Ireland, Norman J. and Waterson, Michael (2006) Cartels and search. Working Paper. Coventey: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.770).

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Abstract

This paper unifies two significant but somewhat contradictory ideas. First, search costs potentially influence market price equilibria significantly; in many equilibria consumers do not search despite above-competitive prices. Second, cartels must guard against individual members offering lower prices, thereby creating incentives for consumers to search. We develop a simple framework, and then an example, in which whether search takes place depends upon the magnitude of search costs. Three potential equilibria result, dependent upon model parameters. These include a tacit cartel agreement exhibiting price variance and volatility. A policy conclusion is that such market characteristics do not always guarantee non-cartelisation.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HF Commerce H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Searching behavior, Cartels, Commodity control, Competition, Industrial concentration
Series Name:	Warwick economic research papers
Publisher:	University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Place of Publication:	Coventey
Official Date:	October 2006
Dates:	Date Event October 2006 Published
Number:	No.770
Number of Pages:	36
Institution:	University of Warwick
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access (Creative Commons)

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