The transition to democracy: collective action and intra-elite confict
Ghosal, Sayantan and Proto, Eugenio (2007) The transition to democracy: collective action and intra-elite confict. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.807).
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This paper studies how intra-elite confict results in transition to democracy, characterized as both franchise extension to, and lowering the individual cost of collective political action for, an initially disorganized non-elite. Two risk averse elites compete for the appropriation of a unit of social surplus with initial uncertainty about their future relative bargaining power. Both elements of a democracy are necessary to ensure that the two elites credibly commit to a mutually fairer share of the surplus and we derive sufficient conditions for democracy to emerge in equilibrium. Our formal analysis accounts for stylized facts that emerge from an analysis of Indian and West European democracies.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
J Political Science > JC Political theory
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Democracy -- India, Intergroup relations, Coalitions, Economic development -- India, Collective bargaining -- India|
|Series Name:||Warwick economic research papers|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick, Department of Economics|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Official Date:||July 2007|
|Number of Pages:||37|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
 Acemoglu, D, and J. Robinson , 2000. Why did the west Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality and Growth in Historical Perspective, The Quarterly Journal of Economics CXV, 1167-1199.
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