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Remembering and Forgetting IPE: Disciplinary History as Boundary Work

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Accepted for publication September 10th 2020.

*Review of International Political Economy [https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2020.1826341]*

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**Abstract**

A full understanding of the development and re-production of IPE is only possible with an appreciation of its disciplinary politics. This institutionalises four aspects of academic inquiry: (a) what is considered admissible work in the field, (b) how work should be conducted and where it should be published (c) where the field’s legitimate boundaries are, and (d) ‘external relations’ with cognate disciplines. Academic gatekeepers in positions of disciplinary influence shape perceptions about appropriate conduct within the field, what constitutes its core, and what lies outside its realm. Disciplinary political definitions of the field’s nature and limits are manifest in the writing of texts introducing students to IPE. Particularly important are origin stories, which are always partly about directing and coordinating scholarly activity in the present and for the future. Disciplinary history entails *forgetting* certain events, scholars and works that do not fit the prevailing chronology, marginalising or excluding some topics, debates and questions from the core of the field. We evidence our claims about the boundary work done in narrating IPE’s origins through bibliometric mapping and network analysis of IPE citation patterns and practices. We find that IPE is a narrower, more blinkered field than it typically presents itself to be.

**Key words:** Disciplinary politics, International Political Economy, Boundary work, Textbooks, Bibliometrics, Disciplinary history

**Acknowledgements**

We are most grateful for the highly engaged and constructive commentary on earlier versions of this article from the editors and three anonymous referees. We have also benefitted from extensive feedback from colleagues when we have presented earlier drafts in seminars at the Universities of Copenhagen, Manchester, Warwick and the College of William and Mary. In particular we would like to thank David Blaney, Joelle Dumouchel, Muireann O’Dwyer, Matthew Paterson, Lena Rethel, Ben Richardson, Matthew Watson and Georgina Waylen for their comments and suggestions. We would like to thank Sophie Worrall, Daniela Dominguez and Ingrid Thuesen for excellent research assistance. Many of the ideas that feed into this piece have been worked through in classes with the excellent IPE students that we have been lucky to teach at Copenhagen and Warwick over the years. Needless to say, any remaining deficiencies are of our own making.
Introduction

The origins of International Political Economy (conventionally known by the upper-case abbreviation IPE) as a field of study seems settled in the minds of most self-identified IPE scholars, namely that it is an inter-discipline founded in the 1970s when a pluralistic group of visionary scholars published their seminal works. However, this narrative about the origins of IPE is the subject of more disciplinary politics than is often appreciated. In this article, we analyse and deconstruct the origin myth and disciplinary history of IPE. Our aim is to reveal the ‘boundary work’ that such periodisations do in shaping academic conduct, marginalising some scholarship, and influencing how the contemporary field of IPE gets understood, discussed, and legitimised.

We contribute to an on-going debate about the nature and evolution of IPE (Blyth and Matthijs 2017; Seabrooke and Young 2017). Much of this debate has revolved around the ‘transatlantic divide’ (Cohen 2007, 2008; Higgott and Watson 2007; Watson 2008; Ravenhill 2008; Blyth 2009; Cox 2009; Germain 2009; Keohane 2009; Maliniak and Tierney 2009) and corollary questions about disciplinary divides, sectarianism, pluralism, intellectual monocultures, orthodoxy, homogeneity and ‘boring’ IPE (Hveem 2009; Katzenstein 2009; McNamara 2009; Weaver 2009; Aggarwal 2010; Cohen 2010; Denemark 2010; Lake 2011; Sharman and Weaver 2013). The growing interest in the nature of the field, questions of epistemological and methodological pluralism, and - not least - a greater geo-cultural sensibility among IPE scholars (Blaney and Inayatullah 2010; Hobson 2013b, 2013a; Helleiner and Rosales 2017) should be welcomed, but this is not another paper about the transatlantic divide. Quite the contrary; we argue that scholars on both sides of, and beyond, this purported divide actually have some striking points of agreement and a relatively homogenous conception of the history, and sometimes even boundaries, of the field. State-of-the-art interventions, we argue, are more revealing as objects of analysis than as unproblematically objective statements on the field. These introspections, even those celebrating pluralism and diversity, make assumptions about the boundaries of the field, its history and evolution, its ontological and epistemological foundations, and also, therefore, what ‘proper’ IPE looks like and how it should be conducted. The bridge-building
vaunted in these papers assumes diverse parts of the field of IPE are built on a common foundation. That foundation is the origin myth that we explore in this article. This particular narration of the history of the field - with its accompanying remembering and forgetting - is a large part of the common ground that different variants of IPE scholarship share. These scholars can still be far apart, but the point is that there is something that unites them despite differences in meta-theory, methodology, empirical focus, and even definition of core subject matter.

This common ground involves unspoken assumptions about what the field is, explored through the organising narratives of ‘voidism’ ‘heroism’ and ‘functionalism’ that we develop in the first part of the analysis here. Remembering the origins of the field of IPE in this way is contestable, and, we argue, entails the marginalisation and forgetting of elements of IPE. In other words, calls for pluralism and bridge-building reveal (paradoxically) the footprints of disciplinary power as they reproduce certain myths about the history of the field and forget and marginalize other parts. It is these narrations of the past, present and future of the field which form the central focus of our article. Our argument is that a full understanding of the development and re-production of IPE, or any other field of study for that matter, is only possible with an appreciation of the dynamics of this type of disciplinary politics.

After a section laying out our understanding of boundary work, the first empirical part of the paper analyses the (self-)image of IPE as presented in conventional textbook representations of the field. The claim to methodological pluralism/openness is a conventional claim - in that most IPE scholars (and textbooks) rehearse that point. This conventional representation may or may not correspond closely to the content and character of actual research within IPE, an issue we explore in the second part of the analysis. The fact that there may be daylight between the two is one of our central points and core findings. The second empirical part of the paper thus turns to how boundary work is performed in the publication and citation practice of two IPE journals that have typically taken a distinctly pluralist and inclusive editorial line. We chart the evolution of the boundaries of the
field over the last 25 years through citation analysis of articles published in New Political Economy (NPE) and Review of International Political Economy (RIPE), in the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s.

Finally, having analysed the disciplinary politics of history-writing and citation practice, the conclusion challenges and de-constructs the origin myth, and its attendant conventional wisdoms about the field. We highlight the limits of methodological pluralism and the narrowing of the field’s core concerns relative to classical political economy, resulting from the blinkers imposed by the conventional wisdom regarding IPE’s origins and evolution. We suggest that the simple appeal to bridge-building as the way to ensure pluralism in the field fails to address the more fundamental exclusions generated by IPE’s disciplinary politics.

The Disciplinary Politics of IPE: Boundary Work and Gatekeeping

We define disciplinary politics as practices of ‘boundary work’ (Gieryn 1983, 1999). Boundary work is the ‘composite set of claims, activities, and institutional structures that define and protect knowledge practices’ (Klein 1996: 1). We are interested in something more than the inevitable classification and categorisation that must, out of functional necessity, follow from any attempt to organise a field of knowledge and to make an intervention in that field. From our perspective, boundary work involves those practices and mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, recognition and misrecognition, remembering and forgetting that continually draw boundaries around what is legitimate IPE and what is not, what is ‘scientific’ or ‘modern’ IPE and what is not. We are particularly interested in how such boundary work institutionalises four aspects of academic enquiry: (a) what is considered to be acceptable work in a given field (admissibility), (b) how work should be conducted and how and where its results should be presented (conduct) (c) where the legitimate boundaries of the field might reside (borders), and (d) the nature of engagement with—or potentially ‘othering’ of—cognate fields and the ‘non-scientific’ external world (external relations) (see Clift and Rosamond 2009).
Gieryn’s original discussion (1983) sought exactly to show how the scholarly demarcation of ‘science’ from ‘non-science’ (and thus the establishment of epistemic authority – Gieryn 1999) was a sociological process involving multiple practices of boundary work (see also Lamont and Molnar 2002). The identification of valid forms of knowledge production in the social sciences has been bound up with claims about the superior quality of work that seeks to emulate natural scientific modes of inquiry (Manicas 1986; Fuller 1991). It goes without saying that the broader social scientific ecosystem (of which IPE is part and within which most of its practitioners operate) continues to be characterised by deep methodological struggles over the best means to generate rigorous and valid knowledge. Methodological struggles are clearly central to determining what a field’s object is (Jackson 2010), but this type of boundary work is already widely examined and contested in IPE.

IPE’s self-image is that of a methodologically pluralist, open and boundary-crossing inter-discipline where distinctive traditions can explore the same research object and learn from each other in the process (Hveem 2009, Seabrooke and Young 2017). This self-image makes IPE all the more interesting as case for studying boundary work. Our argument is that IPE has been characterised by a distinctive—and largely unacknowledged and unexamined—form of boundary work where the conventional understanding of the field’s admissible intellectual space is framed by a widely shared narrative of the field’s origins and subsequent development.

Critiques of the disciplinary politics involved in taken-for-granted assumptions about what the field should (not) focus on have been made most forcefully by feminist political economists. Feminists have argued that IPE’s ‘gender blind’ analysis has deeply iniquitous gendered effects. Apparent ‘equality of treatment’ silences and obscures deep-seated underlying patriarchal assumptions, norms and practices. The modern economy is so deeply encoded with masculinised conceptions that we usually fail to recognise that IPE research is in fact built on masculine norms, and results in the problematic silencing of unequal gender power relations (Steans 1999). For instance, political economy and economics have historically defined the economic in overly narrow terms of the production of goods and services for sale in the formal market. The inclusion of gender
as a central concept within IPE would involve much more than ‘adding women and stirring’, it would radically transform this understanding of the field’s basic subject matter (Bedford and Rai 2010; Elias and Roberts 2016, 2018; Griffin 2007, 2010; Peterson 2005, Steans 1999). Using gender as an optic to explore IPE immediately reconstitutes what political economy actually is. Bedford and Rai (2010) argue that feminist analysis recalibrates IPE to ask questions about the ways in which systems of production, distribution and exchange are gendered. How the ‘public’ and ‘private’ sector, or ‘productive’ and ‘unproductive’ labour are constructed as systems of meaning is not gender neutral (Peterson 2005). At stake in these delineations is whether all kinds of work crucial to social reproduction - things like the production of daily necessities, reproduction and care of the young, sick, and elderly - get included or excluded from a consideration of ‘the economy’ and (thus) political economy (True 2016: 44-5, 53-5). These aspects of social reproduction, and global economic processes located in the intimate and the everyday, are certainly not part of a standard story of IPE. Indeed, the feminist critique is that most IPE work ignores these substantive issues, concepts and themes. Our examination of IPE boundary work helps to unpick why this might be so – beyond the operation of theoretical preference or methodological prejudice. The standard history and origin myth of IPE, we argue, does not invite scholars to undertake research of this kind.

Now, it is obviously impossible to study the disciplinary politics of ‘IPE’, and its boundary work, without to some extent engaging in it. A working definition of the boundaries of ‘IPE’ is necessary in order to identify the very contestations over them. So what is ‘IPE’ as studied here? One option is to opt for a substantive definition, and one that is as broad as possible. For example, we could define ‘IPE’ is as a field that explores contestations of wealth and power within world order and sees politics and economics as intimately entwined, making it impossible to understand one without the other. In such a definition, IPE is inherently part of a broader historical tradition of political economy scholarship going back centuries and exhibits a spirit of pluralism on issues of conduct and admissibility that, along with these longer ancestries, inform a dynamism which emulates ‘pre-disciplinary’ or ‘classical’ political economy (Gamble 1995; Watson 2005, 2008; Clift and
The methodologically pluralistic animating core of this vision of IPE champions openness to different orientations. It is a field which should exercise vigilance regarding disciplinary closures and other types of exclusion, be they methodological or theoretical. This definition has the advantage that it does not privilege work conducted under the banner of ‘IPE as IR (International Relations) subfield’ as the only admissible or relevant IPE. IR furnishes IPE with some useful intellectual resources, and is one possible root towards IPE, but IR is not by any means the exclusive or necessary intellectual homeland of IPE. Such a substantive working definition of IPE may offer much in terms of clarity, but it also risks setting in stone the limits of the possible for IPE, or erecting borders of our own regarding what is admissible.

Our approach to defining ‘the field’ we investigate is therefore primarily sociological. It views the production and organisation of scholarly knowledge as a social process like any other (Camic, Gross and Lamont 2011, Shapin 1995). This sociology of knowledge position emphasises at least two important facets of social scientific disciplines and subfields. First, they are not simply scientific/objective captures of the world ‘out there’, but rather attempts to speak systematically about the world that reflect distinctive (and typically temporally and spatially variable) forms of institutionalisation, cultures of interaction and norms of scholarly practice (Adler-Nissen and Kropp 2015) which are also situated within a wider political-institutional-cultural context (Swidler and Ardidi 1994). Rather than pinning down a substantive object ‘out there’, a sociological working definition of the field would thus emphasize the institutions and practices of ‘IPE’ as performed in publications, teaching, conferencing, advisory work, activism, and so on. This speaks to how boundary work is accomplished through, for instance, the writing of textbooks, the development of journal editorial lines and policies, and day-to-day scholarly practices such as peer review and citation. Second, and following from this, the development and evolution of scholarly fields is not simply a story of academic work responding to shifts in the world it seeks to describe. It is actually better understood as a constitutive process where a mixture of internally-generated factors and

To study the boundary work around ‘IPE’ sociologically is therefore also to study the importance of gatekeeping practices. Academic gatekeepers in positions of disciplinary influence - such as leading journal editors, book series editors, reviewers, organisers of major graduate programmes, textbook authors, and members of search and hiring committee - play important roles in maintaining these boundaries around the field, clarifying what constitutes its core, defining appropriate conduct within it, and delineating what falls outside its realm. Their capacity to define propriety concerning admissibility, conduct, borders and external relations is reflective of power structures within academic disciplines (Cox 1992; Rosamond 2007; McNamara 2009; Lake 2011; Cohen 2019: 8-9; Griffiths 2016: 9-10). These gatekeepers shape the field by deciding which authors and works constitute crucial parts of the canon, what ‘counts’ as precursors to ‘modern IPE’—and what does not. They can also privilege particular histories of IPE as well as understandings of its disciplinary location (for example as an offshoot from IR). This type of boundary work is perhaps most evident when senior scholars write textbooks introducing students to IPE and telling its story, or when journal articles review the ‘state of the art’. Our analysis of boundary work therefore focuses first on how the field remembers its history - the disciplinary political implications of its origin story - and discusses the constitutive effects of the stories that are routinely told about the evolution of ‘IPE’. We explore these issues through a critical analysis of how the field’s history has been represented in textbooks. We argue that the invocation of a relatively stable ‘IPE’ rests not solely on intellectual consensus—be it on subject matter, ontology, epistemology, theory or method—but also on a particular historiography about origins that incorporates (some) intellectual pluralism as integral to the field’s identity but nonetheless delineates the field through a number of exclusions and silences.

This first part shows that the conventional story about IPE revolves around three main propositions on which there is remarkable consensus: (1) That IPE as a field of study began around 1970 as a result of international political economic turmoil; (2) That IPE started as an offshoot of
International Relations (IR) that gradually filled out an inter-disciplinary vacuum in-between International Relations and International Economics; (3) That the establishment and rapid development of the field owed much to a pluralistic group of pioneering scholars (Cohen’s ‘Magnificent Seven’: Cox, Strange, Keohane, Krasner, Kindleberger, Katzenstein and Gilpin) (2008: 8-15). This periodisation, culminating in a characterisation of ‘modern IPE’, is a way of re-enforcing a disciplined vision of the ‘proper’ field. As a matter of course, the shared historiography of these narrations of IPE’s origins smuggles in admissibility and conduct assumptions about what constitutes appropriate and relevant work in the field.

But apart from textbook narrations, boundary practices can also be found in the latent structures emerging from collective publication and citation practices—and indeed even in some of the most (self-professedly) pluralistic IPE journals. In the second part of the analysis, we are interested in how the stories IPE scholars tell to themselves and, not least, to their students about the open, pluralistic and diverse nature of the field via the origin myth in textbooks relate and compare to scholarly conduct as revealed by publication and citation practices. Charting the substantive content of the field via diachronic bibliometric network analysis, we find that even two of the more pluralist outlets for IPE research have become more disciplined, narrower and more blinkered over time—and certainly less open and diverse than the field as a whole presents itself to be.

**Remembering the History of IPE**

Control over knowledge about the field’s past is one of the primary sites of disciplinary political power. It is a crucial means through which particular intellectual moves in the present are justified and legitimised. While disciplinary history may be routine to the everyday practice of the scholarship, a sense of how we got here, where we started from, what common goals we are working towards, and where we might be going are essential to intellectual (re)production. The textbook is therefore a primary site of disciplinary politics. Textbook narration is a boundary practice that both involves remembering and forgetting and in doing so establishes conditions of admissibility. Textbooks act as
important disciplining devices and exertions of disciplinary political power. Textbooks are not accurate representations of the disciplinary past, as Thomas Kuhn (1962: 137-138) forcefully argued in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, but rather ‘begin by truncating the scientist’s sense of his discipline’s history and then proceed to supply a substitute for what they have eliminated’. Textbooks are devices that establish the boundaries of ‘normal science’, expound the body of accepted theory, and define the legitimate problems and methods. Textbook history, in other words, involves ‘selection’ and ‘distortion’ when characterizing how we got here and where we should go from here.

Disciplinary history inevitably involves selectivity. Textbooks, which often cover much more than intellectual history, are therefore inevitably selective in distilling the essence of a field’s evolution into a few prefatory pages or paragraphs. Yet the fact that selection is inevitable does not mean it is necessarily unbiased. Patterned regularities of selectivity reveal something more than just that the full history of the field is too complex to cram into a few paragraphs in a textbook. The selectivity in play reinforces boundary work delimiting the edges of the field, and what lies outside it. Our analysis identifies some clear commonalities in how selections are made.

We consulted the widest array of IPE textbooks, through multiple editions, and in so doing sought to be close to exhaustive in coverage (see appendix). For reasons of space not all are explored at length – but the characterisations discussed were prevalent and frequently occurring across a range of texts, as the citations indicate. A minority of textbooks elect not to narrate the history of IPE as a field (Oatley 2019; Cohn 2016; Lairson and Skidmore 2017) but none advances a different story to the one detailed below. We complemented the textbook analysis with recent journal articles offering overviews of the field (e.g. Blyth and Matthijs 2017; Chaudoin and Milner 2017; Cohen 2017; Seabrooke and Young 2017).

As we analyze these histories of the evolution of the field, we argue that the formative one about origins—where, when and how it all started—is always the most significant. Stories of origin found in textbooks are often sanctified and retold with the sheen of a golden age. Apart from immortalizing early contributions, stories about the genesis of a field are important because they help
establish a general chronology - an academic BCE/CE distinction. They recount the start of time, and, in IPE’s case, instantiate two important distinctions, firstly the origins of ‘modern’ and ‘scientific’ time, and secondly Cohen’s (2008) distinction between lower-case ipe as subject matter and upper-case IPE as academic field. The most striking finding from the textbook analysis is that nearly all reproduce the core narrative of the genesis of the field – especially the origin myth of 1970 – even across texts that situate themselves both as relatively more conventional or critical-heterodox, by scholars from different national academic traditions, across the ‘transatlantic divide’ and indeed any other way one might look to carve up IPE intellectually. The singularity of origins is all the more noteworthy given what Cohen underlined in his recent tour d’horizon as ‘the diversity of IPE’, where ‘variety reigns’ such that ‘words like schizoid, inchoate, or fragmented hardly seem an exaggeration given the remarkable heterogeneity of the field’ (2019: 128). Yet, variety apparently does not reign when it comes to origin stories. There is a striking consensus among scholars who approach IPE from conventional as well as critical-heterodox standpoints that ‘modern IPE’ originated in the intellectual and real-world context of the early 1970s. The narrative takes slightly different shapes in different textbooks, but can be summarised through a series of functionalist, voidist and heroist claims:

(1) Functionalism: That a number of ‘external’ and ‘real-world’ challenges to the international economic order - Breton Woods collapse, stagflation, apparent US decline, the rise of OPEC, calls for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) etc. - in a somewhat functionalist manner stimulated the sudden emergence of the scholarly field of IPE in the early 1970s.

(2) Voidism: That the field emerged as a subfield of IR that reunited the hitherto separated fields of (international) politics and (international) economics in order to fill an inter-disciplinary void—while remaining distinct from comparative political economy (CPE).

(3) Heroism: That the establishment and rapid development of the field owed much to the efforts of a first generation of visionary scholars, labelled by Cohen (2008) as the ‘Magnificent Seven’ (Cox, Strange, Keohane, Krasner, Kindleberger, Katzenstein and Gilpin).
We are interested here in moving beyond a settled description of how scholarship emerged to thinking about the mythologizing processes at work, both in the mooted genesis period and in subsequent depictions of it. Our point is neither to dismiss the outstanding work of these important scholars nor to deny the surge of interest in international political economy from the 1970s. From a nominalist viewpoint, there is little doubt that the term ‘International Political Economy’ experienced a surge post-1970 as the following Google n-gram\(^1\) illustrates:

![Graph showing the rise of 'IPE' over time.]

*Figure 1: The rise of ‘IPE’*

Rather, our point is to interrogate the ‘big bang’ mythology of the field’s genesis. The narrative about the field of IPE beginning in 1970 or thereabouts is important for our analysis and argument because of the boundary work it does. Firstly, the myth of origin asserts where ‘our field’ started. Moreover, it entrenches a number of other highly significant intellectual moves: It defines the parameters of the field, lays out IPE’s substantive concerns and enables the labelling of particular types of work as IPE (or not).

\(^1\) An n-gram is a contiguous sequence of n items in a sample of text or speech. The Google n-gram tool used here maps the occurrence of a search string using a yearly count of n-grams
Functionalism

The functionalist – and externalist – claim in the standard origin story is that the field emerged in the early 1970s in response to sudden and surprising ‘real-world’ challenges posed to international order by the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, apparent US hegemonic decline, the rise of OPEC, calls for a NIEO, and so on. To be clear, we are not arguing that a functionalist and externalist dynamic was the driver of the creation of IPE. What we are demonstrating is that the textbooks present a consistent and pervasive narrative of functionalist response. This is important in framing understandings of what IPE is and what IPE does. Once again this characterisation spans conventional, critical and heterodox texts (see e.g. Crane and Amawi 1997: 27; Frieden and Lake 1995: 3-4; Gill and Law 1988: 3, 7; Gilpin 1987: 3, 5-6; Goddard, Passé-Smith, Conklin 1996: 1-2; Ravenhill 2005: 26; Smith et al 2017: 1, 2-3; Paquin 2016: 1-2; Cohen 2019: 131; Griffiths 2016: 10, 12).

This story is ‘functionalist’ because, in its narration it posits that disciplines arise when there is a societal need for them (see e.g. McNamara 2009: 73), assuming that ‘real-world’ ipe comes before – and thus produces – ‘disciplinary IPE’. The distinction between lower-case ipe and upper-case IPE, which need not be conceived in causal-functional terms, is one of the important moves in disciplinary history and absolutely crucial to the temporal BCE/CE distinction. It enables disciplinary historians to start the intellectual history mainly when proper, disciplinary, upper-case IPE began. A key early IPE textbook by Joan Spero notes that external conditions in the 1970s were ripe (pun intended) for the development of a political economy approach (1990: v). Ravenhill’s textbook argues that ‘The field of international political economy emerged in the early 1970s in response to developments in the world economy, in international security and in the study of economics and international relations’ (2008: 24). Blyth and Matthijs also reproduce the standard 1970s as year zero origin myth, denoting external drivers in the process; ‘IPE was born in the wake of the collapse of the Bretton Woods regime of fixed exchange rates and the “stagflationary” malaise of the 1970s.’ (Blyth and Matthijs 2017: 206).
The implications of the functionalist narration of IPE are twofold. Firstly, the externalist and functionalist claim of response to the 1970s upheavals in world order informs the determination of the appropriate subject matter and substantive content of the field. The central question becomes how the twin pillars of a liberal political economic order and a rules-based international regime are created and reproduced. This - what we might term the Kindleberger problem (cf Kindleberger 2013) - is, in this reading, the key puzzle which IPE exists to solve (see e.g. Gilpin 1987: xiii; Gill and Law 1988: 7; Gamble and Payne 1996: 3; Keohane and Nye 1997; Balaam and Veseth 2001: 3; Paquin 2016: 1-2; Lairson and Skidmore 2017: 3-5; Cohn 2016: 2-3, 5, 10). Secondly, it subtly prioritises particular kinds of work in the present which more readily exhibit a capacity for real-world applicability in general, and applicability to the ‘Kindleberger problem’ in particular. These reveal the effects this boundary work does in legitimising and/or prioritising certain forms of subsequent scholarship, and marginalising others.

The functionalist story is problematic for at least two reasons. First, it assumes that scholarly fields are straightforwardly anchored in a real-world object. This neglects the constitutive world-making role that fields themselves play, in terms of creating that object and defining its boundaries. Put differently, upper case IPE is not merely a reflection of lower case ipe, but a crucial means through which what counts as lower case ipe is turned into an empirical object worthy of academic scrutiny. Second, it assumes that the 1970s was the first time a real-world international political economy crisis was serious enough to warrant academic attention. As IPE origin story, this has the function of potentially suppressing the darker sides of the field’s history, such as earlier colonial and imperial political economy (Hobson 2013a, 2013b, Tilley and Shilliam 2018). Both assumptions require rather more serious scrutiny than the simple functionalist claim allows.

**Voidism**

IPE in the 1970s, this interpretation argues, staked a claim upon terra incognita. Susan Strange, in her famous 1970 article on the ‘mutual neglect’ of international relations and international economics,
identified a ‘gap between international relations and international economics’ which constituted a
‘neglected void’ (1970: 304, see also Strange 1971: 2-3). For Frieden and Lake, IPE was ‘virtually
nonexistent before 1970 as a field of study’ (1995: 1; see also Crane and Amawi 1997: i, 27; Lake
2006: 757, 759-60; Gamble and Payne 1996: 3; Goddard Passé-Smith and Conklin 1996:102; Smith
et al 2017: 2-3; Cohen 2019: 4-6). The genesis myth\(^2\) represents IPE as a new interdisciplinarity
field created by political scientists specializing in international politics as they moved towards international
economics (Frieden and Lake 1995: 3; Gilpin 1987: 3; Cohen 2014; Strange 1988; Lairson and
Skidmore 2017: 1-2; Paquin 2016: 1-2; Cohn 2016: 2-4; Underhill 2000). The 1970 as ‘year zero’
fable foregrounds the idea of IPE as an offshoot from IR, which can be helpfully located under the
auspices of IR in a categorisation of political science and its sub-fields, but can also be defined by its
departure from some central thematic and substantive concerns of IR. Cohen links the genesis saga
to questions of disciplinary location by arguing that IPE has practically belonged as a part of IR, and
furthermore that ‘a broad-based movement to integrate market studies and political analysis is really
of recent origin’ (2008: 1; see also Griffith 2016: fig 1.2, 6-12; Cohn 2003: 11). Cohen here refers to
Lake’s (2006) comment that IPE had by the early 2000s come to maturity as a ‘true interdiscipline’
(see also Smith et al 2017: 1, 2-3; Cohen 2019: 6-7, 131, 141-2; Lairson and Skidmore 2017: 20).

One specific variant of the ‘year zero’ myth sees IPE’s evolution as tied closely to the history
of a particular journal – International Organization (IO): ‘we use the term IPE when we refer to the
subfield of work, centered in IO since 1971, that evolved from the study of international political
economy to analyze a variety of aspects of world politics’ (Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998:
645). This presumed youth and novelty of IPE in part reflects the fact that political economy as a set
of intellectual tools has only recently been assimilated into the core of IR.

Several textbooks reproduce the story about the 1970s birth of an interdiscipline filling out a
virtually ‘empty space’. A later edition of the Spero textbook noted ‘The first edition of The Politics

\(^2\) We should be clear that the use of the word ‘myth’ does not imply falsehood, but is rather used to indicate the
existence of a widely held or recurrent narrative.
of International Economic Relations, published in 1977 was written to fill a void in the study of IR – the gap between international politics and international economics. Since 1977 that gap has narrowed significantly’ (Spero 1990: v, emphasis added). A later edition proclaimed that ‘international political economy has emerged as a new and increasingly prominent field in political science’ (Spero and Hart 2003: ix). The self-image is that of a field engaged in ‘bridge-building’ (see e.g. Cohen 2007, 2008, 2016, 2019; Lake 2011), first and foremost between international economics and international politics (Lake 2006: 757, 763; Lake 2009; Keohane 2009; Spero and Hart 2003), and also amongst different kinds of IPE scholars (Frieden and Lake 2005; Underhill 2000).

Textbooks with very different intellectual ambitions can share the same origin myth about an inter-disciplinary void. For example Gill and Law’s text sets itself in opposition to more ‘managerial’ approaches to the field, going beyond ‘Robert Gilpin’s well-argued Realist approach in The Politics of International Economic Relations’ to incorporate insights from a wider range of perspectives including Gramscian historical materialism (Gill and Law 1988: xvii-xviii). Yet early in the opening chapter it reproduces the standard account of the field’s beginning: ‘the emergence of international political economy as a self-conscious field of study took place in the 1970s’, albeit doing so in a way that appreciated the importance (under-represented in many other textbooks) of acknowledging that the ‘roots of a political economy approach go back centuries’ (1988: 3). Appreciation of the influence and significance of classical political economy is a feature of a small subsection of the IPE textbooks (Cohen 2019: 3-4; Miller 2018: 1, 8-11; Griffiths 2016: 4-6; Smith et al 2017: 3, 12-3; Clift 2014, 2021; Watson 2005). Yet, incongruously, this co-exists in some instances with reaffirmations of the 1970 foundational myth (see e.g. Cohen 2019).

The inter-disciplinarity in play is ‘integrating politics and economics’ (1988: 3). Another heterodox endeavour, Murphy and Tooze’s (1991) The New International Political Economy, sees the novelty/youth of IPE as a field (1991: 4), and the relevant source disciplines in similar terms: ‘the problematique of IPE’ as a focus on questions within ‘four previously distinct academic domains: (1) international politics, (2) international economics, (3) domestic (national) politics, and (4) domestic
economics’ (Murphy and Tooze 1991: 2; see also Cohn 2016: 2-4; Lairson and Skidmore 2017: 1-2; Paquin 2016: 1-2; Underhill 2000).

Susan Strange’s *States and Markets*, first published in 1988 (2nd edition 1994) was another landmark IPE textbook from an era when only a few were available. Although she did invoke a large number of forebears, she somewhat anachronistically went on to argue that the interaction of the economic and the political has historically been neglected (see also Strange 1970, 1971: 2-3). Strange presents a version of the modern foundation myth; blaming the British as ‘mainly responsible for letting the term “political economy” fall into disuse for more than a century, until about the 1960s’. She sees a problematic bifurcation between politics and economics through much of the 20th century (despite evoking towering scholars such as Keynes along the way). Strange goes on to claim ‘only in the 1960s did the study of political economy (outside of radical left-wing circles) once again become popular and legitimate’, citing Richard Cooper’s *The Economics of Interdependence* as a ‘seminal book’ (1994: 20).

The origin myth positioning IPE as an offshoot from IR remained alive and well in the early 2000s as a new generation of textbooks hit the shelves. Ravenhill’s edited collection *Global Political Economy* has grown through successive volumes into a stalwart of IPE teaching. Ravenhill offered a cursory repetition of the origin myth; ‘Since the emergence of international political economy as a major subfield of the study of international relations in the early 1970s’ (Ravenhill 2005: 3). The first edition of O’Brien and Williams’ *Global Political Economy* (2003) began in similar fashion; ‘International Political Economy (IPE) emerged as a subject of study in Western Universities in the 1970s’, claiming that it is now a distinct subfield of IR (O’Brien and Williams 2003:1; see also Phillips 2005: 7-8; Miller 2008: 1; Shields, Bruff and Macartney 2011: 2; Broome 2014: 5, 10; Paquin 2016: 7; Cohen 2019: 7-8; Miller 2018: 18-20; Smith et al 2017: 2, 9, 13-16, 23-34; Griffith 2016: fig 1.2).

Dunn’s (2009) *Global Political Economy* also rehearses the story about studying politics and economics together. However, it also argues that IPE often imported the intellectual traditions of
conventional IR and orthodox economics (whereas Dunn aims to develop a Marxist understanding of the global political economy and introduces various critical approaches to IPE). Although IPE starts institutionalizing and becoming a discipline in its own right, there is a pervasive tendency to portray it as a discipline opposed to disciplinary distinctions between politics and economics, seen as ‘artificial and ultimately, unproductive’ (Lairson and Skidmore 3rd edition, 2003; Underhill 2000). The inter-disciplinary and eclectic character of the field is underlined in some earlier textbooks (Gilpin 1987: 8-9; Gill and Law 1988: 14-15; Hettne 1995: 13; Palan 2000: 2), and is reaffirmed in more recent offerings (O’Brien and Williams, 2010: 10, 14; Ravenhill 2008: 23; Broome 2014: 7; Smith et al 2017: 1, 2-3; Cohen 2019: 6-7, 131, 141-2; Lairson and Skidmore 2017: 3-4, 20; Miller 2018: 1).

The implications of the origin myths and the questionable intellectual moves they entrench are to reproduce a particular, and contestable, disciplinary location of ‘modern IPE’. While the cosy image of an inter-discipline conjures up a sense of pluralism and interdisciplinary tolerance, this periodisation of the field, culminating in a characterisation of ‘modern’ IPE is a way of re-enforcing a disciplinary vision of ‘proper’ IPE, for example as an offshoot of IR. As such these narrations import admissibility and conduct assumptions about what constitutes appropriate and relevant work in the field.

Stubbs and Underhill’s Political Economy and the Changing Global Order, is the first textbook to pay close heed (for the first time in its third edition) to the relationship between IPE and CPE. In the context of an increasingly integrated global political economy, ‘re-integrating what had previously been split up’ made sense where the ‘traditional distinction between the study of things international and things domestic began to break down’; thus ‘comparative and international political economy began increasingly to overlap’. CPE, analysing ‘similarities and/or differences among

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3 Interestingly, aspects of these framings evolved over subsequent editions. For O’Brien and Williams, the range of disciplines evoked to locate the field increases, by the 3rd edition in 2010 IPE is presented as working across the fields of economics, political science, political economy, IR and drawing upon geography, history, sociology, law and cultural studies (2010: 14). In the fourth edition, the 1970s origin myth is excised; ‘In its present form, the field of international political economy (IPE) or global political economy (GPE) is a relatively new undertaking at universities’ (2013:7).
national and/or regional variants of political economy’ and IPE analysing ‘the relationships among the various national/regional components of the global system’. Each dimension began ‘to approach the other within political science/international relations’ (Krätke and Underhill 2005: 29-31; see also Clift 2014, 2021). This theme of cross-fertilisation of IPE and CPE is conspicuous by its absence from nearly all other instances of story-telling of IPE’s origins and character (although see Cohen 2019: 2, 7, 11). The widespread IR+IE=IPE story ends up delineating the boundaries around ‘proper IPE’ in a way that marginalizes CPE, feminist work, non-political science work on international political economy originating in sociology, history or geography, as well as interdisciplinary areas of inquiry such as economic sociology, economic geography, or economic history.

The conventional narrative that IPE emerges to fill the interdisciplinary vacuum between international politics and international economics results in a number of exclusions. In terms of interdisciplinary relations, it affords primacy to an interaction between political science and (neo-classical) economics as central to IPE. This narrative of the field’s origins reinforces, amongst other things, a putative distinction between IPE (an offshoot from IR), and CPE (which grows out from comparative politics – a separate and distinct political science subfield). Many of the recent overviews of the field therefore largely fail to recognise CPE work as part of its universe (see e.g. Cohen 2017). Boundary work in the standard telling of the story of the field involves ‘othering’ CPE through implicit admissibility and content assumptions that place CPE work outside the field. This despite the fact that Katzenstein, a towering scholar of CPE, is recognised as one of the magnificent seven (see below) and therefore one of IPE’s biggest beasts (Cohen 2008: 8). Furthermore, CPE’s liminality as narrated in IPE’s origin and evolution story is largely at odds with citation practices within IPE research.

The boundary work done by voidism fosters a mutual neglect between CPE and IPE. The exclusionary move works in the following way: In describing some work as ‘more akin to comparative political economy than international political economy’ (2017: 661), Cohen reproduces the spurious distinction between the two, and arguably mischaracterises both fields. This false dichotomous opposition is reproduced in critiquing the Open Economy Politics view of international
politics, ‘where comparative political economy is supposed to give way to more strictly international analysis.’ (Cohen 2017: 666).

**Heroism**

The way the history of the field is routinely told places centre-stage certain scholars and scholarship. The origin in the 1970s myth naturally affords priority to works published in and since the 1970s, and organises ‘IPE time’ into pre-1970s (largely a void, except for a few classical works) and post-1970s when a number of innovative contributions shaped the field. More insidiously, it imposes on the temporal pre/post-1970s distinction a corollary epistemological distinction between scientific/modern and pre-scientific/pre-modern IPE that marshals what counts as scientific according to understandings of admissibility and conduct prevalent in the work of the ‘magnificent seven’. The standard periodisation of IPE thus foregrounds ‘modern IPE’ (see e.g. Balaam and Veseth 1996; Miller 2018: 15-8) and provides historical contextualisation of ‘where it came from’ with reference to some or all of the ‘magnificent seven’ dating back to 1970 (Cohen 2008; Phillips 2005: 7-8; O’Brien and Williams 2004: 1; Gamble and Payne 1996: 6; Cohen 2019: 4-5, 145; Griffiths 2016: 3, 10-13; Paquin 2016: 1-5, 12-17; Smith et al 2017: 2-3, 11-12).

The textbook rendition of IPE’s ‘big bang’ allows narrators to argue that ‘Since the mid-1970s, the North American academic community has made great strides in developing the field of IPE.’ (Cohn 2003: 11). Cohen, in an exemplary heroist narrative, vaunts the ‘magnificent seven’ as the most important first classics of the field (2008). Although the exact number of heroes varies in different accounts,^4^ the heroic narrative inserts a number of innovative, daring, foundational and brilliant individuals into the disciplinary void analysed above. Clearly, the whole idea of fields being driven by the work of heroes is itself deeply gendered. It takes little or no account of the social conditions under which this work was produced (‘thanks for typing’). It also fails to acknowledge

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^4^ O’Brien and Williams (2004, 1st ed.) identify ‘three major figures’ in the field – Strange, Keohane and Cox.
that the capacity to exercise voice in academia has also been driven by the gendered division of labour.\(^5\)

Nevertheless, the ‘magnificent seven’ themselves remember the beginning of the field this way. Note how Robert Keohane, who in his own words was “present at the creation” of the field in its present form’, remembers this period: ‘When Susan Strange, Joseph Nye, Peter Katzenstein, Stephen Krasner, John Ruggie, and I started to explore IPE – Susan in the 1960s, Joe and Steve and I around 1970, Peter and John a few years later – there was no field. Very little research was being done. Most economists were ignoring politics, and international relations specialists saw political economy as “low politics”, minor, boring, and incomprehensible. So our task – and opportunity – was first one of identification, then of broad interpretation’ (Keohane 2009: 35).\(^6\) Gilpin’s own highly influential textbook also offers a vignette which re-produces the origin myth, writing himself and Keohane – two of the magnificent seven – into the genesis: ‘My own interest in these themes first emerged as I prepared for a seminar at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard in June 1970. The occasion was the initial presentation of the papers that eventually became Transnational Relations in World Politics (1972), conceived and edited by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. That seminal volume transformed the American discipline of international relations and most certainly my own research agenda’ (Gilpin 1987: xi).\(^7\) The genesis myth, whose chronology starts in 1970, allows these academic gatekeepers to make certain moves. It reinforces the disciplinary location of IPE as an offshoot of IR. Furthermore, when Keohane distinguishes between ‘old IPE’ and ‘new IPE’—the first generation doing big and creative thinking and later generations doing more rigorous but more micro work (Keohane 2009: 34), he establishes temporal parameters of admissibility and conduct. This temporality, of course, largely excludes anything pre-1970s as even IPE. It does not even count as ‘old IPE’.

\(^5\) We are grateful to Georgina Waylen for sharing this insight with us.
\(^6\) Note that Keohane goes on to argue that ‘It would be misleading to give the impression that these new formulations were entirely original’ because there were also important works by Kindleberger, Waltz, Cooper, Vernon and Haas.
\(^7\) Related to the discussion of interdisciplinarity above: Gilpin’s textbook presented politics and the economy as two related but separate spheres (for a discussion see Hveem 2009), and as such presented a distinctive and perhaps rather limited account of political economy.
Some accounts do note a pre-history of IPE. Susan Strange’s textbook, although it invoked parts of the foundation myth—and paid special homage to Robert Cox and name-checked American scholars like Krasner, Keohane and Nye (1994: 20-1)— also evoked a wide array of forebears who took the economic dynamics of international politics seriously. Strange mentions in dispatches ‘Development economists: Myrdal, Seers, Gerald Helleiner, Arthur Lewis, Walt Rostow, Hans Singer, Al Hirschman, Raul Prebisch; Historical sociologists: Mann, Jonathan Hall, Chase-Dunn, Francois Perroux, Fernand Braudel. Economic historians who follow in the footsteps of Weber, Schumpeter, Polanyi, Kuznets, Cipolla. Business historians: Chandler, Dunning, Hannah; Radical historians: Wallerstein, Barrett-Brown, Mandel, Block, Brett.’ (1994: 15). Benjamin Cohen, too, acknowledges that ‘Though we date the modern study of IPE only from the 1970s, the field’s roots go much further back…[but] The pioneers of the 1970s and beyond were the first to succeed in making IPE a recognized and respected academic specialty.’ (Cohen 2008: 17). However, it is illustrative of conventional history that the work of Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill through radical ‘fringes’ such as John A. Hobson, Rosa Luxembourg, Rudolf Hilferding, Vladimir Lenin to John M. Keynes, Herbert Feis and Karl Polanyi is quickly summarised in a few compressed pages, before the remainder of his book moves on to ‘modern’ IPE and the ‘heroes’ of the early 1970s. The Ravenhill textbook retained the simple statement of the origin myth, and the posited disciplinary location of IPE (within IR) through subsequent editions, but evolved to include Matthew Watson’s chapter on ‘the historical roots of the theoretical traditions of global political economy’ placing IPE’s study within the context of the evolution from classical political economy.

Several implications flow from the heroist narrative. Historical accounts will necessarily select and emphasize certain contributions over others, but selectivity becomes problematic when it creates a teleological necessity around existing intellectual heroes (the originators had to become defining figures) while downplaying the contingency of their rise to fame and neglecting their not-so-vaunted contemporaries. By representing their interventions as a radical break in time, the ‘magnificent seven’ are often decontextualized. Yet, the classic contributions seen as foundational
texts of the field were not the interventions of genius into a vacuum, but rather into an intellectual context occupied by other, less well-remembered, academic figures and debates. Writing an academic history like the one outlined above therefore also depends on forgetting certain scholars and works that do not fit into the prevailing chronology.

The benign reading would be that we forget insignificant research but remember the most important contributions, those path-breaking works of insight and genius that spur entire research programs and stand up against numerous rigorous tests including the hardest test of all: time. Through this lens, forgetting need not cause problems for scholars who believe in the cumulative progress of science. It allows its proponents to focus on the research frontier: ‘A science that hesitates to forget its founders is lost.’ (Whitehead 1917: 115). Such a ‘progressive’ view of intellectual change overlooks disciplinary power structures. The less benign reading is that works that do not fit neatly into the dominant disciplinary chronology and narrative are not only forgotten, but suppressed. Disciplinary forgetfulness may seem innocent, but it very much enables particular intellectual moves.

The overwhelming attention to post-1970s scholarship crowds out and obscures the much longer lineage of political economy scholarship – classical political economy. Stubbs and Underhill’s *Political Economy and the Changing Global Order*, first published in 1994 is one of the relatively rare IPE textbooks to establish a clear intellectual link between IPE and classical political economy (see also Phillips 2005: 9; Watson 2005, 2008; Clift 2014, 2021; Miller 2018: 8-11; Cohen 2019: 2-5; Smith et al 2017: 3, 12-3). Plotting a course through IPE scholarship according to the maps and charts of the standard origin myth, and guided by the star of the magnificent seven, one would miss altogether much of this enriching political economy work.

Finally, the focus on a discrete band of scholars orients the focus in terms of substantive focus of work in the field – centring on, for example, US foreign policy and the role of international organisations as well as state autonomy and the adequacy (or not) of a state-centric view of world politics (see e.g. Keohane and Nye 1971: 331). Heroism foregrounds these topics and themes within
IPE. It generates focus on the place of the US (and to a much lesser degree Britain) within the post-Bretton Woods world order.

**Performing the History of IPE**

While the publication of textbooks is an important step in the consolidation of scholarly fields, textbooks are more useful for studying how the boundaries of a field are taught and told. Journals are a better indicator of how the discipline and its boundaries are actually performed in research. The establishment of journals is also a crucial practice of boundary work since they allow practitioners of a new field to control the scientific discourse. Journal editors and reviewers are crucial gatekeepers who sanction what counts as ‘proper IPE’ and gets circulated in the field. Journals have therefore already been used by a sociology of science literature to study empirically the evolution of boundary work and pluralism in IPE (Seabrooke and Young 2017; Maliniak and Tierney 2009). Our bibliometric analysis follows this line of research in using citation patterns and practices to build up an empirical picture of IPE, its evolution, boundary drawing, remembering and forgetting—in the case of two leading journals.

**Bibliometric Method**

Although bibliometrics is a fairly common method for studying the evolution of disciplines, it is itself a practice of boundary work—especially when it comes to methodological choices concerning the selection of bibliometric data, namely which journals and articles to study. Rather than trying to overcome this, the best we can aim for is to be as open and transparent as possible in our methodological choices. We have chosen to focus on the references in two self-avowedly pluralistic IPE journals, namely *Review of International Political Economy* (1994-2019) and *New Political Economy* (1996-2019)\(^8\). This strategy has strengths and weaknesses.

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\(^8\) NPE is available only 2003-2017 in the Web of Science and we (and three research assistants) have therefore coded the remaining articles manually.
First, some might criticize this choice for being too heterodox and not really covering the centre of gravity of, especially American, IPE and the more formal, quantitative and methods-driven part of the field. Indeed, some view these two journals as ‘British School’ IPE while *International Organization (IO)* and *International Studies Quarterly (ISQ)* constitute the home of ‘American School’ IPE (Maliniak and Tierney 2009: 26). These two journals are widely seen (also by themselves) as relatively pluralist, and to a degree heterodox as indicated in their foundational mission statements (Gamble et al 1996; RIPE 1994) and their current aims and scope. RIPE and NPE are thus arguably ‘hard cases’ of non-pluralism compared to journals such as *IO* or *ISQ*, which makes them all the more interesting in this context. Both journals are allegedly more open to theoretical work drawing on classical and historical texts than IO, ISQ or similar journals, so if we find diminishing pluralism and evidence of ‘forgetting’ of classics in NPE and RIPE, the state of things is unlikely to be much better in more conventional journals.

Second, we chose RIPE and NPE because they are dedicated IPE journals, which allows us to analyze all their articles and references over time. NPE and RIPE alone yield a sizeable dataset, comprising a total of 1,933 published items with 113,172 references. Other candidate journals like *IO* or *ISQ* publish a wide range of work, some of which would hardly classify as IPE and their inclusion would require manual coding of each individual article in terms of whether it counts as IPE or not. Manual selection is not only time-consuming but will also to a larger extent impute our own boundary work on the field and thus risks an idiosyncratic inclusiveness that skews the field in a particular (inter)disciplinary direction. For instance, Seabrooke and Young’s (2017) admirably inductive approach deriving the population of IPE journals from IPE syllabi results in a much wider dataset of IPE articles than ours as journals like *American Political Science Review* and *American Economic Review* are included, but nevertheless begs questions about why relevant geography, sociology, feminist, Marxist or other potential ‘boundary’ journals are excluded.

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9 To be specific, NPE’s founding editorial policy statement characterized the journal’s aim as seeking to ‘bridge both the empirical and conceptual divides’ in the field of political economy, to forge ‘a new political economy’ and ‘bring together four key literatures’, comparative political economy, the political economy of the environment, the political economy of development, and international political economy (Gamble *et al* 1996).
Third, given that our objective is to study the historical evolution of citation practices, there are clear advantages of keeping the source journals constant. In a more inclusive set of journals, specific journals may play an outsized role in some years and disappear in others. Changes over time can then be a product of the journals in/excluded. Moreover, if we included articles from a broader set of journals in the dataset alongside those in dedicated IPE journals, we would not be able to see if some types of IPE scholarship over time migrate out of the dedicated ‘IPE’ journals; if, say, Marxist, postcolonial or feminist IPE over time migrates from RIPE into multidisciplinary journals such as *Race and Class*. So by focusing on RIPE and NPE, we can at least be sure that changes over time can be attributed to actual changes in the citation practice within these two, self-avowedly pluralistic, journals.

We start by studying what classical works authors in RIPE and NPE actually reference. We are interested here in how scholars use the history of IPE, particularly regarding intellectual heroes/classics, and in comparing this to the conventional retelling the field’s history. Thereafter, we use bibliometrics to conduct a more structural mapping of how the boundaries of IPE have been drawn in these journals over time. Here we focus mainly on larger disciplinary structures, delineations, and clusters. Our journal citation networks aim to unearth the impact on scholarship of disciplinary politics as well as identifying the ‘footprints’ in IPE research of the boundary work done by the tendencies of voidism, heroism and functionalism outlined above.

*Citing Historical IPE*

As figure 2 illustrates, the majority of references in RIPE and NPE are to relatively recent works. In fact, 50% of references in all volumes 1994-2019 are to works published since 2002 and cited references in any given volume are on average 10-12 years old.
Given our focus on how scholars ‘remember’ IPE’s history through these two journals, we are interested in who are the most cited ‘classical’ authors, defined as those working and publishing pre-1960s, and, secondly, the most cited authors working in the 1960-1980 period of the so-called birth of the field and the heyday of the ‘magnificent seven’. By imposing this temporal periodization, we risk reinforcing the conventional chronology of the field, but we do so in order to compare the results with this very narrative. Note that the Web of Science only codes first-authors and the following, therefore, only records first-authors. Later editions of books have been recoded and count as a reference to the first edition (otherwise Marx would be the most cited scholar publishing in the 1960-1980 period).

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As table 1 illustrates, pre-1960s references in NPE and RIPE are concentrated on a few canonical figures – exclusively dead white men. The most cited classical authors, by far, are Karl Polanyi, Karl Marx and John Maynard Keynes. Polanyi is primarily cited for *The Great Transformation* (1944), Marx mainly for *Das Kapital*, (1867) *Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie* (written in 1857-8, published in 1939) and other works, and Keynes mainly for *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (1936), but also a range of other works. As we move further down the list, we find several forefathers (they are all men) to ‘schools’ in economics and political economy. Apart from Marx, we find other Marxist classical figures such as Antonio Gramsci (primarily *the Prison Notebooks*, 1929-1935) and Vladimir Lenin (*Imperialism*, 1917 and other works), classical liberals such as Adam Smith (primarily *The Wealth of Nations*, 1776) and John Stuart Mill (*Principles of Political Economy*, 1848 and other works), German historical school figures such as Friedrich List (*The National System of Political Economy*, 1841), Max Weber (primarily *Economy and Society*, 1922), Joseph Schumpeter (*Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, 1942 and *Theory of Economic Development*, 1911), Thorstein Veblen (mainly *Theory of the Leisure Class*. 1899 and *Theory of Business Enterprise*, 1904), John R. Commons (*Legal Foundations of Capitalism*, 1924, and *Institutional Economics*, 1934), Austrians such as Friedrich Hayek (mainly *The Road to Serfdom*. 1944 and *The Constitution of Liberty*, 1960), ordoliberalists like Walter Eucken and Wilhelm Röpke.

What is arresting is the breadth and range of political economic concerns these works explored, and the inclusion of heterodox, radical and unconventional scholarship – although works on gender, social reproduction and feminism are conspicuous by their absence. The contrast in terms of substantive concerns between this political economy and contemporary IPE indicates the shaping forces of functionalism and heroism. These have reduced emphasis on broader issues of unequal power relations, class and development, for example, which pervade this earlier scholarship. These are arguably crowded out as IPE research increasingly hones in on particular functionalist/externalist problematiques, notably the aforementioned ‘Kindleberger problem’ of sustaining and regulating the liberal international order.

As we turn to the so-called genesis period (1960-1980), we do find that some of the most cited authors are the so-called magnificent seven: Charles Kindleberger, Stephen Krasner, Susan Strange and Robert Keohane are among the five most cited for works published 1960-1980, and Katzenstein and Gilpin are among the twenty most cited. Kindleberger is highly cited for *The World in Depression* (1973) and *Manias, Panics, and Crashes* (1978). Krasner is highly cited for two works in particular, ‘State Power and the Structure of International Trade’ in *World Politics* (1976) and *Defending the National Interest* (1978). Strange, the only female scholar figuring here, is mainly cited for various journal articles and *Sterling and British Policy* (1971). Keohane is cited mainly for *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (1972) and *Power and Interdependence* (1977), both with Joseph Nye.

More surprisingly, at least compared to IPE’s conventional history of this period, we also find several ‘alternative magnificents’ such as Nicos Poulantzas (*State, Power, Socialism*, 1978, and other works), Raymond Vernon (mainly *Sovereignty at Bay*, 1971), Albert Hirschman (mainly *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*, 1970 and *The Passions and the Interests*, 1977), Immanuel Wallerstein (*The Modern
World System, 1974 and The Capitalist World-Economy, 1979), Mancur Olson (primarily cited for The Logic of Collective Action, 1965), Milton Friedman (Capitalism and Freedom, 1962), Alexander Gerschenkron (mainly cited for Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, 1962), Michel Aglietta (primarily for A Theory of Capitalist Regulation, 1979), Charles Lindblom (Politics and Markets, 1977) and various others. These alternative magnificents again display a striking breadth of concerns, disciplinary origins and array of critical approaches. This all indicates the contingency and consequences of selecting the seven magnificents as IPE’s standard history does.

Interestingly, these ‘alternative magnificents’ rank above some of the scholars in the heroic magnificents narrative, such as Katzenstein and Gilpin. This is presumably because they are actually not cited so much for work published in 1960-1980, but for later work. While Gilpin does attract some citations for work 1960-1980 (US Power and the Multinational Corporation, 1975) and Katzenstein too (Between Power and Plenty, 1978), they are both overwhelmingly cited for post-1980s work; e.g. Gilpin’s War and Change in World Politics (1981), The Political Economy of International Relations (1987) and Global Political Economy (2001) and Katzenstein’s Small States in World Markets (1985). The same goes for Strange who receives the vast majority of citations in the late 1980s onwards for Casino Capitalism (1986) States and Markets (1988), The Retreat of the State (1996) and Mad Money (1998) and Keohane for After Hegemony (1984) and other later works.

The Historical Evolution of IPE Citation

Another way to examine the boundary work at play in the remembering and forgetting of IPE is to study how these two IPE journals have historically performed the history of the field using a diachronic analysis of citation patterns, more specifically, of the most cited authors. In order to trace the historical evolution of IPE citation practice, we divide the dataset into three intervals: 1990s (345 published items with 12859 cited references), 2000s (646 published items with 32446 cited references), 2010s (942 published items with 67867 cited references). For each period, we construct a network of the 100 most cited authors (who may have been publishing in any period). They appear
as nodes and their co-citations as links in-between them. By examining how these most cited authors are cited together (or not) in a number of texts, we gain insight into the structure of the field. Co-citation analysis allows us to study what kinds of authors and journals are most highly cited in IPE but also how they are cited in relation to each other (notably whether they cluster in camps).

The nodes in our author co-citation network are thus cited authors, not citing authors. This approach differs from bibliographic coupling as studied by Seabrooke and Young’s recent paper (2017) where the unit of analysis (the nodes in the network) are the citing item (paper or book); that is, the citing texts are the nodes and the cited text, or common referents, are what tie them together, or make them more similar. In bibliographic coupling, the selection of source items is absolutely crucial as they constitute the nodes. In author co-citation analysis as conducted here, we look only at all the cited literature with RIPE and NPE, taking cited authors as nodes and their co-occurrence in bibliographies as ties/edges. So whereas Seabrooke and Young’s nodes (citing articles) are only connected if they cite the same texts, our nodes (cited authors) will only be connected if they occur multiple times in different RIPE and NPE papers. It is the reverse image; they visualize only citing texts and what makes them hang together is the cited text, we visualize only cited authors and what makes them hang together are the citing texts. This produces a different image of clusterings of intellectual activity. To Seabrooke and Young, the units or nodes will always be ‘IPE texts’ because that is their criteria for including them in the first place. When looking author co-citation analysis, as in this paper, the nodes may be cited authors from ‘other’ fields (e.g. geographers, philosophers, or sociologists) and they may be dead (Marx and Gramsci appear in several networks).

The co-citation links between any two cited authors or journals are undirected. That is, unlike normal citations, which have a direction from citing to cited author, co-citation links have no direction but are the result of two cited authors or journals often co-occurring in the bibliographies of IPE articles. This way, Marx, Gramsci and Foucault can be connected because the authors of these IPE articles co-cite them, but without them necessarily citing each other. We use the freeware program BibAuth to construct the matrix and normalize the co-citation links using the cosine as a similarity
measure (Leydesdorff 2017; see also Ahlgren et al. 2003). Given that most of these authors and journals co-occur in at least one bibliography in the dataset (their co-citation score is almost never zero), the resulting networks are very dense. It is therefore necessary to set a threshold for the strength of co-citation links. The visualization below has removed the weakest of these links to reduce network density, emphasize only strong co-citation link, and make substructures more visible. We set the threshold value (cosine > 0.2) pragmatically, so as to emphasize strong links but also avoid that too many weakly connected nodes detach from the network. At this threshold, very few nodes disconnect from the main network in any given period because they only have weak connections to its authors.

Finally, we have used a community detection algorithm to see if the authors tend to cluster into camps. Community detection algorithms aim to identify the extent to which a network is divided into locally dense but globally separated clusters (also called its modularity). We use the Louvain algorithm which is a widely used modularity maximization method that is both time-efficient and standard software (Blondel et al. 2008, 2; see also Seabrooke and Young 2017: 305). In our case, the algorithm helps identify groups of authors that are highly co-cited within their cluster but rarely co-cited authors from other clusters. This clustering may in the most benign reading provide evidence of the necessary specialisation of IPE work, indeed of a pluralistic ‘niche proliferation’ and peaceful coexistence (Seabrooke and Young 2017: 290). However, there may also be a hierarchy among these clusters, some may be more centrally located than others. Moreover, clustering itself may also provide evidence of the emergence of pathological citation network silos, and a lack of inter-cluster engagement, as some scholars have warned against (e.g. Lake 2011; Cohen 2019). Evidence for this tendency might include groups of authors that are often cited with other authors around their own camps, but rarely cited with authors from other camps. The method results in the following networks of IPE over the three time periods.

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10 There is a highly specialized debate among bibliometricians on which similarity measure is best for the normalization of co-occurrences in author co-citation analysis (Egghe and Leydesdorff 2009). We follow Loet Leydesdorff whose software we are using here.
Figure 3: Author Co-Citation Network 1990s
The co-citation networks reveal numerous trends. Here we will focus on seven: (1) the central role of the so-called ‘magnificent seven’; (2) the persistence and growth of CPE; (3) the diminishing role of Marxist and critical IPE; (4) the diminishing role of political economy classics; (5) the diminishing role of interdisciplinary engagements with for example sociology, geography and development studies; (6) the persistent exclusion of gender and feminist political economy; and finally (7) the emergence of ‘homegrown’ IPE clusters.

First, IPE retains a relatively consistent cluster (royal blue) of most cited authors associated with the heroic ‘magnificent seven’ narrative. The boundary work in citation practice corroborates that of textbooks in this respect. It is striking that six of the seven - Gilpin, Katzenstein, Keohane, Kindleberger, Krasner and Strange – are consistently located in the same cluster, as are an evolving
band of cited authors such as Cohen, Frieden, Helleiner, Kirshner, Lake, Milner, and Moravcsik. Cox is also among most cited in all networks, but is consistently located in other clusters or at the margins. However, the so-called ‘magnificent seven’ and cognate authors only constitute a part of the IPE network and it diminishes somewhat in size over time, albeit remaining in the centre of the network.

Second, there is more than one sizeable CPE cluster throughout the period. So CPE’s liminality as narrated in IPE’s origin and evolution story in textbooks is at odds with IPE research as actually conducted in these two journals. This illustrates the ‘daylight’ between the picture painted of the field in textbooks and the way it is performed in citation practice. By the 2010s, the comparative capitalism grouping (dark brown) has grown and rivals the ‘magnificent seven’ cluster in scale.

Third, in the 1990s, we find evidence of IPE’s inter-disciplinarity and pluralistic embrace of heterodox scholarship as proclaimed by the field’s self-image. There are numerous critical IPE and heterodox groupings including a separate cluster of Marxists, Gramscians and world systems theorists (red) as well as a critical (in some cases Marxist) geography and sociology cluster on globalization, cities and urban political economy, the state and territory (dark purple). Over time, however, Marxism becomes more marginal and eventually disappears as a separate cluster. At the chosen threshold for link strength, the frequency of linkages from historical materialist work to other IPE scholarship weakens markedly over time. Note, for example, how Marx eventually disconnects entirely and cited authors like Jessop and Harvey move from a central position to the outer margins. Maliniak and Tierney also identify a gradual marginalization of Marxism in IPE journals, even more arresting in IO, ISQ et al. In a disciplinary political move, they explain it as a failure to compete in rigor and explanatory power with other IPE work (2009:14-15). An alternative take is offered by Seabrooke and Young who explain the change as the Marxists’ own rejection of conventional IPE and self-imposed migration to more historical materialist-friendly journals such as Capital and Class and Globalizations (Seabrooke and Young 2017:310-311). Yet both readings discount the possibility of marginalisation through practices of gatekeeping that in turn are the product of power relations within academic fields. The structural shift we detect in the network is, we suggest, indicative of processes
of exclusion linked to disciplinary politics and boundary work. Indeed, Marxism is only illustrative of a broader reduction in variety in contemporary IPE. Bodies of scholarship get forgotten. Although this trend is more obviously visible in IO, ISQ and similar (Maliniak and Tierney 2009:15), it is notable (and perhaps more striking) in the self-identified pluralist journals studied here.

Fourth, the narrowing of IPE resulting, we argue, from the disciplinary power of the 1970 foundation myth and the magnificent seven narrative, proceeds further through the forgetting of many political economy classics. The 1990s diagram shows a cluster of political economy classics such as Marx, Hayek, Galbraith, Olson, Schumpeter, Röpke and many others (orange cluster). While some classics such as Polanyi and Marx remain into the 2010s, the majority disappear as the cluster disintegrates.

Fifth, the advancing disciplinary insularity of IPE is indicated by the geography, sociology and globalization cluster (purple) – along with the Marxist cluster (red) – gradually disappearing over time. Data on which journals, rather than authors, get cited (not presented here for reasons of space) also reveals a paring down of IPE’s inter-disciplinarity. In the 2000s, an economic geography community still exists, as does a development cluster, and a somewhat heterodox economics node – but the breadth and variety are significantly reduced. By the 2010s, the inter-disciplinary range and diversity are eroded still further and instead new more ‘pedigreed IPE’ clusters appear.

Sixth, in the most egregious example of exclusion and boundary work, gender scholarship is conspicuous by its absence from the networks throughout. In this respect, the boundary work in journal citation practice correspond with that of textbook historiography. There is one isolated outpost of feminist economists – Nancy Folbre and Diane Elson in the 1990s. Thereafter, it is as if feminist political economy did not exist. There is important feminist work published in both NPE (see e.g. Waylen 1998; Steans 1999; Peterson 2005) and RIPE (e.g. Griffin 2007; Steans and Tepe 2010; Hozic and True 2017) but this does not show up in the networks.

Seventh, the emergence of pedigreed IPE: The voidist narrative identified in part one claims the field camped out on uncharted territory. As the field develops to fill the mooted void, IPE
scholarship increasingly becomes self-referential; citing itself and in the process burning some of the inter-disciplinary bridges with other cognate fields, as well as with the classics of political economy. IPE’s professionalization sees the emergence of citation silos. This process is parallel to the marginalization of varieties of more radical scholarship. What emerges instead are clusters comprising, broadly, constructivist IPE (light blue) and a group bringing together varieties historical institutionalist and liberal IPE authors (light purple). These are distinct from, but closely related to, the ‘magnificent’ core (royal blue), which is still present but now surrounded by these new ‘pluralist’ (with a small ‘p’) IPE clusters evolving around it. Some might read this trend as an indication of the healthy maturation of the field. IPE has come of age. But it also indicates the wider trend of ‘IPE becoming more IPE’, that is, reproducing a more bounded vision of what constitutes IPE by citing mainly itself. Put differently, IPE’s pluralism morphs to operate on a smaller scale, as a more insular and parochial pluralism whose diversity comes from within sets of IPE debates – no longer spanning the array of political economy concerns and traditions indicated in table 1 above. IPE is, it seems, not as open and pluralistic as it likes to present itself.

**Discussion and Conclusion: Forgetting the History of IPE**

Boundary work is probably an unavoidable feature of scholarly practice. Any intellectual move, whether in academic writing or pedagogy, involves the invocation of ‘the literature’ together with some claims about the scope of inquiry, the trajectory of research and the ‘gaps’ in the field. However, boundary work can be undertaken with greater or lesser degrees of pluralism and reflexivity. Our strong suggestion is that all scholarly fields should be reflective about how and why they are constituted, how particular narratives of the origins, evolution and the state of the art contribute to that constitution. Scholars should be mindful that the prevailing mythos of a field, once instantiated in routine academic practice, has the potential to be exclusionary. IPE is an interesting case because – at least in key parts of the field – it projects a strong self-image of being both pluralistic and interdisciplinary. The exercise undertaken here is perhaps best conceived as a cautionary note. Fields
that boast of their pluralism may be less pluralistic in practice than suggested by the prevailing narrative. Moreover, there is a risk that complacent self-assurance about a field’s pluralistic character excuses practitioners from undertaking the necessary reflective work to ensure that the field is not systematically exclusionary.

If IPE is understood in terms of a scholarly reflex to real world developments circa 1970 that initiated a new way of capturing those events analytically, which furthermore can be attributed to the pioneering work of a cluster of key academic innovators, then – regardless of methodological differences – significant boundary work has already been performed. That core understanding situates IPE in both a temporal and a disciplinary context, asserting that IPE is an offshoot of IR, a characterisation many practicing IPE scholars would not accept. It shapes what should be considered as appropriate intellectual antecedents to modern IPE and clarifies, going forward, what is best thought of as ‘the literature’ pertinent to the field. We are suggesting that this way of remembering IPE also involves significant acts of forgetting. The way the history of ‘the field’ is narrated in textbooks and performed in journals constitutes ‘boundary work’. Far from remembering and citing the most important IPE ‘as it really was’, these narratives change over time, thus illustrating not only their historical contingency but also the politics of disciplinary history. By plotting a course through IPE scholarship according to the standard origin myth of a post-Bretton Woods fusion of international politics and international economics under the supervision of a group of seven magnificent scholars, one misses a universe of other enriching political economy work.

To conclude, we have pointed to three types of marginalisation or exclusion at play in narrating IPE’s evolution, and we offer illustrative examples of each. First there are cognate fields that exist in a parallel track, but which are separated from conventional understandings of IPE. The subfield of CPE is perhaps the most obvious instance. Second, there are substantive areas of concern such as gender, which appear to have been largely written out of the story of IPE – not least because a good deal of the relevant work is not recognised as ‘admissible’. Finally, there is antecedent work that the combination of functionalism, voidism and heroism has excluded from the gaze of IPE.
On the first of these points, boundary work in telling IPE’s standard story involves ‘othering’ CPE through implicit admissibility and content assumptions that place CPE work outside the field. Work that does not follow or adopt the ‘IPE as offshoot from IR’ conception of the field, and work at the CPE/IPE interface tends not to, is more likely to fall foul of this sub-disciplinary othering. There are constitutive effects of the origin story here, even if CPE remains a consistent presence within the citation network. After all, the citation networks are not the only ‘reality’ against which we can judge the impact of remembering/forgetting IPE. Other spheres of impact include student reading lists, hiring and editorial decisions, conference paper and panel acceptances and so forth. In each instance, the scholarly ‘othering’ of CPE takes scour from IPE’s origin myth and standard evolution narrative, and the boundary work it entails. CPE becomes marginalized–occupying a somewhat liminal space. A more inclusive approach to the field sees dialogue and cross-fertilisation between IPE and CPE as integral to good academic conduct in each field (see e.g. Clift 2014, 2021; Ravenhill 2008; Krätke and Underhill 2005), advancing as it can a more holistic understanding of political economy.

This shows how narrating the field’s origins and evolution can serve as a way of reproducing and prioritising a particular view of the boundaries of the field – i.e. resting upon contestable assumptions about admissibility and conduct. A second, more structural, example of exclusion is provided by gender in IPE analysis, which is simply absent from the field’s standard origins and evolution story. Focusing on social reproduction, and the arbitrary inequalities that are instantiated by social constructions of femininity and masculinity offers a very different perspective for understanding world order than that derived from the voidist, heroist, or functionalist predispositions of IPE. It is not one contained within or readily reconciled to the standard history of the field and its subject matter. Feminist political economy is absent from the citation networks. In this case, the narration of the field has constitutive effects on its content. This boundary work is also conducted on similar terrain to the CPE example above - through journal editorial policies, academic peer review,
advice to students about doctoral thesis topics, decisions about what panels and papers get accepted to major conferences, and what work finds its way onto module reading lists.

Recognition of a gendered approach does not disqualify IPE scholars from pursuing the Kindleberger problem, but adds a series of profound questions about the character of and power relations within supposed liberal modes of international order. In some ways the study of gender resembles the previous case of CPE; in other ways it does not. While feminist scholars now have some space within the academy, albeit variable and contingent, not all feminist analysis does - and particularly absent is that written before women scholars had anything approaching ready access to universities and academic publishing opportunities. As some recent historians of IR have shown, the readiness to consider non-academic genre work as potentially important allows us to retrospectively admit women authors and feminist/gender-sensitive concerns into the canon (Ashworth 2011; Hansen 2011; Owens 2018). The upshot is not merely an act of intellectual archaeology. It also shines a light on how the story of the discipline/field of IR has been narrated to exclude particular themes and types of contribution, which in turn raises important questions about scholarly practice and pedagogy in the present (Colgan 2017).

Finally, at the level of scholars and scholarship, we argued that the very idea of the ‘magnificent seven’ (i.e. a core group of foundational scholars), allied to 1970 as year zero, has important effects on the ways the field reproduces itself (for example through citation practices) (see Lake 2011). A magnificent seven-inspired rendering of the field contributes to a particular understanding of admissibility (what is valid IPE and what is not IPE?) and conduct (how should IPE be done? What is ‘rigorous’ IPE?). Some of this classical work, particularly Keynes, Polanyi and Marx, remains cited in the two IPE journals studied, but other works and scholars are marginalized in both the historical narrative and citation practices. Candidates for ‘forgotten’ classical IPE scholars include Eli Heckscher (Mercantilism, 1936), Nikolai Kondratiev, John A. Hobson (Imperialism, 1902), Rudolf Hilferding (Finance Capital, 1910), Rosa Luxembourg (The Accumulation of Capital, 1913), Karl Kautsky (The Agrarian Question, 1899), Gustave Schmoller (The Mercantile System and
Its Historical Significance (1895) who are all cited less than 10 times in the dataset. Alternatives to the ‘magnificent’ scholars working 1960-1980 could include Nicos Poulantzas, Raymond Vernon, Immanuel Wallerstein, Mancur Olson, Albert Hirschman, Alexander Gerschenkron, Michel Aglietta, Andre Gunther Frank and even Benjamin Cohen himself. Among the more forgotten alternative ‘magnificent’ scholars working in that period, candidates are Fred Block, John K. Galbraith, Folker Frobel, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Theda Skocpol, Robert Mundell, Friedrich Hayek, Andrew Shonfield, Anne Krueger, Peter Evans, George Stigler, Walt Rostow, Stephen Hymer, Ernst Haas, Bela Balassa, Alfred Chandler, and many more who are cited around or less than 20 times in the dataset. These are but illustrative examples of a forgotten wider canon of classics, marginalised by the exclusionary conventional heroic origin and evolution narrative detailed in this article, to which contemporary IPE scholarship could appeal for inspiration. Although our main concern here has been how much of this antecedent work may enrich the field, it is important to note that the 1970s myth also serves to suppress a ‘darker’ history of, say, colonial and imperialist political economy. A forgetting on which there is much further work to be done.

Our bibliometric analysis reveals that IPE has perennially excluded gender and feminism. Furthermore, contemporary IPE, in contrast to the 1990s, exhibits a particular kind of professionalised diversity which is pluralistic with a very small p, and operates more or less exclusively within the fence of professionalized IPE. Its gaze does not really extend beyond those boundaries very much. Those boundaries, as we have shown, have narrowed considerably in the last three decades, delivering a more parochial diversity. There is still diversity in contemporary IPE, yet at the same time, as we have demonstrated, over time there has also been the progressive exclusion of Marxism, the political economy forebears of IPE, and of other disciplines such as geography. Even this brief discussion of boundary work implies that a truly pluralist field needs to do more than simply ‘un-forget’ those contributions that have been willfully or otherwise excluded from the field. Pluralism, if it to mean anything, must involve more than adding the forgotten element to the existing canon through the additional chapter in the textbook or the extra week on the syllabus. It must incorporate serious
reflective thought about the implications of boundary work for the substance of the field itself. Therefore, a truly pluralistic and reflective IPE must find ways to ‘re-remember’ that which its boundary work has excluded.

**References**


