Ghosal, Sayantan and Proto, Eugenio (2006) Enfranchisement, intra-elite conflict and bargaining. Working Paper. University of Warwick, Department of Economics, Coventry.

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Abstract

Does power sharing between competing elites result in franchise extension to non-elites? In this paper, we argue that competing, risk-averse elites will enfranchise non-elites as insurance against future, uncertain imbalances in relative bargaining power. We show that negligibly small changes in the bargaining power of non-elites, conditional on enfranchisment, via coalition formation, constrains the bargaining power of the stronger elite and result in discontinuous changes in equilibrium surplus division. Our results are robust to public good provision following enfranchisement when there is reference heterogeneity over the location of the public good across the different elites. We conclude with a comparative analysis of Indian democracy and show that our model is able to account for some of the distinctive features of Indian democracy.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	J Political Science > JC Political theory
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Suffrage, Politics, Practical, Collective bargaining, Democracy -- India, India -- Politics and government
Series Name:	Warwick economic research papers
Publisher:	University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Date:	June 2006
Number:	No.750
Number of Pages:	25
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
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URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/1445

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