Enfranchisement, intra-elite conflict and bargaining
Ghosal, Sayantan and Proto, Eugenio (2006) Enfranchisement, intra-elite conflict and bargaining. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.750).
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Does power sharing between competing elites result in franchise extension to non-elites? In this paper, we argue that competing, risk-averse elites will enfranchise non-elites as insurance against future, uncertain imbalances in relative bargaining power. We show that negligibly small changes in the bargaining power of non-elites, conditional on enfranchisment, via coalition formation, constrains the bargaining power of the stronger elite and result in discontinuous changes in equilibrium surplus division. Our results are robust to public good provision following enfranchisement when there is reference heterogeneity over the location of the public good across the different elites. We conclude with a comparative analysis of Indian democracy and show that our model is able to account for some of the distinctive features of Indian democracy.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||J Political Science > JC Political theory|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Suffrage, Politics, Practical, Collective bargaining, Democracy -- India, India -- Politics and government|
|Series Name:||Warwick economic research papers|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick, Department of Economics|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Official Date:||June 2006|
|Number of Pages:||25|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
 Acemoglu, D, S. Johnson and J. Robinson , 2000. Why did the west Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality and Growth in Historical Perspective, The Quarterly Journal of Economics CXV, 1167-1199.
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