Women’s earning power and the “double burden” of market and household work
Chen, Natalie, Conconi, Paola and Perroni, Carlo (2007) Women’s earning power and the “double burden” of market and household work. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.800).
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Bargaining theory predicts that married women who experience a relative improvement in their labor market position should experience a comparative gain within their marriage. However, if renegotiation possibilities are limited by institutional mechanisms that achieve long-term commitment, the opposite may be true, particularly if women are specialized in household activities and the labor market allows comparatively more flexibility in their labor supply responses. Evidence from the German Socio-Economic Panel indeed shows that, as long as renegotiation opportunities are limited, comparatively better wages for women exacerbate their “double burden” of market and household work.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
H Social Sciences > HQ The family. Marriage. Woman
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung. Projektgruppe "Das Sozio-ökonomische Panel", Women -- Social conditions, Labor market -- Germany, Housekeeping -- Germany, Marriage -- Economic aspects -- Germany|
|Series Name:||Warwick economic research papers|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick, Department of Economics|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Official Date:||May 2007|
|Number of Pages:||32|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
|Funder:||Economic and Social Research Council (Great Britain) (ESRC)|
Basu, K. (2004). “Gender and Say: A Model of Household Behavior with Endogenously determined Balance of Power,” Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 2054.
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