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Do functions explain? Hegel and the organizational view

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Cooper, Andrew J. (2020) Do functions explain? Hegel and the organizational view. Hegel Bulletin, 41 (3). pp. 389-406. doi:10.1017/hgl.2020.14 ISSN 2051-5367.

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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2020.14

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Abstract

In this paper I return to Hegel's dispute with Kant over the conceptual ordering of external and internal purposiveness to distinguish between two conceptions of teleology at play in the contemporary function debate. I begin by outlining the three main views in the debate (the etiological, causal role and organizational views). I argue that only the organizational view can maintain the capacity of function ascriptions both to explain the presence of a trait and to identify its contribution to a current system, for it is the only view that considers teleology as a natural cause. To establish how teleology can be considered as a natural cause, advocates of the organizational view return to Kant's analysis of internal purposiveness. However, while Kant identifies the requirements that an object must meet to satisfy the demands of teleological judgment, I suggest that he denies that we can know whether they are truly met. I argue that Hegel's philosophy of nature is better equipped to determine how internal purposiveness can be considered as a natural cause, for it grounds organization in a form of purposiveness that is more fundamental than a designer's intention.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Causation, Teleology
Journal or Publication Title: Hegel Bulletin
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISSN: 2051-5367
Official Date: December 2020
Dates:
DateEvent
December 2020Published
2 September 2020Available
21 January 2020Accepted
Volume: 41
Number: 3
Page Range: pp. 389-406
DOI: 10.1017/hgl.2020.14
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Reuse Statement (publisher, data, author rights): This article has been published in a revised form in Hegel Bulletin http://doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2020.14. This version is free to view and download for private research and study only. Not for re-distribution, re-sale or use in derivative works. © copyright holder.
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access
Copyright Holders: © The Hegel Society of Great Britain, 2020
Date of first compliant deposit: 9 September 2020
Date of first compliant Open Access: 10 September 2020

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