944. At Yalta there was apparently no need therefore for further discussion of details of the occupation administration of post-war Germany. But problems did arise at the Yalta Conference during discussions about the possible participation of France as an occupation power and her inclusion on the Allied Control Council.

At the Anglo-American meeting at Helsinki (January, 1945) prior to the Yalta Conference, the two major Western Allies had agreed that France should have a zone of occupation in Germany which would be created from territory already assigned to the USA and Great Britain. At Yalta, however, Stalin resisted this proposal with the argument that France had succumbed too easily to the German wave in 1940 and that her subsequent contribution to victory had been insignificant. Churchill, eventually supported by Roosevelt, argued at length for
French participation, emphasizing that Britain could not bear the full responsibility of containing Germany in the west. Stalin finally yielded on the question of a French zone on the condition that it was created exclusively from the proposed British and American zones. Stalin also accepted the admission of France to the Allied Control Council, a development which the British representatives at the conference regarded as a necessary extension of France being granted a zone of occupation.

The final protocol of February 11 stated: "It was agreed that a zone in Germany, to be occupied by the French Forces, should be allocated to France. This zone would be formed out of the British and American zones and its extent would be settled by the British and Americans in consultation with the French Provisional Government. It was also agreed that the French Provisional Government should be invited to become a member of the Allied Control Council for Germany."(16)

Stalin remained adamant on one point. He refused to allow a French representative to be appointed to the special (and secret) committee comprising Eden, Vinant and Gusev, which was to prepare the dismemberment of Germany. Consequently the special committee remained a rump, existing alongside the European Advisory Commission, on which France sat as a full member, a contradictory situation, as Philip Mosley points out in his essay, "The Occupation of Germany". The British representative also failed to have France included as a member of the Reparations Commission established in Moscow. Furthermore, France was not mentioned when it was agreed that the Foreign Ministers of the three major Allies should meet at regular intervals for top-level discussions.

The Yalta Conference evaded final decisions on the settlement of the German question. It had not, for example, specified whether or not the French zone of occupation would be situated in the Rhineland, as the French government keenly desired. This question was put to the Allied governments in London and Washington and Bidault raised the topic during a round of talks with Anthony Eden in London (February 1945), but neither the American nor the British government would make any immediate statement on the subject of the zones or their ultimate definition.
F. Roy Willis puts the blame squarely on French shoulders for the situation France found herself in after the Yalta Conference with regard to the zones which had been promised, but not defined. On February 12, 1949, the American Ambassador, Caffery, informed de Gaulle of Roosevelt's invitation to meet him at Algiers for talks. De Gaulle was infuriated by what he considered a slight to French prestige and sovereignty on the part of the American president by inviting the head of France to meet him on French territory. De Gaulle declined the invitation and his choice of language in a public communiqué expressed his indignation in barely guarded terms: "Le président du Gouvernement provisoire répondit à l'ambassadeur qu'il se fâchait d'apprendre que le président Roosevelt projetait de rendre visite à un port français. Le général de Gaulle ajoutait que l'invitation qui lui était adressée de se rendre dans ce port le provoquerait à l'improviste, dans un moment où beaucoup d'affaires exigent sa présence à Paris et au lendemain d'une conférence entre trois chefs de gouvernements alliés, leurs conseillers et leurs experts, conférence à laquelle la France n'avait pas pris part et dont elle ignorait encore les multiples objets."(18) Professor Willis finds that, by refusing Roosevelt's invitation, "De Gaulle thereby denied himself the opportunity to discuss the future boundaries of the French zones and the French share in the invasion of Germany. These decisions were taken on military grounds by the War Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The result was a conflict between the French and the Americans during the invasion of Germany that almost culminated in open fighting."(19)

De Gaulle considered French military participation in the invasion of Germany "le seul moyen assuré d'être partie à la capitulation, à l'occupation et à l'administration du Reich. Dès lors que nous aurions en main une zone du sol germanique, ce qu'il adviendrait de l'Allemagne, ne pourrait être décidé sans nous." De Gaulle was suspicious of Allied intentions regarding the role of the French army in the final attack on Germany. He felt certain that the French would be assigned at the most a passive role in the fighting and he was prepared to take steps to circumvent such a development. "Ma politique ne pouvant pas souscrire à cette stratégie, mes résolutions étaient prises. Il fallait que nos troupes passent, elles aussi, le Rhin. Elles le ferait dans le cadre internatioal si cela était possible. Si cela ne l'était pas, elles le ferait pour notre compte. De toute manière, elles devraient arriver, sur la rive gauche, une zone française d'occupation."(20)
By March 1945 French forces had still not entered Germany. The Allied invasion plan of February had assigned to the French the task of maintaining a passive front on the upper Rhine. This had served to reinforce de Gaulle’s suspicions and his determination to act unilaterally in the pursuit of French interests. In March, however, the plan was revised to permit the French forces to follow the American army into Württemberg and also to occupy the Rhine corridor between the Rhine and the Black Forest. In his memoirs Marshall de Lattre de Tassigny, the French military commander, maintained that he was able to transform this situation to make the French army lead the attack into Baden and south Württemberg (21).

On March 31 the French army crossed the Rhine. Two days later de Lattre de Tassigny issued the order for the attack on Stuttgart to begin. There then followed in quick succession the capture of Leopoldshafen (April 3), Karlsruhe (April 4), Rastatt and Baden-Baden (April 12-13), Stuttgart (April 18-21), Tübingen (April 19), Freiburg (April 21) and Ulm (April 21), the two main prizes being the two regional capitals of Baden (Karlsruhe) and Württemberg (Stuttgart).

The capture of Stuttgart unleashed a major Franco-American crisis. On April 22 General Devers, commander of the Allied armies in South-West Germany, designated the Karlsruhe-Stuttgart-Ulm-Würzburg autobahn as the dividing line between the French and American armies, thereby restoring both Stuttgart and Karlsruhe to the Americans. On April 24 de Gaulle countermanded by ordering de Lattre de Tassigny to continue the occupation and military government of Stuttgart until the French zone of occupation had been settled between the Allied governments. (22) Furthermore, de Gaulle refused initially to vacate the four "Landkreise" of Ionien, Bergzabern, Germersheim and Speyer. Ultimately, however, de Gaulle was forced to concede in the face of American threats to cut off supplies to the French army.

On April 10 de Gaulle informed both his Foreign Minister and his Minister of War of the specific territories which he had designated as the French zone of occupation. They comprised the left bank of the Rhine as far north as Cologne (i.e. the Prussian Rhineland, the Saar, the Palatinate), plus the states of Nassau-Nassau, Nassau-Kassel, Nassau-Darmstadt and Baden on the right bank of the Rhine. These demands had been outlined as early as August 1944 and had not been modified by the series of boundary negotiations which followed the
The essential point of interest for this study, however, is the consistent lack of interest which the French government displayed toward Wurttemberg in the period prior to its occupation by de Lattre de Tassigny.

The French zone was in fact defined in two separate series of negotiations with the British and American delegations to the European Advisory Commission. The British authorities refused to give up the city of Cologne, but were prepared to concede the Saar, the Palatinate and a large part of the Prussian Rhinprovinces. This allowed the French to occupy the left bank of the Rhine as far north as the town of Remagen. Since the American War Department insisted on retaining the motorway and main railway line from Karlsruhe to Munich via Stuttgart, the American delegation was only prepared to offer those parts of Baden and Wurttemberg which lay to the south of the motorway. During the negotiations with the European Advisory Commission the French increased their territorial demands to include Wurttemberg on their list of desired territories. In the final agreement of June 22 it was clear, however, that France had in fact accepted less than she had been demanding. In all she received as her zone of occupation South Baden and South Wurttemberg together with the enclave of Hohenzollern and the Bavarian 'Landkreis' of Landau, the left bank of the Rhine south of Remagen, including part of the Prussian Rhinprovinces, the Palatinate and the Saar and a section of Hessen-Nassau on the right bank of the Rhine.

The document establishing the legal basis for the Allied control of Germany which had been drawn up by the European Advisory Commission and agreed upon at the Yalta Conference was amended on May 1, 1945, to include France in the occupation machinery for Germany. This was approved by the French Cabinet on May 10. The French government named Jean de Lattre de Tassigny as commander-in-chief of the French forces of occupation in Germany.

France had by now achieved part of her ambitions; she was an occupying power in Germany with control over her own zone. This valuable gain did not, however, disguise the fact that she had not yet gained parity with the Big Three on the German question. This was clearly demonstrated by France's exclusion from the Reparations Commission. The USA and Great Britain applied for France's admission to the Commission, arguing that it was a logical extension to France's position as an occupying power and member of the Allied Control Council.
Stalin, however, frustrated the Western Allies by insisting on Poland's inclusion on the Reparations Commission were France to be granted membership. Great Britain and the USA, reluctant to recognize the Polish government, saw themselves unable to agree to Stalin's condition and the question of France's membership of the Reparations Commission was subsequently shelved until the Potsdam Conference.

The Potsdam Conference was convened from July 17 until August 2, 1945, with the specific intention of resolving sources of tension related to three issues: European problems such as Poland and Trieste; the final strategy for the Far Eastern war; and the question of concrete policies for Germany. France's claim for participation was stronger than it had been in February with regard to the Yalta Conference. She was now a permanent member of the UN Security Council and she had a zone of occupation in Germany together with a seat on the Allied Control Council and a veto on all its decisions. Nevertheless, France was not invited to join the Potsdam Conference.

The decisions reached by the Big Three at Potsdam were communicated to the French government in three Notes of July 31, August 1 and August 2. The French government was invited at the same time to associate itself with some of the decisions and also to accept membership on the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Reparations Commission. On August 7 the French government replied to the Allies' proposals in six Notes handed to the ambassadors of the three major Allies in Paris.

In the first Note France accepted the invitation to join the Council of Foreign Ministers. At the same time, however, the Note voiced the reservation that the French government "ne souhaiterait accepter à priori la reconstitution... d'un gouvernement central en Allemagne", which was an eventuality envisaged by the Big Three in their Potsdam communiqué. In the second Note France agreed with the basic aims of the occupation of Germany as defined by the major Allies at Potsdam, but she refused to associate herself with the points concerning the formation of all-German political parties and the re-establishment of central administrative agencies extending over all four zones as long as the question of Germany's frontiers remained unsettled. The French government based its reservation on the argument that the re-establishment of all-German political parties and central administrations ought not to be implemented before the German population had been consulted on their wishes concerning a possible dismemberment of the German Reich.
The third Note accepted the invitation to participate in the duties of the Reparations Commission, but here again France reserved the right to state its position at some later date on the theme of German reparations and the economic principles to be applied in the control and occupation of Germany. The final three Notes are not of importance for the purposes of this thesis.

The question as to whether France did in fact accept the legality of the Potsdam Agreement by the transmission of the six Notes of August 7, 1945, is a legal point which has been much debated. For this study the central point of interest is that the French government in 1945 did not consider itself bound by those Allied conferences and agreements to which it had not been a party and consequently refused to comply with those same agreements as it saw fit. This led to serious complications within the Allied occupation of Germany since France, although not considering herself bound by the decisions of the Big Three at Potsdam and Yalta, sat as a full member on the Allied Control Council which was to affect these same decisions. But the Allied Control Council could not act without the unanimous consent of its members, which meant in effect that the French government, whilst unable to participate in the formulation of Allied policy on Germany, could veto its implementation, a contradiction which was not resolved by France's inclusion on the Council of Foreign Ministers which was charged with settling the future peace treaties.

Things, however, were not to come to a head until after the first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London in September 1945. The first meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers was of primary importance to the French government for, apart from the treatment of the German question, it was the first Great Power meeting to which France had been admitted since 1940. On September 20 the Soviet Foreign Minister, Molotov, approached the British and American representatives with the information that a wrong interpretation had been made of the Potsdam Agreement, which established the form and conditions of the Foreign Minister meetings, and that the USSR could no longer accept the presence of France and China at the discussions on the Balkan treaties since neither of the latter two had signed the armistices with the Balkan states in question. Georges Bidault argued in defence that the decisions reached by the five Foreign Ministers on September 11 at the opening of the conference dictated conference procedure and not the Potsdam Agreement.
It was, however, universally agreed from this point onwards that the conference had failed. The ministers nevertheless agreed, for form's sake, to work through their agenda, but in a superficial manner which would prevent any real treatment of basic problems. Thus the French representatives were finally able to participate in a discussion of the German question on September 26. Two days later Bidault was able, for the first time, to present officially and in detail to the other Allies the "French thesis" on Germany, involving the themes of the permanent occupation of the Rhineland and the creation of an international regime in the Ruhr district, together with the warning that France would not participate in the establishment of a central administration in Germany until her proposals had received satisfaction. The French proposals were shelved for further study, a delaying tactic too obvious to leave the French delegation under any illusions about the Big Three's readiness to accept their proposals.

Bidault warned the Foreign Ministers of the Allied countries that the French representative on the Allied Control Council would not agree to any measures concerning the Ruhr district and the Rhineland until the Foreign Ministers had agreed on the future status of these regions. This warning turned out to be no empty threat. For the following three months the French representatives on the Allied Control Council and its subsidiary bodies employed their right of veto to block every proposal tending toward the re-establishment of a centralised administration in Germany.

On September 2, 1945, General Koelts, deputy Commander-in-Chief of the French zone under General Koenig, rejected an American proposal for the setting up of a central German transport agency. On October 26 General Koenig refused to permit the federation of German trade unions throughout the four zones of occupation.

On November 25 General Koelts vetoed the creation of a central German agency for rail transport. On December 17 Koelts rejected a joint Anglo-American proposal to allow the German free passage between the zones. On March 26, 1946, the French vetoed the establishment of national political parties in Germany and, finally, the French occupation administration turned down Secretary of State James Byrnes's offer of July 20 to unite the American zone of occupation with any or all of the other three zones. The result of these tactics by the French was to paralyse the work of the Allied Control Council, consequently forcing policy decisions more and more into the hands of local commanders-in-chief.
Parallel to these tactics of hindrance and veto de Gaulle maintained a second policy as a respectable alternative to the "French thesis" on Germany. In the late summer of 1945 the French government continued to be frustrated in its attempts to achieve full Great Power status and to implement its policy on Germany. In the face of the Big Three's indifference to the "French thesis" de Gaulle began to expound a policy which could act as a replacement for the stark and obvious realpolitik of the "French thesis". De Gaulle began to stress the need for a "Western bloc", in other words, the consolidation of a special kind of political and economic relationship between the nations of Western Europe, of which France would emerge as both hub and motor, thus strengthening France's role in the councils of the major Powers.

In 1950, in the course of his memoirs, General de Gaulle described his particular policy - which, it must be stated, remained a rhetorical rather than an actual alternative in the years, 1945 to 1947 - as "le vaste plan que j'ai formé pour mon pays ... lui assurer la sécurité en Europe occidentale, en empêchant qu'un nouveau Reich puisse la menacer ... former à ce groupe, aux points de vue politique, économique, stratégique, les États qui touchent au Rhin, aux Alpes et aux Pyrénées. Faire de cette organisation l'une des trois puissances planétaires et, s'il le faut un jour, l'arbitre entre les deux camps soviétique et anglo-saxon."

During a tour of the French zone in Germany in October 1945 de Gaulle constantly stressed the idea of a Western European grouping. On October 3 at Saarbrücken he expressed hope for a successful cooperation between France and the Saar because "s'il en est ainsi, ce sera tant mieux pour l'Occident et pour l'Europe, dont vous êtes, comme nous, les enfants." In Trier de Gaulle repeated the same message and on October 4 at Mainz he said: "Ici, tant que nous sommes, nous sortons de la même race. En nous voici, aujourd'hui, entre Européens et entre Occidentaux. Une de raisons pour que, désormais, nous nous tenions les uns près des autres." At Strasbourg on October 5 de Gaulle re-interpreted France's policy on the Rhineland for the duration of an open-air speech. Instead of stressing the buffer role of the Rhineland, as was the normal feature of the "French thesis", de Gaulle on this occasion outlined the cohesive role of the Rhine in French-German relations: "Je suis ici pour proclamer la grande tâche rhénane française. Hier le fleuve du Rhin, notre fleuve, était une barrière, une frontière, une ligne de combat. Aujourd'hui, puisque l'ennemi s'est
scrolled grâce à notre victoire, puisqu'ils disparu dans les Allemandes les attractions furieuses qui les rassemblaient pour le mal, le Rhin peut reprendre le rôle que lui tracent la nature et l'Histoire. Il peut redevenir un lien occidental ... Oui! le lien de l'Europe occidentale, il est ici, il est le Rhin, qui passe à Strasbourg.\(^{(25)}\)

Shortly after his tour of the French zone de Gaulle, together with Georges Bidault, paid an official visit to Belgium to discuss European and German questions. On October 11th at the University of Brussels de Gaulle, according to his own memoirs, proclaimed "l'espoir que pourrait apporter, un jour, au monde entier l'association de tous les peuples de l'Europe et, dans l'immédiat, un groupement occidental, ayant pour artère le Rhin, le Manche, la Méditerranée.\(^{(26)}\) But this particular volume of de Gaulle's memoirs was written thirteen years after the event, by which time Franco-German relations had undergone radical changes. In 1958 the central theme of European politics was the need for a concerted European policy within the organisation of an economic community. At that period it was therefore to de Gaulle's advantage to portray himself as the standard bearer of a united European community during the mid and late 1940's.

After his visit to Brussels, de Gaulle's memoirs continue, he developed the idea of a united Europe: "Rentred à Paris, je l'expose de nouveau, le 12 octobre, en une vaste conférence de presse ... Voilà donc l'idée lancée.\(^{(50)}\) The "idea" referred to by de Gaulle was in fact scarcely outlined at the actual meeting. Of three vague references to Western Europe the most specific dealt with the identity of Western Europe to the extent that "il y a très longtemps que les Français, les Belges, les Hollandais, les Rhénans et quelques autres naissent du côté où le soleil se lève. Il y a très longtemps que d'autres Européens naissent du côté où le soleil se couche. Je ne vois pas pourquoi ceux de la première catégorie rendent leur qualité d'Occidentaux et je vois aucun inconvénient à ce que les autres proclament leur qualité d'Européens de l'Est.\(^{(51)}\)

In the same interview, however, de Gaulle did not fail to stress the traditional leftist of the "French thesis" on Germany: the need for a confederated Germany, the subjection of the Rhineland from the Reich and the internationalisation of the Ruhr area. Therefore, whilst outlining a new
political framework for Germany and Europe, de Gaulle did not abandon the "French thesis" which continued to be advocated by the French government, even after de Gaulle's resignation on January 20, 1946, over the constitutional issue.

De Gaulle's resignation left the way open for innovation within French government circles. The new government formed under the Socialist, Félix Gouin, was not based on the formula of national unity which de Gaulle had utilised, but rather on a tripartite coalition of Communists, Socialists and MRP. Georges Bidault remained in charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This presented a contradiction since the Socialist party (SFIO) had demonstrated increasing discontent with Bidault's plans for Germany. (32)

The one political party in France to digress from the extent of support for de Gaulle's "French thesis" on Germany was the SFIO, even though three Socialists were cabinet members of de Gaulle's government. All the party's speakers had openly opposed any form of annexation or dismemberment of German territory and had instead insisted on a policy of control of Germany's industry and on the re-education of the German populace. This difference of opinion between the Socialists and the other parties over de Gaulle's traditionally nationalist policy of coping with potential German aggression by annexation and dismemberment had emerged during the foreign policy debates of November 1944, the debates preceding the San Francisco Conference (April 1945) and the Constituent Assembly debate on foreign policy on January 15-17, 1946.

In January 1946 Félix Gouin's outspoken support of the Socialist position on Germany eventually led to conflict with the Foreign Minister. The Gouin Cabinet, however, preserved a public image of unity and concensus and Bidault was thus able to submit his own proposals on Germany at the Paris Conference of April 1946. The Gouin Government, weakened by internal division and tension, survived another six weeks until June 12 when Gouin resigned his leadership of the government. Eleven days later a new government was formed on the same tripartite system under the premiership of Georges Bidault who also retained, significantly, the post of Foreign Minister.
In the meantime Bidault had restated in the name of the Coulin Government the official "French thesis" on Germany in a Note to the Big Three on February 12. In the Note the French government complained that the continuing lack of any sort of statute for Germany was creating problems for the Allied Control authorities in Berlin. The Note pointed out that the French government had already stated its objections to the creation of central German administrations if they were intended to apply to the Rhineland and the Ruhr district. Furthermore, the Note indicated that there were difficulties involved in fixing the levels for Germany's industrial capacity, especially the steel quota, when the question of the inclusion of the Saar district in a customs and monetary union with France had not yet been decided. With this in mind the French government demanded a precise formulation of the political status to be accorded to the Saar and outlined two points which it wished to be considered: that the frontiers of the Saar should remain approximately the same as those of 1919, encompassing the whole of the Saar coalfield; and that the Saar coalfield should be returned to France, as laid down in the Treaty of Versailles, to become the property of France and be included in the French customs and monetary union. Furthermore, the Saar district, according to the Note, should cease to be under the jurisdiction of the Allied Control Council, nor should it in the future come under the jurisdiction of a central German administration. France would thereby assume responsibility for the permanent administration of the Saar and a French military force would be stationed there permanently to preserve internal order.

Having communicated its views on the future of the Saar the French government turned its attention to the question of central German administrations for a second time. On February 24 the French naval Commander-in-Chief, General Koémig, a staunch supporter of the Coulinist thesis on Germany, expressed his views on German administrations at an interallied press conference at which he emphasised that it was only logical that central German administrations should not be called into existence before the territories which they were to administer had been geographically defined. Koémig apparently did not think it necessary to convene a second Fotsdam Conference to settle the matter, but implied that those questions which had not been solved to France's satisfaction at Fotsdam ought to be dealt with by the four major Allies with a minimum of fuss and a maximum of speed.
The following week Foreign Minister Bidault officially reiterated his government's position on the establishment of central German administrations in a communication to the American Ambassador in Paris. The communication pointed out that the French government still insisted on the substruction of specific territories from German sovereignty for reasons of French security. It also maintained that the four major Allies ought to regulate the question of Germany's territorial status before treating the subject of Germany's administrations since, according to Bidault's argument, the German population would inevitably interpret these central agencies as forerunners of an autonomous German government with de facto jurisdiction over the same territories as administered by the central agencies, thus complicating the issue of the future of the Rhineland and the Ruhr and Saar. The only aspect which the French government was prepared to study seriously was the creation of "organismes techniques allemans qui seraient un rôle consultatif et qui pourraient être mis à la disposition du conseil du contrôle allié". The French government recognised the advisability of improving and coordinating services within Germany in order to stimulate economic and financial life, but adamantly refused to treat these problems separate from the major political and territorial questions.

French government policy on Germany also continued to advocate the creation of a federation of states ("Föderationsbund") within Germany's frontiers. André François-Poncet, French Ambassador in Berlin until 1938 and French High Commissioner in West Germany after 1949, published in Le Figaro in the beginning of May 1946 a series of proposals expressing the same views as those currently predominant at the Quai d'Orsay. His plan called for the division of Germany into six federal states. Furthermore, he proposed the establishment of an interallied commission to control and supervise both the industrial output of the Ruhr district and the overall German administrative system. The Rhineland and the Ruhr districts, in his opinion, should in addition be permanently occupied by Allied military forces and the Rhineland ought to be more definitely separated from the rest of Germany than the other federal states from one another.

Meanwhile the question of Germany had again become the subject of Four-Power talks. The first Paris Conference of Foreign Ministers opened on April 25, principally to deal with the outstanding peace treaties for Germany and her war-time satellite allies. On the opening day of the conference Bidault took the oppo-
The memorandum specifically indicated the American zone, where elections had already been held and regional constitutions were being drawn up, and went on to announce that the French government had likewise decided to permit elections in the French zone of occupation as from September 1, 1946, and to authorize constitutions in each of the states which together constituted the French zone. In the words of the memorandum, the French government envisaged the future political structure of Germany on the basis of the zonal "Länder" in order to prevent the re-establishment of a centralist state where the influence of a demilitarized Prussia would continue to dominate.

There were grounds, however, for doubting the viability of using the existing zonal "Länder" in 1946 as the basis of a dependable federal structure when certain of these "Länder" were unwieldy new artefacts created by Allied expediency and bore little or no reference to historical or geographical factors, including commercial and administrative infrastructures. The most obvious cases were the South-Western "Länder" of Württemberg-Baden (capital: Stuttgart) in the American zone and Württemberg-Hohenzollern (capital: Tübingen) and Baden (capital: Freiburg) in the French zone.

Furthermore, the German "Länder" which were created in the individual zones of occupation had been established by order of the respective zonal commanders through a procedure where the Allied Control Council had merely reserved the right of final confirmation. The legal powers of the "Länder" were therefore derived from the zonal commanders-in-chief. Consequently, the precise formula of relationship worked out by the Allies to be operative between the proposed central German administrations and the newly established "Länder" was bound to demonstrate the real relationship between a) the "Länder" governments, b) the zonal commanders-in-chief and their administrations and c) the Allied Control Council representing the highest legal and administrative organ in Germany.
Indeed the topic of central German administrations became the test-piece for any sort of implementation of the Potsdam agreements since it involved the question of the future structure of German administrations and, by implication, the form of any subsequent German government, and the extent of Allied control over both.

The Paris conference of April 1946 did not, however, treat Midlert's memorandum with much attention. The conference closed on May 19 with the decision to re-convene in Paris on June 15. These Paris sessions (April - July 1946) of the Council of Foreign Ministers mark a specific stage of development in the Big Three's policy-making with regard to Germany. The 1945 meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers had been characterised by a series of collisions between the Anglo-Saxon powers and the USSR over the Italian treaty, the question of Austria, the Balkans, Iran and the Far East, collisions which indicated a growing preparedness for confrontation of a global extent between the two power blocs. Consequently both parties had in the course of 1945 come to regard Germany in a different light, namely from the aspect of the strategic role it could play in the apparently forthcoming conflict. Symptomatic of this development was the "iron curtain" speech held by Churchill at Fulton, Missouri, in March 1946 on the dangers of Communism and the "police governments" of Eastern Europe. Churchill's curtain stretched from Stettin to Trieste and behind it he saw the Communist bloc making enormous and wrongful roads into Germany. By early 1946 the Big Three had revised their respective positions to ones which were on the whole markedly more lenient to Germany (what Alfred Grosser terms "la course aux favours de l'Allemagne") and which were to become more and more generous towards German political autonomy, German industry and even German military defence at a rate commensurate with the degree to which the East-West conflict sharpened.

The Second Paris Conference of Foreign Ministers opened on June 15, 1946, but the German question as such did not come up for discussion until July 9 when Molotov reiterated Stalin's Pravda announcement of May 9, 1945, to the effect that it was not the intention of the USSR either to destroy or to dismember Germany. Adding fuel to French fears Molotov supported the American view on centralised German agencies and declared that the USSR would advocate administrative centralisation as a forerunner to the establishment of a central German government. On the subject of reparations the Russians took a position...
again diametrically opposed to French interests and urged the removal of the ceiling on German non-military industrial production together with the resumption of unrestricted freedom for Germany's export and import trade.

The Anglo-Saxon powers expressed primarily economic anxieties. Secretary of State Byrnes called again for the creation of central German administrations in order to ensure the economic unity of Germany and its economic efficiency. The British Foreign Secretary expressed his worry about the cost of the British zone for the British taxpayer which he quoted at £30 million per annum and proposed that zonal production surpluses be used to pay off zonal deficits, including those of other zones, rather than for the payment of reparations.

In this climate of softened attitudes to Germany and her future status, Bidault presented his government's views in a declaration to the conference on July 10 and 12 which demonstrated that the French delegation had come with no fresh proposals. Bidault criticised the proposed establishment of a central German government and the creation of central German agencies, as favoured by the Americans and Russians, prior to the final definition of Germany's frontiers. He also argued on behalf of a confederation of German states as opposed to a federal German state and emphasised that the occupying Allied armies were an essential precondition for the fulfilment of the reparations programme. Bidault backed off the question of treating Germany as a single economic unit, whilst retaining France's objections to any central German administration. He said that in order not to encumber the reparations plan France was prepared to accept for the time being the idea of German economic unity, although this economic unity would encompass provinces which France insisted on substracting from Germany.

Bidault's proposals met with a striking lack of success. His plans for the Ruhr district were rejected by Molotov on the grounds of the USSR's commitment to the principle of the political unification of Germany. On July 12 Molotov also rejected Bidault's suggestions concerning the status of the Saar, although these same proposals had already been accepted in principle by the Americans and the British. The French therefore found themselves held in check by the Soviets, a possibility which they had not foreseen when they signed the Franco-Russian friendship treaty in December 1945. Russian opposition to France's designs was eventually to prove the decisive obstacle to success for the "French thesis" on Germany.
The setbacks which the French experienced at the Paris conferences did not yet, however, seriously affect their resolve to implement the "French thesis". On July 28, 1946, at Bar-le-Duc, de Gaulle came out in support of the French government, stating in the course of a public speech that it was France's duty to prevent Germany from again becoming a centralised and unified Reich which, he prophesied, would inevitably endanger Europe. De Gaulle's antidote to this apparently perpetual danger was a federal or confederated Germany: "La solution de la France, pour un accord sincère, pratique, humain, au sujet de l'Allemagne, est une solution simple et chacun sa conçoit ... laisser les diverses entités traditionnelles de l'Allemagne ... les provinces nord-occidentales, se rassembler, s'administrer, s'orienter chacune pour son compte et à sa manière." (39)

On the same day, twenty-four hours prior to the opening of the second Paris Conference, Georges Bidault, speaking on the subject of Germany at Saint-Étienne, stoutly defended the "French thesis". The theme of his speech was the need "d'empêcher l'Allemagne de se livrer à son industrie nationale la guerre." Bidault claimed that there was a natural line of continuity in the "French thesis", stressing that France had been the first of the Allied powers to present a plan for regulating the German question in the interests of peace. He also pointed out that France had maintained the "French thesis" unchanged since 1945 and that three successive governments had defended it, a proof of the fact, according to Bidault, that the French thesis was the expression of a national standpoint transcending party programmes and political doctrines. (40)

The Anglo-Saxon powers had meanwhile set about modifying their official policies on Germany to positions which were much more conciliatory than the French standpoint. On September 5, 1946, Secretary of State Byrnes officially advertised the end of the punitive phase of American occupation policy in a speech in Stuttgart. France saw cause for annoyance in Byrnes' concomitant announcement of America's intention to release her German POW's and to return them home since there were half a million German POW's in France who were contributing to her reconstruction programme. Indeed France did not begin releasing her POW's until April 1947 and did so only at a very gradual rate over a period of twelve months.
The extent to which French foreign policy was at variance with the revised
Anglo-Saxon attitude to Germany's future was demonstrated on various occasions
during December 1946. On December 2 Great Britain signed the Brussels Treaty
with the USA, thereby implementing an important stage of development in the
possible reunification of the separate zones of occupation. In stark contrast
to this, however, the French government intensified its strategy on Germany by
detaching the Saar district from the French zone of occupation and joining it
in a customs and monetary union with France.

On December 9, 1946, the third Foreign Ministers' Conference (convened in
New York on November 4) agreed that the topic of the German peace treaty would
be broached on March 10, 1947, in Moscow at an ensuing Conference of Foreign
Ministers. On December 11 the conference further agreed on the agenda for the
Moscow Conference. This agenda consisted of six parts: a report prepared by
the Allied Control Council on the work it had achieved; a discussion of the
structure and powers of provisional political organisations in Germany; a report
by the four deputy Foreign Ministers on the political and technical factors in­
volved in the German peace treaty; an American plan for a treaty regulating the
disarmament, demilitarisation and control of Germany; a discussion on the subject
of German coal; and an examination of the terms of a peace treaty with Austria.
All in all, it was already apparent to the French in December 1946 that the Moscow
Conference of Foreign Ministers could prove of cardinal importance for the future
of Germany.

In preparation for the Moscow Conference the French government initiated
a campaign of advertisement for its policy on Germany with the publication on
January 17, 1947, of two memoranda on the future political organisation of
Germany which, according to Agnesse France Frasse, had been drawn up by a com­
mission at Midlin's request. The memoranda were presented to the London Con­
ference of Deputy Foreign Ministers by Couve de Murville on January 24 and were
subsequently transmitted to the governments of the Big Three by the respective
French ambassadors.

The first memorandum dealt with the proposed provisional organisation of
Germany. It stated adamantly that there were certain preconditions to be con­
considered if France were to give her approval to the establishment of central
German administrations affecting economic unity within Germany: firstly, that
Germany should become a confederation of states or, at least, a federal state with a strictly defined separation of powers between "Bund" and "Länder"; secondly, that control over these central administrations should continue to be exercised by the Allied Control Council. The memorandum urged that the individual "Länder" ought to be given full autonomy (i.e., independent of the proposed central administrations) in the following fields: education, arts, justice, regional administration, and the health service. In addition, each "Land" should be empowered to deal with its own financial affairs (budget, taxation and currency) with the sole exception of customs and excise which would be the responsibility of a central agency. Each "Land" was also to be responsible for its own economic policy. The memorandum also insisted that all senior German administrators should be responsible to the Allied commanders of the respective zones and that Allied observers should be included in the apparatus of the central agencies at "Land" level in order to be in a position to resist any measures which contradicted directives by the military commander.

The second memorandum— which was eventually laid before the Council of Foreign Ministers at the Moscow Conference on April 25—presented the French government's views on the political structures which ought to supersede the provisional status quo arrangements. The French attitude was that before the Allies thought of re-establishing a central German government they ought to establish and promote governments in the regional "Länder" so that Germany's future political system would have a federalist infrastructure of "Länder", thus impeding the revival of a centralist German state within which militaristic and imperialistic doctrines might one day re-emerge to threaten world peace. The French emphasized that they intended to promote the role of the "Länder" within Germany's political life. According to the memorandum the solution to the German problem, as far as its future political system was concerned, consisted of achieving a certain amount of economic centralization, on account of the historical structure of Germany and its present needs, and coupling this with a system of political decentralization.

A third memorandum was presented to the Council of Deputy Foreign Ministers in London on February 1, 1947, containing a series of proposals on the Ruhr area. The main point of interest about this particular memorandum was that whilst it reflected France's unmitigated interest in a Ruhr settlement favourable to French industrial needs, it was not so specific on the political future of the
Ruhr apart from demanding that a statute on the Ruhr industries should be written into the German peace treaty. The French press interpreted this silence on the Ruhr's political future as a sign that the French government was prepared to compromise on its demands for a political detachment of the Ruhr area from the rest of Germany. This was sharply refuted by the head of the economic section of the French Foreign Ministry, Harvé Alphand, in a statement on February 5, announcing that his government's position on the Ruhr district was unchanged. This was repeated four weeks later by Georges Bidault in a National Assembly debate on foreign policy (February 28, 1947) when he stressed that French policy toward Germany had not altered since the memorandum of September 1945. (41)

French interests at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers which convened on March 10, 1947, revolved around the four customary themes of the French thesis on Germany: the need for a decentralized, federal German state; the Rhine and Ruhr question; the inclusion of the Saar within the French economic system; and the question of reparations, especially coal. The French delegation to the conference presented its case on those questions on two main occasions: on March 22 Bidault expounded his government's wishes on the subject of centralization and federalism and on April 10 the other three questions were outlined in a long statement by the Foreign Minister.

On the subject of centralization and federalism Bidault made his first emphatic stand on March 22 in reply to a statement by Molotov in which the Soviet Foreign Minister stressed that the Soviet government would not support a federal structure for Germany unless the Germans themselves expressly desired such a system. Bidault referred to the French memorandum of January 17, 1947, on the provisional political organization of Germany and stated that, if agreement was reached at the conference on real economic unity for Germany, the French delegation would be prepared to proceed to a treatment of the subsequent stage of development, viz. the creation of a number of central German agencies charged with the running of those same economic services under the direct jurisdiction and control of the Allied Control Council and with the major exception of the Saar. This was as much as Bidault was prepared to concede on the issue. He stated explicitly that the French delegation regarded proposals concerning the establishment of a provisional German government as premature.
Throughout the conference the French Foreign Minister fought hard for the French concept of a safe and neutered Germany operating on a federal basis. On April 3 the topic of political parties and trade unions was broached. In the course of the discussion a joint British-Soviet-American motion was proposed emphasizing the basic principle of the free development of democratic political parties and trade unions within Germany. The French put an amendment requiring the phrase "within the Länder" to be added as an appendage to the main motion. Bidault justified his action by stating that it would in effect be illegal to permit political parties and trade unions before a decision had been made on the unification of Germany.

On April 5 the Council of Foreign Ministers discussed a five-point report which had been drawn up by a sub-committee on the future political organisation of Germany. Point one of the report established that the USA, Great Britain and the USSR were agreed that the creation of a central German administration ought to be recommended to the Allied Control Council in Berlin and that this organisation should be regarded as the actual forerunner to a provisional German government. The French delegation inevitably raised objections to such a recommendation, e.g. that central German administrations ought to be managed by German executive committees which would act on Allied orders, that the Saar district ought to be excluded from such an arrangement and that the Rhine-Ruhr question ought to be dealt with in an altogether separate plan.

Point three of the report discussed on April 5 concerned the division of powers between the prospective central German government and the "Länder"governments. The point of departure of the debate was a British plan which recommended bestowing full powers on the "Länder"governments with the exception of powers and prerogatives expressly reserved for the central government. The USSR's reaction to this proposal was to stress Soviet support for a highly centralized form of government for Germany. The French inclined quite the other way in favour of a federalist or confederate Germany. The French plan sought to strengthen the rights and prerogatives of the "Länder" with full autonomy in the fields of police and security (on which point the US delegation voiced its approval) and foreign policy.
On the same day Bidault presented a fresh set of proposals to the Council. They were as follows: that the Allied Control Council should be instructed to create central German administrations as soon as possible to deal with those affairs which, on the basis of the Potsdam agreements, required central decision-making, such as food and agriculture; that these administrations should operate under the control and management of the corresponding organs of the Allied Control Council; that each German administration should be headed by a German executive committee consisting of representatives of the various "Länder"; that the aforesaid administrations should not apply to the Saar and should have no influence on the eventual composition of political structures in the Ruhr area and the Rhineland.

Molotov accepted the first two points on Bidault's list of proposals, hedged on the third point by claiming that it was a complicated matter and refused to assume any position whatsoever on point four until he had subjected it to precise scrutiny. Ernest Bevin replied that although he had not come to any real decision on the future of the Ruhr district and the Rhineland he would not create obstacles if the other two Foreign Ministers agreed to Bidault's proposals. George Marshall agreed to the proposals under the condition that complete German unification would not only be the aim, but also the effect of their implementation. All in all, the general tone did not appear hostile to France's demands for decentralisation. This, however, proved an illusion two days later when Molotov returned to the theme with a detailed statement strongly emphasising the USSR's support for full centralist government for Germany with full powers over state security and full responsibility for the payment of reparations to the Allies. This statement effectively frustrated French hopes for winning ground on this issue since, in contrast to the Anglo-Saxons, the Russians did not produce a compromise formula, but rather returned the debate to the original stalemate position of centralist versus federalist views.

On April 10 Bidault presented the other themes of the "French thesis" in a long, detailed statement involving a point-by-point review of his government's case on the Rhineland and the Ruhr and Saar, i.e. the detaching of the Rhine and Ruhr territories from the German Reich and the inclusion of the Saar in a customs and monetary union with France.
The first Foreign Minister to reply to Bidault was the American Secretary of State, George Marshall. His reaction was twofold. On the subject of the economic and monetary union of the Saar with France he demonstrated conciliatory acceptance of Bidault's demands provided that the Saar would retain political autonomy and he urged France to effect this as soon as possible. On the subject of the Ruhr, however, Marshall rejected Bidault's plans in unequivocal terms.

Ernest Bevin's reply to Bidault was equally discouraging for the French Foreign Minister. Bevin pointed out that Great Britain, the USA and the USSR had established a committee at the Teheran Conference (December 1943) to debate the partition of Germany into five separate parts. The committee had in fact held one sole meeting which failed to produce any results. Britain, according to Bevin, had in this period opposed the partition of Germany. At the Potsdam Conference, Bevin continued, Britain was urged to favour a proposal which was diametrically opposed to the one debated at the Teheran Conference, namely to treat Germany as a single economic unit, to institute central administrations and to retain the Rhineland and Ruhr districts as integral parts of Germany. Bevin acknowledged that he and Attlee were aware that it had been a problematical decision to make since France, Belgium and Holland had not been consulted. Britain, however, had made the decision to follow the wishes of the majority at Potsdam and had supported the policy of treating Germany as a single economic unit during the period of occupation. Consequently, Bevin concluded, the British delegation could not accept proposals advocating a separate administration for the Ruhr district whilst the central system was in existence. Bevin adopted a similar stance on the Rhineland. He agreed with the French that it should remain occupied by Allied military forces for a long-term period, but rejected any separation of the left bank of the Rhine from the rest of Germany. The Foreign Secretary strove, however, to soften these blows to French aspirations by voicing support for France's demands for economic and monetary union with the Saar.

The French Foreign Minister who had often likened France's position at the conference tables of the Big Three to that of a mediator between East and West, could now only look to the Soviet Foreign Minister for support. It is, in retrospect, generally agreed that Molotov rang the death-knell for the 'French thesis' on Germany when he rejected the French proposals on April 11, 1947. Molotov
brushed over the question of the Saar in the space of two terse sentences postponing a Soviet decision on the matter for further examination of the topic. Molotov was, however, much more definite and aggressive in his rejection of French designs on the Rhineland and the Ruhr area. The Soviet government refused to countenance the dismemberment of Germany and it specifically demanded some form of four-power control in the Ruhr district. In their opinion it was too important an area in military and economic terms to be under the sole control of the British occupation authorities without the participation of the other Allies apart from the USA. Molotov accused Britain and the USA of acting at variance with the principle of economic unity established at the Potsdam Conference and of effectively cutting the Western part of Germany from the rest of the country. At the very least, Molotov demanded, the Ruhr district ought to be controlled by the Allied Control Council.

Molotov's address reflected a hardening of fronts between the Soviet Union and the Anglo-Saxon powers. His speech attained levels of acrimony hitherto unvoiced at the conference. Bidault, sensing the danger of an uncooperative atmosphere for the already waning French plans, tried to save what he could by urging an immediate solution to the Saar question on the council. He put a motion to council proposing the establishment of a special committee to deal immediately with France's proposals on the future of the Saar. Molotov again warned off the French Foreign Minister with a flat statement that the Soviet government was still not in a position to present the Soviet view on the Saar question. On April 15 Bidault, summing up on this latest development in the Ruhr question, regretted that the viewpoints of his three colleagues differed so widely from the French position. There was, however, little else he could say save half-heartedly reiterate the argument of the "French thesis".

F. Roy Willis provides in his book, The French in Germany, 1945-1949, (42) a succinct overview of the effects of the Moscow Conference on the "French thesis". The Moscow conference thus brought to an end French efforts to have the French thesis on Germany adopted. The characteristics of this period had been the near-unanimity among French political parties as to the means for attaining their two major goals, security and coal; the attempt of France to maintain a central position between the two major power blocs; the refusal of France to accept any measure that would adversely affect the possibility of future acceptance of the French thesis on Germany; and the maintenance of
virtual autonomy in the French zone itself, since any form of central control was blocked by the French veto in the Control Council. With the definite rejection of the French thesis at the Moscow conference all this was changed. A new method of achieving security and economic benefit had to be found. A new plan for the future of Germany had to be conceived, a plan that would take into account the struggle for power between the Western and Eastern blocs. The rejection of the French thesis at Moscow was the necessary prelude to the creation of the West German Federal Republic. (43)

Although the Moscow Conference was the last occasion on which the French government presented its thesis on Germany at a top-level conference with any theoretical chance of success, Georges Bidault did repeat the formula of the thesis in modified form at the London Foreign Ministers' Conference (November 25 - December 16, 1947). Since Bidault's colleagues had not changed their attitudes on Germany in the months following the Moscow Conference there was no possibility of the proposals being accepted at the London Conference. The result was consequently the same as that at Moscow: Molotov blocked Bidault's proposals on the Ruhr and Saar.

The accelerating deterioration of relations between the Soviet Union and the Anglo-Saxon powers had led to a total re-orientation of Anglo-American policies in Germany, as reflected in the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. France, despite her claim to a mediating role between the two power blocs, found herself in an untenable position caught between more powerful protagonists. The logical outcome of the dilemma, i.e. alignment with one bloc or the other, was in fact made on January 2, 1948, when an interim aid agreement was signed between France and the USA whereby France was to receive $200 million in accordance with the aims and conditions of the Marshall Plan. Furthermore, on April 5, 1948, President Truman signed the European Assistance Act which allotted within the framework of the European Recovery Programme $900 million to France and a further $100 to the French zone of occupation. (44)

This de facto alignment with Western bloc interests, together with the failure of the "French thesis" on Germany to produce results and the determination of Great Britain and the USA to act in Germany without France if
need be, led to a gradual change of direction in France’s policy toward Europe. France signed the Treaty of Brussels on March 17, 1940, agreeing to join with Great Britain, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg in the establishment of a West European defense system. The two important effects of this alignment with the interests of the Western powers are, for the purposes of this study, the two resultant changes within the French policy on Germany.

The first development was the stress now laid on a "European" solution of the German problem. In a speech to the National Assembly in the course of a foreign policy debate on February 13, 1948, Bidault indicated that a major turning-point had come in foreign relations in the week, June 27 - July 3, 1947, when the Soviet Union refused to cooperate in the Marshall Plan. Since that date, according to Bidault, France had opted for Europe and European unity. Consequently France saw the solution of the German question within the framework of an integrated Europe. In Bidault’s words, "the solution — and there is no other — is the integration of a peaceful Germany in a united Europe, a Europe where the Germans, feeling secure in their position, will have been able to get rid of the idea of dominating Europe." 

The second major development was France’s acceptance of the London Agreements. After the failure of the Foreign Ministers’ Conference in London (November-December 1947) the three Western allies agreed, after a series of discussions, to convene a tripartite conference of deputy Foreign Ministers in London on February 23, 1948. The agreements reached at this conference between the representatives of Great Britain, the United States and France revealed the extent to which the French government rejected the "French thesis" and participated in the establishment of a sovereign West German state. The London agreements negated a large part of the "French thesis" in that no special structures were to be created for the Rhineland and the Ruhr area was not to be separated from Germany. Furthermore, a central German government was to be established with wide legislative powers. To facilitate French acceptance of the agreements, gestures of compromise were made on two points: the economic and monetary fusion of the Saar district with France was tacitly accepted and France was granted continued control of its zone of occupation until the West German government was legally instituted.
These agreements, published on June 7, 1946, heralded the official shelving of the "French thesis" on Germany. The "French thesis" indeed died of a lack of friends and support at the Moscow Conference and, in a repeat performance, at the London Conference, but a further half-year had to pass before the process of germination providing a new French policy on Germany was complete. All in all, the "French thesis" on Germany was not successful. Of the various issues which together constituted the "French thesis" only one aim was implemented in toto (for a restricted period of time), namely the fusion of the Saar in economic and monetary union with France, whilst one other, the reorganisation of Germany on a confederal or federalist basis, was realised in part since it resulted in a much less stringent form than France had advocated. The other issues failed to gain acceptance and, consequently, did not ultimately affect the destiny of post-war Germany.
Footnotes

Introduction: Section One: The "French thesis" in Germany

(8) ibid., pp. 456 ff.
(9) ibid., pp. 46 ff.
(12) adapted from a summary of the speech quoted in A.W. DePorte, ibid., pp. 80 ff.
(15) ibid., pp. 517 ff.
(24) cf. Fritz Faust, Die Völkerrechtliche Bedeutung, Frankfurt am Main, 1964, pp. 53 f.
(26) Documents français relatifs à l'Allemagne, pp. 13 ff.
(28) Ibid., pp. 210 ff.
(29) Ibid., p. 222.
(30) Ibid.
(32) cf. editorial of Le Populaire (Paris), March 14, 1946.
(36) Paris.
(38) Euro-Archive, p. 18 ff.
(39) Le Monde (Paris), July 30, 1946.
(40) Ibid.
(41) Euro-Archive, p. 529.
(43) Ibid., p. 44.
(44) Ibid., p. 53.
(45) Ibid., p. 51 f.
SECTION TWO: The themes of separatism and particularism which underpinned the "French thesis" on Germany.
The "French thesis" on Germany advocated a policy of separatism aimed at the establishment of a "Südostbund" or at least of a "Bundesstaat". To this end all political, social and cultural matters within the individual "Länder" of the French zone were directed in a way which fostered "Land" autonomy and regional particularism.

The French worked at creating a special rapprochement between the "Länder" of South-West Germany and France, deliberately attempting to wean them away from the historical association with the German Reich and to incline them toward a special relationship of dependence with France. The theoretical ground for such a development was laid in the immediate post-war years by a number of politicians and intellectuals, of whom the outstanding example was Charles de Gaulle himself. Another typifying case was Robert Minier. Perhaps the most outspoken and forthright instance of this effort was Paul Olagnier's book, *Les Trois Allemandes*, which provided an historical justification for the incorporation of South-West Germany into a relationship of special degree with France. The population of South-West Germany, Olagnier argues, were originally Celts and Gauls who were never truly integrated into the German culture despite their adoption of the German language: "Les Allemands propres dits sont de races très différentes mais parlent la même langue, ce qui a donné l'illusion d'une unité ethnique et mentale, non seulement à la plupart d'entre eux, mais plus encore peut-être aux peuples étrangers ... Dans la réalité, trois grands groupes ethniques sont compris sous la dénomination d'Allemands: les Celtes ou Gaulois et les Francs romains de la rive gauche du Rhin et de la rive droite du Danube; les Germains établis entre l'Oder et le Rhin; les Slaves répartis entre l'Oder, la Vistule et au-delà de ce fleuve ... Les Gaulois riverains du Rhin ont parlé latin, pensé en latin, ont été soumis aux lois romaines."

Besides using this specious type of argument as an intellectual justification for their separatist policy in South-West Germany, the French military government authorities also quoted French strategic defence reasons for their support of particularism and separation within their zone.

The pseudo-academic division of historical Germany into German and "non-German" populations provided the French military government in Germany with convenient arguments for the defence of the "French thesis" on Germany. A basic and common tenet of the above-quoted kind of analysis of German history was the claim that the multi-ethnic nature of the German provinces had been
repressed and overshadowed by the rise of Prussia which was subsequently declared responsible for the rise of German militarism and, ultimately, for the emergence and progress of National Socialism. In his book Olagnier advocated that Germany should be divided for racial, psychological and cultural reasons into the original Roman, Germanic and Slavic Germanics. Robert Minier, one of the leading post-war French scholars of German life and letters, supported the theory in his book, Allemande et les Allemands, arguing that Prussia's dominance had deprived the German regions of their varying ethnic distinctions.

This theory of Prussia's implied causal relationship with the emergence of National Socialism is an oversimplified and therefore misleading doctrine. Its value in the eyes of the French military government officials, however, was that it provided them with an academic justification of sorts for advocating the detachment of the "Romanised" section of Western Germany from the Allied Control Council's and Berlin's sphere of authority and returning it to its "natural" and "historical" sphere of cultural and political influence, namely French influence.

At various periods during the initial part of the French occupation of South-West Germany the French government considered a number of plans for the substruction of sections of territory from the former German Reich. These plans can be divided into three categories:

a) to include German territory within metropolitan France, administered and economically exploited as a part of France. Such was the case with the Saar which was included in a customs and monetary union with France in December 1946;

b) to establish new "Länder" as a bulwark against the revival of a centralised Reich. This was the case with the creation of the new "Land" units of Rheinland-Pfalz, Württemberg-Hohenschwaben and Baden-Württemberg. Rheinland-Pfalz has survived unmodified to the present day and must be defined as a direct result of the "French thesis";

c) to join together in South-West Germany "Länder" and parts of former "Länder" to form a new South-Western German state with the possible inclusion of Austria and/or Switzerland, but wholly independent of the rest of Germany and under the strong influence of France.
The plans concerning category c regarding the establishment of a South-Western German state are of acute interest for the purposes of this research in that they cast direct light on French occupation policy and the political situation in Sud-Württemberg in the years 1945-1947. These plans were accompanied by a policy of official, if often discreet, French support for all separatist and particularist movements in those regions.

This policy of fostered separatism had its critics as well as its apologists in France. The leading and most constant critic was the SFIO, the leadership of which opposed any annexation, open or disguised, of German territory or the dismemberment of Germany, advocating as alternative policies a strict control of German industry and a thorough re-education of the German population. The French Socialist party remained, however, the sole political body consistently opposed to a partitioning of Germany. The French government was therefore in a strong position to apply its thesis of dismemberment since there was a limited amount of resistance at home to the policy. The successful implementation of the "French thesis" regarding Germany appeared to depend on external factors, e.g. Allied plans and agreements, relations with the Big Three, the developing East-West conflict, the economic situation in Germany etc.

The French did not go about their policy of separatism in Germany with a public demonstration of their intentions. They had already learned from their administration of the Rhineland in the 1920's how potentially explosive the topic was within the context of German politics. After the Second World War they consequently resorted to an indirect implementation of their thesis of separation and dismemberment, preferring the arena of private approach and intimate discussion to that of public debate. Therefore it is not easy to extricate the French policy on separation from the background of overall occupation activities in the years 1945-1947. But it exists nevertheless as a thread of continuity and causality within French occupation policy, affecting deeply local military government attitudes to German administrative structures and procedures, German party-political life, the re-establishment of German political institutions, German cultural life etc.

There are various pieces of evidence which point to the fact that the French military government in Germany seriously considered and fostered German separatism as a means to an end within French strategic plans concerning Germany's future. One such piece of evidence comes from a lecture held by Professor
Theodor Hachenburg of the University of Tübingen. Professor Hachenburg was "Kommissar für Flüchtlingsangelegenheiten" (Commissioner for Refugee Affairs) in the immediate post-war period in Tübingen and subsequently deputy Minister of the Interior for Württemberg-Hohenzollern. Professor Hachenburg, a political scientist of repute, therefore spoke with a high degree of authority and credibility when he described France's policy on separatism in Germany at a political science conference in 1953 in the following terms: "... auf der einen Seite Frankreich, das in sehr vorsichtiger Form, aus den Erfahrungen der Rheinlandbesetzung heraus, nun nicht mehr offenkundig mit Propaganda den Separatismus förderte, aber doch in stiller Administration alles tat, um eine Vereinigung der westdeutschen Gebiete zunächst zu verhindern. Das ging so weit, daß die französischen Militärregierungen in den einzelnen Gebieten, in Württemberg-Hohenzollern, in Baden und Rheinland-Pfalz, den Regierungen und Beamten verboten, Briefe an die anderen deutschen Länder zu senden, es sei denn über sie selber, d.h., daß sie den gesamten deutschen Verwaltungsverkehr dieser Gebiete mit den anderen deutschen Ländern kontrollierten, in Schulen und allem Dingen, die eine Öffentlichkeit beanspruchen konnten, mit absoluter Vehemenz und französischer Zähigkeit das Wort "deutsch" unterdrückten und auch ihrerseits aufpassten, daß möglichst der Kontakt zwischen den deutschen Ländern in ihrer eigenen Besatzungszone so locker und so lose wie möglich war.

Ich habe diese Dinge alle aus eigener Erfahrung erlebt - in der Presse hat man damals von sehr wenig gesprochen - und kann wirklich sagen, daß die Franzosen diese Politik, von der wir uns dann nicht mehr trennten, virtuos verstanden."
I have personally experienced these things — at that time one learned very little of it all in the press — and I can truly say that the French were past masters in this policy, a policy to which we did not adhere.)

French plans for promoting separatism in South-West appear to have been framed within three concrete proposals. All of these proposals were characterised by French awareness that the fragmentary nature of the rump sections of Baden and Württemberg included within their zone could eventually work counter to French plans for the establishment of a confederation of independent and self-sufficient "Länder". French-occupied Süd-Baden and Süd-Württemberg were, firstly, small units geographically and, secondly, historically inclined in terms of economic and administrative infrastructures toward the northern sections of Baden and Württemberg (which included the capitals of Karlsruhe and Stuttgart), therefore not to be seriously considered as dependable, individual units for France's long-term strategic planning, although pursuance of the "French thesis" did lead the French authorities in both Süd-Baden and Süd-Württemberg to underline autonomy and particularism within those regions. Consequently French plans for South-West Germany were characterised by a desire to integrate Süd-Württemberg within a larger and more durable framework.

One of the obvious choices was to unite Süd-Württemberg and Süd-Baden into one single unit and annex them to France. There is no great evidence that the French seriously advocated this step, apart from some archive material quoted in Hubert Konstanzer's doctoral thesis. Konstanzer wrote: "Wie Viktor Renner später festhielt, scheint manchem "die Sorge kein Hirngespinst zu sein, die Franzosen könnten aus Süd-Baden und Süd-Württemberg eine Art Saargauhaut machen" und "Während einer CDU-Konferenz in Herrnswalde am 4.10.1949 (T 225/131/49) erklärte Zürcher, Carlo Schmid habe damals eine Vereinigung verfehlt."

(As Viktor Renner later maintained, it seemed to many people that "the fear about the French possibly making a sort of Saar district out of Süd-Baden and Süd-Württemberg was not a wild notion" and "At a CDU conference at Herrnswalde on 4.10.1949 (T 225/131/49) Zürcher stated that Carlo Schmid had at the time failed a unification (i.e. of the two regions)."

An alternative to such a plan was to attempt to somehow restore the one or the other of the fragmented "Länder" of Baden and Württemberg to its historical
form and include it in toto within the French zone. This, according to various sources, occurred in the form of a proposal made by the French to the Americans to exchange Sud-Württemberg for Nord-Baden, thereby giving both occupying powers an historical, unified "Land". A contemporary observer wrote in 1947: "The French Government approached the United States Government with the suggestion that the two States should be re-established with Baden entirely under French control and Württemberg under American control. The United States Government rejected this proposal and some form of joint control is apparently under consideration." (8)

Another plan which was treated seriously by the French authorities was the formation of a South German bloc involving the amalgamation of Mid-Württemberg, Mid-Baden, Bavaria and possibly Austria. This theoretical bloc was known among South German political circles as the "Vorderösterreich" scheme, a revival of the historical designation for the southern German Habsburg territories, including upper Alsace and part of the Black Forest. (9) Exploratory talks took place in 1946 and 1947 in Bavaria between French officials and South German politicians on the subject of the establishment of a South German Catholic state closely associated with France. Hermann Zehr, the former "Landrat" of "Kreis Tübingen" (after Viktor Samner's period of office) agreed in the course of an interview that the French contemplated creating a Catholic-dominated state in South Germany and that this was the opinion and rumour of political circles in Tübingen in 1946 and 1947. Zehr refused, however, to quote any concrete details. (10)

One substantial piece of evidence of French intentions concerning the formation of a South German Catholic state comes from a Tübingen publisher who described in a private interview a plan which de Gaulle had apparently entertained for the recreation of a "Reich à la Charlesman" which would have comprised a combination of the following regions: Alsace, Lorraine, Bavaria, the Saar, Baden and Württemberg. These plans were outlined, according to the publisher, in the form of a large, printed work which apparently had been commissioned by de Gaulle personally. The work was furnished with a large amount of precise statistics on the economic and agricultural infrastructures, industrial nature, political background, cultural and military history of the regions in question. A copy of the work was presented to a watch-manufacturer in Schwäbisch Gmünd by French military government officials who solicited his opinion.
on the contents. The watch-manufacturer in turn showed the work to the Tübingen publisher who transmitted it to the attention of Carlo Schmid. This was at the time of the "Ministerpräsidentenkonferenz" (June 1947) in Munich, the first international meeting of "Länder" executive heads. Carlo Schmid apparently paid a visit to the French colonial command, General Koenig, in Baden-Baden to ask his opinion on the earnestness of the designs implicit in de Gaulle's work. De Gaulle, it must be remembered, was no longer head of the French government, having resigned in January 1946. Koenig's answer, after a fortnight's respite, was that the book represented a privately commissioned work for de Gaulle which had nothing to do with the French government or its official policy. Close links existed, however, between de Gaulle and the senior ranks of the French military government administration, especially with General Koenig, which had led to a basis of agreement on matters pertaining to Franco-German relations and occupation policy.

The support which the French military government in South-West Germany lent to separatist and particularist tendencies is difficult to discern and identify in its totality since the French authorities utilised private contacts and indirect methods rather than public means of implementing their policy. There were, it appears, a restricted number of reactions within South-West German political groupings to French overtures. These reactions, like the overtures, were usually not expressed publicly since the future of South-West Germany was still a subject of debate in 1946 and 1947 and few German politicians wished to be inopportunely associated with separatism in case it failed to gain ground. There were a small number of exceptions who openly espoused the causes of regional particularism and separatism. The prime example was Leo Schlab, CDU politician and "Staatspräsident" of Baden, a fierce Baden particularist who attempted to re-establish the historical autonomy of his region. Within Baden-Württemberg a leading particularist was Otto Fager who published his thesis in a book in 1946 entitled "Deutsch-deutsch-deutsche Demokratie, Aufbau und Fortschritt." Fager voiced themes which practically reiterated French designs for South-West Germany in the years, 1945–1947 e.g. "Die Autonomie Südwestdeutschlands könnte somit Muster und Vorbild für ein neues Leben auch der anderen deutschen Lander sein. Der einzige man war eine gewisse Distanz von den eroberten, was man bisher die Reichskönige nannte." (The autonomy of South-West Germany could thus act as a model and example for a new life for the other German "Länder". But we should be allowed a certain amount of detachment vis-à-vis what until now
has been termed the "concept of the Reich") and "Eine Einheit der Ideen bleibt Deutschland immer noch, wenn auch nicht mehr Träger einer einheitlichen Staatsidee. Darüber hinaus kann der kulturelle Austausch mit Österreich, mit der Schweiz, mit den Alpen um so intensiver gepflegt werden, wenn sich darunter nicht politische Hintergedanken und Nebenabsichten verborgen." (Germany will still remain a conceptual unity, even if no longer the vehicle of a unitary concept of statehood. Furthermore, cultural exchange with Austria, Switzerland and Alsace can be fostered all the more intensively when there are no political ulterior motives and secondary objectives concealed in the background.) The French were impressed by Fager's thesis and ordered the printing of a high edition quota, an uncommon practice in the French zone in 1946 when both paper and printing materials were in short demand and severely rationed.

These cases were, however, exceptions. Most of the political personalities in Südtirol-Arlttenberg with whom the French officials held talks about the future of an autonomous South-Western state preferred to maintain discretion on the issue. One reason for this discretion was the fact that a number of these personalities were opponents of separation and wished to prevent aggravating the separatist issue by making the topic public. Professor Aschenburg testified in an article in the Vierteljahreschrift für Einstimmigkeit in 1962 to the strong strain of anti-separatism within Südtirol-Arlttenberg's political and administrative structures: "Es gibt keinen Separatismus in einem derartigen Zusammenhang. Der Gedanke von einer fortwährenden Trennung des Gebiets von Nordwürttemberg keine Rede. Im Gegenteil, man dachte gut württemberisch. Das gemeinsame Ziel war die Wiederherstellung des alten Landes." (There was at the same time no thought of separation in the sense of a permanent separation of the region from Nord-Württemberg. On the contrary, one thought in terms of loyalty to Württemberg. The common goal was the restoration of the old "Land").

There were nevertheless indications of positive reactions to French designs, both for a separate Südtirol-Arlttenberg and for the larger framework of a new South German state, within sections of Südtirol-Arlttenberg's social and political elites, e.g., within the Roman Catholic Church, the Christian Democratic party of Südtirol-Arlttenberg and the landed aristocracy of Südtirol-Arlttenberg. Separatist sentiment was also strong within the geographical area known as "Oberschaben", a predominantly Catholic region in the south of Südtirol-Arlttenberg. This, however, is an extensive topic and is consequently reserved for treatment in subsequent chapters.
Footnotes

Introduction: Section Two: The themes of separatism and particularism which underpinned the "French thesis" on Germany

(2) Paris, 1946.
(3) Ibid., p. 17.
(6) "Die Kriegsziele der Alliierten bezüglich Deutschland 1944/45 und die Deutschland-Politik der Alliierten 1952", in: Vorträge, gehalten während der Hauptabteilung Wirtschaftskonzepte für staatswissenschaftliche Fortbildung, Band II, Bad Homburg and Berlin, 1955, p. 3.
(10) Interview with Landrat aD. Hermann Zahr, Dußlingen (Württ.), April 1974.
(11) Interview with Dr. Karl Katsmann, Tübingen, June 1974.
(12) Leo Wohleb (1888–1955), Christian Democratic politician who emerged from obscurity as an official in the post-war Ministry of Education for French-occupied Süd-Baden with the rank of "Gymnasialdirektor" to become "Staatspräsident" of Süd-Baden. Wohleb vehemently contested the amalgamation of Süd-Baden in union with Nord-Baden and Württemberg-Hohenzollern (1952). In 1952 he was appointed German Ambassador to Portugal.
(13) Konstanz, 1946.
(14) Ibid., p. 95.
(15) Ibid., p. 97.
(16) Interview with Dr. Hans-Georg Siebeck, Tübingen, June 1974.
Footnotes

Introduction: Section Two: The themes of separation and particularism which underpinned the "French thesis" on Germany


(2) Paris, 1946.

(3) Ibid., p. 17.


(11) Interview with Dr. Ewald Katschka, Tübingen, June 1974.


(13) Konstanz, 1946.

(14) Ibid., p. 95.

(15) Ibid., p. 97.


SECTION THREE: The role and importance of Tübingen during the initial years of French occupation
Invaded on two fronts in 1944 Germany was submitted, up till the unconditional surrender of the German Army High Command on May 8, 1945, and the announcement by the Allies of the Declaration of Berlin on June 5, on an ever-increasing scale to two distinct military occupations which were principally determined by the necessities of the military operations in progress. In the East the Soviet High Command controlled German territory which it had gained in the military struggle with Germany. In the West the Allied armies under the command of SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Forces) imposed its authority on the territories which it conquered from the retreating German army. 

Up till June 1945 all civilian and military powers within the occupied territories of Western Germany were concentrated in the hands of SHAEF. These powers were established by General Eisenhower in Proclamation No. 1 of April 1945, investing supreme authority and all legislative, judicial and executive power in all the occupied territories of Western Germany in himself as long as he remained Supreme Commander of Allied Forces and Military Governor.

The general guidelines to Allied occupation in the Western part of Germany had been laid down by the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington. On the basis of the directives issued by this joint command group a modified set of regulations was formulated by SHAEF and published as the Handbook of Military Government in Germany prior to defeat or surrender (December 1, 1944) which was subsequently extended by a series of technical handbooks on specialized areas of military government.

During the course of its existence SHAEF executed its legislative and executive powers by means of fourteen laws and two general orders. They dealt essentially with the creation of Allied military government and the suppression of National Socialist legislation and organizations. The Allied Supreme Commander also delegated powers of military government to the generals commanding the various army groups. These generals in turn transmitted these powers to the armies comprising the army groups. Consequently the French First Army under General (later Marshall) Jean de Lettre de Tassigny was assigned military government powers in the territories which it occupied. General de Lettre de Tassigny's immediate superior was General Jacob L. Devers, commander of the 6th Army Group, of which the French First Army was nominally a part.
This unified system of Allied military government lasted until the Declaration of Berlin on June 5 by which the vacuum created by the collapse of the National Socialist regime was filled by the Allies. The sovereignty of government in Germany was assumed by the four Allies acting together. The essential statement with regard to the military government of Germany was the public announcement to the German population of the four-part division of Germany into zones of occupation and of the political autonomy of the respective zonal commanders: "In the period when Germany is carrying out the basic requirements of unconditional surrender, supreme authority in Germany will be exercised, on instructions from their Governments, by the British, United States, Soviet and French Commanders-in-Chief, each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole."

The declaration of June 5, 1945, therefore dissolved the interallied command for the occupied territories in Western Germany and transferred supreme command to the commanders-in-chief within the individual zones and to the Allied Control Council for matters affecting Germany as a whole. SHAPE was finally dissolved on July 13, 1945, followed two days later by the dissolution of the First French Army. The Allied Control Council, however, did not assume office until August 30 after the termination of the tripartite Potsdam Conference where the principles of coordinated Allied occupation were established.

The Declaration of Berlin established the French Commander-in-Chief as supreme commander of civil and military affairs within the French zone of occupation. On June 15 the French government announced that the French zone of occupation would be headed by a commander-in-chief who would be supported by two "Généraux-Adjoints", one to serve in Berlin on the Co-ordinating Committee of the Allied Control Council and the other to command the French armed forces of occupation, and an "Administrateur Général" to run the civil administrations and apparatus of military government. The French commander at this period was General Jean de Leutre de Tanayguy. On July 25 General Pierre Kemig was appointed the new commander-in-chief of the French zone and on July 24 Emile Lefèvre, a "Directeur Général" of the French Ministry of the Interior, was named as Kemig's "Administrateur Général". On July 31 General Kemig assumed command of the French zone from General de Leutre de Tanayguy.
The establishment of the French zone of occupation has already been mentioned in Section One in the introductory overview of the "French thesis". The definitive statement on its delimitation was the final agreement on zones signed by the Allied representatives to the European Advisory Commission on June 22, 1945, thus concluding a protracted debate between France and the Anglo-Saxon powers. This agreement assigned to France a south-western zone of occupation which comprised territories carved from nine different German provinces, either in whole or in part, and which had the form of an hour-glass or two triangles, one northern and one southern, joined at their apices by a narrow land strip at the Rhine.

The northern triangle included the two "Regierungsbezirke" of Trier and Koblenz, the Prussian "Rheinprovins", four "Landkreise" of the Prussian province of Hessen-Nassau, four "Landkreise" from "Land" Nassau and one "Stadtkreis" lying south of the Rhine, including the city of Mainz, the Bavarian Palatinate and the Saar. The southern triangle of the zone consisted of the area of the "Länder" Baden and Württemberg lying south of the Karlsruhe-Stuttgart-Ulm-München autobahn, the Prussian "Regierungsbezirk" of Koblenz-Stolberg and the Bavarian "Landkreise" of Linzien.

The French zone was also the most heterogeneous and unconvincing of the four zones. This feature of the French zone did not escape notice. In 1953 an American researcher wrote that "whereas the British, American and Russians each received one or more historic Länder or provinces with boundaries intact or substantially unchanged, the French were assigned only fragments." In 1947 two contemporary observers, writing on the French zone in The Contemporary Review, remarked: "The zone itself is a kind of Cinderella. Alleged American military necessities resulted in it being deprived of its two normal main towns and in its virtual separation into two parts, with a sort of wasp's waist as a link. It would, in fact, be difficult to imagine a more artificial and unreasonable division of territory."
The division of Baden and Württemberg was based solely upon considerations of American military logistics. The American deputy representative at the European Advisory Commission, Philip E. Rosely, put this point frankly in his article in Foreign Affairs: "The sole concern was to assure access under American control to the Middle Rhine region and the seaports. On two occasions Mr. Winant and I wired strong protests to Washington against the breaking-up of both Baden and Württemberg. We pointed out that if it was the American intention to revive and strengthen the federal states in Germany as a possible safeguard against excessive centralization of power, it was hardly logical to begin the reconstruction of Germany by breaking up two of the Länder possessing a strong sense of regional identity and a certain attachment to democratic self-government. We suggested that some other device be sought for assuring freedom of movement over the highways and railways. Renewed instructions from Washington to insist on the War Department's proposal finally ended in the French acquiescing." (11)

One American writer pointed out in 1948 the dangers and difficulties ensuing from the division of South-West Germany: "It was not only Prussia that was cut up into several pieces that had little to do with historical tradition. Württemberg was cut into two, Baden was cut into two, and each of these newly created Länder was ordered to constitute itself as an "independent" unit. The absurdity that, say, Stuttgart and Tübingen, or Karlsruhe and Freiburg had suddenly to belong to different "Länder" did not prevent the politicians from writing in dead earnest, as ordered, constitutions with all paraphernalia of a claim to eternity. This has nothing to do with historical tradition or local patriotism. To tell a man in Stuttgart that from a certain day he owes loyalty to a different government than a man in Tübingen, when both by descent and sentiment are simply Württembergers and Germans, is worse than naive." (12) Another American, writing in the same year, contended that "after two years of occupation it is now generally agreed that the actual delimitation of the boundaries of the various zones of occupation has had as unfortunate consequences. Had the zones remained only as areas of security administration, serious difficulties would not have arisen; but when the zones became air-tight compartments, the fantastic nature of the combinations of the territories included in the various zones, with the possible exception of the Soviet zone, became strikingly apparent. The momentous fortuitous decisions to split up two states like Württemberg and Baden, to divide the Rhine province, and to separate counties here and counties there from their natural position, will puzzle students of politics and geography for a long time to come."
The French occupation authorities were keenly aware that tensions and contradictions would arise in the implementation of their federalist thesis since, of the five provinces of the French zone, "trois, la Rhénanie, le Bade et le Wurtemberg, sont amputés d'une vaste portion de leur territoire et privés de leurs capitales traditionnelles (Cologne, Karlsruhe, Stuttgart)."\(^{(14)}\) The observer of the above remark, Nadie Laffon, the chief administrative director of the French military government apparatus, pointed out the inherent contradiction of a federalist policy based on the argument of the natural sovereignty of the German "Länder" and provinces when some of these "Länder" had lost their historical unity and been partitioned: "Une conséquence politique de cette situation géographique apparent immédiatement: comment faire du fédéralisme efficace et cohérent quand des Rhénans, des Badois et des Wurtembergois sont séparés d'autres Rhénans, Badois ou Wurtembergois."\(^{(15)}\)

Another feature of the division of Württemberg into two zones was the fact that the loss of the historical capital of Stuttgart involved a concomitant loss of administrative and economic centrality for the French section which adversely affected the administration and economy of French-occupied Württemberg. La Hauzé emphasized this point as early as August 1945: "L'administration allemande est restée en place ... Mais dans une partie de notre zone, le Bade et le Wurtemberg, dont les capitales, Karlsruhe et Stuttgart, sont aux mains des Américains, le travail de cette administration est particulièrement difficile. C'est de ces capitales que partaient les directives, là que se trouvent les archives, les fonctionnaires qui commandent ..."\(^{(16)}\)

The partition of Württemberg and the subsequent emergence of two new "Länder" (Württemberg-Baden in the American section and Württemberg-Hohenzollern in the French section; q.v. below) had important effects on the political and social history of Tübingen in the period of the French occupation. Tübingen was elevated to the rank of capital of French-occupied Württemberg. For this reason the question of the partition of Württemberg will be treated in various contexts in the course of subsequent chapters.

In September 1945 the French reorganized their zone apparatus of military government into five administrative units:
In the course of 1946 the French administration in Germany again reorganised the apparatus of military government by reducing the five component units to four, of which one (i.e. the Saar) was detached from the French zone and the other three were eventually granted the status of "Länder". On August 90, 1946, the French military government combined the two districts of Rheinland-Hessen and Hessen-Pfalz, despite protests from the Allied Control Council, to form a new "Land" called Rheinland-Pfalz with its capital at Mainz.

The establishment of the new "Land" Württemberg-Hohenzollern was a lengthier process than that involving the creation of Rheinland-Pfalz and included three main stages of development:

1. April - June 1945: French control over the majority of the land mass of Württemberg with French military government headquarters in Stuttgart.

2. July 1945 - May 1947: De Gaulle's expulsion from Stuttgart in July 1945 by the Americans and the subsequent establishment of a French administration in the section of Württemberg lying south of the Stuttgart-München autobahn; this territory was known during this period under the title "Das französisch besetzte Gebiet Württembergs und Hohenzollerns" (or "Süd-Württemberg" in abbreviation) with the French regional military government and a German administration (the "Staatssekretariat für das französisch besetzte Gebiet Württembergs und Hohenzollerns", invested on October 16, 1945) installed in the new "Land" capital of Tübingen.

3. May 1947 -

The establishment of the new political entity, Land Württemberg-Hohenzollern, after mass acceptance by popular referendum of a new constitution in May 1947.

The basic factor to be emphasised in the French reorganisation of their zone, including Süd-Württemberg, during the years 1945-1947, is the zeal with which the French authorities applied the policy of a federated Germany to a situation which did not appear conclusive to such a policy. This was due to the extremely heterogeneous nature of the French zone and to the fact that two of the main units
(Baden and Württemberg) had large parts of their historical territories grouped in a third "Land", Württemberg-Baden, in the American zone of occupation, including the historical capitals and former administrative centres of the same. The central feature of the French zone therefore is the emergence under French direction, of three entirely new federal states (once the Saar had been substracted from the former Reich) within its boundaries: Rheinland-Pfalz, Baden (Süd-Baden) and Württemberg-Hohenzollern (Süd-Württemberg). The creation of these political artefacts in the face of obvious political, administrative, economic and social counter-pressure bear testimony to the determination of the various governments of France in the period, 1945-1947, to apply the "French thesis".

The transformation of the French zone of occupation into a showcase of German confederation created a situation of fait accompli which was deliberately intended to pre-empt any developments toward the re-establishment of a centralised Reich in Germany and to demonstrate the feasibility of the "French thesis". This is an aspect of occupied Germany which has been generally overlooked. Subsequent events within the former French zone of occupation after the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany (1949), namely the return of the Saar to West German jurisdiction (1957) and the fusion of the short-lived "Länder" of Baden, Württemberg-Hohenzollern and Württemberg-Baden into a new "Land", Baden-Württemberg (1952), have tended to overshadow the role and importance of the same, especially of these "Atlantis" states which voluntarily suspended their autonomous existence in 1952 to form Land Baden-Württemberg and subsequently passed into historical oblivion.

In direct contrast to their policy of decentralisation for all forms of German political and administrative life in their zone of occupation, the French occupation administration maintained for itself a strictly centralist hierarchy of internal command which conceded only a limited number of decision-making prerogatives to the regional military government units, prerogatives considered to be conducive to the French policy of instilling a federalist framework in the political life of the zone.

Immediately after crossing the Rhine (March 31 - April 1, 1945) the French First Army had set about establishing military government in those territories which it conquered by arms. On March 21 the first French army proclamation
announcing the establishment of military government was posted in the village of Scheibenhardt and on March 26 the first French military government detachment was installed in Kandel. (17) The French commander, deriving his authority from the Allied commander-in-chief, was assisted in this task by a specialised army unit which, in accordance with the derivation of command, was termed the "5th Bureau of l'État-Major de la 1ère Armée Française" after the Fifth Office of SHAEF, which was responsible for military government in Western Germany, and its immediate subsidiary, the Fifth Office of the Eighth Army Group, which the French First Army formed in combination with the American Seventh Army.

During the phase of military operations military government was delegated within the French army to the various army corps and divisions which were provided with units of the "5th Bureau". (18) These military government administrators were originally soldiers, but eventually teams of personnel, trained in Paris at the Sorbonne in a series of crash courses during the winter of 1944-1945 and known under the abbreviation "AMPA" (i.e. "Administration militaire française en Allemagne"), began arriving to release these officers for active combat duty. (19)

The Allied Declarations of June 5, 1945, transformed the situation of military government in Germany in that it established the supreme authority of each Allied commander-in-chief within his respective zone of occupation. In accordance with this change of circumstances the French government issued a decree on June 15, 1945, creating a "Commandement en Chef Français en Allemagne" and inventing the French Commander-in-Chief with the exercise of those powers of which France was titular in Germany. The decree stated specifically that the French Commander-in-Chief "assure l'exercice du Gouvernement sur les territoires allemands occupés, assure l'autorité sur l'ensemble des services français du Gouvernement d'administration militaire et de contrôle en Allemagne et est chargé de la sauvegarde et de l'exercice des droits et intérêts français en Allemagne." (20)

On July 15, 1945, the French First Army, which still possessed powers of administration, was dissolved and its "5th Bureau" dispersed. The military commander of troops, "Commandant supérieur des troupes d'occupation", assumed the functions of the "État-Major de la 1ère Armée Française". The new "Administrateur Général", Raïs Lafon, nominated by decree on July 24, took over the civil administration (although it was still termed the "military government",
partly for reasons of prestige, partly because there was still a large number of officers in the service) of the French zone of occupation. The appointment of General Pierre Koenig as the new Commander-in-Chief was announced by decree on July 23, 1943.

As a means of spanning the process of transition from the period of SHAEF supremacy in western Germany to the establishment of French autonomy within their zone of occupation, General Koenig issued a decree on July 28 upholding SHAEF legislation within the French zone to the effect that "les ordonnances et règlements promulgués par et sous l'autorité du Commandement Suprême interviennent à ce jour sont maintenus en vigueur et continuent de recevoir application, jusqu'à nouvel ordre." (22)

On August 22, 1945, the French Commander-in-Chief issued an "arrêté" ("Arrêté No. 2 du Commandement en Chef") defining the separate functions of the French troop command and the French military government and thereby taking away all military government rights and duties from the French army of occupation and bestowing them on the civilian administration of the zone. This "arrêté" came into effect on September 6, 1945. The French military government administration, as established by "Arrêté No. 2", was further defined by a series of "arrêtés" issued by the "Administrateur Général" on September 5, 10 and 26, 1945. In accordance with these decrees a main central administrative unit was established in Baden-Baden, the military government capital of the French zone, composed of two "Direction Générales" ("Direction Générale des Affaires Administratives", "Direction Générale de l'Economie et des Finances") and three "Directions" ("Direction du Contrôle du Débarquement et des Effectifs"; "Direction de la Justice"; "Direction de la Santé").

Within the regional provinces (later "Länder") of the French zone the various units of these administrations were assembled in five (later four) major groupings to correspond with existing province boundaries (i.e. Saar, Rheinland-Pfalz, Hessen-Nassau, Hessen-Volta, Mittelbaden, Mitt-Württemberg). These groupings, termed "Départements Supérieures", were designed to organize the provinces on an autonomously regionalist basis in that all German political, administrative and social life was subordinated to the respective "Départements Supérieures" and restricted to operating within the boundaries of the respective provinces. The organisation of the
"Délégations Supérieures" was laid down in a table published in form of an "arrêté" by the "Administrateur Général" on September 14, 1945. The head of the "Délégation Supérieure" was the "Délégué Supérieur", better known within the German population by his other title of "Gouverneur-Général". According to Article I of "Arrêté No. 1" of August 21 he fulfilled the following functions: "l'Administrateur Général adjoint pour le Gouvernement Militaire de la Zone d'occupation française est représenté, à la tête de l'administration d’une province ou d'un pays, par un "Délégué pour le Gouvernement Militaire".(22)

He was therefore Leffson's representative in his respective zone and consequently the "agent de contrôle à l'égard de l'administration allemande de la province"(24)

The four "Délégations Supérieures" which evolved by 1947 were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Départements Subordonnés</th>
<th>Chef-Com.</th>
<th>Délégué Supérieur</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sarre</td>
<td>Sarrebruck</td>
<td>M. Grandval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Rhin-Palatin</td>
<td>Coblenz</td>
<td>M. de Neublumberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pays de Bade</td>
<td>Fribourg</td>
<td>M. Pène</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wurttemberg</td>
<td>Tübingen</td>
<td>M. Widmer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The "Délégations Supérieures" were subdivided into "Délégations de District" and "Délégations de Circles".

The administrative sub-unit, "Délégation de District", corresponded approximately to a "Regierungsbereich". It is, however, not treated in this thesis since Süd-Württemberg was not provided with this intermediary structure. There was a specific historical reason for the absence of "Délégations de District" in Süd-Württemberg. The French established military government administrations within their zone in strict application of the official policy on federalism. "Délégations Supérieures" were created to correspond to the five (later four) major regions, "Délégations de District", to correspond to the former "Regierungsbereiche" and "Délégations de Circles" to correspond to the "Kreise". These structures were modified in accordance with the traditions and peculiarities of the respective provinces. In 1958 the four "Regierungsbereiche" in Württemberg (Heckengäu, Schwäbisch-Gäu, Donaukreis, Jagstkreis) were abolished by National Socialist decree. Consequently, the French, faced with non-existent structures and loath to disturb the regional status quo, avoided creating "Délégations de District" in Süd-Württemberg. In 1958 the number of "Kreise" in Württemberg had
also been reduced from 63 to 34. Similarly, the French adhered to this framework of "Kreise" when establishing the "Délégations de Carole".\(^\text{(26)}\)

The "Délégation de Carole" corresponded precisely to a "Kreis" and was headed by a "Délégué de Carole" who within the hierarchical structure of command derived his authority from the regional "Délégué Supérieur". The "Délégation de Carole" duplicated in miniature the departments of the "Délégation Supérieure". The "Délégué Supérieur" was assisted in his administrative task by a cabinet and five "services", with the "cabinet" serving as a secretariat. The "services" were: "Service des Affaires Administratives"; "Service de l'Economie et des Finances"; "Service du Contrôle du Démarquement"; "Section de la Justice"; "Contrôle de la Sécurité".\(^\text{(27)}\) The "Délégué de Carole" was normally assisted by an adjutant, an officer in charge of legal matters (usually a lawyer by profession), an officer at the head of administrative affairs, one responsible for finance and commerce, another for food and agriculture and finally a "commissionnaire de la Sécurité".\(^\text{(28)}\)

The centralist nature of the French administration is evident from the pyramidal hierarchy of command, extending from the broad base of the "Délégations de Carole" to the apex of the central command in Baden-Baden under the control of the "administrateur général" who in turn was responsible to the Commander-in-Chief. At the same time, however, the French administrative hierarchy incorporated an element of regionalised command structures in the "Délégations Supérieures", as described above. They intentionally directed the composite political, social and economic life of the zone into regional channels and fostered traditions of particularism and regional autonomy. There were no horizontal contacts permitted between the "Länder" or their German administrations. Debate and correspondence on all matters proceeded in vertical lines between Baden-Baden and the subordinate regional commands and the corresponding German administrations in the "Länder". In adherence to the principle of regionalism, the French military government permitted only a few organisations with jurisdiction throughout the zone as a whole. They were the "Devisenbewirtschaftungsstelle" (Currency Control Agency), the "Entschädigungskommission" (Compensation Commission), the "Unabhängige Verwaltung der militärm Veröffentlichungsorgane" (Independent Administration of Official Publishing Bodies), the "Deutsche Bereitschafts Preiskommission" (German Advisory Price Commission), the "Jagd- und
Fischereidienst" (Hunting and Fisheries Office), the "Office du Commerce Extérieur" and the "Architektur- und Städtebauministerium" (Architectural and Town Planning Commission) in Baden-Baden. (29) In contrast to the other Allies, France also emphasized her aloofness from Berlin and her policy of regionalization by maintaining her headquarters of military government in the French zone at Baden-Baden.

In order to maintain a successful marriage of the opposing poles of centralism and regionalism, the regional military government units in the French zone were provided with a frame of reference which specifically outlined the prerogatives and duties of each level of command in the provinces.

In accordance with Proclamation No. 1 of the Allied Control Council (August 30, 1945) on its assumption of authority for Germany "any military laws, proclamations, orders, ordinances, notices, regulations and directives issued by or under the authority of the respective Commanders-in-Chief for their respective Zones of Occupation are continued in force in their respective Zones of Occupation". This had already been established within the French zone by "Ordonnance No. 1" of the French commander-in-chief on July 28, 1945. The French Commander-in-Chief enacted legislation by three devices: "ordonnances", "décisions" and "arrêtés". The "ordonnance" was the highest expression of legislation in the French zone; it had all the powers and characteristics of a promulgated law and could be passed only by the French Commander-in-Chief. The "décision" was generally the enactment of a legislative decision for an individual case, e.g. the nomination of officials; "décisions" were generally passed by both the Commander-in-Chief and the "Administrateur Général". The "arrêté" fixed the conditions of application of various laws (e.g. of the Allied Control Council) and of the "ordonnances" and regulated the functioning of the different occupation administrations; "arrêtés" were passed by the Commander-in-Chief, the "Administrateur Général" and the "Délégués Supérieurs" in the provinces. (30)

The "Délégué Supérieur" consequently had a strictly defined role in the enactment and implementation of French military government legislation. He was responsible for the implementation of legislative and administrative decisions taken by his superiors in Baden-Baden. He had the specific function within the context of the implementation of these decisions of re-issuing general statements of intention made in Baden-Baden in modified form, i.e. as "arrêtés", which took
into account the regional peculiarities of his "Délégation Supérieure". These "arrêtés" were only applicable within the administrative regions of the respective "Délégations Supérieures".

The "Délégations de District" and "Délégations de Cercle" could also issue "arrêtés". These "arrêtés" were limited by two conditions: that they could only apply within the area of responsibility of the issuing "Délégé", i.e. within his "Cercle"; and that they could in content only constitute an adaptation of measures already announced for the local "Délégation Supérieure" (or "Land"). This provided for an elasticity of application which eased the implementation of occupation legislation within the French zone and simultaneously contributed to the aura of authority enjoyed by the French military government commanders at all levels in the eyes of the German populace without any concomitant loss of authority on the part of the central command in Baden-Baden.

The overall structure of the French administration in the French zone comprised the following units:

- Délégation Supérieure de la Sarre:
  - 8 Délégations de Cercle.

- Délégation Supérieure du Land Rhin-Palatin:
  - 5 Délégations de Districts,
  - 34 Délégations de Cercle.

- Délégation Supérieure du Pays de Bade:
  - 3 Délégations de District,
  - 18 Délégations de Cercle.

- Délégation Supérieure du Wurtemberg:
  - 18 Délégations de Cercle.

For the purpose of this study the chain of command between Baden-Baden, the "Délégation Supérieure du Wurtemberg" and the "Délégation du Cercle Tübingen" will be treated to a large extent in isolation of the rest of the local administrations.

As has already been indicated, the area of control and administration of the "Délégations Supérieures" corresponded to that of the new "Länder" created within the French zone, whilst that of the "Délégation de Cercle" corresponded to the administrative unit of the "Kreis". For this study the "Land" and "Kreis" concerned are Süd-Württemberg (later Württemberg-Hohenzollern) and "Kreis Tübingen". 
Mid-Württemberg was carved out of the southern part of the historic "Land" of Württemberg. This "Land", lying between the Swabian-Franconian Schichtstufenland, the Black Forest and Lake Constance with an area in 1945 of 19,508 square kilometres and a population of 2.9 million inhabitants, had received its form in the ancient territory of Swabia when Conradus de Wurtemberg established his dynasty in the eleventh century on the Rotenberg (Stuttgart). A succession of Württemberg counts subsequently enlarged the dynastic territories until the division of Württemberg territory in 1442 between the sons of Eberhard IV, Count Ludwig I (founder of the Urach line) and Count Ulrich V (founder of the Reußen line). The date is of interest to this study since it represents the one and only division of Württemberg prior to the Allied partition of the "Land" in 1945. The unity of Württemberg, proclaimed in 1462 by Count Eberhard in Burt in the "Württemberg Vertrag", decreeing the indivisibility of Württemberg for all time, remained a reality throughout half a millennium of military conflict and political change, including the Thirty Years' War, Louis XIV's wars in Germany, the Napoleonic period, the Prussian wars (initially Württemberg resisted Prussia until its defeat at the battle of Tauberbischofsheim in August 1866), the inclusion of Württemberg in the Reich (1.1.1871) and the First World War.

At the end of the First World War Württemberg ceased to be a kingdom when King Wilhelm II (1891–1918) abdicated his crown at the outbreak of the November Revolution. The Württemberg parliament passed a new constitution on September 25, 1919, which changed Württemberg from a monarchy into a republican "Land" with a unicameral system of parliament within the federal structure of the Weimar Republic. After the emergence of the National Socialist regime in 1933 the National Socialist doctrine of centralised authority did not interfere with the existence of Württemberg as a historical unit. The German "Landes" were utilised as an infrastructure for the reorganisation of political authority on the new model of the National Socialist "Geme", Württemberg was restructured as "Gau Württemberg-Schwikau" under the authority of a "Gauleiter", Reichskanzler Hitler. On the other hand, parliamentary democracy was suspended and Württemberg's political and social existence was subsequently redefined within the totalitarian "Einheitsstaat" (unitary state) by new legislation: the "Reichsgesetzgebungsakte" of March 31, 1933, reshuffled the membership of the Stuttgart parliament in accordance with the percentage distribution of votes between the parties in the Reichstag election of March 5, 1933; on October 14, 1933, the parliament in Stuttgart was suspended by decree of the "Reichspräsident" and the "Reichsgesetz" of January 30, 1934, definitely eradicated parliamentary democracy in Germany.
When the Allies entered South-West Germany in March 1945 it was the first time in a hundred and thirty years (i.e. since the Napoleonic period) that this region experienced war directly. The "Länder" of Baden and Württemberg were occupied for the most part by units of the French First Army which pushed forward, at de Gaulle's insistence and in direct contravention of the orders and plans of the Allied commander, to seize as much territory as possible by force of arms, thereby providing a series of "faits accomplis" for the inevitable post-operational negotiations on territorial affairs. The capture of the two capitals, Karlsruhe and Stuttgart, by French forces was consequently viewed with satisfaction by the French provisional government.

On the day after the capture of Stuttgart General Devers, General commanding the Sixth Army Group, unleashed a major crisis when he laid down the boundary between the territories to be held by the French First Army and the American Seventh Army as "west of Lauffen without change, then the Neußheim-Stuttgart railway as far as Asperg, the autobahn across north of Leonberg, and the autobahn Karlsruhe-Augsburg to Bembenau, Ketsingen, Dittingen,сх Klingen, Rheinstetten (to the 1st Army), Kempen and Hofen (to the 7th Army)".

This boundary along the autobahn to the south and west deprived the French army of the capital of Württemberg, Stuttgart, which, as an industrial city of 400,000 inhabitants, constituted the economic as well as the political fulcrum of the "Land". On April 26 Devers requested that the French commander of troops in Stuttgart, General de Isser, vacate the city. De Isser's superior, De Lattre de Tassigny, forbade him comply with the American request. De Lattre had in fact already received orders concerning Stuttgart from General de Gaulle on April 24: "I order you to keep a French garrison in Stuttgart and to establish a military government there at once ... To the eventual observations (of the Americans) you will reply that your orders are to hold and administer the territories occupied by our troops until the French zone of occupation has been settled between the interested governments ... 156 The American government replied with the threat of a ban on the supply of American fuel and equipment to the French army. Faced with this ultimatum the French army, which was totally dependent on American supplies, had little choice but to eventually comply to this ultimatum of the French zone. On July 8 the French forces occupying Stuttgart vacated the city and moved south of the new sonal frontier dividing the American section of
Nord-Württemberg from the French section of Süd-Württemberg.

The French section of Württemberg, augmented by the addition of the former Prussian "Regierungsbezirk" of Hohensollern-Sigmaringen and the Bavarian "Landkreis" of Linsenhofen, consisted of approximately 40% of the former "Land" of Württemberg. This region, forthwith referred to in this study as Süd-Württemberg (or Land Württemberg-Hohensollern after May 1947), had an area of 10,405 square kilometres and encompassed 18 "Kreise" and 950 "Gemeinden". Its population in January 1946 was 1,114,232 (472,213 males and 642,019 females) of which 21,964 were foreign nationals, mainly Poles, Russians and Austrians. The population of Süd-Württemberg, in comparison to Württemberg which had been predominantly Protestant, had a Roman Catholic majority - 602,660 Roman Catholics as compared to 474,311 Protestants. (57)

Süd-Württemberg was principally agricultural in character. Approximately 45% of the population was employed in agriculture. (58) The main products of the region were fruit, vegetables and wine. The corollary of this was that whilst Süd-Württemberg was indeed rich agricultural territory, it was not so self-sufficient in agricultural products as was often presumed in the post-war years. Süd-Württemberg was indeed compelled to import large amounts of wheat, potatoes and meat.

The main towns of Süd-Württemberg were, in order of size according to the census of October 29, 1946:

- Reutlingen 63,124
- Tübingen 53,952
- Ravensburg 23,765
- Schwenningen 20,739
- Tutlingen 18,456
- Lindau 17,935
- Schorndorf 15,473
- Friedrichshafen 14,275

The industrial centres of Süd-Württemberg were, in order of importance: Reutlingen, with machine and textile manufacture; Tutlingen, the centre of...
the shoe and leather industry in Süd-Württemberg; Friedrichshafen, with the Dornier aeroplane factory and electrical and precision tool firms; and Tübingen, with tool-making and textile firms.

For the administration and military government of Süd-Württemberg the French eventually selected the quiet university town and "Kreisstadt" of Tübingen. Initially the French military government administration for Süd-Württemberg was installed in the spa town of Freudenstadt in the Black Forest after the evacuation of Stuttgart. The choice was in keeping with the unabashed predilection of the French officer corps in Germany for the gracious living and casino ambience of the "Kurorte", exemplified in the choice of Baden-Baden as the military government capital of the French zone in June 1945. This weakness for spa towns was pilloried with illuminating detail in the French press of the period and in a book by the French Communist sociologist, Edgar Morin, entitled: *Allemagne, notre coup*. (1947). Freudenstadt, however, did not prove as suitable to the French as Baden-Baden due to the amount of physical destruction caused during the town's capture by the French First Army. There were too few buildings and villas left intact to satisfy the requirements of the military government. Consequently in September 1945 the French military government for Süd-Württemberg was re-settled in Tübingen.

The collapse of the National Socialist regime in May 1945 and the assumption of supreme authority in Germany by the Allies in June 1945 destroyed all vestiges of German governmental and administrative autonomy. The only German administrative units which survived the events of May and June 1945 were the county and municipal administrations of the "Kreise" and "Gemeinde", of which the "Kreise" remained the senior unit of authority. Consequently, during the initial period of occupation, i.e. April - August 1945, the "Kreise" in the French zone were the most senior units of German administration in existence and were compelled to solve their problems (food, housing, transport, health, etc.) without reference to the traditional decision-making bodies at Reich and "Land" level. The "Kreise" were therefore autonomous during this period and the French military government underwrote this autonomy with a policy designed to maintain the independence of the "Landrat", the executive chief of administration of the "Kreis". There were eighteen such units in Süd-Württemberg.
Tübingen was the administrative seat of "Kreis Tübingen". "Kreis Tübingen" comprised 54 "Gemeinden", of which two, Tübingen and Rottenburg, were of the order of "Stadt", i.e. they had full municipal status. "Kreis Tübingen" had an area of 481.95 square kilometres and a population of 88,426 in 1945. (41)

Tübingen has been defined as a "Land" capital and a "Kreisstadt". There was a third aspect to Tübingen. On March 3, 1935, a decree was issued in Württemberg in supplement to the revised "Deutsche Gemeindeordnung" of January 30, 1935: this decree appointed seven Württemberg towns—Ebingen, Göppingen, Heidenheim, Ludwigsburg, Reutlingen, Schwäbisch Gmünd and Tübingen—as "ummittelbare Kreisstädte". The "Deutsche Gemeindeordnung" of 1935 defined an "ummittelbare Kreisstadt" as a "Kreisstadt" which, although continuing to act within the "Landkreisverband" and remaining subordinate to the "Landrat" in matters pertaining to state administration, was only directly responsible to the Ministry of the Interior within the respective "Land". (42)

This afforded the "ummittelbare Kreisstadt" a certain amount of added scope in dealing with municipal affairs since it dispensed with the intermediary office of the "Landratsamt". It also added a degree of status and importance to the business of running municipal affairs hitherto unknown in these towns. Most important, however, for the purposes of this thesis remains the fact that it created a tradition of municipal management independent of the participation and supervision of the "Landratsamt". This factor was to play a role during the occupation of Tübingen when the town authorities maintained this independence and continued to run much of their affairs without the involvement of either "Landratsamt" or Ministry of the Interior.

The town of Tübingen has an ancient history and a world-wide reputation as a seat of learning. Archaeological research has dated the first settlement in the area now occupied by the town as the seventh century A.D. and the first mention of the name "Tübingen" was recorded in 1070. In 1285 Tübingen was officially elevated to the rank of a township. In 1435 the town acquired the massive and impressive "Rathaus" (townhall) which has dominated Tübingen's main square and housed the municipal authorities to the present day. The main source of Tübingen's renown throughout the centuries was its university.
Founded in 1477 by Graf Eberhard im Bart the University of Tübingen acquired renown as a vanguard of humanism under the influence of Bebel and Melancthon. In 1534 the university pledged its support for the German Reformation. It emerged as one of the foremost theological universities of Germany in the course of the sixteenth and subsequent centuries.

As the sole university in Württemberg it became the focal point of academic life in the kingdom, known throughout Germany as the "Swabian university". This was borne out in the early nineteenth century by the brilliant notables of Swabian intellectuals and students in Tübingen who all contributed to German letters and philosophy: Hölderlin, Wörner, Uhland, Hegel, Fichte. In the course of the nineteenth century the university added another dimension to its predominantly theological and philosophical traditions by the establishment of a medical school. This school continued expanding throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth century, establishing its place among the leading medical centres of Germany. This development was crowned in 1935 when a giant new complex of teaching clinics was opened in Tübingen. The National Socialist administration in Württemberg did not, however, otherwise look favourably upon the University of Tübingen. The preponderance of philosophical and theological teaching and research was regarded with suspicion and prejudice by the National Socialists. As a consequence the arts and philosophy departments of the university were subjected to a series of cutbacks, especially in the intake of students, which culminated in drastic shrinkage during the war years. In stark contrast the younger technical university in Stuttgart received the favours of the regime due to the vocational bent of its applied science courses. Despite these set-backs the university in Tübingen remained the most important institution in the community. In the 1940's Tübingen was a university town to the same extent as Cambridge. For this reason the University of Tübingen will be subjected in a subsequent chapter to an extensive examination of its development during the years, 1945-1947.

Tübingen was the second largest town in French-occupied Württemberg with a population of 35,980 (census of January 26, 1946) which represented an increase of approximately 10,000 since 1939. 2,244 of these were refugees, of whom 953 came from the other Allied zones and Berlin and 1291 were from the German territories east of the Oder-Neisse Line or were "Volkdeutsche". The number of
foreign nationals living in Tubingen at the beginning of 1946 was 1,147, of which the main nationalities were, in order of size, Lithuanians (495), Latvians (134), Poles (71), Austrians (40), Estonians (36), Yugoslavs (34) and Czechs (23). It must be noted, however, that large numbers of foreign workers – especially Russians – and displaced persons had already been returned, often forcibly, to their homelands by the end of 1945.

The main feature of Tubingen’s population in the post-war years was the abnormal ratio of females to males, a phenomenon in keeping with all post-war situations. In 1939 the ratio had been 15,058 females to 15,250 males, i.e. statistically, 99 women to every 100 men. In 1946 there were only 15,057 males to 19,288 females, i.e. 128 women to every 100 men. The census of January 1946 also indicated that there was a high incidence of widowed and unmarried people over the age of eighteen.

The strongest religious group in Tubingen in 1945 was the Lutheran Church which claimed a membership of two-thirds of the populace. The Protestants in toto outnumbered the Catholics by three to one. These figures have been provided in a useful statistical table of the religious affiliation of the town’s inhabitants drawn up in 1946 by the municipal authorities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Group</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>7,395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old Catholic</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutheran</td>
<td>22,461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical Protestant</td>
<td>2,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodists</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mennonists</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adventists</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baptists</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Gottgläubige” (unaffiliated Pietist sect)</td>
<td>914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other confessions</td>
<td>759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>atheist and agnostic</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(45)
Tubingen therefore was an overwhelmingly Protestant community within the predominantly Catholic unit of Süd-Württemberg. Thus the town, like "Kreis Tubingen", found itself in 1945, after centuries of identification with and participation in the religious life of the majority of Württemberg, not least through its university, at variance with the religious views of the majority of the new region of Süd-Württemberg and indeed in a minority position. This divergence from the statistical norm of Süd-Württemberg had fundamental effects on the political and social life of both Tubingen and Süd-Württemberg, all the more since Tubingen was appointed "Land" capital of the new province (these effects are discussed in a later chapter on the CDU).

As capital of Süd-Württemberg Tubingen experienced the influx of a plethora of administrations, both French and German, designed to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of the National Socialist administration in Württemberg and to provide a basis for the government of Süd-Württemberg. The French administrations were obviously the more senior. In the initial period of occupation after the capture of Tubingen the town was under the control of Capitaine de Corvette Metzger who was a member of the "5e Bureau" of the French First Army. He was responsible for the town and surrounding area and used the German title "Ortskommandant" (town commander), thus indicating that his area of responsibility was centred in Tubingen. With the introduction of "Délégations" Captain Metzger was relieved of his post. The "Délégation" system installed a two-tiered system of military government in Tubingen since it was both "Kreisstadt" and capital.

The subordinate unit of military government in Tubingen (i.e. the "Délégation de Cercle") styled itself in its correspondence with the German administrations as the "Gouvernement Militaire Local" and was responsible for the whole of "Kreis Tubingen", including the town. This meant that while two German administrations existed within "Kreis Tubingen", i.e. "Kreis" and municipal authorities, they corresponded with the one unit of French military government. The officer in command of the "Délégation de Cercle" was Lieutenant-Colonel Huchon, later succeeded by Lieutenant-Colonel Courtois.
The senior unit of French government in Tübingen, the "Délégation Supérieure du Wurtemberg", termed itself the "Gouvernement Militaire Régional" and was under the command of the Gouverneur-Général, Guillaume Widmer, who was responsible to Baden-Baden for the administration and government of French-occupied Württemberg. Guillaume Widmer assumed office in Tübingen on September 19, 1945.  

A French military government court was installed in Tübingen in 1945 to deal with infringements of Allied and French military government legislation. The French legal system as such was not applicable in the French zone, except in the cases of French civilians. The basis of judicial organisation and procedure had been laid down before the capitulation of Germany by SHAEF, providing for a three-tiered system of appeal court on occupied territory (Ordinance No. 2). The first ordinance of the new French Commander-in-Chief, General Koenig, on July 29, 1945, ensured the continued application of SHAEF legislation in the French zone. The French military government courts likewise maintained the hierarchy established by SHAEF with certain modifications.

Initially the judicial affairs of the French zone of occupation were run by the "5e Bureau" of de Lattre's occupying army. With the institution of permanent French zonal administrations the judicial system in the French zone also underwent change. Legal and judicial affairs in the zone were regulated by the "Direction Générale de la Justice" in Baden-Baden. This administration was paralleled in the five provinces of the zone in the "Délégations Supérieures", each of which contained a "Direction Régionale de la Justice".

In October 1945 the French established a series of "Tribunaux Généraux" (high courts of appeal) in the five provinces. In the case of Baden-Württemberg this court was installed in Tübingen by a decree of October 12. This court functioned under the authority of a Colonel de Saint-Amans. Prior to this a middle session court had convened fortnightly in Tübingen under the chairmanship of a Captain Ernenn. The decision to establish a high court of appeal in Tübingen was reversed in March 1946 with the issue of an "arrêté" altering the structures of the French judicial system in their zone. The "arrêté" provided for one centralised "Tribunal Général", the highest court of appeal for the entire French zone, to be situated in Rastatt in Baden, for five
"Tribunaux Intermédiaires" (provincial middle session courts) in Freiburg, Neustadt, Koblenz, Saarbrücken and Reutlingen and for thirty "Tribunaux Sommaires" (local courts), one of which was allocated to Tübingen. (50)

The "Tribunal Sommaire" which sat in Tübingen was responsible for "Kreis Tübingen" and "Kreis Hechingen". Tübingen, consequently, was not as important as the neighbouring town of Reutlingen within the apparatus of the French judicial system, all the more so since the publication of "Arrêté Nr. 43 de l'Administrateur Général" (March 3, 1946) on March 8 which, at the same time as reorganising the judicial system of the military government, made the courts independent of the regional judicial administration (i.e. the "Direction Régionale de la Justice" in Tübingen) and placed them under the direct control of the "Direction Générale de la Justice" in Baden-Baden. (51)

Despite this, however, a French military government court of one level or another was in session constantly in Tübingen throughout the period, 1945-1947, thereby adding a dimension to the role of Tübingen during the period of the French occupation of South-West Germany. The activity of the various French courts in Tübingen also offers a relevant source of information for the purposes of this study and reference will accordingly be made in subsequent chapters to military government court trials and the sanctions imposed by the same.

Another feature of the French occupation in the immediate post-war years was the presence of a number of branch offices of independent French administrations installed in the French zone to foster and safeguard certain French interests, especially in the fields of economics and culture.

France's interests in Baden-Württemberg's commerce was reflected in the establishment in Tübingen of a branch of the "Office du Commerce Extérieur" ("Oficex") and of the "Office des Changes". "Oficex" was established by "Arrêté Nr. 28" on December 12, 1945, to regulate the import and export trade of the French zone. It was a subordinate organisation of the "Direction Générale de l'Economie et des Finances" with its head office in Baden-Baden. (52) This office had a total monopoly on the regulation of imports and exports to and from the French zone. All German manufacturers within the French zone were compelled to sell their products to "Oficex" at a reduced price fixed by "Oficex" for
the whole of the zone and paid for in German Reichsmark. The price reduction imposed on the goods was normally 20%. In addition the post-war Reichsmark had no value outside of Germany. "Oftocomex" also paid for the goods from an account which was to a large part created by the compulsory grant by central banks of credits totalling 400 million RM, supplemented by credits on the part of the importing firms. (53) "Oftocomex" sold the goods to French firms at advantageous prices; these firms then resold them on the world market at world prices and paid for in dollars. (54)

The "Office de Changes" was established in Baden-Baden by a decree on July 7, 1946. It subsequently erected "Devisenbüros" (foreign currency offices) in the branches of the former "Reichsbank" in the capitals of the new "Länder" with the purpose of regulating all foreign currency transactions.

In addition to the semi-autonomous branches of "Oftocomex" and the "Office de Changes," Tübingen contained as capital town of Süd-Württemberg the economic department of the "Délégation Supérieure du Wurtemberg," i.e. the "Service de l'Économie et des Finances," which was responsible to Baden-Baden for the implementation of French economic policy within Süd-Württemberg. Tübingen consequently became in the course of 1945 and 1946 the centre-point of the French apparatus which directed and controlled Süd-Württemberg's industrial and commercial life.

In the domain of cultural affairs the French authorities implemented a three-fold policy. They maintained rigid surveillance and control over all cultural matters, enforcing a priori censorship, registering associations, banning specific activities etc.; they fostered and promoted all cultural developments with a regionalist and local bias, thereby underwriting the French federalist thesis; and they introduced French culture to the German population on a scale unrivalled by the other Allied occupying powers. With a view to managing the business of the presentation of French cultural life to the local German population the French authorities installed an "Institut Français" in Tübingen. Opened to the public on November 4, 1946, the new institute, originally known as the "Centre d'Études françaises" and under the auspices of the "Office des Institut Français à l'étranger" in Paris, offered French language and literature courses, provided reading rooms and a well-stocked library.
supervised conferences and exchange programmes and organised weekly visits of
distinguished French artists and academics in concerts, lectures and art
exhibitions of a very high order of excellence. (55)

The intense intellectual and artistic activity of French-occupied Tübingen
in the immediate post-war years became a hallmark of the generosity and efficacy
of France's cultural policy within her zone of occupation. Tübingen discarded
its sleepy provincialism in the course of 1945 and 1946 and emerged, with French
connivance, as a brilliant centre of the arts, outstanding all other towns in the
French zone and indeed most of the great cities of Germany. At no time during
the twentieth century has Tübingen gained such prominence as a patron of the
arts. It certainly did not retain its pre-eminent position after the dissolution
of the French zone of occupation. Consequently the role of culture (especially
in the sense of the "liberal arts" or "high culture") in post-war Tübingen is
a topic of particular importance, representing a very specific phenomenon of
French occupation policy. For this reason French cultural policy in Tübingen
will be treated at length in a subsequent chapter.

The final French administration which perhaps ought to be mentioned is
the "Office des Intérêts Français". The necessity had been felt among the
western allies to open consulates within their zones of occupation, but the
Soviet delegation blocked this proposal on the Allied Control Council. The
Americans, French and British, however, agreed among themselves to create, each
within their own zone, organisations which would fulfill the functions of a
consulate. In the French zone such an organisation was created by decree on
December 29, 1945, establishing "Offices des Intérêts Français" in Baden-Baden,
Saarbrücken, Mainz, Koblenz, Freiburg and Tübingen. The directors of these
offices were subordinate to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and they were
empowered by the above decree to fulfill the functions and formalities normally
performed by consulates. The French authorities insisted that this office was to
be treated as a full consulate by the German administrations in Tübingen in their
administrative business with metropolitan France, with the other "Länder" of
the French zone and with the other zones of occupation. This serves to emphasize
the extent to which the French imposed the "French thesis" of separate development
on a confederal or federalist basis for the South-West German "Länder". In
May 1947 Governor-General Widmer addressed a sharp reminder to the head of the
German administrations in Tübingen on the procedure of correspondence to be followed between the German administrations on the one hand and metropolitan France and the other zones and "Länder" on the other. The reminder, dated May 22, and headed "Règle de correspondance entre l'Administration allemande et française", opened with the warning: "Le Gouvernement Militaire de la Zone française d'occupation a été informé que certaines autorités allemandes de la zone correspondent directement avec d'autres zones ou même avec diverses autorités françaises de la Métropole. Cette façon de procéder est inadmissible". The letter proceeded to point out that in certain administrative areas the services of the "Office des Intérêts Français" had to be employed: "Toutes correspondances relatives aux questions d'État civil (demandes de renseignements, délivrance d'actes ou d'extraits, etc.) doivent être adressées aux Offices des Intérêts Français de la Zone." The existence of the "Office des Intérêts Français" in Tübingen emphasised French determination to invest the capital town of Süd-Württemberg with the status and forms of a functioning political and administrative capital.

The elevation of Tübingen to the rank of regional capital in September 1945 necessarily affected the position of the German administrations operating at that time in Tübingen and the initial degree of self-government allotted them by the French authorities, principally on account of the French decision to install a modified form of German government in Tübingen to administer Süd-Württemberg.

As stated above, Tübingen already had two levels of German administration: the municipal authorities under the "Oberbürgermeister" and the "Lendratsamt". The town maintained a large apparatus to deal with the affairs of municipal self-government and administration. This apparatus was streamlined by the municipal "Gemeinderat" on December 10, 1946, to include, together with the "Bürgermeisteramt", sixteen departments, in place of the original 35 departments. These new departments were:

1. Hauptamt (central town hall administration department)
2. Rechnungsprüfungamt (municipal auditing department)
3. Rechtsamt/Städtische Polizeiverwaltung (municipal legal department/municipal police administration)
The "Landratsamt" in Tübingen had considerably fewer personnel than the local municipal authorities. In September 1945 there were in all eighteen officials employed in the "Landratsamt".

The first indication that Tübingen received of a change of status was the appointment in July 1945 of German "Delegierte (Delegates) to represent the "Landesdirektionen" (Regional Executives) which the French military government had set about establishing in Stuttgart soon after its capture. These were designed to provide a German administration for the whole of Württemberg. The intention clearly was to create a situation of fait accompli as a basis for French plans for south-west Germany, especially with regard to the "French thesis" and its federalist ambitions. On June 13, 1945, the French military government in Stuttgart appointed nine "Landesdirektoren" (Regional Executive Directors) to head nine departments equipped with modified powers to manage the administrative affairs of Württemberg. These departments remained strictly subordinate to and dependent on the French military government in Stuttgart. These departments and their heads were:

- Inneres (Internal Affairs): Ulrich Beysel
- Justiz (Justice): Bayerle
- Kult und Unterricht (Religious Affairs and Education): Dr. Carlo Schmid Kleckert
- Finanzen (Treasury): Franz Weiss
- Ernährung und Landwirtschaft (Food and Agriculture): Albrecht Fischer
- Arbeit und Sozialversicherung (Labour and Social Insurance):
In June 1945, however, the decision was made to split Württemberg into a French and an American zone and on July 8 the French forces of occupation vacated Stuttgart in response to American pressure. Before the French quit the city they opened a series of discussions with the "Landesdirektoren", pressuring them to nominate semi-independent representatives for the French-occupied section of Württemberg. A decision was made on July 11 after a meeting between the "Landesdirektoren" and representatives of both the American and French authorities. It was agreed to designate each "Landesdirektor" a "Delegierter" who was to be charged with the running of that particular branch of administration in the French-occupied part of Württemberg. These "Delegierten" were to be proposed by the "Landesdirektoren" and nominated by the French military government (then in Freudenstadt). The "Delegierten" had their office in Tübingen and were theoretically responsible to both the "Landesdirektoren" in Stuttgart (therefore indirectly to the recently installed American military government in Stuttgart) and to the French military government. This inevitably proved a contradictory situation and source of tension since both the French and American military government administrations were, in accordance with the Berlin Declarations of June 5, 1945, the supreme authority within their respective zones of occupation and since both administrations disagreed fundamentally on a number of their policies toward Germany. The result was that the delegation system broke down within a matter of months, during which time the Tübingen "Delegierten" had assumed increasing independence at the insistence of the French military government.

The creation of the new "Land", Württemberg-Baden, by the American military government on September 9, 1945, speeded the process of division and self-autonomy within the German administrations operating on either side of the zonal boundary in Württemberg. Prior to the proclamation of the new "Land" the American authorities had installed a new German government in Stuttgart under the presidency of Reinhold Maier (including Theodor Heuss as Minister of Education).
In acknowledgment of their increasing independence from Stuttgart, the Tübingen "Delegierten" themselves assumed the title of "Landeidirektoren." At the period of the appointment of the new Stuttgart government the Tübingen office-bearers were:

- **Inneres**: Lothar Roßmann
- **Kult**: Hermann Binder
- **Wirtschaft**: Dr. Gustav Klipper
- **Justiz**: Dr. Gebhard Müller
- **Post**: Vizepräsident Hofer
- **Ernährung**: Ernst Fischer

On October 16, 1945, the French military government authorities completed the administrative division of Württemberg with the establishment of a quasi-government with restricted powers to administer the area of Sied-Württemberg. This institution, termed the "Staatssekretariat für das französische besetzte Gebiet Württembergs und Hohenzollerns" (State Secretariat for the French-occupied section of Württemberg and Hohenzollern) comprised six "Landeidirektoren" under the directorship of five "Landeidirektoren":

- **Landeidirektion für Justiz**: Dr. Karl (Carlo) Schmid
- **Landeidirektion für Kultus, Erziehung und Kunst**: Dr. Karl (Carlo) Schmid
- **Landeidirektion des Innern**: Lothar Roßmann
- **Landeidirektion der Finanzen**: Dr. Paul Binder
- **Landeidirektion der Wirtschaft**: Dr. Gustav Klipper
- **Landeidirektion für Arbeit**: Clemens Moser

The five "Landeidirektoren" together formed the "Direktorium" (directorate) of the Staatssekretariat, of which Dr. Karl (Carlo) Schmid was elected "Vorsitzender" (executive chairman) for a period of three months. Schmid's term of office was twice extended until May 5, 1946, when a motion was passed at a meeting of the "Direktorium" bestowing upon Schmid the title of "Präsident des Staatssekretariats" (President of the State Secretariat). In place of a constitution the "Staatssekretariat" formulated in collaboration with the French authorities a "Statut des Staatssekretariats" (Statute of the State Secretariat), the first article of which declared: "Während des Krieges der
The "Staatssekretariat" survived unchanged as such from October 16, 1945, to December 4, 1946, when the French authorities felt obliged to yield to pressures exerted by the Christian Democratic party in Süd-Württemberg and to recast the "Staatssekretariat" along lines more in keeping with the results of the "Gemeinde" and "Kreis" elections of the autumn of 1946 when the Christian Democrats achieved resounding successes and demonstrated itself to be the inevitable majority party of Süd-Württemberg. Prior to these elections the "Staatssekretariat" had been dominated by Social Democrats to the extent that three of the six "Landesdirektionen" were headed by two SPD members who were also the chairman and vice-chairman of the "Direktorium" whilst the CDU controlled two "Landesdirektionen".

**i.e.**

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<tr>
<th>Chairman</th>
<th>Dr. Karl Schmid (SPD)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Vice-Chairman</td>
<td>Lothar Kofman (SPD)</td>
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<td>Justis</td>
<td>Dr. Karl Schmid (SPD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kult, Erziehung und Kunst</td>
<td>Dr. Karl Schmid (SPD)</td>
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<td>Innereen</td>
<td>Lothar Kofman (SPD)</td>
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<td>Finanzen</td>
<td>Paul Binder (CDU)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arbeit</td>
<td>Clemens Moser (CDU)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wirtschaft</td>
<td>Dr. Gustav Klipper (parteilos)</td>
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On December 4, 1946, the "Staatssekretariat" was reshuffled to include more CDU members. It also received an extra "Landesdirektion" (Landwirtschaft):

**i.e.**

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<th>President</th>
<th>Dr. Karl Schmid (SPD)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Vice-President</td>
<td>Paul Binder (CDU)</td>
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The second "Staatssekretariat" remained in office from December 12, 1946 until July 22, 1947, when the first parliament and government of the new "Land", Württemberg-Hohenzollern, was convened. This latter was also, incidentally, the one and only parliament of Land Württemberg-Hohenzollern; the government of Württemberg-Hohenzollern underwrote the establishment of the new "Land", Baden-Württemberg, and voluntarily merged with the other post-war "Länder" of Baden and Württemberg-Baden to form the same in 1952.

The process of political reconstruction which culminated in the formation of a parliament and government for Süd-Württemberg was characterised by extreme caution on the part of the French authorities and a rigid application of their view that the logical method for re-introducing forms of parliamentary democracy in Germany was to begin at the smallest and most basic unit of political life, the town council, and to progress upwards through "Kreis" and "Land" structures to an eventual arrangement concerning the future of the Reich.

During the National Socialist era the Weimar system of political elections had been banned at all levels and replaced by the totalitarian authority of the NSDAP which resolved political and administrative decisions by the issuing of decrees. Consequently, for more than a decade, Württemberg functioned as part of the machinery of the National Socialist state with absolutely no concessions to Württemberg's traditions of democratic self-government. After the collapse of the National Socialist regime the French occupation authorities, in agreement with the other Allies, took no immediate steps to institute parliamentary democracy in Württemberg.

In contrast to most previous military occupations and in direct contravention of the Hague Convention, the Allies had agreed that the occupation of Germany was not to be regarded primarily as a means of securing and maintaining...
military victory, but as the prerequisite for the implementation of a programme of social and political change within Germany, e.g. the destruction of the existing German government and its administrative system, the outlawing of the NSDAP and all associated organisations, the repeal of National Socialist legislation and the eventual establishment of parliamentary democracy. In legal terms these aims represented the radical feature of the Allied occupation of Germany after the Second World War. The Hague Convention, signed by 44 nations, including the four Allied occupying countries and the former German Empire, laid down the rules of occupation and military government in 1907. According to Section III of the Convention, entitled "Military Authority over the Territory of the Hostile State", the existing political and social structures of the defeated and occupied nation were not to be interfered with. Furthermore, the rights of private property were safeguarded.

Clearly the Hague Convention was disregarded by the National Socialist regime to a far acuter degree during the period of Germany's military dominance of Europe, 1938-1944, than by the Allies in the subsequent post-war occupation of Germany. Both sides, however, rejected the Hague Convention for the reason that it imposed limitations on the ideological struggle at the heart of the conflict of the Second World War. The National Socialists envisaged themselves as the agents of a radical German revolution aimed at establishing a new order within Europe; they consequently refused to be restricted by international agreements formulated by the "old" European order. The Allies, in turn, proclaimed their intention of destroying National Socialism by outlawing both the doctrine and the party. This in itself involved a breach of the Hague Convention. In addition, the rigorous enforcement of "Gleichschaltung" by the National Socialist regime had ensured that there was a minimal degree of discrepancy between the party and the administrative apparatus of the state in terms of party membership. Consequently, a policy which was designed to destroy all vestiges of National Socialism in Germany necessarily involved measures radically affecting the existing political and social structures.

When the French army entered Württemberg in April 1945 no move was made to resuscitate or establish political autonomy, apart from the appointment of "Landräte" and town councillors. On the contrary, political activity was
Initially proscribed for the German population. Eventually, however, the regional French military government authorities were provided with an outline of official French policy on political reconstruction within the French zone, entailing a logical plan of progression from the establishment of nuclei of democracy at "Gemeinde" and "Kreis" level to the creation of autonomous "Länder" governments linked together on a loose, confederative (or federalist) basis. The French authorities in the French zone implemented this policy with caution and circumspection.

The French programme of political reconstruction opened in Süd-Württemberg in December 1945 with the issuing of "Ordonnance No. 22 et 23 du Commandement en Chef" authorising the re-establishment of political parties and associations "à caractère démocratique et anti-national socialistes". The next step was the authorisation of political elections, the first of which to be permitted were the "Gemeinde" (town council) elections of September 15, 1946, followed on October 13 by elections for "Kreisversammlungen" to regulate "Kreis" affairs.

The third development was the election of a "Beratende Landesversammlung" ("Land" Consultative Assembly) of 65 members on November 17, 1946, in accordance with "Ordonnance No. 66" of October 8, 1946. The main function of this consultative assembly was, in conjunction with the "Staatssekretariat", to debate and formulate a constitution for Süd-Württemberg which would ultimately be subjected to popular referendum. In accordance with its brief the "Beratende Landesversammlung" submitted a draft constitution which was presented to the populace in a referendum on May 18, 1947, concomitant to the elections for the new "Landtag" ("Land" Diet) of Württemberg-Hohensollern. The populace returned a majority vote of approval and the constitution was subsequently adopted. The constitution united the 17 "Kreise" comprising Süd-Württemberg in the new "Land" of Württemberg-Hohensollern. The new "Landtag" convened in the Cistercian monastery of Bebenhausen, six kilometres from Tübingen, and the second "Staatssekretariat" was replaced by the new "Regierung von Württemberg-Hohensollern" (Government of Württemberg-Hohensollern). The major feature of the new parliament and government was the predominance of the CDU which won 34 out of 61 seats.
The function of this overview of the development of parliamentary autonomy in Süd-Württemberg is two-fold: firstly, to indicate the sequential thoroughness of the French occupation authorities in the application of their programme of re-introducing parliamentary democracy; secondly, to underline the role of the former "Kreisstadt" of Tübingen in becoming, along with Baden-Baden, Freiburg, Sarrebrücken and Mainz, a focus of political development within the French zone.

This latter point relates to another phenomenon of Tübingen's post-war history: the elevation of Tübingen to the rank of "Land" capital endowed upon the town all the attendant powers and instruments of government and administration of a capital. The appointment of Tübingen as capital of Süd-Württemberg produced within the community a multiplicity of ministerial departments, administrations, courts and the other prerequisites of a centralised government apparatus. As the seat of government Tübingen also attracted an ever-increasing list of head offices of political parties, associations, commercial enterprises, trade unions etc.

A final feature of Tübingen in the years, 1945-1947, was the support which the town received in the field of culture and the arts. It has already been emphasised that the French authorities in Tübingen fostered the arts to a degree unrivalled in the towns and cities of the other zones of occupation. In addition, the "Staatssekretariat" and, after May 1947, the new government of Württemberg-Schweizern reinforced this impression in scale in the cultural and artistic life of Tübingen. The result was that the somewhat sleepy university town received an impressive face-lift in cultural terms, e.g. theatres, exhibitions, festivals etc.

All in all, by 1947, Tübingen had come to represent the optimal cross-section of the political, administrative, economic and cultural infrastructures of Süd-Württemberg. This can be demonstrated by listing the main administrations and offices which were established in Tübingen by 1947:

i.e. the Staatssekretariat and its 6 x Landesdirektionen

the eight ministries of the first government of Württemberg-Schweizern:
Arbeitsministerium (Ministry of Labour)
Plenarministerium (Ministry of Finance)
Innenministerium (Ministry of the Interior)
Justizministerium (Ministry of Justice)
Kultministerium (Ministry of Education)
Landwirtschaftsministerium (Ministry of Agriculture)
Staatsministerium (Ministry of State)
Wirtschaftsministerium (Ministry of Economic Affairs)
central offices of Land administrations:
Landesanstelle für Bodenuntersuchungen (Head Office for Soil Analysis)
Forstdirektion (Head Office, Forestry Commission)
Hauptversorgungsanstalt Land Württemberg-Hohenzollern (Central Pension Office for Württemberg-Hohenzollern)
Landesamt für Denkmalpflege (Head Office for the Preservation of Historical Monuments)
Landsfeuerwehramt Tübingen (Head Fire Brigade Office, Tübingen)
Württembergische Landeskreditanstalt (Württemberg Credit Institute)
Württembergische Landesverwaltungsanstalt (Württemberg Social Insurance Institute)
Staatliche Nachrichtenstelle, Land Württemberg-Hohenzollern (State Information Office of Württemberg-Hohenzollern)
Oberpostdirektion (Post Office Executive)
Rechnungskammer für Württemberg-Hohenzollern (Public Accounts Office of Württemberg-Hohenzollern)
Statstkommissariat für die politische Säuberung (State Commission for Political Denazification)
Statistisches Landesamt für Württemberg-Hohenzollern (State Statistical Office of Württemberg-Hohenzollern)
Amt für Wiedergutmachung (Indemnification Office)
Oberschulamt (Department of Education)
Technisches Landesamt (Central Office for Technical Affairs)
Landeshauptkasse (Chief Cashier’s Office of Württemberg-Hohenzollern)
Gemeindeamt Württemberg-Hohenzollern (Organisation of Town Councils of Württemberg-Hohenzollern)
police administrations:
Landespolizeidirektion für Württemberg-Hohenzollern (Central Police Authority for Württemberg-Hohenzollern)
Landeskriminalpolizeidienst (Central Criminal Investigation Department)
Landespolizei-Oberkommissariat Tübingen (Police Chief Commissioner's Office, Tübingen District)
Landespolizeikommissariat Tübingen-Stadt (Police Commissioner's Office, Tübingen (Urban District))
Landespolizeikommissariat Tübingen-Land (Police Commissioner's Office, Tübingen (Rural District))

churches:
Evangelischer Kirchenrat, Außenstelle Tübingen (Lutheran High Consistory, Branch Office Tübingen)
Caritasverband, Sektion Württemberg-Süd (Roman Catholic charity organisation, SWWürttemberg area)

political organisations:
Landesverband der Demokratischen Volkspartei (Regional association of the DVP)
Landessekretariat der SPD Württemberg-Hohenzollern (Regional secretariat of the SPD)
Landesverband der Christlich-Demokratischen Union (Regional association of the CDU)
Landesleitung der Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes (Regional directorate of the Association of the Victims of the Nazi Regime)

all existing trade unions had a senior branch in Tübingen:
Bau – Steine – Erde (Building and construction trades)
Druck und Papier (Printing and paper-making trades)
Eisen und Metall (Engineering and metal-producing trades)

courts:
Finanzgericht (Fiscal court)
Landesarbeitsgericht (Regional labour court)
Landgericht (Regional court)
Oberlandesgericht (Regional court of appeal)
Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Administrative court)

cultural institutions:
Landestheater Tübingen (theatre)
"Schwäbisches Tagblatt" (newspaper). (73)

The above overview of administrations and institutions in post-war Tübingen concludes this section's account of the factors which qualify Tübingen for valid consideration as a topic of enquiry into French occupation policy in post-war Germany.
Introduction: Section Three: The role and importance of Tübingen during the initial years of French occupation


(2) J.-V. Coffre, L'administration des territoires occupés en Allemagne, These pour le doctorat en droit, Faculté de Droit, Université de Sorbonne, 1946, p. 26.


(11) Philip Mosley, op. cit., p. 601.


(13) Karl Lowenstein, "Political reconstruction in Germany, social and intermental", in: James Pflauring (ed.), Chances and Crisis in European Government, New York, 1946, pp. 46 f.


(15) Ibid.


(17) Cahiers Français d'Information, No. 77, p. 11.

(19) For an account of the development of AUF, q.v., in F. Roy Willis, op. cit., pp. 71 ff.


(22) quoted in ibid., pp. 94 ff.

(23) Journal Officiel du Commandement en Chef français en Allemagne. Gouvernement militaire de la Zone française d'occupation, Baden-Baden, 1er Année (1945), No. 1, 3 Septembre 1945, p. 4.

(24) Cahiers Français d'Information, No. 77, p. 6.

(25) ibid., p. 12.


(27) ibid., p. 27.

(28) ibid., p. 29.

(29) Friedrich Klein, Neues deutsches Verfassungsrecht, Frankfurt am Main, 1945, p. 134.


(33) Staatsarchiv Professor Müller, "Zur Geschichte der Landtags in Baden und Württemberg", in: Beiträge zur Landeskunde, Band 12, Heft 3, Stuttgart, 1936.


(36) ibid., p. 490.


(40) Paris.

(41) "Bewährungsprobe der Selbstverwaltung", im Schwäbischen Tagblatt (Tübingen), 31. Dezember 1957.


(43) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Ast 112/29.


(45) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Ast 112/29.


(47) Cahiers Français d'Information, Nr. 77, p. 33.

(48) Albert Hofstetter, osw., p. 11 f.


(50) ibid.; and Cahiers Français d'Information, No. 77, p. 33.

(51) ibid., p. 134.


(53) Gustav Stolper, osw., p. 71 f.

(54) F. Roy Willis, osw., p. 123.

(55) "Das Zentrum d'Études françaises", in Tübinger Blätter, Dezember 1952, p. 35; and Percy Bidwell, "Napoleon on Culture in the French Zone", in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 1, October 1948, p. 85.

(56) Staatsarchiv Sigmaringen.

(57) ibid.


(68) Ibid.


(70) Cahiers Français d'Information, Nr. 77, p. 42.

(71) Friedrich Klein, op. cit., p. 150.


(73) This list was compiled from the Staatsarchiv Singen, Württemberg-Hohenzollern.
Section Four: The function, aims and methodology of this case study of post-war Tübingen
It is the intention of Section One of this introductory chapter to provide an overview of French occupation policy at governmental level, i.e. the "French thesis" on Germany, as a frame of reference for and background to a case study of Tubingen under occupation. Section Two is designed to illustrate the themes of separatism and particularism within French occupation policy. Section Three is structured to indicate the particular role and importance of Tubingen during the French occupation of South-West Germany in the period following the Second World War. It is now the function of this final section to present a case for the general validity of a microstudy of Tubingen under French occupation; to indicate the specific aims of this dissertation; and to describe the methodology selected.

In order to present a case for a microstudy of the French occupation in Tubingen it is necessary to provide a survey of previous research on the French zone of occupation in post-war Germany. By reason of the highly political nature of its mission and the strong military element in its composition, the French military government of post-war Germany has continued to prove a difficult subject for research. There is little access available to the records of the French military government of Germany, now deposited in various archives in France, mainly in Colmar ("Service des Archives de l'Occupation") and in ministerial departments (especially the Quai d'Orsay) in Paris. In this respect France has constantly maintained a more rigid enforcement of non-access to military government archives than has been the case in America or Great Britain. There are three reasons for this reticence. The first reason is the element of secretive discretion within the French bureaucratic tradition. The second is a result of the radical switch within France's official policy toward Germany in 1947. After the abandonment of the "French thesis" and its advocacy of a dismembered Germany, deprived of the Saar and Ruhr areas and sections of the Rhineland and burdened by a severe programme of reparations and industrial control, the French government turned to an alternative policy of integrating the western part of Germany (later the Federal Republic) into a European framework dominated by France.

To effectively institute this change it was necessary for the French government to control and play down the intentions of the "French thesis" demonstrated during the years, 1945-1947. Since the subsequent creation of the
Coal and Steel Community and the Common Market it has remained in the interests of France to maintain a discreet curtain of silence on the initial post-war policy of General de Gaulle and four successive French governments on the future of Germany and the secondary role of a "European" solution, all the more as West Germany rose to become the industrial giant of the Common Market.

Consequently to this day nothing of value or interest has been published by the French government on its former zone of occupation in Germany. This silence has also been maintained by the former administrators of the zone in stark contrast to many former British and American occupation officials who have since published memoirs, commentaries etc. In 1962 the leading contemporary historian of the French zone of occupation, Professor P. Hoy Willis, wrote in a bibliographical note to *The French in Germany, 1945–1949*: "Although the policies applied in the British and American zones of occupation in Germany are abundantly documented, the facts about the French zone remain relatively obscure. The greatest lack is of personal testimony, from German and especially from French sources; no military government officer has recounted his experiences in the French zone, and no high official has given an over-all account of his part in the occupation. Reconstructing the French policies in Germany is largely a matter of testing certain critical appraisals against official documents and facts gleaned from a wide variety of sources."

The third reason for official French reticence on the subject of the post-1945 occupation of Germany lies in the fact that for a number of years during the period of French occupation the French military government authorities, in accordance with the confederative philosophy of the "French thesis" on Germany, actively fostered and encouraged particularist and separatist tendencies throughout Southern Germany, both within and outside of their zone of occupation (for example, in Bavaria where rounds of talks were held in secret with German politicians on the subject of the establishment of a Catholic South German–Austrian state). Most of these politicians identified themselves later publicly with the establishment of the Federal Republic as the Cold war intensified, with the Adenauer doctrine of the indivisibility of the historical territories of the former German Reich and the moral right of the Federal Republic to represent the real, though (temporarily) divided Germany. In order to protect these personalities and, of course, in order to avoid a public debate the French authorities have maintained silence on the subject.
Within the Federal Republic there exists, although to a much less acute degree, a consensus of discretionary silence on the subject of French post-war policy within the former French zone of occupation. This has been borne out by a series of interviews conducted between Autumn 1973 and Autumn 1974 with personalities from German political, administrative and academic life, all of whom were intimately acquainted with the politics and administration of the French zone in the post-war years. These men almost invariably listed two reasons for the lack of enthusiasm within West German circles, academic and otherwise, to open a debate on the French occupation: firstly, there is the moral argument that the historical circle of antagonism between France and Germany should be broken once and for all and that the onus of reconciliation rests upon the Federal Republic because of National Socialist war crimes in France; consequently it would be inappropriate for West Germans to openly complain about French policy in post-war Germany; secondly, there is the political argument that any public criticism of France's role in post-war German affairs would only serve to damage Franco-German relations and in turn negatively affect the future of Franco-German cooperation within the European Community.

The effect of this general entente of discretion on the subject of France's policy toward post-war Germany is reflected within the field of academic research. Of the four former zones of occupation the French zone has received the least research, both in quantitative and qualitative terms. Little interest has been shown, both in France and the Federal Republic, in the history of the French zone and in the phenomenon of the short-lived zonal states of Württemberg-Hohenzollern and Baden.

In the late 1940's and early 1950's a series of doctorates was written in France on the French zone of occupation. They all suffer, however, from the common failing of inadequate sources of information. Indeed these doctorates were generally limited to a descriptive reproduction of the forms of administration and types of military government court established within the French zone with little or no analysis of French policy or zonal political developments.\(^{(3)}\)

Since this period little has been written in France on the subject, either privately or within the scope of academic research. Doctorates have remained a rarity within this field. This is not surprising when one considers the difficulties involved in acquiring reliable information to satisfy contemporary standards of scholarship.
Within the Federal Republic itself the paucity of research on the French zone of occupation is all the more striking for the straightforward reason that the period, 1945-1949, is of paramount importance as a causal prelude to the establishment of the West German state and as such should be of cardinal interest for research work into the emergence of the German Federal Republic. Although it can be argued to some extent that German post-war history was largely written by the two Super Powers, the USA and the USSR, there is danger of oversimplification in this argument in that it tends to overlook specific contributive factors of development (e.g. the "French thesis"). In addition, a glance at the former French zone of occupation in South-West Germany reveals two important innovations of the post-war period, Rheinland-Pfalz and Baden-Württemberg, federal conglomerations which resulted, to varying degrees, in response to French occupation policy.

A comparison of the amount of literature written on the respective zones of occupation reveals an obvious dearth on the part of the French zone. There are significantly fewer works, for example, in both English and German, on the French zone than the Russian zone, although it must be admitted that there was an ideological incentive during the Cold War for the West German governments to publicise and maintain interest in conditions in the former Russian zone and in the historical development of the GDR.

Furthermore, there are neither substantial nor accurate German bibliographies on the French zone of occupation. The nearest approximation to the same are short bibliographies printed in a general bibliography of Franco-German relations by the "Deutsch-Französisches Institut" in Ludwigsburg, entitled Deutschland - Frankreich. Landesgeschichte und Problem der deutsch-französischen Beziehungen (1956). Apart from this one contribution the West German archival and library system has displayed uncustomary sloth and unconcern with the long overdue work of bibliographical and archival classification for the period of the French occupation of South-West Germany.

The general lack of documentation and research interest naturally conditions any study which sets out to examine the French zone, either in part or in whole. Faced with the general vacuum of knowledge on the French zone there is some justification in the argument that a piecemeal process of area study
would provide, in multiple, a basis of information and frame of reference for a general study of the French zone or for the analysis of specific themes concerning the French zone.

The macrostudy obviously remains the more important and more difficult task with regard to the French zone. In this case, however, a scholarly macrostudy already exists in the form of P. Roy Willis' *The French in Germany, 1945-1949*, which was published in 1962 and provides a general overview of developments within the French zone. The work is well written and, within the limitations imposed by the existing sources of information, well researched. These limitations cannot be overlooked, however, for Willis had to rely heavily on official French publications, produced by both the French military government headquarters in Baden-Baden and the French ministerial departments in Paris, and on contemporary press coverage in France and Germany. There are obvious problems in the use of such material; since the French publications were official they tended to reflect official French policy positively and with an optimistic bias, rather than present objective data. Furthermore, German press coverage of events in the French zone was subjected to strict censorship by the French military government authorities. Finally, French press coverage of developments within the French zone was relatively meagre. As Willis points out, the French press, e.g. *Le Monde*, *Le Figaro* and *Le Progrès*, "devoted occasional short articles to events of outstanding importance, such as the resignation of Laffon. The pro-Communist weekly *France d'Abord* and the Communist *L'Humanité* provided the most regular commentary on the zone, but their evidence, which was consistently anti-German and continually critical of the military government, was sharply slanted toward extreme left wing views".

The main qualification, therefore, which can be made of Willis' work is the fact that a lot of the material on which it is based is contentious whilst the amount of archival documentation is minimal. This is not presented so much as a criticism of Willis' scholarship as a pointer to the difficulties and impediments involved in research into the French zone of occupation. On the contrary, Willis produced a scholarly account of developments in the French zone. It is in fact the only history of the French zone, apart from individual and largely unresearched chapters in various works on post-war Germany (e.g. Alfred Grosser: *L'Allemagne de l'Ouest, 1945-1952*; Hans-Peter Schwar: *Das Reich und Bundesrepublik*). Consequently Willis' *The French in Germany, 1945-1949*...
is an obvious basis for subsequent research on the French zone and is a useful measure of comparison.

The dilemma which Willis faced in the early 1960's of researching into a wide-ranging area of political and social activity covering the whole of the French zone without reliable sources of documentation was avoided by subsequent works of research on the French zone. These works, all of them doctoral theses, tended to limit their field of research to a specific area of enquiry, either geographically or thematically. On the other hand they compensated for this restriction of perspective by applying more stringent standards in the use of documentary evidence. Furthermore, since the respective French government departments remained adamant on their standpoint of non-access to occupation archives, these researchers were obliged to turn to German archives in South-West Germany for material on the former French zone and the French military government. Two doctorates in this area which demonstrate this development were written in the late 1960's for the University of Tübingen and have since been published: Rolf Winkler: Die Schulpolitik in Württemberg-Hohenzollern, 1945-1952 and Eberhard Konstanzer: Die Entschließung des Landes Baden-Württemberg, 1945-1952. Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Landes Württemberg-Hohenzollern (11).

Both of these works make use of documentary material from the state archives of Württemberg (the archives administration in Baden-Württemberg is organised on the basis of the former historical "Länder" of Baden and Württemberg). It is significant that headway has been made in the former "Land" of Württemberg, for the Württemberg section of the archives administration service in Baden-Württemberg is amongst the most liberal of the West German archives administrations.

The extent of this liberalism is reflected in the documentary basis of Konstanzer's significant contribution to the history of the French occupation of South-West Germany. His work presents a detailed and documented account of the work of the French "Délégation Supérieure" in Tübingen and its supervision of political reconstruction in Süd-Württemberg. Indeed the primary value of Konstanzer's study lies in its comprehensive documentation. Konstanzer was aware of the intrinsic value of his material and of his pioneer position; in 1970 he wrote in an article: "Der Zugang zu den Akten, die Aufschluß über die französische Besatungs- und Deutschlandpolitik nach 1945 geben, ist dem Historiker nahezu gänzlich versperrt. Bisherige Deutungswünsche — zum Beispiel die Arbeiten
von Willis, Korff, or the section on the French zone by Echwarm - could therefore only be based on a few documents, pieces of information in memoirs and newspapers as well as announcements in the Journal Officiel, the official gazette of the zonal military government in Baden-Baden. Within the course of a description of the emergence of the federal "Land" of Baden-Württemberg the author now had for the first time an opportunity of examining records concerning the French policy of occupation in the French zone.

Given the conditions in 1972, therefore, when this present doctoral thesis was begun, there were specific practical gains to be achieved from the decision to restrict the area of research to a microstudy of the capital of Jüd-Württemberg. Firstly, it was the first attempt at a close study of a German community under French occupation after the Second World War, although there have been precursors with regard to the British and American zones. As such it provided an opportunity for creating an extension to the works of Willis and Konstanssr.

Secondly, there was the obvious advantage to be gained from the liberal attitude adopted by the Württemberg archives authorities on access to post-war documentation. This thesis has set out to make full use of the liberalism of the situation; the results will become apparent in subsequent chapters in the extensive quotation of unpublished material.

Thirdly, whilst this thesis can be seen as a stage of development in the wake of Willis' and Konstanssr's research, it also attempts to make in its own right a valid contribution, not only to the history of the French zone but also of post-war Württemberg. With all due respect to Willis' scholarship, it is -
Württemberg was allocated minimal coverage in The French in Germany, 1945–1949. Apart from some general statistics and lists of governments there is little information on the actual political life of the region. This doctorate hopes to provide, in terms of spin-off, considerable background information on the political life of South-Württemberg. Furthermore, it sets out to add an extra dimension to the work of Konstanzer and Winkeler by examining and providing comment on the social, aesthetic and academic life of Tübingen and of South-Württemberg.

As in the case of Konstanzer and Winkeler this doctorate derives its documentary foundation from South-West German archives. This has demonstrated positive advantages with Konstanzer's and Winkeler's research in that the German archives provided more objective and reliable information on French occupation policy than the French documentation which was the basis of Willis' work.

In other respects, however, this doctorate seeks to differentiate itself from Konstanzer's methodology. Whilst there is a basic consensus of agreement on the importance of factual and reliable documentation in any treatment of the French zone, the microstudy form of research was not chosen solely in this case on account of the practical consideration that it represented the most reliable method of procuring reliable and extensive sources of information.

The choice of a microstudy represents to an equal degree the intention to employ the microstudy on Tübingen as a meter of analysis to indicate the developments symptomatic for the entire French zone and the "French thesis" on Germany. This microstudy will pursue two ends: firstly, it will describe Tübingen as a community in its own right and with its own specific post-war developments; secondly, it will attempt concurrently to provide a series of valid comments on French occupation policy and the "French thesis" on Germany during the years, 1945–1947.

Bearing in mind the objective need for informative microstudies on the French zone and yet aware at the same time of the insufficiency of a mere presentation of freshly uncovered data, it was decided to formulate a thesis title which would encompass and resolve both considerations. To this end the theme, The French Occupation of Tübingen, 1945–1947: French policies and German reactions in the immediate post-war period was chosen.
since it was flexible enough to serve both as a framework for constructive documentation and as a model of analysis. The extent to which the former function is satisfied will become evident in the course of subsequent chapters. The use of a microstudy of Tübingen as a model of analysis requires, however, further explanation with regard to the two stated aims of the study.

The first of these is to describe Tübingen as a community in itself with its own particular developments. Within the framework of the French zone the German regions and former "Lander" comprising the zone retained their regional identity. The "French thesis" with its confederative doctrine underwrote and encouraged regional autonomy. The main effect of this policy on Tübingen was the elevation of the town to the rank of "Land" capital for a period of seven years. This in itself is an event of note. Along with Freiburg Tübingen experienced a temporary elevation of rank and acquisition of power. The subsequent effects on the town have been, however, of fundamental and lasting importance for Tübingen did not revert totally to its former role of "Kreisstadt". Tübingen indeed remained to a great extent the administrative centre for the region. The history of the post-war situation is therefore an important pointer to developments which have contributed to Tübingen's contemporary position.

The second aim, namely to provide a series of valid comments on French occupation policy during the years, 1945-1947, is evidently the more important role of this case study and consequently requires elucidation and definition.

Successful microstudies have already been written on German communities in the National Socialist post-war era, e.g. Edward N. Peterson: The Limits of Hitler's Power, (16) John Glabis: A German Community under American Occupation. Munich, 1945-1952, (17) Hilary Ann Bakhir: The British Occupation of Germany, 1945-1949, with special reference to Hamburg, (18). These works have all presented varying justifications for the choice of a microstudy as the modus operandi. In The Limits of Hitler's Power Edward Peterson sets out to examine the myth of the absolutist uniformity of the National Socialist state. For this purpose Peterson selects three levels of political life: Land Bayern, the city of Nuremberg and the town of Richstett. His reasons for the choice of Nuremberg are listed as the following: "This study of a city symbolic of National Socialism offers an insight into the working of city government, in this case one that had
a strong local tyrant, one in conflict with the bureaucracy of the national tyrant. It should show one example of local reaction to contradictory pressures from above and below, and therewith the compromises necessary in any command. The city of Nuremberg was one link in the chain of command. How the city reacted may not have been "typical", but Nuremberg is one example of what can happen — it is further evidence of how strong, willful personalities maintain a form of political process within — the framework.(19) On Eichstätt Peterson says further: "One could hardly call Eichstätt a typical German small town of the 1930's, but it may represent the civil "cold war" of the times. Though atypical Eichstätt serves as a reminder that uniformity is a rarity even in the state that gives top priority to uniformity". (20)

The above quotations are of interest for this particular case study of the French occupation of Tübingen since Peterson emphasizes the role which microstudies can play in indicating the contradictions and divergent pressures at play within even highly authoritarian chains of command and totalitarian political systems. Consequently Peterson employs the microstudy as a meter of analysis for demonstrating and gauging the degree of dissonance between national political structures and the individual community. Peterson's methodology, therefore, has a specific relevance for a case study of French-occupied Tübingen for, although the Allied military government of Germany cannot be closely compared with the National Socialist regime, they were in fact both highly autocratic and centralist forms of government and political control.

John Gimbel's study of the town of Harburg under American occupation is an example of the exclusive microstudy. In the introduction to his book Gimbel claims that the intention of the work is to examine "in detail the activities of an American military government detachment at the lowest administrative level to suggest what an analysis of a larger unit might reveal". (21) Gimbel therefore sets out not so much to disprove a general theory, as is the case with Peterson, as to develop a general theory from a particular case study. Elements of this methodology will appear throughout the course of the present thesis, but with the difference that a general frame of reference already exists in F. Kay Willis' work which cannot be overlooked although it will be treated with reserve. In certain respects, therefore, this thesis will fluctuate between Gimbel's and Peterson's methodologies.
The area of potential subject matter for a case study of an occupied community in post-war Germany is exceedingly wide due to the all-pervading nature of Allied occupation legislation, affecting political, social, economic, administrative, educational, recreational and cultural affairs. From this range of possibilities a restricted list of themes has, for practical reasons, to be selected. The main imperative behind the selection is that it should provide the best possible cross-section of the variables governing the activities of the specific community under occupation and of the occupying forces.

Bearing in mind the dictates of the "French thesis" on Germany and the general situation of Tübingen after April 1945 it has been decided to subdivide this thesis into seven principal chapter headings (excluding the introductory and concluding chapters) treating, in order of appearance, the following themes:

1. The Initial period of French occupation in Tübingen, 1945—1946, and the emergence of political groupings, with special reference to the anti-Fascist committee, "Die Demokratische Vereinigung", prior to the reconstitution of party-political life.
2. The reconstitution and development of the German Communist Party (KPD) in Tübingen, 1945—1947.
4. The reconstitution and development of the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) and of the German Popular Party (DVP) in Tübingen, 1945—1947, and the role of the churches in the reconstitution of the same.
6. Cultural affairs in Tübingen, 1945—1947, including developments within the local press and publishing industry.
7. The University of Tübingen, 1945—1947.

The choice and order of arrangement of these themes necessitates some comment. The reason for the choice of Chapter One is self-explanatory in chronological terms since the initial stage of the revival of German political life in occupied Germany was the emergence of anti-Fascist committees which cooperated with the Allied forces. Chapters Two, Three and Four on the development of party-political life in Tübingen were chosen to precede Chapter Five's disc-
cription of the re-establishment of municipal administrations and institutions in Tübingen, although German administrations in fact resumed their duties in post-war Tübingen long before party-political life was permitted to reconstitute itself in Baden-Württemberg; the reason for this lies in the fact that constant reference is made in Chapter Five to a large number of members of various political parties and groupings and to developments within the same, a certain amount of which might be lost on the reader without prior description of the traditional party-political spectrum and respective party loyalties which continued to exert influence in post-war Tübingen before the re-establishment of official political parties in the spring of 1946.

The choice of theme for Chapters Six and Seven may appear to bear a tenuous relationship with the other chapters. Cultural and educational affairs represented, however, important and highly characteristic areas of French occupation policy which were specifically programmed to contribute towards the re-education of the German populace. In addition, as with art and culture, university life is a useful gauge of intellectual and social progress in post-war Germany. Finally, the university was (and still is) the hub of the town's activity and without its inclusion no realistic treatment of the community can be seriously considered. For this reason it is difficult to comprehend John Gimbel's decision to exclude the local university from his case study of Marburg, for, as in the case of Tübingen, the university represented the largest and most important single social unit within the community.

At this point a comment must be made on the exclusion of a comprehensive treatment of the economic situation of Tübingen under French occupation, especially since economics played a major role in the demands comprising the "French thesis" on Germany. It is obvious that this exclusion creates a certain amount of imbalance within the overall analysis of Tübingen's position vis-à-vis French occupation policy. French economic demands, e.g. in the form of restitutions and reparations, severely affected Tübingen's economic and social life as they did in the case of every other community in the French zone. Conversely, Tübingen also experienced a limited degree of economic stimulation through French economic policy; for example, Tübingen was the first town in post-war Germany to hold a trades fair. On March 1, 1946, the fair was opened under the title "Export-Musterschau, Wiederaufbau der Wirtschaft" (Export Exhibition of Economic Revival).
in the former student corporation house, "Chibellinhaus", in the Gartenstraße with the specific intention of publicising the industrial products of Südtürkemberg and at the direct request of Governor-General Münzer. Initially, admission was restricted "to Military Government officers and officials, trade commissions and buyers from other zones and from abroad". Over 150 firms from Südtürkemberg exhibited their products. The fair lasted six months and then developed into a permanent exhibition on Südtürkemberg's industry. Other instances of French intervention in and control of economic life in Tübingen could be enumerated. Nevertheless, despite the importance and effect of economic affairs in post-war Tübingen, it was felt that the question of economic policy ought to be reserved for the specialist knowledge of the economist.

Another feature of the choice of chapter headings is the fact that, although it is the declared intention of this thesis to produce a series of comments on French occupation policy, the themes of the individual chapters appear to recount the specifically German rather than the French perspectives of the occupation situation. This is an inevitable result of the dependence of this thesis on access to German archives, the main function of which lies in the collection and classification of German documentation. Consequently, it is in the nature of things that the documentation offered by these archives contains a starkly German perspective of events and developments. This material, therefore, can be defined as a source of "indirect" comment with regard to French occupation policy, although many statements of direct and immediate relevance have been uncovered and quoted; unfortunately these latter statements did not suffice to create a series of directly "French" themes. This is an impediment which all research into the French zone must face until such time as the French government sees fit to grant access for academic research to its archives. When one compares, however, the value of the material offered by the German archives with the existing, accessible French material, this impediment appears as a small price to be paid.

The choice of the period, 1945-1947, as the time-scale for this case study rather than the period of occupation in toto (i.e., 1945-1949) was based on a number of considerations. It is evident that the period, 1945-1947, was chosen primarily to correspond to the period of predominance of the "French thesis" on Germany with the intention of providing a concentration of perspective of French occupation policy as work within a German community. This period was also selected...
to highlight the specific preoccupations of the "French thesis"; these preoccupations were modified in the course of 1948. However, it is not the intention of this thesis to demonstrate changes of French policy in 1948 and after, but rather to depict the characteristics of French occupation policy at the level of a single community during the period of predominance of the "French thesis". Consequently, the period after 1947 is not dealt with, except for instances of occasional reference and comparison. Finally, on account of the perennial problem of satisfactory documentation, it was considered advisable to concentrate the period of research into as narrow a dimension of time as possible.

It may be argued that, since the "French thesis" on Germany applied in the main to regions north of Württemberg (e.g. the Saar and Rhineland) Tübingen presents an unusual choice for a microstudy involving an appraisal of the French thesis. This consideration, however, is countered by the Popperian principle of proof whereby a scientific thesis is proven, not so much within obvious areas of relevance as in peripheral areas of marginal validity. For this reason Tübingen remains the topic of research.
Footnotes

Introduction: Section Four: The function, aims and methodology of this case study of post-war Tübingen.

(1) Stanford, p. 291.

(2) The material for these assertions is derived from a series of interviews held between Autumn 1973 and Spring 1974 with various personalities from the French academic world and news media who were involved in one way or another (e.g. interpreters) in these talks. For reasons of discretion it has been agreed to preserve the anonymity of these interviewees.

(3) e.g. Jean Coffre, L'administration des territoires occupés par la France en Allemagne, Doctorat en Droit, Université de Strasbourg, 1946; Albert Hofstetter, Les tribunaux du Gouvernement militaire en zone française d'occupation en Allemagne, Doctorat d'État, Université de Strasbourg, 1947; C. Loyseau, Le droit civil de l'occupation, la réforme de 1945, Doctorat d'État, Université de Strasbourg, 1949; Jeanne Servière, La justice en zone occidentale d'occupation en Allemagne, Doctorat en Droit, Université de Montpellier, 1950.


(6) Jbid., p. 292.


(9) Stanford, 1962.


(14) e.g., John Gimbol, A German Community under American Occupation: Hamburg, 1945-1949. Stanford, 1961. (This was originally a doctoral thesis for the Department of History, University of Oregon (1964), entitled Hamburg under occupation: a study of the impact of an American military government (attachment upon a German community) and:


(17) John Gimbol, op. cit.
(20) ibid., p. 395.
(21) John Gimbol, op. cit., p. 1

(23) From a copy of the admission programme kindly lent by the former technical director of the trades fair, Dipl. Ing. Kurt Behnisch, Tübingen.
Chapter One
The initial period of French occupation in Tübingen, 1945–46, and the emergence of political groupings, with special reference to the anti-Fascist committee, "Die Demokratische Vereinigung", prior to the reconstitution of party-political life.
On April 19, 1943, the French army occupied Tübingen. The first measure which affected the political life of the community was an order issued that same day by the French commander in charge of Tübingen instructing the newly appointed provisional mayor ("Kommissarischer Oberbürgermeister") to provide the French military government with a list of the NSDAP members resident in Tübingen. This order was included within the framework of a general order, comprising eleven set instructions, dealing with different aspects of community life, which the "5° Bureau" of the French First Army had obviously formulated prior to the French capture of Württemberg. (1) (q.v. appendix 1)

The compilation of lists of Tübingen's NSDAP members (approximately 1900 in all) was technically not an easy task since one of the final acts of the National Socialist administration in Tübingen prior to the capture of the town had been the destruction of the local NSDAP and municipal files. It was also a difficult task in human terms since the lack of records compelled the town hall officials to in fact inform the occupying forces on the political background of a considerable percentage of the town's population, including the community's social and professional elites.

Consequently an initial feature of occupied Tübingen, as elsewhere, was political denunciation, most of which occurred in the form of individual communications to the French authorities. Inevitably this created an atmosphere of tension and resentment within a large section of the community who now had to fear reprisals on account of party membership and even personal animosities. This atmosphere has been underlined in an unpublished account of post-war Tübingen, "Chronik der Universität Tübingen 1945-1947," written by a local journalist, Hermann Werner. In his records of interviews held with various important personalities of the post-war era in Tübingen Werner noted the comments of Carlo Schmid on the subject: "Einmal wurde er (i.e. Schmid) von den Franzosen auf der Straße verhaftet und mehrere Tage festgehalten bei übler Behandlung. Das konnte jedermann passieren ohne jeden Grund oder auf Grund von jeder Denunziation. (On one he, i.e. Schmid, was also arrested by the French in the street, kept in custody for several days and subjected to unpleasant treatment. This could happen to anybody, without any reason or on the basis of any kind of denunciation)."
The order to draw up lists of NSDAP members was consequently a source of embarrassment to the town hall. In an interview with Hermann Werner in 1951 the mayor who received the order of April 19, Dr. Haufmann, denied having had anything to do with the compilation of the lists. Werner noted in his summary of Haufmann's account: "Die Franzosen brachten bald eine Liste von Leuten, die vorzuladen seien; woher die Liste gebildet wurde, sei unbekannt geblieben; er mußte die Leute kommen lassen, sie wurden in einem besonderen Zimmer im Rathaus überwacht und dann abgeführt. Auch die Festnahme der führenden Nazi erfolgte ohne deutsche Beteiligung." (The French soon produced a list of people to be summoned; no one learned from where they had obtained this list; he had to order the people to come (to the town hall), they were kept under surveillance in a special room in the town hall and then taken away. The arrest of the leading Nazis was also undertaken without any German participation.)

In actual fact the municipal authorities were less active in collecting the names and addresses of National Socialists than were former opponents of National Socialism within the community, e.g. former KPD and SPD members who were now able to emerge from political obscurity. The most systematic compilation of NSDAP membership within Tübingen was done at the instigation of an organised group of former KPD and SPD members, called the "Demokratische Vereinigung" (Democratic Association). This group, acting in unison with the new police chief of Tübingen, a KPD member, forced the local NSDAP functionaries to produce lists. In the Protokollbuch der Demokratischen Vereinigung Tübingen, the handwritten minutes of this group, the secretary wrote: "Auf unsere Anregung hin mußten sich alle Blockleiter der NSDAP am 26. Juni auf dem Polizeiamt Tübingen melden und namenslisten mitbringen, woraus die Mitglieder des Blocks und ihre Funktionen in der Partei und in sämtlichen Gliederungen der SS, SA und NSKK ersichtlich waren." (At our instigation all block leaders of the NSDAP had to report on June 26 at Tübingen police office and bring with them lists of names showing the members of their block cells and their functions in the party and in all organisations of the SS, SA and NSKK.)

The French occupation authorities in Tübingen were, however, already in possession of a list of prominent National Socialists prior to June 26. A former town hall official, Stadtammann Hartter, substantiated this fact in an interview with Hermann Werner. Werner recorded: "Schon in den ersten Tagen nach der

(In the very first days of the occupation Dr. Renner brought back from a meeting with the French a list with about 25 names of mostly prominent Tübingen citizens, among them Feser, Bebermeyer, Gieseler and Kittel, with instructions to summon them to the town hall on May 3. Where the French had the list from has not come to light.)

It is quite possible that the "Demokratische Vereinigung" had already provided the French officials with provisional lists of leading NSDAP members within the community.

On this original list there were 25 names. A certain number of these had already fled Tübingen with the result that 19 persons in all reported to the town hall on May 3 where they were duly arrested. They included 8 university professors (Bebermeyer, Bauer, Vogt, Reihlen, Usadel, Kittel, Feser, Gieseler), one writer (Grabert), one sculptor (Krauß), the head of the municipal "Arbeitsamt" (Spellberg), three police officials plus a miscellaneous group of non-professional occupations (gardener, office worker, baker, railway official).

The decision to arrest these men can be seen as a hasty precursor to the subsequent and more methodical process of denazification which involved wide sections of the population. The intention behind the arrest of these men on May 3 was to swiftly eliminate what the French authorities in Tübingen considered to be the National Socialist activists and elite within the community, the highest ranking party officials, Kreisleiter Rauschnabel and Oberbürgermeister Dr. Weinmann, having fled the town on the eve of its occupation.

The men arrested were installed in a section of "Schloß Tübingen" to await transfer to an internment camp which the French military government in Württemberg had opened in Balingen. Two of the detainees, Professor Vogt and Professor Feser, were released prior to transfer to Balingen.

The internment camp in Balingen, together with a similar prison in the neighbouring town of Reutlingen, acquired a reputation for brutality.
Württemberg which, correct or false, conveyed the impression to the population that the French occupation authorities intended maintaining a hard and uncompromising attitude towards National Socialists. Consequently the National Socialist section of the community, both committed and non-committed party members, maintained on the whole an intensely reserved profile during the initial months of the occupation.

Soon after the occupation the French authorities in Tübingen implemented a system of surveillance over those elements which they considered potentially dangerous, including NSDAP officials, members of the SS, holders of National Socialist honours and "Wehrmacht" staff officers (especially "Ritterkreuzträger"). These groups were required to report at regular weekly intervals to the French authorities and to account for their activities.

According to various contemporary observers of the French occupation of post-war Tübingen, one of the underlying fears of French policy was a constant worry about the possible re-grouping of National Socialists in clandestine or disguised organisations. For reasons of this nature (which will be treated in more detail in the chapter on the CDU and DVP) the French authorities in Tübingen viewed the establishment of the "Deutsche Volkspartei" with intense suspicion since a high proportion of the signatories who underwrote the official application for reconstitution were former members (or associated members) of the NSDAP. In fact the French authorities rejected the original application and refused to permit the establishment of the DVP until the list of signatories had been altered to their satisfaction.

There were good reasons for the French to maintain a general attitude of watchfulness toward National Socialist activists. There was no a priori justification for believing in 1945 that the crushing military defeat suffered by the National Socialist state and its subsequent collapse, followed by the dissolution and proscription of the NSDAP, had totally neutralised National Socialist ideology or the commitment of its ideological activists. Indeed Tübingen provides an excellent a posteriori justification of French fears in that, according to the detailed account of one interviewee, a re-grouping of National Socialist activists did in fact occur within the community, successfully escaping the attention of the French authorities.
Within a matter of months after the occupation this group, which consisted of between 15 and 20 National Socialists, the majority of them ex-"Wehrmacht" officers plus a number of professional people, with a more extended network of clandestine contacts emanating from this nucleus into the community, constituted itself with the initial intention, according to the above interviewee (a founder-member), of "keeping an eye" on the political and social situation in Tübingen.

The "Wehrmacht" faction within this group retained as military an ethos as possible, to the extent that they celebrated the wedding reception of one of their members at his home in "Wehrmacht" dress uniform. This may appear in retrospect a trivial matter, but it was an act of defiance which, owing to the strictness with which the French applied the general ban on the wearing of "Wehrmacht" uniform, would have resulted in drastic punitive measures had the French authorities learnt of the offence.

By adhering to National Socialist and military traditions this group risked severe punishment. Since a number of them were already under surveillance by the French and since, in addition, unauthorised meetings of three or more persons were illegal, the group had to engage in conspiratorial activity to escape detection. The founder-member of the group, from whom the bulk of this information is derived, explained that topics were discussed by means of what he termed "Rundspruchverfahren" (verbal transmission), transmitting news and views through the network of contacts. The nucleus of the group (i.e. the 15-20 activist members) knew each other well, both from personal acquaintance and from contacts within the NSDAP, the "Hitlerjugend" and the "Wehrmacht", and they trusted one another, secure in the ideological commitment of the respective members. It is an indication of the discipline and commitment operating within this group that they escaped detection within Tübingen's medium-sized and closely-knit community where everyone tended to know everyone else's business especially during this period of surveillance and denunciation.

An essential feature of this group was a common anxiety with regard to the acquisition of political influence within the community by KPD and SPD members. They feared a Marxist take-over of Tübingen. These men, now excluded from political influence, viewed with alarm the newly acquired power of the KPD and SPD, especially the fact that the KPD assumed positions of control within the local police forces, the trade
unions, the local newspaper and the municipal administration. Furthermore, they intensely distrusted what they regarded as the Marxist vanguard of such a takeover, the "Demokratische Vereinigung". In short, these men made an equation of comparison between 1918 and 1945 and expected revolutionary activity from the KPD. With this in mind they therefore considered it foolhardy and dangerous of the French authorities to have bestowed the Communists with the preconditions of a successful political coup, e.g. police (in lieu of armed forces), newspaper media (the radio network was not operating), trade unions.

The group later entered into discussions with various members of the community who, though not specifically connected with the group, were also alarmed at the powerful position and intentions of the Marxist Left within Tübingen and Württemberg. Counter-insurgency plans were prepared for the eventuality of a Marxist coup and, during the incipient period of the Cold War, of a Russian attack on the Western zones.

The group's fears concerning a Communist uprising and/or Russian attack proved groundless. Consequently the group remained a potential rather than an actual factor of influence within the political life of Tübingen in the period, 1945-1947. It is, nevertheless, a feature of importance in the sense that it provides an a posteriori justification for the French military government's cautious policy in Tübingen toward committed National Socialists. A part of the group emerged in the course of 1947 within municipal political life as members of the "Fartellofe Wählerverbindung" (Independent Electors' Association) which was a "Hathauptsartei" (i.e. municipal political grouping) established and registered in 1946 exclusively to contest municipal elections.

Despite the existence and activities of this group, the French authorities effectively excluded the former National Socialist elites in Tübingen from active participation in the reconstruction of political life during the initial period of the occupation. This included the disfranchisement of all former NSDAP functionaries. This process was systematised with the later introduction of a programme of demasification designed to purge German society of National Socialist influences. The subject of demasification, however, is an extensive and complex one and has as much been reserved for a subsequent chapter on the municipal administrations, where the effects of demasification were most apparent.
The primary result of the flight of the former NSDAP leaders from Tübingen on April 10, 1945, and the subsequent arrest and exclusion from political influence of NSDAP members was to create a power vacuum within Tübingen. This vacuum was filled by a series of personalities and groupings, some of whom had been active in local politics prior to 1933; others, however, were totally unknown quantities.

The first group to publicly utilise this state of vacuum was a small number of individual personalities who were not native inhabitants of Tübingen, but who had arrived, with one exception, in the rear-guard of the French First Army. Some of these persons were politically motivated; on the whole, however, they were primarily directed by a sense of profit and self-interest. Some were former criminals. The general chaos of the post-war situation in Germany provided an ideal situation for criminal activities. This was a general phenomenon in all three Western zones.

At the same time the Allied occupation forces were obliged to rely on the help and advice of those sections of the German populace which had not been associated with National Socialism. The occupation administrations required the services of German advisers to provide them with detailed information on local conditions and complexities and to act as interpreters and intermediaries. Inevitably the KPD and SED provided manpower for these roles in the initial period of occupation. Another group, however, which was able to capitalise on its non-association with National Socialism were those people who had been imprisoned during the National Socialist era, often in concentration camps, for specifically criminal (rather than political) reasons. It was a phenomenon common to the entire French zone that a number of such men emerged from obscurity posing as "antifeühristen" (anti-Fascists) and "politisch Verfolgte" (victims of political persecution) on the strength of their concentration camp papers. In the initial period of administrative instability it was very difficult for the French to check all their backgrounds thoroughly.

In the case of Tübingen there were at least five such men who, for a short period in the summer of 1945, exercised considerable influence in the management of municipal affairs. Their names were: Strehl, Kittelberger, Haberfelder, Huber and von Vellberg. There was a tenuous relationship between the Marxist Left in
Tübingen and some of these men, especially Haberfelder, although it is not clear whether he, or any of the other four, were KPD or SPD members. Haberfelder acted as intermediary between the Tübingen KPD and the Communist chief of the French "Sureté" in Tübingen with the result that Karl Kammer's nomination within the "Demokratische Vereinigung" as head of the police force was ratified. This in itself does not prove that Haberfelder was also of the Left or at all politically motivated. On the other hand these men did emphasize their "antifaschistisch" past and at least insinuated a left-wing bias; a left-wing bias was, of course, the most respectable political credential in the initial period of occupation.

The Left-wing parties in Tübingen suffered considerably and for a long period of time from a public image of association with these personalities. This association between the Left especially the Communists, and these men led Carlo Schmid to equate them as synonymous. In an interview with Hermann Werner, Schmid maintained that "es seien auch unlautere Elemente durch die Kommunisten und durch die Franzosen eingedrungen worden, die man habe ausmerzen müssen". (shady elements had also been imposed on them by the Communists and by the French and these had to be eliminated.)

These sentiments were repeated in an interview between Werner and the former mayor of Tübingen, Viktor Rümmel: "Dann seien durch die Franzosen auch allerlei schlechte Klemente, die sich an die Franzosen heranschmachten, Schieber und Betrüger aufgedrängt worden wie Huber beim Wohnungswesen, Kammer und Haberfelder bei der Polizei. Nur langsam sei es gelungen, die Verwaltung von ihnen wieder zu säubern." (All kinds of bad elements, racketeers and swindlers who had known how to make up to the French, like Huber in the municipal housing department and Haberfelder in the police, had been imposed upon them by the French. Only slowly had they succeeded in purging the administration of them.)

The sole solicitor licensed to practice in Tübingen in the early months of French occupation stressed in correspondence with Hermann Werner the criminal nature of these men: "In Tübingen selbst hat es verschiedene kriminelle Klemente damals gegeben, die unter dem Vorwand, politische KZ-Häftlinge gewesen zu sein, Kürsorge oder längere Zeit sogar ein wirkliches Terrorregime hier aufgebaut haben und die Dutzende von meist ehelichen Bürgern hinter Schloß und Riegel, unter Mißbrauch des Vertrauens der Beamtenmacht, gebracht haben." (In Tübingen itself
there were various criminal elements at that time who, on the pretence that they had been political prisoners in the concentration camps, even established a genuine terror regime for varying periods of time and who put dozens of mostly honourable citizens behind bars through improper use of the trust placed in them by the occupying power.\(^{(18)}\)

It is important to note that these men used their influence in Tübingen brutally and indiscriminately, thereby alienating the local population, former NSDAP members, and opponents of National Socialism alike. They also used their influence to openly further their own material interests, often by illegal means. This element of criminality proved eventually to be of short duration since the French were ultimately concerned in the long-term perspective with the restoration of a stable and efficient political and administrative system. It was therefore inevitably a matter of time before the French authorities disposed of this class of adjutant in order to create more orderly conditions and to secure a better relationship with the local population.

The most striking example in Tübingen of such a personality and his eventual loss of power concerns the symptomatic case of a self-styled Konrad West Edler von Vellberg, whose aristocratic title was apparently false (the choice of 'von Vellberg' was deliberate in that the district of Vellberg lay in the American-occupied section of Württemberg and it was consequently difficult to ascertain the veracity of the title in Tübingen due to the administrative barriers created by the zonal boundaries).

Konrad West had arrived in Tübingen from Stuttgart in 1944 and had apparently worked as a restaurant waiter during the period prior to the occupation.\(^{(19)}\) After the occupation of the town he emerged as a figure of influence in the role of adviser to the local French authorities. He was subsequently responsible for the arrest of a number of Tübingen citizens.\(^{(20)}\) West was accepted as trustworthy by the French on account of his possession of a certificate of release ('Heilungsschein') from Dachau concentration camp, dated December 22, 1943.\(^{(21)}\) The French authorities presumed that West had been a political detainee.
The Tübingen solicitor referred to above, Dr. Rudolf Zimmerle, who provided legal defence services for National Socialists and others held in custody by the French authorities, described Wiest's activities as principally criminal in a written account of the role of criminals in post-war Tübingen: "... Ein besonders markanter Fall dieser Art war der des "Kamer von Vellberg", der in Hotel "Leens" in Tübingen zeitweilig sein Hauptsitz mit seinen Helfershelfern und seiner Gelleben aufgesogen hatte und der zunächst bei den französischen Stadtkommandanten, später beim amerikanischen Verbindungsoffizier, dunkle Funktionen zum Nachteil Tübinger Bürger ausübte und ernsthaft bemüht war, sich das Hotel "Leens" selbst auszunehmen." (One particularly striking case of this kind was that of "Kamer von Vellberg" who had temporarily set up his headquarters with his accomplices and mistresses in the "Hotel Leens" in Tübingen and who, at first under the auspices of the French town commander and later of the American liaison officer, pursued shady transactions at the cost of Tübingen citizens and also made serious attempts at appropriating the "Hotel Leens" for himself.)

Wiest also opened a private brothel for the French troops in the student corporation house, "Valstia", as a counterpart to the official "maison de tolérance" for commissioned officers which the French authorities had established in another corporation house ("Rothenburgerhaus").

Wiest himself created the situation which precipitated his downfall. In June 1945 a book written by Wiest was published by a Stuttgart publishing firm (Verlag libertas) and printed in Tübingen on the local newspaper's printing press. The title of the slim 70-page volume was Dachauer Erfahrungen in Konservationslagern. (24) In this book, which, according to the preface, depicted real situations and conditions experienced by the author, Wiest attacked in polemic style the behaviour of those Roman Catholic priests who had been fellow-inmates in Dachau, accusing them of non-observance of the vow of celibacy (p. 17), of extortion in the exercise of the rites of confession and absolution (p. 46 f.) and of theft (p. 47). (25)

The other significant feature of Wiest's book was a proposal made by Wiest on the subject of denazification. Wiest advocated that positions of influence should only be given to former concentration camp inmates: "Bei der bevorstehenden Auslese durch die Alliierten kann es nur zwei Fragen geben, die man jedem Deutschen stellen soll:"
Erste Frage: Sind Sie Nazi? - Sie wird stets mit einem Nein beantwortet werden.

West's thesis was received with strong disapproval by a group of emerging political personalities in Tübingen who had themselves not been committed to concentration camps and some of whom had not been at all politically involved prior to the occupation. West's demands were obviously a source of embarrassment to these men, most of whom had joined the ranks of the "Demokratische Vereinigung". This group of men did not lead the initial attack on West's publication, but they supported moves to have him removed. The Roman Catholic bishopric of Württemberg which had its diocesan seat in the town of Kottenburg, some seven miles from Tübingen, was appalled and worried by the vehemence of West's anti-clericalism. On June 26, 1945, the Bishop of Kottenburg registered a complaint with the French Military Governor of Stuttgart, General Schwarzkopf, concerning the book.

West's book had, however, obviously been promoted by the French occupation authorities in Tübingen. This work was the first (by a long head start) to be published in post-war Tübingen. In order to be published the book required publishing and printing permission from the French authorities, plus the grant of a "bon de déblocage" for the requisite amount of paper and other materials, all of which the French rationed and distributed as they saw fit. To obtain these three licences West had to have some form of backing within the local French authorities or, alternatively, to have convinced the French authorities, which in the initial period of the occupation contained a considerable left-wing and Marxist faction, that the book represented a piece of healthy criticism of the National Socialist system.
Wüst lost his support within the French authorities once it was discovered that he had a criminal record and that he had most probably been committed to Dachau for criminal offences, facts which were unearthed in the penal register ("Strafregister") of the neighbouring town of Herrnberg by the solicitor, Dr. Zimmerle, and reported to the military government commander of Tübingen.

The French, embarrassed by this knowledge, arrested Wüst and hastily recalled those copies of the book which were still on display in Tübingen bookshops. On August 7, a representative of the Bishop of Rottenburg reported after a visit to the French authorities in Tübingen, "daß er (i.e. Wüst) wie sein geistiger Drahtzieher Strehl im Gefängnis sitze, wahrscheinlich wegen Hochstapelia. Die 5000 Exemplare seines Dachaubuches, die noch nicht abgesetzt seien, wurden von der Polizei beschlagnahmt, dünn wieder freigegeben. Sie liegen bei Laupp (i.e. local printing firm). Zs wird sich fragen, ob man nicht einen Schritt tun soll beim Tübinger Gouverneur." (that he (i.e. Wüst) like his mental wire-puller, Strehl, was now in prison, probably because of swindling. The 5000 copies of his book on Dachau that had not yet been sold were confiscated by the police, but then released. They are lying at Laupp’s (i.e. printing firm). The question is whether one shouldn't approach the Tübingen Governor.)

The book did not reappear in the bookshops and after a period in prison Wüst moved to Stuttgart.

The other figures comprising this group of opportunists all eventually quit Tübingen under one cloud or another. The man, for example, who had acted as liaison man between the French police authorities and the KPD, Haberfeldar, disappeared overnight from his post in the police force with a number of blank, hence highly valuable, passports. Another man who had been put in charge of the local cinema also quit Tübingen overnight after irregularities had been noticed in his accounting.

The decline of influence of the above group was overlapped by the ascendancy of another group of personalities who were much more politically motivated, consequently better organised, and who were almost all local personalities. This group had worked to curb Wüst, Haberfeldar and the others from their positions of influence, continually stressing to the French authorities the inherent contradiction between French interests in a return to stable conditions and the damage caused to French plans and prestige by the activities of criminal adjutants.
This latter group, which came to be known as the "Demokratische Vereinigung", represents the first stage in the re-establishment and development of autonomous political life in occupied Tübingen. In addition the "Demokratische Vereinigung" presents a case study of the development of the anti-Fascist committees, generally known as "Antifas", which emerged immediately after the Allied occupation. For these reasons the history of the "Demokratische Vereinigung" will be treated in some detail, all the more so since a record exists of the minutes of their meetings in the Protokollbuch der Demokratischen Vereinigung Tübingen which offers unique insight into the workings of an "Antifa" organisation. These committees were common to the whole of Germany in the period of collapse of the Third Reich, according to Theodor-Isenberg: "In zahlreichen kommunalen Bereichen hatten sich antifaschistische oder antinationalsozialistische Aktionenkomitees spontan gebildet. Die alliierten Lokal- und Kreisbeauftragten hörten hinsichtlich der Personalbestellung teils deren empfehlenden oder warnenden Rat an ..." (In numerous areas of municipal life anti-Fascist or anti-National Socialist action committees had formed spontaneously. The Allied local and district commissioners listened to some extent to their advice about personnel appointments, both recommending and cautioning ...)

The "Antifas" were in the majority Left-wing groupings, less sophisticated forerunners of the popular front propagated by the German Communist party in the form of the "Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands" (SED) (Socialist Unity Party of Germany). One observer has pointed out that in general the "Antifas" were "overwhelmingly working class in composition and leadership. The "Antifa" was an ad hoc instrument of the Left for the mobilisation of all possible mass support for the assumption of governmental power in the community. It sought to substantiate its desires for public authority by soliciting the membership of the liberal bourgeoisie; and usually a small minority of Left-wing Catholics and Liberals did participate."(35)

The three criteria of the above general definition of an "Antifa" were satisfied in the case of Tübingen's "Demokratische Vereinigung"; it was originally an invention of the Left which enrolled the aid of men of middle-class, professional background and which (successfully) aspired to performing the functions of a clandestine municipal government. This, however, is not the full story nor the complete definition. At least two important extenuating factors must
be included in an examination of the "Demokratische Vereinigung". Firstly, the "Demokratische Vereinigung" originally acted, not only to implement an anti-Fascist and left-wing programme, but also with the intention of preempting French occupation policy and preventing a complete subordination of Tübingen's interests to those of the French military government. Secondly, specific personalities, who were later to make a name for themselves within Württemberg and Federal German political life, used the "Demokratische Vereinigung" as a power basis for the re-establishment of efficient German administrations and a modified form of government to replace those which collapsed in Süd-Württemberg with the defeat of National Socialism.

Within Tübingen the "Demokratische Vereinigung" has maintained a reputation as a positive example of democratic activism. This is largely due to the fact that former members have at times distorted the real causality of circumstances and events surrounding the establishment and policy of the group. A basic conflict within the ranks of the "Demokratische Vereinigung" between its Left-wing faction and the Centre to Right groups, including non-Marxist SBD members, resulted in the ascendency of the latter who have since tended to understate the role of the Marxist left in their version of events.

This is particularly true of various accounts depicting the original founding of the group. In an interview with Hermann Werner, Professor Carlo Schmid maintained that he in fact had founded the "Demokratische Vereinigung": "Die demokratische Vereinigung habe ich mit dem Justizoberwachtmeister Schuster zuerst ins Leben gerufen und in den "Pflug" gebracht, um Leute zu haben, auf die man zurückgreifen könne. In der Vereinigung haben die Kommunisten auch versucht, alles in ihr Fahrrad zu leiten, und habe das stark und erfolgreich entgangen gewirkt." (He originally founded the "Demokratische Vereinigung" together with Justizoberwachtmeister Schuster and introduced it to the "Pflug" (i.e. in order to get people on whom one could fall back. In the "Vereinigung" the Communists also tried to direct everything into their channels; he energetically and successfully opposed this.)

When Werner, however, came to write his (as yet unpublished) history of post-war Tübingen, he omitted Schmid's version and presented an account which, on the contrary, contradicted Schmid. Werner based his version on accounts given
by other former members of the "Demokratische Vereinigung", e.g., an interview with the local optician, Otto Arbe, a leading light of the DVP in post-war Tübingen. Werner wrote of this interview: "Ich fragte noch nach der Demokratischen Vereinigung, deren Mitglied auch Arbe bald geworden ist. Ihre Ursache sucht Arbe in einem kleinen Stammstisch in "Pflug" aus der Nazizeit, wo sich einige ganz linksehende Leute wie Zeeb, Schuster u.a. trafen. Nach der Besetzung schlossen sich andere an, bald auch Schmid und Renner, früh schon Wirthle." (I also asked about the "Demokratische Vereinigung" of which Arbe also soon became a member. Arbe maintains that its original cell was a small group of acquaintances ("Stammstisch") from the "Pflug" during the Nazi period where some very left-wing orientated people like Zeeb, Schuster and others used to meet. After the occupation others joined, including soon after Schmid and Renner and even Wirthle at an early date.) Zeeb was a KPD member, Schuster SPD and Wirthle DVP.

Arbe’s account has since been substantiated by former members of the "Demokratische Vereinigung" and their relatives in a series of interviews given to the author of this thesis during the summer of 1974. These interviewees included: Karl Kammer, first chairman of the "Demokratische Vereinigung"; Wilhelm Bauermann (SPD), Kammer’s successor to the chairmanship of the committee; Ernst Schittenhelm, formerly KPD member, now Honorary Chairman of the "SPD-Ortsverein Tübingen", founder of the trade union movement in post-war Tübingen; Hermann Schuster, son of the late Karl Schuster, co-founder of the "Demokratische Vereinigung"; Frau Otma Hartmeyer, widow of the late Adolf Hartmeyer, the third post-war mayor of Tübingen.

These interviewees agreed with Arbe on one essential detail: that the "Demokratische Vereinigung" had its origins in an inn in the medieval part of the town ("Altstadt"). This inn, called "Zum Pflug", was run during the National Socialist period by a former KPD member, Frits Kamp, who was also a printer by trade.

It is necessary at this point to elucidate upon the role of the "Stammstisch", mentioned above in the quotation from Werner’s interview with Arbe, within oppositional circles in Tübingen during the National Socialist era. The
"Stammtisch" is a South German phenomenon. It is the regular gathering, usually on one specific night of the week, of a circle of mutual acquaintances at reserved tables in South German inns. Normally the function of such "Stammtisch" meetings is purely social (e.g., card playing). But it is obvious that groups of professionally and politically motivated friends discuss their professional and political interests at the "Stammtisch" (indeed the German equivalent of "armchair politician" is "Stammtischpolitiker"). Consequently it was natural that the "Stammtisch" played a part in maintaining contacts within groups of close acquaintances opposed to National Socialism during the years, 1933–1945.

In retrospect it can be said that there were two such "Stammtische" in Tübingen during the Third Reich, although this can only be said in all caution since neither group was active in their opposition. It was more the case that a section of the population knew where their sympathies lay.

One Stammtisch group met in the "Forelle", a middle-class "Weinlokal" which specialised in fish dishes. This group consisted to a large extent of lawyers (it was known as the "Juristenstammtisch"), including Landgerichtsrat Schmid and Renner. Although this group contained a good proportion of non-party members (e.g., Schmid and Renner) it retained social contacts with the NSDAP elite of Tübingen, possibly for reasons of survival; in any case Schmid remained grateful to Kreisleiter Hause for the latter's protection during the National Socialist era and did his best to repay it in kind after the occupation. This group was described by the former police chief of Tübingen, Polizeirat Bücheler, in an interview with Hermann Werner. Werner noted: "Bücheler erwähnt auch von den wichtigen Stammtischen der letzten Zeit. Er sei zunächst ein "Juristenstammtisch" in der "Forelle" gewesen, dem Hellmann, Renner, Frank angehörten; auch Bücheler kam dazu. Zu diesem Stammtisch brachte einmal einer den Kreisleiter mit, der dann öfter kam und wohl auch Leute seiner Umgebung mitbrachte, so daß Bücheler schließlich nicht mehr hinging." (Bücheler also mentions the important "Stammtische" of the later period of the Nazi era. Firstly, there was a "Juristenstammtisch" in the "Forelle" to which Hellmann, Renner and Frank belonged; Bücheler also joined it. One of them once brought the Kreisleiter to this "Stammtisch"; he then came more often and apparently also brought people from his own milieu with him, with the result that Bücheler stopped going.) (37)
The other "Stammtisch", which had no contacts whatsoever with the NSDAP, kept a much lower profile during the National Socialist period. It consisted of a group of regulars who met in the "Flug". A good proportion of these customers were former KPD and SPD members. A number of them, like the innkeeper, were also printers by trade.\(^{(38)}\)

The printing profession later played an important role in the post-war politics of Tübingen for two reasons: the corporate ethos of the printing profession was (and still is) based very much on ancient guild traditions with a strong group identity, ritualised in initiation ceremonies, titles, offices etc., and comparable perhaps with that of the mining community; secondly, there was a strong Socialist tradition within the printing profession which survived National Socialist "Gleichschaltung" and surveillance. The consequence was that within Tübingen, which was not an industrial centre of importance, but which was a recognised publishing centre, the printers provided an almost ideal basis for left-wing activism after the collapse of the National Socialist administration. A glance at the important political personalities of the Left in post-war Tübingen during the initial period of the occupation reveals a high percentage of printers amongst them, e.g. Ferdinand Zeib (KPD, head of the "Kriminalpolizei"), Adolf Hartmayer (SPD, head of the "Sozialamt", later mayor), Gustav Bickel (secretary of the "Demokratische Vereinigung") etc.

From an examination of interview accounts it is apparent that a specific group of former customers of this inn provided the nucleus of the "Demokratische Vereinigung" and that the original founder-members were proletarian members of the Marxist Left, i.e. the KPD and the SPD. According to these accounts the original members were four in number, two Communists and two Social Democrats, who acted with the original intention of safeguarding and re-formulating the community's interests on the basis of a left-wing coalition in the manner of a popular front committee with the original name of "Antifaschistischer Block".\(^{(39)}\)

The four men, as far as can be ascertained, were:

**KPD**
- Karl Kammer
- Ferdinand Zeib
**SPD**
- Karl Schuster
- Wilhelm Baudermann.

Karl Kammer was appointed first chairman of the committee, but was later replaced by Wilhelm Baudermann.
The group continued to function as a conspiratorial organisation in the first days and weeks of the occupation since it was illegal, by French decree, to meet and organise for political purposes. The fact that the inn provided an ideal cover for the group's activities is a factor of importance in the emergence of the "Demokratische Vereinigung", or "Antifaschistischer Block" as it was originally known.

The group subsequently issued invitations to a number of non-Marxist personalities (e.g. Schmid, Renner) in order to widen its base. Wilhelm Rendelmann claimed in an interview that the specific intention behind the invitation to these men, who had throughout their professional careers been politically non-committed, was to exploit their name and expertise to the advantage of the left-wing coalition within the "Pflug" on the assumption that they would continue to remain apolitical.

This proved to be a basic error of judgement and strategy with far-reaching consequences for both the "Antifaschistischer Block"/"Demokratische Vereinigung" and for the Marxist Left in Tübingen.

In retrospect, however, the decision to include Schmid and other professional people remains understandable. This group of men knew that their lack of experience and professional qualifications would tell against them as soon as they set about implementing their aims within Tübingen's highly academic community. In addition, these men suffered from a very real sense of diffidence vis-à-vis the intellectual and professional elites of the community, especially the "Akademiker" (professional men with university training) who have traditionally been accorded a high degree of social prestige in Germany. Furthermore, they could not foresee that a man whom they had presumed to be apolitical, Dr. Karl (Carlo) Schmid, had in fact powerful political ambitions and peculiarly ideal qualifications for a political career within the French zone.

Schmid was introduced to the small group of working men who met in the "Pflug" after a brush with the French authorities, involving his arrest on the street and subsequent incarceration for a period of 46 hours (April 23–24). After his release Schmid, angry at his treatment, visited Karl Schuster, founder-member of the "Antifaschistischer Block", who lived in the neighbourhood.
Schuster, who knew Schmid from his job as "Justizoberwachtmeister" in the municipal court buildings, invited Schmid to attend the "Pflug" meetings. (41)

Schmid did not come alone; he brought a number of acquaintances from the "Stammtisch" which met in the "Forelle", mostly lawyers like himself with no previous political background apart from a record of service to the state as senior civil servants. Schmid also extended the nucleus in the "Pflug" to include, not just apolitical, professional men, but also specifically bourgeois, hence anti-Marxist, factions. Hermann Werner wrote after an interview with Otto Erbe (DVP): "Schmid forderte Erbe auf, die bürgerlichen Demokraten, sollen sich doch auch beteiligen und nicht wie 1918 die Zeit versäumen. So kamen er, Köhler, Kocher, Forderer, so daß mit einigen der CDU sich Anschließenden ein Gegengewicht gegen die damals noch nicht so feindlichen Sozialdemokraten und Kommunisten da war." (Schmid approached Erbe with the proposal that the "bürgerliche Demokraten" should also participate and not miss the opportunity as in 1918. The result was that Köhler, Scheiter, Forderer and himself came along so that, together with some who had joined the CDU, a counter-balance was formed against the Social Democrats and Communists who at that time were not yet so hostile to one another.) (42)

Within a short period of time Schmid emerged as the dominant personality both of the "Antifaschistischer Block" and of Tübingen. To understand the reasons for Schmid's rise to power and influence and its concomitant effects both on the "Antifaschistischer Block" and the political life of Tübingen, it is necessary to present a background sketch of his biography.

Born in Perpignan (3.12.1896) of a French mother and a scholarly German father ("Privatgelehrter") Schmid grew up bilingual with a remarkable command of both languages and a profound interest in aesthetics and Romance languages (he has translated Baudelaire's "Les Fleurs du Mal" and other works (43)). One of his severest critics, the French sociologist, Edgar Morin, once described Schmid as the "intellectual allemand-nourri-de-culture-française." (44)

Schmid studied law at the University of Tübingen progressing from the doctorate to the "Habilitation" (Dr. habil.). In 1929, by then a "Landgerichtsrat" at the Tübingen assises, he was appointed "Dozent für Völkerrecht und Internationales Privatrecht" (Lecturer for International Law and International Civil
Law) at the University of Tübingen. After the events of 1933 Schmid continued to teach law at Tübingen, but was not promoted to professor despite his obvious abilities. In 1941 he left Tübingen on secondment to an administrative post within the German military government of occupied France as "Kriegsverwaltungsrat" (War Administration Councillor) in the town of Lille, thereby gaining first-hand experience in occupation matters and military government. He already was an expert on the theory of occupation law and had been a member of the International Reparations Court. Schmid had not joined a political party prior to 1933 and he maintained the same position of political non-commitment throughout the National Socialist era; he later justified his political abstention by pointing out that it was forbidden for a Württemberg judge (which he was as "Landgerichtsrat") to participate in party politics.

Schmid consequently found himself in an ideal political situation after the occupation of Württemberg by the French. He was French born (although he had renounced his French citizenship in 1914 to fight on the German side), spoke brilliant French, was neither a member of nor closely associated with the NSDAP (unlike many of his colleagues), was a lawyer and expert on occupation practice and theory and had even procured a reputation as an anti-Fascist during his period of service as a military government administrator in Lille. This reputation was later strengthened by the publication in 1945 of a book by the curé of Lille Cathedral entitled "Sous l'administration allemande (1940-44)" in which Schmid's anti-Fascist role during his period of office was praised in two pages of eulogy.

Immediately after the occupation Schmid set about exploiting his talents and advantages, establishing contact with the French authorities through the University of Tübingen, of which he was officially still a member of staff. The university senate, recognizing his potential value, appointed him liaison man in matters concerning the French military government ("Mittelsmann zwisohen Universität und Besatzungsbahörde"). Consequently Schmid was able to establish formal contacts with the French occupation authorities in Tübingen independently of the "Antifaschistischer Block". Indeed, as Schmid's contacts with the French progressed and he was eventually appointed on June 13, 1945 "Minister für Kultur und Unterricht" in Stuttgart, his influence on the "Antifaschistischer Block" became for a time less direct. His views and policy, however, were assiduously pursued on his behalf within the "'Flag" meetings by his friend and former
colleague, Viktor Henner. Schmid also kept in occasional personal contact with
the group, coming at intervals to hold lectures in the "Pflug", e.g. on August 25,
1945, he spoke to the assembled group on developments in Nord-Württemberg (by
then American-occupied) and on denazification. Schmid was eventually dis­
missed from his ministerial post in Stuttgart by the Americans on account of his
wartime administrative rank in Lille. Schmid subsequently returned to Tübingen
and resumed his contacts, both with the French authorities and with the anti­
Fascist committee in the "Pflug".

The inclusion of Schmid within the "Antifaschistischer Block" had radically
altered the political complexion of the group and of its policy. Symptomatic of
this shift was the change of title. It was Schmid who coined the new name "De­
moskratische Vereinigung" for the group in order, according to Wilhelm Beudermann,
to lend its functions the appearance of democratic respectability. Schmid did
not wish to be embarrassed by a power base which leaned too far to the Left and
frightened either the French authorities or the local population.

The group of personal acquaintances whom Schmid had introduced to the "Pflug"
meetings, together with the larger group of conservative and bourgeois personali­
ties who had also joined the "Demokratische Vereinigung" at Schmid's insistence,
caused a shift of influence which deprived the Marxist Left of its original domi­
nance. The foremost representatives of the conservative elements within the "De­
moskratische Vereinigung" were Jakob Kremp (later co-founder of the Tübingen branch
of the CDU, Otto Erbs, Wilhelm Wirthle (both active in the newly formed DVf in
1946) and Dr. Josef Pöppers (later excluded from the "Demokratische Vereinigung"
on the discovery of his National Socialist and anti-Semitic writings during the
Hitlerian era).

In the first months of its existence, however, policy and decisions within
the "Demokratische Vereinigung" depended to a large extent on the strength and
charisma of individual members. This was partly a feature of the political culture
of the period which respected able public speakers to a greater degree than is
the case in contemporary Germany. It was also partly a result of the spiritual
vacuum left in German communities by the collapse of National Socialism: un­
accustomed to a plurality of social and political alternatives, the German popu­
lation was left exposed and bewildered after twelve years of authoritarian regime
and found solace in assurances put forward by confident men. The "Demokratische Vereinigung", largely working class in its composition, was equally subject to these psychological pressures, especially when confronted with the eloquence of those members who came from the professional classes.

The best example of the effects of a charismatic personality, both on the members of the "Demokratische Vereinigung" and the general population, is the figure of Dr. Schmidt himself. His powerful rhetoric and his ability to flatter and stimulate post-war audiences hungry for recognition and reassurance won him large-scale support. One contemporary observer described the reaction which Schmidt created in his audiences as that of "stark enthütsam" and maintained that people left his meetings satisfied with themselves and the world in general despite, or perhaps because of, the fact that there was little political analysis evident in his speeches. The "Demokratische Vereinigung" was no less susceptible on the whole to the attraction of Schmidt's rhetoric. In an entry in their Protokollbuch the committee secretary wrote about a lecture given by Schmidt in the "Flug" on November 7, 1945: "Die Veranlassung folgte mit Interesse den klaren Ausführungen des gewaltigen Redners, der es verstand, seine Hölder mit den weitverzweigten Verwaltungsapparat unseres Staatswesens vertraut zu machen." (The meeting followed with interest the clear remarks of the fluent speaker who understood how to make his listeners familiar with the widely ramified administrative machinery of our political system.)

The other charismatic figure within the "Demokratische Vereinigung" was Ferdinand Zeeb, KPD member and former printer who had been appointed head of criminal investigations within the Tübingen police force. Zeeb had served in many municipal offices prior to 1933, e.g. "Arbeiterrichter beim Arbeitsgericht Tübingen" (lay member of Tübingen Labour Court), "Vorstandsmitglied der Allgemeinen Ortskrankenkasse Tübingen" (board member of the Tübingen branch of the semi-nationalised health insurance company), member of the "Spruchkammer des Arbeitsamts Reutlingen" (tribunal of Reutlingen municipal employment exchange), member of the "Aufsichtsrat des Konsumvereins Tübingen" (board of directors of the Tübingen co-operative society). Within the Tübingen KPD...
Zeeb was undoubtedly its most attractive and most able member. He was not, however, the party leader in Tübingen.

Within the "Demokratische Vereinigung" Zeeb emerged as the champion of the Left-wing members within the 20-odd strong group. This led to a conflict of interests between Zeeb and Viktor Kenner, the representative during Schmid's absence as minister in Stuttgart of the professional-class group, supported by the conservative elements. Kenner was closely associated with Schmid's plans concerning the re-establishment of German political and administrative autonomy and the re-orientation of the Social Democratic party (at least in Württemberg) as a non-Marxist party. (q.v. Chapter 3 on the SDP). This latter point, which affected a whole range of decisions, provided a source of conflict between Zeeb and Kenner. This conflict ended in the demise of influence of the "Demokratische Vereinigung" and its eventual dissolution.

Prior to its demise and dissolution, however, the "Demokratische Vereinigung" was a powerful institution in occupied Tübingen in the twelve months between the spring of 1945 and the spring of 1946. The French authorities in Tübingen were made aware of the meetings held in the "Pflug", on the one hand, through contacts between the Marxist Left in Tübingen and Marxist members of the military government and, on the other, through Schmid and Kenner. The French authorities ratified the existence of the "Demokratische Vereinigung" as a clandestine municipal government, apparently satisfied with the arrangement whereby the "Demokratische Vereinigung" managed municipal affairs in the initial period in conjunction with military government wishes until such time as the central French administrations in Baden-Salz and Paris felt it opportune to implement a specific policy of political reconstruction. The French military government in Tübingen seems to have recognised that the "Demokratische Vereinigung" could play a role in the running of the community which was beyond the capability of their German adjutants, i.e. to run Tübingen's social and administrative life from a standpoint of intimate acquaintance with its infrastructures, traditions and local peculiarities (e.g. religion, dialect). Faced with the chaos of social conditions in the initial period of the occupation the French were no doubt impressed by the degree of administrative competence and political acumen demonstrated by the group. Wilhelm Baudermann said of the relationship between the "Demokratische Vereinigung" and the French authorities: "Die Franzosen waren froh darüber, daß alles geklappt hat." (The French were glad that everything worked smoothly.) (54)
The most important function which the "Demokratische Vereinigung" exercised was the distribution of municipal offices. The results had a profound effect on the political and administrative life of the community, which prior to 1933 had not strongly supported the left, in that this group of self-nominated men, the majority of whom SPD and KPD members, divided the municipal offices and organs of influence amongst themselves. The list of offices and positions distributed reveals the extent to which the "Demokratische Vereinigung" monopolised the formal positions of power and influence within the community.

- the "Demokratische Vereinigung" elected Viktor Kenner to replace the "kommisarischer Oberbürgermeister" (provisional mayor) of Tübingen, Dr. Haußmann, who wished to retire on age grounds. The Protokollbuch der Demokratischen Vereinigung Tübingen recorded the decision as follows: "Unser OBM Dr. Haußmann erreichte bereits Anfang Juni den Kommandeur um Erhebung von seinem Posten mit Wirkung auf sein fortgeschrittenes Lebensalter. In der Sitzung unserer Vereinigung vom 12. Juni wurde Landgerichtsrat Kenner als Kandidat für die neu zu besetzende Stadtverordnetenstelle einstimmig aufgestellt und der Kommandeur um seine Bestätigung gebeten. Bereits am 18. Juni fand in Gegenwart des Kommandeurs Metzger und seines Adjutanten Spoerry die Amtseinführung des neuen OBM Kenner statt." (As early as the beginning of June Major Haußmann asked the commander to relieve him of his office in consideration of his advanced age. At our association meeting on June 12 Judge Kenner was unanimously appointed candidate for the mayoral position which had to be filled and the commander was asked for his approval. Soon afterwards, on June 18, in the presence of Commander Metzger and his aide, Spoerry, the ceremony of retirement of the former mayor, Dr. Haußmann, and inauguration of the new mayor, Kenner, took place.) (55) Kenner's successor, Adolf Hartmeyer, was likewise selected from within the ranks of the "Demokratische Vereinigung" (q.v. below).

- Viktor Kenner was also nominated "Landrat" of "Kreis Tübingen" once it became apparent that the incumbent, Dr. Geißler, could not retain his position (q.v. below).

- on May 15, 1945, in response to a series of applications made by the "Demokratische Vereinigung", an order was passed by the local French military government appointing three members of the group to municipal posts. The order was subsequently published at a town council meeting (May 25): "Auf Grund des Befehls der
By order of the Military Government of Tübingen, dated May 15, 1945, the following persons were appointed:

1. head of the municipal employment exchange:
   Herr Arno Vödisch, Tübingen
2. head of the municipal housing department:
   Herr Wilhelm Huber, Tübingen
3. head of the municipal welfare department:
   Herr Adolf Hartmeyer, Tübingen
4. head of the Tübingen police departments:
   Herr Karl Kummer, Tübingen.

Vödisch and Hartmeyer were long-standing SPD members. As far as can be ascertained, Huber was not a member of the "Demokratische Vereinigung".

- Ferdinand Kees, a KPD member, was appointed head of the criminal investigation department of the Tübingen police force.

- Will Hane Websacker, a KPD member, was appointed head of the municipal "Kulturamt" (department of cultural affairs); he later acquired the most influential editorial and directorial positions on the local newspaper, the Schwäbische Täschatt (formerly the Tübingner Chronik).

- Ernst Schittenhelm, a KPD member, was instructed by the "Demokratische Vereinigung" to set about regulating the future structures of the local trade union movement. A committee was established within the "Demokratische Vereinigung" to help him in the task.
- Otto Bartels, an SPD member from Berlin, worked for a time in the "Wohnungsamt" (housing department) before being appointed head of the municipal "Kulturamt" in succession to Hebsacker.

- Albert Karle, an SPD member, was put in charge of local railway affairs.

- Richard Wirth, an SPD member, was entrusted with reorganising the local school system.

- Julius Karle, an SPD member, was appointed head of the local health insurance administration ("Allgemeine Ortskrankenkasse").

- Wilhalm Wirth, later a DVP member, was put in charge of the post office. (57)

The net result of this distribution of offices and positions of influence among members of the "Demokratische Vereinigung" was to provide Tübingen with a municipal bureaucracy of Left-wing bias which had no strong basis of support within the population of the town, but maintained itself by French acquiescence to the fait accompli of its existence since, having more than two members, the "Demokratische Vereinigung" was technically an illegal association. The "Demokratische Vereinigung" for its part assiduously cultivated contacts with the French authorities in Tübingen and avoided open conflict in the sensitive areas of French policy.

The claim that the new Left-wing bureaucracy in Tübingen had no majority basis of support within the local population is based on an examination of the election results in Tübingen for the period of the Weimar Republic prior to 1933 and the election results of 1946. In the four town council elections ("Gemeinderatswahlen") between 1922 and 1931 (i.e. 1922, 1925, 1928 and 1931) the KPD gained only one seat in 1931 out of a total of 14 seats. The SVP gained 2 out of 13 seats in 1922, 2 out of 14 in 1925, the same in 1928 and one out of 14 in 1931. (98) In the "Landtag" elections of 1929 and 1932 the KPD gained in Tübingen 2.0% and 5% respectively of the votes cast whilst the SVP gained 19.1% and 15.6% (99). It cannot be argued that this had been the general trend within Württemberg during the Weimar Republic. In the 1926 "Landtag" elections, for instance, the SVP emerged in Württemberg as the strongest single party, gaining
267,077 votes of a total 1,121,093 cast, this giving the SPD 21 of the 80 seats comprising the Stuttgart "Landtag". In the same elections the KPD emerged as fifth strongest party with 82,525 votes and 6 seats. 

Tübingen therefore stands out by a comparison of the voting support for the SPD and KPD in 1928 within Württemberg as a whole as a conservative community electorally in the Weimar period.

Similarly, despite the Left's hopes that, after the object lessons of the excesses of National Socialism, the populace would seek an electoral alternative in the Socialist and proletarian-orientated parties, the electorate of Tübingen did not give a majority vote of confidence in the Left in the municipal and district elections of 1946. The two bourgeois parties, the CDU and DVP, emerged with a large, composite majority of the town's votes and support. These electoral statistics are cited below in detail in subsequent chapters on the political parties in post-war Tübingen.

It is apparent that the "Demokratische Vereinigung" maintained its position within the community on account of its collaborative relationship with the local French authorities in the absence of municipal elections. The "Demokratische Vereinigung" consequently is a phenomenon of the transition period in Tübingen between the collapse of the National Socialist administration and the re-introduction of elections (September 1946).

During its period of influence the "Demokratische Vereinigung" not only distributed municipal offices, but also maintained close surveillance over the management of the same and subsequently over the affairs of the entire community. It required all its members holding municipal office - and even non-members - to report back to its weekly meetings in the "Pflug". These office-holders read detailed reports to the assembled group which then discussed various issues raised in the reports, e.g. Henneberger on cultural affairs (September 12, 1945), Kummer and Zeib on police matters (October 31), Hartneyer on the business of the welfare office and welfare requirements (November 14), Meyer on the food situation and the municipal food administration (October 10) and a report by the man named Kittelberger who was in charge of the municipal department of requisitioning. 

[61]
To convey an idea of the detail and extensiveness of these reports it has been considered necessary to quote at this point from Ferdinand Zeeb's report on police matters in Tübingen (October 31). Zeeb, according to the Protokollbuch, "führte aus, daß er am 13. Juni des Jahres von der Kommandantur zum Leiter der Kriminalpolizei ernannt worden sei. Seine erste Arbeit bestand in politischen Auskünften aller Art, vorwiegend über Beamte aus dem ganzen Kreis, Bürgermeister, Bahn- und Postbeamte, Feuerwehr und über viele Einwohner von Tübingen bis zur Kölnin und Putsfrau. Außerdem Berichte über die Tätigkeit und Tendenz der Parteien und ihrer Programme, über die beiden Landesbischofe sowie sämtliche Geistliche und Sekten, auch aus der Vor-Nazizeit. Desgleichen restlose Auskunft über die Männer der Demokratischen Vereinigung und alle Ausschüsse, die gebildet worden sind. Weiterhin über die Professoren, Dozenten, Studenten und Studentinnen ....

In weiteren Verlaufe seiner Ausführungen lüftete der Redner ein wenig den Vorhang, der die Kriminalität der Außenwelt gegenüber verhüllt ...." (pointed out that on June 13 of that year he had been appointed head of the criminal investigation department by the local military government headquarters. His first task consisted of political information of all kinds, mainly about civil servants throughout the whole of the "Kreis", about town hall, railway and post office officials and fire brigade personnel and about many inhabitants of Tübingen, right down to the cook and the cleaner. In addition, (there were) reports on the activities and political tendencies of the parties and their programmes and on the two regional bishops, as well as all the clergy and sects, including those of the pre-Nazi period. Similarly, full information about the men in the "Demokratische Vereinigung" and all the committees that had been formed. Also about the professors, lecturers and both male and female students ....

In the further course of his remarks the speaker raised a little the curtain of secrecy which conceals the world of crime from the outside world.)

The "Demokratische Vereinigung" criticised where It found fault. The outstanding example of this function was a quarrel within the "Demokratische Vereinigung" over the methods employed by Kittelberger, the head of the department of requisitioning, who was not a member of the "Demokratische Vereinigung". Kittelberger was invited in October 1945 to give an account at a meeting in the "Pflug" of his management of the department, an administration which one member of the "Demokratische Vereinigung", Hermann Zehr (later "Landrat" of "Kreis Tübingen" following Kenner's resignation and promotion to "Innenminister")
described in the following terms: "Die Zigarre im Mund, der Hut auf dem Kopf, die Hände in den Hosentaschen, das sei ein besonderes Kennzeichen der Männer vom Requisitionsamt." (Cigar in mouth, hat on head, hands in pockets, that was a special characteristic of the men from the department of requisitioning.)

Kittelberger defended his administration’s implementation of French requisition orders, but he failed to convince the bulk of the audience. Kittelberger was later replaced as head of the department.

The “Demokratische Vereinigung” acted as watchdog in all aspects of the social and political life of the community, supervising not only the town hall administration, but also extending its influence into such fields as university life, cultural affairs and newspaper ownership. These topics, especially the protracted debate within the “Demokratische Vereinigung” on the re-establishment of the local newspaper, will be treated in a subsequent chapter on French cultural policy in Tübingen (Chapter 6).

At this phase it is, however, expedient to mention two specific cases to illustrate the influence and importance of this self-appointed institution during the initial period of occupation in Tübingen. The first case involves the attitude of the “Demokratische Vereinigung” toward demannification. The left-wing faction within the group was opposed to any compromises on the subject. This was especially true of the KPD members. The left thereby opened an area of conflict with the professional-class group within the “Demokratische Vereinigung” who were more inclined to making compromises in order to preserve as efficient an administrative apparatus as possible. Foremost within this circle were Schmid and Renner. In a lecture in the “Pflug” on August 29, 1945, Schmid maintained, according to the minutes of the meeting, that “die Entlassungen der Nazis aus dem Beamtenwesen u. a. wird bei den Amerikanern strenger durchgeführt als bei den Franzosen ... im französischen besetzten Teil ist es wesentlich besser. Die Überlassung, ob der eine oder andere entlassen werden soll oder nicht. Solange das Land französisch bleibt, wird hier weniger Unheil über die Menschen kommen. ... Jeder Landesdirektor erschrickt, wenn er einen Beamten entlassen muß, weil kein Kraze da ist. Das Ressort des Referenten ist z. B. nur mit einem Drittel der erforderlichen Beamten besetzt. Die Verwaltungsmaschine ist sehr unordentlich." (“the dismissal of the Nazis from the civil service etc. is more strictly enforced by the Americans than by the French ... It is very much better in the
French-occupied section. They leave it up to us whether this person or that person is to be dismissed or not. As long as the "Land" remains French, less harm will come to the people here. ... Every "Landesdirektor" is alarmed whenever he has to dismiss an official because there are no replacements available. The speaker's own department has only one-third of the necessary officials. The administrative machine is very disordered. 

Viktor Renner expressed the same concern when criticised by KPD members for adopting a conciliatory line toward civil servants with National Socialist backgrounds, modifying his thesis with the assertion that there were no former National Socialists under his command. In this he was contradicted by Ferdinand Zeeb: "Zeeb führt eine Reihe von Fällen an, wo Nazis auf den Plätzen geblieben sind. Man spare immer solche Leute ein, die die Arbeit geschaffen haben, während die Großen geschont würden." (Zeeb mentioned a number of cases where Nazis had remained in their posts. One was forever looking up those people who had done the actual work while the big shots were spared.)

The "Demokratische Vereinigung" remained on the whole critical of the denazification measures implemented in Tübingen in 1945. The minutes of a meeting held on October 5, 1945, noted various SPD members' criticisms of the "Fragebogen" (questionnaire): "Dr. Ulmer bemerkt, daß mit dem Vermerk "politisch einwandfrei" nichts getan ist. Er verlangt, daß ein Rat aus unserem Kreise gebildet wird, der in jedem Fall die "politische Einwandfreiheit" nachprüfen hat. Für viele Dienstentlassenen werden Unterschriften gesammelt und sie kommen wieder in Amt und Würden. Wenn der Fragebogen nachgeprüft und die Parteizugehörigkeit festgestellt ist, dann muß der Betroffene unter allen Umständen entlassen werden. Wenn z.B. heute 30 Professoren entlassen sind und es werden morgen 29 davon mit Klang und Gloria eingeführt, so ist das sehr bedenklich ..."

Mitglied Hartmeyer tritt für den Antrag Ulmers ein. Es ist nicht richtig, daß Leute, die man nicht zu ersetzen glaubt, im Amt verbleiben. Diese fühlen sich ganz besonders stark und weichen von ihrer nationalsozialistischen Gesinnung nicht ab.

Vorsitzender Beudernann: Am besten ist es, wenn wir die ganzen Bögen durchprüfen und die zweifelhaften den Franzosen vorlegen, die dann entscheiden können ..."
(Ulmer remarked that nothing was achieved with the entry "politically sound."
He demanded that a council should be formed from within our group with the task
of examining "political soundness" in each individual case. According to Ulmer,
signatures were being collected for many of those dismissed from duty and these
people were regaining rank and position. Whenever a questionnaire had been
checked and party membership established, then the person concerned ought to be
dismissed no matter the circumstances. If, for example, 30 professors were dis­
missed one day and 29 of them re-installed on the next in all pomp and circumstance,
that would be very disquieting...
Member Hartmayer supported Ulmer's motion. It was not right, he said, if people
remained in office just because it was thought that they could not be replaced.
These people felt particularly secure and did not diverge from their National
Socialist views.
Chairman Baudermann: "It would be best if we checked through all of the question­
naires and submitted the doubtful ones to the French who could then decide .."

It can be said that denazification would have been less rigorously applied
in Tübingen in 1945 and early 1946 had it not been for the persistent attitude
of the Left-wing faction of the "Demokratische Vereinigung". There is an implicit
irony in this fact since the French were generally more accommodating and pragmatic
in their attitude to NSDAP members (as opposed to committed and office-bearing
National Socialists) than were, for instance, the Americans in their zone. It was
for this reason that a number of former party members - and some non-party officials
of the National Socialist period, as in the case of Dr. Schmid - crossed from the
American into the French section of Württemberg in search of employment after
having been dismissed by the American military government. The "Demokratische
Vereinigung", however, proved a factor of hindrance, albeit temporarily, in the
continued careers of these people.

The second case illustrating the influence of the "Demokratische Vereini­
gung" in Tübingen concerns a quarrel between it and the university authorities.
Relations between the municipal authorities and the university were strained during
the post-war period for a number of reasons (housing shortage, food shortage etc.;
qv, chapter on French cultural policy). The university recognised, however, that
the municipal authorities had certain legitimate rights and justifiable pre­
occupations concerning the local food and housing situation, student politics etc.
But it did not consider the "Demokratische Vereinigung" qualified to interfere in relations between itself and the municipal authorities. This feeling was exacerbated by a note which the "Demokratische Vereinigung" sent to the Rector of the university, asking him to reverse a decision to appoint the senior university administrative officer, Oberregierungsrat Dr. Knapp, an NSDAP member, to a seat on the Municipal Welfare Committee. The matter was subsequently referred to the mayor who claimed personal responsibility for the decision in a meeting in the "Pflug" on November 7, 1945: "OB Renner kommt auf das Schreiben der Demokratischen Vereinigung an den Rector der Universität zu sprechen, in welchem gebeten wurde, von der Entsendung des Ober-Rat. Dr. Knapp in den Städtischen Sozialausschuß absehen zu wollen und einen anderen Vertreter namenthaft zu nennen. ... Der OB führt aus, daß Knapp nicht vom Rector namenthaft gemacht worden sei, sondern er hatte ihn aufgefordert, diesem Ausschuß beizutreten. Wer in seinem Amt belassen wird, wie das bei Knapp der Fall ist, kann jederzeit zu unpolitischen Aufgaben herangezogen werden. Selbstverständlich wird jetzt für Knapp ein anderer Vertreter in den Ausschuß bestimmt."

Mayor Renner touched upon the letter from the "Demokratische Vereinigung" to the Rector of the university in which the request was put to refrain from delegating Oberregierungsrat Dr. Knapp to the Municipal Welfare Committee and to name another representative. The mayor explained that Knapp had not been appointed by the Rector, but that he himself had asked him to join this committee. Renner added that anyone who was left in office, as was the case with Knapp, could at any time be called upon for non-political work. Another representative would now, of course, be appointed to the committee in place of Knapp.

The "Demokratische Vereinigung" had achieved what it wished, furthermore, it had acted in full awareness of its political power; discarding conspiratorial methods of implementing its will, it had applied directly to the Rector informing him in writing of its wishes.

It is now opportune to mention the other important function which the "Demokratische Vereinigung" exercised besides the distribution of municipal offices: the nomination by the "Demokratische Vereinigung" of all the members of the first post-war "Gemeinderat" (town council) and, when this was dissolved by the French authorities, of its successor, the so-called "Stadtbeirat" (Municipal Advisory Council), almost exclusively from within its own ranks. This is evidence of the intention of the "Demokratische Vereinigung" to dominate.
the community, not only administratively, but also in direct political terms through the policy-forming potential of the “Gemeinderat”. It turned out, however, that its administrative dominance of Tübingen proved more effective and of longer duration than its control over the town council, due to the fact that the French military government deprived the latter of its former powers and influence.

The first post-war “Gemeinderat” met only once on May 25, 1945. The reasons for its dissolution are treated in Chapter 5. The names of those members which the “Demokratische Vereinigung” wished to have considered for seats on the town council had been submitted in advance to the local military government commander, Captain Metzger. From this list Metzger selected sixteen names. These names were communicated to the public in “Bekanntmachung Nr. 44 der Militärregierung” (Announcement No. 44 of the Military Government), published in the local military government publication, Die Mitteilungen der Militärregierung für den Kreis Tübingen, on May 26:

Auf Befehl der Militärregierung trat am Freitag, den 25. Mai 1945 zufolge Einladung von Herrn Oberbürgermeister Dr. Hausmann der neue Gemeinderat zu seiner Konstituierung auf dem Rathaus zusammen.

Dem Gemeinderat gehören an:

(Bv order of the Military Government and at the invitation of the mayor, Dr. Hausmann, the new Municipal Council met at the Town Hall on Friday, May 25, 1945, for the formal constitution of the same.

The Municipal Council consists of the following persons:)

Baudermann, Wilhelm, Schlosser (locksmith)
Schmids, Karl, Landgerichtsrat (associate judge)
Kammer, Karl, Dreher (turner)
Kutle, Albert, Dreher (turner)
Schwarze, Paul, Kaufmann (businessman)
Günther, Richard, Hauptlehrer (principal teacher)
Rothschild, Will-Hans, Schriftsteller (author)
Ortler, Karl, Malermeister (foreman or master decorator)
Kühler, Max, Hoteldirektor (hotel manager)
Hausler, Bernhard, Studentenpfarrer (R.C. university chaplain)
Weidie, Albert, Weingartner (wine-grower)
Bickel, Gustav, Korrektor (printer's reader)
Schmid, Albert, Elektromonteur (electrical fitter)
Schuster, Karl, Justizoberwachtmeister (court security official)
Blessing, Karl, Kaufmann (businessman)
Riehle, Paul, Maschinensetzer (machine compositor).

This list of names had in fact already been announced to the municipal administration on May 15, 1945, in the form of a decree from Captain Metzger. (70)

Apart from Grüter, Riehle, Schwars and Weidle, who held conservative opinions, and Studentenpfarrer Neußer, who was not allowed as a Roman Catholic churchman to participate in active party politics, the rest of the above town council were KPD (Konner, Nebesacker and Blessing) and SPD members. This was a feature of the "Gemeinderat" which perturbed a large number of people in Tübingen in this period. The "Kirchengemeinderat" (parish council) of the Lutheran Church in Tübingen, for instance, wrote a letter to the local French commander on May 25, indicating that there was disparity in the correlation between the population and the composition of the "Gemeinderat." (71)

After the dissolution of the above "Gemeinderat" (q.v. Chapter 4) in the same month as its one and only meeting, a substitute institution was not established until January of the following year when a "Stadtbeirat" (municipal advisory council), convened on January 2, 1946, was appointed by the French commander in Tübingen.

The men appointed were, with possibly one exception (i.e. Professor Küberle), all members of the "Demokratische Vereinigung". There was one important difference. Whereas the composition of the "Gemeinderat" of May 25, 1945, had been predominantly Socialist, the composition of the new group of 16 "Stadtbeiräte" (municipal advisory councillors) reflected a shift of influence within the "Demokratische Vereinigung" and a concomitant shift within the French authorities from a position of support for the Left to a more relative position which allowed the inclusion of conservative factions. The "Stadtbeiräte" were almost equally divided between KPD and SPD members on the one hand and eventual DVP and CSU members on the other. But it was still an in-group in the sense that they all represented the "Demokratische Vereinigung", albeit the final stage of development within the "Demokratische Vereinigung" prior to its breakdown and disintegration into various political parties.
The "Stadtbeiräte" were:

1. Buschmann, Wilhelm, Hausmeister (caretaker)
2. Erbe, Otto, Dipl. Optiker (optician)
3. Habsacker, Willi-Hans, Schriftsteller (author)
4. Hirth, Wilhelm, Zimmermann (carpenter)
5. Kanke, Erich, Dr. Univ. Prof. (university professor)
6. Karle, Albert, Dreher (turner)
7. Keicher, Karl, Fuhrmann und Landwirt (carter and farmer)
8. Kocher, Georg, Malermeister (master decorator)
9. Küberle, Adolf, Dr. Univ. Prof. (university professor)
10. Kraus, Jakob, Schneidermeister (master tailor)
11. Rohm, Johannes, Werkmeister (foreman)
12. Schuster, Karl, Just. Oberwachtmeister (court security official)
13. Schwaarz, Paul, Kaufmann (businessman)
14. Vögelisch, Arno, Leiter des Arbeitsamts (manager of the employment exchange)
15. Wiedle, Albert, Landwirt (farmer)

Those "Stadtbeiräte" not attached either to the KPD or the SPD were Erbe, Kanke, Keicher, Kocher, Küberle, Kraus, Rohm, Wiedle and Wirthle.

Thus, whilst the "Stadtbeirat" did not reflect the relative strength of the potential political groupings in Tübingen (political parties being still banned), since the SPD and KPD continued to be over-represented in comparison with election figures for both the pre-Hitlerian period (1928-1933) and for the post-1946 period, despite Schmid's claim in his opening speech at the first meeting of the "Stadtbeirat", "daß der ernannte Beirat praktisch alle Bevölkerungsschichten und politischen Richtungen repräsentiert und somit ein virtuelles Bild des Volkswillens darstellt ..." (that the appointed Advisory Council represents practically all the social strata of the population and all the political views, thus providing a real picture of the electoral will ...), it seems very likely that the French authorities had made a decision to even the balance of political representation and influence in Tübingen between the Left and the Right. To this end the French authorities had asked the mayor, Viktor
Renner, to submit a list of candidates containing twice as many names as were required, thereby providing a wider basis for selection. Renner had referred the matter to the "Demokratische Vereinigung" which in turn elected a committee (Bürgermeister Karrer, Hartmayer, Völsch, Dr. Ulmer, Dannhauser, Virklis, Zeib, Schwarz, Baudermann, Karle and Kammer) to draw up the list. (75)

Not only did the "Demokratische Vereinigung" elect the members of the original "Gemeinderat" and the senior officials of the municipal administration, thereby exercising the functions of a clandestine municipal government; it also sought to publicly legitimise its position of authority and shed its aura of clandestinity. This was first raised at the "Gemeinderat" meeting of May 25, 1945, when the chairman of the "Demokratische Vereinigung", Wilhelm Baudermann, who also sat on the new advisory council, made the following application: "Gemeinderat Baudermann bittet den Herrn Oberbürgermeister bei der Kommandantur vorstellig zu werden, daß der Demokratischen Vereinigung gestattet werden möge, ihre Zusammenkünfte und Beratungen im Rathaus abhalten zu dürfen. Auch diesen Wunsch wird der Oberbürgermeister weiterleiten." (Councilor Baudermann asked the mayor to apply to the local military government headquarters for the "Demokratische Vereinigung" to be permitted to hold its meetings and debates in the town hall. The mayor said that he would also transmit this wish (to the French).) (76)

Apparently this request was not fulfilled by the French authorities. At other levels the "Demokratische Vereinigung" continued to seek recognition and legitimisation in the eyes of the community for its self-assumed authority. The standard procedure which it adopted to this end was to send representatives to the official ceremonies accompanying the installation in office of top municipal officials. This public demonstration of its influence within Tübingen was particularly marked in the case of the two installation ceremonies for Mayor Renner and his successor, Hartmayer. At the installation of the former on June 10, 1945, the following members represented the "Demokratische Vereinigung" as official guests: Wilhelm Baudermann, Richard Günther, Willi-Hans Habsacker, Albert Karle, Paul Schwarz and Ferdinand Zeib. (77) On December 31, 1945, at a ceremony marking Viktor Renner's retirement as mayor of Tübingen and the installation of his successor, Adolf Hartmayer, the "Demokratische Vereinigung" received public approbation in a speech by Hartmayer, eulogising - in somewhat incorrect historical detail - the role of Renner and the latter group in the initial period of the
In the hardest period, after the total collapse of the Hitlerian Reich, you entered the breach on June 18, 1945, supported by a small number of responsible men who had come together in the "Demokratische Vereinigung", overcoming all the barriers of party and ideology and united in the endeavour to rebuild our Fatherland from the ruins. (At the same ceremony Wilhelm Baudermann spoke on behalf of the "Demokratische Vereinigung".)

After the speech by Staatsrat Prof. Dr. Schmid, Councillor Baudermann expressed the thanks of the "Demokratische Vereinigung" to Mayor Renner for everything he had done for the town and its citizens during his period of office and presented him with a picture of the town as an outward token of thanks. Following this, Herr Baudermann welcomed the newly appointed mayor, Herr Adolf Hartmeyer, in the name of the "Demokratische Vereinigung" and wished him all the best. (The appointment of the "Landrat" by the "Demokratische Vereinigung" is now to be considered in detail for two reasons; firstly, it represents a further demonstration of the position of influence held by the "Demokratische Vereinigung".)

The "Demokratische Vereinigung" had appointed by 1946 two mayors, the heads of all the municipal offices, the newspaper chief and the municipal council; it had also been represented in an official capacity at the important municipal functions and ceremonies. In addition, the "Demokratische Vereinigung" attempted throughout the course of 1945 to extend its influence beyond the municipal boundaries by appointing the new "Landrat" of "Kreis Tübingen".)
during the initial period of the occupation; secondly, the appointment of the
new "Landrat" unleashed a crisis of confrontation within the ranks of the
"Demokratische Vereinigung" between the Marxist Left and Viktor Renner which
precipitated the decline of the group's influence.

A latent confrontation had continually existed in post-war relations
between the KPD and SPD in Tübingen since the local SPD had come under the
influence of new members such as Carlo Schmidt, Viktor Renner, Dieter Roser and
other non-Marxist professional men with essentially authoritarian views and
middle-class backgrounds. This division between the two parties expressed itself
in a series of bitter quarrels within the "Demokratische Vereinigung". The
KPD, for instance, concentrated massive criticism on the figure of Bürgermeister
Strohm, SPD member and mayor of the adjoining community of Derendingen (in­
corporated in Tübingen during the National Socialist era), on account of whom
Tübingen had been fined RM 10,000 for irregularities in the issuing of frontier
passes ("Passierscheine") for the American zone. Strohm countered criticisms
from the KPD - "Mitglied Zeeb führt aus, daß man in Derendingen überhaupt keinen
Geminderat brauche. Strohm solle es machen, wie unser Freund Zehr in Düßlingen,
nämlich sich mit uns in Verbindung setzen und nicht seine eigenen Brotwürste
braten. Die Derendinger Geschichte sei gerade katastrophal. Mitglied Märkle (also KPD) bemerkt noch
zum Schlü, daß Strohm Passierscheine ohne Genehmigung des Kommandeurs ausgestellt
hätte und L. A. einem Brief Verlesen, der in drastischer Weise die bedauerlichen Zustände beleuchtet,
die sich in Derendingen eingeglichen haben." (Herr Zeeb stated that a municipal council was not needed
in Derendingen at all. Zeeb said that Strohm should do what our friend Zehr
in Düßlingen was doing, namely getting in touch with us instead of paddling his
own canoe, and that the Derendingen affair was downright catastrophic. Member Märkle (also KPD) remarked in conclusion that Strohm had issued frontier passes
without permission from the French commander and he had a letter read out which
starkly illustrated the regrettable conditions that had emerged in Derendingen.)
- by attacking the administrative methods of the KPD members of the housing
department.

Friction between the KPD and SPD centered for the most part round the figure
of Viktor Renner whom the KPD in Tübingen distrusted as a bourgeois opportunist.
One case of this friction has already been cited with regard to the KPD's criti-
cism within the "Demokratische Vereinigung" of Renner's attitude to denazification which developed into an open conflict, the sequence and causality of which has been recorded in the Protokollbuch.

Viktor Kenner was originally elected by the "Demokratische Vereinigung" to replace Dr. Haugmann as Tübingen's mayor. The "Landrat" of "Kreis Tübingen" in the initial phase of the occupation was Dr. Geißler, the "Landrat" of "Kreis Tübingen" during the National Socialist period. By August 1945 Dr. Geißler was dismissed in compliance with the Allied Control Council's decree regulating denazification measures. Mayor Kenner was appointed, in addition to his municipal office, "kommissarischer Landrat" (provisional district administrator) by the local French authorities. It was evident, however, that Kenner could not indefinitely retain both offices. The question of an eventual successor therefore became relevant for the "Demokratische Vereinigung". The KPD, distrustful of Kenner and aware of his interest in retaining the office of "Landrat", opened a two-pronged attack: on the one hand, it criticised Kenner's record on denazification and, on the other, it proposed another candidate as the more suitable office-bearer.

At a meeting of the "Demokratische Vereinigung" on August 21, 1945, subsequent to Kenner's appointment, a KPD member opened the assault on Kenner. The protocol minutes record: "... Mitglied Karle eröffnet das Wort zur Geschäftsordnung und erklärte, daß es endlich einmal an der Zeit sei, um zur Landratswahl Stellung zu nehmen. Seit der kommissarischen Übernahme des Landratsamts durch OBK Renner sind mehrere Wochen ins Land gegangen und es befinden sich immer noch eine Anzahl Bürgermeister und sonstiger Beamter auf ihren Posten, die Mitglied bei der NSDAP waren. Er, sowie seine Kameraden, die Jahrzehnte im KZ waren, konnten es nicht begreifen, daß hier noch keine gründliche Säuberung stattgefunden habe." (Member Karle rose to speak on the agenda and declared that at long last it was time to comment on the election of the "Landrat". According to Karle, several weeks had passed since Mayor Kenner's provisional accession to the office of "Landrat" and there were a number of mayors and other officials still in their positions who had been members of the NSDAP. He and his comrades who had spent years in concentration camps could not understand why a thorough purge had not yet taken place in this sector.)
This criticism of Kenner's record on denazification was supplemented at the same meeting by support for the anti-Kenner lobby from the chairman, Wilhala Hauersmann (DSB): "Nunmehr wird die Landratsfrage eingehend behandelt. Der Vorsitzende führt hervor aus, daß mit der Ernennung des OBR Kenner zum kommissarischen Landrat die Dinge noch lange nicht so weit gekommen sind, wie wir es erwartet haben. In den Gemeinden herrschen immer noch die alten Zustände. Es muß dem OBR klar gesagt werden, daß er mit einem geeigneten Vorschlag von den kommissarisch zu verwaltenden Landratsposten abgelöst werden müsse." (But now the question of the new "Landrat" was dealt with in detail. In this connection the chairman stated that with the appointment of Mayor Renner to the office of provisional "Landrat" things had still by no means progressed as far as we had expected. The former state of affairs still prevailed in the townships (i.e. of the "Kreis"). The Mayor ought to be told categorically that he would have to be relieved of the position of provisional "Landrat" once a suitable suggestion had been made.)

At the same meeting the KPD, concerned that Dr. Gießler might be reinstated as "Landrat", proposed Ferdinand Zeeb to succeed Kenner who was by definition temporary head of the "Landratamt" (district administration). Various members stressed that the new "Landrat" had to be chosen from within their own ranks. The meeting eventually agreed to establish a committee to deal with the question.

Thus the "Demokratische Vereinigung" was asserting its original powers in that it, or at least a strong, vociferous faction within it, wished to retain the right of distributing and supervising offices, as in the case of Renner's nomination as mayor of Tübingen by the "Demokratische Vereinigung". At a meeting on September 19, 1945, the "Demokratische Vereinigung" explicitly ordered Renner to relinquish either his position as mayor or as "Landrat", indicating that it would prefer to see the "Landratamt" seat vacated. The argument used was that Renner was obviously overworked, running both municipal and "Kreis" affairs.

Kenner replied to these demands at the following meeting in the "Pflug" on September 26 (he had been absent from the meeting of September 19). His reply heralded a basic turn in the political fortunes of the "Demokratische Vereinigung". The minutes of the meeting recorded the following: "OBR Kenner
ergreift hierauf das Wort und führt aus, daß dieses Schreiben (i.e. from the "Demokratische Vereinigung" informing him of the above-mentioned motion passed at the previous meeting on September 19) durchaus in höflicher Form abgefaßt worden sei. Er schulde aber der Demokratischen Vereinigung keine Rücksicht und habe sich vorher Überlegen, ob er überhaupt hierher gehen sollte, weil er den Eindruck habe, daß er das Votum der Demokratischen Vereinigung nicht besitze. Die beiden Ämter können allerdings nicht zusammen verwaltet werden. Die Entscheidung müsse ihm selbst vorbehalten werden. ... Im Verlaufe seiner Ausführungen bemerkte der Ober, daß er Herrn Zeeb kannte und ihn als ungeeignet für den Landratsposten halte, weil er nicht die klaren Linien oder klare Hiirtinisse. wenn eine kommunistische Ökonomie im Spiele käme, werden die Bauern kopfscheu gemacht. In Tübingen befindet sich nicht nur das Gouvernement Militaire, sondern auch das Gouvernement Régional. Der Landrat immer wieder verlangt, wenn man Information haben will. Er sind oft Dinge zu behandeln, die man gelernt haben muß. Deshalb darf bei der Wahl eines Landrats nur ein Fachmann in Frage kommen. Redner will den Kommandeur die Sache vortragen und ihn um Entscheidung bitten. "Entschiedet er sich für seine Person, dann ergeben sich die Konsequenzen von selber." (Mayor Renner now rose to speak and explained that this letter had been couched in impeccably polite style. He was, however, not accountable to the "Demokratische Vereinigung" and had considered beforehand whether he should come at all as he was under the impression that he did not have the confidence of the "Demokratische Vereinigung". The two offices could admittedly not be administered jointly. The decision would have to be left to himself ... In the course of his remarks the mayor stated that he knew Herr Zeeb and considered him unsuitable for the post of "Landrat" as he was one-sided in his information basis ... He had always noted the lack of a clear line or clear perception (i.e. in Zeeb's thinking). If a Communist economy came into question, the farmers would be alarmed. In Tübingen there was not only the local, but also the regional unit of military government. The "Landrat" was always asked for by the French when they wanted information. Often matters had to be dealt with which demanded specialist training. Therefore only an expert could be considered when selecting a "Landrat". The speaker said that he would submit the matter to the commander and ask him for his decision. If the latter decided in favour of the speaker then the rest would follow automatically.)

 Fellow SPD members, replying to Renner's address, modified and contradicted assertions made by the latter. A member named Oskar Trinks, for instance, one of the founders-members of the post-war "Ortsverein" (town association) of the
SPD in Tübingen, defended Zeeb as a suitable candidate for the "Landratsamt":
"... Wenn dieser (i.e. Kenner) nun sagt, Zeeb sei keine geeignete Person, dann
sage ich, daß ich Zeeb seit einiger Zeit kenne. Er ist ein Charakter und hat
Hut und wird als Landrat keine schlechte Figur machen. Zu dieser Arbeit besitzt
Zeeb großes Geschick." ("... If he now says that Zeeb is not a suitable person,
then I say that I have known Zeeb for some time. He is a man of character and
is courageous and will not cut a poor figure as a "Landrat". Zeeb has great
aptitude for this work.

The important feature of Kenner's speech, however, was not so much his
rejection of Zeeb as a potential candidate, nor even his insistence on professional
qualifications for future "Landräte", but rather his refusal to recognise any
obligation or subordination to the "Demokratische Vereinigung". This marked
the end of the "Demokratische Vereinigung" as a source of political power and as
an adjudicator of administrative and social affairs in Tübingen. It was the
realisation of this fact which moved the chairman of the "Demokratische Vereini-
gung" to protest at the end of Kenner's speech "daß er (i.e. Beudermann) von
Kapitän Spoerry die Versicherung erhalten habe, daß wir in unserer Vereinigung
ungestört weiter arbeiten könnten." (that he had been assured by Captain Spoerry
that we could continue to work undisturbed in our association.)

Kenner's refusal to recognise the authority of the "Demokratische Vereini-
gung" reversed one of the fundamental criteria of the original founding group,
namely to protect municipal life as far as possible from the consequences of
French occupation policy by affecting as many as possible of the municipal
decision-making processes within the group. (90) In the above speech Kenner
stated his intention of turning to the French authorities to prevent the "Demo-
kratische Vereinigung" from implementing a specific decision which had apparently
received the support of a majority of its membership, including fellow Social
Democrats and the committee chairman.

This development also marked a stage of advance in the political ascendency
of the "Carlisten". This was the local generic term for the circle of
professional men who, without previous political backgrounds, had joined the
"Demokratische Vereinigung" (or at least attended the "Pflug" meetings) and later
the SPD and risen to positions of influence under the aegis of Dr. Karl (Carlo)
Schmid. (91)
The "Demokratische Vereinigung" had not been able to prevent these men from establishing a political elite outside of its ranks. This new elite, represented chiefly by Schmid and Renner, was able to function independent of the "Demokratische Vereinigung" since, reinforced by the aura of respectability gained initially through contact with the latter, it had cultivated strong and personal relations with high-ranking officials within the local French authorities, especially within the "Délégation Supérieure" in Tübingen, i.e. the military government command for Süd-Württemberg.

The "Demokratische Vereinigung" had, in its original Marxist composition, deliberately opened its meetings to these men in order to exploit their expertise in dealing with the French authorities. It was consequently not surprising that this circle of professionally trained men in turn exploited their relationship with the French authorities and freed themselves of the surveillance of the "Demokratische Vereinigung". In addition, the French authorities in Tübingen, in response to the emerging Gaullist policy of containing the influence of the German and the French Left (i.e. within the occupation administration) in the French zone, were beginning to view the activities of the "Demokratische Vereinigung" with growing disfavour. In his speech to the "Demokratische Vereinigung" Renner no doubt acted with the support and approval of the local French government when he rejected Zeeb as a potential "Landratsamt" candidate on account of his Communist background.

The "Demokratische Vereinigung" did not recover from Renner's undermining of its authority, although individual attempts were made by members to resurrect its former privileges. At the following meeting (October 3, 1945) a KFD member remarked: "Es ist schade, daß unser OBM heute nicht hier ist. Er will, wie er sagte, unserer Vereinigung gegenüber keine Rechenschaft schuldig sein. Wir müssen aber verlangen, daß unsere Beschlüsse durchgeführt werden, das ist demokratisch." ("It is a pity that our mayor is not here today. He does not wish, as he said himself, to be accountable to our association. We must, however, insist that our resolutions are carried out; that is democratic.") The point, however, was not taken up and Renner did not feel compelled to answer to it nor to subsequent demands.
This loss of privilege and influence on the part of the "Demokratische Vereinigung" was underlined in a matter concomitant to the "Landratsamt" question, namely the choice of Renner's successor as mayor after Renner had been appointed full-time "Landrat". The Ministry of the Interior in Stuttgart had wished, as has already been mentioned in this chapter, to appoint a certain Dr. Schwemmer as mayor, but the "Demokratische Vereinigung" resisted this move, regarding it as an interference in municipal affairs by outside agencies (October 31, 1945).

At the following "Pflug" meeting Renner announced that he had personally settled the matter, stating "daß er vor einiger Zeit erklärt hatte, eines seiner Ämter abzugeben. Nach reiflicher Überlegung habe er den Vorschlag gemacht, daß unser Mitglied Hartmeyer am 1. Januar 1946 den Posten als Oberbürgermeister übernehmen solle. Es fehle nur noch die Bestätigung." (that he had declared some time previously that he was giving up one of his posts. After careful consideration he had proposed that our colleague Hartmeyer should take over the job of mayor on January 1, 1946. There was only the confirmation (i.e. from the French) which was still to be obtained.)

This is a graphic example of the extent to which Renner had come to usurp the powers of the "Demokratische Vereinigung". Some months previously (i.e. June) Renner had been elected mayor by the "Demokratische Vereinigung"; now four months later, he personally made the decision (no doubt in conjunction with the French authorities) concerning the appointment of his successor and did not feel it necessary to justify this step to his colleagues in the "Pflug".

There are two possible reasons for Renner's behaviour, apart from the ever-present theme of personal ambition. The first reason concerns the professional background of Renner and, to an even greater extent, that of Dr. Schmid. Renner and Schmid were both lawyers who had served the German state for years as judges and senior administrators ("Beamten"). Their primary concern, it could be argued, was the re-establishment of stable and self-legitimising political and administrative structures and in their drive to re-organise functioning German administrations were almost compelled to cut corners. Indeed, as lawyers, the question of the emergence of political power - e.g. the "Demokratische Vereinigung" establishing itself by fait accompli - was of less importance than the legitimisation of subsequent institutions. Secondly, there was on the part of both Renner and Schmid a strong anti-Communist commitment which made a com-
frontation with the Marxist faction of the "Demokratische Vereinigung" inevitable. It is therefore not surprising that Kenner chose to make certain political decisions without reference to the "Pilz" meetings in order to preempt the activism of the Marxist Left.

The ascendancy of this elite from within the ranks of the "Demokratische Vereinigung" was paralleled by a decline in power and influence on the part of the "Demokratische Vereinigung". The actual dissolution of the group was caused by two specific forms of pressure, one external and the other internal.

The external pressure came from the French authorities in Baden-Baden in February 1946 in the form of a decree banning the continued existence of the anti-Fascist committees as political organisations and restricting their freedom of activity. In addition, this decree specifically referred to a zonal anti-Fascist organisation with which the "Demokratische Vereinigung" had come to associate itself. This was the zonal committee called "Das Neue Deutschland" founded in December 1945.

Le Monde described the movement as follows: "L'administration française en territoire occupé a autorisé la création pour la zone française d'un mouvement anti-fasciste pour la reconstruction démocratique." (95)

Ce nouveau groupe antifasciste, "La Nouvelle Allemagne", est dirigé par M. Erwin Sack, ancien pasteur protestant, qui fut emprisonné par les nazis pour s'être rallié au parti communiste.

L'organisation comprend des groupements locaux, provinciaux et régionaux, avec une direction centrale à Baden-Baden. Les partis politiques participent à cette direction sur une base paritaire." (96)

The regional headquarters for "Das Neue Deutschland" in Süd-Württemberg was in Tübingen. The head of the organisation in Süd-Württemberg and its representative on the committee in Baden-Baden was Carlo Schmid, since October 1945 chairman of the newly founded "Staatssekretariat für das französisch besetzte Württemberg". The leading light and motivating force behind "Das Neue Deutschland" was not, however, Schmid but the new editor-in-chief of the local newspaper, the Schwäbische Täubler, Will-Hans Nebesker, who made unrestrained use of the newspaper as a propaganda platform for the organisation." (97)
The aims of "Das Neue Deutschland" were published in an article in the Schwäbische Tägblatt:

1. Mobilization of all anti-Fascist forces to eliminate the remnants of Nazism and reaction within the administration, the economy and cultural life and to combat denunciation and all illegal activities of disguised Nazis.

2. Activation of the anti-Fascist masses by public meetings, rallies and training courses for the awakening of a sense of subjective willingness to participate in the voluntary reparation of the misery caused by the Hitler clique in Germany and Europe.

3. Practical suggestions for the overcoming of the general state of need; and control of the departments commissioned to carry out such measures in the townships, districts and regions.
4. Holding of discussions with all democratic parties for the purpose of a united, anti-Fascist course of alignment and concerted political action.
5. Preparation and organisation of cultural events, scientific lectures, concerts, theatre and opera performances, art exhibitions and participation in radio broadcasts.
6. Creation of a unified, anti-Fascist youth organisation along non-partisan and interdenominational lines.
7. Organisation of a central information and documentation centre.
8. Establishment of a central office for the drawing up of lists of anti-Fascist prisoners-of-war in France and in the French occupied zone.
9. Creation of an honest bond of trust between France and the new Germany with the aim of establishing an understanding on the political and economic problems of the post-war period.

This nine-point programme was based on three central political issues. The first of these was the elimination of National Socialism in Germany, i.e. denazification. The second issue was the theme of points 2, 4 and 6 which reflected a pronounced interest in a modified form of popular front; this was a theme which re-emerged after the official establishment of political parties in a protracted series of discussions between the KPD and the SDP on the creation of a single party (KPD) similar to the fusion which occurred in the Russian Zone. The third issue was the theme of point 9: the establishment of a relationship of trust between France and post-war Germany intended to produce an atmosphere of consensus in political and economic questions. It is significant that no mention was made of the other occupying powers. This is symptomatic of French occupation policy. The French zone was politically and economically subordinated to the interests of metropolitan France. Consequently the official anti-Fascist organisations were structured to reflect French interests, not only in their administrations which represented a replica of the French colonial administration, but also in their programmes which advocated consensus, not with those Allied nations comprising the Allied Control Council which theoretically controlled Germany's destiny, but solely with France.

In Tübingen the establishment of "Das Neue Deutschland" received extensive support. The minutes of a town council meeting on January 2, 1946, recorded:
At a meeting of the "Demokratische Vereinigung" on December 12, 1945, a member named Ludwig put the following motion: "Die Ziele der neuen Bewegung "Das Neue Deutschland" hat unser Freund Hebsacker in der Presse bekanntgeacht. Deshalb sollten wir diese Bewegung unterstützen. Ich schlage vor, daß die Demokratische Vereinigung dem "Neuen Deutschland" geschlossen beitreten und beantragen, hierüber abzustimmen." (Our friend Hebsacker has publicised the aims of the new movement, "Das Neue Deutschland", in the press. I propose that the "Demokratische Vereinigung" should join "Neues Deutschland" as a body and I put the motion to a vote.) In appenage to this motion Hebsacker explained, "daß das "Neue Deutschland" keine Partei sei und auch keinen Kampf wolle, aber es will dafür sorgen, daß die Zustände von 1933-45 nicht mehr wiederkehren..." (that "Neues Deutschland" was no political party and did not want a fight either, but that it would ensure that the conditions of 1933-1945 did not return.) The "Demokratische Vereinigung" subsequently voted by a large majority "für den Anschluß der Demokratischen Vereinigung als Ortsgruppe an das Neue Deutschland". (for the affiliation of the "Demokratische Vereinigung" as a local branch within "Neues Deutschland").

This development effectively meant a fusion in Tübingen of the two forms of "Antifa" organisation with the "Demokratische Vereinigung" assimilated as a unit of "Das Neue Deutschland", thus strengthening the base of the latter.

When "Das Neue Deutschland" was redefined by French decree the effect was felt by the "Demokratische Vereinigung"; although the latter continued to meet for a further 3 - 9 weeks (the last recorded meeting was that of April 24, 1946). The French restrictions on "Antifa" movements followed the publication of two ordinances by the commander-in-chief of the French zone: "Ordonnance No. 22 du
Commandement en Chef" of December 12, 1945, re-establishing the right of holding association ("Verein") meetings, political and otherwise, and "Ordonnance No. 23" (December 13, 1945) on the reconstitution of political parties. (102)

The French authorities, having originally welcomed and utilised the anti-Fascist committees as sources of information and reliable manpower, now viewed the continued existence of the name as an impediment to a smooth and uncomplicated return to traditional party-political life and parliamentary democracy. There appears to have been three reasons which motivated this change of opinion and policy. Firstly, the French military government in Baden-Baden observed with growing suspicion the popular front thesis of the Marxist Left in Germany at a period when it was involved in a gradual purge of Left-wing groups and personalities from within its own ranks to allow General Koenig and the Gaullist faction more support for the implementation of an increasingly conservative occupation policy. Secondly, the French came to realise that there was a basic contradiction between their support of a zonal organisation which operated across "Länder" frontiers and the "French thesis" which aimed at stimulating local particularism and establishing a confederation of small states; on the basis of the "French thesis" the French themselves had kept their number of zonal administrations to a minimum, preferring to segment their various bureaucracies under the management of the "Délégations Supérieures" with the exception of specific technical institutions which the French permitted to extend over the whole zone (e.g. "Hauptversicherungsamt" (Central Insurance Office) in Speyer, the "Zentral-Post- und Fernmeldeamt" (Head Post Office and Telecommunications Administration) in Karlsruhe and the "Office de la chasse et de la pêche" in Baden-Baden etc. (104)). Thirdly, the French had technical objections to the "Antifas" during the new phase of party-political life in that they saw the continued existence of the "Antifas" as a breach of the scheme of legal orderliness created by French legislation and planning, viewing them as potential factors of complication affecting the development and autonomy of individual political parties.

In the official intimation of the French restrictions on the anti-Fascist committees from the Governor-General of Baden-Württemberg, Guillaume Eidner, to the head of the "Staatssekretariat", dated February 22, 1946, and entitled "Régularisation de la situation des mouvements anti-fascistes, au regard de l'ordonnance No. 22 du 12 Décembre 1945 rétablissant le droit d'association et, éventuellement, de l'ordonnance No. 23 du 13 Décembre 1945 sur la constitution des partis politiques..." (105),
démocratiques" it was made quite explicit that the French authorities intended depriving the "Antifas" of their former political role: "Dès la cessation des hostilités et dans les premiers jours qui suivirent, se constituèrent spontanément en Allemagne des groupements qui, sous des dénominations diverses, tels que Comités Antifa, Arbeitsmasschinen et, plus récemment, des Neue Deutschland, rassemblèrent les anti-nazis les plus convaincus désireux de mener la lutte contre ce qui subsistait du national-socialisme et étudierent les moyens propres à en éviter le retour.

Ils eurent la possibilité de tenir des réunions publiques et, jusqu'à la fin de 1945, furent les seuls groupes dont l'existence était reconnue, à s'occuper de questions politiques, en se plaçant uniquement sur le terrain de la propagande d'une unité démocratique anti-nazie.


Il convient donc que tout groupement du genre de ceux précédemment indiqués soit inclus dans le cadre de la législation instituée par les ordonnances précitées.

Les mouvements anti-fasistes, en particulier - seule expression, jusqu'à présent, d'une pensée politique qui a pu se manifester ouvertement - ne doivent pas se trouver dans une situation ambiguë.

Si ces mouvements entendent se tenir en dehors des partis et groupent des adhérents de différentes nationalités polices, leur programme se bornant à souligner les faits du régime national-socialiste au point de vue moral, matériel et national et à faire revivre et exalter l'esprit démocratique - ils doivent se placer sous le régime des associations. La solution de multiples problèmes politiques qui se posent pour le peuple allemand, échappe alors à leur compétence, étant du strict domaine des programmes des partis politiques.
Ce qui caractérise, en effet, le parti politique, c'est d'une part, l'universalité des questions évoquées dans son programme (organisation de la nation, des pouvoirs publics, du travail, de la production, de la répartition des richesses, de l'assistance à diverses catégories sociales, de l'enseignement, etc...) et, d'autre part, le but poursuivi qui est l'adhésion du plus grand nombre possible d'électeurs aux vues du parti afin d'obtenir l'accession de ses membres aux assemblées délibérantes et au Pouvoir.

Tel n'est pas le cas pour l'Antifa ou mouvements similaires, aux buts plus limités.

Dans ces conditions, vous voudrez bien inviter les dirigeants des groupements dont il s'agit a se conformer rigoureusement aux dispositions que je vous ai communiquées par mon lettre No. 296, IN/IM/P/FP/JF, du ler février, en ce qui concerne les associations dont la compétence ne dépasse pas le cercle dans lequel elles ont leur siège.

Aucune autorisation ne sera en effet accordée à des mouvements anti-fascistes sur le plan régional.

Les demandes devront donc être déposées à la Mairie du siège du groupement en même temps que le projet de statuts en triple exemplaire, accompagné de la liste des membres fondateurs et des questionnaire (Fragebogen) de ces derniers ...

... Toutefois, afin d'éviter toute confusion dans la période d'organisation des partis, d'une part, de régularisation de la situation des associations, d'autre part, aucune réunion d'un de ces mouvements anti-nazis, quel qu'il soit, ne pourra être tenue avant qu'il n'ait reçu l'autorisation de se constituer ...

The French decree was transmitted by the "Staatssenatrat" on March 14, 1946, to the "Landesrats" and "Bürgermeister" (mayor's departments) of Süd-Westfalen in a modified form. This instruction emphasized that the anti-Fascist committees "können sich nur in der Form einer Vereins weiter behörden" (can only continue to operate in the legal form of an association) and that "es könnten sich nur örtliche Vereine bilden" (only local associations can be set up).
Furthermore, as the French had intimated, the existing anti-Fascist committees had to apply for official permission and registration through the local "Bürgermeisteramt" and "Landratsamt". The instruction which was delivered to the "Bürgermeisteramt" in Tübingen contained the added footnote, "Demokratische Vereinigung", indicating that in the case of Tübingen this group was specifically intended.

This was the end of the "Antifa" period in Tübingen, during which the "Demokratische Vereinigung" had exercised political and administrative influence and been the sole body allowed by the French to involve itself in political affairs. It was now redefined as a club or association, although official application as such was never made to acquire this status. Furthermore, the "Demokratische Vereinigung" was formally subject to the surveillance and control of the town hall and the "Landratsamt", i.e., Mayor Hartmeyer and Landrat Renner, thus concluding the process of political change which involved the ascendancy of former members over the group.

An examination of the minutes of the final meetings of the "Demokratische Vereinigung" in the period, March - April 1945, indicates, however, that the growing split between the Left and other groups within its ranks, especially conservative members, had made the dissolution of the "Demokratische Vereinigung" a foregone conclusion. This was the internal pressure which disintegrated the group from within. Indeed, the above minutes make no reference to the French decree on anti-Fascist organisations and lay the blame for the dissolution of the "Demokratische Vereinigung" solely on the conflict between the Left and the Right within its ranks. This conflict had become particularly pronounced after the publication of the French decree intimating France's intention of re-introducing party-political life in her zone ("Ordonnance No. 23" of December 13, 1945).

The conservative factions which were descended from the parties of the Centre and the Right of the Weimar period had not been able to regroup in the initial period of the occupation to the same extent as the parties of the left (i.e., KPD and WDP), chiefly because they and their membership had compromised themselves to varying degrees during the National Socialist era and because they did not possess public records of opposition and resistance to National Socialism, as was the case with the Left. The re-introduction of traditional party-political
Life with left and right orientations allowed the conservative factions to organize themselves, thus freeing them of the approval of the anti-fascist committees, such as the "Demokratische Vereinigung".

At a meeting of the "Demokratische Vereinigung" on January 22, 1946, a conservative member named Jakob Krau put a motion to consider the possible dissolution of the group. Krau later emerged as a founder-member of the local CDU branch and its chairman. In the course of an interview held in 1974 Krau maintained that he had always differed strongly in opinion from the "Demokratische Vereinigung" on the work which had to be done in the community. This was especially true, said Krau, on the subject of denazification, maintaining that the KPD members within the "Demokratische Vereinigung" took a much less lenient view on the punishment of "small-time Nazis" than he did.

At the meeting of January 22 the chairman, Wilhelm Baudermann, transmitted Krau's motion to the assembled membership: "Der Vorsitzende ... legte vor, daß jetzt die Neubildung der Parteien ... die Frage akut werden lasse, ob es sinnvoll sei, unsere Vereinigung aufzulösen oder noch weiter bestehen zu lassen". (The chairman submitted the suggestion that the recent formation of political parties ... raised the question as to whether it was expedient to dissolve our association or to let it continue to exist.) The left, led by Will-Hans Hebsacker, strongly opposed the proposal: "Hebsacker führt aus, daß die Demokratische Vereinigung auch weiterhin wichtige Aufgaben zu lösen habe. Wenn sich auch die Parteien jetzt neu formieren, so sollte sich trotzdem unsere Vereinigung als der Kern einer überparteilichen Organisation weiterbestehen". (Hebsacker stated that the "Demokratische Vereinigung" would continue to solve important problems in the future. Although the parties were now being re-established, our association ought nevertheless to continue to exist as the core of a non-partisan organisation.) The chairman noted that there appeared to be unanimous agreement to maintain the group.

The division between left and right within the "Demokratische Vereinigung" was, however, too basic to prevent a split. The right-wing and centre groups of the "Demokratische Vereinigung" set up an alternative round-table in March 1946 to discuss and formulate policy. This exasperated and worried the left who saw the schism as the end of the "Antifa" experiment in Tübingen and the return to
traditional party groupings, a situation which was potentially more advantageous to the Right in Tübingen on account of the conservative nature of the majority of the electorate.

At the final meeting of the “Demokratische Vereinigung” on April 24, 1946, both SPD and KPD members criticised this new group. Willi-Hans Hebeacker, active as ever in the cause of “Antifa” arrangements, called on them to rejoin the ranks of the “Demokratische Vereinigung”, stating that: “Es sei beschämend, wenn man überparteiliche Organisationen spaltet. Die Eigenbrötler ist nicht am Platz. Man soll diese Leute auffordern, ihre Tätigkeit einzustellen und in unserem Kreise alles zu erledigen.” (it was regrettable when people split up non-partisan organisations. Eccentricity was out of place. One should call upon these people to stop their activities and to settle everything within our group.) Hebeacker was supported by a respected figure within the “Demokratische Vereinigung”, Professor Kaneke, who asked the committee chairman to contact the local party chairman of the political parties in Tübingen with a view to proposing and securing the continuation of an all-party commission. This apparently failed, but no record has been maintained to explain the reason since the Protokollbuch der Demokratischen Vereinigung Tübingen ceased to record after the meeting of April 24, 1946, indicating that the “Demokratische Vereinigung” had ceased to exist, at least as an effective organisation. It is feasible that the town authorities had finally approached the group with the view to implementing the “Staatssekretariat” circular of March 14, 1946, transmitting the French decree on the redefinition of anti-Fascist committees in the French zone. The “Demokratische Vereinigung” was, however, already too fragmented to survive as a club or association according to the terms of the French decree. Thus ended the “Antifa” period in post-war occupied Tübingen.
Footnotes

Chapter One: The initial period of French occupation in Tübingen, 1945–1946, and the emergence of political groupings, with special reference to the anti-Fascist committee, "Die Demokratische Vereinigung", prior to the reconstitution of party-political life.

(1) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, As: 062-00, "Erste Anordnungen an den Bürgermeister einer besetzten Gemeinde".
(2) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Bände 1-3, Band 1 (1945), p. 10.
(3) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Nachlaß Hermann Werner, "Besuch bei Staatssrat Prof. Dr. Schmid, Goethestr. 17, 3. August 1951".
(4) Abid., "Besuch bei dem früheren Oberbürgermeister Dr. Haßmann am 7. Mai 1951 in Stuttgart-Botnang, Haydstr. 49".
(5) Stadtarchiv Tübingen.
(6) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Nachlaß Hermann Werner, "Stadtschluss mit Ratherr aehült in Anschluß an meinen Besuch bei Oberbürgermeister Dr. Haßmann".
(7) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, As: 6220, and: Nachlaß Hermann Werner.
(9) Interview with Oberst Wilhelm Kohler (Retterkriegsleiter), Tübingen, May 1974.
(10) For example, interview with Ministerialdirektor Dr. Alexander Ney-König, Tübingen, June 1974.
(12) The interviewee has requested that his identity remain anonymous for reasons of discretion.
(13) Allied Control Council, Order Nr. 1 of August 30, 1945, supplemented by "Ordonnance Nr. 10 du Commandement en Chef français en Allemagne" (October 24, 1945).

An idea of how seriously the French authorities in Tübingen viewed the question of the Wehrmacht uniform can be gauged from their reluctant reaction to the town hall's request in November 1945 on behalf of the destitute within the community "die Uniformstücher abzunehmen und daß sie die Hose weiterhin tragen dürfen, bis die Stadtverwaltung ins Lande ist, ihnen Kivilkleidung zu verschaffen" (letter from Oberst Viktor Renger to Lieutenant-Colonel Huchon, Dép. de Gendarmerie de Tübingen, on November 5, 1945: Stadtarchiv Tübingen, As: 062-00). Although the French acquiesced to this request the "Staatsssekretariat" was informed by Governor-General Widner of the re-introduction of a total ban on the wearing of Wehrmacht uniforms (Staatarchiv Sigmaringen, Wi 2 Aeo 32/69, p. 36).
One striking example of such plans was the agreement worked out between members of the group and Eberhard Wildermuth ("Ritterkreuzträger", formerly commander of La Rochelle and later "Bundesminister für Landwirtschaft" in the first Adenauer cabinet) to cover the eventuality of a Russian attack on Western Germany and the implementation of a scorched earth policy by the Allies. This particular plan envisaged the coordinated seizure by force of arms of the electricity and water works and other essential services to prevent the destruction of the same.

Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Ast 1054/3.

Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Nachlaß Hermann Warnen. "Besuch bei Staatsrat Prof. Dr. Schmidt, Goethestr. 17, 3. August 1951".

Ibid., "Besuch bei Innenminister Dr. Remm, Mitte bis Ende 1945 Oberbürgermeister von Tübingen, am 26. März 1951".

Ibid., "Rechtsanwalt Dr. Rudolf Zimmerle: Bericht über meine Tätigkeit als Anwalt in Jahren 1945".

Hinweismeldesamt Tübingen.

Interview with Rechtsanwalt Dr. Rudolf Zimmerle, Reutlingen, August 1974.


Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Nachlaß Hermann Warnen. "Rechtsanwalt Dr. Rudolf Zimmerle: Bericht über meine Tätigkeit als Anwalt in Jahren 1945".


Konrad Wiest, op.cit.

Ibid., Wiest also maintained that a priest who demanded bread in return for the rite of confession had been murdered by fellow prisoners (p. 46). The tone of the work was vindictive, e.g. "... In Leben draußen waren diese Gottessömmen von ihren Gemeinden verwahlicht und kulinarisch arg verwöhnt worden. Sie waren nicht am Kriege, sie konnten eher auch nicht wie andere Häftlinge in allgemeinem Interesse der Lagerinsassen noch nach nach der doch so notwendigen Genügsamkeit befließen." (p.47).

Ibid., p. 67.


Interview with Dr. Rudolf Zimmerle, Reutlingen, August 1974.


Interview with Karl Kummer, former police chief of Tübingen, Tübingen, March 1974.

(32) Stadtarchiv Tübingen.


(35) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Nachlaß Hermann Varnes: "Besuch bei Staatsrat Prof. Dr. Scheid, Goethestr. 17, 3. August 1951.


(37) ibid., "Besuch bei Polizeirat Bücheier, früher staatlicher Polizeiverwalter und örtlicher Luftschutzeilnehmer, am 17. Januar 1951."

(38) Interview with Wilhelm Baudermann, formerly chairman of the "Demokratische Vereinigung", Tübingen, May 1974.

(39) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Protokollbuch der Demokratischen Vereinigung Tübingen, "Bericht über die Zeit vom 15. April bis 30. Juni 1945".


The subsequent experience during his 48 hours in custody – in the toilet of a local joiner named Karl who also was, incidentally, a prominent member of the "Pflug" group – left Schmidt with a feeling of outrage. According to a diary entry of June 20, 1945, of Felicitas Goodman (wife of a member of staff of the American Liaison Officer for Property Control in Tübingen) Schmidt stated angrily in an interview (June 18) with Radio Luxembourg reporters "er sei öfters von Aar Oemtmpo verhört worden. Ria sei er so gekränkt, so schmählich ln einem Verhör behandelt worden, wie ln den swoi Tagen, Ale ihn Ale Frensoesn gehalten hätten."

(Correspondence of October 15, 1974, from Dr. Felicitas D. Goodman, Assistant Professor for Anthropology, Denison University, Granville, Ohio, USA).}

(41) Interview with Hermann Schuster, Tübingen, May 1974.

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(45) Personale- und Vorlesungsverzeichnis der Universität Tübingen, Winterjahr 1935/36 und Sommerhelfjahr 1936, p. 15.


(47) Chamoise L. Petres, Lille, 1945, pp. 348 ff.


(49) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Protokollbuch der Demokratischen Vereinigung Tübingen, "Versammlung am 25. August 1945."

(50) "Unseren Brüdern und Schwestern im deutschen Österreich zum Gruss. Der Schwäbische Albverein steht in treuer Gefolgschaft zu Führer und Reich", in Mütter des Schwäbischen Albvereins, Jg. 1938, Nr. 4, April 1938, pp. 40 ff. and: "Unsere deutsche Abdankung", ibid., Jg. 1938, Nr. 5, Mai 1938, pp. 72 ff. and:

(51) Interview wishes to remain anonymous on this particular point.

(52) "Versammlung an 7. November 1945."

(53) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, As: 1201/14, p. 75.

(54) Interview with Wilhelm Baudermann, Tübingen, May 1974.


(59) "Etude comparative des elections de 1928, 1932 et 1946 dans le Württemberg et Hohenzollern (Zone française d'occupation)", in Württemberg in Zahlen, Zeitchrift für Statistik und Landeswissenschaft, 5/6, 1946, p. 44.


(61) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Protokollbuch der Demokratischen Vereinigung Tübingen.
(62) Ibid., "Versammlung am 31. Oktober 1945."
(63) Ibid., "Versammlung am 24. Oktober 1945."
(64) Ibid., "Versammlung am 25. August 1945."
(65) Ibid., "Versammlung am 26. September 1945."
(66) Ibid., "Versammlung am 3. Oktober 1945."
(67) Ibid., "Versammlung am 7. November 1945."
(69) Universitätsarchiv Tübingen, Sign.: 130/36.
(71) Evangelisches Dekanatamt Tübingen, Archiv, Inv.-Nr. 172.
(72) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Protokollbuch der Demokratischen Vereinigung Tübingen, "Versammlung am 10. Oktober 1945."
(75) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Protokollbuch der Demokratischen Vereinigung Tübingen, "Versammlung am 1. August 1945."
(78) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Protokollbuch der Demokratischen Vereinigung, "Versammlung am 7. August 1945."
(79) Ibid., "Versammlung am 21. August 1945."
(80) Ibid., "Versammlung am 19. September 1945."
(81) Ibid., "Versammlung am 26. September 1945."
(82) Ibid., "Versammlung am 26. September 1945."
(83) Ibid., "Versammlung am 26. September 1945."
(84) Ibid.


Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Protokollbuch der Demokratischen Vereinigung Tübingen, "Versammlung am 5. Oktober 1945."

Abid., "Versammlung am 7. November 1945."

Regierungspräsidium Tübingen, Archiv, AAI 7 - 3151/14.

16-17 Dezember 1945, p. 2.


Abid.


Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Protokollbuch der Demokratischen Vereinigung Tübingen, "Versammlung am 12. Dezember 1945."

Abid.

Journal Officiel du Commandement en Chef français en Allemagne (Baden-Baden), Première Année, No. 9, 21 Décembre 1945, pp. 53 f.

cf. F. Roy Willis, op.cit., pp. 84 f.

Friedrich Klein, Neues deutsches Verfassungsrecht, Frankfurt am Main, 1949, pp. 155 f. and:

La France en Allemagne (Baden-Baden), No. 5, Mars-Mai 1947, p. 106.

Regierungspräsidium Tübingen, Archiv, AAI 7 - 3151/4.

Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Instruction Nr. II - 3151/4.

Interview with Jakob Krauß, Tübingen, May 1974.

Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Protokollbuch der Demokratischen Vereinigung Tübingen.

Abid.

Abid., "Versammlung am 24. April 1946."

Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Nr. II - 3151/14.
Chapter Two
The reconstitution and development of the
German Communist Party (KPD) in Tübingen, 1945 – 1947
The post-war KPD was not the senior German party in chronological terms. It was formally founded in December 1918. Until the outbreak of World War I, the working class had been united in one party, the SPD. Nor did the KPD represent the largest or the most important of the post-war parties in Tübingen. The reason for its choice as the first of three subsequent chapters on the reconstitution of Tübingen's post-war political parties lies in the fact that the KPD's development in the period of transition, encompassing the collapse of National Socialism, the establishment of French military government in Württemberg and the re-institution of party-political life in Tübingen, offers the closest approximation, of all the four post-war parties in Tübingen, to a clear line of political continuity.

The KPD remained categorically anti-National Socialist; it had striven under difficult conditions to retain some form of underground contact up to April 1945; it was the first political grouping after the fall of Tübingen both to operate clandestinely and to emerge publicly during the initial period of occupation; it was the motivating force behind the forerunner of the "Demokratische Vereinigung", i.e. the "Antifaschistischer Block"; and, finally, its political doctrine remained the least unchanged in the post-war years.

After the "Reichstag" fire of February 2, 1933, the KPD was banned by the National Socialist government. This was followed by a nation-wide wave of arrests of Communist functionaries and activists which continued up to 1938. In 1935 the party's strategy was altered to suit circumstances both inside and outside Germany. Prior to 1935 the KPD, under Ernst Thälmann, had rejected popular front theories; this had been especially true of the years of economic crisis and the rise of National Socialism (1929-1933), during which the KPD had designated the SPD as the main enemy, labelling them "Sozialfaschisten" (Social Fascists). In 1935 this policy was altered to provide allies for a weakened KPD. The KPD now actively sought a common basis for cooperation with all anti-Fascist groups, changing its advocacy of a Soviet Germany to that of a democratic republic. There was another wave of arrest and repression after Hitler’s attack on Soviet Russia in 1941, providing the KPD cells and resistance groups with the impetus to become active once more. This was also the case after the unsuccessful attempt on Hitler’s life by Colonel von Stauffenberg.
whilst this was the general situation for the KPD in the most part of Germany during the National Socialist era, it did not fully apply to Tübingen. Tübingen never had been a stronghold of Communist sentiment or support. It was not an industrial centre in over-all German terms (although it did become important for its industry within the context of French-occupied Baden-Württemberg) and did not contain a large proletarian population. A large section of the working class of Tübingen was engaged in crafts ("Handwerker") and agriculture, groups traditionally identified with conservative political attitudes. Tübingen consequently did not produce the same degree of support for the KPD as did, for example, the industrial complexes of Reutlingen and Schwenningen-Villingen.

One consequence of this was that the KPD group in Tübingen was not taken as seriously during the National Socialist era by the authorities and local NSDAP organisations as were KPD groups elsewhere in communities with higher ratios of former members (at the end of 1932 there had been over 300,000 enrolled party members in the KPD). Another consequence was that the KPD members in Tübingen were too exposed as individuals to actively engage in resistance work. These points were stressed in an interview with the former police chief of Tübingen for the latter part of the National Socialist era, Polizeirat a.D. Bucheler. Bucheler added that Tübingen had been too "cosy" ("gemütlich") a community to have indulged in social and political violence on a scale commensurate with larger urban communities. (1)

This latter remark is only partly true since a number of Tübingen Communists were sentenced to varying spells in concentration camps and at least one KPD member died whilst in custody at such a camp. (2) In addition, Tübingen's Jewry had not been spared; a large number of the Jewish population were deported and died in concentration camps. (3) Therefore, in the words of a local Communist personality of the post-war period, although the sense of danger might not have been as acute in Tübingen as in many other parts of the Reich, there was nevertheless a very real threat hanging over Communists in Tübingen during the National Socialist era.

Given the difficulty and danger of resistance activity under the surveillance of the National Socialist bureaucracy in Tübingen's close-knit community it was inevitable that local Communists maintained a low profile during the period, 1933-1945. At the same time, however, a number of KPD members still managed to maintain contacts with one another, on the whole little more than nodding acquaint-
ance based on an unspoken awareness of each other's predicament. There was, in addition, a circle of Communists who maintained closer contacts with one another through the agency of their "Stammtisch" in the "Pflug", which later played an essential role in the establishment of the "Demokratische Vereinigung". Such men were Karl Kammer, Hugo Bonnicker and, prior to his secondment to the front, Ferdinand Zeeb. Kammer himself spent one and a half years in detention. Bonnicker, a master tailor, was the party head in Tübingen in the latter part of the National Socialist era; he was eventually arrested and died in custody before the end of the war.\(^4\)

It was this maintenance of contacts during the National Socialist era which enabled the KPD to swing into political action immediately after the French capture of the town. The Communists in Tübingen were the earliest to regroup and to seek contact, true to the policy of the Moscow conference of 1935, with German anti-Fascists, especially with proletarian SPD members. Party discipline, memories of past shared danger and a sense of common cause also help to explain the efficacy with which the KPD operated in the initial period of the occupation, gaining an early lead over other groups and factions which developed at a slower rate. The cause was certainly not strength of members for, according to varying reports from former KPD members (which are difficult to verify since the archives of the Tübingen KPD were presumably deposited in the German Democratic Republic after the proscription of the KPD within the Federal Republic of Germany in 1956) there were between 20 and 50 members in Tübingen and district. But, as an American doctoral thesis pointed out in 1956, "the party could count on the comparatively few members who had survived the Nazis to be disciplined and ready to carry out instructions and put the party line into effect."\(^5\)

The SPD, on the other hand, whilst stronger in pre-National Socialist Tübingen than the KPD, had not maintained sufficient contacts throughout the National Socialist era to retain party cohesion. Consequently, when the French entered Tübingen the Social Democrats in the town were in a state of disarray, with the exception of those personalities whom the KPD had contacted for the purpose of establishing the "Anti-Fascistischer Block".
The reason which prevented politically conservative groups from making any headway with the French occupation authorities initially, i.e., the association made by the French, and her Allies, between German conservatism, militarism and National Socialism, was the converse of the reason why the KFD played an important role in the period, 1945-1946, in occupied Tübingen. The French not only needed advisers and intermediaries; they also required information in detail about the local National Socialist apparatus and its former activists in order to neutralize them. There was, therefore, an element of denunciation involved in the information sought by the French authorities. It was logical, therefore, to turn to the staunchest opponents of National Socialism, many of whose members had either survived or died in concentration camps, in order to gain the most abundant possible information.

Another reason for the prompt emergence of the KFD in the initial period of occupation in Tübingen lay in the strength of Communist membership within the ranks of the local French military government. This was a consequence of the amalgamation in 1944 of units of the regular French army which had remained loyal or gone over to General de Gaulle with groups of Resistance fighters from the F.F.I. (“Forces Françaises d’Intérieur”). Many of the Resistance officers were active members of the Communist Party of France. Some 137,000 members of the F.F.I. joined 250,000 regular and colonial troops to form the French First Army under General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny.

The French Communist military government officers in Tübingen were naturally more disposed toward cooperation with local KFD members than with other political groups. The case which has been most quoted in interviews as an example of the above is that of the French “Intérieurs” in Tübingen, the senior officers of which, Colonel Georges and Lieutenant Gerber, were “French CP functionaries.” It was through the agency of Colonel Georges that the KFD gained control of the local police apparatus in Tübingen; he apparently supported to an active degree the appointments of Karl Kasmer and Ferdinand Zeeb.

The KFD in Tübingen has since played down the part played by Communist members of the military government in their political fortunes of the post-war period. This may well be due to the collaborative image inherent in such cooperation. One leading former member of the KFD in post-war Tübingen, Ernst
Schittenhelm, who was in charge of the reconstruction of the local trade union movement, described the CP members of the French military government as firstly Frenchmen, secondly soldiers and bureaucrats and, last of all, Communists.

Nevertheless there must have been a sizable degree of political activity among the Marxist and Socialist groups within the French bureaucracy in Tübingen. For example, there was constant tension, according to an informed German source, between the Left-wing and Right-wing factions of the local military government. According to P. Roy Willis this was a phenomenon common to the whole of the French Zone. This tension erupted on one occasion in a shooting incident between the two factions in the "Heckenthal", an outbreak of internal strife which the French authorities hushed up, according to various interview accounts. At another time a high official of the "Deuxième Bureau" stationed in Tübingen was allegedly arrested and subsequently shot for spying for the Soviet Union.

The amount of support which the local KPD group in Tübingen found within the French military government is evident from the extent of municipal power accrued by the KPD in Tübingen within the first half-year of the French occupation. By the end of October 1945 the KPD was in control of the police force (Kammer und Zeab), the local newspaper (Hebsacker and, later, Mosel-Schittenhelm), the trade union movement (Kurt Schittenhelm), together with influential positions within the "Demokratische Vereinigung" and the town council.

It is little wonder that many non-Marxist politicians regarded the relationship between the Tübingen KPD and the French authorities in terms of a conspiracy. As late as September 1974 the leading CDU politician of post-war Tübingen, Gerhard Müller, vice-president of the "Staatssekretariat" under Carlo Schmid, later "Ministerpräsident" of Württemberg-Hohenzollern and second "Ministerpräsident" of Baden-Württemberg (September 1953 - December 1956), chose to ignore in private correspondence that the CDU had begun to profit by 1946 from a swing in French occupation policy towards support of the federalist and particularist groups in the CDU. Müller stated that the French occupation authorities in Tübingen were largely composed of Left-wing personnel: "(...) Dabei ist zu bemerken, daß ange- sichts der fast willigen Einflußlosigkeit der Parteien in den Jahren 1945 und 1946 ...) nur die KPD und deren Mitglieder erfreuten sich einer aufzwingenden Förderung der Besatzungsmacht, die weitgehend von Mitgliedern der Resistenzen und der französischen KPD (sic!) bestätigt war." (...At the same time it ought to
be mentioned that in view of the almost complete lack of influence of the parties in the years 1945 and 1946 ...) ... Only the KPD and its members enjoyed noticeable assistance from the occupying power, the ranks of which were mainly filled by members of the Resistance and the French CR.)

This is an incorrect depiction of the situation. By October 1945 there were two levels of French military government situated in Tübingen; the "Delegation Supérieure" responsible for Süd-Württemberg and the "Delegation de Cercle" responsible for "Kreis Tübingen". Within the former administration there was a higher quota of professional men than in the "Delegation de Cercle" and less Resistance and Communist members. The "Delegue Supérieur", Governor-General Guillaume Widmer, was a conservative man. His immediate subordinate ("Chef de Cabinet"), Colonel Corbin de Sangoux, has been described by Dr. Dieter Roser as a "Linksgau-list" (left-wing Gaullist); thus equating him more with the Centre than with the Left. The head of the education services, Colonel Graf, has been defined in other interviews as apolitical. The officer in charge of university affairs, Captain Cheval, was not a Marxist either. Indeed there were many conservative and apolitical administrators within the French bureaucracy. The CFP members were generally situated in what may be described as middle-management positions. They were especially strong within the "Delegation de Cercle" which was composed to an extent of the original administrators who had come to Tübingen in the initial period of the reorganization of the military government in September 1945; hence the feeling within the community that the French military government in general was left-wing. These middle-management positions held by CFP and Resistance members did have an influence and bearing on the political and administrative life of Tübingen initially since all municipal matters were dealt with by the "Delegation de Cercle" before transmission, if necessary, to the senior administration. But the left-wing within the French administrations had no influence, as implied by Gebhard Müller, on policy and decisions concerning Süd-Württemberg as a whole.

The rise to prominence on the part of the Tübingen KPD in the immediate post-war period must also largely be attributed to the decisions passed by the "Antifaschistischer Block" (cf. later, the "Demokratische Vereinigung"). These such decisions endowed the local KPD with the police force, the local newspaper and the incipient trade unions. It is appropriate at this point to look at the features of the KPD's control of these three institutions.
Karl Kammer appointed Ferdinand Zeeb as his chief of criminal investigation. This position gave the KFD enormous influence and knowledge regarding the political life of Tübingen for the head of the "Kriminalpolizei" was responsible for all municipal matters of a political nature. The most important of his duties in this respect consisted of checking the backgrounds of and providing references—positive or negative—for personalities and political groups applying to the French authorities for legal recognition.

Zeeb consequently was in a strong position to influence decisions made by the French military government in Tübingen concerning the reconstitution of various political groups, including the KPD itself. Zeeb, for instance, had to provide character references for the signatories of the local KFD application for reconstitution as a political party. His character references in this particular case were terse. In reply to the mayor's enquiry entitled "Stellungnahme zu dem Geschäfts- und dem Fragebogen" (Position concerning application and questionnaires) of the local KFD, Zeeb wrote laconically: "Gegen die Antragsteller bestehen in charakterlicher und politischer Hinsicht keine Bedenken" (There are no objections to the applicants on either moral or political grounds.) The mayor was, in accordance with French regulations, the receiving official for party branch applications.

With former political opponents the Tübingen police was, under the guidance of Kammer and Zeeb, less terse. The police drew up files on former National Socialists and forwarded them to both municipal and occupation authorities. To give an impression of the amount of detail which went into this research into National Socialist backgrounds and of the attitude of the Communist officers in charge of the police, it has been considered of value to quote in length one such character reference. Dated June 29, 1945, the reference is headed "Städtisches Polizeiamt. Auskunft. Betreff: Dr. phil. H. O., wohnhaft in Tübingen, V...strasse 20" (Municipal Police Department. Information. Ref. Dr. H. O., resident in Tübingen, V... Street 20.) and concerned a university professor and local church figure: "Dr. war enger Mitarbeiter von Prof. Hauer in der Glaubensbewegung "Deutsche Christen". Er hat einen ganz schlechten Charakter, indem er es versteht, möglichst nichts zu arbeiten und sein Leben so angenehm wie möglich zu gestalten. Außerdem war er ein gefürchteter Spitzel gegen Anderedenkende und benutzte sogar seine Frau und seine Kinder zu dem schmutzigen Handwerk. Er war
The language employed in the above letter indicated a departure from police procedure and terminology of the period prior to the National Socialist "Gleichschaltung", especially of the Weimar era. It reflects an amateurishness within the business of police surveillance, relying heavily on hearsay rather than establishing proven facts, e.g. "es ist anzunehmen ..." and "im allgemeinen wird vermutet" (it is to be assumed ..., it is generally supposed). In addition there are signs of ideological commitment and of emotional over-reaction. The overall impression, however, is that of untutored petty bourgeois prejudice on the part of the above author who was attempting to define not only a National Socialist and former political opponent but also a member of the academic elite of Tübingen (cf. "Er hat einen ganz schlechten Charakter, indem er es verstellt, möglichst nichts zu arbeiten und sein Leben so angenehm wie möglich zu gestalten") (He has a very bad character because he knows how to do as little work as possible and how to make life for himself as pleasant as possible.) This anti-academic trait within the new leadership of the Tübingen police force eventually engendered resentment and reaction within the academic elites in Tübingen which in turn strengthened the anti-Communist lobby in the community and pressurised the French authorities to purge the police force of its KPD officers. In the initial period of the occupation, however, the KPD's influence over police affairs remained unchallenged.
With regard to the local newspaper, the *Schwäbische Tagblatt*, three Communist figures emerged from a list of applicants who sought to gain control of the newspaper which had been requisitioned by the French authorities in accordance with Allied legislation since it had originally been an organ of the NSDAP known as the *Schwäbischer German*. It was common knowledge that the newspaper would eventually be re-assigned to new ownership nominated by the French military government. The three KPD members on the editorial and directorial board of the *Schwäbische Tagblatt* in the period of its founding were Willi-Hans Hebsacker, Rose-Marie Schittenhelm and Werner Steinberger. The other editor-directors were Dr. Josef Förderer, Hermann Werner and Alfred Schwenger, all of whom were politically conservative. The latter three were at different times dismissed by the French (q.v. chapter on French cultural policy). Hebsacker's influence was quite apparent from the beginning. As political editor he was responsible for the interpretation of a major section of the paper's news since the French insisted on the newspapers fulfilling a democratizing and politically educative role. Hebsacker's political affiliations were discernible in his detailed treatment of the Nuremberg trials ('ad nauseam', according to various interviewees), in his support of "Das Neue Deutschland" and in his subsequent advocacy of an amalgamation of the KPD and SPD in a new "Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands" (Socialist Unity Party of Germany, termed "SED") on the lines of the fusion of KPD and SPD in the Russian zone.

The policies advocated by Hebsacker in the *Schwäbische Tagblatt* annoyed various political groupings, from the local SPD branch to the Roman Catholic diocesan authorities in Stuttgart. The local SPD was not only concerned about pro-Communist tendencies in the new reporting; it was also certain that the KPD members on the editorial board were suppressing material concerning the Social Democrats. At a branch meeting of the local Social Democratic party in July 1946 the branch chairman, Gottlieb Karrer, maintained: "Die Berichterstattung des *Schwäbischen Tagblattes* ist eineidig und unterschlägt zu großen Teil wichtige politische Nachrichten und Begebenheiten aus der SPD, so daß das Publikum falsch unterrichtet und die Bedeutung unserer Partei nicht in dem Maße gewürdigt wird, wie es ihrer Größe entsprechend sein sollte" (News coverage in the *Schwäbische Tagblatt* is one-sided and suppresses to a great extent important political news and events concerning the SPD with the result that the public is wrongly informed and the importance of our party is not appreciated to an extent commensurate with its size). The director of the municipal "Kulturaut", an SPD member named
Otto Bartels had already mentioned this suppression of material at an earlier branch discussion on the SED question and the Russian Zone. He complained that it was difficult to obtain news and material on the subject and accused the "Schwäbische Tagblatt," the sole newspaper licensed at that period in French-occupied Württemberg, of twisting the truth about the developments surrounding the SPD in the Russian Zone: "Genosse Bartels verbreitet sich über das Referentenmaterial, welches früher immer zu Hand war. Heute müssen wir es uns erst schaffen. Dr. Schairer unterdrückt im "Schwäbischen Tagblatt" alles. Wir müssen zeigen, daß wir damit nicht einverstanden sind und sagen, was uns veranlaßt, ungetreu zu werden. Im russischen Gebiet eint nicht man sich nicht, sondern beseitigt einfach die SPD. Es ist notwendig, daß wir Material schaffen." (Comrade Bartels enlarged upon the subject of newspaper articles and the material on which they are based. This always used to be available. Today we have to procure it for ourselves first. Dr. Schairer suppresses everything in the "Schwäbische Tagblatt." We must show that we disapprove of this and we must state what it is that is making us suspicious. In the Russian zone there is no unification (i.e. between SPD and KPD) but instead the SPD is simply being eliminated. It is necessary that we produce material (about this)."

By August 1946, however, a liaison man between the local SPD and the French Socialists in the French military government was able to assure a branch meeting of local party representatives that after the introduction of elections the imbalance would be redressed: "Genosse Markschoeffel, der in seiner Eigenschaft als Verbindungsmann mit den französischen Sozialisten einen sehr interessanten Vortrag hielt, teilte unter anderem mit, daß nach den Wahlen eine völlige Neuorganisation der Presse stattfinden soll, die sich hoffentlich so auswirken wird, daß unsere Partei mehr zur Geltung kommt." (Comrade Markschoeffel, who gave a very interesting talk in his capacity as liaison man to the French Socialists, mentioned among other things that after the elections a complete reorganisation of the press would take place which, it is hoped, will result in our party coming more into its own right.)

Prior to this date Carlo Schmid, by now the leading figure of the SPD in French-occupied Württemberg, had opened negotiations with both French and German contacts with a view to forming a completely new type of newspaper from the "Schwäbische Tagblatt." He wished to make a German national daily of the newspaper, raising its standards and involving it in German national affairs. It was also
Schmid’s intention to give the newspaper a Social Democratic orientation, bringing in new editors from outside Württemberg. In his capacity as head of the “Staatssekretariat” Schmid announced his plans concerning the Württembergisches Tagblatt (Württemberg Daily), as he intended renaming the newspaper. The cabinet (“Direktorium”) approved his plans.

Schmid’s plans for replacing the KPD influence on the Schwäbische Tagblatt with a Social Democratic orientation failed. There are two versions for Schmid’s lack of success. One account is given in a short typewritten account of the post-war establishment of the Schwäbische Tagblatt from the newspaper’s own archives: "Ein Zwischenspiel war der Versuch der SPD, unter Führung von Staatsrat Professor Dr. Carlo Schmid, sich des Schwäbischen Tagblatts zu bedienen. Damals sollten zwei SPD-Leute (Ludwig und Cleca) in die Geschäftsführung kommen und außerdem verschiedene Journalisten, die bereits - wenn auch ziemlich voreilig - nach Tübingen verpflichtet worden waren. Aus diesem Handstreich wurde nichts, einmal weil die Beteiligten untereinander selbst uneins waren und weil auf der anderen Seite die französische Besatzungsmacht den Zeitpunkt zur Herausgabe reinen Parteizeitschriften noch nicht für gekommen hielt." (One episode was the attempt by the SPD to gain control of the Schwäbische Tagblatt under the directorship of Staatsrat Professor Dr. Carlo Schmid. At that particular time two SPD people (Ludwig and Cleca) were to join the management, together with various journalists who had already been engaged - although rather prematurely - to come to work in Tübingen. Nothing came of this because, on the one hand, those involved were at odds with each other and because, on the other hand, the French occupying authorities did not consider the time ripe for the publication of exclusively party-oriented newspapers.)

The other version of Schmid’s failure with the newspaper, gleaned from various interviews and also mentioned in the above source, emphasizes the strength of Hebsacker’s contacts and support within the military government. Apparently Hebsacker mobilized support in Tübingen and Baden-Baden against Schmid’s takeover bid. Consequently he was able to maintain his position along with his two party colleagues. One of Hebsacker’s best contacts was the French officer in Tübingen responsible for newspaper affairs and censorship, Captain Angel. It was claimed in Tübingen that Angel was a member of the CPF and, according to the above-mentioned source in the newspaper archive, was responsible for the appointment of
It was the preponderance of Communist influence within the newspaper which moved the Roman Catholic Bishop of Tübingen to write to the Commander-in-Chief of the French Zone, General Koenig, in March 1946: "Le journal à Tübingen est unilatéralement orienté à gauche. Tous les efforts de laïques pour créer un journal catholique ou moins un journal avec tendance chrétienne n'ont jusqu'à présent pas réussi". The Roman Catholic clergy were particularly incensed by the ant clerical articles on religion published in the newspaper by Vomer Steinberg. There was also a general feeling of annoyance within Catholic circles at the fact that the newspaper was not run on the format of a "Heimatzeitung" (regional newspaper) as was later the case with the CDU-oriented Schwäbische Zeitung in Leutkirch. A high-placed employee on the directorial board of the newspaper admitted in an interview (1974) that a large section of the churchgoing population was alienated in the initial post-war years by the general tone of the newspaper, especially by Steinberg's articles and Kechberger's insistence on the Nuremberg trials as a constant leader theme. One reaction, for example, was a threat from the newspaper distributors in the predominantly Catholic "Oberland" of Sidé-Fluettingen, lying between the Swabian Jura and Lake Constance, to declare a boycott on the distribution of the newspaper if the articles continued.

Eventually both Schittenhelm and Steinberg were relieved of their posts (q.v. chapter on French cultural policy).

The political opponents of Marxism in Tübingen were also perturbed by KPD influence within the trade union movement. The trade union movement, which had been incorporated into the "Deutsche Arbeiterfront" (German Workers' Front) after the National Socialist assumption of power, was reconstituted last of all in the French zone (March 1946). In the meantime the "Demokratische Vereinigung" had commissioned, with the approval of the French authorities, one of its members to look into the question of re-establishing trade unions. The man elected was Ernst Schittenhelm, an engineer and former trade union official, who had been a member of the KPD from 1923 to 1927. Schittenhelm rejoined the KPD in 1945 after the collapse of National Socialism.

Schittenhelm subsequently announced in 1946 a public founding meeting to institute what was later to become the Tübingen branch of "IG Metall" (Industriegewerkschaft Metall Tübingen - Trade Union for Steel and Engineering Industries, Tübingen). In 1946 the French authorities gave it the title "Berufsgewerkschaft
Metall Tübingen" and limited its area of responsibility to "Kreis Tübingen".
When permission was given by the French for the creation of a "land" organisation amalgamating the local steel and engineering unions of Süd-Württemberg, a prominent KPD member, Ludwig Becker, was appointed chairman of the "Landeagewerk Metall für Süd-Württemberg" in Schwäbisch Gmünd. Schittenhelm also stressed in an interview that five of the seven members of the executive committee of this trade union were KPD members.

In addition Schittenhelm personally established the printers' trade union in Tübingen in the "Pflege" and the public services trade union (i.e. "Öffentlicher Dienst") in the "Gaststube Ratsstube", writing out the applications for registration and obtaining approval from the French authorities. The local textiles union was founded in the nearby town of Tetnungen by another Communist, Otto Wick. (27)

The composition of Tübingen's first post-war "Gemeinderat", the abortive council which met for one meeting on May 25, 1945, was too Left-wing for a large section of the community. There were sixteen members on this council, of which the majority were SED members; the KPD was represented by three members (Seebucker, Kammer and Blessing). The Lutheran Church in Tübingen reacted strongly to the predominantly Left-wing character of the new "Gemeinderat". In a letter to the local French military government commander the head of the local Lutheran parish council ("Kirchengemeinderat") in Tübingen wrote on May 25: "Sicherem Vernehmen nach ist für die Stadt Tübingen ein neuer Gemeinderat bestellt worden. Er wird noch heute seine 1. Sitzung halten.

Der evangelische Kirchengemeinderat hält sich für verpflichtet, an der Lage Stellung zu nehmen. Nach längerer Aussprache, an der auch andere evangelische Männer der Stadt sich beteiligt haben, hat er sich entschlossen, dem Herrn Chef der Militärregierung und dem Herrn Oberbürgermeister folgendes zu unterbreiten.

Wir gehen davon aus, dass ein Gemeinderat, auch solange eine freie Wahl nicht möglich und nicht erlaubt ist, der äußeren und inneren Struktur der Bürgerschaft entsprechen sollte. Die Bürgerschaft Tübingens gehört in ihrer Oberwiegenden Mehrheit (rund 80%) der evangelischen Kirchengemeinde an. Die Pflege des
Kirchlichen Lebens hat von jeher zu den besten Überlieferungen der Stadt Tübingen gehört.

Wir sind überzeugt, daß diese Gesichtspunkte von den Männern, die für die Zusammensetzung des neuen Gemeinderates sich verantwortlich wiesen, in ihrem Gewicht gewürdigt werden. Wir bringen daher nachstehend mehrere Männer in Vorschlag, von denen, entsprechend der Zahl und Bedeutung des evangelischen Teiles der Bürgerschaft, wenigstens 3-4 den neuen Gemeinderat angehören sollten...

1. Dr. Adolf Küberle, Univ. Professor
2. Hans Künstle, Kaufmann
3. Friedrich Baenschart, Hauptlehrer
4. Jakob Krauf, Schneidermeister
5. Hermann Hepper, Faktor
6. Dr. Reinhold Schönig, Stadtrat.

(According to reports a new municipal council has been appointed for the town of Tübingen. It will hold its first meeting this very day.

The Lutheran parish council considers itself obliged to comment on the situation. After lengthy discussion, in which other Lutherans from within the community participated, it was decided to submit the following statement to the head of the Military Government and to the mayor.

We proceed from the assumption that a municipal council should correspond to the external and internal make-up of the community, even in times when a free election is not possible and not permitted. The overwhelming majority of the citizens of Tübingen (roughly 90%) belong to the Lutheran church parish. The cultivation of church life has long been one of the best traditions of Tübingen.

We are convinced that these considerations will be fully recognised for their importance by the men responsible for the composition of the new municipal council. We therefore submit the names of several men of whom, in accordance with the size and importance of the Lutheran section of the town's population, at least 3-4 should become members of the new municipal council...

1. Dr. Adolf Küberle, university professor
2. Hans Künstle, businessman
3. Friedrich Baenschart, principal teacher
4. Jakob Krauf, master tailor
5. Hermann Hepper, factor
6. Dr. Reinhold Schönig, secondary school teacher.)
Although the French authorities in Tübingen did not react immediately to the letter from the Lutheran church, it was apparent from the composition of the subsequent municipal advisory council ("ehrenamtlicher Stadtrat"), which the French nominated in January 1946 to replace the traditional town council, that they had in the interim period seriously considered this and other representations made on the subject of Communist influence. The "Stadtrat" was composed of 16 members of whom only one, Will-Hans Hubersack, was Communist. In addition, the French included two of the four personalities proposed by the local Lutheran parish council, i.e., the theologian, Professor Kirberger, and Jakob Krumm.

The list of "Stadtrat" nominated by the French indicated a shift of attitude within the military government. More than half the membership of the "Stadtrat" consisted of personalities later identified with the formation of the Christian Democratic and liberal parties. This was the first public indication in Tübingen of a change of attitude within the French authorities away from the parties of the Left, in particular the KPD. It was also the signal heralding the demise of the KPD's short term of influence in post-war Tübingen.

During its period of influence in Tübingen in 1945 and early 1946 the KPD maintained itself to a large degree on the basis of the support it received from factions within the French military government and on account of its record of opposition to National Socialism. Part of its success, however, was also due to its political and organisational energy. In the initial period of the French occupation of Tübingen the KPD took the initiative in political activity and organisation. The outstanding example of this was the founding of the "Antifaschistischer Block". The KPD was also the first political party to emerge publicly and to hold a public meeting (Calw, November 30, 1945).

The legal re-emergence of the KPD as a formally recognised political party (i.e., according to French zonal legislation) was, on the other hand, a more complicated business and as such should be examined in detail in order to illustrate the state of relations, formal and otherwise, between German Communists and French occupiers in Tübingen.

In accordance with French regulations, the KPD first made application to the military government in Tübingen for permission to reconstitute the party at
"Land" level. The application was submitted in February, 1946, and, as required, was signed by five signatories: Alfred Acker, Ludwig Becker and Berthold Furtwangler from Schwenningen, Karl Mauderer from Rottweil and Ferdinand Zeeb from Tübingen. The fact that three of the signatories were domiciled in the industrial centre of Schwenningen demonstrates the relative importance of that town vis-à-vis Tübingen as far as the KPD in Süd-Württemberg was concerned. This was further reflected in Alfred Acker's appointment as "Präsident der kommunistischen Partei Süd-Württemberg - Hohenzollern" and Ludwig Becker's election as chairman of the "Landesgewerkschaft Metall für Süd-Württemberg - Hohenzollern" which was also situated in Schwenningen. The KPD later moved its "Landesleitung der kommunistischen Partei für die französisch besetzte Zone Württembergs" ("Land" executive of the Communist Party for the French-occupied zone of Württemberg) from Tübingen to Schwenningen.

One point of interest is that the KPD was not permitted in this period to use its traditional title of "Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands" since French policy refused to countenance for the first two years of the occupation a return to an autonomous and unpartitioned German state. In accordance with this policy those political parties which featured "Deutschland" in their official title (e.g., KPD, SED) were obliged to drop the term in favour of the name of the local provincial unit, i.e., Württemberg or Süd-Württemberg - Hohenzollern.

On March 18, 1946, the French officially replied to the KPD application for reconstitution at "Land" level by publishing "Arrêté No. 13" in the Bulletin officiel de la délégation supérieure pour le gouvernement militaire du Wurtemberg. This decree officially re-established the KFD in Süd-Württemberg on a legal basis.

In the meantime a parallel application had been made for the reconstitution of the KPD in both the town and "Kreis" district of Tübingen. This "Antrag auf Wiederaufnahme der Kommunistischen Partei für Stadt und Kreis Tübingen" (Application for re-admission of the Communist Party for the town and district of Tübingen) was accompanied by a list of members 1-14 of the local Communist branch plus the obligatory questionnaires on the five signatories. These were: Ernst Bressat, Erna Blessing, Christian Gallus, Otto Schüfer and Gottlob Schmidt. Since the official scrutiny of the signatories' backgrounds by the Communist head of the "Kriminalpolizei" proved little more than perfunctory, the local KPD branches for town and "Kreis" were authorised in March 1946.
Although political parties were theoretically re-permitted within the French zone as from December 1945 and began receiving individual authorization to function as political organizations during the course of March, 1946, another half-year was to pass before the parties were allowed to compete for electoral support in open elections, i.e., the municipal and "Kreis" elections of September and October 1946. During this period, therefore, the political parties had an opportunity to develop contacts with the French authorities, to demonstrate their commitment to the democratic electoral system, to present themselves to the electorate and, very important, to win popular confidence which would later be translated into votes.

The electoral system instituted by the French military government in Süd-Württemberg consisted of a four-tier process beginning with municipal elections and progressing gradually to "Landtag" elections:
- September 15, 1946: direct municipal elections for "Gemeinderat" and "Oberbürgermeister".
- October 13, 1946: direct "Kreis" elections for the "Kreisversammlung" (district assembly).
- November 17, 1946: indirect elections by members of "Kreisversammlungen" and "Gemeinderäte" of towns with populations over 10,000 of the "Beratende Landesversammlung" (consultative regional assembly).
- May 15, 1947: direct elections to "Landtag" (diet) of Württemberg-Hohenzollern and referendum on prospective constitution.

At the municipal elections of September 15, 1946, the KPD presented, as did the other parties, 24 candidates on their ballot paper. These were published and distributed throughout the community by the municipal authorities on September 4 on a broadsheet entitled "Wahlvorschläge in der Universitätstadt Tübingen" (Election recommendations in the university town of Tübingen). There were five groups listed on the broadsheet, i.e., the four official parties plus the so-called "Parteilose Wählervereinigung" (Independent Electors' Association). The KPD candidates comprised the first group, because they had submitted their list before the others ("...und fünf gültige Wahlvorschläge eingereicht worden, welche anschließend in der Reihenfolge des Einlaufes bekanntgegeben werden ..."). (Five valid election groups have been submitted and are announced in appendix..."
in the order in which they were received ... The candidates were:

1. Zeeb, Ferdinand, Polizeiangestellter (police officer)
2. Banzhauer, Georg, Vorschlosser (foreman locksmith)
3. Benzinger, Kina, Schneiderin (tailor's wife)
4. Mühl, Karl, Haushofer m. B. (retired janitor)
5. Mühl, Karl, Elektromonteur (electrical fitter)
6. Blessing, Erna, Hausfrau (housewife)
7. Schittenhelm, Ernst, Metallschleifer (metal grinder)
8. Brosnov, Ernst, Parteisekretär (C.F. Party Secretary)
9. Luible, Anton, Bauholzer (builder's mechanic)
10. Hohl, Christian, Milchhändler (dairyman)
11. Kohner, Ernst, städtischer Vorarbeiter (municipal foreman)
12. Strauss, Richard, Hausfrau (housewife)
13. Offenberg, Joseph, Weichemächer und Landwirt (pointman and farmer)
14. Bölze, Hermann, Glasmacher (master glazier)
15. Kieker, Karl, Feinmechaniker (precision mechanic)
16. Weiβ, Alfred, Angestellter (clerical employee)
17. Gull, Christian, Dreher (turner)
18. Gerstner, Engelbert, Feld- und Waldschütz (forest keeper)
19. Stieger, Christian, Werkzeugmacher (toolmaker)
20. Schieber, Robert, Milchhändler (dairyman)
21. Schüller, Otto, Müller (흘locator)
22. Schmidt, Gottlob, Gartenhändler (gardener)
23. Brunner, Karl, Polsterer und Tapezierer (upholsterer)
24. Müller, Theo, Elektromeister (master electrician)

The numbering of candidates was of importance since the electoral system
employed was based on proportional representation whereby the individual voter
received a number of votes which he could distribute either singly or en gros
(i.e. "kumulieren" and "ponaachieren") among candidates. The numbering of candi­
dates indicated the relative importance which the local party attached to their
individual success. To be placed high on the ballot list of party candidates
correspondingly raised the chances of being elected. Bearing this in mind it is
curious that the KPD's party secretary and branch head, Ernst Brosnov, was situated
as low as position No. 8 where he had minimal chances of being elected.
It was customary among the political parties in Tübingen, as elsewhere in Germany, that the acknowledged party leaders headed the party's list of candidates, thereby asserting their claim for party support and allegiance and their desire to seek office. A glance at the other groups on the broadsheet of September 4 confirms this fact: Wilhelm Virthke, the chairman of the DVP, was candidate No. 1 on their list, likewise Adolf Hartmeyer for the SFD and Jakob Krauf for the CDU. In the case of the KPD the primary position was taken by Ferdinand Zeck, a local and charismatic personality by all accounts. The head of the local KPD, Brossat, was, on the other hand, a Rhinelander and newcomer to Tübingen, having arrived in the town after its occupation by the French. Former KPD members from this period in Tübingen have testified that Brossat was designated head of the Tübingen KPD by the party office in Stuttgart. The KPD in Tübingen was possibly aware that it had little chance of winning elections in such a tightly-knit community with newcomers as candidates. Hence, perhaps, the reason for the divergence from normal political practice in the municipal ballot papers.

The other striking feature of the KPD's list of candidates was its total lack of representatives of the professional and middle classes, especially of university academics. The DVP list in contrast contained a university lecturer, a woman doctor, a teacher and three town hall officials. The DVP presented among its candidates the director of the postal services, a bank owner and a bank manager, a wholesale paint merchant, two firm proprietors, a solicitor and three white-collar office workers. The CDU in turn offered in its list a school teacher, a woman doctor, two shopkeepers and three white-collar office workers.

The Tübingen KPD went into the municipal elections of September 1946 fully aware that it had a difficult task on its hands to win votes within the basically conservative community. There had, however, been no municipal elections for the previous fourteen years (1932) and the KPD evidently hoped that the experience of National Socialism would have added a new dimension to the political consciousness of the community which would operate in their favour. One incident occurred, however, which put the KPD on its guard and marred its optimism, leaving it suspicious both of the oppositional groups and the town hall administration and of the eventual outcome of the elections. On September 14, the eve of the elections, Ernst Brossat wrote to the municipal office in charge of election
affairs ("Wahlerei"): "Wir teilen Ihnen hierdurch mit, daß nach unseren Informationen Unregelmäßigkeiten bei der Verteilung der Stimmzettel vorgekommen sind. In mehreren Fällen haben die Wähler keine kommunistischen Stimmzettel erhalten. Wie mir Dr. Hau (Wahlreiseleiter) mitgeteilt hat, haben bei der Verteilung der Stimmzettel in die Umhüllungen 300 kommunistische Stimmzettel gefehlt ... Wir sind der Auffassung, daß trotz der Versuche der Stadtverwaltung die begangenen Unregelmäßigkeiten zu bereinigen, eine Benachteiligung für unsere Partei bestehen bleibt ... Da sich der Umfang der begangenen Unregelmäßigkeiten für uns noch nicht übersehen läßt, behalten wir uns vor, die Gültigkeit der Wahl ansuzweifeln ..." (We hereby inform you that, according to our information, irregularities have occurred in the distribution of ballot papers. In several cases voters have not received Communist ballot papers. As Dr. Hau (head of the office in charge of election affairs) has informed me, 300 Communist ballot papers were missing when the ballot papers were deposited in the envelopes ... We are of the opinion that, despite the attempts by the municipal administration to clear up these irregularities, our party is still at a disadvantage ... As the extent of the irregularities affecting us cannot yet be estimated, we reserve the right to challenge the validity of the election ..."

The municipal election results of September 15, 1946, demonstrated the failure of the Tübingen KPD to gain the confidence of the majority of the community’s electorate. Of a total 281,029 votes cast to determine the election of 24 "Gemeinderat" the following results were achieved:

| 1. CDU | 94,242 votes | 8 seats |
| 2. JWP | 75,204 votes | 7 seats |
| 3. KPD | 70,140 votes | 6 seats |
| 4. Parteilose Wählervereinigung | 26,547 votes | 2 seats |
| 5. Parteilose Wählervereinigung | 12,896 votes | 1 seat |

The two Communist seats on the "Gemeinderat" were occupied by candidates Nos. 1 and 2 on the KPD ballot list, i.e. Ferdinand Zeek, who with 4,240 votes was the 14th successful candidate on the table of voting statistics, and Georg Dannhauer, who with 1,842 votes was the 24th and last. (39)
This result was a serious setback for the KPD's hopes in post-war Tübingen. Although in retrospect their election achievements may seem quite substantial given the marked conservatism of the population, the KPD had looked forward to an era of success after the defeat of National Socialism. The trend of success which the KPD had initially, and very obviously, enjoyed throughout 1945 and part of 1946 was reversed in the course of this one election which denoted it to the position of a small minority party within the community. Indeed, many former critics and opponents of the KPD in Tübingen maintain that the reverse of fortunes experienced by the KPD in post-war Tübingen would have been more severe had it not been for the respect and affection which Ferdinand Zeeb had accumulated within the community. (40)

Four weeks after the municipal elections came the elections for the local "Kreisversammlung". In accordance with the size of its population, "Kreis Tübingen" was called to elect 26 members, to be elected by proportional representation. The low turn-out and the influence of the rural areas within "Kreis Tübingen" contributed to the CDU gaining an absolute majority in the "Kreisversammlung" (renamed the "Kreistag"), receiving 14 of the 26 seats. The SPD gained 5 seats, the MFP 4 seats and the KPD 3 seats. The three Communist seats were held by two Tübingen members, Ferdinand Zeeb and Erna Blessing, plus a member from the neighbouring village of Häsingen. (41) As with the "Gemeindevertretung" election in Tübingen the KPD found itself in stark minority to the bourgeois parties with little chance of exerting influence in the elected council.

The next elections in French-occupied Württemberg were not direct popular elections. They occurred on November 17, 1946, to establish the membership of the "Beratende Landesversammlung" which was intended to frame the future constitution of Süd-Württemberg (now termed Württemberg-Hohenzollern) in conjunction with the "Staatssekretariat" (now termed the "provisorische Regierung", i.e. provisional government). This new body was to comprise 68 members to be elected by two electoral colleges according to a system of proportional representation: 36 members were to be chosen by and from within the "Kreisversammlungen" and 27 members were to be chosen by and from within the 19 town councils representing those towns in Süd-Württemberg with a population of 10,000 and more, plus 5 members from the former Bavarian enclave of Lavina. The CDU again won the absolute majority with 40 seats, the SPD gained 14 seats, the CDU 7 seats and the KPD only 4 seats. (42) The sole Tübingen representative among the four KPD deputies was Ferdinand Zeeb.
The last of the series of four elections re-introducing political institutions in South-Württemberg took place on May 11, 1947, with the parliamentary elections for the "Landtag" of Württemberg-Johannisburg. In all 60 seats were contested. The CDU gained the absolute majority with 54.2% of the vote, although this represented a slight drop in support in comparison with the results of the "Kreisversammlung" elections. All the other three parties gained in comparison with the "Kreisversammlung" elections, the KPD raising its overall "Landtag" percentage from 6.9% to 7.3%. Of the 483,536 votes cast the KPD in South-Württemberg gained 27,571, winning 5 seats in the "Landtag" (which was installed in the medieval Cistercian monastery of Bebenhausen outside Tübingen). **(43)**

These figures represent what could have been regarded in South-Württemberg by May 1947 as the norm of expectation for KPD support within the electorate, i.e. fluctuating between 5% and 10%. If, however, one takes the "Landtag" election figures for Tübingen on their own, a different picture is presented. In Tübingen of the 9,936 votes cast,

- the MDP gained 3,697 = 37.3%
- the CDU gained 2,783 = 28.5%
- the SPD gained 2,010 = 20.5%
- and the KPD gained 1,536 = 15.4% **(44)**

This discrepancy in electoral behaviour in Tübingen vis-à-vis the KPD has always been explained by the presence of Ferdinand Seeb who represented the KPD as parliamentary candidate in the Tübingen constituency. **(45)** There is, however, another, more obvious explanation in that the urban communities of South-Württemberg provided a fractionally higher percentage of electoral support for the KPD than the rural areas because of industrial work forces, trade union organisations etc.

One important feature of the "Landtag" election of May 11, 1947, was the concomitant referendum on the proposed constitution for Württemberg-Johannisburg, which was accepted throughout the province by more than a two-thirds majority (69.8%) with 260,701 voting for and 116,045 voting against the constitution. **(46)**

In this respect Tübingen also differed from the "Landtag" results in that a majority of the Tübingen electorate rejected the constitution; 4,473 voted in favour of the constitution whilst 5,668 voted in opposition to the same. This anomaly...
in electoral reaction on the part of Tübingen introduces the theme of the KfD
and the constitution of Württemberg-Hohenzollern.

In the "Beratende Landesversammlung" the KfD had rejected the draft
constitution formulated by the CDU majority and, together with the DVP, had
recommended its rejection by the electorate. The CDU, under the leadership
of Lorenz Böck and his deputy, Emil Wiethofer, presented their proposed con­
stitutional bill to the French military government in April 1947, after intense
disagreement with the other three parties, none of which would consent to the
Christian Democratic proposals. These proposals entailed the establishment
of a strong presidential system whereby the "Staatspräsident" would have
evacancy powers to dissolve parliament and govern by decree. The bill also
proposed the establishment of a second chamber termed the "Staatsrat" which
would not be popularly elected but rather selected on an individual basis by
the "Staatspräsident": "Die Erräumung setzt voraus, daß der zu ernennende sich
in seinen Amt oder freien Beruf hervorragend betätigt hat und über eine reiche
Erfahrung in den Anforderungen der Staatsführung verfügt." (An appointment
presupposes that the person to be appointed has eminently distinguished himself
in his office or his profession and is well experienced in the requirements of
state administration.)

This conservative interpretation of the division of political power in
Süd-Württemberg was anathema to the KfD who viewed a powerful presidency with
suspicion, especially when linked with a second chamber appointed exclusively
by the president. In addition, the KfD was opposed to the Christian Democratic
orientation of the preamble to the constitution acknowledging the Christian
basis of the state, and considered that nothing fundamental had been done about
the question of land reform whilst too much emphasis had been laid on the proposed
re-introduction of confessional schools.

The SPD and DVP were in partial agreement with the KfD and all three
parties subsequently boycotted the "Verfassungsamtsauschü" (constitutional com­
mittee) of the assembly. This led the French governor-general of Süd-Württemberg,
General Widner, to reject the CDU's constitution draft (April 5, 1947) and to
order the parties to find a compromise formula by April 23. Since the CDU
refused to countenance the SPD's counter-proposal of simply adopting the Württem¬
beringen constitution (i.e. of American-occupied Württemberg and Baden) which had been drawn up to a large extent by Carlo Schmid during his period of office in Stuttgart, both the CDU and SPD, acting under strong French pressure, moved to a compromise and the necessary two-thirds majority for ratification of the same. In the night of April 22, 1947, the constitution draft was accepted with 46 members in favour and 11 against. The eleven votes of opposition represented the seven DVP and four KPD deputies.

With the acceptance of the constitution draft by the "Beratende Landesversammlung" on April 22, 1947, and the subsequent seal of approval by the electorate in the referendum of May 8, the stage was set for the role which the KPD in Württemberg was compelled to enact for the ensuing nine years until the judgement of the Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic in Karlsruhe on August 17, 1950, defined the KPD as unconstitutional and ordered its dissolution. As from May 1947 the KPD in Württemberg had to function within the framework of a Christian Democratic constitution, an obvious impediment to a Marxist party advocating fundamental social and political change. In addition, since constitutional alterations (e.g. on questions of property rights, religion, education etc.) required a two-thirds majority, the KPD had little realistic chance of passing this hurdle, all the more so since the SPD in Württemberg was under the influence (till his departure to the "Bundestag" in Bonn) of an active anti-Communist in Carlo Schmid. The KPD, thus outmanoeuvred in the second year of the French occupation, assumed an outsider role in Württemberg's political life, raising its voice in constant negation and criticism at the development of events in Württemberg and Germany as a whole throughout the Cold War until its eventual dissolution.

The KPD's stance on the constitutional issue also reflected the gulf which had developed between the party and the French occupation authorities. By 1947 the French military government had revised its attitude to the KPD. The Communist party by this period was no longer regarded as a valuable and dependable source of aid and information, but was increasingly considered a hindrance to the promotion of a regional identity in South-West Germany along the lines of the "French thesis", i.e. with a view to establishing one or more autonomous states. To this end the French exploited and utilised local and regional cultural phenomena and traditionalist institutions such as the churches, the local aris-
tocracy and separatist groups. The KPD viewed this with consternation and, refusing to compromise on basic issues to the extent to which the SPD and CDU were prepared, openly criticised French policy. This lost the KPD whatever favour it had accrued with the French.

It could be argued that this process of estrangement between the KPD and the French military government was an inevitable development once General de Gaulle had firmly established himself as the government of France and set out to counter what he considered the main danger to France's security in the post-war period, namely Communism. De Gaulle's anti-Communism affected French occupation policy, even after his resignation as head of government in January, 1946, through his close ties with his wartime subordinate, General Koenig, Commander-in-Chief of the French Zone, who the French Communist Party considered "took his orders from General de Gaulle rather than from the French government."

The extent of the isolation in which the KPD in Wurttemberg found itself after a period of two years - which represents conversely the extent of its lack of success - is underlined by the fact that not once in the subsequent years was the KPD invited to participate in the government of Wurttemberg. This was also true of the "Staatssekretariat" under Carlo Schmid, the composition of which was not based initially on election results and in which one might have expected a delegation of Communist representatives in the initial post-war period of anti-Fascist demonstration. Indeed the Wurttemberg KPD was the sole Communist group in the whole of Germany which at no time in the post-war years held government office, an anomaly which has been stressed by Professor Röchling: "Die Regierung Wurttemberg-Wohenzollern war die einzige in Deutschland, der selbst in den ersten Jahren kein Kommunist angehörte. Das verstand Schmidt zu verhindern." (The government of Wurttemberg-Wohenzollern was the only one in Germany which even in the first years had no Communist members. Schmid knew how to prevent that.)

The discrepancy between, on the one hand, the favoured position enjoyed by the KPD in Tirol (and elsewhere) in 1945 after the installation of French military government in Wurttemberg and, on the other, its exclusion from office in the regional government ("Staatssekretariat" and Landesregierung")
of Südwürttemberg together with the party's failure to instil a positive response in the electorate invites an examination of the causes behind this loss of influence.

The central problem facing the KPD in post-war Tübingen was the objective factor that Tübingen, whilst ranking third on Südwürttemberg's list of manufacturing towns, gained this distinction only by dint of comparison, for Südwürttemberg was predominantly a rural and agricultural region where only two communities, Schwäbisch-Villingen and Reutlingen, represented characteristic industrial centres. The KPD in Tübingen was aware that there was no substantial industrial proletariat within the community on which the party could rely for vanguard support. In addition, the industrial minority of the town was largely assimilated into the petty bourgeois and religious ethos of Swabian small-town life with its characteristically conservative undertones. On the whole this was representative of the KPD's situation in Südwürttemberg, except for the industrial agglomerations of Schwäbisch-Villingen and Reutlingen. F. Roy Willis described the KPD's dilemma as follows: "The Communists were never able to win much support in a scene that was predominantly rural and Catholic. The interests of the population, especially in Baden and Württemberg, were too sharply opposed to the Communist party's aim of national unification, agrarian reform and separation of church and state."(93)

The KPD owed its rise to political prominence in post-war Tübingen, as has already been indicated, to its initial political activism and to the favour which its record of anti-Fascism found in the eyes of a handful of Marxist ex-Resistance officers based within the military government in Tübingen. This left the KPD even more dependent on the goodwill of the occupying forces than the other three political parties. Consequently the KPD was compelled to maintain the favour of the French or else to win the electorate's confidence.

Maintaining the goodwill of the French proved difficult on two counts: firstly, the KPD's base of support within the military government was gradually removed and, secondly, the KPD maintained a level of criticism of French policy which alienated the local occupation authorities.
General Koenig, distrustful of French Communist influence within the zone and personally annoyed by criticism levelled at him by Communist (and Socialist) newspapers in Paris, set about reducing Marxist influence within the French occupation authorities in Germany in 1946. This process was galvanised after the French Communist party instructed its members holding ministerial office to withdraw from the Ramadier government in May 1947. In the late 1940s a 'Sentorial' article described the development with brevity: "Das Barometer der Besatzungspolitik des Quai d’Orsay stand auf Revanche bis Wiedergutmachung. Die erste Wendung: Austritt der Kommunisten aus der Regierung Ramadier. Die Radikalen waren fort. Sie verschwanden auch aus der Besatzung. Auch wenn sie so tüchtige Männer waren wie Oberst Deglane-Pouche, der Gouverneur von Konstanz."

(The barometer of occupation policy at the Quai d'Orsay fluctuated between revanche and «restitution. The first development same with the withdrawal of the Communists from the Ramadier government. The radicals were gone. They also disappeared from the occupation administration. Even such able men as Colonel Deglane-Pouche, the governor of Konstanz.)

In a retrospective look at the situation prior to 1948 the former CDU newspaper, Bildertdeutsche Union, doubted whether the rumoured purge of the Left within the occupation administration had, in fact, occurred. "Es hieß zwar, daß die französischen Beamtenbehörden einen Abbau ihres ungeheuren Apparates, der aus dem besetzten Gebiet heraus erarbeitet wird, vorgenommen hätten. Von der Entlassung von 3000 Angestellten, vor allem ausgesprochenen Kommunisten, war die Rede. Die Bevölkerung der französischen Zone hat indessen wenig von einem Abbau des französischen Personals bemerken können." (Certainly it was said that the French occupation authorities had carried out a reduction of their immense apparatus which was fed from the produce and at the cost of the occupied zone. There was talk of dismissing 3000 employees, in particular committed Communists. However, the population of the French Zone noticed little reduction in the number of French personnel.)

There is little doubt, however, that a good proportion of the Communist officers within the French military government in Tübingen were either dismissed or transferred elsewhere. This was established in the course of an interview with a prominent member of the post-war SPD in Tübingen, Dr. Dieter Reiser. Reiser emphasised that not only was the Gaullist faction interested in reducing Communist...
Influence within military government administrations, but also the French Socialist party. An example was cited in the figure of Salomon Grumbach (1884-1952) of the SFIO, chairman of the "Commission des Affaires Etrangères de l'Assemblée Nationale". According to Roser, Grumbach was a tough opponent of Communism who came on at least one occasion to Tübingen in the post-war period to check on the development of social affairs and who had "großen Einfluß auf die Redressierung der KF-träumlichen Offiziere." (Great influence on the redressing of balance with regard to pro-KPD officers.)

The KPD in Tübingen had in any case already alienated itself by 1947 from the local French military government on account of its critical attitude to developments within the community. It was a logical development that the French administrations in Tübingen came to regard the local Communists not so much an aid as an irritant. The KPD was hypercritical at times of a whole series of issues which the French military government did not wish to open to discussion. These issues included such controversial issues as the food and housing situation in Tübingen, land reform, denazification and separatism.

In comparison with the other parties the KPD maintained the most critical and outspoken attitude vis-à-vis French policy and municipal affairs, thereby arousing not only the animosity of the French authorities, but that of the German administrations and the other political parties in Tübingen who feared harsh French reactions to this criticism. There was justification for such fears, for example the dismissals of Ernst Fischer, the original founder and director of the "Landesdirektion für Ernährung und Wirtschaft" in Tübingen after the evacuation of Stuttgart by the French, for contradicting General de Gaulle at a personal interview during de Gaulle’s visit to Freiburg on October 4, 1945, (98) and of Hermann Verhase from the editorial board of the Schwäbischer Tagblatt for writing an article on the local food situation. The KPD’s critical attitude to political and social developments seems to have been a hallmark of the party in the post-war years in Bad-Württemberg, despite the assertion made in 1946 by the American Foundation for Foreign Affairs in its Field Report on the French Zone in Germany that the KPD "concentrates on attacking the German administrations, their poor functioning and their costly staffing, while fully recognising the French administration." (59) This generalisation, however, presents a slanted version of the KPD’s political work in the immediate post-war years for the party did stick its neck out time and time again with trenchant criticism of both French policy and management.
In its criticism of conditions in post-war Tübingen the local KPD group worked mainly for the improvement of the living standard of the working-class population. Within the "Gemeinderat" and "Kreisversammlung" meetings and within the "Demokratische Vereinigung" KPD members constantly raised their voices in criticism and protest on the subject of living conditions in Tübingen. In the "Gemeinderat", for instance, Ferdinand Zeeb pointed out discrepancies in the distribution of goods and amenities. One such case was the "Gemeinderat" meeting of September 29, 1947, the relevant minutes of which read as follows: "... In der sich anschließenden lebhaften Aussprache des Gemeinderats weist Beigeordneter Zeeb auf die große Dürre und ihre Folgen hin. Er bittet Herrn Oberst Brochu (i.e., local French military government commander) dafür zu sorgen, dass im Interesse einer gerechten Lebensmittelverteilung in Zukunft die Angestellten bei den französischen Dienststellen keine zweite Lebensmittelkarte mehr erhalten.

In der Kartoffelversorgung müsse man dem Herrn Landwirtschaftsminister, Herrn Dr. Weiβ, den Vorwurf machen, daß er zu große Versprechungen gemacht habe, auch sei es nicht richtig, zweimalte Karte anzubauwenden. Beigeordneter Zeeb weist sodann noch auf die besonderen Schwierigkeiten der hauptsächlich aus Arbeitern bestehenden Landbevölkerung hin ... Nach kurzen Bemerkungen zur Fleischversorgung erklärt er zur Wohnungfrage, es könne festgestellt werden, daß sich die Arbeiter den jetzigen Verhältnissen willig anpassen, dies sei jedoch bei den Herren Professoren und höheren Beamten nicht der Fall.

(... In the ensuing and lively discussion within the municipal council, Councillor Zeeb referred to the state of severe drought and its consequences. He asked Colonel Brochu to ensure that in the interests of a fair distribution of foodstuffs, the employees of French administrations should not in future receive a second ration card.

Zeeb continued that, with regard to potato supplies, Minister of Agriculture, Dr. Weiβ ought to be reproached for making overgenerous promises, and that it was not proper either to apply two kinds of standards. Councillor Zeeb then referred to the special difficulties of the rural population which consisted mainly of labourers ... After some short remarks about meat supplies, he stated with regard to the housing question that it could be proven that the labourers readily adjusted to the existing conditions, but that this was not the case with the professors and senior civil servants.)
In this speech Zeeb was criticizing one of the features of French policy in Tübingen. University professors and senior civil servants within the German administrations received double ration cards plus adequate wood supplies for heating purposes from the French authorities in the form of a special "carte de protection". In addition, these people, in contrast to the rest of the population, were allowed after the initial period of occupation to retain their houses for themselves. This was interpreted during the course of an interview with a former recipient of such favours as a deliberate "Bestechung der oberen Schicht" (bribing of the élites). According to the same interviewee the French were interested in two specific reciprocal services from these élites: cooperation and discreetness. The system apparently worked efficiently to the advantage of the French, bar the occasional mishap, such as the publication in the Schneidelsches Postblatt of a meal enjoyed by Carlo Schmidt and others at a "Landratetagung" in Saulgau in 1946, causing a storm of protest. The meal, consisting of roast veal, potato salad and vegetables with cream cake for dessert, released "ein Sturm im Bäutental" (i.e. a storm in the newspapers) since, in the words of Gebhard Müller, "war doch pro Person die Fleischration eines Monats und mehr Zucker verwendet worden, als die Jahresauszahl betrug" (a whole month's meat ration and more sugar than the annual ration amounted to had been consumed per person). [62]

Within the "Kreisversammlung" the two elected KPD members were equally active in their criticism of the living conditions endured by the working-class population of Tübingen. These members were Ferdinand Zeeb and Arna Blessing. Zeeb, for example, constantly touched upon the question of food shortages. Despite the fact that the minutes of the "Kreisversammlung" meetings are a polished and less controversial version of the actual speeches held (e.g. names were not recorded in instances of specific criticism) they still reflect the toughness and edge of Zeeb's criticism: "Mitglied Zeeb, Tübingen (KPD), erklärte, daß er es für seine Pflicht halte, auf die traurige Essenslage hinzuweisen. Er bedauerte, daß der Vertreter der Militärregierung bereits weggezogen ist. Denn gerade auch die Militärregierung solle die wahrte Lage kennen, damit uns der Vorwurf erspart bleibt, daß wir alles hinnehmen. Die heutige schlimme Lage gab dem Mitglied Zeeb Anlaß, die Aufmerksamkeit erneut auf die Frauenkreise zu lenken, die für das heutige Elend verantwortlich sind." (Member Zeeb, Tübingen (KPD), declared that he considered it his duty to refer to the miserable food situation. He regretted that the military government representative had already
left. For the military government in particular should be acquainted with the true situation so that we would be spared the reproach of having put up with everything. The existing bad situation gave Member Zeub cause to draw attention again to the groups of people responsible for the present misery. (63)

Zeob was assisted in his criticism of local conditions by the support of his fellow party member in the "Kreisversammlung", e.g. at the meeting of October 29, 1946, "Frau Blessing, Tübingen (KPD), wies auf die Notlage der arbeitenden Bevölkerung in der Stadt hin, die nur das zum Leben habe, was sie auf ihre Lebensmittelkarten bekomme" (Frau Blessing, Tübingen (KPD), referred to the plight of the working population of the town who only had what they got from their ration cards with which to stay alive) (64) and at the meeting of November 5, "Frau Blessing (KPD) nimmt das Wort, um den Ernst der Ernährungsfrage hauptsächlich für die arbeitende Bevölkerung auffällig zu machen. In der Frage der KohleverSORgung bemängelt sie, daß die alten alleinstehenden Leute heuer überhaupt keine Kohlen bekommen ..." (Frau Blessing (KPD) rose to speak and pointed out the seriousness of the food situation, especially for the working population. Concerning the coal supplies she criticised the fact that old, single people were getting no coal at all this year.) (65)

The most striking example of the KPD's critical role within the "Kreisversammlung" was a speech held by Ferdinand Zeob at the latter of the above-mentioned meetings in which he levelled criticism at the proposed land reform in the French Zone, the food situation and the distribution of building materials: "Mitglied Zeob (KPD) sprach davon, daß ihm die Bodenreform, wie sie für die französische Zone vorgesehen ist, sehr frappiert habe. Denn hier sollen im Gegensatz zur in der Kontrollrat festgesetzten Mindestgröße Güter erst von 150 ha an enteignet werden. Als ein wichtiges Ziel der Bodenreform bezeichnete Mitglied Zeob die Ernährung des Adels und der Militärs. Aus den großen Gütern hervor sollten erst die Kräfte erwachsen, die zum Krieg getrieben haben. Wenn man davon denke, wie die Güter vielfach entstanden sind, sei es nicht verständlich, daß man (vor allem die Adelsgüter) bei der Enteignung entschieden werden sollen. Im übrigen vertret er die Auffassung, daß die Kommunalgüter von der Bodenreform nicht betroffen werden ...
Zu den Ausführungen des Vorsitzenden über die Baustätigkeit bemerkte Mitglied Zeeb, daß bei der Zuteilung von Bauvorräten die kleinen Leute in allgemeinen kaum zum Zuge kommen. Er versteht es zwar zum Teil, daß die landwirtschaftlichen Gebäude in erster Linie wieder aufgebaut werden müssen. Dabei dürfen aber die kleinen Leute nicht vergessen werden."

(Mitglied Zeeb (KPD) stated that the agrarian reform as planned for the French zone had astounded him. For here, in contrast to the minimum size of estate laid down by the Allied Control Council, only estates of 150 acres were to be expropriated. Member Zeeb stated that it was an important goal of the agrarian reform to deprive the nobility and the militarists of power. According to him, the large estates produced the forces that had advocated and caused the war. If one thought how the estates in fact had originated in many cases, then it was incomprehensible that they (and especially the estates of the nobility) were to be compensated for whenever expropriated. In addition, he was of the opinion that communal land should not be affected by the agrarian reform ...

Member Zeeb defined the food question as an extremely serious one. Although the allocation of 3 cwt. of potatoes was to be welcomed, the allocation of fat was totally insufficient. The physical condition of the populace would continue to deteriorate as a result of insufficient nourishment. He said that he was prepared for the worst in the coming spring ...

With regard to the chairman's remarks concerning building matters, Member Zeeb remarked that the ordinary people hardly had a chance whenever building materials were being allocated. He could partly understand that agricultural buildings had to be rebuilt first of all. But at the same time ordinary people should not be forgotten ...)}

It can, of course, be argued that Zeeb was able to fulfill a role of advocate of the French military government and the German administrations since neither he nor his party was associated with the government of Süd-Württemberg nor with the administration of either the state or of "Kreis
Tübingen". If this line of argument is accepted then Zeeb's role within the "Kreisversammlung" was a self-perpetuating one for the KFD's criticism of military government policy, German administrations and political opponents only served to alienate the latter groups, thus further diminishing its chances of participation in political decision-making at levels above that of municipal positions. Conversely, the KFD's criticism of living conditions and occupation policy in Tübingen did not gain the party electoral support since the population of Tübingen and district, impressed though it may have been by Zeeb's personality and bonhomie, never learnt of his party's dedication to an improvement of the living conditions within the community. French censorship prevented the publication of all political and administrative negotiations and meetings. This had been clearly spelt out in a number of edicts from the French military government to the German administrations and political parties. Thus in terms of political strategy the KFD's dislike of - or incapacity for - flexibility on specific issues and its subsequently critical stand reaped negative rewards in that it did not produce major electoral support but served, on the other hand, to win an extensive and impressive list of enemies within the French military government, within the other political parties and within the community's social and professional élites, indeed throughout the middle classes, who were specifically annoyed at Communist involvement in such questions as rationing, land reform, education and, above all, denazification.

Within the community the opponents of the KFD organised themselves in open and in secret opposition to both the party and those party members installed in municipal office. The principal opponents of the KFD in Tübingen for the period, 1945-1947, since the National Socialists were excluded for the time being from political life, were, on the one hand, the church circles within the nascent CDU movement, especially the Roman Catholic diocese of Rottenburg, and, on the other hand, that group of newly recruited professional men who had joined the SPD under the aegis of Carlo Schmid.

The Roman Catholic diocesan authorities in Rottenburg participated in the political life of Tübingen and Württemberg with more alacrity and a greater degree of commitment than did their Protestant counterparts. This feature of Tübingen's post-war life is described below in a subsequent chapter on the CDU (Chapter 4). For the purposes of this chapter it will suffice to
document the active antagonism demonstrated by the Roman Catholic authorities in Rottenburg toward the Communist Party in Germany in general and in Tübingen in particular. The Bishop of Rottenburg, however, was surprised to learn from the French authorities that he could not use his influence and authority to the fullest in condemning Marxist ideology. This issue arose over the Bishop's wish to publish prayers prescribed by Pope Pius XI "against the Communist Heresies". In a letter to the military government commander of Tübingen, Lieutenant-Colonel Buchon, on August 31, 1945, the bishop wrote the following in protest: "Bitte Sie, dann ich mich in einer Angelegenheit an Sie wende, die mir äußerst peinlich ist:

Ich habe mich auf Ihre Bitte vermocht, das Kirchliche Amtsblatt zur Prüfung vorzulegen, obwohl es mir geist, nunmehr weniger Freiheit in diesem Punkt zu haben, als in der Zeit des Naziregimes. Von Gouvernement Régional wurde mir wiederholt versichert, als handle sich bei der Vorlage nicht um eine eigentliche Censor.

Nun wurde mir aber in Tübingen von einem Orden, in dem ich die von Pius XI vorgeschriebene Gebeteintention für die Gebete nach der heiligen Missa gegen die komunistischen Irrlehren anordnete, der "Präf.: "gegen die komunistischen Irrlehren" gestrichen.

Ich muß gegen Mangel behaupten, weil diese Stichung einen Eingriff in die Lehrfreiheit der Kirche darstellt, die uns dankenswerter Weise von der Militärregierung ausgesichert worden ist. In Schreiben des H.B. Generale Schwartz von ... wurde uns in einem Absatz die libertés absolue versprochen.

Ich bitte deshalb dringend, von der weiteren Vorlage offizieller kirchlicher Schriftenstecke absehen zu wollen."

(Permit me to address myself to you on a matter that is extremely distressing to me:)

I was compelled to submit the Church Gazette for censorship in accordance with your request although it embarrasses me to now have less freedom in this respect than during the period of the Nazi regime. I was repeatedly assured by the Gouvernement Régional that submitted (texts) did not constitute actual censorship.
Now, however, the passage "Against the Communist heresies" has been deleted in Tübingen from a decree in which I ordered the use of the instructions on prayer specified by Pius XI for prayers after Holy Mass on the subject of Communist heresies.

I must object to this because this deletion represents an intervention in the freedom of instruction of the Church which has been kindly assured us by the military government. In the letter from General Schwerdt, date ..., we were promised "liberté absolue" in the first paragraph.

Therefore, I urgently request you to refrain from enforcing the further submittal of official Church documents. 

The bishop did not consider the issue at this point as closed. The use of the pulpit and the parish magazine was a traditional and fundamental basis of the bishop’s influence on political life within the diocese. At the next possible opportunity the bishop put his case to the highest authority concerning French occupation policy in Germany. This occurred in January 1946 in a letter from the Bishop of Hottenburg to Francisque Gay, ARP member and Minister of State in the French Government with responsibility for German affairs. The bishop wrote with reference to the abovementioned censorship: "... C’est la même chose pour le Journal Officiel Ecclésiastique qui contient les informations et ordonnances officielles pour le clergé. Je regrettais avec douleur qu’un passage "contre les erreurs communistes" y fut effacé, et je considérais cela comme une violation de la liberté de l’enseignement religieux. Je vous serais très reconnaissant si vous pouviez faire enlever cette chaine de ma liberté, d’autant plus que, sous les nazis, je n’ai jamais soumis ni volontairement ni forcément le Journal Officiel Ecclésiastique ni des lettres pastorales à la censure préalable.

The Bishop of Hottenburg cultivated intensive contacts with a wide range of influential personalities with the intention of gaining sympathy and support for the Church’s struggle against, as he saw it, the exaggerated and unnatural rise of Communism within a basically Christian community. In a letter to Cardinal Emmanuel Schérer, Archbishop of Paris, the bishop outlined his main worry: "... Wenn ich in schwerer Sorge, wenn ich an die allenthalben entfesselten antichristlichen und antikirchlichen Kräfte denke, die sich bedrohlich, wie mir scheint, in Frankreich wie im übrigen Europa auswirken ..." (... I am greatly troubled when I think
of the anti-Christian and anti-Church forces everywhere which, it seems to me, are making themselves ominously felt, in France as well as in the rest of Europe ..., to which the French cardinal replied: "... Je souscris pleinement aux considérations dont vous me faites part à propos de la situation générale actuelle." (72)

The bishop obviously hoped that support could be gained within French clerical and proclerical circles and attention directed to the Communist danger in the South-Western section of the French Zone in Germany. The intention, logically, was to apply pressure on both the French government in Paris and the semi-autonomous French occupation administration in Germany for a change of attitude toward the KFD as acceptable political and administrative partners to the French military government.

At the same time the bishop himself applied all his authority and influence in repeated protests and warnings to the local French military government about the dangers of Communism. On June 26, 1945, scarcely a month after the capture of Stuttgart, the Bishop of Rottenburg, Jr. Sproll, wrote a lengthy report to the French military commander of Stuttgart, General Schwiene, outlining the situation of the Roman Catholic diocese of Württemberg. The submission of such a report had been agreed upon in a previous meeting between Bishop Sproll and the French military government officer in charge of religious affairs, Captain Lang. In the course of his report the bishop touched upon his fears concerning Communism: "... Es ist uns überhaupt ein großes Anliegen, unser armes Volk, soweit es der schrecklichen Härte des Nationalsozialismus verfallen ist, gründlich davon zu heilen, es aber auch vor dem anderen Extrem des Bolschewismus mit allen uns zur Verfügung stehenden religiösen Mitteln zu warnen. Die Päpste Pius XI und Pius XII haben uns hierfür die Marschroute angegeben. Aus guter Quelle, nämlich von einem Geistlichen, der sich aus Berlin zu uns durchgeschlagen hat, sind wir dahin informiert, daß dort zwar keine Religionsverfolgung stattfinde, daß man aber doch deutlich spüre, daß es mit der religiösen Freiheit nicht weit her sei. Auch falle auf, daß die Propaganda aus Berlin ganz anders klinge als die Wirklichkeit ..." (It is essentially a matter of great concern to us to thoroughly heal our poor people from the terrible heresy of National Socialism to which it has fallen prey and to warn it at the same time against the other extremes of Bolshevism by all the religious means at our disposal. Popes Pius XI and Pius XII have shown us
the way. We have been informed from a good source, namely from a clergyman who has managed to make his way through to us from Berlin, that, although no religious persecution is taking place, there was a distinct feeling that religious freedom had a very shaky basis. It was also apparently obvious that propaganda in Berlin gave quite a different picture from the actual reality of things ...)

A fortnight later the French commander of Tübingen, Lieutenant-Colonel Huchon, together with his adjutant, Lieutenant Spoerry, paid a formal visit to the episcopal palace in Rottenburg. The minutes of the meeting indicate that the bishop's senior advisers were surprised at the negative reaction of the French officers to a remark about the "Communist danger": "Als Huchon weiter darauf tippte, er wolle gern in konkreten Sorgen uns behilflich sein, brachte S. unsere Sorge die kommunistische Gefahr betreffend zum Ausdruck. Als ein leichtes Stirzen spürbar wurde, betonte er, daß er damit nicht den Bolschewismus als verbündete Macht meinte ..." (When Huchon continued to hint that he would be pleased to help us with specific worries, S. expressed our concern with regard to the Communist danger. When a mildly startled reaction became apparent (i.e. on Huchon's part) S. emphasised that by this he did not mean Bolshevism as an Allied Power (i.e. Russia) ...)(74)

It was not easy in the initial period of the occupation to open a campaign in Süd-Württemberg against the KPD, especially within Tübingen which was dominated in the years 1945 and 1946 by the "Demokratische Vereinigung". In 1945 the KPD was still recognised by the French and other Allied occupation administrations as the antithesis of National Socialism with a history of resistance during the Third Reich. The thoroughness with which the Communists had been persecuted by National Socialism stood them in good stead after the war as a barrier against criticism, at least for a period of time. Furthermore, Communism was identified by the French military government with the victorious ally and emergent superpower, the Soviet Union, and criticism of the former was regarded as taboo at many levels of local military government. There were, of course, also French Communists within the French military government.

The diocesan authorities in Rottenburg persevered throughout the years, 1945-1947, in its campaign to minimise the influence of the KPD in Süd-Württemberg and Tübingen. This campaign had a minimal effect on the Tübingen electorate which
was principally Lutheran, but it nevertheless had seriously negative consequences for the political fortunes of the KPD on two counts. Firstly, the Bishop of Rottenburg established a network of contacts within Paris and the military government authorities in both Baden-Baden and Tübingen (q.v. section on the Roman Catholic Church in Chapter 4) and these contacts gradually paid dividends as support was increasingly solicited with the primary aim of severing the life-line of communication between the KPD in Süd-Württemberg and local military government administrations. This occurred in response to an analysis by Dr. Kruse, political adviser to the Bishop of Rottenburg: "... Die Gefahr von links sei sehr groß; sie dränge sich vor, sie allein habe eine organisierte politische Arbeit. Sie scheue den Terror nicht und mißbrauche dazu auch untergeordnete alliierte Stellen ..." (The danger from the Left is reckoned to be very great; it asserts itself and it alone produces organised political activity; it does not shrink from the use of terror and in addition makes wrongful use of subordinate Allied positions to these ends ...). Secondly, the bishop created an impediment to possible support for the KPD within the predominantly Catholic electorate of Süd-Württemberg by issuing an instruction to the Catholic population in the form of a pastoral letter read from the pulpit on the last Sunday before the "Gemeinderat" elections of September 15, 1946. The instruction to the clergy read as follows: "Bei der entscheidenden Bedeutung, welche die Wahlen in allen Besatzungs­ zonen für die Gestaltung nicht nur des bürgerlichen, sondern auch des kirchlichen Lebens in den Gemeinden und im Staate haben, macht der Bischof alle walhberichtigen Gläubigen, besonders auch die Frauen, darauf aufmerksam, daß es ihre ernste Gewissenspflicht ist, zur Wahl zu gehen und nach ihrem christlichen Gewissen zu wählen.

Diese Pflicht legte der Heilige Vater in einer Ansprache vom 12. Mai 1946 in der Peterskirche zu Rom mit allem Nachdruck den Frauen und Jungfrauen am Hera ..." (At the next and indeed at all future elections in the communities etc. the following passage is to be announced at the morning services of a suitable Sunday or holiday prior to the elections or on election Sunday (should this be the case):...
Given the basic importance which the elections have in all the zones of occupation for the shaping not only of civilian but also of church life, both at the level of the communities and of the state, the bishop consequently draws the attention of all believers who are entitled to vote, especially women, to the fact that it is their serious moral duty to register their vote and to do so according to their Christian conscience.

In a speech on May 12, 1946, in St. Peter’s in Rome the Holy Father emphatically commended this duty to all women, old and young alike.

Although this letter did not specifically mention any party or parties it was clear that the intention was to deprive the nonclerical parties, above all the KPD, of the Catholic vote. This indeed was the result. Subsequently the KPD within Süd-Württemberg made no headway at all with the Catholic population and remained alienated from the Catholic electorate until the Karlsruhe ban on the party in 1956. Since the Catholic electorate represented the majority within Süd-Württemberg this meant that the KPD could not realistically aspire beyond minority party status. This was no doubt a contributory factor for the shift in French attitude toward the KPD: not only was the CDU more accessible concerning French plans for South-West Germany, but it was also the obvious majority party in Süd-Württemberg.

Given the fact that the Christian Democrats inevitably found favour in the eyes of the Roman Catholic bishop and, correspondingly, of the Catholic majority in Süd-Württemberg, the obvious political strategy for the KPD was to ally itself in coalition with the other nonclerical party, the SPD, (q.v. discussion of SED debate in Chapters 1 and 3) in the hope of gaining a majority. This solution was, however, frustrated by the fact that the SPD in Süd-Württemberg was headed and totally dominated by one of the KPD’s most active opponents within the province, Carlo Schmid. In addition, Carlo Schmid actively contributed in a major way to the downfall of the Tübingen KPD in the period between 1945 and 1947.

Carlo Schmid and his group of conservative supporters (the “Carlisten”), especially Viktor Renner, were annoyed and concerned at the rapid accumulation of positions of influence (i.e. police, newspaper, trade unions etc.) by the KPD in the first months of the occupation and set about to redress the balance.
Schmid's excellent relations with the French military government, both in Tübingen—especially with Guillaume Sidler, Governor-General of French-occupied Württemberg—and Baden-Baden, played an important role. A master of rhetoric and legal argumentation, Schmid was time and time again in a position as head of the German administrations to persuade high-ranking French officials of the necessity of containing the local Communists.

There were a number of motivations influencing Schmid's rejection of the KPD, a rejection which was so absolute that Schmid at times preferred the cooperation and aid of former, if repentant, National Socialists to that of Communists. His secretary during this period, for instance, was a former "Hitler-Jugend-Führerin" (female Hitler Youth leader), one of the National Socialist offices proscribed by Allied legislation with regard to the tenure of positions of political influence.

On one occasion Schmid caused a wave of protest within Tübingen when the content of a speech became known which he had held to prisoners in the French internment camp in Balingen. These detainees represented to a large degree the former elite of the National Socialist apparatus in the section of Württemberg occupied by the French. In a subsequent "Gemeinderat" meeting (November 13, 1946) Ferdinand Zeibert protested at the strongly conciliatory tone of Schmid's speech:

"Aus der Ansprache von Staatsrat Schmid an die Gefangenen habe ihm allerdings der Satz sehr mißfallen: "Ohne euch (Nazi) ist kein Aufbau Deutschlands möglich..." (He disliked very much, however, one sentence from Staatrat Schmid's speech to the prisoners: "Without you (Nazis) no reconstruction of Germany is possible."")

Schmid was also personally active in the rehabilitation of various members of the NSDAP and the Hitler Youth, as was the case with the well-known Reutlingen artist, Heinrich Hartmann.

On the subject of denazification Schmid said at the sixth sitting of the "Beratende Landesversammlung" of Württemberg-Hohenzollern (January 9, 1947):

"Ich glaube auch, daß eine ganze Reihe ehemaliger und ehrenvoller ehemaliger Nationalsozialisten mit uns darin einig geben (i.e. on denazification); denn ich stehe nicht am, zu sagen, daß es unter den Mitgliedern der NSDAP nicht nur Lümmen geben hat ..." (I also believe that quite a number of decent and respectable former National Socialists will agree with us on this; for I do not hesitate to say that there were not only scoundrels among the members of the NSDAP ...)
The purpose of inserting this and other quotations is not to portray Carlo Schmid in any way as a friend or supporter of former National Socialists, although a Serbian article in 1949 interpreted Schmid's generosity in denazification matters as motivated partly by personal gratitude and partly by political calculation: "...Einige anständige SS-Leute" deckten ihn, unter ihnen der in Nürnberg verurteilte Ohlendorff-Freund Martin Sandberger. Schmid seinerseits revanchierte sich, indem er nach dem Krieg für über 400 HJ-Führer guteteigte, "soweit ich es verantworten konnte. Sie stehen hinter mir, von Amsmann angefangen, und wenn ich pfeife, sind sie da." (...some decent SS men protected him, among them Ohlendorf's friend, Martin Sandberger, who was sentenced at Nuremberg. Schmid for his part reciprocated by vouching for more than 400 Hitler Youth leaders after the war, "as far as I could account for them. They are behind me, beginning with Amsmann, and if I whistle they all come."

Schmid's primary concern with regard to denazification was the maintenance of Ohlendorff's administrative apparatus (q.v. Chapter 5). A pragmatic realist and experienced administrator, Schmid was interested in assimilating as many former National Socialist administrators and civil servants as possible into the administrations under his charge, especially those men who had joined the KdD after 1936.

The purpose of this sketch of Carlo Schmid's attitude to denazification is to demonstrate the discrepancy between his liberal relativism towards former KdD members and his unswerving antagonism towards the KPD. Carlo Schmid, despite his admission to and subsequent presidency of the SPD in Süd-Württemberg was fundamentally a bourgeois politician with high ambitions and little time for Marxist ideology. He chose the SPD as his platform in 1945, despite its partially Marxist programs, for a series of reasons which will be discussed in the subsequent chapter. Suffice it to say for the moment that Schmid's influence on the SPD in Süd-Württemberg was enormous and that he thrust the party from 1945 onwards on an anti-Communist course.

Thus the KdD in Tübingen - and in Süd-Württemberg - found itself in constant, if not always open conflict with the local SPD at a time when the Central Committee of the KdD was seeking a nationwide entente with the SPD in the new popular front organisation, the "Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands".
In addition, Carlo Schmid ensured that the German administrations and ministries in Tübingen observed an anti-Communist stance. This was most pronounced within the police headquarters in Tübingen where officials strove over a period of years to purge the force of Communist officers appointed by the French in the initial months of the occupation. The effects of this administrative campaign against the KPD caused considerable damage to the party's position in post-war Tübingen, not least for the reason that the French authorities came to regard the KPD as an impediment to a smoothly functioning relationship with the German administrations.

Schmid did not solely oppose the KPD on ideological grounds, although this remained an important aspect. For instance, in 1920 Schmid had, according to the Ministry, fought in the Ruhr against the Communists as commander of a student battalion. Schmid also saw the KPD in 1945 as a potential obstacle to the realization of his ambitious political plans. Not only had the KPD acquired positions of influence; it was also, in terms of electoral support, the SPD's traditional rival for members and votes. This was especially true within the trade union movement.

Consequently, when the Tübingen KPD approached the SPD "Ortsverein" and "Landessekretariat" with a series of proposals concerning the amalgamation of the KPD and SPD in the "Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands", Schmid reacted with a categorical negative. Schmid's plans for the KPD in Baden-Württemberg envisaged an eventual rejection of the KPD's Marxist-based programme in favour of a bourgeois-liberal programme, rehabilitating religious freedom and free enterprise. The SPD proposals consequently presented a disruptive factor for Schmid's plans and ambitions. His closest associates within the SPD set about convincing the party of the dangers involved in an entente with the KPD. A perusal of the record of minutes ("Protokollbuch") of the SPD "Ortsverein Tübingen" for the years 1946 and 1947 reveals that the related topics of Communism and the SPD proposals worried the SPD functionaries more than any other theme, indeed more than Christian Democratic successes in the elections.

Carlo Schmid must also have known, through his good relations with French officials, that the central military government in Baden-Baden disapproved of the establishment of the SPD in the French zone since the KPD campaign was directed by the headquarters of the KPD in Berlin. This contradicted the French policy of
creating autonomous political groupings within their own zone. The French military
government in Tübingen, for instance, was well aware that Communist functionaries
came periodically to Tübingen to check on developments in the SED question. It
was partly for this same reason, i.e. that political influence was exerted across
sonal boundaries into the French zone, that the French authorities banned "Das
Neue Deutschland" and other "Antifa" organisations. Schmid was no doubt aware
that the newly proposed SED had no real future within French-occupied South-West
Germany.

By early 1940 the French authorities had begun applying restrictive pressure
on the SED activists. The main steps taken were, firstly, to refuse to recognise
the organisation as a political party and, secondly, to impose a ban on propaganda
material. This latter ban was communicated to the mayor of Tübingen in the
following circular, dated February 9, 1940, and signed by the deputy to the
Minister of the Interior, Dr. Theodor Sechenburg: "Die Militärregierung hat an
den Herrn Staatspräsidenten folgendes Schreiben gerichtet:"

"Es ist mir mitgeteilt worden, daß die in anderen Zonen genehmigte, jedoch
in der französischen Zone verbotene SED Broschüren und Flugblätter nach Württemberg
hatte bringen lassen, die an die Bevölkerung verkauft würden.

Ich behabe mich, Ihnen mitzuteilen, daß jegliche Propaganda jeder Art zu-
gunsten einer in der französischen Zone nicht genehmigten Partei fälschlich untersagt
ist.

Ich bitte Sie daher, besorgt zu sein, daß kein Redner, kein Journalist und
keine politische Vereinigung diesen Verfügungen ausserhandel.

Die Übertreten, die Sie eventuell feststellen können, müssen mir an
reich als möglich in Form eines Berichtes mitgeteilt werden." (The Military
Government has addressed the following letter to the State President:
"I have been informed that the SED, which is permitted in other zones, but banned
in the French zone, had brochures and handbills brought into Württemberg which were
then sold to the population.

I wish to inform you that all propaganda of any kind in favour of a political party
not permitted within the French zone is forbidden.

I request you therefore to ensure that no speaker, journalist or political associa-
tion acts contrary to these orders. Should you perhaps register transgressions, they must be reported to me as quickly as possible in the form of a report).

In retrospect it is apparent that the Tübingen SPD had electoral reasons for fearing amalgamation with the KPD. The KPD became associated in the public's mind with Russian Communism, still a taboo topic for a substantial section of the populace as a result of twelve years of National Socialist propaganda on the evils and dangers of Communism. Furthermore, the strongly religious population of Tübingen, which in the post-war years was still very much under the influence of Swabian Fimism, rejected the materialist and antireligious ideology of the KPD. Carlo Schmid, aware that an almost sentimental religiosity was sweeping the land as a reaction to the excesses of National Socialism and the horrors of total warfare, was determined to introduce a religious element into the SPD's party programme. He also knew that the local population, shocked at reports and rumours of the ferocity of the Red Army's advance through eastern Germany and worried about the fate of German POW's in Russian captivity, would come to identify the KPD on a wholesale scale with the Soviet army and Soviet occupation administration.

The SPD's refusal to cooperate with the KPD and Schmid's efforts to strike a middle-of-the-road course in the party's programme, thereby altering its structure and orientation from that of a classical "Arbeiterpartei" (i.e. class-oriented workers' party) to one of a majority-seeking "Volkspartei" (i.e. a "national" party attempting to transcend and resolve class differences), which would act as a reservoir for a plurality of political groups, left the KPD essentially isolated on the Left. This was corroborated in an interview with an elder Left-wing member of the SPD "Ortsverein Tübingen", who maintained that Carlo Schmid allowed "keine Chance für Diskussion, obwohl manche Gemeinsamkeiten zwischen den beiden Parteien existierten." (no chance for discussion although many common interests existed between the two parties)

One reason why the KPD was unattractive as a political partner to Carlo Schmid was that of the four permitted political parties the KPD was by far the most proletarian in its social composition and by far the least academic and/or intellectual in background. It has already been mentioned in connection with the 1946 elections that the Tübingen KPD had absolutely no middle-class representatives on its ballot list; this is another aspect of the same phenomenon. The
chronic lack of trained and professionally qualified members - a feature which characterised the KPD in Tübingen during the post-war years of Tübingen’s accession to the rank of regional capital - proved one of the serious drawbacks to the Communist cause in Tübingen in the years 1945-1947. Equally serious was the fact there were few KPD members in post-war Tübingen who had had political or administrative experience in the period prior to French occupation of Tübingen in April 1945; the obvious exception to this rule was Ferdinand Zeeb.

There was an obvious historical reason for the lack of trained professional members and experienced politicians within the ranks of the Tübingen KPD in 1945, apart from the traditional reluctance on the part of the German professional groups (i.e., lawyers, doctors, civil servants etc. as distinct from 'intellectuals') to associate itself with Marxism. The KPD was a strongly centralised party during the Weimar Republic with local headquarters in the "Länder" capitals. Consequently, the administrative headquarters of the KPD in Württemberg prior to the advent of National Socialism was situated in Stuttgart. Those former members of the party bureaucracy in Stuttgart who had survived the National Socialist regime found themselves initially subject to the policy and orders of the French occupation army in Stuttgart. With the division of Württemberg, however, in July 1945 into two separate zones the KPD bureaucracy in Stuttgart was cut off from all formal contacts with Süd-Württemberg and its new capital, Tübingen. It, of course, remained in discreet contact with the Tübingen KPD and a series of couriers maintained the chain of command from Berlin. The French authorities in Tübingen were aware of these clandestine contacts (none of the political parties accepted literally the French ban on interzonal contacts) and maintained a vigorous vigilance, expelling transgressors from their zone.

The separation from the party organisation in Stuttgart threw the onus of responsibility and political efficacy onto the Tübingen organisation. Of the few permitted political parties, however, the KPD in Tübingen required the most support from outside on account of its lack of political and administrative experience. Despite the fact that the KPD in Tübingen threw itself with vigour and enthusiasm into the tasks allotted it by the local French military government, it was, in terms of political experience and technical know-how, ill equipped to master the problems facing the community over a broad spectrum of issues. In this respect the KPD in Tübingen suffered most of all the political groupings from the division of Württemberg into two zones and the French ban on interzonal contacts.
Prior to the war and subsequent occupation Tübingen had been a rather quiet "Kreisstadt" and seat of an ancient university. As such it had not played an important role in Communist strategy in comparison with the industrial complexes of Stuttgart, Ulm, Reutlingen, Schwäbisch Gmünd and Friedrichshafen. The KPD had first entered the political lists in Tübingen in 1931 with the nomination of candidates for the "Gemeinderat" elections of December 6, 1931, when it won one seat on the town council (as did the SPD) gaining 8,490 votes of a total 124,943 cast. Prior to the "Gemeinderat" election of 1931 (in which the NSDAP emerged as the leading party), Tübingen was a stronghold, in terms of electoral support, of the "Deutsch-Demokratische Partei", the "Deutschnationale Volkspartei" and the "Deutsche Volkspartei". The "Zentrum" party was also strongly represented.

The French military government's choice of Tübingen as the capital and seat of government for Süd-Württemberg was consequently to the KPD's disadvantage. The KPD in Süd-Württemberg would have preferred an industrial centre as the new provincial capital instead of the essentially bourgeois-conservative university town. In contrast, the two newly founded bourgeois parties of the post-war period, the CDU and the DVP, profitted from the choice of Tübingen as the seat of government. Acting as reservoirs for the former members and supporters of the proscribed bourgeois parties of the Weimar period, these latter parties were able to acquire a powerful following without much difficulty in the capital town, a factor of importance which will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

The KPD in Tübingen also remained less flexible than its political opponents in its policies. It remained the classical Marxist representative of the interests of the proletariat and advocate of social and political change. There were two reasons for this. Firstly, the local KPD took its general line from orders relayed to it at intervals from Stuttgart and Berlin. Secondly, it would have required an original and gifted personality with sufficient expertise and willpower to have widened the KPD's platform of appeal in defiance of the national party programme and in a manner approaching Carlo Schmid's technique. There was no such personality, despite the positive effect of Ferdinand Zeeb on both the party and the electorate, within the Tübingen KPD.

The loss of Stuttgart took the strongly centralised KPD in Württemberg by surprise in that no preparatory arrangements had been made in Süd-Württemberg for
such an eventuality. The loss of Stuttgart was felt much more by the Tübingen
KPD than, for example, the SPD or CSU, which were composed of groups with pro-
nounced federalist and regionalist traditions which made it a relatively easy
task to resurrect some half-forgotten regional contacts and infrastructures. The
KPD in Baden-Württemberg, on the other hand, although it entered the political
arena contemporaneously with the arrival of the French First Army, took much
longer to orientate its political organisation to the realities of French
occupation policy in Baden-Württemberg.

With the exceptions of Will Hane and Ferdinand Seeb the KPD in
Tübingen had no qualified or experienced leadership. Seeb, admittedly, had
comittee experience, but his lack of administrative and legal expertise was an
obvious hindrance for the tenancy of offices requiring an insight into Germany's
legalistic system of civil administration. This was no doubt one of the con-
tributive factors behind his losing the struggle for the position of "Landrat"
of "Landkreis Tübingen" to the trained lawyer and ex-judge, Gerichtsrat Viktor Kenner.
(q.v. Chapter 1 on the "Demokratische Vereinigung.) The loss of the "Landratsamt"
was a blow to the fortunes of the KPD in Tübingen in that it had presented the
clearest chance of providing their most charismatic and able member with a high-
ranking post and the concomitant administrative experience.

The KPD did gain a number of positions of importance within Tübingen, but
none of these office-holders managed to make political capital of their positions.
The most successful was Hane who eventually acquired a one-third share of the
local newspaper, but even he failed to gain the sympathy of the community, partly
due to a whispering campaign concerning his private life. The KPD's management
of the local police force, despite Seeb's efforts as head of criminal investigation,
was a striking example of administrative failure. The men nominated by the French
as Tübingen's top police officials were patently unqualified and unsuited for
their positions. The former lathe operator, Karl Kamm, who was appointed head
of police, eventually had to resign over a personal scandal concerning a motor
accident in which Kamm committed a hit-and-run offence. Two of Kamm's KPD
colleagues within the "Landespolizei Baden-Württemberg", Pfitzner and Pfitz, were
relieved of senior administrative posts for reasons of incompetence. The failures
incurred by the KPD with its choice of police administrators provided powerful
ammunition for the opponents of Marxism, both within the French military government
and the German administrations.
The Tubingen KPD also made a serious mistake in permitting itself to be associated with the group of unsavoury political adventurers mentioned in Chapter 1, e.g. Haberfellner, von Vallberg etc. To this day former members of the post-war KPD in Tubingen regret that they were not strict enough with fringe elements seeking to exploit the anti-Fascist reputation of the KPD to their own ends or for personal satisfactions. One such personality was a local horse-butcher named Friedrich Schilling who had a bad reputation for brutality and whose exclusion from the party had been advocated by a number of members on the grounds that he could only damage the party’s reputation.

A striking feature of the post-war Communist movement in Tubingen was that it received practically no support from the substantial body of university academics within the community. The obvious explanation which comes to mind is that well-nigh all German Marxist academics in 1945 were either dead, in exile or in enforced retirement. This, however, does not fully explain the totality of the university’s rejection of the KPD. There were many professors and lecturers who had become pro forma members of the NSDAP and/or associated organisations in order to retain their positions. A large section of these men obviously found the local KPD with its inflexible attitude on denazification and lack of sympathy for those professional groups which had succumbed to the pressures of “Gleichschaltung” an unpleasant choice. There was, however, at the university a small minority of non-party members, plus a larger number of academic newcomers of non-committed background, who demonstrated the same reluctance to join the KPD.

There is one further straightforward explanation why the academic staff of the University of Tubingen provided no support for the local KPD. This involves the influential person of Carlo Schmid. Schmid contacted the non-National Socialist members of the university staff and convinced a good proportion of the more liberal among them of the validity of a Social Democratic solution to the problem of Germany’s future; many of these men became fervent disciples and lifelong friends and admirers of Carlo Schmid (“Carlisten”). Young ambitious academics also found Schmid and the local SPD a source of employment, especially after Schmid’s elevation to the directorship of the “Staatsekretariat” in October 1945. The list of academics and politicians who began successful careers in Tubingen under Schmid’s protection is impressive: Rosenthal, Ziegert, Kochbaur, Riehle, Kupp, Lau etc. A majority of these men joined the SPD at Schmid’s insistence. There was an obvious
relationship between Carlo Schmidt's domination of both the Tübingen SPD and the German administrations and the career prospects for unemployed ambitious men with university qualifications. Entry into the SPD was an extra qualification for secure employment in a period of extreme deprivation and economic crisis. The KPD was not able to develop such attractive side-features for hungry, middle-class careerists.

Nevertheless, all question of career aside, it remains an anomaly why no university members at all in Tübingen embraced Communism as the intellectual and political antidote and antithesis to National Socialism. Elsewhere in Germany the KPD gained committed academics and university graduates as members. The answer lies partly in the particular ethos of stark political self-effacement developed within the University of Tübingen during the era of National Socialism (q.v. Chapter 7), partly in Tübingen's general indifference to the ideology of Marxism and partly in the image presented to the community by the local KPD. It has been said earlier in this chapter that the Tübingen KPD was essentially working-class in composition. Its most articulate advocate was the autodidact Leeb, who did not identify himself publicly with the KPD. The proletarian and, at times, strongly didactic tone of its members no doubt alienated many university teachers.

Another reason for the lack of support for the KPD among the middle classes in Tübingen, and the population in general, was a deep-seated suspicion of the conspiratorial structures of the party organisation, as exemplified in the person of the party secretary in Tübingen, Ernst Brossat. According to Karl Kammer, Brossat was a Rhinelander, approximately fifty years of age, who had been installed in Tübingen by the party office in Stuttgart. A man of poor health who made few public appearances and held no public office, Brossat was never accepted within the closed Swabian community. Brossat's position as party chief tended to undermine the positive image created among the electorate by Ferdinand Leeb, for it gradually became local knowledge that Brossat and Leeb were opposed to one another on fundamental points of policy and that Brossat's authority within the local party had to be restored on more than one occasion by party directive. This knowledge served to make the Tübingen electorate increasingly dubious about the source of KPD policy for Tübingen and Baden-Württemberg and the autonomy of such men as Ferdinand Leeb in the formulation of local party policy. This in turn strengthened the association in the public mind between the KPD and the party headquarters in the Russian Zone.
In the same interview Kanner complained that the KFD regional headquarters in Stuttgart maintained too strict a surveillance on political developments and party policy in Tübingen in the post-war years. With the aid of couriers the KFD office in Stuttgart determined the smallest details of party policy concerning Tübingen and also involved itself in the day-to-day running of those offices held in Tübingen by Communists, especially the police. This, according to Kanner, created technical impediments for Communist office-holders and left the Tübingen KPD in a permanent state of dependence with little chance of developing independent initiatives. (91)

The French authorities in Tübingen were also in the dark about Brosset's function within the KFD, apart from knowing that direct links were maintained with Stuttgart in contravention of their ban on interzonal contacts. There were, however, no academically qualified Communists in Tübingen who could correspond with the leading officials within the French military government in Tübingen on a basis of social and professional parity (e.g. with Governor-General Widmer and Chef de Cabinet Corbin de Mangoux) and explain Communist policy to them in French. As can be seen from the example of Carlo Schmid, the ability to converse with the elite of the French occupation authorities in their native tongue was one which proved of paramount importance; apart from a number of French Alsations who held middle-rank positions, the rest of the French officers relied on interpreters. The ability to speak French not only flattered the cultural chauvinism of the French administrative elite, thus producing positive results for a whole range of requests and enquiries, but also created links of interdependence between the French officials and their French-speaking German contacts. Conversely, not to maintain constant linguistic and social contact with the French authorities was to alienate one's party from the French administration and to lose lines of support and communication.

Unlike the SFD which acted under the diplomatic tutelage of Carlo Schmid, the KFD maintained to its disadvantage too strict a contact with exclusively ideological partners within the French administrations and did not make the effort to widen its contacts on a social and linguistic basis. There were simply no KFD members in Tübingen with the requisite education to master the language barrier. Consequently, when the French government purged the French social administrations of Communists and Marxists, the ground was cut from beneath the feet of the
of the Tubingen KPD. It lost its partners and was unable to replace these contacts. The result was that the French military government in Tubingen became increasingly alienated from the local KPD branch and demonstrated a commensurate lack of interest and sympathy for its policies and aspirations.
Chapter Two: The reconstruction and development of the German Communist Party (KPD) in Tübingen, 1945-1947

(2) Interview with Frau Erna Blessing, former KPD member, [former member of the "Demokratische Vereinigung" and of the "Kreisver sammlung" for "Kreis Tübingen" (1946), Tübingen, June 1975.
(4) Interview with Karl Kasner, Tübingen, January 1974.
(7) Interview with Karl Kasner, Tübingen, January 1974.
(8) Interview with Ernst Schittenhelm, Tübingen, July 1974.
(9) Interview with Dr. Rudolf Zimmerle, Reutlingen, August 1974.
(10) F. Roy Willis, q.v. cit., pp. 86, 89 f.
(11) Interview with Karl Kasner and Ernst Schittenhelm, Tübingen, January-July 1974.
(12) Correspondence from Dr. Gebhard Müller, Stuttgart, dated September 16, 1974.
(13) Interview with Ministerialdirektor Dr. Dieter Roser, Innenministerium Stuttgart, June 1974.
(15) It has been decided for reasons of discretion not to disclose the identity of H. G.
(19) Abh., "Sitzung der Vertrauensleute: 20 August 1946".
(22) ibid., p. 5.
(24) Interview with Hermann Sautter, Tübingen, April 1974.
(26) Interview with Ernst Schittenhelm, Tübingen, July 1974.
(27) ibid.
(28) Evangelisches Bekenntnissarchiv Tübingen, Archiv, Inv.-Nr. 172.
(31) Regierungspräsidium Tübingen, Archiv, As.: 11-3151/30 (24.2.1946).
(32) Regierungspräsidium Tübingen, Archiv, As.: 11-3160.
(33) Regierungspräsidium Tübingen, Archiv, As.: 11-3163, Ziffer 59.
(35) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, As.: 1201/12.
(36) ibid., Nr. 11: Kennwort - Kommunistische Partei".
(37) e.g., Interview with Karl Kramer and Ernst Schittenhelm, Tübingen, January – July 1974.
(38) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, As.: 1201/12.
(39) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, As.: 1201/14 and 1201/12.
(40) e.g., Interview with Landrat a.D. Hermann Zeh, Jakob Kraus, Ministerialdirektor Dr. Dieter Hofer, Polizeidirektor a.D. Friedrich Michel et al.
(42) P. Hoy Wilis, op. cit., p. 197.
(44) ibid.
(45) ibid. For example, the typifying explanation "... erheblich über dem Landesdurchschnitt (i.e. K/D "Landtag" resulte in Tübingen) was der Partei KPD zuzuordnen war." This was also the opinion of a number of interviewees.
(46) ibid., p. 13.
(47) Quote from the so-called "Entwurf Bade-Niiethammer", in: Das Haus Wort (Stuttgart), 2 Jg. (1947), Heft 7/8, p. 4.


(53) F. Roy Milis, op. cit., p. 193.

(54) cf. ibid., pp. 78 f.


(57) Interview with Ministerialdirektor Dr. Wiener Bauer, Innenministerium Stuttgart, June 1974.


Fischer maintained in the course of the interview that he was invited, together with other high-ranking administrators and politicians from Tübingen, to attend the ceremonies surrounding de Gaulle's visit to Freiburg. He was eventually escorted into a private audience with de Gaulle. In Fischer's own words the following altercation occurred:


Fischer: "Ich hatte erwartet, Herr General, daß Sie kommen würden, uns von einer solchen Sitten zu befreien."

According to Fischer the conversation was hereupon terminated abruptly. In Tübingen he was subsequently relieved of his post. Up to his death in 1975 Fischer remained bitter about the lack of support he received from his party, the CDU, at the time of his dismissal.


(61) Interview with Professor Rupp of the Federal Constitutional Court, formerly "Ministerialrat" in the "Staatssekretariat" with special responsibility for university affairs, Tübingen, July 1974.


ibid., pp. 11 ff.

Stadtarchiv Tübingen.

Date is not included in this copy of the letter. The date was in fact May 27, 1945.


ibid., letter dated August 31, 1945.

ibid., letter dated January 2, 1946.

ibid., letter dated March 6, 1946.

ibid., letter dated March 15, 1946.

ibid., letter dated June 25, 1946.

ibid., "Bericht über den Besuch des Gouverneurs in Tübinger, Oberstleutnant Buchon bei Dr. Esselmann am 5. Juli 1945, Dauer 12 Stunden".

ibid., "Wesprechung mit Dr. Kruse in Stuttgart am 20. Juli 1945."


Interviewee wishes for reasons of discretion to remain anonymous.

Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Gemeinderat-Protokoll 1946, p. 309.


Bar plein (Hamburg), 3 Jg. (1949), Nr. 11, 12. März 1949, p. 4.

1938 was regarded as a norm by the post-war authorities in Germany since that was the year when the process of "Gleichschaltung" became acute for those civil servants who had not yet joined the NSDAP.

ibid., letter of January 9, 1948, entitled: "Propaganda einer nicht genehmigten politischen Partei.

This has been confirmed in a number of interviews with personalities who were active, politically and administratively, in post-war Tübingen e.g. Landeskonservator Dr. Adolf Rich, Ernst Schittenbeka, Ministerialdirektor Dr. Dieter Hoser et al.

Interviewee wishes to remain anonymous for reasons of discretion.

Interview with Ministerialdirektor Dr. Dieter Hoser, Innenministerium-Stuttgaurt, June 1974.

(90) Interview with Frau Arna Blessing, Tübingen, August 1974.

(91) Interview with Karl Kasner, Tübingen, January 1974.

(91) Ibid.
Chapter Three

The reconstitution and development of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) in Tübingen, 1945-1947
In the Weimar period the SPD in Württemberg had not, unlike the more federalist and rural-oriented bourgeois parties (e.g. "Zentrum"), established a strong party infrastructure in the rural districts and small towns of the province. Like the KPD, the SPD concentrated on the industrial centres where they could expect strong electoral and trade union support.

Nevertheless, prior to 1933 the SPD established itself as a stable minority within the electoral tradition of Tübingen. A comparison of voting figures for the last four council elections of the Weimar Republic in Tübingen demonstrates its position:

- December 10, 1922: the SPD gained 17,490 of a total 55,818 votes cast, gaining 2 out of 14 "Gemeinderat" seats.
- December 6, 1925: the SPD gained 11,821 of a total of 75,696 cast, gaining 2 out of 14 seats.
- December 9, 1928: the SPD gained 19,641 of a total of 105,269 cast, gaining 2 out of 14 seats.
- December 6, 1931: The SPD gained 14,301 of a total of 125,014 cast, gaining 1 out of 14 seats. (This was the year of a swing to the Right; the NSDAP, entering the communal elections for the first time, gained more than double this figure (29,100) and 4 seats.)

As was the case with the KPD, the SPD was banned by the National Socialist government of Germany in 1933 and its leading members and activists were jailed or subjected to intense surveillance. This surveillance, implemented both by NSDAP organisations and various branches of the police force, was particularly thorough in the cases of small communities like Tübingen where rural traditions and closeness of ties combined to make everyone's personal life and business common knowledge. It has, however, been stated in previous chapters that the KPD, whilst not maintaining active resistance against the National Socialist regime in Tübingen, did retain contacts with one another, mainly under the guise of social drinking in the "Pflug". The SPD group in Tübingen was, if anything, a little less active during the National Socialist era, most of its former activists concentrating on surviving National Socialist repression unscathed. An example of this preoccupation with survival was the case of Adolf Hartmayer, later mayor of Tübingen.
A number of Social Democrats who lived in Tübingen between 1933 and 1945 still maintain that the local SPD maintained conspiratorial contacts within its former membership during the National Socialist era. The existence of these contacts has been denied, however, by other members who insist that a nodding acquaintance with one another was the best that activists could achieve in the face of political surveillance, apart from instances of long-established friendships. One member wrote in private correspondence: "In der Nazidiktatur gab es natürlich keine SPD. Wer die 'geleiteten' Parteien hätte, wäre am Galgen gesessen! Wie gesagt: in der Nazi-Diktatur waren Parteien verboten. Alte Sozialdemokraten blieben zwar eine verschworene Gemeinschaft, organisieren aber konnten sie sich nicht." (During the Nazi period there was of course no SPD. Whoever would have 'led' it, would have ended on the gallows! As I said: under the Nazi dictatorship political parties were forbidden. Old Social Democrats did remain a conspiratorial brotherhood, but they could not organise themselves.)

The fact, moreover, that the SPD was not as prepared as the KPD had been at the arrival of the French army in Tübingen suggests that political contacts among its former members had not been, by comparison, extensively developed.

This is the main reason why the SPD group in Tübingen momentarily fell behind the KPD in the initial period of the occupation (i.e. April-May, 1945), especially with regard to the acquisition of positions of influence, despite the fact that the SPD also enjoyed a general reputation for anti-Fascist resistance. The lack of coherent party discipline and of an infrastructure of contacts during the final years of the Third Reich in Tübingen created a temporary vacuum within the Social Democratic movement immediately after the capture of the town. A handful of former activists threw themselves into the task of regrouping members and resuscitating a party organisation. The consequent lack of obvious figureheads within the party from the period of National Socialism left the leadership question open to the advantage of Carlo Schmid, Viktor Renner and other new self-proclaimed Social Democrats who emerged from political obscurity to dominate the SPD in Tübingen and subsequently Süd-Württemberg.
In Chapter One, describing the establishment of the "Antifaschistischer Block", it was emphasised that the KPD was the group from which the original impetus came to found a secret "Antifas" committee of Left-wing bias to manage the town's affairs and that the KPD had contacted two SPD men, Wilhelm Haedersmann and Karl Schuster. The other prominent SPD members in this original nucleus were Adolf Hartmeyer and Oskar Trinks, later director of the local health insurance administration (AMD). This group of SPD men were traditional Socialists in their political outlook.

Carlo Schmid (then Landgerichtsrat Dr. Karl Schmid) introduced a new element to the political development of the Tübingen SPD group in that he modified the group’s original Left-wing bias and usurped the leadership of the SPD, both locally and at “Land” level, within a short period of time. It was also due to Schmid’s efforts primarily that the SPD gained prominence in post-war Tübingen, where the party had played a minority role during the Weimar Republic.

At the beginning of the occupation the distribution of positions of influence between the KPD and the SPD in Tübingen was to the KPD’s advantage in that it secured positions normally regarded as bases of political strength: i.e. in the local newspaper, trade unions and police force. By 1946 the SPD had overtaken the KPD, establishing itself for the period up to the founding of the “Landtag” of Württemberg-Hohenzollern as the most influential party in Tübingen. This development is directly attributable to Schmid’s successful relations with the French military government and to his manipulation of the policies and traditions of the SPD in Süd-Württemberg to bring them in line with French occupation policy, the post-war situation and the mood of the electorate. For these and other reasons, e.g. as head of the German administrations in Süd-Württemberg, Schmid was the most powerful personality in Tübingen in the years 1945-1947, his role must be included and examined in detail within the framework of any analysis of the SPD in post-war Tübingen.

Schmid’s contacts with the French military government during the French occupation of Stuttgart had been rewarded with a ministerial post in the German administration established by the French to administer Württemberg. He subsequently lost this post, the Ministry of Education, when the Americans assumed control of Stuttgart in June 1945. On his return to Tübingen Schmid was the obvious choice...
for the French to head the quasi-government which they established to head the German administrations, the "Staatssekretariat für das französisch besetzte Gebiet Württembergs und Hohenzollerns" (October 1945).

Carlo Schmid's rise to power and prominence had a profound effect on the political fortunes of the SPD in Tübingen and Süd-Württemberg. The first major effect which Schmid's career had on the party in post-war Tübingen was to introduce an element of political nepotism to the distribution of municipal and, later, governmental posts. In 1932 the SPD controlled no important administrative posts in Tübingen. In 1946 the party provided incumbents for a majority of the administrative posts of executive nature within the town hall and related institutions.

This was not at all Schmid's doing for the SPD, like the KPD, was an obvious choice with its anti-fascist record for office-bearers to replace NSDAP administrators. Furthermore, the "Demokratische Vereinigung" allocated a portion of municipal administrations to the SPD, e.g.

| Kulturstät | Otto Bartels |
| Arbeitsamt | Arno Völdisch |
| Beschäftigten | Adolf Hartmeyer |
| Allgemeine Ortskrankenkasse | Otto Frinks, etc. |

Schmid, however, made a conspicuous contribution to establishing the SPD as "die Partei der Stadtverwaltung" (the party of the town administrators) in that he threw his weight behind Viktor Venn's campaign to become mayor (and later "Landrat") and Venn's subsequent nomination of Adolf Hartmeyer as Venn's successor to the post of mayor. There was strong resistance to both those moves, but Schmid's contacts and influence ensured their eventual success.

The SPD in post-war Tübingen eventually came to regard certain administrative posts as its special prerogatives. This was especially true in the case of the appointment of replacements to municipal and administrative offices already held by Social Democrats. Such appointments were regulated internally within the SPD, usually by a meeting of the branch executive committee. A good example of this was the "Vorstandssitzung" (executive committee meeting) of the Tübingen "Ortsverein" of July 29, 1947, which was convened to discuss the replacement of the director of the municipal housing department by the former Bürgermeister (deputy mayor) Gottlieb
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Schmid, however, made a conspicuous contribution to establishing the SPD as "die Partei der Stadtverwalter" (the party of the town administrators) in that he threw his weight behind Viktor Renner's campaign to become mayor (and later "Landrat") and Renner's subsequent nomination of Adolf Hartmayer as Renner's successor to the post of mayor. There was strong resistance to both those moves, but Schmid's contacts and influence ensured their eventual success.

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Karrer, an SPD member who had been forced to resign from the deputy-mayorship on account of National Socialist connections during his period of office in Berlin-Charlottenburg. The first point on the agenda of this meeting was entitled "Neubesetzung des Wohnungsamts" (New appointment of manager of the municipal housing department). The minutes of the meeting report the following: "... Der Vorsitzende Kost berichtet ... An den Genossen Karrer sei schon verschiedentlich Male herangetreten worden mit der Bitte, die Leitung des verwaisten Wohnungsamts zu übernehmen. Genosse Karrer habe ihn, den Vorsitzenden, gebeten, diese Angelegenheit in einer Vorstandssitzung des Ortsvereins zu behandeln ... Der Vorstand des Ortsvereins der SP (i.e. SPD) befürwortet die Annahme der Leitung des Wohnungsamts durch den Genossen Karrer. Die Befürwortung gilt der zunächst provisorischen Übernahme des Amtes. Der Vorstand empfiehlt den Genossen Karrer, die Bestätigung der Übernahme seines Amtes durch das Gemeindeparlament baldigst vorzubringen. (Chairman Kost reported ... (that)Comrade Karrer had been approached several times with the request to take over the running of the housing department, which was without a manager. Comrade Karrer had asked him, i.e. the chairman, to deal with the matter at an executive committee meeting of the local SPD association ... The executive committee of the local SPD association recommended that Comrade Karrer should accept the office of manager of the housing department. The recommendation specified that the office should be initially granted on a provisional basis. The executive committee recommended Comrade Karrer to have his assumption of office confirmed at the earliest possible date by the town council.) The minutes then continue to demonstrate the extent to which the executive committee of the "Ortsverein" was determined to involve itself in the management of municipal offices: "... Der Ortsvereinsvorstand erwartet, daß Genosse Karrer ihm Fälle zu gegebener Zeit vorträgt, deren Entscheidung von Instanzen des Wohnungsamtes getroffen wurden, die sich mit dem Ansehen der Partei oder der Führung des Amtes durch Genossen Karrer nicht vereinbaren lassen. Der Vorstand wird nach Vortrag durch Genossen Karrer erneut darüber befinden, ob das Amt alsdann noch durch den Genossen Karrer besetzt bleiben könne ..." (... the executive committee of the local SPD association expected that Comrade Karrer would in due course submit those cases to it where decisions had been made by the housing department which were not compatible with the party's good name or Comrade Karrer's tenure of office. The executive committee stated that it would again decide after the next report by Comrade Karrer whether he could then remain in office.)
The French authorities in Tübingen were aware that the SPD ran certain municipal offices almost as party sinecures, but it suited the French to allow this practice to continue as long as it did not conflict with official French policy. This was also the case with the obvious advantages enjoyed by SPD members in the composition of the "Staatssekretariat" and its attendant bureaucracies. Thanks to the efforts of Carlo Schmid who chose his departmental lieutenants as he pleased with reference to no bodies other than the highest French officials in Süd-Württemberg, e.g. Müller and Corbin de Hanacou, the SPD became to all intents and purposes the "government party" of Süd-Württemberg in the period prior to the "Landtag" elections, although it can be argued that the CDU domination of the "Beratende Landesversammlung" had already altered the balance of power.

A glance at the SPD membership of the "Direktorium" (cabinet) of the "Staatssekretariat" reveals Schmid's influence. There were initially five, later six "Landesdirektionen" of which Schmid held "Justiz" and "Kultus, Erziehung und Kunst", whilst another SPD member, Lothar Koch (later Viktor Renner), held the other important ministry of "Innern". The other posts were divided between the CDU and the representative of the Hohenzollern enclave (Querke Moser). At the level of departmental heads below these ministers the SPD was very favourably represented, most of them having been hand-picked by Schmid for the job (e.g. Zweigert, Rupp, Rau, Riehl etc.).

The CDU was understandably annoyed and frustrated by this development, which they came to regard as a usurpation of their right to power, being obviously the strongest party in Süd-Württemberg. The CDU felt by mid-1946 that it ought to have whatever form of administration or quasi-governments the French authorities chose to permit. The French, however, chose to ignore Christian Democratic complaints in this direction. They apparently felt that there was more to be gained from a close relationship of cooperation with a highly capable Carlo Schmid than with the less competent leaders of the CDU. This attitude was maintained by the French military government up till the indirect elections to the "Beratende Landesversammlung" (November 17, 1946) when the CDU gained the absolute majority, thus ensuring the eventual adoption of a Christian Democratic constitution for Süd-Württemberg.
The elections to the "Beratende Landesversammlung" accelerated a process of change within French occupation policy. French policy with its primary interest in stimulating some form of federalism within the French zone had become increasingly attracted by the strong regionalist and federalist traditions inherent within the groups composing the CDU and saw it as a better ally from a long-term consideration than the more centralist SPD. The election results of November 17, 1946, lent weight to the CDU's demands for extended participation in government affairs and simultaneously provided the local French authorities in Süd-Württemberg with an excuse for upgrading the Christian Democrats within the "Staatssekretariat" at the expense of the favoured position previously enjoyed by Schmid's Social Democratic nucleus. The result was that, concomitant to the French Commander-in-Chief's declaration of December 14, 1946, indicating an increase of status for the "Staatssekretariat" to the rank of "Provisorische Regierung" (provisional government) with extended powers, an announcement was made intimating a reshuffle within the same. The number of ministries was extended from five to seven and the number of CDU ministries was raised from two to four. The remaining three ministries were divided between two SPD and one DVP member. The CDU therefore acquired a majority of the ministerial posts within the "Provisorische Regierung", although Schmid remained President and Minister of Justice (he lost the ministry "Kultus, Erziehung und Kunst" to a Christian Democrat). The CDU accepted Schmid's continued presidency in a formal declaration.\(^{(12)}\)

Before introducing the SPD in Süd-Württemberg and Tübingen to participation and experience in government and administrative affairs, Schmid felt compelled initially to extend the ranks of the SPD, especially in Tübingen, to include sufficient numbers of professional people. He therefore introduced a large group of university-trained professional men to the party, which resulted in the establishment of a new elite within the Tübingen SPD. This elite did not alter the structure of the SPD "Ortsverwalt" in Tübingen since this new group focused its attention on the party's "Landessekretariat" (party secretariat for the "Land") once this was permitted by the French. The "Ortsverwalt" on the other hand was relegated to a subordinate position of influence and decision-making, subordinate to and communicating with the "Landessekretariat" through a party liaison man (generally Dr. Dieter Koeber).\(^{(13)}\)

Competition between the parties to attract competent and qualified members was sharp. Schmid was highly successful with his own enrolment campaign. This
was partly due to the fact that he was not a committed Socialist nor accepted the SPD's party programme of 1925 as binding upon the future of the party. Using his personality and gifts of persuasion to their utmost, Schmid was able to ensure many professional colleagues that the SPD in Baden-Württemberg would eventually undergo a change of party programme. The search for new members was, from Schmid's point of view, a totally pragmatic affair, designed to equip the party with potential administrators in order to strengthen the party's base within the emerging German administrations. Schmid approached bourgeois conservatives within Tübingen with twin offers of membership and employment.

One such personality was Eberhard Wildermuth, later Minister of Agriculture in the first Adenauer government. Wildermuth refused to join the SPD. A biographical account of Wildermuth's life and work in post-war Tübingen has described his rejection of Schmid's offer as follows: "... Obwohl sich die Sozialdemokratie von ihren alten klassenkämpferischen Theorien längst entfernt hat und Wildermuth in ihren Reihen oftmals verständnisvolle Aufgeschlossenheit kennengelernt hat, vermocht er den Freund Carlo Schmid nicht in dieses Lager zu folgen ..." (Although Social Democracy had long since abandoned its old theories on class struggle and Wildermuth had often come across understanding openness within its ranks, he was not able to follow his friend Carlo Schmid into that particular camp ...). Despite Schmid's failure, however, with a number of local personalities such as Wildermuth, he was initially far more successful in attracting talented and qualified men than the other parties.

Carlo Schmid's rise to the presidency of the "Staatssekretariat", surrounded by a group of able and loyal supporters of middle-class background and outlook, was paralleled by an equivalent development within the SPD in Tübingen, which this coterie of professional men came to dominate at the level of the "Landessekretariat". Prior to examining this development it is firstly necessary to retrace the chronological sequence of events which led up to this development, beginning with the SPD's application to the French authorities for official approval to their resumption of normal political party life.

In accordance with the process of application and registration laid down by the central French occupation authorities in Baden-Baden, the SPD applied initially for permission to reconstitute political party life at "Land" level in
January 1946. Simultaneously the SPD had to apply for permission to hold the meeting at which they intended electing a prospective executive committee and discussing organisation matters. Oskar Trinks wrote the request on January 19, 1946: "Um den Vorstand der Sozialdemokratischen Partei für die gesamte französisch besetzte Zone Württembergs wählen zu können und die Organisation durchzusprechen, beabsichtige ich auf Sonntag, den 3. Februar, vorm. 10 Uhr, eine Konferenz unserer Anhänger nach Tübingen einzuberufen. Ich bitte um Genehmigung hierzu." (In order to elect the executive committee of the Social Democratic Party for the whole of the French-occupied Zone of Württemberg and to discuss its organisation in detail, I intend to call a conference of our supporters in Tübingen for Sunday, February 3, at 10 a.m. I request permission for this.)

On March 10, 1946, in response to the SPD application for reconstitution at "local" level, "Arrêté No. 11 du Délégué Supérieur pour le Gouvernement Militaire du Wurtemberg" was announced permitting the re-establishment of the "Parti Socialiste" in Süd-Württemberg.

The local town branch ("Ortsverein") had some technical difficulties before it received official registration. The mayor, Adolf Hartmeyer, forwarded the "Ortsverein's" request for re-establishment in Tübingen to the "Délégué" du Cercle", Lieutenant-Colonel Courtioux: "Je remets à M. le Commandant une requête en trois exemplaires que nous avons reçue le 31.1.1946 de M. Oskar Trinks ... Il s'agit de l'autorisation pour une réorganisation de l'association locale du parti démocrate-socialiste du Wurtemberg et Rohensollern dans la ville de Tübingen. Ci-joint les statuts préalables, les questionnaires politiques des 7 membres du comité directeur ainsi que l'avis du chef de la police en trois exemplaires. Comme il s'agit de membres fondateurs et de membres du comité directeur qui sont tout à fait irréprochables du point de vue carakètre et politique je pris de bien vouloir accorder cette demande dans les délais les plus rapides."
En conséquence je vous retourne ci-joint la demande présentée par
Monsieur Trinks pour la constitution d'une section du parti socialiste ...

The revised application from the "Ortverein" was signed by five members
who had been elected by the Social Democratic nucleus to constitute the executive
committee of the local branch: Gustav Nickel, Christof Kost, Julius Bösele,
Heinrich Kost and Herbert Konicki. (19) The application, as usual, was accompanied
by intensive questionnaires on the political past of the signatories. The
executive committee members of the "Ortverein" were exclusively working-class
personalities, Schmid and his group having already established themselves within
the party directorate for Süd-Württemberg.

The "Ortverein" was publicly founded on February 25, 1946, at a meeting
of local Social Democrats in the "Museum" restaurant in Tübingen, despite the
fact that official permission for the re-establishment of "Ortverein Tübinger"
was not granted by the French until the following month. (20) This meeting was a
by-product of the "Ländersparteitage der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Süd-Württemberg"
(Land' party conference of the SPD in Süd-Württemberg) of February 10, 1946, which over
five hundred delegates and members had attended in the "Bundeshalle" in Reutlingen.

At this conference Carlo Schmid emerged as the obvious leader of the SPD
in Süd-Württemberg with no contenders. He made a strong impression on the dele­
gates at the conference with a powerful speech on the need for change in the
party's programme. It was a credit to Schmid's energy and ambition that the SPD
was the first party in post-war Süd-Württemberg to hold a "Ländersparteitage".

Schmid's speech to the conference brought the internal party debate on its
future policies and programme into the open. In this issue Schmid had, if any­
thing, even more influence on Social Democracy in post-war Tübingen and Süd-
Württemberg than in the other spheres already mentioned. In his speech Schmid
paid lip-service to the SPD programme of 1925. At the same time he categorically
rejected the class struggle and dialectical materialism as the tenets of the
party of which he had just been elected chairman ("erster Vorsitzender"). The
Protokollbuch of the "Ortverein Tübinger" provides both a good synopsis of the
main points of the speech and an insight into the positive response which the
speech received from the majority of the delegates: "... Eine große Rede des neuen Landesvorsitzenden, Staatsrat Professor Dr. Schmid, gab der neugegründeten Partei ihr Programm und zeichnete den Weg in die Zukunft. Der Redner betonte, daß die Sozialdemokratie nach wie vor eine Partei des Kampfes gegen den ausbeuterischen Kapitalismus in jeder Form ist und bleibt. Sie will auch weiterhin den angegriffenen Nationalismus bekämpfen. Die Bildung der Vereinigten Staaten von Europa wird für notwendig gehalten. Als demokratische Partei lehnt sie die Sozialdemokratie ab, ihr Ziel, die Beseitigung des Kapitalismus, mit den Mitteln einer irgendein gearteten Diktatur zu verwirklichen. Sie hält die Lehren des historischen Materialismus in ihrer Einsichtsfähigkeit für widerlegt und für ergänzungsbedürftig durch die Anerkennung idealistischer und ethischer Willenskräfte. Damit ist auch die Ablehnung des Begriffs des Klassenkampfes ausgesprochen. Die Sozialdemokratie ist keine klassenkonfessionelle Partei mehr und sieht ihr Vorbild in der englischen Arbeiterpartei, deren Macht gerade darauf beruht, daß sie bewußt auf das Dogma des Klassenkampfes verzichtet hat. Sie will nicht nur eine Arbeiterpartei, sondern eine Partei des ganzen Volkes sein. Die Sozialdemokratie ist keine christentumsfeindliche Partei. Sie hat ehrfürchtvolle Achtung vor allen denen, die das Christentum ernst nehmen und ist durchaus gewillt, im öffentlichen Leben dem Christentum die Bedeutung einzuräumen, die ihm mit Recht gebührt. Mit dieser Abspaltung der früheren Parteiausschnitte und Parteiprogramme hat der heutliche Parteitag einen Schritt getan, mit dem die sozialdemokratische Partei ganz neues Landleben betritt, indem sie die Tore weit auseinander für alle Schichten des deutschen Volkes ..." (An imposing speech by the new "Land" chairman, Staatsrat Prof. Dr. Schmid, gave the newly founded party its programme and showed the way into the future. The speaker emphasised that Social Democracy is still a party committed to the struggle against exploitative capitalism in any form and will remain so. It will continue to combat narrow-minded nationalism. The formation of the United States of Europe is considered necessary. As a democratic party Social Democracy refuses to realise its goal, i.e., the elimination of capitalism, by any kind of dictatorship whatsoever. It considers the doctrine of historical materialism to be refuted in all its one-sidedness and to be in need of extension through the a discreditment of idealistic and ethical forces of intellect. The dogma of the class struggle is thus rejected. Social Democracy is no longer a party committed to the class struggle, but sees its model in the English Labour Party whose power is based on the fact that it consciously rejected the dogma of class struggle. Social Democracy does not only want to be a workers' party, but also
Social Democracy is not an anti-Christian party. It has reverential respect for all those who take Christianity seriously and it is in every way prepared to concede to Christianity the importance within public life to which it is rightly entitled. The Neutlingen party convention has taken a step forward with this revision of earlier party views and programmes and with it the Social Democratic Party enters completely new terrain by opening its doors wide to all strata of the German people... (22)

Schmid repeated this performance at the founding meeting of the SPD "Ortsverein" in Tübingen two weeks later in the "Kursaal" restaurant (February 25). The Protokollbuch notes: "... Im Mittelpunkt stand die richtungsweisende Rede des Landesvorsitzenden, Staatsrat Professor Dr. Schmid, der in ähnlicher Weise, wie in seiner großen Neutlinger Rede, den zukünftigen Weg der Sozialdemokratie aufzeichnete..." (The central issue was the trend-setting speech by the "Land" chairman, Staatsrat Professor Dr. Schmid, who, in a manner similar to that of his great Neutlingen speech, sketched the future path of Social Democracy.)

A contemporary observer of developments in post-war Tübingen, Dr. Walter Haubmann, son of the first post-war mayor and a student at the university, attended this meeting. In his memoirs of life as a member of a student corporation ("Verbindung"), Dr. Haubmann described Schmid's speech as follows: "... Interessant war das, was ich — was war die Genehmigung zur Gründung demokratischer Parteien erteilt worden — bei der Gründungsversammlung der SPD Tübingens aus dem Munde von Staatsrat Schmid vernahm. Carlo Schmid nahm schon das Godesberger Programm vorweg; er lehnte den Klassenkampf ab und gab sich christlich. Ich notierte damals: 'Wenn dieses Programm wirklich durchgeführt wird, gewinnt die SPD viele Anhänger.'" (What was interesting was what I heard from Staatsrat Schmid's own mouth — permission for the founding of democratic political parties had already been granted — at the constitutive meeting of the Tübinger SPD. Carlo Schmid in fact already anticipated the Godesberg programme; he rejected class warfare and pretended to be Christian. At that time I noted down: "If this programme is actually carried out, the SPD will gain many supporters"). (24)

The theme of this speech was repeated by the Social Democratic Minister of the Interior of Württemberg-Baden, Ulrich, in a public address held in the same restaurant on July 26. The "Ortsverein" minutes state: "... entschieden lehnte es der Redner ab, Christentum und Politik zu verquicken. Gegenlegen legte er Wert darauf, dem gewerblichen und bäuerlichen Mittelstand zu zeigen, daß SPD ihnen..."
Selbständigkkeit und Schaffen sichere." (The speaker emphatically refused to amalgamate Christianity and politics. But he laid great store on telling the commercial and farming middle class that the SPD assured them independence and work.)

These sentiments were reiterated by Bürgermeister Kerrer in a speech to a general members' meeting of the "Ortsverein" on September 20, 1946: "... Die SPD hat sich zu einer wahren Volksparthei entwickelt, die alle Schaffenden umschließt. Nicht nur die Hand- und Kopfarbeiter, sondern der Bauernstand, der Handwerkerstand, die Beamten, Angestellten usw. sollen unverhältnis die Wähler der SPD." (The SPD has developed into a true popular party comprising all types of working people. Not only manual and brain workers, but also the farming community, tradesmen, civil servants and clerical employees etc. are gradually filling the ranks of the SPD.)

Schmid had therefore already redefined the SPD within Süd-Württemberg in 1946 as a "Volksparthei", a broadly based party with a platform specifically designed to attract electoral support from different social strata, as opposed to a party of the proletarian and revolutionary left like the KPD. To this end Schmid discarded the obvious impediment of the thesis of class struggle. He also felt compelled to renounce what he termed "historical materialism", no doubt aware that an atheistic party would have little chance of electoral support within the intensely religious communities of Süd-Württemberg. Hence his rhetorical terms of respect for the sanctity of religious freedom, even though he himself was regarded as an anticlerical and atheistic free-thinker by the local Roman Catholic hierarchy who crossed swords with him on various occasions over the question of religious education in state schools.

Schmid's rejection of a Socialist or Marxist platform was his most fundamental contribution to the new policy of the SPD in post-war Süd-Württemberg. There was one other important area of policy-making in which Schmid played the dominant role. This concerned the decision as to whether the SPD in Süd-Württemberg would yield to the pressures of the French occupation policy of stimulating particularism and regionalism, thereby departing from the party's tradition of centralism.
Schmid was not only an opponent of particularism within Süd-Württemberg, i.e. the fostering of a feeling of autonomy and independent identity within the newly created province, but also of South-West German particularism and separatism which aimed at the establishment of an autonomous South-West German state. Schmid resisted pressures to have the SPD in Süd-Württemberg definitely circumscribed as a South-West German political party. Admittedly, there was nothing he could do to prevent the party title, "SPD", being altered to "SP" or to the lengthier formula "Sozialdemokratische Partei Süd-Württemberg", thereby excluding the reference to Germany. (27) This was implemented by French decree and was an integral part of the French policy of isolating political parties within the individual "Landes", thereby strengthening regional party infrastructures and contacts at the expense of interregional ones.

Although he could not prevent a change of party name, Schmid maintained an anti-particularist line in the face of French pressures and enforced this policy on the SPD in Süd-Württemberg. Schmid clearly enunciated his party's rejection of a particularist, as opposed to federalist, solution to the German question in an interview with a member of the French Socialist Party on May 23, 1946: "Am 23.5.1946 besuchte mich angeblich im Auftrag der UFL ein Herr Kirnbaum (oder Kostheim). Er erklärte, dem leitenden Gremium der französischen Partei angenommen. Er fragte mich, wie die deutsche Partei zur Frage der Reparationen und zum Aufbau Deutschlands stünde. Ich sagte ihm, daß die Reparationspflicht im Rahmen der Möglichkeiten anerkannt würde und daß die Partei jeden Separatismus verwarf, indessen für einen federalistischen Aufbau Deutschlands eintrat.


Anschließend fragte er, was ich dazu dachte, wenn uns die französische Partei unterstützt und wie das wohl geschehen kame. Er denke es sich so, daß
die französische Partei jemand bei uns abordne, den wir unsere Wünsche mitteilen könnten ... 


(On 23.5.1946 I was visited by a Herr Kirnbaum (or Kostenbaum) ostensibly on behalf of the SFIO. He explained that he was a member of the executive committee of the French party. He asked me how the German party stood on the question of reparations and the reconstruction of Germany. I told him the obligation to pay reparations would be acknowledged within the framework of what was possible and that the party rejected any form of separation but advocated, on the other hand, a federative reconstruction of Germany.

Herr K. subsequently wished to know my personal state of relations with the Baden Socialist party. I told him that we in Württemberg refused to produce a newspaper in conjunction with the Baden party as long as the latter was not clearly integrated into the SPD. Herr K. then said that he had spoken the day before to the leading figures of the Baden Socialist party and had definitely gained the impression that they were pursuing the same goals as we were. We should not be bothered at all with questions of party titles, especially since the title "SPD" was rather compromised throughout the world. I strongly denied this.

He then asked me what I thought of the idea of the French party supporting us and how this could be done. He thought that the French party could delegate us somebody to whom we could transmit our wishes.

I told him that I had nothing in principle against such an arrangement, but I asked him to bear in mind that the Württemberg party was an integral part of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (i.e., SPD). In reply to this Herr K. said: "We did not mean it any other way ..."

There was, however, a difference between discussing and criticising French separatist aims with a member of the French Socialist party, which was in active and vociferous opposition to French plans for the partition of Germany, and doing likewise with senior French officials in charge of the military government of the French zone whose appointed task it was to implement the same plans for partition.
With the latter Schmid had to employ a much greater degree of tact and flexibility. At the same time, however, he conveyed to the French authorities in Tübingen and Baden-Baden that neither he nor his party were interested in separatism.

A clear example of the position which Schmid enforced within the party is the speech which he gave at the first of the series of "Landräteversammlungen," regular meetings convened between the "Landräte" of Südwürttemberg and the officials of the "Staatssekretariat" to discuss administrative problems. These meetings were also attended by French officials whose duty it was to report back on the matters discussed. At this first meeting, held in Tübingen on November 3, 1945, Schmid made a public stand against separatism within Südwürttemberg: "Unser schönes Württemberg, das uns so lieb, wird durch eine militärische Demarkationslinie durchgeschnitten, die uns in manchen Sachgebieten sich fast wie eine Grenze auswirkt, und es hat uns so bitter weh getan, weil Württemberg für uns nicht ein bloßer Verwaltungsbezirk, ein Sprung, eine Provins ist, sondern unser engeres Vaterland ..." (Our beautiful Württemberg, so dear to us, is traversed by a military demarcation line which affects some fields of administration almost like a border and it has hurt us bitterly because Württemberg to us is not just an administrative district or parish or province but our very own Fatherland ...). At another meeting of Südwürttemberg's "Landräte" Schmid proclaimed: "Wir sollten darum schon nun ausdrücklich betonen, daß wir diese Teilung unseres Landes durch eine Militärdemarkationslinie nicht nur als etwas äußerstes betrachten, sondern auch als etwas betrachten, das die Grundformen unserer politischen Existenz nicht anstatten vermag." (For this reason we should already state that we regard this division of our "Land" by a military demarcation line not just as something temporary but also as something that cannot interfere with the basic structures of our political existence.)

The SPD's rejection of separatism, both at the level of Südwürttemberg and of a larger South-West state substracted from the territory of the former German Reich, eventually proved a major factor in switching French interest from the SPD to the CDU in furtherance of the "French thesis" on Germany. This situation was reflected in a bitter denunciation of French separatist policy and the CDU in South-West Germany published in 1947 in the "Jahrbuch der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands" 1947: "Die französischen Regierungen seit 1945 haben ohne Unterschied der politischen Zusammensetzung immer "darauf geachtet, die französische Besatzungszone nach Möglichkeit politisch und wirtschaftlich von den
Übrigen Besatzungszonen zu separieren ... Der Hauptgrund für die Abschirmung der französischen Besatzungszonen war der Versuch, dieses Gebiet gewissermaßen als Pfland gegen die Einheitsbestrebungen sowohl der deutschen politischen Parteien, wie auch der übrigen Alliierten bei einer zukünftigen Staatskonstruktion Deutschlands in fester Hand zu behalten ... Die politischen Parteien haben sich mit Ausnahme der CDU wenig oder gar nicht in ihrer Grundhaltung von den französischen Einflüssen beirren lassen. Die Sozialdemokratische Partei in den drei Ländern der französischen Besatzungszonen betont bei jeder Gelegenheit ihre natürliche Zusammengehörigkeit mit der Gesamtpartei und, darauf basierend, ihren Willen zu einer Gesamtlösung des deutschen Problems. Die KPD spielt natürlich auch hier die von Moskau gesenkte Einheitskarte. In der CDU machen sich verschiedene Strömungen bemerkbar. Es gibt in allen drei Ländern der französischen Zone einen CDU-Flügel, der dem vonfranzösischen Klerus stark unterstützten föderalistischen Gedanken sehr zugänglich ist ..." (Without regard to political composition, French governments since 1945 have always made a point of separating the French zone of occupation as far as possible both politically and economically from the remaining zones of occupation ... The main reason for this isolation of the French zone of occupation was the attempt to retain this area firmly in their hands as security to a certain extent against the unitary tendencies within the German political parties as well as the other Allies when it came to some future political reconstruction of Germany ... With the exception of the CDU, the political parties have not at all (or scarcely) let themselves be swayed in their basic attitude by French influences. The Social Democratic Party in the three "Länder" of the French zone of occupation emphasises at every opportunity its natural solidarity with the party as a whole and, on this basis, its commitment to an overall solution of the German problem. On this subject the KPD (Communist Party) of course is also playing the unification card which has been marked by Moscow. In the CDU various trends are becoming apparent. In all three "Länder" of the French zone there is a wing within the CDU that is very much open to the federal idea supported by the French clergy ...) (51)

Such open criticism of French occupation policy - the above book was published in Göttingen in the British Zone - would have been impossible within the French zone because of the strict censorship and indeed general ban on all criticism of French and Allied policies. But there is little doubt that the SPD in Baden-Württemberg, and the other "Länder", contributed to this article with
background information for, despite the French authorities' ban on interzonal political party contacts, the SPD in Tübingen maintained links with the emerging nucleus of Social Democratic leadership in the British Zone.

These links involved transmission of information on the occupation policy of the French administration in Süd-Württemberg. In the course of an interview, Professor Fritz Eberhard, an emigrated Social Democrat who had returned from exile in London to Stuttgart in June 1945 immediately after French evacuation of the city (he was flown in by the British in contravention of an Allied ban on the return of German political emigres) claimed that Kurt Schumacher had expressed concern at the founding meeting of the Stuttgart SPD (in the sorting department of the main post office) at the danger of the French establishing a chain of small states in South-West Germany. Schumacher subsequently kept in touch with developments in Tübingen and, contrary to French regulations, illegally visited the town on the quiet. It was quite common for the French authorities to ban politicians from other zones from speaking or operating within their own. F. Roy Willis quotes one case in *The French in Germany, 1945-1949* where Dr. Schumacher, head of the SPD in the British Zone by 1947, was refused permission to address a Socialist meeting in Speyer in the French zone in April 1947.

At the same time the SPD in Süd-Württemberg sent delegates and couriers to sister groups in other "Länder" of the French and other zones. In the case of Württemberg this was not a difficult task since Carlo Schmid had been appointed "Staatsrat" (privy councillor) by Reinhold Mader, head of government in Stuttgart of the American-occupied section of Württemberg-Baden, with the specific purpose of acting as observer at cabinet meetings in Stuttgart, thereby maintaining contact with Süd-Württemberg. On these visits Schmid naturally met and discussed issues with the SPD group in Stuttgart.

Contacts with the party branches in Rheinland-Pfalz and the Saar were more tenuous, possibly more so than with the emerging party headquarters in Hannover under Kurt Schumacher. The Süd-Württemberg SPD, for example, sent Dietrich Reiser as a delegate to the SPD party congress in May 1946 without consent from the local military government. Because of its commitment to an undivided Germany the SPD in Tübingen found itself on various occasions obliged to break the rules laid down by the French authorities.
Given that the SPD under Carlo Schmid adopted an anti-particularist line and given that it was common knowledge among politicians in South-West Germany that the French intended implementing the dismemberment of South-West Germany, it could be argued that Carlo Schmid, by accepting the headship of the "Staatssekretariat", obviously designed as a forerunner to an autonomous government of Süd-Württemberg, was in a self-contradictory fashion objectively fostering French aims. There was, after all, no objective reason in 1945, at a time when it was generally held that a twenty-five year occupation of Germany was probable, why newly created structures such as Süd-Württemberg (later Württemberg-Hohenzollern) should not have taken permanent root. Indeed Rheinland-Pfalz, another creation of French occupation policy, did take root and exists to this day as a German "Bundesland" (federal "Land" unit). With this in mind Dr. Dieter Roser was asked in an interview whether it might have been more logical for Schmid, given his anti-separatism, to have adopted a policy of non-cooperation with the French. Roser contradicted this view with the argument that if Schmid had not been chosen for the job, a less able man could have been nominated who might have complied with French separatist wishes. Roser stressed that Schmid constantly modified French policy which at that period was having considerable influence on various social and political elites in Süd-Württemberg and in the neighbouring section of Süd-Baden. As evidence of Schmid's success in containing French pressures the interviewer quoted two prima facie pieces of evidence: the "Statut" of the "Staatssekretariat" and the constitution of Württemberg-Baden, both of which were formulated in the main by Carlo Schmid. (96)

The "Statut des Staatssekretariats für das französisch besetzte Gebiet Württembergs und Hohenzollerns vom 30. Oktober 1945 (Amtbl. 1946 S. 2) in der Fassung der Rechtsordnung vom 10. Dezember 1946 (Amtbl. 1947 S. 25)" (The Statute of the State Secretariat for the French-occupied area of Württemberg and Hohenzollern of October 30, 1945 (Gazette 1946, p.2) in the formulation of the decree of December 10, 1946 (Gazette 1947, p.25).) stated in its opening two articles: "Während des Ruhen der Staatsgewalt der Württembergischen Landesregierung in Stuttgart in dem französisch besetzten Gebiet Württembergs übt das Staatssekretariat für die Landesregierung die Staatsgewalt in der französisch besetzten Zone Württembergs aus ... (Art. 1)" (During the period of time when the executive power of the Württemberg "Land" government in Stuttgart is suspended within the French-occupied section of Württemberg, the State Secretariat will exercise executive power in the French-occupied zone of Württemberg on behalf
of the "Land" government) and "Das Staatssekretariat handelt in eigener Verantwortung. Es wird überall, wo nicht andere Gründe dazu führen, bemüht sein, dass in beiden Zonen Württembergs einheitliches Recht erhalten und geschaffen wird und einheitliche Verwaltungsmaßnahmen durchgeführt werden." (The State Secretariat acts on its own responsibility. Except where there are cogent reasons for the reversal, it will endeavour to ensure that a uniform system of law is created and maintained and that uniform administrative measures are implemented within both zones of Württemberg.)

These two articles in themselves make a clear statement of commitment to a future government of all Württemberg. There had been, however, a previous version of Article II which, in the opinion of the French administration, went too far in its declaration of Württemberg's unity. The original version written by Schmid read: "Das Staatssekretariat handelt in eigener Verantwortung, aber in enger Anlehnung an die Landesregierung in Stuttgart ..." (The State Secretariat acts on its own responsibility, but in close contact with the "Land" Government in Stuttgart ...) When this version was submitted to the French military government for approval, Governor-General Widmer replied to Carlo Schmid in a communication entitled "Approbation du statut du Secrétariat d'État pour la zone française du Wurtemberg et le Hohenzollern: Vous n'avez soumis pour approbation un projet de statut du Secrétariat d'État pour la zone française du Wurtemberg et le Hohenzollern.

Je ne formule aucune objection à l'établissement du statut en cause, après cependant qu'en aura été retiré, à l'article II, la phrase "en liaison étroite avec la Landesregierung", (30) Schmid was forced to comply and delete the offending phrase.

On the question of the future constitution of Süd-Württemberg Schmid demonstrated the same energy in retaining as much unity as possible between the French-occupied and American-occupied zones of Württemberg. As the architect of the Württemberg-Baden constitution he, of course, had vested interests in its adoption in Süd-Württemberg for reasons of personal political success and prestige. At the same time Schmid constantly used his influence to persuade (albeit unsuccessfully) both the French authorities and German political colleagues of other parties to adopt the constitution for the obvious positive effect it would have had in forging a link between the two sections of Württemberg which were undergoing separate developments.
Kevertheleen, Gchmid was not prepared to allow the Württemberg-Baden constitution be introduced into Süd-Württemberg at any price. In the spring of 1946 Governor-General Widmer asked Schmid to present proposals regarding an eventual implementation of the Württemberg-Baden constitution. Schmid's personal report on the meeting with Widmer reads as follows: "Der Gouverneur bat mich, ihm sobald als möglich den Verfassungsentwurf für Württemberg-Baden zuleiten und ihm Vorschläge zu machen über eine eventuelle Übernahme dieser Verfassung für Süd-Württemberg. Ich habe ihm dies zugesagt, ihn jedoch dringend davor gewarnt, eine Verschmelzung von Württemberg-Baden der französischen Zone analog dem amerikanischen Vorbild vorzunehmen. Die Voraussetzungen lagen hier völlig anders. Er schien meiner Ansicht zuzustimmen und bat mich, meine Gründe schriftlich zu geben." (The Governor asked me to supply him as soon as possible with the draft constitution for Württemberg-Baden and to submit suggestions to him about a possible adoption of this constitution for Süd-Württemberg. I have promised him this, but urgently warned him against undertaking a merger of Württemberg-Baden with the French zone along the lines of the American model. I stated that the conditions here were completely different. He seemed to agree with my opinion and asked me to give him my reasons in writing."

Schmid foresaw the possibility of the French considering the assimilation of French-occupied sections of Württemberg and Baden into a single bloc with the use of the Württemberg-Baden constitution as a bait and moved swiftly to counteract such moves.

In the constitution of Württemberg-Baden there was a statement of loyalty to the unity of Germany: "Württemberg-Baden ist ein demokratischer und sozialer Volksstaat. Er ist ein Glied der deutschen Republik." (Württemberg-Baden is a democratic and social republic. It is a member unit of the German Republic.)

This sentiment was later repeated in the constitution of Württemberg-Schleswiger. The expression of commitment to German unity in these two latter constitutions was stronger than in the case of the other Länder of the French zone (the Saar having been integrated into a monetary and customs union with France). Rheinland-Pfalz's constitution stated vaguely: "Rheinland-Pfalz ist ein demokratischer und sozialer Gliedstaat Deutschlands," (Rheinland-Pfalz is a democratic and social member state of Germany) whilst Süd-Baden's formulation was very much in accordance with French aspirations in Germany: "Baden ist ein demokratischer und sozialer Freistaat und ein Glied der Gemeinschaft der deutschen Länder," (Baden
is a democratic and social Free State and a member of the community of German "Länder" in that it stressed Süd-Baden's autonomy ("Freistaat") and presupposed inclusion in a form of German confederation. It is therefore to Schmid's credit that both the new Württemberg constitutions unequivocally rejected separatism and particularism.

Schmid's proposal for the acceptance of the Württemberg-Süd constitution was rejected by the leadership of the CDU majority in the "Landtag" of Württemberg-Hohenzollern. The CDU intended formulating a constitution closer to their own political philosophy. The resultant CDU bill, known as the "Bock-Wiethammer plan" after its two architects, produced strong opposition within the SPD, together with the KPD and DVP. On French instructions the CDU moved to a compromise with the SPD and produced a formula which was accepted by Schmid; the KPD and DVP, however, remained in opposition to the bill.

Although Schmid gained major concessions in the constitutional issue, principally in that the new bill provided for a unicameral legislation and that executive power was vested in a cabinet responsible to the government, there were still many features within the bill which were anathema to veteran Social Democrats. In keeping with Christian Democratic philosophy of a divinely ordained natural law as the basis of government, the bill opened with the preamble: "Das Volk von Württemberg-Hohenzollern gibt sich in Gehorsam gegen Gott und in Vertrauen auf Gott, dem alleingerechten Richter, folgende Verfassung ..." (The people of Württemberg-Hohenzollern grants itself, in obedience to God and in trust in God, the only truly just judge, the following constitution ..., (43) and proceeded to formulate articles of special protective status for family rights, church life and confessional schools.

A contemporary French news publication said of the new constitutional bill that "Il favorisait l'école confessionnelle en laissant aux parents le choix sur la forme d'école qu'ils désiraient. Il accordait trop d'avantages aux églises, à qui il garantissait les prestations de l'État et qu'il plaignait sur le même pied que celui-ci en soumettant leurs différends à un tribunal d'arbitrage. Enfin, par la garantie d'indemnité, il empêcherait la réforme agraire et la socialisation des grandes entreprises." (44) It was therefore to be expected that there would be rumblings of protest, especially at grass roots levels, within the SPD.
With this in mind Schmid arranged for speakers to contact the "Ortsvereins" to put forward the reasons for the compromise. In the case of the Tübingen "Ortsverein" Dr. Dieter Roser, the liaison man between the "Landessekretariat" and the "Ortsverein", presented these reasons to a meeting of the executive committee of the "Ortsverein" on April 24, 1947, i.e. mere two days after the compromise between the SPD and the CDU in the "Landtag". The minutes of the meeting make no reference to controversy over the reversals and contradictions inherent in the SPD's agreement to such a heavily biased Christian Democratic constitution. They merely state: "... Nun mehr sprach Genosse Dr. Roser über das Thema: "Warum hat die SPD die Verfassung angenommen?" Er legte noch einmal die Gründe dar, die unsere Landtagsfraktion berechtigt, diese Verfassung, die noch besser sei als die nordwürttembergische, annehmen." (Then Comrade Dr. Roser spoke on the subject: "Why did the SPD accept the constitution?" He once more presented the reasons that decided our "Land" Diet Parliamentary Group to accept this constitution which, he said, was even better than the Nord-Württemberg one). (45)

The extent to which Schmid dominated the party is evident in the fact that, contrary to his constitutional proposals of 1946 and 1947, i.e. to adopt the constitution of Württemberg-Baden, his delegates were now arguing with success in local branch meetings that the Christian Democratic version was better for Süd-Württemberg than his own (i.e. "nordwürttembergisch", referring to Württemberg-Baden).

Although Schmid eventually won the day in convincing the party of the necessity of accepting the compromise constitution, there was a certain amount of opposition from rank-and-file members. An example of this had been an earlier general meeting of the "Ortsverein" on February 14, 1947, when Dr. Roser "berichtete nunmehr kurz über die Tätigkeit der Beratenden Landesversammlung und bestätigte hierbei besonders den bevorstehenden Kampf um die Verfassung ..." (then reported briefly on the work of the "Beratende Landesversammlung" and touched in particular upon the impending constitutional struggle). In the ensuing discussion "ergriff nunmehr Genosse Adolf Bükle das Wort. Er warnte die sozialistische Einstellung unserer Partei, die sich allemal in bürgerlichem Fahrwasser bewege. Die Fraktion müsse korrekt und vorbildlich sein. Vor den vielen Kompromissen warnt er und verlangt für jede Woche einen Diskussionsabend ..." (Comrade Adolf Bükle rose first to speak. He said that he regretted to see that our party's Socialist
commitment was drifting too far in the wake of the bourgeois group. He also
said that the parliamentary group would have to behave in a correct and exemplary
manner. He warned against numerous compromises and insisted on a discussion
evening being held every week ...) Such voices of dissent were, however, not
paid serious attention within the party since the local "Ortsverein" had little
effective influence via Lew Schmidt and the "Landessekretariat" of the SPD.

At this point it is expedient to leave the question of Schmidt's and the
SPD's attitudes to separatism and the constitutional question and to turn to the
subject of relations between the party's "Landessekretariat" and the Tübingen
"Ortsverein". The SPD was the sole party in Süd-Württemberg to have both levels
of organisation based in Tübingen. Once Schmidt had established himself as the
chairman of the SPD in Süd-Württemberg, after a successful climb through the
"Demokratische Vereinigung" and the incipient post-war SPD "Ortsverein", he was
rarely seen at the "Ortsverein". This was also true of the group of qualified
"Carlisten", e.g. Viktor Kenner. Only Dr. Roser continued to attend occasional
meetings in a liaison capacity. The "Ortsverein" retained a qualified degree of
influence within the community in that a group of its members held municipal ad-
ministrative posts, e.g. Adolf Hartmeyer ("Oberbürgermeister"), Gottlieb Karrer
("Bürgermeister"), Otto Bartels ("Kultusamt"), Arno Weidach ("Arbeitsamt") etc.
Nevertheless, the "Ortsverein" experienced a real drop of prestige and influence
when the "SPD-Landessekretariat" was opened in Tübingen in 1946 in that the latter
overshadowed the "Ortsverein" and pre-empted a lot of decision-making which, in
the case of other parties (apart from the KPD), was performed to a greater extent
by local party branches, e.g. the CDU.

In July 1947 the local "Ortsverein" felt that the state of relations
between itself and the "Landessekretariat" and the lack of coordination between
the two justified sending a note of complaint to the "Landessekretariat". The
branch executive committee, according to the minutes of a meeting held on July 29,
1947, "beschloß einstimmig, an den Landesvorstand ein Schreiben zu richten, dessen
Inhalt von Vorsitzenden verlesen wird und in dem an Abstellung von verschiedenen
Mängeln gebeten wird, die sich in letzter Zeit herausgestellt haben. Eine enge
Zusammenarbeit mit dem Landesvorstand wird darin angestrebt ..." (decided unani-
mously to address a letter to the "Land" party executive committee, the contents
of which were read out by the chairman, requesting that various faults which had
recently become apparent be remedied. Close cooperation with the "Land" executive committee was also defined as an aim ...\(^{(47)}\)

There was, however, little that the "Ortsverein" could do to remedy the situation other than to send such resolutions to the central office. For one thing it had come to rely heavily on the "Landesekretariat" for smoothing out difficulties with the French authorities. This was especially true of the municipal office-holders from within the ranks of the Tübingen "Ortsverein". Schmid was eminently successful in negotiations with the French authorities and used his judgement and powers of intercession on behalf of those administrators. Schmid's success in post-war Tübingen was based on those personal abilities which at that particular period in French-occupied Württemberg provided unique opportunity for political advancement, i.e. French mother, command of French language, experience in occupation affaires, a legal and administrative background, together with consummate social ease in maintaining personal contacts. The "Ortsverein" had no members who could emulate Schmid in any of these respects; indeed, none of the members of the "Ortsverein" - apart from the liaison figure of Dr. Kosar - could speak French, a sine qua non of successful relations with the military government.

Schmid's and the "SPD-Landessekretariat's" contacts with the French can be subdivided into two groupings: firstly, Schmid's contacts with the French occupation authorities, both in Tübingen and Baden-Baden, and with specific important personalities within the French administrations, e.g. Governor-General Guillaume Widmer and his deputy, Chef de Cabinet Corbin de Laïgoou; secondly, the "Landesekretariat's" contacts with the French Socialist Party (SFIO) which, like all other French parties, kept in close touch with events in the French zone. The former grouping, i.e. Schmid's contacts with the French authorities, have been touched upon and will continue to be examined at various points within this thesis. The latter grouping, namely the relations between the SFIO and the SPD in Tübingen, requires, however, some elaboration.

The SFIO took a liberal attitude to the German question and opposed the "French thesis" on the dismemberment of Germany. Félix Gouin's speech to the Socialist party congress on March 30, 1946, reflected his party's views, by stating: "... we can only consider the administration and control of these
territories, which constitute the vital heart of Germany, from the international point of view. Hostile to any dismemberment or any annexation, and equally (hostile) to the division of Germany into four zones of occupation, the Party demands international occupation of this area, prolonged until total denazification has been carried out; economic internationalization, for the benefit of the war-torn countries, of that arsenal of war which is the Ruhr; and exploitation by France, as reparations, of the Saar mines."

The SFTI also took a liberal view towards the SFD. In May 1946 the SFTI resumed contacts with the British Labour Party in a meeting at Clacton-on-Sea where it was decided to hold periodic meetings. Two conferences resulted (November 1946 in Bournemouth; June 1947 in Zürich). At the Zürich conference, despite Kurt Schumacher's urgings, it was decided to do no more than establish a liaison committee with the SFD. Salomon Grossbach, however, managed to obtain SFD admission to the Socialist conference at Anvers (November 29 - December 2, 1947). Alfred Grosser maintains that this concession did not reflect the unanimous opinion of his party, quoting Daniel Meyer and Jules Koch. In one of his works Grosser also quotes the case of Guy Rollet, the Secretary-General of the SFTI elected at the party congress in August 1946, who felt unable to overlook the fact that Carlo Schmid had worked during the German occupation of France in the infamous military government administration of Lille, where numerous resistance members had been condemned and executed, and was consequently unwilling to appreciate that Schmid had helped sections of the French population.

Despite this jarring note the SFTI maintained contact with Carlo Schmid in Tübingen. The conversation held between an SFTI member named Kiernbaum (or Kostenberg) and Carlo Schmid has already been quoted in this chapter. Salomon Grossbach, chairman of the "Commission des Affaires Étrangères de l'Assemblée Nationale" in 1946, came on more than one occasion to Tübingen to survey developments in Bad-Württemberg. As already stated in the chapter on the KPD, Grossbach was particularly interested in assessing the influence of pro-Communist officers within the French occupation administration in Tübingen. Grossbach stayed during his visits to Tübingen at Dr. Moser's house.

At the more immediate level of contacts with French Socialists within the French administrations in Tübingen itself there is little evidence that the French Socialists were as organised or as resolute in their influence as were,
for example, the Communist officers who supported the KPD. The notable exception
to this was the relationship between Dr. Kosar and the French officer in charge
of the administrative section, "Jeunesse et sport", Captain Humbiot. Various
contemporaries of the Social Democratic movement in post-war Tübingen have
tested in interviews to this being the sole, though fruitful, permanent source
of liaison between local departmental officials within the French military
government and the Tübingen SPD.

It must, however, be stressed that the SPD did not suffer from a lack of
intermediary contact with the French authorities, thanks to the strength of
Schmid's relations with the top officials of the French military government in
Baden-Württemberg. Schmid's contacts were, in short-term effect, of greater import
than the more tenuous relations with the French sister party, since General
Koesig, the Gaullist Commander-in-Chief of the French Zone, tended to ignore
French Socialist criticism of the "French thesis" on Germany, applying de Gaulle's
policy with pronounced impunity. Under these circumstances Schmid's personal
contacts and influence were more effective than the support of and liaison with
the SPD which, of the four major French parties, was the outsider on the German
question.

The final point relating to Schmid's influence on the Social Democratic
movement in post-war Tübingen has already been mentioned in the previous chapter
on the KPD in Tübingen. This concerns Schmid's rejection of a popular front
colalition with the Communists in the proposed "Sozialistische Einheitspartei
Deutschlands" (SED). It has also been stressed that Schmid was a militant anti-
Communist. It now remains to demonstrate how the party in Tübingen approached
the question.

Some of the veteran SPD members were men of the Marxist-oriented Left
and, after the experiences of the Third Reich, not adverse to the idea of a
coalition with the Communists for a prevention of a return of Fascism. They were,
however, a minority within the party in Tübingen. The majority of members,
swayed by Schmid and a contingent of able speakers during a protracted series of
meetings and discussions, reacted negatively to the SED proposals. Typical of
the line followed by the anti-SED activists was the speech held at a meeting of
the Tübingen "Ortsverein" on June 14, 1946, by Landesparteisekretär Denker from
Stuttgart (i.e. another contravention of French regulations) who pointed to the Russian zone as an example of the dangers of Communism: "... Bei der KPD sollten doch die letzten zwölf Jahre eine Lehre gewesen sein, was die Diktatur für unmittelbare Formen angemessen hat. In der Ostzone haben wir den Beweis dafür, was die KPD will. Man kann nicht von Sozialismus reden, wenn die Maschinen eingepackt und abtransportiert werden und durch diese Maßnahmen die Arbeiter brotlos sind. Die KPD müssen wir ablehnen und nur mit ihr zusammenarbeiten, wenn es die Sache erfordert ..." (For the KPD the past twelve years should indeed have been a lesson with the disastrous forms which dictatorship had assumed. In the Eastern zone we have proof of what the KPD wants. One cannot speak of Socialism when machines are being packed up and transported away and the workers are being put out of work by these measures. We must reject the KPD and only cooperate with it when circumstances demand so ...). (52)

Bürgermeister Karrer, the first chairman of the committee delegated to put the organisation of the "Ortsverein" on a firm footing, also voiced his distrust of the KPD: "Nach einer fesselnden Schilderung seines arbeitserreichen Lebens sprach er noch einige Worte für die Einigung der sozialistischen Parteien. Auch wir wollen hin, weil wir davon überzeugt sind, daß ein gemeinsames Ziel schneller erreicht wird, wenn alle Kampfrunden einge sind. Wir wollen uns aber nicht vergewaltigen lassen, wie es anderwärts der Fall ist, wo man uns als Parteiikader übernehmen will. In diesem Falle sagen wir nein. Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht über unser Schicksal sei höchstes Gut und bleibt es. Wenn auf diesem Boden eine scheinbare sozialistische Partei entsteht, dann sagen wir aus ganzen Herzen Ja ..." (After an extremely interesting description of his busy life he also said a few words on the subject of the amalgamation of the Socialist parties. We also aim for that goal, said Karrer, because we are convinced that a common goal is easier reached when all campaigners are united. But we do not want to be violated, as is elsewhere the case, whereby we would be taken over by others as the corpse of a party. In such a case we say Ja. The right of self-determination with regard to our fate is our most precious possession and remains such, said Karrer. If a united Socialist party materializes on the basis of these demands, then we say Yes from the bottom of our hearts ...). (53)

The ubiquitous Dr. Roser often spoke to the "Ortsverein" against the Communist proposals for amalgamating the SPD and the KPD. In this respect he had
a firm supporter in Otto Bartels of the "Kulturaus". Roser was particularly con-
cerned, once it became known that the French authorities intended re-introducing
electoral systems, that the KPD should not become associated in the public's mind
with the KFD. A perusal of the minutes of the executive committee meeting of the
"Ortsverein" on April 23, 1946, illuminates Roser's and Bartels' stance, which in
turn reflects the policy and opinion advocated at that period by the KPD's "Landes-
sekretariat": "Genosse Dr. Roser hält es für wichtig, daß die Gemeinden ihre Kandi-
daten auffassen ... Das Thema KPD-SPD-Kooperation sollte man in Augenblick nicht
behandeln, sondern bis nach den Wahlen zurückstellen.

Genosse Bartels verbrässt sich über das Referentenmaterial ... Dr. Schairer
unterbricht im "Schwäbischen Tagblatt" alles. Wir müssen zeigen, daß wir damit
nicht einverstanden sind und sagen, was uns veranlasst, misstrauisch zu werden. Im
russischen Gebiet einigt man sich nicht, sondern beseitigt einfach die KPD. Es
ist notwendig, daß wir Material schaffen ... Dr. Koeber Wir müssen die Frage der Einigung nicht als Thema benutzen,
sondern nur in der Diskussion darauf antworten.

Genosse Klett (Dillingen): Die Kommunisten in Dillingen schlugen kürzlich eine
gemeinsame Verhandlung vor. Wir haben mit einem glatten "Nein" geantwortet.
Genosse Bartels: Das kommunistische Landessekretariat steht in Verbindung mit
Berlin. Die ganze Sache geht darauf aus, eine Einheitspartei zu gründen und den
Titel KPD verschwinden zu lassen, weil er unpopulär ist."

(Comrade Dr. Koeber considers it important that the communities nominate their
candidates ... At present, one should not deal with the subject of the KPD-SPD
unification, but should postpone it until after the elections.
Comrade Bartels enlarges upon the newspaper articles and the material upon which
they are based ... Dr. Schairer suppresses everything in the "Schwäbischen Tagblatt.
We must show that we disapprove of this and state what it is that is making us
suspicious.
In the Russian zone there is no unification (of KPD and KFD) but
instead the KPD is simply being eliminated. It is necessary that we produce
material (about this) ... Comrade Dr. Roser: "We must not use the question of unification as a topic, but
only reply to it in discussions."
Comrade Klett (Dillingen): "The Communists in Dillingen recently suggested a
joint conference. We have replied with a plain 'No'."
Comrade Bartels: "The Communist "land" secretariat is in communication with Berlin.
The whole thing is aimed at the foundation of a united Socialist Party and to let
the title of KPD disappear because it is unpopular). Such massive criticism of a popular front coalition with the KPD effectively silenced those SPD members who felt that a rapprochement ought to be established with the Communist party.

Apart from the dominance of the "Schmid's line of sharp demarcation from the KPD" (Schmid's line of sharp demarcation from the KPD), there were three other reasons which militated against acceptance of the SPD proposals: firstly, the negative reaction of the population (hence the electorate) to reports of harsh conditions in the Kuo and an increase in the number of popular identification with the KPD and the Russian occupation administration made the KPD an unattractive partner for the SPD; secondly, French opposition to popular front organisations with the obvious centre of command outside of the French zone ("Neue Deutschland" and other "Antifa" organisations) was inevitable, given the nature of French particularist ambitions; thirdly, there was the strongly anti-Communist line of the party executive of the SPD under Schumacher in Hanover.

Now that the effects of Carlo Schmid's dominance of the SPD have been described, it is expedient to assess the causes for the failure on the part of the SPD to gain the confidence and votes of the electorate, not only within the predominantly Catholic hinterland of Süd-Württemberg, but also in Tübingen itself, after the head start which the SPD received over the bourgeois parties in the years 1945 and 1946, both at governmental and municipal level.

Before examining these causes it is perhaps useful to outline the electoral results in which the SPD did so badly. As already mentioned, the French re-introduced an electoral system with the establishment of municipal elections. The local SPD "Ortsverein" threw itself into the electoral campaign, aware of the importance of these elections as an indicator for future election results. It was essential for the SPD to establish itself in the new electoral climate within a community in which it had never gained more than a consistent minority of votes in the pre-1935 communal elections: 1922, 2 out of 14 seats; 1925, 2 out of 14 seats; 1928, 2 out of 14 seats; 1932, 1 out of 14 seats.

The exigencies of the post-war situation were a source of difficulty for all electoral campaigns. The shortage of paper, ink, printing press, transport,
fuel etc. seriously hampered these campaigns. These material questions were the subject of intense debate at "Ortsverein" meetings. The minutes of the executive committee meeting of April 23, 1946 reflect these worries: "Der Vorsitzende, Genosse Karrer, eröffnete die Sitzung mit dem Bemerkung, daß die Gemeinderatswahlen im französisch besetzten Gebiet Ende August stattfinden sollen. Er habe es für notwendig gehalten, sofort eine erweiterte Vorstandssitzung einzuberufen und zu dieser Frage Stellung zu nehmen. Wir müssen schon heute alles einsetzen und die notwendigen Vorbereitungen treffen. Vor allem Dingen mit der Verbund neuer Mitglieder unermüdlich gearbeitet werden. Die 56 Gemeinden in unserem Kreis müssen so schnell wie möglich besucht werden. Es müssen um Wagen zur Verfügung stehen, damit wir zu jeder Zeit die einzelnen Gemeinden besuchen können ... Genosse Kranke verlangte schnellste Schaffung der Stützpunkte. So wie es jetzt ist, können wir die Organisation nicht aufbauen. Die CDU und die KPD haben Wagen. Diejenige Partei, welche die beste Organisation hat, hat auch die besten Vorteile. Ob Hartmeyer: Die Fahrbereitschaft kann von beiden der Stadt und Kreis gestellt werden ..."  

(The chairman, Comrade Karrer, opened the meeting with the remark that the municipal council elections in the French-occupied zone were to take place at the end of August. He had considered it necessary to immediately convene an extended executive committee meeting and to give his opinion on this question. He said that we had to do our utmost and make the necessary preparations. Above all, according to Karrer, constant effort ought to be invested in the recruitment of new members; and the 56 communities within our "Kreis" ought to be visited as soon as possible. Cars would also have to be made available so that we could visit the individual communities at any time ... Comrade Frank demanded the earliest possible setting up of motor pools. As things were at that moment, he pointed out, we could not build up our party organisation (i.e., throughout the "Kreis"). The CDU and the KPD had cars, Frank said, and the party that had the best organisation also had the best advantages. Mayor Hartmeyer: "The communal motor pool can be made available (to us) by both the town and "Kreis" authorities ...")  

The minutes do not in fact record whether Hartmeyer’s proposal to exploit the communal "Fahrbereitschaft" (i.e., unit of civilian and commercial vehicles requisitioned for municipal and official purposes) for party purposes was accepted although Landrat Renner, who was present at the meeting, expressed unease at the idea.
On the whole complaints and considerations of a technical nature dominated these meetings. There was also a good deal of criticism voiced at existing campaign methods, e.g. on September 5, 1946: "... Über das Ankleben unserer Plakate wurden lebhafte Klagen hervorgebracht. Der mit dieser Arbeit betraute Mann brachte es wiederholt fertig, unsere Plakate an der hintersten versteckten Seite der Plakatwände anzuwirken ..." (vociferous complaints were raised about our bill posting. The man entrusted with this work repeatedly managed to fix our posters on the most out-of-the-way and concealed sides of the advertising pillars ...). (88)

There was one interesting and important debate on the forthcoming municipal elections which concerned the question of the parties' respective list of candidates. Apparently a series of three respective meetings took place between the SPD “Ortsverein” chairman, Bürgermeister Karrer, and the other three political parties to discuss the possibility of forming coalitions of the party lists of candidates (i.e. “Listenverbindung”): "Genosse Karrer hatte mit dem Vorsitzenden der KPD, Zeeb, und mit dem Vorsitzenden der CDU, Krau, eine Unterredung in Sachen der Listenverbindung bei den bevorstehenden Wahlen. Die Demokratische Partei will sich ebenfalls mit uns verbinden, wenn wir einige Plätze für die einnehmen. Eine Listenverbindung kommt jedoch für uns nicht in Frage. Wir treten bei den Wahlen mit eigenen Wahlvorschlägen auf ..." (executive committee meeting, July 8, 1946) (Comrade Karrer had a discussion with the chairman of the KPD, Zeeb, and with the chairman of the CDU, Krau, concerning the matter of coalition lists of candidates for the forthcoming elections. The Democratic Party (DVP) also wants to link up with us if we concede them some seats. However, a coalition list of candidates is out of the question for us. At the elections, we will appear with our own lists of candidates ...). (99)

In retrospect one could argue that the SPD made a serious mistake in not allying itself, for instance, with the local DVP. Of a total 261,029 votes cast to determine the election of 24 members to the town council, the results were as follows:

1. CDU : 94,242 votes = 8 seats
2. DVP : 75,204 votes = 7 seats
3. KPD : 70,140 votes = 6 seats
4. KVP : 26,547 votes = 2 seats
5. "Parteileiten Wahlvereinigung": 12,696 = 1 seat (60)

An election coalition with the DVP may indeed have given the SPD more influence within the "Gemeinderat". As it was, the SPD gained exactly 25% of the seats. This was a distinct improvement on the pre-1933 election results. The SPD, however, was disappointed. It reckoned that, considering its anti-Fascist past and its record of municipal service since the French occupation of the town, it deserved greater support from the electorate. (61) The figure of 25% representation on the town council reflected a decline in comparison with SPD membership of the "Gemeinderat" of May 25, 1945, and the "Städtischer Beirat" of January 2, 1946. (62)

The SPD results in Tübingen lay far above the average gain of municipal seats by the party throughout Baden-Württemberg, winning 13.6% of the vote in Tübingen as opposed to 4.07% throughout the province. (63) The six members of the "SPD-Fraktion" (i.e. SPD group in town council) in the town council were, in order of votes gained:

1. Gottlieb Karrer, Bürgermeister (mayor) (5,394)
2. Dr. Gertrud Hilmann-Richer, Arztin (doctor) (4,478)
3. Arno Widisch, Arbeitsamt (Employment Exchange) (4,318)
4. Paul Weisel, Schreiner (joiner) (3,052)
5. Karl Schuster, Justizsekretär (court secretary) (3,026)
6. Johannes Kost, Weingärtner (vine grower) (3,064)

Their positions on the list of successful candidates were 2nd, 5th, 11th, 13th, 16th and 23rd respectively. (64)

As yet the results of this election did not undermine the SPD's power base within the town hall for the SPD mayor, Adolf Hartmayer, whose office had been up for re-election on the same ballot paper as that for the new "Gemeinderat" on September 15, 1946, retained his position with another SPD member, Gottlieb Karrer, as his deputy. Secondly, the mayor was with few exceptions, chairman of the municipal committees in the town hall, e.g. "Immerer Ausschü" (Technical Committee), "Sozialausschuss" (Committee for Social Welfare Committee) etc. (65) The SPD therefore retained a power base within the town hall.
The municipal elections of September 15, however, demonstrated that the SPD in Tübingen had failed to gain the confidence of the electorate. It proved that, despite the experiences of National Socialism and despite the new Social Democratic policy advocated by Schmid in Tübingen and Mid-Württemberg, the population had remained deeply conservative and inclined toward support for the bourgeois parties. This fact was reinforced by the results of the elections to the "Kreisversammlungen". Of a total of 26 members which "Kreis Tübingen" was called to elect by direct proportional representation, the SPD only managed to gain five seats. The CDU gained, in contrast, the absolute majority. This was not an isolated phenomenon; throughout Mid-Württemberg the CDU gained the majority in the "Kreisversammlungen", i.e. 61.6% for the CDU = 207 seats in all, as opposed to 20.6% for the SPD = 72 seats. (66)

The results of the "Kreisversammlung" elections in Mid-Württemberg proved doubly negative for the SPD in that, in accordance with the electoral and legislative structures defined by the French military government in Baden-Baden, these "Kreisversammlungen" were to provide by a process of indirect election a majority of the membership (38 of 65 members) of the "Beratende Landesversammlung", the major function of which was the framing of the future constitution of Mid-Württemberg. Not surprisingly the CDU majority in the "Kreisversammlungen" was reflected within the "Beratende Landesversammlung". The CDU received 40 seats, whilst the SPD received a mere 14 (the DVP 7 and the KPD 4). Therefore the "Kreisversammlung" results in Mid-Württemberg pre-empted, and indeed provided the causal basis for, the eventual provision of a Christian Democratic constitution for Mid-Württemberg (later Württemberg-Schleswig).

Up to the "Landtag" elections of May 19, 1947, however, an anomalous situation persisted in that, whilst the elections to date had all been dominated by the CDU, consequently all the existing elected representative bodies, from the majority of Mid-Württemberg's "Gemeinderäte" to the new constituent assembly of Mid-Württemberg (i.e. the "Beratende Landesversammlung"), the executive (i.e. the "Staatssekretariat") continued to be dominated, despite certain modifications already described, by Carlo Schmid.

There are conflicting reports on how the CDU responded to this situation. Some formerly active members of the post-war Tübingen CDU, including the co-founder
of the local CDU branch, Jakob Kraul, maintain that the CDU was unhappy about Carlo Schmid's often single-handed actions in running the "Staatssekretariat" and Bad-Württemberg's affairs at a time when the electorate had firmly declared its support for the CDU and its policies. \(^{(67)}\) Gebhard Müller on the other hand denied in private correspondence in 1974 any such annoyance on the part of the CDU at their inability in the two initial post-war years to implement Christian Democratic policy: "... Da Carlo Schmid sich intensiv bemühte, den Belangen der nicht sozialistisch eingestellten Bevölkerung, die sich später mit nur teil absoluter Mehrheit zur CDU bekannte, Rechnung zu tragen, kann von einer tiefgreifenden Beunruhigung innerhalb der CDU über eine "ihre ungünstige Zusammensetzung" der Regierung wohl nicht gesprochen."

Since Carlo Schmid made intensive efforts to take into account the interests of the non-socialist population of which practically the absolute majority later professed its support for the CDU, one cannot speak of a deep uneasiness on the part of the CDU about an "unfavourable composition" of the government (i.e. unfavourable to the CDU).\(^{(68)}\) This statement, however, belies the fierce political in-fighting which charactarised relations between the SPD and CDU in the years 1945-47, especially over the question of confessional schools.\(^{(69)}\)

In addition, the CDU did make representations to the French authorities for a redress of the balance of power within the "Staatssekretariat". The French complied and the result was a reshuffle of ministerial posts (described above) whereby, concomitant to the French Commander-in-Chief's decree of December 4, 1946, concerning the extension of powers of the new "Provisorische Regierung", an announcement was made granting the CDU four of the seven cabinet posts whilst Schmid remained head of government.\(^{(70)}\)

This latter situation was reversed by the results of the "Landtag" elections of May 10, 1947, in which the CDU gained the absolute majority by winning 32 of the 60 seats. The CDU now wished to replace Carlo Schmid as head of government with a president of their own choice. The resulting negotiations have been described by Katalin Konstanzer who gained extensive access to government archives for her research: "Trotz der klaren Mehrheitsverhältnisse im Landtag kam es zwischen CDU und SPD zu Uneinigkeiten über die Person des Staatspräsidenten. Innerhalb der CDU waren als Kandidaten Dr. Gebhard Müller und Rechtsanwalt Lorenz Bock im Gespräch. Die SPD schlug den seitherigen Präsidenten des Staatssekretariats,

\[^{(70)}\]"
Carlo Schmid, vor. In den Verhandlungen wies die CDU darauf hin, daß sie "aus Prestigegründen den Staatspräsidenten für sich verlangen müsse, nachdem sie nun zweimal die absolute Mehrheit erlangt habe." Von seiten der SPD hingegen wurde betont, daß "kein besseres Staatsoberhaupt gefunden werden könne als Staatsrat Schmid". In den Verhandlungen mit den Franzosen könne niemand die Interessen des Landes besser vertreten als er." (Despite the clear state of majority in the "Land" Diet, there were arguments between the CDU and the SPD over the choice of State President. Within the CDU both Dr. Gebhard Miller and Arend Bock the solicitor were discussed as potential candidates. The SPD proposed the then president of the State Secretariat, Carlo Schmid. In negotiations the CDU pointed out that "for reasons of prestige they had to insist on the State Presidency for themselves since they had now twice gained the absolute majority". The SPD stressed, however, that "no better Head of State could be found than Staaterrat Schmid" and that no one could better represent the interests of the "Land" in negotiations with the French.)

The argument that Schmid was the best man for dealing and negotiating with the French was not as effective in 1947 as it had been in the previous years. Firstly, the economic and political situation was beginning to show signs of stability and, secondly, the French had obviously committed themselves to a return to some form of German parliamentary autonomy in Baden-Württemberg. Furthermore the CDU was aware by 1947 that it was looked upon in a more favourable light than previously by the French occupation authorities. During the negotiations for the nomination of the new president of Baden-Württemberg, the French withdrew from all participation in the dealings. This was tantamount to a withdrawal of French support for Schmid since he had survived since the results of the elections to the "Beratende Landesversammlung" as head of the German executive solely on the support of the French military government. Without this backing Schmid had no power base left and he consequently had to vacate the presidential office. He was re-appointed vice-president of the "Landtag".

Schmid's departure from presidential office marked in fact the final stage of the period of Social Democratic dominance of Tübingen and Baden-Württemberg in the years, 1945-1947. Hermann Verner, the local historian, described the situation thus: "Seit die anfangs verbotenen Parteien, wenigstens die demokratische Richtung, wieder zugelassen waren, beherrschten sie auch die Wahlen und damit war der sozial-
...demokratischen Führung in Staat und Stadt die Grundlage entzogen". (When those parties which had been initially banned were re-registered (at least the democratic ones), they dominated the elections with the result that the Social Democratic leadership lost its (power) base, both at the level of town and "Land" politics.) Vermer's observation was correct. The majority of the electorate of Süd-Württemberg, including that of Tübingen, at no time opted for Social Democracy in the three direct elections between September 1946 and May 1947, leaving the SPD without a power base as the French returned modified executive powers to elected legislative bodies.

At this point one should turn to an analysis of the reasons behind the electorate's rejection of Social Democracy in order to complete this exposition of the history of the SPD in French-occupied Tübingen in the years, 1945-1947. The first and most obvious reason was that, as in the case of the KPD, post-war Süd-Württemberg presented objectively unfavourable conditions for Social Democracy in any form of election. Süd-Württemberg had too few industrial centres and too large a rural and peasant population with conservative traditions to offer any real chances of electoral success for the SPD. The SPD recognised these problems and described the difficulties in an analysis written in the *Jahrboch der sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschland* 1946: "Der politische Kampf der SPD in diesem Lande (i.e. Süd-Württemberg) ist ... ein Kampf innerhalb einer weithin kleinbürgerlichen und bäuerlichen Bevölkerung, gestützt auf die politische Energie einer in wesentlichen auf einige wenige Industriorte beschränkten Arbeiterchaft und einer schleichend kleine Gruppe von Geistesarbeitern der Landeszentralbehörden und der Hoch- und Fachschulen in Name Tübingen-Reutlingen. Er stützt sich übriwgsen auf die evangelische Bevölkerung des nördlichen Gebietsteils. Dem entspricht der Wahlserfolg der SPD. Bei den Gemeinderats- und Kreistagswahlen in Herbst 1946 erhielt die SPD in gleichen Raum nicht ganz 10 % der Stimmen." (The SPD's political struggle in this "Land" (i.e. Süd-Württemberg) is a struggle which is maintained within a largely petty bourgeois and rural population and which relies on the political energy of a working class restricted in the main to a few industrial centres and of a numerically small group of intellectuals with the central "Land" administrations and the universities and technical colleges in the Tübingen and Reutlingen area. It draws its support mainly from the Lutheran population of the northern part of the "Land". This is reflected in the SPD's election successes.
In the municipal and "Kreistag" elections of the autumn of 1946 it gained a little over 20% of the votes ... In the elections of 1924 the SPD gained in the same area not quite 10% of the votes.](74)

In the above quotation an indication is given of another specific cause for the SPD's failure to gain extensive electoral support, namely the subject of religion. The SPD received some support, although not as much as indicated above, from the Protestant community. But it gained as good as no support from the Catholic electorate. The Protestant community tended to be more liberal and therefore more diverse in its approach to politics; consequently a percentage of the Protestant electorate favoured the SPD, although the majority appears to have voted for the DNVP (q.v. subsequent chapter).

The Catholic community reacted to Social Democracy with a unified negative reaction. There were three reasons for this. Firstly, the Catholic Church and its adherents could not overcome their suspicions towards any form of Socialism, including Carlo Schmid's strongly modified version of the former party programme. Secondly, the Catholic Church had a different attitude from the Protestant Churches to the question of temporal politics. The Catholic Church has always stimulated political Catholicism within political life in response to its belief that it has a duty to exert influence in politics in order to prevent too great a process of secularisation within political and social life and to protect specific Church interests (e.g. religious education, family rights etc.). This was an impetus behind the establishment of Christian Democracy in Sudwurttemberg (as elsewhere) and the Catholic Church, logically enough, actively stimulated its members to vote for the CDU. The Catholic voters, it is evident, responded to this call. This feature of the political make-up of post-war Sudwurttemberg is discussed in more detail in the ensuing chapter on the CDU.

The third reason for the lack of Catholic support for the SPD lay in the history of bitter enmity which existed between the Catholic Bishop of Rottenburg, Dr. Sproll, and Carlo Schmid, a lapsed Catholic. This enmity was sparked off during a series of discussions between Carlo Schmid and representatives of the Bishop of Rottenburg on the question of the form of school education which was to replace the National Socialist system. At the time of the meetings (June-July 1945) Schmid was "Minister für Kult und Unterricht" in French-occupied
Stuttgart (and later "Landesdirektor" in Tübingen). The Roman Catholic Church in Württemberg, i.e. the diocese of Rottenburg, was intensely committed to the re-institution of confessional schools. During a meeting with Schmid on July 1, 1945, two representatives of the bishop learnt that Schmid had no intention of reviving confessional education. The report of the meeting, as written by the two church delegates (a vicar-general and a dean) reads as follows: "... Herr Generalkonvikar kam dann allmählich auf den springenden Punkt: Konfessionschule und Nichtkonfessionschule. Schmid erklärte, daß darüber Übereinstimmung bestehe, daß die Konfessionschule nicht mehr neu aufgemacht werden sollte. Herr Generalkonvikar verfuhr nachdrücklich den kirchlichen Standpunkt. Er umriß das katholische Schulideal und sprach auch auf die Forderungen des WJC (75) in dieser Beziehung hin. Schmid erwiderte, daß ihm die Rahmenbestimmung des Codex schon bekannt seien, machte dann noch einige Komplimente gegen Benedikt XV und die Kodifizierung des kirchenrechtlichen Standpunkts, sei aber, daß Rom den besonderen Verhältnissen gerecht Rechnung tragen werde, er sprach für die Gemeinschaftsschule hier auf Grund langjähriger Entwicklung und er käme nichts anderes, er habe das reiflich durchgedacht, ja er spräche hier nicht nur als Advocatus civitatis, sondern auch als Advocatus ecclésiae, wenn er die Konfessionschule nicht re-introduiere ... er fügte noch bei, daß ihm die Damenbestimmung von Anfang an deutlich gemacht habe, daß sie die Gemeinschaftsschule wünsche. . . ." (The vicar-general then slowly came to the crucial points: confessional or non-confessional schools. Schmid declared that agreement had been reached that the confessional school should not be re-introduced any more. The vicar-general emphatically defended the church's viewpoint. He outlined the Catholic ideal of schooling and also referred to the requirements of the WJC (i.e. canon law) in this matter. Schmid replied that he was already acquainted with the framework of provisions of the Codex, then made a few compliments concerning Benedict XV and the codification of canon law, but stated that he thought that Rome would surely take into account the special circumstances involved: he said that he was speaking on behalf of the co-educational school on the basis of long years of historical development, that there was nothing else he could do and that he had thought it over carefully, he maintained that he indeed was speaking in this matter not only as advocatus civitatis but also as advocatus ecclésiae when he did not re-instate the confessional school ... He also added that the occupying power had made it clear to him from the beginning that they wanted the co-educational school ...) (76)
The bishop subsequently turned to the French authorities to put his case on confessional education, thereby opening a duel with the SPD which lasted until popular acceptance of the CFA’s constitution on May 20, 1947, which guaranteed confessional schools. These representations to the French on the educational question extended over a wide range of activities, from audiences with leading French politicians, e.g., with Pierre Schnaider, Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on September 6, 1946, in Tübingen, to letters of complaint to General Konig, Commander-in-Chief of the French Zone in Saar-Baden and to French Ministers of State, e.g., Francisque Gay, the minister in charge of German and Austrian affairs to whom Bishop Sprott wrote on January 2, 1946: "... Or jusqu'à présent, tous ses efforts en faveur de l'école confessionnelle ont échoué. L'administration württembergeoise des cultes établit, via facti, la si-disant école simultanée chrétienne, mais qui est, à mon opinion, préjudiciable à nous autres catholiques. Le Gouvernement Militaire Français semble bien autoriser l'école confessionnelle en principe, mais de fait, elle n'est instituée nulle part. Une action spontanée comme celle par une partie de nos diocèses et curés de solliciter les votes des parents et des éducateurs pour l'école confessionnelle produit de la gêne à l'administration württembergeoise des cultes, et on ne trouve pas l'agrément du Gouvernement Militaire Français non plus."

In this struggle with Carlo Schmid the Catholic bishop applied his most effective weapon by imposing an indirect boycott on the SPD in the elections. This boycott was expressed in a series of pastoral letters read from the church pulpits of Sles-Württemberg at Sunday Mass prior to elections. Whilst these pastoral letters did not specifically proscribe the Socialist and Marxist parties by name, the terms stated in them left no doubt that they would not come within the scope of the type of political parties recommended. For example, the pastoral letter of September 2, 1946, prior to the municipal elections, contained the following announcement: "... Bei der entscheidenden Bedeutung, welche die Wahlen in allen Bezirksämtern für die Gestaltung nicht nur des bürgerlichen, sondern auch des kirchlichen Lebens in den Gemeinden und im Staate haben, macht der Bischof alle wahlberechtigten Gläubigen, besonders auch die Frauen, darauf aufmerksam, daß es ihre erste Gewissenspflicht ist, nur Wahl zu gehen und nach ihrem christlichen Gewissens zu wählen." (... In view of the decisive importance which the elections have in all occupied zones for the shaping not only of civic, but also of religious life within the communities and within the state as a whole, the bishop draws the attention of all
In addition to failing to gain the Catholic vote, the SPD was not very successful in acquiring the Protestant vote. In Tübingen, for instance, where the population was predominantly Protestant, the election results were more favourable toward the SPD than in the rural communities of Süd-Württemberg but they still did not reflect a major shift from pre-1933 voting patterns. One of the causes of this lay in the decision by influential Protestant personalities and groups in Tübingen to vote DVP. This feature of post-war Tübingen has been comprehensively outlined in Hans Georg Mosck's book, „Christlichkeit und Fraktionspolitik in Hessen, Rheinland-Pfalz und Baden-Württemberg, 1945-49“, and is treated in detail in the ensuing chapter on the SPD and DVP in Tübingen.

Apart from the question of religion as a contributive factor to the lack of success on the part of the SPD in post-war Tübingen and district, it is necessary to look at the SPD's performance whilst in power during the period prior to the re-institution of elections. The SPD, like the KPD, gained an inflated political importance in the initial period of the occupation of Tübingen on account of the backing of the French military administration and a series of political and administrative faits accomplis implemented by the „Demokratische Vereinigung“. The Social Democrats, swollen in number and dominated by a new academic elite, established itself, after the KPD's acquisition of police, newspaper and trade unions, within the administration of Tübingen at all three levels: municipal, county („Kreis“) and government („Staatssekretariat“). There were advantages and disadvantages in this situation. The obvious main advantage was that the SPD, a minority party within the community, was able to impose its influence on the administrative, social and political life of Tübingen, and Süd-Württemberg, without resorting to electoral confrontation.

The main disadvantage lay in the fact that, having acquired positions of power on the bank of the French military government, as it were, the SPD became identified to varying degrees with the French occupation administration and its often unpopular policies. According to Dr. Mosck, the SPD was unable in the post-war years to eradicate popular identification within the community between the
Social Democratic elite and the French military authorities. This was especially true of Carlo Schmid who, in his capacity as head of the "Staatssekretariat", had to issue to the population "Rechtsanordnungen" (decrees) which were in fact often transcriptions of French military government decrees to the "Staatssekretariat".

The French authorities at the same time took great pains to conceal from the local population the extent to which these "Rechtsanordnungen" were direct French orders. The German administrations were forbidden to include the phrase "auf Anordnung der Militärregierung" (by decree of the Military Government) which was employed in the initial period of the occupation. The French military government even forbade verbal reference by the German administrations to statements or instructions from members of the French administrations. A circular, for example, was sent from the "Direktorialart" of the "Staatssekretariat" on May 24, 1946, around the various departments and administrations with the following heading: "Benachrichtigung auf Äußerungen von Angehörigen der Militärregierung": "Es besteht Veranlassung, darauf hinzuweisen, dass von Seiten deutscher Bevölkerungsangehöriger in keinerlei Voraussetzungen oder Äußerungen der öffentlichkeit oder gegenüber höheren Stellen auf Äußerungen von Angehörigen der Militärregierung Bezug genommen werden dürfe." (Gause has been given to stress that no reference may be made in any announcements or comments, either in public or vis-à-vis subordinate departments, by German members of administrative authorities to statements by members of the Military Government.)

The vice-president of the "Staatssekretariat", Gebhard Müller, made a strongly worded attack on the French method of concealed indirect government at a CDU election meeting on May 8, 1947: "Die Lage des Landes ist darum, dass die französische Militärregierung (i.e., of Süd-Württemberg) selbst entscheiden muss, wie die Dinge in ihrer Besatzungszone weitergehen sollen. Die Methode der indirekten Regierung - das bedeutet, dass die französische Militärregierung tatsächlich regiert und die deutschen Stellen lediglich als ausführende Organe behandelt, sie aber nach außen hin als die Verantwortlichen im Vordergrund treten lässt - ist auf die Dauer mit dem Grundsatz der Demokratie, nämlich mit der Regierung durch das Volk, nicht zu vereinbaren." (The situation in the "Land" is such that the French military government (i.e., of Süd-Württemberg) has to decide how things ought to progress within its zone of occupation. The method of indirect government -
meaning that the French military government in fact governs and treats the German authorities simply as executive organs but lets them appear to the public as the ones in charge – is in the long run inconsistent with the principles of democracy, namely with government by the people.\(^{[84]}\) However, although the CDU complained about this situation and resented the restrictions on autonomous government, it was the SPD which netted the greater losses in terms of reputation and electoral support.

At this point Carlo Schmid's handling of public relations must be criticised in that he made little effort to minimise the public image of close identification between the SPD élite and the French military government. On the contrary, Schmid's behaviour and style of management emphasised his close, personal links with the French military government at a time when the local population existed on a subsistence diet as a result of French policy. A close associate of Schmid's in this period described his political conduct and image as that of a "duodecimo prince" ("DuodesfUrst").\(^{[85]}\)

Schmid's close relations with the French authorities, both in Tübingen and Baden-Baden, not only made him suspect and resented within sections of the population. It also freed him from the need for a power base, apart from the inner cabinet of qualified and capable administrators whom he had hand-picked to run various departments efficiently and loyally. This system functioned well during the initial years of the occupation, i.e. from the establishment of the "Staatssekretariat" to the election of the "Beratende Landesversammlung". But it had a weakness in that the party élite, above all Schmid himself, tended to neglect the rank-and-file organisation of the SPD, with the exception of the period of establishment of the SPD (autumn 1945 - spring 1946) when Schmid, Remer and Halmann had worked hard to create an infrastructure for the reorganised SPD throughout Baden-Württemberg. Schmid's subsequent neglect of party life at local branch level had, as has been mentioned already in this chapter, negative effects on morale, efficiency and commitment at "Ortsverwalt" level. This in turn was reflected in negative election results. By comparison it appears that both the CDU and DVH "Landessekretariate" kept in closer contact with their local branches and maintained a higher level of qualified academic and professional members within the same, thus supplying local branch life with expertise and dynamism.
It is possible that Schmid relied on his not inconsiderable talents and achievements to promote his party's cause and expected a favourable electoral response to his successes at governmental level. Schmid's abilities and efforts as head of government and his many successes remained little-known, unpublished facts within the general public, apart from administrative circles and the local intelligentsia. There were two causes for this: firstly, French censorship and, secondly, the KPD's control of the local newspaper. Schmid and the SPD were extremely annoyed at the newspaper's failure to provide satisfactory coverage of the Social Democratic contribution to Tübingen's political and administrative life. An executive meeting of the "Ortverein" complained that "(es) bedauerlich sei, daß uns keine Zeitung zur Verfügung stünde. Die Berichterstattung des "Schwäbischen Tagblatts" ist einseitig und unterschlägt zu großen Teil wichtige politische Nachrichten und Begebenheiten aus der SPD, sodaß das Publikum falsch unterrichtet und die Bedeutung unserer Partei nicht in dem Maße gewürdigt wird, wie es ihrer Größe entsprechend sein sollte." (it) was to be regretted that no newspaper was available to us. The news coverage in the Schwäbische Tagblatt is one-sided and suppresses to a great extent important political news and events concerning the SPD with the result that the public is wrongly informed and the importance of our party is not appreciated to an extent commensurate with its size.)

Given this situation, however, Schmid might have employed the "Ortverein" of his party to greater effect as agencies of news dissemination and propaganda, had he remained in closer contact with them.

Another major criticism that must be made of Schmid's leadership of the SPD in post-war Tübingen is that he concentrated his party's focus of attention too rigidly on the KPD rather than on the opposition from the Right, i.e. the CDU and DVP. Schmid's analysis of the post-war electoral mood in Süd-Württemberg was correct when he surmised that there would be little general interest for Marxist-oriented programmes. He tended, however, to over-emphasise the danger of popular identification with Marxism and the KPD and to concentrate the SPD's energies on shaking off the advances of the KPD regarding amalgamation in the proposed SED.

After the elections of 1946 (i.e. "Gemeindewahlen" and "Kreisversammlungen") the Jahrbuch der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschland 1946 wrote the following with the wisdom of hindsight on the situation in Süd-Württemberg: "Der Hauptaggressor
der Partei ist die CDU, in der sich in erster Linie die durch eine evangelische
Hinterhalt verstärkte katholische Bewölkung zusammengefunden hat und die über
die absolute Majorität innerhalb der politischen und kommunalen Körperschaften
des Landes verfügt. Davon tritt die Gegnerschaft gegen die bisher schwachen
Gruppen der DVP und KPD mehr in den Hintergrund. Der Kampf beschränkt sich a.2.
vor allem auf die Schaffung der künftigen Verfassung, dort vornehmlich auf die
in Süddeutschland immer hochpolitisch betrachtete Frage der Bekennnisschule,
durch die die verfassungsmäßige Einheit des Landes Württemberg gefährdet ist."
(The main opponent of the party is the CDU, in which primarily the Catholic
population, augmented by a Lutheran minority, have come together and which controls
the absolute majority within the political and communal corporate bodies of the
"Land". In contrast our opposition to the hitherto weak groups of the DVP and
KPD recedes increasingly into the background. Our struggle at the moment concerns
particularly the establishment of the future constitution, especially in this
respect the question of the confessional school which is always considered a
highly political theme in South Germany and by which the constitutional unity
of "Land Württemberg" is endangered.) It was an a posteriori lesson which
the SPD took to heart only after the loss of power and influence within the
constituent assembly and legislature.

The establishment of the constituent assembly ("Beratende Landesversammlung")
introduces the theme of the final factor to be cited as a contributive reason for
the SPD's fall from power and influence, namely the graduated electoral system
established by the French authorities. No equitable form of electoral system
would have given the SPD in South-Württemberg a majority in the legislature. But
there is one feature which proved an impediment to the SPD at an important stage
in the restoration of German autonomy. This was the case of the indirect elections
to the "Beratende Landesversammlung" which perpetuated the CDU gains made in the
"Kreisversammlung" elections. The "Kreise" were in the main rural units and had
reflected Christian Democratic and traditional church aspirations in their voting
patterns. Even in those "Kreise" which were dominated by a large urban community,
e.g. in the case of "Kreis Tübingen" and the town of Tübingen, there existed in
each case sufficient rural hinterland within the respective "Kreise" boundaries to
modify SPD gains within the urban community. In the case of "Kreis Tübingen"
there was an obvious discrepancy between the municipal elections when the SPD
gained 26 % - 6 out of 24 seats and the "Kreisversammlung" election when it gained
under 20% = 5 out of 26 seats. The fact that the "Kreisversammlungen" elected
the majority of the membership of the new constituent assembly perpetuated the
Christian Democrats' position.

This feature, it must be admitted, should not be overemphasised since
the SPD had no real chance of gaining a majority. But the system did serve to
understate the role of the SPD in Tübingen and Süd-Württemberg and to accentuate
the position of the CDU as the "natural" party of Süd-Württemberg.

A perhaps even more important aspect of the electoral system created by
the French is the fact that the strategists within the French occupation
authorities were undoubtedly aware that the electoral system which they were
formulating was bound to favour the CDU to the disadvantage of the Socialists.
Consequently it can be assumed that the electoral system laid down by the French
military government, in conjunction with instructions from Paris, itself repre-

sented a review of existing occupation policy which was tantamount to a reversal
of political patronage vis-à-vis the political groupings within the French zone.
Whereas the SPD (and the KPD) had initially received open patronage between 1945
and 1946 from the French occupation authorities, it became increasingly apparent
by the middle of 1946 that the Christian Democratic movement was becoming the
principal recipient of French attention.
Chapter Three: The reconstitution and development of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) in Tübingen, 1945–1947

(1) Interview with Ministerialdirektor Dr. Dieter Roser, Innenministerium Stuttgart, June 1974.

(2) Tübinger Chronik und Stadtmachbote, 61 Jg. (1925), Nr. 287, 8. Dezember 1925.

(3) ibid., 84 Jg. (1928), Nr. 291, 11. Dezember 1928.

(4) ibid., 87 Jg. (1931), Nr. 286, 9. Dezember 1931.


(6) e.g., interview with Wilhelm Haudermann, Tübingen, May 1974.


(8) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Protokollbuch der demokratischen Vereinigungen Tübingen.

(9) Interview with Professor Georg Melchers, Tübingen, May 1974.


(11) ibid.


(13) Sozialdemokratische Partei Süd-Württemberg, Ortsverein Tübingen, Protokollbuch 1.


(19) Regierungspräsidium Tübingen, Az: 3164, Ziffer 85.


(21) Sozialdemokratische Partei Süd-Württemberg, Ortsverein Tübingen, Protokollbuch 1. "Einleitung".

(22) ibid.
(23) *Abd.*
(24) "Meine Pünktlichkeit 1945/46. Erinnerungen an die beiden ersten Nachkriegs-
semester in Tübingen", in: *Festschrift zum 150. Geburtstag der Universität Tübingen*, copy of manuscript kindly lent by
author.
(26) *Abd.*, "Mitgliederversammlung: 20. September 1946".
(27) *Abd.*, "Kundgebung in der Bundessynode. Streit zur Entwicklung der deutschen
Zeit an der Universität 1933. Stuttgart und Heidelberg, 1955,
(28) Staatsarchiv Singen, Amt Wü 2, Acc 32/69, "1. Ordner: Niederschrift über
Besprechung mit Gouverneur Widmer, 1945-1951. Niederschrift über
Besprechung mit einem führenden französischen Sozialisten am 23.5.1946".
(29) Staatsarchiv Stuttgart, Protokoll der Landritterschaften. Tübingen, 1946,
(30) *Abd.* p. 8.
(32) Interview with Professor Fritz Eberhard (Freie Universität Berlin), Bad
(33) Interview with Martin Schmid, Tübingen, May 1974.
(34) F. Roy Willis, *et al.* p. 191.
(35) Interview with Ministerialdirektor Dr. Dieter Roser, Innenministerium/
(36) *Abd.*
(37) Regierungspalast Tübingen, Amtsverwaltung Württemberg-Schwarzwald,
(38) Staatsarchiv Singen, Amt Wü 2, Acc 32, 600/25.
(39) Staatsarchiv Singen, Amt Wü 2, Acc 32/69, "1. Ordner: Niederschrift über
Besprechung mit Gouverneur Widmer, 1945-1951. Niederschrift über
Besprechung mit dem Gouverneur am 27.5.1946 im Justizgebäude."
(47) ibid., "Vorstandssitzung am 29. Juli 1947".

(48) Le Populaire (Paris), March 31 - April 1, 1946.

(49) La IVe République et sa politique extérieure. Paris, 1961, p. 117.

(50) Interview with Ministerialdirektor Dr. Dieter Koser, Innenministerium/ Stuttgart, June 1974.

(51) Interviews with Hermann Schuster and Professor Georg Melches, Tübingen, Summer 1974.

(52) Sozialdemokratische Partei Süd-Württemberg, Ortsverein Tübingen, Protokollbuch I. "Mitgliederversammlung am 14. Juni 1946".

(53) ibid., "Mitgliederversammlung am 15. März 1946 in der Rathastube".

(54) ibid., "Sitzung des erweiterten Vorstandes im kleinen Rathaussaal am 23. April 1946".

(55) Interview with Ministerialdirektor Dr. Dieter Koser, Innenministerium/ Stuttgart, June 1974.

(56) Tübinger Chronik und Stadtschichten. Jg. 81, 84 and 87 (1925, 1928 and 1931).

(57) Sozialdemokratische Partei Süd-Württemberg, Ortsverein Tübingen, Protokollbuch I. "Sitzung des erweiterten Vorstandes im kleinen Rathaussaal am 23. April 1946".

(58) ibid., "Sitzung des erweiterten Vorstandes am 5. September 1946".


(60) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Ass. 1201/14 and 1201/12.

(61) Interview with Wilhelm Bandermann, Tübingen, May 1974.


(64) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Ass. 1201/14.

(65) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Gemeinderat-Protokoll 1946, pp. 4 ff.

(66) Gerhard Konstanzer, op. cit., p. 47.

(67) Interview with Jakob Krausl, Tübingen, May 1974.

(68) Correspondence from Dr. Gerhard Müller to author, dated September 16, 1974.


(71) Rolf Winkelar, op. cit., p. 56.
(72) ibid.
(74) Göttingen, 1946, pp. 107 f.
(75) Codex Juris Canonici (i.e. Canon Law)
(76) Bischöfliches Ordinariat Rottenburg, Archiv, "Bericht über den Besuch bei Landesdirektor Dr. Schmidt am 1.7.1945 zugewiesen Herr OV und Me. S - Bauer 7/4 Stunden".
(77) Bischöfliches Ordinariat Rottenburg, Archiv, "Bericht über den Empfang bei Minister (Staatssekretär) Schmalz beim Verbandsaußenministerium am 6. September 1946".
(78) Bischöfliches Ordinariat Rottenburg, Archiv, letter dated July 12, 1946.
(80) Bischöfliches Ordinariat Rottenburg, Archiv, Pastoral circular; br. A 8971.
(82) Interview with Ministerialdirektor Dr. Dieter Roser, Innenministerium/Stuttgart, June 1974.
(83) Staatsarchiv Sigmaringen, As: 100/1 Acc 53/59.
(84) Landratsamt Tübingen, Archiv, electoral address dated May 8, 1947, p. 10.
(85) For reasons of discretion the interviewee wishes to remain anonymous.
(87) Göttingen, 1946, p. 108.
Chapter Four:

The reconstitution and development of the Christian Democratic Party (CDU) and the German Popular Party (DVP) in Tübingen, 1945–1947, and the role of the churches in the constitution of the same.
This chapter will treat the respective developments of the "Christlich-Demokratische Union" and the "Demokratische Volkspartei" (later assimilated into the FDP). There are a number of reasons for this decision. Firstly, although the DVP gained more votes in Tübingen in the elections of 1946 and 1947 than the SPD and the KPD, it remained throughout the years, 1945-1947 (i.e. the years of Carlo Schmid's period of dominance of the "Staatsssekretariat"), a small and ineffective organisation. As such it does not warrant the attention of a single chapter. Secondly, several factors combine to facilitate a treatment of the two parties under one chapter heading: they were, unlike the SPD and KPD, new organisations; they were both bourgeois parties with strong church connections; finally, within the context of Tübingen, the CDU and DVP were closely associated with each other in the initial period of post-war political reconstruction by an extended debate on the amalgamation of the two groupings.

The CDU being the larger and more important of the two parties, this chapter will firstly treat the establishment and development of the CDU in a subsection encompassing approximately two-thirds of the chapter. The remaining one-third will be devoted to a subsection on the DVP.

The CDU

The CDU was a creation of the post-war period in the sense that there had been no CDU organisation as such prior to 1933. The CDU, however, did have precursors which provided not only political personalities and voters but also political traditions and infrastructures which had not been erased from public or private memory by the efforts of the National Socialist regime. These precursors were invariably former parties of the Right and the Catholic Centre.

In the case of Tübingen one must refer back to the election results of the pre-1933 period in order to gain a picture of the electoral resources upon which the CDU could, and did, draw during the period of its establishment. These resources were the following parties, in order of importance within pre-1933 Württemberg: "Württembergische Zentrumpartei", "Württembergischer Bauern- und Weingärtnersbund", "Christlicher Volksdienst", "Volkerechtspartei" ("Reichspartei für Volksrecht und Aufwertung"), "Reichspartei des Deutschen Mittelstandes" ("Wirtschaftspartei"). The emphasis is somewhat different when the election
situation in pre-1933 Tübingen is considered, for example with regard to the municipal elections. In the pre-1933 municipal elections in Tübingen these above parties were less strongly represented than elsewhere in Württemberg, especially in predominantly Catholic "Oberschwaben" which dominated the political landscape of post-war Süd-Württemberg.

In the municipal elections of 1922 the "Württembergische Zentrumspartei" gained fifth position of a total of six parties, receiving 11,213 of a total 86,868 votes cast and winning two out of 12 seats on the town council. The sixth position was filled by the "Wirtschaftspartei" which received 8,369 votes but no seats. The 1925 municipal elections in Tübingen saw a decline in strength of electoral support for the "Zentrumspartei", gaining 9,114 votes of a total 73,696 and one seat. This decline was reversed in the municipal elections of 1928 when the "Zentrumspartei" gained 13,469 votes of a total 103,289 cast and two seats on the town council. This result, however, still placed the "Zentrumspartei" on position No. 5 among the six parties contesting the elections. The sixth position was taken by the "Christlicher Volksdienst" which successfully campaigned for the first time in Tübingen's local elections, gaining 9,350 votes and one seat. In the municipal elections of 1931 in Tübingen eight parties gained seats on the town council. This election represented a change of established electoral patterns in that the NSDAP came in with a large number of votes, winning four seats. The KPD also emerged for the first time with one seat gained. On the whole the trend was toward the Right. The "Zentrumspartei" and "Christlicher Volksdienst" gained positions No. 5 and 6 respectively, thereby passing the DVP on position 7 and the KPD on position 8.\(^{(2)}\)

In Tübingen the "Württembergische Zentrumspartei" and the "Christlicher Volksdienst" can be regarded as the specific precursors of the political traditions represented within the local post-war CDU. The former party gained its name from the mother grouping, the "Deutsche Zentrumspartei", so-called after the Catholic "Fraktion" (parliamentary group) in the Prussian parliament between 1852 and 1867. The "Zentrumspartei" was established after the creation of the Reich in 1871 and developed into a Catholic party with anti-Prussian and federalist elements.\(^{(3)}\) The "Christlicher Volksdienst" (originally termed the "Christlich-Sozialer Volksdienst") was founded in 1924 in South-West Germany as a representative of Protestant ("evangelisch") interests. By 1927 it had gained sufficient strength
to open a "Reichsgeschäftstelle" (national headquarters) with publishing house in Korntal-Stuttgart. (4)

In the initial period of the post-war occupation the politicians and supporters of the former clerical parties discovered that the policy implemented by the French military government presented them with a mixed bag of blessings with negative and positive factors, in stark contrast to the KPD and SPD who from the very beginning enjoyed massive French support, which elevated both parties to positions of influence far beyond that which they would have acquired through electoral support.

The obvious disadvantage suffered by the representatives of former clerical parties in the initial period of the occupation was the fact that these parties had tended to right of centre in their politics and as such were treated with suspicion by the Allied military government authorities. Whilst the military government did not accuse all these parties of having actively colluded with the National Socialists in the pre- and post-1933 period, there was a strong feeling that they had not resisted National Socialism with sufficient demonstrativeness, certainly not on a par with the SPD and KPD. There was also a suspicion abroad within the French military government in 1945 concerning most former German parties and organisations of the Right that they characterised the causes and ideologies which produced the excesses of National Socialism, e.g. anti-Semitism. The military government was also aware that many of these parties' members and supporters had voted National Socialist and joined the NSDAP in large numbers. There are various reasons at hand to explain this shift of support, the most feasible being the pressure of "Gleichschaltung" which forced men of middle-class background and professional status into National Socialist professional associations (e.g. legal and medical associations).

Despite the various reasons as to why these men joined the NSDAP, the starkness of the contrast between the resistance record of the KPD and the SPD on the one hand and the passivity of the "Mitgliedliche Parteien" (non-Socialist parties) on the other cast the latter in a perspective of association with National Socialism. This disadvantage was aggravated in the initial period of the occupation by the concomitant suspicion, both on the part of sections of the German...
population and of groups within the French military government, that the newly formed Christian Democratic groups were reservoirs for forces and groups of unrepentant reaction and conservatism, including the large group of former NSDAP members deprived of a political fulcrum. The CDU was well aware of the potential danger of association with the NSDAP and campaigned against this image. For instance, in early 1946, the CDU fortnightly, *Mittleres Union*, wrote: "...Da alle rechts von Demokraten (i.e., DVP) und früherem Zentrum stehenden Parteien..." (Since all parties to the right of the Democrats (i.e., DVP) and the former "Zentrum" (i.e., Catholic party) have disappeared and their former supporters must now find a place within the four at present authorised parties, all these parties will gain advantage from this as far as votes are concerned, but there will also be disadvantages. At all events it is wrong to pretend that the Christian Socialists (i.e., CDU) and Democrats (i.e., DVP) are catchment reservoirs for former Nazis, militarists and capitalists. We know that many former National Socialist party members who were Communists or Social Democrats before 1933 have found their way back to their old parties. Therefore it would be better if no one party were to cast up to the other parties about the return of supporters after a period of political aberration.)

Nevertheless, the CDU - and the DVP - did enjoy a certain political advantage vis-à-vis the KPD and the SPD in that both the former parties served as reservoirs for the former supporters and members of the plethora of bourgeois and non-Marxist parties which had flourished in Tübingen and Württemberg prior to 1933. This provided rich returns for the CDU and the DVP in the elections of 1946 and 1947, for few of these voters revised their political creed and affiliations after the experience of National Socialism to the extent that they considered a Marxist or Socialist ideology politically feasible. On the contrary, the bulk of the population tended to avoid an analytical confrontation with the phenomenon of National Socialism and clung tenaciously to religion and conventional ethics for...
an explanation of National Socialist excesses in Hitlerite Germany. The churches in Württemberg, as elsewhere in Germany, experienced a post-war boom, both in terms of attendance and committed patronage, of an unprecedented scale since the turn of the century.

The former political parties from whose supporters the CDU could have expected electoral support were, apart from the so-called "Württembergische Zentrumspartei" and "Christlicher Volksdienst", the "Deutsch-Demokratische Partei", the "Deutsche Volkspartei" and the "Deutschnationalen Volkspartei". The latter three parties cannot, however, be regarded within the context of Tübingen as the precursors of the CDU, since the majority of their former activists and voters chose the newly established post-war DVP as their home party due to, among other reasons, the identity of political programmes (q.v. subsection on DVP). At the same time, however, there was bound to be a certain amount of electoral cross-fertilisation with former supporters of the "Deutsch-Nationale Partei" and of the "Deutsch-Demokratische Partei" voting CDU and former "Zentrum" and "Volksdienst" supporters polling for the new DVP.

When one considers that the main precursors of the post-war CDU were two parties which were not particularly strongly represented in the pre-1933 elections in Tübingen - the leading parties were the "Deutsch-Demokratische Partei", the "Deutsche Volkspartei" and the "Deutsch-Nationale Volkspartei" - it is not surprising that the original impetus for the establishment of the CDU within Südwürttemberg did not come from Tübingen.

Two accounts have to date been written on the establishment of the CDU in Südwürttemberg. Both of them are relatively sparse in detail, although substantial by comparison with the total dearth of historical accounts of the post-war development of both the SPD and the KVP in Südwürttemberg. These accounts are: "Christliche und Freie Demokratie in Baden, Rheinland-Pfalz und Württemberg, 1945-1946" (1968) by Hans Georg Wiegand, a creditable work with good documentation; the other account is a self-congratulatory and propagandistic pamphlet published by the CDU in 1996 to mark the tenth anniversary of the foundation of the "CDU-Landesverband", entitled: "Zehn Jahre Landesverband Württemberg-Jochensee der Christlich-Demokratischen Union. Festschrift". It must also be stressed that both these versions have been contradicted from within the ranks of post-war CDU activists in Südwürttemberg, to whom occasional reference will be made.
Both versions agree that the initial impulse for the establishment of a new Christian Democratic party came principally from personalities in Stuttgart, partly because it was the former capital city and political nerve-centre of Württemberg and partly because, under American direction, political life was resumed sooner in Stuttgart than in the French zone. The first public announcement of the incipient Christian Democratic grouping was made in the Stuttgarter Zeitung on October 27, 1945, by Josef Andrä, former American Minister for American-occupied Württemberg, announcing the establishment of a new "Christlich-Demokratische Volkspartei" (the name "Christlich-Demokratische Union" was not adopted in Württemberg until December 13, 1946). Former "Zentrum" politicians were particularly active in the preliminary groundwork involving liaison and the establishment of contacts between Stuttgart and French-occupied Württemberg. The principal figure of liaison was a certain Oberlandwirtschaftsrat Dr. Franz Weiß who lived in Zwingingen, the principal town of the former Prussian and predominantly Catholic enclave of Hohensolingen-Zwingingen. He provided a centre of stimulus for the CDU in Süd-Württemberg. This stimulus has been described in the following terms: "... Fast geschlossene Wohngebiete der katholischen Bevölkerung sind die Zellerausbecken in Trier und Hohensolingen-Zwingingen, historische Hochburgen des Zentrums, die beleuchten die Stärke der Tradition und die Einfachheit des Problems der Parteibildung in diesen Gebieten. Die eigene Tradition und die Problematik der Partei bildung kennt zu den Alternativen zwischen Zentrum und "Christlicher Partei". Es fiel auf die Zentrums- und die katholische Tradition auf die Wahl zwischen dem Zentrums- und dem "christlichen Volk". Der Beschluss wurde am 27. Oktober 1945 in Stuttgart getommen." (The county districts of Trier und Hohensolingen-Zwingingen are almost self-contained localities of the Catholic population and are historical strongholds of the "Zentrum" party. The strength of their tradition and the straightforwardness of the problem of party formation are clearly indicated by the fact that the latter question was simplified to the point where "Zentrum" followers had a choice between the "Zentrums-" and the "christliche Partei". The decision was eventually made for the establishment of a new Christian Democratic party.)
Weiß's role in the initial construction period within SüDWürttemberg's CDU:

"... im Kreise der früheren Zentrumspolitiker trat vor allem Dr. Franz Weiß sehr aktiv hervor. Er konnte mit seinem nordwürttembergischen Parteifreund André, der sich für die Bildung einer interkonfessionellen Partei einsetzte, sprechen und bemühte sich mit besonderer Energie der französischen Besatzungsbehörden jeden der fünfzehn, (sic) südwürttembergischen Kreise, um dort auftretende Fragen sowie die lokalen politischen Strömungen zu studieren." (... Within the circle of former "Zentrum" party politicians Dr. Franz Weiß emerged very actively. He was able to speak to his party colleague, André, in Nord-Württemberg who championed the formation of an interconfessional party and he visited, after receiving special permission from the French occupation authorities, each of the fifteen (sic) "Kreise" of SüDWürttemberg in order to study emergent questions and local political trends.)

Weiß gave a personal account of his political activities during 1945 in the above-mentioned Festschrift. He states that he was commissioned (but does not say by whom) to found the CDU in SüDWürttemberg: "Die politischen Kräfte im politischen Lager zu mobilisieren, war mir als Aufgabe überessen", (The task allotted to me was to mobilise the political forces within the political sphere) and that he subsequently drove round SüDWürttemberg in the last months of 1945 in a borrowed Opel P4 developing and extending a web of contacts.

Weiß also acknowledges the debt he owed to both the major churches in establishing these contacts, in particular to Landesbischof Dr. Theophil Wurm, head of the Lutheran Church in Württemberg ("Evangelische Landeskirche"), for helping to counteract a pre-established tendency among Württemberg Protestants to vote DVP. Wieck describes this development in his book: "Um im evangelischen Lager noch intensiver für den CDU-Gedanken werben zu können, führte Dr. Weiß auch Gespräche mit Landesbischof Dr. Wurm. Er berichtet darüber: "... Ich suchte u.a. auch Landesbischof Wurm auf der evangelischen Seite (in Stuttgart) auf, um durch die Zustimmung mehr Einfluss auf die evangelischen Kreise zu gewinnen. Landesbischof Wurm stellte sich rückhaltlos auf die Seite der CDU, nachdem ich ihm Ziel und Zweck auseinandergesetzt hatte. Durch die Unterstützung von Landesbischof Wurm wurde die Wende der CDU auf evangelischer Seite erheblich gefördert ..."

Es kann danach nicht in Frage gestellt werden, daß der Bischof mich persönlich für die interkonfessionelle Zusammenarbeit auf politischem Gebiet lebhaft einsetzte. Er gab aber doch nur seiner eigenen Auffassung Ausdruck, denn die
Kirchenleitung hatte sich ja, wie bereits dargestellt, offiziell auf eine neutrale Linie festgelegt.“ (In order to enable himself to converse more effectively for the idea of a CDU party within the Lutheran camp, Dr. Weiß also held talks with Bishop Wurm. His report reads as follows: "I called on, among other people, Bishop Wurm from the Lutheran side (Stuttgart) with the intention of acquiring, through the latter's approval, more influence on Lutheran circles. Bishop Wurm placed himself unreservedly on the side of the CDU after I had explained to him its aim and purpose. Thanks to Bishop Wurm's support, the CDU's case was considerably helped within the Lutheran camp..."

It consequently cannot be doubted that the bishop himself actively advocated interconfessional co-operation in the field of politics. Nevertheless he was only expressing his own opinion since the governing body of the church had, as already explained, commuted itself to a stance of neutrality.)

There was, however, widespread opposition in Süd-Württemberg to the idea of an interconfessional party, especially in the traditionally Catholic areas of Süd-Württemberg, former "Zentrum" strongholds. Many former "Zentrum" members and Catholic church activists favoured a re-establishment of the "Zentrum" party along traditional lines. Weick's interviews with leading CDU politicians of that era testify to this struggle: "Daß der katholisch Volksteil Süd-Württembergs ursprünglich stärker einer Wiedergründung des Zentrums unzweißt, wird auch von Dr. Weiß bezüglich Staatssekretär a.D. Dr. Binder betoniert, daß vor allem die niedere Geistlichkeit sich zunächst besonders dafür einsetzte, da die glaubte, daß eine rein katholische Partei, gestützt auf die, wenn auch nur geringe, katholische Mehrheit in Land, am ehesten alle wichtigen politischen Positionen in hand übernehmen könne." (Dr. Weiß also testifies to the fact that the Catholic section of the population of Süd-Württemberg was originally more inclined to a re-establishment of the "Zentrum" party. Dr. Binder, former Secretary of State, is of the opinion that the lower orders of the clergy in particular advocated this since they thought that a purely Catholic party, based on the (admittedly small) Catholic majority within the "Land", would soonest procure all important political positions.)

The most important opponent of an interconfessional party was Lorenz Bock (elected "Staatspräsident" of Württemberg-Hohenzollern in May 1947): "Für die
Wiedergründung des Zentrums trat jetzt nur noch Dr. Lorenz Bock aus Rottweil, später erster Staatspräsident von Bad-Württemberg-Hohenzollern, ein. Er argumentierte ähnlich wie die Zentrumsanhänger in Nordrhein-Westfalen: 

"... wie bereits erwähnt, verhielt sich der nachmalige Staatspräsident Lorenz Bock zunächst ablandend in der Überzeugung, daß mit einer partei, die beide Konfessionen umfaßt, eine erfolgreiche parlamentarische Arbeit nicht zu leisten sei. Die Gegensätze seien zu groß, er könne sich nicht vorstellen, daß in einer Fraktion, der beide Konfessionen angehörten, positive Arbeit geleistet werden könne ..." 

(Dr. Weiß an den Verfasser (i.e., Weck) am 18. November 1953).


(Dr. Weiß an den Verfasser (i.e., Weck) am 18. November 1953).

At the decisive meeting in Aulendorf on January 6, 1946, Bock also voted for the "Zentrum" party. However, he yielded to the majority vote and did not make any attempt to re-establish the "Zentrum" party alongside the CDU but instead joined the new party.

The Aulendorf meeting referred to in the above quotation was convened in response to a decree published by the French Commander-in-Chief, General Kö nig, on January 13, 1945, permitting in principle the re-establishment of political parties in the French zone in accordance with a prescribed procedure. One of the conditions laid down by the decree was that political parties had to be organised hierarchically from the top and not from the base as might have been expected in view of the recent experience of strictly hierarchical authoritarianism under
National Socialism. Consequently, once the rudimentary groundwork of establishing contacts had been done, a meeting was convened in Aulendorf to formally found the CDU in Süd-Württemberg. At this meeting an "Aktionssausschuss" (action committee) was established to supervise the necessary organisational work; Weiß was elected chairman of the committee. His first duty was to obtain permission from the French military government for the official establishment of the CDU in Süd-Württemberg, since each prospective party had to make individual application for registration.

At this meeting, according to an account given by Dr. Gebhard Müller, Tübingen was not represented. The "Kreise" represented were the predominantly Catholic ones of "Oberrickenbahn": "Bei der Gründungstagung der CDU in Aulendorf am 6. Januar 1946 waren nur die Kreise Tuttlingen, Wangen, Regensburg, Biberach, Singen und Sigmaringen - die vor 1933 mit großer Mehrheit Zentrum gewählt haben - insgesamt 25 Personen, vertreten, nicht aber der Kreis Tübingen." (At the constitutive meeting of the CDU on January 6, 1946, in Aulendorf only the districts ("Kreise") of Tuttlingen, Wangen, Regensburg, Biberach, Singen and Sigmaringen - which voted "Zentrum" by an overwhelming majority prior to 1933 - were represented, in all 25 people, but not "Kreis Tübingen.")

The application for registration as a political party was submitted to the headquarters of the French military government of Süd-Württemberg via the "Staatssekretariat" on January 17, 1946: "Die Unterzeichneten richten hiermit an das Staatssekretariat für Württemberg und Hohenzollern (französische Zone) die Bitte, bei der französischen Militärregierung die Genehmigung einer Partei mit der Bezeichnung
terlich-Demokratische Union

Der vorläufige Vorstand:

Dr. Weiß, Franz
Sethalaffa, Ariat
Hanle, Karl

Oberlandwirtschaftsarzt
Fabrikant
Kassenleiter
Sigmaringen
Iény
Nottwill
(The undersigned hereby request the State Secretariat of Württemberg and Hohenzollern (French Zone) to obtain permission from the French Military Government for the foundation of a party to be known as the Christian Democratic Union for Süd-Württemberg and Hohenzollern. The party’s programme is presented within the context of the enclosed draft of an appeal to the general public which is to be published in the press. The particulars of the persons listed below have been checked by the French Military Government and no objections have been raised. The party’s office is situated in Singen. 

The provisional Executive Committee:

Dr. Weiß, Franz senior executive official in Singen
Bethelzis, Aris businessman in Singen
Gerger, Karl master tailor in Horb
Bischoff, Philipp bank manager in Tübingen
Krauß, Jakob master tailor in Singen
Hofer, Christian bank manager in Tübingen
Bäuerle, Josef businessman in Wangen i. Allgau
Stein, Josef registrar in Rottenburg.

There are three features of interest in this document which concern this study. Firstly, the party headquarters were established, not in Tübingen, but in Catholic Singen, although a “Landesgeschäftsstelle” (party organisational executive) was later opened in Tübingen for obvious reasons of convenience. Secondly, there was only one signatory from Tübingen (Jakob Krauß) among the obligatory list of six. Thirdly, of the six signatories only two were Protestant (Jakob Krauß and Aris Bethelzis). These three factors combine to demonstrate the predominance of Catholic “Überwuchern” within the newly established CDU in Süd-Württemberg. The Protestant groups within the party had to struggle to maintain a balance of influence and to reflect this image within their own community.
Wieck quotes an example of this struggle in a letter from Arist Dethelffs to the "CDU-Kreisvorsitzender" of "Kreis Wangen", Amtsgerichtstr Kiedhe, on May 20, 1946, in which Dethelffs protested against the election of a Catholic to the post of deputy chairman: "... Wenn ich gegen seine Wahl zum 2. Vorsitzenden des Kreises Wangen hiermit formell Einspruch erheben muß, so erfolgt dies nicht primär aus dem Grund, weil der Abt unser Vertrauen (i.e., of the Protestant community) verloren hat, sondern deshalb, weil es Grundsatz der Union ist, daß das Amt des 2. Vorsitzenden einem Vertreter der konfessionellen Minderheit über­tragen werden muß ..." (If I now formally lodge an objection to his election to the vice-chairmanship of "Kreis Wangen" this is not done primarily because the abbot has lost our confidence (i.e., of the Protestant community) but because it is a basic principle within the Union (i.e., CDU) that the office of vice-chairman should be assigned to a representative of the confessional minority ...)

The proposed "Entwurf für einen in der Presse zu veröffentlichen Aufruf" (draft of an appeal to the general public to be published in the press) mentioned in the above application for registration was intended as a precursor to a party programme, giving the French authorities an insight into the intended policies of the party since the CDU, unlike the SPD and KPD, was a new creation with no historically established programme.

An "Aufruf" (appeal to the general public), entitled "Ist der Nationalsozialismus überwunden?" (Has National Socialism been overcome?), presented the public with a relatively cautious statement of CDU policy. No specific items of policy were in fact outlined. The clearest statements were made in the following paragraph: "Bei der politischen Neuauflage unseres Volkes haben die Christen eine besondere Verantwortung. Wir müssen erkennen, daß nur da, wo Grundsilze christlicher Lebensordnung sich in Öffentlichen Leben auswirken, die politische Gemeinschaft vor dämonischer Intraktion bewahrt bleibt. Wir sind an einer Politik ohne Gott zugrunde gegangen. Wir müssen uns daher jetzt einsetzen für eine Politik mit Gott und im Gehorsam gegen Gottes Ordnung. Wir dürfen den politischen Aufgaben gegenüber nicht abseits stehen und unsere politische Stellungnahme nicht einseitig von wirtschaftlichen allein oder von Standesgegnissen abhängig. Die doppelte Moral zwischen dem Privatleben und dem öffentlichen Leben, die es gab, hat sich verhängnisvoll ausgewirkt."
Dieser Erkenntnis folgend, schließen sich Christen beider Konfessionen in der Christlich-Demokratischen Union zusammen ..." (Within the process of the political reorganisation of our people Christians bear a special responsibility. We must recognise that it is only when Christian principles have a bearing within public life that the political community is protected against a decline into demonic degeneration. We must therefore advocate a political programme in keeping with God and in obedience to God's order. We dare not stand on the sidelines where political tasks are concerned nor formulate our political stance alone on the basis of economic or class egoism. The double standards in morals between private and public life which existed previously had disastrous effects.

In response to this knowledge Christians of both confessions are uniting in the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). The important feature of this extract, apart from the obvious statement of Christian Democratic political philosophy, was the advertised attempt to find an interconfessional basis of consensus and support, spreading the appeal of the party's policy to encompass both Catholics and Protestants.

The CDU in Süd-Württemberg was granted legal status as a recognised political party by "Arrêté No 12 du 25 Mars 1946". In the months following the publication of this decree the French authorities in Tübingen waited impatiently on the CDU to submit its programme and articles of association ("Satzung") to them via the standardised channels of the "Staatssekretariat" for the obligatory approval. On June 17, 1946, Dr. Franz Weiβ wrote to the "Landesdirektion des Innern" of the "Staatssekretariat", i.e. ultimately to the French authorities, that the "Satzung und Programm der CDU" would be definitively established at the first "Landeskonferenz" of the CDU in Süd-Württemberg, to be held in Sigmeningen on June 22, 1946.

The "Landeskonferenz", which elected Dr. Weiβ as party chairman, produced three documents: the party programme, the articles of association and a second "Aufruf" to the general public.

The party programme contained a preamble and four subsequent sections. The preamble stated: "... Wir wollen den Geist des Christentums in der Staatsform der Demokratie verwirklichen. Christentum im Bereich des politischen Lebens heißt..."
Verbundenheit, Gemeinschaft, Zuzahmengehörigkeit. Mit einander, zu einander, für einander.

Christ sein heißt: In der Gemeinschaft denken und handeln, als ihr lebendiges Glied nach den Maßstäben der göttlichen Schöpfungsordnung seine zeitliche und ewige Bestimmung erfüllen ..." (Wir wish to embody the spirit of Christianity within the democratic form of government. Christianity in the arena of political life signifies: obligation, fellowship, solidarity. With one another, to one another, for one another. To be a Christian means: to think and act within the community and to fulfill one's temporal and eternal mission as its living member according to the rules of the Divine order of creation.)

The first section defined the rights of the individual as envisaged by the newly formed party: "Der Mensch ist als Geschöpf Gottes Träger unverbindunglicher Rechte. Der Staat hat zu garantieren:

1. Das Recht auf politische und religiöse Freiheit.
2. Das Recht auf Arbeit und auskömmliche Versorgung.
3. Das Recht auf Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz.
4. Das Recht auf Unverletzlichkeit der Familie als Keimzelle eines Volkes.
5. Das Recht der Eltern auf die Erziehung ihrer Kinder, insbesondere bei der weltanschaulichen Gestaltung des Unterrichtes.

As one of God's created creatures man is the possessor of irrevocable rights. The state must guarantee:

1. The right of political and religious freedom.
2. The right to work.
3. The right of equality before the law.
4. The right of the inviolability of the family as the basic unit of the nation. The right of parents to determine their children's education, especially with regard to the ideological content of the subject material.
5. The right to religious instruction conformable to the respective creeds as a full subject of instruction in all schools.
6. The right of young people to education and training solely on the basis of their abilities.
4. The right of women to the protection of their specifically feminine attributes and to the free development of the same in public and private life.

The second section prescribed the role of the state:

5. The state is a constitutional state and the judiciary is independent and subject only to the law.

6. No social class has special privileges. Everyone is equal in the sight of the law and has the same duties. All are ultimately responsible to the nation as a whole.

7. All claims to dictatorial or totalitarian authority are condemned. Minorities must be protected as such. The misuse of democratic institutions will be prevented by all the means at the disposal of the state.

8. A conscientious-minded corps of permanent civil servants familiar with the basic principles of economical and fair administration is the backbone of all public services...

9. The churches are corporations (bodies-corporate) under public law. The state protects them in the fulfilment of their religious duties.

Section Three defined the party's views on the economy:


11. Das Recht auf Eigentum ist zu gewährleisten. Ungleichheiten in Einkommen und Besitz entsprechen natürlichen Verschiedenheiten. Wo aber nackte Armut neben Überfluss existiert, unverschuldetes Not neben Bereicherung besteht, entspricht es sozialer Gerechtigkeit, Ausgleich zu schaffen ...

(10. The economy should serve the people. Its structure, the extent of its freedom of decision and action and the orientation and boundaries of the present system of control are determined by the situation of need and the requirements of the present period. Private initiative and autonomous decision-making are only permitted in those areas of the economy where the free market best serves the satisfaction of needs. On the basis of these principles, the elimination of big business and the assumption of control of the means of production by public bodies is a sequential development.

Small and medium-sized firms are to be supported.

11. The right of property is to be ensured. Inequalities in incomes and possessions reflect natural differences. However, wherever stark poverty exists alongside a superfluity of wealth or innocent need alongside self-enrichment, it is socially just to strike a balance between them) 

Section Four: analysed work and production:

"...


16. Ein kräftiger Bauernstand ist der Nährboden des Volkes. Alle Zweige der Landwirtschaft sind zu stärken und erreicht zu machen ...

17. Ein gesundes Handwerk ist für den Wiederaufbau unerlässlich. Die Selbständigkeit des Handwerkers und der kleinen Gewerbetreibenden ist unantastbar ..."
15. Shop stewards and trade unions are to remain outside of the influence of politics and religion and are to be guaranteed by the constitution.

16. A strong farming community is the food provider of the nation. All branches of agriculture are to be strengthened and made productive ...

17. A flourishing artisan class is indispensable for the work of reconstruction. The independence of the artisan and the small tradesman is inviolable. (28)

The content of the programme reflects traditional Christian Democratic philosophy with strong emphasis on those electoral groups and professions historically and potentially inclined toward the policies of their precursors, especially the following four groups: the churches, the civil service ("Beamtenklientel"), the farming community and the independent tradesmen ("Handwerk").

Other hallmarks of Christian Democratic theory are evident in the rejection of class struggle, the protection of private property (although there seems to be some contradiction in Article 10 which will be treated below) and the views expressed on apolitical trade unions. These statements of policy were reiterated in a second "Aufruf" to the population which was formulated at the conference with an equivalent stress on appeal to the abovementioned social groups and an equivalent circumscription of the future role of trade unions to exclude political activism: "... Wir fordern daher Verwirung der Arbeit als etikette Leistung und bejahen den Zusammenschluss der Arbeiter zur Wahrung ihrer Berufsentinnungen ..." (Therefore we demand that work be defined as an ethical achievement and we support the proposal that workers band together for the protection of their professional interests ...). (28)

The "Aufruf" also contained an explicit statement which reinforces, in retrospect, the apparent contradiction in Article 10 of the party programme concerning "die Ausschaltung des Großkapitals und die Übernahme besonders der Ursprochaltung durch die öffentliche Hand" (the elimination of big business and the assumption of control of the means of production by public bodies) (27), and appears as a radical element within a Christian Democratic framework. The particular section of the "Aufruf" dealing with the party's intentions on economic and industrial reconstruction reads: "Christlicher Sozialismus ist die Grundlage all unserer wirtschaftlichen Bestrebungen. Beim Aufbau unserer Wirtschaft ist das
Gemeinwohl in den Vordergrund zu stellen ...

Zusammenballung von Kapital in wirtschaftlichen Machtgebilden ist abzulehnen; 
derartige bestehende Gebilde sind öffentlich zu kontrollieren."

Christian Socialism is the basis of all our economic aspirations. While our 
economy is being rebuilt the common good is to be placed in the foreground ...

The concentration of capital within economic power structures is banned, 
structures of this kind which already exist are to be publicly controlled.)[28]

It is difficult to state definitely why this section on "Christian 
Socialism" was included in the "Aufruf". There were admittedly groups within the 
CDU in American-occupied Württemberg, notably in Stuttgart, who considered the 
possibility of fusing Christian and Socialist or Social Democratic ideals (reflected 
in the original title "Christlich-Soziale Partei") and the Stuttgart CDU grouping 
had given the initial impetus to the establishment of the CDU in Süd-Württemberg.
By the time of the publication of this "Aufruf", however, Württemberg had been 
definitely divided into two units and the founding German parties in the French-
occupied section of Württemberg had been categorically informed that they were to 
regard themselves as autonomous organisations independent of Stuttgart. In addi-
tion, the CDU leadership in Süd-Württemberg, reflecting the conservative mentality 
of "Überschwaben", was less inclined toward courting the traditional spectre of 
Socialism than the more cosmopolitan groups in Stuttgart.

Hans Georg Vieck presumes that the Süd-Württemberg CDU had borrowed the 
concept of "Christian Socialism" from the CDU party programmes formulated in 
Berlin and Cologne around the same period: "Nach ihrer ersten programmatischen 
Aussage vom 22. März 1946 bekannte sich die Süd-Württembergische CDU zu einem 
"christlichen Sozialismus", durch den jedem Bürger menschenwürdige Lebens- und 
Arbeitbedingungen zu schaffen und zu garantieren seien ... Dieser Begriff eines 
"christlichen Sozialismus" - wahrscheinlich von den Berliner oder Kölnner Program-
meinungen übernommen - wurde jedoch später nicht wiederholt, die süd-württembergischen 
Christlichen Demokraten sagten es vielmehr vor, sich nicht programmatisch zu äußern, 
sondern direkten den sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Fragen der Tage unwirksam 
Stellung zu nehmen. Jede Vorgemeinschaftung, Verstaatlichung, Enteignung oder 
Aufteilung industrieller Unternehmen und landwirtschaftlicher Betriebe wurde von
hnen entschieden abgelehnt." (According to its first programmatic statement of March 22, 1946, the Süd-Württemberg CDU professed a "Christian Socialism" through which humane working and living conditions were to be created and guaranteed for every citizen ... This concept of a "Christian Socialism" - probably borrowed from statements included in the Berlin or Cologne policy programme - was not repeated, however, at a later date; the Süd-Württemberg Christian Democrats preferred rather not to make programmatic statements but to adopt individual stances on the social and economic questions of daily reality. All forms of socialisation, nationalisation, dispossession or partition of industrial firms and agricultural units were emphatically rejected by them.)

Hick, however, does not provide an explanation as to why the Süd-Württemberg CDU only used the formula of "Christian Socialism" for this one isolated instance. It could be argued that there were two possible reasons for the disappearance of the formula from party policy and statements.

The first possible reason is that the inclusion of even the modified use of the term Socialism caused internal party controversy to the advantage of the more conservative groups within the CDU, especially those groups directly connected with the Roman Catholic Church, resulting in their winning the day. For instance, leading personalities from social and economic elites resisted the "Socialist" element, no matter how diluted a version, within the new Christian Democratic movement. This was especially true of Süd-Württemberg's landed aristocracy who specifically feared the question of land reform, then a topic of intensive debate. Symptomatic of the fears of the aristocracy in Süd-Württemberg was a letter sent by a leading aristocrat, Reichs-Minister von Waldburg zu Zeil, to the Bishop of Rottenburg on April 5, 1946: "Gestatten Euer Excellenz, mich in meiner Beschwerdeakte vertrauensvoll an den Bischof zu wenden.

Von einer Reihe verschiedener Faktenen sind wir Nachrichten über ein Referat ausgegangen, das auf einer Beiratsversammlung in Allendorf durch Herrn Direktor Johann Baptist Müller, zust. Leiter des Katholischen Künstlerwerks der Diözese gehalten worden ist. Bei dieser Gelegenheit habe die Art starker Rufe erregt, in welcher der genannte Referent für die baldige Aufteilung der mehr als 100 ha umfassten Uinten eingetreten sei ...
Dürfte ich Euer Exzellenz gehörigst bitten, Herrn Direktor Miller, der ja allgemein als treu kirchlicher Mann bekannt ist, und vielleicht bei Gelegenheit des Clusus der Diözesi in geeigneter Form auf die Lehre der Kirche in Algamentafragen und auch auf die Unzweckmäßigkeit des Eintretens für aus Russland stammende Bodenreformforderungen im Hinblick auf den kirchlichen Grundbesitz hinzuweisen. Ich glaube, es würde allgemein dankbar empfunden werden,...

(Your Excellency, permit me to apply to your person in confidence on a matter of complaint.

From a number of different people I have been informed of a lecture given by Director Johann Baptist Miller, at present head of the Catholic Men's Association within the diocese, at a conference of clergymen in Aulenföld. The way in which the afore-mentioned speaker on this occasion advocated splitting up all estates of more than 100 acres apparently aroused great indignation...

May I venture to ask your Excellency to draw the attention of Director Miller, who indeed is known as a loyal churchman, and perhaps also at some opportunity and in an appropriate manner, the attention of the diocesan clergy to the teaching of the Church concerning matters of property and to the inappropriateness, in view of the Church's landed property, of supporting demands for agrarian reform which originated in Russia. I believe that this would be favourably received in general since, as I have heard, the statements made by the above-mentioned speaker have since caused some protest... With such powerful opponents resisting the emergence of a debate on "Christian Socialism" it is little wonder, one could argue, that the thesis disappeared from the agenda of the CDU in Baden-Württemberg.

The second possible reason for the rapid disappearance of "Christian Socialism" from the political programme of the CDU was that it never was, in real terms, on the party's agenda. In other words, the section on "Christian Socialism" in the "Aufruf" could well have been included as a piece of realpolitik on the part of the CDU to create what they imagined would be a positive impression on the French authorities, rather than on the local population. The CDU, and the Catholic Church, perturbed by the political and administrative positions gained by the KPD and the SPD in Baden-Württemberg's urban communities, tended to exaggerate the left-wing bias of the French military government. Consequently, since the French military govern-
went exercised the ultimate power in the period 1945-46, and not the electorate, it could be argued that the use of the term "Christian Socialism" was intended to placate the military government. At the same time the phrase, "Konzentrierung von Kapital in wirtschaftlichen Machtverhältnissen ist unzulässig; derartige bestehende Genüsse sind öffentlich zu kontrollieren" (The concentration of capital in economic power structures is banned; structures of this kind which already exist are to be publicly controlled) might have equally been designed to coincide with a general theme of Allied occupation policy, namely the decartellization of the giant industrial complexes ("Industriegemeinschaften") created by the National Socialists (e.g. "I.G.-Farben").

In any case no further allusion was made publicly to "Christian Socialism" by the CDU in Baden-Württemberg. The question of a new economic order was swept under the table, at least out of sight of the public eye. By 1947 the CDU was categorically and publicly opposed to all socialist policies. In the oft quoted election speech by Dr. Gabriel Müller, then chairman of the CDU and vice-president of the "Staatssekretariat" prior to the "Landtag" elections of May 1947, the question of nationalisation was treated: "... Ladies and gentlemen, do you really believe that the CDU intended advocating, purely for theoretical considerations of principle, the transfer of private property to communal ownership or indeed dispossession? I don't think that even the fiercest opponent of the CDU would insinuate that ... Now as before, however, we advocate in principle the retention of private property and we want to give the worker and the farmer a share in this private property; we want to raise the worker out of his proletarian situation and give him a share in the prosperity of the whole nation, as has already generally been the rule in Württemberg." (Ladies and gentlemen, do you really believe that the CDU intended advocating, purely for theoretical considerations of principle, the transfer of private property to communal ownership or indeed dispossession? I don't think that even the fiercest opponent of the CDU would insinuate that ... Now as before, however, we advocate in principle the retention of private property and we want to give the worker and the farmer a share in this private property; we want to raise the worker out of his proletarian situation and give him a share in the prosperity of the whole nation, as has already generally been the rule in Württemberg.)(31)

This closes the introductory, if lengthy, account of the founding of the CDU in Baden-Württemberg. In contrast to the two preceding chapters on the KPD
...this chapter opened with an extensive description of party activity outside of Tübingen. This method of development was chosen because it was felt that it best corresponded to the actual process of establishment of a CDU group in Tübingen. Unlike the case of the KPD and the SPD, the creation of a Christian Democratic branch in Tübingen was an "imported" phenomenon, brought to Tübingen through the agency of Dr. Franz Weiβ and not without attendant difficulties.

According to various accounts the proposal to establish a new interconfessional Christian Democratic party was raised in Tübingen by Dr. Franz Weiβ. The first chairman of the "CDU-Ortgruppe" in post-war Tübingen, Jakob Krauß, related in the course of an interview that he was visited by Dr. Weiβ in November 1945. Weiβ had apparently contacted the various churches in Tübingen with a view to drawing up a list of men qualified to establish a local branch of the new CDU and had acquired information on Krauß's background from the Catholic deacon of Tübingen, despite the fact that Krauß was a Lutheran Protestant. Nevertheless he had been active in the CVJ (i.e., German TNGA) prior to 1933 and was known locally as an active Christian. Krauß had already been contacted by supporters of the new CDU and had agreed to meet the recognized head of the CDU in Tübingen, Wilhelm Mirthle. Krauß, however, eventually joined the CDU and was elected chairman in recognition of his reputation and of the Protestant majority in Tübingen. Krauß also claimed that Weiβ visited a large group of Tübingen personalities with a view to enlisting them in the CDU. As stated before in the chapter on the CDU, there was a number of professional and, as yet, apolitical or politically non-committed men who had not been totally absorbed into NSDAP membership despite the pressures of "Gleichschaltung". Consequently, the new founding parties often approached specific individuals concurrently, thus creating a degree of competitiveness. Such was, for example, the case with Viktor Henner who not only discussed membership with the KPD but was also contacted by Dr. Weiβ before finally joining the CDU. (32)

Gebhard Müller has also testified in private correspondence to the importance of Dr. Weiβ's efforts in establishing the CDU both throughout Middle-Württemberg and in the specific case of Tübingen. (33) At the same time there were other personalities who contributed in varying degrees to the establishment of the CDU branch of the CDU. Since the CDU in Middle-Württemberg was largely a resuscitated and modified version of the former "Zentrum" party, despite the interconfessional label, there was a tendency in the traditionally Lutheran areas of Middle-Württemberg,
especially in Tübingen, to view it with suspicion. Therefore the energy and eloquence of those Protestants who aided with the new CDU was an important element in the potential success or failure of the CDU to establish a foothold in Lutheran districts. They helped to broaden the party's appeal and to prevent it from being identified wholly as the political representative of "Oberschwaben" rather than of all of Südtirol and Württemberg. The CDU wished to avoid such a development (despite the fact that it possessed in the Catholic population of "Oberschwaben" a potential electoral majority) since this would have had eventual negative effects for the sister party in the predominantly Lutheran area of Nord-Württemberg.

The influential Protestant figures in the CDU in Tübingen were Jakob Krauße, Oberregierungsrat Heins Autenrieth and Professor Adolf Köberle of the Faculty of Lutheran Theology at the University of Tübingen. These three men provided the nucleus of examples for Protestant participation within the CDU. They represented the three most influential professional groups in Tübingen: the skilled tradesmen (Krauße was a master tailor), the civil servants and administrative officers (Autenrieth) and the university and church circles (Köberle). These men were also associated with the "Bekenndende Kirche" (Confessional Church) of the National Socialist era, a fact which accorded them a modified form of resistance due to the stand taken by the "Bekenndende Kirche" against the "Deutsche Christen" and thereby indirectly against National Socialist ideology. Autenrieth, who in fact came to Tübingen from Stuttgart where he had published the Schwäbische Zeitung was probably the most active of the three, gaining immediate access to the social and economic élites of Tübingen. He, for example, enlisted the services of Dr. Hans-Georg Siebeck, the owner of the prestigious academic publishing house, Verlag J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), as a founding signatory for the Tübingen "Ortgruppe"'s application for registration.

In January 1946 an application for official registration as a political party was made by the "Ortgruppe"; in accordance with French procedures the application was submitted separate to those of the "Kreisgruppe" and the "Landesverband". The application was signed by five signatories: Jakob Krauße, Hans Niesla, Dr. Hans-Georg Siebeck, Professor Theophil Loubacher and Paul Schwarm. (55) Krauße and Schwarm had both been associated with the "Demokratische Vereinigung". The CDU "Ortgruppe" in Tübingen was formally founded in a public meeting on April 11, 1946, under the chairmanship of Jakob Krauße, accompanied by the speakers, Dr. Uebhaxd Müller and Professor Köberle.
There is, however, a counter-version to the series of accounts mentioned above which is of sufficient interest to be noted here. Shortly before his death in 1975 the first "Landesdirektor für Ernährung und Wirtschaft" in post-war Tübingen, Ernst Fischer, gave a private interview on the subject of the French occupation. Fischer maintained that he was instrumental in the founding of the CDU in Südwürttemberg and Tübingen. According to his version he was visited in hospital in Tübingen, having suffered a collapse in November 1945, by a number of men, of whom he named three: Hummel, Lindenhof and Krüger. Hummel apparently was acting as an envoy for former Reichsminister Andreas Hermes, chairman of the CDU in 1945 in the Russian Zone and Berlin, with the specific commission to invite Fischer, then a man of considerable importance in Süd-Württemberg, to found the CDU in Südwürttemberg. At a second series of meetings held, according to Fischer, in the "Haus der Jäger" (Hartenstraße) in Tübingen, the above-mentioned men appeared together with Oskar Pany and Hermann Hohsmüller, all of whom were later CDU personalities. At one such meeting, Fischer claimed, the decision was made to found the CDU in Süd-Württemberg and an application was subsequently made to the French. Fischer swore that he was one of the five signatories. At this point the discrepancies between Fischer's version and the more "official" versions of CDU publications and prominent CDU members become acute since Fischer's name does not appear on the official application which has since been lodged with the state archives of Baden-Württemberg, a transcript of which has already been quoted above from the Festschrift. The issue is further complicated by the fact that Fischer had a serious personal altercation with General de Gaulle during the latter's first visit to post-war Germany (Freiburg; October 4, 1945) which resulted in Fischer being summarily sacked from his position. Considering this fact, it is feasible that the French ordered the CDU to find a replacement for Fischer as a signatory. There is evidence recorded in the second subsection of this chapter, concerning the Lutheran Church's records and the CDU's application, which demonstrates that the French authorities on occasion ordered records to be altered and signatories to be replaced.

In addition, despite the fact that Fischer developed into a bitter man, resenting the lack of support shown by the CDU at his loss of office over what he considered to be an honourable defence of the legitimate interests of the German population, and is therefore as such an objectively suspect source of evidence, Hans-Georg Wieck provides material which suggests verification of Fischer's
account of an original application signed by himself among others. In his book Wieck describes how the Auelendorf meeting of January 6, 1946, formulated the decision to submit an official application to the French authorities for permission to operate as a legitimate political party: "Ein erster Antrag an die Militärregierung auf Genehmigung der "Christlichen Volkspartei" wurde vom Aktionärs- schul am 11. Januar 1946 formuliert, wegen offengebliebener technischer Fragen jedoch nicht abgeschickt. Am 17. Januar waren dann alle Unklarheiten beseitigt ..." (An initial application to the Military Government for authorisation of the "Christliche Volkspartei" was formulated by the Action Committee on January 11, 1946, but was not submitted on account of technical questions which had not been resolved. But then on January 17 all the difficulties were settled ...). (38)

The point which has to be stressed at this stage is the difficulty involved in ascertaining specific developments in Süd-Württemberg during the initial period of the occupation. The major barrier is the difficulty in obtaining documentary material from the French military government and occupation archives, located in Paris and Colmar. The second impediment is the fact that the aggressive jockeying for power and position which inevitably occurred within the various political parties and groupings in the initial period of the occupation has since been disguised in a whitewashing process of "official" party history.

There is, nevertheless, one feature of the establishment of the CDU in post-war Süd-Württemberg and Tübingen which is relatively well documented. That is the role of the Roman Catholic Bishop of Rottenburg and the diocesan administration in providing impetus and contacts for the nascent party. It has already been stated elsewhere that the Roman Catholic Church was inevitably involved with the emergence of post-war Christian Democracy once the decision had been made not to resuscitate the "Zentrum" party. This involvement will now be treated in detail.

A leading Lutheran church administrator of the post-war years in Tübingen and expert on religious affairs during the French occupation of Süd-Württemberg subdivided in the course of an interview the Roman Catholic Church's interests in Süd-Württemberg's political life under three main headings: firstly, the general aim of political Catholicism, i.e. to retain as much of the church's historical role as possible in supervising the distribution of power (in the church's doctrine, ultimately derived from God) among temporal bodies and political institutions and
to resist the forces and pressures of secularist and materialist ideology which sought to impede the church's involvement in political life; secondly, the question of religious education within the school system and/or confessional schools; thirdly, a factor which the interviewee termed "die Erhaltung der Vorposition", i.e. the retention of the new and powerful position of advantage enjoyed by the Catholic population of Süd-Württemberg by the division of the historical territory of Württemberg into a predominantly Lutheran area in the north and a predominantly Catholic section in the south.

The first point made by the above interviewee, i.e. the role of the Roman Catholic Church in post-war Süd-Württemberg in the light of the church's self-appointed historical mission of supervising the moral and social order of things temporal as well as spiritual, is demonstrated by evidence quoted in subsequent paragraphs illustrating the Bishop of Rottenburg's intense interest and participation in the management of political affairs and party life in Württemberg. The traditional nature of the Catholic Church's attitude to temporal power in Württemberg is made all the more apparent by comparison with the political attitudes of the Lutheran Church of Württemberg (also treated in subsequent sections).

The other two points made by the interviewee, i.e. confessional education and "die Erhaltung der Vorposition" are also discernible within relations between the CDU and the Roman Catholic diocesan authorities in Rottenburg. The former point concerning confessional education has already been mentioned in connection with Carlo Schmid and is, in addition, well documented in Rolf Winkeler's published thesis, *Schulpolitik in Württemberg-Hohenzollern, 1945-1962*. The latter point concerning the Catholic Church's interest in the maintenance and exploitation of the status quo which had created a new Catholic-dominated unit of autonomous government and sovereignty, Süd-Württemberg, later "Land Württemberg-Hohenzollern", is not so obvious but it can be deduced from evidence compiled from various sources. This latter aspect inevitably comes under the heading of particularist and separatist tendencies within the Catholic Church and the CDU and is treated as such at a later stage in this chapter.

In order to implement a policy of Catholic activism the Bishop of Rottenburg participated in all the stages involving the establishment of the CDU in Süd-Württemberg. This was a major power base to which the CDU in Tübingen, especially
in the period after the creation of the "Staatssekretariat" (October 1945), had constant recourse for advice, support and mediation. As such it can be equated with the power bases which the KPD and SPD had cultivated within the French military government. Indeed, through the mediation of the Bishop of Rottenburg the CDU found a small but potentially influential support group within the French authorities.

The Bishop of Rottenburg was faced with various alternatives in 1945 with regard to the question of establishing and maintaining political Catholicism in Württemberg. The main alternatives were three in number: to influence the course of politics by having convinced Catholics "placed" in top administrative and party political posts; to found an exclusively Catholic party along the lines of the former "Zentrumspartei"; to found a new interconfessional party uniting Catholics and Protestants but with a Catholic majority.

All three alternatives were considered by the bishop. In addition he sent his political adviser, Dr. Kruse, to his ecclesiastical superior, the Archbishop of Freiburg, on August 10, 1945 to sound out the latter's views on the question. The Archbishop's reply, relayed back to the bishop in form of a written report by Dr. Kruse, categorically rejected the revival of an exclusively Catholic party. The Archbishop condemned the attempts of former members of the "Zentrum" in Baden to reconstitute the party without asking his opinion and stated that he would not recognise their new grouping. He apparently went on to say that they were also too reactionary in their political programme: "... die alte Zentrumspartei ... die doch nur rückwart gerichtete Pläne und Gedanken habe und mit Reaktion kämne man nicht die neue Zeit gestalten ..." (the old "Zentrum" party ... only had reactionary plans and ideas, one could not shape the new era with reactionary policy ...). The Archbishop went on to consider the feasibility of implementing the counter-plan of inserting good Catholics of sound reputation and ability in top positions within the political parties but came down in support of a new interconfessional party. Kruse wrote: "... Er hätte mich eine breitere Grundlage einer Art christlicher Volkspartei gedacht, die weit nach links und rechts debata..." (... He had thought of a broader basis of some kind of Christian popular party which would extend far to the Left and to the Right ...).
The Bishop of Rottenburg, it would appear, took his cue from his superior's views for he came to support, however cautiously, the idea of an interconfessional political party. The bishop was without doubt aware of the feelings predominant among the lower orders of the clergy in "Uberschweben" who were, according to the testimony of Dr. Binder quoted above in Wieck's book, in favour of a revived "Zentrum". The bishop established contacts with the "mother" group of the CSV (then termed the "Christlich-Soziale Volkspartei") in Stuttgart through the agency of the ubiquitous church intermediary, Dr. Kruse, and a certain Dekan S. On January 3, 1946, Dekan S. held a series of discussions with the "Christlich-Soziale Volkspartei" in Stuttgart on the orders of the bishop. The deacon's subsequent report read: "Exzellenz wünschte am Neujahr Fühlungsmahe mit der neu gebildeten christlich-sozialen Volkspartei. Da sich dieselbe in Stuttgart bereits konstituierl hatte, empfahl es sich, zuerst mit dieser die Fühlung aufzunehmen. Dies geschah mit Oberregierungsrat Walter, Reichsbahninspektor Groß, Frau Professor Rist, Dr. Kruse, Minister André ... Ähnliche Faktengeschehen seien jetzt überall gegründet worden. Man habe auch schon Fühlung mit einander aufgenommen auf einer Konferenz in Godesberg am Rhein... Man plane, die Leitung der christlich-demokratischen Union von Berlin wegzubringen und dadurch den Einfluß der Russen zu entziehen.


Inzwischen habe sich in Stuttgart ein Parteibüro gebildet, in der Kolbsstraße 4 ... Finanziert werde dieses Büro zunächst von Spendern, besonders auch der führenden Männer ...

In Stuttgart seien bis jetzt 2 Versammlungen gewesen. Die erste sei gut gewesen, die zweite schlecht vorbereitet und schlecht besucht. Das sei aber kein Grund zum Freisprechen, denn man sei überzeugt, daß die christlich-soziale Partei gut abgescheiden wurde, ja sie werde wohl als stärkste Partei aus dem Wahlkampf hervorgehen. Man denke an die vielen Frauen, die wählen dürften, ferner alle Nicht-CP und die PG von 1937 an ...

Zunächst seien die Protestanten überhaupt sehr abwartend beiseite gestanden, denn die Kantaler Richtung (Christlicher Volksbund; Hauptdörfer, Bauern;
Bei der Evangelischen Landeskirche noch unsympathischer als die Katholiken. Dies habe sich aber wesentlich gebessert. Am letzten Samstag sei eine Besprechung der Partei gewesen in Kornthal. Dort habe als Vertreter des Landesbischofs Oberkirchenrat Haug gesprochen. Dieser sei Feuer und Flamme gewesen für die Partei und habe versichert, daß nach dem Willen des Herrn Landesbischofs nicht nur die Kornthalier, sondern die Evangelische Landeskirche bereit sei, mitzutun. Die Parteifunktionäre sollen nur in die evangelischen Pfarrhäuser gehen und sich dort die Namen geeigneter Leute für die Mitarbeit nennen lassen..." (His excellency expressed the desire at New Year for contact to be established with the newly formed "Christlich-Soziale Volkspartei". Since the latter had already been constituted in Stuttgart, it was advisable to establish contact with it first. This took place between Oberregierungsrat Walter, Reichsbahninspektor Groβ, Professor List, Dr. Kruse and Minister André... Similar party organizations had now been set up everywhere. At a conference at Godesberg on the Rhine they had already established contact with each other. It was intended to transfer the executive body of the CDU away from Berlin and thus remove it from the influence of the Russians.

In Westphalia the old "Zentrum" party had got started again; that was due to the influence of the new cardinal, Galen, who for reasons of family tradition was firmly committed to the "Zentrum" party. But it was hoped for the sake of the general good to be able to integrate this party with the others.

In the meantime a party office had been opened in Stuttgart at Kolbstraße 4... This office was initially financed by donations, in particular from the party's leading figures...

Two meetings had so far taken place in Stuttgart. The first had been a success, the second was badly prepared and badly attended. But that was no reason to be pessimistic for people were convinced that the "Christlich-Soziale Partei" would do well, indeed that it would surely emerge as the strongest party in the election campaign. One should remember the many women who had the vote and the non-Party members and those Party members who joined the NSDAP after 1937...

Initially the Protestants had in general stood on the sidelines with a very cautious attitude of wait and see because the Kornthal group's trend (i.e. of
"Christlicher Volksservice; Simpandärf, Bauach, Bauernbund Stepp") had been even more unattractive to the Lutheran Church in Württemberg than to the Catholics. But things had improved a great deal. Last Saturday a party discussion had taken place at Kronental. There Oberkirchenrat Haug had spoken as the representative of the Lutheran "Land" bishop. Haug had been very enthusiastic about the party and had stated that, in accordance with the wishes of the "Land" bishop, not only the Kronental group but also the Lutheran "Land" Church would be prepared to participate. He said that party officials should just go to the Lutheran manses and obtain from them the names of suitable people to cooperate with them.

Acting on the basis of such reports and encouraged by the political preference indicated by his ecclesiastical superior, the Bishop of Hottenburg instituted a campaign of support for the CDU in Süd-Württemberg although, according to Weck, the diocesan authorities were initially sceptical of the success of an interconfessional grouping. This campaign developed several avenues of activism. The bishop, for instance, established personal contact with Konrad Adenauer, the chairman of the CDU in the British Zone. An example of the bishop's influence on CDU policy in Süd-Württemberg can be seen from his correspondence with Adenauer. In April 1946 the Bishop of Hottenburg wrote to Adenauer: "Ich danke verbindlichst für die Zusage u.d. Programms und der Rundfunkrede der CDU in der britischen Zone, die uns lebhaft interessiert haben. Mit besonderer Befriedigung habe ich daraus entnommen, dass die dortige CDU eindeutig zur konfessionellen Schule steht. Dies scheint in Stuttgart und Sigmaringen noch nicht der Fall zu sein. Ich wäre deshalb dankbar, wenn Euer Hochwohlgeboren an die Landesleitung der CDU in Stuttgart, Kochstr. 4, und an die in Sigmaringen (Dr. Franz Weiß), falls dies noch nicht geschahen ist, die Schriftenstücke schicken wollten ...." (I thank you kindly for sending me the programme and radio speech of the CDU in the British Zone; these interested us very much. I learned from them with particular satisfaction that the CDU in the British Zone is clearly committed to the confessional school. This does not seem to be the case yet in Stuttgart and Sigmaringen. Therefore I would be grateful if Your Honour would also send these documents to the regional executive of the CDU in Stuttgart, Kochstr. 4, and also to the one in Sigmaringen (Dr. Franz Weiß), should this not yet have been done ....) The bishop, pleased with Adenauer's formulation of the theme of confessional education, did not wait on Adenauer's response to his request but himself submitted the above-mentioned programme three days later to both party executives in Stuttgart and Sigmaringen.
"Herr Dr. Adenauer, der Vorsitzende der CDU in der britischen Zone, hat uns eine Rundfunkrede übermittelt, in der er das Programm der CDU entwickelt. Mit besonderer Befriedigung haben wir den Abschnitt über die Volkschulfrage entnommen, daß die dortige CDU eindeutig für konfessionelle Schule eintritt, und zwar als für ein Recht, das uns von den Nazis geraubt worden ist. Wir nehmen gerne an, daß Ihnen diese Rede auch zugesandt worden ist." (Dr. Adenauer, the chairman of the CDU in the British Zone, has forwarded a radio speech to us in which he sets forth the CDU’s programme. We learned with particular satisfaction from the paragraph on the question of the primary school that the CDU in the British Zone clearly advocates the confessional school and indeed as a basic right of which we were robbed by the Nazis. We hope very much that this speech has also been sent to you.)

There are two points of interest in this correspondence. The first concerns the obvious pressure which the Catholic bishop could bring to bear upon the CDU in Süd-Württemberg in relation to certain issues, in this case the reinstitution of confessional schools. In order to retain influence on policy-making and to strengthen the links between the diocese and the party executive the bishop delegated one of his officials to enter the service of the CDU as "Landschaftsführer" (head administrative organiser) in Tübingen. The bishop maintained his influence within the new Christian Democratic party in Süd-Württemberg by a variety of methods and activities for which the CDU was to an extent dependent on him: supplying lists of committed Catholics (and Protestants) throughout the "Gemeinde" for purposes of party membership and political activism; providing references ("Parteischeine") for party politicians; establishing contacts within and outside of Württemberg, e.g. with the other zones and indeed other countries. The latter point about the establishment of contacts illustrates the second feature of interest in the bishop’s correspondence with Adenauer, namely the church’s ability to cross zonal frontiers.

It has already been stated in previous chapters that the French military government categorically prohibited interzonal contacts of all kinds, above all political contacts with a limited number of exceptions. One such exception was the case of institutionalised religion. The French authorities did not attempt to interfere with church life beyond what they considered to be essential matters; even denazification was an internal church affair. The Catholic hierarchy in
Württemberg remained in control of church affairs within the historical diocesan boundaries, which was in effect the whole of Württemberg. The diocese of Rottenburg, established in 1927 from an amalgamation of sections of the former dioceses of Konstanz, Würzburg, Worms and Augsburg, had been established in Rottenburg on the orders of the Royal House of Württemberg which had wished to exclude Catholic influence from the capital, Stuttgart, and to isolate Catholicism within Württemberg's hinterland.

In 1945 the post-war division of Württemberg placed the Bishop of Rottenburg in a favourable position in that he was the sole church head resident within Süd-Württemberg, only 12 kilometres from Tübingen. In addition, since he retained full responsibility for his diocese, including American-occupied Nord-Württemberg, the bishop had unrestrained freedom of movement and contact within the American zone and Stuttgart. This afforded the bishop an unrivalled opportunity of exploiting his contacts for political ends, which he subsequently did to the fullest. His contacts as a leading churchman extended, however, well beyond the boundaries of Württemberg and since his activities as a man of the church were less subject to surveillance than those of other organisations, he was of invaluable aid to the CDU in Süd-Württemberg. The use of the churches as courier agencies to cross zonal boundaries on political missions has been a relatively common, if not widely advertised feature of post-war Germany, extending up to present times in the contacts between East and West German church organisations.

Despite the fact that French censorship authorities kept an eye on the church's official publications in Süd-Württemberg and at times intervened to curtail some article or other which contravened French or Allied policy (for instance the case when Bishop Sproll complained to Francisque Gray over the ban on publication of the papal bull on the "errors of communism") there seems to have been no surveillance of the bishop's correspondence with groups outside of Süd-Württemberg. This compares strikingly with the clandestine activities of the political parties in their attempts at maintaining interzonal contacts.

An examination of the bishop's correspondence and reports illustrates the extent of his contacts and the positive feedback which this had on the CDU leadership who in the initial period of the new party's establishment were striving for recognition, support and contacts. In the course of this and previous chapters
some of the more important figures contacted by the bishop have been mentioned: Frédéric Gay, Pierre Schneider, General Koenig, the Archbishop of Paris, the Archbishop of Freiburg. In all of these contacts it must be stressed that matters of political importance according to the philosophy of Christian Democracy were discussed and defended. The Bishop of Rottenburg was in effect the most influential expounder and apologist of Christian Democracy in Süd-Württemberg during the years 1945-46. To complete the picture of Bishop Sroll's political involvement on behalf of the CDU certain other pieces of his correspondence will now be reviewed.

As early as April 25, 1945, i.e. 6 days after the military occupation of Tübingen, the bishop received his first report from Tübingen which established the pattern of feedback of information which came to characterise the bishop's surveillance of political and social, as well as religious, developments in Tübingen. The acknowledgement of the report which was subsequently lodged in the diocesan archives read: "Bericht über Tübingen. Nachsorgeten wäre, daß die Be- petenten in Tübingen den Eindruck haben, daß die evangelischen Geistlichen mich etwas stark anhehren bei der Besatzungsmacht" (Report on Tübingen. It must be added that trainee priests in Tübingen are under the impression that the Lutheran clergy are chumming up rather much to the occupying power). This alarm, whether true or false in content, helped determine the bishop to keep a close eye on developments in Tübingen.

The bishop subsequently developed close relations with the French authorities in Tübingen. For instance, he met in a personal interview the leading French officials in the town, including the commander of Tübingen, Lieutenant-Colonel Huchon, on July 5, 1945. At this meeting his subordinates formulated his concern at the influence gained by the Commisists: "Als Huchon weiter darauf typte (sic), er wollte ganz in konkreten Sorgen seine behilflich sein, brachte S. unsere Sorge über die kommunistische Gefahr betreffend zum Ausdruck. Als ein leichtes Stuten sprüng sich wurde, betonte er, daß er damit nicht den Bolschewismus als verbündete Macht meinte ..." (When Huchon continued to hint that he would be pleased to help us with specific worries, S. expressed our concern with regard to the Communist danger. When a mildly startled reaction became apparent (i.e. on Huchon's part) S. emphasized that by this he did not mean Bolshevism as an Allied Power (i.e. Russia) ...) Despite such occasional mishaps the bishop maintained
a campaign of pressure on the French authorities against the Left, e.g. during a meeting with Governor-General Widmer's deputy, Colonel Corbin de Faugeux, in 1946 the church representative complained at the French decision to allow each political party its own newspaper on the grounds that "das scheint aber eine sehr mechanische Aufteilung zu sein, wenn man das Kräfteverhältnis CDU zu Kommunisten 40:4 in Betracht zieht." (That appears, however, to be a very mechanical distribution, in consideration of the fact that the ratio of strength between the CDU and the Communists is 40:4.)

The bishop also realized the importance of maintaining contacts with the French clergy responsible for ecclesiastical affairs within the French zone, for they were a potential voice of influence and mediation within the French authorities. One such figure was Abbé R. Viron who first came to Tübingen on October 16, 1945, to attend the reopening of the University of Tübingen. The bishop's records relate as follows: "... Beim Festakt der Wiedereröffnung der Universität Tübingen stellte sich nachher dem Bischof und Dekan S. ein französischer Abbe vor, der im Auftrag der Militärisierung in Baden-Baden sich am anderen Tage über verschiedene Fragen, besonders auch über die Schulfrage, mit dem Bischöflichen Ordinariat sprechen wolle"; (At the reopening ceremony of the University of Tübingen a French abbe introduced himself to the suffragan bishop and to Deacon S. The abbe wanted to discuss, on behalf of the Military Government, various questions with the diocesan authorities on the following day, in particular the topic of school education.) One of the topics the French abbe wished to discuss was "das peinliche Gefühl der Bevölkerung, daß es allmählich von der Scylla in die Charybdis gekommen sei, daß vorher der Nazi-Terror und jetzt Franzosevil— kur. (the embarrassing feeling on the part of population that it had gradually progressed from Scylla to Charybdis, that previously Nazi terror system had prevailed and now it was French arbitrariness.)

The exchange of confidences which the bishop cultivated with the French authorities was based on a direct and uncompromising statement of the Church's interest, including its political policies and preferences. For instance, in the course of a meeting between Dekan S. and Colonel Corbin de Faugeux the colonel asked "wie der Bischof sich zu den politischen Fragen, besonders zu den neugebildeten Parteien stelle. Antwort: Er identifiziere sich nicht damit, sei aber sehr interessiert an den politischen Fragen und stehe der CDU sympathisch gegenüber, weil er von ihr hoffe, daß sie die Beläge der Kirche am besten von allen Parteien vertreten werde." (..., what the bishop's attitude was on political questions,
especially with regard to the newly formed parties. Reply: He did not identify himself with them, but was very interested in political questions and was sympathetic towards the CSU because he hoped that it would be the parties best represent the interests of the Church.\(^{(53)}\)

In contrast the bishop's relations with representatives of the French Catholic Church was less explicit. On the one hand he welcomed the opportunity of establishing contacts with the princes of the Catholic Church in France, e.g. his correspondence with Cardinal Dubourd, Archbishop of Paris: "Neben manchen Erleuchtungen des religiösen Lebens und neben manchen Entgegenkommen, das ich von der französischen Beamtenschaft dankbar erfahren durfte, bin ich in schwerer Sorge, wenn ich an die allenthalben entfesselten, antichristlichen und antikirchlichen Kräfte denke ..." (Despite many facilities within religious affairs and many concessions which I gratefully received from the French occupation authorities, I am very concerned when I think of the anti-Christian and anti-Church forces which are raging everywhere ...), terminating with an open request for support and cooperation in combating these dangers "durch eine Pflichtnahme der prominenten Vertreter des deutschen und französischen Episkopats." \(^{(54)}\)

On the other hand the bishop was aware of potentially adverse sides to these politically minded contacts within the church. There was, for instance, the case of a Jesuit priest, Father Chaillet. The minutes of a meeting with the priest ("Bericht über ein Gespräch mit Pater Chaillet am 28. September 1945") stated that Chaillet had already visited Tübingen in 1937 and that he had maintained connections with Berlin, Vienna, Rome and Constantinople and expressed anxiety about his past and present missions: "Wir hatten ihn schon damals in Verdacht, dass er eventuell in diplomatischer Mission, wenn nicht gar als Spion unterwegs war." (We had suspected him even then that he was possibly travelling on some diplomatic mission, or even possibly as a spy.)\(^{(55)}\) The discussion with Chaillet centred on the question of confessional school education. Chaillet obviously fulfilled the role of liaison man for both the French authorities and the Catholic Church in France. When asked how he could be contacted Chaillet replied that he could be reached through the agency of the "Gouverneur von Tübingen, von dem der Pater versichert, dass er sein Freund sei." (Governor of Tübingen who, the priest maintained, was his friend.)\(^{(56)}\) Chaillet in fact appears to have been an active Gaulist, according to a note in the diocesan
Another French clergyman who played an important role in the establishment and promotion of the new Christian Democratic party in Tübingen was the Catholic military priest attached to the occupation forces in Tübingen, Abbé Laueois, who also maintained close contacts with Rottenburg. Abbé Laueois' importance as a mediating figure for the local CSU has been emphasized by a number of interviewees, especially by Dr. Erich Katzen, director of the Katzen Verlag KG and, since the post-war years, director of the theological "Studentenhaus", the "adolf-Schlatterhaus", who contrasted the political activism of Abbé Laueois with the neutral attitude of the latter's Protestant colleague. (57)

Wick quotes further evidence of Laueois' contribution to the Christian Democratic movement in Tübingen: "Über die Haltung der besetzungsbehörde, deren katholische Vertreter, wie schon erwähnt, die katholischen Belange besonders zu unterstützen bereit waren, wie Dr. Weiß folgt zu berichten:

"... Die Gründung einer christlichen Partei wurde vor allem durch den französischen Abbé Laueois begünstigt und gefördert. Er ermöglichte mir insbesondere durch die Bereitstellung von Beamten den Besuch der 15 Landkreise des Landes und unterstützt sich auch sonst in jeder Hinsicht tatkräftig." (Dr. Weiß has the following to say on the attitude of the occupying power, within which the Catholic Church representatives were, as already mentioned, prepared to especially support Catholic interests:

"... The foundation of a Christian party was especially favoured and
supported by the French abbé, Laugedie. By providing me with petrol he enabled me above all to visit the 15 "Landkreise" of the "Land" and he also actively assisted me in every way.\(^{39}\)

The proximity of the episcopal palace to the seat of the military government in Tübingen made it a natural focus of political intercession with the French authorities on behalf of the CDU and to an extent of which the Lutheran Church was deprived since it had its executive in American-occupied Stuttgart. The importance and efficacy of this intermediary role cannot be overemphasised. The number of meetings and the range of topics discussed between the bishop’s representatives and French officials and German politicians, all recorded assiduously in minutes and reports and filed in the diocesan archives, illustrate this point. It would create an imbalance to attempt to give a complete overview of all the subjects discussed at these meetings for they covered numerous aspects of political, social and religious life. For practical reasons, therefore, a limited choice of two topics will be treated here, a certain number of topics having already been mentioned, e.g. confessional education and the dangers of Communism.

One major topic constantly breached by the bishop’s representatives at these meetings was the question of the appointment of trusted Catholics to top political and administrative offices. This, of course, was tangential to the original consideration of inserting Catholics into top positions within the political parties rather than establishing a Catholic party. The Bishop of Rottenburg was thereby not only promoting the CDU but also maintaining an eye on his own church’s interests. An example of the combination of these motives was the meeting between church representatives from Rottenburg and Carlo Schmid, recorded in two documents from the diocesan archives entitled "Bericht über die Ereignisse vom 18.-20. August 1945" (Report on the events of August 18-20, 1945)\(^{60}\) and "Bericht über den Besuch von Generalvikar, Dr. Storr und Sedlmayer und Dr. Kruse bei Landesdirektor Schmid (dies) am 25.8.1945" (Report on the visit paid by the vicar general Deacon Storr and Sedlmayer and Dr. Kruse to Landesdirektor Schmid on 25.8.1945)\(^{61}\)

The first document relates: 

"... Ministerialdirektor Wurtle hat mich das Leben genommen. Dr. Kruse erklärte den Landesdirektor (i.e. Carlo Schmid) di", dann an diese wichtige Stelle ein Katholik kommen solle und zwar nicht nur als frommer Wunsch sondern als ordentliche das man."
K issue solchen zu benennen macht allerdings einige Schwierigkeiten. Otto Knapp erscheint zu alt, Otto Schmid, der schon in der Ministerialabteilung ist, sei weniger genehm als nicht Humanist. Genannt wurden Namen wie Mühleisen, aber keiner, der hervorragende Qualitäten besitze. Es könnte auch ein Hochschullehrer sein, der allerdings einige Schülererfahrungen haben müße; man wolle sich doch noch um Namen bemühen. (Ministerialdirektor Würtle has taken his own life. Dr. Kruse explained to the 'Landesdirektor' that a Catholic should now occupy this important post, and indeed not because of some pious wish but as a condition sine qua non.

There were, however, some difficulties in naming such a person. Otto Knapp seemed too old, Otto Schmid, who was already in the ministerial department was less acceptable as a non-humanist. Names like Mühleisen were also mentioned but none that had exceptional qualities. It could also be a university teacher but he would have to have some school experience; we stated that we wished, however, to look for other names.

At the subsequent meeting with Carlo Schmid the above question was again raised, the Catholic representatives having prepared their line of argument:

... Dann berührte Sedlmair 's Nachfolgerschaft des so tragisch aus dem Leben geschiedenen Ministerialrats (sic) Würtle. Wir müßten schon darauf anheben, daß an diese Stelle nun ein Katholik käme. Schmid erwiderte, daß ihn der von uns genannte Name Mühleisen sehr sympathisch sei, daß dieser Humanist und ein sehr tüchtiger Schulmann wäre, daß er aber doch begrifflicherweise die Ernennung nicht mehr vornähme wolle, nachdem er selbst so gut wie demissionär sei (i.e. relieved of his post as Minister of Education by the Americans). Er werde jedoch seinem Nachfolger eine diesbezügliche Aktennotiz hinterlassen... (Then Sedlmair touched upon the question of a successor to Ministerialrat (sic) Würtle who had died so tragically. We really would have to emphasize that a Catholic should fill this position. Schmid replied that the name, Mühleisen, which we had mentioned, appealed very much to him as he was a Humanist and a very competent teacher but that it would be understandable that he did not wish to make the appointment since he himself was as good as relieved of his post... He said that he would, however, leave a memorandum for his successor concerning the matter ...)
THE FRENCH OCCUPATION OF TUBINGEN, 1945-1947

FRENCH POLICIES AND GERMAN REACTIONS
IN THE IMMEDIATE POST-WAR PERIOD

by

ANGUS A.D. MUNRO M.A., M.A.

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Chapter Five:

The reconstruction of municipal administrations and elected municipal government in Tübingen, 1945-1947
It has already been indicated elsewhere in preceding chapters that Tübingen, a former Kreisstadt, experienced as from its occupation in April 1945 a gradual and supervised creation of levels of administrative bureaucracy and political autonomy, culminating in its emergence in 1947 as a fully fledged "Landeshauptstadt" ("Land" capital). These progressive levels were five in number and were introduced and established by the French military government on an ascending scale of power and responsibility in the following chronology: municipal authorities and "Gemeinderat"; county authorities ("Landratsamt") and "Kreisversammlung"; "Staatssekretariat"; provisional government ("Provisorische Regierung") and constitutive assembly ("Beratende Landesversammlung"); government and parliament ("Landtag") of Württemberg-Hohenzollern.

It is not the purpose of this chapter to reiterate events and developments already mentioned but to reveal and underline the degree of French supervision inherent in the political and administrative systems of post-war Tübingen during the years, 1945-1947, thereby providing a basis for comment on French occupation policy and methods in those years. Since Konstanser's able piece of research into the relations between the "Staatssekretariat" and its successors(1) adequately covers the latter three levels described above, this chapter will concentrate on the two former levels, especially that of municipal administration. Consequently it will examine the state of relations between the town hall (i.e., municipal administrations and municipal council) and the local French authorities and the effects of French occupation policy on the same, with a closing reference to the "Landratsamt" and the French military government. For practical reasons it has proved necessary to select specific topics and areas from within Tübingen's administrative life to illustrate this relationship. These are, in order of appearance: the re-emergence of a post-National Socialist town hall management; the question of denazification; the specific administrative examples of the municipal "Wohnungsamt" (municipal housing department), "Ernährungsamt" (municipal food department) and police authorities; the re-institution of town councils; and finally the position of the "Landratsamt".

On the morning of April 19, 1945, the French army captured Tübingen. Within a short period of time a French officer appeared at the town hall where he was received by Dr. Kaufmann, the "stellvertretender Oberbürgermeister" (acting mayor), who had been left in charge of the town the day before by the National Socialist
mayor, Dr. Weinmann, and the respective chairmen of the municipal "Erwürfnungsamt" and "Wirtschaftsamt", Herr Meyer and Herr Wahl. Dr. Hauffmann was reinstituted in his office as mayor and immediately provided with the first "Anordnung der Militärregierung" (Military Government order) which he was instructed to make public as soon as possible by means of posters. The decree read:

"Auf Befehl der Militärregierung hat der Oberbürgermeister oder sein Stellvertreter unverzüglich folgende Anordnungen auszuführen:

1) sich dem Ortskommandanten zur Verfügung zu stellen und ihm die geeignetsten Quartierlagen zu bezeichnen.

2) eine beschränkte Ortpolizei aufzustellen, um die Ausführung der an die Einwohnerschaft auserteilten Befehle zu sichern. Diese Ortpolizei trägt Zivilkleidung mit weißer Armbinde, Aufschrift: "Polizei".


4) Im Einkommen mit dem Ortskommandanten muß ein Ausgangsverbot für die Bevölkerung festgesetzt werden: von 8 Uhr abends bis 6 Uhr morgens, falls nicht anders verfügt wird.


6) Wirtschaften, Gasthäuser und andere öffentliche Gebäude müssen geschlossen werden.

7) Alle Angehörigen deutscher Truppenteile (Wehrmacht, SS, Volkssturm usw.), die sich in der Gemeinde befinden, müssen dem Ortskommandanten ausgeliefert werden.

8) Der Bürgermeister wird folgende Listen aufstellen und bereit halten:
   a) Liste der Mitglieder der NSDAP,
   b) Liste der männlichen Einwohner der Gemeinde mit Angabe des Alters,
   c) Liste der ausländischen Gefangenen, Deportierten und Arbeiter nach Staatsangehörigkeit geordnet,
   d) Liste der Lebensmittelquellen,
   e) Liste der Fabriken und industriellen Unternehmungen.

9) Der Bürgermeister wird der Bevölkerung bekanntgeben:
   a) daß es verboten ist, die Grenze der Gemeinde zu überschreiten,
   b) Fahrräder zu benutzen,
   c) daß jeder Einwohner im Besitze der Kennkarte oder eines Arbeitsbuches sein muß.
10) Der Oberbürgermeister muß für Quartier und Verpflegung aller in seiner Gemeinde anwesenden Kriegsgefangenen und Deportierten sorgen.

11) Zur Lösung etwaiger Schwierigkeiten wird sich der Oberbürgermeister, soweit es möglich ist, mit den Offizieren der nächstliegenden Militärregierung in Verbindung setzen.

(By order of the Military Government, the Mayor, or his deputy, has to carry out the following directions without delay:

1) to put himself at the disposal of the local commander and to indicate to him where to find suitable troop quarters;

2) to organise a limited local police force to ensure the execution of orders directed at the population. This local police force will wear civilian clothes with a white armband with the inscription: "Police";

3) Weapons, ammunition, wireless receiving equipment, cameras and field-glasses must be surrendered in return for a receipt at a locality guarded by the local police.

4) In agreement with the local commander a curfew must be laid down for the population: from 8.00 p.m. till 6.30 a.m., unless otherwise decreed.

5) All anti-tank obstacles must be removed and the streets within the town cleared for traffic. All dead civilians must be buried and animal carcasses interred.

6) Public houses, guest houses and other public buildings must be closed.

7) All members of the German armed services (Wehrmacht, SS, Volkssturm etc.) who are located within the community, must be handed over to the local commander.

8) The Mayor will prepare the following lists for use:

a) list of members of the NSDAP,

b) list of the male inhabitants of the community, stating their age,

c) list of the foreign prisoners, deported persons and workers, arranged according to their nationality,

d) list of the food depots,

e) list of the factories and industrial firms.

9) The Mayor will announce to the population:

a) that it is forbidden to cross outside the municipal boundaries,

b) or to use bicycles,

c) and that each inhabitant must be in possession of an identity card or a workman's log book.

10) The Mayor must provide food and quarters for all prisoners of war and deported persons located within his community.
In the case of further difficulties, the Mayor will, in so far as this is possible, contact the officers of the nearest Military Government.\(^{(2)}\)

Thus was the initial function of the mayor in post-war Tübingen defined. He was the intermediary official who transferred orders from the French military government to the populace. In all, some seventy decrees and bans were transmitted to the population of Tübingen by the mayor, covering a wide range of activities from the modification of existing curfews to the banning of street meetings.

The French military government in Tübingen, initially unacquainted with the town’s political and social background, required reliable sources of information and the help of qualified and politically dependable Germans to help administer the community. This feature has already been noted in Chapter 1 with regard to both the criminal elements which initially gained the confidence of the French authorities and the eventual emergence of the local “Antifa”, the “Demokratische Vereinigung”. The latter provided two mayors from within its ranks.

The French authorities in Tübingen, having satisfied themselves about Dr. Haußmann’s background (i.e. non-party member), swiftly realised that they would eventually require a replacement for him since he was already in his seventies. But they left the issue unresolved for the initial weeks of the occupation. The French military government installed itself temporarily in a former inn (“Hotel Lamm”) across the square from the town hall and immediately set about assessing the situation in the community.\(^{(3)}\) To achieve this it instructed the “Bürgermeisteramt” to provide it with what were termed “Stimmungsberichte” and “Tätigkeitberichte”. The “Stimmungsberichte” were intended to interpret the prevailing political climate and morale of the local population; the “Tätigkeitberichte” were reports on the work and progress achieved by the reorganised municipal administrations. At first these reports were delivered in verbal form in daily meetings between the French commander of Tübingen and the Oberbürgermeister. This practice was later modified to a series of weekly written reports which was maintained throughout the entire period of the occupation.

The mayor initially possessed no inherent political authority since German law, and consequently the “Deutsche Gemeindeordnung” (German Municipal Code)\(^{(4)}\),
had ceased to have validity by Allied decree. The mayor and his deputy administra-
tors derived their authority solely from the French military government.

This feature of the administrative management of Tübingen in the initial
post-war period enabled the "Demokratische Vereinigung" to run the political and
administrative life of the community. Having secured the confidence of the local
military government authorities, it proposed a successor to Dr. Haußmann when the
latter announced his inevitable retirement in June 1945. The French authorities
accepted the proposal and subsequently informed the town hall on June 14 in a
tersely phrased communiqué: "Monsieur Renner est désigné pour remplir les fonctions
de Bourgmestre de Tuebingen où il succédera à Monsieur le Docteur Haußmann. Il
prendra ses fonctions le lundi 18 juin 1945.

Le Capitaine de Corvette Metzger
Cdt. le Gouvernement Militaire —
Tuebingen. (5)

Capitaine de Corvette Metzger was the third local commander of post-war Tübingen.
The names of the first two have not been retained in Tübingen archives, possibly
because unlike Capitaine Metzger they were purely military commanders and not mili-
tary government officials. Metzger, as his title suggests, was in fact a French
naval officer who, according to one interviewee, had originally been assigned to
the French First Army to survey the German Naval Depot in Freudenstadt and sub-
sequently the Naval Section of the Medical School of Tübingen University. (6) This
cannot be verified for lack of documentary material. In any case, Capitaine Metzger
assumed command of Tübingen on April 27, 1945, in charge of "Détachement de
Gouvernement Militaire No 5391" with a certain Sous-Lieutenant Sperrey as his ad-
jutant. This unit of military government remained in control of Tübingen's affairs
until the reorganisation of French military government in Württemberg following the
withdrawal of the French army from Stuttgart in July 1945 and the establishment of
the system of "Délégations Supérieures" and "Délégations de Carole". The "Délégation
de Carole" for"Kreis Tübingen" subsequently assumed responsibility for Tübingen's
affairs. This was effected in accordance with "Arrêté No 4 du Commandement
en Chef" which came into effect on August 21, 1945. (7) "Kreis Tübingen" experi-
enced three consecutive "Délégations de Carole" during the relatively short period
from 1945 to 1947: they were Lieutenant-Colonel Huchon, Chef d'Escadron Courtois
and (from August 1947) Colonel Brochu. It is difficult to ascertain how large the
military government staff was in Tübingen; the only figure available is the one
which has already been quoted from a report read to the "Demokratische Vereinigung" by Karl Meyer of the "Staatsgewalt" ("Man müsse bedenken, daß wir außer der Einwohnerschaft ca. 4000 Besatzungsangehörige versorgen müssen") but this statistic does not differentiate between military government officials and strictly military personnel.

In the initial period of the occupation Captain Ketzger and his staff had a relatively free hand in local decision-making, such as affairs relating to the appointment of officials and the distribution of offices. This feature has already been stressed in the opening two chapters on the "Demokratische Vereinigung" and the KPD. The initial period of occupation was a fairly bewildering situation for local French military government officials, not merely because of the general chaotic condition of defeated Germany but also because of the lack of cohesive directives from the central command of military government in the French zone during the period of command of Marshal Jean de Lattre de Tassigny.

The result was that local commanders were confused on issues of policy and very often happy to see energetic German groups and personalities of anti-Fascist repute reorganising large areas of their own community life. A striking example of this within the French zone was the extraordinary influence accumulated and exerted by the Tübingen "Antifa" group, the "Demokratische Vereinigung", which practically ran the town for a period of time. At the same time two essential qualifications must be made: firstly, on the question of authority and, secondly, on the subject of German economic life. The French military government in Germany in early 1945, despite its insecurity on questions of general policy, was acutely aware of two areas of policy where it recognized official consensus; firstly, that it was expected to maintain an authoritarian regime and strike a conqueror's pose to impress the image of arriving in the Allies' baggage train; secondly, it knew that whatever government assumed power in Paris there would be little internal disagreement on the economic exploitation of the zone, e.g. requisitions and reparations.

Apart from these two issues, i.e. so long as French authority was publicly and unquestioningly recognized and there were no serious conflicts over economic policy and requisitioning, the French military government allowed the "Demokratische Vereinigung" extensive freedom in managing municipal affairs. The "Demokratische
Vereinigung" distributed those offices comprising the town hall administration among its members. Those offices were: the mayor ("Oberbürgermeister") and his deputy, the "Bürgermeister"; "Arbeitsamt"; "Hoch- und Tiefbaamt"; "Beschaffungsamt"; "Ernährungsamt"; "Hauptamt"; "Kulturamt"; "Rechtsamt"; "Sozialamt"; "Versorgungsamt"; "Wirtschaftsamt". At first the distribution of offices and assumption of authority by these office-holders, which was implemented by a local military government order of May 25, 1945, bestowing a row of municipal administrative offices with new chairman, (10) was a remarkable procedure. The town hall on the other hand had been spared serious difficulties by the fact that, in accordance with the final order of the National Socialist mayor, Dr. Weinmann, of April 16, 1945, the majority of the town hall personnel had remained at their posts, thus providing the basis for effective administration.

The majority of these administrators were, however, NSDAP members, some by conviction, others on account of "Gleichschaltung". These professional administrators inevitably were affected by the Allied laws on denazification. This was no easy task since it first had to be ascertained who in fact had been NSDAP members since all party files had been destroyed on Weinmann's orders prior to Tubingen's capture; hence the military government decree of April 19 (q.v. above) instructing the mayor to draw up a list of the local NSDAP members.

In accordance with Allied and French policy the heads of Tubingen's municipal administrations made public pledges of their determination to purge the same of National Socialists. The clearest statement of this intent was made by Viktor Renner in his installation speech as mayor of Tubingen on June 18, 1945. According to the minutes of the public ceremony Renner stated that "... eine der Hauptaufgaben, die ihm als Leiter der Stadtverwaltung in allerletzter Zeit bevorstehen, sei die Feststellung, wer von den Mitarbeitern von der Stadtverwaltung im Amt bleiben dürfte und wer entfernt werden müsse. Es sei dies eine sehr schwere, auf jeden Fall eine unankbare Aufgabe. Aber die Beteiligten dürfen versichert sein, daß er seine Feststellungen und Entscheidungen nur nach gewissenhafter Prüfung jedes einzelnen Falles treffen werde ..." (... one of the main tasks facing him in the very near future as head of the town hall was the decision as to which of his colleagues in the town administration would be allowed to remain in office and which would have to be removed. This was a very difficult and thankless task. But the persons concerned could be assured that he would make his assessments and decisions only after a conscientious examination of each individual case ...) (11)
There were a number of town hall administrators who, on account of the fact that they had been prominent NSDAP supporters or had gained promotion to their present positions because of party connections, were obvious targets for denazification. At the very beginning three prominent National Socialists were suspended by decree: Oberbürgermeister Dr. Weinmann (who had in fact already fled); Stadtprüfer Hermann Seeles; Stadtoberinspektor Otto Morlock. (12)

The first overview of the extent of denazification within the municipal administrations was presented in an internal circular issued by the mayor on July 31, 1945, announcing the dismissal of 26 persons:

| Stadtbaurat 1. Dr. Weinmann, Ernst, Oberbürgermeister |
| Stadtbrupper 2. Seeles, Hermann, Stadtprüfer  |
| Hausverwalter 3. Faesel, Alfred, \n| Hausverwalter 4. Kiirner, Ernst, Hausverwalter  |
| Hausverwalter 5. Lutz, Eugen, Hausverwalter  |
| Kanzleiassistent 6. Mannherz, Karl, Kanzleiassistent  |
| Stadtberinspektor 7. Morlock, Otto, Stadtoberinspektor  |
| Verwaltungssekretär 8. Moser, Heinrich, Verwaltungssekretär  |
| Hausverwalter 9. Schmeck, Eugen, Hausverwalter  |
| Waldschütz 10. Stuils, Friedrich, Waldschütz  |
| Stadtoberinspektor 11. Werner, Karl, Stadtoberinspektor  |
| städtischer Angestalteter 12. Bär, Eugen, städtischer Angestalteter  |
| 13. Gohner, Alfred,  |
| 14. Knörzer, Wilhelm,  |
| 15. Krebs, Eugen,  |
| 16. Leister, August,  |
| 17. Lempp, Christian,  |
| 18. Maek, Heinrich,  |

Oberbürgermeister Dr. Weinmann (who had in fact already fled); Stadtprüfer Hermann Seeles; Stadtoberinspektor Otto Morlock.
On the basis of the directions of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces, the following municipal officials, clerical employees and workers have been dismissed on 31.7.1945 for political reasons from their positions within the municipal administration:

I. General Municipal Administration
1. Dr. Weinmann, Ernst, Mayor
2. Seebig, Hermann, City Treasurer
3. Faust, Alfred, Caretaker
4. Münner Ernst, Building Yard Manager
5. Lutz, Eugen, Caretaker
6. Manzher, Karl, Administrative Assistant
7. Morlock, Otto, Municipal Chief Inspector
8. Moser, Heinrich, Administrative Officer
9. Schneck, Eugen, Caretaker
10. Stilla, Friedrich, Forester
11. Werner, Karl, Municipal Chief Inspector
12. Bauer, Eugen, Clerical Employee
13. Griffith, Alfred,
14. Knörrer, Wilhelm,
15. Krebs, Eugen,
16. Leister, August,
17. Leyppe, Christian,
18. Kneck, Heinrich,
19. Steidle, Hans, clerical employee
20. Stöckler, Georg
21. Wechale, Karl, municipal labourer

II. Municipal Public Works
22. Grüninger, Christian, works inspector
23. Fischer, Richard, clerical employee
24. Härkle, Fritz, meter reader
25. Katz, Richard, collector

In addition, the following were dismissed at an earlier date:
26. Clemens, Hedwig, assistant clerkess at the municipal department of economy. (13)

This announcement was followed by a series of decrees from the local military government ordering the formal dismissal of further members of the town hall administration. These decrees were announced by a circular from the mayor on October 1, 1945: "Durch Verfügung der Militärregierung Tübingen vom 5., 19. und 29. September 1945 wurde verboten, die nachstehend aufgeführten städtischen Beamten und Angestellten, die längere Zeit aus politischen Gründen inhaftiert waren, im öffentlichen Dienst weiter zu verwenden:

1. Kimmdich, Karl, Stadtsekretär
2. Michele, Robert, Stadtoberinspektor
3. Beuter, Jakob, Farrenwärter
4. Kehrer, Hermann, Verwaltungsobersekretär
5. Krebs, Christof, Stadtsekretär

(By decree of the Military Government of Tübingen of September 5th, 19th and 29th, 1945, the municipal administration has been forbidden to continue to employ in public service the following municipal officials and clerical employees who have been under arrest for political reasons for a lengthy period of time:

1. Kimmdich Karl, municipal administrator
2. Michele, Robert, municipal chief inspector
3. Beuter, Jakob, cattleman
4. Kehrer, Hermann, chief administrative secretary
5. Krebs, Christof, municipal administrator
6. Wailinguer, Karl, administrative assistant.)(14)
By January 11, 1946, the number of dismissed municipal employees had risen to 30, plus three compulsory retirements, i.e. 41 in total, according to a report made that day to the "Städtischer Beirat" (advisory municipal council) (15).

The most comprehensive overview of the effect of denazification measures on the town hall personnel was presented to the "Städtischer Beirat" on May 13, 1946, by Bürgermeister Karrer. Although the overview is rather long, it has been decided to reproduce it in full since there are several comments on the structure and political background of the town hall inherent in the statistics provided. The text, taken from the Gemeinderat-Protokoll 1946 reads as follows:

**Entnazifizierung der Stadtverwaltung**

Bürgermeister Karrer gibt den Stadtbeiraten folgende Übersicht über das bisherige Ergebnis der Entnazifizierung im Bereich der Stadtverwaltung:

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### Städtische Beamte

1. **Personalstand am 18. April**
   - Beamte im Dienst, bei der Wehrmacht, in Kriegsgefangenschaft und vermisst: 70 Beamte
2. **Zugang in der Zeit von 19.4.1945 bis Januar 1946**
   - 73 Beamte
3. **Hiervon Pgs.**
   - 66 Beamte
4. **Davon ausgeschieden:**
   - a) entlassen aus politischen Gründen: 18 Pgs.
   - b) gefallene Pgs.: 2 Pgs.
   - c) z.Zt. noch vermisst oder in Kriegsgefangenschaft befindlich: 4 Pgs.
   - **insgesamt:** 28 Beamte

* = 42% der Pgs.

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### Städtische Angestellte

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II. Städtische Angestellte

1. Personalstand am 18.4.1945
   (Angestellte im Dienst, bei der Wehrmacht, in Kriegsgefangenschaft und vermißt)
   169 Angestellte

2. Zugänge vom 19.4.1945 - Januar 1946
   107 Angestellte


4. Davon ausgeschieden
   a) entlassen aus politischen Gründen 24 Pg.
   b) z. Z. noch in Kriegsgefangenschaft oder vermißte Pg. 6 Pg.
   c) aus sonstigen Gründen entlassene Pg. 32 Pg.
   = 40 % der Pg.

III. Zusammenstellung:

I. 66 Pg. Beamte
II. 111 Pg. Angestellte

zusammen 147 Pg.

III. Ausgeschieden sind:
   (einschließlich der noch vermißten und in Kriegsgefangenschaft befindlichen Pg.)
   a) Beamte 26 Pg.
   b) Angestellte 32 Pg.
   zusammen 60 Pg.
   = 41 %

IV. Säuberung der Arbeiterschaft:

Aus dem Kreis der städtischen Arbeiterschaft wurden wegen Zugehörigkeit zur NSDAP vor 1933 entlassen insgesamt:
4 Arbeiter.
Deputy Mayor Karrer gave the following outline of the result of denazification within the municipal administration to the town councillors:

I. **Municipal Officials:**

1. Number of persons employed on 18th April (officials on duty, in the armed forces, prisoners of war and missing)
   - 70 officials

2. Accessions during the period from 19.4.45 till January 1946
   - 3 officials

3. Number of NSDAP party members
   - 73 officials

4. Of these the following have left:
   a) dismissed for political reasons 18 party members (i.e. NSDAP)
   b) party members killed in action 2 party members
   c) at present still missing or in captivity 4 party members
   d) retired since 19.4.1946 25 party members
   
   Total 28 officials

= 42% of the party members

II. **Municipal Clerical Employees:**

1. Number of persons employed on 18.4.1945 (clerical employees on duty, in the armed forces, prisoners of war and missing)
   - 169 clerical employees

2. Accessions from 19.4.1945 - January 1946
   - 67 clerical employees

3. Number of NSDAP party members
   - 81 party members

4. Of these the following have left:
   a) discharged for political reasons 24 party members
   b) party members at present still in captivity or missing 6 party members
   c) party members discharged for other reasons 2 party members
   
   Total 32 party members

= 40% of the party members
III. Summary

I. 66 party member officials
II. 51 party member clerical employees
Total 147 party members
III. Of these the following have been discharged:
   (including the party members still missing or in captivity)
   a) officials 26 party members
   b) clerical employees 22 party members
Total 60 party members

IV. Denazification of the Labour Force

From the municipal labour force a total of 4 workers have been discharged because of their membership in the NSDAP before 1933.

The first obvious comment to be made on the above statistics concerns the high number of former NSDAP members among the "Beamten", 66 out of a total of 70 "Beamten", representing 94% party membership (assuming that the three new "Beamten" appointed after the French occupation of Tübingen were not party members). This compares starkly with the percentage of party members within the ranks of the "Angestellten" which was 47% (87 of a total of 169 Angestellte). This in turn reflects the pressures to which the "Beamten" had been subjected by "Gleichschaltung".

The second comment concerns the relative rates of dismissal between the "Beamten" and the "Angestellten". Twenty-two of the original sixty-six "Fg-Beamten" (National Socialist civil servants) were dismissed or forcibly retired. This represents a percentage of 33%. Twenty-four of the eighty-one "Fg-Angestellten" (National Socialist employees) were dismissed, representing 30%. Therefore in percentage terms both groups seem to have suffered equivalent losses through denazification. This, however, must be modified by a third factor concerning the overall situation of the "Beamten" vis-à-vis the "Angestellten" by early 1946. The comparatively high losses of qualified personnel among the "Beamten" for all four reasons quoted (denazification, war casualties, POW internment and forcible retirement) representing 28 of the original 70 "Beamten" was only marginally offset
by the addition of three new "Beamten". This represented a total loss of 25 out of 70, equalling an effective drop of 35 % on pre-April 1945 numbers. This compares very unfavourably with the situation of the "Angestellten" who lost 33 of the original complement of 169, but gained an extra 87 members after the occupation, representing in fact an increase in manpower of 55 members, an effective rise of 32 %.

Therefore there was a comparatively disproportionate loss of personnel among the municipal "Beamten" who represented the upper echelons of the town hall staff with higher levels of formal education and specialist training, longer experience and greater ability. It was therefore logical that, since the management grades were the hardest hit of the professional ranks within the town hall, a drop in the standard of administration would prove an inevitable consequence. It was this factor which made men like Carlo Schmid and Viktor Renner, themselves highly placed state "Beamten", vigorous opponents of a rigorous procedure of denazification, especially after the establishment of the "Staatssekretariat".

The French military government also came round to the view that it would have to adopt a milder approach to denazification if it wished to implement specific governmental policies within the French zone; for example, a successful economic exploitation of the French zone required a competent German administration acting subordinate to French instructions. Denazification was subsequently modified in the French zone in comparison with the initial period of occupation.

The local population was aware of this change of attitude towards denazification on the part of the French military government, having observed the initial ruthlessness with which it had arrested, interned and dismissed local NSDAP officials and members and the subsequent modification of the denazification programme with respect to the "Staatssekretariat" and its administrations which resulted in the application of far less stringent sanctions. It consequently developed a cynical and angry attitude towards the French policy on denazification, concluding that the French intended making an example of their antagonism towards National Socialism by selecting less influential former members of the NSDAP for punishment, whilst at the same time avoiding a wholesale prosecution of the more influential middle-class professional groups. This sentiment was reiterated by Ferdinand Zeib
before the assembled "Demokratische Vereinigung". Although he himself was a persistent advocate of a thorough system of denazification and had little sympathy for the fears and problems of former National Socialists, Zeeb nevertheless was sufficiently moved to denounce the fact that "man sperre immer solche Leute ein, die die Arbeit geschaffen haben, während die Großen geschont würden" (one was always locking up those people who had done the work while the big shots were being spared). (17)

Zeeb's complaint had a political edge to it which failed to take into account the fact that during the initial period of harsh denazification measures there were no administrations in operation other than municipal and county ("Kreis") authorities and that consequently top administrative officials were not the subject of immediate concern. When the services of these particular administrators were required, especially after the establishment of the "Staatssekretariat", French denazification policy had by then been modified to the advantage of these people.

At the same time whilst the French modified the standards of their denazification policy they did not allow the topic to become a dead letter. In 1946 they delegated the matter to the "Staatssekretariat" with the proviso that they would retain the right of surveillance and intervention. The result of this delegation of authority on the subject of denazification was the publication of a "Rechtsanordnung zur politischen Säuberung" (Legal Regulation concerning Political Denazification) by the "Staatssekretariat" on May 28, 1946, and the appointment of a "Staats-Commission" in charge of a complicated apparatus at the base of which existed the "Kreis-Untersuchungsaußschü" (District Committee of Inquiry). There were in all 34 such committees, two for each "Kreis", one to deal with "Öffentlicher Dienst" (Public Services) and the other with "Wirtschaft und freie Berufe" (Trades and Independent Professions). It was the job of these committees to investigate and establish the background of cases of National Socialists in offices and positions of influence. The results of these investigations were subsequently forwarded to one or other of seven "Säuberungsaußschüße"; for the group "Öffentlicher Dienst" there were four, divided according to categorisation of employment (Ausschuß 1: Inners und Finanzen, Ausschuß 2: Justiz und Kultus, Ausschuß 3: Wirtschaft und Sozialversicherung, Ausschuß 4: Sonderfälle); the group "Wirtschaft und freie Berufe" was divided into three such committees on a regional basis using the existing infrastructures of chambers of commerce (Ausschuß 1: Industrie- und Handelskammer (Chamber of Commerce) Ravensburg, Ausschuß 2: Industrie- und Handels-
kammer Reutlingen, Ausschuss Industrie- und Handelskammer Hottweil). These "Säuberungsaußschüsse" reviewed the evidence submitted by "Kreis-Untersuchungsausschüsse" and subsequently passed provisional judgement on the individual cases. These provisional judgments were then transmitted, by way of a number of commissions, to one or other of two "Politische Landes-Hoheit" (Political Regional Councillors) depending on whether the judgment concerned "Öffentlicher Dienst" or "Wirtschaft und freie Berufe". The function of each respective "Politischer Beirat" was to make a decision on the validity of the provisional judgments and to formulate the final individual judgments which were then forwarded by way of a series of technical advisors (so-called "Nachbearbeiter" and "Referenten") to the "Staats-Kommisar" for ratification. (q.v. Appendix Nr. 3) The final step remained, however, as in all administrative decisions of importance, the seal of approval by the French Governor-General ("Die vom Staatskommissar getroffen Entscheidungen werden in allen Fällen nach Bestätigung durch den Norm Gouverneur rechtskräftig") (The decisions made by the State Commissioner become legally binding in all cases after confirmation by the Governor).

The important features of the above "Rechtsanordnung" (legal decree) were stressed in a circular from the "Staats-Kommisar", entitled "Richtlinien für Kreisuntersuchungsausschüsse, Säuberungsaußschüsse und politischen Landesbeirat": "... Bei allen Entscheidungen, die auf Grund der Rechtsanordnung zur politischen Säuberung getroffen werden, muß man sich vor Augen halten, daß die Rechtsanordnung kein Strafgesetz ist, sondern dem politischen Wiederaufbau dienen soll. Sie vermeidet deshalb die Ausdrücke "Schuld" und "Strafe", sondern spricht von "Belastung" einerseits, von "Vorbeugungs- und Räumemaßnahmen" andererseits. Somit entscheidet nicht der Grad der subjektiven - von Standpunkt des Betroffenen aus gesehen - Verschulung, sondern das Maß der objektiven - von Standpunkt der Allgemeinheit gesehen - Belastung. Was auf Grund seines Verhaltens die Kündigung oder der feste Wille abgesprochen werden muß, daß nicht die Sittlichkeit der Politik, sondern umgekehrt die Politik der Sittlichkeit untergeordnet ist, der kann nicht Anspruch auf Einfluß auf das Öffentliche, kulturelle oder wirtschaftliche Leben des deutschen Volkes erheben; gegen ihn richtet sich die Vorbeugungsmaßnahmen, welche die Rechtsanordnung vorsieht. Bloße Räumemaßnahmen reichen nur dort aus, wo die politische Belastung so gering ist, daß bei dem Belasteten eine Sünde und Unschuld erwartet werden kann" (Directions for District Committees of Inquiry, Denazification and the Political Regional Council: "With all decisions made on the basis of the "Legal Regulation concerning Political Demasification" one must bear in mind that..."
the Legal Regulation is not a penal law, but is rather intended to contribute to
the work of political reconstruction. It therefore avoids the expressions "guilt"
and "punishment" and speaks of "incrimination" on the one hand and of "preventive
and expiatory measures" on the other. Thus, not the degree of subjective guilt —
as seen from the viewpoint of the person concerned — is decisive, but instead the
measure of objective incrimination — as seen from the general viewpoint. Whoever
cannot be trusted, on account of his behaviour, to share the view or commitment
that morality is not subordinate to politics but that, on the contrary, politics
are subordinate to morality, cannot lay any claim to influence within the public,
cultural or economic life of the German people; the preventive measures which
are provided by the "Legal Regulation concerning Political Denazification" are
directed against such persons. Simple expiatory measures only suffice in cases
where the political incrimination is so negligible that a process of introspection
and conversion can be expected of the accused."

The "Rechtsanordnung", according to the interpretation laid down by the
"Staatskommissar", concerned three main groups: ("Bei meinen Entscheidungen gebe
ich aus folgenden Grundsätzen aus: Mit Maßnahmen aus Anlaß der politischen Sau­
berung haben vor allem drei Gruppen von Personen zu rechnen.") (In my decisions
I proceed from the following principles: There are three main groups of persons
who have to reckon with political denazification measures.) These groups
were defined by the "Staatskommissar" as follows: "Die ersten Gruppe gehören
diesjenigen, welche den Nationalsozialismus oder Militarismus durch Wort oder Tat
gefördert haben; einem Förderer des Militarismus ist gleichzusetzen, wer als In­
haber einer militärischen oder sonstigen Befehlsgewalt für sinnlose Zerstörungen
oder Verwüstungen verantwortlich ist ... Die zweite Gruppe der Belasteten umfaßt
die sogenannten Nutznießer des Nationalsozialismus oder Militarismus, mit anderen
Worten: vor allem diejenigen, welche zur Befriedigung ihrer Nachfrage, ihres Är­
geres oder ihrer Neidsucht aus dem Nationalsozialismus Nutzen gezogen haben. Da
das nationalsozialistische Regime bei Beamten Beförderungen regelmäßig und grund­
sätzlich nicht nach Maßgabe der Leistung und Eignung, sondern auf Grund der Zuge­
hörigkeit zur Partei vornahm, so wird bei Beamten, welche nach ihrem Beitritt zur
NSDAP befördert wurden, zu unterstellen sein, daß die Nutznießer des Nationalsozia­
isman sind ... Die dritte und umfangreichste Gruppe der Belasteten bilden die­
jenigen, die aus Charaktereigenschaften des Nationalsozialismus oder des Militarismus
ihrer Angehörigkeit oder Gefügigkeit bekundet haben oder ihnen nicht nach Möglichkeit
entgegengesetzt haben. Das hat vor allem für solche Personen Bedeutung, welche nach den
30. Januar der NSDAP freiwillig beigetreten sind ...” (In the first group there are those who have promoted National Socialism or militarism by word or deed; whoever is responsible as a bearer of military power, or any other form of power, for senseless destruction or devastation is to be defined as a promoter of National Socialism ... The second group of politically incriminated comprises the so-called beneficiaries (“Nutznissen” of National Socialism or militarism; in other words: principally those who derived advantage from National Socialism for the satisfaction of their lust for power, their ambition or their avarice. Since the National Socialist regime regularly promoted civil servants (“Beamten”) as a matter of principle on the basis of their party membership (i.e. NSDAP) and not according to proficiency and qualifications it must consequently be presumed in the case of civil servants who were promoted after joining the NSDAP that they are beneficiaries of National Socialism ... The third and most extensive group of politically incriminated consists of those who, because of weakness of character, have demonstrated subservience or pliancy vis-à-vis National Socialism and militarism or else did not oppose the same as far as was possible. This is above all relevant for those people who voluntarily joined the NSDAP after January 30.)

This definition and categorisation of guilt was less strict than those applied within the American Zone. As opposed to the three categorisations of guilt formulated by the “Staats-Kommissar”, the American military government used a scale of five groupings.

The list of respective punishments laid down by the “Staats-Kommissar” (although the term "punishment" was avoided in official use in favour of the term "preventive measure" or "expiative measure") also reflected a relative attitude to the problem of denazification, the favourite sanction being demotion rather than suspension or dismissal from office (what was termed "Zurückstufung um ... Dienstalter-Stufen" (down-grading by ... grades of seniority); q.v. appendix). This method was defended in a verbal report by the "Staats-Kommissar" to the assembled "Staatssekretariat": "... Wenn bei der Kritik vielfach auf die Handhabung in Nord-Württemberg hingewiesen wird, da dort die sogenannten Mitläufer angeblich wesentlich günstiger behandelt worden wie bei uns, so weise ich darauf hin, daß in der nord-Württembergischen Zone fast ausnahmslos sämtliche Fk's kurze Zeit nach der Besetzung entlassen wurden und bis heute sich nicht im Dienst befinden. Die dadurch getroffene Sanktion ist einschneidend wie die bei uns in vergleichbaren
The assessment of each individual case was based primarily on an assessment of individual questionnaires, the infamous "Fragebogen"(25), which had to be filled in by practically everyone with tenure of office and position. These questionnaires were very extensive, taking in every feature of a person's professional, political and social background for the period 1933-1945. (q.v. the two examples of questionnaire reproduced in Appendix Nr. 4.) Indeed some questionnaires contained more than ninety separate questions and queries.

As in the case of the other western zones of occupation the system of questionnaires produced its pros and cons. The major advantage was that it created a semblance of order within an emotionally fraught situation which had previously
been largely dominated by the untrustworthy feature of denunciation. This factor had moved Carlo Schmid to formulate an "Erlaß zur Bekämpfung des Denunziantentums" (decree to combat denunciation) which was subsequently accepted by the "Staatssekretariat" on June 21, 1946. The proposed decree represented a radical assault on the act of denunciation: "... Die Mindestrafe für wissentlich falsche Anschuldigung beträgt einen Monat, die Höchststrafe fünf Jahre Gefängnis, bei vorzeitlicher oder leichtfertiger falscher Anschuldigung einen Tag bzw. ein Jahr Gefängnis oder eine Geldstrafe ... Liegt bei einer Demunziation der Tatbestand der falschen Anschuldigung nicht vor - sei es, daß der Täter seine unrichtige Behauptung nicht bei einer Behörde oder einem zur Entgegennahme von Anzeigens anständigen Beamten oder nicht öffentlich, sei es, daß er sie nicht in der Absicht aufgestellt hat, ein behördliches Verfahren oder andere behördliche Maßnahmen gegen den Demunierten herbeizuführen - so ist der Tatbestand der Beleidigung (§ 185 StGB), der üblen Nachrede (§ 186 StGB) oder der Verleumdung (§ 187 StGB) gegeben ..." (The minimum penalty for premeditated false accusation is one month, the maximum penalty is five years' imprisonment; for wilful or irresponsible wrong accusation the minimum and maximum penalties are one day and one year or a fine ... If, in a specific case of denunciation, the offence of false accusation has not been committed — either because the culprit has not made his false accusation to an administrative authority or to an official commissioned to receive such complaints or in public, or because he has not made the same with the intention of instituting administrative proceedings or other official measures against the person whom he has denounced — there exists nevertheless the offence of insult (Paragraph 185, Penal Code), slander (Paragraph 186, Penal Code) or defamation of character (Paragraph 187, Penal Code)...). (The French military government, however, refused to countenance the application of such direct pressure on potential, if occasionally erratic, sources of information. The liaison man and interpreter in Schmid's "Direktorialamt" (cabinet office) returned with a negative answer: "Herr Donndorf teilt mit, daß die Militärregierung ihre Erlaubnis zur Veröffentlichung des Erlasse zur Bekämpfung des Denunziantentums versagt hat". (Herr Donnorf reports that the Military Government has refused its permission for the publication of the decree to combat defamation.) (27)

The major disadvantage involved with the system of questionnaires was the fact that many people did not submit the correct details. This topic was discussed by the "Demokratische Vereinigung" and suggestions made to alleviate the
situation: "... Punkt 1 der Tagesordnung, Kontrolle der Erhebungsbögen, läßt eine gründliche Diskussion aus, an der sich die anwesenden Mitglieder fast ausnahmslos beteiligen. Es hat sich herausgestellt, daß viele Parteimitglieder ihre Angaben entweder falsch oder in verschleiert Form gemacht haben. Deshalb wurde beschlossen, die Erhebungsbögen im Rathaus aufzulegen und eine Aufforderung im Nachrichtenblatt sowie durch Anschlag zu erlassen, damit diejenigen, die unrichtige oder verschleierter Einträge gemacht haben, ihre Angaben berichtigen können." (...) Item 1 of the Agenda, Surveillance of Questionnaires, triggered off an exhaustive debate in which almost all the members present participated. It has become apparent that many (National Socialist) Party members have made statements either falsely or in an oblique manner. It was therefore decided to display the questionnaires in the town hall and to publish a decree by means of news gazette and posters to those who made incorrect or disguised entries, instructing them to correct their statements.)

The final comment which remains to be made concerning the process of denazification within Tübingen was the obvious difference which existed between the initial and often ruthless purge of middle and lower administrative strata, together with the former elite of the NSDAP party organisation, and the subsequent modified approach to the denazification of high civil servants, business personalities, artists and churchmen, groups which the French military government wished not to alienate in order to maintain a smoothly functioning administration of the community and of Süd-Württemberg as a whole. Indeed the French were remarkably lax on the denazification of professional artists (q.v. subsequent chapter on cultural policy) whilst they allowed the churches to implement their own internal denazification tribunals, very much in the style of denazification courts. In addition the "Staatssekretariat" was exempted by the French authorities from a thorough purge of National Socialists along the lines laid down for other administrations. Schmid gained this concession in the course of negotiations with Governor-General's adjutant (Chef de Cabinet) during January and February 1946. The minutes of one such meeting read: "... Die besondere Säuberungsaktion für die Beamten des Staatssekretariats ist genehmigt. Die Landesdirektoren selbst sind nicht zu überprüfen." (The special method of denazification for the officials of the State Secretariat has been approved. The "Landesdirektoren" themselves are not to be investigated.)
It is quite possible that P. Roy Willis was aware of these anomalies within the French system of denazification when he wrote: "The Württemberg ordonnance of May 28, 1946, attempted to improve the system of denazification in several ways. It laid down that strict declassification by party membership could not be taken as legal proof of an individual's guilt. It attempted to give the accused a fair hearing by holding it in his own locality and by having present in the examination committee members of his own profession — doctors, for example, helping to try doctors. It attempted to speed up the work by increasing the number of committees and to allow the fairest possible review of each case by processing it at four levels. It allowed the accused the right of self-defense and ordered that the case against him be laid down in writing.

A further change in the organisation of denazification was taken in 1947, after the Control Council had passed its Directive No. 36, ordering the adoption throughout Germany of a system of denazification similar to that of the American zone. The major changes implied were the adoption of the American "Spruchkammer" system, and the adoption of the five classifications of degree of guilt. The military government ordered the "Land" governments to pass laws of denazification in accordance with the Control Council directive, and these new laws were written ... in May (1947) in Württemberg. Yet even at this time neither the Germans nor the military government of the French zone were willing to go along with the full details of the directive ... Debating the new law in Württemberg in April 1947, Viktor Renner, minister of the interior, pointed out with pride that the laws for denazification in Württemberg differed considerably from those of the American zone, especially in not containing the five categories into which the population was to be classified. In Württemberg, he claimed, the process was regarded more as a political measure than as a judicial matter, and it was something that had to be done quickly...".

Willis' depiction of French denazification policy tends to over-fairness in that the negative aspects of their policy are glossed over in a general statement of outline. These main faults have already been alluded to, e.g. the relative severity of punishment allocated to lower grade officials, the exemption of specific groups (churches, theatre, "Staatssekretariat" etc.) from formal denazification procedures. One cause of this bias in Willis' interpretation seems to be a certain degree of over-reliance on the published official accounts on denazification which
were issued by the French military government and the "Staatssekretariat", both of which published somewhat optimistic accounts of denazification.

The best overview to date of the question of French denazification policy in South-West Germany during the period of occupation has been provided by Professor Theodor Eachenburg, a leading political scientist and lawyer who gained first-hand experience in Tübingen during the post-war period of French occupation policy in his capacity as "Kommisssar für Flüchtingenangelegenheiten" (Commissioner for Refugee Affairs). Professor Eachenburg wrote: "In der französischen Zone lagen die Verhältnisse, weil es sich um drei kleine Länder handelte und es fast keine Großstädte gab, einerseits einfacher als in den beiden anderen Westzonen, andererseits schwieriger, weil diese Zone von dem selbst schwer notleidenden Frankreich stark ausgebeutet wurde. Die Militärregierung beurteilte aufgrund ihrer bürokratischen Erfahrung das Denazifizierungsvorgehen in seiner Handhabung und Auswirkung sowie in seinen Chancen skeptisch. Denk der eigenen Arttradition bejahen sie die Institution des Berufabeantrags, wenn sie auch der konservativen Einstellung des deutschen Beamten mißtrauten ... Auf ihrem Gebiet qualifizierte, kundige und findige deutsche Beamt verteten eher Verständnis und Respekt bei ihren französischen, in gleichen Kategorien denkenden Partnern als Laien, die sich erst einarbeiten mußten. Hohe Reichs- und Landesbeamte, z.B. Ministerialdirektoren und Staatssekretäre sowie durch nationalsozialistische Aktivität Belastete, liefen allerdings weder die Landesregierungen noch die französischen Militärregierungen zu. Schon aber passierten die Prüfung der französischen Behörden deutschen Beamten, die in von Hitlerregime annektierten Gebieten tätig waren, und die Franzosen, d.h. überwiegend normale Verwaltungsarbeit geleistet hatten, selbst Kriegsverwaltungstätigkeit im besetzten Frankreich war nicht ohne weiteres hinderungslos. Carlo Schmid, von Haus aus Richter und Universitätsdozent, seit Herbst 1945 Regierungschef in Württemberg-Schanzsollern, war Oberkriegsverwaltungsrat in Lille gewesen. Die Franzosen stellten sogar einige Nationalsozialisten ein, die es nicht nur nominal waren, weil diese als besonders gefügig galten. Eben wegen des Gefügigkeitsverdachts versuchten sich die deutschen Ämter gegen deren Einstellung zu wehren oder die Betroffenen administrativ zu isolieren. Es kam auch vor, daß mit besonders versierten, aber belasteten Beamten unter stilleblässender Duldung der französischen Behörden Werkverträge abgeschlossen wurden und diese Beamten im allgemeinen Verwaltungsverkehr nicht in Erscheinung traten. Die französischen Besatzungsbehörden, aber auch die Regierung in Paris, waren an einer leistungsfähigen, gleichsam administrativ autarken Verwaltung in
den Ländern ihrer Zone besonders interessiert, weil sie, von Rheinbundvorstellungen ausgehend, diese Länder an ihren Grenzen in Selbständigkeit und Isolierung gegenüber den anderen deutschen Ländern erhalten wollten und zunächst entschiedene Gegner der Bildung eines westdeutschen Staates waren." (Conditions in the French zone were, on the one hand, easier than in the other Western zones because it consisted of three small "Länder" and had almost no large cities, but also, on the other hand, more difficult because this zone was severely exploited by France which itself was in dire need. On account of its administrative experience the (French) military government viewed the process of denazification, in its form and effects as well as in its chances, with scepticism. Thanks to their own administrative tradition they approved of the institution of the professional civil service although they distrusted the conservative ethos of the German civil servant ... Professionally qualified, knowledgeable and resourceful German civil servants sooner won understanding and respect from their French partners who thought in the same categories than laymen who first had to familiarise themselves with the work. However, neither the regional German governments (of the French zone) nor the French military government permitted the employment of (former) high officials of "Reich" and "Land" administrations, e.g. "Ministerialdirektoren" and Secretaries of State, or of those who had incriminated themselves by National Socialist activism. No doubt, however, German officials who had performed predominantly normal administrative work in Alsace when it was annexed by the Hitler regime probably passed scrutiny by the French authorities. Even administrative war service in occupied France was not in itself an impediment. Carlo Schmid, originally a judge and university teacher and from the autumn of 1945 onwards head of government in Württemberg-Hohenzollern, had been a senior military government official ("Oberkriegsverwaltungsrat") in Lille. The French even employed some National Socialists whose party commitment had been more than nominal because they were considered to be especially compliant. Because of this very suspicion of compliance the German administrations tried to prevent these people from being employed or either to isolate them within their administrative field. Employment contracts were also concluded with specially qualified but politically incriminated administrative officials with the tacit toleration of the French authorities and these officials did not operate openly within the general business of administration. The French occupation authorities and the government in Paris were particularly interested in an efficient and practically independent administration in the "Länder" composing their zone because the French wanted with their theories of a
"Rheinbund" confederation to keep these "Länder" independent of and isolated from the other German "Länder" within their own borders and because the French were initially emphatic opponents of the formation of a West German state. \(^{(31)}\)

Kaschara's account therefore emphasizes the factor of realpolitik in the French attitude to denazification; the French authorities implemented denazification standards in accordance with their wider policy of establishing the framework for a series of separate and autonomous states in South-West Germany. In conclusion, however, it must be said that whilst the French modified their standards drastically on denazification they did not allow the topic to become a dead letter altogether. The best example of this in post-war Tübingen was the case of the deputy mayor, Bürgermeister Gottlieb Karrer, a leading member of the local SPD and the official who submitted the May 13 report on municipal denazification to the municipal council, was himself denazified on account of his activities as "Stadtrat" (i.e. "Bürgermeister") of Berlin-Charlottenburg during the National Socialist era. Admittedly, another position was found for him which meant in effect that he was denoted.

Karrer's case was discussed in a municipal council meeting of June 9, 1947:

"Durch die Bekanntmachung des Staatssekretariats über die Ergebnisse der politischen "Säuberung" vom 8. August 1946 - veröffentlicht im Amtsblatt des Staatssekretariats Nr. 15, Seite 150 - wurde Gottlieb Karrer als Bürgermeister entlassen, er kam jedoch als Verwaltungsbeamter weiter verwendet werden. Verwaltungsdirektor Dr. Ebner schlägt nun dem Gemeinderat vor, Herrn Karrer die Leitung der den städtischen Wohnungsamt angegliederten Umweltstelle zu übertragen.\(^{(32)}\) By virtue of the State Secretariat's announcement of August 8, 1946, regarding the results of denazification - published in the Official Gazette of the State Secretariat No. 15, page 150 - Gottlieb Karrer was dismissed from his post as deputy mayor but may still be employed as an administrative official. Verwaltungsdirektor Dr. Ebner now put the proposal to the municipal council to entrust Herr Karrer with the running of the resettlement office which is attached to the municipal housing department.\(^{(32)}\)

This arrangement was indicative of the manner in which the SPD disposed of municipal offices in post-war Tübingen; this, however, has already been described in Chapter 3.

Since it is the purpose of this chapter to demonstrate the supervised reconstruction of German administrations and institutions, hence the specific relationship between the French military government and the same German adminis-
trations and institutions, it has been deemed appropriate to examine those municipal administrations which, apart from the Bürgermeisteramt, maintained the closest ties with the military government: these were the "Wohnungsamt", the "Amt für Berechnung" and the municipal police.

One of the major problems of post-war Tübingen was the difficult housing situation, created less by war damage (which had been relatively slight) than by the requisition demands of the French army and military government. This was exacerbated by the elevation of Tübingen to the rank of "Staatssekretariat", together with its various administrations and personnel, required both office and housing space. Thirdly, the university of Tübingen placed a burden on the town's housing resources when it re-opened on October 16, 1945 and began enrolling students from outside Tübingen.

In the initial period of the occupation the French army and military government in Tübingen requisitioned housing space as they saw fit, serving and enforcing the notices of requisition themselves. The "Wohnungsamt" was re-opened in the first weeks of the occupation (i.e. late April 1945) but it is difficult to present an overview of its initial activities since it acted parallel to the requisitioning efforts of the French authorities. Furthermore, the first director of the "Wohnungsamt" was one of those personalities who have subsequently been designated in Tübingen as one of the criminal elements who arrived in the rear guard of the French First Army. The former mayor, Viktor Renner, described the above personality, a man named Huber, in the course of an interview with Hermann Werner as a "Schieber und Betrüger" (racketeer and swindler). (33)

The two subsequent occupants of the office of "Leiter des Wohnungsamtes" (manager of housing department) proved to be equally unpopular with both the local population and the municipal administration. Huber was succeeded on January 1, 1946, by a man named Kittelberger who was also not a native of Tübingen. Kittelberger was installed directly in office by the French authorities and not through the "Demokratische Vereinigung". Huber was in turn appointed head of the "Requisitionsamt" by the French. (34) Kittelberger eventually made himself intensely disliked within the population and a source of embarrassment to the other sections of the town hall administration which feared being associated with Kittelberger's methods and attitudes. Kittelberger's subordinates were also criticised, especially
a man named Kübler who was later promoted to manager of the "Wohnungsamt" in place of Kittelberger. At a meeting of the "Städtischer Beirat" on April 15, 1946, the following criticism was made of the "Wohnungsamt": "... Übergreifend zur Tätigkeit des Städtischen Wohnungsamtes erhebt Stadtbaurat Schwarz lebhafte Klage über einige der Angestellten dieses Amtes. Insbesondere sei es der Angestellte Kübler, der bei Wohnungseinsichtungen sehr rigoros, ja nicht zu sagen, unverschämt vorgehe. Man sollte erwarten können, daß die Angestellten des Wohnungsamtes der Bevölkerung gegenüber auch anständig auftreten ..." (... turning to the work of the municipal housing department, Councillor Schwarz complained strongly about some of the employees of this department. He mentioned in particular the case of an employee named Kübler who acted very harshly, not to say insolently during house inspections. People should be able to expect the employees of the housing department to behave decently to the population ...).

When Kübler was in charge of the "Wohnungsamt" he again came under fire from the mayor and the municipal council. At the municipal council meeting of June 26, 1947, Oberbürgermeister Hartmeyer reported on Kübler's failings as an administrator: "... Des weiteren kommt Oberbürgermeister Hartmeyer auf die Personalkonstellation in der Leitung des Wohnungsamtes, sowie auf einzelne besonders krasse Wohnungsfalle (Fall Pörtner u.a.) zu sprechen. Der bisherige Leiter, Herr Kübler, habe sich neuerdings krank gemeldet. Tatsache sei, daß die Dinge beim Wohnungsmamt so wie bisher nicht weitergehen können. Im Fall Pörtner habe sowohl er - der Oberbürgermeister - als auch Dr. Ebner eingreifen müssen, weil das Wohnungsamt nicht funktionierte. So gingen die Dinge nicht mehr weiter und es sei zu Überlegen, ob nicht in der Leitung des Wohnungsamtes ein Wechsel vorgenommen werden sollte. Den Vernehmen nach trage sich Herr Kübler selbst mit dem Gedanken, den Posten des Leiters des städtischen Wohnungsamtes zu verlassen und ins Ausland zu gehen. Wenn man in Wohnungsmamt keinen Verwaltungsmann einbauen wolle, so neige er - der Oberbürgermeister - zu der Auffassung, einem eingesehenen Tübinger Bürger, der mit den hiesigen Verhältnissen gut vertraut sei, zu suchen und ihn das Amt zu übertragen. Er denke ersteinig an Herrn Gottlieb Karrer, den er für den geeigneten Mann halte.

In der Aussprache wirft Gemeinderat Kocher (UWP) die Frage auf, ob Herr Karrer den Aufgaben des Leiters des Wohnungsamtes gewachsen sei. Das Wohnungsmamt sei ein ganz besonders schwieriges Amt, auf das u.U. manches nicht stimmte. Der
jetzige Leiter Kübler habe genau so abgewirtschaftet wie der Vorgänger Kittelberger. Vor allem komme es darauf an, die Dinge objektiv zu behandeln. Insbesondere müsse der etwaige neue Leiter des Wohnungsamts, mehr als dies bisher der Fall gewesen sei, darauf achten, daß die Beschlüsse der Wohnungsabteilung auch durchgeführt werden, andernfalls die Mitglieder der Wohnungsabteilung zurücktreten würden. Den hauptsächlichen Anstoß erregt zum. daß vom Wohnungsamt, wenn irgend etwas nicht stimme, die Besatzungsmacht eingeschaltet werde."

(... In addition Mayor Hartmayer turned to the topic of the personnel situation in the management of the housing department and of individual and particularly blatant housing anomalies (the case of Fürth and others). The present manager, Kübler, had recently reported sick. It was an obvious fact that things could not continue as they had been in the housing department. In Fürth's case both he (the mayor) and Dr. Ehmer had to intervene because the housing department was not functioning at all. Things could not go on like this any longer and it would have to be considered whether a change ought not to be made in the management of the housing department. According to reports Herr Kübler was considering the idea of quitting the post of manager of the municipal housing department and going abroad. If the committee did not want to install a professional administrator in the housing department, then he (the mayor) was in favour of the idea of looking for a resident Tübingen citizen who was fully familiar with local conditions and conferring the office upon him. He said he was thinking in the first instance of Herr Gottlieb Karrer whom he considered to be the suitable man.

In the discussion Councillor Kocher (DVP) raised the question as to whether Herr Karrer was a match for the duties of manager of the housing department. The housing department was a particularly difficult office where many things were at the moment not in order. The present manager, Kübler, had mismanaged it as badly as his predecessor, Kittelberger. What mattered above all was that things were dealt with objectively. In particular, the new manager whoever he was would have to ensure, to a greater degree than had previously been the case, that the resolutions passed by the housing section of the committee were in fact carried out; otherwise the members of the housing section of the committee would resign. The principal source of grievance provided at that period by the housing department was the fact that, whenever something went wrong, it brought in the (French) occupation authorities.
There were, however, specific extenuating factors concerning the "Wohnungsamt" and the general housing situation in Tübingen which the municipal council did not, or indeed did not wish to, take into account. The first of these was the fact that, whilst the French military government was prepared to allow the town hall and the "Demokratische Vereinigung" a certain amount of decision-making in municipal affairs, there was no debate permitted initially in those areas which were of unqualified interest to the French. One such area was the question of housing.

With the memory of the German occupation of France still fresh, the French army commanders were generally not prepared to compromise on questions of military logistics or supply, or even simple self-interest, in order to demonstrate a humanitarian attitude towards the local German population. In addition, the French army of occupation was composed in good part of elements of the former French colonial army with long experience in matters of requisitioning, a factor which André Gorin severely criticised in 1946 in his book, *L'An Zéro de l'Alliance*.

Consequently the French army of occupation and military government applied requisitions as they saw fit. At first they enforced many of these themselves. Gradually, however, the French authorities resorted to a specific policy of indirect administration whereby it passed on its wishes to the respective German administrations. In the case of house and building requisitioning the French authorities let the "Wohnungsamt" know in no uncertain terms that there was no room for discussion or contradiction. Usually the "Wohnungsamt" was provided at intervals with specific lists of addresses together with the date by which the buildings had to be evacuated. It was then up to the "Wohnungsamt" to ensure that these instructions were carried out to the letter. This involved the "Wohnungsamt" inevitably in a series of perpetual confrontation with the local German population and the situation increased in difficulty as French demands grew whilst the amount of available accommodation remained static. A symptomatic result of these confrontations and the concomitant pressures was a high turn-over of staff within the "Wohnungsamt" in the post-war years.

As a result the "Wohnungsamt" was bound to prove one of the most unpopular of municipal administrations in post-war Tübingen, no matter which personality acted as its manager. It was possibly the worst office to have held in post-war
Tübingen in terms of local prestige and freedom of action. The chief function
of the office was not so much to attend to the needs of the population as to
serve the interests of the military government and the army of occupation. It
is indicative of the French authorities' attitude to the housing question and the
role of the "Wohnungsamt" that, during the initial two years of the occupation
when they were seeking to establish improved relations with the local political
and social élites, the French retained these three highly unpopular administrators
in office. These unpopular men were indispensable from the French point of view
in that they served French interests without contradiction in a field of adminis-
tration where the French military government would not have in any case brooked
opposition.

In retrospect the local German politicians in Tübingen were thereby spared
a difficult and embarrassing office in the harsh years of 1945-1947 and were pro-
vided at the same time with classical bogeymen, all non-Tübinger and therefore
outsiders, to contrast with their own good services and commitment, e.g. in the
"Sozialamt", "Hilfswerk", "Rechtsamt" etc.

Initially the French instructed that as far as possible former members of
the NSDAP were to be the victims of requisitioning, a decision which was strongly
supported by the left-wing members of the "Demokratische Vereinigung". However,
as the town received the status of "Land" capital and became the seat of ever
larger units of French military government and administration these criteria were
quietly by-passed. The local historian, Hermann Werner, described this develop-
ment as follows: "... Nicht lange konnte sich die Beschlagnahme an den ersten
Grundsätzen halten, die Häuser alter Parteigenossen in Anspruch zu nehmen; bald
suchten sich die Franzosen eben die schönsten Lagen und die am besten eingerich-
teten Häuser aus. Ihre Bewohner mußten auch den größten Teil ihrer Habe, eine
"einwandfreie" Einrichtung zurücklassen, selbst die Hauswäsche liefern und nur
das Nötigste mitnehmen." (... Requisition confiscations could not be limited
for long to the initial principle of claiming the houses of Party members with
long records of service; soon the French just selected the most attractive sites
and the best furnished houses. The (former) occupants also had to leave behind
the majority of their possessions and "satisfactory" furnishing, even supplying
the house linen; they could only take the most necessary effects with them.)
In addition the French military government closed down all of the town's hotels and inns. The five largest hotels were requisitioned for use by the occupation authorities (i.e. Lamm, Kaiser, Deutsches Haus, Krone, Uchsen). The French military government, conscious of France's recent experience of defeat and occupation and of the official French attitude of maintaining France's prestige both within the German population and vis-à-vis her Allies, was aware of the importance of representation. Consequently, it insisted on installing itself in the most impressive buildings in Tübingen. The very extensive court building - an impressive, if ugly, pile of Wilhelmian architecture situated on a slope overlooking the main street of Tübingen - was eventually selected by the French as the seat of military government for Tübingen and Süd-Württemberg. The "Justizgebäude" (court building) was probably the largest single building in the community.

When the new "Délégué de Cercle", Lieutenant-Colonel Huchon, arrived in Tübingen in July 1945 to replace Captain Netzger, a complete student fraternity house ("Verbindungshaus") on the same hill overlooking Tübingen (i.e. the Osterberg) was put at his disposal. The same occurred when Guillaume took up residence in Tübingen as "Délégué Supérieur" for Süd-Württemberg.

The extent and largeness of French requisitioning may seem considerable, especially when the statistics quoted below are considered. There was, however, one feature of the French system of house requisitioning for which the populace of Tübingen was grateful, namely that the same procedure of house requisitioning was not implemented as was current in the American zone of occupation. The American army of occupation requisitioned houses according to its policy of non-fraternisation with the German population. In application this meant that, instead of requisitioning individual houses, the Americans requisitioned whole streets and districts for their exclusive use. In those requisitioned areas Germans were then not permitted to have their residence - and were only allowed restricted rights of movement, e.g. German employees etc. This led to considerable wastage of living space and consequently to resentment within the population of Nord-Württemberg against the American requisitioning policy.

Another extenuating circumstance which the town hall tended to ignore in its assessment of the "Wohnungsamt"'s performance in the first two years of the occupation was the objectively difficult situation with which the "Wohnungsamt" had to contend in those years. The first problem for the "Wohnungsamt" was the
fact that prior to the town's capture by the French in April 1945 the National Socialist administration had destroyed the entire housing files on Tübingen. On one sole occasion Oberbürgermeister Rammer conceded this point to offset criticism from the Municipal council: "Beim Herannahen der 1. französischen Armee wurden auf einen unsinnigen Befehl hin die Unterlagen des Wohnungsamtes vernichtet, so daß zunächst eine Wohnraumlenkung ohne empfindliche Störungen gar nicht möglich war. So rasch wie möglich hat man alle vorhandenen Wohnräume zu erfassen versucht und eine neue Wohnungskartei aufgebaut. Was das bedeutet, in einer Zeit, in der jeden Tag durch die Besatzung, die Ausländer und Zuziehenden neuer Wohnraum in Anspruch genommen wurde, kann nur denjenigen, der unter solchen Umständen mit der Wohnbewirtschaftung zu tun hatte. Der Leiter des Wohnungsamtes und seine Beamten hatten eine unerhörte Arbeit zu bewältigen und es ist einsichtig und un­ gerecht, wenn man ihnen vorwerfen will, daß sie manchmal scharf aufgetreten sind und es ihnen nicht gelang, zu helfen." (As the French First Army advanced (on the town) the records of the housing department were destroyed in response to an insane order, so that at the beginning it was not at all possible to implement a supervised system of housing area distribution. An attempt was made to register all available accommodation as quickly as possible and a new housing register was composed. What that means at a time when new accommodation is being claimed every day by occupation authorities, foreign nationals and new arrivals in town, can only be appreciated by those who were involved with the supervision of accommodation under those circumstances. The manager of the housing department and his officials had to cope with an exorbitant work load and it is unreasonable and unjust if they are to be accused of acting drastically on occasion and of not succeeding in providing aid.)

Furthermore, the French authorities in Tübingen maintained close surveillance on the activities of the "Wohnungsamt" and dictated its quotas and policy through constant contact and a flow of orders and decrees. Admittedly, the municipal and "Kreis" administrations had been accorded a theoretical amount of autonomy in housing affairs by Article 1 of Law Nr. 18 (March 8, 1946) of the Allied Control Council, which allowed local German authorities the right to issue instructions to the German population. This power, however, remained subject to the decisions of the respective military governments since Article 1 also stated that the German housing administrations were to carry out their duties "en conformité avec les instructions et les règlements prévus par celui-ci (i.e. le Gouverne-
ment Militaire). The French military government utilised this power of supervision to the utmost.

A comparison of statistics demonstrates the extent to which housing affairs were administered primarily according to the interests and dictates of the French military government and the occupying army. These statistics serve as the final extenuating circumstance for the activities and negative reputation of the “Wohnungsamt” in the years, 1945-1947.

The “Wohnungsamt” finished its statistical analysis of Tübingen’s housing situation in early August 1945. The report was forwarded to the “Munizenvorstand” on September 5. According to this report the population of Tübingen had increased by August 8, 1945, from 30,002 in 1939 to 35,779 plus 3,000-odd foreigners and the French military government and army personnel (for which figures were not quoted). The figure of 3,000 foreigners (i.e. Displaced Persons) must be treated with some reservation since by this time the French military government had already begun to deport the mainly Russian and Polish “Fremdarbeiter” (foreign workers) from Tübingen. For example, Hermann Werner quotes much lower statistics, listing 810 male and 800 female foreign workers.

The above report also stated that there were in Tübingen on August 18, 1945, 7,967 apartments in 4,435 houses. In a pencilled aside the report further noted that of these units 206 apartments and houses had been requisitioned, but no breakdown was provided of the ratio of houses to apartments. Hermann Werner, however, provides figures in his history of post-war Tübingen based on research done in the municipal archives. According to him by the end of 1945 the French had requisitioned 450 apartments and 1050 single rooms plus hotels, garages, office buildings, storehouses and student hostels.

The result was that great strain was put on Tübingen’s already shaky housing resources and the “Wohnungsamt” had to implement incisive measures to retain a semi-orderly situation, for, prior to the chaos created by French requisitioning, Tübingen had already considerably more households, i.e. 8,700 including 695 evacuee households, than apartments, i.e. 7,967. Under pressure from the “Wohnungsamt”, the municipal administration came to the conclusion that it could not afford to allow continued migration into Tübingen from outside. In the post-war period
Tübingen was an attractive prospect for thousands of families wishing to re-establish themselves in a community which had been spared the worst ravages of warfare. Consequently the town hall eventually gained the approval of the French military government for the establishment of a "Ausnahmegewahl" (immigration ban/ban on transfer of domicile to Tübingen) as from September 1, 1945. In the meantime the National Socialist "Kriegsverordnung" (war decree) of 1943 was retained in force with regard to the housing situation: everyone with extra living space, i.e. with more than one room per person, was compelled to report it to the "Wohnungsamt"; in addition, rooms could only be rented to persons in possession of an "Einweisungskarte" (assignment card) from the housing department; furthermore, large rooms were partitioned to create more rooms and the names of the inhabitants of each house had to be written on the house door with full particulars, including age and place of birth. The "Wohnungsamt" constantly checked and modified its files on the housing situation and rigorously implemented a system of surveillance. It is little wonder that the "Wohnungsamt" was unpopular among the town populace.

In this respect the French authorities gained the desired effect. Fully aware that the extent of their requisitions would antagonise and alienate the local population, they used the "Wohnungsamt" to indirectly implement their wishes and to bear the brunt of popular anger. The "Wohnungsamt"'s task became progressively more difficult and unpleasant as French housing demands increased. Also, the "Ausnahmegewahl" did not apply to two groups: students and French occupation personnel. The number of French personnel increased radically in Tübingen after the town's elevation to the rank of capital of Nord-Württemberg. In addition, no limitation was imposed upon the extent of family and dependents which the French personnel could transfer from France to Tübingen. In occupied Germany the military government staff and their dependents were ensured of a secure income and relatively comfortable living standard, in comparison with the shortages of food, housing and fuel which were a feature of post-war France. This standard of living was maintained, in direct contrast to the British and American zones which were heavily subsidised, at the exclusive cost of the German population (c.f. F. Roy Willis and Edgar Norin) in the form of food, clothing (each German family in Tübingen had to donate one full set of clothing) and house requisitioning and in the form of direct financial levies. It was therefore understandable that each military government unit gradually increased its entourage of dependents (q.v.)
F. Roy Willis, p. 94), sending in many cases for entire clans of relatives or as

Hermann Werner stated ironically, "... bis zu den Großmüttern ... wöblie die deut-
ischen Vorstellungen von der aussterbenden Nation gründlich widerlegt wurden".
(Right down to their grandmothers ... thus thoroughly refuting German notions of
the dying nation.)

This avalanche of new arrivals was reflected in the amount of unabated

house requisitioning in Tübingen between 1945 and 1947. In the mayor's report

on the housing situation to the municipal council (January 16, 1947) for the

period, 1945-1946, the figures indicated a dramatic rise in requisitioning:

"... Der Bedarf der Besatzungsmacht beträgt zur Zeit:

505 Wohnungen, von 2 bis und mehr Zimmern
410 Einzelzimmer
119 Garagen
62 vollständige Häuser
35 gewerbliche Räume und Betriebsstätten
20 Hotels und Gaststätten
8 öffentliche Gebäude und
2½ Kasernen.

Von dem verbleibenden Raum mußte für die deutsche Landesregierung ebenfalls eine

ganz beträchtliche Zahl an Räumen zur Verfügung gestellt werden ... Wenn zudem

noch die neu angewandten Einwohner und schließlich noch über 3000 Studenten Wohn-

und Schlafgelegenheit finden müssen, so braucht man kein Rechenkünstler zu sein, um

zu wissen, wo uns der Schuh drückt."

(The requirements of the occupation authorities amount to at present:

505 apartments of 2 to 5 and more rooms,
410 single rooms
119 garages
62 complete houses
35 commercial and business premises
20 hotels and restaurants
8 public buildings and
2½ barracks.

From the remaining living space (in the town) quite a considerable number of rooms
had to be made available to regional German government (i.e., regional and regional departments of Süd-Württemberg).

If, in addition, the town’s new inhabitants and, finally, more than 3000 students have to find living and sleeping accommodation, then one does not need to be a mathematician to know where the shoe is pinching in our case.\(^{(48)}\)

In August 1946 the "Bürgermeisteramt" had already drawn up a report on the housing situation in Tübingen in connection with a general report on municipal affairs to the "Liga der freien Wohlfahrtsvereine für Württemberg-Süd und Hohenzollern": "... Bei der Volkszählung am 26.1.1946 wurden in Tübingen 33,980 Einwohner gezählt. Das bedeutet gegenüber 1939 eine Zunahme der Bevölkerung um 11,7%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Der Wohnraum betrug 1939</th>
<th>7929 Wohnungen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neubauten</td>
<td>39 Wohnungen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wohnraum 1946</td>
<td>7967 Wohnungen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hier von gehen ab:

- von der Truppe bzw. Militärregierung
- beschlagnahmte Wohnungen 681 (meist Villen und Einfamilienhäuser)

Beschlagnahme von deutschen Behörden am. 80

- Totalbombenschäden und schwere Schäden 108 = 869 Wohnungen
- Rostwohnungen 6098

Einer Zunahme der Bevölkerung um 11,7% steht eine Abnahme an Wohnraum um 10,9% gegenüber.

Dazu kommt, daß etwa 1340 Einzelzimmer für die französischen Besatzungsanghörigen beschlagnahmt sind. Die Unterbringung der hier weiter zum Studium angemessenen Studenten steht vor unlösbaren Schwierigkeiten. Die Vielzahl der gewünschten Einzelzimmer zu beschaffen, ist, bei einer derartigen Überbelegung, wie sie in Tübingen vorhanden ist, gänzlich unmöglich. Hinzu kommen ständige Anforderungen an weiteren Wohnungen und Zimmern für Angestellte der Militärregierung, die von auswärts kommen, hier zusiehen und untergebracht werden müssen ..."

(In the census of 26.1.1946, 33,910 inhabitants were counted in Tübingen. Compared with 1939 this means an increase of population of 11.7 %.

- Housing space in 1939 amounted to: 7929 flats
- New buildings: 32 flats
- Housing space in 1946: 7967 flats

From these are to be deducted:
- Flats requisitioned by the French army or Military Government resp.: approx. 601 (mostly villas and one-family houses)
- Requisitions by German authorities: approx. 869 flats
- Totally bomb-damaged and severely damaged: 108 = 669 flats
- Remaining Flats 6998

An increase of population of 11.7 % is to be set against a decrease of housing space of 10.9 %.

If one considers that even in the years, 1937-1938, there was a considerable lack of housing space in Tübingen, one can gain a rough picture on the basis of these figures of the present situation in the housing market. There are, on the one hand, 2, 3 and more families housed in one flat; on the other hand, they have had to accommodate themselves in the basement rooms of requisitioned flats (e.g. ironing room, other service rooms, cellar, attic). These conditions are most unhealthy and are not tolerable in the long run, especially during the forthcoming winter.

To this should be added the fact that about 1340 single rooms have been requisitioned for members of the French occupation authorities. The question of accommodating the students who are enrolled to continue their studies here faces insurmountable difficulties. It is completely impossible to provide the large
number of single rooms required in view of the state of overcrowding which prevails at present in Tübingen. In addition, there are the constant demands for more flats and rooms for Military Government employees who, coming in from outside, take up residence in Tübingen and have to be housed ...(49)

By October 1947 the amount of living space requisitioned by the French had again risen, although solely in the form of single rooms of which some seventy-odd were requisitioned. (50) Although this proved to be an indication that French requisitioning quotas were levelling off, the question of house requisitioning remained a problem child with the Tübingen municipal authorities long after 1947; indeed as late as November 19, 1955, the Schwäbische Täglich noted that a total of 13 complete houses, 102 apartments and 39 single rooms still remained as requisition items in French use. (51)

As already said, the German administrations not only bore the stress of the administrative labour involved in solving situations often created by French demands in such fields as food, clothing and housing, but were also compelled to defuse resentments emerging within a population unhappy with its economic lot. The "Wohnungsamt", as an instance, became the focal point of a protracted squabble between municipal administration, "Staatsekretariat" and university authorities. The "Staatsekretariat", aware that little satisfaction was to be gained from the French authorities, tried to impose its wishes concerning living and office space on the town hall with scant regard for the problems facing the municipal administration in the housing sector, with the result that a struggle of interests developed with each party trying to outmanoeuvre the others. The town hall, for example, tried to limit the number of students enrolled from outside of Württemberg. At the same time the "Staatsekretariat" endeavoured to have the guide lines laid down by the "Wohnungsamt" altered to its advantage, namely to provide more living space for its personnel. This developed into a particularly serious struggle between town hall and the "Staatsekretariat". After publication of the housing law of the Allied Control Council of March 18, 1946, which required the establishment of housing norms within each administrative area, the "Wohnungsamt" in Tübingen laid down a set of guide lines which provided an average living area of 12,3 square metres per person. The "Staatsekretariat" was not satisfied with the new housing regulations and consequently set out its own instructions on housing matters. The French military government, from which official approval was required for the
publication of such decrees, delayed the publication of the "Staatssekretariat"s instructions until December 20, 1946. In the meantime the "Staatssekretariat" set about imposing its will on the town hall. Hermann Werner described this quarrel as follows: "Inzwischen aber hatte sich die Landesdirektion des Innern am 28. Oktober in einem auffallend scharfen Schreiben an die Stadtverwaltung gewendet; sie warf dieser unter Hinweis auf Erfahrungen von Angehörigen des Staatssekretariates vor, ihre Rahmenan im Wohnungswesen seien ungenügend, der Anstellab von 12,3 Quadratmetern pro Person sei zu günstig. So sei in Tübingen seit längerer Zeit so gut wie unmöglich, eine Familienwohnung zu erhalten, und auch Einzelzimmer seien nur durch langes Suchen von Haus zu Haus zu finden. Immer wieder mäse die Behörde auf die Anstellung notwendiger Fachkräfte von auswärtigen Versichten. Das Schreiben forderte lückenlose Erfassung und zweckmäßige Verteilung des Wohnraums und gab dazu Richtlinien, die jener noch nicht veröffentlichten Bauordnung entsprachen. Zu ihrer Durchführung sollte die Stadtverwaltung eine Reihe von 10 bis 15 Kommissionen von je mindestens drei Personen aufstellen ... Schließlich drohte das Schreiben mit der Anstellung eines Staatskonsisera für das Wohnungswesen für Tübingen. In einer Gemeinderatssitzung am 15. November wurden die Vorwürfe allgemein entschieden zurückgewiesen ... Der Leiter des Wohnungswesens wies darauf hin, daß gerade in letzter Zeit infolge der ständigen Vermehrung der Bewerber des Staatssekretariats andere Bewerber um Wohnungen überhaupt nicht mehr zum Zuge gekommen seien, eben fordernd die Landespolizei wieder 59 Wohnungen ... In der Antwort an die Landesdirektion des Innern wurde ausgeführt, Tübingen sei zu klein für die heutige Beanspruchung, das Staatssekretariat solle überlegen, ob es nicht durch Verlegung eines Teils seiner Ämter in andere Städte Tübingen entlasten könne. Die Norm von 12,3 qm sei in Tübingen längst überholt.

So erließ das Wohnungswesent unter dem 4. Dezember 1946 neue Richtlinien, die der Rechtsanordnung angepaßt waren und stellte auch die gewünschten Kommissionen auf "

(In the meantime, however, the "Landesdirektion des Innern" addressed itself to the town hall administration on October 28 in a very sharp letter; referring to the experience of certain members of the State Secretariat, it expressed dissatisfaction with the town hall, stating that its measures in the field of housing were insufficient and that the scale of 12.3 square meters per person was too generous.

For some time it had been as good as impossible to get a family apartment in
Tübingen and single rooms could also only be found after long searching on a house-to-house basis. Time and time again the State Secretariat executive had to dispense with employing badly-needed experts from outside Tübingen. The letter demanded a consistent system of listing and a practical allotment of housing space and included guidelines which corresponded to the (new) legal decree which had not yet been published. To implement the same the town hall administration was instructed to appoint a number of commissions (about 10) of at least three members each ... Finally, the letter threatened with the appointment of a state commissioner for housing affairs for Tübingen. In a municipal council meeting on November 19 these reproaches were firmly rejected in totality ... The manager of the housing department pointed out that, especially lately as a result of the continuous increase of civil servants in the State Secretariat, other applicants for apartments had no chance at all and that at this very moment the police was demanding another 59 apartments ... In the reply to the "Landesdirektion des Innern" it was stated that Tübingen was too small for the present level of demand and that the State Secretariat ought to consider whether it could not relieve Tübingen by transferring a part of its offices to other towns. The norm of 12.3 square metres had long since been discarded in Tübingen ...

Thus the housing department issued new bulleting guidelines on December 4, 1946, that corresponded to the legal decree and, in addition, appointed the required commissions ...

This was a pure struggle of interests. The "Staatssekretariat" was aware, especially Carlo Schmid, that the French military government bore the ultimate responsibility for the housing situation in Tübingen. Nevertheless Schmid and the "Landesdirektor des Innern", Hofmann, refused to compromise on their demands; they established their priorities and implemented them in the face of municipal needs and opposition. On the other hand, when specific interests were not involved Schmid was prepared to make representations of a general nature to the French authorities and plead for milder programs of house requisitioning. This was usually done in private audiences with French occupation officials. At the Munich "Ministerpräsidentenkonferenzen", however, in June 1947 Carlo Schmid publicly criticised Allied housing policy in the context of a general lecture, entitled "Die Neuregelung des Besatzungsrechtes" (The redefinition of occupation law), in which it was evident that Schmid was referring specifically to the French occupation

Eine besondere Rolle spielt die Requisition von Wohnraum für die Bedürfnisse der Besatzungstruppe. Das ist, wie jeder weiß, besonders heute ein sehr hart empfundener Eingriff in die Lebenssphäre des einzelnen Mannes. In Tübingen house requisitioning was the subject of much private criticism, little of which was actually put directly to the French military government, although the French generally learnt of it through their liaison men in the German administrations. One of the most interesting criticisms of the French housing policy was made in Gebhard Müller's already quoted election speech (1947) in which he compared the Americans, once the bogey men of Württemberg in matters of house requisitioning, favourably with the French: "... Die amerikanische Militärregierung ist durch eine neuerliche Entscheidung mit gutem Beispiel vorangegangen, indem sie bestimmt hat, daß ab dem 1. Mai keine Beschlagnahme von Wohnungen mehr erfolgen soll. Ich bin ebenfalls der Auffassung, daß das Maximum der Haus- und Möblierbedürfnisse der französischen Militärregierung heute erreicht sein sollte, daß sie in Anbetracht der festzustellenden Ruhe und Ordnung unseres Landes und der genauen Kenntnis unseres Verwaltungsapparates denken kann, den Verwaltungsapparat kleiner zu gestalten." (The American military government set a good example in a recent decision by ruling that no further requisitioning of apartments is to be carried out as from May 1. I am also of the opinion that the maximum housing and furnishing requirements of the French military government ought to have been satisfied.
by now and that in view of the evident state of peace and order within our "Land" and of the French military government's intimate acquaintance with our administrative system, it should gradually consider reducing its administrative machine. (55)

But even this criticism remained private in the sense that it was never published. Directed at a much less wider audience than Schmid's paper to the Munich "Ministerpräsidentenkonferenz", it remained the knowledge of a limited circle since French censorship prevented any mention of the topic in the press. Indeed Gebhard Müller could possibly have lost his office for such criticism, as did others, e.g. Ernst Fischer and Hermann Werner.

Resentment at what one French observer described later as a negative and greedy housing policy ("... La cohabitation des occupants, logés d'offices dans des villes requisITIONnées, avec les propriétaires souvent exilés au grenier ou la cave donnait lieu à des contacts peu plaisants, et l'expulsion pure et simple des familles allemandes dans des villes dévastées par les bombardements soulevait évidemment l'indignation des victimes ...") came to a head in Tübingen in November 1947 when the French authorities demanded an extra 25 appartements to cover the arrival of newly appointed officials. The "Wohnungsabteilung" (housing section) of the municipal council, i.e. a sub-committee of the municipal council, replied that it was not prepared to designate any more appartements for requisitioning and indicated that the administration for housing and lodging within the French military government should implement its own wishes. (57) This in fact represented a rebellion within the town council against the French system of indirect administration by which the German administrations implemented and largely took the blame for French decisions. According to Hermann Werner this confrontation was pushed into the background by another, more serious confrontation over the question of a series of lists of machinery earmarked for dismantling, the so-called "Maschinenentnahme II" (Machinery Removal, II). The signs of a newfound spirit of independence was nevertheless abroad in the late 1947 within the town hall administrations of Tübingen after more than two years of acquiescence, during which period the French authorities effectively defused opposition and criticism.

Another major example of the French military government's success in defusing a potentially explosive theme within Tübingen was their policy on food rationing. This leads on to an examination of the "Ernährungsamt" in Tübingen as
one of the municipal administrations which was compelled per se to maintain close ties with the French authorities and to implement French policy to the letter.

It was generally admitted during the period, 1945-1947, that, with the possible exception of the Russian Zone, the population of the French zone suffered most from food shortages. The food shortage in Süd-Württemberg, occurring in one of the agricultural belts of Germany, was the consequence of several main causes. Firstly, it was official occupation policy for the French army of occupation to live off the land in traditional Napoleonic style, in contrast to the British and Americans who financed the feeding of their occupation armies. The second cause lay in the fact that Süd-Württemberg had to provide agricultural products for other less agriculturally prosperous parts of the French zone, plus Berlin. Gebhard Müller maintained in 1952 that, had it not been for French policy, Süd-Württemberg would have been able to have maintained itself agriculturally, e.g.: "... Das Land wäre an sich in der Lage gewesen, sich mit Fett und Fleisch, auch mit Kartoffeln aus eigenen Beständen auch ohne Rationierung zu versorgen. Es mußten jedoch z.B. von den abgelieferten Kartoffeln bis zu 45 % der Umlage an die französische Armee, an Ausländerlager, an das Saargebiet, nach Rheinland-Pfalz und Berlin geliefert werden." (... The "Land" would have been on the whole in a position to satisfy its needs with regard to fat, meat and also potatoes from its own resources without even rationing. For example, up to 45 % of the potatoes surrendered (i.e. to the food rationing administration) had to be supplied to the French Army, foreigners' camps, the Saar district, the Rhineland-Palatinate and Berlin.)

Müller's statement, however, must be treated with some caution for it appears that a third cause for Süd-Württemberg's difficult food situation was the division of Württemberg into two zones which disturbed the agricultural and economic infrastructure of the "Land" and robbed Tübingen, for example, of part of its economic hinterland. In a letter to Theodor Heuß, minister of education for American-occupied Nord-Württemberg, the university of Tübingen stressed this fact to underline demands for extended support from Nord-Württemberg to feed university students.

Finally, when the French authorities were forced by dire circumstances to import cereals and other food-stuffs into the French zone they paid for them through the profits made from German industrial production in the French zone.
through the agency of "OPICOMEX" (Office de Commerce Extérieur), set up to manage the export and sale of German industrial products. In the period August 1945 to March 1947 the French imported $93.5 million of food-stuffs to alleviate the food situation in their zone, paying for this from the profits of OPICOMEX.\(^{(60)}\)

The occupying army, together with the occupation administration, consumed a high proportion of the zone's production in terms of food. One account written in a Contemporary Review article in 1948 noted that "though the French deny that their people live off the land, the Germans must provide every Frenchman with 3 lb. of butter and 48 eggs a month, and the household of a general is entitled to 750 eggs. The Germans, on the other hand, receive 150 grams of butter a month, and forty eggs a year, and the total meat production is almost equally divided between the 6,000,000 Germans and the French occupiers. Exactly how many of the latter there are has never been known ... the French estimate of 15,000 is too low. According to a memorandum prepared by a German Ministry last year there were in the French zone eighteen Frenchmen for every 1,000 Germans as compared with two or three Americans in the neighbouring American province ... This secrecy is characteristic of the French zone which is almost completely cut off from the rest of Germany and the rest of the world ...\(^{(61)}\) An article some eighteen months earlier in the London Times in December 1946 threw a harsher light on the food situation in the post-war period of French occupation in South-West Germany: "... the nominal daily ration for the average consumer was 1,250 calories. It has been much lower. Over the last year the official ration has averaged about 1,000 calories, but it has seldom or never been met in full."\(^{(62)}\) In contrast, the rations as foreseen for the German population in the Potsdam agreements were set at a daily average of 1,500 calories per day.

The French statistics published between 1945 and 1947 on the food situation in the French zone were, whilst not positively encouraging, somewhat rosier than the reality behind the figures. All the available statistics date from the years 1946 and 1947, during which period the food situation had only improved marginally for the German population. To provide an insight into the official optimism of the French statistics it has been decided to provide three sources.

The first, quoted in a report entitled "L'occupation française en Allemagne (Ruèpêle)" in the journal, Christian Social, offered the following table for the month of June 1946:

\(^{(60)}\) The reference text is not provided.
The second source, *Société Française d'Information*, No. 77, of February 1947, published the following figures for August, September and October 1946:

"Pays autres que la Sarre:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Août</th>
<th>Septembre</th>
<th>Octobre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ville de plus de 20,000 habitants</td>
<td>1,165 calories</td>
<td>1,429 calories</td>
<td>1,350 calories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ville de moins de 20,000 habitants</td>
<td>1,250 calories</td>
<td>1,200 calories</td>
<td>1,163 calories</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The third source is a piece of academic research, entitled *Méthodes d'administration française en Allemagne*, which was given in lecture form to the Centre d’Études de Politique Étrangère in Paris in May 1947 by a Professor Hornboestel from the University of Poitiers who was also a member of the "Comité juridique de la zone française d'occupation". Professor Hornboestel struck a reassuring note in his elaboration of the nutritional levels enjoyed by the German population: "Au point de vue alimentaire, chaque habitant reçoit 1300 calories; il y a le marché noir qui augmente sensiblement le nombre de ces calories. La population est peut-être sous-alimentée, mais il n'y a pas d'épidémie; l'état sanitaire est bon; il y a moins de décès que en 1938. Il suffirait de relever le niveau alimentaire de 3 ou 400 calories pour que la situation de la Zone française soit bonne."

The optimism of the above accounts of the food situation in the French zone, and consequently Bad-Wurtemberg, must be modified on two counts: firstly, by a fleeting comparison with the food situation in the neighbouring American zones and, secondly, by a detailed look at the reality of the actual food situation in Tübingen in the years 1945-1947.
For the American zone two sources may be quoted to indicate the more favourable food situation. Marshall Knappen wrote in 1947 about the rationing in the American Zone that, whilst Major-General Stayer, the OMGUS medical officer, had recommended a 2200 calorie diet as the basic ration for German civilians, "there was strong opposition from the French and some from the British to allow such an allowance for the late enemies, at a time when food was still short at home. In the end our headquarters agreed on 1,550 calories as the basic allowance." (66) Karl Brandt, looking back in 1949 at the situation in the American zone in the initial years of occupation, maintained that "the goal of 1,550 calories a day for normal consumers was far below what was necessary to maintain work efficiency. Three times in succession the food-rationing system broke down. In the early months of 1946, 1947 and 1948 rations fell to disastrously low levels. In May, 1947, food riots broke out and a general strike and bloodshed were avoided only by an emergency shipment of 70 vessels loaded with flour and grain. Early in 1946 the American army intended to raise the rations in our zone to 2,000 calories daily, but for various reasons did not even obtain the necessary allocations or appropriations for maintaining the 1,500-calorie ration. (67)

The official food levels in the American zone were therefore marginally higher than the official levels in the French zone. This was a feature which exasperated the municipal administration in Tübingen for those students from Nord-Württemberg who attended the University of Tübingen possessed ration cards which entitled them to a higher calorie consumption than the local population. Despite the fact, however, that the American zone enjoyed higher food levels than the French zone it experienced food riots whilst Süd-Württemberg did not, although the Pfalz did have fairly extensive food strikes. This is all the more surprising since the official French food statistics had little relation at times with reality, as can be demonstrated in the specific case of Tübingen. Tübingen therefore serves to illustrate and highlight discrepancies within the official - and meagre - French accounts of their occupation of South-West Germany.

It is in this respect that the standard work on the French zone, The French in Germany, 1945-1949, by P. Hoy Willis, (68) displays structural weaknesses of argument in that it raises rather obviously at times on French sources to relativise criticisms which had been levelled at the French military government, without examining what actually went on in the individual communities of the French zone.
to test the truth of the French sources. For instance, on the subject of causes for the low food levels in the French zone (which Willis blamed principally on poor seed supply and the lack of fertilizer, machinery and manpower\(^{(69)}\)) the author stated that "... Germans saw this army (i.e. the French) as a swarm of locusts and poured stories of its extravagance into willing ears. Experts on Germany added their support to these charges. Gustav Stolper, the economist, claimed that the French in their zone "exploit even its poverty" while Karl Brandt, an expert on food supply, noted that "the food shortage in 1947 was worst in the French zone, where a large occupation force lived off the land.""

Several points must be made in reply to these criticisms. First ... Second, the requisitioning of food did not include wheat, sugar and coffee.\(^{(70)}\)

This latter point made by Willis is incorrect and corresponds in no way to the actuality of the situation in post-war capital town of Tubingen. According to a municipal archive document, entitled "Lebensmittellieferungen des Städtischen Ernährungsausschusses auf Anforderungen der französischen Armee" (Foodstuffs deliveries by the municipal food supplies' department in response to requisitions and demands by the French army), almost half a million kilos of bread flour (425,637) were requisitioned by the French authorities in Tubingen in the period between April 24 and December 31, 1945, alone.\(^{(71)}\)

These facts, however, did not reach the newspapers since the French were particularly concerned about disguising the real food situation in their zone and maintained tight censorship on the subject. A Constance newspaper for example, was banned in June 1947 for publishing verbatim a resolution passed by the Baden "Landtag" on food conditions.\(^{(72)}\) Another instance is quoted by F. Roy Willis for the year 1948: "The Socialist newspaper, Die Freiheit, finally passed the point of tolerable criticism and was suspended when it published on April 23, 1948, a graph purportedly showing that a concentration camp inmate in Buchenwald in 1944-45 received a better food supply (1,675 calories a day) than the average consumer in the French zone in 1947 (805 calories a day).\(^{(73)}\)

The specific situation in post-war Baden-Württemberg has been described as follows by Gehard Müller: "Nach dem Zusammenbruch des Jahres 1945 gingen die
Lebensmittelrationen immer mehr zurück. Der tiefste Stand wurde erreicht im Mai 1946 mit 905 Kalorienwert der aufgerufenen Rationen, also etwa 1/3 einer Normalration. Auch im Jahre 1947 war die Ernährung noch unzureichend. Man war glücklich, als man in diesem Jahre das Ziel, 1500 Kalorien, erreichte. Erst 1948 kam eine fühlbare Besserung. Ende des Jahres betrug der Kalorienwert 1868, im Dezember 1949 war er auf 2044 gestiegen. (After the debacle of 1945 food rations decreased more and more. The lowest level was reached in May 1946 with a calorific rate of 905 calories (i.e., per day) for the rations provided, that is about 1/3 of normal daily rations. In 1947 the nutritional level was still insufficient. We were glad that we reached the goal of 1500 calories (i.e., per day) in that same year. It was not until 1948, however, that there was a noticeable improvement. At the end of 1948 the calorific value corresponded to 1868 calories, by December 1949 it had risen to 2044.)

In another essay Müllers described the situation in more dramatic terms: "... Das kleine Land mußte aus seiner landwirtschaftlichen Erzeugung nicht nur die große Besatzung und den französischen Sektor Berlins, sondern weitgehend das Saargebiet und Teile von Rheinland-Pfalz und Baden versorgen. Schließlich waren die Lebensmittelentnahmen so erheblich, daß pro Kopf der Bevölkerung im eigenen Land nur noch 620 Tagekalorien übrig blieben, während die ärztliche Wissenschaft 2000 Kalorien als Existenzminimum für notwendig hält." (The small "Land" had not only to supply with its agricultural produce the large apparatus of the occupation authorities and the French sector of Berlin, but also to a great extent the Saar district and parts of the Rhineland-Palatinate and Baden. The food requisitions were eventually so extensive that there were only 620 calories per day per head for the population of Süd-Württemberg, while medical science considers 2000 calories as the necessary subsistence minimum.)

These figures quoted by Müller may appear somewhat dramatic but there is some evidence that French forces requisitioned 74.6% of Süd-Württemberg's meat supply in the course of 1945, 57.5% in 1946 and 36% in 1947. At a cabinet meeting of the "Staatssekretariat" of March 1946 the "Landsdirektor" responsible for food and agriculture, Dr. Klipper, reported that the French zone was still by far the worst of the three western zones for food supply: its figures for Süd-Württemberg were "937 Kalorien gegen 1040 in der englischen und 1300 in der amerikanischen Zone" (937 calories as compared with 1040 calories in the English and 1300 in the American zone).
As late as 1967 a weighty and official piece of local statistics, the *Amtliche Beschreibung des Landkreises Tübingen* (Official Description of the Rural "Kreis" of Tübingen) stated: "Die Lebensmittelversorgung, die im Mai 1946 mit einem Kalorienwert 905 der aufgerufenen Rationen (rund ein Drittel einer Normalration) ihren tiefsten Stand erreicht hatte, verbesserte sich wohl bis 1947 auf 1500 Kalorien je Ration, blieb aber weiterhin mangelhaft." (Food supplies which had reached its lowest level in May 1946 with a calorific rate of 905 calories (per day) for the rations provided (about a third of a normal day’s rations) improved by about 1947 to 1500 calories per (daily) ration, but continued to remain deficient.)

This therefore was the general background to the food situation in Tübingen during the period, 1945-1947. As soon as the French arrived in Tübingen they set out a list of food supplies which the community had to provide for their upkeep. In addition, specific firms were closed down by the French authorities. Restrictions were also imposed on the opening times of food shops in order to regulate the sale of foodstuffs; this measure was published in the first newspaper edition of the post-war period in Tübingen and read as follows: "Von dieser Woche ab haben die Lebensmittelgeschäfte an folgenden Wochentagen ihre Läden wieder regelmäßig, wie folgt, geöffnet zu halten:" (As from this week, food shops will have to keep their shops open again on the following weekdays:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bakeries</th>
<th>Dienstag, Donnerstag und Samstag</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Butcher's shops</td>
<td>Mittwoch, Freitag und Samstag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonial stores</td>
<td>Montag, Donnerstag und Samstag</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tübingen, den 30. April 1945; (Tübingen, April 30, 1945; Der stellvertretende Oberbürgermeister). (The Deputy Mayor.)

Again, it is interesting to note that this order was transmitted to the population indirectly via the acting mayor and not by the French.

In the course of a debate held by the "Demokratische Vereinigung" on the food question (October 10, 1945), Karl Mayer, the head of the municipal "Ernährungsamt" in Tübingen, stated: "Man müsse bedenken, daß wir außer der Stadtbewohnerchaft..."
ca. 4000 Besatzungsangehörige versorgen müssen. Diese erhalten pro Kopf und Tag:

- 250 g Fleisch
- 60 g Butter
- 60 g Fett
- 500 g Brot
- 30 g Käse
- 35 g Öl
- 50 g Zucker.

One ought to bear in mind that, in addition to the inhabitants, we have to provide for approx. 4000 members of the occupation authorities. These are receiving per head and per day:

- 250 g meat
- 60 g butter
- 60 g fat
- 500 g bread
- 30 g cheese
- 35 g oil
- 50 g sugar.

Much more precise statistics of the extent of food requisitioning in Tübingen in 1945 are provided by a document in the municipal archives (Stadtarchiv) in Tübingen; unfortunately, no equivalents were to be found for the subsequent years 1946 and 1947. The statistics for 1945 are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zeitraum 1945</th>
<th>Brot = Mehl</th>
<th>Butter</th>
<th>Fleisch</th>
<th>Käse</th>
<th>Teigwaren</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>kg</td>
<td>kg</td>
<td>kg</td>
<td>kg</td>
<td>kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. 4.-31. 8.</td>
<td>337941</td>
<td>11605</td>
<td>7995</td>
<td>10364</td>
<td>19999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. 9.-30. 9.</td>
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<td>16197</td>
<td>43830</td>
<td>8903</td>
<td>6306</td>
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<tr>
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<td>10171</td>
<td>37120</td>
<td>5707</td>
<td>4911</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.11.-30.11.</td>
<td>25451</td>
<td>8132</td>
<td>32359</td>
<td>4710</td>
<td>3490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.12.-31.12.</td>
<td>10606</td>
<td>7408</td>
<td>22876</td>
<td>4106</td>
<td>2968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Zusammen</strong></td>
<td><strong>425087</strong></td>
<td><strong>52513</strong></td>
<td><strong>143760</strong></td>
<td><strong>33690</strong></td>
<td><strong>37673</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Zeitraum 1945 | Vollmilch | Öl | Butter | Kartoffel | Frischgemüse
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24. 4.-31. 8.</td>
<td>23518</td>
<td>4742</td>
<td>67166</td>
<td>204500</td>
<td>60308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3299</td>
<td>12103</td>
<td>104679</td>
<td>84973</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.10.-31.10.</td>
<td>8635</td>
<td>2814</td>
<td>2983</td>
<td>90997</td>
<td>19717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.11.-30.11.</td>
<td>8596</td>
<td>2136</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>88426</td>
<td>34015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.12.-31.12.</td>
<td>10661</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>87015</td>
<td>36507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Zusammen</strong></td>
<td><strong>50456</strong></td>
<td><strong>14990</strong></td>
<td><strong>83322</strong></td>
<td><strong>585617</strong></td>
<td><strong>256856</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Period 1945) Bread = Flour | Butter | Meat | Cheese | Farinaceous Products
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>42830</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.10.-31.10.</td>
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<td>10171</td>
<td>37120</td>
<td>5707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.11.-30.11.</td>
<td>25431</td>
<td>8132</td>
<td>32939</td>
<td>4710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.12.-31.12.</td>
<td>10606</td>
<td>7408</td>
<td>22876</td>
<td>4106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>425087</strong></td>
<td><strong>52513</strong></td>
<td><strong>143760</strong></td>
<td><strong>33690</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Period 1945 | Full-Cream Milk | Öl | Eggs | Potatoes | Fresh Vegetable
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24. 4.-31. 8.</td>
<td>23518</td>
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<tr>
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<td>104679</td>
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<td>34015</td>
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<tr>
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<td>36507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>50456</strong></td>
<td><strong>14990</strong></td>
<td><strong>83322</strong></td>
<td><strong>585617</strong></td>
<td><strong>256856</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to tables reproduced by Hermann Werner from municipal archives, the result of these requisitions was that the town hall was forced to maintain a system of strict rationing for the community. For the first weeks of the occupation (April-May 1945) the same ration system was maintained as that employed in Tübingen prior to the occupation. By the end of 1946 Werner reports that the average...
consumer in Tübingen received 8,000 grammes of bread, 440 grammes of meat, 125 grammes of butter and three kilos of potatoes per week. Milk was exclusively reserved for children. The food supplies, however, constantly fluctuated with occasional drastic shortages in some goods, the only steady deliveries remaining the meat supply and the annual ration of 35 eggs per capita.

The town hall administration was acutely aware that the population was in a worse food situation than that experienced during the war period. This was admitted in a letter from the "Bürgermeisteramt" to the "Liga der freien Wohlfahrtspflege für Süd-Württemberg und Hohensollem": "Noch im Kriegsjahr 1940 war die Ernährung der Bevölkerung so, daß die Nahrung je Kopf und Tag einen Wert von 3000 Kalorien darstellte. Gegen Schluß des Krieges, also etwa zu Anfang des Jahres 1945 war der Kalorienwert bis auf etwa 1500, also die Hälfte gesunken. Die Sätze der neuesten Zuteilungsperiode (August 1946) sind auf einem Minimum angelangt. Zum Beweis und Vergleich mögen die Sätze der Jahre 1940 und 1945, der Zuteilungsperiode für August 1946 und die bisher niedrigsten Sätze in der französisch besetzten Zone einander gegenüber gestellt werden:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nahrungsmittel</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1945</th>
<th>Zuteil. Periode für Aug. 1946</th>
<th>bisher niedrigste Sätze</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brot</td>
<td>12 000</td>
<td>6 000</td>
<td>7 500</td>
<td>6 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehl</td>
<td>1 000</td>
<td>1 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fett</td>
<td>1 050</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zucker</td>
<td>1 250</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nahrungsmittel</td>
<td>1 000</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleisch</td>
<td>1 200</td>
<td>1 000</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kartoffeln</td>
<td>Frei</td>
<td>Frei</td>
<td>4 kg</td>
<td>4 kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gemüse</td>
<td>Frei</td>
<td>Frei</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obst</td>
<td>Frei</td>
<td>Frei</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaffee-Kräuts</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1/4 l tägl. in der Woche</td>
<td>1/4 l</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milch</td>
<td>1/4 l tägl.</td>
<td>1/4 l tägl.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Sonderaufruf soweit vorhanden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Käse</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Aus dieser Aufstellung geht hervor, daß die Rationssätze im Jahre 1940 noch angängig waren und die Bevölkerung mit den notwendigsten Lebensmitteln durchkam. Diese Sätze konnten bis Kriegsende nicht beibehalten werden, vielmehr trat im Lauf der Kriegsjahre eine Senkung der Rationsätze ein, die schließlich im Frühjahr 1945 nur noch etwa 1500 Kalorien entsprachen. Damit aber war der Kalorienansatz bereits unterschritten, der zur Erhaltung der Arbeitskraft der Menschen notwendig war ... War schon in den letzten Kriegsmonaten eine ausreichende Versorgung nicht mehr gewährleistet, so wurde dies nach der Besetzung durch die alliierten Truppen in weiterem Maße verschlechtert. Die bei Kriegsende gültigen Rationsätze befanden sich in der Tat in einem niedrigeren Niveau, als es von daher anerkannte Niveau für eine Erhaltung der Arbeitskraft...“

(League of Independent Welfare Work for Sid-Württember and Hohenzollern: In the war year, 1940, the food situation for the population was still such that the food then available per head per day represented a level of 3,000 calories. Towards the end of the war, that is, about the beginning of the year, the calorific level had dropped to about 1500, that is, the half of the previous amount. The rates for the new food allocation period (August 1946) have sunk to an absolute minimum. For the sake of proof and comparison, the rates of food allocation for the years 1940 and 1945 and for the allocation period August 1946 can be set against each other, together with the rates which so far have been the lowest in the French zone:

### Normal Consumer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1945</th>
<th>allocation period</th>
<th>lowest rates so far</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bread</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>flour</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fat</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sugar</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>baby food</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>meat</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>potatoes</td>
<td>no rationing</td>
<td>no rationing</td>
<td>4 kg</td>
<td>4 kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vegetables</td>
<td>no rationing</td>
<td>no rationing</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fruit</td>
<td>no rationing</td>
<td>no rationing</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coffee substitute</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>milk</td>
<td>1/4 litre daily</td>
<td>1/4 litre daily</td>
<td>1/4 litre per week</td>
<td>1/4 litre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cheese</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>special distribution whenever available</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This list shows that the ration rates for the year 1940 were still feasible and that the population survived on the most essential foodstuffs. These rates could not be maintained until the end of the war; on the contrary, a drop in the level of ration rates ensued in the course of the war years so that finally by the spring of 1945 they only corresponded to roughly 1500 calories. Thus the ration rates had already fallen below the calorific level which was necessary to preserve the working capacity of people ... Although it was already the case by the last months of the war that sufficient food provisions were no longer provided, this situation was further worsened by the presence of the Allied troops after the occupation. The ration allowances which were effective at the end of the war were reduced again and reached their lowest level in August 1946. Today's ration allowances are literally not sufficient to support life, let alone maintain the strength to work ... \(^{86}\)

This evidently reflected a drastic reduction in food consumption on the part of the entire population of Tübingen, with the possible exception of specially designated industrial jobs, for which the workers received a "Schwarbeiterzulage" (extra bonus allowance for heavy workers), and of local politicians and senior civil servants, including university professors, who received double rations from the French authorities in an undiluted effort to pre-empt articulate protest from the community's elites. \(^{86}\)

It was nevertheless to be expected that, despite French restraints, there would be some criticism of the food situation among the German population, just as there had been concerning the housing situation. The local "LPD-Ortsverein" listened on one occasion to Oberbürgermeister Kartsen's complaint (August 1946) that "besonders unsere Kinder haben unter dem Mangel an Lebensmitteln zu leiden. Man solle aber auch in Betracht ziehen, daß nicht nur der körperlich schwerarbeitende Mensch eine Zulage benötige. Auch die geistig Schaffenden, die oft 15 bis 18 Stunden angestrengt tätig sind, gehören zu den Schwarbeitern." (... our children were suffering in particular from the lack of food. An increase of rations would have to be made for that part of the population engaged in hard, physical work. It ought also to be realized, however, that it was not only the people who had hard, physical work who required extra rations. Brain-workers, who often worked hard for 15 to 16 hours, also belonged to the category of heavy workers.) \(^{87}\)
This, however, was as public a level of criticism as was possible without sanctions. The normal form of complaint was private recourse to the French authorities, either to the head of the local military government unit or to the administrative department, "Revitaillement", which was responsible for directing food affairs within Süd-Württemberg. An example of such correspondence is provided in the appendix (Appendix Nr. 5) in a reproduction of a letter from Landrat Zahr, Kenner's successor, to Lieutenant-Colonel Courtot, the officer responsible for Kreis Tübingen. Another form of criticism was expressed by a department within the "Landesdirektion des Innern" which was responsible for health affairs ("Gesundheitswesen"), in the context of a report dated October 29, 1945, and addressed to a Colonel Fabre of the Gouvernement Militaire Regional with the request to communicate the contents to Governor-General Widmer. In precise, academic terms the director of the German administration for health pointed out the concomitant dangers of undernourishment, especially the fear of epidemics: "Die augenblicklich scheinbar sehr günstige Ernährungs Lage mit vielen zunächst sporadischen Krankheitserscheinungen im ganzen Land darf nicht über die ernste Gefahr hinweg täuschen, welche darin liegt ..." (The present, apparently very favourable situation with regard to epidemic diseases with its numerous but sporadic cases of individual illness throughout the "Land" should not be allowed to obscure the serious danger inherent in the situation...).

In addition, the trade union organisation, "Gewerkschaftsbund Süd-Württemberg und Hohenzollern", wrote a long letter of complaint to the French military government, including a verbatim copy of a motion of censure passed at a meeting of the trade union executive on June 19, 1947 (q.v. Appendix Nr. 6). The "Staatssekretariat" also made constant representation to the French authorities. One example of this may be quoted here from a cabinet meeting of the "Staatssekretariat" on September 29, 1946, on the agenda of which the first item was entitled "Ernährungs-Lage": "Landesdirektor Dr. Kilpper weist auf den großen Ernst der Ernährungslage in Gebiet des Staatssekretariats infolge der verschiedenen Maßnahmen und Auflagen der Militärregierung hin. Die Auflagen sind so drückend geworden, daß das Direktorium Landesdirektor Dr. Kilpper ernsthaft, an die Militärregierung heranzutreten und darauf hinzuweisen, daß eine vertretbare Ausgabe der Lebensmittel an die Bevölkerung erreicht wird, andernfalls die Militärregierung gebeten werden soll, die entsprechenden Anordnungen selber zu erlassen." (Food situation: Landesdirektor Dr. Kilpper referred to the gravity of the food situation within the area...).
of control of the State Secretariat as a result of the Military Government's various actions and orders. These orders had become so oppressive that the cabinet authorized Landesdirektor Dr. Klipper to approach the Military Government and try to negotiate a valid allocation of food for the population, otherwise the Military Government might be requested to issue the appropriate decrees (i.e. concerning foodstuffs) itself.

This statement represented a change of attitude in the "Staatssekretariat" on the food question. In contrast with the optimistic and self-congratulatory note of the first months of its existence, a certain anxiety had arisen within the "Staatssekretariat". This was mainly a result of the publication in the Schwäbisch-Günther-Tageblatt of an article by the French military government in which the impression was clearly given that the "Staatssekretariat" was in the main responsible for the strict rationing policy and shortages.

The French authorities, aware of the inevitability of criticism and resentment within an increasingly hungry German population, avoided confrontations and social disturbances by applying the same technique of indirect administration as was applied in housing affairs. As in the case of the "Wohnungsamt", the "Ernährungsamt" in Tübingen had to implement French decisions in its own name and without reference to the decrees from the French military government upon which it was acting. Consequently, it had to bear the brunt of local anger, a development which was foreseen by the French military government's policy of gaining maximum benefits with a minimum of local antagonism. For instance, in such areas as the black market, upon which a substantial part of the population depended for supplementary food, the French themselves did not risk going into action against the practice, as was the case with the American military police, but instead instructed the German "Kreis" authorities how to regulate the matter. These in turn informed the municipal authorities of French orders. One such case was Rund-Erlass Nr. 24Q/46 (November 25, 1946) of the "Kreisernährungsamt" (District Food Supply Office) which instructed the municipal "Ernährungsamt" in Tübingen: "Um den immer mehr um sich greifenden Schlebertum auf dem Lebensmittelsektor, den schwarzen Markt und den Hauernermierungsweg entgegenzuwirken zu können, ist auf Anordnung der Militärregierung eine scharfe und verstärkte Kontrolle über Lebensmitteltransports erfolgt..." (In order to effectively combat the increasing extent of profiteering within the food sector, the black market and hoarding, a rigorous and intensified control of
The "Verpflegungsamt" in Tübingen helped to alleviate the worst of the situation by sheer perseverance and hard work. The most successful venture by far was the establishment of a communal soup kitchen, known as the "Volksküche", which was established on July 15, 1946, when the town's potato supplies ran out and the mayor launched an appeal to the farmers of "Kreis Tübingen" to donate food supplies, especially potatoes, to the town. (95)

At a municipal council meeting of November 4, 1946, Oberbürgermeister Hartmeyer described the founding of the "Volksküche":

"Die Frage der Ernährung der Bevölkerung ist in den letzten Monaten immer mehr in den Vordergrund getreten, nachdem die Kartoffeln aus dem Vorjahr allmählich zu Ende gingen und die neue Kartoffelernte noch nicht zur Verfügung stand. Die Gaststätten waren nicht mehr in der Lage, ihren Gästen Essen zu verabreichen. Bei dieser Lage war es unumgänglich notwendig, von Seiten der Stadt eingreifen. So wurde die Volksküche aus freien Stücken ins Leben gerufen. In den Monaten August und September wurde eine Kinderspeisung eingerichtet, welche allmählich einen großen Umfang angenommen hat. Später wurde die Abgabe von Essen aus der Volksküche auch auf junge Leute, Lehrlinge, auswärtige Arbeiter usw. ausgedehnt ... Heute werden nun von der Volksküche täglich ca. 3,000 Essen ohne Marken zu billigem Preis und guter Qualität abgegeben. Es sei den Hausfrauen gegenwärtig nicht möglich, ein Essen zu bereiten, wie es die Volksküche abgeben könnte." (Volksküche (communal soup kitchen): The question of feeding the population had over the past months moved more and more into the foreground as the potato supply from the previous year gradually ran out before the new potato harvest was available. The restaurants were no longer able to provide meals for their guests. In this situation it was absolutely necessary for the municipal administration to intervene. Thus the communal soup kitchen was started voluntarily. During the months of August and September a children's meal service was set up and it had gradually increased on a large scale. Later the issuing of food was also extended to young people, apprentices, workers from outside town etc. ... At that period of time approximately 3,000 meals were being distributed daily by the soup kitchen without the use of ration-cards and these were cheap and of good quality. For the time being the housewives were unable to prepare the kind of meal which the soup kitchen could provide. (94)
by Karl Meyer, the head of the "Ermährungsamt". He gave added credit to the aid and efforts of the "Evangelisches Hilfswerk" (Lutheran charity organisation) and Swiss church organisations. Hermann Werner, who was sacked by the French from his initial post as co-editor of the Schwabacher Tschatt for writing an article in late 1945 on the food situation, paid tribute to the "Volksküche" and various charity organisations in his history of post-war Tübingen: "... That under such circumstances an amenity like the oommunal soup kitchen, set up in 1946, was kept very busy throughout the whole year. In 1947 it provided a total of 620,000 meals in return for a very moderate ration coupons charge; in the summer (of 1947) about 1700 persons were served but in the autumn further access had to be curtailed in view of food supply difficulties. There had already been a lack of potatoes in the spring of that year. In November after the harvest the communal soup kitchen had again organised (food) collection among the farming community. For the school children, whom malnutrition was making itself felt, particularly affecting school performance, it was possible to provide a school meal service on the Easter holidays until the autumn holidays. Food donations from abroad, from Switzerland (Aarau) and the United States and contributions from the Tübingen "Hilfswerk" (i.e. charity relief organisation), the Lutheran "Hilfswerk" and from the Catholic "Caritas" charity organisation permitted this to be carried out for those three months. On 78 feeding days it was possible to serve 139,330 portions of about 350 calories each: up to 3460 children were provided with meals, some twice, some four times weekly and some daily."
The accumulated effect of these charity organisations obviously greatly helped Tübingen to survive the two post-war years without serious problems. The massive aid which Tübingen received from Swiss and American charity organisations was due to a large extent to trips undertaken by the mayor to Switzerland to appeal for help from church and lay organisations.

The German authorities not only had to contend with French requisition demands and their particular form of indirect administration which placed the onus of confrontation with the local population on German administrations, but also in certain cases (one of which has already been mentioned in this chapter) the municipal authorities and "Staatssekretariat" were faced with specific situations where the French authorities deliberately shifted the responsibility for food shortages onto their shoulders by publishing false ration quotes in the local Tübingen newspaper. The "Staatssekretariat" was worried by the resultant wave of resentment directed against it by the local population which presumed that it was being cheated, not by the French but by their own political and administrative leaders. At a cabinet meeting of June 25, 1946, this situation was discussed: "Landrat Dr. Renner berichtet über die Unruhe, welche in der Bevölkerung infolge des im "Schwäbischen Tagblatt" vom 22.6.1946 erschienenen Artikels über die Ernährungslage ("Die Rationen im Juni") entstanden ist. Es besteht allgemeine Verwirrung gegen das Staatssekretariat, da die Bevölkerung den deutschen Behörden den Vorwurf macht, daß sie geringere Rationen als die von der Militärregierung amtlich festgesetzten verteile. Die Redaktion des "Schwäbischen Tagblatts" hat auf Anfrage Landrat Dr. Renner mitgeteilt, der fragliche Artikel sei auf Anweisung französischer Stellen aufgenommen worden."

Es wird auf Grund dieser Tatsache beschlossen, daß das Direktorium zur Abwendung einer auf andere Weise nicht zu behebenden Vertrauensruptur die erforderlichen Maßnahmen trifft, um die Bevölkerung in den Genuss der in der Presse verkündeten Festeitteilung zu bringen ..." (Landrat Dr. Renner reported on the unrest caused in the population by the article on the food situation ("The rations situation in June") which was published in the Schwäbisches Tagblatt on 22.6.1946. There was widespread indignation directed against the State Secretariat since the population blamed the State Secretariat for distributing lower rations than officially laid down by the Military Government. The editor's office of the Schwäbisches Tagblatt had stated in reply to an enquiry by Landrat Dr. Renner that the article...
in question had been included on the instructions of the French authorities.

On the basis of this fact it was decided in order to avert a crisis of confidence which could not be eliminated by any other means that the cabinet would undertake the necessary measures to give the population the benefit of the fat allotment announced in the press...

This ends the section on the food situation in post-war Tübingen and the problems facing the municipal "Armhrungsamt" vis-a-vis requisitioning and French administrative methods. It remains, however, to add an appendage in justification of the length and detail of this exposition of Tübingen's food shortages. The answer lies in the stark contrast between the chronic food situation in Tübingen and the French policy on cultural affairs which elevated Tübingen to a position of cultural brilliance which outclassed most of the other cultural centres of post-war Germany. This contrast is an important one for it helps to illustrate the priorities laid down by French occupation policy in Baden-Württemberg. This discrepancy between social deprivation and cultural brilliance did not go unnoticed by contemporary observers, of which three may be quoted: French, British and German. Emile Laffon, administrateur-général of the French Zone, wrote in 1947 on the subject of education and culture: "Allons-nous, pour la première fois, réussir à modifier la vieille mentalité germanique? Les circonstances, certes, ne sont pas des plus favorables, car la démocratie et la culture ne remplacent pas les calories. Notre action intellectuelle et morale n'aura son plein effet que si un minimum alimentaire est assuré aux individus." In an article in Foreign Affairs in October 1949 ("Emphasis on Culture in the French Zone") Percy Bidwell wrote: "The French admit that they are pursuing a tough economic policy. They are strictly rationing food and clothing... They admit also that the presence of large numbers of occupation troops and civilian employees, with their families, constitutes a great drain on the limited housing and food resources of the zone. They are keenly aware of the conflict between these economic policies and their cultural program. The educational officers, in particular, foresee increasing difficulty in opening German minds to the new cultural ideas as long as the standard of living remains depressed and as long as opportunities for getting a better living seem so remote." Finally, Hermann Werner described the situation in Tübingen as follows: "Es war schließlich kein Wunder, daß man in Hinblick auf die schwerige Armährungs Lage ironisch von einer kulturellen Hochkonjunktur sprach,
die gerade über die französische Zone gegangen sei. Circensea – sagte man –
diesmal nicht zusammen mit Brot, sondern statt des fehlenden Brotes. (It was
after all no wonder that, in view of the difficult food situation, people spoke
ironically of a cultural boom that had just hit the French zone. A series of
circus spectacles in the old Roman fashion – thus the boom was described – with
the difference however, that this time they were not presented together with bread
but instead of the necessary bread.)

One of the areas of responsibility for which the respective municipal
councils found themselves answerable for a period as a result of French occupation
policy was the field of police administration. When the French occupied Tübingen
on April 19, 1945, the police chief, Polizeirat Bücheler, assembled his entire
force in front of the police station. There they were disarmed and taken prisoner;
that same afternoon, however, the majority of them were reinstated in accordance
with a French decree to the mayor commanding him "eine beschränkte Ortspolizei
aufzustellen, um die Ausführung der an die Einwohnerschaft ausgestellten Befehle
zu sichern. Diese Ortspolizei trägt Zivilkleidung mit weißer Armbinde, Aufschrift
"Polizei"." (to set up a limited local police to ensure the execution of the
orders issued to the inhabitants. This local police force will wear civilian
dress with a white arm-band, inscribed "Police"). On May 15 Karl Kummer was
appointed police chief of Tübingen by a direct order from the local military gov­
ernment office.

The next day Polizeirat Bücheler was arrested and imprisoned, but he was soon released to join the "Landratsamt" as "Flüchtlingskommissar"
(Commissioner for Refugee Affairs) for "Kreis Tübingen".

At the ill-fated "Gemeinderat" meeting of May 25, 1945, Mayor Baumann
declared that "das staatliche Polizeiamt wird vorläufig als städtisches Amt weiter-
geführt" (the state police office will be managed provisionally as a municipal
department for the time being). The head of the Tübingen police force was
also responsible for the policing of "Kreis Tübingen". In December 1946 a re­
organisation took place within the town hall – by which the existing 35 municipal
departments were reduced in number to 15 – and the municipal police administration
was subordinated to the "Rathausamt" of the town hall. This presented problems
for the town hall since, according to the town council meeting of December 10, 1946,
"für die künftige Polizeiverwaltung müsse eine andere Bezeichnung gefunden werden,
da die Stadtverwaltung die Bezeichnung "Polizei" nicht führen dürfe" (a different title would have to be found for the future police administration as the municipal administration was not allowed to use the title "Police") (105)

The municipal council also subjected the local police force to a degree of surveillance in that it received and discussed regular reports transmitted to the mayor from the town police administration (i.e. "Landespolizeikommissariat Tübingen-Stadt"). For example in January 1947 the police reported: "Das Landespolizeikommissariat Tübingen-Stadt hatte 1946 136 Anzeigen über Vergehen und Verbrechen, 149 Überwachungsanzeigen verschiedener Art, 97 Verkehrsunfälle mit Sachschäden, 91 Verkehrsunfälle mit Personenschäden, 126 Neuigkeitenmeldungen. 10 blinde Feueralarme wurden gegeben, ein Frevel, der nicht scharf genug gegeißelt werden kann. 703 gebräuchliche Verwarnungen wurden erteilt..." (The "Landespolizeikommissariat Tübingen-Stadt" (i.e. local Tübingen police division) recorded during the year 1946 136 reports of offences and crimes, 149 reports of petty offences of various kinds, 97 traffic accidents with material damage, 91 traffic accidents with physical injuries, 126 pieces of reported information. 10 false fire alarms were raised, a form of misdeed which cannot be condemned strongly enough. 703 cautions with fine were imposed...). (106)

The final feature which made the town hall a focal point in the policing of Tübingen was the hierarchical system of formal application laid down by the French with regard to requests and enquiries from the German administrations to the French military government. For municipal matters the mayor applied to the "Délégué du Cercle" through the "Landratsamt" and the matter was either dealt with at this level or transmitted to higher authorities; the resultant decision was returned to the mayor in reverse order through the same channels. The mayor had occasionally to make applications concerning police affairs. An example of this was given in the municipal council debate of May 22, 1947, concerning the arming of the local police ("§180, Bewaffnung der Feldschützen"): "Auf ein vom Oberbürgermeister an den Herrn Kreisdirektor in Tübingen gerichteten Schreiben betr. Ausstattung der städtischen Feldschützen mit Waffen und Munition zum Schutz der Ernte, wurde vom Kommissar der französischen Sicherheitspolizei in Tübingen im Auftrag des Herrn Kreisdirektors unter 2. Mai 1947 mitgeteilt, daß der Herr Kommandeur der Garde von Württemberg den Bescheid gegeben habe, daß die augen-
blicklichen Bestimmungen und der vorhandene Vorrat an Waffen es nicht erlauben, der Bitte des Oberbürgermeisters zu entsprechen.


In reply to a petition submitted by the mayor to the "Délégué du Cercle" in Tübingen concerning the equipping of the municipal police constabulary with weapons and ammunition for the protection of the harvest, the commissioner of the French security police stated on behalf of the "Délégué du Cercle" on May 2, 1947, that the police chief of the "Sûreté" in Württemberg had replied that the present regulations and the existing stock of weapons did not allow him to meet the mayor's request.

"As the mayor informed the municipal council of this situation, he also added that, according to a report which he had submitted that day, Constable Haïd had been struck several times by men who were picking flowers without permission from gardens near the Bismarck monument and in the neighbourhood of the West station and whose particulars the constable had wished to ascertain. These incidents showed how urgently the arming of the police constables was required. Mayor Hartmeyer said that he would again make representations on this matter to the commissioner of the French security police in Tübingen." (107) The affair, of course, has its humorous aspect but it demonstrates the extent to which the police turned to the mayor for support and mediation.

On January 10, 1946, the "Staatssekretariat" had published a decree ("Rechtsordnung") with the prior approval of the French authorities entitled "Rechtsordnung über die Einrichtung einer Landespolizei in dem französischen Gebiet Württem­bergs und Hohenollerns" (Legal decree on the establishment of a regional police force in the French zone of Württemberg and Hohenollern). (106) This established a totally new police system within Mid-Württemberg. The central administration of this system was termed the "Landespolisoldirektion" and was situated in Tübingen.
In addition, in a subsequent decree of June 22, 1946, Süd-Württemberg was divided into a number of "Landes-Oberkommissariats", of which Kreis Tübingen comprised one unit, i.e. one "Landes-Oberkommissariat". Landes-Oberkommissariat Tübingen contained two "Landesaufgemeinde-Kommissariate": Tübingen-Stadt und Tübingen-Land. The following overview is provided by the archive of the "Landratsamt" in Tübingen:

Oberkommissariat Tübingen
95,874 Einwohner : 109 Beamte
which was divided into 3 "Kommissariate" of which two were based in Tübingen (the third being in Rottenburg):
- Kommissariat Tübingen-Stadt
  50,000 Einwohner : 50 Beamte
- Kommissariat Tübingen Land
  45,874 Einwohner : 59 Beamte
which was divided into 11 "Landesaufgemeinde-Kommissariate". There were therefore in all four levels of police administration operating within Tübingen.

Despite the arrival of this impressive array of police departments in Tübingen, the municipal council continued to play a role in the police administration of the community, again as a result of French policy. On the instructions of the French authorities, the "Staatsssekretariat" issued a circular on September 25, 1946, instructing municipal authorities in Süd-Württemberg to transfer specific police duties from the police administrations to the town hall. This was officially intimated to the municipal council in Tübingen at a meeting on January 16, 1947 ("§1. Aufhebung der staatlichen Polizeiämter"): "... bringt Stadtrat Bartels das Kundschreiben der Landesaufgemeindendirektionen des Innern und der Finanzen über die Aufhebung der staatlichen Polizeiämter vom 25. September 1946 ... zur Kenntnis des Gemeinderats.

According to this circular, the duties of the administrative police were to pass to the municipal administration as from October 1, 1946. This concerned about 30 functions, among them trade regulations and affairs, issuing of passports, registration of civilian population, nationality, emigration, altering of names, traffic, supervision of public water, restaurant and off-licence permits and alcohol retail trade, administration of municipal prisons, veterinary affairs, prevention of cruelty to animals, lost property etc. (110)

There is no doubt that the French authorities felt that the time had come to redefine the functions and duties of the German police force. During the National Socialist era the police authorities had increased its range of functions and developed into a gigantic bureaucracy of surveillance and control. The above measures, instituted on French orders, reflected a pruning down of the powers of the police to a scale commensurate with a non-totalitarian society. This ends the section on the police in Tübingen and also terminates the examination of the working relationship between the French military government and the municipal "Wohnungsamt", "Fremdenaufnahmestelle" and police force, chosen as indicators of French policy and its effects on the municipal administrations of Tübingen.

It is now appropriate to consider the reconstruction of democratic political institutions in post-war Tübingen, 1945-1947, and the degree of control which the French military government exercised throughout the process. In their zone the French set about reviving elected democratic political institutions from the lowest power base, i.e. municipal council. This contrasted with their policy of re-establishing political parties with a "Landessekretariat" (regional secretariat) and then allowing the same to organise local branches in the community.

Although the French generally applied a rigid system for the establishment of elected political bodies, introducing limited autonomy at the lowest level and progressing on an increasing scale of power and responsibility to the eventual institution of regional governments, Tübingen provides an interesting exception to
the rationalism of the French military government's scheme of a graduated transfer of political autonomy.

This occurred in the form of a decree issued on May 15, 1945, by the commander of Tübingen, Captain Metzger, to the mayor intimating the establishment of a "Gemeinderat" for Tübingen. (111) The decree further established the date of its first meeting (May 25) and listed the membership of the council, in all a group of 16 men. All of these men were members of the "Demokratische Vereinigung" and the later head of the "Arbeitsamt", Arno Vödisch, maintained that the choice was probably made on the advice of Viktor Renner. (112)

The list of members contained names which have reappeared throughout the chapters of this thesis, men who played an integral part in the reconstruction of political and administrative life in post-war Tübingen:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Profession</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wilhelm Neudermann</td>
<td>Schlosser (locksmith)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Karl Schmidt</td>
<td>Landgerichtsrat (regional assises judge)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karl Koenen</td>
<td>Dreher (turner)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albert Karl</td>
<td>Dreher (turner)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Schwarz</td>
<td>Kaufmann (shopkeeper)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Guntner</td>
<td>Hauptschulrat (senior teacher)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will Hans Mebesacker</td>
<td>Schriftsteller (author)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karl Gruber</td>
<td>Malermeister (master decorator)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max Kuhler</td>
<td>Hoteldirektor (hotel manager)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernard Hammer</td>
<td>Studentenpfarrer (university chaplain)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albert Veldt</td>
<td>Weinmetzler (winegrower)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gustav Nickel</td>
<td>Korrektor (proof reader)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albert Schmidt</td>
<td>Elektromonteur (electrician)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karl Schuster</td>
<td>Justizoberwachmeister (court attendant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karl Blessing</td>
<td>Kaufmann (shopkeeper)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Rische</td>
<td>Maschineneuster (machine compositor)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The newly nominated "Gemeinderat" duly met on May 25. The appointment of the council was intimated to the general public on the following day in "Bekanntmachung Nr. 44" (Announcement No. 44) published in "Die Mitteilungen der Militärregierung für den Kreis Tübingen i. Nr. 2" (Military Government Communiques for Kreis
Tübingen), which listed the nominated members with the terse comment: "Auf Befehl der Militärregierung trat am Freitag, den 25. Mai 1945 zufolge Einladung von Herrn Oberbürgermeister Dr. Haßmann der neue Gemeinderat zu seiner Konstituierung auf dem Rathaus zusammen ... Zu seinem Präsidenten wählte der Gemeinderat aus seiner Mitte: Landgerichtsrat Dr. Schmid." (By order of the Military Government the new town council met at the invitation of Mayor Dr. Haßmann on Friday, May 25, 1945, in the town hall to constitute itself ... The town council elected as president from within its midst: Landgerichtsrat Dr. Schmid.)

According to existing protocols nothing of essential importance was implemented at the meeting of May 25, with perhaps the exception of three resolutions: firstly, Carlo Schmid was elected "Präsident des Gemeinderats" (President of the municipal council), a grandiose title which bore little relation to the actual power of the "Gemeinderat"; secondly, a report on conditions in Tübingen was drawn up for the French military government; thirdly, in this meeting Carlo Schmid provided the motivation for a census ("Bevölkerungs- und Wohnraumzählung") which was affected on July 8, 1945, to rectify the chaotic administrative situation created by the National Socialists' destruction of files on April 18.

This proved to be the sole meeting held by this "Gemeinderat". The council was dissolved on May 31, 1945, on orders from Baden-Baden. The actual dissolution of the council was implemented by a decree from the mayor, entitled "Vorläufige Aussetzung der Tätigkeit des Gemeinderats": "Vom Chef der Militärregierung Tübingen liegt ein Schreiben vom 31. Mai 1945 vor, wonach durch höheren Befehl angeordnet worden sei, daß noch keine Gemeinderäte eingesetzt werden dürfen. Der in Tübingen gebildete Gemeinderat dürfe daher nicht mehr einberufen werden. Die Zusammensetzung des Gemeinderats könne geändert und erst wieder gebildet werden, wenn eine neue Genehmigung vorliege. Bis dahin bleibe der einzige zuständige Beamte für die Ausführung der Befehle der Militärregierung der Oberbürgermeister." (Temporary suspension of town council activity: A letter dated May 31, 1945, had been received from the head of the Military Government in Tübingen according to which the order had come through from higher authority that no municipal councils were yet to be appointed. The municipal council formed in Tübingen could not therefore be convened again. The composition of the municipal council could only be changed and reconstituted when new permission was given. Until then the only official responsible for the execution of Military Government orders was the mayor.)
It is difficult to ascertain whether Captain Metzger had in fact misinterpreted the existing military government line on political reconstruction or whether the French military government in Germany had in fact not yet formulated its policy or received policy directives from Paris. The promptness with which the headquarters of the military government reacted to the establishment of a municipal council in Tübingen (i.e. within, at the most, six days of its first meeting) suggests that Captain Metzger had unwittingly contravened existing policy.

Hermann Werner suggests in his history of post-war Tübingen that Captain Metzger had reacted positively to the cooperative response which he had experienced within the town hall and that he had made a personal decision based on a favourable assessment of the ability of the municipal administration to adapt to a measure of autonomy, although, of course, the question of an elected council had not been countenanced. In other words, Werner suggests that Captain Metzger made full use of the freedom of decision enjoyed by local military government commanders in the opening months of the occupation. Werner’s portrayal of this development reads as follows: "Allmählich war die Zusammenarbeit zwischen der Stadtverwaltung und dem französischen Stadtkommandanten etwas eingespielt. Korvettenkapitän Metzger nahm in den Grenzen seiner Möglichkeiten auf die Bedürfnisse der Stadt Rücksicht. Die Stadtverwaltung hatte in ganzem gesehen die Verhältnisse in der Stadt wieder unter Kontrolle; zu so chaotischen Zuständen, wie sie in den Großstädten besonders Norddeutschlands entstanden waren, kam es in Tübingen nicht. So schien die Zeit gekommen, der Stadtverwaltung als Anfang eines demokratischen Wiederaufbaus einen beratenden Gemeinderat zur Seite zu stellen." (Gradually the system of cooperation between the municipal administration and the French town commander had developed a routine. Lieutenant-Commander Metzger showed consideration for the town’s needs within the bounds of what he could do. On the whole the municipal administration had conditions in town under control again; such chaotic conditions as had arisen in the large cities, especially in North Germany, did not occur in Tübingen. Thus the time seemed ripe for providing the municipal administration with an advisory municipal council as the beginnings of democratic reconstruction.)

In any case, the subject of the "Gemeinderat" of May 25 was glossed over and indeed became a taboo topic. Captain Metzger was also eventually replaced as
head of military government in Tübingen. Only once was its existence recognised officially by subsequent bodies; the protocol of the opening meeting of the first elected municipal council in post-war Tübingen, formed on the basis of the election results of September 15, 1946, made a terse comment of one sentence in recognition of its historical existence: "Ende Mai wurde der erste Gemeinderat gebildet, der freilich nicht wirken konnte, weil die Genehmigung durch die Besatzungsmacht noch nicht gegeben wurde." (At the end of May the first municipal council was formed but it could not function because permission had not yet been given by the occupation authorities.)

In the period, however, between May 25, 1945, and September 15, 1946, the French military government in Tübingen could not dispense with the services and expertise of a German municipal committee like the "Gemeinderat" to manage the day to day running of administrative affairs, to advise the French authorities and to act as a buffer for the French method of indirect administration. Consequently a substitute was defined and established. This substitute form was formally announced in Baden-Baden on September 15, 1945. An official military government account of French zonal legislation described the introduction of these new councils as follows: "À partir du 15 septembre 1945 une circulaire de la Direction Générale des Affaires Administratives établissait des organes consultatifs auprès des communes qui restaient dans l'état de chaos où se trouvait l'Allemagne, les éléments premiers d'un regroupement de la vie publique. Dans ces comités consultatifs devaient s'insérer "des représentants des diverses tendances politiques et confessionnelles des syndicats professionnels, ainsi que les personnalités dont la présence serait jugée nécessaire pour la gestion des intérêts communaux." En outre les bourgmestres avaient la faculté de délégier à quelques membres de ces comités certaines fonctions propresment administratives telles que: l'État civil, l'assistance, le logement."

This substitute council was ceremoniously installed in office in Tübingen on January 2, 1946, in the presence of local French military government officials and the administrative heads of the "Staatesssekretariat". The council was termed the "Tübinger Stadtheirat" (Tübingen advisory municipal council) (sometimes also the "Städtischer Beirat"), thereby stressing the advisory role of its membership. It was composed of 16 "Beirute" (advisory councillors) in all who, as in the case
of the "Gemeinderat" of May 25, 1945, were nominated by the French. Their duty was to assist the mayor in an advisory capacity and to inform the population of measures undertaken by the town hall. They did not have, however, the right to issue decrees to the populace or to German administrations; this remained the sole preserve of the mayor. (120)

According to Hermann Werner the "Stadtbeirat" were also chosen from within the ranks of the "Demokratische Vereinigung" ("... Am 2. Januar 1946 wurde der Stadtverwaltung ein ehrenamtlicher Beirat von 16 Mitgliedern zur Seite gesetzt, einer "Demokratischen Vereinigung" entnommen ..." (on January 2, 1946, an honorary advisory council of 16 members taken from a "Demokratische Vereinigung" was appointed to assist the municipal administration ...). Certainly, the "Demokratische Vereinigung" had been apprised in advance of the forthcoming nomination of "Stadtbeirat" by Oberwirte horn at a meeting in October 1945: "Da Tübingen Hauptstadt der französischen Militärregierung ist, dürften hier ca. 15-20 Stadtirat in Betracht kommen", (As Tübingen is the capital of the French Military Government then probably 15-20 municipal councillors will be considered) (...)

A comparison of the membership lists of the "Gemeinderat" of May 25, 1945, and of the "Stadtbeirat" of January 2, 1946, reveals that of the original 16 members of the "Gemeinderat" only six were re-nominated by the French onto the "Stadtbeirat". The probable reason for this has already been outlined in Chapter 4 with relation to the Lutheran "Kirchengemeinderat's" protest at the left-wing emphasis of the original "Gemeinderat". It is difficult to state definitely whether all, or what proportion, of the "Stadtbeirat" were also members of the "Demokratische Vereinigung" since the latter had been expanded to include men of anti-Left and bourgeois background. Among the list of "Stadtbeirat", i.e.

1. Baudemann, Wilhelm, Hausmeister (caretaker)
2. Erbs, Otto, Dipl. Optiker (optician)
3. Hebsecker, Will-Hans, Schriftsteller (author)
4. Hirn, Wilhelm, Zimmermann (carpenter)
5. Kamke, Erich, Dr. Universitätsprofessor (university professor)
6. Karlse, Albert, Dreher (turner)
7. Kohrer, Karl, Pflanzen und Landwirt (carrier and farmer)
8. Kocher, Georg, Kalkermeister (master decorator)
9. Köberle, Adolf, Dr. Universitätsprofessor (university professor)
10. Krauß, Jakob, Schneidermeister (master tailor)
11. Köhm, Johannes, Werkmeister (work foreman)
12. Schuster, Karl, Justizoberwachtmeister (court attendant)
13. Schwarze, Paul, Kaufmann (shopkeeper)
14. Vödisch, Arno, Leiter des Arbeitsamtes (manager of municipal employment exchange)
15. Weidle, Albert, Landwirt (farmer)
16. Wirthle, Wilhelm, Postamtman (post office executive)

Various non-left members are recognisable as coconitent members of the "Demokratische Vereinigung", e.g. Professor Erich Kamke, Jakob Krauß, Paul Schwarze, Wilhelm Wirthle etc.

The "Stadtbeirat" was subdivided into four committees with rigorously defined duties: they were the "Finanzausschuß" (financial committee), including the "Rechnungsausschuß" (accounts committee) and the "Ausschuß für Schulgeldsachen" (school finance committee), the "Bau- und Wohnungsausschuß" (building and housing committee), the "Ausschuß für Grundstückschätzung" (committee for real estate valuations) and the "Ausschuß für Pflegesachen" (welfare committee).

These committees in fact performed the normal administrative functions of the "Gemeinderat" without possessing any powers of political decision-making. The advantages for the French military government were obvious in that they had a functioning German municipal executive at their service which performed the difficult job of managing a post-war community under occupation in accordance with military government policy without even the right of protest or contradiction.

It was a situation with which the town administration was not happy, but it had no choice but to accept the system imposed on it and to make the best of it. At the opening ceremony on January 2, 1946, attended by French officials, Oberbürgermeister Henner struggled to find words to sweeten the bitter pill of the loss of elected municipal representation in Tübingen: "Diese Ernennung..."
ist ein wichtiger Schritt auf dem Wege zu einer demokratischen Stadtverwaltung.

Meine Herren! Stoßen Sie sich nicht an der "Ernennung". Wohl sind Sie noch nicht gewählt, sondern nur ernannt. Das bedeutet aber keineswegs, daß Sie bestellte Beifallsklatscher und Sänger sein sollen, wie das die angeblichen Vertreter des Volkes in dritten Reich waren. Sie sind nur den bestehenden Gesetzen und Verordnungen und Ihren eigenen Gewissen unterworfen. Ihre Aufgabe ist beratender Natur." (This act of appointment is an important step on the way to a democratic municipal administration.

Gentlemen! Do not take offence at the word "appointment". It is true that we have not been elected yet, but rather only appointed. But that does not at all mean that you are to be appointed applauders and singers as the so-called representatives of the people were in the Third Reich. You are only subject to existing laws and regulations and to your own conscience. Your task is of an advisory nature.)

At the same ceremony Carlo Schmid likewise attempted to relativise the loss of municipal autonomy and responsibility resulting from the replacement of the "Gemeinderat" by the "Stadtbeirat" and to present the latter in optimistic tones: "Freilich handelt es sich doch nicht nur um ein Organ, das auf Grund freier Wahlen aus dem Volkswillen heraus entstanden wäre, sondern um eine Körperschaft, deren Mitglieder durch hoheitlichen Akt ernannt worden sind. Es ist aber hierbei mit so viel Geringes hervorgegangen, daß der ernannte Beirat praktisch alle Verwaltungs- und politischen Aufgaben repräsentiert und somit ein virtuelles Bild des Volkes darstellt. Wir hoffen, daß wir bald in der Lage sein werden, diesen Beirat durch einen echten, aus freien Wahlen hervorgegangenen Rat ersetzen können und ich bin überzeugt, daß niemand dies schmerzer wünscht, als die hier Anwesenden.

Gebiet entwöhnt worden ist, ist es nötig, behutsam zu verfahren; die all zu schnell und unbedächtig wieder hergestellte, politische Freiheit könnte sich sonst zum Unheil auswirken.

Die Zeit für die politische Phase unseres bürgerlichen Lebens ist noch nicht gekommen, wir müssen uns noch in einer administrativen Phase einrichten und der richtige Weg scheint mir der von der Militärregierung eingeschlagen zu sein, daß nämlich in diese administrative Phase fortlaufend mehr und mehr Elemente demokratischer Selbstverantwortlichkeit eingebaut werden.

Den Gemeinden kommt hierbei eine hervorragende Rolle zu. Sie sind die Körperschaften, in denen man es zuerst mit der Demokratie versuchen müssen, einmal deswegen, weil die Gemeinden der breite Unterbau sind, auf dem das Leben des Staates ruhen muß."

(It is true that this is not an organ that originated out of the will of the people on the basis of free elections but a corporate body, the members of which have been appointed by sovereign act (of the military government). But so much care has gone into this project that the appointed advisory council represents practically all strata of the population and all political trends and thus offers a virtual picture of the will of the people. We hope that we will soon be in the position to replace this advisory council by a real municipal council on the basis of free elections and I am convinced that nobody wishes this more than those present here.

The functions of this advisory council are exclusively of an advisory nature. But the (occupation) authorities' commitment to accept or at least to discuss issues is in itself already a democratic element because it will be very difficult to ignore the authority of resolutions passed by such an organ even though it only has advisory functions. Admittedly we are aware of the inadequacies of this state of affairs. But in a nation that has been accustomed for so long to thinking responsibly in the field of politics it is necessary to proceed cautiously; otherwise political freedom which is restored too quickly and rashly could have adverse consequences.

The time has not yet come for the political phase of our civic life; we must still accommodate ourselves to an administrative phase and the right way seems
to me to be the one taken by the Military Government, namely that more and more elements of democratic self-responsibility will be continuously incorporated into this administrative phase.

Within this a role of major importance will fall the lot of the municipal administrations. They are the bodies in which we shall first have to try out democracy because the municipal administrations are the broad foundation on which the life of the state must rest. (127)

Carlo Schmid's statement of optimism about a future elected municipal council was not so much a hint in the direction of the attendant military government officials as a piece of consiliatory rhetoric for the German audience, especially for the wider newspaper readership. Through his contacts with the French authorities Schmid could not have failed to know that Baden-Baden intended introducing a slow and gradual return to electoral autonomy, beginning at the level of municipal elections.

According to Hermann Werner the military government commander of "Kreis Tübingen" mentioned in April 1946 the possibility of municipal elections being held sometime in August or September of that year. On May 28, 1946, the Journal officiel published a decree in the name of the Commander-in-Chief of the French troops to institute the drawing up of electoral lists; the decree also outlined the conditions surrounding loss of electoral rights and exclusion from the electoral lists. A special list of those not entitled to vote (e.g. personalities with Nazi or militarist backgrounds) was published soon afterwards but a date of election was not yet given. (128)

In fact according to the already quoted Cahier Français d'Information, Nr. 27, a preliminary list had already been drawn up as a working basis: "Dans un premier stade, on fit établir par les Allemands une liste électorale préliminaire. On cherchait simplement à posséder une base de travail. Ces listes, achevées à la fin de mai 1946, n'étaient en somme qu'un recensement. Y figuraient toutes les personnes réunissant, dans chaque commune, les conditions d'âge et de résidence nécessaires à priori pour être électeurs. Elles n'avaient aucune valeur légale.

Le 20 mai - second stade - étaient signées les ordonnances du Commandant en
chef n° 44 et 45 (celle-ci s'appliquant à la Sarre, la première au reste de la zone) sur l'établissement des listes électorales. Ordonnances complétées le 29 mai par les arrêtés d'application n° 61 et 62 de l'Administrateur général.\(^{129}\)

This overview of the re-introduction of electoral lists continued with an account of the method of establishing these lists: "Les listes définitives devaient être élaborées, à partir des listes préliminaires, par un comité de révision présidé par le bourgmestre, comprenant des représentants des partis et éventuellement des membres du comité consultatif et de la commission d'épuration. Un comité d'appel dans chaque Kreis décidait au second degré sur les cas litigieux, parfois au premier en matière de décisions sur l'inéligibilité. Le comité de révision prenait d'abord sur la liste les incapables du droit commun, ce qui allait de soi. Il rayait aussi, c'était l'essentiel, les incapables politiques. Il faut ici souligner le caractère très remarquable de notre législation et sa supériorité sur les solutions retenues ailleurs.

Les ordonnances n° 44 et 45 posèrent très fermement le principe de l'exclusion des membres de certaines organisations nazies, dont la liste figure dans les textes réglementaires. Mais d'une part elles excluent les personnes qui "sans avoir appartenu au parti ou à ses organisations, ont eu à l'égard de ce dernier une attitude et une activité reconnue de nature à justifier leur élimination"; d'autre part elles permettent qu'exceptionnellement "les personnes ayant des titres particuliers" puissent être tant électrices qu'éligibles, selon les décisions à intervenir du comité de révision et du comité d'appel.

On tendait ainsi à réaliser une adaptation plus exacte des mesures prises au but visé. Ce faisant, la France manifestait ce souci du cas particulier qui est le propre même de l'esprit d'équité, et montrait aux populations administrées qu'elle ne se contentait pas d'appliquer aveuglément une même règle à des cas semblables d'apparence, mais au fond différents.\(^{130}\)

This particular claim has been upheld by F. Roy Willis quoting different source material (i.e. "Les élections de l'automne de 1946 dans la zone française d'occupation", \textit{France en allégiance}, No 3, 1946).\(^{131}\): "The French noted with some pride that "one should emphasise here the very remarkable nature of our legislation and its superiority to solutions employed elsewhere ... In this
manner, France showed the respect for the individual case which is the true spirit of justice."(132)

In the specific case of Tübingen the mayor implemented the French regulations by a decree ("Verfügung") establishing a municipal election committee ("Gemeindewahlausschuss") comprising members of the three permitted political parties (the DVP, as yet, not having been granted official recognition) under the chairmanship of the mayor and the secretaryship of a certain Dr. Rau from the "Staatssekretariat".(133)

The mayor's decree specifically stated:

"Die Aufgaben des Ausschusses sind:
1. Prüfung der vorläufigen Wählerliste.
3. Aufstellung einer Liste solcher Personen, die in der vorläufigen Wählerliste gestrichen wurden, aber für eine Wiedergewährung des Wahlrechts vorgeschlagen werden.
4. Prüfung der endgültigen Wählerliste.
5. Entscheidung über die Einsprüche gegen Eintragungen oder Nichteintragungen in der Wählerliste."

(The duties of the committee are:
1. Examination of provisional voters' list.
2. Preparation of the list of persons deleted from the provisional voters' list.
3. Preparation of a list of those persons who have been deleted from the provisional voters' list but who are proposed for re-conferment of the right to vote.
4. Examination of the final voters' list.
5. Decision on objections to registration or non-registration on the voters' list.) (134)

In addition the mayor nominated the following persons as members of the municipal election committee:
Dr. Rau, the official in charge of the technical side of organizing the elections, subsequently submitted a report to the "Bürgermeisteramt", that is indirectly to the French authorities, at the end of May 1946. In his report, entitled "Bericht über den Stand der Arbeiten an der vorläufigen Wählerliste für die Gemeindewahlen 1946" (Report on the state of work on the provisional voters' list for the municipal elections of 1946), Rau listed a series of complaints and technical difficulties. Two main points were stressed by Rau: firstly, the lack of comprehensive files and statistics on the local population accentuated the
committee's problems; secondly, a deep reserve and suspicion was evident within
the town population which had already experienced intensive personal classification
by the National Socialist administration, a process which had proven potentially
detrimental to the careers and livelihoods of many citizens: "Die zur Eintragung
aufgeforderten Bewohner Tübingens haben der an sie ergangenen Aufforderung in den
ersten Tagen nur in ganz geringer Zahl Folge geleistet. Die zweiseitige reibungslose
Arbeit vorgenommene Einteilung nach Straßen und Verteilung auf bestimmte Tage wurde
so wenig beachtet, daß mehr Helfer für die Erledigung von Nachzüglern als für die
normale Arbeit eingesetzt werden mußten. Die schriftlich eingehenden Meldungen
waren vielfach ungenügend ausgefüllt und mußten zurückgeschickt werden. Viele
Personen gaben die Erklärung für andere Personen ihres Bekanntenkreises ab, ohne
die erforderliche Kenntnis der Dinge zu besitzen, nach denen gefragt werden mußte.
Die Beteiligung war sehr ungleichmäßig sowohl innerhalb der Straßen wie innerhalb
der einzelnen Volksschichten. Allerhand unsinnige Gerüchte (die eingesessenen
Tübinger brauchten sich nicht zu melden, kein Mensch könne dazu gezwungen werden,
Parteigenossen dörften ja doch nicht wählen, die Feststellung der Parteizugehörig-
keit werde zu neuen Zwangsaufnahmen verwertet werden usw.)... Zur Meldung gekommen
sind nur etwa 60 v. H. der in Betracht kommenden Personen... Es muß immer wieder
bedacht werden, daß es nicht möglich gemacht worden ist, durch Anwendung entspre-
chender Verwaltungsmaßnahmen, die bis zu gehörspflichtigen Verladungen und Ord-
nungshaftungen gehen konnten, die Bevölkerung zu zwingen, daß sie der Stadtverwaltung
die für diese Arbeit nötigen Unterlagen liefern. Selbst die intelligentesten Leute
haben sich auf den Standpunkt gestellt: wenn ich nicht wählen will, brauche ich
der Vertretung gegenüber auch keinerlei Auskunft über meine Person zu geben."
would not be allowed to vote anyway, that the establishment of (NSDAP) party membership would be used for new compulsory measures etc. Only about 60% of the persons concerned had been reported... Again it is to be regretted that it has not been made possible by dint of appropriate administrative measures, which could have extended to the use of summonses and fines, to compel the populace to provide the municipal administration with the particulars required for this work. Even the most intelligent people have adopted the following viewpoint: "If I don't want to vote, then I don't need either to give the municipal administration any information about my person." (136)

In electoral affairs the mayor was in the fullest sense of the term a mere executor of French military government decisions. The electoral issue was regarded with such importance by the French that they defined and established the smallest details concerning the topic. An example of the extent to which this was the case is reflected in the precision of detail in a progress timetable presented to the mayor by the French military government. This timetable is a document illustrating the French occupation bureaucracy's surveillance of German political and administrative affairs and, as such, deserves quoting:

Übersetzung

Gouvernement Militaire de la Zone Française d'Occupation
D. G. A. G. — Intérieur
3ème Section

Zeitplan für den Ablauf der Wahlvorbereitungen

Auf der Grundlage der vorläufigen Wählerlisten und nach Einführung des Verordnungstextes betreffend die Streichung der durch die Bürgermeistereien der vom Wählauflauf betroffenen Personen:

Prüfung der Liste durch den Gemeindezialausschuss

Vorlage der Vorschläge für die Wiedergewährung der Wahlberechtigten an den Berufungsausschuss

Prüfung durch den Berufungsausschuss

Beginn der Auflegung der Wählerlisten in den Gemeinden

Auflegungsfest (10 Tage)

Prüfung durch die "Commission de Révision" (8 Tage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Dates</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prüfung der Liste durch den Gemeindezialausschuss</td>
<td>10.-20. Juni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vorlage der Vorschläge für die Wiedergewährung der Wahlberechtigten</td>
<td>spätestens am 30. Juni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prüfung durch den Berufungsausschuss</td>
<td>vom 30. Juni bis 10. Juli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beginn der Auflegung der Wählerlisten in den Gemeinden</td>
<td>am 12. Juli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auflegungsfest (10 Tage)</td>
<td>bis 22. Juli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prüfung durch die &quot;Commission de Révision&quot; (8 Tage)</td>
<td>bis 30. Juli</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Prüfung der Einsprüche durch den Gemeindewahlausschuß (Comité de Revision) 8 Tage
Mitteilung der Entscheidungen an die Beteiligten
Vorlage der Beschwerden an den Berufungsausschuß Entscheidung durch den Berufungsausschuß innerhalb 8 Tagen
Mitteilung an den Bürgermeister (3 Tage)
Eintragung der Berichtigungen und Abschluß der Liste bis 9. August

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zusatzliste</th>
<th>(Zurückkehrende Gefangene und Deportierte)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eintragung</td>
<td>spätestens 12 Tage vor der Wahl</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veröffentlichung (2 Tage)</td>
<td>&quot; 10 &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
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<td>Vorlage an den Prüfungsausschuß</td>
<td>&quot; 8 &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Berufung</td>
<td>&quot; 4 &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abschluß der Liste</td>
<td>&quot; 1 &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Translation)

Gouvernement Militaire de la Zone française d'Occupation
D. G. A. G. - Intérieur
3. Section

Time schedule for the course of election preparations:

On the basis of the provisional voters' list and after receipt of the text of the decree regarding the deletion by local mayor's offices of persons rejected by the election committee:

- examination of the list by municipal election committee  : from June 10 - 20
- submittal of proposals to appeal committee concerning the re-conferment of the right to vote on specific persons  : not later than June 30
- examination by appeal committee  : from June 30 to July 10
- beginning of period of public display of the voters' lists in the townships  : on July 12
- period of display (10 days)  : till July 22
- examination by the "Commission de Revision" (8 days)  : till July 30

Gouvernement Militaire de la Zone française d'Occupation
Le 31 Mai 1946
examination of appeals by municipal election committee
(Comité de Révision) 8 days i till August 9
notification of decisions to persons concerned i not later than August 10
submittal of objections to appeal committee i till August 13
decision by appeal committee within 8 days i till August 21
notification to Mayor (3 days) i till August 24
entry of corrections and closure of voters' list i till August 25

Additional lists:
(returning prisoners and deportees)
entry not later than 12 days before the election
publication (2 days) " " " 10 " " "
submittal to examination committee " " " 8 " " "
appeal " " " 4 " " "
closure of voters' list " " " 1 " " "

This attention to detail and to every possible eventuality, a hallmark of French bureaucratic thoroughness, was again reflected in Ordonnance No 49 issued by the French commander-in-chief on August 5, 1946, establishing the procedure and circumstances of the impending municipal elections, right down to the colour of the ballot envelopes. The French government publication, Cahier Français d'Information, No. 77, provides an apology for the extent of this detail: "Les Allemands avaient eu le temps d'oublier quels sont les détails pratiques d'une procédure électorale. L'ordonnance No 49 est donc à la fois minutieuse et précise: vote sous enveloppe opaque et marquée d'un cachet, vérification de l'enveloppe déposée, fermeture de l'urne, bureau disposant des pouvoirs de police nécessaires, dépouillement des bulletins, etc. ... Les électeurs allemands - dont beaucoup sont nouveaux - disposeraient ainsi d'un guide sûr lorsque le jour sera venu pour eux de manifester par un vote une opinion politique." (139)

The announcement of the date for the new municipal elections in Süd-Württemberg (September 15, 1946) was released on the same day as Ordonnance No 49, i.e. in the form of Ordonnance No 51 of August 5. In fact, on that day five such ordinances (Ordonnances Nos. 50 – 54) were published in Baden-Baden, one for each of the five provinces comprising the French Zone. (139) The official apologist in the Cahier Français d'Information, No 77 justified this duplication of decrees in the
following terms: "En effet, le Gouvernement militaire a voulu marquer que la France visait à relier le présent au passé démocratique antérieur au nazisme en élaborant des textes qui soient dans la ligne de la législation antérieure à 1933, et ceci pour chaque province."(140) This version, which emphasizes a desire on the part of the French to return to the pre-1933 situation of the Weimar Republic, must be treated with caution in the light of the "French thesis" on Germany and France's interests in the stimulation of regional separatism as a basis for a confederated Germany, i.e. not simply to return to the modified federal system of Weimar but a stage further retrospectively to the pre-1870 situation in Germany.

Ordonnance Nr. 51 of August 5 laid down specific changes within the system of municipal administration in Süd-Württemberg. These changes, which in fact involved a radical break with the traditional "Gemeindeordnung" (Municipal Code) of Württemberg, will be discussed below with reference to the new "Gemeindeordnung". Another feature of Ordonnance Nr. 51 was that the mayor, who up to this point had been a nominee of the French military government, was to be elected separately on the same ballot paper of September 15, 1946, as the municipal council. Another feature was that the town had to bear the election costs in toto.(141)

On August 19, 1946, the "Stadtbeirat" of Tübingen met to discuss and implement the new regulations and to make the necessary preparations for the municipal elections of September 15. It was decided to open 15 polling stations in the town, each station to deal with approximately twelve hundred voters ("Wahlberechtigte"). An election executive ("Wahlvorstand") was elected to supervise the course of the election and the vote counting. By September 11, it was decided, the voters were to be informed by post of their inclusion on the electoral list and this notification was to be accompanied by the "Stimmsettel" (ballot lists) of the respective parties. (142) Since the DVP had in the meantime been officially registered there were now four parties, plus the "Parteilose Wählervereinigung", on the lists.

The final reference which ought to be made on the elaborate stage-managing of the electoral procedures surrounding the municipal elections in Tübingen is a series of comments provided in the course of an interview by Dr. Meyer-König, a former official in the "Staatssekretariat". Dr. Meyer-König stated that the French
authorities in Tübingen displayed a high degree of tension and concern throughout the electoral preparations. According to Dr. Meyer-König the French authorities feared that a large section of the population would bide their time until the eventual re-emergence of a new party with an ideology akin to National Socialism. In connection with this the DVP was regarded as a potential pool of such energy (q.v. section in Chapter 4 on DVP). On the day of the elections the French, according to Meyer-König, installed for the occasion a battery of some fifty telephonists complete with the necessary equipment (no mean feat in that period of shortage) in the French military government headquarters to monitor the progress and results of the elections in the other "Kreise" of Süd-Deutschland and transmit the same to Baden-Baden and Paris.

The Tübingen municipal results were (in brief, since they have already been quoted elsewhere) as follows: of a total of 291,029 votes cast for 24 seats

- the CDU gained 94,242 votes = 8 seats
- the DVP gained 75,204 " = 7 "
- the SPD gained 70,140 " = 6 "
- the KPD gained 26,547 " = 2 "
- the "Parteilose Wählervereinigung" gained 12,896 " = 1 "

The results reflected a change in the political make-up of the town council in that only 8 of the 16 former "Stadträte" were re-elected.

Oberbürgermeister Hartmeyer, however, retained his position, gaining 10,674 of a total of 12,792 votes cast, which was not surprising since there were no other candidates. At the ceremonial opening meeting of the new "Gemeinderat" on September 21, 1946, three deputies were elected to aid the mayor in his functions; these men were termed "ehrenamtliche Beigeordnete" (honorary advisory deputies). They were:

1. Beigeordneter und Stellvertreter des Oberbürgermeisters —
   Gemeinderat Paul Schwars (CDU)

2. Beigeordneter — Gemeinderat Otto Erbe (DVP)

3. Beigeordneter — Gemeinderat Ferdinand Zeeb (KPD)

(1st Advisory Councillor and Deputy Mayor —
Councillor Paul Schwars (CDU)

2nd Advisory Councillor —
Councillor Otto Erbe (DVP)

3rd Advisory Councillor —
Councillor Ferdinand Zeeb (KPD)"
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The Tübingen municipal results were (in brief, since they have already been quoted elsewhere) as follows: of a total of 281,029 votes cast for 24 seats

- the CDU gained 94,242 votes = 8 seats
- the DVP gained 75,804 " = 7 "
- the KPD gained 70,140 " = 6 "
- the Parteilose Wahlvereinigung gained 28,547 " = 2 "

The results reflected a change in the political make-up of the town council in that only 3 of the 16 former "Stadtbeiräte" were re-elected.

Oberbürgermeister Hartmayer, however, retained his position, gaining 10,674 of a total of 12,792 votes cast, which was not surprising since there were no other candidates. At the ceremonial opening meeting of the new "Gemeinderat" on September 21, 1946, three deputies were elected to aid the mayor in his functions: these men were termed "ehrenamtliche Beigeordnete" (honorary advisory deputies). They were:

1. Beigeordneter und Stellvertreter des Oberbürgermeisters -
   Gemeinderat Paul Schwers (CDU)
2. Beigeordneter - Gemeinderat Otto Rabe (DVP)
3. Beigeordneter - Gemeinderat Ferdinand Zeob (KPD)

(1st Advisory Councillor and Deputy Mayor -
Councillor Paul Schwers (CDU)
2nd Advisory Councillor -
Councillor Otto Rabe (DVP)
3rd Advisory Councillor -
Councillor Ferdinand Zeob (KPD)"
At the same ceremony Oberbürgermeister Hartmeyer stressed the need for hard work to alleviate the damage and misery caused by the war. Hartmeyer, aware that many aspects of French occupation policy in Tübingen antagonised sections of the community against the town hall which was the executor of French demands, advised the assembled municipal councillors how to react to such antagonisms: "Wir seien noch keineswegs aus den Schwierigkeiten heraus, vielmehr stehe ein viel härterer und schlimmerer Winter vor uns, als dies der letzte gewesen sein. Er könne demzufolge der Bevölkerung keine Versprechungen machen und es sei notwendig, die Einwohnerschaft über unsere tatsächliche Lage aufzuklären. Er bittet die anwesenden Gemeinderatsmitglieder auch ihrerseits aufklärend in der Bevölkerung zu wirken ... Die vor uns liegende Aufbauarbeit müsse geleistet werden im Interesse und zum Wohle unserer guten Stadt Tübingen. Wenn es dabei zuweilen auch aus bestimmten Kreisen der Bevölkerung zu versteckten Angriffen gegen die Arbeit des Gemeinderats komme, so seien diese nur als Unverstand und böser Wille zu werten. Gegen diese Kreise müsse jedes Gemeinderatsmitglied auftreten und mit Klugheit und Wahrhaftigkeit sollen die Gemeinderatsmitglieder der Bevölkerung die Dinge so darlegen, wie sie sind." (He said that we were by no means out of difficulties yet, on the contrary that a much harder and severer winter than the previous one was in store for us. Therefore he could make no promises to the populace and it was necessary to inform the inhabitants of our actual situation. He asked the municipal council members present also to contribute for their parts towards informing the populace ... The reconstruction work facing us would have to be done in the interests and for the good of our good town Tübingen. If in the course of this task concealed criticism of the municipal council's work was occasionally generated from within certain circles in the populace it was to be regarded as nothing more than lack of judgement and ill-will. Every municipal council member would have to take a firm stand against these groups and the council members ought to explain things to the populace just as they were with prudence and veracity.)

At the second meeting of the municipal council eight committees were elected from within the members: Technischer Ausschuß, Innerer Ausschuß, Sozialausschuß, Kulturausschuß, Ernährungs- und Wirtschaftsausschuß, Wohnungsausschuß, Schätzungs­ausschuß and Haushaltsausschuß (technical committee, committee for internal and administrative affairs, welfare committee, cultural committee, committee for food and economic affairs, housing committee, valuation committee and budget committee).
The establishment of an elected "Gemeinderat" in Tübingen reflected two important factors of the political life of the community, apart from the obvious feature that it indicated a stage in the process of a return to political autonomy: firstly, the existence of the new municipal council provided a platform for the newly permitted political parties and therefore an area of experience; secondly, the new municipal council reflected a change in the political municipal life of Süd-Württemberg in that the French authorities had imposed what was tantamount to a new "Gemeindeordnung" (Municipal Code) on the townships of Süd-Württemberg by means of their decrees concerning the establishment of elected municipal councils.

The pre-1933 system of municipal government in Württemberg had been altered gradually at first by National Socialist decrees and finally replaced by the "Deutsche Gemeindeordnung" (German Municipal Code) of 30.1.1935 which created a standard form of municipal government for the entire Reich based on National Socialist principles, especially the ethos of the "Führerprinzip" (principle of hierarchical leadership emanating from the Führer). During the latter part of the National Socialist era in Tübingen this provided for an "Überbürgermeister" and two deputies, a "hauptamtlicher Beigeordneter" (full-time advisory councillor) for financial affairs (i.e. the "Stadtkämmerer" — city treasurer) and an "ehrenamtlicher Beigeordneter" (honorary advisory councillor) (i.e. "Stadtrat" — municipal councillor). Although a new "Gemeindeordnung" was not formally introduced in post-war Süd-Württemberg until the "Gemeindeordnung" of March 14, 1947, it is evident that the rules laid down by Baden-Baden on the form of the newly elected "Gemeinderat" of September 15, 1946, constituted a substitute form of "Gemeindeordnung". This situation had been envisaged as far back as December 14, 1945, when the cabinet of the "Staatssekretariat" considered forwarding a proposal to the French authorities for the assumption of the "Gemeindeordnung" of Nord-Württemberg in Süd-Württemberg with a view to creating a basis for the administrative unification of Württemberg. Carlo Schmid, who had just returned from a meeting of the Stuttgart cabinet, mentioned that a new "Gemeindeordnung" was to be soon introduced in Nord-Württemberg and Nord-Baden and "schlägt ... vor, diese Gemeindeordnung auch für den Bereich des Staatssekretariats zu übernehmen ... Es besteht Einigkeit darüber, daß die Übernahme vorgesehen wird, um auf diesem wichtigen Gebiet die Einheit Württembergs herausstellen, ... Die Entscheidung wird vertagt." (proposed ...
the adoption of this municipal code for the region under the control of the State Secretariat ... All were in agreement over the adoption (of this code) in order to establish the unity of Württemberg in this important field ... the decision was postponed. Presumably Schmid delayed the decision until he had sounded out the French for their reactions; on receiving an inevitably negative response the matter must have been dropped, for it did not reappear in the proposed form.

According to Eberhard Konstanser "Carlo Schmid führte zu diesem Zweck mehrere Unterredungen mit Gouverneur Widmer und dessen Kabinettssdiraktor, da die französischen Vorstellungen teilweise erheblich von den deutschen abwichen." (To this end Carlo Schmid held several discussions with Governor Widmer and his cabinet director, as French views differed considerably in parts from German views.) Konstanser bases his facts on the protocol of the fortieth cabinet meeting of the "Staatssekretariat" (March 16, 1946) which reads as follows:

"Staatsrat Schmid berichtet von einer Unterredung mit dem Kabinett des Gouverneurs vom 16.4.46.

Nach Instruktionen von Baden-Baden sollen die Gemeindewahlen so rasch als möglich abgehalten werden.

Die Frage wird eingehend beraten und Einigkeit darüber erzielt, die nachfolgenden Grundsätze und Vorschläge bei der heutigen Gouverneursbesprechung der Militärregierung gegenüber zu vertreten:

I. Das französische Wahlgesetz von 1884 eignet sich nicht für württembergische Verhältnisse. Bei dem Unterschied im Aufbau der französischen und der deutschen Gemeinde ist es besser, auf die alten, ausgesprochen demokratischen Wahlgesetze Württembergs zurückzugreifen ...


Die Wahl möglichst zurückzustellen. Durchführung nach altem württembergischen Recht mit Ausschreibung ...

Falls dieser Vorschlag nicht durchzubekommen, Erstvorschlag: Bürgermeister ausnahmsweise für diese erste Wahl durch Gemeinderäte zu wählen, ohne Bindung an Voraussetzung der Zugehörigkeit zum Gemeinderat ...."

According to instructions from Baden-Baden, the municipal elections were to be held as soon as possible.
The question was debated in detail and it was agreed to present the following statements of principle and suggestions to the Military Government at the Governor's conference of that same day:

I. The French electoral law of 1884 is not suitable for conditions in Württemberg. Considering the difference of make-up of French and German municipal organisation it is better to go back to the old and distinctly democratic electoral laws of Württemberg...

III. Election of Mayors. In principle mayors should be elected by the people as was always the case in Württemberg. The election, if at all possible, is to be postponed — and the execution of same, according to old Württemberg law, should include the issue of writs...

If this proposal is not acceptable there is a substitute proposal: By way of exception mayors are to be elected in this first election by the municipal councillors but are not required to be members of the municipal council itself...(152)

This protocol indicates that there had been differences of opinion between Schmid and the French on these points.

In a meeting on the same day with Governor-General Widmer Schmid appears to have gained a concession from the French in that the "Staatssekretariat" was empowered to produce a series of proposals on these subjects and to submit them to the Governor-General: "Es wurde besprochen das Problem der Gemeindewahlen. Seitens des Staatssekretariats wurden die Vorteile der alten württembergischen Gemeindeverfassung dargelegt und dargetan, daß der französische Vorschlag auf die hiesigen Verhältnisse nicht passe. Der Gouverneur bat um eine Ausarbeitung unserer Vorschläge." (The problem of the municipal elections was discussed. On the part of the State Secretariat the advantages of the old Württemberg municipal code were set forth and it was demonstrated that the French proposal did not suit local conditions. The Governor asked for a formulation of our proposals.) (153)

Detailed proposals were consequently worked out by the "Staatssekretariat" with the aid of a special commission which it had established to examine the question of a new "Gemeindeordnung". At a cabinet meeting of the "Staatssekretariat" on March 26 the matter was again raised: "Landesdirektor Rothen legt die bis jetzt von einer Kommission in Anlehnung an die Deutsche Gemeindeordnung und das Stuttgarter Gesetz zur Änderung der Deutschen Gemeindeordnung erarbeiteten Teile einer in Neufassung zu verkündenden Gemeindeordnung, eine Rechtsanordnung
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Detailed proposals were consequently worked out by the "Staatssekretariat" with the aid of a special commission which it had established to examine the question of a new "Gemeindeordnung". At a cabinet meeting of the "Staatssekretariat" on March 26 the matter was again raised: "Landsdirektor Roßman legt die bis jetzt von einer Kommission in Anlehnung an die Deutsche Gemeindeordnung und das Stuttgarter Gesetz zur Änderung der Deutschen Gemeindeordnung erarbeiteten Teile einer in Neufassung zu veränderteren Gemeindeordnung, eine Rechtsanordnung
The question was debated in detail and it was agreed to present the following statements of principle and suggestions to the Military Government at the Governor's conference of that same day:

I. The French electoral law of 1884 is not suitable for conditions in Württemberg. Considering the difference of make-up of French and German municipal organisation it is better to go back to the old and distinctly democratic electoral laws of Württemberg ...

III. Election of Mayors. In principle mayors should be elected by the people as was always the case in Württemberg. The election, if at all possible, is to be postponed - and the execution of same, according to old Württemberg law, should include the issue of writs ...

If this proposal is not acceptable there is a substitute proposal:

By way of exception mayors are to be elected in this first election by the municipal councillors but are not required to be members of the municipal council itself...

This protocol indicates that there had been differences of opinion between Schmidt and the French on these points.

In a meeting on the same day with Governor-General Widmer-Schmid appears to have gained a concession from the French in that the "Staatssekretariat" was empowered to produce a series of proposals on these subjects and to submit them to the Governor-General: "Es wurde besprochen das Problem der Gemeindewahlen. Seitens des Staatssekretariats wurden die Vorteile der alten württembergischen Gemeindeverfassung dargelegt und dargetan, daß der französische Vorschlag auf die hiesigen Verhältnisse nicht paßt. Der Gouverneur bat um eine Ausrbeitung unserer Vorschläge." (The problem of the municipal elections was discussed. On the part of the State Secretariat the advantages of the old Württemberg municipal code were set forth and it was demonstrated that the French proposal did not suit local conditions. The Governor asked for a formulation of our proposals.) (393)

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the adoption of this municipal code for the region under the control of the State Secretariat ... All were in agreement over the adoption (of this code) in order to establish the unity of Württemberg in this important field ... the decision was postponed. Presumably Schmid delayed the decision until he had sounded out the French for their reactions; on receiving an inevitably negative response the matter must have been dropped, for it did not reappear in the proposed form.

According to Eberhard Konstanser "Carlo Schmid führte zu diesem Zweck mehrere Unterredungen mit Gouverneur Widmer und dessen Kabinettdirektor, da die französischen Vorstellungen teilweise erheblich von den deutschen abwichen." (To this end Carlo Schmid held several discussions with Governor Widmer and his cabinet director, as French views differed considerably in parts from German views.) Konstanser bases his facts on the protocol of the fortieth cabinet meeting of the "Staatssekretariat" (March 18, 1946) which reads as follows: "Staatsrat Schmid berichtet von einer Unterredung mit dem Kabinett des Gouverneurs vom 16.4.46. Nach Instruktionen von Baden-Baden sollen die Gemeindewahlen so rasch als möglich abgehalten werden. Die Wahl möglichst zurückstellen. Durchführung nach altem württembergischen Recht mit Ausschreibung ... Falls dieser Vorschlag nicht durchzubekommen, Erstevorschlag: Bürgermeister ausnahmsweise für diese erste Wahl durch Gemeinderäte zu wählen, ohne Bindung an Voraussetzung der Zugehörigkeit zum Gemeinderat ..." (Staatsrat Schmid reported on a discussion held with the Governor's cabinet on 16.4.1946. According to instructions from Baden-Baden, the municipal elections were to be held as soon as possible.
The question was debated in detail and it was agreed to present the following statements of principle and suggestions to the Military Government at the Governor's conference of that same day:

I. The French electoral law of 1874 is not suitable for conditions in Württemberg. Considering the difference of make-up of French and German municipal organisation it is better to go back to the old and distinctly democratic electoral laws of Württemberg...

II. Election of Mayors. In principle mayors should be elected by the people as was always the case in Württemberg. The election, if at all possible, is to be postponed — and the execution of same, according to old Württemberg law, should include the issue of writs...

If this proposal is not acceptable there is a substitute proposal:

By way of exception mayors are to be elected in this first election by the municipal councillors but are not required to be members of the municipal council itself...

This protocol indicates that there had been differences of opinion between Schmid and the French on these points.

In a meeting on the same day with Governor-General Widmer Schmid appears to have gained a concession from the French in that the "Staatssekretariat" was empowered to produce a series of proposals on these subjects and to submit them to the Governor-General: "Es wurde besprochen das Problem der Gemeindewahlen. Seitens des Staatssekretariats wurden die Vorteile der alten württembergischen Gemeindeverfassung dargelegt und dargetan, daß der französische Vorschlag auf die hiesigen Verhältnisse nicht passe. Die Gouverneur bat um eine Ausarbeitung unserer Vorschläge." (The problem of the municipal elections was discussed. On the part of the State Secretariat the advantages of the old Württemberg municipal code were set forth and it was demonstrated that the French proposal did not suit local conditions. The Governor asked for a formulation of our proposals.)

Detailed proposals were consequently worked out by the "Staatssekretariat" with the aid of a special commission which it had established to examine the question of a new "Gemeindeordnung". At a cabinet meeting of the "Staatssekretariat" on March 26 the matter was again raised: "Landesdirektor Seidman legt die bis jetzt von einer Kommission in Anlehnung an die Deutsche Gemeindeordnung und das Stuttgarter Gesetz zur Änderung der Deutschen Gemeindeordnung erarbeiteten Teile einer in Neufassung zu verkündenden Gemeindeordnung, eine Rechtsordnung..."
über die politische Gestaltung des Wahlrechts und eine Gemeindewahlordnung im Entwurf vor. Diese Entwürfe sollen der Militärregierung sofort vorgelegt werden. Zu einer Beratung im Direktorium bleibt keine Zeit. Sie soll nach Vorlage an die Militärregierung erfolgen ..." (Landesdirektor Kochmann submitted those sections of a municipal code which up till then had been undergoing formulation by a commission in accordance with the German Municipal Code and the Stuttgart Law on the Amendment of the German Municipal Code and which was to be published in a revised version, a legal decree concerning the political form of franchise and a municipal election statute in draft form. These drafts were to be submitted immediately to the Military Government. There was no time left for a cabinet discussion of the topic. This would take place after submission to the Military Government ...)

The final formula of the new proposed "Gemeindeordnung" was presented at the next cabinet meeting. It was subsequently forwarded, as required, to the French authorities. (155)

On May 17 the "Staatssekretariat" passed its own formula as the new legal "Gemeindeordnung" for Mitt-Württemberg in the form of a "Rechtsanordnung" without waiting on the approval of the French military government. The military government's reaction to this step came as a surprise to the "Staatssekretariat". Eberhard Konetzner, who has closely studied this area, writes: "Austausch des Staatssekretariats regelte die Militärregierung diese Fragen (i.e. concerning the 'Gemeindeordnung') aus eigener Zuständigkeit. Durch die Verordnungen Nr. 44, 53 und 61 von General König wurden die vom Direktorium geplanten Rechtsanordnungen gegenstandslos. Die Besatzungsmacht hatte Württemberg-Odenwald ihre eigene Auffassung von Demokratie oktroyiert. Sie hatte zahlreiche Einsätze des Direktoriums nicht berücksichtigt. Die Bürgermeisterwahlen mußten zusammen mit den Gemeinderatswahlen als Volkswahlen stattfinden. Die Militärregierung präsentierte auch den bislang unbekannten "ehrenamtlichen" Bürgermeister. ... In Tübingen war man enttäuscht und fühlte sich, wie Carlo Schmidt dies einmal in Singraringen ausdrückte, als "Schulbuben" behandelt." (Contrary to the expectations of the State Secretariat the Military Government settled those questions on its own jurisdiction. Ordinances Nos. 44, 53 and 61, issued by General König, thus invalidated the legal decrees which were planned by the cabinet. The occupying power had imposed its own concept of democracy on Württemberg-Odenwald. It had not considered the many objections submitted by the cabinet. The mayoral
elections had to take place, along with the municipal council elections, as popular elections. The Military Government also imposed the as yet unknown institution of "honorary" mayor ... People were disappointed in Tübingen and felt, as Carlo Schmid once expressed it in Hugsmaringen, that they had been treated as "school-boys."

The point about the "ehrenamtlicher Bürgermeister" (honorary mayor) was the central issue of the controversy. The "Staatssekretariat" resolved to appeal to the French military government to alter this feature (August 20, 1946): "Dr. Meyer-König, who had been summoned to Commandant Houllès about this matter on 16.8.46, reported on the result of his negotiations. In view of the great importance of the regulations contained in Ordinance No. 53 it was unanimously decided to again make representations of an emphatic nature to the Military Government for changes to be made in Ordinance No. 53 to the effect that the local authorities would have the possibility of installing the mayor on a full-time basis.

The problem lay in the fact that the French authorities in Baden-Baden had resolved to alter the traditional role of the "Oberbürgermeister" in old-Württemberg by imposing an historical French interpretation on the office. Alfred Dehlinger outlined the difference between the French and the traditional South German concept of mayoral office in his prestigious work, "Württemberg unter den alliierten Besatzungsmächten": "Die Franzosen betrachten den Bürgermeister nicht als den Verwalter der Gemeinde, der sich vorwiegend mit Verwaltungsgeschäften zu befassen hat, sondern als eine politische Persönlichkeit, die unabhängig sein soll. Dementsprechend wird nur ein ehrenamtlicher Bürgermeister gewählt, der auch nicht durch eine staatliche Stelle bestätigt wird und auch kein Gehalt von der Gemeinde bezieht. Damit wurde seine Stellung eine rein politische ... Als Stellvertreter stehen den Bürgermeister ehrenamtliche Beigeordnete zur Seite."
administrator who has to deal mainly with administrative business, but as a political personality who has to be independent. Accordingly, only an honorary mayor is elected who is no longer confirmed in office by any government authority and who does not draw any salary from the community. Thus his office became a purely political one. The mayor is assisted (in his office) by honorary advisory councillors acting as his deputies.}

The replacement of a full-time professional executive by an elected local politician as head of municipal administration has been recognised as one of the characteristics of French occupation policy, described by various commentators as the introduction of the "maire-et-adjoints" system into South-West German municipal life and generally evaluated as a failure in the long term. One commentator, Raymond Shephard, wrote: "They (i.e. the French) did, however, like the British, bring some ideas with them from home. They tried, in fact, to introduce the maire-et-adjoints system, and, like the British again, immediately encountered the hostility of the senior professional officials. The latter seemed to think that if the maire was to have adjoints these should not be councillors but experts — that is themselves. The officials maintained their hostility throughout and all the French moniker reverted to their previous systems as soon as they began to enact their own legislation." This view is identical with the one offered by J.F.J. Gillams in his research report, *State and local government in West Germany, 1945-1953*: "... what the Germans objected to in the "maire-et-adjoints" system for the Gemeinden and Stadtkreise was that it struck at the full-time professional top executives, the Bürgermeister and the Beigeordneten." (160)

The French authorities did not justify their decision for importing the "maire-et-adjoints" system into their zone by referring to the relative efficacy or superiority of their own system of local government. Instead the emphasis of argument was laid on the centralizing process of National Socialist "Gleichschaltung" by which the NSDAP had deprived municipal authorities throughout Germany of their traditional areas of independence and on the subsequent need to re-establish the autonomy of the "Gemeinden" under the tutelage of elected, unpaid political leaders representing political will rather than full-time professional "Beamten." (161)
One final factor remains to be mentioned in connection with the autonomy of the town hall in Tübingen during the post-war years of occupation, namely the relationship of power and legality between the town hall and the "Landratsamt" as defined by French policy. This question comprises the final section of this examination of the municipal administration of Tübingen during the years, 1945-1947.

The important feature of the relationship between town hall and "Landratsamt" was based on a contradiction, that is, whilst the "Landratsamt" was responsible for all correspondence and contacts between the town hall on the one hand and the French military government and the "Staatsekretariat" on the other, it had no formal authority over the town hall. Tübingen was one of a number of medium-sized towns in Süd-Württemberg which, because of their size of population, had been declared "unmittelbare Kreisstädte" in 1935, thereby subordinating them from the control and supervision of the local "Ländere" and placing them directly subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior. The French retained this administrative arrangement after the establishment of the "Staatsekretariat" in October 1945. The retention of this system in the case of Tübingen has proved useful for the purposes of this case-study in that the lines of communication between town hall and "Landratsamt", being those of transmission rather than command, serve to simplify the position of Tübingen in that Tübingen can be presented as an enclosed unit, at least to a greater degree than many other communities in Süd-Württemberg.
Footnotes

Chapter Five: The reconstruction of municipal administrations and elected municipal government in Tübingen, 1945-1947


(3) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Nachlaß Hermann Werner, "Besuch bei dem früheren Oberbürgermeister Dr. Hauckmann am 7. Mai 1951 in Stuttgart-Nöthnang, Haydstr. 49."


(5) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Ass. 006 - 012, Commissio datet June 14, 1945.

(6) Interview with Dr. Rolf Fritz, Koordinator der Deutsch-Französischen Gesellschaft Tübingen, Tübingen, April 1974.

(7) Journal officiel du Commissariat en Chef français en Allemagne (Baden-Baden), Première Année, No. 1, 3 Septembre 1945, p. 4.

(8) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Protokollbuch der Demokratischen Vereinigung Tübingen, "Veranstaltung am 10. Oktober 1945."


(14) Ibid., § 1016, p. 76.


(17) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Protokollbuch der Demokratischen Vereinigung Tübingen, "Veranstaltung am 26. September 1945."

(18) Stadtarchiv Reutlingen, Ass. Nr. 215, "Organisations-Plan für die politische Säuberung des französisch besetzten Gebiets Württemberg und Hohenzollern".

(20) Stadtarchiv Reutlingen, A: Nr. 215, "Richtlinien für die Kreisuntersuchungsausschüsse, Säuberungsausschüsse und den politischen Landesbeirat", p. 4 f.

(21) ibid., p. 1.

(22) ibid., pp. 1 f.

(23) Stadtarchiv Reutlingen, A: Nr. 219, "Allgemeine Akten zur Rechtsanordnung für die politische Säuberung", pp. 3 f.


(26) Staatsarchiv Sigmaringen, Wü 2 Acc 32/69, 6800/25.

(27) ibid., Ziffer 10.

(28) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Protokollbuch der demokratischen Vereinigung Tübingen, "Versammlung am 15. August 1945".


(30) P. Roy Willis, op. cit., pp. 150 f.


(33) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Nachlässe Hermann Werner, "Besuch bei Innenminister Dr. Kenner, Mitte bis Ende 1945 Überbürgermeister von Tübingen, am 28. März 1951".


(38) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Hermann Werner, op. cit., Band I (1945), p. 60.

(44) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Az: 1112/23, op. cit.
(46) *ibid.*, p. 93.
(47) *ibid.*
(49) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, *Gemeinderat-Protokoll 1946*.
(51) *ibid.*
(53) *ibid.*, pp. 46 f.
(54) *Jahrbuch für internationales und ausländisches öffentliches Recht* (Hamburg), 1 Jg., 1949, pp. 127 ff.
(55) Landratsamt Tübingen, Archiv, p. 16.
(62) "In the French Zone, System secluded from the rest of Germany", December 20, 1946, p. 5.
(63) No. 4, May 1947, p. 355.
(91) Staatsarchiv Sigmaringen, "Niederschrift über die 82. Sitzung des Direktoriums: 25. September 1946".

(92) Landratsamt Tübingen, circular dated November 25, 1946.

(93) Stadtrat Tübingen, Hermann Werner, op. cit., Band II (1946), p. 35.

(94) Stadtrat Tübingen, Gemeinderates-Protokoll 1946, p. 35; November 1946, "Fortführung der Volksküche", pp. 55 f.

(95) Ähnl.


(97) Staatsarchiv Sigmaringen, "Niederschrift über die 64. Sitzung des Direktoriums: 25. Juni 1946".

(98) Cahiers Français d'Information, No. 77, p. 9.

(99) Vol. 17, No. 1, October 1946, p. 85.

(100) Stadtrat Tübingen, Hermann Werner, op. cit., Band I (1945), p. 130.

(101) Ähnl., p. 46.

(102) Stadtrat Tübingen, Azl 062-00.


(108) Abdruck der Stadtratssitzungen für das französische besetzte Gebiet Mittelguard und Rheinlanders (Tübingen), 1946, p. 2.

(109) Landratsamt Tübingen, Azl: 100-20, "Staatlicher Polizeivollzugsdienst. Allgemein".


(113) Stadtrat Tübingen, Hermann Werner, op. cit., Band I (1945), pp. 98 f.

(114) May 26, 1945.

(115) Stadtrat Tübingen, Hermann Werner, op. cit., Band I (1945), p. 89.

(116) Stadtrat Tübingen, Reg.-Nr. 1201, § 36, p. 43.


Alfred Dehlinger, Württemberg unter den alliierten Besatzungsbehörden bis heute, Stuttgart, 1951, p. 274.


ibid., p. 276.

Historical Division of the Executive Secretary, Executive Office of the U.S. High Commissioner in Germany, 1953, p. 121.
Chapter Six

Cultural affairs in Tübingen, 1945–1947, including developments within the local press and publishing industry.

1) Tübingen's cultural programme, 1945–1947

2) French newspaper policy in Tübingen, 1945–1947

3) French policy in publishing affairs, 1945–1947
Since it is the function of this chapter to examine French military government policy on cultural affairs in the light of the specific case of Tubingen, it was decided to introduce the theme by stating the general features and conditions of France’s cultural policy in her zone of occupation in the period, 1945-1947, and then to relate these to the particular situation in Tubingen with specific reference to a restricted number of cultural topics.

The first obvious point to make about the French cultural programme in their zone of occupation is the fact that there has been, both during the period, 1945-1947, and since, a fairly universal consensus of opinion that of the four occupying powers in post-war Germany France implemented the most successful cultural programme, despite the various and diverging motivations operating behind the formulation of policy.

F. Roy Willis accepted this consensus judgement in 1962 whilst reviewing the French cultural programme in his book, The French in Germany, 1945-1949: “There can be no doubt of the success of the French educational and cultural programme. In spite of occasional opposition from conservative and nationalist groups, from the churches, and even from the universities, and of the complaints that Germans were “stuffed with culture” rather than food, the programme succeeded … Day-to-day association with French people and with the cultural achievements of France undoubtedly created a friendliness toward France which was not felt in the other zones toward their occupiers.”

In 1950 an article in a French journal, Documents, Revue mensuelle des questions allemandes, stated that within French occupation policy the cultural programme had proved its most successful feature: “C’est peut-être, en effet, dans ce domaine et dans celui des Rencontres Internationales que la puissance d’occupation française a réalisé le travail le plus intelligent et certainement le plus utile au rapprochement franco-allemand. Les Allemands, malgré ce qui a été dit ou écrit de part et d’autre à l’endroit de cet effort de propagande culturelle, puisque ce mot de “propagande” a été si souvent employé, ne se lassent pas des spectacles français que nous soumettons à leur jugement. Pendant treize ans ils ont tout ou presque tout ignoré de la vie des Lettres et des Arts en France. Ils reconnaissent, d’autre part, bien volontiers, que notre patrimoine littéraire et artistique n’a
Alfred Grosser's opinion is that "the French cultural effort in Germany took many forms: from the remarkable school for teachers to the creation of the university of Mainz, from the drafting of text-books (sometimes disastrously bad) to the introduction of the baccalauréat. Being much wider in scope than the work of the other occupying powers, it had more successes and also more failures. But the really original French action was carried out against the general tendency of the administration and against the isolation of the zone, which was a sort of political dogma of the French occupation."(5)

It is also fitting to quote some contemporary acknowledgements of the French cultural programmes in the post-war years. In December 1946 the London Times wrote: "Lavish and brilliant cultural propaganda has added much to the amenities of life in the French zone. Art exhibitions, concerts, French films and books are sincerely appreciated and welcomed, but probably produce little political effect. The French encourage German artists and writers, many of whom have come to the French zone from elsewhere. They produce some of the best of current German periodicals ... But none of these suffices to outweigh material cares or give Germans faith in their future."(4) Eighteen months later the Economist commented with a touch of irony: "The best that the French drama and music can offer is sent to Germany and one wonders what significance there can be in the favour that Molière enjoys among Germans."(5) The following year Percy Bidwell's article in Foreign Affairs, entitled "Emphasis on Culture in the French Zone", underlined the efficacy of the French cultural programmes, noting that "characteristically the French programme is marked by a sincere belief that learning and culture can produce civilised men, coupled with an anchor to windward in the form of strict economic controls."(6)

This wave of cultural promotion and activity was felt throughout the French zone. In this respect Tübingen was no exception; indeed it became a representative example of French cultural policy at work within South-West Germany. The local historian, Hermann Werner, wrote of French cultural activities in Tübingen: "Mehr sprüre man auch eine starke und meist recht sachliche kulturelle Propaganda, die
hervorragende französische Künstler und Kunstwerke, besonders in Musik und Theater, später auch Wissenschaftler nach Tübingen brachte." (Soon people also noticed a powerful and, for the most part, fairly skilful policy of cultural propaganda which brought to Tübingen distinguished French artists and works of art, particularly in the fields of music and the theatre, and indeed scientists as well at a later date.)

The second point which has been stressed by observers is that the French cultural programme had an inherent advantage over, for example, the American and British cultural efforts, in that South-West Germany had a geographical and therefore historical relationship with France. In 1947 W. Friedmann, a contemporary historian of occupied Germany, wrote that "the French had a smaller but still quite definite advantage (over the Russians) in having as their occupation zone a region of South-Western Germany which had long cultural and even political associations with France" and "politically the French have every reason for repulsion and bitterness against everything German, but between them and in particular the South-West of Germany, which they occupy, there is a great deal of common standards of civilisation."

It is generally accepted by many that the historical relationship between France and South-West Germany left concrete vestiges which potentially enhanced political and cultural rapprochement. This sentiment was publicly demonstrated as late as De Gaulle's state visit to Germany in September 1962. The Stuttgarter Zeitung published a lengthy and detailed article in reaction to this visit, entitled "Frankreichs Ausstrahlungen auf unsere Heimat" (France's influence on our homeland).

The post-war emphasis on the cultural relationship between France and South-West Germany must, however, be modified by a number of facts: firstly, there is the self-evident fact that the geographical proximity between France and Germany traditionally aggravated political tensions and xenophobic nationalism since the wars of Louis XIV and that the wars between France and Germany were characterised by a mutual distrust of the cultural and social background of the other; secondly, there was a disparate reaction to French culture and influence within the former states composing South-West Germany, e.g. Baden was pronouncedly more pro-French
than Wurttemberg and had maintained the Napoleonic Civil Code until 1900; thirdly, the nationalism of the National Socialist era in Germany had been particularly xenophobic in idea and practice, resulting in the de facto suppression from 1935 onwards of French language and literature teaching. In October 1945, during his tour of the French zone, Charles de Gaulle summed up the fragility of cultural relations between France and South-West Germany in an equivocal reference in a speech made in Freiburg: “Il peut y avoir, entre le pays de Bade et la France, entre le Wurtemberg et la France, des liens qui n’existaient pas, sinon il y a fort longtemps, et qui peut-être se renoueront.”

Despite the fact that cultural relations between the two countries may have been somewhat tenuous in 1945 the French authorities in Germany immediately set about defining a cultural programme and an administrative apparatus to strengthen the same. By 1946 the administrative apparatus responsible for cultural affairs in Germany had the following hierarchical structure:

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Direction Générale des Relations Culturelles

Inspecteur Général des Oeuvres Françaises
(Henry Spitzmuller)

Gouvernement Militaire Français de la Zone française d’Occupation

Direction de l’Éducation Publique
(Raymond Schmittlein)

Service Éducation Publique: Wurtemberg
(Commandant Graf)

Since the "Direction de l’Éducation Publique" was subordinate to the policy and decrees of the head of French military government in Germany, General Koenig, it must be considered as an arm of military government, implementing French occupation policy in its own way. At the same time, however, it has been generally recognised that certain departments within the French military government acquired a considerable amount of autonomy. One such department was the "Direction de
1'Education Publique”, especially its branches in the respective sonal provinces. In addition, many of the officials of the "Direction de l'Education Publique" disagreed with the basic tenets of French occupation policy and worked to neutralise them as much as possible, although they could not openly demonstrate their opposition. This factor of contradiction and tension between central occupation policy as defined by Paris and Baden-Baden and the field operations of the cultural affairs teams in the provincial capitals of the French zone is a recurring theme of French cultural policy.

An official French government publication, L'œuvre culturelle française en Allemagne, set out the three main aims of France’s cultural programme for her zone of occupation under the following headings: "la propagation de la langue française", "la diffusion de la pensée française", "l'expansion artistique". These tasks were on the whole delegated to a section within the "Direction de l'Education Publique" called "Beaux-Arts". Its functions have been described in a doctoral thesis by Richard Gilmore in the following terms: "Beaux-Arts was responsible for all German archives, libraries, museums, theatres, literary societies and architecture in the French zone. With its extensive authority to reorganise in several important cultural areas, this division could effectively parry Nazi propaganda. Through a careful selection and control process French and, secondarily, other national cultural contributions were to receive the attention they deserved, heightening German appreciation and esteem for French civilisation. The long-term goal was always re-education and a change in the direction of German thinking, more in keeping with the finer traditions of Western civilisation."

In order to examine French cultural policy at work within a single community and to gauge the consistencies and disparities within the same, it was decided not only to restrict the field of research to the community of Tübingen but also to limit the number of topics within the theme of "culture" in order to prevent too diffuse a frame of reference from emerging. The French, after all, were specific and analytical in their treatment of culture, subdividing the concept into areas of responsibility and delegating administrative sections for the promotion and control of these respective areas. The thematic choice of this study fall on three topics, all of which will be allocated a subsection in this chapter. They are: a) the programme of cultural events provided and fostered by the French in

It was felt that these three topics, viewed compositely, provided an overview of French cultural efforts and the direction of French cultural policy in post-war Tübingen since they involved a range of secondary themes, e.g. censorship, "dirigisme", attitudes on education and the functions of "culture" etc.
Footnotes

Chapter Six: Cultural affairs in Tübingen, 1945-1947, including developments within the local press and publishing industry.

Introduction

(1) Stanford, 1962, p. 179.
(3) Western Germany. From Defeat to Rearmament, London, 1955, p. 79.
(4) "In the French Zone. System secluded from the rest of Germany", in: The Times (London), December 20, 1946, p. 5.
(6) Vol. 27, No. 1, October 1948, p. 78.
(9) Ibid., p. 42.
(10) No. 206, September 8, 1962, p. V.
Section 1: Tübingen’s cultural programme, 1945-1947

This section is divided for reasons of simplicity into six subheadings. They are: theatre; music; art exhibitions; conferences; the role of the Institut Français; and clubs and societies (i.e. "Vereine").

When considering theatre life in post-war Tübingen it is imperative to differentiate between French and German theatre. The former entailed theatre programmes consisting of French plays produced and performed in French by French troupes which visited the zone under the auspices of the French cultural programme. These theatre visits were part of a more general programme of entertainment which included visits by French orchestras, lectures and readings by French artists and academics and film shows. The overall programme was designed to expose the German intelligentsia and social élites which had been starved of foreign literary and artistic production during the Third Reich to a cross-section of French intellectual production. The simplest method of demonstrating the volume and concentration of this effort within Tübingen is to reproduce some of the weekly programmes of post-war Tübingen as advertised in the Tübinger DP-Wochenblatt during the period, October—December 1946:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Théâtre (Schilleraal)</th>
<th>Hirsch-Idätspiele</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dimanche 20, 14 h.45, 16 h.30 et 19 h.; Münchhausen. Film allemand, en couleur.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dimanche 20, 16 h.45 et 19 h.; Opérette avec Willy Forst et Maria Holst. Un film de la Vienne d'auteur (parlant allemand) jusqu'au jeudi 24.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lundi 21, 16 h.45 et 19 h.; Héôl Programme.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lundi 21, 16 h.45 et 19 h.; Héôl Programme.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concerts (Salle des fêtes de l'Université)</td>
<td>Concerts (Salle des fêtes de l'Université)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mardi 22, 14 h.15, 16 h.30 et 21 h.15; Hans Albers, Brigitte Horney, Ilse Werner, Hans Münchhausen. Film parlant allemand en couleur.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Theatre (Schillersaal)

au programme: Beethoven
et Brahms.

Vendredi 25, 20 h. Récital
de chants
Carla Spletter
Conférence et spectacles
divers

Dimanche 20, 11 h.
Schillersaal: Seance
d'hypnotisme et de
magnétisme, Carl Sundra.

Auditoire 9 de l'Uni-
versité

Mardi 22, 20 h.: Con-
férence allemande du
Prof. Grisebach, "Die
Kunst der deutschen
Landschaft".

Salles supérieures
dauf Museum

Jeudi 24, 20 h.: Soiree
classique. Anna Damann
récite Hölderlin.

Schillersaal

Samedi 26, 16 h.: Eurythmie.
Ballet allemand.

Museum-Lichtspiele

Mercredi 23, 14 h.15,
16 h.30, 19 h. et
21 h.15;
Même Programme.

Jeudi,14 h.15, 16 h.30;
Même Programme.

Vendredi 25, 14 h.15
et 16 h.30;
Même Programme.

Samedi 26, Relâche.

Dimanche 27, 14 h.15,
16 h.30 et 19 h.:
Le Coupable avec P.
Blanchard. Film
français, sous-
titres allemands.

21 h.15: La huitième
femme de Barbe-Bleue.

Käse Programme.

Mercredi 23, 14 h.30,
16 h.45 et 19 h.:
Même Programme.

Dimanche 27, 14 h.30, 16 h.45
et 19 h.:
Même Programme.

Samedi 26, 14 h.30, 16 h.45
et 19 h.:
Même Programme.

Dimanche 27, 16 h.45 et
19 h.:
Même Programme.

Gouvernement militaire régional du Wurtemberg

Beaux arts

Information

La Semaine à Tubingen du 27 Octobre au 3 Novembre

Theatre (Schillersaal)

Jeudi 31, Vendredi 1,
Samedi 2, 20 h.
Noum ohne Herz, Operette de Peter-
Arnold, musique de Peter
Igelhoff, mise en scène
Karl Klee, la Premiere
a lieu le Jeudi 31
octobre, Concerts

Lundi 28, 20 h.: Salles
Supérieures du Museum.
Greta Bratthaus, Danse.
Sur des musiques classi-
ques et modernes.

Museum-Lichtspiele

Dimanche 27, 14 h.15,
16 h.30 et 19 h.:
Le Coupable. Film
français, sous-titres
allemands.

21 h.15: La Huitième
femme de Barbe-Bleue.
Film américain,
sous-titré en français.

Hirsch-Lichtspiele

Dimanche 27, 16 h.45 et
19 h.:
Jules Berry, Blanchette Brunoy dans
un film de Leon Joannon
retrochant la vie des
bohémiens. Le Camion Blanc.

Lundi 28, 16 h.45 et 19 h.:
Même Programme.
### Théâtre (Schillersaal)
- Conférences et spectacles divers.
- Dimanche 27 octobre, à 14 heures au Stade Militaire: Courses de Motos dans toutes classes.
- Dimanche 3 novembre, 14 h. : Rédanal Minon valin. Salles supérieures du Muséum.

### Museum-Lichtspiele
- Lundi 20, Mardi 29, Mercredi 30, 16 h.30, 19 h. et 21 h.15, chaque jour: La coupable. En Film, de M. Bernard avec Pierre Blanchard et Sigmoro Vutan Minc. Film français, sous-titré allemand.
- Jeudi 31, Relâche.
- Vendredi 1, Relâche.
- Samedi 2, Relâche.
- Dimanche 3, 16 h.45 et 19 h. : Même Programme.

### Hirsch-Lichtspiele
- Mardi 29, 16 h.45 et 19 h. : Même Programme.
- Mercredi 30, 14 h.30, 16 h.45 et 19 h. : Même Programme.
- Jeudi 31, 16 h.45 et 19 h. : Même Programme.
- Vendredi 1, 16 h.45 et 19 h. : Schrammel avec Kari Harell, Hans Rosen et Hans Holt. Film parlant allemand.
- Samedi 2, 14 h.30, 16 h.45 et 19 h. : Même Programme.
- Dimanche 3, 16 h.45 et 19 h. : Même Programme.
- Dimanche 1, 14 h.15, 16 h.30 et 19 h. : L'Emigrante avec Marie Peuiller. Film français, sous-titré allemand.
- Dimanche 1, 16 h.15 : Le plus beau roman d'amour de tous les temps: Back Street d'après le roman de Fanny Hurst avec Charles Boyer, Margaret Sullivan. Film américain, parlant français.

### Gouvernement militaire régional du Wurtemberg
- Beaux arts Information

**La Semaine à Tubingen du 1er Décembre au 8 Décembre**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Théâtre (Schillersaal)</th>
<th>Museum-Lichtspiele</th>
<th>Hirsch-Lichtspiele</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lundi 2, 21 h. Schillersaal: Jacques Bauer dans Silène. Comédie en 3 Actes de Jacques Devai avec Madeleine Dubas, Leon Hauter, Rachel Archer, Simone Michelis, Henry Kairer, Jeanne Gray, Claude Le Sache et Germaine Delba.</td>
<td>Dimanche 1, 14 h.15, 16 h.30 et 19 h. : L'Emigrante avec adèle Foulquier. Film français, sous-titré allemands. 21 h.15 : Le plus beau roman d'amour de tous les tems: Back Street d'après le roman de Fanny Hurst avec Charles Boyer, Margaret Sullivan. Film américain, parlant français.</td>
<td>Dimanche 1, 16 h.45 et 19 h. : Lise Delamare, Julien Bertheau, Aime Clariond, Aline Borg dans un grand film romantique La Valse Blanche avec Aline et Marcelle Genrat. Mise en Scène: Jean Stelli, musique de Rene Sylvestre. Film parlant français, sous-titré allemands. (jusqu'au jeudi 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comédie en 3 Actes de Jacques Devai avec Madeleine Dubas, Leon Hauter, Rachel Archer, Simone Michelis, Henry Kairer, Jeanne Gray, Claude Le Sache et Germaine Delba.</td>
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</table>
### Théâtre (Schillersaal)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jour</th>
<th>Heure</th>
<th>Programme</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jeudi 5</td>
<td>20 h</td>
<td>Schillersaal</td>
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<td>Première</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jeudi 5, Der Trojanische Krieg findet nicht statt (la guerre de Troie n'aura pas lieu), Comédie de Jean Giraudoux</td>
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<td>Vendredi 6, 20 h Schillersaal Fême Programme.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Concerts (Salle des Fêtes de l'Université)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jour</th>
<th>Heure</th>
<th>Programme</th>
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</table>

### Conférences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lundi 2</th>
<th>20 h 30</th>
<th>Auditorium Maximum</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Prof. Dr. Eduard Spranger, Erhabende Liebe in Goethe'scher Schule.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mardi 3, 20 h Flieghofsaal: Erich Schwebach (Stuttgart), &quot;Anton Bruckner&quot;.</td>
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</tbody>
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### Musée-Lichtspiele

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lundi 2</th>
<th>14 h 15</th>
<th>16 h 30: Un film de Leo Joannon avec Dédée Feuillère, Jean Chevrier, Georges Tinneval, Teynard Alain, Lamers, Laroque, Aimé, L'éditrage ou le royaume d'une aventurière. Film parlant français. Sous-titres allemands.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Mardi 3, 16 h 30, 19 h 15: Fême Programme.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Mercredi 4, 16 h 30, 19 h et 21 h 15: Fême Programme.</td>
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</table>

### Hirsch-Lichtspiele

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lundi 2</th>
<th>16 h 45 et 19 h</th>
<th>Fême Programme.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Mardi 3, 16 h 45 et 19 h. Une mère lutte pour son enfant dans Monika. Un film de Willy Forst avec Ivan Petrovisch, Carlen Lehmann, Theodor Loos, Rudolf Platte. Film parlant allemand.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Mercredi 4, 16 h 45 et 19 h. Film amérindien, parlant français, couleurs de W. Wagner.</td>
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<td>Dimanche 8, 16 h 45 et 19 h: Fême Programme. (1)</td>
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<td>Mardi 3, 16 h 30, et 19 h: Der scheinbare Florain avec Joe Stöckl et Josef Reichstein. Film parlant allemand.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Mercredi 4, 16 h 30 et 19 h: Les mille et une nuits.</td>
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</table>

Hermann Werner wrote in acknowledgement of the effort made by the French authorities in propagating French culture in Tübingen in the late 1940s: "Die Franzosen wollten in der schwäbischen Universitätsstadt einen kulturellen Mittel-
The French wanted to create a cultural focal point for their zone in the Swabian university town. Soon they also started a skilful and well managed policy of cultural propaganda and brought eminent groups of French artists and also individual French artists to Tübingen, for example, the Paris Choir Boys as early as September 22–23 and in December two excellent artists, the violinist Miguel Candela and the pianist Jeanne Marie Darré as well as a theatre group from the Sorbonne in Paris. The result of this was the desirable side-effect of seeing representatives of French and German authorities being drawn closer together in human terms within this field of activity.

Although the French military government was responsible for both French and German theatre within their zone of occupation there was a considerable disparity of approach and effort involved in supervising the two. The production of French theatre was generally a simple matter. The cast was usually French; the material and interpretation were mostly chosen for their representational aspect of French culture and were hence mainly selected from the repertoire of traditional French theatre; the local military government units were in a position to alleviate all material problems by virtue of their control of industrial and other materials through the "déblocage" system.

The German theatre presented different problems, mainly because, like all other elements of German cultural life, it had undergone the process of "Gleichschaltung" during the National Socialist era and consequently required in accordance with Allied regulations a close degree of surveillance and control. This meant that the traditions of the theatre as they had developed throughout the Thirties' and early Forties' had to be modified to suit Allied and French views. The other major difference between French and German theatre in the French zone was that the German theatre had, logically, to be run by German nationals; consequently a system of control had to be erected, as in the fields of party-political life and municipal administration, to ensure that French instructions were...
implemented by the German officials in charge of theatre affairs.

Prior to the French occupation there was no theatre company in Tübingen. In the late nineteenth century (1857) the town built a concert hall, the "Museumsaal", to accommodate musical and theatrical performances and hired a theatre director named Heydecker. In 1905, however, a contract was signed between the society which ran the "Museumsaal" (i.e. the "Museumsgeellschaft") and the "Hoftheater Stuttgart" which provided for a regular series of performance tours to Tübingen by the latter. This arrangement lasted until the Second World War.

The importance of this arrangement for Tübingen's pre-war cultural life is quite apparent. For the post-war situation on the other hand it proved a negative feature in that Stuttgart was part of the American zone and therefore cut off from Tübingen.

A minor feature of pre-war theatre life in Tübingen proved of importance after the French occupation of the town. This was the student theatre group which regularly performed plays on an amateur basis. After the occupation there was no immediate attempt made, apart from occasional references during meetings of the "Demokratische Vereinigung", to reconstitute theatre life in the community. There were numerous problems of more urgent social context requiring immediate attention (e.g. food, clothing, housing etc.) and cultural affairs consequently received scant support initially. In addition German officials were cautious in the opening stages of the occupation about approaching the French authorities on cultural matters since there were many loaded themes in cultural affairs which had to be treated diplomatically until such time as the French had formulated a clear policy on German culture.

During this period of initial diffidence the student drama society of the University of Tübingen emerged with a production of Shaw's Pygmalion, a factor which has been conveniently overlooked by most accounts bar that of Hermann Werner. As early as September 1945 two students wrote to the town hall in Tübingen, complaining that the efforts of the university drama group had been seriously underestimated. "Die Tübinger Kammerspielen verdanken ihr Entstehen der Idee des jetzigen Leiters der Bühne, Herrn Viktor Dräger, die bis zur Besetzung bestehende Studentenbühne auf den Namen Tübinger Kammerspielen umzubenennen. Mit
der Aufführung von "Pygmalion" traten sie am 10. Juli 1945 zum ersten Male an
die Öffentlichkeit ... Präger hat die Absicht, laufend Berufsschauspieler einzu-
zustellen und will mit einem aus Leiden und Berufaktionären gemischten Ensemble
bis zum 15. November weitauspielen ... " (The Tübingen theatre club owes its
origin to an idea by the present theatre manager, Herr Viktor Präger, to change
the name of the students' theatre group which had existed in Tübingen up to the
time of the occupation, to the Tübingen Theatre Club. They made their first
public appearance on July 10, 1945, with the performance of Pygmalion ... Präger
intends to constantly engage professional actors and intends to continue per­
formances until November 15 with a mixed cast of amateurs and professional
actors ... )

The success of this group stimulated imitators who hoped to follow in the
students' wake. The result of such efforts was the production of a series of
open-air theatre performances ("Freilichtaufführungen") in the autumn of 1945.
An article in the Stuttgart publication, Die Wochenpost, in August 1947 examined
the development of theatre in post-war Tübingen and noted the following:
"... Warum so viel hierüber? Weil sich hieran Tragik und Leistung eines Theaters
in einer gegebenen Situation aufzeigen läßt. Zuerst die Leistung: In einer mitt­
leren Stadt wie Tübingen erwacht nach Kriegsende aus Freilichtaufführungen auf
dem Marktplatz ("Romeo und Julia") ein ständiges Theater, in einer Stadt, deren
Theaterbedürfnisse vorher von der nahegelegenen Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart befrie­
digt wurden. Das Verlangen nach einem eigenen Theater existierte niemals vorher
einfach nicht". (... Why so much about all this? Because here the tragedy and
the accomplishments of a theatre can be demonstrated within a given situation.
First the accomplishments: In a medium-sized town like Tübingen a permanent
theatre emerges after the end of the war on the basis of open-air performances on
the market square (Romeo and Juliet), in a town where theatre requirements had
been satisfied by the nearby "Land" capital of Stuttgart. The demand for a theatre
of their own simply did not exist before,)

The open-air performances quoted above were introduced in Tübingen in
August 1945. They were instituted under the original title of the "Theatermarkt",
a cosy term designed to portray the combination of theatre and setting, i.e. the
market place. The market place - which is also Tübingen's most prominent and
attractive square — was an ideal choice since it avoided the technical problems involved in acquiring and fitting a theatre hall, especially since the French had requisitioned the "Kunstmuseum" for use as a cinema. The first open-air performance was a production of Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet which ran from August 1 till September 1, 1945. The first post-war director of the Tübingen theatre, Dr. Günther Stark, described the events leading up to this performance as follows: "Mit Genehmigung des französischen Chefs der lokalen Militäradministration Tübingen, Colonel Huchon, traf Frau von Bülow, die ein Schloß nahe Tübingen besaß, mit dem Colonel bei mir in Freudenstadt mit einem Besatzungswagen ein. Sie trug mir kurz vor, daß die mit Freunden beschlossen hatten, "Romeo und Julia" in Tübingen auf dem Marktplatz als Freilichtauführung zu veranstalten, und sofort den Colonel Huchon dafür begeistern konnte. Sie bat mich, diese Aufgabe gleich zu übernehmen ..."

Zunächst suchte ich unter schwierigsten Umständen die amerikanische Besatzungsmacht von Stuttgart auf, wo ich manche heute sehr prominente Schauspieler antraf, die begeistert zu uns kamen.

Colonel Huchon stellte ein leeres Studentenhaus für Unterkunft und Proben zur Verfügung, Kostüme kamen aus Stuttgart.

Am 1. August 1945 endlich konnte die Premiere stattfinden. Der Marktplatz wurde festlich beleuchtet ... Es waren mit Hilfe der Militärregierung Tribünen aufgebaut worden und französische Offiziere, aus Teil aus Straßburg und Paris, waren unsere Ehrengäste. Die Zugänge zum Marktplatz wurden während der Theaterveranstaltung von französischen Offizieren abgesperrt. Die Besucher hatten auf Grund einer Sondergenehmigung der Militärregierung durch den Erwerb einer Eintrittskarte Ausgeberlaubnis bis 3 Uhr morgens ...

Die Premiere wurde ein unbeschreiblich großer Erfolg. Leider kam der Herbst sehr früh. Bis zum 1. September konnten wir spielen ... 

Dann sogen wir in ein ehemaliges Kino für den Winter um und spielten als zweites Stück "Marieke" von Anouilh als deutsche Erstaufführung. Vor Prof. Carlo Schmid, der den Theatervorstand angehörte und sehr viele deutsch-französische Werke und Dramen übersetzte, auch spanische, spielten wir dann als Erstaufführung
von Calderon "Morgen kommt ein neuer Tag".

Als zweite deutsche Uraufführung brachten wir dann das "Goldene Netz" von Erna Weissenborn. *(With permission from the French commander of the local military administration in Tübingen, Colonel Huchon, Frau von Bülow, who owned a castle near Tübingen, arrived here in Freudenstadt with the colonel in a French car. She told me in a few words that she and some friends had decided to perform *Romeo and Juliet* on the market place in Tübingen as an open-air performance and had immediately been able to gain Colonel Huchon's enthusiasm for the venture. She asked me to undertake this task ...)*

First of all I visited Stuttgart in the American zone of occupation under the most difficult of circumstances and there I met many actors who are today very prominent personalities; these people were delighted to join us.

Colonel Huchon placed an empty student corporation house at our disposal for accommodation and rehearsal purposes and costumes came from Stuttgart.

At last on August 1, 1945, the premiere was able to take place. The market square was festively illuminated ... Stands had been erected with the assistance of the Military Government and French officers, some from as far as Strasbourg and Paris, were our guests of honour. The entrances to the market square were cordoned off by French officers for the duration of the theatre performance. Thanks to special permission from the Military Government those theatre-goers with admission tickets were granted curfew extension until 3 o'clock in the morning. The premiere was an unmitigated success. Unfortunately autumn arrived very early. We were able to perform the play until September 1 ...

Then we moved into a former cinema for the winter and performed as our second piece the German premiere of Anouilh's *Duras*, We then performed the premiere showing of Calderon's *Tomorrow is a new day* in the translated version by Professor Carlo Schmid who was a member of the theatre committee and who translated many works into both French and German as well as Spanish.

We then produced *The Golden Net* by Erna Weissenborn as our second German premiere. *(?)*
The town hall was initially not interested in putting on potentially expensive theatre performances or in supporting them financially when there was large-scale social deprivation and community reconstruction which called for immediate financial assistance. The result of this lack of municipal interest was that a society was established along commercial company lines to establish and fund the open-air theatre. Most of the finance was provided by the above-mentioned Frau von Bülow (who was still in fact married to the author, Friedrich Sieburg, hence her occasional designation as Frau Sieburg). The municipal archive in Tübingen contains documentation which illustrates the development of this company, entitled, the "Interessengemeinschaft für Freilichtspiele in Tübingen" (Contracting group for open-air performances in Tübingen). This group, for example, received monopoly rights on all open-air performances in Tübingen: "Durch eine Erklärung vom 23. Juli 1945 hat die Stadtverwaltung Tübingen der Interessengemeinschaft für Freilichtspiele in Tübingen eingesagt, daß sie keiner anderen juristischen oder Einzelperson das Recht einräumte, Freilichtaufführungen auf Plätzen der Stadt durchzuführen." (In a statement on July 23, 1945, the municipal council of Tübingen promised the "Contracting Group for Open-Air Performances in Tübingen" that it would concede to no other corporate body or individual person the right to perform open-air performances on any public squares in the town.)

The municipal archive also contains a lengthy report written in December 1945 by Oberbürgermeister Renner on the formation of this theatre group which is more lucid than most accounts: "An der Gründung des Theatermarkts hat sich die Stadt nur insofern beteiligt, als sie Frau Sieburg, Fräulein Dr. Doeile und Herrn Peter Neumann das Recht einräumte, auf dem Marktplatz zu spielen. Die Veranstaltung, die ja erst im August begann, war gewissermaßen eine Generalprobe, deren Risiko allein die drei genannten Veranstalter trugen. Der Erfolg der Veranstaltung war groß; das Sozialamt der Stadt hat von dem Reingewinn etwa 5000,- Mk erhalten.

Beierteilung der Lizenzen dachten weder die Stadtverwaltung noch die Veranstalter daran, daß die Stadt selber ein Theater gründen und die Freilichtspiele-aufführungen übernehmen könnte. Bei der Gründung des Theaters kamen als Intendanten Herr E.F. Neumann und Herr Wolfgang Müller in Betracht. Die Wahl fiel auf Herrn Müller. Mitbestimmend dafür war, daß sich zwischen dem Spielleiter, Herrn Dr. Stark, und Herrn Neumann Differenzen ergeben hatten...
Es entspräche nun nicht der Billigkeit, die ursprünglichen Veranstalter des Theatermarkts auszuschalten und die Sache von der Stadt aus zu übernehmen, nachdem die Generalprobe ergeben hat, daß der Theatermarkt auch ein gutes Geschäft ist.

Zwischen der Interessengemeinschaft (Frau Sieburg einerseits, Fräulein Dr. Noelle und Herr Neumann andererseits) bestehen nun allerdings auch Differenzen, es kann aber nicht bestritten werden, daß die Idee von Herrn Neumann stammt und daß ohne seine Energie die Sache wohl nicht hätte durchgeführt werden können ... (The town was involved in the establishment of the open-air theatre only as far as it conceded to Frau Sieburg, Dr. Noelle and Herr Erich Peter Neumann the right to perform plays on the market square. The performance, which indeed did not take place until August, was in a way a dress rehearsal, the risk of which was borne exclusively by the three above-mentioned organizers. The success of the performance was striking; the municipal welfare department received a clear profit of about 5,000 Reichsmark.

It would not be fair now to eliminate the organizers of the open-air theatre and to have the municipal administration assume control of matters after the dress rehearsal had shown that the open-air theatre is also a profitable business.

Admittedly there are now also differences within the Contracting Group (Frau Sieburg on the one side and Dr. Noelle and Herr Neumann on the other). However, it cannot be denied that the idea came from Herr Neumann and that without his energy the event would probably not have succeeded...

In October 1945 two decrees were issued by the French military government which gave a boost to nascent theatre life in Tübingen. Firstly, in the words of Hermann Werner, "die grundsätzliche Freigabe künstlerischer Veranstaltungen durch
die Militärregierung erfolgte freilich erst auf 15. Oktober durch eine Verfügung von 12. Oktober 1945. Vorher mußte Genehmigung in jedem Fall eingeholt werden. (The regulation requiring all artistic performances to be approved in advance by the Military Government was not revoked in principle, however, until October 15 after the issuing of a decree on October 12, 1945. Before that a permit had to be obtained in each specific case.) Secondly, the minutes of a municipal council meeting of October 7, 1947, recorded in retrospect how in response to French support the mayor issued a decree on October 1, 1945, establishing a municipal theatre in Tübingen: "Stadtammann Bartels berichtet über Entwicklung des Städtischen Schauspielhauses, das aus den Marktplatzspielen des Jahres 1945 herausgewachsen ist. Damals befanden sich in Tübingen viele namhafte Schauspieler ausgebombt und heimatlos, die an Oberbürgermeister Renner herantraten mit dem Vorschlag, hier ein Gegenstück zu den Römerbergspielen von Frankfurt am Main zu schaffen. Nach der Abwicklung der Tübinger Marktplatzspiele 1945 traten Dr. Günther Stark und Wolfgang Müller mit dem Vorschlag hervor, hier ein ständiges Theater einzurichten. Doch fanden sie keine Bereitschaft bei der Stadtverwaltung, bis auch die Militärregierung sich einschaltete (Oberst Huchon und Kapitän Ehrmann) und die Bedenken in finanzieller Hinsicht dadurch überwand, daß sie die Überschüsse der Kneusellichtspiele (sie betrugen z.B. im Januar 1946 rund 30 000 RM) und des Kreisamtsblatts für kulturelle Zwecke der Stadtverwaltung in Aussicht stellte, daß auf Grund dieser Anerbietungen Verwaltungsratsmitglied Renner am 1.10.1945 die Errichtung des Stadttheaters und des Kammerorchesters, mit letzterem dem Verlangen nach einem Symphonieorchester entsprechen sollte. Schon nach kurzer Zeit stellte sich jedoch heraus, daß die finanziellen Hilfen seitens der Militärregierung sich nicht verwirklichen würden, und da die Verträge bereits geschlossen waren, so wurde der Nachbarstadt Reutlingen die Beteiligung am Stadttheater vorgeschlagen.)" (Stadtammann Bartels reported on the development of the municipal theatre which had developed from the plays performed on the market square in 1945. At that time there were many renowned actors in Tübingen who were homeless on account of the bombing and they approached Mayor Renner with the suggestion of establishing here a counterpart to the "Römerberg" festival in Frankfurt. While the Tübingen market square plays were still being performed in 1945, Dr. Günther Stark and Wolfgang Müller came forward with the suggestion of establishing a permanent theatre here. But they found no willingness on the part of the municipal council until the Military Government also stepped in (Colonel Huchon and Captain Ehrmann).
and dispelled their doubts concerning the financial aspects by holding out to the municipal council the prospect of the profits from the "Museum" cinema (amounting in January 1946, for example, to about 30,000 Reichsmark) and of the Official District Gazette being used by the municipal administration for cultural purposes. Only on the basis of these offers did Mayor Kenner order the establishment of the municipal theatre and of the chamber orchestra on 1.10.1945, thus fulfilling with the latter the demand for a symphony orchestra. But after a short period of time it was discovered that financial aid would not materialise from the Military Government and, as contracts had already been signed, the suggestion was made to the neighbouring town of Reutlingen to participate in the municipal theatre. 

The actual decree of October 1, 1945, reveals that it was issued at the express instruction of the French military government rather than in response to financial inducement. "Auf Wunsch der Militärregierung Tübingen wird von der Stadt Tübingen ein Theater und im Zusammenhang damit ein Kammerorchester errichtet." (At the request of the Military Government of Tübingen a theatre and, in connection with this, a chamber orchestra are being established by the town of Tübingen.)

The decree of October 1 proceeded to outline the conditions governing the municipal theatre in Tübingen:

1. Das Theater-Koferat der Universitätsstadt Tübingen wird von Herrn Universitätsprofessor Dr. H. Schneider, dem derzeitigen Rektor der Universität, versehen.
2. Mit dem Aufbau des Theaters werden die Herren Wolfgang Müller als Gesamtleiter und Dr. Günther Stark als erster Spielleiter ... beauftragt.
3. Die städtischen Dienststellen haben die in Ziffer 2 genannten Herren bzw. ihre Vertreter und Beauftragten möglichst zu fördern.
4. Das Stadtheater führt die Bezeichnung "Städtisches Schauspielhaus Tübingen".
5. Der Sitz des städtischen Schauspielhauses ist das "Museum" in Tübingen.
6. Es ist in Aussicht genommen, mit der Geschäftsführung einen Beamten zu beauftragen ... 
7. Das städtische Schauspielhaus und das städtische Orchester sind als ein besonderes Unternehmen der Stadt Tübingen im Sinne des §67 Abs. 2 DGO. nach wirtschaftlichen Gesichtspunkten zu verwalten."
1. The municipal office for theatre affairs of the university town of Tübingen will be directed by Professor H. Schneider, the present rector of the university.

2. Wolfgang Müller and Dr. Günther Stark are commissioned to organise the theatre as theatre director and head stage manager respectively.

3. Municipal departments are to assist as much as possible the three gentlemen mentioned above under Section 2 or their deputies and authorised agents.

4. The municipal theatre will bear the title of "Municipal Playhouse of Tübingen".

5. The official theatre building (with all legal rights) of the Municipal Playhouse is the "Museum" in Tübingen.

6. It is intended to commission a civil servant with the business management ... 

7. The Municipal Playhouse and the municipal orchestra are to be administered as a special enterprise of the town of Tübingen according to efficient economic principles and within the framework of definition of Paragraph 67, Section 2 of the German Local Authorities' Statute.

In accordance with the mayoral decree the municipal theatre, "Städtisches Schauspielhaus Tübingen", was opened on October 23, 1945. Dr. Günther Stark wrote an article on the new theatre venture in the Schwäbische Tagesblatt (October 7, 1945), in which he set out the philosophical and ideological outlook of the programme directors: "Das Tübinger Schauspielhaus sucht keine Experimente. Wir wollen Menschenleid und Menschenfreude auf der Bühne erleben, wollen die menschlichen Grenzen gegen das Göttliche brennen. An ein poetisches Theater ist gedacht, das aus dem Drang des Alltags in die gehobene Sphäre unserer Sehnsüchte trägt, in eine Welt, in der Menschen wieder menschlich leiden und weinen, lieben und hassen und in Ehrfurcht verhalten vor dem Unbegreiflichen, das alles Leben erfaßt und bedroht. Five große Bögen überspannen den Grundgedanken der Spielplanung: europäische klassische Dramatik, religiöses Spiel, modernes geistiges Theater, Volksstück und anspruchsvolle Unterhaltung." (The Tübingen Playhouse is not looking for experiments. We want
to experience human suffering and human joy on the stage and to see human limits illuminated in relief against the Divine.

We have in mind a poetic theatre which will carry us from the stress of everyday life into the elevated sphere of our yearnings, into a world in which human beings can learn again how to be able to laugh, cry, love and hate like a human being and how to stand in awe of the great mysterious element which maintains and threatens all life. Five great arcs span the basic concept of this repertory: classical European drama, religious plays, modern intellectual theatre, popular folk plays and a fastidious level of entertainment.

It is appropriate at this point to provide an overview of the programmes for the three seasons which ran in Tübingen during the period under investigation, 1945-1947:

**Spielzeit 1945/46.**

- Calderon: *Morgen kommt ein neuer Tag*
- Shakespeare: *Othello* — Das Vintermärchen
- Goethe: *Iphigenie* — Stella
- Schiller: *Kabale und Liebe* — Maria Stuart
- G. Hauptmann: *Hose Bond*
- Holl: *Das Apostelspiel*
- Anouilh: *Eurydice* (deutsche Uraufführung)
- Vormühl-Benatsky: *Meine Schwester und ich*
- Michael: *Ausflug mit Damen* (Uraufführung)
- Braun: *Mit meinen Augen*
- Soldatshau: *Der Raub der Sabinerinnen*
- Rüssner: *Karl III und Anna von Österreich* (Märchen)

**Spielzeit 1946/47.**

- Shakespeare: *Ein Sommernachtstraum*
- Molière: *Der eingebildete Kranke*
- Goldoni: *Mirandolina*
- Goethe: *Urfaust — Clavigo*
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Schiller</th>
<th>Don Carlos</th>
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<tr>
<td>Tschechow</td>
<td>Der Kirschgarten</td>
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<td>G. Hauptmann</td>
<td>Der Biberpelz</td>
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<tr>
<td>Giraudoux</td>
<td>Der trojanische Krieg findet nicht statt</td>
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<tr>
<td>S. Weisenborn</td>
<td>Das goldene Netz (Uraufführung)</td>
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<td>Wilde</td>
<td>Bunbury</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thomas</td>
<td>Moral</td>
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<td>Meano</td>
<td>Die Geburt der Salome</td>
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<td>Weise-Moedtke</td>
<td>Sophienlund</td>
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<tr>
<td>Holm-Abott</td>
<td>Drei Mann auf einem Pferd</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peters-Arnolds</td>
<td>Mann ohne Herz</td>
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**Spielzeit 1947/48**

Intendant: Paul Rose

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shakespeare</th>
<th>Was Ihr Wollt</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lessing</td>
<td>Der Freigeist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cocteau</td>
<td>Torquato Tasso</td>
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<td>Hölderlin</td>
<td>Agamemnon</td>
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<td>Ibsen</td>
<td>Die Wildente</td>
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<td>Strindberg</td>
<td>Orestes</td>
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<td>Shaw</td>
<td>Candida</td>
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<td>G. Hauptmann</td>
<td>Die Hatten</td>
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<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>Ein Spiel von Tod und Liebe</td>
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<td>Knittel</td>
<td>Via Mala</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scribe</td>
<td>Don Juan de la Encina</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ervine</td>
<td>Die erste Frau Gelby</td>
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<tr>
<td>Salacrou</td>
<td>Die große Liebe (deutsche Uraufführung)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pagnol</td>
<td>Zum goldenen Anker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zinn</td>
<td>Die gute Lieben</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scharoun und Nebel</td>
<td>Wer leben will, muß tot sein (Uraufführung)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veiller</td>
<td>Der Prozess Mary Dagon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Schwitzkroeffl</td>
<td>Margarite</td>
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<tr>
<td>Schurek</td>
<td>Straßensmusik</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Kürchen)</td>
<td>Max und Moritz – Aschenputtel – Dormitschen. (16)</td>
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The outstanding feature of these programmes was the high density of classical drama, both German (Goethe, Schiller, Lessing) and foreign (Shakespeare, Chekov, Molière, Calderon etc.). This reflected a high degree of artistic ambition which might have been considered incompatible with the situation of a founding theatre in a provincial post-war occupied community which had not possessed a municipal theatre for the previous half-century. Indeed the programme for the season, 1945–1946, turned out to be less ambitious than the original plans drawn up by the theatre executive in October 1945.

The artistic and technical confidence expressed inherently in the content of the above programmes was based on four factors: support from the French and German authorities; sound financial backing; a competent organisation; lastly, highly qualified artistes.

French support was an a priori condition of the establishment of the theatre. Such decisions were totally dependent on the approval of the military government;
indeed in this case the military government had instructed the town hall to found the theatre. French promotion of such cultural ventures as the municipal theatre won the respect and gratitude of many Germans in Tübingen. For example, in an essay, entitled "Sieben Jahre kulturelle Arbeit in Württemberg-Hohenzollern, 1945-1952" (Seven years of cultural work in Württemberg-Hohenzollern, 1945-1952), Anton Frey wrote in modification of his description of the extent of French surveillance that "wenn im Überblick die Einengung der Entscheidungsfreiheit durch die Besatzungsmacht erwähnt wurde, so muß gesagt werden, daß auch wertvolle Anregungen auf kulturellem Gebiet von ihr ausgingen" (although the limitation of freedom of decision by the French authorities has been mentioned in this overview, it must be stated that valuable impulses also came from them in the field of cultural affairs). (18)

The theatre venture was assured official German support on account of the fact that both Carlo Schmid and Viktor Renner were literary personalities with a common interest in the promotion of art. This was particularly true of Carlo Schmid who not only demonstrated an avid theatre-goer's interest but also translated a play by the Spanish dramatist Pedro Calderon de la Barca (1600-81) which was performed by the Tübingen theatre. Schmid also sat on the executive of the municipal theatre.

The question of financial backing was more vexing than the question of official support and commitment. In the above-quoted report by Stadtantmann Bartels on October 7, 1947, mention was made of a promise on the part of the French to provide financial backing for the founding theatre. This promise proved empty in that "schon nach kurzer Zeit stellte sich jedoch heraus, daß die finanziellen Hilfen seitens der Militärregierung sich nicht verwirklichen würden, und da die Verträge bereits geschlossen waren, so wurde der Nachbarstadt Reutlingen die Beteiligung am Stadttheater vorgeschlagen. Noch im Oktober 1945 kam der Vertrag, wonach die beiden Städte zu gleichen Teilen die Fortführung des Theaters sichern sollten" (after a short period of time it was already discovered that financial aid would not materialise from the Military Government and, as contracts had already been signed, an suggestion was made to the neighbouring town of Reutlingen to participate in the municipal theatre. As early as October 1945 a contract was signed in which the two towns guaranteed the continuation of the theatre by equal efforts). (19)
Reutlingen's inclusion as part-owner of the theatre halved the financial burden for the Tübingen municipal administration. An agreement was drawn up dividing the theatre season between performances in Tübingen and Reutlingen. The theatre altered its name to that of "Schauspielhaus Tübingen-Neutlingen". This arrangement lasted until late 1947 when a new contract was agreed upon in a municipal council meeting of November 10, altering the name to the "Städtetheater Tübingen-Neutlingen" and establishing the enterprise on a more legal basis according to traditional German terms. This latter change, however, was not implemented until after the publication of the "Satzungen des Zweckverbands "Städtetheater Tübingen-Neutlingen" (Rules of association of the special association "Municipal Theatre of Tübingen and Neutlingen") in the Amtsblatt der Militärregierung und Behörden des Kreises Tübingen on March 31, 1940. (20)

The first performance of the "Städtisches Schauspielhaus" was held on October 20, 1945. Although the theatre did better than was expected - "In its first season the Playhouse indeed gained the support of the populace (1405 subscribers; average proceeds from one performance = 2070 Reichsmark instead of the estimated 1600 Reichsmark; Wintermärchen with Theodor Loos even earned 2960 Reichsmark)" (21) it was soon obvious that financial support would be necessary to maintain the theatre. At a municipal council meeting on January 11, 1946, the mayor presented details of losses: "Bis 31. Dezember 1945 beliefen sich die Ausgaben des Schauspielhauses auf rund 100,000 RM und die Einnahmen auf 97,000 RM, somit Defizit 3,000 RM.

Zur Deckung des Defizits (i.e., including that of the municipal chamber orchestra) hat das Staatssekretariat einen Staatszuwuchs bis zu 100,000 RM in Aussicht gestellt. Die Finanzierung dieser beiden städtischen Unternehmen ist somit gesichert." (Up till December 31, 1945, the expenses of the Playhouse amounted to about 100,000 Reichsmark and the takings to 97,000 Reichmark, therefore a deficit of 3,000 Reichsmark.
To cover the deficit the State Secretariat has held out the prospect of a state subsidy of up to 100,000 Reichsmark. The financing of these two municipal enterprises has thereby been secured. The season 1945-1946 ended with an overall loss of 37,529 Reichsmark. Season 1946-1947 closed with a loss of 20,163 Reichsmark, although the "Museumgesellschaft" agreed to waive debts totalling 19,800 Reichsmark owed to it by the theatre company for rent and hall charges.

In return for its financial aid the "Staatssekretariat" demanded a voice in the running of the theatre's affairs: "Es wurde ein Zuschu von 100 000 RH bewilligt, wogegen ein Theaters-Beirat geschaffen wurde, dem außer Mitgliedern der beiden Stadtverwaltungen auch Vertreter des Staatssekretariats angehörten." (A subsidy of 100,000 Reichsmark was granted; in return for this a Theatre Advisory Council was set up which, in addition to members from the two municipal councils, included representatives of the State Secretariat.)

It was eventually decided to establish a fourteen-member executive board, the "Theater-Beirat", to formulate theatre policy. The membership of this board was as follows:

- Frau Silberg
- Staatsrat Professor Schmid (Staatssekretariat)
- Oberbürgermeister Hartmeyer
- Oberbürgermeister Kalbfell (Reutlingen)
- Oberregierungsrat Dr. Zweigert (Staatssekretariat)
- Professor Schneider (Universität)
- Landesdirektor Möller (Staatssekretariat)
- Landrat Renner
- Dr. Allmendingen (Reutlingen)
- Dr. Rist (Staatssekretariat)
- Intendant Wolfgang Müller
- Dr. Günther Stark
- Dr. Reißmüller (Staatssekretariat)
- Stadtrat Hartels

The composition of this executive board is interesting in that a predominant section of it was comprised of five members of the "Staatssekretariat" whilst Tübingen and Reutlingen town halls were designated two members apiece. At a meeting
of the "Theater-Beirat" on March 4, 1947, the composition of the theatre executive was altered to include two members from Tübingen and Reutlingen respectively, four members from the "Staatssekretariat", one member from the University of Tübingen, four members from the four respective political parties and two members from the "Theatergründer", i.e. those personalities who originally founded the theatre in the autumn of 1945. The "Staatssekretariat" evidently retained its position of influence on the new executive. This proved a sore point within the two municipal administrations which were nominally responsible for theatre affairs in that they both felt that the "Staatssekretariat" exercised too tight a control on the financial affairs of the theatre and that it dictated through its board representatives an excessive amount of the theatre programme. Despite these grievances, however, the "Theater-Beirat" provided the requisite executive organisation to manage the theatre's affairs. The success of this work was in part due to the contribution of the competent administrators from the "Staatssekretariat" who had been appointed onto the theatre executive board.

The final contributive factor which was mentioned concerning the success of Tübingen's post-war theatre was the question of qualified artistes. This topic is one of the most striking themes within the cultural life of post-war Tübingen. An examination of the archive files of the "Landestheater Tübingen", established in 1950 as the successor to the "Städtetheater Tübingen-Reutlingen", confirms that Tübingen, a small, provincial university town, was during the period of French occupation the residence and employer of such established and even celebrated figures of German theatre and film as Dr. Günther Stark, Paul Rose, Theodor Loos, Hans Messmer, Lotte Hardt, Anna Demann, Elisabeth Flickenschildt and Erika von Thellmann. Two men were instrumental in procuring this group of artistes for the Tübingen stage: Wolfgang Müller and Carlo Schmid. Wolfgang Müller was already resident in Tübingen as a war refugee when the French occupied the town. In 1939 Müller had written a dramatic adaptation of Heinrich von Kleist's novella Die Marquise von O., entitled Die glückliche Ehe, in the initial production of which Elisabeth Flickenschildt played the leading role. Together with Dr. Günther Stark, Müller had joined a war-time troop entertainment group, called "Das Fronttheater", of which Elisabeth Flickenschildt and Lotte Hardt, among others, were members. In the course of a tour of German-occupied France the "Fronttheater" played in Lille where the troupes made the acquaintance of Carlo Schmid. Consequently, when the decision was made to found a theatre in Tübingen Müller and Schmid were able
to call on the services of former "Fronttheater" members with whom they were personally acquainted.

In retrospect the outstanding personalities of the "Fronttheater" group who settled in Tübingen were Elisabeth Flickenschildt (born 1905 in Hamburg)\(^{16}\), Hans (later Hannes) Reissner (born 1924 in Dillingen)\(^{20}\) and Theodor Loos (born All three later developed reputations in the German Federal Republic as film and television actors as well as stage artistes. They have, however, not only been selected for examination on account of the fame and reputation which they gained after leaving Tübingen but also on the basis of their relationship with the French authorities, thus serving as indicators of French policy.

The most controversial figure was that of Theodor Loos. A distinguished actor, he had compromised himself in the eyes of many, especially of the American military government, by his lead role in Veit Harlan's notoriously anti-Semitic film, *Jud Süss* (1940)\(^{30}\). At the period of the Allied occupation of Württemberg, Loos was resident in Stuttgart. After the American army's assumption of military government control in Stuttgart Loos was prevented on American orders from resuming a theatrical career. Dr. Stark subsequently fetched him to Tübingen to work for the "Schauspielhaus Tübingen". The French initially turned a blind eye to Loos' membership of the NSDAP and his role in *Jud Süss*. The local press, taking a lead from the military government's reactions, maintained a discreet silence on the actor's past and concentrated on panegyrical accounts of his contemporary achievements as an actor; for instance, the *Schwäbische Tagesblatt* wrote on November 20, 1945: "Das Städtische Schauspielhaus hat auch eine Reihe von Sonntagsabenden angestoßen; der Anfang war glücklich und bedeutsam. Theodor Loos, einer der großen deutschen Schauspieler, der für Tübingen gewonnen werden konnte, stellte sich mit dieser Feier vor ... Theodor Loos, der in seinem Auftritt am Vortragstisch gar nichts Schauspielerisches hat und dessen Stimme zunächst auch eher spritzen als klingend wirkt, ist ein Sprecher von durchgeistiger Gestaltungskraft ..." (The Municipal Playhouse has also announced a series of Sunday evening recitals; the first of these was both successful and significant. Theodor Loos, one of Germany's great actors whom it had been possible to acquire for Tübingen, introduced himself in this (first) meeting ... Theodor Loos whose bearing at the lectern has nothing theatrical about it and whose voice also sounds brittle rather than resonant is a speaker of intellectual and creative power ...\(^{31}\). Loos was
feted by Tübingen’s academic and social élites. This acclaim was reflected in
the favour which the actor found in the eyes of Carlo Schmid and the Hohenzollern
family. Margareta, wife of the Prince of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen (i.e. the cadet
Catholic branch) installed Loos in the Hohenzollern castle at Krauchenwies (Sigrum-
ingen).

Loos had occasional difficulties in Tübingen, especially in the opening
season, 1945-1946. The minutes of the municipal council meeting of October 7, 1947,
record in retrospect that “im 1. Spieljahr ... mußte Theodor Loos als ehemaliger
Parteigenosse längere Zeit aussetzen, was die Leistungen des Theaters und damit
den Besuch des Publikums ungünstig beeinflußte” (in the first season ... Theodor
Loos had to cease acting for a lengthy period of time because of his NSDAP member­
ship; this had adverse effects on the theatre’s standards and consequently on the
public’s attendance.). Such interruptions did not, however, prove a serious
hazard to Loos’ post-war career in Süd-Württemberg. Indeed even when he was having
difficulties on account of his political past the theatre executive board ensured
that he could be retained on their books. The minutes of a “Theater-Beirat” meeting
of February 22, 1946, record that “Herr Loos soll weiterhin dem Ensemble angehören.
Wenn es nicht möglich ist, ihn bis zum 15. März 1946 wieder einzusetzen, wird ab
diesem Datum eine 50%ige Senkung seiner Gage eintreten, bis Herr Loos wieder be­
schäftigt werden kann.” (Herr Loos will continue to be a member of the company.
If it is not possible to reinstate him by March 15, 1946, 50% of his salary will
be deducted until he can be employed again.)

Hannes Messemer began his theatrical career in post-war Tübingen as a young
man of twenty-two. His natural talents made him a favourite with the theatre-going
circles in Tübingen. His ability was recognised by the French military government
when the rumour arose in 1947 that Messemer intended quitting Tübingen. The local
head of the “Section des Beaux-Arts” in Süd-Württemberg wrote on June 6, 1947, to
the equivalent administrative department within the “Staatssekretariat” ( Haupt­
abteilung Kunst ) that Messemer ought to be prevailed upon to stay in Tübingen:
“Das Städtische Schauspielhaus Tübingen-Reutlingen gibt zur Zeit eine bemerkens­
werte Aufführung des „Sommermachtstraum“, getragen von einem gut eingespielten,
aufeinander abgestimmten Ensemble, das dank diesem Gesamtarbeitsgeist zu einem
außerordentlich interessanten Ergebnis kommt. Das Publikum feiert seine Künstler.
Zu gleicher Zeit erfahren wir, daß vier seiner besten Schauspieler Tübingen verlas-

(The Municipal Playhouse for Tübingen and Reutlingen is giving at present a remarkable performance of Midsummer Night's Dream, presented by a well-rehearsed and well-coordinated company which, thanks to this team-spirit, creates an extremely interesting effect. The public extols its artistes. At the same time we learn that four of the best actors are leaving Tübingen and that the theatre is consequently to be deprived of its main supports. They are Fräulein Weilguny, Herr Tacik, Herr Vorzel and Herr Messemer. The "Section Beau-Arts du Gouvernement Militaire Régional du Württemberg" would like to help the State Secretariat and the towns of Tübingen and Reutlingen to maintain their artistic reputation in the hope that these towns will muster enough artistic appreciation to enable these excellent artistes to continue the careers which they began so hopefully in Tübingen and Reutlingen. I have Herr Messemer particularly in mind. You will rarely find, in my opinion, an artist who is so popular with the public both in serious and humorous roles. His departure would be very regrettable and I would like everything to be done to make a continuation of his career in Tübingen possible.)

Elisabeth Flickenschildt, the grande dame of West German theatre of the 1950's and 1960's and close associate of Gustaf Gründgens in his theatre productions of that era, is remarkably reticent on the subject of post-war Tübingen in her autobiography, Kind mit roten Haaren. Ein Leben wie ein Traum (1971). In her book Flickenschildt concedes that she had difficulties with the American military government in Stuttgart on account of her acquaintance with leading National Socialists. There is, however, no mention made of her career on the Tübingen stage. This part of her life has been largely ignored apart from occasional references...
in the local press. Elisabeth Flickenschildt not only continued her career as an actress in Tübingen after the initial setback in the American zone; she also gained experience as a theatre director, making her debut during the "Tübinger Kunstwochen" (q.v. below) of August 1946 when she produced her version of Goethe's tragedy "Mitila.

Despite the obvious largesse of the French authorities toward actors and the theatre in general it would be erroneous to attribute the same solely to a policy of liberalism on the part of the French military government. French interest in cultural affairs had a strong political bent which was later openly acknowledged by Carlo Schmid in an interview with Hermann Wernor: "... dazu kam der Wunsch der Franzosen ... kulturell etwas aus ihrer Stadt zu machen ... und sehr spürbar der Gedanke, von der Kultur her einen Separatismus zu wecken". (In addition to that the French wished ... to make something of their town in cultural terms ... and the very obvious intention to arouse some form of separatism within the sphere of culture.)

Two examples of discrepancy within French cultural policy in Tübingen can be quoted to highlight the occasional lack of liberalism within the same. Firstly, the "Section des Beaux-Arts" in Tübingen maintained a system of surveillance and censorship on the theatre programmes throughout the occupation period. French military government censorship of German theatre life has been given a mention in Gilmore's doctoral thesis: "German theatres were reconstructed and several new ones were put up at a fast pace. French troops like the "Academie Francaise" created special road shows throughout Germany, and plays were carefully selected to coincide with the general goals of reeducation. At times, however, the selection process was a more stiff form of censorship. An official administrative project for the reorganization of the theatre in the Zone Francaise d'Ocupation called for the temporary elimination of plays containing any existential philosophy which could encourage an amount of passivism that would not gel with the campaign for democracy. Although this proposal was not fully adhered to, it did mean that some of the better plays by modern French playwrights were excluded from the repertoire for the Zone Francaise d'Ocupation.

Censorship was even more severe with regard to German literature. The most popular play between 1945 and 1950 in Western Germany, "Der Turm des General," by
Carl Zuckmayer, was first shown in the Zone Française d'Occupation in 1948, approximately two years after its original debut in Zurich and was not translated into French until much later - French censors undoubtedly had plausible reasons for their actions, but they were, nevertheless, harshly criticised by Frenchmen and Germans alike. The inevitable problem was that rules of censorship too stringently followed smacked of pure propaganda, not made any more digestible by its high anti-Nazi content.<ref>(37)</ref>

The French authorities were not only stringent in their censorship of dramatic literature with nationalistic and National Socialist themes; they also suppressed plays with historical anti-French themes, regardless of the position of these works within the broader context of German culture. The starkest example of this sensitivity occurred in late 1947 when the French military government banned the production of Minna von Barnhelm, the comic masterpiece (1765) by Germany's great Enlightenment dramatist, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781) who was also a fierce and life-long critic of France's cultural hegemony over Germany in the eighteenth century.<ref>(36)</ref> It is difficult to say whether the French military government and its cultural advisers regarded Lessing as a negative cultural influence on account of his anti-French and nationalist stance on cultural affairs or whether they took specific offence at the satirical presentation of French salon life in Minna von Barnhelm. In any case the play was banned from the Tübingen stage and the matter subsequently became a dead letter in Baden-Württemberg due to the French ban on all material and correspondence which had been a subject of controversy between French and German authorities. In the American zone, however, the <i>Stuttgarter Zeitung</i> took up cudgels on behalf of Lessing's reputation in an article in January 1948<ref>(39)</ref> but the French authorities paid scant attention to newspaper articles in the American zone and the ban remained.<ref>(39)</ref>

The second discrepancy within French cultural policy in Tübingen which can be cited to illustrate the occasional lack of liberalism on the part of the French cultural officials concerns the outrightly authoritarian stance adopted in issues involving French interests and personal wishes. The potentially authoritarian and at times ruthless element in their methods of administration is best illustrated by the quarrel between Verwaltungsdirektor Otto Goede, the official responsible for the running of the "Städtisches Schauspielhaus", and the French authorities.
The row arose over continuous demands by the French military government for free tickets and the best seating for theatre performances. This system had been introduced immediately prior to the open-air showing of Romeo und Julia when the military government chief of Kreis Tübingen, Lieutenant-Colonel Huchon, sent a "note de service" (August 24, 1945) to the town hall with the following instructions: "Pour faciliter aux éléments français en séjour dans la ville l'accès aux divers spectacles ou manifestations artistiques qui y sont donnés, il est créé au Gouvernement Militaire local à compter du lundi 27 août un bureau de location de places ..."

Le bureau recevra systématiquement en temps voulu de la part des organisateurs de tout spectacle donné à Tübingen 40 billets. Les officiers ou militaires de la ville pourront les y retirer. Les places ainsi louées seront réservées.

Precisely one year later Otto Goecke submitted the following report to Oberbürgermeister Hartmeyer (August 19, 1947): "Vor einigen Tagen wurde ich von Herrn Dr. Rieth informiert, daß Commandant Dollfuss und Capitaine Vanuxem, Section Beaux-Arts, für jede Veranstaltung der "Kunstwochen" je 50 Karten für französische Studenten, davon 15 Freikarten und 35 Karten zum herabgesetzten Preis von 2,- RM, jeweils die besten Plätze zu haben wünschen ..."

... Am Mittwoch kam gegen Abend Monsieur W. vom Government Té, don al ins Theater und verlangte nicht 50 sondern 500 Freikarten für die Vorstellung von Eurydice am Sonntag den 17.09.1940.

... Am Nachmittag wurde ich zu Capitaine Vanuxem gerufen, der von mir in sehr erregtem Ton sofort 50 Karten verlangte, sich jede Diskussion und jede Erklärung verbunden und sowohl mit der Schließung des Theaters als auch des Ladens von Reder (i.e., travel and ticket agency) als auch mit der Abgabe der Karten an die Section Jeunesse et Sport geliefert würden ... Es sei ein Befehl des Gouverneurs, der strikt eingehalten werden müsse. Mein weiterer Hinweis, daß es sich augenscheinlich um eine Requisition handele und ich in diesem Falle noch weniger zuständig sei und ich zumindest den Befehl des Gouverneurs schriftlich verlangte, endete mit meinem Hinauswurf. Reder und ich haben uns dann so geholfen, daß wir 50 Karten, die ursprünglich für auswärtige Besucher vorgesehen waren, ausliefernten."
Der Verlust des Theaters bei 15 Freiplätzen : 105,- RM
und bei 35 besten Plätzen à 2 RM : 175,- RM
Also bei einer Vorstellung: (z.B. "Maria Stuart") : 280,- RM

Ich habe Frau von Bülow — als Teilhaberin des "Othello" — von dem "Befehl
des Gouverneurs" in Kenntnis gesetzt und sie lehnte es für den "Othello" strikt ab.

Kein Vorschlag geht dahin, bei Herrn Oberst Courtois vorstellig zu werden
oder beim Gouverneur selbst und diesen auf die Unhaltbarkeit dieser Forderung hinzuweisen. Wir können und dürfen uns einen derartigen Verlust nicht leisten."

(A few days ago I was informed by Dr. Rieth that Commandant Dollfuss and Captain
Vanuxem ("Section Beaux-Arts") wished to have for each performance of the "Arts
Festival" 50 tickets for French students, 15 of these to be free tickets and 35
tickets at the reduced price of 2 Reichsmark and that these tickets were to represent
in each case the best seats.

... On late Wednesday afternoon Monsieur Uebel from the "Gouvernement
Régional" came to the theatre and demanded not just 50 but 500 free tickets for
the performance of "Othello" on Saturday, 17.8.1946.

... In the afternoon I was called to Captain Vanuxem who immediately demanded
50 tickets in a very excitable voice, forbade any discussion or explanation and
threatened me with the closure of the theatre and Meder's business (i.e. ticket
and travel agency) as well as the compulsory dismissal of Herr Miller and myself
if the tickets were not delivered within five minutes to the "Section Jeunesse et
Sport"... He said that it was an order from the Governor which had to be strictly
observed. My subsequent remark that this was obviously a requisition matter for
which I was even less competent and that I required at the very least the Governor's
order in writing resulted in my being thrown out. Meder and I then found a way
round the matter by handing over 50 tickets which had originally been reserved for
out-of-town visitors.

Loss to the theatre through 15 free seats : 105 Reichsmark
and for 35 of the best seats à 2 Reichsmark : 175 Reichsmark
therefore loss for one performance (e.g. "Maria Stuart") : 280 Reichsmark
I have informed Frau von Biilow - in her capacity as joint proprietor of the Othello production - of the "governor's order" and she absolutely refused to accept it for Othello.

I suggest that representations be made to Colonel Courtois or to the Governor himself and that the unreasonableness of this demand be pointed out to him. We cannot and dare not accept such a loss.

Oberbürgermeister Hartneyer for reasons of his own forwarded Goecke's report directly to Lieutenant-Colonel Courtois on August 31. French reaction to Goecke's criticism was brutal. On September 2 Courtois issued a decree to the town hall instructing the municipal authorities to relieve Goecke of his post. Goecke was subsequently dismissed. Goecke's mistake appears to have been the fact that he formalised his complaints in writing rather than conveying them verbally to Hartneyer. Once in writing Goecke's complaints were tantamount to a breach of the French ruling which forbade the publication and circulation of criticism of the French and Allied military governments. The French were sensitive about the potential within the German administrations for criticism and caucusing on policy issues.

These modifications concerning the degree of liberalism inherent in the French military government's theatre policy do not, however, detract from the overall impact and efficacy of the same. Tübingen was without doubt the fulcrum of theatre life in the French zone and this position was maintained with the active aid of the local military government which entered into keen rivalry with the occupation administrations of other towns of the French zone, notably with the town of Freiburg-im-Breisgau. This element of rivalry was in keeping with the French policy of stimulating cultural pride and achievement at provincial and regional levels.

Tübingen rapidly emerged in the post-war period, 1945-1947, as one of the foremost theatre centres of Germany with season programmes far superior to those offered in most German cities. Tübingen also attracted theatrical talent away from other cities on account of French military government policy on denazification and the allocation of finance, ration cards and lodging for theatre personnel. In comparison with the shattered community life and social deprivation of the
majority of German cities Tübingen presented a relatively comfortable haven for those categories of German professional groups who received special consideration in the distribution of food, clothing and lodging. One of the many personalities who were attracted to French-occupied Tübingen was the theatre director, Paul Hose, who had managed his own theatre in Berlin, the "Hose-Theater", up to the last years of the war. In December 1946 he applied for and received the position of director of the municipal theatre in Tübingen.\(^{(43)}\)

The foremost example of the efficacy of French theatre policy in Tübingen was the presentation in August 1946 of a six-week arts festival, the "Tübinger Kunstwochen". This festival was the first of its kind in post-war Germany and proved an unmitigated success, although various persons closely involved with the festival have admitted that a large number of the thousands of visitors from the American zone, primarily Stuttgart, made use of the relaxed visa entry for Süd-Württemberg to buy dairy and garden products on the black market rather than to participate in the festival.\(^{(44)}\)

In a lecture held in January 1973 Landeskonservator Dr. Adolf Kiehl paid tribute to French support in cultural affairs, including the "Kunstwochen": "So mußte im Bereich der Kultur beim Punkt Null angefangen werden und gerade in diesem Sektor regten sich, trotz der Kontrolle der Besatzungsmächte, die ersten deutschen Initiativen. Sicher waren wir in dieser Hinsicht in der französischen Zone noch am besten dran: die Franzosen ermunterten uns geradezu zum kulturellen Neubeginn, gaben Anregungen über Anregungen ... die Franzosen ermunterten uns zu Theatergründungen, zu Konzerten, zu Ausstellungen, und so kam es schon 1946 zu den Kunstwochen Tübingen-Heutlingen, die sich über sechs Wochen ausdehnten ..." (Arts Festival: ... thus a start had to be made from the very bottom in the sphere of cultural affairs and it was in this very sphere that the first German initiatives emerged despite the surveillance of the occupying powers. Admittedly we in the French zone were in the best position of all. The French encouraged us in every way to make a new start in cultural affairs and made suggestion after suggestion ... the French encouraged us to establish theatres, to arrange concerts and exhibitions and thus it was that the Arts Festival of Tübingen and Heutlingen came about as early as 1946, lasting for a period of more than six weeks ...\(^{(45)}\)
An examination of the minutes of the municipal council meetings of April 1946 reveal that the idea of an arts festival was originally formulated by the French military government. At the meeting of April 15 the leader of the local DVP branch, Wilhelm Berthle, criticised the proposal to the effect "that too much was being done in Tübingen in the field of culture. He had confirmed that 22 events had been put on within a period of 30 days. This was a very sad fact for the populace considering that there was such a great lack at that period of the most basic necessities of life such as food, clothing and footwear. He wished to ask the mayor to resist such demands in a somewhat more forceful manner whenever they were submitted." The mayor's stance was "that there was no way, even for the municipal council, in which they could adopt other than a favourable attitude towards the planned festival of art and culture... and that the idea of a festival of art and culture came from the Military Government. He had only wished to inform the advisory municipal councillors of the matter. As for the rest, the events would be put on in any case if the Military Government ordered it."

The festival ran for six weeks from Sunday, July 21, 1946 till the Sunday evening of September 1. During this period Tübingen offered a major art exhibition (Otto Dix, Erich Heckel, Kurt Georg Becker, Max Ackermann, Wilhelm Fehrle), six different theatre productions (Maria Stuart, Der elektrische Kranke, Uhella, Narzisse, Armandina and Ausflug mit Damen), twelve public lectures and sixteen concerts of classical music. A complete overview of events is provided in an appendix to this chapter (q.v. Appendix 7); the official programme is too extensive...
to include within the text of this chapter but an examination of its contents in the appendix demonstrates the brilliance and scope of the festival.

For the festival a handbook, the Almanach zu den Kunstuochten Tübingen-Knotlingen 1946, was published by the "Staatssekretariat". The French military government used this publication as a platform for its views on German culture and Franco-German relations. In a foreword entitled, "Was Deutschland von Frankreich noch lernen könnte" (What Germany could still learn from France) a French military government expert in Tübingen on German culture, Captain Pierre Angel (later professor of German at the University of Poitiers) wrote: "... In den kulturellen Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich war Frankreich nicht immer der Nehmer, sondern auch Oft der Geber. Wir wollen hier nicht betonen, welchen Einfluß über viele Jahrhunderte hin Frankreich auf die deutsche Kultur ausgeübt hat. Wir wollen nur darum erinnern, daß auf dem Gebiet der Literatur und der Baukunst Frankreich oft maßgebend war, und zwar nicht nur für Deutschland, sondern für ganz Europa ... Die Vaterlandsliebe, die allerdings in einzelnen Fällen in Chauvinismus ausarten kann, ist in Frankreich ein ganz anderer Begriff als in Deutschland (wie das Heine schon eingesehen hat). Als sich die Patrioten während der großen Revolution eine neue Gesetzgebung verliehen, schwöre ihnen nicht nur das los ihren eigenen Landes vor, sondern das wohl der ganzen Menschheit. Diese Schöpfer des modernen Begriffs "Nation" walteten ihre Liebe und ihre Sendung als Befreier über die Grenzen Frankreichs hinaustragen ... Der Deutsche hat sich immer alles - das Gute wie das Schlechte - von oben aufkotzieren lassen. Statt dessen sollte er lernen, von unten aus seinen Staat aufbauen ... Wenn Frankreich eine echte Sensation in Deutschland zu vollbringen hat, so besteht sie darin, den Deutschen den Sinn für Freiheit, das logische Denken, das folgerichtige Handeln, den kritischen Geist zu bringen. Damit Deutschland ein für allemal von seinem alten Fluch erlöst werde, der einen Hitler möglich gemacht hat, muß der Deutsche endlich lernen, ein Staatsbürger und ein Weltbürger zu werden.

Ohne unscheinbar sein zu wollen, glauben wir, daß es gerade uns gegeben ist, diese beiden Begriffe häufig zu vertreten und zu verkörpren. Durch die Verbreitung unserer Literatur, Kunst und Wissenschaft, durch das Beispiel des echten Frankreich, seines Humanismus, der damaligen eines Gaste, eines Humbold so ähnlich ist, kann unser Land dieser schweren, aber fruchtbaren Aufgabe nachkommen.
Ich will hoffen, daß sich die Deutschen diesen Worten nicht verschließen werden. Wir Franzosen verlangen ja nicht, daß die Deutschen französisiert werden, sondern daß sie mit unserer Hilfe zu ihrer eigenen Menschlichkeit zurückfinden, daß sie nicht nur Deutsche, sondern auch und vor allem Menschen, freie Menschen sein sollen.” (In the area of cultural relations between Germany and France, France was not always the recipient but actually more often than not the donor. We do not want to emphasise here the degree of influence which France has exerted on German culture over the centuries. We only want to point out that France was often the leading influence in the fields of literature and architecture not only for Germany but for the whole of Europe ... Although patriotism can degenerate in individual cases into chauvinism, it is quite a different concept in France from what it is in Germany (as Heine already realised). When the patriots of the great Revolution wrote a new code of legislation, they not only had the fate of their country in mind but also the welfare of all humanity. These creators of the modern concept of “nation” knew how to carry their love and their mission as liberators beyond the borders of France ... The German has always let everything - good as well as bad - be imposed on him from above. He should learn instead to build his state from the base upwards ... If France has a true mission to perform in Germany, then it is to instil in the Germans a feeling for freedom, logical thinking, consistent action and critical intellect. In order to deliver Germany once and for all from the old curse which made a Hitler possible, the German must at last learn how to become a citizen of his own community and a citizen of the world.

Without wishing to appear presumptuous, we believe that we alone have been given the mission to represent and embody these two concepts in a multiplicity of examples. We can comply with this difficult but fruitful responsibility by disseminating our literature, art and science and through the example of the true France and its humanism which is so close to that of Goethe and Humboldt.

I would like to hope that Germans will not close their minds to these words. After all, we French do not ask that the Germans become French but that they find the way back with our help to their own humanity and that they not only be Germans but also and above all human beings, free human beings.)
The theme of the "Tübinger Kunstwochen" serves to introduce two other aspects of Tübingen's aesthetic life in the years, 1945-1947: music and graphic art. A glance at the programme of the "Kunstwochen" confirms the important role which they played in the spectrum of cultural affairs provided by the German administration in Tübingen.

The importance of music within German cultural life is a self-evident fact which requires no explanation. The extent to which music found municipal support in Tübingen is reflected in Hermann Werner's account of the revival of cultural affairs in post-war Tübingen in 1945: "Jenes erste Kammermusikkonzert am 17. Juni, bei dem Tübinger Künstler (Leonhardt, Genzner, Gertrud und Otto Gilbert, Lydia Raur) mit zwei auswärtigen Gästen (Klemm - Stuttgart und Riet - Bremen) Mozart, Schumann und Brahms spielten, war das erste in einer schönen Reihe, mit der die Universität wieder ins Leben der Stadt eintrat, ehe sie noch ihre eigentliche Tätigkeit aufnahmen konnte. Später begann auch die Studentenschaft für ihre Kräfte wieder mit Kammermusikabenden bei mäßigen Preisen. Bei der fünften Veranstaltung der Universität wagte man schon einen der "entarteten" Modernen, Hindemith, auf das Programm zu setzen. Auch die einheimischen Musikvereine begannen sich wieder zu regen. Schon am 5. August begann der Akademische Musikverein mit Proben für ein Konzert von Händels "Messias", die im Oktober stattfand; Anfang September trat die Tübinger Chorgemeinschaft, zu der sich die verschiedenen Chöre in den Kriegsjahren zusammengekommen hatten, mit einer Silberfeierhöhung (Silcher was a Tübingen composer of choral music) hervor, am 29. September war in der Stiftskirche ein erster Motettenabend. Auch die Kunsmuseumssellschaft trat am 25. August mit einem Konzert von Willi Rosenau und Cläre Feuerbacher-Lutz, begleitet von Professor Leonhardt, wieder in die Öffentlichkeit. (That first chamber music concert on June 17, in which Tübingen artists (Leonhardt, Genzner, Gertrud and Otto Gilbert, Lydia Raur) together with two non-resident guests (Klemm Stuttgart and Riet Bremen) played Mozart, Schumann and Brahms, was the first in a wonderful concert series with which the university re-entered civic life even before it was able to resume its actual function (as a teaching institution). The students also began again later to put on chamber music evenings for themselves at reasonable prices. At the fifth university performance the organizers went so far as to insert one of the "decadent" modernists, Hindemith, into the programme. The local musical associations also began to stir themselves again. As early as August 5 the Academic Musical Asso-
association started rehearsals for a performance of Handel's Messiah which took place in October; at the beginning of September the Tübingen Choir Association, within which various choirs had amalgamated themselves during the war years, distinguished itself with a Silcher tribute concert; on September 29 the first motet evening took place in the "Stiftskirche". The Museum Company also appeared before the public again on August 25 with a concert by Willi Rosenau and Claire Faßbender-Lutz, accompanied by Professor Leonhardt.(51)

As in the case of the municipal theatre the French military government in Tübingen ordered the establishment of a municipal orchestra. This was implemented by the same mayoral decree of October 1, 1945, as created the municipal theatre. Like the theatre it was founded as a municipal concern: "Das Städtische Kummerorchester wurde durch die Verfügung des Oberbürgermeisters vom 1. Oktober 1945 als Unternehmen der Stadt Tübingen in Sinne von § 67 Absatz 2 der Deutschen Gemeindeordnung (1935) gegründet." (The Municipal Chamber Orchestra was established by mayoral decree of October 1, 1945, as an enterprise of the town of Tübingen in accordance with Paragraph 67, Section 2 of the German Local Authorities Statute (1935).) The "Städtisches Kummerorchester" was formally established on November 1, 1945.

The French authorities had arranged that, as far as possible, the town hall was to be responsible for the orchestra's finances. The town hall found itself, as in the case of the theatre, forced to seek the aid of the "Staatssekretariat". By December 31, 1945, for instance, the orchestra had run up a larger deficit than the municipal theatre, i.e. a loss of 5,000 Reichsmark as opposed to 3,000 Reichsmark by the theatre. This, however, must be seen in light of the fact that the town hall had set aside 15,000 Reichsmark for the running of the theatre and 5,000 Reichsmark for the orchestra. The "Staatssekretariat" provided 100,000 Reichsmark to cover the eventual losses of both the theatre and the orchestra.

The costs involved in maintaining a municipal orchestra at such a time of need and shortage inevitably became the subject of criticism from groups less committed to the arts than the French military government and the Schmid-Rennert coterie. For the latter Schmid's introduction to the programme handbook of the "Tübingen Kunstwochen" may apply as the motto of their commitment to artistic
achievement: "Niemals ist es notwendiger, in das lebenspendende Meer der Kunst zu
tauchen, als in den Zeiten der Nöte und der Zusammenbrüche. In der Kunst äußert
sich die Kraft des Menschen zu schöpferischer Fruchtbarkeit am dichtesten und blü-
hendsten, und indem er ihre Werke in Wort, Bild und Ton genießend betrachtet und
aufnimmt, wird er seiner eigenen Kräfte inne, und sein Mut wird geweckt, auf dem
ihm zugeordneten Plane, das Trümmerwerk abzubauen, von den Gründen aus
neu zu schaffen. Inspreekt denkt die Kunst an der Natur, der natura naturans, gleich
wie die schafft die Welt und wie sie heckt sie Semente und Wachstumskräfte, zeugend
und ertragend zugleich." (It is never more necessary to plunge into the life-
giving sea of art than in times of trouble and breakdown. Man’s power for creative
productivity manifests itself in its most impervious and vigorous form in the
sphere of art and by contemplating and absorbing artistic works in word, picture
and sound man becomes aware of his own powers and his courage is multiplied to re-
create the very basis of things within the area of existence assigned to him
and to push aside the debris. In that respect art equals nature, the natura naturans:
like nature it creates its world and breeds forces of seed and growth, be-
getting and bearing fruit at the same time.)

In the "Stadtbeirat" discussion of September 10, 1946, on the municipal
household budget for 1946 the subject of subsidies for the theatre and orchestra
was broached. Some council members were critical of the rate and extent of sub-
sidisation accorded to both the theatre and orchestra; for instance: "Stadtbeirat
Kocher kommt auf die Zuschüsse zum --chauepielhuiis und Orchester zu sprechen, er
würde es begrüßen, wenn diese Zuschüsse vermindert werden könnten und er wolle
hoffen, daß der Oberbürgermeister dies gelingen werde." (Stadtbeirat Kocher touched
on the subsidies for the playhouse and the orchestra. He would welcome it if these
subsidies could be reduced and he hoped that the mayor would succeed in this
respect.) The municipal official responsible for cultural affairs, Stadtrat
Bartels, director of the municipal "Kulturamt", was forced to concede at the same
meeting that there were problems involved in the running of the municipal orchestra,
for which he was unable to consider radical alternatives because of French policy:
"... Das Kammerorchester bösst für die Stadt ein Sorgenkind. Dieses sei im Jahre
1945 auf Wunsch der Besatzungsmacht gegründet worden. Seine Leistungen waren bis-
hier gut. Das Kammerorchester erforderle einen großen Aufwand, welchen die Stadt
allein nicht tragen könne. Deshalb müsse das Orchester sehen, daß es seine Hin-
nahmen durch Veranstaltungen auf dem Lande verbessere. Unser Ziel sei, daß sich das Kammerorchester selbst tragen könne. Die Frage, ob das Kammerorchester notwendig sei oder nicht, müsse bejaht werden, denn die Universitätsstadt Tübingen sei dazu verpflichtet ...

Stadtrat Bartels hofft, daß sich unser Kammerorchester in Jahr 1946 durch intensive Tätigkeit selbst tragen werde, sodaß weitere Auszahlungen von der Stadt nicht mehr erforderlich seien. "... The chamber orchestra was a problem child for the town. It had been established in 1945 at the request of the occupying authorities. Up till now its performances had been good. The chamber orchestra required considerable expenditure which the town could not provide alone. Therefore the orchestra would have to try to improve its income by performances in rural areas. It was our aim for the orchestra to pay its own way. The question as to whether the chamber orchestra was necessary or not would have to be answered with "yes" because as a university town Tübingen was under an obligation to support it ... Stadtrat Bartels hoped that our chamber orchestra would be able to pay its own way in 1946 by dint of sheer hard work so that no further subsidies would be required from the town."(90)

In return for subsidies the "Staatssekretariat" demanded that the orchestra's frame of reference be extended from that of a municipal orchestra to fulfill the functions of a state (or national) orchestra. In January 1947 the cabinet of the "Staatssekretariat" debated the issue: "Auf Grund einer eingehenden Beratung wird die Verstaatlichung des Tübinger Kammerorchesters ins Auge gefaßt, um es so in die Lage zu versetzen, seinen kulturellen Aufgaben in Mittel-Württemberg und Hohenzollern gerecht zu werden ..." (After detailed consultation the question is being consid­eled whether the Tübingen chamber orchestra should be placed under public control in order to thus enable it to do justice to its cultural task in Mittel-Württemberg and Hohenzollern.) The chamber orchestra was eventually re-named the "Kammer­orchester Tübingen" and placed under the control of the "Landesdirektion für Kultus, Erziehung und Kunst."

The role of art exhibitions in the French zone has been well defined in Gilmore's doctoral thesis: "The exhibits offered by "Beaux-Arts" were of an extremely high caliber, showing that a great deal of effort was made to make them contemporary and relevant to German public interest. Whenever possible art shows and special exhibits were made into road shows, touring several of the smaller..."
towns throughout the Zone Française d'Occupation in order to attract large and varied audiences. A random selection of exhibits included modern French painting, engravings, ceramics, illustrated French books, graphic designs, and the history of the plastic arts in France. There were also special exhibits organized around historical ties between France and southwestern Germany, such as "Exposition France - Pays de Bade. Deux Siècles d'histoire:1560-1860", which included a collection of paintings, furniture, jewelry, books and private correspondence. In the preface of its brochure, Schmittlein stressed the transcendental quality of cultural ties.

The message of this brochure and others is perfectly clear and constructive in promoting the improvement of Franco-German relations. Its effect on the public who attended cannot be accurately measured, but since the attendance records were always high and the German press reviews were consistently favorable, it can be concluded that the exhibits themselves were highly appreciated.

The function of art shows, however traditional a medium they may be, as a useful means to explain a national culture to foreigners and to induce wider-scale international cultural cooperation was fully understood by the French. The Franco-Baden exhibit, or an art show of German works organized by the "Beaux-Arts", involved a close working relationship between qualified Frenchmen and Germans, who eventually got accustomed to working together. The situation was not comparable in the inter-war period when such shows had limited official support and when physical constraints made their occurrence highly infrequent. The Baden-Baden approach to exhibits demonstrated their potential effectiveness as a modern means of communication."

In an interview with Lundeskonservator Dr. Adolf Kluth, the official who was responsible within the "Staatssekretariat" for art and architecture (after an initial tenure of office by Dr. Zweigart), provided the following list of art exhibitions:
1946 Mai – Juli
1947 Mai
1948 April

"Ausstellung mit Otto Dix, Erich Heckel, C.G. Becker, Ackermann"
"Moderne deutsche Kunst"
"Ausstellung mit Wilhelm Lehmbruck"

"Weiterwerke aus den Kölner Museen und der württembergischen Staatalgalerie"
"Moderne französische Keramik"
"La sculpture française de Rodin à nos jours"

1 September “Meisterwerke aus den Kölner Museen und der Württembergischen Staatsgalerie”
1947 Mai “Moderne deutsche Kunst”
1948 April “Ostasiatische Graphik”

These exhibitions were well attended. Approximately 48,000 visitors attended the exhibition, "Meisterwerke aus den Kölner Museen und der Württembergischen Staatalgalerie" (Masterpieces from the museums of Cologne and the Württemberg State Gallery) and 18,000 attended the art show, "Moderne Deutsche Kunst".

Arts exhibitions, however, had their original beginnings in post-war Tübingen at a more primitive, but no less effective level. This concerned the proposal put forward by Erich Peter Neumann for a Christmas exhibition in Schloß Tübingen in December 1945. The idea was in itself fairly simple: to build a large-scale montage of the Biblical Nativity scene ("Weihnachtsberg") along the line of traditional South German Nativity representations. The proposal was attractive to the authorities in that it was obvious that the Christmas of 1945 would prove a bleak time for a populace traditionally committed to an emotional celebration of
Christmas. Neumann’s proposal ensured that it was possible for the town population, above all the children, to vicariously experience elements of the traditional Christmas mood. Neumann’s widow, Professor Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, described the establishment of this exhibition as follows in private correspondence:

"Über die beiden wichtigsten kulturellen Veranstaltungen, die mein Mann und ich in Tübingen organisiert haben, besitze ich ziemlich viele Unterlagen, also über die zehn Freilichtaufführungen von "Romeo und Julia" auf dem Tübingen Marktplatz, durch die dann der Kern des späteren Tübinger Theaters gebildet wurde, und die Organisation der Ausstellung auf dem Tübinger Schloß, "der Weihnachtsberg", die übrigens ihrerseits einen Vorgänger hat in einer Ausstellung, die in den 30er Jahren im Erzgebirge veranstaltet wurde, der sogenannte "Feierabend" (Feierabend), Ausstellung von erzgebirgsischer Kunst und Kulturgerömmen. Der Veranstalter dieser erzgebirgsichen Volkskunstausstellung war Friedrich Krauss. Der einzige Mitarbeiter von Krauss bei dieser erzgebirgsichen Ausstellung war mein Mann, und aus den Erfahrungen dieser Zeit stammte ganz maßgeblich die Idee für die Tübinger Weihnachtsausstellung." (I possess quite a few records of the two most important cultural events organised by my husband and myself in Tübingen, that is, of the ten open-air performances of Romeo and Juliet on Tübingen market square from which the nucleus of the Tübingen theatre was later formed and of the organising of the exhibition in Tübingen Castle, the "Christmas Crèche", which had for its part a predecessor in an exhibition which had been arranged in the Thirties’ in the Erzgebirge, the so-called "Feierabend" (evening leisure), an exhibition of art and cultural customs. The organiser of the Erzgebirge folk art exhibition was Friedrich Krauss. My husband was Krauss’ assistant for the Erzgebirge exhibition and the idea of the Tübingen Christmas exhibition had its origins to a considerable extent in the experiences of that occasion.)

The "Weihnachtsberg" proved an exceedingly popular venture which exceeded all expectations, attracting thousands of visitors.

In the post-war period in Tübingen there was a dearth of public entertainment; consequently it is not surprising that there was a large turnout at whatever events were offered. This was equally true of the numerous lectures and conferences held in post-war Tübingen. Lectures were an obvious and cheap method of providing public entertainment and they were always well attended. The French authorities also saw a useful pedagogical factor in public lectures and used them extensively as a form of disseminating French culture, as well as French policy, throughout
the German community. To this end French artists and academics were enrolled to participate in lecture tours throughout the zone. These lectures were normally held in Tübingen in the "Institut Français" (q.v. below). Jean Cocteau, for example, gave a lecture in Tübingen. The French were particularly fond of utilising the services of French Germanists, men academically equipped to provide a theoretical basis to French post-war attempts at rapprochement between France and South-West Germany.

These specialists on Franco-German affairs were also employed in a series of conferences held throughout the post-war period of occupation. They were organised by the "Section Beaux-Arts" in conjunction with many private organisations. The list of academics and experts on Franco-German relations recruited by the French occupation authorities and the French Foreign Ministry was impressive, including such names as d'Harcourt, Vermeil, Angelloz, Fumet, Cohen, Marcel and Arland. Among the list of conferences held in post-war Baden-Württemberg one particular event stands out as an unusual occasion. This was a conference tour by the "Société française d'Archéologie" through Süd-Baden and Süd-Württemberg ending in a closing conference in Baden-Baden on June 15, 1947. This tour represented in effect the annual conference of the society. It was such a rare occasion for the society to hold its annual conference outside France that the 1947 tour "raised some eyebrows" according to one informed interviewee who wishes to remain anonymous. In the opening address to the closing conference a certain Paul Deschamps, representing the Ministry of Sport, Arts and Letters, conceded that "depuis sa fondation en 1834 la Société n'a, je crois bien, franchi que trois fois nos frontières, en 1846 et en 1922, pour visiter la Rhénanie et cette année pour parcourir les territoires de Bade et de Wurttemberg.

In 1922, of course, the Rhineland was occupied by French troops on a scale similar to that of the post-1945 period, a fact which was indirectly acknowledged by the director of the society, Marcel Aubert: "Comme après l'autre guerre, nous avons parcouru la Rhénanie et visité ses magnifiques églises, ses abbayes et ses châteaux pour étendre nos recherches jusqu'aux limites de l'art français; ainsi, après cette guerre, nous sommes heureux pu moner notre enquête dans ce coin de l'Allemagne du sud."

Aubert continued: "Nous y avons trouvé l'écho des rapports séculaires entre les civilisations et les hommes des deux bords du Rhin dont la trouée n'est qu'un accident, l'effondrement de hauts sommets divisant en deux les Vosges et la Forêt-Noire autrefois versants d'une même chaîne de montagnes ..."
expressed in this quotation on the historical links between France and South-West Germany represent an exemplary statement of the "French thesis" on South-West Germany.

The role of the above-mentioned "Institute Français" was a central feature in the military government's programme for disseminating French cultural propaganda. These institutes were situated in the capital towns of the French zone to provide regular and structured forms of introduction to French language and culture. Percy Bidwell described their functions in 1946 as providing "reading rooms and courses of studies in the French language and literature, as well as art exhibitions, lectures and concerts of a very high order of excellence."(69) The "Institut Français" in Tübingen was originally founded under the title of "Centre d'études françaises" on November 4, 1946, by the French government agency, "L'Office des Instituts français à l'étranger". For this purpose a student fraternity house on the Österberg, the "Normannenhaus", was requisitioned; the institute later moved into a villa in the same area which was owned by the Duke of Württemberg. A membership association was established at the same time. In a press notice to the Schwäbische Zeitung the institute defined its role in the following terms: "Ce centre est destiné aux étudiants et au public à la ville universitaire de Tübingen qui désirent connaître les réalités intellectuelles françaises. Il met à la disposition de ses membres des cours pratiques de langue française, des conférences de civilisation et de littérature française, des bibliothèques et des salles de lectures où figurent les dernières publications françaises dans l'ordre de la science, de l'art et de la philosophie."(71)

In a report written in 1947 some details are given of the institute's progress. Firstly, with regard to the institute building itself, there was an impressive list of amenities: "Le bâtiment (i.e. the building) comprend un rez-de-chaussée une grande salle de conférences de 250 places et un salon de réception. - 1er étage: 6 pièces: 2 salles de bibliothèque, 1 petite salle de cours (40 places), 1 salle de lecture des revues. - 2ème étage: une salle de travail (réservée aux étudiants) secrétariat etc.". Secondly, it shows the strength of membership: "... ouvert le 4 Novembre 1946 avec 200 adhérents, il (i.e. the institute) compte aujourd'hui près de 700 personnes."(73) It must be stressed at this point that a good number of these members would have joined the institute for straightforward reasons for self-advancement; the professional and administrative
The intensity of the institute's teaching programme was quite impressive. The opening programme of the "Centre d'Études" for the winter session of 1946–47 consisted of four parts.

1. Öffentliche Vorträge.
2. Praktische Kurse der französischen Sprache:
   a. Kursus für Anfänger (Mlle. Uff, licenciée et diplômée de Philosophie)
   b. Mittelkurse (M. Pons, licencié et diplômé d'Études)
   c. Oberkurse (M. Pons, licencié et diplômé d'Études)
3. Vorlesungen über französische Kultur und Literatur:
   a. "Blaise Pascal" : Directeur Callot
   b. "Die französische Renaissance und ihr Einfluss auf die Literatur des 16. Jahrhunderts" : M. Pons
   c. "Le mouvement encyclopédique et les écrivains français du XVIIIe siècle" : M. Pons
   d. "Péguy und seine Bestimmung" : M. Pons

(1) Public lectures.
2. Practical courses in French language:
   a. course for beginners
   b. intermediate course
   c. advanced course.
3. Lectures on French culture and literature:
   a. Blaise Pascal
   b. The French renaissance and its influence on the literature of the 16th century.
   c. Le mouvement encyclopédique et les écrivains français du XVIIIe siècle
   d. Péguy and his vocation.
4. Library and Reading Rooms.
In the following session, i.e. the summer session of 1947, the programme was even denser (76) (i.e. Appendix No. 8). The "Centre d'Études" (or "Institut français") has lasted in Tübingen on a very healthy basis until the present day and has developed an important position within the cultural life of the town.

The final aspect of post-war Tübingen to be included in this section is the question of clubs and societies. The role of "Vereine" is an integral part of German cultural life and involves a myriad of clubs and associations covering practically every aspect of social and cultural life. Specific types of clubs can be cited as exemplary and traditional features of community life in Germany, e.g. "Schützenverein", "Turnverein", "Liederkranz", "Albverein" (Rifle Club, Athletics Club, Choir, Alpine Association) etc. These and other associations have traditionally cultivated and maintained an intensity of cultural and social intercourse unrivalled in Western Europe. The running of these societies is traditionally prescribed by a section of German civil law known as "Vereinsrecht" (i.e. association law).

Associations and societies were formally banned by the Allies after the occupation of Germany. In the French zone they were re-permitted by Decree No. 22 of the Commander-in-Chief, issued on December 12, 1945. In a circular to the "Landratsämter" of Mittelbergen and the "Verwaltungsämter" of Tübingen, Reutlingen and Schwäbisch Gmünd the "Staatssekretär" stressed that, among the various conditions laid down by the decree, the French wished four classifications of association to be employed in applications for registration. They were:

"a) Vereine, die sich auf die gesamte französisch besetzte Zone Württembergs und Schlesien oder auf mehrere Kreise erstrecken ... b) Vereine, die sich auf den Kreis oder die Gemeinde beschränken, in dem sie ihren Sitz haben und die keine Ortsgruppen eines Landesvereins darstellen ... c) Orts- oder Kreisgruppen von bereits genehmigten Landesvereinen ... d) Jugend- und Sportvereine." (a) associations which extend over the whole of the French-occupied zone of Württemberg and Schlesien or over several "Kreise" ... b) associations which are confined to the "Kreis" or community in which they have their branch office and which are not the local branch of a "Land" association ... c) local or "Kreis" branches of "Land" associations which have already been approved ... d) youth and sports associations.) (77)
In the case of the first group classification the French authorities were circumspect. These associations seeking re-establishment were required to apply to the respective "Landesdirektionen" within the "Staatssekretariat", depending on the nature of the individual association, "zum Zwecke der Weiterleitung an den Herrn Gouverneur, Délégué Supérieur pour le Gouvernement Militaire du Wurtemberg" (for the purpose of forwarding to the Governor, Délégué Supérieur pour le Gouvernement Militaire du Wurtemberg). The Governor-General of Süd-Württemberg therefore decided in the cases of those associations wishing to operate on a scale larger than that of a single "Landkreis".

The second group received its authorisation from the local "Délégué du Cercle", thereby suggesting a more relaxed level of surveillance. In the case of the third group the respective "Landesdirektionen" were empowered to implement the process of registration. The fourth group, i.e. youth and sports clubs, was subject not only to Ordonnances No. 25 and 33 of December 1945, but also to conditions laid down in a letter from Governor-General Milnar to Carlo Schmid on February 7, 1946. The most striking feature of this letter was a ban on clubs catering for the following sports forms: "le pratique du tir, des armes, du sport, de la boxe, du Geländesport, des sports aéronautiques, de la gymnastique aux armes." (79)

The official initially in charge of cultural affairs within the "Staatssekretariat", Oberregierungsrat Dr. Zweigert, issued a circular on February 9, 1946, to the "Landräte" and the three main "Bürgermeisterämter" (i.e. including Tübingen) on the subject of the "Wiedereröffnung der Vereine, die geistige oder künstlerische Bestrebungen zum Inhalt haben" (re-establishment of associations concerned with intellectual or artistic aspirations). The circular described the required manner of application: "Ich bitte die Wiedereröffnung der Vereine, die geistige oder künstlerische Bestrebungen zum Inhalt haben, beschleunigt in Angriff zu nehmen. Nach meinen Besprechungen mit den zuständigen Offizieren des Gouvernement Militaire ist hierfür die Verfügung Nr. 25 (abgedruckt im Journal Officiel du Commandement en Chef Français en Allemagne von 21.12.45, S.56 ff.) entsprechend anwendbar.

Vormaligen ist also ein Gesuch, zusammen mit einem Entwurf der Satzungen und einer Liste der Personen mit Fragebögen, die die Wiedereröffnung betreiben,
in dreifacher Ausfertigung... Außer den in der genannten Verfügung angeführten Unterlagen sind - soweit vorhanden - alle Veröffentlichungen anzufügen, die der Verein seit 1933 herausgebracht hat." (I wish a speedy start to be made with the re-establishment of associations concerned with intellectual or artistic aspirations. According to my discussions with Military Government officials in charge of the matter, Decree No. 25 (printed in the Journal Officiel du Commandement en Chef Français en Allemagne of 21.12.1945, pp. 56 ff.) is adequately applicable in this case.

Therefore an application is to be submitted together with a draft copy of the statutes and a list of the persons who are supervising the business of re-establishment and their questionnaires, each in triplicate... In addition to the documents mentioned in the above decree, all publications - in so far as they are available - which the association has issued since 1933 are to be included.

The request for haste by Mr. Zweigert proved to be not unfounded. This is borne out by the circumstances surrounding the application made by the Lustnau men's choir ("Liederkranz"). On August 15, 1946, Oberbürgermeister Hartmeyer submitted an application to the local military government commander: "Ich lege dem Herrn Oberstleutnant in Anlage das Gesuch um Gründung des Männergesangvereins "Liederkranz" in Tübingen-Lustnau nebst dem Entwurf der Satzungen des Gesangvereins, einer Liste der Gründungsmitglieder und den Fragebogen derselben in je 3-facher Ausfertigung..." (Enclosed I submit to the colonel an application for the founding of the male choral society, "Liederkranz", in Tübingen-Lustnau together with a draft copy of the statutes of the choral society, a list of the founder-members and the questionnaires of the same, each in triplicate. According to information received from the police commissioner's office in Tübingen there are no objections in either political or moral respect to be raised against the founder members. I request that the society be authorized to hold its founding meeting.)

On October 8, 1946, Lieutenant-Colonel Courtois replied to Hartmeyer: he...
granted the "Liederkranz" the right to hold a meeting of its constitutive body, yet reserved the final authorisation on the grounds that "le montant de la cotisation fixée par l'assemblée constitutive devra être communiqué dans le compte-rendu de cette assemblée pour que l'association obtienne au moins autorisation définitive." After a constitutive meeting on November 7, 1946, in the inn "Sur Ronne" in Lustnau, Hartmeyer again forwarded a formal request for authorisation on December 11, 1946, together with the following listed documents:

2°. Le procès-verbal de l'assemblée constitutive.
3°. La liste des membres du comité.
4°. Une déclaration du président disant que les statuts furent acceptés sans changement par l'assemblée constitutive.

After another period of waiting Hartmeyer sent another request to Lieutenant-Colonel Courtois on February 14, 1947, reminding the French "Erwin" governor of his letter of December 11, 1946. In response to this letter the "Liederkranz Tübingen-Lustnau" finally received official authorisation on February 24, 1947.

There were, of course, specific features of German cultural and community life which the French military government, in keeping with the Allied policy of proscribing and repressing all symptoms of nationalism and militarism in German life, refused to permit. For example, prior to the occupation Tübingen had housed ten "Kriegsvereine" and "Regimentvereine" (i.e. veterans' associations). The French military government was not prepared to allow the continued existence of these regimental associations in Tübingen; on the contrary, it attempted to eradicate all vestiges of their existence. In July 1945 it ordered the local "Lendrastamt" to collect the files and archives of all existing military associations. The "Lendrastamt" in turn wrote to the municipal authorities in Tübingen: "Die Militärregierung verlangt die Abgabe amtlicher Archive und schriftlicher Unterlagen, die sich im Besitz der aufgelösten früheren Kriegsvereine und der an ihre Stelle getretenen nationalsozialistischen Organisationen befunden haben". (The Military Government orders the surrender of all archives and written records that have been in the possession of the disbanded ex-servicemen's associations and of the National Socialist organisations which replaced them.)
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3°. La liste des membres du comité.
4°. Une déclaration du président disant que les statuts furent acceptés sans changement par l'assemblée constitutive.
5°. Les questionnaires vérifiés des membres du comité Gottlieb Harscher, Albert Schmidt et Karl Klein.(83)

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Another example of French policy in Tübingen towards German associations and club life was the case of the "Hölderlin-Gesellschaft". The "Hölderlin-Gesellschaft" was founded in Tübingen (the town where the poet had spent the vast majority of his life) in 1943 chiefly as a result of the efforts of Professor Friedrich Beicher, a leading expert on Hölderlin at the university of Tübingen. When the French military government answered the society's application for permission to re-establish itself (August 1946) the reply came from Colonel de Marmoux, Governor-General Widmer's deputy, rather than from the "Erste" governor, thus indicating that the decision had been reached at a higher level of zonal authority than, for example, in the case of the "Liederkrönung Tübingen-Lustnau".

The French authorities insisted that the society altered its name to demonstrate a break with the past:

"Monsieur l'Administrateur Général Adjoint pour le Gouvernement Militaire de la Zone française d'Occupation fait savoir par la note 3495 DGAA/350 du 7.8.1946 qu'il donne son agrément à la fondation de la Société Friedrich Hölderlin."

The reconstituted "Friedrich-Hölderlin-Gesellschaft" was also compelled to hold founding meeting with the purpose of electing a new management committee. This has been described as follows in the Hölderlin-Jahrbuch 1947: "In der Gründungsversammlung wurden die fünf Herren des Gründungsausschusses sowie Professor Friedrich Beicher-Tübingen und der Direktor der Landesbibliothek in Stuttgart, Dr. Wilhlem Hoffmann, in den Vorstand gewählt. Dieser Vorstand wählte dann Professor Paul Kluckhohn zum Präsidenten und Professor Romano Guardini zum stellvertretenden Präsidenten der Gesellschaft ... In den Beratenden Ausschus, der an die Stelle des früheren Beirats trat, wurden u.a. gewählt: Dr. Theodor Neu, Ministerialrat Theophil Frey, Vorsitzender des Vorwaltungsausschusses der Stuttgarter Hölderlin-Ausgabe, Professor Dr. Wilhelm Böhm-Hannover, Professor Dr. Walter F. Otto-Tübingen, Professor Dr. Paul Rickmann-Heidelberg, Frau Vilma Münnich-Hamburg, Oberregisseur Paul Smolny-Weimar. In Weg der Kooperation und in der ersten Hauptversammlung soll dieser Beratende Ausschuss ergänzt werden, besonders auch durch Mitglieder aus dem Ausland; denn die Wirkung Hölderlins im Ausland zu fördern, seiner "hesperischen" Sonntage gemäß, liegt der Gesellschaft besonders am Herzen." (At the founding meeting five gentlemen from the founding committee together with Professor Friedrich Beicher (Tübingen) and the director of the State Library in Stuttgart, Dr. Wilhlem Hoffmann, were elected to the managing committee. This committee then elected Professor Paul Kluckhohn as president and Professor Romano Guardini as deputy-president of the society ...
The following were elected, among others, to the advisory committee which took the place of the former advisory board: Dr. Theodor Haus, Ministertialrat Theophil Frey, chairman of the administrative committee of the Stuttgart Hölderlin Edition, Professor Röhm (Hanover), Professor Walter P. Otto (Tübingen), Professor Paul Böckmann (Heidelberg), Frau Ilma Röhkeberg (Hamburg), Oberregisseur Paul Smolny (Weimar). In the first general meeting this advisory committee will be extended by means of co-optation, in particular with members from abroad; this is because the society attaches great importance to the promotion of Hölderlin's influence abroad, in keeping with his "Hesperian" mission.\(^{(87)}\)

The example of the "Friedrich-Hölderlin-Gesellschaft" demonstrates that the French authorities maintained close surveillance of Tübingen's clubs and associations and intervened when they saw fit in the management and practices of the same. French intervention in the German legal code governing clubs and societies (i.e. "Vereinsrecht") mainly concerned the form of election of board members. The French laid down that club and association committees were to be elected by the annual general meeting and that these in turn were to elect the members of the executive boards. This system was in fact reversed in Tübingen after the departure of the French military government, with the exceptions of the local "Skitverein" (riding club) and "Verkehrverein" (tourist office) which retained this electoral procedure.\(^{(88)}\)

On rare occasions the French military government in Tübingen departed from its strict and formal policy of surveillance and registration with regard to cultural affairs and organizations. As early as September 1945 the French began permitting sports events in Tübingen although the various sports clubs had not yet been officially sanctioned: "... Gleichzeitig wurde das Sportleben in Tübingen wieder in Gang gebracht und am Sonntag, den 2. September fand der erste Sportkampf statt und zwar ein Fußball-Wettbewerb zwischen den Stadtmannschaften von Tübingen und Reutlingen." (At the same time sports activities in Tübingen were started again and on Sunday, September 2, the first competitive sports event was held, namely a football match between the local teams of Tübingen and Reutlingen.)\(^{(89)}\)

In the following month the local military government authorities permitted two folk-song concerts, entitled "Schwäbischer Abend". The Schwäbische Zeitung of October 31, 1945, reported: "Die Liedergruppe Erwin Herkle hatte mit der Wieder-
holung ihres "Schwäbischen Abends" einen großen Erfolg". (The Erwin Korkle Choir had a great success with a repeat performance of their "Swabian Evening".)

It must, however, be stated that the latter event was probably more a result of French strategy than French liberalism. The accent of these two concerts was on Swabian culture and this was in keeping with the French policy of using local folklore and indigenous regional traditions to distract the population from the concept of "Großdeutschland". In the initial period of the occupation the French, for example, turned to the mayor for a list of those associations which would play a role in the expression of Swabian culture within the community.

In a series of decrees issued between January-March 1946 the French authorities announced that a number of organisations had been granted permission to re-establish themselves in Tübingen and Süd-Württemberg alongside the official political parties. They were principally: "Die Falken (sozialistische Jugendbewegung); "Bund Junger Schweben"; "Evangelisches Jugendwerk"; "Christlicher Verein Junger Männer"; "Katholische Schwebenjugend"; "Tübinger Sportverein"; "Friedrich-Hölderlin-Gesellschaft"; "Freiwillige Gesellschaft Tübingen"; "Anthroposophische Gesellschaft in Süd-Württemberg" (The Falcons; League of Young Swabians; Protestant Youth League; Young Men's Christian Association; Catholic Swabian Youth; Tübingen Sport Association; Friedrich Hölderlin Society; "Freiwillige"-Society of Tübingen; Anthroposophical Society of Süd-Württemberg). In this list the emphasis on Tübingen and Swabian affairs is fairly evident (the sole exceptions being the two Lutheran church organisations) and reflects French interest in limiting cultural perspectives within the community to the max.
Footnotes

Chapter six: Cultural affairs in Tübingen, 1945-1947, including developments within the local press and publishing industry.

Section One: Tübingen's cultural programme, 1945-1947.

(1) Jg. 1, 1946, He. 17, 18 and 23.
(3) Der Landesherald Tübingen, Amtliche Kreisblätterhefte, Band 1, Tübingen, 1946, p. 657.
(5) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Az: 3300-01.
(7) "Ende und Neubeginn - Auszüge aus den Erinnerungen an die Theatergründung in Tübingen 1945 aus dem Nachlaß von Professor Dr. Günther Stark". Kindly lent by Frau Stark, Oberbrücken-Kentirsch.
(8) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Az: 3210-01.
(9) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Az: "Schauspielhaus".
(11) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Az: 5920.
(12) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Az: 5920, "Verfügung vom 1. Oktober 1945".
(13) ibid.
(14) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Kartenauf- zur Chronologie der Stadt Tübingen 1945-1951.
(15) "Zur Gründung des Städtischen Schauspielhauses Tübingen", No. 35.
(17) Nachlass Prof. Dr. Günther Stark, "Spielplanentwurf für die Spielzeit: 1945/46".
(18) Kultur und Unterricht (Stuttgart), No. 11, 1962, nichtamtlicher Teil, p. 49.
(19) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Az: 5920.
(23) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Abs. 5920, pp. 2 ff.
(24) ibid., p. 2.
(25) Archiv des Landestheaters Tübingen, "Theaterbeirat-Gespräche: Protokolle".
(28) ibid., p. 122.
(29) ibid., p. 111.
(30) ibid., p. 66.
(31) ibid., p. 10.
(32) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Abs. 5920.
(33) Archiv des Landestheaters Tübingen, "Theaterbeirat-Gespräche: Protokolle".
(34) Archiv des Landestheaters Tübingen.
(35) Hamburg.
(36) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Hamburger Stadtarchiv.
(37) Richard Gilmore,sprache des Textes auf die Gesellschaft und die Beziehungen der Wirtschaft in der Nachkriegszeit.
(39) ibid., pp. 142 ff.
(40) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Abs. 330-00.
(41) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Abs. 331-01.
(42) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Abs. 332-01.
(43) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Abs. 330-00.
(44) Interview mit Landestheater-Tätigen, Mai 1974.
(53) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Abs. 5920.
(54) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, 'Hiederschrift über die Verfassungen der Oberbürgermeister der Stadt Tübingen, 1826', § 53, p. 99.


(56) 'Gespräche im Landtag Tübingen - Landtag 1826', Tübingen, 1946, p. 5.


(58) ibid.


(60) Richard Gilmore, op. cit., pp. 137 f.

(61) List and statistics compiled for this study by Landesarchivar o. J., Dr. Adolf Nieth.

(62) ibid.

(63) Correspondence dated April 1, 1975.

(64) Richard Gilmore, op. cit., p. 143.


(66) ibid., p. 295.

(67) ibid.


(69) Institut français de Tübingen, Archive.


(71) Institut français de Tübingen, Archive.

(72) Institut français de Tübingen, Archive, 'Renseignements sur le Centre d'études françaises de Tübingen'.

(73) ibid.

(74) Interview with Dr. Wolf Fritz, Koordinator der Deutscher-Französischen Gesellschaft Tübingen, Tübingen, May 1974.

(75) Institut français de Tübingen, Archive.

(76) Material is taken from a Tübingen weekly for 'displaced persons', entitled: 'Zur Tübinger Zeitung', Jg., 1947: April, 41.

(77) Regierungszentralblatt Tübingen, A 50/1 Acc 53/2/07, "Vereinsrecht".

(78) ibid.

(79) ibid.

(80) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, A 50/1 Acc 53/1959, "Vereinsrecht".

(81) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, A 50/1 Acc 53/1959, "Vereinsrecht".

(82) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, A 50/1 Acc 53/1959, "Vereinsrecht".

(83) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, A 50/1 Acc 53/1959, "Vereinsrecht".
(84) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Az: "Vereinsrecht".
(85) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Az: "Vereinsrecht".
(86) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Az: "Vereinsrecht", and:
Interview with Professor Wilhelm Hoffmann, Landesbibliothek Stuttgart, July 1975.
(88) Interview with Dr. Rolf Fritz, Koordinator der Deutsch-Französischen Gesellschaft Tübingen, Tübingen, May 1974.
(90) Tübingen.
(91) Interview with Professor Julius Wilhelm, Tübingen, May 1974.
(92) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Az: "Vereinsrecht".
Section Two: French newspaper policy in Tübingen, 1945–1947

In August 1946 the official military government publication for the French zone, *La France en Allemagne*, remarked in an article on the German press in the French zone of occupation that "dans le domaine de la Presse, comme dans les autres, il a fallu tout créer à partir de rien et presque sans préparation. Le milieu n'était pas favorable. La zone française, si bizarre: "... " estaba true in one sense: there is a special relationship between large, urban communities and major newspapers which meant that the French zone was deprived a priori of an established national daily newspaper. On the other hand, however, there is an element of exaggeration, consequently a false perspective in the above statement. This is due to the fact that the French article did not give credit to the density and variety of newspaper life in South-West Germany in the 1920's and early 1930's at the level of local newspapers ("Heimatzeitungen"). The ratio of newspapers to population was traditionally high in Württemberg: "Die Länder Baden und Württemberg waren in der Weimarer Republik die Länder mit den meisten Tageszeitungen, bezogen auf Größe des Landesgebietes und die Bevölkerungszahl. 1933, ehe die Machthaber des Dritten Reiches die Presse "gleichschalteten", wurden in Württemberg 203 und in Baden 192 selbständige Zeitungen ausgefert. In den folgenden sechs Jahren ging die Zahl der Tageszeitungen in Württemberg auf 139 ... zurück." (The "Länder" Baden und Württemberg were the "Länder" with the most daily newspapers in relation to the size of area and population during the Weimar Republic. In 1933, before the dictators of the Third Reich had brought the press "into line", 203 independent newspapers were produced and distributed in Württemberg and 192 in Baden. In the following six years the number of daily newspapers in Württemberg fell to 139 ...).

Within the framework of Württemberg's press Tübingen had demonstrated a static, if unexceptional development. This development has best been outlined in Hans Widmann's book, *Tübingen als Verlagstadt*: "... schon von 1. Januar 1845 an war eben bei Maxmillian Müller die "Tübinger Chronik" herausgekommen, die 1855 zum Amtsblatt erhoben wurde ... Die "Tübinger Chronik" hatte im Jahre 1897 eine Auflagehöhe von 5000 Exemplaren erreicht. Mehrere Konkurrenz-Unternehmungen versuchten zwischen 1890 und 1892 ihr Glück, kamen aber gegen die bestehende Zeitung.


(On January 1, 1845, the "Tübinger Chronik" was published by Maximilian Müller and in 1885 it was promoted to the rank of Official Gazette ... In 1887 the "Tübinger Chronik" had attained a circulation of 5,000 copies. Several competitors tried their luck between 1880 and 1892 but they were no match for the existing newspaper. A serious rival to the "Chronik" emerged, however, in the form of the "Tübinger Wochenblatt" which was published from 1893 onwards and bore the title of "Tübinger Tagblatt" as from May 1898. This paper was sold to the "Tübinger Chronik" on September 30, 1923. By now, however, the printing and publishing firm of Eugen Göbel published the "Tübinger Zeitung" which initially followed the course of the "Württembergische Bürgerpartei" (known as the "Deutschnationale Volkspartei" in the rest of the Reich) while the "Tübinger Chronik" kept roughly to the centre course of the "Deutschdemokratischen Partei". On May 1, 1933, after the seizure of power by Adolf Hitler on January 30, the "Tübinger Zeitung" was taken over as the "Neue Tübinger Tagblatt" by the "NS-Presse GmbH" (i.e. National Socialist press company); in connection with this disagreements arose during this period between it and the
The French occupation of Tübingen on April 19 replaced the National Socialist legal system in the town with Allied occupation legislation, a lot of which had been formulated prior to the occupation of Württemberg. With regard to the press in Tübingen Allied measures were of major importance. Firstly, Law Nr. 52 of the Supreme Allied Commander, termed "Contrôle de biens" by the French authorities, established that all possessions of the German state, of the NSDAP and of other organisations specifically listed were to be frozen, indicating that they could not be employed in economic transactions. Control of this property in fact passed to the respective military governments. Secondly, Law Nr. 191 of the Supreme Allied Commander ordered the closure of all German newspapers which had existed during the National Socialist era; this was followed on May 12, 1945, i.e. five days after the formal German surrender, by SHAEF's "Nachrichten-Kontroll-Vorschrift Nr. 1" (regulation on the control of news) which modified Law Nr. 191 in that Germans were permitted to publish newspapers subject to the granting of newspaper licences. Therefore, in the light of these three pieces of Allied legislation, the Tübinger Chronik was automatically assigned to French military government control and could not be re-published until successful application had been made for a newspaper licence.

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In December 1933 Dr. Karl Höhn sold the Tübinger Chronik to the "NS-Presse GmbH". Thus resulted the amalgamation with the Neues Tübinger Tagblatt on January 1, 1934; the first edition of 1934 bore the heading, Tübinger Chronik, and below that in slightly smaller setting Neues Tübinger Tagblatt; the "Tübinger Chronik" was given in the impressum as the publishing house. (Since then Tübingen has had only one newspaper.) The last edition of the paper left the printing presses on April 18, 1945.

Although the German press in post-war occupied Germany was initially banned and then subjected to varying licence systems in the respective zones, the Allied armies and military governments found it necessary to publish newspapers themselves for the German population; the main aim of this was to disseminate the numerous Allied orders in detail throughout the German population. One of the speediest
publications to emerge in occupied Germany was a newspaper licensed by the Red Army in the Russian sector of Berlin and published by Russian experts: "Nur sechzehn Tage war Berlin im Chaos des Kriegsendes ohne Tageszeitung. Am 29. April 1945 erschien letztmalig "Der Panzerbür - Kampfbütt für die Verteidigung Groberlins". Am 2. Mai kapitulierte Berlin, und schon am 15. Mai erschien die von den Sowjets lizenzierte "Tägliche Rundschau". Sie wurde in der in aller Haste wiederhergerichteten Druckerei des "Völkischen Beobachters" hergestellt. Die Redaktion bestand zunächst ausschließlich aus Russen." (Berlin was only for sixteen days without a daily newspaper during the chaos at the end of the war. On April 29, 1945, the "Panzerbür - Combat paper for the defence of Berlin" appeared for the last time. Berlin capitulated on May 2 and already by May 15 the "Tägliche Rundschau" had appeared, having been licensed by the Russians. It was produced in the hastily restored printing shop of the "Völkischer Beobachter". Initially the staff consisted exclusively of Russians.)

In the American zone of occupation the process was different in that newspapers were first distributed prior to the licensing of German newspapers. The development of the press in the American zone was described in an editorial retrospect in the official American publication, Die neue Zeitung (Munich), as follows: "... So soon as the American troops entered a town, they distributed the "Mitteilungen", a news bulletin, to the inhabitants ... After the occupation the printing offices were re-opened as soon as this was technically possible. Within a very short period
of time more than a dozen weekly newspapers emerged which were written by members of the American Army and produced by German personnel under American supervision... Surprisingly soon after the cessation of hostilities a department of the American Army, the Information Control Division, succeeded in selecting suitable German journalists to whom licences for an independent German press could be given. As early as June 27, 1945, the first licence of this kind was given to the German publisher of the Aachener Nachrichten. By and by, in the following months, the publications of the American Army were replaced by licensed German newspapers.\(^{(5)}\)

In contrast to the above-mentioned cases of early publication, the French military government in Tübingen relied initially for a period of time on the exclusive use of bill-posters for the dissemination of military government orders to the populace. This system was altered by the publication on May 23, 1945, of the first edition of a local military government news-sheet entitled Die Mittelungen der Militärregierung für den Kreis Tübingen. This news-sheet was edited by a member of the "Demokratische Vereinigung", Paul Kiehl, and was published twice weekly, with two or alternatively four pages. It was printed on the press of the former Tübinger Chronik.\(^{(6)}\)

There were in all eight editions of this news-sheet published between May and July 1945. The first edition of May 23 was comprised almost exclusively of military government and town hall edicts, signed by the mayor and entitled "Aufrufe an die Tübinger Bevölkerung" (Proclamations to the inhabitants of Tübingen). The edition of May 23 contained 37 such edicts, a large number of which were post-dated and had already appeared throughout Tübingen on bill-posters. The edicts were also numbered, beginning with No. 1 of April 19. The first edition of this news-sheet also presented the public with the German text of the following Allied laws: Nr. 6 (Befreiung von der Pflicht zur Befolgung deutscher Rechtsvorschriften auf Grund Ernichtigung der Militärregierung), Nr. 52 (Sperre und Beaufsichtigung von Vermögen) and Nr. 161 (Grenzkontrolle) (No. 6. Exemption from the obligation to observe German legal regulations on the basis of the authorisation of the Military Government) (No. 52. Freezing and supervision of assets) (No. 161. Border control). Proclamation No. 1 of General Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander, was also included.

The second edition (May 26) continued the relay of edicts to the general
public, i.e. edicts No. 36 to No. 44. The most significant of these in political terms was No. 44 which intimated the establishment of a new "Gemeinderat". The next announcement of note appeared in edition No. 5 of June 15, 1945, which informed the public of the first hesitant steps being taken to revive cultural life in the community. The announcement read as follows: "Die Universität Tübingen veranstaltet am Sonntag, 17. Juni 1945, im Festsaal der Neuen Aula ein Konzert unter Mitwirkung von:

Hermann Rieth von Stadttheater Bremen — Baß
Ernst Klemm (Stuttgart) und Gertrud Gilbert — Violine
Lydia Raur — Bratsche und Otto Gilbert — Violoncello
Carl Leonhardt und Harald Gennser — Klavier

Vortragfolge:
Mozart : Streichquartett D-dur
Brahms : Vier ernste Gesänge
Schumann : Klavierquartet

Eintrittskarten zum Einheitspreis von 2,- RM sind bereits ausverkauft."

(On Sunday, June 17, 1945, the University of Tübingen is giving a concert in the auditorium maximum of the main assembly hall. The performers are:

Hermann Rieth of the Bremen State Theatre — Bass
Ernst Klemm (Stuttgart) and Gertrud Gilbert — Violin
Lydia Raur — Viola, and Otto Gilbert — Violoncello
Carl Leonhardt and Harald Gennser — Piano

Programme:
Mozart : String Quartet in D major
Brahms : Four Serious Songs
Schumann : Piano Quartet

Tickets at the standard price of 2 Reichsmark are already sold out.)

Since all the tickets to this concert were already sold out by the date of printing, the function of the announcement was not so much that of an advertisement as that of a primitive return to a "Feuilleton" (i.e. arte review), thereby fulfilling the traditional newspaper role of commentator on local cultural affairs.
This chamber concert was indeed reviewed in the subsequent edition (No. 6; June 23, 1945) by Dr. Josef Förderer. Edition No. 6 also provided, in addition to the increasing lists of official edicts and announcements (by edition No. 6 the list had reached "Bekanntmachung Nr. 86"), further information on the new political situation emerging under the control of the French military government. There was an article on the installation of Viktor Kenner on June 18 as the new mayor of Tübingen. Furthermore, there was a lengthy announcement on the "Ernennung der Leiter der württembergischen Landesverwaltungen: Auf Grund der ihm übertragenen Vollmachten hat der Generalgouverneur von Stuttgart, Befehlshaber des Gebietes Württemberg, durch Beschluss vom 13. Juni 1945 neun Landesverwaltungsbehörden geschaffen und deren Leiter ernannt ... Im Rahmen der Gesetze und Bestimmungen der Militärregierung und der noch gültigen deutschen Gesetze sind die Verwaltungsleiter von Zeitpunkt ihrer Ernennung an der Militärregierung für die Tätigkeit ihrer Dienststellen verantwortlich. Ihr Amtsbereich erstreckt sich auf das ganze Gebiet des Landes Württemberg." (Appointment of the heads of the "Land" administrations of Württemberg: On the basis of the legal powers delegated to him, the Governor-General of Stuttgart, Commander-in-Chief of the region of Württemberg, has created nine "Land" administrative authorities and appointed their respective directors by decree on June 13, 1945 ... Within the framework of the laws and regulations of the Military Government and those German laws which are still valid, the administrative directors are responsible to the Military Government for the activities of their departments as from the time of their appointment. Their jurisdiction covers the whole of the region of "Land" Württemberg.)

This announcement was made prior to the acquisition of Stuttgart by the Americans and the division of Württemberg into two zones. This, and similar statements of the initial period of the occupation, was forgotten once the French military government was obliged to withdraw into Süd-Württemberg and subsequently changed its policy to one of promoting a sense of regional identity within Süd-Württemberg and of erecting barriers to free movement across the zonal boundary.

The edicts and announcements directed in the news-sheet at the populace reflected, among other things, the overriding importance of material worries and physical survival for the majority of the German population. In edition No. 6, for example, the topic of linden leaves, popular among Germans as a health tea, was the subject of "Bekanntmachung Nr. 81": "Das Pflücken von Lindenblüten an den städtischen Bäumen ist nur mit besonderer Erlaubnis gestattet." (Picking the blossoms of linden trees from the urban trees is only permitted with special permission.)
werden im Rathaus Tübingen, Zimmer 27, gegen eine Gebühr von 20 Pfennig ausgegeben. Die auf dem Erlaubnischein abgedruckten Bedingungen sind genau einzuhalten." (Announcement No. 81. The picking of linden blossom from municipal trees is allowed only with special permission. Permits will be issued at Tübingen town hall, Room 27, for a fee of 20 pfennig. The conditions printed on the permit are to be strictly observed.)

Jede Familie und jede alleinstehende männliche Person müssen abliefert:
1) einen zivilen Herrenanzug (Rock, Weste - kein schwarzer Anzug, nicht Gehrock, Cott oder dgl. - Hose, Hut)
2) Unterwäsche: 1 Hemd mit Kragen, 2 Taschentücher, 1 Unterhose, 1 Paar Strümpfe, 1 Krawatte.
3) 1 Paar Schuhe ...


Männer, die mehr als 4 Garnituren besitzen, werden aufgefordert, 2 Garnituren abzugeben ...”

A major change occurred with news-sheet No. 9 of July 6, 1945, in that the title of the news-sheet was altered to that of Nachrichtenblatt der Militärverwaltung und Behörden für den Kreis Tübingen. The change of title indicated a step towards a return to normal newspaper life in that it deliberately replaced the news-sheet idea (i.e. Mitteilungen) by a term indicating a more solid news publication (i.e. Nachrichtenblatt). It cost ten pfennig.
This news publication acquired features of a regular newspaper within the course of a few editions. Edition No. 14 of August 10 represents the pivotal point of the development from a news-sheet to a newspaper. In contrast to the previous ones, this edition was composed of three pages (i.e., six sides). In addition, it had a section on local news entitled "Tübinger Stadtnachrichten". For the first time it also carried an extensive amount of advertising. These advertisements were of four categories: employment, artistic events (three concerts and a theatre production), marriages and engagements and, lastly, advertisements for marriage partners ("Heiratsanzeigen"). There was also a section on Lutheran and Roman Catholic church affairs ("Kirchliche Nachrichten"). This edition was also the first one to approximate a regular newspaper in that it contained a series of articles on German and international politics, e.g. "Die Vereinbarung der Konferenz in Potsdam", "Englands neue Männer" ("The convention of the Potsdam Conference", "England's new men") etc. From this point onwards the Nachrichtenblatt developed the depth as well as the contours of a newspaper. It maintained a commentary on political affairs, however sparse, and provided detailed reviews on Tübingen's cultural life.

In September 1945 the French authorities gave their approval to the publication of a new German newspaper in Tübingen. Conversely, it could be argued that the new newspaper was in fact a reissue of the former Tübinger Chronik under new management. This inevitably reduced the news value of the Nachrichtenblatt and it returned to being exclusively an official news-sheet. The Nachrichtenblatt appeared twice weekly, on Wednesdays and Saturdays, whilst the new newspaper, the Schwäbische Tagblatt, appeared on Tuesdays and Fridays. In addition, as from September 5, 1945, the French military government in Baden-Baden began the publication of a Journal Officiel du Commandement en Chef Français en Allemagne, of which nine issues had appeared by the end of 1945. This was the official French publication of reference for French occupation legislation. Furthermore, towards the end of November 1945 the Staatssekretariat introduced the Amtsblatt des Staatssekretariats for the announcement of its decrees ("Rechtsanordnungen") and those directives from the French military government which, in accordance with the French policy of indirect administration, it was obliged to publish in its own name. Consequently, there was a fair amount of publications in the Tübingen area in the months following August 1945. On the other hand only the Schwäbische Tagblatt developed into a full
newspaper, fulfilling most criteria of definition of a newspaper. The focus of attention switches therefore at this point from the Nachrichtenblatt and the other official publications to the Schwäbisches Tagblatt.

The Schwäbisches Tagblatt was established five months after the capture of Tübingen. During this period the French military government authorities in Tübingen and Baden-Baden had considered various alternatives open to them before deciding on a general policy for newspaper publishing affairs. Bearing this in mind it is perhaps of use to introduce this examination of the Schwäbisches Tagblatt by outlining the discernible main features of French newspaper policy in the French zone.

These main features may be summarised as follows for the period, 1945-1947: the relative lateness in granting licences in comparison with other zones, for example, the American zone; the initial introduction of regional non-party newspapers designed to appeal to the respective readership in the various provinces and edited by inter-party editorial boards of mixed political views, complemented in 1946 by the licensing of separate, exclusively party-political organs; a liberal attitude within the French authorities toward the employment of former NSDAP members, except in cases of overt commitment to National Socialism; finally, the relatively severe degree of censorship which, in addition, was maintained for a longer period of time than was the case in other Western zones.

In the French zone the German press was resuscitated in its traditional forms at a later date than in the American zone where licenced newspapers of repute were appearing by August 1945 at the latest, e.g. the "Allgemeine Zeitung of Berlin, the Frankfurter Rundschau and the Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung. In comparison the French zonal newspapers appeared in the following chronology: "Als erste neue Presse-organen wurden dabei in den Ländern der französischen Zone lizenziert: in Südbaden der "Südkurier", Konstanz, erstmals erschienen am 7.9.1945; in Süd-Württemberg das "Schwäbische Tagblatt", Tübingen, erstmals am 21.9.1945; in Rheinland-Pfalz "Die Rheinpfaß", Neustadt/Haardt, erstmals am 29.9.1945, und in französischen Sektor Berlins "Der Kurier", welcher am 12.11.1945 erschien." (The first new press organs to be licenced in the "Länder" of the French Zone were: Der Südkurier, Konstanz, in Südbaden, which appeared for the first time on 7.9.1945; the Schwäbisches Tagblatt, Tübingen, in Süd-Württemberg on 21.9.1945; Die Rheinpfaß,

The French military government in Baden-Baden selected a specific style of editorial board to run the newspapers which they intended licensing. In contrast to, for example, the British zone where party-political newspapers were encouraged, the French authorities originally promoted the formation of editorial boards of mixed political views, representing as far as possible the former main regional political groupings. The French government publication, Cahier d'Information, No. 77, of February 1947, defined this initial stage in a retrospective look at the development of the German press in the French zone: "Dans les comités de rédaction allemands figuraient des représentants de tous les grands partis autorisés (la nuance politique s'accentua selon les pays en la personnalité du rédacteur en chef)." (11)

The next development occurred prior to the electoral campaigns of 1946 when the French authorities introduced a section in all newspapers, entitled "Tribune der Parteien", in which the permitted regional political parties were allowed equal opportunity to outline their programmes and voice their opinions. The last development involved the establishment of party-political newspapers for the permitted political parties. Heinz-Dietrich Fischer's well-researched work, Parteipresse in Deutschland seit 1945, best describes this development: "Vor den im Herbst 1946 durchgeführten Gemeindewahlen wurde zunächst auf dem Weg zu einer Parteipresse eine Übergangslosung praktiziert. Darüber heißt es in einem Bericht der "Division de l'Information" der französischen Militärregierung: "Les partis politiques peuvent développer leur doctrine et leurs thèses dans les journaux qui existent alors. Une "Tribune des Partis" comportant une demi page à une page entière, est à leur disposition dans chaque numéro. Ainsi, le lecteur connaît toutes les opinions et chaque parti a rigoureusement les mêmes chances au départ, pour l'acquisition d'une clientèle électorale." Nach den Wahlen erkannte die französische Militärregierung den Wunsch der Wählerschaft nach ausgeprochenen "feuilles d'opinion" an, wodurch weniger eine unabhängige Meinung, als vielmehr eine wirkliche Parteipresse vorstehen sollte. Auf einer Sitzung des "Comité de Direction de la Presse" der Militärregierung wurde am 5. Februar 1947 entschieden, künftig nur noch einige der "Überparteilichen" Blätter bestehen zu lassen, während die restlichen bis zu jenem Zeitpunkt lizenzierten Blätter entweder ihr Erscheinen..."
Before the municipal elections in the autumn of 1946 a temporary solution was first implemented prior to the introduction of a party-political press. A report by the "Division de l'Information" of the French Military Government stated with regard to this: "Les partis politiques .... d'une clientèle électorale". After the elections the French Military Government acknowledged the electorate's wish for distinct "feuilles d'opinion", by which a real party-political press was meant rather than a press espousing independent opinion. At a meeting of the "Comité de Direction de la Presse" of the Military Government on February 3, 1947, it was decided to allow only a few of the "non-partisan" papers to continue to exist, while the remaining licenced newspapers were either to cease publication or go over to the side of a political party. The Schwäbische Tarblematt was one of the newspapers of mixed editorialship which were allowed to continue. In accordance with French policy four party-political newspapers were founded in Süd-Württemberg:

- **SPD**: Der Württemberger (Reutlingen)
- **CDU**: Die Schwäbische Zeitung (Leutkirch)
- **DVP**: Der Schwabacher (Obenheim)
- **KPD**: Unsere Stimme (Schwenningen)

In the course of an interview Professor Fritz Eberhard of the Freie Universität Berlin - a former Social Democratic politician who returned in 1945 from exile in war-time London to work in Stuttgart - compared the degree of leniency shown by the French toward the question of denazification within the newspaper profession favourably with the American press policy. The main feature of French policy in this respect, according to Professor Eberhard, was the generous attitude shown by the French in their zone in employing former newspaper editors and chief editors who had worked within the National Socialist press and many of whom had crossed into the French zone in search of employment once they were barred from working in other zones.

French newspaper censorship in the period, 1945-1947, came in three forms: initially, there was a system of censorship prior to publication ("Vorsensur"), which was replaced in 1947 by censorship after publication ("Nachensur"); parallel to these two systems the French applied bans of varying periods of time on newspapers which jeopardized what the authorities deemed to be French interests.
In August 1946 the military government publication, La France en Allemagne, provided an argument and defense on behalf of the benefits of the system of censorship prior to publications "Porte d'une très ancienne et libérale tradition journalistique dont la presse française d'aujourd'hui reste l'héritière, la France se devait de marquer sa présence en Allemagne en faisant naître dans sa zone une presse spécifiquement allemande, mais imprégnée d'objectivité et largement ouverte aux nouvelles du monde et aux grands courants d'idées de l'après-guerre.

Dans cet effort de propagation par l'enseignement de la liberté et des principes démocratiques, dans la lutte contre les séquelles de l'esprit nazi, dans la propagation de nos thèses sur l'Allemagne de demain et l'explication de notre politique quotidienne en zone, la presse sous notre contrôle est l'instrument le plus efficace.

Une objection peut être faite à notre système actuel: c'est l'existence d'une censure a priori. Si paradoxal que cela paraisse à première vue, cette censure a été jusqu'ici le plus honnête moyen de contrôler et d'orienter les journalistes allemands d'aujourd'hui. Car ils ont souvent tout à redouter ou à apprendre. Ils se sentent plus libres et ils sont plus audacieux, que s'ils avaient sans cesse à redouter les sanctions de la censure a posteriori.

Cette censure a priori n'est certes pas destinée à durer. Le public allemand se rééduque, en même temps que les journalistes se perfectionnent techniquement et politiquement. Un essai de censure a posteriori va être tenté sur un grand journal de la zone. Si l'expérience est satisfaisante, le procédé sera généralisé. (15)

The French authorities applied no scales of discrimination or preference in imposing bans on German newspapers which contradicted or criticized French policy. Within Baden-Württemberg the KPD newspaper, *Hamburger Aktion*, was served with a publication ban from October 28 to November 14, 1946, "pour avoir publié un article injurieux contre des hommes politiques alliés". (16) The non-party newspaper in Konstanz, *Der Stadkurier*, was banned for a week in June 1947 for publishing the contents of a resolution adopted by the Baden "Landtag" deploiring the food situation. Indeed, all public discussion or advertisement of such topics as food conditions, the Saar and the question of German unity was taboo. (17) Newspapers published in other zones were also banned whenever they came into conflict with either French
policy or the French authorities. The principle example of this tactic was the case of the Rhein-Eckar-Zeitung which was denied distribution rights throughout the French zone for a period of three months on account of an article written in February 1940 criticizing French occupation policy. The French authorities also applied like bans on the French press whenever it was felt that French occupation interests in Germany were being prejudiced by the same. F. Roy Willis indicates in his book that the Socialist newspaper, France d’abord, had been banned in the zone by Koenig after it had opened a strong attack on the zonal administration in its issue of May 29, 1947.

Despite the existence of these obvious features of some policy in the initial year of the occupation no specific directives on German press affairs were issued by the French occupation command in Baden-Baden. The predominant feature was a wait-and-see attitude accompanied by a slow and, at times obviously reluctant, licencing of a small number of newspapers. There was no formal definition of general policy on newspaper matters nor statement of legislation by the French. This appears as an apparent contradiction within French occupation affairs; most other aspects of German social and political life were carefully defined by systematic formulae as specific aspects of French policy. This was not the case with the German press. There was, for example, no general edict from the Commander-in-Chief of the French Zone permitting the establishment and publication of newspapers, as was the case with German political institutions, political parties, clubs and associations, legal systems, trade unions etc. For this reason the establishment of newspapers in the French zone was a piece-meal process, very much subject to the conditions in the local "Hinterland". The major factor which emerged as a result of the unusual laxness of the military government headquarters in Baden-Baden about the formulation of press affairs was the relative influence of local military government commanders in determining the nature and composition of the newspapers founded in their areas of command.

At this point it is appropriate to turn to the specific development of an exclusively German press in Tübingen. The re-establishment of a German-run newspaper - as opposed to the tabloid newspapers which existed in Tübingen as from May 23, 1945 - was first indicated during a series of debates held by the "Demokratische Vereinigung" on the topic. The first mention was made at the weekly members' meeting in the "Plug" inn on August 14, 1945: "... Hierauf ergiff unser
Mitglied Dr. Förderer das Wort und berichtete über die von französischen Militär- gouverneur geplante Gründung einer Tageszeitung großen Stils, die in Tübingen herausgegeben und gedruckt werden soll. In dieser Angelegenheit hatte er bereits eine längere Unterhaltung mit Oberbürgermeister Kenner, der am Donnerstag, den 23. August den Mitarbeiterstab für diese Zeitung vorstellen wird. Das Blatt soll täglich 4-6 Seiten stark erscheinen. Nebenher darf kein Nachrichtenblatt herausgegeben werden ... Der Vorsitzende ist überrascht über das von Dr. Förderer Aufgeführte und kann nicht verstehen, daß man unserer Vereinigung dieses Vorhaben verschwiegen habe ... ist Mitglied Hartmeyer überrascht, daß wir von der Gründung einer Zeitung nicht in Kenntnis gesetzt worden sind. Wenn am Donnerstag die Mitarbeiter vorgestellt werden sollen, so weise er darauf hin, daß in Tübingen technisch und redaktionell vorgebildete Kräfte in genügender Zahl vorhanden seien ... Hierauf wird eine Kommission bestimmt, die in dieser Sache mit Oberbürgermeister Kenner verhandeln soll. Sie besteht aus den Mitgliedern Barthel, Dr. Förderer, Hartmeyer und Habsacker. (Nach diesem unserer Kollegen Dr. Förderer und berichtete über die von französischen Militär- gouverneur geplante Gründung einer Tageszeitung großen Stils, die in Tübingen herausgegeben und gedruckt werden soll. In dieser Angelegenheit hatte er bereits eine längere Unterhaltung mit Oberbürgermeister Kenner, der am Donnerstag, den 23. August den Mitarbeiterstab für diese Zeitung vorstellen wird. Das Blatt soll täglich 4-6 Seiten stark erscheinen. Nebenher darf kein Nachrichtenblatt herausgegeben werden ... Der Vorsitzende ist überrascht über das von Dr. Förderer Aufgeführte und kann nicht verstehen, daß man unserer Vereinigung dieses Vorhaben verschwiegen habe ... ist Mitglied Hartmeyer überrascht, daß wir von der Gründung einer Zeitung nicht in Kenntnis gesetzt worden sind. Wenn am Donnerstag die Mitarbeiter vorgestellt werden sollen, so weise er darauf hin, daß in Tübingen technisch und redaktionell vorgebildete Kräfte in genügender Zahl vorhanden seien ... Hierauf wird eine Kommission bestimmt, die in dieser Sache mit Oberbürgermeister Kenner verhandeln soll. Sie besteht aus den Mitgliedern Barthel, Dr. Förderer, Hartmeyer und Habsacker.)

The reason for Renner's silence on the matter appears to have stemmed from his wish to secure control of the newspaper as a municipal enterprise. Renner was constantly in search of extra sources of income to bolster the exhausted municipal revenues in a time of high capital expenditure and increased municipal responsibilities. In an interview with Hermann Werner in 1951 Renner was quoted as saying the following about the founding newspaper: "Man kommt noch auf die Gründung des
Tübinger Tagblattens zu sprechen. Dr. Renner, habe als Oberbürgermeister sich darum bemüht in dem Bestreben, auf kulturellem Gebiet voranzukommen, wobei man am besten zu den Franzosen in bessere Verbindung kam; und er habe Förderer dazu nach Tübingen zurückgerufen. Dann habe er aber die Zeitung in eine gewisse Beziehung zur Stadt zu bringen gewünscht, um für die Stadt eine Einnahme zu bekommen (wie er auch das Kino in städtische Kegel zu bekommen sich bemühte), nicht in redaktionelle Abhängigkeit. Es sollte eine GmbH mit sieben Geschäftssstellen in Händen von Männern der Stadt gebildet werden, ein Vertrag sei schon notariell abgeschlossen gewesen, auch das Gouvernement Regional sei einig gewesen. Darauf sei aber Förderer "sehr böse" geworden und habe Colonel Loutre, der in Baden-Baden die Presseaufgaben hatte, für sich gewonnen; das Tagblatt sei dann völlig unabhängig von der Stadt lizenziert worden. (A discussion was also started about the founding of the Tübinger Tagblatt. Renner said that as mayor he had striven for this with the intention of making headway in the field of cultural affairs, since this was the best way of developing improved contacts with the French; and for this purpose he had recalled Förderer to Tübingen. He had wanted at the same time to establish a specific kind of relationship between the newspaper and the town hall in order to obtain revenue for the town (just as he was trying to have the cinema placed under the management of the town hall) and not in order to subject it to a state of editorial dependency. A limited company was to be formed under seven shareholders from within the community, a contract had already been notarially concluded and the "Gouvernement Regional" had also agreed. But, according to Renner, Förderer had become "very angry" on account of that and had enlisted the aid of Colonel Loutre who was responsible for press affairs in Baden-Baden; the Tagblatt had then been licensed completely independent of the town hall.)

At a meeting in the "Flug" on September 4, 1945, Paul Riehle, the editor of the Mitteilungen and subsequently of the Nachrichtenblatt, rose to complain about the position acquired by a certain Dr. Hersog in the organisation of the new newspaper: "Mitglied Riehle meinte, es sei in der Zwischenzeit doch viel geschehen. Dr. Hersog hätte zwei Mitarbeiter herangewiesen und mit ihnen verhandelt, trotzdem (sic) er (i.e. Riehle) mit der Geschäftsführung betraut worden sei. Ihm gegenüber habe sich Dr. Hersog als Betriebsdirektor vorgestellt. Schließlich sei Herr Barthel bei ihm erworben und verlangte die Personalakte des Betriebes. Er sei deshalb bei Oberbürgermeister Renner gewesen und hätte ihm gefragt, wer in der "Tübinger Chronik" eigentlich etwas zu sagen habe. Am nächsten Abend hätte er dem

Mitglied Seeb fragt, wer denn eigentlich den Dr. Herzog eingeifhrt und ihm die Türen geöffnet hatte. Alles, was wir schaffen, ist tatsächlich umsonst ... 

Hierauf erklärt Mitglied Barthel, daß Dr. Herzog von den Franzosen die Lizenz erhalten habe und ihm der Verlag der "Tübinger Chronik" übertragen worden sei. Er verließ hierauf ein Schreiben des Oberbürgermeisters Renner über seine Ernennung zum Geschäftsführer der "Tübinger Chronik". (Colleague Richle thought that a lot had happened in the meantime. Dr. Herzog had recruited two colleagues and negotiated with them although he (Richle) had been entrusted with the management of the newspaper. Dr. Herzog had introduced himself to him as works manager. Finally Herr Barthel had called on him to demand the firm's list of staff. On account of this he had gone to Mayor Renner and asked him who was really to have a say in the Tübinger Chronik. On the same evening he had decided to hand in his notice. He wanted to know whether he was still manager. After consultation with the mayor it was decided that he would remain at his post as long as the Nachrichten were being published and not retire until the new newspaper was published.

Colleague Seeb asked who in fact had installed Dr. Herzog and opened doors for him. Everything which we were doing, he said, was indeed all in vain ...

Colleague Barthel then explained that Dr. Herzog had received the licence from the French and that the publishing side of the Tübinger Chronik had been assigned to him. He then read out a letter from Mayor Renner concerning his appointment to manager of the Tübinger Chronik.

Dr. Paul Herzog had in fact previously submitted a plan to the French authorities for the re-establishment of a newspaper in Tübingen with the use of the stock and machinery of the former Tübinger Chronik: "Durch den Kriegsausbruch ist dem deutschen Südwesten seine Aufgabe klar vorgeschrieben. Er muß, wenn er leben will,
aus sich selbst heraus schaffen. Und er darf diesmal nicht nur die Talenten stellen, sondern er muß sie auch bei sich zur Blüte kommen lassen. Sozial und künstliche sollen in einem Lande erfolgen mit Wirkung nach allen Seiten.

Je höher die Konzeption eines Werkes ist, um so weiträumiger verspricht seine Wirkung zu sein. Deshalb strebt der nachstehende Plan über den örtlichen Rahmen hinaus und will Tübingen zur Trägerin einer großen deutschen Kulturbewegung machen ...
time it should not only provide the talents but should also let them put forth blossoms within a South-West German context. Sowing and harvesting should occur within the one "land" whilst allowing at the same time the influences of the same to be felt outside its borders in all directions.

The higher the conception is behind a particular work the more far-reaching does its effect promise to be. For that reason the following plan strives beyond the local frame of reference and seeks to make Tubingen the representative of a great German cultural movement ...

Plan

In Tubingen there is a publishing concern, the "Tubinger Chronik", which, since it was a National Socialist-owned enterprise, falls under the terms of the occupying power's decree on confiscation (of National Socialist property). The former owner of the publishing house, a manufacturer named Dr. Hohn from Ulm, wishes to buy back the publishing firm. Hohn was formerly a German-Nationalist (Deutsch-nationaler). Therefore his interest in the firm is undesirable. The publishing firm should rather be placed in democratic (anti-Fascist) hands and established according to the following aspects:

1. Magazine Publisher
   1) *Tubinger Chronik*: Daily newspaper, last edition figure - 20,000, to be made into the major Swabian daily with branches in all the larger towns. Extended political, cultural and economic sections, headed by the best Swabian and German editors.
   2) *Schwarze Sonntagspost*: Weekly newspaper, last edition figure 250,000, to be redesigned as the major Swabian pictorial and family magazine.
   3) Scientific and literary magazine, new publication, initially quarterly, then monthly, in the style of *Germania, Hochland, Neue Rundschau* with the objective of promoting "Das Neue Deutschland". Title: *Geist und Wort* (Mind and Word).

2. Book Publisher
   Politics, history, philosophy, belles-lettres.

3. Art Publisher
   Treatment of South German art ...

Despite the batching of these proposals, couched as they were within a frame-
work of South-West German reference, they could not fail to have an affect on the French military government with its vested interests in promoting particularist and regionalist tendencies. It is therefore little wonder that Dr. Herzog was granted a position on the founding newspaper by the French.

A further development emerged at a meeting of the "Demokratische Vereinigung" on September 12 when Willi Hans Hebsacker indicated that there was a divergence of opinion between the local "Kreis" commander, Délégué du Gouverneur Lieutenant-Colonel Huchon, and the "Délégation Supérieure" of Südwürttemberg over the eventual form of the Tübingen newspaper: "Mitglied Hebsacker erstattete einen Bericht über das neu erwachende kulturelle und sportliche Leben in unserer Stadt und kam hierbei auch auf die Neugründung einer Tageszeitung zu sprechen. Oberst Huchon will eine Zeitung für Tübingen, während das Gouvernement Régional eine solche für den Bereich der französisch besetzten Gebiete verlangt." (Colleague Hebsacker reported on the newly awakening cultural and sporting life of our town and in doing so touched upon the re-establishment of a daily newspaper. Colonel Huchon wanted a newspaper for Tübingen while the Gouvernement Régional demanded one for the whole of the French-occupied zone.)

This controversy was one of fundamental importance for the future of the newspaper which had been instructed by the French authorities to alter its name from Tübinger Chrologie to Schwäbischen Tagblatt. The Amtliche Kreisbeschreibung for "Kreis Tübingen" gives two reasons for this change of title: "... einmal weil die französische Zensurstelle Anweisung hatte, die in der Zeit des Dritten Reiches gebrauchten Titel nicht zuzulassen, zum anderen weil die neu lizenzierte Zeitung aus Gründen des Papiersmangels ein Gebiet - sofern der Vorrat reichte - beliefern musste, in dem vor dem Dritten Reich etwa ein Dutzend kleinerer Heimatzeitungen, mit Streuung bis Münningen im Südosten, Tuttlingen im Südwesten, Schwäbisch Hall in Westen und bis an die Grenze des Landkreises in Norden, erschienen waren." (... on the one hand because the French censorship office had instructions not to permit titles which had been used during the Third Reich, on the other hand because the newly licensed newspaper had, for reasons of paper shortage, to supply an area - in as far as stocks lasted - in which prior to the Third Reich about a dozen smaller local papers had been published, including Münningen in the south-east, Tuttlingen in the south-west, Schwäbisch Hall in the west and as far as the borders of "Kreis Tübingen" in the north.)
This version is, however, not totally correct in that it fails to mention that aspect of French press policy in 1945 which apparently concentrated on establishing one major regional newspaper in each of the respective "Lander" of their zone at the expense of the former "Heimatzeitungen" (i.e. local newspapers aimed at catering for local needs and interests). The intention behind this move was no doubt to develop a news media of regional identity. Hence the above-mentioned controversy between the local military government commander and the military government command for Süd-Württemberg over the newspaper's future form. The French authorities considered the Schwäbische Tagesblatt too important as the newspaper of the capital of Süd-Württemberg to sacrifice to local wishes. According to the present managing director of the Schwäbischen Tagesblatt, Hermann Sauter, Huchon was merely reiterating the wishes of the wishes of various groups within the community who had approached him on the subject. Sauter maintained that the local population was annoyed at the loss of the homelier aspects of the "Heimatzeitung" to which they had been accustomed. Indeed, as soon as was legally possible, i.e. in 1949, when both censorship and newspaper licensing were abolished, the Schwäbische Tagesblatt returned to the format of a "Heimatzeitung". In 1949 a "Schwäbische Verlagsgesellschaft" (Swabian Publishing Company) was founded to encompass a consortium of "Heimatzeitungen" created by fragmenting the Schwäbische Tagesblatt into local editions. Although the Schwäbische Tagesblatt retained its title in Tübingen, the editions published in Calw, Mössingen, Tutzingen, Balingen, Freudenstadt, Haßlingen and Schwäbisch Gmünd adopted more regional names. This consortium later renamed itself "Schweinfurt-Preußen", the title under which it is still known today.

The first edition of the Schwäbische Tagesblatt appeared on September 21, 1945, having received the buildings and printing press of the Tübingen Chronik for its use. The newspaper was registered to appear twice weekly, on Tuesdays and Fridays. The first edition had four pages and was produced in the so-called "Berliner Format". The licensees responsible for the running of the newspaper were guaranteed independence from intervention and surveillance by the German administrations. The first edition was comprised of 50,000 copies, of which almost half (21,443) were assigned to subscribers. The high number of subscribers in this period of shortage was indicative of the intense interest among the population in social and political developments after the upheavals of the war and of a desire to return to long-established cultural habits.
The first edition of September 21 bore the names of three licensees: Dr. Josef Forsterer, Ulrich Nebeacker and Hermann Werner. In accordance with Law Nr. 52 on the control of National Socialist property, the newspaper had no legal form apart from that of a "Treuhändlergesellschaft" (trust company) under the chairmanship (till 1946) of Nebeacker. The choice of the above men as licensees of the newspaper was preceded by a series of quarrels which serve to illustrate the difficulties facing the French in press matters.

A clear introduction to the history of quarrels surrounding the founding of the Schwäbische Tagblatt is provided by a chronology in the newspaper archives, entitled "Geschichte des Schwäbischen Tagblatts. Zeitraum von 1945 bis 1959". This reads as follows: "Die Gründung des "Schwäbischen Tagblatts" vom September 1945 hatte eine lebhafte Vorgeschichte. Zu einer ersten Besprechung im August 1945 beim Kreishauptmann in Tübingen waren die Herren Dr. Herzog, Dr. Forsterer, Dr. Blünneke, Gerster und Willi Nebeacker eingeladen worden, und zwar auf Vorschlag des damaligen Oberbürgermeisters Kenner, der von Anfang an lebhafte Anteil an der Zeitungsgründung nahm. Schon in dieser ersten Besprechung wurde den Herren Gerster und Dr. Blünneke beispielsweise, daß die Zeitung nach Möglichkeit von Schweizer oder von Süddeutschen gestaltet werden solle, was von den beiden Herren nicht gerade beifällig aufgenommen wurde, sie aber doch dazu bewog, sich von "Schwäbischen Tagblatt" zurückzuziehen. Die vorbereitenden Arbeiten im August 1945 wurden dann von den Herren Dr. Herzog, Dr. Forsterer, Willi Nebeacker und Hermann Werner weitergeführt, bis Mitte September aus Baden-Baden zwei französische Pressoffiziere abgeordnet wurden, und zwar als Schriftführer der Section Presse, Colonel Lothoude, in dessen Begleitung sich Capitaine Angel befand, den Colonel Lothoude als den künftigen Pressoffizier der Zentralen der französischen Militärregierung vorstellte. In Abwesenheit von Dr. Herzog, der verreist war, wurde der Redaktionstag der ersten Ausgabe mit den Herren Dr. Forsterer, Nebeacker und Werner besprochen. Nach der Rückkehr von seiner Reise zog sich, wie schon vorher die Herren Gerster und Blünneke, auch Dr. Herzog von der Zeitung zurück und gründete - ebenfalls in Tübingen - ein publizistisches Büro (Sonntags-Zeitung), wie er es schon vor 1945 in Berlin getrieben hatte."
clear to Herr Gerster and Dr. Münneke that the newspaper was to be produced as far as possible by Swabians or South Germans, a situation which did not exactly please the two gentlemen and which indeed induced them to withdraw from the Schwäbischen Tagblatt. The preparatory work in August 1945 was then continued by Dr. Herzog, Dr. Forderer, H. Hebsacker and Hermann Werner until two French press officers were detailed from Baden-Baden to visit Tübingen in mid-September as authorised representatives of the "Section Presse", Colonel Lautre and with him Captain Angel. Captain Angel was introduced by Colonel Lautre as the future Military Government censor for Tübingen. The day of publication of the first edition was discussed together with Dr. Forderer, Hebsacker and Werner in the absence of Dr. Herzog who was out of town. After returning from his trip Dr. Herzog, like Messrs. Gerster and Münneke before him, also withdrew from the newspaper and founded - likewise in Tübingen - a literary agency dealing in works of fiction, just as he had done prior to 1945 in Berlin. (29)

This situation did not last long on account of the arrest of two of the three original licensees: "Die zunächst friedliche Entwicklung in der Zeitung wurde gestört, als zunächst Dr. Forderer verhaftet wurde, und zwar wegen der Veröffentlichung eines ihm zur Last gelegten Artikels mit antisemitischer Tendenz in den "Blättern des Schwäbischen Alvereins" während der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus. Damit nicht genug, zog sich Herr Hermann Werner den Unwillen der französischen Besatzungsmacht zu, und zwar wegen eines Artikels im "Schwäbischen Tagblatt", den er über die Gesundheitsverhältnisse in Württemberg-Hohenzollern veröffentlicht hatte. Als Dritte wanderte die Redaktionssekretärin Sofie Ührlich in das Sûreté-Gefängnis, weil sie die Ausführung verschiedener Aufträge für die französische Besatzungsmacht (Dienst in der französischen Nachrichtenstelle) abgelehnt und erklärt hatte, lieber in "Schwäbischen Tagblatt" bleiben zu wollen. Nach ihrer Entlassung aus der Haft schieden die Herren Dr. Forderer und Werner aus dem Verlag der "Schwäbischen Tagblatt" aus." (The initially peaceful development within the newspaper was disturbed first of all when Dr. Forderer was arrested for the publication of an anti-Semitic article in the Blättern des Schwäbischen Alvereins during the National Socialist period. As if that was not enough, Hermann Werner incurred the displeasure of the French occupation authorities because of an article which he had published in the Schwäbischen Tagblatt on the subject of health conditions in Württemberg-Hohenzollern. A third case was that of the editorial secretary, Sofie Ührlich, who ended up in the "Sûreté" prison because she had refused
to perform various tasks for the French occupying power (service in the French news agency) and had stated that she preferred to remain with the \textit{Schwäbisches Tagblatt}. After their discharge from prison Dr. Förderer and Herr Werner withdrew from the publishing unit of the \textit{Schwäbisches Tagblatt}.(30)

The French dismissed Dr. Förderer on account of three articles which he published between April 1938 and February 1939 in the \textit{Schwäbische \textit{Tagblatt}}. The first article (April 1938), entitled "Unsere Brüder und Schwestern in deutschen Österreich zum Gruß" (Greetings to our brothers and sisters in German Austria), was written in eulogy of the "Anschluss". The second, "Unsere deutsche Mission" (Our German mission), (May 1938), attacked Marxism and the third, "Ausschaltung der Juden" (Exclusion of Jews from professional and social life), (February 1939), voiced vehement support for Hitler's repressive measures against the Jewish community. Förderer was a prime example of the type of National Socialist which the French authorities could not tolerate in a position of importance. In the case of Hermann Werner French displeasure was the result of a single incident in which Werner had contravened French regulations by writing an editorial commentary on the food situation in late 1945.

By the first edition of 1946 (January 4) the newspaper had acquired, apart from Hebsacker, an entirely new management board comprising five licensees: "Auf Vorschlag der französischen Pressestelle wurde im Jahre 1946 die Firma \textit{Schwäbische \textit{Tagblatt GmbH}} gegründet. An ihr waren beteiligt: Will Hans Hebsacker (parteilos), der von der SDP ihm seit vielen Jahren bekannte Dr. Ernst Müller und ebenso auf Vorschlag katholischer Kreise der frühere Redakteur der \textit{Kottenburger Zeitung}, Alfred Schwanger (CDU). Zwei weitere Mitglieder des \textit{Schwäbischen \textit{Tagblatt}}-Verbands ihre Berufung an das \textit{Schwäbische \textit{Tagblatt}} dem französischen Pressenoffizier, Captain Angel, und zwar Frau Rosemarie Schittenhelm (Demokratischer Frauenbund) und Werner Steinberg (KPD)." (At the suggestion of the French press authorities the firm of the \textit{Schwäbische \textit{Tagblatt GmbH}} was founded in 1946. The participants were: Will Hans Hebsacker (independent), Dr. Ernst Müller from the SDP whom he had known for many years and also, at the recommendation of Catholic circles, the former editor of the \textit{Kottenburger Zeitung}, Alfred Schwanger (CDU). Two other members of the \textit{Schwäbischen \textit{Tagblatt}} owed their appointment to the \textit{Schwäbischen \textit{Tagblatt}} to the French press officer, Captain Angel: they were Frau Rosemarie Schittenhelm (Democratic Women's League) and Werner Steinberg (KPD).) (34)
Rosemarie Schittenhelm was, in fact, a KPD member as was, of course, Willi Hans Hebsacker. The numbers and important role of Communists within the Schwäbischen Tagblatt characterise the Tübingen newspaper as an exception to the general rule applied by the French only licensing "überparteiliche" newspapers. In this respect, therefore, the Schwäbischen Tagblatt indicates that decisions which were made at "Land" and "Kreis" levels within the military government administration tended to be less conservative than those made by the central command in Baden-Baden.

This density of KPD members on the management board of the newspaper did not last long: "Im Frühjahr 1947 schieden aus dem "Schwäbischen Tagblatt" die Mitherausgeber Werner Steinberg und Frau Schittenhelm aus. Sie gründeten in Reutlingen die Jugendzeitschrift "Sukzess", der für Erscheinen allerdings mehr bald wieder eingesetzt werden musste, weil auch dieses Blatt in der Öffentlichkeit nicht den erwarteten Widerhall fand. Auch der Vertreter der CDU, Alfred Schwenger, schied im Jahre 1948 aus dem "Schwäbischen Tagblatt" aus." (In the spring of 1947 the co-editors Werner Steinberg and Frau Schittenhelm quit the Schwäbischen Tagblatt. They founded a magazine for young people, *Sukzess*, in Reutlingen which soon, however, had to cease publication because it did not meet with the expected response. The CDU representative, Alfred Schwenger, also quit the Schwäbischen Tagblatt in 1948.)

By 1948, therefore, the only persons left in charge of the Tübingen newspaper were Hans Hebsacker and Dr. Müller.

The changing fortunes of the members of the management board reflected the difficulties facing the newspaper as it struggled to find a modus vivendi with the French authorities. The newspaper learnt by its mistakes in many cases but these were frequently painful lessons for the newspaper personnel.

One obvious element of a successful modus vivendi was the newspaper's compliance with French censorship regulations. Until 1947 the French authorities in Tübingen applied pre-publication censorship with each separate page submitted for scrutiny before printing. In the period 1945-1947, the Schwäbischen Tagblatt had two consecutive censors, Pierre Angèle and David Adam. Their official title was "commisairer-censeur". During this period the press censor had his office in the newspaper building; later in 1946 the censor's office was moved into a student
corporation house on the Österberg. Both men, apparently, were fluent German
speakers; Angèle, a Germanist, later became Professor of German Studies at the
University of Poitiers.

A further stage of press surveillance was instituted by the French authori-
ties in the creation of a French-controlled news agency which possessed a monopoly
for supplying the newspapers in the French zone with news material. In other words
the Rheinische Nachrichtenblatt was obliged, like the other newspapers of the French zone,
to pay for and publish the material forwarded to it by the news agency. This
system has been described in a doctoral dissertation written in 1959 (Heidelberg):
"1946 wurde auf Veranlassung der Militärregierung von französischen Pressoeffizieren
die 'Rheina' (Rheinische Nachrichten-Agentur) gegründet. Sie wurde von französi-
schen Pressoeffizieren unter Assistenz deutscher Journalisten geführt. Am 1.
April 1947 wurde sie von der 'Südwestdeutschen Nachrichtenagentur, Südena (GmbH)' abge-
löst, die zwar nicht Rechtsnachfolgerin wurde, aber die Nachrichtenfunktion der
'Rheina' fortsetzte. Die "Südena" war eine Gmbhl, mit einem Stammkapital von
100 000,- M. 49 % wurden von Verein der deutschen Zeitungsvorleger in der fran-
zösischen Zone eingezahlt, 51 % auf französischer Seite. Die 1944 neu gegründete
Agentur AFF (Agence France Presse), die von Staat subventioniert wird, hatte die
Majorität der Anteile der "Südena" ... Die deutschen Verleger der französischen
Zone waren "Obligo-Räuber", die mußten den Dienst der "Rheina" bzw. "Südena"
abonnieren ... Angestellt wurde der Dienst der "Südena" durch einen Artikeldienst
"Kosmos", der auch, wie die "Südena" abonnieren mußte. Der "Kosmos" übernahm
für die Zeitungen auch verschiedene Vermittlungsdienste. Nur über ihn konnten
die Zeitungen Bevisen erhalten, ausländische Zeitungen bestellen, Korrespondenten
in anderen Ländern oder Zonen unterhalten." (In 1946 "Rheina" (Rheinische News
Agency) was founded by French press officers at the instigation of the Military
Government. It was managed by French press officers with the assistance of German
journalists. On April 1, 1947, it was superseded by the "Südwestdeutsche Nachrichten-
agentur, Südena (GmbH)" (South-West German News Agency Ltd.) which continued
the news function of "Rheina", although it did not become successor in title ...
"Südena" was a limited company with a capital stock of 100,000 Reichsmark. 49 %
was paid in by the Association of German Newspaper Publishers in the French Zone,
51 % by the French. The agency AFF (Agence France Presse), founded in 1944 and
subsidized by the French state, controlled the majority of shares of "Südena" ...
subscribers of both "Büdena" and "Üüdena". "Üüdena"'s service was complemented by an article service, "Kosmos", which also had to be subscribed to. "Kosmos" also undertook various agency services. Only through "Kosmos" were the newspapers able to obtain foreign currency, to order foreign newspapers or to maintain correspondents in other countries or zones.)

An official French comment on this use of news agencies (written in 1947) was quite frank - apart from failing to mention the obvious financial gains - about the benefits gained by the French government from the system: "La France assure ainsi la pérennité de son influence par la constitution d'une agence où les intérêts français sont très largement représentés. En outre- la création d'un bureau d'articles Kosmos permettra aux différents journaux de la zone française et des zones voisines de reproduire plus régulièrement les échos de la vie française, lettres et chroniques de Paris, qui étaient transmises sur initiatives personnelles."

The obligation to use this system was per se a limitation on the independence of the editorial board of the Schwäbische Tagblatt, for which, in addition, the newspaper had to pay the annual fee of 250,000 Fr. Indeed, the "Redaktionsbericht des Schwäbischen Tagblatts für das Jahr 1947" (Editorial report of the Schwäbische Tagblatt for the year 1947), written in early 1948 for submission to the French authorities, demonstrates an unusually explicit degree of annoyance on the part of the editorial staff with the French system of monopolistic news agencies: "Die politische Redaktion bediente sich als Quelle für die große Berichterstattung vorwiegend des Materials, das uns durch die "Üüdena" und den "Kosmos"-Pressedienst übermittelt wurde. Hier müssen wir aber zu unseiner Bedauern sagen, daß wir weder mit der "Üüdena" noch mit dem "Kosmos"-Dienst zufrieden waren. Unsere immer wieder hervorgebrachte Klage ist, daß die "Üüdena" zwar sehr viel und sehr umfangreiches Material durch den Fernschreiber übersendet, daß aber alle diese langatmigen Ausführungen keineswegs redaktionell sinnvoll sind und daher unsere Schriftleiter mit ihren Hilfskräften über Gebühr belastet werden, weil es kaum vorkommt, daß eine "Üüdena"-Meldung einfach übernommen werden kann. Die vorzüglichen Berichte der "Üüdena" müssen fast durchweg neu redigiert werden, was sich besonders dann sehr störend bemerkbar macht, wenn es sich um aktuelle Berichte handelt, die erst an den Umschlagtagen (Montag und Donnerstag) bei uns eingehen. Auch die Zuverlässigkeit der "Üüdena"-Meldungen läßt sehr zu wünschen übrig ... Um unsere Zeitung
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aktuell zu gestalten, waren wir genötigt, auch andere Informationsquellen zu be-
mutzen. Vor allem haben wir unseren eigenen Radiosender ständig wieder ausgebaut
und in zwei Schichten besetzt, so daß wir in der Lage sind, einem der "Südona"-
Nachrichten zu kontrollieren und andererseits neue Nachrichten aus aller Welt sofort
auszuarbeiten, wenn uns die "Südona" im Stich läßt. (The editorial department for
political affairs chiefly used as its source for its main news the material that
was transmitted to us by "Südona" and "Kosmos" news services. We were obliged to
our regret at this point that we were not satisfied with the news services of
either "Südona" or "Kosmos". Our repeated complaint is that, although "Südona"
indeed transmits a lot of very extensive material by telex, all of these long-
printed statements are by no means ready for editorial use and our editors and their
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things very inconvenient, especially in the case of reports which reach us on
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use other sources in addition. In particular we have constantly expanded our own
radio service and operate it in two shifts so that we are able on the one hand to
check "Südona" reports and on the other hand to immediately utilize new reports
from all over the world whenever "Südona" lets us down.)

One of the sharpest criticisms of French censorship to be voiced in the
post-war period was formulated in the 1947 election speech by Dr. Gebhard Müller
which has already been quoted on occasion in previous chapters of this thesis.
In his speech Dr. Müller set out to defend the German administrations (he was
vice-president of the "Staatssekretariat") and the CDU from undeserved blame:
"Man hat der CDU vorgeworfen, daß sie angesichts der katastrophalen Lage an Energie
und Kraft habe fehlen lassen ... Dieser Vorwurf ist jedoch nicht berechtigt.
Von den täglichen, mühseligen und aufreibenden Verhandlungen, die wir mit den
Dienststellen der französischen Militärregierung zu führen haben, den zahllosen
Petitionen und Interventionen, kommt selbstverständlich nichts in die Zeitungen,
die meisten Zeitungsleser sind sich nicht im Klaren darüber, wenn sie in der Presse
von irgendwelcher Maßnahme, die sie gar nicht trifft, oder über die Erhebung einer
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sind, um eine für die Bevölkerung günstige Regelung zu erreichen. Die meisten
ihn auch nicht, da manches verhindert wurde, was öffentlich nicht bekanntgegeben werden kann." (The CDU has been accused of lacking in energy and enterprise in the face of this catastrophic situation ... This accusation, however, is not justified. Nothing of course gets into the newspapers about the difficult and exhausting negotiations we have to conduct daily with French Military Government departments and the countless petitions and interventions. Most newspaper readers do not realise when they read in the press about some measure which does not affect them at all or about the relaxation of some regulation that this was frequently preceded by very difficult negotiations with a view to obtaining an arrangement which was beneficial to the population. Nor do most of them have an idea how many things were prevented but about which nothing can be disclosed in public.)

In another part of his speech Müller compared press censorship in the French zone with that of the other zones of occupation: "Der Grad der Sensur ist in den einzelnen Zonen sehr verschieden, und in der englischen Zone kaum Völker mit Selbstverständlichkeit vorgetragen werden, was hier große Ärger verursacht, denn nicht schon schlimmere Folgen hervorrufen würde." (The degree of censorship in the individual zones varies greatly and in the English zone a lot can be reported as a matter of course which would cause a great deal of irritation here, and perhaps even worse consequences.) Finally, Müller refused to support the widely spread view that the French military government published false food statistics in the local newspaper in order to divert blame for the severe food rationing on to the "Staatssekretariat", thereby discredit the same in the eyes of the German population. He did, however, concede that false figures were on occasion issued to the press by the French: "Es wird mir häufig vorgeworfen, wie man es anlegen solle, daß, n. a. immer wieder - zuletzt erst vor einigen Tagen - völlig falsche Lebensmittelzuteilungen in der Presse verkündet werden, obwohl bekannt sein müße, daß die französische Militärregierung überhaupt nicht so große Nahrungsmittelbestände zur Verteilung freigibt, um die veröffentlichte Zuteilung zu erfüllen. Hierdurch werden französischerweise bei der Bevölkerung Erwartungen geweckt, die praktisch durch die deutsche Verwaltung mangels der erforderlichen Mengen wieder zerstört werden müssen. Es entsteht daher bei dem Mann auf der Straße eine Vorstellung, als ob die französische Verwaltung ihn ausreichend ernähren wolle, die deutsche Verwaltung ihn aber hungern ließe. Ich halte solche Auffassungen nicht für richtig, sondern derartige Redenungen beruhen zweifellos auf Mißverständnissen, die zwischen französischen
Militärbehörden und französischen Pressestellen entstanden sind." (I am frequently asked how it can be explained that again and again - the last time was only a few days ago - completely wrong food allocations are announced in the press although it must be a known fact that the French Military Government does not at all release large enough food stocks for distribution in order to meet the published allocation. In this way expectations are aroused within the population by the French which have to be as good as dashed again by the German administration for want of the necessary supplies. Consequently the man in the street forms the idea that the French administration wants to feed him adequately but that the German administration lets him starve. I do not think that such interpretations are correct but I rather believe that such reports are based without doubt on misunderstandings which have arisen between French Military Government authorities and French press offices. (41)

The first edition of the "Schwäbische Tägblätter" of September 21 published a programme of intent, entitled "Vor neuen Aufgaben" (Facing new tasks) and signed by the three licensees. The tone of this essay was vague and rhetorical but totally representative of the attitudes adopted by post-war German politicians to explain the excesses of National Socialism: "Eine neue Zeitung erscheint mit dem heutigen Tag in unserem schwäbischen Land. "Schwäbischer Tägblatt" nennt sie sich. Von Schwaben geschrieben, mit dem Schwaben Zwangse, Rücksicht und Aussehen halten, Bausteine beitragen für das Haus der Zukunft, in dem unser Volk leben will...

Die öffentliche Meinung, früher ein unbestechlicher Richter, wurde von un­
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Wenn die Arbeit der Jahrtausende an Glauben und Hoffnung nicht umsonst ge­
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finden, wohl aber aus der Zeit der großen Denker und Helden des Geistes ...

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ritten by Swabians, it wants to maintain a dialogue with Swabians, looking both into the past and to the future, and to make a contribution towards building the house of the future in which our people wants to live...

Public opinion, formerly an incorruptible judge, was misled by corrupt forces to commit the greatest follies... The common cultural heritage is, if not totally destroyed, at least gravely obscured and the connecting threads are torn... demonic forces arose which almost seemed to defeat reason and intellect...

If the work of millennia of faith and hope is not to have been in vain and all ideals are not to be completely devalued, then there are possibilities for a different life! And we believe that there are these possibilities. They offer us a chance, therefore, the call goes forth to the Swabian people: Renounce the dilemma of confidence versus doubt and belief versus disbelief!...

According to F. Roy Willis the German press in the French zone fulfilled its role positively: "The newspapers of the zone give full coverage of the political life of the Länder and provide a remarkably free expression of German opinion on French policy in action. Most useful in their coverage are the federalist Rheinischer Merkur of Koblenz, the Radler Tagblatt of Boden-Baden, and the Schwibbogischer Tagblatt of Tübingen. After 1947 the political parties in each Land had their own party newspaper, of which the most lively and informative were the Communist Leben Leben and the Socialist Die Freiheit in Rheinland-Pfalz."

If one accepts Willis' judgment the Schwibbogischer Tagblatt lived up to a high standard of journalism during the period of French occupation. That, however, is a generalization which is not operative. This specific case study on Tübingen contradicts Willis' generalization and points to the weakness of research work in new fields of enquiry which bases its conclusions on data supplied by unconfirmed newspaper reports and government publications. This case study adopts a contradictory stance to that of Willis and indeed borrows a view on French zone newspapers propagated in 1946 by an American research team working for a project for the Foundation for Foreign Affairs (Washington): "There is no real source of public information. Foreign newspapers are forbidden to Germans and the German newspapers..."
in the French zone are dull and regional in character. The ordinary citizen thus finds himself shut up in his zone or even in his region. This judgement is quite pertinent in the case of the Schwäbische Tagblatt. In the years between 1945 and 1946 the Schwäbische Tagblatt failed to develop political influence or virility of any noticeable extent and, according to Professor Eberhard who was a Secretary of State in Württemberg-Baden during the equivalent period, was accorded less attention for this reason by political observers outside of the French zone than other newspapers published in the zone, e.g. in Konstanz and Freiburg.

Despite - or rather, because of - the incidents surrounding the arrest and dismissal of Hermann Werner and Dr. Forderer, the paper did not develop an independent political attitude vis-a-vis the French authorities after the KPD influence within Tübingen and the newspaper had been curbed by the joint efforts of the KPD, the "Staatssekretariat" and the French military government. The removal of the KPD influence on the newspaper was clearly reflected in the high turn-over of staff between 1949 and 1947. By 1947 three KPD members had quit the newspaper (Rosemarie Schittenhelm, Werner Steinberg and Dr. Schirrer) to be replaced by editors of centrist political views, e.g. Jürg Blumberger, Dr. Kilcza, Franz Mayer.

In the editorial report to the French authorities for the year 1947 the editorial board provided a justification in part for these changes in staff. It also offered an apology and defence for its editorial policy: "Das Schwäbische Tagblatt" wurde schon bei seiner Gründung so aufgebaut, daß nicht einer Weltenanschauung oder politischen Richtung auf Kosten der anderen das Überwiegen gegeben werden sollte. In der Zeit des Aufbaus war es allerdings nötig, gegen die zahlreichen und immer noch sehr starken Überreste des Nationalsozialismus tatkräftig Stellung zu nehmen, und das hat sich gezeigt, daß das "Schwäbische Tagblatt" hin und wieder einen sehr offensiven Charakter gegen Faschismus, Nationalismus und allzubegreifenden Opportunismus zeigte... Von Anfang an bestand die Absicht, den überparteilichen Charakter des "Schwäbischen Tagblatt" noch dadurch zu garantieren, daß jede Partei einen Vertreter in der Redaktion hatte, allerdings nicht in der Weise, daß der betreffende Schriftleiter etwa der Beauftragte seiner Partei wäre...
Die Herausgeber des "Schwäbischen Tagblatts" haben von 1.1.1947 Herr Josef Klingelhöfer ... ein ... Herr Dr. Kiecza war bis dahin Leiter der Pressestelle der Württembergischen Landesregierung und Chef des Südwestdeutschen Nachrichtendienstes gewesen. Er ist parteilos und von uns eben aus diesen Gründen mit der Übernahme der politischen Redaktion betraut worden ... Damit hat eine Entwicklung ihren Abschluss gefunden, die wir von Anfang an angestrebt haben, nämlich eine politische Redaktion, deren Angehörige keiner Partei angehören ... Hauptaufgabe der politischen Redaktion war es, grundsätzliche Fragen an erster Stelle zu erörtern, weshalb der Leitartikel für die Behandlung von allgemeingültigen Phasen herangesogen und die Aktualität auf die reinen Nachrichten beschränkt wurde. Durch Analogie von Seiten mit zusammenfassenden politischen Artikeln konnte ein Überblick über die ausgebliebenen aktuellen Probleme in einer Form gegeben werden, die den knappen zur Verfügung stehenden Raum entspricht. Wir haben uns daher bemüht, innehaltlich umgekehrt den Kurs der bestehenden Regierungskoalition zu halten, ohne dennoch jedoch jede Kritik zu unterlassen. Der umweltwissenschaftliche Kurs war situationsbedingt, mit Berücksichtigung unserer Auffassung zu dem Bonn des deutschen Wettbewerbs" (sobald the Schwäbische Tagblatt was organised in such a way that no one ideology or political course would gain the upper hand at the expense of others). During the period of German social and economic reconstruction, however, it was necessary to adopt an active stance against the numerous and still powerful vestiges of National Socialism and that compelled the Schwäbische Tagblatt to demonstrate once and again a very aggressive nature towards Fascism, Neo-fascism and self-indulgent opportunism ... From the beginning it was also our intention to guarantee the non-partisan character of the Schwäbische Tagblatt by granting every party a representative on the editorial board although not at all in such a way that the editor concerned was somehow the delegate of his party ... The publishers of the Schwäbische Tagblatt offered the position of economics editor to the DVP and as a result Herr Josef Klingelhöfer joined the paper on 1.1.1947 ... Up till then Dr. Kiecza had been in charge of the Press Office of the Württemberg "Land" government and head of the South-West German news service. He is non-partisan and has been entrusted by us for this reason with the position of political editor ... Thus a development is concluded, one which we have striven to attain from the start, namely an editorial department for political affairs in which no members belong to any party ... The main duty of the political editor's
department was above all to discuss basic questions; for this reason the leading article was used for dealing with themes of general validity while topical themes were limited to the straightforward news. By inserting pages with summaries of political articles it was possible to have an overview of the most relevant and acute problems presented in a form compatible with the scarcity of available newspace. Therefore we have endeavoured to keep approximately to the course of the present government coalition as far as home affairs are concerned, without, however, renouncing all criticism... Our course on foreign policy was determined by the existing state of affairs with emphasis on our affiliation to the zones of the western part of Germany.\(^{46}\)

This self-portrayal is somewhat exaggerated. The final statement of commitment to the other Western zones puts some doubt on whether the report was ever in fact submitted to the French authorities for such a statement contradicted French policy and could well have resulted in sanctions against the editorial board. In addition, no mention was made in the report of the Marxist bias within the newspaper in its initial phase when KPD members had held positions of strength on the board.

According to Obermaier Konstanzer's research the first occasion of the *Schwäbische Tagblatt* criticising the French authorities occurred on November 7 and 11, 1947 (apart from Hermann Werner's article in December 1945) over the question of factory dismantling in Süd-Württemberg: 'Die Konterpart konnte sich zu diesem Zeitpunkt einer öffentlichen Stellungnahme allerdings nicht mehr enthalten, da die Demontageliste am 7. November in der Presse bekanntgeworden war. Diese Liste führte erstmals in der jungen Pressegeschichte Württemberg-Öhnenzollern zu einer heftigen Kampagne gegen die Besatzungsmacht, die am 11. November ihren Höhepunkt erreichte. Der "Schwäbische Tagblatt"... räumte der Diskussion einen Sonntagszeit zu ...' (At this point of time the government, however, could not avoid issuing a public statement since the dismantling list had been published in the press on November 7. For the first time in the nascent press history of Württemberg-Öhnenzollern this list led to a fierce campaign against the occupying power, reaching its peak on November 11. The *Schwäbische Tagblatt* ... allowed a special page for the discussion ...).\(^{47}\)

The KPD did not gain much satisfaction from the limitation of KPD influence
within the Schwaebischen Tagblatt, although the new director alongside H. Heb-

sacker, Dr. Ernst Müller, was a card-carrying member of the local Social Democratic

party branch. Dr. Müller strongly resisted all suggestions that the paper should
develop a Social Democratic line. The SPD in Tübingen felt that the Schwaebischen
Tagblatt deliberately neglected coverage of its role within the community and of
Social Democratic party affairs in general and it imputed this to the Marxist

group on the management board.

In 1946 Carlo Schmid felt compelled for three reasons to acquire control of
the newspaper. These reasons were: firstly, Schmid felt that not only the SPD
but also the "Staatssekretariat" received inadequate coverage; secondly, the news-
paper was too regional and parochial for his tastes and ambitions, this being a
deliberate result of the French policy on regionalism and particularism which pre-
vented the Schwaebischen Tagblatt from developing a broader perspective than one
circumscribed by the frontiers of Baden-Württemberg; thirdly, the French authorities
deliberately established an editorial and management board which was independent
of the "Staatssekretariat" and the German administrations, thus preventing it from
becoming a power base and instrument of propaganda vis-à-vis the local population
and the French military government in Tübingen.

According to Dr. Ernst Müller, the sole surviving co-founder of the post-
war period, Carlo Schmid not out in 1946 to acquire control of the newspaper and
to extend its base of reference and its appeal to approximate the style and format
of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. (48) A note in the archive of the Schwaebischen
Tagblatt accentuates on the other hand the party-political aspect of Schmid’s
motivations: "Ein Zwischenspiel war der Versuch der SPD, unter Führung von Staats-
rat Prof. Dr. Carlo Schmid, sich des "Schwaebischen Tagblattes" zu bemächtigen.
Dahals sollten zwei SPD-Leute (Ludwig und Clege) in die Geschäftsführung kommen
und außerdem verschiedene Journalisten, die bereits - wenn auch ziemlich voreilig -
nach Tübingen verpflichtet worden waren. Aus diesem Handstreich wurde nichts,
einschließlich die beteiligten untereinander selbst unsicher waren und weil auf der
anderen Seite die französische Besatzungsmacht den Zeitpunkt zur Herausgabe ihrer
Parteizeitungen noch nicht für gekommen hielt." (An incident occurred when the
SPD attempted, under the leadership of Staatsrat Professor Carlo Schmid, to gain
control of the Schwaebischen Tagblatt. At that time two SPD people (Ludwig and Clege)
were to be brought into the management together with several journalists who had
already been engaged, albeit rather prematurely, for Tübingen. This coup de main led to nothing because, on the one hand, the persons concerned were not agreed among themselves and, on the other hand, the French occupation authorities did not consider the time right for the publication of exclusively party-political newspapers. (49)

The sequence of events concerning Carlo Schmid’s attempt to assume control of the newspaper began some time in late 1945 when Schmid contacted local military government officials to discuss the possibility of a change of newspaper policy for the Schwäbischen Tagblatt. On January 8, 1946, at a cabinet meeting of the “Staatssekretariat”, Carlo Schmid proposed the following according to the official minutes of that meeting: “Staaterrat Schmid teilte mit, daß der Schwäbische Tagblatt ab 1.2.1946 ein völlig neues Gesicht bekommen werde. Der neue Chefredakteur, Herr Häcker, der aus Württemberg stammt und beim Schwäbischen Kurier und dann Feuilleton-Chefredakteur der Vossischen Zeitung war, wird einen eigenen Stab mitbringen, darunter den früheren Chefredakteur des Handelsteils der Vossischen Zeitung. Staaterrat Schmid bittet um Zustimmung, die Zeitung in Württemburschen Tagblatt umzubenennen. Der Vorschlag von Staaterrat Schmid findet allseitige Billigung.” (Staaterrat Schmid reported that the Schwäbischen Tagblatt would receive a completely new complexion as from 1.2.1946. The new chief editor, Herr Häcker, who came from Württemberg and had worked with the Schwäbische Kurier, then chief editor of the Vossische Zeitung, would bring a staff of his own, among them the former chief editor of the commercial section of the Schwäbische Zeitung. Staaterrat Schmid asked the cabinet for its consent to renaming the newspaper the Württemburschen Tagblatt. Staaterrat Schmid’s proposal met with general approval. (50) On February 22, at a subsequent cabinet meeting, Carlo Schmid informed his colleagues “daß die Umgestaltung des Schwäbischen Tagblattes und Herr Dr. Häcker als Chefredakteur durch die Militärregierung genehmigt ist. Ferner ist für das Zeitungsunternehmen die Rechtsform als Genossenschaft genehmigt worden, die personell aus Vertretern der politischen Parteien zusammengesetzt sein soll.” (51) (see Appendix 11(b) for English Translation)

When Willi Hans Hesacker learnt of Schmid’s plans and of the support which they enjoyed within the Delegation Supérieure for Süd-Württemberg, he applied to the French officer in Baden-Baden who held overall responsibility for press affairs in the French zone, Colonel Loutré. A struggle of interests ensued between Carlo Schmid and Governor-General Vilmor on the one hand and Hesacker together with
Colonel Leutre on the other which resulted in Schmid's failure to secure control of the newspaper. The staff whom he had already installed in anticipation of his successful take-over were dismissed by the French, in all about five people. By June 1946 Schmid had to concede defeat on the issue in a meeting of the "Staatssekretariat": "Staatsrat Professor Dr. Schmid berichtet, daß diese Angelegenheit noch auswärts sei. Die reine Rechtslage sei namentlich kompliziert und es bestehe wohl kaum ein klarer Rechtsanspruch seines Dr. Häcker an das Staatssekretariat. Andererseits wolle sich das Direktorium des moralischen Anspruchs Dr. Hickers nicht verschließen. Die Gesamtforderungen Dr. Hickers betragen 37.000,- RM." (Staatsrat Professor Schmid reported that this matter still had to be settled. The purely legal position was rather complicated and a clear legal claim on the part of Dr. Häcker vis-à-vis the State Secretariat scarcely existed. On the other hand, the cabinet was not willing to reject Dr. Häcker's moral claim. Dr. Häcker's total claim amounts to 37,000 Reichsmarks.)

Consequently the "Koblenzer Tagesblatt" retained its format. This format also survived the French reform of the German daily press in late October of 1946. This reform was announced to the "Staatssekretariat" in the course of a report by Carlo Schmid to his cabinet on a meeting held between himself and Governor-General Widroer on October 25:

"Herr Präfekt Houllies machte folgende Mitteilungen:

1) Es soll eine neutrale Zeitung und für jede Partei eine eigene Parteizeitung erscheinen.
2) Statt der Vorzensus soll eine Nachzensus eingeführt werden. Der Gouverneur teilt mit, daß im Laufe eines Monats die Neureorganisation bestehen solle."

(Prefect Houllies issued the following announcements:
1) A neutral newspaper and a separate party-political paper for each party are to be published.
2) Post-publication censorship is to be introduced in place of pre-publication censorship. The Governor announces that the re-organisation should be completed within the course of the ensuing month.)
The French press reform was implemented in 1947. It did not directly affect the Schönbuchener Tagblatt although the overall number of independent newspapers in the French zone was reduced. Indirectly, however, the newspaper was made to feel the presence of new rivals. These were the party-political newspapers founded after May 1947 as party organs in accordance with French policy.

In the opinion of the Schönbuchener Tagblatt the main threat posed by these new papers was a technical question concerning the distribution of paper and ink. As was the case with most industrial products there was a chronic shortage of paper and printer's ink in the French zone during the occupation period. There was no dye factory in Südbaden itself, the nearest being in Stuttgart and therefore outside of French control. Supplies of ink were obtainable only in strictly limited quantities.

The question of newspaper paper was no less problematic. The French zone produced comparatively less paper than the other two Western zones. In addition, like all industrial production, the paper production within the French zone and the distribution of same was subject to the French system of "deblockage". Furthermore, although there was a plentiful supply of wood in the French zone, thanks largely to the reserves of the Black Forest, there was an extreme shortage of cellulose which was in the main imported from Sweden.

The shortage of paper seriously affected the circulation of the Schönbuchener Tagblatt in the years, 1945-1947. The newspaper's readership was supplied through two avenues of distribution: the subscribers' list ("Abonnement") and delivery agents (both wholesale and retail distributors, e.g. newsagents). Statistics from the archives of the Schönbuchener Tagblatt reveal the extent to which the newspaper's growth was hampered by restricted paper supplies. They also reveal that the subscribers' list was accorded highly preferential treatment. The figures for the period, September 1945 - December 1946, are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>September 1945</th>
<th>21,443 copies (reserved for subscribers)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 1945</td>
<td>110,668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1946</td>
<td>129,692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1947</td>
<td>130,776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1947</td>
<td>137,309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1947</td>
<td>148,699</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(55)
In contrast, the rates of distribution to newsagents and wholesale distributors were seriously affected. In February 1946 the "Groß- und Einzelhändler-Auflage" (i.e. circulation to wholesale and retail traders) was 10,000 copies; by March this rose to 23,000 copies. Paper shortage then itself acutely felt in July 1946 for the first time and by August the dealers were receiving only 10,000 copies. In October the figure rose dramatically to 50,000, only to fall in November to 19,000 copies. This figure dropped to practically nil in February 1947, rose to 10,000 by May and levelled off at around 20,000 copies for August and the remaining months of 1947. Consequently it was little wonder that the committed section of the newspaper readership opted increasingly for a newspaper subscription guaranteeing regular delivery. The French also preferred the subscription system for it corresponded to the French policy of a strictly controlled and rationally planned economic system.

The Schwäbische Tagblatt made reference to the above statistics in the already quoted editorial report to the French authorities at the beginning of 1948 in which a complaint was registered on paper shortages: "...die aus unseren Auflagenmeldungen hervorgeht, haben wir bis heute immer noch den unmittelbar verantwortlichen Haupthebel auf unsere Auflagen Làmend zu ziehen. In den Monaten Mai und Juni erfolgte die Anlieferung von jeweils rund 20,000 Exemplaren. Wir hatten zu beklagen, daß die Anlieferungsmeldungen wegen fehlender Verlagerung der Druckerei und Mangel an Zeitungspapier nur zeitweise eingehalten werden konnten. Die im Januar und Februar aufgebrachten Klagen des Tagblatt-Verkaufs und die hinreichende Ausnutzung der Verlagserzeugnisse zeigten deutlich, daß eine Verbesserung der Anlieferungsmeldungen noch zu erreichen war. Wir hatten es in den ersten Monaten des Jahres auf die starken Bestellungen ankommen müssen. Die Verlagerung der Druckerei und der Mangel an Zeitungspapier konnten wir nicht ganz decken. Die Anlieferungen am 15. April betrugen noch 16,000 Exemplare, am 1. Mai 14,000, am 15. Juni 15,000, am 15. Juli 16,000, am 15. August 17,000, am 15. September 18,000, am 15. Oktober 19,000, am 15. November 20,000, am 15. Dezember 21,000 Exemplare. Die berechnete Anzahl der Abonnenten war jedoch weiterhin auf 13,000 festgelegt, so daß wir in einer derartigen Lage die Verpflichtung an die Kunden, sie mit der Zeitung zu versorgen, nicht erfüllen konnten. Wir hatten uns daher in einer solchen Lage zu entschuldigen, und wir hatten uns zu entschuldigen, daß wir unsere redaktionellen Aufgaben nur dann in ausreichendem Maße erfüllen konnten, wenn wir in Zukunft besser mit Fahrzeugen, Verbindungen und Treibstoff versorgt werden. ... Ein weiteres Schmerzbank auf unser Verlagsamt sind die immer wieder gekürzten Stromzuführungen ..." (our circulation statistics show that up till now we have always performed the task of publishing a newspaper with a circulation of about 130,000 copies from a paper allocation of approximately..."
23 tons, but this was done only under great difficulties and by exploiting all
the possibilities open to us in the other zones which are becoming, however, more
and more limited and which no longer promise extensive exploitation for 1948.
Therefore we take the liberty at this point of repeating our request to supply us
a little more liberally with paper since the Schwäbische Presse is the only
non-partisan daily newspaper in Württemberg and Hohenzollern and fulfills
the function of serving the whole of the population, without consideration for
party or ideology, as an important and representative newspaper offering both
information and news. As a result of the continuous paper reductions we have to
go over repeatedly to decreasing the size of type of our paper. . . . Since we are
already on the subject of this list of wishes we would also like to remind you
that we can only fulfill our editorial duties to a sufficient extent if we are
better supplied in future with vehicles, tyres and fuel. . . . A further problem
child of our publishing house are the electricity supply allocations which are
reduced time and time again...)

This quotation on the material and technical difficulties facing the
Schwäbische Presse in the period 1945-1947, closes this subsection on the
development of the German press in French-occupied Tübingen during those years.
The theme of material and technical difficulties was intentionally chosen to close
the topic of newspaper life since it logically leads on to the subsection on the
publishing industry in post-war Tübingen, both the newspaper and the publishing houses
having undergone related and often similar problems and crises.
Footnotes

Chapter Six: Cultural affairs in Tübingen, 1945-1947, including developments within the local press and publishing industry

Section Two: French newspaper policy in Tübingen, 1945-1947

(1) "La presse allemande en zone d'occupation française", in: No. 2, Août-Septembre 1946, (Baden-Baden), p. 29.

(2) Peter Kustermann, "Unser Pressewesen; ein Bild der Vielfalt", in: Beiträge zur Landeskunde. Regelmäßige Beiträge zum Staatsanzeiger für Baden-Württemberg (Stuttgart), Jg. 1, Nr. 1, Februar 1962, p. 10.


(5) ibid., p. 22.


(8) ibid.

(9) ibid.

(10) ibid.


(14) Interview with Professor Fritz Eberhard, Bad Münstereifel, March 1974.


(16) ibid., No. 3, Novembre-Décembre 1946, p. 139.


(20) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Protokollbuch der Demokratischen Vereinigung Tübingen, "Versammlung am 14. August 1945, nachmittags 5 Uhr im "Pflug".
(21) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Nachlaß Hermann Werner, "Besuch bei Innenminister Renner, Kette bis Ende 1945 Oberbürgermeister in Tübingen, am 26. März 1951".
(22) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Protokollbuch der Demokratischen Vereinigung Tübingen, "Versammlung am 4. September 1945".
(23) Universitätsarchiv Tübingen, ASt K969.
(24) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Protokollbuch der Demokratischen Vereinigung Tübingen, "Versammlung am 12. September 1945".
(26) Interview with Hermann Seitter, Tübingen, April 1974.
(28) ibid., "Verlagsbericht des "Schwäbischen Tagblatts" für das Jahr 1947".
(29) ibid., pp. 1 ff.
(30) ibid., pp. 2 ff.
(31) 50 Jg., Nr. 4, Tübingen, 1939, pp. 40 ff.
(32) ibid., 50 Jg., Nr. 5, pp. 72 ff.
(33) ibid., 51 Jg., Nr. 2, pp. 23 ff.
(35) ibid., p. 5.
(37) Cahiers Français d'Information, Nr. 77, p. 35.
(38) Zeitungsarchiv des "Schwäbischen Tagblatts" (Tübingen).
(40) ibid., p. 6.
(41) ibid., p. 10.
(42) ibid., p. 1.
(43) F. Roy Willis, op. cit., p. 294.
(45) Interview with Professor Fritz Oberharm, Bad Dürkheim, March 1974.
(46) Zeitungsarchiv des "Schwäbischen Tagblatts" (Tübingen), "Redaktionsbericht des "Schwäbischen Tagblatts" für das Jahr 1947".


(48) Interview with Professor Ernst Müller, Tübingen, February 1974.


(51) Staatsarchiv Sigmaringen, "Niederschrift über die 34. Sitzung des Direktoriums am 22. Februar 1946".

(52) Staatsarchiv Sigmaringen, "Niederschrift über die 62. Sitzung des Direktoriums am 11. Juni 1946".


(55) Zeitungsarchiv des "Schwäbischen Tagblatts" (Tübingen), "Verlagsbericht des "Schwäbischen Tagblatts" für das Jahr 1947".

(56) ibid.

(57) Zeitungsarchiv des "Schwäbischen Tagblatts", "Redaktionsbericht des "Schwäbischen Tagblatts" für das Jahr 1947".
Section Three: French policy on publishing affairs in Tübingen, 1945-1947

The first general factor which should be mentioned in any definition of French policy on publishing in post-war Germany is the fact that the French occupation authorities tended to disregard the Supreme Allied Commander's regulations concerning the German publishing industry: "Die französische Zone gehörte ... auch zum Geltungsbereich des vom Obersten Befehlshaber erlassenen Gesetzes Br. 191. Jedoch finden wir in keiner Verlautbarung der französischen Militärregierung des Gesetzes oder die zu ihm ergangenen Verordnungen ausdrücklich genannt. Am 27. Oktober 1945 erging von der Direction Générale des Affaires Administratives (Information) ein Kundschreiben an die nachgeordneten Dienststellen, das "Circulaire concernant l'Édition" (No. 500 DGA/JNF). In ihm waren alle Angelegenheiten nicht nur des Verlagswesens, sondern auch des Buchhandels geregelt, und zwar mit erheblichen Abweichungen von der in den anderen Zonen geltenden Ordnung". (The French Zone ... also came under the jurisdiction of Law No. 191 issued by the Supreme Commander. However we do not find the law nor its ordinances specifically mentioned in any announcement by the French Military Government. On October 27, 1945, a circular was issued by the "Direction Générale des Affaires Administratives (Information)" the "Circulaire concernant l'édition (No. 500 DGA/JNF)" to its subordinate departments. In it the technical business of the book trade and the publishing business was systematised and indeed with some considerable deviations from the system in force in the other zones.)

This corresponds with other aspects of French occupation policy in the sense that the French pursued a political goal which was tangential to the interests of the two other occupying Western powers, with the logical consequence that discrepancies of policy emerged from time to time in administrative and economic areas of control.

The second feature of French policy on publishing within their zone of occupation was the establishment of a German zonal agency to supervise the running of publishing affairs in the French zone. This organisation was termed the "Börsenverein der deutschen Buchhändler in der französisch besetzten Zone" (Association of the German Book Trade in the French Zone of Occupation) in imitation of the pre-war "Börsenverein" in Leipzig which had regulated German publishing affairs. The new "Börsenverein" of the French zone was established on a federalistic basis, comprising five "Landesverbände" ("Land" associations) with a central headquarters in Freiburg-im-Breisgau. The "Börsenverein" was responsible for the following
areas within the book trades: publishing, wholesale book selling and retail book selling or, to use the more explicit German terminology to describe their own system, "Verlagbuchhandel", "Zwischenbuchhandel" and "Sortiment".

The chairman of the "Landesverband Süd-Württemberg" was Hermann Leins who possessed the "Hainer-Wunderlich-Verlag" in Tübingen. The establishment of the "Börsenverein" ensured that the publishing trade in the French zone was isolated from the influences of the other Allied authorities and from the authority of the resuscitated "Börsenverein" in Leipzig or any other central German agency.

The third major feature of French policy on publishing during the years, 1945-1947, was an attitude of authoritarian surveillance. This authoritarianism manifested itself in various forms. Firstly, the French occupation authorities were quite ruthless in their rejection of applications for the founding of publishing firms whenever they felt that their interests were thereby prejudiced. By November 1947 the number of such rejections totalled 130: "Il faut d'ailleurs noter que le nombre d'éditeurs serait encore beaucoup plus élevé si les services de contrôle français y avaient consenti: 130 demandes d'ouverture ou de réouverture de maisons ont dû être refusées jusqu'à ce jour, la plupart en raison du manque d'intérêt des programmes, les autres comme étant présentées par des personnes n'ayant aucune qualité professionnelle ... outre les nazis il a fallu repousser également les éditeurs déjà autorisés dans les zones alliées et dont la demande n'avait pour but que de s'assurer une attribution de papier supplémentaire ...." In this same article (in "La France en Allemagne") it was claimed that by June 30, 1947, there were almost 200 publishing houses in the French zone.

Another aspect of this surveillance was implicit in the method used for releasing paper supplies for the publishing industry, i.e. the system of "déblocage". When the French authorities gave official approval for the publication of a book this approval was accompanied by a "déblocage" coupon for the necessary amount of printing paper required for this specific purpose. This coupon was issued only to the publisher who subsequently procured the paper from a paper mill and then passed it on to the printer who had been selected for the production of the book. This particular system of paper rationing ensured that the printing industry was not in possession of unaccounted excess paper at any one time which could be used for printing material which had not received the official approval of the French military government authorities.
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printing material which had not received the official approval of the French military
government authorities.
The most direct expression of the military government's surveillance of publishing affairs remained, however, its implementation of a complex system of censorship which was designed to screen in advance all material which German authors and publishing houses wished to print. The system of censorship applied in the French zone involved a double check in that two administrations were employed separately to consider and approve the manuscripts submitted for publishing permission. Each manuscript had to be accompanied by a "demande de licence d'édition" in duplicate; this was a two-page application form which not only furnished the publisher's name etc., but also provided the author's name and profession together with his curriculum vitae and his previous affiliations, if any, with the NSDAP, including time of membership and offices held. Another section of the "demande de licence d'édition" concentrated on the technical details of the proposed publication, thereby reflecting French interests in the economic aspects of costs and raw material, e.g. "forme de l'ouvrage, prix de vente au public, format du livre (en cm²), format du papier (en cm²), genre du papier, poids au m², nombre de pages, chiffre du tirage demandé, poids total du papier nécessaire au tirage". (q.v. Appendix Nr. 9)

The manuscript and the duplicate application form were submitted via the local military government to the "Direction de l'Education Publique", the duty of which it was to provide the manuscript with a note of approval, termed the "avis de la Direction de l'Education Publique". The manuscript was then forwarded to the "Direction de l'Information" for the final seal of approval, termed "autorisation de la Direction de l'Information".

There was a specific logic behind the duplicate approval. The officials within the "Direction de l'Education Publique" were experts in cultural affairs and could recognize nationalistic trends within philosophical and aesthetic works, also trends and statements which were out of line with the various aspects of French occupation policy, e.g. denazification, separatism, Alsace-Lorraine, the future of the Saar and the Rhineland etc. The members of the "Direction de l'Information" on the other hand were specialists in political and legalistic matters, as well as in the field of propaganda and news dissemination. Consequently the ultimate decision of approval on all publishing licences for German publications in the French zone was delegated to the latter administration. An example of this system can be provided from any book published during the occupation period in the
French zone; for the sake of example, *Anthologie der deutschen Meinung. Deutsche Fragen auf eine französische Umfrage* (Konstanz, 1946) which bore the following seal of official approval:

**O.H.F.Z.O**

Visa No. 6162/P de la Direction de l'éducation Publique

*Autorisation No. 4961 de la Direction de l'Information.*

In addition, the French authorities employed a fail-safe device to ensure that the German publishers did not alter the text of those works passed for publication by the French: the printer was obliged to forward a copy of each work to the French authorities for the purposes of comparing and checking with the publisher's original copy of application.

The French system of pre-publication censorship was retained until after the currency reform of 1946, in stark contrast to the American zone where this form of censorship was dropped in 1946. The French also maintained the practice of licensing publishing houses until 1949. They imposed restrictions on the purchase of printing paper by publishers until April 1, 1949, when the Inspector-General of the "Direction de l'éducation Publique" in Baden-Baden abolished the system of paper rationing.

These above-listed factors were the important features of the French publishing policy in their zone of occupation. Within the specific context of Tübingen, however, the development of the local publishing industry in the years, 1945-1947, provides an added insight into French policy, especially in such fields as denazification and censorship. A short history of the publishing industry in post-war Tübingen is already available in Hans Widmann's work, *Tübingen als Verlagstadt* (1971), in a twenty-page section (Chapter 9), entitled "Die Jahre seit 1945". However, whilst Professor Widmann provides a chronology of the main, obvious events and a list of the principal publishing houses of the post-war period, he fails to mention any of the contentious issues surrounding the publishing industry in post-war Tübingen, despite the fact that, as the director of the university library in the post-war era, he was intimately acquainted with the trade. The bareness of account and shallowness of detail displayed in Professor Widmann's book is...
tantamount to a false presentation of events and indeed approximates in its distortion of perspective a whitewash version which plays down the tensions of internecine quarrels within the Tübingen publishing trade as well as the repressiveness of French surveillance. This subsequent section on Tübingen's publishing trade in the post-war era will provide a different perspective of developments from Widdmann's neat and harmonious account.

The first event of the occupation period to affect the publishing trade was the announcement on June 27, 1945, in the Mittelungen der Militärverwaltung für den Kreis Tübingen of a decree entitled "Beschlagnahme nationalsozialistischer Bücher" (Confiscation of National Socialist books) which ordered that all publications of National Socialist content and tendency were to be handed in to the town hall by July 2 at the latest. Later on, the university library was used as the depot for these works.

The next formal development was a communiqué from the regional headquarters of the French military government to Oberbürgermeister Renner in mid-September 1945: "Herrn Dr. Katzmann und Herrn Wasmuth ist mitzuteilen, daß Herr Oberleutnant Ernst, Gouvernement Militaire Regional (Justizgebäude, Zimmer Nr. 71), sie kennenzulernen und mit ihnen Verlagsangelegenheiten zu besprechen wünscht. Auch übrigen Verlagern ist, sobald sie auf das Rathaus bekannt werden, die gleiche Mitteilung zu machen" (Dr. Katzmann and Herr Wasmuth are to be informed that Lieutenant Ernst of the "Gouvernement Militaire Regional" (Law Court, Room No. 71) wishes to meet them and discuss publishing matters with them. The same message is to be given to other publishers as soon as they become known to the town hall.) Dr. Katzmann and Herr Wasmuth were men with previous publishing experience. In response to this communiqué the town hall notified the two men, together with a third personality from the publishing trade, Hermann Leins.

This was the first official indication of French intentions of re-organising the publishing industry in Tübingen. Prior to this date only one book had been printed in Tübingen, the ill-reputed and short-lived work, *Rechenschaft im Konzentrationslager*, by Konrad West Käul von Velburg. The only other material which had been printed were ration cards, application forms, instruction leaflets etc., all of which had been produced on behalf of the military government.
The first publishing house to receive a licence in Tübingen — and indeed in the French zone — was the "Rainer-Wunderlich-Verlag" under the directorship of Hermann Leins. The second was "J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck)" which under the ownership of Dr. Hans Georg Siebeck had acquired a prestigious reputation as an academic publishing house. This firm was granted its authorisation from the "Direction de l'Information" on December 7, 1945: "La Firme J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), H. Leuppsche Buchhandlung à Tübingen, Wilhelmstraße 14, Responsables: Propriétaire: Hans Georg Siebeck
Propriétaire: Hans Georg Siebeck
Fondateur: Hans Georg Siebeck, Luise Haberle
est autorisée à reprendre son activité d'éditeur. Elle recevra prochainement une autorisation officielle de réouverture." 

The list of publishing houses which were established in Tübingen during the French occupation is impressive. About a dozen in all were granted licences by the French authorities. They were: "Furche Verlag KG" (later "Katzmann Verlag KG"), "J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck)", "Otto Keilch Verlag "Der Leuchter"", "Verlag Ernst Wasmuth", "Rainer Wunderlich Verlag (Hermann Leins)", "U.J. Heckenauer Verlag", "Dr. N. Matthiesen & Co. KG", "C.L. Schultheiß Musikverlag", "Vita Nova Verlag (Kurt Latsche)", "Vero-Kunst-Verlag", "Verlag Klingelhöffer". The majority of these publishing houses, many of which have been dissolved since the late 1940's, have not attained any importance within the publishing industry of South-West Germany.

Four of these firms, however, did gain a reputation in post-war publishing circles. They were: "Furche Verlag KG", "J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck)", "Rainer Wunderlich Verlag (Hermann Leins)" and "Verlag Ernst Wasmuth". The "Furche Verlag KG" was founded in Tübingen by Dr. Ewald Katzmann on July 15, 1945. The original "Furche Verlag" was registered in 1917 in the Berlin commercial register as "Furche Verlag GmbH" and existed as a publisher of Lutheran religious literature, including the prestigious theological periodical "Die Furche", until its status was changed in 1936 in accordance with National Socialist regulations to that of a "Kommanditgesellschaft" (limited partnership) with six directors ("Gesellschafter"). During the war the firm's publishing department in Berlin and its warehouse in Leipzig were destroyed by Allied bombing. The idea of re-founding
the firm in Tübingen arose during the course of an "Evangelische Woche" (Lutheran Week) in Tübingen (May 20–26, 1945). Landesbischof Theophil Wurm proposed the publication of the speeches and lectures given during the conference. At the same time Hermann Leins approached Dr. Katzmann for a signed statement to certify that his publishing firm required twenty tons of printing paper to publish the proposed collection of speeches. The venture eventually collapsed but Landesbischof Wurm pursued the idea by approaching Dr. Katzmann and Dr. Eberhard Müller, both of whom were former directors of the Berlin "Furche Verlag", and urged them to consider a re-establishment of the publishing firm for theological purposes. The "Furche Verlag" was founded in July 1945 (although it did not receive its official publishing licence till later) under the directorship of six "Gesellschaften". According to the firm's archive they were "neben Dr. jur. Ewald Katzmann die Herren Dr. Reinhold von Thadden-Trieglaff (spätere Kirchentagspräsident), Dr. Hanns Lilje (spätere Landesbischof in Hannover), Dr. Eberhard Müller (spätere Akademiedirektor in Bad Boll), Bischof Dr. Samuel Baudert-Harrnhut (spätere Bad Boll), Präsident i.R. Franz Irmer und Heinrich Rennebach, der bisherige persönlich haftende Gesellschafter des Berliner "Furche Verlag". Wirtschaftsprüfer und Steuerberater Dr. Katzmann ... übernahm die persönliche Haftung und erhielt Anfang Dezember 1945 die Verlagslizenzen Nr. 4 der französischen Militärregierung in Baden-Baden". (In addition to Dr. Ewald Katzmann, Dr. Reinhold von Thadden-Trieglaff (later President of the Lutheran Church Convention), Dr. Hanns Lilje (later "Land" Bishop in Hannover), Dr. Eberhard Müller (later director of Bad Boll Academy), Bishop Dr. Samuel Baudert-Harrnhut (later Bad Boll), President (retired) Franz Irmer and Heinrich Rennebach, the former general partner of the Berlin publishing "Furche Verlag". Dr. Katzmann, a qualified chartered accountant and tax consultant ... assumed private liability and received Publishing Licences No. 4 from the French Military Government in Baden-Baden at the beginning of December 1945.) According to Dr. Katzmann none of the theologians were prepared to maintain legal responsibility for the firm and were subsequently all paid off by Katzmann with a credit note for 10,000 Reichsmark each. The firm was then re-established as the "Furche Verlag Dr. Katzmann KG (Tübingen)" in July 1946.

The "Furche Verlag" was one of three Protestant publishing houses licensed within the French zone. In 1945 and 1946 the French authorities released, according to Dr. Katzmann, twenty-two tons of printing paper per month for use by Protestant theological publishing houses and eighty tons per month for Catholic publishers.
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Dr. Katzmann claims that this discrepancy was revised after he applied personally about the matter to the chairman of the zonal "Börsenverein", Dr. Josef Knecht (Freiburg), who in turn contacted the French authorities. (14)

Much of Dr. Katzmann's success in establishing his business was attributable to his good relations with Landesbischof Wurm and the local church administration in Tübingen. Katzmann had originally come to Tübingen at Wurm's request during the latter stages of the war in order to supervise the management of a Tübingen seminar building, the "Schletterhaus", of which he (Katzmann) had been a director in 1938. Originally the property of the "Deutsche Christliche Studentenvereinigung" (German Christian Students' Union), the "Schletterhaus" had been transferred voluntarily in 1939 to the care of the "Landeskirche" of Württemberg on the occasion of a National Socialist decree banning the "Deutsche Christliche Studentenvereinigung". The "Schletterhaus" emerged in the post-war period under Dr. Katzmann's management as the largest restaurant in Tübingen, distributing up to 1,000 meals per day. As a result of his job Dr. Katzmann came into constant contact with the French authorities in Tübingen. He used these contacts to acquire a "Passierschein" (frontier pass) furnished with the clause "pour visiter les évêques protestants avec bicyclette", which enabled him to cross into the American-occupied section of Württemberg. After a clash with the French authorities in late May 1945 Dr. Katzmann was provided as a gesture of compensation with a pass for both the entire French and American zones. With the use of this pass he was able to procure extra paper supplies in the American zone. (15)

Dr. Katzmann, however, received his greatest boost through a chance intervention by Charles de Gaulle. In early 1946 a Tübingen academic, Professor Schols, submitted a manuscript to Dr. Katzmann, entitled "Zwischen den Zeiten". (16) It was in essence a rather vague religio-philosophical treatise on the National Socialist era which attempted to provide a prognosis on Germany's future. Dr. Katzmann duly forwarded an application for publishing permission to cover a request for 10,000 copies. According to Dr. Katzmann, some official in Baden-Baden was so impressed by Schols' thesis that the manuscript was eventually forwarded to de Gaulle who in response ordered an edition of 100,000 copies. De Gaulle's order was in fact extended by two subsequent decrees which provided for in total an edition of 400,000 copies. (17)
Dr. Katzmann maintained in an interview that dealings with the French censors were not always easy or successful. He stressed that Baden-Baden employed an extra screen of censorship for the theological works. In the case of Protestant works this was the "Aumônerie Protestante" in Baden-Baden which was responsible, not only for German Protestant church affairs in the French zone, but also for providing critiques and references for theological publishing applications. Dr. Katzmann indicated that difficulties often arose over acquiring favourable references for submitted works because of the fact that "Aumônerie Protestante" was staffed by French theologians of the French Reformed Church, consequently of Calvinist persuasion, who were more favourably inclined to the views of, for example, Karl Barth than the more relativist Gospel interpretation of the main body of the Lutheran Church. At times Dr. Katzmann had difficulties in obtaining approval for works written by respected members of the theological faculty of the University of Tübingen, itself a prestigious and world-renowned centre of theological teaching and research. In an interview Dr. Katzmann described his problem with the "Aumônerie Protestante" in the following terms: "Man musste denken, dass die Tübingen Theologie auch Theologie war." (One had to make it clear to them that Tübingen theology was also theology.)

It is not an exaggeration to say that religion and theology enjoyed an important role in the social and intellectual life of post-war Germany as a reaction to the excesses of the National Socialist regime and the moral and physical shock of total warfare and defeat. The University of Tübingen possessed an international reputation as a theological centre. Given these two facts it was therefore inevitable that theological and religio-philosophical writings should have played an important part in the publishing industry of post-war Tübingen.

This theological aspect of Tübingen's publishing industry was underlined in an interview with the proprietor of "J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck)", Dr. Hans-Georg Siebeck. Dr. Siebeck claimed that the public demand for theological works was higher than the rate of supply permitted by the French authorities. Dr. Siebeck laid the blame for this on the French departmental head for publishing affairs in Baden-Baden, Hipault, who, according to Siebeck, was an atheist and member of the PCF. Dr. Siebeck quoted an example of Hipault's stance with the case of Rudolf Bultmann's book, Das Theologische des Neuen Testaments, which was first published by the Mohr firm in 1940. Mohr had published some of Bultmann's research in the
years prior to the National Socialist seizure of power, e.g. *Glauben und Veracht-
hen.* Consequently in 1945 Baltmann sent the manuscript of his new book to Dr. Siebeck who forwarded it to the head of the "Aumônerie Protestante", Colonel Sturm. Sturm apparently furnished the application with positive references and sent it to Rieult. According to Dr. Siebeck, Rieult rejected the application with the argument that there was a surfeit of theological works. The book was thereupon shelved for a further eighteen months before publishing permission was granted. (21)

"J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck)" had been founded in Tübingen by Dr. Siebeck's father. Dr. Siebeck inherited the firm in May 1936. After military service and subsequent capture Dr. Siebeck returned to Tübingen in 1945 to find that a large part of his firm and of the adjoining apartment had been requisitioned by the French. In May 1945 he was visited by a certain Senatorspräsidient Martin from the "Oberlandesgericht" (Court of Appeal) in Freiburg and was offered building space and amenities in Freiburg for the re-establishment of his publishing firm. Freiburg was another logical choice in the post-war period for publishers, especially from the Hussion zone, seeking a new base. It had the same advantages as Tübingen; indeed a form of rivalry developed between the two towns in this respect as well as generally in the field of cultural affairs. Dr. Siebeck reported this offer to the town hall in Tübingen and thereby indirectly to the French authorities, and as a result the requisition order on his property was lifted within 48 hours. (22)

Nevertheless Dr. Siebeck was not particularly successful in re-establishing his firm in 1945. In that year he published no substantial works but merely two bibliographical pamphlets; one was a bibliography of the works of the renowned Tübingen Orientalist, Professor Hanno Littmann, the other a bibliography of works previously published by "J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck)". Throughout 1946 the firm's development was impeded, according to Dr. Siebeck, by a tough policy of censorship by the French.

Like "J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck)" the publishing firm "Kainer Wunderlich Verlag (Hermann Leins)" existed prior to 1933. The mainstay of the firm's production before the National Socialist era had been belletristic and biographical publications. This trend was continued throughout the entire period of the French occupation. Leins was highly successful in marketing during the post-war era an
extensive series of unimposing but profitable publications. The outstanding feature of this series was the pronounced Francophile tendency in the works submitted by Leins to the French authorities. A glance at Leins' own bibliography of published works, *Die Bücher im Keiner Sonderlich Verlag (Hermann Leins) in Tübingen, 1936-1957*, confirms this:

- Cheval, René J.: *Probleme der deutschen Universitäten*. 1943
- Widmer, Guillaume: *De la Primauté de l'Esprit*. Von Vorrang des Geistes. Französisch u. deutsch. 1945

It is therefore not surprising that Leins gained a large section of the printing paper supply allocated to Tübingen for the publishing trade.

Hermann Leins was a powerful figure within the publishing industry of Tübingen and indeed South-West Germany. He was a deputy chairman of the sonal "Börsenverein" as well as chairman of the "Landesverband" ("Land" Association) of the same in Süd-Württemberg. Leins was also the chairman of the denazification committee for the publishing industry in Süd-Württemberg; as in the case of certain other professional groupings, e.g. the Church, universities, the civil service, the publishing industry was allowed by the French military government to implement its own denazification programme.

The fourth major publisher in post-war Tübingen, "Verlag Ernst Wasmuth", was originally a Berlin concern which had specialised since the Wilhelmian period in architectural and art publications.
destroyed by Allied bombing. During the war a brother of the managing director, Wald Rembruch, moved to Tübingen where he was a freelance writer. Both he and his brother, i.e. Günther, the firm's director, had good connections in that neither had been members of the SSND, indeed Günther had spent some time in a concentration camp. Wald Rembruch made contacts within the local French military government soon after the occupation of the town and these contacts proved useful to his brother Günther once the decision was made to re-establish the firm in Tübingen.

The role played by personal contacts within the French authorities in the establishment of publishing firms in post-war Tübingen was – perhaps not surprisingly – one of considerable importance. Tübingen fulfilled a set of criteria which made it, like Freiburg, a very attractive choice as a publishing centre for firms seeking to re-settle their businesses away from the devastation of the bombed industrial cities, especially Berlin and Leipzig. Tübingen had not suffered extensive bomb-damage, therefore possessed a large amount of storage and commercial premises in comparison with other towns; secondly, Tübingen was an academic centre; thirdly, it was a capital town of the French zone where, as was becoming increasingly recognised, the French authorities pursued a positive and stimulating policy on cultural affairs.

In response to these conditions a number of publishing firms applied to Tübingen for permission to establish their firm, or at least a branch, in the town. It was obligatory for these firms to apply to the town hall which, in conjunction with the French military government, operated a system of planned economy, allocating storage and works premises as well as living quarters to the various newcomers. Under the enlightened regime of Oberbürgermeister Rüffer the town adopted a positive attitude to requests from publishing firms seeking to settle in Tübingen. For example, on October 12, 1945, Rüffer wrote to the director of the "Kultur- und Presseamt", then Will Hans Heinsacker: "Von Herrn Ernst erfuhr ich, daß folgende berühmte Verlage nach Tübingen überweisen wollen:

1. Verlag HILDEGARD, früher Leipzig
2. Verlag HOFFMANN, früher Leipzig
3. INSELVERLAG, früher Leipzig
4. Verlag PAUL PALEY, früher Berlin"
destroyed by Allied bombing. During the war a brother of the managing director, Ewald Wasmuth, moved to Tübingen where he was a freelance writer. Both he and his brother, i.e. Günther, the firm's director, had good credentials in that neither had been members of the NSDAP; indeed Günther had spent some time in a concentration camp. Ewald Wasmuth made contacts within the local French military government soon after the occupation of the town and these contacts proved useful to his brother Günther once the decision was made to re-establish the firm in Tübingen.

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1. Verlag RECLAM, früher Leipzig
2. Verlag BIZOKHAUS, früher Leipzig
3. INSELVERLAG, früher Leipzig
4. Verlag PAUL PAREY, früher Berlin."
Nach Auseinandersetzung von Herrn Bartels kann ein Herr Pfeifer, Stuttgart, Tübingerstr. 18 hierüber nähere Auskunft geben.

Die Übersiedlung dieser Verlage wäre nur zu begrüßen. Ich bitte, daß Sie sich der Sache annehmen und auch bei der Auswahl geeigneter Geschäftsstätten behilflich sind.

(Municipal Office for Press und Cultural Affairs:)
I have been informed by Herr Bartels that the following famous publishing houses want to move to Tübingen:

1. "Verlag RECLAM", formerly of Leipzig,
2. "Verlag BROCKHAUS", formerly of Leipzig,
3. "INSELVERLAG", formerly of Leipzig,

According to Herr Bartels, a certain Herr Pfeifer of Stuttgart, Tübingerstr. 18 can provide further detailed information about this.

The transfer of these publishing houses to Tübingen can only be welcomed. I would like to ask you to attend to the matter and also to assist in the choice of suitable business premises.

On the occasion of his replacement by Adolf Hartmeyer as mayor (January 11, 1946) Kenner marked the "Frage der Verlegung verschiedener bedeutender Verlage (Furche und Brockhausen) nach Tübingen und anderes mehr" (Question of the transfer of several important publishing houses ("Furche" and "Brockhaus") to Tübingen and other matters) as one of the imperative outstanding matters to be settled.

Although Hartmeyer's administration reiterated the intention of settling publishing houses in Tübingen, its record was not in fact a good one. Had the town administration under Hartmeyer succeeded in retaining those publishing houses interested in settling in Tübingen, the town would doubtless have developed into one of the primary publishing centres of Germany. The prestigious firms of "Reclam" (Stuttgart), "Brockhaus" (Wiesbaden), "Insel" (Frankfurt) and "Paracelsus" (Berlin) eventually settled elsewhere in the Western zones. Other publishing firms, e.g. the "Hugen Miederichs Verlag", formerly of Jena and now in Düsseldorf, the "Otto Reich Verlag "Der Leuchter"", formerly of Darmstadt and now in Hanover, and the
"Matthiesen Verlag", formerly of Berlin and now in Lübeck, did in fact come to Tübingen but eventually moved elsewhere in search of more congenial conditions.

This was the shadow side of the publishing industry in post-war Tübingen. It is difficult to determine the specific reasons for the failure of the town to establish these firms in Tübingen. In the course of a series of interviews conducted in 1974 with various personalities who were well acquainted with the publishing trade in post-war Tübingen (and who, for reasons of discretion, wish to remain anonymous) the impression was given that this failure was due to a combination of three reasons: gross ignorance on the part of the town hall administration as to the future importance of a publishing industry; an acute lack of building space within the community and a shortage of printing materials; the resistance on the part of at least some of the established publishing firms in Tübingen to a further expansion of numbers.

In the municipal archives in Tübingen there is a copy of a refusal from the "Staatssekretariat" in reply to an application to permit the establishment of a branch in Tübingen of a certain "Verlag Josef Wiroth" from Gera in Eastern Germany. The municipal authorities had referred the application to the "Staatssekretariat" which replied on August 16, 1946: "Nach vorheriger Prüfungnahme mit dem Landesverband der deutschen Buchhändler teile ich Ihnen mit, daß von Standpunkt des hiesigen Buchhandels und Verlagswesens das Bedürfnis nach der Errichtung von Auslieferungszentren und Niederlassungen auswärtiger Firmen - es liegt bereits eine reichliche Besetzung in der hiesigen Zone vor - nicht anerkannt werden kann." (After preliminary talks with the "Land" Association of the German Book Trade, I wish to inform you that it is the view of the local book and publishing trade that they cannot acknowledge the necessity for establishing distribution and branch agencies for out-of-town firms as this zone is already amply provided for.)

This letter indicates that the Süd-Württemberg organisation of publishers and book dealers practised protectionism in pursuit of the interests of the existing members. This protectionism was quoted by the owner of the "Südwest Verlag" (Disseldorf) as the reason for his failure to obtain permission to settle in Tübingen: "Meine Bemühungen um eine Ansiedlung des Verlages in Tübingen wurden nachdrücklich von Dr. Carlo Schmid unterstützt ... Die nachgesuchte Lizenz wurde mir jedoch aus Gründen, die mir damals noch nicht durchsichtig waren, nicht erteilt. Dabei sprach sich sicher mit, daß die in Süd-Württemberg ansässigen Kollegen nicht sehr entzückt
The apparent unwillingness on the part of the local French military government to promote the publishing industry in Tübingen to its fullest potential was a somewhat contradictory feature of French policy in post-war Tübingen. It was contradictory in the sense that in every other sphere of cultural life the French authorities made serious efforts to establish Tübingen as a cultural centre of the first order. In contrast, however, Freiburg profited more during the period of occupation from French assistance in publishing affairs and emerged in the 1950's as a major publishing town. Freiburg's ascendancy over Tübingen as a publishing centre was evident during the occupation period. For instance, Freiburg was outstanding for its publication of periodicals, e.g. Badische Illustrierte, Benediktische Konviktsschrift, Bauern und Wohnum, Sudetana, Der Führmann, Evangelisches Kirchenblatt, Licht und Rockel, Die Augenwarte etc. In comparison Tübingen published only two periodicals: Der Komat and Deutsche Rechtszeitung.

One feature of French policy on publishing affairs in post-war Tübingen which contained no elements of contradiction was the strict censorship of all printed and published material. This surveillance was one reason for the French system of licence application for each piece of printed matter to leave a German press; another reason was economic in that it supervised and restricted the use of printing paper.

A number of classical oeuvres fell victim to French sensitivity on the Alsace question. Dr. Siebeck claimed that a re-print of Marianne Weber's biography of her husband, entitled Ehe Weber, Ein Lebensbild, was not permitted by the French because of passages of description of "Teutonic" student life and army service in German Alsace (especially Strasbourg) at the turn of the century.
Dr. Siebeck also maintained that Albert Schweitzer's work, *Der Ruhm der Heiligen* (1906), was refused permission for a re-print by the French authorities because of a reference to German Strasbourg in the foreword.

Furthermore, according to Dr. Siebeck, the French refused to approve a licence for Rudolf Springer's philosophical treatise, *Natur der Seele*, and also rejected the theologian, Emmanuel Hirsch's work, *Geschichte der evangelischen Theologie im Kampf um die Aufstellung und Betreuung der evangelischen Kirche*. On the grounds of Hirsch's former NSDAP membership and his activities as a "Deutscher Christ". Another author who had difficulties in receiving publishing assent from the French authorities was Ernst Jünger, for whose book, *Strahlungen*, a personal diary of the Second World War period, Dr. Katzmann submitted a licensing application in 1946. Although Jünger could not be defined as a National Socialist and some of his works had been banned by the National Socialists, he had flirted with the NSDAP in the 1930's; in addition he had written two works of controversial bias, *Der Kampf um die innere Befreiung* (1922) and *Die totale Kollaboration* (1934). Jünger lived in the British Zone in the immediate post-war period and had been unable to receive permission there for publication of any of his new works. He was, however, on friendly terms with Carlo Schmid and consequently submitted his manuscript to the "Furche Verlag" with an extra copy for Carlo Schmid. Two factors combined to frustrate Jünger's applications; firstly, he had been an official in the censorship department of the German military government of occupied Paris in the early 1940's; secondly, he had shared the enmity of Alexander Dehlin, the renowned author of *Berlin Alexanderplatz*, who returned from exile in the USA as a naturalized Frenchman to work with the section for cultural affairs within the French military government in Baden-Baden. Most of the Tübingen publishers agree that Dehlin was a serious and constant impediment to their ambitions. They depict Dehlin as a cross and difficult personality who resented those writers and artists who, unlike himself and a large number of others, had elected not to go into exile.

The French authorities imposed a second form of censorship on works of technical and non-ideological nature which were already in stock at publishing houses on the advent of the military occupation of Tübingen. In this case an a posteriori censorship was imposed. The outstanding example of this method was a book dis-
French instructions to the publishing industry were generally relayed as from March 1946 by means of the "Börsenverein" periodical, *Mitteilungen für den Buchhandel in der französischen Zone*. This helped to systematise French surveillance of the publishing industry. In the first edition of the *Mitteilungen*, for instance, there were four sections included under the general heading of "Bekanntmachungen", i.e. "Bekanntmachungen über die Wiedereröffnung von Verlagsanstalten, Genehmigungen zur Veröffentlichung und denazifizierbare Auslagen", "Richtlinien für Verleger und Sortimenten" (Guidelines for publishers and retail booksellers), "Verbotene Bücher" (Prohibited books) and "Die Organisation des Börsenvereins der deutschen Buchhändler in der französisch besetzten Zone" (The organisation of the Association of the German Book Trade in the French occupied Zone). These announcements demonstrated a tightening up of the apparatus and procedure of French surveillance, e.g. "Die Herausgeber müssen in 3 Exemplaren das Formular Nr. 1 ausfüllen ... und es ihrer Genehmigung zur Wiedereröffnung beifügen. Diesen Genehmigungsausschlag sollte der Herausgeber mindestens genau so vollständig und ausführlich wie die Auslage der zur Genehmigung kostenlosen überlegen sein ... Die Herausgeber müssen die Kurzexemplare der Nichtverlagsausschläge einreichen ... Die Herausgeber müssen auf Wunsch des Verlagsausschlags in 12 Exemplaren jedes bewilligten Werkes an die Direktion der Information, Abteilung "Presse Edition", Baden-Baden, Einsendung ..." (Publishers must complete Form No. 1 in triplicate and enclose it with their application for permission to re-open. This application must contain a programme of publications in as much detail as ...
The publishing industry in post-war Tübingen consisted not only of publishing houses but also of book dealers and printing firms. The role of the book dealer ("Buchhändler") has traditionally been a factor of great importance within German academic life on account of the high training standards and prestige of the profession. Tübingen's reputation as an historical centre of learning is still associated with the famous bookshop and publishing house, "Cotta'sche Buchhandlung" (the publisher of Goethe's and Schiller's works), which was established in Tübingen in the early seventeenth century; the firm transferred to Stuttgart in 1811.

In issue Nr. 6 of the Mitteilungen (August 1, 1946) it was announced that six Tübingen bookshops were permitted to re-open: "Auf Grund der Berichte des Aufnahmeausschusses im Landesverband der Buchhändler von Süd-Württemberg, Hohenzollern und Lindau hat das Gouvernement Militaire, Section Information, folgende Entscheidungen getroffen:

Buchhandlungen, die ohne Einschränkung weitergeführt werden dürfen:
- Buchhandlung Beneke
- J.J. Heckenhauer
- Buchhandlung Gebr. Kircher
- Oelander'sche Buchhandlung
- Buchhandlung Elisabeth Schiemer
- Buchhandlung Erwin Wijt."

(On the basis of reports submitted by the "admissions committee" of the "Land" Association of the German Book Trade in Süd-Württemberg, Hohenzollern and Lindau, the "Gouvernement Militaire, Section Information", has reached the following decisions:

Bookshops which may resume business without restrictions:
- Buchhandlung Beneke
- J.J. Heckenhauer

possible and the publisher's phone ... Publishers must submit 12 copies of each licenced work for checking purposes to the "Direction de l'Information", department "Presser edition", Baden-Baden ... Each book licence will receive a number which must be specified on the back of the title page ... Authors cannot apply directly to the "Direction de l'Information" but have to submit their manuscript through a licenced publisher.)
In July 1947 this list was extended by the inclusion of "Reichs Buchhandlung". These bookshops had, in accordance with the denazification procedure laid down by the French, been cleared by the denazification committee of the "Landesverband".

There was, however, one major anomaly which demonstrates that the denazification committee was lenient, if not protective, in its interpretation and implementation of French policy. In the case of the "Osiandersche Buchhandlung", Tübingen's most renowned bookshop, the French authorities indicated that sanctions ought to be applied. The business was owned by two committed National Socialists, Petzold and Jordan. Jordan in fact was arrested by the French in 1945 and interned for a period in the Balingen internment camp. A former employee, Julie Gastl, was subsequently appointed business manageress by the local French officer responsible for publishing affairs and the two owners were dispossessed of all powers of decision making. This fact, however, was not published in the Mittelungen. In the British and American zones where Allied legislation was more rigidly applied in matters of denazification active National Socialists were not allowed to run their own bookshops and had to find managers to run their businesses. In 1946, however, the "Bürenverein" reached an agreement with the French authorities in Baden-Baden whereby the "Bürenverein" itself supervised the management of these businesses whilst the owners maintained the day-to-day running of the same. In the case of Baden-Württemberg this supervision was the duty of the "Geschäftsführer des Landesverein" (General secretary of the "Land" Association), Walter Güte, who was required to check these listed premises regularly, e.g. for forbidden material, and to manage their accounts.

In the case of Tübingen there were two such cases. These were announced in issue Nr. 7 of the Mittelungen: "Buchhandlungen, die unter der Bedingung weitergeführt werden dürfen, daß der Bürenverein während zweier Jahre die ordnungsgemäße Führung überwacht und daß kein Vorstoß gegen die Anordnungen der Militärregierung in Buchhandelsfragen erfolgt:

Tübingen: Franz Heitacker  Buchhandlung
Anton Hailler  Antiquariat."
(Bookshops which may resume business on the condition that the Association of the German Book Trade supervises the running of the same within the terms of the law for a period of two years and that there is no incidence of infringement of Military Government instructions concerning the book trade.

Tübingen: Franz Pflaum, Bookshop
Anton Haller, Second-hand Book Dealer.)

Haller in fact was arrested and imprisoned for a period of three days by the French for emitting to clear his stocks of all proscribed literature; unfortunately for Haller he had overlooked a book on the history of the "German" which expounded anti-French sentiments on the Alsace question.

Walter Götze maintained in the course of an interview that the "Landesverband" was proud of the fact in the post-war years that it had managed to gain the consent of the French to a system of self-determination in matters of denazification and that it had displayed a marked degree of humaneness toward those of its members with a pronounced National Socialist past. There was, according to Götze, no instance in Württemberg of a work ban ("Berufsverbot") being imposed on any publisher or dealer or of any publishing houses or bookshops being closed for political reasons. This leniency of attitude must be related, however, more to the overall French policy on denazification and the professional élites within their zones (cf. church, university, civil service, theatre etc.) than with any particular flair on the part of the "Landesverband" for negotiating with the French authorities.

In post-war Tübingen there were five printing firms, "Tübingen Chronik", "H. Laupp", "Geobel", "Belzle" and "Gulde", of which the two largest were the printing unit of the "Tübingen Chronik" and the firm, "H. Laupp." Both those firms had an easier time than the others in 1945, even if only marginally, for they received commissions to produce application forms, fly-posters, ration cards etc. for both the military government and the "Staatssekretariat". The French authorities in Tübingen maintained a close watch on the printing of even this material. A result of this surveillance was the appearance before a military government court of Rudolf Laupp, owner of the Laupp printing firm "Wegen Anfertigung einer Druckschrift ohne vorherige Genehmigung durch das Gouvernement Militaire. Urteil: 200,- RMark Geldstrafe" (for producing a publication without acquiring a licence in advance from the "Gouvernement Militaire". Verdict: 200,- Reichsmark fine.)
The principal event of the printing industry in post-war Tübingen was the creation on July 26, 1946, of a "Fachverbindung Druck" (Professional Association for the Printing Trade) within the umbrella organisation of the "Fachvorband der Papier-, Pappe-, Holzstoff- und Holzstoffindustrie, Papierverarbeitung und Druck für das französische besetzte Gebiet Württemberg und Hohenzollern" (Professional Association for Paper, Cardboard, Cellulose and Wood Pulp Industries and Paper Processing and Printing for the French-occupied Section of Württemberg and Hohenzollern).

The chairman of the "Fachverbindung Druck" was Rudolf Laupp. The functions of this latter organisation, according to a circular from Laupp to the other members (October 10, 1946), were: "Mitwirkung bei der Bewirtschaftung der vom graphischen Gewerbe benötigten Rohstoffe (Papier, Bleche und Metalle, Bensin, Glue etc.), Vertretung der Betriebe bei kommenden Tarifverhandlungen, Festlegung von Preis- und Zulagebedingungen, Schätzung der Betriebe für Kauf- und Mietverhandlungen, Rationalisierungsvorschläge usw.“ (Participation in the rationing of raw materials required by the graphic trade (paper, iron and metal, benzine, glue etc.), representation of firms in future collective bargaining, fixing of price standards and uniform payment terms, assessment of firms for purchase and lease negotiations, suggestions for rationalisation etc.)

Consequently the "Fachverbindung Druck" provided a fulcrum of bureaucratic rationalisation for the printing industry in post-war Tübingen during the chaotic situation of the immediate post-war period when the French occupation authorities were attempting to rationalise resources while considering French needs and policy.

A second important development in the printing trade was the establishment of the printing press unit of the former "Tübinger Chronik" as an independent enterprise separate from the newspaper. This was possible under Allied occupation legislation whereby former National Socialist property which had been sequestered could be collectivised on application by a cooperative ("Genossenschaft") formed by personnel employed within the same. The printers within the "Tübinger Chronik" made an application in 1946 with the backing of the local trade union movement. The application was granted in 1947 and the "Gründungsversammlung" (founding meeting) was held on September 3, 1947. The cooperative was subsequently registered in the "Genossenschaftsregister Nr. 94 (Band III, Blatt 74) vom 5. November 1947" (Co-operative Register No. 94 (volume III, page 74) of November 5, 1947) as "Tübinger Chronik, Druckerei und Verlagsgenossenschaft, eingetragene Genossenschaft."

This was an unusual occurrence which was paralleled only once in the post-war period in South-West Germany, namely in the case of the Heilbronner Stimme in the American Zone where the business was divided into a newspaper section and the "Vereinsdruckerei" (now "Druckhaus Heilbronn").

The final aspect of French publishing policy in post-war Tübingen to be included in this section concerns the establishment in Tübingen of a publishing company with the aim of publishing French works in German translation. In 1947 the French approached three Tübingen publishing firms, "Ernst Vasmuth", "J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck)" and "Reiner Sanderlich Verlag (Hermann Leine)"; together with a fourth from nearby Bruch, the "Dr.-Kurt-Port-Verlag", with the proposal to found a joint company for the publication of French literature; this new company, of which the French military government was to possess fifty percent, would exist parallel to the founding firms. In 1948 this venture was established under the name "Tübinger Verlagshaus". The new firm published a series of French works in translation, most of which had already been published in Germany, e.g. Gustave Flaubert: Madame Bovary (1949), Blaise Pascal: Über die Religion und über einige andere Gegenstände (1940), Honoré de Balzac: Cesare Bistritze: Brieven van Voltaire (1949). In 1950 the firm folded up when it became obvious that it could not survive under its existing policy which was geared to French interests rather than to the wishes of the local readership or to the demands of the market.
Chapter Six: Cultural affairs in Tübingen, 1945-1947, including developments within the local press and publishing industry


(2) La France en Allemagne (Baden-Baden), Nr. 7, November 1947, p. 48.


(4) Mitteilungen für den Buchhandel in der französischen Zone (Baden-Baden), 4 Jg., Nr. 9, 1. Mai 1949, p. 303.

(5) Tübingen.

(6) Nr. 7, "Bekanntmachung Dr. 87".

(7) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Az.: 5500.

(8) Tübingen, 1945.

(9) Hans Sidmann, Tübingen als Verlagssitz, p. 189.

(10) Copy of original lent by Dr. Siebeck, Tübingen.


(13) Interview with Dr. Ewald Katzmann, Tübingen, June 1974.

(14) ibid.

(15) ibid.

(16) Heinrich Schols, Tübingen, 1946.

(17) Interview with Dr. Ewald Katzmann, Tübingen, June 1974.

(18) ibid.

(19) Tübingen.

(20) Tübingen, 1933.

(21) Interview with Dr. Hans-Georg Siebeck, Tübingen, June 1974.

(22) ibid.

(23) Tübingen, n.d.
(24) Mitteilungen für den Buchhandel in der französischen Zone (Baden-Baden), Nr. 2, April 1946, pp. 17 ff.
(26) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Az.: 5500.
(28) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Az.: 5500.
(29) Correspondence from Fr. Peter Diedrich, Näbig Helpersdorf, dated March 11, 1974.
(32) 1. Auflage, Tübingen, 1926.
(33) Tübingen.
(34) Interview with Dr. Hans-Georg Siebeck, Tübingen, June 1974.
(35) Tübingen, 1947.
(37) Berlin.
(38) Berlin.
(39) Berlin, 1930.
(40) Berlin, 1940.
(41) Baden-Baden.
(42) Abb., Nr. 1, 1. März 1946, pp. 3 ff.
(43) Abb.
(44) Abb., Nr. 6, pp. 97 ff.
(47) 1. September 1946, p. 106.
(48) Interview with Fr. Julie Gastl, Tübingen, June 1974.
(49) Interview with Walter Gütze, Stuttgart, June 1974.
(50) Interview with Paul Marx (Prokurist, Firmen Laupp), Tübingen, July 1974.
(51) Nachrichtenblatt der Militärverwaltung und Behörden für den Kreis Tübingen (Tübingen), Nr. 20, 1. September 1945.
(52) Document in firm archive of Firmen H. Laupp, Tübingen.

(54) Interview with Helmut Ludwig, Geschäftsführer der Druckerei "Tübingen Chronik", Tübingen, July 1974.

(55) History of development of Tübingen Verlagshaus, including list of publications, kindly supplied by Diplom-Bibliothekar Friedrich Hayy on behalf of the Universitätsbibliothek Tübingen.
(54) Interview with Helmut Ludwig, Geschäftsführer der Druckerei "Tübinger Chronik", Tübingen, July 1974
(55) History of development of Tübinger Verlagshaus, including list of publications, kindly supplied by Diplom-Bibliothekar Friedrich Henn on behalf of the Universitätsbibliothek Tübingen.
Chapter Seven

The University of Tübingen, 1945-1947
The university of Tübingen did not survive the National Socialist era nor the Second World War unscathed. Although both the teaching and the examination systems were maintained until the day prior to the occupation of the town, a large proportion of both staff and students were called up for war service of some kind or other. By 1943 42% of the staff was either in the armed forces or on secondment duty. The university was also used as an evacuation centre for other academic institutions since the town enjoyed relative safety from Allied bombing; these included a number of "Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institutes" (1943), a large section of the "Reichsuniversität Straßburg" (1944) and the establishment of the German atomic research unit in the neighbouring village of Haigerloch. (1)

At Tübingen University the National Socialist seizure of power in 1933 was followed by the nomination of a "Staatskommissar" (state commissioner), Professor Gustav Bebermeyer, who was made responsible for the implementation of a programme of "Gleichschaltung": The chancellor of the university, August Hegler, resigned. In accordance with the anti-Semitic articles of the "Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbefermtenum" (Law on the re-establishment of the professional civil service) (April 7, 1933) seven members of the academic staff were dismissed, including the physicist and later Nobel Prize winner, Hans Bethe. (2) It has been pointed out in a book written in 1957 that Tübingen University experienced the lowest rate of professorial dismissals in the first years of the National Socialist era. During the first year of the National Socialist regime three professors were sacked out of a total of 185; this was equivalent to a percentage dismissal of 1.6%, considerably less than Berlin (32.4%), Frankfurt-am-Main (32.3%), Heidelberg (24.3%), Munich (8.3%) etc. (3) The implication of these figures is not only that the University of Tübingen had a lower percentage of Jewish academic staff than other universities, but also that its non-Jewish membership tended to be politically more acquiescent than elsewhere.

On November 25, 1933, the constitution of the university (i.e. "Universitätsverfassung") was altered by a decree from the "Kultministerium" in Stuttgart to the effect that the rights and powers of the "Großer Senat" and the "Kleiner Senat" were to be assumed by a rector appointed initially by the "Kultministerium" and subsequently by the "Reichskanzler" himself. In 1935 both senates were dissolved to make way for a new eleven-member "Senat" with strictly advisory functions. By 1937 the university was able to boast that it was the sole German university in
which "der Führergedanke restlos durchgeführt ist" (the Führer principle, i.e. principle of totalitarian leadership, has been completely implemented). In addition, the standardised "Hochschulverfassung" (university constitution) of April 1, 1935, decreed for all the universities of the Reich, created the offices of "Dozentenschaftsleiter" and "Studentenschaftsleiter", both of whom were appointed by the "Reichswissenschaftsminister" (Minister of Science). Furthermore, the traditional student corporations were replaced by National Socialist "Kameradschaften".

The National Socialist era also demonstrated in Tübingen a change of emphasis within the range of academic subjects competing for acknowledgement and finance. In 1935 the "Chirurgische Klinik" (surgical Clinic) was completed and in 1936 the "Hygiene-Institut" (Institute of Hygiene) and the "Hals-, Nasen- und Ohrenklinik" (Ear, Nose and Throat Hospital) received new, modernised premises. In 1939 the "Hygiene-Institut" became the first university institute in Germany to be equipped with an electron microscope. In 1942 the "Physikalisch-Chemisches Institut" (Physicochemical Institute) was founded, whilst in the closing months of the war the "Pharmazeutisch-Chemisches Institut" (Pharmaceutical Institute) was established. These subjects were favoured by the National Socialist administration because they possessed obvious industrial and military values.

Certain other subjects gained the approval of the National Socialist ministry of education in as far as they coincided with National Socialist ideology. The Department of Anthropology at Tübingen gained a professorial chair in 1934. In 1939 an "Arisches Seminar" (Department of Aryan Studies) was created in the philosophical faculty under the Indologist, Wilhelm Haug, founder of the "Deutsche Glaubensbewegung" (German Faith Movement). In 1939 a chair for "Weltpolitische Auslandskunde und Kolonialwissenschaft" (Geopolitical geography and colonial affairs) was founded. Sport was also one of the disciplines which were directly promoted by the National Socialist regimes; in 1939 the university acquired a glider training field.

Dr. Volker Schäfer, the present director of the university archive, has described the situation of the university at the end of the war as follows: "Bei Kriegsende wies die Universität 45 Institute und 9 Kliniken auf. Von den etwa 180
Mitgliedern des Lehrkörpers stand im Februar 1945 ein Drittel im Wehrdienst. Von den 4064 im Wintersemester 1944/45 immatrikulierten Studierenden befand sich sogar die Hälfte im Kriegseinsatz, und von den in Tübingen Verbliebener waren nicht weniger als 38 % Studentinnen. In der Philosophischen Fakultät belief sich ihr Anteil zeitweilig auf 58 %. Große Opfer forderte der Krieg vonallen Universitätsangehörigen. Die in den Vorlesungsverzeichnissen veröffentlichten "Ehrentafeln" verzeichneten allein bis zum 5. Januar 1945 406 Gefallene. Dagegen blieben die Universitätsgebäude verschont – eine Folge der fehlenden kriegswichtigen Industrie in Tübingen wie auch der Errichtung von Lazaretten in den Universitätskliniken..." (At the end of the war the university had 45 institutes and 9 clinical hospitals. One third of the approximately 180 members of the teaching staff was serving in the armed forces in February 1945. As much as one half of the 4,064 students enrolled for the winter term of 1944-1945 were on military service and no less than 38 % of those who remained in Tübingen were female students. In the Philosophy Faculty the quota of female students was at times 58 %. The war demanded great sacrifices from all university members. The "rolls of honour" published in the university calendar listed 406 killed in action alone for the period up to January 5, 1945. On the other hand the university buildings were spared – a consequence of the fact that there were no essential war industries in Tübingen and that military hospitals had been set up in the university clinics ...). (b)

The National Socialist preference for technological subjects at the expense of the humanities also affected the university's matriculation figures. Whereas in 1929 there were 3,726 students enrolled at the university, the last peace term of 1939 had a matriculation roll of 1591. By the winter term of 1944-1945 this number had risen to 2068 but it contained a high percentage of war-wounded returning to study, female students (i.e. 784) and medical students required for the war effort. These students were distributed among the respective faculties as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mathematik und Naturwissenschaften (Mathematics and Natural Sciences)</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemie</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmazie</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medizin</td>
<td>1041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zahnheilkunde</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rechtswissenschaft</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wirtschaftswissenschaft</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The differences in enrolment are reflected in the subject distribution.
The university closed in March 1945 for the Easter vacation. The new "Sommer-
semester" (summer term) was announced for May 1945, but the resumption of studies
was prevented by the arrival of the French army in Tübingen on April 19.

In the winter of 1944 and spring of 1945 the university of Tübingen was in
an enviable position compared with the majority of German universities. It had
suffered no damage whatsoever from Allied bombing. Indeed there were only seven
other universities in Germany with library buildings which were immediately usable
after the war. In addition, only three other universities (Erlangen, Göttingen
and Heidelberg) remained totally undamaged by Allied bombing and military
occupation.

The arrival of the French army of occupation and the accompanying apparatus
of military government in Tübingen instituted a process of change within the un-
iversity which radically altered its status, programmes and composition. The first
stage of this development may be defined as the period between April 10 and October
10, 1945, i.e. between the military occupation of Tübingen and the official re-
opening of the university. During this period the local military government in
Tübingen set about altering the status quo of the university on a short-term and
somewhat piecemeal basis. The second stage emerged after October 10, by which
time the French military government had evidently worked out a general policy for
university and higher educational affairs.

At the time of the French military occupation of Tübingen the rector ("Rektor")
of the university was Professor Otto Stickl, director of the "Hygiene-Institut",

Ferner sind beurlaubt:

(Also given leave of absence are):

Wehrmachtangehörige
sum totalen Kriegseinsatz
aus sonstigen Gründen

(Members of the armed forces)
(for full-time war duty)
(for other reasons)

322
35
20

990
912
74
who was not only a committed member of the NSDAP but also an army officer in his function as "Beraterender Hygieniker" (consultant hygienist) to the local army command ("Standort Tübingen"). Aware that he would receive short shrift from the French occupation authorities, Stickl preempted developments by temporarily assigning the duties of his office to his deputy, the philosopher Haering.\(^{(11)}\) On April 19 the university and its institutes were placed under the protection of the occupying army; notices and boards were erected by French officials putting the university area off-limits to unauthorised French and Germans alike. There was no plundering worth mentioning. The French did, however, requisition the electron microscope in the "Hygiene-Institut" (May 11). Furthermore, an order was given on April 23 to vacate the "Chirurgische Klinik" of all German wounded within 24 hours.\(^{(12)}\)

Professor Haering, whose function according to the note which he had been sent by Stickl was that of "Geschäftsführer" (executive director), set up a working committee ("Arbeitsstab") on April 20. According to the diary notes of Universitätsherr Knapp, the university's head administrator in this period, this committee was composed of Professor Haering, Carlo Schmid, Dr. Zweisig and Ministerialrat Bauer and its function was that of "Betreuungs- und Meldestelle" (welfare and registration office).\(^{(13)}\) This committee set out to execute three main tasks; to supervise the welfare of the members of the university; to afford protection to those university members living in unprotected areas outside the town centre where they were exposed to plunder and assault; finally, to supervise and escort visits made by French and American scientists who wished to examine the university and its institutes.\(^{(14)}\)

Theodor Haering, however, had himself been a committed National Socialist and had demonstrated his ideological allegiance by the publication of two books: "Was ist deutsche Philosophie?" Ein Beitrag zur geistigen Abwehrkunst (1936)\(^{(15)}\) and Das Teufel in der Herrn Liebesmitte (1940)\(^{(16)}\). The content of the former work is evident from its title; the second work was what the Germans term a "Ritterkreuzgeschichte", i.e. a laudatory tale of military adventure. It was therefore a matter of time in April 1945 before the French became aware of Haering's National Socialist commitment. On May 7, according to the diaries of the Tübingen geographer, Professor Schröder, those professors who had not been party members assembled to
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Professor Hermann Schneider, professor of German philology, was appointed the new rector of the university. Prior to this meeting pressure had been put on Professor Stickl to resign from the rectorship. Dr. Knapp's diary reads as follows: "7. Mai. Steigender Druck auf Rektor Stickl, abzugehen, um der Universität ein neues Gesicht zu geben. Nachmittags legt Stickl sein Amt nieder, um nicht einer glücklichen Entwicklung im Weg zu stehen. Rektor wird Schneider, der Germanist." (Kay 7. Increasing pressure on Rector Stickl to resign in order to give the university a new countenance. Stickl resigns his office in the afternoon so as not to be in the way of positive developments. Schneider, the Germanic philologist, becomes rector.)

On May 8 Professor Schneider wrote the following letter to the French military commander of Tübingen: "Um den Verhältnissen Rechnung zu tragen, hat der bisherige Rektor der Universität, Professor Otto Stickl, gestern das Rektorat niedergelegt. Auf übereinstimmenden Beschluß aller 6 Fakultäten habe ich mich bereit erklärt, die Leitung der Universität zu übernehmen. Die Universität kehrt damit zu ihrer früheren autonomen Verfassung zurück. Ich beehre mich, Sie, Herr Kommandant, davon in Kenntnis zu setzen, daß ich von heutigen an die Eberhard-Karls-Universität vertreten werde und daβ die Durchführung der erforderlichen Maßnahmen in meine Hände gelegt ist. Ich wäre Ihnen sehr verbunden, wenn Sie mir Gelegenheit geben würden, mir von Ihnen zu erkundigen ..." (The former rector of the university, Professor Otto Stickl, resigned yesterday from the office of rector in acknowledgement of present circumstances. I have agreed at the unanimous decision of all 6 faculties to assume control of the university administration. Thus the university returns to its former autonomous constitution. I have the honour to inform you, Commander, that as from today I shall represent the Eberhard-Karl University and that the implementation of all necessary measures has been placed in my hands."

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This request was granted by the French commander on the following day and Schneider's assumption of office was confirmed at the same meeting.

Schneider's next step was to resuscitate the "Kleiner Senat" by convening a meeting on May 11, 1945, which was attended by thirteen members of staff:

- Prof. Dr. Schneider als Rektor
- Prof. Dr. Rückert als Prorektor
- Prof. Dr. Köberle als Dekan der ev.-theol. Fakultät
- Prof. Dr. Geiselmann als Dekan der kath.-theol. Fakultät
- Prof. Dr. Stock als Dekan der medizinischen Fakultät
- Prof. Dr. Stadelmann als Dekan der philosophischen Fakultät
- Prof. Dr. Knopp als Dekan der naturwissenschaftlichen Fakultät
- Oberregierungsrat Dr. Knapp - Universitäterrat
- Prof. Dr. Bernhold als Vertreter der ordentlichen Professoren
- Prof. Dr. Zimmermann als Vertreter der außerordentlichen Professoren
- Dozent Dr. Schmid als Vertreter der Dozenten
- Verwaltungsdirektor Balbach als Vorstand des Universitätskanzleramtes
- Regierungsrat Knopp als Universitätssekretär.

At this meeting Schneider reported on developments to date: "Der neue Rektor berichtet über die Lage und die Aufgaben, die der Universität bevorstehen:

"Ich habe vorgestern eine Unterredung mit dem französischen Ortskommandanten..."
Metsker (wie) gehabt. Der Kommandant habe ihn zum Amtsantritt beglückwünscht und seine Genugtuung darüber ausgesprochen, daß die Universität ihre Verwaltung aus eigenem freien Entschluß umgebildet und nicht den Druck der Besatzungsmacht abgewendet habe.


Die zweite Aufgabe sei, den künftigen akademischen Unterricht vorzubereiten. Der Kommandant habe ihm erklärt, daß die Universität jetzt noch nicht in Tätigkeit treten könne; die Entscheidung werde sich einige Wochen verzögern. Es sei also immerhin möglich, noch in diesem Sommer ein Semester abzuhalten und es könnten auch jetzt schon die anwesenden Studenten gefördert werden, aber nicht durch Vorlesungen und Übungen in den Hörsälen und Instituten, sondern durch Privatunterricht zu Hause. Das für das Kürzersemester aufgestellte Vorlesungsverzeichnis sei nur noch ein historisches Dokument und dürfe nicht mehr ausgegeben werden. Er bitte die Dekane, den neuen Vorlesungsplan vorzubereiten...

Die dritte und heikelste Frage sei die der "Reinigung" durch den zu erwartenden Kommissar der Besatzungsmacht. Man tue gut daran, sich beizeiten auf diesen Schlag zu sichten. Er werde alles tun, um die Kollegen zu schützen. Er werde einen besonderen Ausschuß für diese Angelegenheit einsetzen, dessen Zusammenhang aber strung geheim sei. Er bitte alle Kollegen um äußerste Verschwiegenheit in dieser Sache.

(The new rector reported on the situation and the tasks facing the university: Two days previously he had a discussion with the local French commander Metsker. The commander congratulated him on his assumption of office and expressed his satisfaction that the university had reformed its administration of its own free will and had not waited on pressure being applied by the occupying power.)
The first task was to re-instate the *old collegial constitution* in its own right. A start had to be made by setting up the "Kleiner Senat" because it had not yet been possible to convene the "Großer Senat" because of traffic hindrances. The composition of the "Kleiner Senat", which was now established, required, however, the consent of the "Großer Senat". He (the rector) intended to travel to Heidelberg in the next few days to see how it was done there, for rumour had it that the university there was again in operation. After his return he would convene the "Großer Senat".

The second task was to prepare our forthcoming academic teaching. The (military government) commander had explained to him that the university could not yet resume its functions; the decision would be postponed for some weeks. It was nevertheless possible that they could hold a semester this summer and that the students could already be assisted, not by lectures and seminars in lecture-halls and institutes but by private tuition at home. The university calendar drawn up for the summer term was already nothing more than an historical document and would no longer be distributed. He asked the deans of faculty to prepare the new lecture schedule ...

The third and most delicate question was that of denazification which everyone expected would be undertaken by a commissioner appointed by the occupying authorities. Schneider said that they would be well advised to prepare themselves in good time for this blow. He would do his best to protect his colleagues. He would appoint a special commission for this matter but its composition would remain strictly secret. He asked for the utmost discretion from his colleagues in this matter. (21)

The "Großer Senat" was subsequently convened on May 19, 1945. This meeting was attended by a majority of the professors (57 in all) together with fourteen "Dozenten" (headlers) and three administrators. At this meeting, which included a considerable number of former Nazi members, Schneider made an attempt to strike a diplomatic note on the subject of his election which many professors resented on the grounds that it represented a usurpation of senate powers by a "RumpfSenat" (rump). Schneider argued his case by indicating the objective necessity for a change of rector which arose with the capture of Tübingen and the installation of
French military government: "...fähne ist allgemein als nichtwendig erschienen, 
nämlich der Wechsel im Rektorat, obwohl der vom nationalsozialistischen Regime 
ingestellte ehemalige Rektor ein Mann war, dessen Anführungsunfähigkeit unverkennbar war ... 
Der Grund für die Notwendigkeit eines Rektorwechsels habe also nicht in der Persönlichkeit des bisherigen Rektors gelegen; sondern der Fall des politischen 
Regimes habe eine Umgestaltung der Universität und ihrer Vertretung folgen müssen ... 
Von der Lehrkörperschaft - die Bild der Einigkeit vorgestellt habe, so hätten doch 
in Wirklichkeit tiefe Kluftf läge zwischen seinen Mitgliedern geklafft und die Gegner 
des Regimes hätten die Vorräume gefühlt zu handeln und nicht untätig abzuwarten, bis die Besatzungsbehörden eingriffen ... Er sei gefragt worden, ob er das 
Rektoramt übernehmen wolle. Er habe mehrere Unterredungen mit dem früheren Rektor 
gemacht. Dieser habe erklärt, daß seine Person nicht im Wege stehen dürfe, aber 
absichtlich das tun, was die Besatzungsmacht wünsche und er (i.e. Schneider) habe ihm antworten müssen, daß er sich im Reformen handeln, deren Unterlassung er schon seit 
12 Jahren als schweren Druck empfinden habe. Die Kluft habe sich aufgetan und 
Professor Stickl sich schließlich zum Rücktritt entschlossen.

Die Universität sei den Besatzungsbehörden zum Dank verpflichtet, daß sie 
ir ihr die Gelegenheit zu eigenem Handeln so bereitwillig eingeräumt hätten, wie Überhaupt ihr Verständnis für die Belange der Universität geäußert werden möchte. Es 
gelänge ihr (sic) besonderer Dank dafür, daß sie die gegenwärtige Sitzung des 
Großen Senates genehmigt habe, sicherlich ein einzigartiges Ereignis innerhalb der 
Familie der deutschen Hochschulen.

Die nichtnationalsozialistischen Mitglieder des Lehrkörpers - immerhin eine 
stattliche Zahl von 31 - hätten sich nun zusammengeschlossen, sich auf den Boden 
der bewährten Universitätsverfassung von 1912 gestellt und sich damit zur Autonomie 
der Universität, zur Wiederherstellung der kollegialen Verwaltung anstelle des 
Führerprinzips, zur freien Wahl der Universitätsorgane anstelle ihrer Ernennung 
bekannt. ... Der französische Kommandant habe ihm erklärt, daß der freiwillige 
Entschluß der Universität, sich auf eigene Reise zu stellen und damit zu ihrem 
wahren und ursprünglichen Wesen zurückzufinden, die Aussichten für einen baldigen 
Semesterbeginn verbessere. Möge dies sein, wie auch immer, auf alle Fälle sei die 
Tübinger Universität sehr viel besser daran als Heidelberg, wo sich noch kein Leben 
regt und demgemäß die Universität zu bloßer Passivität verurteilt scheine."
Französische Militärherrschaft: "... Eines ist allgemein als notwendig erschienen, nämlich der Wechsel im Rektorat, obwohl der vom nationalsozialistischen Regime eingesetzte amtierende Rektor ein Mann war, dessen Autonomie und Führungsqualitäten ... Der Grund für die Notwendigkeit eines Rektorwechsels habe also nicht in der Persönlichkeit des bisherigen Rektors gelegen; sondern den Fall des politischen Regimes habe eine Umgestaltung der Universität und ihrer Vertretung folgen müssen ... Wenn der Lehrkörper auch das Bild der Einigkeit vorgestellt habe, so hätten doch in Wirklichkeit tiefe Klüfte zwischen seinen Mitgliedern geklafft und die Gegner des Regimes hätten die Verpflichtung gefühlt zu handeln und nicht untätig abzuwarten, bis die Besatzungsbehörden eingriffen ... Er sei gefragt worden, ob er das Rektoramt übernehmen wolle. Er habe mehrere Unterredungen mit dem früheren Rektor gehabt. Dieser habe erklärt, daß seine Person nicht im Wege stehen dürfe, aber zuletzt die Frage gestellt, ob es nicht gegen die nationale Ehre ginge, ohne Zwang das zu tun, was die Besatzungsmacht wünsche und er (i.e. Schneider) habe ihm antworten müssen, daß es sich um Reformen handele, deren Unterlassung er schon seit 12 Jahren als schweren Druck empfunden habe. Die Klüfte habe sich aufgetan und Professor Stickl sich schließlich zum Rücktritt entschlossen.

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Die nichtnationalsozialistischen Mitglieder des Lehrkörpers – innerhalb einer staatlichen Zahl von 31 – hätten sich nun zusammengeschlossen, sich auf den Boden der bewährten Universitätsverfassung von 1912 gestellt und sich damit zur Autonomie der Universität, zur Wiedereinsetzung der kollektiven Verwaltung anstelle des Führerprinzips, zur freien Wahl der Universitätsorgane anstelle ihrer Ernennung bekannt. ... Der französische Kommandant habe ihm erklärt, daß der freiwillige Entscheider der Universität, sich auf eigene Beine zu stellen und damit zu ihrem wahren und ursprünglichen Wesen zurückzufinden, die Aussichten für einen baldigen Semesterbeginn verbessere. Möge dies sein, wie auch immer, auf alle Fälle sei die Tübinger Universität sehr viel besser daran als Heidelberg, wo sich noch kein Leben räte und demgemäß die Universität zu bloßer Passivität verurteilt scheine."
(One thing is generally regarded as essential, namely a change in the office of rector, although the officiating rector installed by the National Socialist regime was a man whose term of administration had been irreproachable... The reason therefore for a change of rector did not lie in the personality of the present rector; rather, it was the case that the collapse of the political regime had to be followed by a reorganisation of the university and its official representatives...

Even though the teaching staff had presented a picture of unity, deep divisions had existed within its ranks and the opponents of the (National Socialist) regime had felt obliged to act and not to wait idly until the occupying authorities intervened... He had been asked whether he would take over the office of rector. He had several talks with the former rector. The latter had stated that his person should not be allowed to stand in the way but had posed the question as to whether it was against national honour to do what the occupying power wanted without being compelled to do so and he (Schneider) had had to answer him that it concerned reforms, the neglect of which had been a severe burden to him for 12 years. The gap between them had widened and Professor Stickl had finally decided to resign...

The university was indebted to the occupying authorities for readily conceding to it the opportunity to act on its own account and for their sympathetic understanding for the university’s interests, a feature which indeed had to be commended. Special thanks was due to the occupying authorities for permitting the present session of the "Großer Senat", surely a unique event in contemporary German university life.

The non-National Socialist members of the teaching staff – an impressive number of 31 after all – had now come together, committed themselves to the framework of the trustworthy university constitution of 1912 and thereby declared themselves for the autonomy of the university, for the restoration of the collegial administration instead of the principle of totalitarian leadership, for the free election of university bodies in place of their being appointed... The French commander had stated that the voluntary decision by the university to stand on its own feet and thus to find its way back to its true and original character improved the chances for an early start of term. Be that as it may, the University of Tübingen was in any case very much better off than Heidelberg where there was no sign of life stirring yet and where the university seemed accordingly to be condemned to mere passivity.)
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Professor Schneider held the office of rector for one academic year. During this period the main bulk of the denazification of the university was achieved. In the initial stages of the occupation denazification procedures within the university, as elsewhere, was a haphazard business. On May 3, 1945, the French authorities arrested eight professors; three of those were released within a matter of days. By October 15, the official date of re-opening, twenty-two professors and eight lecturers had been suspended from teaching, according to Hermann Werner. By August 1946 this number had swollen considerably to encompass 40 professors, eight "Dozenten" and eleven "Assistenten" (lecturers).

The French military government rationalised the process of investigation into the political background of university staff by introducing the system of "Fragebogen" (questionnaire) to the university in June 1945. The rector informed his colleagues of this development in a circular dated June 12: "Die französische Militärregierung hat angeordnet, daß die Mitglieder des Lehrkörpers der Universität einen Fragebogen nach dem beiliegenden Vordruck auszufüllen haben. Der Fragebogen muß vollständig beantwortet werden. Ich bitte, ihn spätestens an nächsten Montag, den 18. Juni vormittags, dem Rectorat zurückzugeben." (The French Military Government has ordered that members of the university teaching staff must complete a questionnaire similar to the enclosed printed form. The questionnaire must be completed in full. I would like to ask you to return the same to the rector's office not later than midday on Monday, June 18.)

In the months of July and August 1945 the position of former NSDAP members at the university became more insecure as the French authorities imposed Allied Control Council regulations concerning the dismissal of all former party members. The Allied Control Council regulations were applied within the French zone in the form of two decrees (July 14 and 18). On August 23 the ministry of education in Stuttgart informed the University of Tübingen of a new decree whereby a work and wages ban was to be imposed on the following categories:

1. Alle Angehörige der SS,
2. alle Staatsbetriebsleiter, die vor 15.1.1933 der NSDAP beigetreten sind,
3. alle Staatsbetriebsleiter, die nach 15.1.1933 Mitglied der NSDAP geworden sind und das Amt eines Kreisauflagungsoffiziers oder Kreispropagandaleiters inne hatten oder im SD verwendet waren sowie solche, die sich in einem
anderen Amt in der Partei vom Ortsgruppenleiter an aufwärts betätigt haben,
4. alle offenkundige Fälle, in denen sich Staatsbedienstete aus Selbstverschulden bisher nicht auf ihrer bisherigen Dienststelle gemeldet haben,
5. Staatsbedienstete, die mit der Abgabe des Fragebogens offensichtlich im Verzug sind,
6. Staatsbedienstete, die bereits vom Amt suspendiert sind, deren Bezüge aber noch nicht abgeschrieben sind,
7. ledige Staatsbedienstete, die von der Wehrmacht noch nicht zurückgekehrt sind (einschließlich Vermisster).

(1) All members of the SS,
2. all civil servants who joined the NSDAP before 1.5.1933,
3. all civil servants who became members of the NSDAP after 1.5.1933, who held the office of a "Kreis" training leader or "Kreis" propaganda leader or had a function within the SS, as well as those who have been active in any other capacity within the NSDAP, from local branch leader upwards,
4. all obvious cases in which civil servants have not, through their own fault, reported to their former department,
5. civil servants who obviously are late with the submittal of their questionnaires,
6. civil servants who are already suspended from duty but whose salaries have not yet been withdrawn,
7. unmarried civil servants who have not yet returned from the armed forces (including those missing). (26)

On September 4, in accordance with the terms of the decree, Carlo Schmid informed the rector of the dismissal of thirty-four professors. (27)

On August 29 Professor Schneider issued a second circular on the subject of denazification to the members of staff: "Als Rektor bin ich für Geist und Wirken unserer Universität verantwortlich und habe mich den französischen Kommandanten gegenüber für ihre Haltung verbürgt. Der Forderung der Besatzungsmacht ist Genüge geschehen, den Lehrkörper von denjenigen Persönlichkeiten zu entlasten, die eine ausreichende Gewähr gegen die Nachwirkungen des Nationalsozialismus in Haltung und
Lehre nicht zu bieten schienen; mit dem Abschluß dieses Reinigungsvorganges wird, wie ich hoffe und wünsche, die innere Einheit des Lehrkörpers und die vertrauensvolle Zusammenarbeit wiederkehren.

Ich wende mich an die Gesamtheit der Dozenten, namentlich aber an diejenigen, die in ihrer äußeren Betätigung und ihrem Denken der Partei irgendwie nahegetreten sind, mit der sehr ernst gemeinten Aufforderung, künftig in Leben und Lehre jede Art näherer Annäherung an den Nationalsozialismus zu meiden ... .

(As rector I am responsible for the attitude and functioning of our university and have been made answerable to the French commander for its behaviour. The occupying power's order to relieve the teaching staff of those personalities who did not seem to offer adequate guarantee against the after-effects of National Socialism, both in their bearing and teaching, has been obeyed; I hope and wish that with the conclusion of this denazification process a sense of inner unity and trustful co-operation will return to the teaching staff.

I appeal to all university lecturers, in particular to those who have in some way or other demonstrated close contact with the (National Socialist) party in external deed or thought, with the very earnest request to avoid in future any kind of rapprochement with National Socialism both in their personal life and their teaching ... .)

In the light of Carlo Schmid's letter of September 4 the optimistic note of the above circular proved premature. All in all, despite the stern warning above, the rector adopted a protective attitude towards the academic staff in denazification matters. On September 10 Schneider circulated a third notice to those members of staff who had been suspended by the French advising them to counteract their dismissal by writing appeals to the German education authorities. It has not been ascertained whether the rector issued this circular at the instigation of the German administration or not. The circular read as follows: "Um wortuell die über Sie ausgesprochene vorläufige Amtsenthebung rückgängig zu machen, möchte ich Ihnen nahelegen, umgehend, spätestens bis Donnerstag, 13.9., 9 Uhr, einen entsprechenden Antrag bei mir einzulegen. Der Antrag ist zu richten an den Rektor "zur Weiterleitung an die Landesverwaltung für Kultus, Erziehung und Kunst, Stuttgart und an die Militärregierung in Baden-Baden" (3-fache Fertigung). Er soll
auf höchstens 2 Schreibmaschinenseiten Auskunft geben über die Gründe Ihres Beitrags zur NSDAP und alle Momente aufzuführen, die Sie politisch entlasten. Eine Beifügung von Belegen usw. ist nicht erwünscht. Die Darlegung sollte ausklingen in einem Satz etwa folgenden Inhalts: "Aus diesen Gründen stelle ich den Antrag, die gegen mich ausgesprochene Amtsenthebung rückgängig zu machen." (In order to reverse, if possible, your suspension from office, I would like to urge you to submit an appropriate application to me at your earliest convenience and not later than Thursday, September 13, 9 a.m. The application is to be addressed to the rector "to be forwarded to the "Land" Administration for Religion, Education and Art in Stuttgart and to the Military Government in Baden-Baden" (in triplicate). Within not more than 2 typed pages it should give details about your reasons for joining the NSDAP and should list all the factors which may help to clear you politically. The enclosure of documentary evidence etc. is not desired. The statement should end in a sentence of roughly the following gist: "For these reasons I submit this application to reverse my suspension from office").

This circular loosed a flood of appeals. In many cases the appeals were submitted by the wives of professors who were in prison or in PoW camps.

With the official opening of the university in October 1945 Schneider presumed that university life could return to normal and that the denazification programme would be abandoned. This optimism was reflected in his report to the "Großer Senat" on October 13: "Der Rektor bemerkt einleitend: Die Tatsache, zu der heutigen Sitzung eingeladen worden zu sein, bedeute für viele eine Schicksalswende. Er begrüße die Kollegen, die der Universität erhalten werden konnten. Die Epuration sei der Universität nicht aufgedrängt worden, aber es sei hier von selbst der Druck entstanden, daß manche Kollegen nicht in die neue Zeit paßten. Es sei bitter, daß sie geopfert werden mußten. Aber er freue sich, daf die Epuration in ganz so sanfte Weise ausgefallen sei." (The rector remarked by way of introduction that the fact they had been invited to the meeting meant a change of fortune for many people. He welcomed those colleagues whom it had been possible to retain as university staff. The denazification purge had not been forced upon the university but rather the impression had arisen of its own accord that many colleagues did not fit into the new period. It was a painful fact that they had to be sacrificed. But he was glad that the purge had turned out to be so lenient on the whole.)
Schneider turned his attention some weeks later (November 8) to those members who had been dismissed and whose letters of appeal had failed to gain the desired effect: "The material insecurity, which accompanied the dismissal of a number of colleagues and their families, compels me to suggest that in the event of sudden need and predicaments they should confidently apply to the Academic Rector's Office. I have tried to take measures in two ways: firstly, by obtaining interest-free loans, the repayment terms of which would be agreed upon according to the existing situation; secondly, by granting financial aid which did not require to be repaid in particularly urgent cases of illness or other unexpected situations requiring ready cash.

I should be pleased if in this way we succeeded in relieving the colleagues concerned and their families of very pressing material worries and I ask them to put their trust in the discretion and willingness to help of the Academic Rector's Office.)

In January 1946 the question of the denazification of university staff was raised at a cabinet meeting of the "Staatssekretariat". According to the minutes of the meeting the ensuing discussion arose: "Landesdirektor Dr. Binder suggests that the Lehrkörper der Universität each be scrutinized anew politically. It was his belief that this would be better than to proceed in an arbitrary manner in the hope that the student body would assume a different stance, as indeed has been the case."
Staatsrat Schmid warnt davor, noch einmal in den Lehrkörper störend einzugreifen. Die Leute, deren Wirksamkeit auf die geistige Haltung der Studenten wirklich gefährlich werden könnte, seien größtenteils gar nicht die, die auf Grund Parteizugehörigkeit usw. bei einer schärferen Säuberung ausgeschieden werden könnten. Es besteht Übereinstimmung, von einer erneuten politischen Überprüfung der Dissizität abzustand zu nehmen ...

(Landesdirektor Dr. Binder suggested subjecting the teaching staff to a fresh political investigation. The previous one had been implemented in a very lenient fashion in the expectation that the students would assume a different attitude than what was in fact largely the case at the present time.

Staatsrat Schmid warned against interfering in a disruptive manner again with the teaching staff. Those people whose influence on the intellectual attitude of the students could really become dangerous were for the most part not at all ones who could be removed by a stricter denazification campaign on the basis on party membership etc.

There was general agreement (i.e. within the cabinet) about to refrain from instituting a fresh political investigation of the teaching staff ...

In May 1946, however, the theme was re-opened by the announcement of the Staatssekretär’s decree, "Rechtsanordnung zur politischen Säuberung" (Legal decree concerning political denazification). In accordance with the articles of this decree the university was required to establish a denazification committee, termed the "Säuberungsausschuss" (denazification committee). This resulted in contention between the university and the French military government over the extent of autonomy to be granted the university in the running of this committee. The subsequent compromise reached between the two parties was described later by Staatspräsident Boek in a cabinet meeting of the government of Württemberg-Hohenzollern (November 11, 1947): "... Die Militärregierung habe sich vor die nach Erhebungen der Rechtsanordnung zur politischen Säuberung vom 20. Mai 1946 auf den Standpunkt gestellt, daß die politische Säuberung des Lehrkörpers ausschließlich eine Angelegenheit der Militärregierung sei, wobei die letzte Entscheidung in Baden-Baden zu fallen habe. Auf Grund einer Besprechung mit der Militärregierung am 24. Oktober 1946 sei festgelegt worden, daß die Beamten, Angestellten und Arbeiter der Universität dem normalen Säuberungsverfahren unterworfen werden sollen, für den Lehrkörper aber..."
A special denazification committee was to be formed for the teaching staff. The denazification committee, however, had only to check whether and to what extent a pension should be awarded to those dismissed or whether they were to be subjected to even further measures, but not to decide whether dismissals which had been pronounced by the Military Government were correct or not. Nor was it the function of this committee to re-examine members of the teaching staff who had already been re-installed in their office on the basis of a decision by the Military Government.

In April 1946 the French authorities also set about reducing the influence of former NSDAP members within the decision-making bodies of the university. On April 18 the official within the "Staatssekretariat" responsible for university affairs, Ministerialrat Dr. Kupp, wrote to the rector: "Die Militärregierung hat mich um Vorschläge darüber ersucht, wie der Einfluß der früheren Mitglieder der NSDAP im Kleinen Senat der Universität ausgeschaltet werden kann. Nach meiner Kenntnis gehören an früheren Parteimitgliedern dem Kleinen Senat nur 2 Professoren Bernhold und Professor Kern an. Ich erachte, den genannten Herren nachzuzeigen, ihr Amt als Mitglied des Kleinen Senats niederzulegen. Der Große Senat hätte dann so bald als möglich zu einer Konsultation zu schreiten, bei der anstelle der beiden ausgeschiedenen Mitglieder andere Ordinarien, die nicht Mitglieder der NSDAP waren, zu wählen wären." (The Military Government has asked me for suggestions as to how the influence of former NSDAP members can be eliminated within the
"Kleiner Senat" of the university. According to my knowledge the only former party members on the "Kleiner Senat" were Professor Bernhold and Professor Kern. I request you to urge these gentlemen to resign from their office as members of the "Kleiner Senat". The "Großer Senat" would then have to proceed as soon as possible to a replacement election in which other full professors who were not NSDAP members would be elected in place of the two retiring members.\(^{34}\) A year later (March 1947) the rector was instructed to inform twenty-one professors, all former NSDAP members, that they were banned from participating, either directly or indirectly, in the election of a new rector.\(^{35}\) The French thus prevented those party members at the university who had escaped dismissal from exercising influence on the administrative or political affairs of the university.

In December 1947 the university lost whatever autonomy it possessed in denazification procedures. The French military government integrated the university into the general apparatus of denazification in Süd-Württemberg by establishing a "Spruchkammer" (denazification tribunal) for the university in which the five political parties and the trade unions were represented. On December 12 the rector informed his professorial colleagues of the composition of the new body:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Verwaltungsrat</th>
<th>Stellvertreter</th>
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<td>CDU: Prof. Erbe</td>
<td>Dr. Zweigert</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPD: Prof. Küberle</td>
<td>Dr. Lambacher</td>
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<td>DVP: Prof. Kieß</td>
<td>Dr. Kieß</td>
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<td>KPD: Frau Grieshaber</td>
<td>Dr. Lambacher</td>
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<td>Gewerkschaften: Ernst Kirner</td>
<td>Prof. Erbe</td>
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<td>Berufsgruppen: Prof. Weber</td>
<td>Frau Grieshaber</td>
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<td>Prof. Teschemacher</td>
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(Chairman: Prof. Erbe, Deputy: Dr. Zweigert)
This sort of directive from the "Staatssekretariat" to the rector created considerable animosity within the university since many professors regarded such directives as a usurpation of the university's autonomy as formulated by the university constitution of 1912. In an apparent gesture of defiance the university faculties had insisted on selecting their own representatives for the "Säuberungsausschuss"; in April 1947, however, the rector informed the faculty heads that the "Staatssekretariat" insisted on its choice being implemented in the composition of the denazification committee: "Die Landesdirektion ersucht mich, die Fakultäten darauf aufmerksam zu machen, daß es unmöglich sei, anstelle der von der Landeskultdirektion als Mitglieder des Säuberungsausschusses ernannten Fakultätsmitglieder andere Herren der Fakultät als Vertreter zu entsenden ..." (The "Landesdirektion" has asked me to point out to the faculties that it is not permissible to delegate faculty staff as representatives other than those faculty members appointed by the "Landeskultdirektion" to be members of the denazification committee ...).

The "Staatssekretariat"'s method of intimating French decisions on denazification matters by means of decree was also strongly resented within university quarters. An example of such was the decree of May 16, 1946, from the "Landesdirektion für Kultus, Erziehung und Kunst" to the rector: "Auf Grund des Erlasses des Herrn Gouverneur vom 4. Mai 1946 Nr. 1256 CAB. Nr. 1/RC/MS werden durch Beschluß des Direktoriums des Staatssekretariats nachfolgende Mitglieder des Lehrkörpers der Universität mit sofortiger Wirkung aus dem Beamtenverhältnis entlassen:

Der ordentliche Professor Dr. Hermann Faber,

Artur Weiser,

Walther Schönfeld,

Hans-Erich Feins,

Georg Eisner,

Hans-Noeller,

Friedrich Focke,

Heinrich Dannenhauer,

Otto Stückl,

Felix Höring,

Otto Thies,

Dottor Hermann Heimberger,

Gotthold Hackh ..."
On the basis of a decree by the Governor of May 4, 1946, No. L86 CAB, UN 1/40/49, and of a decision by the cabinet of the State Secretariat, the following members of the university teaching staff are dismissed with immediate effect from their positions as civil servants:

Professor Hermann Faber,
- Arthur Weiser,
- Walther Schönfeld,
- Hans-Erich Feine,
- Georg Kieser,
- Herko Muller,
- Friedrich Fiek,
- Heinrich Dannenhauer,
- Otto Stickl,

Reader Dr. Richard Kienzle,
- Dr. Felix Höring,
- Dr. Otto Thies,

Lecturer Dr. Hermann Heimberger,
- Dr. Gotthold Hackh ...)

In reprisal the university constantly dragged its feet over various issues related to denazification. The outstanding case concerned appointments to professorial chairs which had been vacated at the orders of the French military government or the denazification committee. The "Staatssekretariat" retaliated by accusing the university of endeavouring to keep the chairs open for their previous incumbents. On December 5, 1946, Dr. Rupp wrote a strongly worded letter to the rector: "Obwohl es im Laufe des letzten Jahres erfreulicherweise gelungen ist, die Mehrzahl der durch die politische Säuberung freigewordenen Lehrstühle neu zu besetzen ..., liegen mir für einige besonders wichtige Lehrstühle trotz wiederholten Erwähmens bis heute immer noch keine Berufungsvorschläge vor ... Ich habe den Eindruck, daß die betroffenen Fakultäten mit der Vorlage von Berufungsvorschlägen deshalb zögern, weil sie immer noch eine Wiedereinstellung der entlassenen bisherigen Lehrstuhlinhaber erwarten, obwohl von seiten des Staatssekretariats wie auch von seiten der französischen Militärregierung mehrfach und mit Nachdruck erklärt worden ist, daß damit in keinem Fall zu rechnen sei ... ich muß daher nun darauf bestehen, daß mir Berufungsvorschläge für die noch freien Lehrstühle bis spätestens 15. Februar 1947 vorgelegt werden." (Although in the course of last year those profes-
so rial chairs which had fallen empty because of denazification measures were successfully filled to one's satisfaction... proposals of appointment have not yet reached me for some especially important chairs despite my repeated requests... I am under the impression that the faculties concerned are hesitating with the submission of proposals of appointment because they still expect that the former occupants of professorial chairs who were dismissed will be reinstated, although it has been emphatically stated several times both by the State Secretariat and by the French Military Government that this should not be reckoned with under any circumstances... Consequently I must now insist that proposals of appointment for the as yet vacant chairs be submitted to me by not later than February 15, 1947.)

By February 1947, however, the "Staatssekretariat’s" wishes had not been fulfilled and Dr. Hupp again wrote the university demanding that short lists for appointments to the vacant chairs be forwarded to the "Staatssekretariat" by March 15 at the latest. There were nine chairs in all awaiting appointment: geology and palaeontology, chemistry, medicine, law, classical philology, history, psychology and education and two in Protestant theology. In the course of 1947 the university, eventually capitulated in the face of the "Staatssekretariat’s" strident demands, especially when the "Staatssekretariat" set about directly appointing replacements to the chairs.

The nomination of professors by Carlo Schmid was an especially sore point between the university and the "Staatssekretariat". Carlo Schmid and the local French military government were in agreement that a successful renaissance of academic life in Tübingen after the twelve-year period of subjection and commitment to National Socialist ideology required the appointment of new academics from outside Tübingen, men who had already proven their ability and whose reputation would enhance that of the university. Tübingen was already fortunate in that it had gained a number of prestigious academics with the re-settlement of a number of "Kaisers-Wilhelm-Institute" in Tübingen during the war years. The two outstanding personalities were Professor Adolf Butenandt, Nobel Prize winner (1939) and director of the "Kaisers-Wilhelm-Institut für Biochemie", and Professor Alfred Kühn, director of the "Kaisers-Wilhelm-Institut für Biologie".

In addition Carlo Schmid gained Eduard Spranger, formerly professor of philosophy at Berlin, for the chair of philosophy. Spranger was a well-known
academic figure in both the pre-war and post-war era. Furthermore, Schmid persuaded Romano Guardini, a former professor of Berlin, to accept the chair of "Religionsphilosophie und Katholische Weltanschauung" (Religious Philosophy and Catholic Ideology). Schmid's invitation to Guardini led to a dispute between the university and the "Staatssekretariat". In the course of an interview between Carlo Schmid and representatives of the Bishop of Lübeck Schmid, according to minutes of the meeting recorded by the churchmen, gave his version of the quarrel as follows: "... Zwischen hinein sagte er, es reue ihm schon etwas, daß er der Universität die ganze frühere Freiheit wiedergegeben habe, denn es zeigte sich, daß sie im Fall Guardini sich nicht so benehme, wie er es erwartet hätte. Zunächst hätte der Senat seinen Vorschlag, Guardini in die philosophische Fakultät zu berufen, restlos zugestimmt. Hinterher hätten sie ihm wissen lassen, eine Übersiedelung nach Tübingen werde sich nicht empfehlen, es gelinge, wenn er jeweils am Donnerstag zwei Stunden lese. Er werde den Senat aber wissen lassen, daß dies nicht seinen Intentionen entspreche." (In the course of this he said that he already regretted a little having given the university back all its former freedom for it was becoming apparent, as in the case of Guardini, that it was not behaving as he had expected. Originally the "Senat" had completely agreed to his suggestion to appoint Guardini to the Philosophy Faculty. Afterwards they had informed him that a transfer to Tübingen by Guardini would not be recommended and that it would be sufficient if Guardini held two hours of lectures every Thursday. But he would let the "Senat" know that this did not comply with his intentions.)

An equivalent dispute broke out over the proposal to offer the Freiburg philosopher, Martin Heidegger, a chair of philosophy. This was a surprising choice in view of Heidegger's controversial allegiance to National Socialism. According to Professor Ohlmeyer, director of the post-war "Leibniz Kolleg" at the university, this apparent contradiction was explicable in terms of French realpolitik in the sense that the French authorities were prepared to overlook points of general principle in order to gain specific advantages. The philosophical faculty eventually debated the issue on November 23, 1945. During the meeting it was revealed that Heidegger's application had the backing of the French military government: "... Auf Dannenbaeuer Hinw, Heidegger sei unverständlich, sondern hochschulpolitisch nicht unbelebtet, erweise der Dekan, der profenalischen Beschräulung seien andere da, politisch schütze ihm die Militärregierung." (In reply to Dannenbaeuer's objection that Heidegger was incomprehensible and that, further-
more, he had no clean record with regards to university politics, the dean stated that others were there for the (first-year) propædeutic introductory courses and that the Military Government was protecting him politically. (47) The faculty members finally voted in favour of another candidate named Krüger, thereby rejecting Heidegger's application by nine to one.

At a meeting of the "Kleiner Senat" on May 7, 1946, the new rector, Professor Steinbichel, raised the subject of two new professorships which had caused controversy between the university authorities and the "Staatssekretariat": "Den Rektor gibt bekannt, daß zwei Vorfälle der jüngsten Zeit, die als Nichtbeachtung von Beschlüssen des Großen Senats anzusehen seien, die Einberufung des Kleinen Senats veranlaßt hätten. Die Universität dürfe sich die Nichtbeachtung ihres Selbstverwaltungsrechtes nicht gefallen lassen, sondern müsse dagegen Protest einlegen.

Über den "Fall Weischedel" berichtet Professor Knopp: Wie er von Professor Butenandt erfahren habe, habe das Staatssekretariat, das auf unbekanntem Wege von dem Beschlus des Großen Senats vom 30.4. Kenntnis erhalten habe, unter Nichtbeachtung des Senatsbeschlusses Dozent Dr. Weischedel zum außerordentlichen Professor ernannt. In einer Besprechung hätten er, Professor Kliegl, Professor Kaske und Professor Butenandt die Ansicht vertreten, daß die Universität diesem empörenden Vorgang sich nicht gefallen lassen dürfe. Eine Ernennung über den Kopf des Senats und der Fakultät hinweg habe sogar nach 1933 zu den Seltenheiten gehört und sei vor 1933 so gut wie undenkbar gewesen. Man habe den Universitäten den Vorwurf gemacht, sie hätten gegen ähnliche Eigenmächtigkeiten im Dritten Reich nicht rechtzeitig und bestimmt genug Einspruch erhoben. Diese Unterlassung dürfe sich nicht wiederholen.

In der Aussprache wird richtiggestellt, daß die Ernennung Weischedels noch nicht erfolgt sei, aber mit großer Wahrscheinlichkeit nahe bevorstehe ... Die Senatsmitglieder sind sich darüber einig, daß ein Protest der Universität gegen diese Eigenmächtigkeit notwendig sei und daß die Universität ihre Autonomie wahren und betonen müsse.

(The rector announced that two recent incidents, which could only be defined as cases of non-compliance with resolutions passed by the "Großer Senat", had caused the "Kleiner Senat" to be convened. The university could not tolerate such non-compliance with its right of administrative autonomy and would have to protest against it.)
In the case of Weischedel Professor Knopp made the following report: As he had learnt from Professor Butenandt, the State Secretariat, having received knowledge by some unknown means of the resolution passed by the "Großer Senat" on April 30, had appointed the Lecturer, Dr. Weischedel, to Reader and thereby failed to comply with the "Senat's" resolution. In the course of a discussion (with the State Secretariat), Knopp said, Professor Kliegl, Professor Knaake, Professor Butenandt and himself had taken the view that the university could not tolerate this outrageous event. Even after 1933 it had been a rare event to have had an appointment made over the heads of "Senat" and faculty and prior to 1933 it had been as good as inconceivable. The universities have been accused of not having objected early enough and emphatically enough against similar arbitrary acts during the Third Reich. This omission must not be repeated.

In the ensuing discussion it was pointed out in rectification that Weischedel's appointment had not yet gone through although it was in all probability about to be made ... The members of the "Senat" were agreed that it was necessary for the university to lodge a protest against such arbitrariness and that the university had to protect and emphasize its autonomy.

The second item on the agenda of the meeting concerned the promotion of Carlo Schmid to the rank of full professor. Carlo Schmid had first been appointed "außerplanmäßiger Professor" (associate professor) in June 1945 while he held the position of Minister of Education in Stuttgart; this promotion had received confirmation at a meeting of the "Großer Senat" on June 23, 1945. At a cabinet meeting of the "Staatssekretariat" on April 23, 1946, Schmid was subsequently promoted to the rank of "ordinärer Professor", a rank which normally differentiates the full professor from the host of honorary and state professorships which are a specific phenomenon of German social and academic life. The ceremony of promotion was an odd occasion since Schmid himself was responsible, as head of the "Staatssekretariat" and the "Landesdirektion für Kultur, Erziehung und Kunst", for the dispensation of professorial titles. Schmid went to pains to avoid the impression of self-promotion to the extent that "während der Beratung ... war Staatsrat Professor Dr. Schmid abgetreten. Den Vorsitz übernahm Landesdirektor Roßmann" (staatsrat Professor Schmid had withdrawn ... during the course of the debate. Landesdirektor Roßmann took the chair). The minutes of this meeting recorded:
Ministerialrat Dr. Rupp berichtet über die Stellungnahme von Fakultät und Senat der Universität bezüglich der Neubesetzung des durch Ausscheiden von Professor Genzmer frei gewordenen Ordinariats für Öffentliches Recht von der rechts- und wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät. Eine Berufung des an erster Stelle auf der Vorschlagsliste genannten Professor Verdross (Vien) erscheint aussichtslos. Es wird deshalb einstimmig beschlossen, Herrn Staatsrat Professor Dr. K. Schmid, der an zweiter Stelle genannt ist, zum ordentlichen Professor in der rechts- und wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität zu ernennen.

In Anbetracht der Tatsache, dass Professor Schmid schon im Jahre 1934 als ordentlicher Professor nach Tübingen berufen werden sollte, auch einen Ruf nach Leipzig erhielt, diese Berufungen jedoch jeweils aus politischen Gründen von Seiten der Partei abgelehnt wurden, wird beschlossen, das Besoldungsdienstalter für Staatsrat Schmid auf 1.4.1934 festzusetzen. Die Bezüge aus der Professur ruhen während der Tätigkeit von Staatsrat Schmid als Landesdirektor mit Ausnahme der Kollegengarantie von jährlich Mk 2000.- ...


(Ministerialrat Dr. Rupp reported on the attitude of both faculty and "Senat" concerning the Professorship of Public Law in the Faculty of Law and Economics which had become vacant on the retirement of Professor Genzmer. The appointment of Professor Verdross (Vienna), whose name headed the list of suggestions, seemed futile. It was therefore unanimously decided to appoint Staatsrat Professor Carlo Schmid, whose name was second on the list, as a full professor in the university's Faculty of Law and Economics.

In view of the fact that Professor Schmid was already supposed to have received a professorship at the University of Tübingen in 1934 and indeed had also received a call to the University of Leipzig and that these appointments had, how-
"Ministerialrat Dr. Hupp berichtet über die Stellungnahme von Fakultät und Senat der Universität bezüglich der Neubesetzung des durch Ausscheiden von Professor Genzmer frei gewordenen Ordinariats für Öffentliches Recht von der rechts- und wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät. Eine Berufung des an erster Stelle auf der Vorschlagsliste genannten Professor Verdross (Venien) erscheint aussichtslos. Es wird deshalb einstimmig beschlossen, Herrn Staatsrat Professor Dr. K. Schmid, der an zweiter Stelle genannt ist, zum ordentlichen Professor in der rechts- und wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität zu ernennen.

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In view of the fact that Professor Schmid was already supposed to have received a professorship at the University of Tübingen in 1934 and indeed had also received a call to the University of Leipzig and that these appointments had, how-
ever, been rejected in each case by the NSDAP on political grounds, it was decided to define Staatsrat Schmid's remuneration seniority as for the period from April 1, 1934. The professorial salary will be suspended, with the exception of the annual basic lecture fee of 2,000 Reichsmark, during Staatsrat Schmid's period of office as "Landesdirektor"...

...The cabinet's decision concerning his appointment as professor was communicated to Staatsrat Schmid. Staatsrat Schmid declared that he would not ("in accordance with the wishes of the cabinet")—amendment appended after receipt of permission by telephone from Landesdirektor Hofmann), however, exercise his rights and duties as a member of the "Großer Senat" in view of his superior position as chairman of the cabinet and as "Landesdirektor für Kultus, Erziehung und Kunst". The circumstances surrounding Schmid's appointment to the chair of law became a subject of bitter dispute which culminated in a series of court cases in the 1960's between Carlo Schmid and the Tübingen publisher of *Der rote Kufmord* by Kurt Ziesel, in which Schmid was accused of self-promotion. The publisher, Schlichtenmeyer, lost three court cases and subsequently committed suicide. The affair was a newspaper theme for some considerable time in the 1960's (especially in *Neue Hamburger Generalanzeiger*).

At the "Senat" meeting of May 7, 1946, the members were scathing in their criticisms of Schmid's self-advancement at the expense of the basic principles of the university's constitution and traditions: "Der 2. Fall betrifft die Ernennung des Staatsrats apl. Professors Dr. Schmid zum ordentlichen Professor für Öffentliches Recht ebenfalls unter Ignorierung des Senatbeschlusses vom 30. April. Das Staatssekretariat bzw. Professor Schmid habe die Bedingungen, von denen der Große Senat seine Berufung abhängig gemacht habe, überhaupt nicht beachtet. Eine so große und wichtige ordentliche Professur, wie die des Öffentlichen Rechts, könne nicht im Nebenamt versehen werden. Professor Schmid habe es auch abgelehnt, eine große Vorlesung über Öffentliches Recht zu übernehmen und begnüge sich mit einer Dies-Vorlesung über ein abgelegenes Thema (Machiavelli). Auch in diesem Palle dürfe die Universität keine Schwäche zeigen, selbst wenn Professor Schmid's Verhalten vielleicht rein formal nicht beanstandet werden könne." (The second case concerned the appointment of Staatsrat Professor Schmid as Professor of Public Law in disregard of the "Senat's" resolution of April 30. The State Secretariat and Professor Schmid had
not at all observed the conditions upon which the "Großer Senat" had made his appointment contingent. Such a major and important professorship as that of Public Law could not be held as a subsidiary position. Professor Schmid had also declined to hold a full lecture series on public law and had contented himself with a special lecture ("dies") on a remote subject (Machiavelli). In this case too the university should not show any weakness, even if Professor Schmid’s attitude could not perhaps be censured on strictly formal grounds.)

Another example of this conflict of interests between the university and the "Staatssekretariat" may be quoted from a heated exchange of correspondence between Ministerialrat Dr. Rupp and the university rector concerning the nomination of a certain Dr. Otto Schmitt from the Technische Hochschule Stuttgart as an honorary professor. Dr. Rupp felt it necessary to defend the "Staatssekretariat's" decision at length against criticisms made by the "Großer Senat" when ratifying the request to appoint Dr. Schmitt. Rupp took particular exception to the phrase: "Der Große Senat ist daher mit dem Vorschlag der Philosophischen Fakultät einverstanden, allerdings mit dem Bemerken, daß solche Zusicherungen von seiten des Kultministeriums vor erfolgter Annahme mit den zuständigen Universitätsinstanzen wohl als der traditionellen Autonomie der Hochschulen abträglich erscheinen mUsse." (Therefore the "Großer Senat" is in agreement with the suggestion from the Philosophy Faculty, whilst noting at the same time, however, that assurances of this kind given by the Ministry of Education before the competent university authorities have been approached must appear without doubt detrimental to the traditional autonomy of the universities.)

Such conflicts developed into a general dispute over the constitution of the university and the university's traditional right of autonomous self-management. At the first meeting of the "Kleiner Senat" on May 11, 1945, the rector stated, according to the minutes, "es sei nun die erste Aufgabe, die alte kollegiale Verfassung wieder in ihr Hecht einzusetzen" (the first task was now to restore the old collegial constitution to its rights). On the day after the opening of the theological faculties (August 20, 1945) Professor Schneider wrote to the local military government commander of Tübingen, Lieutenant-Colonel Huchoni: "Ich gestatte mir, nach Beginn des Herbstsemesters an Sie erneut die Bitte zu richten, mich in Lage versetzen zu wollen, daß ich die in der Verfassung der Universität Tübingen
not at all observed the conditions upon which the "Großer Senat" had made his appointment contingent. Such a major and important professorship as that of Public Law could not be held as a subsidiary position. Professor Schmid had also declined to hold a full lecture series on public law and had contented himself with a special lecture ("dies") on a remote subject (Nechianelli). In this case too the university should not show any weakness, even if Professor Schmid's attitude could not perhaps be censured on strictly formal grounds.\(^{(55)}\)

Another example of this conflict of interests between the university and the "Staatssekretariat" may be quoted from a heated exchange of correspondence between Ministerialrat Dr. Rupp and the university rector concerning the nomination of a certain Dr. Otto Schmitt from the Technische Hochschule Stuttgart as an honorary professor. Dr. Rupp felt it necessary to defend the "Staatssekretariat"s decision at length against criticisms made by the "Großer Senat" when ratifying the request to appoint Dr. Schmitt. Rupp took particular exception to the phrase: "Der Große Senat ist daher mit dem Vorschlag der Philosophischen Fakultät einverstanden, allerdings mit dem Bemerken, daß solche Zusicherungen von Seiten des Kultministeriums vor erfolgter Annahme mit den zuständigen Universitätsinstanzen wohl als der traditionellen Autonomie der Hochschulen abträglich erscheinen müssen." (Therefore the "Großer Senat" is in agreement with the suggestion from the Philosophy Faculty, whilst noting at the same time, however, that assurances of this kind given by the Ministry of Education before the competent university authorities have been approached must appear without doubt detrimental to the traditional autonomy of the universities.)\(^{(56)}\)

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vom 5.10.1912, in der Fassung des Nachdrucks von 1929, den Rektor der Universität eingeräumten Rechte ausüben darf und es keiner Sondergenehmigung für den Einzelfall bedarf. Unter die hier gemeinte Zuständigkeit fällt z.B. die Einberufung des Großen Senats zur Wahrnehmung der diesem Selbstverwaltungsorgan der Universität gemäß § 39 der Verfassung zustehenden Rechte." (I humbly request you, now that the autumn term has begun, to empower me to exercise the rights granted to the rector of the university by the constitution of Tübingen University of 5.10.1912, in the reprint edition of 1929, without requiring recourse to special permission in individual cases. The term "competency" includes in this case, for example, the convocation of the "Großer Senat" for the purpose of safeguarding the rights vested in this autonomous body of the university by Paragraph 39 of the constitution.)

The French authorities did not in fact permit the rector or senate to wholly resume their traditional rights during the period, 1945-1947. Carlo Schmid and Dr. Hupp maintained close surveillance on university affairs and implemented French policy whenever instructed to by the military government. Schmid's role can best be illustrated perhaps by quoting from Widmer's correspondence with Schmid. In March 1947, for example, Widmer wrote: "Vous m'avez fait parvenir le 6.2.1947, sous le No. II. 342, une lettre relative à la mise en place d'un comité d'épuration pour l'université de Tübingen.

La composition de ce comité peut prêter à un certain nombre de critiques qui pourraient compromettre dans l'opinion la position de l'université.

Je relève, entre autres, qu'un professeur ayant signé la trop fameuse déclaration du 1.3.1933 (i.e. declaration of allegiance to Adolf Hitler), a été désigné comme membre de ce comité.

Il est absolument nécessaire que les personalités appelées à juger de la compromission politique de leurs collègues soient elles-mêmes au-dessus de tout soupçon.

En conséquence, je vous serais reconnaissant de bien vouloir user de votre influence personnelle pour donner à cette action d'épuration, en soi délicate, un caractère de netteté sans laquelle elle serait d'avance condamnée."
The university retaliated by attempting to block those measures which it considered a usurpation of traditional university autonomy. Inevitably conflicts arose. Such a case was the row over a proposed honorary doctorate for the novelist, Hermann Hesse. The philosophical faculty refused to follow the "Staatssekretariat"'s recommendation to invest Hesse with an honorary doctorate on the occasion of his seventieth birthday (July 2, 1947). This in turn provoked a sharp reaction from the "Staatssekretariat" in the form of a letter from Dr. Hupp: "Um etwa mögliche Mißverständnisse von vornherein auszuschalten, betone ich, daß nach meiner Auffassung sich eine Fakultät völlig frei darüber entscheiden soll, ob sie eine bestimmte Persönlichkeit einer akademischen Ehre, etwa der Verleihung des Ehrendoktors, für würdig hält oder nicht. Wenn ich auf Anregung des Directoriums an die Universität mit der Bitte herangetreten bin, die Frage der Verleihung eines Ehrendoktors an den Dichter Hermann Hesse aus Anlaß seines 70. Geburtstags am 2. Juli des J. zu überlegen, so war dies lediglich eine Anregung, die in keiner Weise der freien Entscheidung der Fakultät vorgreifen sollte ..."

Die Behandlung der Angelegenheit in der Fakultätsitzung vom 11.4.47, die Vertragung auf 22.7.47 und der Beschluß, die Sache als erledigt zu betrachten, da der Dichter inswischen für den schriftlichen Glückwunsch des Herrn Rektors und der Fakultät gedankt habe, stellt eine formelle, aber keine sachlich begründete Erledigung dar.

Ich darf deren erinnern, daß Hermann Hesse eine Persönlichkeit ist, die jedenfalls durch ihre frühen Werke dem schwäbischen Raum eng verbunden ist und inzwischen für die ganze Welt etwas bedeutet und daβ er trotz seiner Schweizer Staatsangehörigkeit ein deutscher Dichter ist.

Wenn auch eine Ehrenung aus Anlaß des 70. Geburtstags zu spät kommt, so wäre es doch möglich, immer noch einen sachlichen Beschluß zu fassen, namal, da in diesem Jahr die Universität Tübingen ihr 470. Jubiläum feiert ...."

(To eliminate all possible misunderstandings from the very beginning I wish to emphasize that in my opinion a university faculty should be completely free to decide whether it considers a specific personality worthy or not of an academic honour, for instance, the award of an honorary doctorate. When I approached the university at the suggestion of the cabinet with the request to consider bestowing
an honorary doctor of philosophy on the poet, Hermann Hesse, on the occasion of his 70th birthday on July 2 of this year, it was only a suggestion which was in no way intended to forestall the faculty's freedom of decision...

The handling of the matter at the faculty meeting of 11.4.1947, its postponement till 22.7.1947 and the decision to consider the matter settled since the poet had in the meantime expressed his thanks for the written statement of congratulation from the rector and the faculty all represent a formal but not a factually substantiated way of settling the matter.

May I remind you that Hermann Hesse is a personality who at all events is closely connected with the Swabian region through his early works and who since then has come to mean something to the whole world and that he is a German poet despite his Swiss nationality.

Even if it is too late for some honour on the occasion of his 70th birthday it would still be possible to pass a relevant resolution to this effect, especially as the university of Tübingen is celebrating its 470th anniversary this year...

This level of quarrelling was to a large extent a result of the French policy of indirect administration. As in other spheres the French established the general lines of policy and maintained close surveillance on events; they preferred, however, to remain as much as possible discreetly in the background whilst the "Staatssekretariat" implemented policy and, concomitantly, bore the brunt of annoyance of disgruntled faculty and "Senat" members.

At the same time, however, many of the decisions taken by the "Staatssekretariat" were expressions of Carlo Schmid's personal concept of post-war university life and of his own aspirations. His personal contacts within the French military government ensured that his ideas and proposals received at least an attentive audience. Consequently it is difficult to ascertain fully which decrees issued by both the French and the "Staatssekretariat" were the results of Schmid's efforts and which were not. The French authorities, for instance, instructed the university to establish a second chair of Romance philology in December 1945; it could equally have been in Schmid's interest to promote Romance languages, considering that he...
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was a leading expert in the subject. Similarly, in December 1946, a notice from Governor-General Wimmer informed the university that he had given his approval to the appointment of Dr. Theodor Rosenburg "appelé à faire durant le semestre d'hiver des conférences sur la république de Weimar". Dr. Rosenburg in fact settled in Tübingen at Carlo Schmid's insistence and received a position as "Fluchtlingskommissar" (Commissioner of Refugee Affairs) in the "Staatssekretariat".

The French authorities, whilst cultivating very close contacts with Schmid, did not rely on the "Staatssekretariat" solely to implement French policy within the university. As early as May 1945 the French military government installed a young captain, René Cheval, in Tübingen as the French official in control of university affairs. By training Cheval was a Germanist. Indeed he knew Friedrich Wehler, the Tübingen expert on Hölderlin, personally from his period of study as an exchange student at the University of Gießen. As such Captain Cheval was characteristic of French cultural policy within the French zone in that "the French officials responsible for education in the zone - from ministers to university and school officers - are 'germanistes'. Some possess a lively sympathy for and understanding of the Germans, which tends to discredit them in the eyes of some Frenchmen in the zone. If a few tend themselves to be sceptical of the possibility of the re-education of Germans - even by Frenchmen - the majority seem to be single-minded enthusiasts, veritable "missionaries" of French culture".

Cheval possessed a number of titles. He was known by the Germans as the "Hochschuloffizier" (University officer) or the "Verbindungsoffizier für Hochschulangelegenheiten" (liaison officer for university affairs). To the French authorities he was known as the "curateur de l'université". This was a specific office by definition of the French military government. This office has been described by Richard Gilmore as follows: "At the upper echelon of the university there was a French curator, "... généralement un jeune Normalien, chargé de surveiller l'épuration et l'orientation de l'enseignement supérieur". In specific terms, it meant that he had duties similar to those of a university Vice-Chancellor, heading along with his German counterpart a board of admissions for both faculty and students, an inter-faculty committee for curriculum decisions and a student-faculty administration group for general university problems."
As the official in charge of university affairs Cheval was included as a permanent member on the "cabinet du gouverneur", which advised the governor-general on policy and administrative matters. Within the university itself Cheval was responsible, according to a written reply to questionnaire queries, for the surveillance of four areas of university activity in which "nous avons gardé un droit de regard:

a) sur la nomination (Berufung) des professeurs,
b) sur l'admission (Zulassung) des étudiants,
c) sur la vie de l'association des étudiants (AKTA),
d) sur les publications (announced au visa GRZFO). " (69)

Cheval also had the authority to impose his personal standards and views on the university administration and indeed did so on occasion. For example, at a meeting of the "Kleiner Senat" on January 13, 1947, Cheval's criticism of a series of lectures was announced to the assembly: "Professor Butenandt berichtet über eine Unterredung mit dem Verbindungsoffizier der Militärregierung, Capitaine Cheval. Dieser habe sich sehr enttäuscht über das Programm der dies-Vorlesungen im Sommersemester ausgesprochen. Er vermisse Vorlesungen über große Themen, besonders Ringvorlesungen durch alle Fakultäten. Der dies universitatis sei nach bestimmten Richtlinien zu gestalten und nicht dem einzelnen Professor zu überlassen. Der Rector erklärt, dass er zu diesem Zweck einen Ausschuss einberufen werde." (Professor Butenandt reported on a discussion with Captain Cheval, the Military Government liaison officer. The latter had expressed his disappointment at the programme of the special guest lectures ("dies" lectures) in the summer term. He failed to note any lectures on important subjects, in particular "Ringvorlesungen" (i.e. series of lectures given by different professors on same topic) in all the faculties. The "dies universitatis" was to be arranged according to specific guidelines and was not to be left up to the individual professors. The rector stated that he would convene a committee for this purpose.) (66)

The early re-opening of the University of Tübingen in the autumn of 1945 reflected the importance which French policy makers attached to education and cultural affairs within their zone of occupation. There were three universities within the French zone at the period of Germany's collapse in 1945, Tübingen, Freiburg and Saarbrücken (the French maintained that there were only two, since they considered the Saarland as a separate entity), and the former two were among the
first in Germany to resume undergraduate teaching after the defeat of National Socialism. The French created a fourth university within their zone by establishing a new university in Mainz on May 22, 1946. This new university represented in actual fact the resurrection of the ancient University of Mainz which had flourished between 1477 and 1807.

It is probable that Tübingen was the first German university to officially resume its work in the post-war period. In January 1947 the "Akademisches Berufsamt" (University careers office) of the university claimed that "die schwäbische Landesuniversität war die erste der deutschen Universitäten, die mit Unterstützung der französischen Militärregierung ihre Tore im Sommer 1945 wieder eröffnete. Zunächst waren es nur die theologischen Fakultäten beider Konfessionen, die den Lehrbetrieb aufnahmen" (the Schwäbian university was the first of the German universities to open its gates again in the summer of 1945 with the assistance of the French Military Government. Initially it was only the theological faculties of the two confessions which resumed teaching).

In reply to a specific query concerning the reasons for the comparatively early re-opening of the university of Tübingen, Professor Cheval wrote: "Pourquoi l'université de Tübingen a-t-elle été la première a rouvrir ses portes en 1945? a) Elle n'avait subi aucun dommage du fait de la guerre. b) Il aurait été malaisé de laisser inactive une jeunesse qui, après l'effondrement du régime nazi et les blessures de la guerre, cherchait un sens nouveau à l'existence. c) L'épuration, au moins pour les deux facultés de théologie qui ont été les premières à reprendre leur activité, a été menée plus rapidement, et, aux dires des Allemands eux-mêmes, de façon plus libérale que dans les autres zones d'occupation." (67)

The first public indication of the possible re-opening of the university for teaching was given during a meeting of the "Großer Senat" on June 23, 1945, when Professor Schneider declared, according to the minutes of the meeting: "Der neue Kommandant der französischen Militärregierung zeigte großes Verständnis für die Universität und trat allem nach dafür ein, daß sie möglichst bald - spätestens im Herbst - wieder eröffnet werde. Das kommende Semester soll den Charakter eines
Zwischensemester oder Versuchssemester haben". (The new French Military Government commander showed great understanding for the university and advocated, as far as appearances went, that the university should be re-opened as soon as possible — in the autumn at the latest. The coming term was to bear the character of an intermediate or trial term.)

The first stage of the re-opening of the university was established by 
"Arrêté No. 2 de l'Administrateur général concernant la réouverture des Facultés de Théologie des Universités de Tübingen et de Fribourg" of August 1945. On August 8 the rector fixed the date of the re-opening of these faculties and informed the deans of the faculties by letter of his decision: "Nach seither von der Militärregierung an mich erfolgter Mitteilung können die beiden theologischen Fakultäten der Universität mit den Unterricht beginnen, sobald sie wollen. Ich habe mit dem Herrn Prorector als Termin der Eröffnung des Semesters den 20. August vereinbart, wenn die Benachrichtigung und Herbeiführung der Studenten bis dahin möglich ist." (According to information just sent me by the Military Government the two theological faculties of the university can start teaching as soon as they wish. I have agreed with the vice-rector on August 20 as the date for the opening of term if it is possible to inform and summon the students by then.)

Two days later the rector informed Carlo Schmid of his decision to open the theological faculties on August 20. In the same letter the rector underlined the necessity for other teaching departments to be integrated into the teaching programme: "... Über den Beginn der Vorlesungen an anderen Fakultäten ist bis jetzt keinesfalls noch nicht mitgeteilt worden. Doch hat mich Oberstleutnant Buchon veranlaßt, ein Gesuch einzureichen, das er selbst baldzeitig in Baden-Baden vorlegen wird und das sich für eine Eröffnung auch der Medizinischen Fakultät am 1. September d.J. einsetzt...

Im Interesse eines vollständigen Unterrichts in Rahmen der Medizinischen Fakultät liegt es selbstverständlich, daß auch die Lehrgänge der vorklinischen Semester vertreten werden, die ja großparteils in den Händen der Mitglieder der Naturwissenschaftlichen Fakultät liegen. Auch dafür ist ein Antrag schon gestellt...

Die theologischen Fakultäten haben ihrerseits ebenfalls den Wunsch, ihr Studiengebiet etwas zu erweitern, da sie auf dem Stupunkt stehen, daß gewisse

Die Mediziner ihrerseits wünschen französische und englische Sprachkurse für die Angehörigen ihrer Fakultät ... Die Sprachkurse der Theologen (Griechisch und Hebräisch), deren Unentbehrlichkeit gleichfalls feststeht, sollten wenn möglich wie früher in die Hände der Lehrbeauftragten der Philosophischen Fakultät gelegt werden. (... Nothing definite has so far been communicated to me about the start of lectures in the other faculties. Colonel Huchon has, however, prevailed upon me to submit a petition, which he himself will immediately submit to Baden-Baden, requesting the opening of the medical faculty as well on September 1 ...

It is, of course, in the interests of a systematic teaching programme within the medical faculty that the curricula of the pre-clinical terms, which for the most part are supervised by members of the Science Faculty, are also included. An application to this effect has also been submitted ...

The theological faculties for their part also wish to somewhat extend their range of studies as it is their opinion that certain liberal studies and lectures are indispensable to the young theologian. Applications from the two faculties along these lines are enclosed and are strongly supported by myself.

The medical men for their part want French and English language courses for members of their faculties ... The language courses for theologians (Greek and Hebrew), a need for which has also been established, should if possible be taught by lecturers and professors from the Philosophy Faculty, as was formerly the case. ([2]

It was obvious, of course, that these requests represented an indirect demand for the opening of the other faculties.

On August 16 the rector sent the following request to Radio Stuttgart which by that date was under American control: "Ich bitte um die Bekanntgabe des folgenden Textes, der für die Universität und die Studenten von größerer Wichtigkeit ist:

"Wichtige Mitteilung für alle Studenten von Akademischen Rectorat der Universität Tübingen über die Teilrolloffnung der Tübinger Universität am 20. August 1945:"

Studenten können sich ab sofort bei der evangelisch-theologischen, katholisch-theologischen und medizinischen Fakultät der Universität Tübingen einschreiben.

Carlo Schmid submitted a request to the French military government on August 20 for the reopening of the other faculties (natural sciences and mathematics, law, philosophy): "... Gleichzeitig erlaube ich mir, ergebenst die Bitte vorzutragen, daß noch Möglichkeit nicht nur die Medizinische, sondern auch die Naturwissenschaftliche, Juristische und Philosophische Fakultät der Universität ihren Lehrbetrieb sobald als möglich wieder aufnehmen dürfen. Ich glaube, diese Bitte im gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt deshalb vorbringen zu dürfen, weil die politische Reinigung des Lehrkörpers in sämtlichen Fakultäten der Universität schon seit längerer Zeit zum Abschluß gebracht ist und weil ein großes Interesse daran besteht, den vielen jungen Menschen, die infolge des Krieges ihr Studium unterbrechen mußten oder nicht beginnen konnten, bald die Möglichkeit zur Aufnahme ihrer Arbeit zu geben ...". (... At the same time I respectfully request that, if possible, not only the medical faculty but also the faculties of natural science, law and philosophy be allowed to resume teaching as soon as possible. I believe that I can submit this request at the present moment because the political denazification of the teaching staff in all...
the faculties of the university has now been concluded for some time and because great interest has been shown in giving the many young people who had to break off their studies or could not begin them due to the war the chance to resume their education ... (74) This request, however, was not immediately satisfied. The theological faculties remained for another two months the principal indication of a resumption of university life in Tübingen.

On October 7, 1945, the French military government announced the opening of the other four faculties by "Arrête No. 12 de l'Administrateur général concernant la réouverture des Facultés des Sciences, de Médecine, de Droit et de Philosophie de l'Université de Tübingen" which fixed October 15 as the earliest opening date. (75) The opening ceremony in fact took place on October 14 and was attended by an impressive list of guests. In his welcoming speech Professor Schneider paid his respects to the guests: "Ich begrüße an erster Stelle den Herrn Bevollmächtigten für die Militärregierung, General Laffon, und den Herrn Generalgouverneur von Süd-Württemberg, General Widmer, den Kommandanten der 5. Panzerdivision, Herrn General Schlesser, den Platzkommandanten von Tübingen, Herrn General Posat, und den Herrn Generaldirektor des Öffentlichen Kreisbildungswesens in der Militärregierung, General Schmittlein, den Direktor des Hochschulwesens für die französische Zone, Herrn Oberst Sausasin, und Herrn Oberst Huchon, den Kreiskommandanten von Tübingen ... ferner unsere deutschen Ehrengäste, voran Herrn Kultminister Dr. Heuß von Stuttgart, Herrn Staatsrat Prof. Dr. Schmid, den Leiter der württembergischen Delegation in der französischen Zone, den Herrn Weihbischof Dr. Fischer als Vertreter des Herrn Bischofs von Rottenburg, den Herrn Oberbürgermeister und stellvertretenden Landrat Kenner, sowie die übrigen Vertreter der staatlichen und kommunalen Behörden." (I firstly welcome the Military Government representative, General Laffon, and the Governor-General of Süd-Württemberg, General Widmer, the commander of the 5th Armoured Division, General Schlesser, the local commander of Tübingen, General Posat, and the Director-General of Public Education for the Military Government, General Schmittlein, the director of university education in the French zone, Colonel Sausasin, and Colonel Huchon, the district commander of Tübingen ... also our German guests of honour, at their head Minister of Education Dr. Heuß from Stuttgart, Staatsrat Professor Schmid, the head of the Württemberg administration in the French zone, Suffragan Bishop Fischer as the representative of the Bishop of Rottenburg, Mayor and Deputy-Landrat Kenner as well as the other representatives of state and communal authorities.) (76)
The most significant feature of this ceremony was a speech held by Governor-General Widmer. The majority of the speech was in fact written by Captain Cheval who was better versed in cultural affairs and policy. Inevitably the speech hinged on the need for eradicating all vestiges of National Socialism from the university and for resuming a humanist stance based on a commitment to democratic forms:

"... Au sortir d'un long cauchemar, la Jeunesse d'Allemagne a besoin d'un nouveau climat spirituel. Elle cherche sa nourriture intellectuelle. Il importe de ne la point décevoir; il convient que vous l'aides pour lui faire retrouver le sens de la dignité et de la personne humaine, celui de la responsabilité individuelle, de la valeur de l'engagement personnel. La Jeunesse doit savoir que l'homme ne s'accomplit pas en renonçant à lui-même. Il n'y a pas de solution toute faite à l'angoisse humaine et les promesses d'Âge d'Or ne sont que de fausses appes pour conduire les peuples à la guerre et à la ruine. Un idéal raisonnable, de mesure et d'équilibre, assure préserver contre les dangers de l'ivresse collective. La personne humaine qui vous est confiée aura donc d'abord à se trouver, à se situer, se définir, pour être consciente de sa dignité. L'Université nouvelle renoue ainsi avec son antique et vraie tradition.

L'idéal démocratique ne saurait s'accomplir sans une éducation. Ici encore c'est l'Université qui sera le guide de ceux qui cherchent ... L'Université, consciente et fière de traditions centenaires doit contribuer à l'édifice de la Paix. Dans cette œuvre pour l'homme, vous êtes les ouvriers ..." (77) This speech has since been published and distributed under its original title, De la Primauté de l'Esprit, on various occasions (the last one being in 1974) by the French authorities in Tubingen who still regard its formulae as a succinct and positive expression of the benefits of French cultural policy in Tubingen and the French zone.

The official opening of the university in October 1945 not only permitted the re-emergence of the six faculties but also of a number of "Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut". The "Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut" represented the various scientific divisions which constituted the "Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften" (Kaiser Wilhelm Society for the Advancement of Science), founded
in Berlin-Dahlem in 1911 for the promotion and channelling of scientific research. In February 1948 the society was re-named the "Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften". Tübingen retained three institutes (Biologie; Biochemie; Ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht; = biology; biochemistry; foreign and international civil law) until the mid-1950's when the latter two were transferred to Munich and Hamburg respectively.

The "Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft" had selected Süd-Württemberg in 1943 as a relatively safe area for the re-allocation of its institutes. The director of the institute for biology, Professor Georg Melchers, described the transfer in an article in the Tübinger Blätter (1973) as follows: "1943 war die Arbeit der Berliner Institute der Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft wegen eingezogener und gefallener Mitarbeiter schon reduziert, der zunehmende Bombenkrieg begann mehr und mehr auch die bauliche Substanz zu gefährden. Verlagerung aus Berlin wurde angeordnet.

Die Wahl fiel für verhältnismäßig viele Dahler Institute auf Süd-Württemberg (Hechingen, Haigerloch, Tailfingen, Tübingen) and hatte zwei Gründe: da man von der Art des Endkrieges schon damals überzeugt war, glaubte man erstens, daß diese Gegend strategisch uninteressant sei und zweitens in der Nachkriegszeit verhältnismäßig viel von der erforderlichen Stille in diesem Teil Deutschlands voraussehend ...".

(In 1943 the work of the Berlin Institutes of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society was already reduced due to the call-up and death of colleagues and the increasing Allied bombing began to endanger the buildings more and more. *Evacuation from Berlin was decreed.*

For quite a lot of the Dahlem institutes the choice fell on Süd-Württemberg-Hohenzollern (Hechingen, Haigerloch, Tailfingen, Tübingen) and there were two reasons for this: since people were even then convinced of the kind of final victory which Germany would gain over the Allies they believed, firstly, that this region was of no interest strategically and, secondly, that in the post-war period a fair amount of the peace and quiet necessary for research would be found in this part of Germany ...)

Professor Melchers also stated in a personal interview that the French authorities made an unsuccessful attempt in the occupation period to place the
autonomous Kaiser Wilhelm institutes in Tübingen under the control of the rector of the university. Melchers also wrote in the above-quoted publication that the results of French policy on the "Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institute" varied in effect, both positive and negative. "Die französische Militärregierung mit der Politik des 'Seidenen Vorhangs' gegen die anderen Zonen half am Ort, wo sie konnte. Als ich einen ihrer Vertreter, Philippe Webel, einmal für die hier praktizierte föderalistische Kulturpolitik, die man in Frankreich mit der starken Konzentration auf Paris doch so entbehre, lobte, war er ehrlich genug zu sagen, leider seien die Motive nicht so edel.

Ein anderer Mitarbeiter des Gouvernement Militaire Régional, Paul Pouché, studierte neben seiner amtlichen Tätigkeit bei Köhn und Butenandt und promovierte mit einer in Tübingen gemachten Arbeit. Es gab aber nicht nur solche Idylle in den Beziehungen zwischen Besatzern und den "Ex-Institut-Kaiser-Wilhelm", wie die Franzosen sagten ... sondern reale Hilfe ... 

... Nach den damals neuen Atlantikpakt-Abmachungen durfte aber ehemaliges deutsches Wehrmachtsgelände nicht zweckentfremdet werden. Mit eben noch bemerkenswertem Augenzwinkern wurde von den Franzosen, vermittelt durch den "Officier de Liaison de l'Université Tübingen", René Cheval, jetzt Kulturattaché an der französischen Botschaft in Bonn, eine endgültige Vermessung des Truppenübungsplatzes angeordnet - es blieb Platz für die Abteilung Köhn und manche andere Gebäude."

(The French Military Government with its policy of the "Silk Curtain" toward the other zones assisted locally where it could. When I once complimented one of its representatives, Philippe Webel, for the federalist cultural policy which was implemented here but which was not at all the case in France with its strong concentration on Paris, he was honest enough to say that the motives (i.e., behind the federalist cultural policy) were unfortunately not quite so noble.

Another member of staff of the "Gouvernement Militaire Régional", Paul Pouché, studied under Köhn and Butenandt in addition to his official activities and received a doctorate with a thesis written in Tübingen. But there were not only idylls of this nature in relations between the occupiers and the "Ex-Institut-Kaiser-Wilhelm" as the French called it ... for there was also genuine help ... 

... According to the then recent Atlantic Pact agreements, former German armed forces property was not to be "used for purposes other than originally
intended. With a barely perceptible wink the French ordered through the agency
of the "Officier de Liaison de l'Université Tübingen", René Cheval, who is now
the cultural attaché at the French Embassy in Bonn, a final survey of the military
training ground (in Tübingen) — and there was room left over for Kühn's department
and many other buildings.)

A second major statement of French university policy was inherent in the
terms and conditions of university entrance laid down by the French occupation
authorities. The lack of university places throughout Germany in the autumn of
1945 ensured that there was a high number of applications from which a fixed quota
had to be sifted by a previously defined process of selection. Hermann Werner
described the situation thus in his history of post-war Tübingen: "Fast so
schwierig wie die Entnazifizierung und die Regelung der Rechtsverhältnisse der
entlassenen Universitätslehrer erwies sich die Frage der Zulassung zum Studium.
Der Andrang war über alles erwartet groß und stürmisch. Eine ganze Reihe von Jahr­
gängen drängten nun auf einmal auf die Hochschulen, da nur eine begrenzte Zahl von
Universitäten eröffnet werden konnte. Da aber auch Studenten aus den abgetrennten
Ostgebieten auf die westlichen Hochschulen angewiesen waren und eine größere Zahl
außländischer Studenten, besonders aus dem Kreis der Déportés, aufgenommen werden
mochte, kam ein riesiger Zuwachs nach Tübingen, das auch noch durch die Unversehr­
theit lockte. Man hörte Zahlen bis zu 10 000 Meldungen; es wurde unumgänglich,
scharf auszulesen. Rückausbildungen und Arbeitsmöglichkeiten gingen über ein gewisses Maß
nicht hinaus, auch die Arbeitskraft der Lehrer hätte nicht ausgereicht. Eine Be­
grenzung machte auch die Ernährungs- und Wohnungsverhältnisse in der Stadt nötig.
Zudem erschien ein Zuwachs in diesem Ausmaß weit über alle künftigen Bedürfnisse
an akademisch geschulten Leuten hinausgehen.

So wurde ein Zulassungsausschuss gebildet, um jede einzelne Meldung zu prüfen.
Die schwierige, vieler Kritik ausgesetzte Leitung hatte Professor Dr. Kamke. Der
Ausschuss hatte festgelegt und mit den Staatsschulstatistik vereinbarte Richtlinien,
einesteils nach der Kriegszeit der Bewerber zum Studium oder bereits zurückgelegten
Semestern, andersteils nach den militärischen Verhältnissen (lange Kriegsteilnahme
oder Verwundet, kaum zugelassen wurden gewisse aktive Offiziere), weiter nach
einer politischer Betätigung in der Partei oder umgekehrt nach Verfolgung in der
Zeit der Partei. Lassenheit im Studium konnte zur Rücknahme der Zulassung führen,
daher wurden alle möglichen Zwischenprüfungen eingeführt. Die am stärksten über­
füllte medizinische Fakultät musste besonders streng sieben, während die theologischen
Fakultäten aber noch Verstärkung brauchen konnten, um die großen Kriegsverluste auszugleichen. Württemberger und alte Tübinger Studenten sollten immerhin einen Punkt voraus haben ... Den Abiturienten der letzten Jahre aber mit dem bloßen Kastenvermerk wurde auferlegt, noch ein richtiges Zeugnis in einer Oberschule zu erwerben oder in Tübingen Ergänzungskurse zu besuchen und mit einer Prüfung abzuschließen."

(The question of the admission of students to university studies proved to be almost as difficult as that of the denazification and clarification of the legal position of dismissed university teachers. The rush was great and frenetic, contrary to all expectations. A whole series of age groups now crowded at the same time into the universities since only a limited number of universities could be opened. But since students from the lost German territories in the East were dependent on the western universities and since a fairly large number of foreign students, especially deportees, had to be accepted, a giant influx came to Tübingen, which had become an attraction on account of its undamaged state. There was talk of up to 10,000 applications; it became absolutely necessary to implement a rigorous method of selection. Rooms and study facilities did not exceed a certain limit and the working capacity of the teaching staff would not have sufficed either. Food and housing conditions within the town also made restrictions necessary. Besides, an influx on this scale seemed to exceed by far all future needs for qualified university graduates.

So an admissions committee was formed to check each individual application. Professor Kamke held the difficult and much criticized post of chairman of the committee. The committee used fixed guidelines which had been agreed by the State Secretariat and which were based, on the one hand, on the applicants' suitability for university study or university terms already completed and, on the other hand, on military factors (e.g. lengthy military service or disablement, former regular army officers were rarely admitted) and on possible political activism in the NSDAP or conversely a record of persecution during the National Socialist period. Negligence in one's studies could lead to withdrawal of matriculation; for this reason all possible kinds of intermediate examinations were introduced. The medical faculty was the most overcrowded and had to screen applicants very strictly, while the theological faculties on the contrary were in need of reinforcements to balance the heavy war losses. Students from Württemberg and former Tübingen students should, however, be given an extra point on the scale determining entrance ... But the
school-leavers of the past years who were in possession of only the war-time "school certificate" were required to obtain a proper school-leaving certificate or to visit complementary courses in Tübingen and to conclude them with an examination.\(^{(81)}\)

The process of selection adopted by the admissions committee ("Zulassungsausschuß") was established by the French authorities and communicated by a series of decrees to the "Staatssekretariat" or the university respectively. In accordance with the French practice of indirect administration these bodies then had to implement the decrees in their own name and with as little reference to the French military government as possible.

The first indication which the university received of the creation of an admissions committee was a letter from Carlo Schmid (then Minister of Education in Stuttgart), dated August 3, 1945, in which he argued for a mild formula of entrance regulations: 

"... Ich ersuche daher, die Zulassungsbedingungen für das Herbstsemester 1945 so zu fassen, daß lediglich beim Medizinstudium Einschränkungen eintreten... Ebenso soll der Zugang zum Studium anderer Fächer allen Studierenden freistehen, bei denen die allgemeinen Voraussetzungen für das Hochschulstudium vorliegen.

Außerdem sind die Studierenden darauf hinzuzweisen, daß sie sich einer Prüfung ihrer bisherigen politischen Betätigung zu unterziehen haben. Diese Prüfung wird zweckmäßigerverweise durch eine besonders eingesetzte Kommission vorgenommen, der als einzige Richtlinie nur die gegeben werden soll, daß "aktive" Nationalsozialisten keinen Zugang zum Studium haben sollen."

(I therefore request you to formulate the conditions of admission for the autumn term of 1945 in such a way that restrictions only occur in the case of medical studies... In the same way access to other subjects should be open to all students who satisfy the general requirements for university students.)\(^{(82)}\)
school-leavers of the past years who were in possession of only the war-time "school certificate" were required to obtain a proper school-leaving certificate or to visit complementary courses in Tübingen and to conclude them with an examination. (61)

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(Therefore request you to formulate the conditions of admission for the autumn term of 1945 in such a way that restrictions only occur in the case of medical studies... In the same way access to other subjects should be open to all students who satisfy the general requirements for university students.

Furthermore, students are to be informed that they have to undergo a check on their former political activities. It will be expedient to have this check carried out by a specially appointed commission which is to be given only one guideline, namely that "committed" National Socialists should not be allowed access to a university course. (62)
For the winter semester of 1945–46 a table of conditions of entrance was printed for the general information of university members. This table read as follows:

"Zulassungsbestimmungen für das Wintersemester 1945/46"

I. In der medizinischen Fakultät werden ohne Einschränkung zugelassen:
1. Kriegsversehrte, die den Verschleissstufen II–IV angehören,
2. Kriegsteilnehmer, die durch den Wehrdienst mindestens 5 Jahre an ihrer Ausbildung verloren haben,
3. männliche Studierende im 10. Semester.

Nach Maßgabe des Platzes können auch sonstige Studierende zugelassen werden; bevorzugt werden dabei Württemberger und solche, die früher in Tübingen Medizin studiert haben ...

II. In den anderen Fakultäten werden ohne Einschränkung zugelassen:
1. Kriegsversehrte der Stufen II–IV,

Unter den Übrigen werden bevorzugt zugelassen:
1. Württemberger,
2. frühere Tübinger Studierende,
3. Studierende, die in diesem oder dem kommenden Semester ins Examen gehen werden ...

III. Ausländer

Ausländer werden zum Studium in allen Fakultäten zugelassen. Sie haben sich aber, soweit sie in Tübingen noch nicht immatrikuliert waren, einer Prüfung zu unterziehen, deren Gegenstande sind
1. Beherrschung der deutschen Sprache,
2. allgemeine Bildung,
3. (außer bei 1. Semester) ein der Semestzahl entsprechender Stand der Fachkenntnisse.

IV. In besonderen Fällen bleiben andere Entscheidungen vorbehalten. Die frühere politische Tätigkeit des Studiumsbewerbers wird geprüft. Der Studiumsbewerber hat sofort ein schriftliches Zulassungsantrittsformular einzureichen ...

(entrance regulations for winter semester 1945–46)

I. The following will be accepted for study in the medical faculty:
1. War disabled who belong to Disablement Classifications II–IV,
2. Ex-combatants who have lost a minimum period of 5 years in their education through military service,
3. Male students in their tenth semester (i.e. fifth year).

Other students may be admitted according to the number of places; Württemberg students and those who formerly studied in Tübingen are to be given preference at the same time.

II. The following will be accepted for the other faculties:
1. War disabled who belong to Disablement Classifications II-IV,
2. Ex-combatants with school-leaving certificate from 1.4.1942 and earlier, among the other applicants the following will be preferred:
   1. Württemberg students,
   2. former Tübingen students,
   3. students who are taking their finals in this or in the following term.

III. Foreigners

Foreigners are allowed to enroll for university courses in all faculties.
However, if not yet matriculated in Tübingen, they must take an examination testing:
1. Fluency in German language,
2. general knowledge,
3. (except in the case of first-year students) subject knowledge, to ensure that the student's knowledge of his subject corresponds to the semester for which he wishes to enroll.

IV. In special cases it is possible to make special decisions. The previous political activity of each applicant will be checked. Each applicant must submit a written application for admission ...

These conditions of entrance were modified on December 7 by a letter from the "Staatssekretariat" to the university informing the latter of a French decree concerning the admission of former German Army officers: "Die französische Militärregierung hat angeordnet, daß sämtliche ehemaligen aktiven Offiziere der deutschen Wehrmacht, gleich welchen Dienstgrades, die in Tübingen studieren wollen, unverzöglicher den üblichen 4-seitigen französischen Fragebogen auszufüllen und über das Rektorat und das Staatssekretariat an die französische Militärregierung zu leiten. Von der Prüfung dieses Fragebogens hängt es ab, ob der einzelne zum Studium zugelassen werden kann ...". (The French Military Government has ordered that all former regular officers of the German armed forces, no matter which rank, who want to study in Tübingen must complete without delay the usual 4-page questionnaire.)
and forward it to the French Military Government by way of the rector's office and the State Secretariat. It depends on the examination of this questionnaire whether the applicant can be admitted to the university... The French, for all their relative liberalism in educational and denazification matters, found it difficult to forgive the German Army for the role it played in the occupation of France.

A further extension of terms was formulated by a decree from the French military government to the "Staatssekretariat" on December 13, 1945. This decree was transmitted to the university in the following form on December 20: "Auf Anordnung der Militärregierung Nr. 547 vom 13.12.1945 sind von Beach maßlicher höheren und Hochschulen der französischen Zone

1) sämtliche Angehörige der Hitlerjugend, des Jungvolks und des Bunde Deutscher Mädel, die den Dienstgrad eines Gefolgschaftsführers, Fähnleinführer, einer Kädegruppenführer, Jungmädelgruppenführerin oder das Amt eines Jungstammführers, einer Mädelringführerin, Jungmädelringführerin oder einem höheren Dienstgrad oder ein höheres Amt bekleideten,

2) sämtliche Angehörigen einer Nationalpolitischen Erziehungsgesellschaft, einer Adolf-Hitlerschule, einer Ordensburg oder anderen Parteischule vorläufig ausgeschlossen.

Die Ausschlossenen haben jedoch das Recht, bei den Militärregierungen der Kreise Ausnahmeverlassungen folgenden Wortlauts zu beantragen:

Engagement

Je soussigné .... (Name) .... exclu de l'enseignement en tant que ancien .... (Eigenschaft gemäß 1, 2, 3) ...., demande à être admis exceptionnellement à suivre les cours de .... (Name der Anstalt) .... .

Je m'engage sur l'honneur à m'abstenir de toute activité politique et à me conformer loyalement aux règlements scolaires dictés dans la zone française d'occupation."

(By order of the Military Government, No. 547 of 13.12.1945, the following are provisionally excluded from attending all colleges and universities of the French Zone:

1) all members of the Hitler Youth, the Junior Section of the Hitler Youth and of the Association of German Girls who held the rank of "Gefolg-
...find of the original composition of the admissions committee in late 1945. By January 1946, however, it contained eight members:

"Dem auf Anordnung des Staatssekretariats für das französisch besetzte Gebiet Württembergs und Hohenzollerns, Landesdirektion für Kultus, Erziehung und Kunst, eingesetzten Ausschuss zur Prüfung der politischen Unbedenklichkeit für die Zulassung zum Studium gehören an:

Prof. Dr. Knopp als Vorsitzender,
" ... als Mitglied und Vertreter der evangelisch-theol. Fakultät;
" Teschemacher " " " " rechts- und wirtschaft.
Oberarzt Dr. Strack " " " medizinischen
Prof. Dr. Herding " " " philosophischen
" Kunke " " " naturwiss.
G. C. S. W. Weltbrecht", " " " der Studentenschaft.

(= 279 =)

(The following are members of the commission for examining the political background of student applicants which was established on the orders of the State Secretariat for the French-occupied area of Württemberg and Hohenzollern (Landesdirektion für Kultus, Erziehung und Kunst):

Professor Knopp as chairman,
" ... as member and representative of the Lutheran Theological Faculty
" Teschemacher " " " " Law and Economics Faculty
Senior Registrar Dr. Stack " " " " Medical Faculty

...
The severest member of the committee by far was Professor Kamke, a mathematician who had experienced personal difficulties during the National Socialist era on account of his marriage to a Jewess. On January 24, 1946, Professor Kamke submitted his notice of resignation to the rector as a result of a dispute over the proposed admission of a certain Major Kohler. Wilhelm Kohler was a soldier of some reputation within Tübingen: a tank commander and “Ritterkreuzträger mit Eichenlaub” (Holder of the Knight’s Iron Cross with Oak Leaves) he had lost a leg in action. (Kohler in fact never succeeded in gaining admission to the university: he subsequently joined the “Bundeswehr” after its establishment. In 1974 Kohler, a colonel, was the commanding officer of the Tübingen military region.) In his letter of resignation Professor Kamke aired a number of grievances, both particular, e.g. “Der Anlaß hierfür ist ein gestern gegen meine Stimme gefallter Beschluß des Ausschusses, den früheren Beschuß auf Abweisung des Majors u. a. Kohler von der Universität zu revidieren”, and general, e.g. “Nur wenige studierende sind abgewiesen worden. Die Abweisung erfolgte gewöhnlich nur nach langer Debatte. Der Beschuß sollte endgültig sein, aber weil in der Hälfte aller Fälle wurde dann doch wieder durch Mitglieder des Ausschusses ein Antrag auf Revision eingereicht”. (The reason for this is a resolution passed by the commission against my vote to revise the earlier resolution refusing Major Kohler admission to the university) and (Only a few students were turned down. Normally refusal of admission occurred only after a lengthy debate. The decision was intended to be final but in about half of all such cases an application of appeal was then submitted by members of the commission.)

By March, however, Professor Kamke was again active on the admissions committee, indeed as chairman of the committee. This promotion was announced to the university in a circular from the rector dated March 6. In April Kamke resigned again, this time definitely. In his letter of resignation Kamke expressed dissatisfaction at the committee’s interpretation of the regulations governing admissions: firstly, with regard to a proposed pre-university term (or year) of corvée for university applicants, during which period physical contribution would be made to
the reconstruction programme in industry and agriculture ("Eine neue Lage ist nun plötzlich dadurch entstanden, daß nach Mitteilung des Herrn Landesdirektors für Arbeit bei der letzten Sitzung des Landesdirektoriums die Förderung einer Wiederaufbauarbeit der Studierenden abgelehnt worden ist. Damit ist der Zulassungsaußenschmack der Universität bei einer wichtigen Kalenderzeit der vorher Zuspruch gefunden hatte, der Boden entzogen. Alle durch die Universität und die Ausschüu-
glieder schriftlich und mündlich an die Studierenden bereits ergangenen Weisungen müßten zurückgenommen werden. Die durch die Presse von dem Plan unterrichtete Bevölkerung wird seine Dämmung wohl kaum begreifen."); secondly, concerning the occasional admission of former "Wehrmacht" staff officers, despite French instructions to the contrary ("...daß die Zulassung der früheren Berufsoffiziere zum Studium eine heikle Angelegenheit ist, ist allgemein bekannt. In Tübingen war bei der juristischen Fakultät eine verhältnismäßig hohe Anzahl, nämlich 35, eingeschrieben gegenüber 27 an allen übrigen Fakultäten zusam-
men. In Wahrheit werden die Zahlen höher sein, da nicht immer richtige Angaben gemacht sind. Diese verhältnismäßig große Zahl von Berufsoffizieren wurde der Universität mehrfach zum Vorwurf gemacht. In der Tat bilden sie ein der Universität sonst fremdes Element und es strahlte von ihnen im vorigen Semester eine gewisse Beunruhigung aus, insbesondere galt die höheren Dienstgrade als Kristallisationspunkte für die niedrigeren. ... Bei den unter 1. genannten vorbereitenden Besprechungen wurde hierfür folgender Grundsatz schriftlich fixiert vorgelegt: Von Berufsoffizieren werden in allgemeinen nur die Offiziere bis zum Hauptmann einschließlich neu oder zum weiteren Studium zugelassen"). (A new situation has now suddenly arisen in that, according to the "Landesdirektor für Arbeit" at the last cabinet meeting, the request for student contributions to the work of national reconstruction has been rejected. The ground has thus been cut from under the feet of the admissions commission and the university in this important measure which had already been agreed upon. Instructions which had already been given verbally and in writing to the students by the university and the commission members would have to be withdrawn. When the populace is informed by the press of this plan it will scarcely understand why it was sus-
pended."

"...It is generally known that the admission of former regular army officers to the university is a sensitive matter. In the faculty of law in Tübingen a relatively large number, namely 35, were enrolled as against 27 for all the other faculties together. In fact the numbers will actually be higher than that since correct details are not always given. The university is often criticised for this
relatively high number of professional army officers. They in fact formed an alien element within the university and they radiated a certain spirit of discontent during the previous term; the senior ranks in particular were looked upon as focal points of orientation by the lower ranks ... In the preparatory discussions mentioned above in Paragraph 1 the following principle was submitted in writing: "With regard to regular army officers only officers up to the rank of captain will generally be admitted to begin or continue a university course" ... (91).

In July 1946 Captain Cheval reiterated the standpoints of French policy on student admissions: "Der Prüfungsausschuss soll alle Fälle prüfen, die ihm vorgelegt werden. Er darf keinerlei Automatismus geben, weder bei der Zulassung noch bei der Ablehnung. Jeder Fall muß für sich geprüft werden. Trotzdem müssen einige Richtlinien beobachtet werden:

1. Die politische Stellung der Bewerber ist bestimmend. Die Studenten werden in 3 Klassen eingeteilt:
   a) "politisch unbelastet"
   b) "politische Mitläufer"
   c) "politisch schwerbelastet".

Diejenigen, die der Klasse a) angehören, genießen volles Vorrecht.

2. den Schwerkrankheitswurzten wird nur insoweit ein Vorrecht gewährt, als sie den Forderungen des §1 genügen.

3. die früheren Offiziere bedürfen einer besonderen aufmerksamen Prüfung. Als Regel soll gelten, daß kein Offizier mit höherem Rang als Hauptmann zugelassen werden soll ...

5. Das Prinzip, nur Württembergor aufzunehmen, kann nicht aufrecht erhalten bleiben. Es ist im Widerspruch mit der internationalen Ansicht, die einen freien Verkehr von Zone zu Zone wünscht ..."

(The examining committee will examine all cases which are submitted to it. There must be no automatism at all in this process, neither in decisions concerning admission nor ones resulting in rejection. Each case must be examined separately. Nevertheless some guidelines must be observed:

1. The political stance of the applicants is decisive. The students will be divided into 3 classes:
   a) politically non-incriminated
   b) political "fellow-travellers"
   c) politically incriminated (to a serious degree).
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1. The political stance of the applicants is decisive. The students will be divided into 3 classes:
   (a) politically non-incriminated  
   (b) political "fellow-travellers"  
   (c) politically incriminated (to a serious degree).
Those who belong to class (a) enjoy full priority.
2. Preference will only be given to seriously disabled ex-servicemen in so far as they satisfy the requirements of Paragraph 1.
3. Former officers are to be subjected to a particularly stringent examination. It ought to apply as a rule that no officer above the rank of captain should be admitted ...
4. The principle of admitting only students from Württemberg cannot be upheld. That contradicts Allied policy which wishes to see free communication between zones ... (32)

In reply to a query from the assistant rector of the University of Mainz, the rector of Tübingen University established the following details as the main criteria for selection employed by his university's admissions committee: "Die Auswahl fand nach folgenden Richtlinien statt:


Selbstverständlich schieden von vorneherein diejenigen aus, die nach den Bestimmungen der Militärregierung nicht zugelassen werden konnten (Funktionäre der NS, ehemalige Angehörige nationalsozialistischer Schulen, aktive Offiziere). Im übrigen hatten politisch Unbelastete den Vorzug."

(Selection took place according to the following guidelines:

Anyone only able to produce mediocre school certificates was generally rejected. Ex-combatants with long years of service and war disabled were given preference. Those who were born in 1926 and after were only considered if very special achievements were to be expected of them on the basis of their school certificates. Access to courses was not restricted to Württemberg students. Male and female applicants with equal qualifications were treated equally. Students resident in Tübingen were accepted in addition as "guest students" ("Gasthörer").

Naturally those who could not be admitted on account of French military government regulations (e.g. Hitler Youth functionaries, former members of National Socialist schools, regular army officers) were excluded at the outset. For the rest, students with politically clean records had priority.)
According to Hermann Werner, 3,326 students enrolled at Tübingen during the course of the first term, of whom 525 were foreigners. The figures arrived at by the author of this thesis are marginally different (i.e., 3,364 students); the difference is negligible for the use of comparison with those for the summer term of 1944 (3,015) and the winter semester of 1945 (2,288). The post-war admissions figures at Tübingen University reflect a positive commitment on the part of the French authorities in that the French were prepared to allocate funds and materials for higher education which might have been diverted into other channels.

One surprising feature of the post-war admissions figures for the University of Tübingen was the fact that a very high percentage of the students came from the American-occupied sector of Württemberg. Indeed, according to Hermann Werner, by the end of the first winter semester of 1945-1946 there were 1,900 Württembergers at the university, of whom 750 came from the French section as opposed to 1,210 from the American. The French did not prevent the university from operating across the zonal boundaries in exercise of its ancient prerogative as the primary university of Württemberg.

The students from the American-occupied sector of Württemberg carried ration-cards which entitled them to a higher level of rations than the students from Nord-Württemberg; the difference had to be made up from municipal food stocks. Despite protracted arguments between municipal and university authorities the French military government chose not to intervene and left it up to the university to approach the government of Nord-Württemberg for compensation. The university was advised to do so much by its own "Universitatsrentamt" (university finance office) in a note to the rector dated December 13, 1945: "... Die Studenten aus den nicht-französischen Besatzungsbezirken zurückzuweisen, geht nicht an, weil Tübingen die einzige Universität Württembergs ist; ebenso ist es ohne große Mühe nicht möglich, Kranken aus den nicht französisch besetzten Gebieten die Kliniknahme zu verweigern. ... Übrig bleibt nun, den württembergischen Herrn Ministerpräsidenten und den württembergischen Herrn Kultminister zu bitten, bei den amerikanischen Besatzungsbehörden und dem Landesernährungsamt dafür einzutreten, daß dem Ernährungsbezirk Tübingen für die nicht aus den französisch besetzten Gebieten stammenden und in Tübingen zu ernährenden Studierenden und Kranken aus den amerikanisch besetzten Gebieten Lebensmittel in einer Menge zugewiesen werden, die dem..."
Bedarf von 2300 Köpfen entsprechen. Es kann Tübingen auf die Stunde nicht zugemutet werden, ohne jeden Ausgleich die aus nicht französisch besetzten Gebieten stammenden Studierenden und Kranken zu versorgen." (... It will not do to turn back students from the non-French zones of occupation because Tübingen is the only university in Württemberg; in the same way it is not possible to refuse admission to university hospitals to patients from the non-French zones of occupation without causing great hardship. ...) It only remains to ask the Württemberg Minister-President and Minister of Education to apply to the American occupation authorities and the "Land" Food Department for rations to be allocated from the American-occupied areas to Tübingen district in sufficient quantity to cover the needs of 2,300 people; they will go to feeding the students and patients who are not from areas occupied by the French but who nevertheless have to be fed in Tübingen. In the long run it cannot be expected of Tübingen to provide without compensation for students and patients from areas not occupied by the French.\(^{(96)}\) The rector submitted this report to the "Staatssekretariat" to forward to Dr. Theodor Neu, then Minister of Education in Stuttgart. Neu was apparently convinced by the argumentation presented by the university for he used the report almost verbatim in a letter which he submitted in his capacity as Minister of Education on January 30, 1946, to the "Wirtschaftsministerium" (Ministry of the Economy).\(^{(99)}\) In May, the "Wirtschaftsministerium" replied rejecting the university's request and listing a number of reasons for doing so; the most pertinent was possibly that "die Beförderung der Universitätskliniken von Tübingen zu Gunsten von Studierenden und Kranken aus der U.S. Zone würde seitens der Landes-Militärregierung davon abhängig gemacht werden, daß eine Gegenrechnung aufgestellt werden müßte für die Studierenden aus der französischen Zone in den Kliniken von München, Erlangen, Würzburg, Marburg/ Lahn, Heidelberg und diversen Krankenhäusern nahe der französischen Zonengrenze, wo bisher eine weit unter bessere Vorpfling vorherrschte." (The provision of food to the university hospitals in Tübingen for students and patients from the American zone would have to be made, in the view of the "Land" Military Government, contingent upon a counter-claim being submitted for students from the French zone in hospitals in Munich, Erlangen, Würzburg/Lahn and various hospitals near the French zonal border where far better rations have so far prevailed.)\(^{(100)}\)

French policy on university affairs manifested itself in Tübingen within various other issues. According to Professor Julius Hilsela, professor of Romance philology and literature at Tübingen, the French attempted to introduce the so-
called "Doppelabitur". This was a school-leaving examination which was to extend over a two-year period. In the first year the student was to sit an examination, the successful completion of which was to be followed by a year of philosophy and general studies which would also end with an examination.\(^{(101)}\) This proposed examination form corresponded closely to the French "baccalauréat".

Furthermore, the French authorities proposed at one stage introducing the French concept of a propaedeutical year at the university as an intermediate year of general introductory study at the start of degree courses. This suggestion was submitted in the form of an explicit programme entitled "Propädeutische Kurse der Universität Tübingen. Zwischensemester 1945": "Alle ersten Semester mit Notabitur oder Reifevermerk und nur siebenjähriger oder kürzerer höherer Schulbildung haben an propädeutischen Kursen teilzunehmen, die die Universität veranstaltet und über deren erfolgreichen Besuch später eine Prüfung abzulegen ist. Im allgemeinen sollen sich diese Kurse durch zwei Semester erstrecken.

Der obligatorische Teil der Kurse umfaßt sechs Wochenstunden, nämlich zwei Stunden Latein, zwei Stunden Mathematik und Physik, zwei Stunden Deutsch mit Stilübungen. Daneben besteht Gelegenheit zur Erlernung der Französischen und englischen Sprache, die fakultativ bleibt. Außerdem sind die Teilnehmer der propädeutischen Kurse gehalten, an dies universitatis mindestens vier Stunden zu belegen und regelmäßig zu besuchen, die ihre weltanschauliche Erziehung und historische Allgemeinbildung auf eine festere Grundlage zu stellen geeignet sind."

(Propaedeutical courses (i.e. first-year introduction) at the University of Tübingen. Intermediate term 1945: All first-term students with an emergency school-leaving certificate or war-time certificate of aptitude and a grammar school education of only seven years or less have to attend propaedeutical courses arranged by the university which are followed by an examination after completion of the course. Generally the courses are to extend over two terms.

The obligatory part of the courses comprises six hours per week, namely two hours of Latin, two hours of mathematics and physics and two hours of German with practice in composition. Besides this there is the opportunity of learning French and English although they remain optional. Furthermore, the participants of the propaedeutical courses are obliged to enroll for at least four hours of the "dies universitatis" lectures and to attend them regularly since these are suitable
for putting their ideological education and general knowledge of history on a firm basis.)\(^{(102)}\)

There was resistance to the idea within the university despite the fact that the suggestion was supported by such figures as Romano Guardini and Eduard Spanger. According to Professor Ohlmeyer, a compromise was found in the counter-proposal to establish the course on a voluntary basis within the framework of a college to be created expressly for this purpose. A commission was formed to debate the proposal and eventually in February 1948 the “Collegium leibnizianum” (or “Leibniz Kollag”) was established to provide a “studium generale”, which was in fact a loan-word borrowed from the medieval conception of an all-round education. French involvement in these schemes can be interpreted as a result of French scepticism concerning the German university system. The lack of resistance on the part of the German universities to the ideology and demands of the National Socialist regime led the French to believe that the German university system was in need of revision, especially with regard to what was considered over-specialisation within individual disciplines. The “Leibniz Kollag”, although it has survived until the present day under the chairmanship of Professor Ohlmeyer, did little to alter the system for the Tübingen academics who proposed its establishment envisaged it as essentially a method of preventing the French from interfering with the traditional structures and curricula of academic life in Tübingen. There were therefore limits to the revivalist intentions behind French policy on university affairs in Tübingen for the University of Tübingen had long and deeply-rooted academic traditions which could not be reformed overnight, especially in cases where the French policy met with antagonism from the university’s academic staff. Resistance to French university policy also arose in Tübingen over the question of the school-leaving examination. A detailed example of this is provided in a “Stellungnahme des Rektors und der Dekane der Universität Tübingen zu der von der französischen Militärregierung geplanten Abitur-Reform” (Official attitude of the rector and deans of faculty of the University of Tübingen on the reform of the school-leaving certificate as planned by the French Military Government)\(^{(104)}\), listed below in the appendix (Appendix Nr. 10).

When the French entered Tübingen in April 1945 they set about requisitioning a considerable amount of housing, plus offices, storage buildings and inns. The university also lost a number of its buildings to the occupation authorities. The
main ones were the student refectory (Hotel Prinz Karl), the "Chirurgische Klinik", a seminary which formerly belonged to the "Tübinger Bibelkreis" (Tübingen Bible Circle) and a number of student corporations. These buildings were not returned during the period, 1945–1947. In this respect the French did not relax their attitude; there was a marked tendency within the French military government and the French army of occupation to regard the comfort and equipment of French troops and administrators as the cardinal priority, after which all others were subsequently considered.

The French officials in Tübingen were quite liberal in their attitude towards the university library and its stocks. The first instruction concerning library stocks was transmitted to the university on July 13, 1945, and concerned the removal of National Socialist literature. A committee was set up to debate the issue for there were complications regarding what the French authorities considered to be National Socialist or even nationalistic and militaristic literature. The minutes of a meeting of the committee held on July 18 read: "... Einverständnis herrschte darüber, daß nach rückwärts nicht über das Jahr 1919 zurückgegangen werden soll." (... There was a consensus of agreement that they should not go back beyond the year 1919.) The committee agreed to put to the side all works which could be regarded as National Socialist and appointed various professors to examine the respective disciplines.

On January 25, 1946, however, the local French commander submitted a more specific statement on banned works: "Conformément au §11 des directives sur l'édition, les éditeurs, vendeurs ou loueurs de livres sont responsables des livres détenus par eux à un titre quelconque.

Sont interdits et ont du être retirés de la vente ou du prêt les livres, brochures, revues, périodiques, propagant les idées:

- nationales-socialistes
- racistes
- fascistes
- anti-démocratiques
- militaristes
- pangermanistes
- impérialistes
Irrespectueuses ou démolissantes vis-à-vis des Alliés contraires aux prescriptions du Gouvernement Militaire.

Les œuvres ne pouvant se classer dans une des catégories ci-dessus mais dont l'auteur est universellement connu (liste noire) comme ayant appartenu au Parti ou propagé des idées national-socialistes ou fascistes sont à éliminer.

En principe les ouvrages de caractère purement historique ou philosophique sont autorisés. Cependant lorsqu'ils propagent des idées favorables au militarisme ou au panélanisme comme certains, signés pourtant de noms illustres, ces ouvrages sont à écarter.

En aucun cas une autorisation ou une visite de contrôle des officiers ayant pour tâche l'épuration des livres et brochures ne couvre la responsabilité dont vous êtes chargée.

Avant que ces livres et brochures retirés de la vente ou prêt ne soient transportés dans le local fermé que vous désignerez l'officier d'information du cercle vous devrez les réunir, les classer et trier et en établir une liste en trois exemplaires à en-tête de votre firme avec les indications suivantes:

- auteur
- titre
- éditeur
- lieu de publication
- date de publication
- quantité

Ces listes devront être terminées et communiquées à l'officier d'information du Gouvernement Militaire du cercle de Tübingen avant le 5 Février 1946.\(^{107}\)

By February 11 the director of the university library was able to inform the local military government commander that he had nearly completed the task of clearing his stocks of prohibited material. He added that "les livres détachés se trouvent dans un cabinet toujours fermé et inaccessible à aucune personne profitant de notre bibliothèque. De même il est absolument défendu aux fonctionnaires et aux employés de notre bibliothèque, excepté en ordre officiel spécial."\(^{108}\)
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The thousands of books which were gathered in this fashion did not leave the library premises. They remained under lock and key, together with thousands of copies deposited by local bookdealers in accordance with a decree (drla) T U 1 Nr. 742) from the "Staatssekretariat" on June 11, 1946, designating the university library as the depot for all banned literature. These works were gradually returned to the library stacks in the course of the 1950's.

In this aspect of their cultural policy the French occupation authorities were more liberal than the occupation administration had been in the Rhineland after the First World War. During the Rhineland occupation the French had published a very extensive list of prohibited works entitled Adate der von der interallierten Rheinland Komission in Coblenz für das besetzte Gebiet verbotene Bücher, Lichtbildstreifen und Zeitungen (List of books, photographic films and newspapers forbidden within Occupied Territory by the Interallied Rhineland Commission in Coblenz). There were various lists of prohibited works published in post-war Germany, the principal one of which was the Liste der auszuwendenden literatur, herausgegeben von der Deutschen Verwaltung in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone (List of literature to be removed from stocks and stored separately; published by the German administration in the Soviet zone of occupation). Despite their bureaucratic tradition the central French occupation authorities refrained from publishing such a list in the post-war period (although they occasionally referred to a "liste noire" in correspondence with the university, it did not materialise); instead they left the purge of libraries and bookshops largely up to the local military government authorities. Tübingen University Library was particularly glad about this arrangement as it was of the opinion that the two officials responsible for the purge, Commandant Dollfus and Captain René Cheval, were sympathetic to German academic problems.

In a report dated May 11, 1947, a librarian wrote: "... Weder die Militärregierung noch die deutschen Behörden haben feste Richtlinien für die Arbeit erlassen. Vielmehr müssen sich die mit der Kontrolle betrauten Beamten innerhalb eines sehr weiten Schemas halten. Es ist unvermeidlich, daß eine so schwierige Arbeit, die nicht nach Normen sondern nach persönlichen Urteilen geleistet werden soll, weitgehend auch von nicht praxis fassbaren Stimmungen beeinflußt wird. Die Militärregierung hat das selbst anerkannt, indem einer ihrer Vertreter die Aufgabe als "insoluble" definierte. Andererseits ist das Fehlen fester Richtlinien..."
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als ein Glück zu bezeichnen, man muß sich sogar hüten, solche zu extrahieren oder Fragen zu stellen, welche die Beschlügebehörde selbst in Verlegenheit bringen könnten. Es ist nötig zu befürchten, daß die alsdann erlassenen Anweisungen außerordentlich weit gehen und den Universitätsunterricht in mancher Hinsicht behindern würden. Den jetzigen Schwebezustand beizubehalten liegt in deutschen Interessen, so unangenehm die Unsicherheit auch sein mag. Er gestattete es, Irrtümer zu berichtigen, ohne die Militärregierung zu benützen, sowie einzelnen angesehenen deutschen Benutzern Bücher wenigstens im Lesesaal zugänglich zu machen, deren Sekretierungsnötigkeitsweise zweifelhaft ist. Nicht eine kanonische, sondern eine elastische Haltung gilt es im Interesse der Wissenschaft einzunehmen, wobei der Grundsatz strenge zu wahren ist, das anstößige Gedankengut unbedingt abzusperren.

Neither the Military Government nor the German authorities have issued firm guidelines for this work. On the contrary, the officials entrusted with denazification have to keep within a very loose framework. It is unavoidable that such difficult work, which has to be performed on the basis of personal judgement rather than according to fixed norms, is also strongly affected by vague and intangible moods and opinions. The Military Government itself acknowledged this when one of its representatives defined the task of denazification as "insoluble". On the other hand, the lack of firm guidelines can be considered a fortunate aspect and we should even guard against drawing up guidelines or posing questions which could embarrass the occupation authorities themselves. It is to be feared that the instructions which would be issued in response would be extremely far-reaching in their effect and would obstruct university teaching in many respects. It is in German interests to retain the present undefined situation, however unpleasant the uncertainty may be. It permitted the correction of errors without troubling the Military Government as well as giving access, at least in the reading room, to books where there was some doubt about the need for their being locked away to individual, distinguished Germans. In the interests of science a flexible rather than a canonical attitude must be assumed while at the same time the basic rule about isolating offensive literature is to be strictly maintained.

As early as June 1945 the university staff at Tübingen had become aware of the relative liberalism of the local French officials in university library matters. On the day after the mayor's announcement of June 27, ordering the surrender of all National Socialist literature to the university library, two professors, Genzmer and Merkl, successfully applied to the rector to have the order modified to the
extent that university institutes specifically involved in research fields which were often the subject of National Socialist propaganda, e.g. law, history, theology, philosophy, were allowed access to this literature for research purposes. (113)

The relative freedoms enjoyed by the university library contrasted sharply with the degree of surveillance shown by the French authorities in their control of the book trade in Tübingen and the punitive measures implemented against those who failed to abide by military government regulations (q.v. previous chapter).

On one specific library issue, however, the French authorities maintained an uncompromising attitude. This concerned the library of the Reichsuniversität Straßburg which had been transferred to Tübingen in autumn of 1944 to prevent it both from being damaged by Allied bombing and from falling into Allied hands. It was accepted by the majority of Tübingen's academics that there was every justification for the return of the library to its original seat. A debate did arise, however, over a number of subordinate issues which were subsequently set out in a letter from the newly created "Abwicklungstelle der Reichsuniversität Straßburg" (Clearing office of the German Reich University of Strasbourg) to the rector of the University of Strasbourg (19.5.1945): "... Bei der Verlagerung ist im geringen Umfang auch Privateigentum der deutschen Professoren mitverlagert worden, insbesondere zum Teil deren wissenschaftliche Privatbibliotheken. Diese Dinge waren zu keiner Zeit Eigentum der Universität Straßburg. Sie sind auch bei der Abwendung des Gutes kenntlich gemacht worden und daher leicht auseinandersetzbar. Ich bitte zunächst mit der Rückgabe dieses Gutes an die Eigentümer einverstanden zu sein.


Für die Einrichtung der deutschen Universität Straßburg hat die deutsche
Regierung in den Jahren 1940 bis 1944 23 Millionen Reichsmark ausgegeben. Etwa 7 Millionen für Bauten, den Rest für Apparate und wissenschaftliche Literatur. Die Beschaffung der Apparate und der Literatur erfolgte naturgemäß unter dem Gesichtspunkt des Aufbaus einer deutschen Universität. Daher sind sicherlich auch Dinge beschafft worden, welche für die deutsche Wissenschaft bedeutsam, für die französische aber meines Wissens von geringen Interesse sein dürften; zum Beispiel gewisse nährhin zu bestimmende Teile nordischer und religiöswissenschaftlicher Literatur. Dankbar wäre ich indes für eine Mitteilung, ob Sie grundsätzlich geneigt wären, eine unter diesen Gesichtspunkten erfolgende Bitte entgegenzunehmen...

Then there is the so-called "students' library" which is also among the evacuated goods. This is a reference library which serves non-scientific purposes and is intended primarily to afford students the opportunity of a comfortable relaxation area and a sensible activity for the promotion of their general knowledge during breaks between several lectures. Furthermore, this library was not created from funds of the German Reich but from funds belonging to the central office of the German Reich's Student Administration in Berlin, a self-help student organisation. Since many millions of books have been destroyed in Germany by bombing, I request that this library be left with us.

The French refused to grant the university's request and abruptly closed the matter.
Regierung in den Jahren 1940 bis 1944 23 Millionen Reichsmark ausgegeben. Etwa 7 Millionen für Bauten, den Rest für Apparate und wissenschaftliche Literatur. Die Beschaffung der Apparate und der Literatur erfolgte naturgemäß unter dem Gesichtspunkt des Aufbaus einer deutschen Universität. Daher sind sicherlich auch Dinge beschafft worden, welche für die deutsche Wissenschaft bedeutsam, für die französische aber meines Wissens von geringem Interesse sein dürften; zum Beispiel gewisse näherhin zu bestimmende Teile nordischer und religionswissenschaftlicher Literatur. Dankbar wäre ich indes für eine Mitteilung, ob Sie grundsätzlich geneigt wären, eine unter diesen Gesichtspunkten erfolgende Bitte aufzunehmen". (... During the evacuation a small amount of private property belonging to German professors was also removed, in particular parts of their personal scientific libraries. These items were at no time the property of the University of Strasbourg. They were also marked when the goods were dispatched and are therefore easy to put aside. I ask you first of all to consent to the return of these goods to their owners.

Then there is the so-called "students' library" which is also among the evacuated goods. This is a reference library which serves non-scientific purposes and is intended primarily to afford students the opportunity of a comfortable relaxation area and a sensible activity for the promotion of their general knowledge during breaks between several lectures. Furthermore, this library was not created from funds of the German Reich but from funds belonging to the central office of the German Reich's Student Administration in Berlin, a self-help student organisation. Since many millions of books have been destroyed in Germany by bombing, I request that this library be left with us.

In the years, 1940 - 1944, the German government spent 23 million Reichsmark on facilities for the German University of Strasbourg. About 7 million Reichsmark on buildings and the rest on equipment and scientific literature. The provision of this equipment and literature was naturally undertaken from the point of view of establishing a German university. It is therefore certain that many things have been provided which are of significance to German science but which, according to my knowledge, would be of little interest to French science, for instance certain sections of Nordic and theological literature. I would nevertheless be grateful if you could inform me whether you would be inclined to accept a plea submitted on the basis of these considerations... The French refused to grant the university's request and abruptly closed the matter.
The French officials in Tübingen were equally intransigent on the subject of student corporations (i.e. "Verbindungen", "Korporationen", "Burschenschaften" etc.). The student corporations presented a difficult theme for the French authorities in that it abounded in contradictions. The majority of the student corporations were founded in the early to mid-nineteenth century and had developed in the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries nationalistic and militaristic creeds which the French occupation administration equated with the social and intellectual factors behind the rise of National Socialism. On the other hand, however, the French were aware that the National Socialist regime had imposed measures on the student corporation movement incorporating it into the National Socialist apparatus. In October 1935, an umbrella organisation of student corporations, the "Deutsche Burschenschaft", signed a contract with the National Socialist government, by which the corporations were replaced by National Socialist "Kameradschaften". In May 1936 Rudolf Haß issued a decree forbidding NSDAP members from joining "Verbindungen". By this period a large number of corporations had already dissolved themselves. In 1938 a compromise formula was found in the new "Korporationskameradschaften" which partly revived the system of "Burschenschaften" with some radical concessions to National Socialism in matters of dress, ritual and ideology. (115)

The losses incurred by the student corporation movement in Tübingen during the National Socialist era were listed in a government statistic of 1950: "... Vor dem Jahre 1933 gab es in Tübingen 35 Häuser studentischer Verbindungen. Eigentümer waren die Altherrenvereine oder die Hausbauvereine. 23 dieser Verbindungshäuser sind in den Jahren 1936 bis 1943 von den Eigentümern verkauft worden, meist gegen Entgelt, teilweise auch unentgeltlich. Die Anwesen sind entweder von Organisationen der NSDAP (NSW, Reichsfrauenführung, Altherrenschaften des NS-Studentenbundes, Reichsstudentenwerk) oder von der Stadt Tübingen, teilweise auch von Privatpersonen, in einem Fall von Land Württemberg und in einem Fall von der Evangelischen Landeskirche in Stuttgart erworben worden. Die Stadt Tübingen, die zunächst acht Häuser erworben hatte, hat später drei dieser Häuser an Organisationen der NSDAP weiter verkauft." (... Before 1933 there were 35 student fraternity houses in Tübingen. The house owners were former fraternity students' associations or "house-building associations" (i.e. founded to house the building and maintenance of a fraternity house). 23 of these fraternity houses were disposed of by the owners during the years, 1936 - 1943, mostly against payment but also gratuitously in some cases. These properties
were acquired either by NSDAP organisations (NSV, Reich Organisation for Women, former members' associations of the National Socialist Student Association, Reich Student Organisation) or by the town of Tübingen, in some cases also by private persons, in one case by Land Württemberg and in another by the Lutheran Church of Württemberg in Stuttgart. The town of Tübingen, which had originally acquired eight buildings, later re-sold three of these buildings to NSDAP organisations.)

Since these buildings had been acquired by NSDAP organisations they automatically came under the requisition regulations of Law Nr. 52 (Articles 1, 1c and 1,lg) of the Allied Control Council which placed all National Socialist property at the disposal of the military government. The French military government requisitioned a large number of student corporation houses for a variety of purposes, as residence villas, administrative centres and brothels.

The management committees of the respective student corporations in Tübingen felt that there was good justification for a speedy return to traditional corporation life since they regarded themselves on the whole as persecuted opponents of National Socialism. The question of the revival of student corporation life was consequently broached soon after the occupation of Tübingen by prominent former members ("Altherren") of these corporations. On May 27 the rector received an enquiry on the matter from a Professor Walter Zimmermann, followed immediately by a "Memorandum sur Krage der Wiedereinführung von Korporationen in Tübingen" (memorandum on the question of the re-establishment of student corporations in Tübingen) by a self-styled "Vereinigung Tübinger Korporationstudenten" (Association of Tübingen Corporation Students).

In response to these enquiries the rector called a number of meetings to discuss the matter (May 30, June 1, 4 and 13). According to the minutes of the final meeting the rector gave a negative answer to the requests for the re-establishment of student corporations: "... Seine Magnifizenz teilt im Anschluß an die letzte Sitzung mit, daß die Besatzungsbehörde ein Wiedererstehen der alten Korporationen abgelehnt hat. Der Rector wird aber Material über anti-nationalsozialistisch Betätigung der Korporationen dort vorliegen." (... His Magnificence reported subsequent to the previous meeting that the occupation authorities had objected to a revival of the old corporations. But the rector said that he would submit material to them on the anti-National Socialist activities of the student corporations.)
Professor Karl-Heinz Schröder, professor of geography at the University of Tübingen, stated in the course of an interview (1974) that he had founded the "Vereinigung Tübinger Korporationsstudenten", composed of approximately twenty students representing several hundred others. Professor Schröder also claimed that he himself had composed the "Memorandum" and that it had met with the approval of the University rector. According to Professor Schröder the rector was prepared to advocate the re-establishment of corporations but was opposed by Carlo Schmid on personal grounds, e.g., Schmid had not been a corporation member during his university career. Schröder maintained that Schmid went to Stuttgart to ensure a French veto on Schröder's plan. Apparently the French occupation authorities in Stuttgart sent an officer to Tübingen to order the rector to forego any announcement on the re-establishment of corporations. At this point, Schröder maintained, he and the "Vereinigung Tübinger Korporationsstudenten" halted their campaign.

A history of the post-war student corporation movement in Tübingen written in 1974 ("Die Bestrebungen zur Schaffung neuer studentischer Gemeinschaften an der Universität Tübingen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg") (Endeavours to create new students' associations at the University of Tübingen after the Second World War) defined Carlo Schmid and the Catholic university chaplain, Father Bernhard Hanfler, as the principal antagonists to the re-establishment of student corporations:

"Die Bemühungen der einen Gruppe, die sich durch besondere Verbundenheit mit der Universität und gleichzeitig durch gute Beziehungen zur französischen und amerikanischen Besatzungsmacht auszeichnete, galten neben der baldmöglichsten Wiedereröffnung der Universität Tübingen der Verhinderung der Restauration der alten Korporationen. Mit letzterem Bestreben fanden sie sofort die Zustimmung der Besatzungsmächte. Während letztere mit der Wiederherstellung der Korporationen eine Restauration nationalistischer Tendenzen befürchteten, sahen die deutschen Korporationsgegner in Übereinstimmung mit den Vertretern der Universität in den Korporationen unerwünschte sozialreaktionäre und sozialexklusive Kreise.

Führend in dieser Gruppe waren der damalige Landgerichtsrat Prof. Schmid sowie der damalige Studienrat und katholische Studentenseelsorger Bernhard Hanfler." (The efforts of the group, which distinguished itself by its specific solidarity with the university and, at the same time, by its good relations with the French and American occupying powers, were directed at the earliest possible re-opening..."
of the University of Tübingen and at preventing a restoration of the old corporations. With regard to the latter aim they immediately gained the support of the occupying powers. Whilst the latter feared a revival of nationalistic tendencies if the corporations were restored, the German opponents of corporations, together with the representatives of the university, saw in the corporations socially reactionary and socially exclusive circles which were not to be desired.

Prominent in this group were the then Landgerichtsrat Professor Schmid as well as the then school master and Catholic university chaplain, Bernhard Hamburger.\(^{(120)}\)

The author of the above article failed, however, to include the third very important figure of Captain Cheval. René Cheval, a Germanist with first-hand experience of German student and academic life, was in favour of imposing a ban on student corporations. In this respect he was, according to his own testimony, in agreement with French policy: "... Nous avons tout fait pour empêcher la reconstitution des Verbindungen, en qui nous voyions l'expression d'un romantisme moyenâgeux peu compatible avec l'esprit démocratique. Nous avons échoué sur ce point."\(^{(121)}\)

The failure to which Professor Cheval refers occurred outside of the time-span of this study. During the period, 1945–47, and indeed throughout the period of the French occupation until 1949, student corporations were not permitted in Tübingen. After the promulgation of the Basic Law in May 1949 the university was in a better position to act unilaterally. On October 10 the "Großer Senat" of the university passed a resolution applauding the formation of student corporations under specific conditions: "... Im Bild der kommenden studentischen Gemeinschaft wird kein Platz mehr sein für die Veranstaltung von Manouren, die Behauptung und Herausstellung eines besonderen Körpers, die Abhaltung geistloser und lärmender Massengelage, die Ausübung einer unfreiheitlichen Vereinsdisziplin und das öffentliche Tragen von Farben." \(^{(122)}\) This resolution in turn became the subject of an equivalent resolution passed a number of days later by the "Westdeut-
On December 3, 1949, the "Großer Senat" of the University of Tübingen issued a series of "Vorschriften über die Bildung studentischer Gemeinschaf-ten" (Regulations concerning the establishment of student associations) (123). In a meeting of the "Kleiner Senat" on February 2, 1950, the Catholic student corporation, "Alamannia", was granted its application for re-establishment.

On the subject of student representation the French authorities were not so adamant. According to Professor Schröder, the first steps towards some autonomous form of student representation were taken by Father Hambler. Hambler approached Schröder in 1945 immediately after the latter's unsuccessful attempt with the "Vereinigung Tübinger Korporationsstudenten" at reviving student corporations and suggested the creation of a new student representative body from four existing student groups: the "Evangelische Studentengemeinde" (Lutheran Student Community), "Katholische Studentengemeinde", "Verbindungen" etc. and the female students. The duties of this proposed body were to be three in number: student finances; the representation of student interests; and the surveillance of student affairs as part of the process of transition to stable democratic conditions. The rector agreed to cooperate with this body and gave it permission to assume its self-defined duties. Dr. Schröder was elected chairman of the group which was entitled the "Geschäftsführender Vorstand der Tübinger Studentenschaft" (Executive Board of the Tübingen Student Body). Not only was this body recognised by the rector but also de facto by Captain Cheval who held discussions with them. (124)

This group immediately set about discussing the essentials of student representation. The meeting secretary of the group has left an overview of the topics discussed in a précis entitled Protokollauszüge which now lies in the university archives: "Am 18.VII.1945 kamen als Vertreter der in Tübingen bestehenden studentischen Gruppen - Evangelische Studentengemeinde, Katholische Studentengemeinde, Vereinigung Tübinger Korporationsstudenten, Studentinnen - der evangelische Studentenpfarrer, Herr Pastor Braun, der katholische Studentenpfarrer, Herr Pfarrer Hambler, der Vorsitzende der Vereinigung Tübinger Korporationsstudenten, Herr Dr. Schröder, und die Vertreterin der Studentinnen, Fräulein Link, mit je einem weiteren Vertreter ihrer Gruppen zusammen.

Zunächst wurden die künftige Verfassung und das Gemeinschaftsleben der Studenten in Tübingen besprochen. Da die Anwesenden aber erkannten, daß eine Lösung
dieser Fragen nicht ohne Mitwirkung der erst mit Semesterbeginn nach Tübingen kom­
menen Studenten und außerdem nur in längeren eingehenden Beratungen gefunden wer­
den können, einigten sie sich darauf, zunächst zur Erledigung der dringendsten Fra­
gen der studentischen Verwaltung einen treuhänderischen Ausschuß einzusetzen ...

Am 23.VII.1945 wurde eingehend erörtert, ob die Wahl eines legalen "Allge­
meinen Studentenausschusses" im Augenblick wünschenswert und durchführbar sei. Aus
folgenden Gründen wurde jedoch von einer solchen Abstand genommen:
1. Der Beginn der vorliegenden Arbeiten würde unnötig lange hinausgezögert werden.
2. Auch der gewählte Asta würde nur vorläufig - bis zum Semesterbeginn - als legal
angesehen werden können.
3. Der technischen Vorbereitung der Wahl müßten wahrscheinlich noch langwierige
Verhandlungen mit übergeordneten Stellen vorausgehen.

Es wurde daher einstimmig beschlossen: es wird ein Ausschuß gebildet, der
sich als Vertretung der Tübinger Studentenschaft dadurch legitimiert, daß er seine
Beauftragung durch die zur Zeit vorhandenen studentischen Gruppen hochweist. Dieser
Ausschuß betrachtet sich als geschäftsführenden Vorstand der Studentenschaft
in Sinne einer Treuhänderchaft und handelt in Benehmen mit dem Herrn Rektor. Der
Ausschuß erblickt seine vordringlichste Aufgabe darin, der Studentenschaft einen
verfassungsmäßigen Vorstand zu geben. Der Ausschuß handelt unter Berücksichtigung
der Verfassung der Tübinger Studentenschaft, wie sie vor dem 30.1.1933 in Kraft war.

Die zahlenmäßige und personelle Zusammensetzung des "geschäftsführenden
Vorstandes der Tübinger Studentenschaft" wurde am 25.VII.1945 festgelegt. Der
Evangelischen Studentengemeinde wurden 4, der Katholischen 3, der Vereinigung Tü­
binger Korporationsstudenten 2 und den Studentinnen 2 Sitze zugebilligt. Bei der
Vertretung der Vertreter soll darauf geachtet werden, daß möglichst alle Fakultäten
in Erscheinung treten ...".

(On 28.7.1945 the Lutheran university chaplain, Pastor Braun, the Catholic university
chaplain, Pastor Hanßler, the chairman of the Union of Tübingen Corporation Students,
Dr. Schröder, and the delegate of female students, Fräulein Link, each with one
other representative of their respective groups, met as representatives of the
existing Tübingen student groups, i.e. the Lutheran Student Community, Catholic
Student Community, Union of Tübingen Corporation Students and female students.)
Firstly, the future constitution and the community life of the students were discussed. But since those present realised that a solution to this question could not be found without the co-operation of those students who would not arrive in Tübingen until the beginning of term and even then only after lengthy and detailed debates, they agreed to first of all appoint a trust committee to settle the most urgent questions of student administration...

On 23.11.1945 the question was discussed in detail whether the election of a legal "General Students' Committee" was desirable and practicable at the moment. The meeting rejected this, however, for the following reasons:

1. the commencement of the work at hand would be delayed for an unnecessarily long period;
2. even the elected "ANSA" (i.e. General Students' Committee) could only be temporarily considered legal - until the beginning of term;
3. the technical preparation for the election would probably have to be preceded by wearisome negotiations with higher authorities.

Therefore it was unanimously agreed: a committee will be appointed which will legitimise itself as the representative of the Tübingen student body by proving its authorisation to act as such has the present student groups. This committee considers itself the executive board of the student body in the sense of a trusteeship and acts in agreement with the rector. The committee considers its most urgent function to give the students a constitutional executive. The composition of the "Executive Board of the Tübingen Student Body" in terms of numbers and personnel was established on 25.7.1945. 4 seats were allotted to the Lutheran Student Community, 3 to the Catholic Student Community, 2 to the Union of Tübingen Corporation Students and 2 to the female students. When delegating the representatives care must be taken that all the faculties are included if possible ...)

In the course of the first winter semester this body reorganised itself as the "Allgemeiner Studentenausschuss (ANSA)" (General Students' Committee) constituted on the basis of student elections. This development has been described by
Hermann Werner as follows: "Ein schon vor der Gründung der Universität gebildeter "geschäftsführender Ausschuss" Tübinger Studentenschaft" konnte sich im Lauf des ersten Winters wieder zu einem "Allgemeinen Studentenausschuss" entwickeln, dessen Satzungen etwa denen der Zeit vor 1933 entsprachen. Er war in den Zulassungs- und Überprüfungsausschüssen vertreten - auch die Studenten mussten ja damals, vor den Jugendreformen, politisch überprüft werden -. Er gliederte sich einem Kulturausschuss an, der früh mit Konzert- und Vortragsabenden beginnen konnte, und arbeitete auch mit dem Studentenwerk zusammen, dem die Studentenschaft als körperschaftliches Mitglied angeschlossen war. Dieses Studentenwerk hatte seine Tätigkeit gleich nach Gründung der Universität aufnehmen können und wurde im Lauf des Semesters als privater Verein organisatorisch und nach seinen Leistungen ausgebaut. Es wurde geleitet von einem Direktionsausschuss unter Vorsitz von Professor Dr. Kamke und errichtete nicht bloß eine Mensa mit billiger Verpflegung in der Neckarmüllerstraße (der "Prinz Karl", Sitz des früheren Studentenwerks, war von der Besatzungsmacht beschlagnahmt) und eine Erfrischungsstelle in der Neuen Aula, es hatte auch bald wieder eine Studentenhilfe, Stellen für Studien-, Berufs- und Rechtsberatung, einen Gesundheitsdienst und Krankenpflege und regelmäßigen Leichenuntersuchungen. Es betreute auch die akademische Wohnungsstelle ...". (An "executive committee of the Tübingen student body", which was formed even before the opening of the university, was able to develop again in the course of the first winter into a "general students' committee", the statutes of which corresponded roughly to those of the period prior to 1933. It was represented on the admissions and examinations committees (at that time, prior to the youth amnesty, students had to be politically examined as well), it incorporated a cultural committee which was able to start early with concerts and lecture evenings and it also co-operated with the "Studentenwerk" (i.e. university administrative apparatus for student affairs) in which the student body (i.e. students' union representatives) was included as a corporate member. This "Studentenwerk" had been able to take up its work immediately after the opening of the university and was extended organisationally in the course of the term as a private association and on a scale commensurate with its attainments. It was headed by an executive committee under the chairmanship of Professor Kamke and it not only set up a students' refectory with cheap food in the "Neckarmüllerstraße" inn (the "Prinz Karl", which was the former "Studentenwerk" building, had been requisitioned by the occupying power) and a refreshments bar in the Main Hall, but also set-up a students' aid service, offices for advisors of studies, careers advisory service and legal guidance, a student health service with nursing facilities and regular compulsory medical examinations. It also managed the university accommodation office ...). (126)
This "AStA" submitted a draft constitution ("Entwurf einer Satzung für die Tübinger Studentenschaft") to the rector on July 11, 1946; it was later accepted. The former deputy-chairman (and chairman) of the "AStA" was a politically active student named Bruno Heck who later became under Adenauer the Federal Minister for Family and Youth ("Bundesminister für Familie und Jugend"), 1962-1968. Dr. Heck described the functions of the post-war "AStA" as follow in private correspondence: "Ich kann mich nicht erinnern, daß die Zuständigkeitsbereiche des AStA je schriftlich fixiert worden sind. Ich kann Ihnen deswegen nur mitteilen, was wir de facto an Aufgaben wahrgenommen haben:

Wir konnten uns mit allen die Universität betreffenden Fragen befassen und entsprechende Stellungnahmen dem Rektor bzw. dem Kultusministerium bzw. der zuständigen Besatzungsbehörde zuleiten. Wir konnten eine Studentenzeitung herausgeben, die "Studentischen Blätter", deren Redakteur der jetzige Intendant des Süddeutschen Rundfunks, Herr Professor Bausch, gewesen ist ...". (I cannot remember the General Students' Committee's responsibilities ever having been set out in writing. Therefore I can only tell you what functions were in fact carried out:

We were able to concern ourselves in all questions relating to the university and to submit appropriate comments to the rector, the Ministry of Education and the competent occupation authorities. We were able to publish a students' newspaper, the Studentischen Blätter, the editor of which is the present director of the South German Radio, Professor Bausch ...). (127)

On the whole the French authorities - and the "Staatssekretariat" - maintained a watchful surveillance on the development of political attitudes among the students. According to Dr. Kellar, the post-war representative of the Lutheran Church in Tübingen, the students in the immediate post-war period were for the most part apolitical, indeed tired and suspicious of political involvement and commitment. They were almost exclusively concerned with procuring a professional training to ensure themselves job security and with finding the material means to achieve this end. In addition, according to Keller, many of this age group had been members or affiliated members of the NSDAP and were consequently cautious in demonstrating further political commitments. (128) The Tübingen professor of philosophy, Eduard Sprunger, used his observations on Tübingen to make the following comment on the post-war student generation: "Nie wurde eine Generation unter tragischeren Umständen studiert, als die von 1946 bis 1949. Schon in späterer Hinsicht: sie war mittellos, mangelhaft ernährt, gesundheitlich gefährdet, schlecht untergebracht,
oft völlig heimatlos. Sie hatte auf der Schule wenig oder nichts gelernt; sie hatte das schrecklichste Schicksal gehabt, einen Krieg zu führen, an dessen Enden sie vielleicht zu Schluß in keiner Beziehung mehr glauben konnte. Sie hatte zum Teil schon einmal ungewöhnliche Macht besessen und fand sich nun sogar unterrechtet. Sie war naturgemäß innerlich völlig disorientiert, ratlos, wurde aber zugleich von allen Seiten der Siegermächte her mit Heilmitteln und Umerziehungsversuchen bestürmt, denen sie sich nicht ohne weiteres eröffnen konnte. Sie war überhaupt verschlossen bis zur Verbissenheit." (Never has a generation studied under more tragic circumstances than that of the period, 1946-1949. From an external point of view alone! It was without money, inadequately fed, its health endangered, badly housed and often stateless. It had learned little or nothing at school; it had suffered the terrible fate of waging a war in which it could no longer at all believe, at least not towards the end. It once partly possessed unusual power and now found itself deprived of all rights. It was in the order of things that it was mentally completely disorientated and perplexed while at the same time it was assailed from all sides by the victorious powers with remedies and re-education methods which it could not readily absorb. On the whole it was withdrawn to the point of moroseness.)

The "Staatssekretariat" was constantly reminded by the French authorities, especially by the head of the "Gürstè" in Tübingen, Colonel Georges, about their concern regarding political attitudes within the student body. At a cabinet meeting of the "Staatssekretariat" on December 14, 1943, this topic was discussed: "Landesdirektor Roßmann berichtet von einer Unterredung mit Colonel Georges. Anknüpfend an die Ernennung von Herrn Ficht hat ihm Oberst Georges seine ernste Besorgnis über die Haltung der Tübinger Studentenschaft in politischer Hinsicht ausgedrückt. Oberst Georges betonte, er habe keine speziellen Fälle im Auge, wenn er auch über einzelne Vorgänge sowie über das Bestehen einzelner sehr reaktionärer Körner informiert sei. Er fürchtete, wenn es so weiterginge, zum Eingreifen gezwungen zu sein, was er gern vermeiden würde. Die Zulaufsausschläge seien zu lax ..." (Landesdirektor Roßmann reported on a conversation with Colonel Georges. With reference to the appointment of Herr Ficht, Colonel Georges had expressed serious concern about the attitude of the Tübingen student body to politics. Colonel Georges had emphasised that he was not thinking of any special cases, even though he was informed about individual incidents as well as about the existence of a number of very reactionary circles. He had said he was afraid that if things continued in this way he would be forced to intervene, a step which he would like to avoid.)
According to him, the admissions committee was too lax. Four days later the "Staatsekretariat" felt obliged to discuss the issue again: "Staatsrat Schmid: Es existiert hier in der Studentenschaft anscheinend eine Art 'Herwolf'-bewegung. Es handelt sich offenbar größtenteils um ehemalige aktive Offiziere. In der Nacht von vergangenen Samstag auf Sonntag ist in Dr. Doblers Zimmer eingebrochen worden; es wurden Dokumente entwendet. Die Täter sind in den genannten Kreisen zu suchen. Dies ist ein eklantenter Fall. Im übrigen muß aber festgestellt werden, daß die Gesamthaltung der Studentenschaft überhaupt höchst bedauerlich ist, insbesondere in der juristischen Fakultät, wo die Hass ehemaligen aktiven Offiziere eingeschrieben ist. Ich halte ein scharfes Durchgreifen für notwendig. Wir können es uns nicht leisten, daß die Universität zu einem Hort der Reaktion wird, wie man jetzt schon ab und zu hören kann. Die Frage der Zulassung aktiver Offiziere muß scharfer angepackt werden. Aber auch eine Reihe von Professoren tragen einen Teil Schuld." (Staatsrat Schmid: There exists seemingly a kind of "Herwolf" (i.e. National Socialist guerilla organisation) exists here within the student body. These are apparently in the main former regular officers. During the night from last Saturday to Sunday Dr. Dobler's room was broken into; documents were stolen. The perpetrators are to be found within the afore-cited groups. This is an isolated case of a scandalous nature. As for the rest it has to be said that the overall attitude of the student body is on the whole most deplorable, in particular in the law faculty where the bulk of the former regular officers are enrolled. I consider rigorous action necessary. We cannot afford the university to be turned into a stronghold of reaction, as can be heard on occasion. The question of the admission of regular officers must be tackled more rigorously. But some professors are also to blame to an extent.)

According to various reports Carlo Schmid was deeply disappointed that the students as a whole did not demonstrate great enthusiasm for the new situation which had emerged at the university after the destruction of National Socialism. In Schmid's eyes the students did not fully appreciate their new found freedom and did not participate sufficiently in activist roles in the business of reconstruction. A contemporary witness of post-war student affairs in Tübingen, Dr. Volker Kreis, described this situation as follows: "Als natürliche Folge des "nationalsozialistischen Scheitels" mit den Idealismus der Obrigkeitshöhenheit im 3. Reich war die Studentenschaft zunächst sehr zurückhaltend. Aus diesem Kontrast heraus, daß wir mehr oder weniger alle glücklich waren, endlich studieren zu können."
According to him, the admissions committee was too lax...)

Four days later the "Staatsekretariat" felt obliged to discuss the issue again: "Staaterrat Schmidt: Es existiert hier in der Studentenschaft anscheinend eine Art Wervolfsbewegung. Es handelt sich offenbar größtenteils um ehemalige aktive Offiziere. In der Nacht vom vergangenen Sonntag auf Sonntag ist in Dr. Dobler's Zimmer eingebrochen worden. Es wurden Dokumente entwendet. Die Täter sind in den genannten Kreisen zu suchen. Dies ist ein eklatanter Manko. In Übrigen muß aber festgestellt werden, daß die Gesamthaltung der Studentenschaft überhaupt höchst bedauerlich ist, insbesondere in der juristischen Fakultät, wo die Namen der ehemaligen aktiven Offiziere eingeschrieben sind. Ich halte ein scharfes Durchgreifen für notwendig. Wir können es uns nicht leisten, daß die Universität zu einem Hort der Reaktion wird, wie man jetzt schon ab und zu hören kann. Die Frage der Zulassung aktiver Offiziere muß scharfer angepackt werden. Aber auch einige der Professoren tragen einen Teil Schuld." (Staaterrat Schmidt: Seemingly a kind of "Werwolf" (i.e., National Socialist guerilla organisation) exists here within the student body. These are apparently in the main former regular officers. During the night from last Saturday to Sunday Dr. Dobler's room was broken into; documents were stolen. The perpetrators are to be found within the afore-cited groups. This is an isolated case of a scandalous nature. As for the rest it has to be said that the overall attitude of the student body is on the whole most deplorable, in particular in the law faculty where the bulk of the former regular officers are enrolled. I consider rigorous action necessary. We cannot afford the university to be turned into a stronghold of reaction, as can be heard on occasion. The question of the admission of regular officers must be tackled more rigorously. But some professors are also to blame to an extent.)

According to various reports Carlo Schmid was deeply disappointed that the students as a whole did not demonstrate great enthusiasm for the new situation which had emerged at the university after the destruction of National Socialism. In Schmid's eyes the students did not fully appreciate their newfound freedom and did not participate sufficiently in activist roles in the business of reconstruction. A contemporary witness of post-war student affairs in Tübingen, Dr. Volker Mers, described this situation as follows: "Als natürliche Folge des "nationalsozialistischen Reinform" mit der Idealismus der Obrigkeitstüchtigkeit im 3. Reich war die Studentenschaft zunächst mehr zurückhaltend. Allerdings kam hinzu, daß wir mehr oder weniger alle glücklich waren, endlich studieren zu können.
Abgesehen davon gab es kleine Zirkel, die innerhalb der Studentenschaft oder auch außerhalb deres bereits politisch aktiv wurden und allmählich auch bei den Mitstudierenden Verständnis und Verständnis für Belange außerhalb des Fachstudiums zu wecken vermochten (z. B. die Vereinigung Verfolgter des Naziregimes, bei der Prof. Hans Bauch und Fritz aktiv waren, oder aber auch eine Gruppe um Dr. Bruno Heck). Die eigentlich aktivste Gruppe war aber zweifellos unser damaliger APTA. Das Staatsssekretariat war über den Mangel an politischem Interesse deshalb so enttäuscht, weil Prof. Carlo Schmid, Herr Dondorf, Herr Rupp und andere, meines Bissens später auch Prof. Sachenburg, geglaubt haben, dass die aus dem Krieg zurückkehrende Generation die Befreiung von politischer Bevormundung mit Enthusiasmus zu eigener politischer Tätigkeit mitnehmen würde. It was a natural consequence of the "National Socialist Scandal" with its idealization of authoritarian subservience during the Third Reich that the student body was at first very reserved. On top of this was the fact that we were all more or less glad to be able to study at last.

Apart from this there were small groups which were already becoming politically active, both within and outside the student body, and which gradually managed to arouse understanding, among other things for matters outside of university studies (e.g., the Association of the Persecuted of the Nazi Regime in which Professor Hans Bauch and Fritz were active and also a group around Dr. Bruno Heck). But the most active group at that period was without doubt our "APT" (General Students' Committee). The State Secretariat was as disappointed as it was about the lack of political interest (among the students) because Professor Schmid, Herr Dondorf, Herr Rupp and others - including Professor Sachenburg later - had believed that the generation returning from the war would enthusiastically use their release from political tutelage for their own political use. (192)

The chairman of the "APT", a medical student named Matacz, was forced to resign in 1946 after a quarrel with the French over his role in the distribution of unauthorized "Passierscheine" (frontier passes) for the American zone. The French authorities did not hesitate to order the resignation of personalities whom they considered to be oppositional or counter-productive to French interests. The clearest example of French impatience with opposition from university figures was the case of Professor Schneider's reluctant resignation from his office as rector of the university. At a meeting of the "Großer Senat" on March 16, 1946, Schneider
announced that he would not stand for re-election at the forthcoming rectorial election and quoted French instructions as the cause of his decision: "Der Rector gibt bekannt, daß die Militärregierung angeordnet habe, die Parteigenossen von der Wahl auszuschließen. Er habe dagegen Einspruch erhoben, weil durch diesen Ausschluß die Verfassung verletzt werde, doch sei sein Einspruch erfolglos geblieben. Er bitte ihm keine Stimme zu geben, denn die Militärregierung wünsche einen neuen Rector; sie habe diesem Bumach in die Worte gekleidet: die Inanspruchnahme des Rectors sei so groß, daß die Amtszeit ein Jahr nicht überschreiten solle." (The rector announced that the Military Government had ordered the exclusion of NSDAP members from the election. He had protested against this as the (university) constitution would be violated by this act of exclusion, but his protest had no effect. He then asked the "Senat" not to vote for him because the Military Government wanted a new rector; it had expressed this wish in the words, "the demands made on the rector are so great that the term of office should not exceed one year"). At the following meeting of the "Großer Senat" on March 19 a professor of Catholic theology, Theodor Steinbüchel, was elected rector of the university.

During his period of office Schneider refused to cooperate fully with either the French authorities or the "Staatssekretariat". It is therefore not surprising that the French singled him out for retirement at the earliest possible instance. It would appear from various interview accounts that Schneider was fairly unpopular among the university staff on account of his autocratic methods. In a report ("Rechenschaftsbericht") to the "Großer Senat" on October 13, 1945, Schneider described his relationship with the university as that of scapegoat and presented a picture of his disputes with the "Staatssekretariat", especially on the subject of denazification: "... Aber am nächsten Tag wurde von der Besatzungsmacht in Baden-Baden telegraphiert, daß die theologischen Fakultäten eröffnet werden können. Die medizinische solle am 1. September folgen. Dieser Termin wurde jedoch immer wieder verschoben und es mehnten sich die Stimmen, daß unsere Erinnerung nichts taugen und ihr Namen weiter gezogen werden müsse. Und dann trat der verhängnisvolle Augenblick ein, in welchem ein Vertreter des Kultministeriums erklärte, daß hier nach amerikanischem Recht verfahren werden solle, also jede Parteigenossen zu streichem sei. Das sei der Wille der Regierung in Baden-Baden. Merkwürdig war dabei das eine, daß die hiesigen örtlichen Stellen verzeichneten, nichts davon zu wissen. Aber der Ministeriumsvorstand beharrte auf seinen Standpunkt. Es wurden sämtliche Parlei-
genossen suspendiert, im ganzen etwa 120 Kollegen. Die Universität verlor damit ihre Lebensfähigkeit und es war ein Hohn, daß dieses Vorgehen die Voraussetzung für die Eröffnung der Universität sein sollte. Ungeheuere Gerüchte entstanden, die Vertrauenskrise überschlug sich, die Verängstigung nahm unglaubliche Formen an, eine Wirren bemächtigte sich der ganzen Stadt. In dieser allgemeinen Erregung war es ein Glück, daß die Universität einen Rector hatte, einen Schäfersbock, einen Prügelknaben, auf dem alles abgeladen werden konnte, was die Besatzungsmacht getan hatte." (...) But next day the occupation authorities in Baden-Baden telegraphed that the theological faculties could be opened. The medical faculty was to follow suit on September 1. This date, however, was postponed time and time again and voices were increasingly raised to the effect that our denazification was no good and that its frame of reference would have to be extended. Then the fatal moment occurred when a representative of the Ministry of Education declared that the American system was to be adhered to in this matter, namely that every Römer member was to be deleted. That was, he said, the wish of the government. The curious thing about this was that the local authorities assured us that they knew nothing about it. But the representative from the Ministry persisted in his point of view. All Römer members were suspended, in all about 120 colleagues. The university lost its viability through this and it was a mockery that this procedure should serve as a premonition for the opening of the university. Monstrous rumours resulted, a crisis of confidence followed in quick succession, the general anxiety developed unbelievable forms, an unrest seized hold of the whole town. In this general agitation it was fortunate that the university had a rector, a scapegoat and whipping boy, on whom everything which the occupation authorities had done could be unloaded. (194)

In the same report Schneider defended himself against the charge that he had acted high-handedly in the execution of his office; also he implied that he had maintained an effective opposition to certain aspects of French policy, e.g. "die Abwendung der Gefahr eines französischen Kurators" (the averting of the danger of a French university curator). (195) Like Professor Kampe, Schneider was the type of personality whom the French authorities abhorred as administrators: pugnacious, honest to a fault and indiscreet. In private correspondence (1974) Professor René Cheval listed other reasons for Schneider's failure to remain in office: "Au sein même des deux Sénats (Großer und Kleiner Senat) de l'université, beaucoup de
professeurs reprochaient au Recteur Schneider son excès de conservatism. Ils voyaient en lui un obstacle à la rénovation de l'université. ... Le Recteur Schneider lui-même était conscient d'être un "Übergangsrektor" et n'avait pas le désir - et peut-être l'énergie - d'orienter l'université sur les voies nouvelles. (156) These may well have been secondary considerations but the primary cause for Schneider's resignation and replacement was certainly his reluctance to implement French policies without contradiction.

It has been decided to close this chapter on the University of Tübingen by quoting Professor Cheval, the key figure in the formulation and implementation of French policy within the university, on the factors and conditions governing the post-war academic situation in Tübingen and the specific features of French policy which, in his opinion, characterised the French cultural and educational effort in Germany and contributed to its success. Cheval admitted that there were objective conditions in Tübingen in 1945 which facilitated his work: "CERTAINES FACTEURS SONT INDEPENDANTS DE LA PRESENCE FRANCAISE ET DE L'ACTION DE SES REPRESENTANTS; PAR EXEMPLE, LE FAIT QUE TUBINGEN ETAIT UNE PETITE VILLE EPARGNEE PAR LA GUERRE (OUI LE PROBLEME DU LOGEMENT ETAIT MOINS AIGU QU'AILLEURS), SITUEE EN MILIEU RURAL (OU LES POSSESSIOlS DE REVITALISATION ETAIENT PLUS FAVORABLES). IL NE FAUT PAS OUBLIER NON PLUS QU'A LA SUITE DE L'EVACTION DES GRANDES VILLES (NOTAMMENT DE BERLIN) EN RAISON DES BOMBARDEMENTS ALLIES, TUBINGEN ET LA NURSBERG-SUD ETAIENT DECHERCHES COMME LIEU DE REPRI ... À L'ARRIVEE DES FRANCAIS, DES CONDITIONS FAVORABLES ETAIENT DEJÀ FORMES [...]

Professor Cheval then listed the following aspects of French policy as the specific contribution of the military government to the successful revival of academic life in post-war Tübingen which soon established the university as one of the foremost academic centres of occupied Germany: "CE QU'ON PEUT METTRE AU COMPTE DE LA POLITIQUE FRANCAISE, C'EST SON RELATIF LIBERALISME; ON SAISIT QUE LES AUTORITES FRANCAISES ETAIENT MOINS FORMLISTES POUR LES QUESTIONS D'EPURATION, QU'ELLES S'EFFORÇAIENT DE CREER UN CLIMAT - MATERIEL ET SPIRITUEL - PROPRE À LA REPRISE DU TRAVAIL INTELLECTUEL. DES SAVANTS ÉMINENTS ONT ÊTÉ ALORS RETIRÉS ET RETENUS PAR TUBINGEN: CAZARDINI, BUESCHEN, SPRANGER, SEMMERS, THIELICKE ETC. BEAUCOUP D'ALLEMANDS EXPRESSION LE SENSIMENT QUE LES FRANCAIS, AU MOINS SUR LE
plan intellectuel, étaient plus proches d'eux que les autres Alliés. Il est certain que dans son domaine (ce n'est pas vrai pour tous les domaines), notre action n'a pas été conçue comme punitive, mais était tout entière tournée vers le renouveau, vers la recherche d'une nouvelle fraternité. \end{document}
Footnotes

Chapter Seven: The University of Tübingen, 1945-1947


(4) Volker Schäfer, op. cit., p. 200.

(5) ibid.

(6) ibid.

(7) ibid.

(8) ibid., pp. 201 f.

(9) Universitätsarchiv Tübingen, As: 117c/303.


(11) Die Nürnberger Juden in Germany, Munich, 1956, p. 442.

(12) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Nachlaß Hermann Werner, "Besuch bei Universitätsrat Dr. Knapp am 11. Oktober 1951"

(13) ibid.


(15) Stuttgart.

(16) Heilbronn.

(17) Interview with Professor Karl-Heinz Schröder, Tübingen, July 1974.

(18) Stadtarchiv Tübingen, Nachlaß Hermann Werner.

(19) Universityarchiv Tübingen, As: 131/137.


(21) ibid.


(25) Universitätsarchiv Tübingen, Aa 11043.
(26) Universitätsarchiv Tübingen, Aa 131/137.
(27) Universitätsarchiv Tübingen, Aa 1899.
(28) Universitätsarchiv Tübingen, Aa 969.
(29) Universitätsarchiv Tübingen, Aa 899.
(31) Universitätsarchiv Tübingen, Aa 899.
(33) Staatsarchiv Singen, Aa 2 2 Acc 24/70, p. 1018/3.
(34) Universitätsarchiv Tübingen, Aa 1176/8.
(35) Universitätsarchiv Tübingen, Aa 1176/9.
(36) Universitätsarchiv Tübingen, Aa 1899.
(37) Universitätsarchiv Tübingen, Aa 131/140.
(38) Universitätsarchiv Tübingen, Aa 899.
(39) Universitätsarchiv Tübingen, Aa 899.
(40) Universitätsarchiv Tübingen, Aa 899.
(45) Author of Zeit und Zeit (1927).
(46) Interview with Professor Paul Ohlmeyer, Tübingen, May 1974.
(47) Universitätsarchiv Tübingen, Aa 131/160, "Protokoll über die Fakultäts-Sitzung vom 23. November 1945".
(50) Staatsarchiv Singen, "Niederschrift über die 49. Sitzung des Direktoriums am 21. April 1946".
(51) Ibid.
(53) Der große Brechung (Hamburg), IV Jg., Er. 4, 4. April 1962, pp. 33 f. and Interview with Oberst Wilhelm Köhler, Tübingen, May 1974.
(54) Reutlingen, October 7, 1950, p. 4.
(55) Universitätsarchiv Tübingen, Art 47a/9, "Sitzung des Kleinen Senats am Dienstag, den 7. Mai 1946".
(56) Universitätsarchiv Tübingen, Art 131/141.
(57) Universitätsarchiv Tübingen, Art 47a/3.
(58) Universitätsarchiv Tübingen, Art 969.
(59) Universitätsarchiv Tübingen, Art K889, letter dated March 22, 1947, 1/290/CAU/UG/AN.
(60) Universitätsarchiv Tübingen, Art K882.
(61) Universitätsarchiv Tübingen, Art "Universitätsangelegenheiten".
(62) Interview with Professor Julius Wilhelm, Tübingen, May 1974.
(64) France's post-war cultural policies and activities in Germany 1945-1946, Thése. Faculté des Sciences économiques et Sociales, Université de Genève, 1975, p. 113.
(68) Letter from Professor N. Cheval, dated May 28, 1974.
(70) Journal Officiel du Gouvernement en Chef Prussien en Allemagne (Baden-Baden), 1re Année, No. 5, 3 Septembre 1945, p. 5.
(71) Universitätsarchiv Tübingen, Art K969.
(72) Universitätsarchiv Tübingen, Art K969.
(73) Universitätsarchiv Tübingen, Art K969.
(74) Universitätsarchiv Tübingen, Art 117/941.
(76) "Rede, gehalten bei der Neueröffnung der Universität Tübingen am 15. Oktober 1945 von Prof. Dr. Hermann Schneider, Rektor", in: Über Landtage, Träger und Vehem den Namen in der Geschichte der Staatsun, Tübingen, 1950, pp. 7 ff.
(77) De La Première de l'Empire, Allocution de Monseigneur le Gouverneur Guillaume Ullens, Officiel auprès pour le Gouvernement Militaire du Luxembourg, en l'Honneur de la Nouveauté de l'Université de Tübingen, 14 Octobre 1945, Tübingen, 1945.

(71) Interview with Professor Georg Melchers, Tübingen, May 1974.

(72) "Die Zellen der Hydra", in: "Festschrift der Universitätsbibliothek Tübingen", ed. by Hermann Werner, Tübingen, 1974, p. 104.

(73) Interview with Professor Georg Melchers, Tübingen, May 1974.

(74) University archive Tübingen, Az 117/K939.

(75) University archive Tübingen, Az 117/K939.

(76) University archive Tübingen, Az 117/K970.

(77) University archive Tübingen, Az 117/K970.

(78) University archive Tübingen, Az 117/K970.

(79) Ibid.

(80) Ibid.

(81) University archive Tübingen, Az 117/K941.

(82) University archive Tübingen, Az 117/K941.

(83) University archive Tübingen, Az 117/K941.

(84) University archive Tübingen, Az 117/K941.

(85) University archive Tübingen, Az 117/K941.

(86) University archive Tübingen, Az 117/K941.

(87) University archive Tübingen, Az 117/K941.

(88) University archive Tübingen, Az 117/K941.

(89) University archive Tübingen, Az 117/K941.

(90) University archive Tübingen, Az 117/K941.

(91) University archive Tübingen, Az 117/K941.

(92) University archive Tübingen, Az 117/K941.

(93) University archive Tübingen, Az 117/K941, letter dated May 24, 1946.

(94) University archive Tübingen, Az 117/K941.

(95) University archive Tübingen, Az 117/K941.

(96) University archive Tübingen, Az 117/K941.

(97) University archive Tübingen, Az 117/K941.

(98) University archive Tübingen, Az 117/K941.

(99) University archive Tübingen, Az 117/K941.

(100) University archive Tübingen, Az 117/K941.

(101) University archive Tübingen, Az 117/K941.

(102) University archive Tübingen, Az 117/K941.

(103) University archive Tübingen, Az 117/K941.

(104) University archive Tübingen, Az 117/K941.

(105) University archive Tübingen, Az 117/K941.

(106) University archive Tübingen, Az 117/K941.

(107) University archive Tübingen, Az 117/K941.

(108) University archive Tübingen, Az 117/K941.
(113) Universitätsarchiv Tübingen, A/13/96.
(114) Universitätsarchiv Tübingen, A/13/96/30.
(115) Interview with Professor Karl-Heinz Schröder, Tübingen, July 1974.
(116) Staatsarchiv Ebermannstädten, A/162 Acc 32/69, 7373.
(117) Universitätsarchiv Tübingen, A/13/96.
(118) Universitätsarchiv Tübingen, A/13/96.
(120) Konstantin Hank, in: Beiträge zur deutschen Studentengeschichte, 7 Jg., Heft 1, April 1964, p. 73.
(121) Letter from Professor K. Schröder, dated May 28, 1974.
(122) "Die Bestrebungen zur Schaffung neuer studentischer Gemeinschaften an der Universität Tübingen nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg", in: Beiträge zur deutschen Studentengeschichte, p. 52.
(123) Abb., p. 53.
(124) Interview with Professor Karl-Heinz Schröder, Tübingen, July 1974.
(125) Universitätsarchiv Tübingen, A/13/96.
(128) Interview with Oberkirchenrat Dr. Herbert Keller, Stuttgart, August 1974.
(132) Letter from Dr. Volker Bars, Stuttgart, dated November 15, 1974.
(135) Ibid.
(137) Ibid.
(138) Ibid.
Conclusion
In the introductory chapter to this thesis two aims were defined as the
primary motivation for the choice of title, "The French occupation of Tübingen,
1945-1947: a case study of France's policy of occupation in Germany in the
immediate post-war period": firstly, to describe Tübingen as a community in
itself with emphasis on its specific post-war developments; and, secondly, to
provide concomitantly a series of comments on French occupation policy and the
"French thesis" on Germany during the period, 1940-1947. This concluding chapter
is consequently devoted to a final statement of formulation and summary on these
two themes in order to distil a perspective of overview from the data presented
in the preceding chapters.

With regard to the former aim, i.e. to describe Tübingen as a community in
itself with emphasis on its specific post-war developments, it is evident from
the extensive data underpinning this research that the thesis was partly conceived
as a form of "Zeitdokument" on the history of French-occupied Tübingen. This
ongoing empirical account of selected aspects of Tübingen's post-war history also
provides the frame of reference for an examination of French occupation policy.

The arrival of the French army and French military government in Tübingen
heralded a series of developments which brought change to the lives of every member
of the community and altered the political and social composition of the town.
Some of these developments were traditional aspects of military occupation, such
as the physical presence of a foreign army, the imposition of requisition orders
on housing, food, fuel, machinery etc. and the enforcement of military government
legislation. These were common to the whole of the French zone and have been
referred to throughout this thesis. Other effects of the French occupation were,
however, of unique importance for Tübingen and were not automatically paralleled
throughout the zone. It remains to define these developments and experiences which
were specific to and characteristic of Tübingen in the period, 1945-1947, as a
direct result of French occupation policy.

The outstanding feature of the French occupation of Tübingen was its eleva­
tion to the rank of regional capital of Süd-Württemberg and seat of French military
government. After centuries of political passivity and loyalty via-là-via Stuttgart,
the historical capital of Württemberg, this medium-sized "Kreisstadt" and university
town, whose highest achievements and ambitions were previously restricted to the
fields of academic research and theology, was catapulted into the political arena as the highest level of political and administrative authority in Süd-Württemberg and consequently one of the major towns of South-West Germany. Thus the town was compelled to reject its traditional role of political dependence on Stuttgart and to assume newly defined powers and stature whereby it inevitably entered into a situation of rivalry with Stuttgart. This newfound autonomy fostered a strong element of dualism in Tübingen's political life in that, whilst obliged to assume the mantle and attendant powers of an autonomous regional capital, it was nevertheless constantly aware of a powerful counter-current of historical loyalty and commitment to Stuttgart and a unified Württemberg. This factor is treated below in more detail in a subsequent section on French separatist policy in Tübingen.

The emergence of Tübingen as a regional capital of the French zone of occupation constitutes one of the grey areas of German post-war history. On the whole the political and academic elites of the Federal Republic have displayed to the present day little interest in an in-depth analysis of the causes, course and effects of the French occupation of South-West Germany. This general lack of interest in the post-war affairs of South-West Germany is reflected in the paucity of political commentary and academic research on the role of post-war Tübingen, despite the fact that Tübingen was an important source of political influence within South-West Germany during the French occupation and that it remained the "Land" capital of Württemberg-Hohenzollern until 1952. Various historical factors of significance concerning French-occupied Tübingen - for example, that it played host to the first post-war industrial trade fair in Germany, that it was the first university town of the post-war period to resume full university life and that it was a leading patron of the arts in post-war Germany - have failed to gain any significant attention within the various accounts of the period of the Allied occupation of Germany. This thesis attempts to make a contribution toward establishing an equilibrium of perspective about Tübingen's post-war role by depicting the concentration of power, influence and prestige which the town acquired during the initial two years of French occupation and by underlining its importance within the political and social framework of South-West Germany during the same period.

This acquisition of power and influence was expressed in administrative as well as political terms. An important concomitant effect of the town's elevation to the rank of regional capital was the establishment in Tübingen of a considerable
number of governmental and other bureaucracies. Within a relatively short space of time Tübingen developed into a major centre of administration, assuming for the area of Süd-Württemberg all the administrative powers which were formerly exercised by Stuttgart. This development subsequently affected and altered the social composition of the town in that Tübingen acquired a large group of specialist administrators who rapidly imposed their attitudes and standards on the community. In response to its new status as the centrifugal hub of Süd-Württemberg's administrative apparatus Tübingen eventually acquired all the characteristics of a German "Beamtenstadt" (town of civil servants).

One of the striking features of the new administrative apparatus of Süd-Württemberg was the nature of the central authority in Tübingen, the "Staatssekretariat", which, operating under a close system of checks and balances by the French military government, exercised powers of control and surveillance over it. The "Staatssekretariat" did not incorporate the principle of the division of powers but rather represented a hybrid of administrative executive and government which developed its own highly individualistic style of management.

This style of management was largely determined by the flamboyant figure of Carlo Schmid. During the one and a half years of Schmid's premiership all other political personalities and groupings were eclipsed and obliged to play a secondary role whilst Schmid and his circle of lieutenants, known generally in Tübingen as the "Carlisten", set the tone of political and administrative co-existence with the French military government. Schmid's style of management was autocratic in nature and he imposed his personal ideals and ambitions on the various administrations in Tübingen as unwritten statements of commitment which were tantamount in effect to policy directives. The most apparent of these unwritten statements of commitment was that of support for an eventual reunification of Württemberg. The Tübingen administrations adopted Schmid's view that the Allied division of Württemberg and the subsequent establishment of two separate "Länder" within Württemberg's historical boundaries was to be regarded as a temporary phenomenon of the occupation.

Another major feature of the "Staatssekretariat" and its attendant bureaucracies in Tübingen was their high degree of administrative efficacy. This was in the main a result of two factors: firstly, Carlo Schmid's personal flair for legal and administrative affairs; and, secondly, Schmid's choice of highly qualified
professional men to act as his departmental lieutenants with delegated duties. Under these men the Tübingen bureaucracies maintained an overall high standard of administration despite the enormous problems presented by the objective conditions of the post-war situation and the difficulties created by the demands of the occupying army and the French military government's tactic of indirect administration. One effect of this efficacy was the emergence in Tübingen, despite the feeling of loyalty and commitment to Stuttgart and Württemberg, of a sense of pride in its own achievements, especially in the fields of administration, the social services and cultural affairs.

A further feature of the French occupation of Tübingen was the fact that Carlo Schmid's career and rise to power introduced an element of political nepotism and jobbery in the distribution of municipal and government posts. Although the DVP and CSU were, in terms of electoral support, the "natural" parties of Tübingen (and Süd-Württemberg) Carlo Schmid installed his political lieutenants and social acquaintances in positions of administrative and political influence. Since the majority of these men were newly enrolled members of the Tübingen SPD branch the German administrations in Tübingen came to represent an almost exclusive source of party sinecures for the Social Democrats. Possession of these offices, together with Carlo Schmid's dominance of the "Staatssekretariat", ensured the SPD the predominant political role in Tübingen in the initial period of the French occupation. This situation was gradually reversed with the reintroduction of elective local and regional government. In the period, however, between the establishment of the "Staatssekretariat" and the reinstatement of elective government Tübingen was to all intents and purposes an SPD-governed community, a situation which was a novelty for Tübingen and one which has not repeated itself since.

Prior to this period of Social Democratic dominance Tübingen experienced a short period of Communist dominance in the initial six months of the occupation when KPD influence extended throughout the local police force, the local newspaper, the trade unions, the town council and the local anti-Fascist committee. This remains the sole instance in Tübingen's history of the KPD acquiring bases of real political influence within the community. The Communists have not since emerged as a political force in Tübingen. They have never been really at home in Tübingen's social and political milieu and have never made much headway in the municipal and district elections. The KPD's accession to positions of influence in the initial
The occupation period was outwith the party's standing within the community and was only possible with French support and within the framework of local French military government policy.

The major reason for the KPD's failure to maintain its position of influence in post-war Tübingen is described below in the section on French occupation policy as the party's loss of favour in the eyes of the French military government on account of the party's anti-particularist stance and its centralist tradition. There were, however, two attendant factors which are of specific interest with regard to the history and situation of post-war Tübingen. Firstly, the KPD demonstrated such a low level of efficiency and ability in the execution of its delegated offices that Tübingen must surely rate as one of the most negative examples of Communist municipal management in post-war Germany. Secondly, the total failure on the part of the Tübingen KPD to gain support and membership within the community's professional and middle classes is another characteristic of post-war Tübingen. The uncompromising rejection of Communist ideology by the professional elites of Tübingen is best exemplified by the reluctance of Tübingen's university academics to associate themselves with the local Communist party and its Marxist-Leninist ideology. Carlo Schmid's active lobbying of those university academics without a National Socialist past possibly cost the KPD a number of potential members. On the other hand the university obviously had a strongly conservative tradition which was reinforced by the renown and influence of the faculties of theology. Furthermore, the university was situated in a former "Kreisstadt" of medium size which did not offer the same range of political commitment as large, industrial conurbations such as Berlin, Munich and Leipzig with their commensurably representative Socialist and proletarian parties and activist groups. Nevertheless, it remains somewhat of an anomaly that not one single member of Tübingen's post-war academic community saw a viable proposition in the ideology and programme of the KPD as an alternative to the excesses of the National Socialist system.

Both the KPD and the SPD initially found a base of action and platform for party propaganda in the anti-Fascist committee, the "Demokratische Vereinigung". The role of the "Demokratische Vereinigung" in Tübingen's post-war history is a factor of importance for it represented the sole and focal point of democratic self-help in the community. There were, of course, equivalent developments throughout Germany as former political opponents of National Socialism, trade unionists
and left-wing activists joined in groups in an attempt to fill the political and administrative vacuum created by the collapse of National Socialism, especially at the level of municipal government and administration. The Tübingen anti-Fascist committee, however, initially demonstrated a more radical break with political tradition than was the case with larger and more industrial communities since the "Demokratische Vereinigung" was in its original composition and programme totally unrepresentative of the town's political affiliations. As the committee's membership was extended to include members of centrist and conservative views it eventually came to represent the political spectrum of Tübingen, although it did not reflect a true cross-section of the town's political composition since the Left continued to be over-represented in comparison to its actual base of support within the community. This relative over-representation of the Left was most evident in the question of denazification; it is the opinion of the thesis writer that the denazification programme in Tübingen would have been even less rigorously applied during the period, 1945-1946, had it not been for the persistent and uncompromising attitude of the left-wing faction within the "Demokratische Vereinigung".

The "Demokratische Vereinigung" was able to run Tübingen's social and administrative life from a standpoint of intimate and personal acquaintance with the community's political and administrative infrastructures, its historical and social traditions and its local peculiarities. The specific features of importance of the "Demokratische Vereinigung" within the context of Tübingen's post-war history were: firstly, that it acted as a form of clandestine municipal government bridging the transition period between the collapse of the National Socialist administration and the reintroduction of modified municipal government (i.e., the "Stadtverordnetenversammlung") in January 1946; secondly, that it unwittingly served as a power base and springboard for Carlo Schmid's emergence from political obscurity to eventual dominance over Südpfalz; thirdly, that it made a very real contribution in quantitative and qualitative terms to the standard of living of the community. This latter point is a reference to the effort which the "Demokratische Vereinigung" invested in the management of the community's social services, especially in the provision of food, fuel and housing in the face of the French military government's policy of harsh economic exploitation. The "Demokratische Vereinigung" displayed in microcosm the famed Swabian qualities of industry and organisational skill and succeeded in mitigating the hardship experienced by the populace as a result of dire shortages of shelter, food, clothing, fuel etc.
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Another feature of the period, 1945-1947, in Tübingen's history was the fact that the town experienced, after twelve years of totalitarian administration, a gradual reintroduction of democratic political institutions which radically altered the political texture of the town, not only with respect to the immediately preceding National Socialist institutions but also those of the pre-1933 period.

After the initial, and mistaken, attempt by the local military government commander in May 1945 to establish a nominated town council of traditional type, the ensuing eight months of suspended town council activity was terminated by the nomination in January 1946 of a consultative town council of sorts ("Stadtbeirat") whose advisory functions in fact resembled to a degree the limited, advisory capacity of the National Socialist form of town council. The municipal elections of September 1946 reinstituted the traditional form of elected town council ("Gemeinderat") and restored the business of municipal government - within the framework of French policy, of course - to the council. The loss of municipal autonomy between May 1945 and September 1946 was understandably resented in Tübingen. Much more strongly resented, however, was the French military government's redefinition of mayoral office which altered the status of the "Oberbürgermeister" from one of a municipal administrative director to that of political head of the community. This definition of office was reversed in Tübingen after the founding of the Federal Republic. This topic is treated in more detail below in the subsequent section of this chapter on French occupation policy.

The creation of three new levels of political institution in the period, 1945-1947, - "Kreisversammlung", "Beratende Landesversammlung" and "Landtag" - represented a series of totally novel experiences for Tübingen. Consequently Tübingen had to develop new dimensions of political maturity and responsibility within a short space of time. Political and administrative elites had also to emerge within the former "Kreisstadt" to operate these new institutions. The town itself provided in fact few members of the political and administrative elites of the new region of Süd-Württemberg. With the notable exceptions of Viktor Renner and Eberhard Wildermuth most of the leading personalities came from outwith Tübingen, e.g. Carlo Schmid, Gebhard Müller, Theodor Scheunburg. This influx of talent had a profound effect on the post-war fortunes of the town, in addition to the attention which the town received as the regional capital and seat of military government. These new political and administrative elites imported and developed standards of
efficiency and levels of expectancy commensurate with the objective requirements of the machinery of administration and government as political autonomy was returned to Südbad-Württemberg. Many of the new administrators had previously served in an administrative capacity in Stuttgart, especially as senior civil servants. Consequently they were versed in the business and forms of government administration. This was an important contributive factor to Tübingen's smooth accession to regional autonomy.

By 1947 Tübingen had not only acquired the rank of regional capital but had also emerged as one of the major centres of high culture in Germany, rivalling Berlin and other cities in its patronage of the arts. In cultural terms Tübingen was no longer a sleepy, provincial town, having established a municipal theatre which was renowned throughout Germany both for its variety of programme and standard of performance, together with a municipal chamber orchestra, a regional newspaper to replace the former "Heimatzeitung", an "Institut Français" with an extensive choice of programme, a widely extended publishing industry and a full return to academic teaching within its university. In short, Tübingen emerged as a cultural centre of the first order by contrast with the majority of German towns in the post-war period. This aspect of the French occupation of Tübingen is also treated in the subsequent section on French occupation policy.

Finally - and for many of the populace this was a point of cardinal importance - Tübingen no longer considered itself during the period, 1945-1947, as an integral part of the majority religious community within which it existed but as part of the religious minority of Catholic-dominated Südbad-Württemberg. On the one hand this new situation gave Tübingen a feeling of alienation from the regional unit of Südbad-Württemberg, of which it was the capital; on the other hand it strengthened the community's traditional loyalty and orientation toward Stuttgart, the historical capital of Lutheran-dominated Württemberg. This served later as a powerful contributive factor toward the creation of "Land Baden-Württemberg." Tübingen's orientation toward Stuttgart paved the way for a unification of the two post-war "Länder" of Württemberg-Nord and Württemberg-Süd which in turn raised the question of the inclusion of "Land Baden" (i.e. formerly French-occupied Südbad). The result was the establishment of "Land Baden-Württemberg" in 1952.
In conclusion to this section on the post-war developments which were particular to Tübingen during the period, 1945—1947, two facts ought to be emphasised. Firstly, whatever was true for Tübingen was not necessarily true for the other communities of Süd-Württemberg in the sense that Tübingen was bound, as the capital and seat of military government of Süd-Württemberg, to undergo more radical forms and more intensive degrees of political, administrative and social change than the other towns in the new regional unit. This does not, however, invalidate Tübingen for the purposes of a case study. On the contrary, for this very reason, Tübingen offers an intensive model of analysis of French policy and strategy across a wide spectrum of themes and perspectives. This has been adequately demonstrated, it is felt, by the range and depth of documentation offered within this thesis.

Secondly, it was logical and inevitable that Tübingen, having undergone these intensive changes and experiences under the French occupation, would not revert to its pre-occupation role of provincial "Kreisstadt". This was demonstrated in 1952, when Tübingen renounced its position as regional capital, in that the town retained a perspective of intermediate importance between "Landeshauptstadt" and "Kreisstadt" as the seat of the "Regierungspräsidium" for a new administrative unit entitled "Süd-Württemberg-Hohenzollern".

It was established in the introductory chapter that the central exercise of this thesis was to provide a series of comments on French occupation policy and the "French thesis" on Germany in the light of a micro-study of Tübingen for the period of predominance of the "French thesis", 1945—1947. Therefore the role of this second section of the concluding chapter is quite the contrary from the initial section in that the aim is not so much to emphasise specific factors of interest as to draw conclusions of general validity from the specific case of Tübingen.

The first government of liberated France under General de Gaulle displayed scant interest in the existence and affairs of Württemberg during the formulation of the "French thesis" prior to the occupation of South-West Germany. For the very reason of this peripheral position within the framework of interests postulated by the "French thesis" this thesis has selected Tübingen as an indicator and meter of the objectives and effects of the "French thesis".

The most obvious theme of French occupation policy with regard to the
"French thesis" was France's insistence on the dismemberment of Germany and, concomitantly, on a confederative or federalist solution to the post-war German question, involving the reinforcement of the prerogatives and autonomy of the German "Länder". The corollary to this objective was the stimulation of regional German particularism and of separatist tendencies.

It is evident from the evidence presented by this thesis that there were three main sources of separatist sentiment in Süd-Württemberg: the Roman Catholic diocesan authorities in Hottenburg, a section of the indigenous aristocracy and landed gentry and the regional CDU groupings in "Oberschwaben". Although none of these publicly advocated a policy of separatism in defiance of Carlo Schmid's semi-official commitment to the unification of Württemberg, it was common knowledge in political and administrative circles in Süd-Württemberg that these three groups maintained a long-standing dialogue with the French authorities on the subject of separatism both in the sense of founding an autonomous unit of government in Süd-Württemberg and of establishing a separate German state in South or South-West Germany.

Concomitant to this dialogue the French authorities in Tübingen expressed the twin themes of federalism (or confederalism) and particularism inherent in the "French thesis" through the medium of their occupation policy. This was particularly evident in the French military government's imposition of a systematic and fastidiously supervised return to democratic self-government in Tübingen. The political parties were not permitted to present themselves as units of all-German political movements nor to include the designations "German" or "Germany" in their official title. In addition, they were restricted in the geographical sphere of their political activity to the area encompassed by the boundaries of Süd-Württemberg and were forbidden all contacts, formal or otherwise, with sister movements in other "Länder" of the French zone or in other zones. The obvious intention was to foster party-political life in Süd-Württemberg with a regional orientation and to involve it exclusively in regional issues, thereby depriving it of the wider, all-German perspective. The restriction of party-political life to solely regional perspectives was no doubt also seen by the French authorities as a counter-balance to the fact that two of the four political parties permitted in the French zone, the KPD and the SPD, were strongly centralist movements with a pronounced and historical commitment to Berlin and the unity of Germany.
In the initial period of the occupation, the French authorities in Tübingen, as elsewhere, relied on the services of the KPD and SPD to provide them with the requisite background information and know-how for the purposes of occupation administration. The KPD was the first political grouping in Tübingen to enjoy French patronage because of its record of opposition and organizational continuity and because of the large proportion of PCF members in the original composition of the French military government in Tübingen. By 1947, however, the French military government in Tübingen had radically revised its attitude toward the KPD and had come to regard the KPD not so much as a dependable source of aid and information, but as a hindrance to the promotion of autonomy and particularism in Süd-Württemberg. The French military government subsequently pursued a programme of active neutralization of all Communist influence in Tübingen in contrast to its original policy of installing KPD members in positions of municipal authority.

The French volte-face of attitude toward the KPD was a striking feature of French occupation policy in Tübingen. It was furthermore a development which was common to the French zone in general. Süd-Württemberg was nevertheless the most extreme example of the French military government's reversal of policy toward the KPD. At no time was the KPD invited during the occupation period to join the "Staatssekretariat" or its successor, the government of Württemberg-Schleswig, thus distinguishing Süd-Württemberg as the sole region in post-war Germany to deny cabinet participation to the KPD. Within the context of the "French thesis" on Germany and its theme of dismemberment and confederation, it is logical that the most centralist party in Tübingen, i.e., the KPD with its obvious commitment to the policy and directives of the central committee in Berlin, should have been the first party to experience the restrictive pressures of the "French thesis".

The SPD in Tübingen maintained itself longer than the KPD as a political force within the community. It, however, also lost favour eventually in the eyes of the French military government on account of the fact that it too was a centralist party with a tradition of loyalty to Stuttgart and Berlin. There is little doubt that the SPD survived as long as it did as the "government" party of Süd-Württemberg on the strength of Carlo Schmid's special relationship with the French authorities and especially with the French governor-general of Süd-Württemberg, Guillaume Widmer. As in the case of the KPD, the SPD was a natural choice in the
initial occupation period as a recruitment pool for the numerous political and administrative positions left vacant by the collapse of National Socialism and the resultant initial purge of the German administrations by the French military government. Schmid's conversion to the Social Democratic cause in 1945 considerably augmented the party's standing in the eyes of the French military government, especially after Schmid succeeded in enrolling an elite group of administrators and academics (the "Carlisten") within the ranks of the Social Democratic movement.

The SPD in Tübingen and Süd-Württemberg refused on the other hand to associate itself with regional particularism and remained strongly committed to the eventuality of an all-German Social Democratic party and a unitary German state. Carlo Schmid was compelled as a result to maintain a subtle state of equilibrium between compliance with and resistance to French separatist policy across a broad spectrum of themes. It has already been stated in this chapter that Schmid imbued the administrative apparatus of Süd-Württemberg with an ethos of loyalty to Stuttgart and to the historical unity of Württemberg; this commitment was visible in Schmid's wording of the "Statut des Staatsekretariats". Consequently, although the French occupation authorities fully appreciated Schmid's abilities and utility value and were more dependent upon him than any other German politician, they came to realise that, in terms of their policy of fostering regional particularism, the SPD in Süd-Württemberg was a factor of impediment. Therefore the particularist dictates of the "French thesis" decreed an eventual shift of emphasis in the nature of relations between the French military government and the German political parties resulting in an increase of French interest in the Christian Democratic cause in Tübingen and Süd-Württemberg.

The CDU in Süd-Württemberg was not committed in its entirety to separatism; this was particularly true of the party executive in Tübingen. On the other hand there were within the Christian Democratic movement in Süd-Württemberg strong pressure groups which were interested in some form of regional autonomy. It appears, however, to be the case that, whilst strong contacts existed between these groups and the French authorities, the CDU executive in Tübingen did not allow itself to be publicly identified with the causes of separatism and regional particularism beyond the limit of associating itself unreservedly with the founding of "Land Württemberg-Hohenzollern" and the definition of its constitution. This represented a starkly contrasting development from that which occurred in Süd-Baden where the CDU minister-president, Leo Wohlb, gained notoriety for his separatist aims.
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The switch of interest and support within the French authorities in Tübingen from the SPD to the CDU was a less drastic and less obvious development than in the case of the KPD's fall from favour. This was largely due to the circumstance that the election results for the period, September 1946 – May 1947, demonstrated that the SPD had failed to win the confidence and support of the majority of the electorate of Tübingen. This made matters simple for the French military government in Tübingen since the SPD was thus condemned per se to exclusion from power without necessitating French interference. One event, however, serves to indicate French willingness to mitigate the influence of Schmid and the SPD within Bad-Württemberg. This was the case of the reshuffle within the "Staatsssekretariat" in 1946 in response to an application by Dr. Gebhard Müller for increased CDU participation after publication of the results of the elections in which the CDU emerged as the majority party in Bad-Württemberg. The French military government chose to concede to Müller's application; it could, however, just as easily rejected Müller's request without giving a reason. On many points of policy the French authorities in Tübingen overlooked requests and even protests when it suited their purposes. In this particular instance it was deemed advantageous by the French military government to increase Christian Democratic influence within the "Staatsssekretariat" at the expense of the SPD since this corresponded directly with the interests and dictates of the "French thesis".

Within Tübingen's political life the "French thesis" was also evident in the themes of taboo defined by military government censors. The corollary to the "French thesis" energetic advocacy of a confederative political system was a strict policy of suppression of all reference to the historical unity of Germany, political and cultural, and to the factors of cohesion in Germany's social and historical composition. The French military government censors in Tübingen imposed a ban on such topics as the future of the Rhineland and South-West Germany, the status of the Saar district, the division of Württemberg and the question of a unified Germany and of all-German institutions.

To ensure the maintenance of these taboos the French authorities maintained a rigid system of surveillance on the production of all printed material, including newspapers and books, on the various forms and levels of political life and regional administration, on the activities of clubs and societies, as well as on the educational system and the management of cultural affairs. The French authorities in
Tübingen, as elsewhere in the French zone of occupation, maintained a priori censorship until after the currency reform of 1948, long after it had been modified in the other Western zones of occupation. Within the framework of the "French thesis" this degree of censorship was a logical development. During situations of radical social change, such as those of political revolution and military occupation aimed at altering the socio-political status quo, the dissemination of news, information and cultural opinion is an acutely political issue. This was particularly relevant in the case of the French occupation and the "French thesis" which sought to re-align political traditions and establish new political structures in South-west Germany. To this end, therefore, it is understandable that the French chose to maintain a stricter form of censorship for a longer period of time than the British and Americans who had less rigid and less doctrinal policies with regard to German political reconstruction and the future of Germany.

The French authorities' surveillance of political affairs in occupied Tübingen can be subdivided under two headings: surveillance of party-political life and surveillance of political and administrative institutions. With regard to the French military government's surveillance of party-political life in Tübingen during the period, 1945-1947, the first feature of importance was the relative slowness with which the French military government proceeded to reintroduce democratic party life in comparison with the other zones of occupation. The relatively lengthy period of ascendancy of the "Demokratische Vereinigung" and of the "Carlsten" who emerged from within its ranks suggests that this situation of transience suited French occupation policy. It would appear from an examination of developments in post-war Tübingen that during the period, April 1945 - February 1946, the French authorities were engaged in an assessment of the political make-up of their zone, on the basis of which they subsequently formulated a codified plan of action for the regulation of party-political affairs which corresponded to the requirements of the "French thesis". The hallmarks of French policy in Tübingen regarding party-political life were: the precise and cautious nature of the legal procedure within which party politics was introduced; the intense degree of scrutiny to which the founding applications of the respective parties were subjected; the imposition of a "Landessekretariat" on the newly constituted parties instead of allowing a party leadership to evolve on the basis of grass roots approval and nomination; a close surveillance of the day to day business of the political parties; and the switch
of support from the centralist parties, the KPD and SED, to the more regionalist CDU.

There was an evident relationship between the "French thesis" and the French policy in Germany on political parties. In contrast to the British and American governments, the French government produced in the period, 1945-1946, a precise definition of its solution to the problem of the future political organisation of Germany. This in turn necessitated the definition of a frame of reference within which zonal political developments could be channeled in accordance with French government policy. Hence the highly detailed occupation legislation on founding political parties in the French zone. By the same token it was more expedient for the French zonal authorities than for the other Western occupation administrations to impose a rigorous system of scrutiny on applications from founding political parties since these would be required to comply with the clearly established objectives of French government policy.

The imposition of a "Landesekretariat" on the newly constituted parties was directly related to the "French thesis" and the dismemberment issue. The French occupation authorities were not prepared to allow traditions to evolve within the zonal political parties as a result of grassroots pressures which were outside of French control and therefore potentially capable of operating contrary to the interests of French policy. To pre-empt such developments the French authorities established not only a geographical delimitation to the competence of the political parties by restricting them to within the respective "Land" boundaries, but also provided in the "Landesekretariat" a ceiling to the scale of organisational expansion beyond which the parties could not legally aspire. The "Landesekretariat" also served as the gendarme of French interests and policy in that it tended to prevent party policy being created through membership pressure at the basis by formulating and releasing policy directives after consultation and agreement with French military government officials.

An authoritarian surveillance of party-political business by the French authorities was likewise a logical effect of the "French thesis" on Germany. Since it was the stated intention of the Allies to impose changes in the political and social landscape of occupied Germany it was apparent from the outset that they would interfere, on at least a supervisory basis, in German party-political life.
This was all the more relevant for the French zone since the French government strove to implement a more specific and more radical thesis of political and social change than the British and Americans. Consequently the degree of control and surveillance of party politics in the French zone was correspondingly acuter than in the other Western zones.

At the same time, however, it must be conceded that there was a subjectively French quality to the authoritarianism underlying the entire French system of political surveillance and this can only be related to historical aspects of the French bureaucratic tradition. It is apparent that the French military government officials imported to a great extent an indigenously French administrative ethos of hierarchical authoritarianism and bureaucratic centralism. Edgar Morin saw a causal relationship between this authoritarianism and the French colonial experience. This was probably a contributive feature, but the central factor behind the authoritarian attitudes of the French occupation authorities was without doubt the historical ethos of centralism in French state bureaucracies. These state bureaucracies, within which the majority of these officials had gained their administrative experience, were, like the British Civil Service, essentially closed systems which operated on a basis of hierarchy, discretion and corps tradition and were structured in subordination to a centralist executive. It is ironic that those same officials who acted within the French zone as executors of the "French thesis" had no background experience in federalist or regionally autonomous traditions of bureaucracy. As a result contradictory imbalances constantly emerged between, on the one hand, their efforts to stimulate regional autonomy and a sense of self-identity within the fragmented regions of South-West Germany and, on the other hand, their authoritarian imposition of French policy directives, together with their sensitivity to criticism and reluctance to brook opposition.

French surveillance of German political institutions in Tübingen and of their attendant administrations was as much an effect of the "French thesis" on Germany as was the surveillance of German party-political life. The formula of the "French thesis" represented per se as an eventual imposition of French policy on German political and administrative infrastructures within the French zone. Although the French occupation administrations in Tübingen were faced in 1945 with the specific problem of the division of Württemberg, which tended to conflict with French separatist plans, the position of the French in Süd-Württemberg was not totally negative with regard
to the prospective implementation of the "French thesis" for they enjoyed the same general advantages as the other allies. Firstly, the National Socialist regime had eliminated all vestiges of political pluralism in Germany. Secondly, the subsequent military defeat of National Socialism eradicated not only the NSÜAF and the National Socialist government but also the entire apparatus of Germany's state bureaucracies, with the exception of the substructure of district and municipal administrations to maintain a modicum of essential services. The resultant effect of these developments was the post-war phenomenon of a total vacuum in German political affairs and a partial vacuum in administrative matters, thus allowing considerable leeway for imported Allied policies for social and political change, such as the Russian policy of socialism in Eastern Germany and the "French thesis" in South-West Germany.

The political and administrative vacuums caused by the collapse of National Socialism was no less noticeable in Tübingen than elsewhere, although a thread of administrative continuity was retained by the presence of Dr. Hartmann as caretaker mayor after the flight of the National Socialist municipal executive. By effect of Allied and French decrees all German administrations in Tübingen with the initial exception of the "Bürgermeistertum" and, to a modified extent, the "Landratsamt" ceased to function upon the arrival of the French army on April 19, 1945. The French occupation authorities established provisional administrative systems and resuscitated a number of municipal offices. They also initially employed a group of German adjutants who had arrived in the rearguard of the French army of occupation. These men have already been classified in the course of this thesis as essentially criminal elements on account of their opportunism, their interest in self-enrichment and their dubious methods of administration. Since the French were, however, ultimately concerned in the long term with the establishment of a stable and efficient political and administrative system it was inevitably only a matter of time before they exchanged this class of adjutant for a more respectable form of assistant. Nevertheless, although the French authorities required the assistance of professional administrators to cope with the management of what was essentially an alien community with the attendant problems of language, cultural differences, legal and administrative traditions etc., they were apparently not yet prepared in the spring and summer of 1945 to set about re-establishing a hard and fast system of German administrations in Tübingen. In retrospect it is apparent that the local French authorities in Tübingen wished to bide their time until they were in possession of a clear formula of administrative reconstruction from their superiors in
Baden-Baden. Baden-Baden in turn obviously waited on a definite statement of policy from the French government in Paris before proceeding with the creation of permanent administrative structures. The French government, however, was itself involved till as late as spring 1946 in the formulation of the "French thesis" and was consequently unable to provide concrete directives on the matter. Consequently, in the case of Tübingen the initial class of criminal adjutant to the French authorities was replaced not by permanent municipal services with professional administrators but by the "Demokratische Vereinigung" and a group of largely amateur administrators from within its ranks. In this way the French authorities bought time and postponed the final decision on the ultimate nature of the administration of Tübingen until such time as a definitive plan had been formulated in Paris and Baden-Baden and submitted to the regional military government authorities. The concentration of a professional administrative élite within the "Staatssekretariat" was not seen as a contradiction of French plans since the "Staatssekretariat" itself had been designed as a temporary stop-gap measure to perform the necessary administration of Württemberg until such time as a decision had been reached on regional administrative structures.

Once the military government in Tübingen was reassured that the "Demokratische Vereinigung" was politically and administratively dependable, it allowed such a concentration of administrative authority to pass to the anti-Fascist committee that the "Demokratische Vereinigung" developed into a form of clandestine municipal government. The "Demokratische Vereinigung" functioned in this capacity on the basis of the approval of the local French military government and not by the consensus of the populace. It suited the French authorities to maintain this situation throughout the whole of 1945 and early 1946 since the existence of the "Demokratische Vereinigung" excluded the immediate necessity for municipal elections. It was in the interests of the "French thesis" in the immediate post-war period to delay the re-introduction of democratic elements until a working basis of consent, either at the Allied conference tables or within the French zone, had been established on the implementation of the "thesis". The "Demokratische Vereinigung" therefore objectively served the interests of the "French thesis" in that it helped to impede the return of democratically elected bodies. The abortive Tübingen "Gemeinderat" which convened for the sole meeting of May 25, 1945, demonstrated that the local French military government in Tübingen was under orders to postpone a return to political and administrative autonomy until receiving central policy directives from Baden-
Baden. The nomination of the "Städtischer Beirat" in January 1946 further illustrated that the French did not yet consider the time opportune for the reintroduction of municipal self-government. The major gain which consequently accrued to the French military government was the fact that nominated municipal administrations and executives could not offer the same degree of resistance to French occupation policy as democratically elected bodies.

The orchestrated institution of regional administrations and executives in Tübingen, culminating in May 1947 with the emergence of Tübingen as a fully fledged capital of a new German "Land", also reflected the influence of the "French thesis" in operation. This was evident in the way in which these executives were restricted by the French to a regional sphere of activity with neither connections nor competence outside the boundaries of Baden-Württemberg. It was felt strongly within the French military government in Tübingen that to encapsulate Baden-Württemberg in this way was a necessary development, not only as a response to overall French policy on regionalisation but also, more specifically, because Tübingen had at no time voluntarily jettisoned its tradition of loyalty and service to Stuttgart and Württemberg. The founding phase of the "Staatssekretariat" was characterised by French insistence on a separation of powers between the "Staatssekretariat" and the government of Württemberg-Baden in Stuttgart. The establishment of "Land" Württemberg-Bohmenland with parliament and government in Tübingen was a subsequent effect of the "French thesis" and indeed was a logically necessary development within the framework of a successful implementation of the same.

Concomitant to the emergence of Baden-Württemberg as a separate German unit of regional autonomy was the establishment of a plethora of administrations which sprang up in Tübingen during the period, 1945-1947, to satisfy the needs of the new unit. This was largely an effect of the "French thesis" separatist policy in the sense that German sonal administrations were limited within the French zone to an absolute minimum while regional administrations were stimulated within the individual "Länder" to the greatest possible degree of bureaucratic self-sufficiency. Most administrative services were fragmented into regional units and restricted in their geographical area of competence to that of the respective "Länder". The result was that parallel administrations were reproduced in all of the regional capitals. For these regional capitals, most of which had been relatively insignificant communities prior to the French occupation, this duplication of services...
and bureaucracies within each province represented a radical break with the past, as can clearly be seen in the case of Tübingen. During the initial two years of French occupation Tübingen acquired a multiplicity of administrations which ensured, by the nature of their tasks, by the skills and expectancy levels of their personnel and by their very number, that Tübingen's previous role as a provincial "Kreisstadt" would have to be starkly redefined. It was also a concomitant effect of the nomination of Tübingen as the capital of Süd-Württemberg and the establishment in Tübingen of the governmental and administrative executives of Süd-Württemberg that the town developed an ethos and enlarged perspective of its own importance. This specific effect was a major tactical objective within the strategy of the "French thesis" and French occupation policy did its utmost to reinforce a sense of self-importance and self-identity in the zonal capitals.

Another important aspect of French administrative policy within the French zone of occupation, as highlighted in the case of Tübingen, was their stark preference for an indirect administration of the zone in the sense that German administrative authorities implemented French policy and directives but without reference to the French military government as the source of both general policy and specific decrees. The main advantages which the French authorities gained from this method of indirect administration were: that the German administrations were compelled to cope with the stress of administering a very difficult and at times near-chaotic situation created by the war and exacerbated by French requisitions and economic policy; that the German administrations were forced to bear the burden of apparent responsibility for French occupation policy vis-à-vis the local population and consequently had to bear the brunt in defusing the resentments of a populace unhappy with its economic lot; that the French authorities were able not only to avoid serious confrontations with the local populace but also to play off one German administration against the other, thus impeding the emergence of anti-French coalitions and caucuses within the German administrative system. The German administrations, in particular the "Staatssekretariat", were therefore thrust into a focal point of confrontation and argument by the French military government in order to minimize the constantly potential backlash from within the German populace or the administrations themselves in reaction to the impositions and restrictions imposed by French occupation policy and to the stringent conditions of economic life in the French zone. There was also a direct relationship between the "French thesis" and the French military government's preference for indirect administration.
in that the French military government was aware that the separatist objectives of the "French thesis" represented a sensitive area of policy which could arouse resistance within large parts of the German population. Consequently the French military government did not at any time publicly define its separatist policy in Tübingen but relied rather on the medium of the German administrations to implement its instructions. This therefore must be considered as a further major advantage enjoyed by the French from their use of indirect administration.

This case study of Tübingen has served to illustrate, among other things, the extent to which the French military government employed methods of indirect administration as a means to implementing French occupation policy with a minimum of resistance. At the same time, however, this study has highlighted a major factor of disparity within the French system of indirect administration: namely, the role played by Carlo Schmid. It is apparent that, theoretically, the delegation of even limited and closely supervised powers to German administrations contained the germ of an expansion of power and influence in meaningful political terms, especially when the head of the German executive was to prove as ambitious and resourceful a figure as Carlo Schmid. In the course of this thesis it has been demonstrated how Schmid succeeded in exploiting his position as chief executor of French policy to implement his personal views and to satisfy his ambitions. It is evident that Schmid used the lines of communication placed at his disposal by the French military government to superimpose his own interpretation of policy upon the framework of French policy directives. This factor will be enumerated in a subsequent section of this chapter as one of the causal factors which helped to frustrate a successful implementation of the "French thesis" in Baden-Württemberg.

A striking feature of French administrative policy was the logical and sequential strategy with which the French military government in Germany introduced democratic self-government and self-administration. This was partly due to the traditional French administrative ethos of bureaucratic formality and legalistic exactitude. As in the case of the French military government's surveillance of German political life, however, it was also in part an effect of the "French thesis". The French strove to implement fundamental changes within their zone of occupation in accordance with the "French thesis" and were consequently obliged, to a greater degree than their neighbouring Allies, to formulate a precise modus operandi to guide developments in the required directions.
The one major contradictory aspect of French administrative policy vis-à-vis the "French thesis" appears to have been the French attitude to the traditional German "Gemeindeordnung". On the whole the French, in obedience to the dictates of the "French thesis", tended to avoid interfering with regional infrastructures and traditions. On this one point, however, the French apparently felt that it was necessary within the context of the elimination of National Socialism and its contributive factors, to alter the traditional role of the "Oberbürgermeister" in Südtiibemberg by imposing an historically French definition on the office. The replacement of a professional executive administrator by an elected political personality as head of the municipal administration has come to be recognized as a distinguishing characteristic of French occupation policy in Südtiibemberg. This system of municipal government - known as the "maire-et-adjoints" system - was not successfully transplanted into Südtiibemberg's political life. After the termination of the French occupation Südtiibemberg reverted to its traditional definition of mayoral office.

Another major aspect of the "French thesis" at play within French occupation policy was the question of the official French attitude to denazification. The "French thesis" aimed at the establishment of a federal or confederative system within Germany and based on a framework of autonomous "Länder". To this end the French required stable regional administrations to act as infrastructures for the new "Länder" since there was only one historical "Land" within the French zone, i.e. the Saar. At the same time the French were aware that the entire apparatus of the German civil service had been subjected to the pressures of "Ocilchschiitlung" during the National Socialist period and had eventually been compelled almost to a man to join the ranks of the NSDAP and/or affiliated organizations. Consequently in the period, 1945-1947, the French occupation authorities were faced with the obvious problem of fulfilling the regionalist dictate of the "French thesis" by maintaining autonomous and reliable regional administrations while complying with the denazification policy of the Allied Control Council by purging the German administrations of National Socialist personnel, especially in the upper echelons of the executive management grades. The case of Tübingen illustrates that the particularist and regionalist interests of the "French thesis" gained precedence over Allied policy and over the understandable tendency to purge German society of the former enemy and occupier. It is apparent that the French applied restraint from the very beginning of the occupation in their programme of denazification in Tübingen and...
aimed at the removal of only the most obvious National Socialist activists and senior party officials, a comparatively low number in comparison with the overall National Socialist membership within the community. By comparison with the American zone the French military government adopted a relatively mild approach to denazification. This was a factor of disparity between the occupation policies of the French and American military governments for, with the exception of the related fields of cultural and university affairs, the French generally applied more repressive policies than the Americans. In the field of denazification, however, it would appear that the French realised that, in order to establish autonomous regional states with separate administrative infrastructures, it was necessary to maintain qualified and experienced administrators, especially executive personnel. In turn it was obvious that these men could only be recruited in sufficient numbers and within a short period of time from within the ranks of the former administrators of the Third Reich. Consequently for reasons of realpolitik the French authorities assumed a more lenient stance on denazification than the Americans.

A number of contemporary observers in the post-war period interpreted the French attitude to denazification as the result of inherent French liberalism and/or French awareness of the predicament of the individual German within the National Socialist state. On the whole, however, these views are erroneous in that they overlook the degree to which the theme of denazification was subordinated to the dictates of the "French thesis".

In logical compliance with the central interest of the "French thesis" - the establishment of regional "Länder" with all the supportive features of statehood: autonomous political parties and political institutions, independent administrative systems and regionally biased cultural and religious interests - the French military government was notoriously lax in the denazification of German social and political elites in their zone. In this study it has been demonstrated that the French in Tübingen showed special leniency towards senior civil servants, university academics, churchmen and artists, all of whom represented professional groupings which the French did not wish to alienate but rather to win over to co-operation with French occupation policy. This was the reason for other favours shown by the French to these groups, including the assignment of double food rations.

A characteristic feature of French denazification policy in Tübingen with regard to the social and political elites of the community was the fact that the
French permitted the various professional groups concerned to implement denazification programmes internally through the agency of their professional organisations. The main examples of this in Tübingen were the churches and the local "Landesverband" of the publishing industry, both of which were obviously lenient in their standards of examination and punishment. The university felt the effect of denazification somewhat more acutely than the other professional bodies in Tübingen, with the exception of school teachers, since it was directly involved in the task of re-education involving the sensitive area of ideology. Nevertheless, even the university had cause to be grateful to the French authorities for allowing it to establish internal "Reuberungsausschüsse" within the university instead of handing over the business of denazifying the university to external committees. Not surprisingly the university denazification committees tended to demonstrate a vein of collegial subjectivity in their judgements.

Although the French decision to permit the "Staatssekretariat" to issue its own "Rechtsanordnung zur politischen Reuberung" was based on a preference for methods of indirect administration rather than an attitude of liberalism within the French military government, the effect nonetheless on denazification procedures within Süd-Württemberg was one of relativism and comparative liberalism. It might arguably have been expected of the post-war generation of German political leaders, who had all experienced the excesses of National Socialism, that they would have been relatively severe in their interpretation of the function of denazification. Indeed in occupied Tübingen the "Demokratische Vereinigung" would have imposed a thorough purge of National Socialists if it had not been impeded by two factors: firstly, the French military government was interested in retaining the bulk of the extant administrative and social elites to ensure the strongest possible infrastructure for regional autonomy; secondly, there was an apparent coalition of interests between French denazification objectives and Carlo Schmid's plans for Süd-Württemberg and his own personal career. Schmid was obviously of the opinion that a liberal interpretation of denazification legislation would prove more beneficial to Süd-Württemberg in the long run than a strict interpretation. Schmid no doubt felt on account of his experience as an administrator that the cardinal priority in post-war Süd-Württemberg was to combat by means of efficient administration the aftermath of chaos and deprivation left by the military collapse of Germany and its occupation by Allied armies. To this end Schmid advocated, like the French, a mild definition and implementation of denazification legislation.
Furthermore, Schmid was probably aware that with regard to a future political career it would eventually prove an impediment to be seen in the eyes of the professional classes as the author and executor of a strict programme of denazification. Schmid consequently sought approval from the French military government for as mild a code of denazification procedure as possible and even went so far as to attempt to outlaw the concomitant feature of denunciation. In short, the presence of Schmid as head of the German executive ensured that a lenient chord was maintained in the application of denazification regulations. This in turn complemented French interests in a mild denazification programme in accordance with the objectives of the "French thesis".

The "French thesis" on Germany was also evident in the French military government's policy on re-education. Re-education, as envisaged by the French, was not simply a matter of adapting the existing educational system but rather entailed an overhaul of the entire cultural life of the French zone and of its individual communities. One of the chief characteristics of French occupation policy was the apparent antithesis between, on the one hand, the severity and authoritarianism of French methods of military government and the harsh discomfort of physical life in the French zone and, on the other hand, the brilliance of the French cultural programme. Despite the various and diverging ulterior motivations behind the formulation of French cultural policy, France implemented the most successful cultural programme by far of the four occupying powers. The ulterior motivations behind the French cultural programme were essentially political in nature concerned with underpinning the long-term objectives of the "French thesis". The French authorities saw the realms of art and culture as useful tools in the area of cultural propaganda as well as in the fields of re-education and re-democratisation. The French implemented their cultural programme with two main objectives in mind: to wean the population of Südschwarzwald from traditional feelings of loyalty and inclination toward Württemberg and/or the German Reich and to create a consensus of identification with the existence of Südschwarzwald as an organic and autonomous unit; to create a basis for rapprochement between France and South-West Germany by orientating the population of Südschwarzwald, or at least its social and political elites, toward France and French culture by introducing them to an intensive and lavishly impressive diet of French cultural and academic events.
With regard to the former objective the French military government limited most cultural perspectives within Tübingen to a Swabian dimension, "Swabian" being the generic term for the dialect and culture of Württemberg and Franconia. This objective was apparently based on the exaggerated and hence erroneous assumption that Prussia was mainly responsible, in terms of historical causality, for the rise of militarism and National Socialism in Weimar Germany. This was a view which was held by many elements within the Allied camp, both during the war and in the post-war period; the disintegration of Prussia at the Potsdam Conference testified to the strength of this feeling. The French were by far the most assiduous advocates of this theory. They strove hard to create a correlation between the Wilhelmian Reich, Hitler's "Großdeutschland" and Prussia, portraying Prussia as the "evil genius" of modern German history which continually sought to suppress the naturally democratic and humanist traditions of the German provinces for its own imperialistic and militaristic ends. In extension the French claimed that any attempt at a restoration of a centralised Reich would necessarily pervert the indigenous liberalism and democratic culture of the German provinces.

These theories, however, fit so snugly into the general framework of the "French thesis" on Germany that it is difficult to ascertain whether the French government was in fact convinced that the rise of National Socialism and the subsequent "Blitzkrieg" and occupation of France in 1940 were necessary effects of the foundation of the German Reich under the aegis of Prussia or whether it regarded the theory essentially as a convenient, theoretical mantle with which to disguise the cynical truth that a dismembered neighbour is, in political and military terms, a weakened neighbour. There is no clear answer to this problem but it is difficult, in view of the historical inaccuracy of the doctrine of Prussia's responsibility for the emergence and rise of National Socialism, to eradicate the suspicion that it served in the latter role as a respectable cover for a policy of dismemberment based on the realpolitik of military analysis.

In cultural terms Tübingen developed in the post-war period a strongly French accent as a result of the second main objective of the French cultural programme, i.e. to orientate the German population toward France and French culture by offering an attractive venue of French cultural events. It was logical, within the terms of a successful implementation of the "French thesis" on Germany that the French should seek to establish a special relationship of entente and acquaint-
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ance between France and the German provinces of the Rhineland and South-West Germany on the French border. From this perspective the richness of diet of the French cultural programme in post-war Tubingen, including the important aspect of French language teaching, had its foundation in the realpolitik of the "French thesis". It cannot be denied that regional administrators of French cultural affairs often tended to add a liberal dimension to this policy. Nevertheless, in the final analysis the cultural programme in Tubingen, as in the rest of the French zone, was accorded a role of importance and a generous budget because the French authorities recognized that artistic and cultural events could function as factors of reinforcement for the "French thesis" on Germany. The cultural programme in post-war Tubingen succeeded to a large extent in creating a favourable climate of opinion toward France and French culture despite the harshness of French occupation policy in such fields as food rationing, house requisitioning, political surveillance and censorship. On the whole French replaced English within the community, including the school system, as the major foreign language until the mid-1960's.

Thus the role of cultural affairs within French occupation policy was essentially one of cultural propaganda. This is not to deny the fact, however, that in a great many respects French cultural policy was truly humanist in statement and effect, for there were many officials in the "Direction de l'Éducation Publique" who disagreed with the objectives of the "French thesis" or at least with the manipulation of their cultural programme for specific political ends and who sought to mitigate the effects of the "French thesis" on German cultural life. On the whole, however, it remains a fact that French cultural policy was adapted to serve as a supportive appendage to the "French thesis" and its regionalist objectives.

With regard to the "French thesis" on Germany, it was stated in the introductory chapter of this thesis that, since Baden-Württemberg was a peripheral area within the context of the objectives comprising the "French thesis", it possessed added value as a motor of analysis in that it could indicate whether the "French thesis" was reserved for application within certain areas of importance (e.g. the Rhineland and the Saar district) or whether it applied throughout the French zone. This study has demonstrated that the latter was the case.
Tübingen and Süd-Württemberg were apparently affected by only one of the major tenets of the "French thesis", namely that of the dismemberment and regionalisation of German territory. The other, more specific tenets of the "French thesis" did not directly affect Süd-Württemberg, since they concerned the annexation of the Saar district, the internationalisation of the Ruhr district and the establishment of an independent state on the left bank of the Rhine. The principle of dismemberment and regionalisation was, however, common and basic to those latter three objectives of the "French thesis" and indeed was obviously the motivating concept and a priori condition of the "French thesis". Consequently the three tenets of the "French thesis" concerning the Rhineland, the Saar district and the Ruhr district were evidently practical implementations of the general thesis of dismemberment. It is now apparent in retrospect that the basic theme of dismemberment and regionalisation which underpinned the "French thesis" was not formulated with specific reference to the provinces of the southern triangle of the French zone because the French government had originally not expected to acquire these territories. Nevertheless, as this study had indicated, the French military government set about redressing this imbalance by implementing a policy of regionalisation in Süd-Württemberg and Süd-Baden after their occupation of these provinces. This remained, however, a less coordinated and less publicised effort than in the cases of the Rhineland and the Saar district.

On the whole the French separatist venture in Süd-Württemberg was also a less successful venture than in Rhineland-Palatinate, the Saar district and even Süd-Baden. This case study points to a number of causal factors for this comparative lack of success. The major reason appears to lie in the choice of Tübingen as the capital of Süd-Württemberg. The French made a serious mistake in this respect since Tübingen was not an integral part, either politically or religiously, of the majority population of Süd-Württemberg. Furthermore, Tübingen was not attracted by the idea of joining together with the other predominantly Catholic regions of South-West Germany in the establishment of a South German state. In this issue Tübingen was strongly supported by the Lutheran "Landeskirche" of Württemberg and by the Pietist movement in Süd-Württemberg. Consequently Tübingen resisted with success the pressures and inducements of French separatist policy. With the wisdom of hindsight one can now say that Starnberg would have in all probability been a more effective choice on account of its Catholic, aristocratic and particularist traditions and the absence of a dimension of historical loyalty to Württemberg since
it had formerly been part of the Prussian enclave of Sigmaringen-Hohenzollern.

The second mistake which the French authorities in Tubingen committed with regard to the "French thesis" was the choice of Carlo Schmid as head of the German executive. Although he was in many respects the ideal personality for the leading role in the political and administrative life of post-war Tubingen and Baden-Württemberg, it is apparent that Schmid maintained a stance of loyalty to the historical unity of Württemberg and imposed the same upon the German administrative apparatus of Baden-Württemberg. It is difficult to presume how successful the French authorities in Tubingen would have been with their policy of separation and regionalization if they had appointed a more accommodating personality than Schmid to head Baden-Württemberg's administration and executive; nevertheless, the case of the neighbouring Baden and the career of Baden's minister-president, Leo Wihleb, serve as an example of what might have possibly developed.

Another factor which impeded the successful implementation of the "French thesis" in Baden-Württemberg was the objective factor of the division of Württemberg, not through the will of the German population nor the dictates of French occupation policy, but in accordance with the military logistics of the American army command in Germany which insisted on retaining control of the Frankfurt-Mannheim autobahn. Unlike the Rhineland territories and, to a lesser extent, Baden, Württemberg had an extremely low history of uninterrupted unity. The division of Württemberg consequently proved to be an event of cultural shock for many groups in Baden-Württemberg, despite the fact that Catholic groupings in "Oberschwaben" saw political and religious advantages in the creation of Südwürttemberg. In the northern and more Lutheran section of Baden-Württemberg the population tended to view the division of Württemberg as a profound intrusion in the infrastructures and traditional life of the province and came to regard the French occupation as a serious impediment to a return to the traditional framework of Württemberg's political and social life. The French were acutely aware of this groundswell of feeling within sections of the population; it was this knowledge that induced them to make the proposal concerning an exchange of Südwürttemberg in return for Nord-Baden from the Americans. The Americans rejected the offer and the French were obliged to continue to seek a political settlement for Südwürttemberg in keeping with the objectives of the "French thesis". At the same time, however, the French maintained a more discreet profile in their search for such a settlement in Baden-Württemberg than in the other
it had formerly been part of the Prussian enclave of Sigmaringen-Schbenzollern.

The second mistake which the French authorities in Tbingen committed with regard to the "French thesis" was the choice of Carlo Schmid as head of the German executive. Although he was in many respects the ideal personality for the leading role in the political and administrative life of post-war Tbingen and Süd-Württemberg, it is apparent that Schmid maintained a stance of loyalty to the historical unity of Württemberg and imposed the same upon the German administrative apparatus of Süd-Württemberg. It is difficult to presume how successful the French authorities in Tbingen would have been with their policy of separatism and regionalisation if they had appointed a more accommodating personality than Schmid to head Süd-Württemberg's administration and executive; nevertheless, the case of the neighbouring Baden and the career of the minister-president, Leo Molleb, serve as an example of what might have possibly developed.

Another factor which impeded the successful implementation of the "French thesis" in Süd-Württemberg was the objective factor of the division of Württemberg, not through the will of the German population nor the dictates of French occupation policy, but in accordance with the military logistic of the American army command in Germany which insisted on retaining control of the Frankfurt-Munich autobahn. Unlike the Rhineland territories and, to a lesser extent, Baden, Württemberg had an extremely long history of uninterrupted unity. The division of Württemberg consequently proved to be an event of cultural shock for many groups in Süd-Württemberg, despite the fact that Catholic groupings in "Oberschwaben" saw political and religious advantages in the creation of Süd-Württemberg. In the northern and more Lutheran section of Süd-Württemberg the population tended to view the division of Württemberg as a profound intrusion in the infrastructures and traditional life of the province and came to regard the French occupation as a serious impediment to a return to the traditional framework of Württemberg's political and social life. The French were acutely aware of this groundswell of feeling within sections of the population; it was this knowledge that induced them to make the proposal concerning an exchange of Süd-Württemberg in return for Nord-Baden from the Americans. The Americans rejected the offer and the French were obliged to continue to seek a political settlement for Süd-Württemberg in keeping with the objectives of the "French thesis". At the same time, however, the French maintained a more discreet profile in their search for such a settlement in Süd-Württemberg than in the other
regions of the French zone. With the exception of Otto Feger’s book there was little public demonstration of support for French separatist policy in Süd-Württemberg, in stark contrast to the activist separatist groups elsewhere throughout the French zone.

There was therefore an apparent disparity of effect between the success of the “French thesis” throughout the zone as a whole and within Süd-Württemberg in particular. Although the “French thesis” failed to attract the support of France’s allies at the post-war conference tables and was consequently doomed to eventual failure, it did make some headway within the French zone during the initial two years of occupation. Süd-Württemberg, however, was a marked exception to the general scale of zonal response to the “French thesis”. This has been emphasised within the course of this case study. A further factor of interest and importance which this study has also served to demonstrate is the degree to which Tübingen managed to strike a balance between unequivocal rejection of French separatist plans and definition of a modus vivendi with French occupation policy.

There was a theoretical possibility during the French occupation of South-West Germany — and nowhere more than in Süd-Württemberg — that, on account of the severity of social and economic conditions, the authoritarianism and inflexibility of French zonal administrations and the cynical realpolitik of the “French thesis”, the population of South-West Germany would grow resentful and hostile toward their French neighbour and continue to nurture this feeling after the termination of the occupation and a return to political autonomy in South-West Germany. It is arguable that if this had proven to be the case the history of post-war European unification would have been altered. It is doubtful whether the special entente of interests which underpinned the Common Market, namely the Franco-German Friendship Treaty, could have been forged in the face of strong anti-French animosity in South-West Germany. If there had been a considerable reservoir of resentment in South-West Germany as a result of the French occupation, Adenauer could then hardly have risked alienating the electorate of South-West Germany, which represented (and still represents) a powerful and important heartland of conservative, Christian Democratic support, by entering into coalition with France. It was therefore an important factor of post-war German and European history that the population of South-West Germany did not demonstrate active resentment or hostility toward the former occupier despite the severity of the French occupation and the cynicism of the “French
thesis. This development in fact ensured that the vicious circle of aggression and counter-aggression between France and Germany could be broken in the period following the Second World War.

This case study of occupied Tübingen during the period, 1945-1947, serves to demonstrate that there were two central causal factors behind this phenomenon. Firstly, there was a definite effort of will within the German community after the war, especially among the political and administrative elites, to prevent an upsurge of Francophobic animosity. The majority of members of these elites accepted Germany's initial responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities and Germany's guilt for war-crimes perpetrated in occupied France. These men, such as Carlo Schmid and Viktor Renner, strove to cultivate in the face of economic deprivation and an authoritarian French administration a positive relationship with the French occupation authorities.

To this end the French approach to cultural affairs proved a boon. French cultural policy consequently represents the second causal factor behind the phenomenon of rapprochement between South-West Germany and France in the post-war period. On the one hand, it provided a life-line for the German politicians of the occupation period seeking to establish common ground between French and German interests despite the pointed self-interest of French occupation policy. On the other hand, French cultural policy in Tübingen demonstrated a degree of commitment to the principles of humanism and to a genuine rapprochement between the two nations, despite the obvious fact that cultural policy was continually subjected to the objectives of the "French thesis". In other words, despite the separatist emphasis of French cultural policy in occupied Germany, there was a basic statement of general humanism in the same which transcended the realpolitik of the "French thesis" and captured the enthusiasm of a considerable number of Germans in South-West Germany.

French occupation policy in the period, 1945-1947, as exemplified by the case of Tübingen, was therefore a dualistic experience, for there were, on the one side, the demands of the "French thesis" and of French economic interests and, on the other, the brilliance and efficacy of the French cultural programme. However, in conclusion, it remains to be re-affirmed that during the period, 1945-1947, the "French thesis" was the most important factor of influence and motivation behind French occupation policy in occupied Germany.
Auf Befehl der Militärregierung hat der Bürgermeister oder sein Stellvertreter (1. Beigeordneter, Kassierer, Schulrevisor, usw.) unverzüglich folgende Anordnungen auszuführen:

1) Sich dem Ortskommandanten zu Verfügung zu stellen und ihm die geeignetsten Quartierlager zu bezeichnen.

2) Eine beschränkte Ortpolizei aufzustellen, um die Ausführung der von der Bevölkerung auserwählten Befehle zu sichern. Diese Ortpolizei trägt Zivilkleidung mit weißer Armbinde (darauf stehende Inschrift "Polizei").

3) Waffen, Munition, Rundfunkgeräte, Fotocameras und Fernrohre müssen gegen Ablieferungsschein an einem von der Ortpolizei bewachten Lokal abgeliefert werden.

4) Im Einvernehmen mit dem Ortskommandanten muss ein Ausgangsverbot für die Bevölkerung festgesetzt werden: von 8 Uhr abends bis 6 Uhr Morgens, soweit nicht anders verfügt wird.

5) Alle Panzersperren müssen beseitigt und die Straßen der Gemeinde freigelegt werden. Zweige tote Zivilpersonen müssen beerdigt werden, Totenfleisch muss verbrannt werden.

6) Wirtschaften, Geschäfte und andere öffentliche Gebäude müssen geschlossen werden.

7) Alle Angehörigen deutscher Truppenteile (Wehrmacht, SS, Volkssturm, usw.), die sich in der Gemeinde befinden, müssen dem Ortskommandanten ausgeführt werden.

8) Der Bürgermeister wird folgende Listen ausstellen und bereithalten:
   a) Liste der Mitglieder der NSDAP
   b) Liste der männlichen Einwohner der Gemeinde, mit Angabe des Alters
   c) Liste der ausländischen Gefangenen, Deportierten und Arbeiter, nicht zu kennzeichnen geordnet
   d) Liste der Verwundeten
   e) Liste der Fabriken und industriellen Unternehmen

9) Der Bürgermeister wird der Bevölkerung bekannt geben
   a) dass es verboten ist, die Grenzen der Gemeinde zu überschreiten
   b) dass es verboten ist, Fahrräder zu benutzen
   c) dass jeder Einwohner im Besitz eines Kundschafts- oder Arbeitsbuch sein muss.

10) Der Bürgermeister muss für Quartier und Vorräte aller in seiner Gemeinde anwesenden alliierten Kriegsgefangenen und Deportierten sorgen.

Am 5. Mai 1945 wurden folgende Personen von der Französischen Wehrmacht in Haft genommen:

1. Bebermeyer Gustav, Tübingen-Lustnau, Büchenerstr. 3
2. Grabert Herbert, Tübingen, Vogesenstrasse 20
3. Hauer J. J., Tübingen, Langenarchstr. 10
4. Vogt Josef, Tübingen, Tunnelbergstr. 5
5. Bethlen Hans, Tübingen, Waldhäuserstr. 75
6. Endris Walter, Tübingen, Wildenrichstr. 29
7. Sautter Franz, Tübingen, Kelternstr. 9
8. Krauss Heinrich, Tübingen, Rappstr. 5a
9. Gönner Hermann, Tübingen, Schmidtorstr. 1
10. Mühleisen Wilhelm, Tübingen, Pulvermühlestr. 10
11. Gaedel Lilly, Tübingen, Universitäts-Frauenklinik
12. Hipp Eugen, Tübingen, Thünepolstr. 55
13. Kozer A., Tübingen, Eisenbahnhstr. 16
14. Renner Max, Tübingen, Uhlandstrasse 9
15. Spellenberg Erich, Tübingen, Steinbachallee 16
16. Mittel Gerdhard, Tübingen, Tunnelbergstr. 5
17. Feber Karl, Tübingen, Neubehaid 1
18. Gieseler Wilhelm, Tübingen, Hermann Kerzstr. 16
Die politische Säuberungsaktion beruht auf der Rechtsanordnung zur politischen Säuberung vom 28.5.46 und den Anordnungen des Staatskommissare.

In Anwendung dieser Bestimmungen ergibt sich folgendes:

1.) Kreis der politisch belasteten Personen und auszuweisende Vor- nehmlich- und Ehrenbeschränkungen

Bei meinen Entscheidungen gehe ich von folgenden Grundsätzen aus:

1.) Zur ersten Gruppe gehören diejenigen, welche den Nationalsozialismus oder Militarismus durch Wort oder Tat gefördert haben; der Förderer des Militarismus ist gleichzeitig, wer als Inhaber einer militärischen oder sonstigen Geschäfts- und Verwaltungen vorsätzlich ist, die Zahlung der üblichen Beiträge an die NSDAP oder der als gleichgestellten Organisationen oder die Ausübung lediglich untergeordneter Tätigkeiten innerhalb der NSDAP oder der als gleichgestellten Organisationen soll nicht als Förderung im Sinne der Rechtsanordnung gelten. Daher ist als Förderung jede irgendwie erhebliche Tätigkeit zu bewerten, die objektiv geeignet oder auch nur subjektiv darauf gerichtet war, den Nationalsozialismus oder Militarismus zur Herrschaft zu verhelfen, diese Herrschaft zu vertreiben, zu erweitern und zu stärken. Dabei kommt nicht nur der Handlungen in Frage, welche unmittelbar der Verwirklichung nationalsozialistischer Ziele dienten, sondern auch jede durch Förderung dieser Ziele gehörige, so z.B. Wörter von Anderen und what, was sich in der Propagandätigkeit sowie die Unterstützung der Partei durch materielle Mittel, die über den Rahmen der normalen Arbeitsleistung hinausging, vor die Verfolgung und Unterdrückung in einem oder vermöglich des nationalsozialistischen Regimes. Es ist nicht in allen Fällen notwendig, dass dem Betroffenen bestimmte konkrete Schadenersatz-Erleichterung schadensfähige, sondern auch eine im normalen Rahmen der nationalsozialistischen Regimemkehrung lediglich vertreten „schadensmäßig“ steht und nicht ohne Verwirklichung nationalsozialistisches Regimes oder politisch nationalsozialistisches Regimemehlen die Förderer des Nationalsozialismus verblieben.

2.) Die zweite Gruppe der belasteten umfasst die restlichen nationalsozialistische oder Militärweiter, die anderen Wörter vor allem diejenigen, welche nur zeitlebens ihrer Macht, ihres Begründes oder ihrer Erstürmung durch Nationalsozialismus natürlichen oder natürlichen Befugnissen aus dem Nationalsozialismus natürliche Zugehörigkeit zur Partei vornehm, so wird bei ihnen, welche nach ihrem Beitritt zur NSDAP belästigt wurden, zu unterstellen sein, dass sie Nutznießer des Nationalsozialismus sind.
Ebenso ist im Zweifel als Putzfeuer zu behandeln, wer unter der Herrschaft des Nationalsozialismus ein öffentliches Ehrenamt übernommen hat, also beispielsweise zum Ratsherrn oder zum Mitglied der Industrie- und Handelskammer ernannt wurde.

Besonderes Augenmerk ist auch auf die Fälle zu richten, in denen Wortführer, also insbesondere Angehörige freier Berufe, Gewerbetreibende oder Landwirte der Partei oder einer Parteigliederung beigetreten sind, um sich wirtschaftliche Vorteile zu verschaffen oder ihre Zugehörigkeit zur Partei oder einer Parteigliederung in irgendeiner Weise auszunutzen kamen.


Es ist im übrigen möglich, dass jemand in mehrfacher Hinsicht belastet ist, der freiwillig der NSDAP nach dem 20. Januar 1933 beigetreten ist und später Ratsherr oder Kreisvorsitzender geworden ist, gehört sowohl zur dritten, als auch zur zweiten Gruppe der Belasteten; ist er ausserdem noch politischer Leiter gewesen, so fällt er auch in die Gruppe der Förderer.

Bei der Anordnung der Nachfragen und Sühnemaßnahmen soll die Schwere der Belastung durch die Art und Artikulation der Nachfragen entscheidend sein.

Ein schwerer Belastung liegt vor allem da vor, wo das Ziel der politischen Einstellung die Ausschaltung der Belasteten aus jedem maßgeblichen Einfluss auf das politische, kulturelle und wirtschaftliche Leben des deutschen Volkes erfordert.
Wo es dem Wohl des deutschen Volkes dien, ist nachdrücklich Vorgehen geboten; daher muss in jedem Falle zunächst geprüft werden, ob Vorbeugungsmassnahmen, die einer Ausschaltung des Belasteten dienen, angezeigt sind, und nur dort, wo diese Frage zu verneinen, also die wenigstens bedingte Zuverlässigkeit der Belasteten zu bezweifeln ist, sind Sühnemassnahmen ausreichend. Schon hier, nämlich bei der Wahl zwischen Vorbeugungs- und bloßen Sühnemassnahmen, muss ein strenger Kasstab bei denjenigen Belasteten angelegt werden, von denen in Abhängigkeit ihrer öffentlichen oder gesellschaftlichen Stellung, ihrer wirtschaftlichen Unabhängigkeit oder des Grades ihrer Bildung vorgezogen werden, dass sie sich den Nationalsozialismus oder Militarismus verschaffen. Er muss insbesondere verhütet werden, dass Personen in leitender Stellung, die politisch belastet sind, in dieser Stellung verbleiben; sie haben aus dem öffentlichen oder wirtschaftlichen Leben auszuscheiden oder sind mindestens, und zwar auf der Stelle, in untergeordneten Stellungen zurückzuversetzen. Hier gilt auschließlich für Beamte als auch für Angehörige der freien Berufe und der Wirtschaft.

Auch bei der Zulassigkeit mildender Umstände darf das politische Ziel der Säuberung nicht aus den Augen verloren werden. Daher müssen Handlungen von Parteigenossen, welche gegen die genannten Parteigrundsätze verstoßen (beispielsweise Eintreten für politische Gegner der Partei), nur dann als mildender Umstand betrachtet werden, wenn ihr Beweggrund die innere Abwendung vom Nationalsozialismus gewesen ist; als entlastend wird nicht diese oder jene Handlung als solche, sondern als Ausdruck der Gesinnung des Handelnden bewertet.

Bei der ersten Gruppe der Feinsten, den aktiven, werden regelmäßig Vorbeugungsmassnahmen ausgesprochen sein; bei Aktivisten kann der Zweck der politischen Erleichterung mit bloßen Sühnemassnahmen den weitaus meisten Fällen nicht erreicht werden, die an dieser Gruppe gehören, müssen daher je nach der Schwere ihrer Belastung, mit der Entziehung oder mit der Verweigerung in den Ruhestand rechnen; in diesen Fällen werden daneben noch weitere Vorbeugungsmaßnahmen nach Maßgabe der § 6 Ziffer 1 - 9 der Rechtsanordnung anzuordnen sein, je nachdem der einzelne Fall so erfordert. Hierzu können, insbesondere in individualer Abtretung, Sühnemassnahmen treten, etwa die Verrechnung eines Beamten in den Ruhestand oder die Beendigung seiner Stellung. Lediglich bei Aktivisten geringerer Grades werden die Rückversetzung in eine niedrigere Dienststellung oder die Zurückstufung hinsichtlich der Beziehungen unter Umständen in Verbindung mit der Beförderungs- oder Versetzungsgenehmigung gelten.


Bei Nichtbeamten, wenn sie aus dem Nationalsozialismus wirtschaftlichen Nutzen reichen haben, die Sühnemaßnahmen darin bestehen, dass ihnen in der Höhe des gezogenen Nutzens Vermögenssachen auferlegt werden, sei es in der vollständigen oder teilweisen Einziehung ihres Vermögens, sei es in der Auferlegung einmaliger oder laufender Geldzahlungen. In diesen Fällen werden die Untersuchung- und Säuberungsausschüsse um angemessene Sühnemaßnahmen vorschlagen zu können, die Vermögens- und Einkommenverhältnisse der Belasteten festzustellen und berücksichtigen müssen.


Bei allen Entscheidungen, die auf Grund der Rechtsnormen zur politischen Sühnegebung getroffen werden, muss man sich vor Augen halten, dass die Rechtsnormen kein Strafgesetz ist, sondern dem politischen Widerstand dienen soll. Sie vermitteln durch die Ausdrücke "Sühne" und "Strafe", sondern spricht von "Belastung" einerseits, von "Vorbereitungs-“ und "Sühnemaßnahmen" andererseits. So weit entscheidet nicht der Grad der Subjektivität - vom Standpunkt des Betroffenen aus gesehen - Bewertung; sondern das Form der objektiven - vom Standpunkt des allgemeinen gesetzlichen Bestehens - Belastung. Jemals auf Grund seines Verhaltens die Mänschetten oder der festen Stelle abgesprochen werden zu müssen, dass ihm nicht die Möglichkeit der Politik werden, sondern er die Politik der öffentlichen Kultur und wirtschaftlichen Leitungen des deutschen Volkes erwirksam, gegen ihm richtet sich die Vorbereitungs- maßnahmen, welche die "Sühne" in Vorschlag bringt. Hier sind Sühnemaßnahmen zu suchen nur dort, wo die politische, Belastung so
gering ist, dass bei den Belasteten eine Einkehr und Umkehr erwartet werden kann. Die erfor-derete Sühne soll ein Ausgleich des Schadens sein, den der Belastete aus politischer Einsichtslosigkeit oder aus Charakterschwäche dem deutschen Volke hunt zufließen helfen. In diesem Sinne, also nicht als Strafmaßnahme, sondern als politische Massnahme, ist es auch gemeint, wenn die Rechtsanordnung deren, die sich vor dem Zusammenbruch des Nationalsozialismus belastet haben, jeden gleichstellt, der sich nach dem 1. Mai 1945 durch Wort oder Tat als Anhänger des Nationalsozialismus oder des Militarismus bekundet; wer auch heute noch seine politischen Pflichten verkennt, verurteilt seine politische Lage.

3. hiervon Maßnahmen bei der öffentl. Verwaltung Anlage Nr. 1,
4. hiervon Maßnahmen bei der freien Wirtschaft Anlage Nr. 2.

2. Verfahren.
Das Verfahren ist in § 10 ff. der Rechtsanordnung zur politischen Säuberung ausführlich geregelt.

Verfahrenslei tung.
Durch die Presse wurde die Anordnung Nr. 4 öffentlich bekannt gemacht, wonach der Forderung des § 24 Abs. 2 S. 2 in Verbindung mit § 10 der Rechtsanordnung zur politischen Säuberung dadurch genügt ist, dass die politischen Fragebogen eingeholt sind. Nach dem Schreiben des Staatskommissariats für die politische Säuberung von 6.7.45 ist für die Zukunft den Betroffenen die Einleitung des Verfahrens schriftlich mitzuteilen nach einem besonderen Muster (Anlage Nr. 1).
Die statistischen Unterlagen werden zusammengestellt:

- nach den Landkreisen in der Reihenfolge der Nummern-Kreise,
- nach den Haupt- und Untergruppen in der Reihenfolge der Landkreise.

Darüberhinaus benötigte spezielle Zusammenstellungen werden nur nach Anforderung vorgenommen.

d) Die Ausschüsse und Kommissionen

Der Untersuchungsausschuss (Jeder umfasst 8 – 10 Mitglieder)

a) Anzahl der Ausschüsse

17 für den öffentlichen Dienst (Behörden)
37 für die Wirtschaft (verschiedene Betriebe)

Dem können noch weitere Ausschüsse für spezielle Aufgaben erschlossen werden.

b) Haustechnische Ermittlung – Bestattung

Nach Feststellung der Beraunungen sollen die in Frage stehenden Personen und die getroffenen Tatsachen ermittelt werden. Das für die Tatsachen durch Ermittlung der Tatbestände erarbeitete, das unter Ermittlung des Tatbestandes, werden mit einem Anhang auf die vom Tatverdächtigen ergriffene gemäß, von der Behörde die wesentlich entnehmenden Tatbestände wiedergegeben. Der Untersuchungsbericht umfasst der so präparierten Formen in der Behördendiagnose und der behördlichen Tatbestand von größter Wichtigkeit, die ein aufgefundenes Nebenprodukt einer Fremdursache der Tatsachen eines Tatverdächtigen ist. Der Tatbestand ist für die eintrittsweise Ermittlung der Tatsache persönlich verantwortlich. Kritik zu der Durchführung ergibt der Staatskommissar auf Grund der Rechtsordnung.

c) Prüfung und Aufbau

Jeder Untersuchungsausschuss ist, in Beratung mit denen privaten Parteien und den Gesellschaftern, von Staatskommissar einzustellen, Jeder Untersuchungsausschuss besteht aus:
ständige Mitglieder:
1 Vorsitzender
1 stellv. Vorsitzender
3 ständige Beisitzer
(davon je 1 Beisitzer aus den zugel. Parteien u. d. Gewerks.)

wechselnde Mitglieder:
1-3 Stellv. Vorsitzende

die wechselnden Mitglieder sind zu ernennen:
bei den Behörden: durch die jeweils zuständige
Landesschicht
bei der Wirtschaft: durch den Staatsschirmacher,
auf Vorschlag der zuständigen-
Handwerkskammer u. d. Gewerkschaft
bei den freien Berufen: durch den Staatsschirmacher,
auf Vorschlag der einschlägigen
Berufsorganisation.

d) Untersuchungsausschuss

Die eingelieferten Unterlagen sind beim Untersuchungs-
ausschuss nach den geforderten Gruppen des Untersuch-
ausschusses anordnen (siehe Anlage 2). Die Anzahl der
Stellen des Untersuchungsausschusses angeben. Die Unterlagen
sind auf dem 29. jedes Monats an das Staatsschirmacher
zentral eingesandt.

Jeder Untersuchungsausschuss hat über jeden behandel-
ten Fall und dessen Verhältnisse eine alphabetisch ge-
ordnete Protokolle zu führen. Diese Protokolle (nicht früher)
(zwecks Schirmacher) weiter-
gaben. Dort dienen sie zu Vergleich mit dem jeweils-
vorliegenden der Kontrollen. Es wird festgestellt, ob alle
vom Untersuchungsausschuss behandelten Fälle von
Staatsschirmacher vorlagen, dann nicht, wo diese Fälle
verblieben sind bzw. welche Fälle nachzuarbeiten sind.

Der Untersuchungsausschuss (jeder umfasst 3-10 Mitglieder)

a) Auswahl der ausschüss

3 für den öffentlichen Dienst (Behörden)
3 für die Wirtschaft

Soweit es zweckmäßig erscheint, können noch
weitere Ausschüsse für spezielle Aufgaben ernannt
werden. (Untersuchungsausschuss für das Staat-
schirmachter)

b) Hauptaufgaben: Vorschlag - Ausspruch

Nachdem jeder einzelne Fall sorgfältig geprüft ist,
schlägt der Untersuchungsausschuss vor, welche Vorschläge
er für angezeigt hält. Sein Ausspruch wird schrift-
lieh niedergeschrieben.
Der Vorsitzende des Erhebungsausschusses soll die Entscheidung möglichst unabhängig durchführen. Durch die im Erhebungs ausschuss anwesenden Berufsvertreter, soll vor allem das beruflich-menschliche Bild der zu prüfenden Person seine richtige Bewertung und Feststellung finden. Der Vorsitzende ist für die einmalige Bearbeitung der Fälle persönlich verantwortlich.

a) Ernennung und Aufbau (entspricht dem Untersuchungs- ausschuss)

Die Aufgliederung des Tätigkeitsbereiches ist bei dem öffentlichen Dienst (Behörden)
1. Ausschuss: L.B. der Innern und Finanzen
4. Ausschuss: Spezial für den Staatsschutz der Wirtschaft XXVII-III


Der politische Landerrat (jede Kommission unabhängig)

a) Anzahl der Kommissionen

1. Der politische Landerrat ist aufgegliedert in
4 Kommissionen für den öffentlichen Dienst (Behörden)
2 Kommissionen für die Wirtschaft XXVII-III

Dazu können noch weitere Kommissionen für spezielle Aufgaben eingesetzt werden.

b) Hauptaufgabe: Beschluss-Vorberatung zur Entscheidung

(letzte in Verbindung mit den Referenten der Staatskanzlei)

Die entscheidenden Fälle sollen praktisch ihre Entscheidungsgründe bei den politischen Kommissionen erhalten. Falls Mitglied der Kommission ist für die einvernehmliche Bearbeitung der Fälle persönlich verantwortlich.

a) Ernennung und Aufbau

Die zugelassenen politischen Parteien schlagen die aus ihrer Partei gewählten Personen den Staatssekretariat vor. Das Staatssekretariat ermittelt die politischen Landesverbände.

Der Staatssekreter bildet aus ihnen die Kommissionen. Jede Kommission setzt sich aus drei Mitgliedern zusammen. Sie muss angehören:

1 Mitglied der K.P.D.
1 Mitglied der S.P.D.
1 Mitglied der C.D.U.

d) Die Unterschriften

Für die ist der in den Kommissionen tätige Referent verantwortlich.

Hinweise


Aus anderen Zonen abliegende und der unerwünschte Anweisungen kommen bleiben den Rechtsbehelfsbezirken, die thematisch politisch überrascht zu sein. Unterschriften allein müssen sie sich einen Überprüfungssitzung nach den hier gelten den Verwaltung zu unterziehen.

Für beschuldigte oder angepeilte Werte muss zur Verwaltung und Verhinderung einer freundschafts-geschäfts
gegenständen werden; diese fallen gerade nicht in den Aufgabenkreis, der hier gestellt ist.

Zusammenfassung:

Es kann gesagt werden, dass durch die beschriebene Organisationsform der hier gezeigten Art, in welcher die betreffenden Funktionen für die politische Führung den angestrebten Ziel erreichen können:

Einerseits in einwandfreien Verfahren und in einwandfreier Form.

Die Reihenfolge der Aufgabenstellung:

Entscheidung = Feststellung
Verwaltung = Ausprägung
Erledigung = Vorbereitung der Entscheidung
Entscheidung

Zur anderen die Reihenfolge der Ausführungs- und Instanzen nach der Tatsäch.

17 = 4 (bzw. 4) = 4 (bzw. 2) = 1

Einzelne Gründe dafür sein, dass bei zeitweiliger Insolvenz und einwändter Fatale folgen gegen die letzte Stufe in der Durchführung der Durchführung, die Entscheidung in der Eilfalle dann folgend ist.

Die Erörterung der Sache und ihre Ausführung sollte in der genannten Arbeitsweise den gestellten Anforderungen entsprechen.

Zulagen, den 14. Mai 1946
GOUVERNEMENT MILITAIRE EN ALLEMAGNE

Questionnaire

Avertissement. En vue de la clarté ce questionnaire a été rédigé en français et en allemand. En cas de douze le texte friction fait foi. Les réponses des déclarations inexactes ou incomplètes seront sanctionnées en tant que violation des décrets militaires. Aucune des feuilles supplémentaires n'est pas de place dans le questionnaire.

Les formulaires doivent être remplis à la machine ou en lettres d'imprimerie. Ressortit le questionnaire avant de répondre. Quand une question ne vous concerne pas, écrivez: "ne s'applique pas."

A. Renseignements personnels.

Nom:
Prénom:
Carte d'identité No:
Date de naissance:
Lieu de naissance:
Nationalité:
Adresse actuelle:
Residence permanente:
Profession:
Emploi actuel:
Emploi sollicité:
Emploi avant 1933:

B. Participation dans le Parti Nazi

1. Avez-vous jamais été membre de la NSDAP?
   oui, non:
2. Dates:

Fragebogen


Die Formulare sind mit Schreibmaschine oder in Druckschrift auszufüllen. Lesen Sie den ganzen Fragebogen durch, bevor Sie antworten. Beantworten Sie jede Frage, wenn eine Frage sich nicht auf Ihren Fall bezieht; schreiben Sie "nicht zutreffend."

A. Persönliches

Name:
Vorname:
Ausweiskarte Nr.:
Geburtsdatum:
Geburtsort:

Staatsangehörigkeit:
Gegenwärtige Anstellung:
Ständiger Wohnsitz:

B. Mitgliedschaft in der NSDAP

1. Warum Sie einmal ein Mitglied der NSDAP?
   Ja, nein:
2. Gründe:

5. 49. 10232. Berlin, Potsdam
3. Aviez-vous jamais rempli une des fonctions suivantes à la NSDAP ?

a) Reichsleiter ou employé dans un bureau dirigé par un Reichsleiter ? oui, non; genre de fonction; dates:

b) Gauleiter ou employé du Parti dans un bureau dirigé par un Gauleiter ? oui, non; dates; à quel endroit?

c) Kreisleiter ou employé du Parti dans un Kreis ? oui, non; genre de fonction; dates; à quel endroit?

d) Ortsgruppenleiter ou employé du Parti dans une Ortsgruppe ? oui, non; genre de fonction; dates; à quel endroit?

e) Employé dans la Chancellerie du Parti ? oui, non; dates; genre de fonction:

f) Employé à la Direction Centrale de la NSDAP ?

g) Employé à l'office supérieur pour le personnel enseignant ? Dans l'office du Delegué du Führer pour la surveillance du personnel et de l'industrialisation philosophique de la NSDAP ?

h) Directeur ou instructeur dans une école complémentaire du Parti ? oui, non; date; genre de fonction; Nom de l'unité ou de l'école:

i) Étiez-vous membre du Corps des Dirigeants politiques ? oui, non; dates:

j) Êtiez-vous dirigeant ou fonctionnaire de tout autre office, unité ou agence (excepté les formations, organisations affiliées et organisations sous le contrôle des N.S.D.A.P. ?)

k) Avez-vous des proches parents qui ont occupé une quelconque des situations mentionnées ci-dessous ? oui, non; si oui indiquer le nom, l'adresse et dites où on quoi consistait leur fonction:

3. Haben Sie jemals eine der folgenden Stellungen in der NSDAP bekleidet?

a) Reichsleiter oder Beamter in einer Stelle, die einem Reichsleiter unterstand? Ja, nein; Titel der Stellung, Daten:

b) Gauleiter oder Parteibeamter innerhalb eines Gaues? Ja, nein; Daten, Amtsort:

c) Kreisleiter oder Parteibeamter innerhalb eines Kreises? Ja, nein; Titel der Stellung; Daten, Amtsort:

d) Ortsgruppenleiter oder Parteibeamter innerhalb einer Ortsgruppe? Ja, nein; Titel der Stellung; Daten, Amtsort:

e) Ein Beamter* der Reichsleitung? Ja, nein; Titel der Stellung; Daten:

f) Ein Beamter der Reichskanzlei? Ja, nein; Titel der Stellung; Daten:

g) Ein Beamter* der Hauptstelle für Struktur* im Amt des Delegierten des Führer* für die Umgebung* der Volksbildung oder des NSDAP? Ein Direktor oder Lehrer* in einer Tertiär* Ausbildungseinrichtung? Ja, nein; Titel der Stellung; Daten:

h) Waren Sie Mitglied des Corps der politischen Leiter? Ja, nein; Daten der Mitgliedschaft:

i) Waren Sie ein Träger oder Funktionär* in irgend einem anderen Amt, Einheit* oder Stelle* (waren Sie ein Mitglied der offiziellen, geschäftlichen oder elektoralen Organisationen der NSDAP)? Ja, nein; Titel der Stellung; Daten:

j) Haben Sie irgend welche nahe Verwandte, die irgend eine der oben angeführten Stellungen bekleidet haben? Ja, nein; Wenn ja, geben Sie deren Namen und Auskunft und eine Bezeichnung der Stellung.
C. Tätigkeit in NSDAP-Hilfsorganisationen

Geben Sie hier an, ob Sie ein Mitglied waren und in welchem Ausmaß Sie an den Tätigkeiten der folgenden Gliederungen, angeschlossenen Verbänden und betreuten Organisationen teilgenommen haben:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mitglied</th>
<th>Ja</th>
<th>Nein</th>
<th>Dauer der Mitgliedschaft</th>
<th>Amt, bekleidet</th>
<th>Dauer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>der Mitgliedschaft</td>
<td>Quels emploi</td>
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<td>dure de ces fonctions</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Gliederungen

_Formations affiliées_

- a) SS
- b) SA
- c) HJ
- d) NSDAP
- e) NS
- f) NSV
- g) NSKK
- h) NSFK

2. Angeschlossene Verbände

_Formations affiliées_

- a) Reichsland der Deutschen Beamten
- b) DAF einschl. KdF
- c) NSV
- d) NSKOV
- e) SS Bund deutscher Technik
- f) NSD Aerbathand
- g) NS Lehrverbund
- h) NS Rechtswahrerbund

3. Betreute Organisationen

_Organisations contrôlées_

- a) VDA
- b) Deutsches Frauenwerk
- c) Reichskolonialbund
- d) Reichsbund deutscher Familie
- e) NS Reichsbund für Leibesübungen
- f) NS Reichsbund deutscher Schwestern
- g) NS Altersverbund

4. Andere Organisationen

_Autres organisations_

- a) RAD
- b) Deutscher Gemeindezug
- c) NS Reichskriegerbund
- d) Deutsche Studentenschaft
- e) Reichsfrauenbewegung
- f) DFR
- g) "Deutsche Christler"-Bewegung
- h) "Deutsche Glaubensbewegung"
5. Étiez-vous jamais membre d'une organisation nazi non mentionnée ci-dessus? oui, non. Nom de l'organisation, dates, genre de fonction à quel endroit:

6. Avez-vous jamais rempli la fonction de Jugendwalter dans une école? oui, non:

7. Avez-vous jamais reçu des titres, rangs, médailles, distinctions, diplômes ou autres honneurs quelconques d'une des organisations ci-dessus? oui, non. Si oui, indiquez le genre de ces distinctions, le date, la raison et l'occasion:

---

D. Publications et discours

Indiquez sur une feuille séparée toutes les publications (livres ou brochures) que vous avez rédigées en entier ou en partie, que vous avez réunies ou éditées et toutes les allocutions ou conférences que vous avez faites depuis 1923 jusqu'à ce jour, avec spécification de l'originalité des thèmes et de leur édition. Si vous avez fait un tel travail en collaboration avec une organisation, indiquez en le nom. Dans la négative écrivez: "Aucune publication et discours".

Si vous avez rédigé des publications, indiquez l'éditeur, son adresse et le tirage.

Si vous avez tenu des conférences et de conférences indiquez l'endroit où ils ont été tenus et à quelle occasion.

---

E. Emplois

Indiquez tous vos emplois depuis le 1er janvier 1923 jusqu'à ce jour. Toutes vos situations, le genre de votre activité, le nom et l'adresse de vos employeurs publics ou privés doivent être indiquées. En outre il y a lieu de mentionner la durée de l'emploi, le motif de sa cessation, s'il y a lieu la durée du chômage, y compris le chômage occasionné par le temps passé aux écoles et au service militaire.

---

Von Bis A Of Service Profession Employment Art of Service Genre of Employment Salary Reason for Dismissal

---

8. Waren Sie jemals Mitglied irgend einer nationalistisch-nationalsozialistischen Organisation, die vorstehend nicht angeführt ist? Ja, nein:

Name der Organisation:

Titel der Stellung:

Daten, Ort:

6. Haben Sie jemals das Amt eines Jugendwalter in einer Schule bekleidet? Ja, nein:

7. Wurden Ihnen jemals irgendwelche Titel, Ränge, Auszeichnungen oder Urkunden von einer der oben genannten Organisationen ehrenhalber verliehen oder salb von dieser anderen Ehren zuteil?

Ja, nein:

Falls ja, geben Sie an, was Ihnen verliehen wurde (Titel usw.), das Datum, den Grund und Anlaß für die Verleihung:

---

D. Schriftearbeiten und Reden

Verzeichnen Sie auf einer besonderen Liste alle Veröffentlichungen von 1923 bis zum heutigen Tage, die ganz oder teilweise von Ihnen geschrieben, gesammelt oder veröfentlicht wurden, und alle Ansprachen und Vorlesungen, die Sie gehalten haben; der Titel, der Datum und der Verleihung einer Ehrenzahlung sind auszugeben. Ansonsten sind derselben, die ausschließlich technischen, künstlerischen, oder unpolitischen Themen zum Inhalts gehalten haben. Wenn Sie diese in Zusammenarbeit mit einer Organisation verfasst haben, so ist der Name anzugeben. Falls nein, schreiben Sie: "Keine neuen oder Veröffentlichten".

Wenn Sie Schriftarbeiten veröffentlicht haben, geben Sie den Namen des Verlegers, seine Adresse und die Auflage an.

Falls Sie Vorträge und Ansprachen gehalten haben, geben Sie an, bei welcher Gelegenheit und an welchem Ort.

---

E. Dienstverhältnisse

### F. Revenus

Comptez les sources et le montant de vos revenus depuis le 1er janvier 1933.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Année</th>
<th>Sources des revenus</th>
<th>Montant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
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<td>1943</td>
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<tr>
<td>1944</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### G. Service Militaire

Avez-vous fait du service militaire depuis 1919 ?

- Oui, non :
  - Si oui, indiquez les détails sur vos emplois, les services que vous avez effectués, le lieu et la durée de votre service :

#### H. Voyages à l'Etranger

Mentionnez ici tous les voyages effectués en dehors de l'Allemagne depuis 1933 :

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pays visités</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### G. Militärdienst

Haben Sie seit 1919 Militärdienst geleistet ?

- Ja, nein :
  - In welcher Waffengattung? Deine :
  - In welcher Armee? Deine :
  - In welchen Jahren? Deine :
  - In welchen Händen? Deine :
  - An welchen Orten? Deine :

#### H. Auslandereisen

Verzeichnen Sie hier alle Reisen, die Sie außerhalb Deutschlands seit 1933 unternommen haben :

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lande besucht</th>
<th>Daten</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Avez-vous fait le voyage pour votre propre compte?

Si non, sous quels auspices?

Quelle personne, quelles organisations avez-vous visitées?

Haben Sie die Reise auf eigene Kosten unternommen? Ja, nein:

Falls nicht, unter wessen Beistand wurde die Reise unternommen?

Besuchte Personen oder Organisationen:

I. Activité Politique

a) A quel parti politique avez-vous appartenu avant 1933?

b) Avez-vous jamais depuis 1933 été membre d'une société secrète ou cachée d'un parti ou groupe d'opposition Anti-Nazi? oui, non:

Lesquels? Depuis quand?

c) Avez-vous jamais été membre d'une association ou d'une organisation professionnelle ou commerciale supprimée par les Nazis? oui, non:

d) Avez-vous jamais été membre d'une association ou d'une organisation professionnelle ou commerciale supprimée par les Nazis? oui, non:

En mi d'affirmation indiquez les détails ainsi que le nom et deux noms de deux personnes pouvant témoigner de l'exactitude de vos déclarations.

J. Observations

Les déclarations faîtes ci-dessus sont exactes.

Signé

Date

Témoins

Nom et adresse du témoin

I. Politische Mitgliedschaft

a) Welcher politischen Partei haben Sie als Mitglied vor 1933 angehört?

b) Waren Sie Mitglied irgend einer verbotenen Oppositionspartei oder -gruppe seit 1933? Ja, nein:

Welcher? Seit wann?

c) Waren Sie jemals ein Mitglied einer Gewerkschaft, einer Gewerkschaft oder Handelsorganisation, die nach dem Jahre 1933 aufgelöst und verboten wurde? Ja, nein:

d) Wurden Sie jemals aus dem öffentlichen Dienste einer Lehrtätigkeit oder einer kirchlichen Ämter entlassen, weil Sie in irgend einer Form den Nationalsozialisten Widerstand leisteten oder gegen deren Lehren und Theorien auftraten? Ja, nein:

e) Wurden Sie jemals aus medizinischen oder religiösen Gründen, oder weil Sie aktiv oder passiv den Nationalsozialisten Widerstand leisteten, in Haft genommen oder in ihrer Freiheit oder von Ihrer Freizügigkeit, Freiheit oder von Ihrer Freiheit, irgendeine Freiheit verloren? Ja, nein:

Falls ja, geben Sie Einzelheiten über das beliebte Namen, Art Ihrer Tätigkeit, Gebiet und Vater des Dienstes an.

J. Anmerkungen

Die Angaben auf diesem Formular sind wahr.

Gezeichnet

Datum

Zeuge

Name und Adresse des Zeugen
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Renseignements complémentaires:</th>
<th>Weitere Angaben:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Situation de famille</td>
<td>Familienstand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Titres universitaires</td>
<td>Universitätsdiplome</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
GOUVERNEMENT MILITAIRE EN ALLEMAGNE

QUESTIONNAIRE / Fragebogen

ATTENTION: En cas de doute, c'est le texte français qui prévaut. A chaque question il doit être répondu comme indiqué. Les omissions, les indications inexactes ou incomplètes entraînent des poursuites pour violation des ordonnances militaires. Des feuilles supplémentaires doivent être attachées, si le bloc sur ce questionnaire est insuffisant.

Avertissement: En cas de doute, c'est le texte français qui prévaut. A chaque question il doit être répondu comme indiqué. Les omissions, les indications inexactes ou incomplètes entraînent des poursuites pour violation des ordonnances militaires. Des feuilles supplémentaires doivent être attachées, si le bloc sur ce questionnaire est insuffisant.

A. ÉTAT CIVIL / A. Persönliche Angaben


B. ÉCOLE ET UNIVERSITAIRE / B. Grundschul- und höhere Bildung


C. EXAMENS PROFESSIONNELS / C. Berufs- oder Handwerksprüfungen


Impressum: Nationale. — J. 278 — (2)
D. ERUERATION CHRONOLOGIQUE DE TOUS LES EMPLOIS ET DES SERVICES MILITAIRES

23. Indiques ci-dessous, par ordre chronologique, vos emplois et services militaires à partir du ler janvier 1951 en donnant les raisons de votre sortie, avancement, stagnation, déplacement, changement, fréquentation de cours de formation (excepté ceux indiqués sous II) ou d'examens de perfectionnement ainsi que le service dans des organisations paramilitaires (des activités secondant à l'indiquer sous F). Si vous dites de sortir de la police, précisez : Stadtpolizei, Kreispolizei, Sicherheitsdienst, Gestapo, Päpsteiner, Wehrdienst im Gefängnis, Grenzpolizei, Zuchthaus ou I.G. (K.I.). Alle à la ligne pour tout changement d'emplacement ou de grade, les périodes de service, la fréquentation d'examens spéciaux et les transferts d'une organisation militaire ou paramilitaire à une autre.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>An</th>
<th>Adresse du logement du Police ou du Poste de Police, de l'Armée ou du Chief de Police du Chief de Police</th>
<th>Grade du Chef de Service ou Grade du Chief de Police</th>
<th>Emploi ou Grade du Chef de Police</th>
<th>Professions d'activité et responsabilités professionnels</th>
<th>Date du changement ou de la création de l'Emploi ou du Grade</th>
<th>Motif de la création ou de la modification de l'Emploi ou du Grade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td></td>
<td>Subsidières de la police</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tübinger ohne Änderung</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D. CHRONOLOGISCHE AUFZÄHLLUNG JEDER CHRONOLOGISCHE AUFZÄHLLUNG JEDER


24. Indiques ci-dessous, par ordre chronologique, vos emplois et services militaires à partir du ler janvier 1951 en donnant les raisons de votre sortie, avancement, stagnation, déplacement, changement, fréquentation de cours de formation (excepté ceux indiqués sous II) ou d'examens de perfectionnement ainsi que le service dans des organisations paramilitaires (des activités secondant à l'indiquer sous F). Si vous dites de sortir de la police, précisez : Stadtpolizei, Kreispolizei, Sicherheitsdienst, Gestapo, Päpsteiner, Wehrdienst im Gefängnis, Grenzpolizei, Zuchthaus ou I.G. (K.I.). Alle à la ligne pour tout changement d'emplacement ou de grade, les périodes de service, la fréquentation d'examens spéciaux et les transferts d'une organisation militaire ou paramilitaire à une autre.

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>1931</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tübinger ohne Änderung</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### E. AFFILIATIONS / E. Mitgliedschaften


48. A la date d'entrée au Parti, que vous êtes membre de l'Ordre Nazi, que vous avez exercé des fonctions honorifiques ou professionnelles et que vous avez été membre de l'Ordre Nazi, que vous avez exercé des fonctions honorifiques ou professionnelles dans les organisations suivantes: SA, DAF, NSDAP, NSD-Arbeitsbund, NS-Dienstverband, etc. 

49. Affiliation, grade et activité professionnelle principale dans les organisations suivantes: SA, DAF, NSDAP, NSD-Arbeitsbund, NS-Dienstverband, etc. 

50. A la date d'entrée au Parti, que vous êtes membre de l'Ordre Nazi, que vous avez exercé des fonctions honorifiques ou professionnelles et que vous avez été membre de l'Ordre Nazi, que vous avez exercé des fonctions honorifiques ou professionnelles dans les organisations suivantes: SA, DAF, NSDAP, NSD-Arbeitsbund, NS-Dienstverband, etc. 

51. A la date d'entrée au Parti, que vous êtes membre de l'Ordre Nazi, que vous avez exercé des fonctions honorifiques ou professionnelles et que vous avez été membre de l'Ordre Nazi, que vous avez exercé des fonctions honorifiques ou professionnelles dans les organisations suivantes: SA, DAF, NSDAP, NSD-Arbeitsbund, NS-Dienstverband, etc. 

52. A la date d'entrée au Parti, que vous êtes membre de l'Ordre Nazi, que vous avez exercé des fonctions honorifiques ou professionnelles et que vous avez été membre de l'Ordre Nazi, que vous avez exercé des fonctions honorifiques ou professionnelles dans les organisations suivantes: SA, DAF, NSDAP, NSD-Arbeitsbund, NS-Dienstverband, etc. 

53. A la date d'entrée au Parti, que vous êtes membre de l'Ordre Nazi, que vous avez exercé des fonctions honorifiques ou professionnelles et que vous avez été membre de l'Ordre Nazi, que vous avez exercé des fonctions honorifiques ou professionnelles dans les organisations suivantes: SA, DAF, NSDAP, NSD-Arbeitsbund, NS-Dienstverband, etc. 

54. A la date d'entrée au Parti, que vous êtes membre de l'Ordre Nazi, que vous avez exercé des fonctions honorifiques ou professionnelles et que vous avez été membre de l'Ordre Nazi, que vous avez exercé des fonctions honorifiques ou professionnelles dans les organisations suivantes: SA, DAF, NSDAP, NSD-Arbeitsbund, NS-Dienstverband, etc.
55. An welchen Erwerbsgesellschaften waren Sie beteiligt? (Offene Handelsgesellschaft, OHG, Kommanditgesellschaft, KG, AG, G. m. b. H., Genossenschaft usw., Welches Amt hatten Sie im Verbands- oder Aufsichtsrat? 

56. Waren Sie jemals Mitglied eines Geschäftsführers, städtisches, Landtags, von wann bis wann, und welche Partei haben Sie vertreten?

57. Waren Sie ab 1940 in irgendeiner Tätigkeit oder Dienststellung im Else oder Lothringen? Wenn ja, wo und wie lange, freiwillig oder abgeordnet?

58. Gibt es jemanden, der Ihnen eine solche Tätigkeit oder Dienststellung annehmen konnte?

59. Sind Sie jemals Mitglied einer verbotenen Oppositionspartei oder Gruppe?

60. Haben Sie irgendwelche nähere Verwandte, die jemals Amt, Rang oder einflußreiche Stellen in irgendeiner der von 46 bis 56 genannten Organisaten ausüben? 

61. Informieren Sie den Namen und Anschrift einer Person, die Ihnen diese Tätigkeit oder Dienststellung annehmen kann. 

62. Gibt es nachfolgend im ersten Teil von Ihnen direkt oder indirekt an die NSDAP oder andere rechtliche Organisationen, Gewerkschaften oder andere Bereiche des öffentlichen Lebens gesetzte oder außerordentliche Beiträge in Form von Geld, Sachen oder Dienstleistungen?

63. Indes auf eine andere Frage: Indem die Organisationen vertraten, ob Sie in der NSDAP oder in einer anderen Organisationsform, ist es Ihnen zulässig, Auswahlsprinzipien auf diese Art zu vertreten, die nicht von Ihnen, sondern von einer anderen Person, die für die NSDAP oder eine andere Organisation berufen ist, vertreten werden?

64. Sind Sie je an den Diskurs oder die Organisationen der NSDAP beteiligt?

65. Waren Sie Mitglied einer politischen Partei oder eines antifaschistischen Kämpfbundes (Reichsbanner und soziale Hilfsorganisation vor 1933) oder etc. der NSDAP oder einer anderen Organisation?

66. Sind Sie jemals Mitglied einer politischen Partei oder eines antifaschistischen Kämpfbundes (Reichsbanner und soziale Hilfsorganisation vor 1933) oder einer anderen Organisation?

67. Waren Sie seit 1933 Mitglied einer verbotenen Oppositionspartei oder Gruppe?

68. Waren Sie seit 1933 Mitglied einer nach 1933 aufgelösten oder verbotenen Organisation?

69. Waren Sie seit 1933 Mitglied einer nach 1933 aufgelösten oder verbotenen Organisation?

70. Waren Sie seit 1933 Mitglied einer nach 1933 aufgelösten oder verbotenen Organisation?

71. Sind Sie jemals Mitglied einer politischen Partei oder eines antifaschistischen Kämpfbundes (Reichsbanner und soziale Hilfsorganisation vor 1933) oder einer anderen Organisation?

72. Waren Sie seit 1933 Mitglied einer verbotenen Oppositionspartei oder Gruppe?

73. Waren Sie seit 1933 Mitglied einer verbotenen Oppositionspartei oder Gruppe?

74. Waren Sie seit 1933 Mitglied einer verbotenen Oppositionspartei oder Gruppe?
F. MITGLIEDSCHAFT ODER NEBENDIENST IN ANDEREN ORGANISATIONEN

72. Indiquez sans mentionner les réponses déjà données sous D et E:

a) Fonctions, postes honorifiques, qui vous ont été confiés par un ministère du Reich, par l'office central du plan quadrennial ou par tout autre service de contrôle économique, les associations professionnelles, les bourses de victimes, les organes de l'administration, des organisations ou des mouvements politiques, industriels ou commerciaux, politiques ou d'opposition, d'actions ou de défense, de contrôle, de défense nationale, de police, de sécurité, de protection des ouvriers.

b) Fonctions, postes honorifiques, qui vous ont été confiés par un ministère du Reich, par l'office central du plan quadrennial ou par tout autre service de contrôle économique, les associations professionnelles, les bourses de victimes, les organes de l'administration, des organisations ou des mouvements politiques, industriels ou commerciaux, politiques ou d'opposition, d'actions ou de défense, de contrôle, de défense nationale, de police, de sécurité, de protection des ouvriers.

73. Indiquez sans mentionner, les réponses déjà données sous D et E:

a) chaque fonction honorifique, ou poste de confiance, qui vous a été confié par un ministère du Reich, par l'office central du plan quadrennial ou par tout autre service de contrôle économique, les associations professionnelles, les bourses de victimes, les organes de l'administration, des organisations ou des mouvements politiques, industriels ou commerciaux, politiques ou d'opposition, d'actions ou de défense, de contrôle, de défense nationale, de police, de sécurité, de protection des ouvriers.

b) chaque fonction honorifique, ou poste de confiance, qui vous a été confié par un ministère du Reich, par l'office central du plan quadrennial ou par tout autre service de contrôle économique, les associations professionnelles, les bourses de victimes, les organes de l'administration, des organisations ou des mouvements politiques, industriels ou commerciaux, politiques ou d'opposition, d'actions ou de défense, de contrôle, de défense nationale, de police, de sécurité, de protection des ouvriers.

74. Indiquez sans mentionner, les réponses déjà données sous D et E:

a) chaque fonction honorifique, ou poste de confiance, qui vous a été confié par un ministère du Reich, par l'office central du plan quadrennial ou par tout autre service de contrôle économique, les associations professionnelles, les bourses de victimes, les organes de l'administration, des organisations ou des mouvements politiques, industriels ou commerciaux, politiques ou d'opposition, d'actions ou de défense, de contrôle, de défense nationale, de police, de sécurité, de protection des ouvriers.

b) chaque fonction honorifique, ou poste de confiance, qui vous a été confié par un ministère du Reich, par l'office central du plan quadrennial ou par tout autre service de contrôle économique, les associations professionnelles, les bourses de victimes, les organes de l'administration, des organisations ou des mouvements politiques, industriels ou commerciaux, politiques ou d'opposition, d'actions ou de défense, de contrôle, de défense nationale, de police, de sécurité, de protection des ouvriers.

75. Unter Auslassung der bereits in Abschnitten D und E beantworteten Punkte führen Sie an:

a) jedwedes Nebenamt, einflußreiches unbezahltes oder Ehrenamt, oder Vertrauensstellung, welche Sie als Vertreter eines Reichsministeriums oder der Leitstelle für den Vierjahresplan, oder ähnlichen Wirtschaftsüberwachungsstellen innehalten.

b) jedwedes Nebenamt, einflußreiches unbezahltes oder Ehrenamt, oder Vertrauensstellung, welche Sie als Vertreter eines Reichsministeriums oder der Leitstelle für den Vierjahresplan, oder ähnlichen Wirtschaftsüberwachungsstellen innehalten.

c) jedwedes Nebenamt, einflußreiches unbezahltes oder Ehrenamt, oder Vertrauensstellung, welche Sie als Vertreter eines Reichsministeriums oder der Leitstelle für den Vierjahresplan, oder ähnlichen Wirtschaftsüberwachungsstellen innehalten.

76. Indiquez sur une feuille spéciale les titres et les noms des éditeurs de toutes les publications que vous avez écrites ou publiées, entièrement ou partiellement, depuis 1931. Si vous n'avez pas de publications, indiquez le cas échéant que vous n'en avez pas.

G. PUBLICATIONS ET DISCOURS / G. Veröffentlichung und Reden


H. EINKOMMEN / H. Einkommen

77. Indiquez sur une feuille spéciale les titres et les noms des éditeurs de toutes les publications que vous avez écrites ou publiées, entièrement ou partiellement, depuis 1931. Si vous n'avez pas de publications, indiquez le cas échéant que vous n'en avez pas.

77. Herkunft und Beträge des jährlichen Einkommens vom 1. Januar 1931 bis zur Gegenwart, in Ermangelung von Belegen sind ungefähre Beträge anzugeben:

78. Indiquez sur une feuille spéciale les titres et les noms des éditeurs de toutes les publications que vous avez écrites ou publiées, entièrement ou partiellement, depuis 1931. Si vous n'avez pas de publications, indiquez le cas échéant que vous n'en avez pas.

79. Indiquez sur une feuille spéciale les titres et les noms des éditeurs de toutes les publications que vous avez écrites ou publiées, entièrement ou partiellement, depuis 1931. Si vous n'avez pas de publications, indiquez le cas échéant que vous n'en avez pas.

80. Indiquez sur une feuille spéciale les titres et les noms des éditeurs de toutes les publications que vous avez écrites ou publiées, entièrement ou partiellement, seit 1931. Si vous n'avez pas de publications, indiquez le cas échéant que vous n'en avez pas.

81. Indiquez sur une feuille spéciale les titres et les noms des éditeurs de toutes les publications que vous avez écrites ou publiées, entièrement ou partiellement, seit 1931. Si vous n'avez pas de publications, indiquez le cas échéant que vous n'en avez pas.
79. Haben Sie oder ein unmittelbarer Angehöriger Ihrer Familie je Besitz erworben, der anderen Personen aus politischen, rassischen oder religiösen Gründen entzogen oder enteignet wurde oder dem die betreffenden Personen aus den gleichen Gründen seit 1931 verkauften? 

80. Haben Sie oder ein unmittelbarer Angehöriger Ihrer Familie jemals Besitz erworben, der anderen Personen aus politischen, rassischen oder religiösen Gründen entzogen oder enteignet wurde oder dem die betreffenden Personen aus den gleichen Gründen seit 1931 verkauften?

81. Falls ja, geben Sie Einzelheiten an, einschließlich Zeit- und Ortsangaben, sowie Namen und gegenwärtigen Aufenthalt der ursprünglichen Besitzer.

82. Waren Sie jemals als Verwalter oder Treuhänder für jüdischen Besitz zwecks Förderung von Arisierungserlassen oder Verordnungen tätig?

83. Falls ja, geben Sie Einzelheiten an.

84. Befanden Sie jemals in einem Entschuldigungsverfahren, wann und mit welchem Erfolg?

85. Listet alle Reisen und Wohnsitze außerhalb Deutschlands auf (Feldzüge einbezogen):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Reise/Verweildauer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Schweiz</td>
<td>1933 - 38</td>
<td>Geschäftsreise von 1 - 2 Tagen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

86. Haben Sie die Reise auf eigene Kosten unternommen?

87. Falls nein, auf wessen Kosten?

88. Welche Persönlichkeiten oder Organisationen haben Sie besucht?

89. Haben Sie jemals oder falls ja, in welcher Rolle in der Zivilverwaltung in einem der von Deutschland eingegliederten oder besetzten Gebiete gedient?

90. Falls ja, geben Sie Einzelheiten über Ihr Amt, Ihren Pflichtenkreis, sowie Ort und Zeitdauer des Dienstes.

91. Kenntnis: Kenntnis der ausländischen Sprachen und Grad der Vollkommenheit...

92. Signature / Eigenhändige Unterschrift

93. Date / Datum

ATTESTATION DU CHEF DE SERVICE

Ich bestätige hiermit die Richtigkeit obigen Namens und obiger Unterschrift. Mit Ausnahme der nachfolgenden Punkte sind die in diesen Formularen gegebenen Antworten meines besten Wissens und Gewissens und im Rahmen der mir zur Verfügung stehenden Archivmöglichkeiten richtig. Ausnahmen (das Wort „keine“ ist einzutragen, falls solche nicht vorhanden sind):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stelle</th>
<th>Funktion</th>
<th>Ort</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Signature / Eigenhändige Unterschrift</td>
<td>Date / Datum</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Einsatz


An Herrn
Oberstleutnant Courtois
Tübingen

Belieferung: Mahl- u. Brotgetreideversorgung.

Sehr verehrter Herr Oberst!


Zur Behebung der Belieferung wurde die Durchführung folgendermaßen beschlossen:
1.) Hochgradige Belieferung von Getreide, Mahl und Brot bei den Erzeugern.
2.) Vorbeugung des sofortigen Drucks möglichst geister Getreidegaben von der neuen Ernte.

Die Anführung von Getreide, die im Normalzulieferungsverband besondere Verantwortung bei der Anführung von Ablieferung in die verkehrlich zum Abschluß kam, ist damit erbracht aufgenommen worden. Ich habe mich daher in einem Aufruf im Anrück zu die Erzeuger gewagt und in einem Meldescheibe in die Er- gänzungserkundigung über meine Leitung des Beliefe- mung gemäß Generalen Kredite in die Stammverlie- mellen, wo die neuen Maßnahmen so eine tragbare Erfahrung auf dem abliefern festgestellt, die von den anschließenden Ablieferung bekannt wurden.

Die Ihnen, sehr verehrter Herr Oberpriest, gegebene Anzahl von 2o.6, kann nicht als Beistand für die Abteilung betrachtet werden, die Sie den Benotungen die Entschädigung besonders wichtig gibt, aber meine Zahlen sind von mir durch die Abteilung auf den Teilnehmerd und dort im Abteilungsorgan, das auf der 3o.6.7 festgestellt wurde, nicht durch das tatsächlich behufentliche Feststellen gedacht.

Ich habe viele Meinungen persönlich geahnet und bestätigte jede freche Meinung, die denkbar an war. Äußerungen im der freizügigen Herrschaft werden, also Verhältnisse durch ähnliche Gemeinden zu unternehmen.

Die Ergebnissebleiben, genau an die Abteilungsdruck, hinter den Erwartungen zurückbleiben, dass ich möchte die Hilfe unserer Bevölkerung, die nicht verschlossen Partei nehmen, auf die Bedürfnisse hinwirken, sondern die frei gesteckte Abteilung und Gesetzesordnung ihren Schaden ist. Den größten Teil unserer Schülerlichen Bevölkerung steht nicht mehr so viel, als für Verständigung, die Ihnen zum Verständnis und Durchführung nachgelassen.

Die Wiedergabe der Kapitale Ursache möglichst meiner Erziehung in die neue Erhöhung als Verantwortung für die Stellung, welche die Schüler, aber auch das Lösung aller technischen und organisatorischen Fragen, die sich in den einzelnen Gemeinden zeigen.

Eine namentliche Verhältnis von mehr ist auszuschließen, da unsere Schülerliche Bevölkerung selbst nicht mehr über die richtigen Verhältnisse verfügt.

Den besonderen Wunsch konnte ich nicht bei der Verhältnis der Schüler, aber auch die Schüler, den Schule, die die Schüler. Meine Schüler, die sich der Zeit, dass zu 2.12.65 vorhandenen Kommissionsbüro erteilt wurden, sind durch Betreuung, länger dauernden Winter, Unruhen usw., nicht im Verständnis ihrer Idee verbrachten.

Ich bitte aber auch das öffentliche zu wissen, dass die Verständigung dieses bisher allgemein getroffenen Stimmungsablaufs steht.

Unseren Kuren finden und Bastian und René wurden von Streit und Arbeitsscheidenungen in der Ordinance, und das Land von wirtschaftlichen Fehlern in politischen Strukturen und ungeschacht, von meinem freien Willen, wie es zu Freundschaftsinnerung und Freundschaftsinnerung befreit werden, welche Pflicht und die Verhältnisse sich selbst setzen baldwirnung von durch die weitere Geschäftliche Übereinstimmenheit, die

Ein großer Teil meiner Meinung hat die Verhältnisse in der juristischen Wirkung für die eigenen Anschauung, und die Tatsachen die freundlichen Verbände von der großen Stärke, die sie bewirkten, für welche der große Eifer und die getrennte Linke, zu den Gründen ist die
Land schon seit Jahrtausenden überwältigt. Der Besitz in Kleinere Teile aufgeteilt, der Boden ist und das Klein-
land. Man lacht manchmal lachend, und: "Daß der Arbeiter ist
unserer Arbeit". Derart wird in seiner aufgenommenen Form eine
unvermutete Verständigung angewendet, um eine
Einschnitte ohne Ende zu erzielen. Man sieht hier klar-
stellen, daß es sich um eine der ältesten Dinge in der Welt handelt, weil es um die Zeit und das Ge-
denken der Menschen, um Schaffung der Zeit, um Zeitfüllung und um alles an Ablenkung. "Wir lernen
unseren Pelz nicht ohne Bedeutung", denn das ist aus der
Lehre, daß die Gründe für gegebene Anordnungen nicht
der Welt nicht entsprechen. Es ist nicht zu vermeiden, was
vorübergehende deutsche Einzelheiten, die in Ein-
vernehmen mit der Französischen Färbereimäßigkeit erzeugt,
was uns, wenn man diese genauer betrachtet, kurz nach dieser wie so beraubt wurde. Die Zei-
kosten wurden die Gärten aus unserer Kultur entwickelt,
Diese Formen allein hätten die besten bisherigen Schriftstel-
ler vorübergehend produziert, wenn nicht überwunden
wären. Es wurde dort gesagt, daß die allgemeine Verwaltung schwierig
laufende wurde jedoch manchmal auf die Abenteuer eines Ritters.

Zu dieser wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Belastung voll-
zog Landwirtschaft durchgeführt. Auf die Bedeutung
Prägungen, die von dauernden und festen Erscheinungen
durchgeführt und von denen auch von ihnen noch getragen
werden, was um das Wählen unserer Landwirtschafts-Verhäl-
stellungen zu können, es nicht mehr einer gegebenen Flask
hat, doch keine anderen gegebenen Flaschen haben, die man
besonders vollen Vorstellungs für die Färbereimäßigkeit
berger, schlechthin Aufforderung haben, aber man weiß, was
auch als Bedeutung bestellt, das nach der großen Zeit
ihres Ursprungs nicht erstellt wurde, wie uns gegenüber
Sträucher sind uns von Jahren, die sie an die Westfassischen
das betriebene Bunt der neue Angelegenheit.

Zu dieser Stellung auf dem Lande kommt noch, daß die ver-
antwortlichen Stellen der Landwirtschafts-Verhältnisse
der und innerhalb ihrer selbst, daß die meisten der Hausschafe
mit ihren Arbeitern im Dialekt, den sie beherrchen
sich bei mir, daß die Überprüfungen, vorgesprochen Staatsthi-
ken, Beschränkung von der, handlungsunfähig, die nach
haltungen unserer Landesfähigkeit werden. Die Erfüllung dieser
Übersicht, der Übersicht oder gar noch. Erhalten.
Diese Ehrlichkeit will, wie man mir immer wieder verleicht, durch den "Kalenderzug" unterbunden.

Ich bitte Sie, sehr verehrter Herr Oberst, meine Ehrlichkeit nicht überzeuhen zu wollen und ich darf Ihnen nach wie vor verleicht, daß unser gemeinsamer Streit zu Ihren, Herr Oberst, heute noch eine von vielen Verletzungen ist. Ich bitte Ihnen und immer wieder gesagt werden bei reizen Pflichten, daß der Herr Kriegsgenieur unbegreiflich von vielen dieser Dinge nichts weiß, sonst hätte er Sie nicht abgestellt.

In einer ausserordentlichen Sitzung des erweiterten Bundesvorstandes und der Vorsitzenden der Landesberufsgewerkschaften am 13. Juni 1947 in Tuttlingen wurde nach eingehenden Beratungen und Würdigung aller beim Bund vorhandenen Unterlagen einstimmig folgender

Beschluss

bzw. Versorgung der Bevölkerung mit Lebensmitteln

gefasst:


Die Erregung aller Schaffen durch die neueste Verkürzung der Ration nimmt immer noch zu. Dieser durchbrochenen Missstimmung können und wollen sich die Gewerkschaften nicht entgegenstellen, es ist für sie doch einstimmig, dass mit den Lebensmittelrationen keine ernstzunehmende Arbeit geleistet werden kann.

Bevorzugte Versorgung der in Prioritätsbetrieben Beschäftigten muss unter solchen Umständen als Unrecht empfunden werden. Ausser diesen Betrieben gibt es in Südwürttemberg auch arbeitende Berufszweige, die für die Gesamtwirtschaft des Landes eine erhebliche Bedeutung haben, ohne entsprechend versorgt zu werden.

Gewerkschaftsbund Süd-Württemberg
und Hohenzollern

Tuttlingen, den 18.6.47
Uhlandstr. 3, Tel. 603

[Unterschrift]


Die Versorgung mit Textilien aller Art ist nicht besser. In kommenden Winter muss Gewöhnlich auch von diesen Gesichtspunkt aus mit grössten gesundheitlichen Gefährdungen gerechnet werden.


Mitten im Sommer zeigen sich bereits erste Schatten des Winters. Es geht nicht mehr allein um den Hunger, die Katastrophe muss vermieden werden. Die Gewerkschaften sind sich ihrer Verantwortung bewusst. Seit Monaten sie, wenn nicht durch
konstruktive, weitsichtige wirtschaftspolitische Maßnahmen erzielt werden, ist der Zusammenbruch der Wirtschaft Südwürttemberga-Hohenzollerns unvermeidbar.


Der Bundesvorstand des Gewerkschaftsbundes Südwürttemberg und Hohenzollern.
PROGRAMM
DER KUNSTWOCHE
TÜBINGEN
REUTLINGEN
1946

[Handwritten notes and text, difficult to transcribe accurately.]
TÜBINGEN

Sonntag, 21. Juli 1946

11.00 Festsaal der Neuen Aula der Universität

FESTAKT
Georg Friedrich Händel: Orgelkonzert in B-dur
3. Satz: Andante

Ansprache:
Oberbürgermeister Adolf Hartmeyer, Tübingen
Staatsrat Professor Dr. Karl Schmid, Tübingen
Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart: Marsch in D-dur
Es spielt das Städt. Kammerorchester Tübingen
unter Leitung von Hubert Reichert
Orgel: Eva Hültferlin

16.00 Kunstgebäude, neben der Neuen Aula, Nauklerstr. 1

ERÖFFNUNG DER KUNSTAUSSTELLUNG
Otto Diet, Erich Heckel, Kurt Georg Becker, Max
Ackermann, Wilhelm Fehle

Ansprache Dr. Adolf Ritsch, Tübingen

Vortrag von Prof. Dr. Hans Hildebrandt, Stuttgart
"Das Bild als Kunstwerk und die Naturtreue"

Musikalische Ausgestaltung:
Gilbert-Quartett. Werke von Palestrina und Bach

20.00 Festsaal der Neuen Aula der Universität

SYMPHONIEKONZERT
Städt. Kammerorchester Tübingen in Verbindung
mit dem Philharmonischen Orchester Stuttgart
Leitung: Hubert Reichert
Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart: Symphonie in G-moll
van Beethoven: Symphonie in E-dur Nr. 3 (Eroica)
**TÜRINGEN**

*Montag, 22. Juli 1946*

20.00 Neue Aula, Auditorium maximum
Lichtbildervortrag von Museumsdirektor Dr. Walter Passarge, Mannheim
WANDLUNGEN DER PLASTIK SEIT 1900

20.00 Silbersaal des Museums

**KLAVIERKonzert**

**Professor Walter Reiberg**

*Sonatas von Franz Schubert*

Ausz des Programms:
Sonate in C-dur, D.571
Sonate in G-dur (Farewellsonate)
Sonate in B-dur

*Dienstag, 23. Juli 1946*

20.00 Schloßhof des Schlosses Heinitzübingen

**SCHLOSSHOFKONZERT**

Werke von Mozart
geprüft von Prof. Kammersolisten der Universitätsmusik
unter Leitung von Eduard Reichert

Programm:
Symphonie in C-dur (Jugendwerk)
Andante für Flöte und Streichorchester
Menuett in D-dur (Adagio)
Hofzeremonie in D-dur

Solisten: Fritz Behr, Flöte; Folkmar Längen, Cello; Fernando Zepparoni, Violine

**TÜRINGEN**

*Mittwoch, 24. Juli 1946*

20.00 Neue Aula, Auditorium maximum
Lichtbildervortrag von Dr. Franz Roh, München
MALEREI IM 10. JAHRHUNDERT

*Donnerstag, 25. Juli 1946*

20.00 Silbersaal des Museums

**MARIA STUART – PREMIÈRE**

Spieleleitung: Dr. Günther Stark
Bühnenbild: Friedhelm Strenger
Maria Stuart: Anna Damm
Königin Elisabeth: Elisabeth Flickenschmidt

*Freitag, 26. Juli 1946*

21.30 Schloßhof des Schlosses Heinitzübingen

**MOZART-TANZABEND**

Mitwirkende: Die Kammersängergruppe des Stadt-
Schallplattelabels Tübingen-Entlingen unter der
Leitung von Helmut Hase
Das Städtische Kammerorchester Tübingen unter
der Leitung von Helmut Hase
Aus dem Programm:
Deutsche Tänze, Die Kleine Nachtmusik
TÜBINGEN

Montag, 22. Juli 1946

20.00 Neue Aula, Auditorium maximum
Lichtbildervortrag von Museumsdirektor
Dr. Walter Passarge, Mannheim
WANDLUNGEN DER PLASTIK SEIT 1900

20.00 Silbersaal des Museums

KLAVIERKONZERT
PROFESSOR WALTER KELLBERG
Sinfonie von Franz Schubert
Abschluss des Programms:
Sonate in G-dur, D. 840, Mov. 1
Sonate in G-dur (Funtasieonat
Sonate in B-dur

Dienstag, 23. Juli 1946

20.00 Schloßhof des Schlusses Holmestüldingen

SCHLOSSKONZERT
Werke von Mozart
vom Sekt. Kammerorchster Tübingen
unter Leitung von Hauten Reichert

Programm:
Symphonie in G-dur (Jugendwerk)
Andante für Flöte und Streichorchester
Marsch in D-dur
Adagio für Cello und Streichorchester
Hoffnereronde in D-dur
Solisten: Fritz Bohm, Flöte; Folker Längen, Cello;
Fernando Zeppeletti, Violon

TÜBINGEN

Mittwoch, 24. Juli 1946

20.00 Neue Aula, Auditorium maximum
Lichtbildervortrag von Dr. Franz Roh, München
MALEREI IM 20. JAHRHUNDERT

Dienstag, 27. Juli 1946

20.00 Silbersaal des Museums

MARIA STUART - PREMIÈRE
Spieleleitung: Dr. Günther Stark
Bühnenbild: Friedhelm Strenger
Maria Stuart: Anna Damann
Königin Elisabeth: Elisabeth Flickenschildt
Weitere Mitwirkende: Heide Helmer, Ellen Krug,
Alf Thorneysen, Hans Frommann, Günther Gube,
Bernd Hellmann, Georg König, Egon Schäfer, Jörg
Schleicher, Wolfgang Schröder, Victor Tcsel, Fritz
Weischl, Karl Wonsel, Hans Wolfgang Zegers

Freitag, 26. Juli 1946

21.30 Schloßhof des Schlusses Holmestüldingen

MOZART-TANZABEND
Schloßpausenhaus Tübingen-Readling unter der
Leitung von Heinz Klee
Das Städtische Kammerorchester Tübingen unter
der Leitung von Helmut Hasse
Aus dem Programm:
Deutsche Tänze, Die Kleine Nachtmusik
SüDINGEN

Samstag, 27. Juli 1946

20.00 Schloßsaal des Museums
MARIA STUART

Samstag, 28. Juli 1946

10.30 Pfortenfeier
MATINEE - DER LETZT ALFRED DUBLIN

20.00 Schillersaal des Museums
ZEPPARONI-QUARTETT
Zappparoli, Klemm, Dohler, Langin
Programm: Haydn Quartett in G-moll
Mozart Quartett in C-dur
Schubert Quartett in A-moll

21.00 Stadtbeleuchtung
PLATANENALLEE-KONZERT

Montag, 29. Juli 1946

20.00 Neue Aula, Auditorium maximum
Vortrag von Prof. Romano Guardini, Tübingen
LANDSCHAFTSBETRACHTUNG IN DANTES GÖTTLICHER KOMÖDIE

Dienstag, 30. Juli 1946

20.00 Neue Aula, Auditorium maximum
Vortrag von Rudolf Alexander Schröder
BESINNUNG - LICHTEN UND TRACHTEN

TÜDINGEN

Donnerstag, 3. August 1946

20.00 Schillersaal des Museums
MARIA STUART

Freitag, 2. August 1946

16.00 Neue Aula, Auditorium maximum
Vortrag von Professor Günter Müller, Boon
ÜBER GEDICHTINTERPRETATION

20.00 Schillersaal des Museums
AUSFLUG MIT DAMEN
Komödie von Friedrich Michael
Spieleitung: Dr. Günther Stark
Bühnenbild: Friedhelm Strenger
Kostüme: Gili Raff

Samstag, 3. August 1946

16.00 Neue Aula, Auditorium maximum
Dichterlesung von Ernst Pernold, München
BILD-BETRACHTUNGEN

20.00 Schillersaal des Museums
MARIA STUART
TÜBINGEN

Sonntag, 4. August 1946

12.00 Festakt der Neuen Aula der Universität

FESTAKT ZUR EROFFNUNG DER TAGE
MODERNER MUSIK

1. Paul Hindemith: Oxyd-klänge
3. Vortrag von Professor Dr. W. Huber, Freiburg, Vom Wesen der Musik des Abendlandes

4. Harald Genzmer: Orgelmusik

Mitwirkende:
Hermann Achenbach, Baßbariton
Herbert Liedecke, Orgel

20.00 Festakt der Neuen Aula der Universität

KONZERT DES STÄDTISCHEN KAMMERORCHESTERS TÜBINGEN

Leitung: Hubert Reichert

Werke moderner Komponisten

Aus dem Programm

Heinrich Schumann: Divertimento für Streichorchester
Paul Hindemith: Fünf Stücke für Streichorchester
Gerhard Prommel: Ballade, Symphonische Musik für Streichorchester (Uraufführung)
Igor Strawinsky: Concerto in Es für Kammerorchester

TÜBINGEN

Montag, 5. August 1946

16.00 Neue Aula, Auditorium maximum

Vortrag von Dr. Bahle, Konstanz

KULTURSCHAFFENDE PERSÖNLICHKEIT

20.00 Pflegsalsaal

SONATENABEND IM RAHMEN
DER TAGE MODERNER MUSIK

Konzert von ihren eigenen Werken

Aus den Programmen

Erich Aed: Sonate für Flöte und Klavier
Bruno Stürmer: Sonate für Violine und Klavier
Walter Reichart: Sonaten für Klarinette und Klavier
Hans Boer: Sonaten für Violine und Klavier

Solisten: Margarete Aed, Flöte; Ursula Stürmer-Scherben, Violin; Erich Aed, Klavier; Philipp Dreier, Klarinette; Willi Müller, Cembalo, Violine; Bruno Stürmer, Klarinette; Professor Walter Reichart, Klavier

Dienstag, 6. August 1946

21.30 Markt Platz

OTHELLO Tanzspiel von William Shakespeare

Intervision: Dr. Günter Stark

Choreographie: Heinz Klee

Musik: Fritz Wilm Wilm Born

TÜBINGEN

Mittwoch, 7. August 1946
18.00 Neuer Aula, Auditorium maximam
Vertrag von Architekt Alfred Roth, Zürich
ARCHITEKTUR UND PLANUNG
NACH MENSCHENMASS

20.00 Festsaal der Universität
SYMPHONIEKONZERT IM RÄMEN
DER TAGE MODERNER MUSIK
Städt. Kammerorchester Tübingen in Verbindung
mit dem Philharmonischen Orchester Stuttgart
Leitung: Generalmusikdirektor Hermann Scherchen, Zürich
Solistin: Margarete von Winterfeld
Werke von Hermann, Schönberg, Gerser und Hindemith

Donnerstag, 8. August 1946
20.00 Schillersaal des Museums
MARIA STUART

Freitag, 9. August 1946
21.30 Schlachtoben des Schlosses Hohen Tübingen
MOZART-TANZABEND
Mitwirkende: Die Kammermusikgruppe des Städt. Schauspielhauses Tübingen-Neuhausen unter der
von Helmut Haase
Das Städtische Kammerorchester Tübingen unter der
Leitung von Helmut Haase
Aus dem Programm
Die Deutsche Tänze, Die kleine Nachtmusik

TÜBINGEN

Samstag, 10. August 1946
20.00 Schillersaal des Museums
LIEDERABEND GÜNTER BAUM, Hamburg

21.30 Marktplatz
Othello

Sonntag, 11. August 1946
10.30 Pflegehaus
MATINEE - Es liest PAUL ALVERDES

21.30 Marktplatz
Othello

Montag, 12. August 1946
21.30 Marktplatz
Othello

Dienstag, 13. August 1946
21.30 Marktplatz
Othello

Mittwoch, 14. August 1946
20.00 Schillersaal des Museums
CHANSONABEND
MIT ERIKA VON THELLMANN

Donnerstag, 15. August 1946
20.00 Schillersaal des Museums
MARIA STUART

Freitag, 16. August 1946
20.00 Schillersaal des Museums
MARIA STUART
Tübingen

Samstag, 17. August 1946

10.00 Schließung des Museums
Eukynike
von Lese Anonilih
Spielleitung: Dr. Göthe; Stark
Bühnenbild: Friedhelm Strenger
Kostüme: Cilli Ruf
Mitwirkende: Karolina Dobbs, Hilde Helmers,
Bella Krug, Alice Thurney, Herta Maria Walser,
Folke Alfereck, Hans Fromm, Günther Gebbe,
Gertrud Höhe, Hans Moserme; Heinrich Winkler,
Egon Schiele, Fritz Wunder, Karl Wrenzel

Samstag, 18. August 1946

10.30 Pflughofsaal
MATINEE – Es liest JOSEF EBERLE
21.00 Marktplatz
FESTLICHES KONZERT
des Städtischen Kammerorchesters Tübingen
Leitung: Hubert Reichert
Solist: Eduard Minhols (Violine)
Programm
Rosemuller: Sinfonie
Thelemann: Tafelmusik
Haydn: Streichquartett
Mozart: Eine kleine Nachtmusik

Montag, 20. August 1946

21.30 Marktplatz
OTHELLO

Mittwoch, 21. August 1946

21.30 Marktplatz
OTHELLO

Donnerstag, 22. August 1946

20.00 Schillersaal des Museums
DER EINGEBILDETE KRANKE
von Molière
Spielleitung: Dr. Sigmund Strenger, Leipzig
Bühnenbild: Friedhelm Strenger
Kostüme: Cilli Ruf
Geplott von Mitgliedern des Städtischen Schauspielhauses Tübingen-Reutlingen

Freitag, 23. August 1946

20.00 Schillersaal des Museums
MARIA STUART

Samstag, 24. August 1946

20.00 Schillersaal des Museums
DER EINGEBILDETE KRANKE

Sonntag, 25. August 1946

10.30 Pflughofsaal
MATINEE – Es liest FRIEDRICH BISCHOFF
20.00 Schillersaal des Museums
DER EINGEBILDETE KRANKE

Montag, 26. August 1946

21.30 Marktplatz
OTHELLO
TÜBINGEN

Dienstag, 27. August 1946
10.00 Silberball des Museums
KONZERT - OPERNARIEN
Hermann Rieth, Bremer
Claire Fassbinder-Lutz, Freudenstadt
Abends, 27. August 1946
21.30 Markt-Platz
OTHELLO

Donnerstag, 29. August 1946
10.00 Schillersaal des Museums
DER EINGEBILDETE KRAKKE

Freitag, 30. August 1946
10.00 Schillersaal des Museums
DER EINGEBILDETE KRAKKE

Samstag, 31. August 1946
10.00 Festvahl der Neuen Aula der Universität
SYMPHONIE-KONZERT
ausgeführt von Orchester der Württembergischen
Staatsoper Stuttgart. Leitung Prof. Carl Leonhardt
Programm:
Stravinsky: Don Juan
Peter Tchaikowsky: Violinkonzert in D-Dur
Henri Berlioz: Phantastische Symphonie, Episoden
aus dem Leben eines Künstlers

Sonntag, 1. September 1946
10.00 Schillersaal des Museums
DER EINGEBILDETE KRAKKE

REUTLINGEN

Samstag, 27. Juli 1946
10.00 Olympia-Theater
FESTAKT

Ansprache: Staatsrat Professor Dr. Karl Schmid, Tübingen
Oberbürgermeister Oskar Kalffel, Reutlingen
Musikalisches Umrahmung: Städtisches Kammerorchester Reutlingen. Leitung: Hans Grinchkat
11.00 Heimatmuseum
ERÖFFNUNG DER KUNSTAUSSSTELLUNG

Ansprache: Oberbürgermeister Oskar Kalffel

Sonntag, 28. Juli 1946
10.00 Olympia-Theater
MIRANDOLINA
Komödie in drei Akten von Carlo Goldoni
Deutsch von Paul Fima

Spielleitung: Peter Wackernagel
Bühnenbild: Friedhelm Strenger
Kostüme: Cilli Ruf
Musik: Helmut Haase

Mitwirkende: Katharina Dobbe, Ruth Kommerell,
Ellen Krug, Helmut Lange, Heinrich Finkelsky,
Fgon Schäfer, Jörg Schlesker, Hans Wolfgang
Zeiger
REUTLINGEN

Dienstag, 30. Juli 1946

20.00 Garten des Heimatmuseums
LANZELOT UND SANDEREIN
Abendländisches Schauspiel, überetzt von Friedrich M. Hübner
Spielleitung: Peter Wackerwag
Musik alter Meister, gespielt vom Städtischen Kammerorchester Tübingen
Mitwirkende: Mitglieder des Städtischen Schauspielerbundes Tübingen-Beiligen

Mittwoch, 31. Juli 1946

20.00 Olympia-Theater
SYMPHONIEKONZERT
ausgeführt vom Städtischen Symphonieorchester Reutlingen unter Leitung von Hans Grischkat
Programm
Haydn: Symphonie in Es-dur (mit dem Paukenwirbel)
Beethoven: Klavierkonzert in Es-dur
Monost: Symphonie in G-moll
Solist: August Leopold, Frankfurt

Donnerstag, 1. August 1946

21.15 Garten des Heimatmuseums
LANZELOT UND SANDEREIN

Mittwoch, 7. August 1946

20.00 Olympia-Theater
MIRANDOLINA

REUTLINGEN

Donnerstag, 5. August 1946

20.00 Volkshildungshaus
Vortrag von Architekt Alfred Roth, Zürich
ARCHITEKTUR UND PLANUNG
NACH MENSCHENMASS

Freitag, 6. August 1946

20.00 Olympia-Theater
MIRANDOLINA

Samstag, 7. August 1946

20.00 Olympia-Theater
MOZART-TANZABEND
Mitwirkende: Die Kammertanzgruppe des Städtischen Schauspielhauses Tübingen-Reutlingen unter
Leitung von Heinz Kleer
Das Städtische Kammerorchester Tübingen unter
Leitung von Helmut Haase
Aus dem Programm
Deutsche Tänze, Die Kleine Nachtmusik

Sonntag, 8. August 1946

21.15 Garten des Heimatmuseums
LANZELOT UND SANDEREIN.

Montag, 9. August 1946

20.00 Volkshildungshaus
LIEDERABEND GÜNTHER BAUM, Hamburg
Mittwoch, 14. August 1946
20.00 Olympia-Theater
MIRANDOLINA
Donnerstag, 15. August 1946
20.00 Volkshochschulhaus
LIEDERABEND TRUDE SANNWALD
Freitag, 16. August 1946
20.00 Olympia-Theater
CHANSONABEND
ERIKA VON THELLMANN
Samstag, 17. August 1946
21.15 Garten des Heimatmuseums
LANZELOT UND SANDEREIN
Montag, 19. August 1946
20.00 Heimatmuseum
MATINEE - Es liest JOSIF EBERLS
Dienstag, 20. August 1946
20.00 Olympia-Theater
STELLA
Erstespiel von Friedolin durch Goethe
Inszenierung: Elisabeth Fricke-Blalt
Bühnenbild: Freydmann 5 Wagner
Kostüme: Celis Jaf
Mitwirkende: Lotte Ham, Ellen Krüg, Heth
Maria Welleney, Victor Teher u. a.

Freitag, 30. August 1946
20.00 Olympia-Theater
LIEDERABEND ALFONS FÜGEL
Samstag, 31. August 1946
21.15 Garten des Heimatmuseums
LANZELOT UND SANDEREIN
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tag</th>
<th>Stunde</th>
<th>Professor</th>
<th>Kurs</th>
<th>Saal</th>
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<tr>
<td>Montag</td>
<td>18.30</td>
<td>M. Pons</td>
<td>Praktischer Kursus der französischen Sprache für</td>
<td>großes Saal</td>
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<td>Vorlesung über: Un individuello du XXe siècle,</td>
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<td>Vorlesung über: Un precurseur du XIXe siècle,</td>
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<td>J. J. Rousseau</td>
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<td>Vorlesung über: Les grands maîtres de la philosophie</td>
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<td>Vorlesung über: Alfred de Vigny, le romancier et le</td>
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**Anfertigung von Karte 5**

Rote tagelte Männer bei ihm. Wenn ihr euch hier gebeugt, so wische der König jenen Spartaner zum Herrscher ein. Landschaft in Hellas rechen. Darauf erwiderte die Spartaner:

„Heldenhaft! Der Ret, den so weg- und, ist einseitig. Du kannst nur, was du von uns, nicht was von uns, verstehst. Du bist der Knecht, aber wir der Freischütz, nicht der, der sich, noch ob dir kletter. Würdest du sie, ja, kletterst, dann würdest du uns raten, nichts Macht auf Spanier für sie zu kämpfen, sondern auch mit Äxten.“

Es brachen hier die hohen Worte von Demokrit auf:

„Die Freude in der Demokratie ist genau wie der renaisc, was die Herrscherschmählichkeit zeigt, wie die Freiheit der Knechtschaft.“

1) Hist. Phr. XLIII 41.

In ihren immer ermutigten Angriffen für die Freiheit waren die Griechen am meisten darüber erstaunt, warum die reichen und übersäten Völker die sich in ihrer Armut anfreunden und ihnen ihren kargen und unfruchtbaren Boden rauben wollten. Wir hielten sie nicht über den Hausrat, der im Xerxes auf seiner Flucht aus Griechenland zurückließ! Als Pausanias das Perserheer, das ihm der Leibwache, welche über der Ruhepolter gebreitet waren, die allbekannten Tische und das silberne und goldene Tafelgeschirr, wollte er einen Vergleich zwischen der griechischen und persischen Haltung dem Krieg gegenüber anstellen, für befahl der gezangeben persönlichen Härkern und Küchen nach der gewohnten Art für ihren Fehlbild ein Mahl zu bereiten. Als den glühenden Mahl auf den körnigen Gerichtsfeldern angebraucht stand, befahl er zum männlichen Schatz seiner eigenen Diener, ein lakonisches Feldeszenen darzulegen aufzustellen. Lachend rief er dann die griechischen Unterführer heraus, wies auf die beiden Zunstungen und sagte: „Heldenhaft! Seht her, weshalb ich euch rufen ließ. Ich wollte euch dieses Perserhändlings Torheit zeigen, der so eilig lebt und doch zu uns kommt, um uns Arme zu behaun."

Der Kampf der Griechen um ihr heiliges Land war nicht immer ein glücklicher. Das schmerzlichste Er- succeed, welches dem griechischen Volk zu Beginn der neuen Zeit widerfuhr, war der Fall von Konstantinopel, denn die Eroberung dieser Stadt durch die Feinde bedeutete auch den Anfang der Knechtschaft für ganz Griechenland. Wie schmerzvoll be-

1) Herod. 982.
DEMANDE DE LICENCE D'ÉDITION

Antrag auf Erteilung der Veröffentlichungsberechtigung

Monsieur: ____________________________________________ Editeur: ____________________________________________
Herr: _______________________________________________ Verleger: ____________________________________________
Raison sociale: ________________________________________ Firma: ____________________________________________
Adresse: ________________________________ Anschrift: ________________________________

demande l'autorisation d'éditer ou de rééditer (1) l'ouvrage suivant (2):

erbittet hiermit die Erlaubnis, das nachfolgende Werk zu verlegen bzw. in Neuauflage erscheinen zu lassen

Nom de l'auteur: ____________________________________________
Name des Verfassers: ____________________________________________
Profession: ________________________________ Beruf: ________________________________
Adresse: ________________________________ Anschrift: ________________________________
Curriculum vitae: ________________________________ Lebenslauf: ________________________________

Appartenance au parti:
Parteizugehörigkeit:
Fonctions dans le parti:
Amt, welches der Antragsteller gegenwärtig in der Partei innehat:

Nom du préfacier (éventuellement):
Name des Verfassers des Vorworts, falls dies von einem anderen Autor geschrieben wurde:

(1) Rayez la mention inutile.
(1) Unbedingt durchstrichen zu streichen
(2) Joindre deux épreuves dactylographiées; il s'agit d'un ouvrage nouveau, deux exemplaire du volume s'il s'agit d'une réédition
(2) Es sind beizufügen: 2 Drukschriften des Manuskriptes, falls es sich um eine Erstauflage handelt.
2 Exemplare des Manuskriptes, im Falle einer Neuauflage.
DEMANDE DE LICENCE D'ÉDITION

Antrag auf Erteilung der Veröffentlichungsberechtigung

Monsieur: ____________________________ Editeur: ____________________________
Herr: ____________________________ Verleger: ____________________________
Raison sociale: ____________________________ Firma: ____________________________
Adresse: ____________________________________________________________
Anschrift: ____________________________________________________________
demande l'autorisation d'éditer ou de rééditer (1) l'ouvrage suivant (2):
erbettet hiermit die Erlaubnis, das nachbenannte Werk zu verlegen bzw. in Neuauflage erscheinen zu lassen
Nom de l'auteur: ____________________________________________________________
Name des Verfassers: ____________________________________________________________
Profession: ____________________________ Beruf: ____________________________
Adresse: ____________________________________________________________
Anschrift: ____________________________________________________________
Curriculum vitae: ____________________________________________________________
Lebenslauf: ____________________________________________________________

Appartenance au parti: ____________________________
Parteizugehörigkeit: ____________________________
Fonctions dans le parti: ____________________________
Amt, welches der Antragsteller gegebenfalls in der Partei innegehabt hat: ____________________________
Nom du prédécesseur (éventuellement): ____________________________
Name des Vorvaters, falls von einem anderen Autor geschrieben wurde: ____________________________

(1) Rayer la mention inutile.
(1) Unbedingt streichen.
(2) Inserieren deutsches dt.
(2) Es sind beizufügen: 2 Durchschläge des Manuskriptes, falls es sich um eine Erstauflage handelt.
(2) Exemplare des Manuskriptes, im Falle einer Neuauflage.
Forme de l'ouvrage: Livre — brochure — revue (5)
Format: Buch — Broschüre — Zeitschrift
Prix de vente au public:
Linge:
Format du livre (en cm):
Format du papier (en cm2):
Papierformat (in cm):
Genre de papier:
Papierequalität:
Poids au m2:
Gewicht pro qm:
Nombre de pages:
Seitenzahl:
Chiffre du tirage demandé:
Bemtragte Stückzahl der Auflage:
Poids total du papier nécessaire au tirage:
Gesamtgewicht des für die Anlage erforderlichen Papiers:
S'il s'agit d'un ouvrage illustré, joindre pour l'illustrateur les mêmes renseignements que ceux demandés pour l'auteur.
S'il s'agit d'un illustriertes Werk landen, sind über den Verfasser der Abbildungen die oben vom Verfasser des Textes verlangten Angaben beizufügen.

Date: ___________________________ Signature: ___________________________
Datu: __________________________ Unterschrift: __________________________

Avis de la Direction de l'Enseignement:

Décision de la Direction de l'Information:

(5) Bayer les mentions inutiles.
(9) Unzutreffendes zu streichen.
Appendix 10
Stellungnahme des Rectors und der Dekane der Universität Tübingen zu der von der französischen Militärregierung geplanten Abitur-Reform.

Am 27. Juni 1947 fanden sich in der Universität Tübingen zu einer Besprechung über die Reform des Abiturs folgende Herren zusammen:

Administrateur Cheval,
Dr. Rupp und Dr. Lambacher vom Staatssekretariat,
Rektor und Dekane der Universität Tübingen.


Durch Herrn Administrateur Cheval Tübingen.
Die angekündigten Bestimmungen über die Abiturprüfung und Zulassung zur Universität begegnen in der Universität ernsten Erörterungen. Wir bitten um Einspruchlieferung der Herren des höheren Schulwesens zur Stellungnahme. Rektor und Dekane der Universität Tübingen.

(zug.) Steinbüchel


Der Unterschriftende tauscht auf Wunsch von Herrn Administrateur Cheval und in Übereinstimmung mit den Herrn Dekanen die Stellungnahme des Rektors und der Dekane der Universität Tübingen in Folgen-

In der Sitzung vom 17. Juni kam diese Einigkeitlichkeit der beiderseitigen Übereinstimmung erneut zum Ausdruck.

Wir sind von der Notwendigkeit einer Auswahl der zur Universität Zuzusendenden, von einer Beschränkung also der Zahlung der Zulassung überzeugt und sehen das Begabtenprinzip als Ausnahmen dieser Auswahl. Er woher in einer Reform des Abiturs ein geeignetes Mittel zur Hochhändigung der Universität. Wir wollen ebenfalls unbedingt erreichen, dass die Begabten aus allen gesellschaftlichen Schichten die Möglichkeit zur Erzielung des akademischen Studiums und zur Universitätseinlieferung geboten wird.

Umb das medizinische Examen der Reform des Abiturs wurde in der Sitzung vom 17. Juni besprochen, dass nicht erörtert.

Zu dem Wille der Reform dessen Stuabstudium reichen wir nicht nur eine Neuregelung des Abiturs, wir schildern dazu auch eine, ohne weiterführende Beschreibung, durch eine Prüfung etwas beim Übergang von Mittelschulen höherer Schichten die Begabtenwahlslese erfolgt. Doch schon von allem Wissen an erhielt die Frage der Begabung, sowohl die Möglichkeit, dass ohne es man zogen werden, dass bereits bei der Aufnahme in die höhere Schule und man, wieder nach dem ersten Jahre durch eine Prüfung zur Begabtenwahlslese des Gesundheit der Begabte Schule ermöglicht, in meiner Rede von der Reform des Abiturs wird durch diese Möglichkeit, dass die Begabtenwahlslese erfolgt. Es soll dabei nicht der Wesenscharakter, sondern auch die charakterliche Entfaltung bestehen.

Das hieziger Studium bietet noch sicherer Gewähr für rechtsfähige Eignung und Universitätsstudium. Daher soll die Besonderheit der Studia in der Universität, wo man Staat der Begabtenwahlslese bereitstellen und versteht sich, dass nicht mehr als ein Semesterszimmern bestanden und einen Stoff untreffen, der eine erste Zähn im Gesamtbild des Fachwissens darstellt.

II. Ist der Wille zur Reform des Abiturs zwischen Militärregierung und Universitäten einübereinstimmig, so wollen auch solche innerhalb dieser Sitzung in einem solchen Reform gesagt werden soll.

Aus dem Berichte von Herrn Administrateur Chapel in der Sitzung vom 17. Juni entnehmen wir, dass die Reform des Abiturs zunächst nur das
französisch besetzte Gebiete betroffen und nur für eine Übergangszeit von etwa fünf Jahren gelten soll, dass aber die Reform in der englischen und amerikanischen Zone bald folgen und sich inhärent mit der französischen Reform decken soll.


In Hinblick auf diesen werden wir ein Herabsinken der jetzt allgemein anerkannten Höhe anderer Universitäten bei der Durchführung der Reform nur in der französischen Zone hinaus den Universitäten Tübingen und Württemberg-Hohenzollern horab:

1) Die Studienzeit wird geändert.
2) Die akademische Vereinheitlichung der Studienabschriften muss sich negativer auf die Produktivität der geläufigen Arbeiten auswirken.
3) Die Sorge, dass hervorragende, nach Tübingen berufene Gelehrte vorübergehend auf abnehmen, ist von der Hand zu weisen.
4) Die durch die Zentralisierung garantierte Rechtsfähigkeit der Studenten ist einem entsprechend nicht zu verschieben.
5) Infolge der Beschränkung der Tübinger Studentenschaft auf die Länder von Baden-Württemberg und Hohenzollern.
6) Infolge der Zulassung nur solcher Studenten, die aus den Mittelstädten der Rhein I bestehen.

Aus diesem Grunde ist der dringende Wunsch nach einer internationellen Regelung der Abiturreform nicht zu unterdrücken, selbst nicht für die kurze Zeit des Übergangs, ehe die beiden anderen Zonen der Reform in der französischen Zone folgen.

2) Es sei bei der Abiturreform nicht um ein gemäß dem Verordnung Nr. 435 über die Hochschulen der Länder der Zone Frankreichs durchgehende, der Militärregierung vorbehaltenes Gebiet handelt, sondern die Militärregierung ihr Vorgehen offensichtlich auf die Erklärung, dass die beteiligten deutschen Stellen nicht durch eigene Initiative zu einem über ihnen gestellten Vorgang getrieben sein können, innerhalb der Zone militärischen Maßregelungen gelangen könnten. Die wirtschaftliche Umsetzung hat an der Juni-Militärregierung Vorschläge für die Novelle zur neuen abitur. Entscheidend haben viele die Landeshöhen in Frankreich und Oberland der Militärregierung gegenstandsgebunden. Die Militärregierung hat zu diesen Vorschlägen schrift-
lich bisher nicht Stellung genommen; eine Ablehnung ist bis heute nicht erfolgt. Es hat also weder an einer Initiative der deutschen Stellen noch an der Übereinstimmung der von ihnen gemachten Vorschläge gefehlt. So ist darum nicht ersichtlich, aus welchen Gründen die Militärregierung die von den deutschen Stellen gemachte Infragestellung gemachten Vorschläge nicht anzuennen vermochte.

3) In welcher Form und in welchem Mass der Universität an der Abiturientenaufsicht zu beteiligen ist, bleibt näher festzusetzen.

4) In der tief in Geschichte und Gegenwart des Volkes eingewobenen Bildungfrage muss die deutsche Eigenart und Geschichte verständlich und im Schulwesen ihr Gesicht gegeben werden. Die Bildungsreform kann von der deutschen Schulreform nicht getrennt werden und muss der Art der in der Schule vermittelten, auf historischer Tradition beruhenden Bildung entsprechen. Wir sind unbestritten gewillt, eine "Vergangenheit zu liquidieren", die beiden Fragen nicht gleichzusetzen, und anerkennen auch aus diesem Gesichtspunkt eine Reform der bisherigen Abitur als unbedingte Notwendigkeit, möchten aber diese Reform dem historisch gewordenen Geist der deutschen Schul- und ihrer besten geistigen Tradition angeglichen sehen.

Die von Seiten des Rektors und der Dekanen erhobenen Bedenken wurden vom gesamten Lehrkörper der Universität geteilt. Unsere Universität legt Wert auf die Feststellung, dass diese ihre Stellungnahme voll und ganz den Auslassungen der Freiburger Universität, der Landesmilitärwesen und der Kirchenleistungen, besonderen Konnotationen entspreche.

Wir bitten, unsere Bedenken aus der verantwortlichen, obige für das Bildungs- und Universitätswesen und insbesondere auch für die Tübinger Universität, die sich der hohen Förderung durch die Militärregierung in den letzten beiden Jahren so sehr verdient hat, zu vernehmen, und bitten am Schluss nochmals unsere Jüterung von der Notwendigkeit, das Abitur zu verschärfen, einer Notwendigkeit, von der wir ebenso wie die französische Militärregierung überzeugt sind.

Rektor und Dekane der Universität Tübingen

[Unterschrift]

Nr. 1205.

Den Rektoren und Dekanen zur Kenntnisnahme mit der Bitte, die Fakultät von dem Inhalt dieses Schreibens zu unterrichten.

Tübingen, am 20. Juni 1917
Der Rektor und Dekane der Universität

[Unterschrift]
a) Translation: Volume II, Page 43

Billetting arrangements have a special significance in the case of a very lengthy occupation, especially in a country where living space has been restricted to such an extent by the effects of war. The extent of billetting should be related in a clearly defined way to population size on the one hand and to the numbers comprising the occupation forces on the other. An established code for billetting affairs, which would be binding on both sides and would substantiate their respective claims, could be one of the most important instruments today for stabilising living conditions in Germany. At any rate the satisfaction of certain minimum needs must be guaranteed for the German civilian population. Perhaps it would be a good thing if certain changes in legal competence were introduced in this sector by the Allied occupying powers. I would consider it itself a great improvement if it was not the local army headquarters but rather the military government which was ultimately responsible for this sector.

The requisitioning of household articles plays a special role with regard to the requirements of the military government personnel. As everyone knows, this is seen, especially in the present time, as a severe form of interference in the private life of individuals ...

b) Translation: Volume II, Page 190

that the reorganization of the Schwäbische Zeitblatt with Dr. Häcker as chief editor has been approved by the military government. In addition, approval has been given for the newspaper to be founded in the legal form of a cooperative society which is to be comprised of representatives of the (respective) parties.
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Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart
Landesbibliothek Stuttgart
Staatsarchiv Sigmaringen
Stadtarchiv Reutlingen
Stadtarchiv Tübingen
Universitätsarchiv Tübingen
Zeitungarchiv des "Schwäbischen Tagblatts"

2. Interviews

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Wilhelm Baudermann, Tübingen
Dipl. Ing. Kurt Behnisch, Tübingen
Folksirat a.D. Friedrich Bücheler, Tübingen
Professor Fritz Eberhard, Berlin
Walter Erbs, Tübingen
Professor Theodor Eschenburg, Tübingen
Landesdirektor a.D. Ernst Fischer, Tübingen
Dr. Wolf Fritz, Tübingen
Fräulein Julia Gasti, Tübingen
Dr. Dieter Hartmann, Tübingen
Frau Etta Hartmann, Tübingen
Rudolf Hartter, Tübingen
Professor Wilhelm Hoffmann, Stuttgart
Amtsgerichtsrat Bernhard Jung, Rottenburg am Neckar
Willi Jung, Tübingen
Karl Kamer, Tübingen
Dr. Ewald Katzmann, Tübingen
Oberkirchenrat Dr. Herbert Keller, Stuttgart
Oberst Wilhelm Kohler, Tübingen
Jakob Krauß, Tübingen
Holzau Ludwig, Tübingen
Paul Markert, Tübingen
Professor Georg Melchers, Tübingen
Ministerialdirektor Dr. Alexander Meyer-König, Tübingen
Frau Elisabeth Mörlke, Tübingen
Professor Ernst Müller, Tübingen
Professor Paul Ohlmeyer, Tübingen
Landeskonserverat a.D. Dr. Adolf Rieth, Tübingen
Ministerialdirektor Dr. Dieter Roser, Stuttgart
Bundesverfassungsgerichter Professor Rupp, Tübingen
Hermann Sautter, Tübingen
Fritz Schimpf, Tübingen
Ernst Schittenhelm, Tübingen
Albert Schmid, Tübingen
Martin Schmid, Tübingen
Professor Heinz-Georg Schröder, Tübingen
Hermann Schuster, Tübingen
Dr. Hans-Georg Siebeck, Tübingen
Günther Wasmuth, Tübingen
Professor Julius Wilhelm, Tübingen
Arbeitsminister a.D. Dieter Wirsching, Reutlingen
Landrat a.D. Hermann Zahr, Durlingen (Württ.)
Dr. Rudolf Zimmerle, Reutlingen

3. Correspondence

Otto Hartels, Essen
Professor Hans Bausch, Intendant des Mitteldeutschen Rundfunks, Stuttgart
Professor René Cheval, Conseiller cultural, Embassy of France, Vienna
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