Aziz, Haris, Paterson, Michael S. and Leech, Dennis (2007) Combinatorial and computational aspects of multiple weighted voting games. Working Paper. University of Warwick, Department of Economics, Coventry.

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Abstract

Weighted voting games are ubiquitous mathematical models which are used in economics, political science, neuroscience, threshold logic, reliability theory and distributed systems. They model situations where agents with variable voting weight vote in favour of or against a decision. A coalition of agents is winning if and only if the sum of weights of the coalition exceeds or equals a specified quota. We provide a mathematical and computational characterization of multiple weighted voting games which are an extension of weighted voting games1. We analyse the structure of multiple weighted voting games and some of their combinatorial properties especially with respect to dictatorship, veto power, dummy players and Banzhaf indices. Among other results we extend the concept of amplitude to multiple weighted voting games. An illustrative Mathematica program to compute voting power properties of multiple weighted voting games is also provided.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory Q Science > QA Mathematics
Divisions:	Faculty of Science > Computer Science Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Game theory, Power (Social Sciences), Voting, Combinatorial analysis
Series Name:	Warwick economic research papers
Publisher:	University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Date:	2007
Number:	No.823
Number of Pages:	19
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
Funder:	Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC), National ICT R&D Fund (Pakistan)
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URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/1393

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