The EU inter-regional influence in comparison: the case of the institutionalization of ASEAN disaster management

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The EU inter-regional influence in comparison: the case of the institutionalization of ASEAN disaster management

Giulia Tercovich
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Abstract

The overall aim of this research is to provide a contribution to the current debates on EU actorness, in particular to its inter-regional dimension, by exploring the effectiveness of the EU in influencing regionalisation processes. As the process of regionalisation is the result of the interaction of different endogenous and exogenous drivers (Murray and Brennan 2015), this thesis focuses on the role of actors and goes beyond the conceptualization of the EU as a sui generis actor, by adding other relevant actors into the analysis, namely Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the US. It does so by applying an original analytical framework based on four analytical categories: the leader, the reference, the sponsor and the implementer and by exploring the role played by the EU within these four categories in comparison to other actors involved. By using a process-tracing methodology (Beach and Pedersen 2013) this research looks at the process of institutionalization of ASEAN regional disaster management. The empirical analysis of the institutionalization of ASEAN regional disaster management is divided into three parts: the first part is dedicated to the adoption in 2004 of the ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management (ARPDM); the second part focused on the signature in 2005 of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER); and the third part is devoted to the operationalization of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (the AHA Centre). Despite the increasing emphasis within and outside the EU on the strategic importance of regional integration and inter-regionalism, this research shows how just sharing the label ‘regional organization’ and recognizing each other as a valuable partner
is not enough to effectively collaborate together. Even more, this research advanced doubts on the effective role of the EU as ‘point of reference’ for other regional organization, demonstrating how – at least in the disaster management case - the initial reference role played by the EU was lost during the process. This research, while contributing to the theoretical debate on EU actoriness, also has strong policy implications. First, it provides an updated overview of the disaster response policies implemented by the EU and ASEAN, thus contributing to the knowledge of both systems in responding to crisis. Second, the debate on the role of the EU outside its borders is on-going. The EU Global Strategy (2016) reinforced the importance of interregional organizations in EU external policies, yet too often the interregional bond is taken for granted and its concrete added value is lost in vague declarations.
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<tr>
<td>AADCP</td>
<td>ASEAN-Australia Development Cooperation Programme</td>
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<td>AADMER</td>
<td>ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Emergency Response</td>
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<td>AAECPP</td>
<td>ASEAN-Australia Economic Cooperation Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACMDC</td>
<td>ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management</td>
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<td>ACE</td>
<td>AHA Centre Executive Programme</td>
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<td>ADPC</td>
<td>ASEAN Disaster Preparedness Centre</td>
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<td>AEEMP</td>
<td>ASEAN-EU Emergency Management Programme</td>
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<td>AEGDM</td>
<td>ASEAN Expert Group on Disaster Management</td>
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<td>AEMM</td>
<td>ASEAN-EU Foreign Ministers Meeting</td>
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<td>AFTA</td>
<td>ASEAN Free Trade Area</td>
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<td>AHA</td>
<td>ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIFDR</td>
<td>Australia-Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction</td>
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<td>ANZUS</td>
<td>Australia-New Zealand-US Security Treaty</td>
</tr>
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<td>ARDEX</td>
<td>ASEAN Emergency Response Simulation Exercise</td>
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<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
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<td>ARPDM</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South East Asian Nations</td>
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<td>ASEM</td>
<td>ASEAN Europe Meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>BNPB</td>
<td>Indonesian National Disaster Management Authority</td>
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<td>CCA</td>
<td>EU Council Crisis and Coordination Arrangements</td>
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<td>CCPM</td>
<td>European Community Civil Protection Mechanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDEMA</td>
<td>Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>CECIS</td>
<td>Common Emergency Communication and Information System</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cecis</td>
<td>EU Common Emergency Communication and Information System</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMPD</td>
<td>EEAS Crisis Management and Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COSD</td>
<td>ASEAN Committee on Social Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPCC</td>
<td>EEAS Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR&amp;OC</td>
<td>EU Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>EU Common Security and Defence Department</td>
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<td>DELSA</td>
<td>ASEAN Disaster Emergency Logistic System</td>
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<td>DEVCO</td>
<td>EU Development and Cooperation DG</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIPECHO</td>
<td>ECHO Disaster and Preparedness Programme</td>
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<td>DMRS</td>
<td>ASEAN Disaster Monitoring and Response System</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAS</td>
<td>East Asia Summit</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>EU Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DG or Department)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>EFAS</td>
<td>EU Flood Alert System</td>
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<td>EFFIS</td>
<td>European Forrest Fire Information System</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMA</td>
<td>Emergency Management Australia Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERAT</td>
<td>ASEAN Emergency Rapid Response and Assessment Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERAT</td>
<td>ASEAN Emergency and Response Teams</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU ERCC</td>
<td>EU Emergency Response Coordination Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU HR</td>
<td>EU High Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>FEMA</td>
<td>US Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>HFA</td>
<td>Hyogo Framework for Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>HTTF</td>
<td>ASEAN Environment-Haze Technical Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>IcPS</td>
<td>Instrument contributing to Peace and Stability</td>
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<td>IDNDR</td>
<td>International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction</td>
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<tr>
<td>JAIF</td>
<td>Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>JICA</td>
<td>Japan International Cooperation Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIC</td>
<td>EU Monitoring and Information Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDMOs</td>
<td>National Disaster Management Offices</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Coordinating Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCIPEP</td>
<td>Canada's Office of Critical Infrastructures Preparedness and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCIPEP</td>
<td>Emergency Preparedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHDACA</td>
<td>US Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDC</td>
<td>US Pacific Disaster Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>READI</td>
<td>EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEATO</td>
<td>Southeast Asia Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOPs</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDAC</td>
<td>UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination Teams</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHRD</td>
<td>UN Humanitarian Response Depot</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNISDR</td>
<td>UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
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<tr>
<td>USTATF</td>
<td>ASEAN-US Technical Assistance and Training Facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>WebEOC</td>
<td>Web-based Emergency Operation Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>UN World Food Programme</td>
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“The development of the AHA Centre is a mix of taking the best practice, experience, and at the same time, fitting it to our culture here in ASEAN. It’s still evolving, and that’s the beauty of the ASEAN Way. Everybody, every Member State, every stakeholder in the Member States has a viewpoint, and we consider their viewpoints very carefully before we embark on what we are going to do. It has its limitations, and it tends to go slower. But it works — slowly, but surely.”

Colonel Kadir Maideen, Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF)  
(AHA Centre 2016e, 58)

INTRODUCTION

The overall aim of this research is to provide a contribution to the current debates on EU actorness, in particular to its inter-regional dimension. More specifically, the thesis explores the effectiveness of the EU in influencing regionalisation processes by examining the process of institutionalization of ASEAN regional disaster management. As the process of regionalisation is the result of the interaction of different endogenous and exogenous drivers (Murray and Brennan 2015), this thesis focuses on the role of actors and goes beyond the conceptualization of the EU as a sui generis actor, by adding other relevant actors into the analysis, namely Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the US. It does so by applying an original analytical framework based on four analytical categories: the leader, the reference, the sponsor and the implementer and by exploring the role played by the EU within these four categories in comparison to other actors involved and by using a process-tracing methodology (Beach and
Pedersen 2013). Despite the increasing emphasis of scholars and practitioners within and outside the EU on the strategic importance of regional integration and inter-regionalism, this research shows how just sharing the label ‘regional organization’ and recognizing each other as a valuable partner is not enough to effectively collaborate together. Even more, this research argues that the EU constitutes a ‘point of reference’ for other regional organizations, demonstrating how – at least in the disaster management case - the initial reference role played by the EU was lost during the process. This research, while contributing to the theoretical debate on EU actorness, also has strong policy implications. First, it provides an updated overview of the disaster response policies implemented by the EU and ASEAN, thus contributing to the knowledge of both systems in responding to crisis. Second, the debate on the role of the EU outside its borders is ongoing. The EU Global Strategy (2016) reinforced the importance of interregional organizations in EU external policies, yet too often the interregional bond is taken for granted and its concrete added value lost in vague declarations.

The puzzle

Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission during her first hearing at the European Parliament in November 2014 stated, ‘I think we will need to work together with other regional organisations […] . We have common work, just as we have a common agenda’. During the last decade there has undeniably been a growing emphasis within and outside the EU on the strategic importance of regional integration and inter-regionalism, not only as
region-to-region relations, but also as institutionalised multidimensional cooperation between at least one regional grouping and either a regional grouping or a large country belonging to a different region (Telò, Fawcett, and Ponjaert 2015). This is sometimes understood as a process of regional emulation, in which existing regionalisation processes trigger the formation of new ones, with potentially positive or negative consequences (Hettne 2002; Rüland 2001). Others understand inter-regionalism as a means of managing relations in a globalising world; in particular in terms of a division of labour where regional actors take on increasingly important roles (Fawcett 2004). According to this understanding regions can be seen as a forum for building trust that is not possible on a global scale. For this reason, regions can often be more effective in establishing common policies (Telò 2007; Haver and Foley 2011). Scholars have developed multiple analyses of processes of regionalisation: by looking at the region-specific factors (Mattli 1998; Rosamond 2000; Söderbaum and Shaw 2003; Wiener and Diez 2009; Laursen 2003), or as reaction to global challenges (Fawcett and Hurrell 1995; Gamble and Payne 1996; Hettne 2002, 2007). Scholars looked at the EU as model for other regions, as well as a sui generis actor that cannot be replicated elsewhere. The post-revisionist approach to regionalisation on which this thesis builds (Telò, Fawcett, and Ponjaert 2015) asks for a synthesis between these two approaches. It still considers the EU as an important point of reference for other regions, but without ignoring the reality of the multipolar world. Today the observation from Söderbaum and Langenhove about the ‘pressing need to learn more about the ‘Why’ and ‘Hows’ of Interregionalism in the EU’s foreign policy’ (Söderbaum and Van Langenhove 2005, 3) is still valid.
This research contributes to the literature that defines inter-regionalism as the institutionalised multidimensional cooperation between at least one regional grouping and either a regional grouping or a large country belonging to a different region (Telò, Fawcett, and Ponjaert 2015, 2). This definition is in line with the most recent understandings of inter-regionalism (Baert, Scaramagli & Söderbaum 2014) that it is not anymore limited to ‘pure’ forms of interactions between institutionalised regional organisations, but it includes also forms of hybrid inter-regionalism between one regional organisation and one regional group or between two regional groups (Hänggi 2006), forms of transregionalism where the interregional relations is even more dispersed (Aggarwal and Fogarty 2004) and forms of quasi inter-regionalism between one regional organisation and a single third state (Hänggi 2006). The use of inter-regionalism for this third category, might be perceived as a borderline form of inter-regionalism, yet it is relevant and useful to describe a relation that cannot be labelled as bilateral as it involves at least one regional organisation and it is not limited to two nation-states (see the work done by Fioramonti and Kotsopoulos 2015 on the relations between the EU and South-Africa). Based on these considerations the relation between ASEAN and its strategic partners enters more the definition of (borderline) inter-regionalism, than bilateralism.

The aim of the thesis is to contribute to the debates on the inter-regional dimension of actorness, where ‘actorness’ is defined as the effective capacity of an actor in influencing regionalisation processes. This study provides an empirical application of the post-revisionist approach by looking at the EU as a
proponent of the management of disasters at regional level, but without excluding from the analysis local and external actors who played a role in the process. By doing so, it proposes an original framework that goes beyond the idea of the EU as a sui generis actor and adds a comparative dimension to the analysis of the EU’s influence on these regional processes.

The EU’s influence towards other regions has been mainly studied by looking at direct influence in the terms proposed by the policy transfer literature (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Dolowitz and Marsh 1996), as well as in terms of indirect influence as proposed by the diffusion literature (Börzel and Risse 2009, 2012b). While looking at the potential influence that the EU had on the institutionalization of ASEAN disaster response this research will dialogue with both these two literatures, contributing to their advancement by proposing a way to empirically analyse the influence of the EU in relation to the other actors involved. Furthermore, the study will integrate the role played by local actors. This element is often forgotten in the analysis of regionalization processes that looks at the EU as a potential model (Acharya 2004, 2009).

Overall, this research not only provides a research framework to study the influence of the EU towards a policy implemented by another regional organisation, but it does so by looking into a less explored policy field such as disaster management. While substantial research has been carried out on the EU’s Interregional relations in the field of trade and economics, there is currently a gap –filled by this study - in addressing disaster response policy at regional level.
The puzzling case: the institutionalization of ASEAN disaster management

The thesis focuses in particular on the institutionalization of ASEAN regional management of disasters. The EU and ASEAN are among the most advanced region-building projects and the EU-ASEAN inter-regional relationship is considered an example of pure Interregionalism (Hettne 2014). They both recognise stability and prosperity as goals of their regional projects. Yet, both regions are heavily affected by natural and man-made crises that might represent serious hazards. Therefore, crisis management represents a priority for both EU and ASEAN.

In July 2005, with the signature of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER), the ten members of ASEAN created their own regional disaster management mechanism. In November 2011 the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA) was officially launched and between 2011 and 2016 developed a full regional disaster response mechanism. As the crisis management domain has been traditionally an exclusive competence of nation states, the ASEAN regional institutionalization of disaster management was an unexpected development for scholars studying this region (Pennisi di Floristella 2015). Even more puzzling were the two different explanations of this process given by scholars focusing on the relationship between the EU and ASEAN.
On one hand, diffusion scholars explained the ASEAN development in disaster response as a selective borrowing from the EU, reinforcing the idea that the EU represents a point of reference not only for its neighbours but also towards the far abroad, de facto influencing the policy implemented by another region (Börzel and Risse 2012b; Pennisi di Floristella 2015). In fact, the institutionalization of ASEAN disaster management followed the EU implementation of its own disaster regional mechanism. In 2001 the Community Civil Protection Mechanism (CCPM) was officially established. The aim of the mechanism was to facilitate and reinforce the cooperation on civil protection assistance among EU member states. Two years after the EU created the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC), a coordination hub at the centre of the EU regional coordination of disasters. This explanation of the ASEAN institutionalization as a consequence of the EU advancement in the same domain is often replicated in EU officials’ narrative (European Commission Official 2015, European Commission Official 2017a, European Commission Official 2017b, EEAS Official 2015).

On the other hand, differently from the diffusion scholarship, scholars who see ASEAN as an anti-EU model would argue that these developments are similar just because they are responding to parallel problems (Yeo 2009). Although acknowledging the importance of both literatures in explaining regional phenomenon, this research aims at going beyond these literatures, adopting a deductive approach to the empirical analysis and assessing the direct and indirect influence of the EU in comparison with the other internal (ASEAN members) and external (non-ASEAN members) actors involved in the process of
institutionalization. These two alternative explanations of the evolution of disaster management within ASEAN are puzzling. Therefore, the aim of this research is to further shed lights on this unexpected ASEAN institutional development.

**The research question**

Overall, the aim of this research is to analyse the relative role of the EU in influencing the policies of other regional organizations, and in particular the institutionalization of the ASEAN regional response to disasters. In order to do so the mechanism that explains this process needs to be unpacked.

The central research questions of this project are: *Who are the main actors in the process that have influenced the institutionalization of the ASEAN disaster response mechanism? Does the EU directly or indirectly influence this process?*

By opening the black box of the processes that lead to the institutionalization of ASEAN disaster response policy, the thesis focuses on exploring the role of the EU in directly and indirectly influencing another regional organization but taking into account the other potential internal and external actors’ that contributed to this outcome.

Influence is one of those catch-all, vague concepts that can be used and applied in all sorts of contexts. Influence is often analysed by looking at the effectiveness, impact and/or performance of the actor(s) involved (Costa and Jørgensen 2012a). In this problem-driven and empirically-oriented research
(Costa 2017; Jupille and Caporaso 1998) influence is defined as the adoption of a similar policy.

The EU capacity to spread institutions and policies across different contexts has been extensively analysed and discussed by EU studies scholars with a focus on the causal mechanisms (legal imposition, positive and negative incentives, and socialisation by persuasion and learning) through which the EU’s transfer is achieved (Börzel and Risse 2009; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Graziano and Vink 2006; Sedelmeier 2011). But they were not the first to explain why different institutions (regional organisations in this case) have the tendency to develop similar tools to respond to similar challenges, arguing that this is not the result of independent decision, but should be understood in the framework of transnational context and interdependent decisions (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).

The idea that institutions, and in particular countries and international organizations might have an influence on decisions taken by other countries and international organizations is present in many academic works coming from different fields of study. The first research on how and why institutions influence each other started in the public policy literature with the famous works of DiMaggio and Powell (1983) on institutional, coercive and mimetic isomorphism, of Rose (1993) on lesson drawing and of Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, 2000) and their work on coercive and voluntary transfer. A systematic analysis of these processes has only recently started in the field of International Relations (Gilardi 2013). Yet, analysis on how policies and institutional designs spread can be found in related (sub) disciplines, from EU studies with Europeanisation and diffusion theories (Radaelli 2006; Börzel and Risse 2010),
to the literature on inter-organizational studies (Costa 2017). Moreover, comparative analysis has also informed the discussion on the spread of policies but looking more at the outcome (congruence) than focusing on the mechanisms of transfer and diffusion (Bennett 1991).

**The research design**

The thesis considers the institutionalization of a regional policy as the outcome to be explored by looking at the influence of domestic, regional and international actors. The thesis argues that the mechanism that explains the institutionalization of a regional policy is based on the influence on the process of four actors’ types: the leader, the reference, the sponsor and the implementer.

The main analytical component of the study uses a process tracing methodology to investigate the institutionalization process of ASEAN disaster response and to identify the actors influencing this institutionalization. The fundamental logic behind the methodology of process-tracing is to investigate the causal mechanisms (Bennet 2008; George and Bennett 2005; Beach and Pedersen 2012) defined by Glennan as ‘a complex system, which produces an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts’ (Glennan 1996, 52), rather than focusing on the correlation between independent and dependent variables (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994).

As discussed in the second chapter of the thesis, this relatively new methodology is particularly suited for an in-depth analysis through a qualitative methodology. The institutionalization of ASEAN disaster response is set as the outcome that
needs to be explained. The selection of actors that could potentially influence the institutionalization of a regional institution was identified in the first phase of process-tracing (collection of empirics). This included the ten ASEAN member states; other external actors’ such as: the EU; other states that supported the institutionalization of the ASEAN policy on disaster management, mainly Australia, Japan, US, New Zealand; and the UN as a multilateral driver of integration. The roles of the identified actors in influencing processes of institutionalization have been explored by the different literatures discussed above. These literatures are used to inform the building of the causal mechanism (third phase of the process tracing) that explains the chosen outcome: the institutionalization of ASEAN disaster management. Overall, the thesis proposes a *theory-building* process-tracing, as the objective is to provide strong inferences about a specific phenomenon with the aim ‘to build a theory about a causal mechanism that can be generalised to a population of a given phenomenon’ (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 11). The empirical analysis of the institutionalization of ASEAN regional disaster management is divided into three parts: the first part is dedicated to the adoption in 2004 of the ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management (ARPDM); the second part focuses on the signature in 2005 of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER); and the third part is devoted to the operationalization of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (the AHA Centre).

The research uses data from primary and secondary sources. As further discussed in the section dedicated to data collection, documentary analysis, as well as
expert interviews have been conducted to collect the necessary information to ‘build the process’ of institutionalization of the ASEAN disaster response policy and to trace back the role of the different drivers in the process, as well as to run the comparative analysis. Interviews were conducted in the EU and ASEAN Headquarters in Brussels and Jakarta. In order to improve the reliability of data, triangulation both across different interviewees and between different kinds of sources has been applied.

Policy implications

This research, while embedded in the theoretical debate on Interregionalism as part of the EU external policies and the conceptual research on the EU mechanisms to influence the far-abroad, is also strongly linked to policy analysis and therefore involves strong policy implications.

First, this research provides an updated overview of the disaster response policies implemented by the EU and ASEAN and by doing so it contributes to the knowledge of the EU and the ASEAN systems to respond to crisis. Reciprocal knowledge is the first steps to help policy-makers in fostering cooperation. Moreover, disasters affect all regions of the world, therefore the experiences of the EU and ASEAN might serve as an example for other regional organizations, such as the African Union, the League of Arab States, the Gulf Cooperation Council, as well as the Caribbean Community. Even more, crises are not only transboundary (between countries that share borders, see Boin, Ekengren and Rhinard 2013) but are also transregional. A crisis in a region might have effects -
as shown by the 2004 Tsunami-in other far-abroad regions. These effects not only lead to economic losses, but also directly affect the local population, as well as tourists, workers and students coming from other regions. In a world that is more and more globalized it is unavoidable to look for new actors that can provide solutions that national states cannot provide alone.

Second, debates on what the role of the EU outside its borders should be is ongoing. The EU Global Strategy (2016) has reinforced the importance of interregional organizations in EU external policies, yet too often the interregional bound is taken for granted and its concrete added value lost in vague declarations. This research shows how just sharing the label ‘regional organization’ and recognizing each other as a valuable partner is not enough to effectively collaborate together. The EU has to learn from ASEAN as much as ASEAN has to learn from the EU, but mutual visits are not enough anymore and it is time to move the cooperation to a next step. Having a regional organization in South-East Asia that can be the single point of contact in times of crisis represents an immense opportunity for the EU (and the world) and should be not only supported, as other actors in the region have already understood, but also taken as a best practices producer. By showing what ‘the others’ are doing to support ASEAN in implementing its disaster response policy, this research aims to open the door to other possible ways of collaboration between the EU and ASEAN.
The structure of the study

To summarize, this doctoral research looks at the institutionalization of the ASEAN disaster response policy to assess the influence of the EU in comparison with other actors of regional integration.

In July 2005 the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) signed the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER). In 2016 the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA) coordinates a full regional disaster response capacity. *Who are the main actors in the process that have influenced the institutionalization of the ASEAN disaster response mechanism? Does the EU directly or indirectly influence this process?* These are the research questions that guide this research project.

By using a process tracing methodology to analyse the institutionalization process and to identify the actors involved in the process, this doctoral study represents an example in which ASEAN was not subject to the influence of the EU, yet developed regional cooperation mechanisms to respond to disasters, overall concluding that in a competitive multipolar world being a regional organization is simply not enough for the EU to (directly or indirectly) influence other regions.

The aim of this research is to contribute to the field of studies that looks at the actoriness of the European Union and at its capacity to influence institutions outside its borders, by claiming that a comparative perspective is missing and
that this should be added in order to be able to assess the real role of the EU in influencing other regional institutions. Moreover, this research project contributes to the massively growing empirical discussion on EU-ASEAN relations (Rülund, Hänggi, and Roloff 2006; Wunderlich 2012; Murray and Brennan 2015; Allison 2015b) in particular on disaster management, as a topic relevant for both regions.

The doctoral thesis is divided in to three main parts. The first part covers the relevant theory and methods used in the analysis. The first chapter provides a systematic review of the literature. It presents the two weaknesses of the EU actorness literature addressed by this research. The importance of moving beyond the consideration of the EU as a sui generis actor that cannot be compared is challenged and a clear definition of actorness is provided. The different understandings of the concept of influence in different literatures are discussed and the argument that the analysis of influence should look at the outcome as much as at the process is made. The second chapter presents the research design and the methodology used in the study. Regional policy institutionalization is chosen as the outcome to be explored in the process-tracing analysis. As the study aims at showing the relative influence of the analysed actors in the process, the chapter explains how the concept of influence is operationalized in the study. A process tracing methodology is used to explore the potential influence of the EU on the process and to put this in perspective by analysing the influence of other relevant actors. The analytical framework proposed by this thesis is presented and the four analytical categories (leader, reference, sponsor and implementer) are defined and explained.
The second part is needed to set the scene of the study. The third chapter provides the global context in which the institutionalization of ASEAN disaster management took place. It presents the disaster management policy’s evolution at national, global and regional level. In this chapter the EU, as well as Australia, Japan, US, New Zealand policies are presented to show how all actors could have potentially exercise the same level of influence on the regional process that took place in ASEAN.

The third part is devoted to the empirical analysis and is divided in three chapters. Each chapter investigates a different phase of the institutionalization process of ASEAN disaster response by using a theory building process-tracing based on empirical evidence. The fourth chapter focuses on the first part of the process that led to the institutionalization of the ASEAN regional disaster management: the adoption in 2004 of the ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management (ARPDM). The fifth chapter analyses on the second part of this process: the signature in of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER). The sixth chapter is dedicated to the last phase of the analysed process: the operationalization of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre).

The investigation of the process pays equal attention to all actors involved in the different stages (not the EU only) and after introducing each outcome, the mechanism is explained by identifying the four actors involved: the leader, the reference, the sponsor and the implementer. For each of the actors the objective
of the influence, the rationale behind it and the modes in which this is realised are spelled out.
CHAPTER 1

The European Union’s ambitions to be an influential inter-regional actor: an overview of the literature

The first chapter of the thesis presents a review of the literature. By identifying the main weaknesses of the addressed literature, the chapter aims at showing how the research’s overall aim is to provide a concrete contribution to the current debates on EU actorness, in particular to its inter-regional dimension.

This chapter starts with a short introduction on the EU’s external policies. It stresses in particular two main elements. First, when discussing the external policies of the EU, our understanding should go beyond what has been until 2009, the second pillar of the European Union (the Common Foreign and Security Policy) and it should comprise other policies with an external dimension, such as trade, development, environment and humanitarian aid of the EU (Smith 1998; White 2001; Keukeleire and MacNaughton 2008; Bretherton and Vogler 2005; Tonra and Christiansen 2010; Telò and Ponjaert 2016; Hill, Smith and Vanhoonacker 2017). Second, EU external actions have responded to different logics depending on whether directed to its neighbours or its partners far abroad (Börzel and Risse 2009, 2012; Ponjaert 2013). Therefore, the different elements of the EU external actions should be interpreted differently according to the target towards which they were directed. Following this introductory part dedicated to the debate on the EU’s external policies, the main weaknesses of the literature of EU actorness in its external policies are introduced. Overall, this
literature review is organised around two main weaknesses faced by the literature on EU actorness (Drieskens 2017).

First, the need to move beyond the consideration that the EU is a sui generis actor, with the consequent impossibility to compare it with other actors, has been identified by both scholars focusing on EU actorness (Niemann and Bretherton 2013; Drieskens 2017), as well as by scholars focusing on the inter-regional dimension of this actorness (Wunderlich 2012; Murray and Brennan 2015; Telò, Fawcett, and Ponjaert 2015). Although suggesting different options to do that, they agree that adding a comparative dimension to the analysis of processes in which the EU plays a role should help in evaluating the EU actorness in perspective.

Second, the exploration of EU actorness cannot avoid to clearly define what actorness is. Here the chapter discusses the different ways in which actorness has been conceptualized, in particular in the inter-regional literature. As in this thesis actorness is defined as the effective capacity of an actor in influencing regionalisation processes, the concept of influence is further explored in the second part of the chapter. By looking at both public policy literature, as well as IR literature, this part of the chapter presents a different understanding of influence. On one hand, defining influence should include a clear explanation of what the influence is about, who is the influencer and who is the target of this influence, and finally which are the mechanisms that trigger this influence. On the other hand, the literature review will show how often the analysis of influence has focused more on the outcome and less on the process. Furthermore,
when focusing on the process, both public policy and IR literatures give more attention to the reasons behind the action of the sender rather than those of the receiver, thus missing a comprehensive analysis of the process, when the same actor can sometimes influence and sometimes be influenced.

This chapter concludes by stating how this research aims at contributing to the literature(s) discussing EU inter-regional actoriness, by filling the gaps identified in the literature review.

1.1 EU actoriness in its External Policies

1.1.1 The External Policies of the EU: an overview

The European Union started as a regional project in the aftermath of the Second World War. As of 1951 with the signature of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the six founding countries started an economic cooperation with the aim of avoiding conflict by promoting economic and political integration. Today the EU, with 28 member states, is one of the largest global players in world trade and is playing a growing role in the international arena. It is therefore not surprising that the EU has been studied more and more as an international actor able to influence the international system. Even more so since the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and the launch of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union. Yet, the low efficiency and lack of effectiveness of the EU response towards the wars in former Yugoslavia (1991-1995) inspired the revision of CFSP in the Amsterdam Treaty (1997). In October 1999 Javier Solana was appointed as the first EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and
Security Policy in charge of co-ordinating and representing the EU’s foreign policy. Solana’s main focus in the following 10 years was to enhance the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) set up in the context of the Cologne and Helsinki Council decisions in 1999 (Koops 2012). Although the Maastricht Treaty divided the policies of the EU with an external dimension across the three pillars1, the analysis of what the EU’s external action is, cannot be limited to CFSP and CSDP. In fact, the limited success of these two intergovernmental policies was paralleled by the growing relevance of the external policies coordinated by the European Commission (EC). In addition to that the activism of the EU in policies such as trade, development and humanitarian aid is often cited as an element of success for the EU (Smith 1998; White 2001; Keukeleire and MacNaughton 2008), reinforcing the idea that the EU is a relevant international actor worth studying.

Another consideration that should be taken into account when discussing EU external policies is the unavoidable division in geographical targets and the consequent different logic that also explains EU’s actions abroad. As summarized by Ponjaert (2013) the EU responds to different logics in its external actions: an *enlargement logic* is applied to countries that are considered as part of Europe (Eastern Europe, Malta and Cyprus before accession, Turkey, Montenegro, etc.); a *stabilization and partnership logic* is applied to countries that are part of the EU’ neighbourhood (mainly Mediterranean countries such as Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, etc., as well as eastern countries such as Belarus,

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1 With external trade, development cooperation, conflict prevention and sanctions part of the first pillar characterized by community method and the CFSP/CSDP assigned to the second pillar with decision taken by unanimity by the Council.
Georgia, Ukraine, etc.); *bilateral logic* with the emerging powers which are strategically important for the EU (such as China, Brazil, Japan, India, etc.); and *inter-regional logic* when dealing with other regional groupings (such as ASEAN, African Union, League of Arab States, etc.) no matter if located in the near or in the far-abroad. Different scholars coming from different disciplines have analyzed the external policies of the EU and its different components (CFSP, CSDP, trade, development, humanitarian aid, etc.). Realists, Institutionalists and Constructivists have all discussed the different logics of EU external actions (Manners and Whitman 2000; Bretherton and Vogler 2005; Tonra and Christiansen 2010; Telò and Ponjaert 2016; Hill, Smith and Vanhoonacker 2017). Indeed, the EU and its external policies, still remain a key element to be researched.

### 1.1.2 The current weaknesses of the research on the EU actorness in its external policies

Since the 1970s discussions about the role of the EU in International Relations (IR) moved away from the state-centric approach that looks at the EU as the result of member states’ interests to analysing the EU as an actor active in the global sphere (Cosgrove and Twitchett 1970; Galtung 1973; Sjöstedt 1977). Although the seminal work of Cosgrove and Twitchett looked not only at the European Economic Community, but also at the United Nations as new international actors, the research on actorness has evolved since then with a ‘strong European imprint’ (Drieskens 2017, 1536). This is due to the fact that the work of Sjöstedt, referred by scholars working on actorness as the ‘first
systematic study (Niemann and Bretherton 2013, 265), focused on the EC’s actor capability producing the definition of actorness as the ability to work ‘actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system’ (Sjöstedt 1977, 7).

The discussed progressive attempts to provide a framework to the study of actorness focused more and more on the EU, with Bretherton and Vogler (2006) finally renouncing to provide a framework with relevance beyond the EU by labelling the EU as a *sui generis* actor (Drieskens 2017, 1536). This conceptualization of the EU as an actor like no others led the next generation of European Studies scholars to explain the EU external policies by looking inside the EU. Indeed, following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the launch of the inter-governmental Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as second pillar of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, discussions started among researchers about the most appropriate label for the EU. Discussions about the EU identity proliferated (Drieskens 2017) and academic debates focused on whether the EU is or should be not only a (conflicted) trade power (Meunier and Nicolaidis 2006) or a market power (Damro 2012), but also a civilian power, using diplomatic co-operation means to solve international problems (Duchêne 1972; Telò 2005); a normative power, where the focus is given to the capacity of the EU to shape ideas (Manners 2002); or an ethical power where the EU is evaluated for what it does in promoting the ‘global good’ (Aggestam 2008). In addition to that, discussions about the nature of the EU continued. Conceptualized as a superpower using diplomacy, economic and political incentives, and soft power to exercise a global influence (McCormick 2007), or
as a small power, strategically acting more like Argentina or Sweden than as a
great power such as China or Russia (Toje 2008), the EU has been also
considered an integrative power able to influence organizational processes
between the EU’s institutions, as well as with external actors’ such as NATO and
the UN (Koops 2011).

After the innovations produced by the adoption of the Lisbon treaty and the
global financial crisis that heavily affected the EU’s member states, scholars
progressively abandoned the discussion of what sort of power the EU is and
focused again on the broader discussion of EU actorness. The reason behind this
shift is well explained by Niemann and Bretherton. They noticed how studies on
the EU were primarily concerned with its character, taking actorness for granted
and they underlined how ‘perhaps the second step was taken before the first, that
is, that talking about ‘what sort of power/actor’ initially requires more
(systematic) analysis of actorness itself’ (Niemann and Bretherton 2013, 264).

Based on this consideration, EU scholars took a step back to systematically
analyse EU actorness (Niemann and Bretherton 2013), in particular by following
the so-called ‘effectiveness turn’ (Drieskens 2017, 1539), which built from
Smith’s observation that EU actorness should be looked at by analysing its
activities and policies (Smith 2010). Overall, according to these scholars, the
study of EU actorness needed to move away from its conceptualization as ‘the
capacity to act’ and focus more on ‘the empirical explorations of the actual
extent of EU actorness and especially effectiveness in international politics’
(Niemann and Bretherton 2013, 262).
Overall, this new focus on actorness asked EU Studies scholars to consider two changes in their research approach. First, the new research on EU actorness should move beyond the consideration of the EU being a *sui generis* actor. For Niemann and Bretherton this meant adding a comparative dimension to the research on the EU, by integrating other actors (Niemann and Bretherton 2013). Second, the new research on actorness should be as clear as possible on what is the definition of actor. If this is not possible with one single definition, then researchers using this concept should at least clarify their understanding of actorness by clearly stating how the concept is operationalized in terms of, for example, presence, impact, capacity, power, effectiveness and influence.

The next two sections will discuss these two major weaknesses of EU actorness, in particular by looking at the role of the EU as an inter-regional actor. Not the only one, but one among others. By presenting these weaknesses in the literature, the two sections will show how the thesis aims at giving a contribution to the different, yet complementary literatures that looks at the EU as an actor of the international arena.

**1.2 Moving beyond the EU as a *sui generis* actor**

**1.2.1 The challenge of moving beyond the EU as a *sui generis* actor**

The need to move beyond the conceptualization of the EU as a *sui generis* actor, and to add a comparative perspective on the analysis of EU actorness has recently encountered the favour of EU scholars. Among the various attempts, Hettne’s framework of actorness was built by looking at both the EU and the US
in a comparative manner (Hettne 2007). Overall, the inclusion of a comparative dimension to EU Studies on actorness has been interpreted in two different ways.

The first way suggests assessing the actorness of the EU by looking at its performance on a specific issue by contemporarily including the comparative analysis of other actors’ performance on the same issue. Among the most recent attempts, Brattberg and Rhinard proposed an examination of EU actorness in international disaster relief by comparatively assessing the United States role in the 2010 Haiti earthquake (Brattberg and Rhinard 2013). Their comparative choice is based on the assumption that ‘the actorness concept was first developed in an EU context, but can be applied elsewhere and is constituted by variables that, in principle, are ‘abstract from any particular institutional form’ (Brattberg and Rhinard 2013, 357). Indeed, they show how their definition of effectiveness as context-related, coherence-related, capability-related and consistency-related could be equally applied to the EU, as well as to the US.

The second way recently implemented by scholars who want to move beyond the conceptualization of the EU as a sui generis actor, is the attempt of discussing actorness by not looking at the EU only, but by including other regional organizations such as ASEAN or Mercosur in the discussion on actorness – regional actorness, in these cases. Here the work of Wunderlich, which comparatively examines the actorness of the European Union and ASEAN, is particularly relevant (Wunderlich 2012). Wunderlich suggests a framework that challenges the uniqueness of the EU as an international actor. By using his framework based on self-image/recognition, presence/institutionalization and
decision-making structures, he argues that ASEAN is also more and more behaving as an international actor. Relevant to this discussion is the link between regional actorness and the socio-historical background in which the process of regional integration took place. This was explored by Brennan and Murray (2015) with their edited volume that looks at the drivers of integration and regionalism in Europe and Asia. Even more relevant for this thesis is the intuition of Allison. Based on Wunderlich’s framework Allison’s research looks at the European Union’s ambition to be an international actor by promoting its regional experience to ASEAN (Allison 2015b). What Allison suggests is to move beyond a simple comparison of the EU and ASEAN regionalism(s) by looking at the inter-regional dimension of EU-ASEAN relations, meaning looking at the concrete ways in which the EU is intervening in the ASEAN regional process.

Overall, the two intuitions on how to move beyond the idea that the EU cannot be compared (i.e. the policy focused comparative intuition of Brattberg and Rhinard and the regional dimension of Wunderlich, Murray and Brennan and Allison) were lost in the subsequent works that looks at EU actorness, which went back to an EU inner-looking approach, giving up on the idea that the EU actions should be compared in order to be properly understood and assessed (Koenig 2014; Lettenbichler 2014). And the same Allison’s intuition (i.e. the exploration of EU actorness with the literature on norm diffusion), although deserving attention, it finally focused only on the EU avoiding to go deeper in the analysis, by looking into the role played by other relevant actors in the region different from the EU. Therefore, this thesis should be read as an attempt to
contribute to the discussed EU actorness literature by going beyond the incomparability of the EU by focusing on one single policy, meaning disaster management, while looking at the role played by other actors beyond the EU itself.

Indeed, the need to avoid the ‘EU as a sui generis actor’s’ conceptualization as a way to prevent any comparative analysis was also felt in the inter-regionalism literature. The next section will show how the suggestion of expanding the analysis of EU actorness by including other relevant actors into the analysis was not only relevant for EU scholars working on actorness, but also for scholars looking at regionalism and Interregionalism.

1.2.2 The EU as a non-unique inter-regional actor

Interregionalism defined as a region-to-region interaction and as the situation or a process in which two (or more) regions interact as regions (Baert, Scaramagli, and Söderbaum 2014) is not a prerogative of the EU only. International regions were initially defined as ‘a limited number of States linked together by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence’ (Nye 1971, vii). New Regionalists gave more attention to the institutional dimension of these regions and they refined *regionalism* to signify institutionalized, multidimensional cooperation among interdependent neighbouring countries belonging to the same continent (Telò, Fawcett, and Ponjaert 2015). New Regionalists focused more on globalization and the economy as drivers of these new forms of institutionalized regional cooperation, giving less importance to the security issues typical of the Cold War period. More recently, the ‘pure’
understanding of Interregionalism has been enlarged to encompass other forms of cooperation. ‘Pure Interregionalism’, as the cooperation developed between two clearly identifiable regional organisations within an institutional framework (Aggarwal and Fogarty 2004) has been extended to other forms of Interregionalism, like Hybrid Interregionalism, a framework where an organised region negotiates with a group of countries from another unorganised region (Aggarwal and Fogarty 2004; Telò, Fawcett, and Ponjaert 2015) or Transregionalism, a dialogue process with a more diffuse membership which does not necessarily coincide with regional organisations (Rüland 2010).

Interregionalism flourished in the 1990s and early 2000s. All three main IR literatures have contributed to the discussion and the development of Interregionalism. Realists focus on the balancing function of Interregionalism, Institutionalists on the mechanism of cooperation, and Constructivists on the constitution of identities and the process of regionalism though Interregionalism (Doidge, 2014). As Baert, Scaramaglì and Söderbaum (2014) argue, it remains conceptually and theoretically underdeveloped, but the still on-going cooperation between regional organisations and the discourse of regional organisations’ leaders, support the idea that it would be misleading to conclude that Interregionalism is giving way to other forms of cooperation like bilateralism, regionalism and multilateralism. Even more so as Interregionalism has become a ‘consistent and manifest component of the EU’s external action’ (Ponjaert 2013, 140).
Far from being perfect, it is undeniable that the EU is a successful example of regional integration where tensions between competing countries have been transformed in a cooperative structure where divergences are peacefully discussed (Fawcett and Gandois 2010). Therefore, it is not surprising that the EU tries to export its model outside the region. Yet, this idea of looking at the EU as the champion of regional integration able to export its norms and institutions have been questioned by the revisionist scholarship which invites us to look at other alternative examples to the EU and to take into greater consideration the local drivers of regionalism. The two following sections will present the main features of these two opposite views of the role of the EU in the inter-regional arena.

1.2.3 The EU as a Model: The Eurocentric vision

A plethora of embryonic regional projects exploded already before 1945. They did not immediately result in formal structures of cooperation, but helped the development of a ‘regional consciousness’ (Fawcett 2015b, 36). Initiatives such as Pan-Americanism (Sikkink 2014), the conferences that lead to the creation of the League of Arab States in 1945 (Fawcett 2013), as well as discussions about African Unity or discourses on Pan-Africanism (Murithi 2005) developed before the start of the European project. Yet, since the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, and the ensuing experiences of EURATOM and the European Economic Communities (1957), Europe provided the first successful example of formal regional institution-building. The economic link between Europe and its former colonies reinforced the idea that the European model would be - to some degree - exportable to other regions of
the world. Furthermore, the successful adoption of the Maastricht Treaty (1992) favoured the idea that the European project could represent a model not only for economic integration, but that also political and security issues could be dealt at regional level.

The scholarship that looks at the EU as a potential model for other regions is based on the idea of the EU as a normative power (Manners 2002) and as a global actor alternative to US leadership (Bretherton and Vogler 2006). This view is articulated in two distinct understandings, one looking at the direct mechanism that the EU uses to promote its model and the other one arguing that the EU is a model that other regions autonomously decide to emulate (Börzel and Risse 2009).

The first group of scholars look at EU foreign policy and its efforts to promote the European way outside via external incentives (conditionality) in the near abroad, as well as technical and financial assistance (capacity-building) in the far-abroad (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004; Vachudova 2005; Radaelli 2006). The explicit efforts to promote regional cooperation outside its border is also perpetrated by using political dialogue and cooperation venues to persuade other actors to adopt the EU model –or at least some elements of it. In this framework inter-regionalism defined as ‘institutionalized multidimensional cooperation’ (Telò, Fawcett, and Ponjaert 2015, 2) has been the main venue used by the EU to diffuse its institutions and policies. Some examples of this are the EU relations with Mercosur and the 50 million euro to support its Secretariat and Parliament. Similarly, the EU also supported the Andean community in building
its regional institutions and, finally, the EU also influenced to some extent ASEAN through a 40 years long structured cooperation (Börzel and Risse 2015).

On the other hand, the second group of emulation scholars still consider the EU a model that is replicated by others without the need of self-promotion or in the specific framework of an inter-regional cooperation agreement. Emulation is driven by recipients and in the words of Börzel and Risse ‘the EU is often more successful as a model of regionalism when it just sits there, while others emulate and localize its institutional designs’ (Börzel and Risse 2015, 49). The EU is here considered as a model because other actors emulate its policy or institutions because these are perceived to be the best practices in a certain policy (Börzel and Risse 2009) or because an actor is looking to increase its legitimacy by adapting practices and norms implemented by another actor recognised as legitimate (Polillo and Guillén 2005).

Overall, it is not always easy to distinguish between the two understandings. Is the EU actively promoting itself as a model for other regions, or are the other regions simply looking at the EU as a model as such? Although different mechanisms have been proposed to assess the level of influence of the EU, as we will see later in the chapter, it is hard to argue in favour of one explanation excluding the other. For example, Jetschke and Murray (2012) argue that ASEAN has adopted EU-style institutions -and in particular the Committee of Permanent Representatives and elements of economic integration- in a case of lesson-drawing and normative emulation in which the EU only played a passive role. Yet, the fact that the EU and ASEAN are considered a model of inter-
regional relations with many opportunities for their representatives to meet and exchange (Rüland, Hänggi, and Roloff 2006) makes it hard to believe that the EU did not play any role in the promotion of its institutions towards ASEAN.

The idea of the EU being a model, in both its understanding of self-promotion and emulation, has been counter-balanced by a more critical view provided by the Euro-critical scholars inspired by the work of Acharya (Acharya 2004, 2009).

1.2.4 The irrelevance of the EU: contesting the EU as a Model vision

Euro-critical scholars started from the assumption that the EU is a *sui generis* actor that cannot be replicated elsewhere, as perfectly summarised in the sentence ‘one of the lessons of European integration is that it is not a lesson’ (Hurrell 2005, 40). The distinctive nature of the European integration process is too embedded in its historical and geographical features to be replicated. The general perception that Europe is in crisis has reinforced the idea that the EU should not be considered as a model for other regions anymore. According to this critique the Eurozone crisis (2008) shows some of the limits of the economic integration of European member states (Fawcett 2015b). Even more the rejection of the European project expressed by UK citizens in the pro-Brexit vote (2016) risks, according to some, to end the European dream. These discourses reinforce those scholars contesting the idea of perceiving the EU as a model for other regions in the world. To explain why the EU should not be considered as a model for other regions, Euro-critical scholars advanced two alternative proposals.
The first proposal focuses on the alternative options available in the multipolar world. Although the EU is the most integrated regional organisation, there are alternative models that can be take into consideration. The UN remains a key norm producer in the global world, but also other growing regional organisations can provide an alternative understanding of regionalism. The most famous example of this is the inter-governmental alternative structure proposed by ASEAN and the general idea of the ASEAN way. But also Latin America proposes several alternative options, as with Mercosur and its alternative model to the Western-hegemonic view (Malamud 2013).

The second proposal prioritizes internal dynamics and localization processes. Here the main drivers of integration should be found in the cognitive priors of the local actors (Acharya 2004). The analysis should focus on the local agents and on how they reconstruct foreign norms to ensure the norms fit with the local’s cognitive priors and identities. This Euro-critical literature has its foundation in Acharya’s work (2004, 2009). He was the first scholar that raised the attention around the important role played by local agents in diffusing norms in the case of ASEAN. According to him, the international relations scholars who want to focus on the causal mechanisms and processes by which ideas spread, should take into consideration local agents and how they reconstruct foreign norms to ensure the norms fit with the agents’ cognitive priors and identities. Acharya named this process localization. In more detail, Acharya defined localization as the ‘active construction through discourse, framing, grafting, and cultural selection of foreign ideas by local actors, which results in the former developing significant congruence with local beliefs and practices’
(Acharya 2004, 245). When discussing the conditions that may affect the likelihood of localization, Acharya identified four main catalysts: first, a main economic or security crisis that might question the existing norms/practices; second, a more systemic change in the distribution of power; third, a domestic political change in the norm-taker (for example a new focus on human rights); fourth, international or regional demonstration effect could lead to ‘norm borrowing’ via emulation, imitation, and contagion, and so on (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Furthermore, Acharya (2004) argues that localization also depends on ‘its positive impact on the legitimacy and authority of key norm-takers, the strengths of prior local norms, the credibility and prestige of local agents, indigenous local traits and tradition, and the scope for grafting and pruning presented by foreign norms’ (Acharya 2004, 247).

Initially the aim of this literature was to counterbalance the ‘illusionary and rhetorical’ Eurocentrism of the literature (Telò, Fawcett, and Ponjaert 2015, 3) and to bring the attention to the role of beliefs and practice arguing that the process is more complex, interactive and co-constitutive than a mere copying of the EU. For example, Biörkdahl et. al (2015) focused on how the normative power of the EU is perceived and received in different parts of the world and how EU norms are sometimes resisted if not rejected. In addition to that, some scholars have been highly critical of the EU’s external action both in terms of efficiency and legitimacy (Cusumano 2018; Bicchi 2014; Carta 2014). Yet the EU remains a recognised key actor of the international scene. This has encouraged EU scholars to re-conceptualize the role of the EU in the world
In this context, post-revisionist scholars present themselves as the synthesis of the Eurocentric and Euro-critical visions.

1.2.5 The EU as a Point of Reference: the post-revisionist vision

The post-revisionist approach to Interregionalism is a theoretical approach that aims at going beyond the Euro-centric approach of ‘normative power Europe’ (Manners 2002) but still looking at Europe’s distinctive integration process that continues to be referenced by other regional organizations. Moreover, this approach also aims at going beyond the more Euro-critical approach to Interregionalism, which argues that ‘the only lesson to be drawn from the EU’s experience of integration is that there are no lessons to be drawn’ (Telò, Fawcett, and Ponjaert 2015, 5). The post-revisionist approach to Interregionalism, similar to the recent considerations of the literature on EU actorness, recognises that Interregionalism is not a monopoly of the European Union (EU), since a set of other state-powers and regional organizations have initiated various partnerships with regions belonging to other continents. Yet, this approach still considers the EU as key proponent of the regional option within the emerging multipolar system. The three main questions identified by Fawcett, Ponjaert and Telò are: ‘How should we understand and locate European regionalism in the wider world of regionalism and multilateralism? How is the EU changing its internal and external policies towards other regions? And how do other regional groupings make reference to the EU’s unprecedented institutional experience?’ A series of attempts to apply the post-revisionist approach to the study of inter-regionalism explored the impact of EU-sponsored interregional dynamics on de facto drivers of regionalism in other regions of the world (Shu 2015; Valladao 2015; Jakobeit
2015). The three authors, with a focus on the EU’s interregional efforts towards East Asia, Latin America and Africa, answered the question ‘How the EU’s purposeful external action has impacted the endogenous regionalization dynamics in its main partner regions?’. Although in their conclusions all three authors remained sceptical and considered the interregional policies and formats set up by the EU inadequate and characterised by a lack of strategic thinking, they do not provide a systematic analysis of where in the process the EU is failing. Their analysis is limited to a pure assessment of the outcome. In addition to that, the missing comparative analysis with the other actors potentially involved in these processes, makes it hard to assess the actorness of the EU as there is no clear benchmark.

Overall, although the post-revisionist understanding to the EU’s role in the international arena has not been yet systematically applied, it suggests a new reading of the inter-regional actorness of the EU that is worth exploring further.

1.3 Conceptualizing EU actorness via its operationalization

The aim of this research is to contribute to overcoming the first challenge of the literature on EU actorness, meaning the identified need to go beyond the conceptualization of the EU as a sui generis actor. The contribution will build on Allison’s proposal to look at EU actorness towards the regionalization process of another region, such as ASEAN, but it will expand the analysis by including the other actors that have an important role in the process of regionalizing ASEAN
disaster management policy. The thesis will look at the EU, as well as ASEAN member states and ASEAN dialogue partners, mainly Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the US.

By doing so this research will contribute to the post-revisionist approach to Interregionalism (Telò, Fawcett, and Ponjaert 2015). It is only by looking at the other actors involved in the process that the extent to which the EU effectively plays any role in the institutionalization process can be assessed. By discussing the effective roles of the EU in its inter-regional organization within a post-revisionist framework, this thesis will contribute to the broader discussion of EU actorness.

1.3.1 The challenge of conceptualizing EU actorness

In an attempt to provide a research agenda for actorness, Drieskens (2017, 1542) noticed how the concept of actorness lacks a clear definition by stating ‘[…] actorness measures the degree to which an entity qualifies as an international actor, so the lack of a universally accepted definition of the latter complicates a universally acceptable definition of the former’. Although she does not provide any clearer definition of what an international actor is –and consequently of what actorness is - she provides a convenient way forward. A researcher who bravely wants to enter the actorness debate, should - at minimum - clearly state how the concept is ‘interpreted’, meaning how the concept is operationalized in her/his research.
Yet, the need to operationalize this general definition of actorness has proved to be a challenge for several generations of researchers. Sjöstedt’s work (1977) has been considered too difficult to operationalize and to apply to specific cases. It focuses too much on ‘state-like characteristics’ as requisites for actorness (Niemann and Bretherton 2013, 265) by ‘implicitly or explicitly using the state as comparator’ (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 1). Another attempt to operationalize the EU actorness concept was proposed by Jupille and Caporaso and their four criteria: recognition, authority, autonomy and cohesion (Jupille and Caporaso 1998). Yet, this framework was also considered excessively complex to apply, given the fact that each of the four criteria contains several sub-criteria (Niemann and Bretherton 2013, 266) and that it is too focused on the EU’s internal dynamics (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). This element was initially raised by Hill in his famous article on the European Community’s ‘capability-expectations gap’ (Hill 1993). By looking at the Gulf War, the Uruguay Round and the Yugoslavia war, Hill concluded that ‘[the] European Community is not an effective international actor in terms both of its capacity to produce collective decisions and its impact on events’ (Hill 1993, 306). Beyond Hill’s pessimistic conclusions, this article raised our awareness on the need to focus the analysis of EU actorness around its effectiveness rather than its mere conditions of existence.

Hill’s intuition inspired the more successful attempt of Bretherton and Vogler (1999, 2006), who pushed the analysis of the operationalization of EU actorness beyond the previous inner-looking attempts. They proposed a framework based on three inter-related concepts: opportunity, presence and capability. Opportunity
is described as the ‘external environment of ideas and events which frames and shapes EU action or inaction’ (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 24). In the second edition of their book, Bretherton and Vogler described post 9/11 as the context in which the EU produced the European Security Strategy (2003) stating that the EU should take its role in the responsibility for global security. Of course, actorness cannot simply be what the EU would like it to be, therefore the two other concepts balance the framework. Presence is defined as the ‘the ability to exert influence externally’ (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 27). Presence, in Bretherton and Vogler’s understanding, is not only the proactive action to shape perception, expectation and behaviours as proposed by Allen and Smith (1991, 1998), but is also a consequence of the simple being of the EU. Finally, they noted how the ‘fact of just being’ is not enough and they added capability as the third concept. Capability refers to the ‘internal context of the EU action or inaction’ (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, 29) which mitigate the notion of presence. By adding the capability element, Bretherton and Vogler remind us that the expectations on what the EU can or cannot do in reality often depends on its capacity to formulate and implement policy. Initially conceived in terms of consistency, coherence and the availability of policy instruments, more recently, the capability element has been explained in terms of coherence among EU instruments (Niemann and Bretherton 2013).

Around the same time Lucarelli (2007) engaged with this evolving literature by noticing how the evaluation of the EU as an international actor was ignoring an important aspect such as the external perceptions of the EU. Her work started a full line of research around the external perception of the EU giving an important
contribution to the discussion on EU actorness (Chaban and Holland 2008; Lucarelli and Fioramonti 2010; Chaban et al. 2013). Yet, this research which operationalized the concept of actorness by looking at the ‘others’ perception’ should complement the research of EU actorness and not substitute the analysis that looks at the action of the EU to assess its effectiveness.

In the literature that looks at the regional actorness – mainly - of the EU, several contributions provided different criteria for actorness. Hettne’s contribution, clearly inspired by Bretherton and Vogler, identifies regioness, presence and actorness as the key elements that identify regional ‘actorship’, meaning the capacity of an actor to act on the external world. Regioness is described as the internal integration, and is complemented by presence, as the means to be influential (economic strength and/or military power) and actorness, as the will to act in the international sphere (Hettne 2007, 2011). Doidge (2008) wanted to pay more attention to the institutional dimension of actorness and proposed another framework based on the action’s triggers (the goals, interests and principles of a given organization as well as to emergent situations requiring a response and which triggers the action), the policy process/structures (the ability to take decisions in relation to an action trigger) and the performance structures (the possession of the structures and resources necessary to implement the action, after the decision to act is taken). In the effort to find a synthesis between Hettne and Doidge, Wunderlich (2012) provides his criteria for regional actorness and applied them to both the EU and ASEAN. He elaborated his own framework around three criteria for actorness: internal self-understanding/self-image; recognition and presence; and institutionalization and decision-making
structures. If Wunderlich applied his framework to a comparative analysis between the EU and ASEAN, Allison (2015b) subsequently used the same framework to look at the interaction between the two regional actors, and in particular at the EU’s promotion of regionalism to ASEAN. In terms of internal self-understanding and self-image, Allison explored if the EU considers itself to have the capacity and responsibility to promote its regionalism experience abroad. She looked at the recognition criteria by exploring ASEAN perceptions regarding the role played by the EU in its more recent regional experience, and presence criteria by assessing if the EU has been able to utilise its resources to promote its experience. The criteria that looks at the institutionalisation and decision-making structures is operationalized by asking if these structures have been adequate to facilitate the EU’s promotion of regionalism towards ASEAN. The element of impact is added to assess if the EU was able to transform the ‘target environment’. Finally, domestic and external perceptions are assessed by exploring if the analysed actions have been considered successfully internally and externally.

Overall, by building on the literature that looks at the EU’s promotion of regionalism to ASEAN, but in line with the effectiveness turn of the actorness literature, this thesis conceptualizes actorness as the effective capacity of an actor to influence the regionalization process. As further discussed in the next sections, in this research the analysis focuses on ASEAN’s process of regionalization, therefore influence results as the best possible concept as it focuses mainly on the recipient, rather than exploring the reasons inspiring the sender. If and how the EU, as well as other relevant actors, influences the ASEAN regionalization
process is the main concern of this thesis. Clearly, influence is a key concept of this research and therefore it needs further clarification.

1.3.2 The challenge of defining influence in Public Policy, IR and EU Studies

There are a variety of explanations on why different regional organizations try to institutionalize similar forms of cooperation. For some scholars, similarities among institutions should be explained by looking at the context, meaning analysing the conditions and challenges faces by the organizations. In this case authors assumed that there is no influence among similar organizations or that the influence is minimal and not enough to explain the fact that different organizations resemble each other (Hay 1995). In contrast the literature on policy transfer and policy diffusion starts from the assumption that organizations influence each other and seek to explain the different mechanisms of this transfer. The literature on policy transfer focuses its attention on the ways in which the influencer projects (and sometimes imposes) its vision, while the literature on policy diffusion pays more attention on the reasons why a receiver accepts the influence. Theories on transfer, diffusion and convergence can all be linked back to the broader concept of influence. Influence is one of those catch-all, vague concepts that can be used and applied in all sort of contexts. Influence is often analysed by looking at the effectiveness, impact and/or performance of the actor(s) involved (Costa and Jørgensen 2012b). Yet, scholars have explored the concept of influence in a variety of ways. Scholars working on the concept of influence in both public policy and IR focus traditionally on the relationship between two identifiable actors: the sender and the receiver, giving alternatively
more attention to one or the other. Moreover, the discussion around influence has sometimes focused on the process of influencing, but much more often on the outcome of this transfer. Indeed, if the literatures on policy transfer and diffusion mainly look at the mechanism to transfer/diffuse policies, comparative policy literature focuses on the outcome, measuring the degree of similarities. The concept of policy convergence (Bennett 1991) has been extensively used by this literature. Comparative literature mainly focuses on identifying the dependent variable that can explain similar outcomes. Less attention has been given to the processes. The following sections will present the concept of influence and its understandings in the public policy literature and in IR literature, where EU Studies, as well as Inter-organizational Studies have given different definitions of influence and different suggestions on how to operationalize this concept.

The question on ‘Why different institutions developed similar instruments?’ has driven the public policy analysis for many years. Some authors claim that institutions assume the same form just because they are subject to the same environment. Hawley argues, ‘Units subjected to the same environmental conditions…acquire a similar form of organization’ (Hawley 1968, 334). Even more, according to the Ecologists in Organizational studies (Hannan and Freeman 1977; Baum and Oliver 1996; Ries 2017), isomorphism results from competitive processes because organizations are pressured to assume the form best adapted to survival in a particular environment (Scott 2001). However, organizational scholars soon realised that similar external factors were not
enough to explain similarities and started exploring the process by which ideas, institutions and organizations spread.

At the first stage the spread of common policy trends across different environments focused on the state level. The studies around the diffusion of legislation among American States (Gray 1973; Walker 1969) show the initial interest for these processes. Yet, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) were the first organizational researchers that focused on the homogeneity of forms and practices among organisations and on the mechanisms that diffuse institutionalisation. In particular the idea of *institutional isomorphism*, as the process that furthers the diffusion of ideas, practices and organizational structure among organizations that adopt similar structures and become similar. According to DiMaggio and Powell organizations become similar due to coercive, mimetic or normative pressures. The *coercive isomorphism* is the result of a vertical pressure from an organization to another dependent organization and can be the result of a direct and explicit imposition of a model. However, as Boxenbaum and Jonsson (2008) underline, coercive isomorphism could also result from resource dependence. In this case the coercive pressure is the result of the demand to adopt specific practices in order to be eligible for funding or to be admitted in a specific group. The *mimetic isomorphism*, also described as modelling, is the response to uncertainty, where the model serves as a convenient source of practice. Organizations model themselves to similar organizations perceived as successful or legitimate in their field. As Greenwood *et. al* (2008) notice, among the mechanisms of diffusion the mimetic one has been the most applied to empirical studies, although often erroneously. Finally, *normative*
isomorphism is used to describe the process that gives similar values to professionals with a similar education and can be described as a horizontal pressure.

Ten years after DiMaggio and Powell, Rose (1993) published the book Lesson Drawing in Public Policy, which provided the basis for the further development of the discussion, promoted by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996; 2000). They defined the transfer of policy as ‘the process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions, etc. in one time/or place is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in another time and/or place’ (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, 344). As Evans (2009) points out, with this definition Dolowitz and Marsh incorporate all previous definitions raised since the 1990s: policy diffusion (Majone 1991), policy learning (Haas 1992), lesson drawing (Rose 1993) and policy convergence (Coleman 1994).

In the Dolowitz and Marsh analysis (1996) actors engage in coercive or voluntary policy transfer. Coercive transfer is the one in which an actor forces another actor to adopt a policy (direct), a typical example is the relationship between the state and supra-national organizations. Alternatively, a change of the environment might also force the actor to adapt to the new reality (indirect), for example because of technological developments, emergence of international consensus. On the other hand, voluntary transfer can be summarised as the voluntary search for a new solution in a situation that does not satisfy the actor looking for the change. Voluntary transfer implies different degrees of transfer. Copying is the full import of a policy without any adaptation. Emulation is based
on the idea that the policy emulated provides the best available standard. The import of policy is limited to the goal of the policy, whereas the content and instruments are adapted to the local reality. Hybridization and synthesis is the act of selectively choosing the part of the policy developed by different actor the best suited the receiver (Rose 1993; Dolowitz and Marsh 1996). Finally, hybridization and synthesis are the two concepts advanced by Rose (1993) and merged by Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) to describe the process of picking and choosing part of the policy from different actors in order to create the best-suited policy for the importer.

The ‘direct coercive transfer’ of a policy/institution is considered rare in terms of imposition done by powerful state, and mainly limited to the standard imposed by supra-national institutions (Radaelli 2006). Therefore, scholars working on policy transfer focus mainly on the degree by which the receiver actor implements institutions or policies initially developed by the sender. Here, mechanisms of learning and emulation are introduced. Policy learning implies a rational decision of the receiver who wishes to improve the efficiency and efficacy of its policies (Rose 1991). On the other side, mimicry and processes of emulation implies the receiver’s deliberate search for legitimacy. Although maybe inefficient, the policy is replicated by the receiver in order to legitimize its actions (and existence sometimes) (DiMaggio and Powell 1991).

In 1991 Bennett moved the discussion from the ‘modes of transfer’ to an analysis more focused on ‘what can be transferred?’, by providing a first set of policy elements that could be transferred: goals, content and instruments (Bennett
1991). Dolowitz and Marsh expand this classification (1996) adding four objects of transfer to the initial three. According to the two authors policy instruments and administrative techniques, as well as institutions, ideology, ideas, attitudes and concept can also be transferred, together with negative lessons. Some of these elements can be considered sub-elements of the three main categories identified by Bennett more than additional categories. For example, the broad concept of goals contains as sub-elements ideas and concept. Institutions can also be considered a sub-element of instrument\(^2\). Overall, this literature argues that norms, as well as instruments, can be transferred. Yet, they are often considered mutually exclusive. As the three empirical chapters of this thesis will show, a systematic analysis of influence can be applied to both norms (Chapter 4 and 5) and instruments (Chapter 6).

Finally, by discussing ‘who’ can transfer a policy, Dolowitz and Marsh identified six main categories of actors that transfer policies: elected official, political parties, bureaucrats/civil servants, pressure groups, policy entrepreneurs, experts and supra-national institutions. In terms of supra-national organisations, the two authors, in agreement with Rose (1991), refer to both intergovernmental and international organizations. Evans and Davies (1999) add that the transfer of a policy does not occur unintentionally, but there should be an agent that intentionally promotes the process. Following this assumption, in order to identify if a policy transfer occurred, it is necessary to: first, identify the agents of transfer, second, specify which role the agents played, and third, the nature of the transfer that the agents are seeking to make (Evans and Davies 1999).

\(^{2}\) The only innovative element adds by Dolowitz and Marsh is the idea that negative lessons can also be transfer.
In 2004 Stone tried to provide the first comprehensive framework covering all the elements discussed in the Public Policy literature: what type of transfer, transfer of what, done by whom (Stone 2004). She distinguished among three modes to transfer policy: Ideational, Institutional and Networks. The Ideational transfer is the soft transfer of ideas, paradigms and lessons, done by think-tanks, experts, professional associations via conferences, professional associations, ‘best practice’ advocacy, etc. The Institutional transfer is the hard transfer of instruments, legislation, policy approaches, done by politicians, international civil servants and state officials, via legislation, regulation, standards setting, war and invasion, aid conditionality. The Networks transfer is both a hard and soft transfer, done by multiple actors including NGOs/civil society and state and international agencies, via partnerships and alliances for implementation. Overall, Stone’s attempt showed the importance of clarifying what we are exploring in terms of transfer, or influence.

To summarise, the public policy literature focused on two main elements. First, the need to always clarify not only the process of transfer between two actors, but also the importance of clearly stating who are the actors exercising and enduring influence, as well as what is the is actually transfer. By focusing on the three types of isomorphism, as well as the differentiations between direct and indirect influence, the public policy literature provided the first analysis of how institutions influence each other.
The idea that countries and international organizations have an influence on the decisions taken by other countries and international organizations is present in many academic works. Yet, a systematic analysis of these processes has only recently started in the field of International Relations, whereas this is much more advanced in the EU studies subfield (Gilardi 2013).

Interesting attempts have also been proposed by inter-organizational studies scholars (Koops and Biermann 2017). Discussing the influence that IOs exert on each other, Costa noticed how ‘assessing the influence of international organizations (IOs) on other IOs has not been a key endeavour of the literature on inter-organizational relations (IORs)’ (Costa 2017, 389). Yet, there are several examples of the attempt to respond to the questions: How much do Inter-organizational relations matter for IOs? How much do they change IOs and in what ways? This said, answers to these questions have often looked back to the EU (Howorth 2003; Biermann 2008; Gehring and Oberthür 2009; Brosig 2010; Gawrich 2017).

Indeed, the role of the EU in shaping institutions is become a popular topic of research. Although research has been conducted on the role that international institutions play in shaping EU policies (Costa and Jørgensen 2012b), the EU capacity to exert an influence beyond its borders still remains an element to be further explored. Within EU studies the EU capacity of influencing institutions has been discussed at different levels of analysis, both looking inside and outside the EU borders. These different levels of analysis have produced different literatures. The first level of analysis (internal) analyses the role of EU member
states (but also non state actors) in shaping the EU and its policies, as well as the reverse process that looks at the role of the different EU institutions in shaping its member states policies. A second level of analysis (external near-abroad) focuses on the capacity of the different EU institutions in influencing the policies of the country located in the neighboured area, as these countries experience different types of preferential relationship with the EU (free trade agreements, accessions agreements, etc.). A third level of analysis (external far-abroad) explores the ways in which the EU influences (and is influenced by) states that are not involved in the EU accession process (US, Canada, China, etc.). A fourth level of analysis (inter-regional) is the one that focuses on the capacity of the EU to influence other regional processes. Although the EU is considered the most integrated regional organisation, other parts of the world also experience processes of regional integration (ASEAN, African Union, League of Arab States, Mercosur, etc.). This literature looks at the other regional integration processes to assess the influence exercised by the EU. Finally, the fifth level is the one that looks at the multilateral level, exploring the ways in which the EU influences and has been influenced by international organizations, such as NATO and the UN.

The EU capacity to spread institutions and policies across different contexts has been mainly analysed and discussed by EU studies scholars in Europeanisation research studies. Europeanisation studies focus on the EU’s impact on the domestic policies, institutions, and political processes of the member states as well as on the accession candidates, particularly with regard to its Eastern enlargement (Börzel and Risse 2009; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Graziano
and Vink 2006; Sedelmeier 2011). Börzel and Risse (2009, 2012) explain that in order to spread its ideas the EU has developed five sophisticated diffusion mechanisms that exert direct and indirect influence. Coercion, manipulation, socialization, and persuasion are the direct mechanisms, in general, used to explain the Europeanisation process within the European Union, whereas competition, lesson-drawing, normative emulation are the indirect mechanisms that are more relevant when there are no binding laws to comply with, as it is the case in EU-ASEAN relations. The ways (legal imposition, positive and negative incentives, and socialisation by persuasion and learning) through which the EU’s transfer is successful have been studied. As Börzel and Risse rightly noted, ‘the further we move away from the EU and its immediate neighbours, the less it makes sense to call the spread of EU policies and institutions Europeanisation’ (2012, 2)

Policy diffusion can be defined as the process in which a policy spread from one primary institution to a plethora of other institutions. The literature on policy diffusion mainly developed in the IR literature, but as Gilardi (2012) noticed, the mechanisms of diffusion are similar to those identified by the policy transfer literature: coercion, competition, learning and emulation. If coercion, competition and emulation somehow replicate the policy-transfer literature, competition adds the case in which countries, or organizations, compete to attract the same economic resources and therefore their policies (such as privatization, deregulations, etc.) look more and more similar (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Drezner 2001). Börzel and Risse (2012) provide a synthesis of the transfer/diffusion mechanisms that have been used to explain influence. They use
the EU as their main case study, useful to explain both direct and indirect influence. Direct influence is divided into pure coercion, as well as socialisation and persuasion. Indirect influence is explored in its three understandings: competition, lesson learning and mimicry.

**Table 1. The modes of influence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direct influence (focus on Sender)</th>
<th>Indirect influence (focus on Receiver)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coercive transfer (by powerful state)</td>
<td>Learning (to improve efficiency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercive transfer (standard set by supra-national organization)</td>
<td>Emulation or mimicry (to improve legitimacy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialization</td>
<td>Competition (to access resources)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persuasion</td>
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**Chapter conclusions**

This chapter presented the literature on EU actorness by focusing on two of its identified weaknesses: the need to move beyond the conceptualization of the EU as a *sui generis* actor, and the challenge to operationalize actorness by looking at the influence of an actor on a process. The review of the literature was instrumental in explaining the aim of this thesis as a contribution to the literature on EU actorness.

Overall, this thesis aims to build on the research that looks at the EU-ASEAN inter-regional relations by going beyond the idea of the EU as a *sui generis* actor that cannot be compared. Following Allison’s attempt (Allison 2015b), this
thesis looks at the role played by the EU in the regional institutionalization process of ASEAN and it does so by not limiting the analysis to the EU, but by looking at the role played by the other actors involved. Inspired by the recent turn of Interregionalism policy which suggests that the EU is not the only actor promoting regionalism, and that we have to take into consideration the entire framework in which this is happening (Telò 2015b), this thesis adds a comparative dimension to the analysis by taking into consideration, beyond the EU, other relevant actors, namely Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the US. In order to do that, and following the suggestion of Brattberg and Rhinard (2013) this thesis focuses on the specific policy of crisis management and explores the mechanism that led to the institutionalization of this ASEAN’s policy and assess what the role of the EU has been in the process in comparison to other actors involved.

To respond to the second identified challenge faced by the actorness literature, meaning the need to clarify the understanding of actorness by clearly stating how the concept is operationalized, this part of the chapter introduces the concept of influence.

The discussion about the way in which public policy and IR look at the concept of influence, and in particular at the similarities among institutions, showed the divisions between the investigations that focus on the outcome of the influence (convergence), and the ones that focus on the process that lead to the specific outcome (policy diffusion or transfer). Moreover, among the latest work, a clear
division exists between the research that focuses on the sender (policy transfer) and the research that looks at the receivers (isomorphism).

In this thesis influence is defined as the capacity of an actor to condition a policy or institution adopted by another actor. By arguing that in the institutionalization process the roles are less clearly defined, this research focuses both on the role played by the recipient, while exploring the different roles played by the external actors involved in the process. In fact, this research argues that the ASEAN member states, as well as the ASEAN Secretariat, that are traditionally perceived as the influenced actors, can exercise both roles: they can influence the process, as much as they can be influenced by other actors in pursuing one type or another type of institutionalization. Overall, this thesis will contribute to the discussion on influence and inter-regional actorness by providing an analysis (and an original framework) which gives equal attention to the exploration of the outcome, as we need to know if the two policies/institutions are actually similar, and to the process, as we need to explore the actions that influence the process in one or in another direction, in order to ultimately explain how did we get to the existing outcome.

Although more and more scholars have recognized that regional organisations are interested by the process of transfer (Stone 2004; Börzel and Risse 2012a; Lenz 2013; Jetschke and Lenz 2012) the focus has been mainly on the EU ability to transfer regionalism, in terms of regional structures (Börzel and Risse 2012a), rather than on the general ability of transferring specific policies to other regional institutions. There is a lack of attention in the analysis of how and with which
effects policies are transferred from one regional institution to another. The EU is still recognised as a model for other regional organisation and as Börzel and Risse (2012) rightly noted the research on the diffusion of the EU’s institutional models to other regions of the world is just beginning. What this thesis argues is that this research should expand by focusing not only on assessing the EU capacity to be perceived as a regional reference of regional integration, but also as a reference for other policies, and more specifically as a potential point of reference for other regions in the disaster management domain.

This thesis will start from the assumption that the exploration of the influence exercise by an actor towards a process, will tell us more about the actor itself. The traditional role of the EU as a model or as a point of reference will be analysed by looking at the process of regionalization of a policy, rather than limiting the analysis to the influence towards an actor as such.

Based on these assumptions, the next chapter will introduce the original analytical framework to analyse the process of ASEAN regional institutionalization of the disaster management policy and to assess the EU (relative) effectiveness in directly or indirectly supporting this process composed of four types of actors: the leader, the reference, the sponsor and the implementer.
CHAPTER 2

The research design: an original analytical framework and a process-tracing methodology

This second chapter presents the analytical framework of the thesis and the methodology used to answer the main research question: *Who are the main actors in the process that have influenced the institutionalization of the ASEAN disaster response mechanism? Does the EU directly or indirectly influence this process?*

As the overall aim of this research is to provide a contribution to the debate on the inter-regional dimension of EU actorness, the research question will be used to guide the analysis. By exploring the role of actors as drivers of the process that led to the institutionalization of the ASEAN disaster response mechanism, the thesis will unpack the actorness mechanism and will assess the role of the EU in directly or indirectly influencing this process. By doing so the thesis will contribute to overcoming the identified two weaknesses of the EU actorness literature, moving beyond the conceptualization of the EU as an actor that cannot be compared and operationalizing the conceptualization of actorness via the actor’s influence.

The chapter is divided into five main sections. The first section introduces the institutionalization of a regional policy as the outcome to be explored. It starts by introducing New Institutionalism and its different understandings (rationalist, historical and sociological) as the most fitting approach to study institutional
change. The section continues by justifying why the analysed process is labelled as an ‘institutionalization process’, instead of using labels particularly focused on the regional dimension of the process, such as ‘regionalization’, ‘regional-integration’, ‘region-building or ‘regionalism’. The discussion proceeds by reflecting on ‘institutionalization’ as a progressive process characterized by consecutive phases (multi-phases process) and on how this choice has affected the empirical component of this thesis.

The second section gives an overview of the drivers (both actors and factors) identified by the scholars working on these processes of regional change. It introduces the influence of domestic, regional and international actors as the independent variable that explains the outcome (the explaining causes). By doing so it reinforces the idea that the EU is not the only actor influencing ASEAN institutionalization processes, but that other relevant actors in the region should be equally explored as potential drivers. Overall, it provides a concrete contribution to the debate on how to add a comparative dimension to the study of EU actorness.

The third section presents the analytical framework. Overall, it is argued in this thesis that actors are fundamental drivers of the institutionalization of regional policies and that their role in influencing this process should be explored in a systematic way. This analytical framework will allow for this more systematic analysis. In particular, this chapter introduces the mechanism that –the thesis argues- explains the institutionalization of a regional policy. It suggests that there are four key actor types involved in this process: the leader, the reference, the
sponsor and the implementer. Each of them performs an important role in influencing the adoption of the identified regional policy. This chapter offers a conceptualization of each of these key actors and it defines what, how and why they are influencing. Finally, it also looks at the disaster management case in ASEAN, advancing the hypothesis on how the EU would be expected to perform in one of these roles.

The fourth section covers the methodology used in the study. It starts by presenting the debates surrounding the nature of causality and the different understandings of the nature of causal mechanisms. The causal mechanism is then defined, the ways to observe it are discussed, and the choice of using interpretative process-tracing justified. The section continues by introducing process-tracing as the methodology applied to this research and, and more specifically, explains how a theory-building design of process-tracing has been operationalized in the research.

The final section describes how data were gathered via expert, semi-structured interviews and document-analysis. The strengths and limitations of doing fieldwork are also discussed in order to present the reasoning behind the specific research choices of this thesis.
2.1 The explored outcome: the institutionalization of a regional policy

This research established the institutionalization of a new policy at regional level as its main outcome to be explored. The next section will introduce the conceptualization of ‘institutionalization’ as the multiphase process that this thesis will investigate.

2.1.1 Focusing on (regional) institutions

The attention of political scientists on institutional arrangements started in the 1930s (Reus-Smit and Snidal 2008), but has been substantially revised in the 1980s with the launch of ‘new institutionalism’. Before that, other theories tried to explain the change within organisations. The structural-contingency theory focuses on the selection of appropriate structural arrangements to face circumstances, tackle uncertainty and gain objectives; resource-dependence theory focuses on the dependency on other organisations in terms of resources; and ecological theory focuses on the inability of organisations to quickly adapt to the change of the environment (Greenwood et al. 2008). Yet, since the 1970s the literature on political institutions increased and urged the need to prioritise the focus on the political institutions rather than on the social context and on the roles of individual actors (March and Olsen 1983). Interesting questions like ‘What is a political institution?’, or ‘How do political institutions work?’ were stimulated by March and Olsen’s work.
New institutionalism did not respond with one single answer, but different approaches try to address these questions from different perspectives. The differentiation proposed by Hall and Taylor (1996) identifies three main approaches: rationalist, historical and sociological. *Rationalist (Rational-choice) institutionalism* sees institutions as an arena used by individuals to maximize their utilities. Actors create the institution for their advantage, in order to ‘gain from cooperation’ (Shepsle 2009). The change in the approach is justified by the change in the preferences of the actors involved (Tolbert and Zucker 1999). *Historical institutionalism* combines institutions with organizations and the rules or conventions promulgated by formal organization. The focus is on the sequencing of change across time and it is characterised by a path-dependency logic (Mahoney 2000; David 2001) interrupted by critical junctures as the causes of change. *Sociological institutionalism* focuses on why organizations take on specific sets of institutional forms, procedures or symbols and the meaning institutions, as norms and cultures, represent for individuals. Institutions embed rules and routines that define what constitutes an appropriate action (appropriateness logic). Variants of sociological institutionalism are its constructivist and discursive understandings. In 2006 Hay underlined the importance of including *Constructivist institutionalism* to the family of institutionalism (Schmidt 2002, 2008; Campbell, Pedersen, and Pedersen 2001). According to Hay (2006), institutions are codified systems of ideas and the practices they sustain. Ideas, discourse and narratives are used to explain, deliberate or legitimate political action. Similarly, Schmidt (2010) suggested another form of institutionalism: discursive institutionalism. It focuses on institutional change, and in particular on the dynamics of this change generated
by the interaction of preferences, strategies, and normative orientation of the actors. This change is explained, according to Schmidt, by looking at ideas and discourse. Although the three key understandings of new institutionalism are still valid and useful to explain reality, they are often accused of focusing mainly on the outcome often assuming the process (Mizruchi and Fein 1999). In addition, they complement each other in particular if the focus of the research is on processes. A single approach could be useful to explain one single phase of the process, but for the researcher who aims at exploring more complex processes (multiple phases and multiple actors) one single logic is not sufficient. Even if they seem providing competing logics to explain reality, they are also complementary sources of theoretical inspiration (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002).

The European Union is one of the most institutionalised international organizations in the world (Pollack 2007) and the most integrated regional organization. Therefore, it is not surprising that the lenses of new institutionalism, as the most dominant approach to understanding organisations (Greenwood et al. 2008), has been widely used to explain the European institutionalization process. Rationalist institutionalism explained institutional development in the EU by mainly focusing on principle-agent theory (Pollack 1997). Historical institutionalism gives more attention to structures, explaining institutional development by applying logics of path-dependency. Finally, sociological institutionalism focuses on the capacity of the EU to diffuse its norms inside or outside its borders (Schmidt 2013). Overall, a lot of attention has been given to the endogenous elements that influence the institutionalization of
the EU, whereas less attention has been devoted to the role of exogenous actors and factors in this process. An exception to this tendency is the volume edited by Costa and Jørgensen (2012a), where they look at the influence of international institutions on EU internal and external policies, processes, institutions and behaviour. Differently, the case of ASEAN has been mainly analysed looking at the exogenous actors, giving less attention to the endogenous drivers of institutionalization. In particular the EU is often looked at as model (Börzel and Risse 2009) or as a point of reference (Telò, Fawcett, and Ponjaert 2015) for the institutionalization processes within ASEAN.

In summary, inspired by the work of Costa and Jørgensen (2012a), this thesis looks at the ASEAN institutionalization process in disaster management policy, to assess the influence of the EU, as one exogenous actor among many that have influenced the institutionalization of the disaster management policy within ASEAN.

2.1.2 Defining (regional) institutionalization: a process

Processes of regional institutionalization have been labelled differently in the literature on regional and inter-regional relations. Terms such as regionalization, regional-integration, region-building and regionalism have been used interchangeably.

Regionalization is understood and defined in two different ways. First, regionalization is understood as the horizontal process that sees the creation of more and more regional institutions in the world. This process must be
understood in parallel with the globalization process (Fawcett and Hurrell 1995; Gamble and Payne 1996; Hettne 2002; Telò 2007; De Lombaerde and Schulz 2009; Telò 2015a). For some authors, this process is led by state or non-state actors (Hettne 2014), for some others the process is led by the market, private trade and investment flows, which supports regionalism, understood as the emergence of intergovernmental dialogue led by national states (Breslin 2002).

Second, regionalization is understood as the vertical process that sees a region deepening the level of integration among its member states (Eliassen and Arnesen 2007; Coman and Ponjaert 2015). A full set of other terms has been used to explain the same process. Concepts such as regional integration (Fawcett 2015a), region-building (Murray and Brennan 2015) and even regionalism (Allison 2015a) have been used to describe this exact process.

Starting with ‘regional integration’, even if the term is understood as a process and not as a finished product, as suggested by Haas (1958) and Fawcett (2015a), other authors would argue that this process of integration involves only the EU and no other regional organizations, such as ASEAN, where the same process would be better described as increasing regional cooperation (Murray and Brennan 2015).

*Region-building* has been initially defined as the application of a self/other perspective to regions (Neumann 2003). This initial focus on regional identity building has then been extended to the entire process of regionalization or regionalism (Murray and Brennan 2015). Similarly, also the term regionness has
been understood as ‘a prelude and integral part of formal regionalism’ (Fawcett 2015b, 34).

The term *regionalism* described as the ‘formation of regionally-based groupings for the purposes of policy coordination’ (Fawcett 2015b, 36; Van Langenhove 2016) or ‘institutionalized multidimensional cooperation among neighbouring countries’ (Telò, Fawcett, and Ponjaert 2015, 2) would, according to some authors, better describe the process of what we have called vertical institutionalization. For example, Söderbaum (2007, 200) argues that ‘Regionalism represents the policy and project, whereby state and non-state actors cooperate and coordinate strategy within a particular region or as a type of world order. It is usually associated with a formal programme, and often leads to institution-building’. Yet, it does not reflect enough the idea of a multiphase process this research aims to address. As noticed by Gamble (2007) when we talk about regionalism, we refer to a static system of policies whereas when we talk about regionalization we refer to a complex process.

Overall, in order to avoid any terminological confusion, ‘institutionalization’ has been chosen as the best term to describe the process analysed in this thesis, as it already captures the outcome to be explored in this research with no need to further underline its regional dimension.

The understanding of institutions as a ‘set of social arrangements’ is paired with the understanding of the institution as a process (Scott 2014). Indeed, Scott underlined the importance of answering the question ‘How and why does
institutionalization occur?’ as according to him, institutional theorists have ‘too often neglected to address questions of the ‘who’ and ‘how’ with regard to institutional effects’ (Scott 2014, 144). Reflecting on the various strands of institutionalism, Scott identifies three conceptions of institutionalization. The first one based on increasing returns and a path-dependent process. This mechanism is based on positive feedbacks that produced the effect that ‘further developments in the same direction are rewarded, whereas the costs of switching to an alternative increase over time’ (Scott 2014, 144). The second conception of institutionalization proposed by Scott is institutionalization based on increasing commitments (Scott 2014, 145). This mechanism is based on the idea of Selznick (1957, 16) that ‘in its most significant meaning ‘to institutionalize’ is to infuse with value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand’. Finally, the third conception advanced by Scott is based on increasing objectification. This mechanism is based on the progressive transmission of objectified beliefs to third parties, defined as ‘the individuals who played no role in constructing them’ (Scott 2014, 148). Tolbert and Zucker (1999) are among the scholars that, according to Scott, mostly contributed to this conceptualization of institutions as processes by advancing a model based on four stages. First innovation, understood as the moment in which an organization search for a solution to an occurred problem. Second habitualization, when new structures are set up to respond to the identified problem. Third objectification, when some degree of social consensus is built around the value of the new structures. Finally sedimentation, when the new created structures are perpetuated over time.
Overall, in this research institutionalization, set as the outcome to be explored, is indeed understood as a progressive process characterized by consecutive milestones. Therefore, there is the need to identify certain events that more than others, represent a step forward in the process. The adoption of a first programme, the signature of a legally binding agreement and the launch of a dedicated instrument have been identified as the three key temporal steps, as, it is argued, in each of this step the regional cooperation among ASEAN member states deepened. This is reflected in the empirical analysis, where the process is divided into three main phases. The first identified phase is the institutionalization of the ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management, as it marked the emergence of a regional approach to disaster within the ASEAN regions (Chapter 4). The second phase towards a deeper institutionalization of a regional approach to disaster is the adoption of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Disaster Response (AADMER), as a more institutionalize and legally binding agreement (Chapter 5). The third and final phase of the analysis covers the creation of the actual instrument to regionally coordinate the ASEAN response to disaster: the AHA Centre (Chapter 6). Although the empirical analysis looks at the influence of actors on these three milestones of the institutionalization process separately, the overall claims of the thesis speak at the institutionalization process of ASEAN disaster management as a whole.
2.2 The explanatory factors of regional integration: the actors’ influence

This section will first provide an overview of the main drivers that have been used in the literature to explain why independent states decide to integrate policies at regional level. As this thesis aims at contributing to the debate on actorness, the section introduces also the influence of national, regional and international actors as the explanatory elements that also contributed in explaining the outcome analysed in the thesis. Finally, the section is devoted to explaining how crises will be conceptualized in the empirical part of the thesis as intervening variables.

2.2.1 The drivers of regional integration: a focus on national, regional and international actor’s influence

The research that looks at regional institutions cannot avoid answering the question ‘how and why regional organizations -such as the EU and the ASEAN- are formed and sustained?’. However, it is hard to present a single set of factors that facilitate the creation and the further institutionalization of regional organizations. Comparing regional experiences is always considered risky as the specificities of each organization allowed them to be considered ‘unique cases’. For example, the historical and geographical factors that facilitated European integration cannot be found in the ASEAN experience. Yet the effort should be made to better understand the processes that drive institutionalization. Moreover, although different in substance some common factors are present across different experiences (Mattli 1998; Laursen 2003; Murray and Brennan 2015). In a
contribution edited by Brennan and Murray (2015) internal or external factors explaining the process of regional institutionalization, intended as progressive regional integration/cooperation have been explored. Fawcett (2015a) identifies three different drivers of regionalism: ideas, institutions and core states. Mayer (2015) proposed historical narratives as normative drivers of integration, and Moxon-Browne (2015) examined the role of institutions in regional integration. Economic and business perspectives are also considered to play a key role in regionalism. Particular focus has been given to the role of international business (Brennan 2015), as well as trade and investment (Andreosso-O’Callaghan 2015). Furthermore, traditional and non-traditional security is also proposed as one of the drivers of regional integration. Here authors look at the role of great powers (Stumbaum 2015), or at specific issues such as food security (Matthews 2015; Silfvast, Brennan, and Murray 2015) and climate change (Torney 2015).

Indeed, there are several elements that could explain a further institutionalization of regional cooperation. The initial attention given by realist to nation-states (Morgenthau 1948) has been progressively challenged by including also non-state actors in the analysis (Keohane and Nye 1977), and then by looking at the normative and cultural aspects as fundamental drivers of these processes (Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner 1998). Without undermining the role that other drivers could potentially play in the process, as the aim of this research is to contribute to the debate on actorness, its focus will be on the actors that could potentially play a role in the process.
The term ‘actors’ here includes domestic, regional and international actors. Indeed, although national actors have been often considered to play a primary role in promoting a deeper regional cooperation (Moravcsik 2002), increasingly attention has been given to similar pre-existing regional structure. The direct consequence of this has been the growing role assigned by scholars and policy makers to the EU as a model for other regional experiences (see discussion in Chapter 1) or to the importance of the inter-regional relations more in general (De Lombaerde and Schulz 2009; Allison 2015b). Finally, international and multilateral actors also deserved attention as ‘crucial factors in the start-up, but also in influencing and controlling […] regionalism’ (Fawcett 2015a, 44). In addition to these three categories of actors, this research also includes the other non-domestic nation states with a role in the process. Fawcett (2015a) refers to them as powerful or hegemonic states, mainly referring to the United States. In this research this fourth category of actors includes state actors relevant to the process and not necessarily powerful states as such.

2.2.2 The role of crisis as intervening variable
Because of the specific focus of this thesis on disasters, among the several elements that could explain the institutionalization process, the role that crises have on the process needs a further exploration. Historical institutionalists consider crises key drivers of regional integration or cooperation (Fioramonti 2012), as these ‘critical junctures’ are fundamental in explaining change (Pierson 2004, 135). Being a threat (Gillespie 2015) or an opportunity (Ryan 2015) it seems hard to exclude crises from the explaining causes of the institutionalization process. Yet, as this thesis looks at the role played by actors,
the existence of a crisis, defined as a ‘perceived threat that must be urgently averted or addressed in order to avoid dire consequences’ (Boin, Ekengren, and Rhinard 2013), will be considered for its effects on actor’s actions. Instead of considering crises that affected the ASEAN member states across the period analysed, as the direct explanatory cause of the further institutionalization of a regional mechanism or as a component of the mechanism, crises will be looked upon as intervening variables (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 188). These variables can vary and are not a necessary elements of the mechanism, as system where each part has no independent causal impact on Y. Overall, crisis will be considered as one potential trigger of actor’s behaviour, when they trigger actor’s involvement in new phases of the process, or as an accelerator of an already existing process, when already agreed phases of the institutionalization process will see an acceleration.

2.3 The analytical framework: internal and external actor’s influences

This thesis advances an original analytical framework to investigate the mechanism that explains the influence of internal and external actors in the institutionalization of disaster management as an ASEAN regional policy. The framework proposed allows for unpacking the concept of actorness in light of institutional literature. By proposing four analytical categories (the leader, the reference, the sponsor and the implementer), the framework is proposed as a tool to explore the EU’s role in comparison to other actors involved in the same institutionalization process, going beyond the conceptualization of the EU as a sui generis actor.
The proposed framework argues that this multiphase process could be explained by the influence exercised by four identifiable types of actors, each of them performing a necessary, but not sufficient role in the mechanism of institutionalization. By un-packing the types of actors that influence the process, the framework is in line with the aim of the thesis of shedding light on the role of actors in institutionalization processes. These roles synthesize the contribution of the different neo-Institutionalist approaches (rationalist, historical and sociological) and they also reflect the debate about the different modes of influencing derived from both IR as well as Public Policy theories (see Table 1, page 65).

These roles have been attributed to both internal, as well external actors, meaning that both ASEAN member states, as well as ASEAN dialogue partners could in principle –and did in reality- perform all these roles. Moreover, it is important to notice that one or more actors can perform the same role, as well as one actor can perform more than one role.

In the following sub-sections each role is defined (see Table 2 The Analytical Framework). After giving a clear definition of what the leader, the reference, the sponsor and the implementer are, each sub-section clarifies what we should expect to be influenced by each actor (objective of influence), the institutional logics that could explain actor’s involvement, as well as the different modes of influence at the disposal of each actor. Finally, the section presents the working hypothesis explaining the reasons why the EU would be expected to perform in
any of the identified roles, as well as the ways in which the EU as a regional actor might exercise influence on an ASEAN institutionalization process.

2.3.1 The Leader

The role of the leader is attributed to the actor(s) that first took the initiative of proposing a new step (goal) towards the institutionalization of a regional policy in general, and disaster management in particular. The leader does not set the content of the new initiative, but makes the point that this new step should be made. The leader is successful in framing the issue as a political or technical objective for ASEAN.

ASEAN member states are the first natural leaders of their regional institutionalization. Yet, as Murray (2015) noticed, also external actors can play a key role in leading these types of processes. This is the case for example in the role played by the US in the EU own process of regional institutionalization.

The reasons why the leader is so keen in proposing certain advancement in the institutionalization of the disaster management policy are of three types and can be explained by looking at the three new-Institutionalist logics. First, as a rationalist reading would suggest the leader is driven by the calculation logic and it has a primary interest in the adoption of the given advancement. This interest can be economic, as the advancement positively impacts the leader, or a more strategic one as leader sees the added value of having the coordination of this policy done at regional level, as it considers it more efficient and effective. In this case the leader will use its political resources to pro-actively propose new
venues for cooperation. Second, as an historical Institutionalist reading of the issue would suggest, the leader sees the institutionalization of this specific policy as a natural continuation of a path broadly involving the region. In this case, the leader will insist on the need to advance the cooperation, as the process cannot be stopped. Finally, following a sociological Institutionalist reading, the leader might be interested in supporting the advancement of the general idea of ASEAN regional integration and the potential advancement in the disaster management domain simply serves this purpose. In this third case, the leader will insist more on the benefits that advancing this policy will have more in general on ASEAN cooperation.

Independently from the logics behind the leader’s action, its influence is realised via a direct influence on the process. Following Börzel and Risse’s conceptualization (2009, 2012a), leader’s influence can take the form of coercion, manipulation of utility calculation, socialisation or persuasion. Firstly, coercion will be difficult to find in the explored case, as ASEAN institutional setting does not allow for rules that are legally binding for member states or partners. Secondly, for similar reasons, the manipulation of utility calculation will be mainly present in terms of positive incentives (and not as negative ones). The leader might propose forms of positive rearwards to its fellows in forms of financial and technical assistance, not necessarily proposing itself as a potential sponsor or implementer (see definitions below), but also by showing that there are credible actors ready to take up these roles. Thirdly, socialization, by setting certain expectations during social situation (from technical working groups to summits) the leader influences the process, as it is able to act as the entrepreneur
that influences priorities and agendas. Finally, persuasion is used by the leader to convince its fellow actors about the legitimacy of its proposals, as they make sense to the overall objective.

**Why would we expect the EU to act as a leader?**

The leader is intended to proactively suggest the adoption of a certain step (goal) towards a more integrated regional cooperation in disaster management and not to provide directions on the content of this norms or instruments. As a key proponent of regionalism and interregional relations, driven sometimes by the desire to export its own version of regional actorness (Mattheis and Wunderlich 2017), the European Union could be expected to act as a leader. European commitment towards regionalism linked with the reading of the EU as a normative power (Manners 2002) suggests that the EU would be a pro-active proponent of the regional solution to tackle disaster cooperation in South-East Asia. The EU would be expected to pro-actively influence ASEAN in seeking to adopt regional norms and instruments to manage crises for three reasons that reflect the institutional logics.

First, following a rationalist logic the EU will insist on the need to have an independent ASEAN in the response to disasters as this will allow the EU to re-direct the funding dedicated to the region towards regions or cooperation areas that are more in-need or that are more relevant for the EU. In this case the EU will not be interested in advancing a particular norm or instruments, but will make a strong point for a general advancement of the policy. Following Manners (2002) suggestions, here the EU can influence the process via procedural or
transference diffusion of goals during high-political discussions. Second, following an historical reading of the EU-ASEAN cooperation, the hypothesis that the EU could act as the leader in the process of institutionalization of ASEAN disaster management is based on the idea that the 40 years of inter-regional relations between the EU and ASEAN, as well as the existence of several programmes (such as DIPECHO and READI) aiming at reinforcing ASEAN disaster management could have influenced the ASEAN Secretariat or ASEAN member states is pursuing certain goal instead of others. Finally, linked with an organizational reading, the explanations that sees the EU being a pro-active proponent of the regional solution on disaster management as a less contested policy then others (or the most appropriate one) to advance further regional integration in the region.

The EU it is not expected to exercise any type of coercion on ASEAN member states, but rather to use other forms of influence including manipulation of utility calculation, socialization or persuasion. Firstly, the EU can propose incentives to ASEAN or ASEAN member states to further strengthen their cooperation for example by proposing itself also as a sponsor or implementer (manipulation of utility calculation). Secondly, the EU and ASEAN have a long-standing cooperation and they regularly meet in different inter-regional settings and at different levels (ASEM meeting, regular invitation of EU representatives to ASEAN Ministerial meetings, etc.). It can be argued, therefore, that there are numerous opportunities to exercise influence via both socialization and persuasion.
2.3.2 The Reference

The role of the reference is assigned to the actor(s) that act as a model for the norms or instruments firstly proposed by the leader. The reference provides a good model from which to take inspiration. In the case of disasters management’s norms adopted by ASEAN, the role of reference is represented by another regional or international organization. The reason is simply that these norms better adhere to the needs of a regional organization. It would be hard for a regional organization to apply a norm conceptualize for a nation states. Yet, in terms of instruments ASEAN member states, as well as nation-states dialogue partners (Australia, Japan, New Zealand and US), can also be a valid reference for the instruments adopted. In fact, a technical instrument can –more easily than a norm- both fit a national, an international, as well as a regional setting. An actor can directly present itself as a reference or the receiver(s) can indirectly choose it.

An actor pro-actively proposes its norm or instruments for different reasons. First, as proposed by rational-choice Institutionalists, the reference considers its norm or instruments the most appropriate for the said policy (calculation logic). Second, as suggested by an historical reading, an actor that is often a reference for the receiver will keep propose its solution to the receiver, following the historical path of their relation. According to this historical logic, an actor that has act as a reference in the past, will try to replicate this role also in the future for other norms and instruments. Finally, as an organizational reading would suggest, if the norm proposed by the referent is chosen this reinforces the legitimacy of the norm or instrument proposed by the reference. In this case the
reference will also try to convince the leader that its norms/instruments are the best available to achieve the objective set by the leader. The actor pro-actively acting as the reference proposes its norm or instrument as the best available by adopting direct modes of influence, including coercion, utility’s manipulation, socialization or persuasion (Börzel and Risse 2012b; Lenz 2013).

On the other hand, the reference can also exercise its role indirectly. In this case, the actor exercises an indirect influence, voluntarily auto-perpetrated by the receiver (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996). The receiver takes inspiration for a norm or instrument already adopted by the reference. Overall, the reference can be a completely passive actor, not even aware of the mechanism is part of. Looking at the reasons why the receiver adopts the norms or instruments of a certain actor as its reference, new-Institutionalist approaches propose three explanations. First, a rationalist view suggests that as the receiver wants to improve its efficiency and efficacy, in a process of learning (Rose 1991) it adopts a policy that is recognised as the best available. Second, according to an organizational understanding, the receiver aim is to gain legitimacy, in a mimic process, it adopts the norm or instruments implemented by an actor that is recognize as legitimate. Finally, the receiver chooses the reference based on a long-standing history of cooperation between the two actors. The receiver does not look too much around to select the most appropriate norm or instruments but adopts the one from a long-standing cooperation partner. Overall, this indirect influence of the Reference can be of different types (Rose 1993; Dolowitz and Marsh 1996; Chapter 1, 16). First, it can be a fully copying of the norms or instrument adopted by the Reference. Second, it can be an emulation of the norm and instrument, meaning that the
norm or instrument adopted by the Reference is then adapted to the local realities. Third, the receiver picks and chooses parts of the norms of instruments from a set of other actors acting as references. The difference with the previous one being that there are more than one actor playing the role of the reference.

**Why would we expect the EU to act as a reference?**

The European Union is the most integrated regional organization; therefore, the system developed by the EU to respond to crises and disasters (see Chapter 3) can act as a reference for the other regional organization wishing to implement a similar regional system.

Following the three institutional explanations, the EU could be expected to directly act as a reference providing the necessary contents to advance the norms of instruments at ASEAN disposal. First, because the EU rationally believes that its own model is the most efficient and effective to deal with disaster. Second, historically the EU as a long tradition of cooperation in the domain of disaster response, in particular with ASEAN member states, therefore it makes sense to imagine that the EU will remain involved in sharing its model. Finally, the EU seeks for legitimacy could justify the pro-active search for influencing the ASEAN process. Similarly, the EU might also be perceived as a valid reference from the receiver. First, as the norm or instrument is indeed the most efficient as it is already tested in a regional setting. Second, the EU is a long-standing partner with several projects launched in the area of disaster management; therefore, it makes sense to imagine that before looking at other potential actors that could act as reference, ASEAN will look at the EU. Finally, ASEAN is also seeking for
legitimacy; therefore, it is reasonable to think that ASEAN will adopt a norm or instrument similar to the one adopted by the EU to increase its legitimacy as regional organization.

The debate about the EU role as a model -or as a reference- of regional integration is quite advanced. As discussed in the first chapter of the thesis the literature discussing the EU as a potential (non-)model, or reference, for other regional organization is quite widespread (Polillo and Guillén 2005; Telò 2007; Börzel and Risse 2012a; Jetschke and Murray 2012). With authors arguing that the EU actively promotes its model to other regional organizations via acts of socialization and persuasions, with other authors arguing that also if the EU does not pursue acts of self-promotion it is still considered an important reference by the other regional organizations. Some authors explored the potential role of the EU as a model for ASEAN by looking at the institutions (Jetschke and Murray 2012), some others by looking at disaster management policy in particular (Pennisi di Floristella 2012). Yet, these studies often lack a comparative dimension with the other actors involved. By not providing a comprehensive assessment of the context in which the EU would be supposed to exercise its influence, they de-facto provide picture of the process that is partial.

2.3.3 The Sponsor

The role of the sponsor is given to the actor(s) that financially sustained the steps that led to the further institutionalization. The sponsor funds both norms and instruments. This support can be direct, meaning financing directly the instruments analysed, or it can sustain the process by sponsoring the meetings,
the workshops and –more in general– the activities in which the norm is discussed. The sponsor might streamline its financial support in a multi-annual cooperation planning, or it might simply use some remnants from other projects or actions for giving an ad-hoc support to the process.

There are different reasons why the sponsor financially supports the adoption of certain norms or instruments. First, in line with a more rational-choice institutionalism perspective, the sponsor might have some internally inspired interests in showing it is supporting the process, for example because its own public opinion is pushing for it. In this case ASEAN’s leaders might see an interest in concretely contributing to the institutionalization process. In addition to that leaders from ASEAN’s dialogue partners might also be pushed to concretely support the process for example in response to the emotional wave generated in the public opinion by particularly severe disasters. This has been the case for the many countries sponsoring various projects in the aftermath of the 2004 Tsunami. Complementary to this is the organizational view according to which the sponsor wants to contribute to reinforcing the ASEAN regional system to respond to disasters, or more in general, it wants to reinforce ASEAN as a regional organization as it believes in the regional solution for the global governance. In addition to this, an organizational explanation would also suggest that the sponsor is interested in financially supporting the institutionalization process as this will legitimate its role in the region as a dialogue partner or as a key actor among other ASEAN member states. Finally, an historical understanding would suggest that the sponsor support a certain norm or
instrument as this is the logic consequence of a previous action taken by the sponsor.

The type of influence that the sponsor exercises is a vertical pressure (coercive isomorphism) towards the actors involved (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). It is not necessarily the result of an explicit imposition, but it can also result of what Boxenbaum and Jonsson (2008) defined as ‘resource dependence’. The demand to adopt specific practices to fulfil eligibility criteria can also be understood as a form of vertical pressure.

Why would we expect the EU to act as a sponsor?

The EU is among the biggest investors in the ASEAN region. The declared interest of the EU in supporting the ASEAN institutionalization of a disaster management policy that could ‘reduce the EU [humanitarian] interventions in the South-East Asia area’ (European Commission Official 2017d) would suggest that the EU would be rationally interested in also financially supporting the steps towards a further institutionalization of the ASEAN disaster management policy. Second, during the 40 years of inter-regional cooperation the EU launched a series of programme to sustain the development of disaster management in the South-East Asia region (see Chapter 3). Starting with the ten years 2006 DIPECHO programme, following with the even stronger cooperation announced after the 2004 Tsunami and the launched of the ASEAN-EU Emergency Management Programme in 2012, the EU invested various billion Euro in their 20 years support in building an ASEAN regional disaster management
mechanism. Therefore, following an historical reading, the EU would be interested in further sponsoring existing norms or instruments as a consequent logic of previous actions. Finally, the continuous research for ways to sustain the further integration of the ASEAN region, explains why the EU would be interested in sponsoring the adoption of norms or instruments.

For the EU that traditionally does not have means to exercise vertical pressure on ASEAN, sponsoring is the activity that might potentially assures more vertical influence. The EU funds are recognised among the strictest in terms of eligibility criteria. Indeed, the actor that would aspire to receive this foundling will be asked to comply to a long series of criteria set by the EU. Although this might result in the actor simply looking for alternatives, in case the EU would be able to act as sponsor this might give it the best possible entry to exercise (some degree of) vertical pressure.

2.3.4 The Implementer

The role of the implementer is ascribed to the actor that is in charge of the technical, implementation of the norm or of the instruments that will advance the institutionalization process. The implementer can influence the technical set up of the norms, by for example (co-)drafting the text of the norm, or the instruments, by taking care for example, of the design of the tool and the drafting of the job-descriptions.

In the analysed case we should expect the implementation part of the mechanism to be potentially done by ASEAN member states, by dialogue partners or by
public or private institutions linked to one of the two (ASEAN member states or dialogue partners).

The reasons why the implementer is interested in being involved in the institutionalization mechanism are three fold. First, as a rational-choice understanding would suggest, the implementer is interested in receiving the funding linked to the implementation of the phase. Second and sometimes complementary to the first one, is the organizational explanation, which would argue that receiving these funds also add to its legitimacy as a credible implementing actor capable of managing this type of project. Overall, it is just another project to have on the list of accomplished results. Third, from an historical point of view, when the leader directly suggests the sponsor, this one aims at keeping good relations with the proponent actors (leader or sponsor) and would therefore implement an instrument in line with the past expectations of the leader or sponsor.

The type of influence exercise by the implementer is a direct influence often translated into almost full copying of an instruments or norm already implemented somewhere else (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996). Indeed, the implementer is often chosen as it has already an experience in implementing similar instruments. Therefore, we should not be surprised if what will be proposed by the implementer it will be slightly different version of what someone else already implemented. The implementer is active in proposing itself as the best available option in implementing the agreed norm or instruments. By adopting socialization or persuasion’s behaviour (Börzel and Risse 2009, 2012a)
it convinces the involved actors that the presented option is the best possible solution. Quite often the leader, the reference and/or the sponsor, already knows the implementer for their previous cooperation in similar projects. In this case, they directly propose the Implementer as the best actor to implement valuable solutions.

**Why would we expect the EU to act as the implementer?**

The EU would also be expected to act as an implementer. The capacity of the EU to influence the process via the technical assistance it provides to regional partners has been widely discussed. According to Lenz (2013) this way of influencing can be linked back to the conceptualization of the EU as a civilian power (Duchêne 1972, 1973).

According to a rationalist logic, EU’s departments are interested in directly being involved in the implementation of the projects because this is perceived as a rational choice to do to implement the most efficient norm or instrument in details. Following an historical logic, several EU financial programmes are designed in a way that, when the EU act as a sponsor, it is inevitably an EU department that deals also with the implementation. In this case the EU’s department act as implementer because it had already a role as one of the other three actor’s types. Finally, EU departments might act as active implementers to legitimate its actions also within the EU.

By supporting the technical implementation of norms or instruments the EU can directly influence ASEAN institutionalization process (Mattheis and Wunderlich
As demonstrated by Allison (2015) the technical assistance provided by the EU to ASEAN in other domains, such economic integration with the APRIS, ARISE and TREATI programmes, demonstrated a high level of transference. In these cases, the EU influence towards the receiver would be a technical knowledge transfer done via the direct organization of (not sponsorships only) and participations to workshops, seminars and trainings directly targeting ASEAN officials directly dealing with the technical element of the issue. In the case of the ASEAN cooperation advancements in disaster management, the main target of the implementer would be ASEAN Secretariat for the norms’ component or the AHA Centre’s officials for the instrument’s component.
### Table 2. The Analytical Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Objective of influence</th>
<th>Logics behind influence</th>
<th>Modes of influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leader</strong></td>
<td>Goals</td>
<td>(RCI) More efficient, effective and/or economically convenient</td>
<td>Direct influence via:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(HI) The natural next step in the institutionalization process</td>
<td>• Coercion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(OI) A way to advance ASEAN regional integration</td>
<td>• Manipulation of utility calculations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Socialization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Persuasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reference</strong></td>
<td>Content of norms or instruments</td>
<td>Direct:</td>
<td>Direct:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(RCI) Reinforce the efficacy and efficiency of receiver</td>
<td>• Coercion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(HI) The actor has already acted as a reference in the past in the same domain</td>
<td>• Manipulation of utility calculations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(OI) Reinforce reference’s legitimacy</td>
<td>• Socialization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Indirect:</td>
<td>• Persuasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(RCI) The norm/instrument is the most efficient</td>
<td>Indirect:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(HI) The reference is a long-standing partner (trust)</td>
<td>• Copying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(OI) The chosen reference is recognised as legitimate</td>
<td>• Emulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Synthesis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sponsor</strong></td>
<td>Financial support to norms (workshops, events, exchanges) or instruments (providing direct funding)</td>
<td>(RCI) In response to public opinion’s requests</td>
<td>Vertical pressure (coercive transfer) via</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(HI) It has already sponsored previous actions in the same domain</td>
<td>• direct imposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(OI) Reinforce ASEAN regional integration &amp; be perceived as a legitimate actor in the region</td>
<td>• resource dependences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implementer</strong></td>
<td>Technical implementation of norms (drafting of text,..) or instruments (design of tool, job descriptions, ..)</td>
<td>(RCI) Interested in receiving the funding to implement the project</td>
<td>Direct influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(HI) involvement linked with already existing relations with the leader, the reference or the sponsor</td>
<td>• copy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(OI) what to be perceived as a legitimate actor in the domain of its actions</td>
<td>• emulation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.4 A Process tracing methodology

This third section of the chapter is dedicated to introducing process tracing (George and Bennett 2005; Gerring and Thomas 2007; Checkel 2008; Beach and Pedersen 2013; Bennett and Checkel 2014) as the methodology used in the research. This in-depth qualitative method makes possible to highlight the role of the actors involved and their logics, providing the methodological tool to explore the institutionalization process under analysis. Process-tracing has been only recently formalized as the qualitative method ‘to study causal mechanisms within a case study’ (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 2) and that allows for in-depth case-study analysis. As case study is here defined as the ‘work that focuses its attention on a single example of a broader phenomenon’ (Gerring and Thomas 2007, 241), ASEAN disaster management is chosen as the case study to analyse a larger phenomenon: the influence of actors on the institutionalization of a regional policy. In particular, the research, as discussed in the previous section, explores the role of four typologies of actors: the leader, the reference, the sponsor and the implementer.

The section starts by discussing the ontology of causality and the debates surrounding it, in order to justify the choice of understanding causality in its mechanistic and deterministic nature. As the concept of causal mechanism is central to the process tracing methodology, a definition of what is a causal mechanism, as well as some reflections on how to observe it are also presented in this section. The choice of using interpretative process-tracing will be justified,
its main challenges will be discussed, and the precautions adopted in the thesis to overcome them will be presented.

After giving a general overview of the understanding of process-tracing that will inform this research project, the actual theory-building process-tracing design will be presented: after defining the key theoretical concepts (X and Y), empirics will be collected and the existence of evidence and causal mechanism assessed. Finally, the importance of cross-verification with the most similar cases will be presented.

2.4.1 Ontology of Causality

When discussing the use of the Process-Tracing method, the debates surrounding the nature of causality cannot be avoided. On one hand, the question whether we should understand a causal relationship as a pattern of regular empirical association (X produces Y, provided that we controlled all possible other variables), or whether causality refers to the deeper connection between cause and effect (opening the black box that explains the mechanism that show how X produces Y) affect the ontological and epistemological foundations of the research. On the other hand, the debate between a deterministic or probabilistic understanding of the causal relations should also be addressed.

Causality: Regularity understanding vs. Mechanistic approach

The most prevalent understanding of causality in Social Science is the one based on David Hume’s assumptions. He defines a cause as ‘…an object, followed by another, and where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects
similar to the second, or in other words where, if the first object had not been, the second never had existed.’ (Hume 1975). The consequence of this definition is that we should define causes in terms of correlations between factors and that causation should be understood as the regular association between X and Y, once other relevant possible causes are controlled (Chalmers 1999; Marini and Singer 1988; Beach and Pedersen 2013). This means that when X increases, Y increases too (directly proportional) or that when X increases, Y decreases (inversely proportional). According to this understanding X and Y are in fact variables. A typical example of this is the set of studies that conceptualize democracy as the dependent variable that varies (in a scale that goes from the negative pole autocracy to the most positive pole full democracy) according to selected independent variables, such as corruption, economic situation, etc.

In opposition to that some scholars recently argued that the regularity understanding of causality does not explain the causal process that shows how X produces Y. The process in the neo-Humean understanding of causality still remains a black-box, and do not permit scholars to have a deep explanatory knowledge of the analysed phenomenon (Salmon 1998). Going back to the previous example on democracy, this means posing the question: “how does corruption affects the state of democracy in a given country?” Scholars such as Bhaskar (1978), Bunge (1997) and Glennan (1996) argue that the mechanistic understanding of causal mechanisms, which was introduced prior to Hume by Descartes, should be reintroduced, after addressing the main critics moved by Hume, which was the inability to empirically verify that X caused Y.
The two different understandings of causality (regularity vs. mechanistic) can be linked to the discussion on regionalism. A regularity understanding is the one that looks at explaining the variation in the regional integration or cooperation, answering to a ‘what question’ such as: ‘What influence a deeper integration/cooperation among a group of states?’. Differently, a mechanistic approach to the studies on regionalism, is the one that looks at answering to the ‘hows’ with questions such: ‘How are these set of factors influencing the integration of a given region?’.

**Causality: Probabilistic vs. Deterministic**

Another ontological debate is the one between probabilistic and deterministic understanding of causality. Beach and Pedersen (2013) define a probabilistic causality the one used mainly by King, Keohane and Verba (1994, 89), in which ‘the researcher believes that we are dealing with a world in which there are random properties, often modelled using error terms’. In the probabilistic approach to causality, the variation of Y is directly linked with the variation of X. We are not focused on the process, but on the variation (Y decrease if X decrease and vice-versa). The probabilistic approach is mainly used in large-n quantitative statistical methods. On the other hand, qualitative scholars have a more deterministic understanding of causality when examining whether X is either a necessary and/or sufficient cause of Y in an individual case and not whether a given X tends to co-vary with Y in a population (Mahoney 2008; Collier, Brandy, and Seawright 2010; Beach and Pedersen 2013). The deterministic approach is mainly applied in case-oriented approaches using
small-n comparison, case study or set-theoretic methods, such as QCA (Della Porta 2008).

To conclude, the ontological assumption of the use of a process-tracing methodology in this thesis is that causality is understood as been mechanistic and deterministic. The purpose of using a process tracing methodology is in fact on one hand, to open that black-box, explaining the causal process that shows how X produces Y (mechanistic approach) and to the other hand to examine whether X is either a necessary and/or sufficient cause of Y (deterministic view).

2.4.2 What is a Causal Mechanism?

The use of a process-tracing methodology and the consequent understanding of causality as a mechanistic element makes necessary to spell out the debates and the positions surrounding the nature of causal mechanisms and the observability of the mechanism should also be discussed as different understandings have different consequences on the ontological stance. The following section will discuss how causal mechanisms are identified, observed and understood in the thesis.

Defining Causal Mechanisms

Glennan (1996, 52) defines a mechanism as ‘a complex system, which produces an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts’. Bennett (2008, 207) defines a causal mechanism as ‘a process through which agents with causal capacities operate in specific context to transfer energy, information or matter to other entities’. More recently, together with Checkel, he addressed the observability
issue made by neo-Humean scholars, arguing that ‘Causal mechanisms are ontological entities and process in the world, and theories and hypothesis are in our heads; we theorize about mechanisms. Such mechanisms are ultimately unobservable, but our hypotheses about them generate observable and testable implications’ (Bennett and Checkel 2014, 12).

In their machine analogy, Beach and Pedersen (2013, 29) explain that each of the parts of the causal mechanism can be conceptualized as composed of entities that undertake activities that produce the change. Each part of the causal mechanism (the sum of an entity doing an activity) is not self-sufficient to explain the outcome Y. Yet it should only be understood as part of the whole mechanism. Even more, each part is vital for the mechanism to work. Considering the part of the mechanism as individually necessary, we avoid the risk of infinitive digression of the parts. In the framework proposed by this thesis the mechanism is composed of four entities (the leaders, the reference, the sponsor and the implementer). Each of this entity undertakes an activity that contributes to explain the analysed outcome (the institutionalization of a regional policy). Entities are not self-sufficient in explaining how the mechanism works, but they are all necessary for the outcome to happened.

**Observing Causal Mechanisms**

The discussion whether causal mechanisms are observable (or not) divides scholars using the methodology of Process Tracing. Some argue that ‘mechanisms are ultimately unobservable physical, social, or psychological

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3 This is what (Mackie 1980) called the INUS condition: the condition that is insufficient but necessary part of a condition that is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result.
processes through which agents with causal capacities operate’ (George and Bennett 2005, 137) and that ‘causal mechanisms are merely analytical constructs that do not have a real-world existence’ (Hedström and Swedberg 1998). In contrast, other scholars argue that ‘mechanisms are not pieces of reasoning but pieces of the furniture of the real world’ (Bunge 1997, 414). Beach and Pedersen suggest that ‘some types of causal mechanisms can be conceptualized and operationalized in a manner that permits quite close observation of actual mechanisms and where plentiful evidence exists that enables us to measure the mechanism quite closely’ (2013, 44). This view suggests that causal mechanisms are quite directly observable, meaning that when operationalizing we look for the fingerprints left by the mechanism in the empirical record. The methodological consequence of accepting the idea that causal mechanisms are observable is that for each part of the causal mechanism we should expect to find observable evidences.

Before discussing how these fingerprints will be find, measured and tested in our process tracing, it is necessary to clarify the epistemology that we intend to use in this research as this have strong implications on how the proposed mechanism will be tested.

**Interpretative vs. Bayesian process-tracing**

The popularity of the process-tracing method has increased in political science. Both positivist and constructivist approaches claim that process tracing can be a valid methodology to capture and explain causal mechanisms in action.
However, the two approaches are clearly different in their epistemology (Bennett and Checkel 2014).

Interpretative process-tracing is based on the assumption outlined by Wagenaar (2011, 243) that ‘the key heuristic moment consists of making sense of raw empirical data. This process of sense making always consists of entering into a dialogue between the preconceptions we bring to the study and the empirical data we have collected’. It is defined by Guzzini (2012, 251) ‘not in terms of a linear scheme, but as the intermeshing of several parallel processes’.

Interpretative process-tracing is presented as an alternative to what is considered a ‘too’ positivist-approach, as the method that better combines deductive and inductive approaches, and that is able to operationalize discourses. Against criticisms from positivist researchers qualifying interpretative work as a soft or unsystematic way of doing research, Wagenaar (2011, 251) responds that interpretative methods are ‘systematic, methodical, empirically driven activities that, when done well, set up conditions for a generative, critical confrontation of theory and the empirical world’. This definition provokes the inevitable question of ‘when is process-tracing properly done then?’.

Scholars with a positivist approach to process-tracing argue that interpretative process-tracing fails the struggles of verifiability or reliability which are the only standards available to scholars applying process-tracing methodology to avoid the story-telling trap (Beach and Pedersen 2013). In contrast, they propose a Bayesian approach to process-tracing, which provides a clear set of logical tools
for evaluating evidence that, might confirm or disconfirm a hypothesis. Yet, they are the first recognising that due to the uncertain nature of empirical observation we cannot claim to be 100 per cent confident about our theory –not even by using a Bayesian approach to process-tracing.

Beach and Pedersen (2013, 83) summarise the Bayesian logic with the following words: ‘Our belief in the validity of a hypothesis is, after collecting evidence (posterior), equal to the probability of the evidence conditional on the hypothesis being true relative to other alternative hypotheses (likelihood), times the probability that a theory is true based on our prior knowledge. Here, we use the term hypothesis to refer to hypotheses about the existence of each part of a theorized causal mechanism’.

Although the adoption of a Bayesian logic to process-tracing would sounds very attractive for a scholar aiming at producing a verifiable and reliable research, it should be also recognised that adding too many boundaries to the way in which the research is conducted might cause the opposite effect: as there is no research that is good enough, there is not research at all (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2015). For all these reasons, in this thesis an interpretative process tracing is adopted. Yet, a strong awareness of the risk of this approach counterbalanced the risk of falling into a story-telling exercise. Even more, in order to avoid the risk of reducing the analysis to a simple story-telling, the analysis will be based on the ten best-practices proposed by Bennet and Checkel (2014, 21) for a systematic, operational and transparent application of process-tracing. These ten best practices can be summarised in four main points. First, alternative
explanations should be seriously taken into consideration while conducting the empirical analysis. Second, the empirical analysis strongly benefits from inductive insights. Third, the investigator should always be aware of its bias on the topic researched, as well as the ones of the sources used to gather primary data. Finally, a good process-tracing is the one that clearly justify when the analysis starts and when it ends.

2.4.3 Main challenges of Process-tracing

Comparative or large-n analyses give more confidence in the relationship between the analysed variables, but as discussed so far, they not provide information on the causal mechanism linking the dependent with the independent variable. Therefore, using a process tracing methodology can, on one hand, provide light to the black box of the mechanism linking the analysed outcome with its explanatory causes, but on the other hand, the main challenges face by scholars using this method should be spelled out and addressed.

Schimmelfennig (2014, 102) categorizes the four main challenges face by scholars using process-tracing: resource problem, the measure-of-fit problem, the storytelling problem and the problem of generalization. First, how do we know when to stop? It is generally agreed that process tracing requires an in-depth knowledge of the analysed case and an enormous amount of information (George and Bennett 2005; Beach and Pedersen 2013; Bennett and Checkel 2014). The number of steps identified, as part of the process is potentially infinite. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify our limit, when are we going to stop? The need to include in the mechanism only the individually necessary part for the
mechanism to work already sets a clear limit to avoid ‘infinite regression’. 

Second, how do we evaluate our evidence? As process-tracing methodology is based on the collection of qualitative data, the only way to be sure that observations are properly evaluate and transformed into reliable evidence is by being clear and transparent about the collecting and evaluating process. Third, how do we know our research is scientifically grounded? The risk of transforming the analysis in a way that appears plausible to the reader is quite high if a scientific test method is not applied. In this research making explicit how and why certain evidence is relevant to the analytical framework proposed will overcome the risk of reducing the analysis to basic story-telling. Meaning constantly asking the question: “what does this observation tell us about the identified actor according to the definition advanced in the analytical framework?” Fourth, how can we generalize our mechanism? Meaning, how can we propose a mechanism that can be then applied to similar cases? The generalization of the process is possible in the theory-oriented typologies of process-tracing (Beach and Pedersen 2013). Observations and evidences will always be peculiar of the analysed case, but it will be possible to extend the identified mechanism to other similar cases (i.e. to other regional organisations, or to other institutional processes within ASEAN), providing that different observations and evidences will bring the same conclusions.

2.4.4 Building a theory by using process tracing

Theory building process-tracing will be chosen as the main research design. The following paragraph will justify this choice, as well as consider the alternatives.
One method, three possible designs

Process tracing has been discussed so far as a single method, but it is fundamental to differentiate among the three different uses of this method (Beach and Pedersen 2013) as this has profound consequences for the operationalization of the method and the overall objective of the research.

A first differentiation in the use of process-tracing is the one between theory-centric and case-centric process tracing. Case-centric process tracing starts with the assumption that the complexity of the social world makes the ambition of producing knowledge that can be generalized almost impossible. The objective is to find a plausible explanation for a puzzling outcome. Based on this assumption, explaining outcome process tracing ambition is to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a particular outcome. Due to its case-specific focus, this method has been attributed mainly to historical scholarship, although social science researchers also apply case-centric process tracing (see Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004). Differently from case-centric process tracing, theory-centric process tracing is based on the assumption that the identified mechanism can be generalised to other cases. Two different process-tracing designs derive from this assumption: theory-testing and theory-building process tracing. Theory-testing process tracing, as suggested by the name, deduces a mechanism starting from an established theory to open the black box that explains the correlation between the dependent and independent variable. This design is mainly used to test existing theory and to enlighten the process that link X and Y. Theory-building process tracing aim is to build a midrange theory that can be generalized, starting from
the empirical observations to design a causal mechanism that can explain how X is linked with Y.

This research will be based on a theory-building process-tracing design. The overall objective is to provide strong inferences about a specific phenomenon with the objective ‘to build a theory about a causal mechanism that can be generalised to a population of a given phenomenon’ (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 11). On the one hand the ambition to design a mechanism that can be generalised, and on the other hand the lack of a single theory that can explain the correlation between the two variables, exclude the use of explaining-outcome and theory-testing process tracing as possible design for this research.

**A theory-building design**

This research is based on a theory-building process-tracing design. In theory-building process-tracing facts are used before theories to build hypothesis, but differently from the explaining-outcome process-tracing, the overall goal is to build a midrange theory that can be generalised outside the single analysed case. Theory-building process tracing can be used in two different situations. First, we know that there is a causal link between X and Y, but we are unsure about the mechanism that link the two. The most famous example here is Janis’ work on Groupthink where Groupthink is described as the causal mechanism that links policy failures (Y) with poor decision-making practices by small and cohesive groups of policymakers (X). Second, we know the outcome (Y), but we want to explore what caused it to happen, meaning we want to identify one or more Xs that could be related to Y. This research is part of the first group as the Y is
identified (regional policy institutionalization), as well as the X (actor’s influence). In this case, Beach and Pedersen (2013, 168) suggest choosing a typical case as this will allowed the causal mechanism to be tested empirically in subsequent research.

After defining the identified outcome (Y), this research has been divided in three main steps: collection of empirics, existence of evidence and existence of causal mechanism. The first step is dedicated to the collection of empirics. The focus is on collecting case-specific ‘facts’ about the first empirical case-study: the creation of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) in the ASEAN HQ in Jakarta, Indonesia. The black-box of the process the leads from the establishment of the first ASEAN Expert Group on Disaster Management (AEGDM) in 1976 to the inauguration of the AHA Centre in November 2011 and its first five years of existence, are unpacked. The second step assesses the evidence. Existing theories on Diffusion mechanisms (Börzel and Risse 2012a) and Institutional Isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) merged with local-focused literature (Acharya 2004, 2009) will be used to detect systematic patterns in the empirical material. The third step identifies the causal mechanism as a ‘theory that can be generalised’. The different parts of the investigated causal mechanism are identified. For each parts an entity that engage in an activity that transmit causal forces will be identified. Raw material data (observations) will be collected and assessed to be used as evidence that update the confidence in the presence of the hypothesized causal mechanism (Beach and Pedersen 2013).
Generalizability of the mechanism

The question: ‘how can we be sure that the theory we built is externally valid, meaning exportable?’ arise. Indeed, this research aims at proposing a mechanism that is valid not only for the ASEAN disaster management policy, but that is also applicable to other similar cases. In this respect the analysed case in this thesis is a revelatory case, where the ‘investigator has an opportunity to observe and analyse a phenomenon previously inaccessible to scientific investigation’ (Yin 2009, 48). For example, by exploring other policies institutionalized at ASEAN level to assess the EU influence, or by investigating other EU inter-regional relations on similar subjects such as: the creation of the African Union (AU) Situation Room in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, within the Peace and Security Directorate in 2009 and; the creation of the League of Arab States (LAS) Situation Room in Cairo, Egypt, in November 2012. In this second example, as the analysed regional organisations differ in terms of structures and scope from ASEAN, we expect the observations and evidence to be different, but the mechanisms to remain the same.
Source: Author’s adaptation of Beach and Pedersen 2013, 17
2.5 Data gathering

The methodology of process-tracing deeply relies on primary sources (ranging from meeting notes to official documents), supplemented by interviews and a wide range of secondary documents (press releases, press articles, policy analyses, scientific articles, etc.). In this thesis, the empirical analysis is mainly based on a combination of document analysis and elite, semi-structured interviews conducted in Brussels and Jakarta.

Following the assumptions of what Beach and Pedersen (2013, 16) define as ‘Theory-Building Process Tracing’, data has been collected in three main steps. The first step focused on collecting the facts about the analysed events. Facts have been chronologically assembled to build a first structure containing the sequence of events that produced the analysed outcome (the institutionalization of a regional policy). The second step focused on collecting the observable manifestation, what Beach and Pedersen (2013, 178) define as evidence, meaning the ‘the proofs that a part of the hypothesized causal mechanism exists’. Both parts have been based on both primary and secondary sources.

In order to improve the reliability of data, triangulation both across different persons and between different kinds of sources have been applied. Moreover, the conduct of field research has been run according to specific protocols and rules. All phases of the research have been done considering the ethical implications for the involved participants, the wider community, and for the researcher.
2.5.1 Document Analysis and Elite interviews as a core

Document analysis and elite semi-structured interviews are at the core of this research. In an iterative process, they informed each other, as well as the first two phases of the research: building the empirical analysis and the collection of empirical observations.

The first step of the research focused on building a first empirical narrative of the process. Here a combination of primary and secondary documents, including the existing literature on the case, have been used together with the first informational and exploratory interviews conducted in Brussels in September and October 2015. These interviews helped familiarize with the topic and case, to inquire about available resources and to reinforce the basic knowledge on the topic acquired during an internship conducted at the European External Action Service between March and July 2012. These first interviews proved to be very effective in identifying the relevant actors within the EU (both EEAS and ECHO), as well as within ASEAN. After building the historical blocs that since the Concord I Declaration (1976) lead to the institutional establishment of an ASEAN regional cooperation in disaster management and the establishment in 2011 of the AHA Centre, the second phase of the data collection started.

During this second phase of the research dedicated to the collection of empirical observation, the dialogue between documents and elite interviews was maintained. Interviews at this stage targeted more senior and less available actors, starting with the relevant policy-makers and ASEAN and EU officers in Jakarta and Brussels, following with the ambassadors to ASEAN and
ambassadors of ASEAN member countries and their colleagues in charge of the disaster management cooperation dossier. Information gained through interviews were integrated with other primary information coming from written sources. Minutes from meetings, project reports and general brochures (both from internal and external use) filled the gap in information and helped in triangulating information obtained via interviews. Here the Knowledge Series Books produced by ASEAN to celebrate the first five years of the AHA Centre proved to be particularly helpful, as were the annual report produced by the AHA Centre and collected during the filed-work in Jakarta.

Overall, the thesis is based on a total of 23 interviews (see Annex 1) and the analysis of over 115 documents. Some of the interviewees have been interviewed twice, both in the first and in the second phase of the data collection. Secondary sources, in particular academic literature and interviews with academics have also complemented the data collection.

Data gained through interviews contributed to illuminate the causal process, and thus helped the building of the theory. Interviewees’ answers have been used to generate and develop the argument. The type of interviews that have been run in the field (both in Brussels and Jakarta) can be classified as ‘elite interviews’, not because of the status of the interviewee, but more in terms of his/her expertise. Elite interviews provided information of what happened, which were the actors involved and their roles. In particular, in this research elite interviews helped identifying, for each parts of the mechanism, the entity that engage in an activity that transmit causal forces. The danger of selection bias is always present in elite
interviews, but in process-tracing is particularly relevant because of the key role that the interviewed elite plays in informing the mechanism. This risk has been mitigated in this research by triangulating all sources and by being conscious of possible bias. Moreover, in this research the possible bias link to the selection of elite interviews was minimised by trying to interview the vast majority of officials directly involved in the process. Officials from both EU and ASEAN were interviewed, as well as representatives from other countries involved in the process. All their accounts were assessed and triangulated. Even if it would have been maybe ideal to interview a much greater number of actors involved in the analysed case to grasp all the micro-components of the process, the choice of focusing on the very specific case of disaster management facilitated the ‘snowball technique’ of building an exponentially increasing network of respondents (Guterson 2008, 98; Warren 2002, 87). The ‘snowball technique’ was not possible when planning interviews with representatives of actors different from the EU, and not based in ASEAN (i.e. Japan, Australia, New Zealand and the US). The turnover of staff and the very specificity of the subject (no more than one attaché is assigned to this issue) made it rather hard to schedule interviews. Yet, the lack of interviews with this category of national experts was compensated by analysing national documents often provided by the embassy in response to the interview’s request.

Interviews with the European Union officials have been run in Brussels and in the EU delegations to ASEAN in Jakarta. In Brussels headquarter elite interviews have been run with the Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Department (EEAS), the relevant EEAS and EU Commission geographical desk
officers, the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) of the EU’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department (DG ECHO), and the Instrument contributing to Peace and Stability (EEAS/DG DEVCO). Interviews with the ASEAN officials have been run in Jakarta in February 2017. In the ASEAN headquarters the relevant officers from the Secretariat were interviewed, as well as officials from the AHA Centre. These interviews have been complemented by interviews with the ASEAN member states representatives, as well as with some of the representatives of the so-called ASEAN Dialogue partners involved in the institutionalization of ASEAN Disaster Management policy. Overall, around 35 officials were approached for an interview, but they – in particular the ones based in Jakarta- were not always available during the proposed time (February 2017) or via Skype. When an interview was not possible, other primary sources, such as original documents, brochures and official reports were used to collect the necessary data.

All elite interviews have been run in English, French or Italian depending on the mother tongue of the interviewee. English was used for all interviewees which mother tongue was not Italian or French. Overall, all interviewees have an advanced knowledge of English, as this is one of the vehicular language used among EU officials, as well as the recognised working language of ASEAN and between ASEAN officials and their partners.

In order to avoid misunderstanding that can undermine the data collected, as well compromise future interactions, all interviews carefully balanced empathy and neutrality. In line with this, although recognising that recording provides a
trustful record of everything said, in order to strength empathy and in the hope to gain more insights, interviews were not recorded, but hand notes were collected during the interviews and re-taped into electronic form. In order to increase the transparency of data, a table containing the name, affiliation, function, contact details, date and time of the interviews, as well as the topic of the interviews has been regularly updated.

2.5.2 Field research as a must

As Philippe Schmitter said, “Fieldwork continues to be the most productive and exciting part of what we do” (Munck and Snyder 2007, 337). Although more developed in other disciplines, like anthropology, sociology and history, field research has been used also in political science since the 1950s. Fieldwork is here understood as the research conduct by ‘leaving researcher’s home institution in order to acquire data, information, or insights that significantly inform the research’ (Kapiszewski, MacLean, and Read 2015). In this respect, fieldwork has been conducted both in Brussels and in Jakarta.

Debates between advocates and sceptics about the value of field research are ongoing. Sceptics argue that fieldwork produced bias that undermined the data collection and therefore question the entire research. According to these scholars, researchers that immerge themselves in the field risk not only to lose objectivity, but also to influence the context they are studying (Shaffir and Stebbins 1990; Munck and Snyder 2007). On the other hand, fieldwork advocates suggest that going into the field allow a researcher to gather more data, to gain more information about the context that inform interviewee believes and to test
researcher’s hypothesis more thoroughly (Becker and Geer 1970; Kapiszewski, MacLean, and Read 2015).

This research benefitted from an informed and well-prepared fieldwork and from the access to policy makers and to the environment within which they operate that was possible thanks to the period devoted to collecting data from the field. Taking advantage of the ULB location in Brussels, as the second institution of the GEM Programme that sponsored this research, the data collection on the EU’s role in the institutionalization of ASEAN disaster management was relatively long and spread across the three years. In comparison the fieldwork in Jakarta was a short, but intense period of two weeks. During those two weeks around 15 interviews were conducted, but most importantly key documents were collected.

Chapter conclusions

This chapter presented the research design, the analytical framework and the methodology of the thesis. It started by providing an overview of the outcome explored in the thesis, as well as the chosen explanatory cause to be further investigated. The institutionalization of disaster management as an ASEAN regional policy is set as the outcome (Y) analysed in this thesis. In order to enable the analysis of this process, three key moments have been selected as representing topical phases of this multiphase process: the adoption of a regional programme (Chapter 4), the adoption of a regional binding agreement (Chapter 5) and the launch and implementation of a regional instrument (Chapter 6). The
influence that national, regional and international actors have on this process is set as the explanatory factors this research aims to explore (X). The chapter proposes an original analytical framework based on the interaction of four actors: the leader, the reference, the sponsor and the implementer. After introducing the main features of each actor, the chapter advanced the hypothesis that the EU could potentially play a role in each of the four identified roles. This original framework is informed by neo-Institutionalist theories (to explain the logics of actors) and the conceptualization of influence proposed by scholars in both IR and Public Policy (to explain modes of influence). It is a contribution to the debate on the EU’s influence on regional processes as it proposes a framework to go beyond the conceptualization of the EU as a *sui generis* actor advancing an analytical instrument to systematically explore EU’s actorness in a comparative way. The proposed analytical framework will be applied in the three following empirical chapters of the thesis (Chapter 4, 5 and 6) to answer the research question.

The chapter also introduced interpretative theory building process-tracing as the methodology used in the thesis. It discusses its main ontological stands, as well as how the challenges of this methodology have been approached in the thesis. In its final part the chapter presents the data gathering phase of the study and how document analysis and elite interviews have been used as the main way to gather the information.
CHAPTER 3

Providing the context of Crisis Management: global norms, the EU disaster management system and ASEAN’s dialogue partners policies

The aim of this third chapter of the thesis is to set the scene for the three empirical chapters that follow. It provides the context in which the institutionalization of ASEAN disaster management took place and it introduces the evolution of the disaster management policy at national, global and regional level, it presents the EU as a relevant actor in this field and the cooperation between ASEAN and other partner’s countries to show how theoretically the EU, as well as Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the United States, could have played a relevant role in this process, as leader, reference, sponsor or implementer.

The chapter is divided into three main parts. The first part presents the evolution of disaster management policy. It argues that disaster management evolved first at the national, then at the global, and finally at the regional level. It presents the two waves that triggered the institutionalization of disaster management centres at the national level by noticing how the civil defence instruments mainly evolved within European states during the Cold War, whereas the discussion started among ASEAN member states in the 1970s. The norms adopted at global level were instrumental in guiding the regional initiatives both within the EU, as
well as within ASEAN. Therefore, the chapter presents the pivotal stages of the global reflections on disaster management. Starting with the UN International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (1990-2000); following with the Yokohama Strategy (1994), and the UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (1999) -and the consequent creation of the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR)-; the section concludes by presenting the main features of the Hyogo Framework first (2005), and the following Sendai Framework (2015). Understanding these global stages is fundamental to put the development of regional disaster management into perspective. This first part concludes by showing how the development at the regional level was encouraged by the global discussions and how it was embedded within the global norms adopted.

The second part of the chapter zooms into the European project to the evolution of the EU as a relevant crisis manager. The EU Civil Protection mechanism is presented in detail, understanding its evolution and features is important to understand the potential model proposed to ASEAN during the three institutional phases discussed in the following three empirical chapters. Moreover, this part introduces the EEAS Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Department and its main features (the Crisis Platform, the Situation Room and the Consular Crisis Cooperation). This EEAS post-Lisbon initiatives represented a potential alternative model to the Civil Protection Mechanism already proposed to ASEAN representatives. Overall, this section argues that the EU system to respond to crisis is multifaceted, complicated to understand and hard to replicate.
The third part starts by recognising that the EU is not the only partner for ASEAN. Quite the contrary, since the mid-1970s ASEAN has strengthened ties with the so-called ten Dialogue Partners, meaning Japan, China, Republic of Korea, Australia, New Zealand, US, Canada, Russia, US, as well as the EU. Therefore, the third part of the chapter is dedicated to the other ASEAN’s dialogue partners that beside the EU played a key role in the institutionalization of ASEAN disaster management until 2016, date in which the AHA Centre celebrated its first 5 years of existence, as well as the conclusion of the first implementation part. In particular, the chapter focuses on Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the US. After providing an overview of disaster management in the dialogue country, the third part of the chapter illustrates the cooperation of the analysed country with ASEAN, in particular in disaster management.

3.1 The emergence of Disaster Management: the policy context

Disasters of all types have accompanied human history since its beginning. Disasters have influenced and shaped history. Pandemics have decimated entire populations and contributed to the perished of entire civilizations. Similarly, historians attribute the end of entire empires to natural disasters. The catastrophic eruption of Vesuvius and the consequent destruction of Pompei in 79 AD, the

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4 The cooperation between China and ASEAN on disaster management has been approved on 6 October 2014. The cooperation agreement includes the provision of 50 million grant assistance in three years to support the implementation of AADMER work Programme, operationalization of the AHA Centre and ASEAN Secretariat’s capacity building on disaster management. Yet, this provision did not impact the institutionalization of the ARPDM programme, of the AADMER Agreement or of the AHA Centre within the period analysed in this study. Therefore, China has been excluded from this study.
enormous floods along the Beijing-Hangzhou Grand Canal in 845AD that contributed to the decline of the Tang dynasty in China, or the change in the monsoons resulting in severe droughts and famine in 850AD that contributed to the fall of Maya empire in Mexico are just few examples among the many (see Fagan 2009). The development of measures to reduce the impact of catastrophes is part of the daily human survival battle. The building of the river control project promoted in Egypt by Amenemhet III (1817-1722 BC) to control the annual floods of the Nile River, or the first professional fire department, the Corps of Vigiles, founded in ancient Rome following the great fire that almost destroyed the city in 64AD (Coppola 2006; Quarantelli 1998) are just some examples of this. In modern years, disaster management evolved as a policy at state, global and regional level. In the following parts the section will discuss this evolution.

3.1.1 Disaster Management at state level

Modern disaster management, understood as the implementation of measures to better respond and mitigate disasters, was developed within the authority of national states. The development of disaster management can be conceived in two consequent waves in the 50s and in the 70s. The first wave is link to the evolution of modern civil defence (Quarantelli 1998). Systems to provide early warning systems, rescue teams and local coordinators were developed since the Great War (1914-18). Initially developed to coordinate civilians during air raids, civil defence departments move their focus on planning the response to a potential nuclear attack during the Cold War. Modern Civil Protection evolved from the Civil Defence provisions established during the Cold War. Among the most famous examples the Britain Civil Defence Act of 1948 that led to the
creation of the Britain’s disaster management agency; or the establishment of the Canadian Civil Defence Organization in 1948 from which developed the Canada’s Office of Critical Infrastructure Preparedness and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP). Even more the US Federal Civil Defence Act of 1950 led to the creation of the US Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (Quarantelli 1998). Finally, the French Ordinance of 1950 and the consequent Decree Relating to Civil Defence of 1965 (Rum 2016) provided the basis for the implementation of the France’s civil protection.

The second wave was inspired by the 1970’s environmental movements, and by the new awareness of the consequences of the climate change. In the developed countries this was reflected in the reforms that led the evolution of the national civil defence institutions in the new civil protection mechanisms. For the developing countries this second wave meant the establishment of their first disaster management agencies. This move was inspired by the new sensibility towards the environment, but it also followed the criticism received by the national governments for the poor management of big disasters, such as the earthquakes in Peru (1970) Nicaragua (1972) and Guatemala (1976) (Coppola 2006). Or the case of Jamaica that one-year after the devastating floods of June 1979, established the Office of Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Relief Coordination (ODIPERC). Similarly, in South East Asia reflections about the fact that disasters are not inevitable and that their tragic consequences could be mitigated via adequate preparedness and response initiatives started in this period. A clear consequence of this new perspective was, for examples, the establishment of the Philippines’ National Disaster Coordinating Council in 1978, or the establishment of the Indonesian BPBP and the Thai National Civil
Defence Committee (NCDC) in 1979.

3.1.2 Disaster Management at international level

The increasing attention given to the management of disasters at national level was well reflected in the international debate. The International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) was launched by the United Nations General Assembly in 1987. On December 22, 1989, the UN Resolution 44/236, established the objectives and goals of the IDNDR, which officially started on 1 January 1990. With the overall objective of ‘reducing through concerted international action, especially in developing countries, the loss of life, property damage and social and economic disruption caused by natural disasters’ (United Nations 1989).

The Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World was launched in May 1994 during the World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction organised in Yokohama, Japan. By recognising the increasingly interdependence of the world, the strategy called for increasing the partnership among countries, as well as to enhance the regional and international cooperation (United Nations 1994). Overall, the Yokohama Strategy provided the first global norm on natural disaster management.

Building on the lessons learned during the IDNDR decade and the implementation of the Yokohama Strategy, the UN launched the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR). The new strategy was launched in July
1999 in Geneva and it represented a shift in the emphasis from disaster response to disaster reduction by encouraging a culture of prevention. The UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) was established as the secretariat of the International Strategy and mandated by the UN General Assembly to ensure its implementation. In 2001 its mandate was expanded to serve as the focal point for all disaster risk reduction activities promoted at UN and regional level (United Nations 2001).

On 18-22 January 2005 the UN organised in Kobe, Japan the Second World Conference on Disaster Reduction. The conference was attended by 168 governments out of 195 countries and produced the Hyogo Framework for Action. The 10-years framework set the initiatives to substantially reduce losses in lives and in the social, economic and environmental assets of communities and countries by 2015 (HFA 2005). The Kobe World Conference represents the moment in which the world not only recognizes the importance of disaster management globally, but it also makes it a top priority of the international policy agenda. After ten years, the pivotal role of the Hyogo Framework for Action was recognized. The HFA was instrumental in raising public and institutional awareness, and in generating political commitment and support to actions implemented by a wide range of stakeholders (SFA 2015).

Ten years after the launch of the Hyogo Framework, the Third World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction was organised by the UN in Sendai, Japan on March 2015. The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 was adopted as the new 15-years plan outlining the new global priorities on disaster
management. The priorities outlined in the new Sendai Framework focus on the need to further reduce the exposure and vulnerability of population, in particular by enhancing the resilient capacities. If the Hyogo Framework link disaster management with development, the Sendai Framework asked for more dedicated actions to tackle the root causes of the dramatic effects of disasters on the population, such as poverty and inequality, climate change, unplanned and rapid urbanization and poor land management. The role of international and regional cooperation in supporting States’ initiatives was confirmed a priority for the framework. Yet, the need to strength and further developed these instruments was set as one of the Sendai’s priority.

In summary, the recognition of disaster management as a global norm was a fundamental step towards the implementation of concrete initiatives both at local, as well as at regional level. The initial focus on disaster response slowly shifted to a culture more focused on prevention and resilience as more effective ways to reduce losses in lives and assets. The global discussion on the need to better coordinate the management of disaster concluded by identifying regional organizations among the best available institutions to enhance the coordination among states. In the years that followed several emerging regional organisations started a discussion about the regional coordination of disaster as a way to sustain affected member state(s).

3.1.3 Disaster Management at regional level

The international initiatives to promote disaster management as a global priority were accompanied by a range of regional initiatives. The need to develop the disaster management cooperation at regional level was already set in the
Yokohama Strategy as a key element to enhance the capacity of states to better respond to disasters. The need to create and reinforce regional mechanisms to manage disasters was also a priority for the Hyogo Framework. Even more, the attention to regional organisations as key institutions enhancing the capacity to prevent and respond are reinforced in the Sendai Framework. Initiatives to implement regional policies do deal with disasters have been implemented by various regions in the world, with different level of integration. Overall, disasters and crises of all types, like floods, hurricanes, earthquakes and conflicts, affect all regions of the world. Therefore, it is not surprising that regional cooperation on disaster management has advanced globally.

Among others, the Governments of the Caribbean have recognised the importance of implementing a regional cooperation on disaster management already in 1973. The Treaty of Chaguaramas, establishing the CARICOM, included disaster risk management as one of the key pillars of the cooperation (Kirton 2013). In 1991 the first regional inter-governmental agency for disaster management in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) was established. The Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDERA), was renamed in 2009 CDEMA (Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency) to cover not only the response to disasters, but all phases of the management (CDEMA 2017). Initiatives advanced also in the African continent. Africa not only is confronted with extreme weather conditions, such as excessive rainfall, severe windstorm and heat-wave, but African countries are also located in a area that is more and more vulnerable to the impact of natural disasters (UNISDR 2017). Yet, the development of disaster management policies at regional level has
slowly progressed. ECOWAS disaster management initiatives have been driven mainly by the aim of fulfilling its peace and security mandate, by including the management of the humanitarian consequences of conflicts. In December 2003 the 51st ECOWAS Council of Ministers established a Technical Committee on Disaster Management. In 2010 ECOWAS launched a 4 years strategic programme to develop and strengthen the response of the regions to extreme weather conditions, as well as to follow the objective of the Hyogo Framework (UNECA 2015). Yet, five years later ECOWAS disaster management experts noted that only a few ECOWAS member states have dedicated National Disaster Management Institutions. Therefore, in October 2015 ECOWAS Ministers adopted a 15 pages Model for the member states’ adoption of National Disaster Management Agencies (NDMA). According to the model Member States are expected to establish a National Disaster Management Agency in their respective states within two years (ECOWAS 2015).

The European Union, facing both natural and man-made crises, is one of the most developed regional organisations in terms of its response system. At the EU level different instruments have been put into place to provide a better response. Starting with the 2001 Community Civil Protection Mechanism, which was revised after the 2004 tsunami and then again after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. All 28 EU member states are part of the mechanism, as are Iceland, Norway, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (since 2012), Montenegro (since 2014), as well as Serbia and Turkey (since 2015). Since 2013 the EU Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) coordinates the mechanism from Brussels and it is 24/7 operational. The ERCC monitors the
situation and it matches countries’ requests and offers for assistance. Since 2001, the EU Civil Protection Mechanism has monitored over 400 disasters and has received over 250 requests for assistance. Since the Lisbon Treaty (2009) and the consequent launch of the European External Action Service, other instruments have been created with the similar objective of supporting a better EU coordination in response to man-made and natural disasters.

Finally, Southeast Asia is located in one of the most disaster-prone regions of the world. In between two oceans, the Pacific and the Atlantic, and at the cross-road of several tectonic plates, the ASEAN region regularly experiences tsunamis, floods, volcano eruptions, typhoons, cyclones and earthquakes. Since the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on 8 August 1967, the region has been hit by more than 1550 natural disasters (EM-DAT 2016). Overall, in the last 50 years more than 460 million people were affected, out of which more than 430,000 lost their lives. The total economic damage for the same period (1967-2016) is estimated being more than 124 billion dollars (EM-DAT 2016), which is why since the early days of ASEAN establishment, the ASEAN Member States have initiated discussions to enhance their disaster management cooperation. A Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) was established in 2003. On 26 July 2005 Foreign Ministers of ASEAN Member States signed the Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) with the aim of providing effective mechanisms to achieve a reduction of disaster impact and to jointly respond to disaster emergencies through concerted national efforts and intensified regional and international cooperation. On 17 November 2011, in the framework of the
AADMER agreement, the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) was created.

Overall, all these regional initiatives to coordinate the management of disasters reflect the discussion at global level, as well as the recognised need to increase the cooperation between states and organizations to effectively respond to crises that do not look at political borders. Yet, the ways in which this regional coordination was -and is- implemented is different in each region. On one hand, it reflects the priority and declared needs of the different member states, with some member states more willing than others to partially limit their sovereignty in favour of a regional coordination. On the other hand, the ways in which each region organise its disaster management policy is also linked with the relations of these regions with other countries, as well as regional and international organisation. If a growing literature explores these regional initiatives to manage disasters from an internal point of view (Coppola 2006; Boin, Ekengren and Rhinard 2013; Kirton 2013; Morsut 2014; Rum 2016), the exploration on the differences and similarities between these regional institutions, as well as the role that other external actors have in influencing the institutionalization process of disaster management initiatives in another region is still underdeveloped. For example, looking at the EU, in the past fifteen years it has developed a quite advanced system to respond to both natural and man-made disasters. This has encouraged some scholars (Pennisi di Floristella 2015), as well as some practitioners to suggest that the EU could potentially be consider a role model for other region interested in implementing a regional system to coordinate the management of crisis. Yet, a systematic analysis of the influence of the EU, as
well as of the other relevant external actors, on regions such as ASEAN, in the field of disaster management is still missing and it will be the contribution of this thesis. In the next section the different instruments implemented by the EU to better respond to crisis will be introduced to present what is considered to be the EU model to respond to crises.

3.2 The evolution of the EU as a crisis manager: a relevant actor

The following section presents the evolution of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism since its first development in the 1980s, as well as the EEAS Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Department, introduced by Catherine Ashton following the Haiti disaster in 2010. The aim of this section is to present the EU as a relevant actor in the crisis management field. Understanding the evolution of the EU as a crisis management actor is important to understand the overall contribution of this thesis, which starts from the assumption that the EU is a relevant regional actor in crisis management, but aims to assess if this relevance was reflected in influencing another regional organisation, namely ASEAN.

3.2.1 The beginning of the European cooperation on Civil Protection (1980-2000)

Civil protection was initially developed in the early 1980s within DG Environment as an attempt to manage environmental disasters such as earthquakes, fires, volcanic eruptions, and oil spills within Europe. Italy was one
of the key drivers of the process. Following the Friuli (1976) and the Irpinia (1980) earthquakes, Italy developed its own Civil Protection in 1982 (Strassoldo and Boileau 1978; Alexander 2002). Two Italian Commissioners for Environment Carlo Scarascia-Mugnozza (1973-1977) and Lorenzo Natali (1977-1981) actively promoted the creation of an informal group to encourage European institutions to discuss civil-protection issues (Wendling 2010). Following these initiatives (European Commission 1988), the foundations of the European civil protection cooperation laid in the ministerial meeting held in Rome in May 1985 promoted by Giuseppe Zamberletti, the first Italian Minister for the Civil Protection (1981-82 and 1984-87).

The Council Resolution on a new approach to technical harmonization and standards set the responsibility of EU member states to ‘ensure the safety on their territory (in the home, at the workplace, etc.) of persons, domestic animals and goods, or the respect of other essential protection requirements in the general interest such as health, consumer or environmental protection etc’. (European Council 1985).

Between 1987 and 1994, six resolutions operationalized the European regional cooperation by implementing instruments to prepare for and respond to different types of disasters (Morsut 2014). In 1987, the Council invited the Commission to finalize within six months a ‘Guide to Civil Protection in the European Community’ with the help of a committee of experts from the EU member states. The main aim of the 1987 Guide was to map the existing instruments at member states level by creating a list of liaison officers, but it also encouraged member
states to share information, exchange personnel and promote joint trainings (European Council 1987). Overall, the 1987 resolution represented the starting point of a more coordinated management of crisis at European level. Several initiatives were proposed and in 1988 the Commission created a new budget heading with an initial allocation of 500,000 ECU to support these initiatives (European Commission 1988). The 1989 resolution focused on the integration by tasking the Commission to compile a multilingual glossary to facilitate the exchange among different national civil protection offices and to encourage member states to create a single national number for emergencies. The 1990 resolution, promoted by the Italian Presidency of the European Council in September 1990 (European Council 1990b), focused on drafting an agreement for the mutual cooperation in the event of natural or technological disaster. It started by discussing the possibility to create an advanced telecommunications system to meet civil protection requirements coming from EU member states (European Council 1990b). The 1991 resolution focused on improving the mutual aid between European member states and set some of the elements of the future Civil Protection mechanism (European Council 1991). The 1994 resolution was already focused on strengthening the member states cooperation on civil protection. The joint European exercise organised in 1993 (Europe 93) reiterated the need to improve the communication among national focal points as a mean to strengthen the cooperation. The 1994 resolution followed the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty (November 1993). The Article 3 of the 1957 Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), was emended by the Treaty of Maastricht which not only introduced the European
Community (EC), but it also listed, for the first time, civil protection as one of the activity of the newly created European Community.

In December 1997 a Council Decision established the Community action programme in the field of civil protection (European Council 1997a). The programme was initially set for two years (1 January 1988 – 31 December 1999) and then prolonged for other five years (2000-2004) (European Council 1999a) and finally extended for an extra year until 20 December 2004. The programme set four priority areas for the cooperation both in terms of preparedness and response (Article 3). In terms of prevention, the priority was to both decrease the risks and damages to persons, environments and properties. In terms of preparedness, the aim was to professionalize the expertise on civil protection at member states level. In terms of response, the programme encouraged pilot projects to improve the techniques and methods of response. In terms of awareness, the programme insisted on the engagement with the public, helping citizens to learn how to best protect themselves. The programme also established the first committee composed of representatives of the member states (Article 4). In the incoming years the Committee on Civil Protection Issues (ProCiv) played an instrumental role in overseeing the Commission work (Morsut 2014).

3.2.2 The development of the Community Civil Protection Mechanism (2001-2004)

The already existing marine pollution framework inspired the evolution from cooperation among states to the creation of a regional mechanism. Indeed, the
The concept of Community Civil Protection Mechanism (CCPM) was mainly developed by officials from DG Environment previously involved in the production of the marine pollution framework in a case of isomorphism (Wendling 2010). In March 1978 the Amco Cadiz incidents on the costs of France resulted in a large oil spill disaster. This incident triggered the creation of an action programme on the control and reduction of pollution caused by hydrocarbons discharged at sea (European Council 1978). In December 1999, the Erika cargo incident happened on the costs of France, accelerating the setting up of a community framework of cooperation in marine pollution for the period 1 January 2000-31 December 2006 (European Council 2000). The framework on marine pollution already introduced elements that were then reproduced by the CCPM, such as the need of sharing information, of implementing an instrument to coordinate the response from different member states and of sharing national expertise.

It was only in 2001 that the Community Civil Protection Mechanism (CCPM) was officially established. The 9/11 attacks accelerated an already on-going process. The 2001 Council Decision (European Council 2001a) created a mechanism to facilitate and reinforce the cooperation in civil protection assistance interventions among EU member states. The aim of the instrument was ‘to provide, on request, support in the event of such emergencies and to facilitate improved coordination of assistance intervention provided by the Member States and the Community, taking into account the special needs of the isolated, outermost and other regions or islands of the Community’. The CCPM
was set to respond both inside and outside the EU, and to both natural and man-made disasters.

The 2003 Decision (European Commission 2003a) further institutionalized the CCPM and established the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) and a Common Emergency Communication and Information System (CECIS). The MIC represented the main coordination hub of the CCPM by matching the request coming from any affected countries (outside and inside the mechanism) with the offer of assistance put forward by participating states. It also acted as a centre for collecting and sharing up to date information of on-going crisis. The 2003 Decision also set up training programme covering civil protection assistance interventions and clarified the procedure to respond inside and outside EU borders. The civil protection unit of DG Environment was in charge of managing the MIC. The Between 2002 and 2007 the CCPM was used to respond to different types of crisis. Starting with the floods in Czech Republic (August 2002), following with the Prestige oil spill in Spain (November 2002) and continuing with the floods in France (December 2003) and in Romania and Bulgaria (May 2005), the forest fires in Portugal (Summer 2003, 2004 and 2005) and Greece (Summer 2007). Outside EU the mechanism was also activated to respond to disasters, such as the earthquakes in Algeria (May 2003), Iran (December 2003), Morocco (February 2004) and Pakistan (October 2005), and the Hurricane Katrina (August 2005) and Rita (September 2005) in the United States (Morsut 2014).
3.2.3 The Community Civil Protection Mechanism in the post-tsunami (2004-2009)

In 2004 the MIC was activated in response to the Indian Ocean Tsunami (European Commission 2005e). The first request for assistance arrived from Sri Lanka, and was followed by requests from Thailand, Indonesia and the Maldives. The MIC remained active until the second half of January 2005 matching offers to needs, facilitating the assistance coming from participating countries and providing information on the situation on the ground. Overall, the 2004 Tsunami represented the first unprecedented disaster that saw the involvement of the CCPM (European Commission 2004) with 230,000 human losses, out of which around 1.400 Europeans mainly from Sweden, Finland, the UK and Germany (Niederlaender 2006), and economic damages estimated at more than 10 billion US dollars (UNISDR 2009).

The 2004 Tsunami represented a political momentum for the CCPM. During the extraordinary Council meeting in January 2005 (European Council 2005b), the need to reinforce the mechanism was recognised. Following the political decision, the EU Commission produced three documents that push the institutionalization of the CCPM further5. In the EU Council held in December 2005 the three initiatives were welcomed and the Commission was tasked to ‘submit as soon as possible, and at the latest by October 2005, further legislative proposals for improving civil protection cooperation’ (European Council 2005a).

The 2004 tsunami showed how the European response was still based on a mix of multilateral and bilateral arrangements. The CCPM was more perceived as ‘enabler’ then ‘driver’ of the EU response, the light coordination role was leavening space for duplication and confusion and the assistance offered not always matched the needs of the recipients (Ekengren et al. 2006).

These identified gaps in the EU response to the 2004 tsunami triggered the proposal to reform the 2001 Council Decision presented by the Commission in January 2006 (European Commission 2006). The civil protection was high in the political debate at that time. In January 2006, the Barroso Commission and the Austrian Presidency tasked Michel Barnier, former Commissioner on regional policy and former French minister of European and Foreign Affairs, to examine the EU’s ability to manage large-scale crises. The famous Barnier report (2006) and its propositions for the development of cooperation on civil protection within the EU were presented in May 2006 and discussed by the EU Parliament. In November 2007 the Council adopted the revised version of the 2001 Council Decision (European Council 2007a). In the revised Decision on the Community Civil Protection Mechanism the new tasks assigned to the commission were clearly divided between preparedness and response. In terms of preparedness initiatives such as reinforcing the sharing of information and communication system (MIC and CECIS) among member states, developing an early warning system and setting up training were included. The response was left in the hands of the participating states and the role assigned to the Commission was mainly to assure the coordination, while avoiding overlaps. Interestingly enough the new Council decision also recognised the UN as the overall coordinator for relief in
third countries, while the CCPM should ensure the effectiveness, coherence and complementarity of the Community response.

3.2.4 The post-Lisbon EU Civil Protection Mechanism (since 2009)

With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (2009) and after the Commission’s reorganization that followed (Boin, Ekengren, and Rhinard 2013), the Civil Protection Mechanism moved under the former European Community Emergency Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO). Created in 1992 under the auspices of Commissioner Bonino, ECHO was renamed in February 2010 Directorate-General for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response broadening de-facto its scopes and dimensions. With the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, decisions on civil protection issues started to be taken by qualified majority, and not as previously by consensus. Since 2012, the aim of the civil protection component of ECHO is to act as a coordination mechanism to respond, both inside and outside the EU, to all types of natural and man-made crises. It is used by member states to ask for and receive assistance in the case of an emergency. This assistance might be provided in the form of equipment and/or personnel.

In 2009, Kristalina Georgieva took over as Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid, and Crisis Response and in 2010, the civil protection and its Mechanism were transferred under DG ECHO in an attempt to exploit synergies between humanitarian aid and civil protection and enhance the coherence of EU response operations. Since then, Civil protection has become a
formal shared policy area governed by article 196 of TFEU, meaning that the European Commission is given the competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate and complement actions undertaken by the Member States, while the Member States continue to exercise their policies at national level.

The changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in these two areas meant organisational changes in the structure of DG ECHO. During Georgieva’s office (2009–2014) the main challenge for DG ECHO was represented by the EU’s quest for more coherence with the risk to subordinate the humanitarian imperative to overriding security, development, and trade goals (Orbie and del Biondo 2015). In particular regarding the security component, the battle of DG ECHO to prove its legitimacy was a fight at the leadership, institutional and instruments levels (Tercovich 2018).

The Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council No 1313/2013/EU on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism in December 2013 and the respective Implementing Decision further developed the Mechanism into a comprehensive framework for European cooperation in disaster prevention, preparedness and response.

**The EU Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC)**

The Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) was established in 2013 and it upgrades the functions of the previous Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC), created in 2001. The ERCC operates within the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department (ECHO) -re-named in 2014
‘Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management’-. The ERCC was set up to support a coordinated and quicker response to disasters both inside and outside Europe using resources from 31 countries participating in the Union Civil Protection Mechanism⁶. The participating states pool resources that can be made available to disaster-hit countries and share best practices in disaster management. The ERCC is operational on a 24/7 (European Commission 2016b).

It collects and analyses real-time information on disasters, monitors hazards, prepares plans for the deployment of experts, teams and equipment, and works with Member States to map available assets and coordinate the EU’s disaster response efforts by matching offers of assistance to the needs of the disaster-stricken country. The ERCC also supports a wide range of prevention and preparedness activities, from awareness rising to field exercises simulating emergency response. Overall, the ERCC provides civil protection assets made available by the participating states. It acts as a coordination hub between participating states, the affected country and dispatched field experts. Any country inside or outside the EU affected by a major disaster can make an appeal for assistance through the ERCC. In response, the ERCC matches offers of assistance with the needs of the disaster-stricken country.

3.2.5 The EEAS Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Department as a post-Lisbon competitor

The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 brought significant changes in the development of the EU crisis management capacity. The pillar division (the

⁶ The 28 EU Member States, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland, Montenegro, Norway, Serbia and Turkey.
supranational Community; and the two intergovernmental pillars ESDP and Police and Juridical Cooperation) established in the Treaty of Maastricht disappeared. This had direct influence on the coordination of crisis management, as the creation in 2010 of the Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Department (CR&OC) within the European External Action Service (EEAS). The department was created by the former High Representative Catherine Ashton with the aim of assuring an effective horizontal Comprehensive Approach (Sherriff 2013; Wilton Park 2012) in responding to natural and man-made crises, by involving both Member States’ representatives and EU institutions services in order to ensure an efficient information flow between them. Following the heavily fragmented and delayed response of the EU to the Haiti Earthquake in 2010, Ashton decided that more rapidly deployable capacities were needed within the EEAS to address similar crises in the future. She appointed Agostino Miozzo, a medical doctor by training with a 30-year career in various humanitarian and crisis response assignments within the Italian Civil Protection Department, as Managing Director of the CR&OC (Tercovich 2014).

The EEAS Crisis Platform
Among the different instruments developed within the department, the creation of the EEAS Crisis Platform has been significant. This Platform is a flexible and agile institutional coordination arrangement activated during the outbreak of an acute crisis in order to coordinate all relevant EU actors and to provide a clear political or strategic objective for the management of a given crisis, including guidelines and assessment of constraints to, and needs for, planning. In times of
acute crisis, it brings together all major actors across Council and Commission institutions dealing with security-related policies, in particular CSDP institutions, such as the EU Military Staff, the Crisis Management Planning Directorate, the Civilian Planning Conduct and Capability as well as EEAS geographical desks and Commission-led institutions, such as DG ECHO, DG Development and Cooperation and DG HOME. This cooperation represents the most far-reaching institutionalized tool for inter-institutional coordination and information exchange; it also places the CR&OC and EEAS firmly at the forefront of the management of crisis (Tercovich 2014).

First, activated during the Libyan crisis in 2011, the Crisis Platform has become a key EU’s instrument to manage crises. The success of this instrument is testified by its survival to the change of management. With the appointment of Federica Mogherini as High Representative/Vice President, the Crisis Response Department gained even more centrality in the EEAS structure. The department, led initially by the Italian medical doctor Agostino Miozzo (2010-2014) as Managing Director, is now led by Pedro Serrano, a EU official with a long work experience within different EU foreign policy department (CSDP, delegation, etc.). While the first one was directly responding to HR/VP Ashton, but without a formal authority over the CSDP structure, the current Deputy Secretary General for CSDP and Crisis Response Serrano is directly responsible for all crisis management instruments within the EEAS: Security and Conflict Prevention, EU intelligence and Situation Centre, Crisis Management and Planning (CMPD) and Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC).
The EEAS Situation Room, SitRoom

The EU Situation Room mainly supports the EEAS’s Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Department (CR&OC) and the activity of the Crisis Platform. The civil-military ‘EU Situation Room’ is 24/7 operational. The aim of the Situation Room is to act as the EEAS switchboard for all information provided by EU actors, including EU delegations, member states, EU CSDP operations, and missions as well as information coming from other regional and international organizations.

The EU Situation Room was formally established on 15 June 2010 by merging elements of the EU Situation Centre, the watch-keeping capability, the former Commission RELEX Crisis Room, and the Council Crisis Coordination Arrangements (CCA) team. Back in 2010, it already represented a certain level of integration from previously autonomous departments dealing with situational awareness and crisis information analysis. On 18 July 2011 the former HR Ashton inaugurated the new EU SitRoom and placed it under the overall responsibility of the newly created position of Managing Director for Crisis Response and Operational Coordination (MD CR&OC) (Tercovich 2014).

The aim of the EU SitRoom, as implemented by MD CR&OC Miozzo in 2012, was to ensure to the High Representative, the EEAS and other EU actors

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7 The EEAS Crisis Platform is a flexible institutional coordination arrangement activated during the outbreak of an acute crisis in order to coordinate all relevant EU actors and to provide ‘a clear political or strategic objective for the management of a given crisis, including guidelines and assessment of constraints to, and needs for, planning’ (Tercovich 2014).

8 Since the arrival of the new HR/VP Federica Mogherini in 2014 and the nomination of Pedro Serrano as Deputy Secretary General for CSDP and crisis response, the CR&OC Department has been restructured and integrated within the CSDP and Conflict Prevention structures. The EU Situation Room has been incorporated to the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre.
(European Commission, General Secretariat of the Council, EU Agencies, Member States, etc.) a continuous support through continuous worldwide situation monitoring, primarily based on information available in the public domain (open source information). By being the main EU focal entry point of information, the three main priorities of the EU SitRoom in face of a particular external situation were: (1) To protect EEAS staff, assets, and interests by ensuring that the lines of communication and command would be activated for proper action and provide situational awareness for events and situations potentially affecting EU Delegations and EU CSDP Missions and Operations; (2) Use the information collected to support more detailed analysis; (3) to ensure operational liaison and international cooperation with dedicated crisis structures from Member States, International Organisations and Third Countries.

In 2012 the EU SitRoom was working under the Standard Operating Procedures (SoPs) that divided the work between three main operational structures (for a total of four teams) mirroring the three main priorities outlined before (support to CSDP Operations and EU Delegations, monitoring relevant political and security events, and cooperation with member States and other organisations) (EEAS 2012).

First, the function of Monitoring 24/7 CSDP Missions and Operations, as well as of acting as a switchboard for EU Delegations was carried on by two Duty Teams, working 24/7 under the authority of the Head of the Watch Keeping Capability of the EUMS. The first Duty Team was in charge of monitoring all CSDP Missions/ Operations and EUSRs activities, mainly supervising civilian
and military CSDP Missions/Operations, EUSRs, and EEAS staff travelling on missions in crisis areas from a duty of care perspective. The second Duty Team was in charge of all staff and assets of EU Delegations, with the aim of immediately alert the Security Directorate for security related issues. The tasks related to EU Delegations were limited to a switchboard function with a single phone number.

Second, the function of Monitoring 24/7 Relevant Political and Security Events, and support EEAS Senior Officials, was carried on by another Duty Team working 24/7 to provide timely, relevant information regarding worldwide major political and security events, focusing on priority and crisis areas, acting as an alerting body, and providing communications support to HR and EEAS Senior Officials. Members of this team were also expected to be deployed in crisis areas to ensure communications support. In case of crisis, they were expected to inform the Crisis Response Planning and operations division, who will coordinate the elaboration of Country Fact Sheets and the necessary support to the Crisis Platform.

Third, the function of Ensuring Operational Liaison and International Cooperation was carried on by a section operating on office hours, but on call in case of major crisis. The main task of this section was the promotion of relations with crisis centres of EU Member States, Third Countries, and International, Regional, and Non-governmental Organizations. The Section was also the focal point to manage the Crisis Coordination Arrangements (EU CCA) when needed.
In case of crisis (both identified in Brussels or reported by a Delegation) the duty officers in charge of the 24/7 monitoring in Brussels were expected to classify the crisis according to an event matrix: Negligible - Low –Medium – High – Critical. Three different call lists were set according to the classification and type of event (Negligible-Low, Medium, and High-Critical). Although the duty officers of the SitRoom were expected to call directly the MD CR&OC in case of incident, events ranked from Negligible to Medium do not necessarily led to the information of top managers and to the HR/VP. On the other hand, for events considered High or Critical (Major event or issue considered to be of high or exceptional importance; events likely to have significant media impact), the direct call list of level 3 was activated, either by SMS or direct call (EEAS 2012).

The Consular Crisis Coordination

The EU member states acknowledged the importance of strengthening their cooperation in consular protection and assistance during crisis with the Article 20 of the Treaty of Maastricht:

(Art.20) Every citizen of the Union shall, in the territory of a third country in which the Member State of which he is a national is not represented, be entitled to protection by the diplomatic or consular authorities of any Member State, on the same conditions as the nationals of that State. Member States shall establish the necessary rules among themselves and start the international negotiations required to secure this protection.
The 1995 Council Decision (European Commission 1995) provided the necessary legal framework, clarifying the conditions under which the protection should be issued and the practicalities of the support. Since then several large-scale crises triggered the cooperation forward. The 2004 South East Asia Tsunami, the 2005 Hurricane Katrina, the 2006 Lebanon crisis, the 2011 earthquake in Haiti and the 2011 Japan nuclear disaster in Japan 2011 were instrumental in developing non-binding guidelines to facilitate the cooperation. Already before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, EU consular crisis coordination implemented different tools in all stages of the crisis. In the prevention phase the cooperation mainly focuses on the exchange of travel advices. Each member state produces its own travel advices on countries in crisis providing advices that range from act with caution in the country, avoid travel to certain areas, avoid travel completely and leave the country immediately. The language as well as the advices varies among EU member states, yet a webpage has been created to keep all EU member states updated on the changes in travel advices triggered by one or the other member states. The tools developed within the preparation phase are mainly focus on sharing information and develop contingency plans that include the protection and evacuation of all EU citizens, including the one without consular representation in the country. The contingency plan includes the designation of the ‘Lead State’ in charge of coordinating the EU consular response. The response phase is driven by the Presidency, which coordinate the information sharing on the actions promoted by the EU member states to protect their citizens, both at capital level, as well as on the ground.
3.2.6 The EU as a multifaceted, complex and evolving crisis manager

This section was dedicated to present the EU as a relevant actor in crisis management. It shows as the EU system to manage crises has profoundly evolved in the past years. Starting with the initial cooperation of the 1980s, moving to the first Community Civil Protection Mechanism implemented in 2001 and then revised following the reforms triggered by the 2004 Tsunami and finally presenting the EU Civil Protection Mechanism as a post-Lisbon instrument under the coordination of DG ECHO. The numerous components and revisions that contributed to the building up of the EU mechanism to respond to crisis are complex and not easy to navigate, a product of years of negotiations among EU member states. Following the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty, Catherine Ashton added a new component to the EU system to respond to crises: the EEAS Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Department. Overall, the multifaceted, complex and evolving model developed by the EU is not easy to understand and even more complicated to replicate.

After presenting the EU as a crisis management actor, the following section will start by introducing the inter-regional relation between the EU and ASEAN in the field of crisis management. As this research aims to explore the role played by the EU in the institutionalization of ASEAN disaster management by also looking at the other relevant actors, after presenting the main steps of the ASEAN-EU cooperation, the section will continue by introducing the other
ASEAN dialogue partners cooperating with ASEAN in the field of disaster management, meaning Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the US⁹.

### 3.3 ASEAN strategic partnerships in disaster management

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Other five countries joined the regional association in the following years: Brunei in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Lao and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999. Yet, already the ASEAN at five recognised the importance of establishing a friendly and mutually beneficial dialogue with external partners. In fact, since the mid-70s the ASEAN Foreign Ministers conferred the status of Dialogue Partner to the external partners with whom they wanted deeper relations. The initial goals of the ASEAN founding members’ external relations were to secure technical assistant for regional cooperation projects; to promote trade and economic relations; and to strengthen political relations with third countries and regional groupings. Based on these aims the first wave of Dialogue Partners started with Australia in 1974 and included in the following years also New Zealand (1975) and Japan (started in 1973 and formalised in 1977), as well as the United States, Canada and the European Union (1977) which were ASEAN’s major trading partners. Following the end of the Cold War and the consequent move to a multipolar world, ASEAN included among its dialogue partners also South

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⁹ The other ASEAN Dialogue partners, meaning Canada (1977), Republic of Korea (1991), Pakistan (1993), India (1995), China (1996), Russia (1996), Norway (2015), Switzerland (1996) did not have disaster management among the area of their cooperation with ASEAN during the analyze period (1967-2016).
Korea, India, China and Russia. Progressively, with the reinforcement of ASEAN the relationship with its dialogue partners has moved from a donor-client relation to a more balanced cooperation (Pushpanathan 2003). As we will see in the following section, disaster management has increasingly become an issue for discussion and an area in which foster the cooperation.

3.3.1 The European Union

ASEAN & EU interregional cooperation: an overview

The EU has been sometimes perceived as an anti-model of regional integration for ASEAN (Yeo 2010; Ba, Kuik, and Sudō 2016). Yet, informal contacts were established between the European Economic Community (EEC) and ASEAN already in 1972. In July 1977 the 10th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting formalised the relation by agreeing that the EEC was among the partners with whom to consolidate and expand a formal cooperation in July 1977 (ASEAN 1977). The ASEAN-EEC Cooperation Agreement was focused on commercial, economic and development cooperation and it was signed in March 1980. In the first phase of the ASEAN-EU cooperation the main focus was on enhancing the dialogue on trade and investments and to negotiate a bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with ASEAN member states.

After 40 years the areas of cooperation expanded considerably in all three domains of ASEAN Communities. Since the 1980s the ASEAN-EU partnership has grown and is considered thoroughly multi-layered and comprehensive. In the ASEAN Economic Community, issues such as internal markets, customs,
standards, statistics, trade liberations and energy are at the core of the EU-ASEAN cooperation. In the ASEAN Political-Security Community the relatively recent cooperation between the two regional organisations covers areas such as border management, confidence building, international peace and mediation, parliamentarian diplomacy and asymmetric risks. Within the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community ASEAN-EU cooperation includes issues such as education, biodiversity, media, climate change, science and technology, as well as relief and disaster management.

The two regional organisations’ highest-level meeting is the biennial ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting (AEMM) where the strategic priorities are discussed, and projects of cooperation are developed. Other area-specific dialogues take place annually (Khandekar 2015). Since 2012, there has been an increase in high-level bilateral visits and the initiation and completion of various agreements between the EU and ASEAN member countries (EEAS official 2017a). The 20th EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting was held on 23 July 2014 under the theme of “Towards Strategic Partnership for Peace, Stability and Prosperity”.

**EU-ASEAN cooperation in disaster management**

Despite South-East Asia having one of the highest levels of vulnerability to disasters in the world, it was only in 2007 and following the tragedy of the 2004 Tsunami, that disaster management officially become one of the areas of cooperation between the EU and ASEAN. Disaster management was not included in the 1980 Cooperation Agreement with ASEAN, in the 2001 Commission’s Communication “Europe and Asia” (European Commission 2001)
and in the 2003 Communication on a “New Partnership with South East Asia” which sets out a comprehensive strategy for future European Union (EU) relations with the region and which outlined specific sectors in which the cooperation between the two regions could be reinforced, namely issues related to economic and trade, justice and home affairs, environment, science & technology, research & development, higher education and culture, energy, transport, information society and statistics (European Commission 2003b). Indeed, the EU mechanism of Civil Protection was still moving its first steps and was not (yet) considered the successful instrument that it is now.

Although not initially listed among the strategic areas of EU-ASEAN cooperation, disaster management was part of the EU initiatives in the South-East Asia region under the development and humanitarian aid umbrella. The initial legal framework for these initiatives was provided by the 1996 Council Regulation 1257 (European Commission 1996). By outlining the aims and objectives of the European Community’s Humanitarian Aid, stated that ECHO’s activities in the field of Disaster Preparedness shall be ‘to ensure preparedness for risks of natural disasters or comparable circumstances and use a suitable rapid early-warning and intervention system’. In this framework the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) initiated in 1996 the Disaster Preparedness ECHO (DIPECHO) program targeting Central Asia, the Andean Community, Latin America and the Caribbean, Central Asia, as well as South and East Asia. This initiative was part of Commissioner Bonino’s strategy to increase ECHO visibility to enhance its legitimacy (Tercovich 2018).
Overall, the DIPECHO program in South East Asia started in 1998 by sponsoring short-term projects targeting Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Philippines, Vietnam and Thailand. Since 2001, the ASEAN regional disaster management was mainly targeted with the launch of the Partnerships for Disaster Reduction – South East Asia (PDR-SEA) project. Overall, the DIPECHO program could be seen as the vehicle used by the EU to act as a leader or as a reference by influencing ASEAN via socialization and persuasion, but also as a sponsor, via resource dependences, or implementer via copy and emulation (see Chapter 2).

For around ten years the EU-ASEAN cooperation on disaster related issue was limited to the DIPECHO programme. It was only in December 2004, with the 9.15 magnitude earthquake, which triggered the Indian Ocean tsunami, that the EU started paying more attention to the management of disasters in South East Asia. The 2004 Tsunami affected both regions. Four ASEAN member states (Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Myanmar) were severely hit with 230,000 human losses and an economic damage estimated by UNISDR at more than 10 billion US dollars, and over 1400 Europeans lost their lives in the disaster.

The 2004 Tsunami represented a critical juncture for both the EU and ASEAN ways of dealing with crisis and disasters. At EU level, as presented in the previous section, it pushes the further institutionalization of the community instruments, and in particular the Community Civil Protection Mechanism (CCPM). At ASEAN level the Indian Ocean Tsunami acted as an accelerator for the adoption of the AADMER agreement, as it will be discussed in the next
chapter. Yet, the initial European and ASEAN Leaders’ reaction to the 2004 Tsunami focused more on the importance of strengthening the respective regional cooperation and not much attention was given to the potentials for the EU-ASEAN cooperation. A Special ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting on Aftermath of Earthquake and Tsunami was held immediately after the disaster on 6 January 2005 in Jakarta (ASEAN 2004). The ASEAN Heads of State and Government committed to strengthen the coordination and cooperation among ASEAN countries and to finalize a regional mechanism on disaster prevention, mitigation and response, and to accelerate the creation of the AHA Centre. Immediately after the Tsunami, European Leaders expressed their support, mainly in terms of financial aid, to the ASEAN population with EC President Barroso speaking at the January Special ASEAN Summit (European Commission 2005c). At the end of the month the December Tsunami was used to urge the reinforcement of the existing EU instruments, such as the ECHO emergency response centre and the Community Civil Protection Mechanism (European Commission 2005d).

Only two months after the Tsunami, the 15th ASEAN-EC Joint Cooperation Committee was held in Jakarta on February 2005, followed in March by the 15th ASEAN–EU Ministerial Meeting. The outcome of both meetings was an endorsement to the new European Commission’s strategy ‘On A New Partnership with Southeast Asia’ published in July 2003 and the opportunity to enhance their commitment ‘through a more comprehensive and balanced agenda’ (ASEAN 2005b). Although disaster management was not mentioned in the joint statements and in the partnerships’ strategy as a potential area of cooperation, the Minister left the door open ‘to work out necessary practical arrangement in order
to further strengthen and to reinvigorate the ASEAN-EU process’ (European Commission 2005a).

In March 2005 Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, visited Indonesia to attend the ASEAN-EU Foreign Ministers Meeting (AEMM). The visit was the opportunity to discuss how to intensify the cooperation in other areas different from trade. In her speech she referred to the tsunami and the support pledged by the EU, but when mentioning potential area of cooperation disaster management was not listed despite the existing cooperation (European Commission 2005b), showing how DG Relex did still not perceive disaster management as a potential area of cooperation. Overall, the 2004 Tsunami triggered a reflection on the possibility to enhance the EU-ASEAN interregional cooperation in disaster management. Yet, it took three more years to include disaster management among the non-trade strategic areas of cooperation between the two regions.

It was the Nuremberg Declaration on ASEAN-EU Enhanced Partnership signed at the 16th Ministerial Meeting on 15 March 2007, which firstly mentioned disaster management as an area of cooperation between ASEAN and EU. The two regional organisations committed in ‘cooperate at regional and global levels on disaster management including supporting the ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management and foster closer cooperation at the regional and global levels on disaster management, preparedness, mitigation and emergency response as well as rehabilitation and reconstruction’. (European Council 2007b).
In the 70 million Euros Plan of Action (European Commission 2007) for the period 2007-2012 that followed the Nuremberg Declaration disaster management and emergency response were identified as one of the key priorities within the Socio-Cultural pillar of the cooperation. The focus of the cooperation was on improving the information sharing and the exchange of know-how, as well as in assisting ASEAN in ‘accelerat[ing] the implementation of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER), especially on risk identification, assessment and monitoring, prevention and mitigation, disaster preparedness, and risk reduction, emergency response, rehabilitation, and technical and research cooperation and consider support for the operationalization of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre)’ (European Commission 2007, para. 4.15)

Since 2007, disaster response was always mentioned as one of the priority area of cooperation between the two regions by ministers during the 17th, 18th, 19th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meetings, respectively in 2009, 2010 and 2012 (Council of the EU, 2009; 2010; 2012). Yet, the progresses are mainly mentioned in terms of ‘enhanced dialogue’ (European Council 2010b) and ‘share of best practices’ (European Commission 2014), suggesting for the EU the role of leader of reference, via socialization and persuasion of goals and norms and instruments.

On 27 April 2012 the EU and ASEAN adopted the Bandar Seri Begawan Plan for Action (2013-2017). The EU-ASEAN Plan of action still emphasised the focus on sharing of experiences and best-practises, raising awareness, as well as
support in the ‘implementation of the Work Programme for the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) and strengthening of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre), through activities such as development of a monitoring and evaluation system for AADMER and the Work Programme, comparative studies on ASEAN’s and EU’s disaster management set-up, knowledge sharing and institutional strengthening, joint exercises, and networking among the two regional disaster management mechanisms.’ (European Council 2010a, para. 3.3.1)

Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the creation of the European External Action Service and the organizational structural changes that followed, EU-ASEAN cooperation on disaster management was mainly supported by two, almost parallel, initiatives: the Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument (READI) and the ASEAN-EU Emergency Management Programme (AEEMP).

The Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument READI aimed at supporting the policy dialogue of the European Union with ASEAN. ‘The objective of READI is to support ASEAN integration through the support of the ASEAN community blue prints, drawing on European experience and know-how through sectoral policy dialogue and knowledge development, thereby supporting the policy development process in non-trade related areas.’ (READI 2017). The 4-years initiative has run between 2011 and 2015 with a budget of 4 million euro.
READI focused on ten components, one of which was disaster management\textsuperscript{10}. The disaster management component of READI focused on two elements. First it supported the development of a system to conduct monitoring and evaluation of the AADMER Agreement. Second, it sustained the development of a strategy to facilitate the exchange of knowledge between ASEAN member states, as well as between ASEAN and other regional and national bodies.

The project was managed by the EU Delegation in Jakarta and the ASEAN Secretariat, was led by the Spanish Altair Asesores, a consortium of technical experts. In June 2012 a study visit was sponsored by READI. During this occasion, the ASEAN ACDM committee’s members together with representatives of the ASEAN Secretariat and AHA Centre visited the EEAS Crisis Response Room, as well as ECHO’s Emergency Response Centre (ERC) in June 2012. The visit was organised by the EU and represented the opportunity to discuss possible areas of cooperation (AHA Centre 2012, 34).

Overall, two main areas of possible cooperation were identified during this first exchange: knowledge-sharing and capacity-building. The main focus of the knowledge sharing was for the AHA Centre ‘to learn’ (AHA Centre 2012, 24) how the EU manages the information sharing among its member states. The main outputs of this exchange would have been the creation of a Manual containing a set of procedures for the AHA Centre and its cooperation with National Situation

\textsuperscript{10} Initially four areas of cooperation were identified: Information and Communication Technology, Energy, Science & Technology, and Disaster Management. In the following years READI added other areas to the cooperation: education, human rights, capacity building, climate change, maritime cooperation and election observation. The project managed by the EU Delegation in Jakarta and the ASEAN Secretariat was led by the Spanish Altair Asesores consultancy.
Rooms. The capacity-building component was focused more on the possibility of providing specific trainings and technical assistance within the framework of the AHA Centre Work Plan, suggesting for the EU the role of sponsor or even implementer. During 2013 the discussion on the implementation of these provisions continued. A preliminary meeting to define the joint programme was organised in July 2013, together with a Belgium-organised workshop on Belgium’s perspective on disaster management.

The ASEAN-EU Emergency Management Programme (AEEMP) started in 2013. The project has been funded for three years by the EU Instrument for Stability with around € 2.2 million (European Commission 2016a), and implemented by EUNIDA, The European Network of Implementing Development Agencies. The declared aim was to reinforce the cooperation between ASEAN emergency response actors, including the AHA Centre, ASEAN Secretariat and ASEAN Member States, as well as connecting them with similar EU bodies, namely the EU Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) and the EEAS Situation Room. In particular, as mentioned in the AHA Centre Annual Report 2015, ‘among major activities under AEEMP are reviews and improvements of the organizational structure and design, strategic planning capabilities, as well as guidelines and SOPs of the AHA Centre, learning from the regional standby arrangement operation best practices in the EU, and enhancing capacity in financial administration in line with the requirement of the European Commission Pillar Assessment’.
The AEEMP ended in October 2016 and was not renewed (ASEAN Secretariat 2015; EEAS Official 2015). Between March 2013 and June 2014 it supported Myanmar to set up a fully equipped crisis response centre, as well as an introductory training for 20 police officers. The Myanmar crisis centre was inaugurated on 12 June 2014. The EEAS Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Department coordinated the implementation of this first part of the AEEMP, which saw a limited participation of ECHO, only represented at the inauguration by the regional field rapid response coordinator, Bernhard Jaspers Faijer. Overall, the initiative towards Myanmar was inspired more by the new bi-lateral EU-Myanmar phase inaugurated by Catherine Ashton in April 2012, when EU sanctions against Myanmar targeting trade, economic and individual were suspended (European Council 2017). The necessity of implementing a more efficient crisis centre in Myanmar to reinforce the cooperation with the AHA Centre was not the main driver behind this part of the project (European Commission Official 2017e).

On May 2015 the AEEMP programme funded a study visit in Paris and Brussels dedicated to the ASEAN representatives of the National Disaster Management Offices (NDMOs), the ASEAN Secretariat and AHA Centre. The one week visit (2-8 May) included the French Crisis Centre COGIC, the Paris Fire School, several EU Departments, and OECD. It also represented the opportunity for ASEAN regional and national representatives to participate in the EU Civil Protection Forum. The bi-annual event brings together the European civil protection community to discuss the field of disaster risk management, to share best practices, and to address new challenges.
According to ASEAN Deputy Secretary-General Alicia Bala, the declared aim of the visit was ‘to gather information about the European emergency management set-up and environment in order to identify best practices which can contribute to building a better regional emergency management system for ASEAN’ (ASEAN Secretariat 2015). One month later, in June 2015, an ASEAN-EU Joint Workshop on Regional Emergency Management Mechanisms and Cooperation was organised in Jakarta, Indonesia. The workshop followed up on issues and questions raised during the ASEAN EU Civil Protection Workshop to Europe in May 2015. Although the workshop was attended once again by ASEAN representatives of the National Disaster Management Offices (NDMOs), the ASEAN Secretariat and AHA Centre, the EU was represented only by Stavros Petropoulous from the Crisis Response Department of the EU External Action Service (EEAS) and Muamar Vebry, from the EU Delegation to ASEAN in Jakarta (EEAS 2015).

Overall, the AEEMP project is not considered among the most successful project of the EEAS Instrument for Stability (European Commission Official 2017e). Set up in Brussels by the EEAS Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Department, it was not a product resulted from the ASEAN-EU dialogue. The AHA Centre had initially a hard time in placing this project in its multi-annual planning. Overall, the most successful project was the inauguration of the Myanmar crisis Centre, yet it was more driven by a bilateral interest then by the genuine will to support the AHA Centre. All other initiatives sponsored by the AEEMP project were focused on the exchange of experiences and practices,
suggesting the EEAS was keen to play the role of the reference, more than the one of leader, sponsor or implementer. Indeed, the AEEMP project was part of the quest for legitimacy that characterised the EEAS Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Department in its first years. Therefore, it is not surprising that its main aim was not to give a concrete support to the AHA Centre, but more to show the presence of the EEAS Department on the global scene of the management of disasters.

In summary, this section showed the evolution of the ASEAN-EU cooperation and how the crisis management component became part of the dialogue only few years after the 2004 Tsunami. It also showed how the project implemented as part of this dialogue proved to be less supportive to the ASEAN regionalization then the previous DIPECHO development programme. The context of the ASEAN-EU Dialogue on crisis management provided by this section will be complemented by an overview of the other ASEAN dialogue partners that played a role in the institutionalization of ASEAN disaster management: Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the US. This following and complementary section will provide the necessary context to the empirical analysis. It will overall show how the EU is not the only actor playing a role in the ASEAN institutionalization of the disaster management policy, but that other actors also have the necessary relations, the capacity and the will to play an important role in the analysed process.
3.3.2 Australia

Disaster Management in Australia

Australia is located in one of the most disaster-prone area of the world. The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) is the institution that builds and maintains emergency response capacities with international partners, ensuring emergency relief supplies and standby arrangements are in place to deliver humanitarian responses. It coordinates Australian’s capabilities such as the Australia Defence Force (ADF), the Australian Medical Assistance Team (AusMAT) and the Search and Rescue (SAR) capability, which provided logistical and medical support during international and domestic events. In case of request for Australian assistance passed by the disaster-affected country, DFAT tasks the Emergency Management Australia (EMA) division to coordinate the response (CFE-DM 2016a).

Australia was among the countries that developed a volunteering system of civil defence during the World War II. Although inactive during the period immediately after the end of the war, the civil defence organizations were reactivated from 1948 to deal with the nuclear concern that characterised the Cold War. If the nuclear concern –fortunately- remain only a concern, a series of natural disasters hit Australia in those years. A series of cyclones, floods and fires keep Australia civil defence busy during the Cold War. The 1967 Tasmanian so-called Black Tuesday bushfires represented a turning point in the Australian management of disasters. The 62 victims and 900 injured people triggered a process of revision on the way in which disaster management was coordinated at local and national level. The revision process culminated in 1974 with the establishment of the Natural Disaster Organization (NDO) (Jones 2007).
In the afterwards of the Cold War the NDO went under a significant series of reforms and was finally substitute by the Emergency Management Australia (EMA) (Peters and McEntire 2010).

The EMA is the agency in charge of the management of disasters. It provides programs, policies and services that strengthen and maintain Australia’s national security and emergency management capability. Moreover, EMA maintains bilateral partnerships with national agencies dealing with disaster management and assures the Australian bilateral and multilateral cooperation on the issue. Overall, EMA is the main Australian partner in the development of ASEAN capabilities in disaster management. The core of EMA is the Australian Government Crisis Coordination Centre (CCC), an all-hazard 24/7 facility that provides situational awareness and provides reports used to inform the decision-making process during a crisis (EMA 2017). EMA is not only the Australian national agency assuring the development of emergency management capabilities and the coordination between the state and local territories on disaster management issues, but it also coordinates the government response to overseas disasters in cooperation with –and often by using the founding provided by- AusAID (Peters and McEntire 2010).

**ASEAN & Australia interregional cooperation: an overview**

In 2016, Australian total trade with ASEAN countries amounted to over 93 billion USD, more than with the US and Japan (Australian Government 2017).
Australia became ASEAN’s very first Dialogue Partner in 1974. Since the late 1970s the approach of Australia towards the ASEAN region moved its focus from defence to economics. The first Australia Labor Government since the Second World War come to office in 1972, de facto marking the end of the Cold War era in the country and starting a new phase in the relations with South East Asia. Although the Australia’s membership of ASEAN was not an option at that time, the Australian Government led by Whitlam promoted the reinforcement of the cooperation with Australia’s neighbourhood. After a series of talks, the partnership with ASEAN was formalised in 1974 and received the support of 5 million Australian dollars (around 3.3 million Euro) for the capacity building and technological development of the region. Overall, Australia supported the regional integration of the region by being one of the founding members of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994 and of the East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2005.

Since the establishment of the partnership the development of the region has been one of the Australia’s priorities. The first cooperation programme was already established in 1974. The ASEAN-Australia Economic Cooperation Program (AAECP) was established to promote the cooperation between Australia and ASEAN in areas of agreed regional development priority (AustraliaAid 2017). In August 2002 the ASEAN-Australia cooperation moved to the next phase with the establishment of the ASEAN Australia Development Cooperation Program (AADCP). Australia committed 45 million AUD to the six-year programme (2002-08) to address development challenges requiring regional solutions with the overall aim of strengthening ASEAN as a regional
group (Barber and Collett 2009). The programme entered its second phase (AADCP II) in 2008. The new 57 million AUD programme will support the development cooperation until 2019 (AustraliaAid 2017).

In 2007 Australia and ASEAN enhanced their historical partnership by signing in Manila, Philippines the first Joint Declaration on ASEAN-Australia Comprehensive Partnership. The Joint Declaration was the first step towards the commitment of both entities in areas of political, economic and socio-cultural cooperation. Moreover, the Joint Declaration already call for a greater cooperation in disaster preparedness, mitigation and emergency response as well as rehabilitation and reconstruction (ASEAN Secretariat 2007, pt. 17). A Plan of Action to implement the Joint Declaration (2008-2013) was subsequently adopted in the same year and was later extended until 2014. A new Plan of Action for 2015-2019 to implement the Joint Declaration on ASEAN-Australia Comprehensive Partnership was adopted in August 2014.

**Australia-ASEAN cooperation in disaster management**

The area surrounding Australia is prone to disaster. Overall, Australian Governments has invested a considerable amount of resources in disaster risk reduction. Australia’s support towards initiatives aiming at reinforcing disaster management policy targets different levels. Starting with supporting international initiatives, such as the UNISDR’s Asia Pacific Program or the World Bank’s Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, as well as community-based activities, such as preparedness and recovery programmes. Australia is also a key supporter of the ASEAN regional initiatives to prevent and respond to disasters.
Since 2011, Australia contributed with a total of around 3.5 million USD (4.56 million AUD) mainly through ASEAN-Australia Cooperation Arrangement for the Implementation of AADMER Work Programme 2010-2015. Australia played a key role in providing the initial 1 million AUD transitional gap fund for the operationalization of the AHA Centre, agreed by the Special ACDM Meeting on 20-21 December 2011. The Australian transitional fund was mainly used to recruit the 13 staff members of the AHA Centre. In addition, Australia supported the ASEAN-ERAT capacity by providing Induction and Refresher Courses.

In 2013, the Australian Government increased its contribution to around 1 million USD (1.4 million AUD). Following the Typhoon Haiyan, further 50.000 USD were allocated from the existing Australia-Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction (AIFDR) to the AHA Centre to support the ASEAN-ERAT team in the Philippines. In 2014, additional AUD 549.000 were mobilised by Australia for the operationalization of the AHA Centre covering the period January-June 2015. In 2015 the Cooperation Arrangement between Australia and ASEAN on the AADMER Work Programme 2010-2015 was amended again to provide additional AUD 928.365 for the period July 2015- December 2016.

Overall, Australia has developed an advanced system to respond to disasters. Australian EMA is the agency that not only coordinates the prevention and response to disasters, but that also leads the programmes to develop the capacity to respond of the ASEAN region at both local, as well as regional level. Disaster management is a formal component of Australia-ASEAN cooperation since
2007, yet several development programmes addressed the issue in the previous years. The implementation of an effective way to respond to disaster is seeing by Australia as a key element to ensure South East Asia is a prosperous and peaceful neighbour region.

3.3.3 New Zealand

Disaster Management in New Zealand

New Zealand does not experience the same number of deadly disasters as some of its neighbours in Southeast Asia. Yet, as noticed by Geoffrey Palmer, the Former Prime Minister of New Zealand ‘Sometimes it does us a power of good to remind ourselves that we live on two volcanic rocks where two tectonic plates meet, in a some-what lonely stretch of windswept ocean just above the Roaring Forties’ (Webb and McEntrie 2008, 1). As for many other first world states, New Zealand’s Civil Defence developed during the World War II. The 1932 Hawkes Bay earthquake was the event that triggered the first act dealing with the management of emergencies: The Public Safety Conservation Act signed in 1932. In 1959 New Zealand established the Ministry of Civil Defence and in April 1962 the Civil Defence Act was formalised.

The focus of New Zealand shifted from nuclear risk to natural and man-made emergency management following the events occurred in 1968. In April, a storm hit the North and South Island causing damages, as well as 51 human losses in the incident of the Wahine ferry in the Wellington Harbour. In May, a severe earthquake hit the West Coast of the South Island causing major damages and
likely only few casualties. These two events triggered the amendments to the
Civil Defence Act introduced in 1968. Among the others the word “disaster” was
changed in “emergency” to reflect the limited effects of the natural events (Webb
and McEntrie 2008). Following a landslide in Abbotsford, Dunedin that in 1979
caus ed several damages to home and forced the authority to evacuate 640 people,
the Civil Defence Act was revised in 1983.

The 1 July 1999 the Ministry of Civil Defence was renamed Ministry of Civil
Defence and Emergency Management. Under the Ministry, the National Crisis
Management Centre is in charge of coordinating New Zealand’s response in case
of emergency. In 2002 the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act replaced
the 1983 Civil Defence Act and it refocused the emergency management of New
Zealand towards the building of resilient communities (Britton and Clark 2000).

**ASEAN & New Zealand interregional cooperation: an overview**

New Zealand became ASEAN’s second Dialogue Partner in 1975. After the end
of World War II New Zealand faced a new phase in the relations with Asia
mainly focused on security. The risk of having the entire continent supporting
communist ideas led New Zealand to support stability actions in the region. In
particular, the initial relation between New Zealand and Southeast Asia in the
post-war period pointed in two directions. The first one was the signature of a
series of regional defence arrangements, such as the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization (SEATO) and the Australia, New Zealand, US Security Treaty
(ANZUS). The second was the implementation of development assistance
programme directed to Southeast Asia countries, and in particular the non-
communist ones. The Colombo Plan was the main example of this. It offered development aid projects in South and Southeast Asia to sustain the emerging nations in the region both socially and economically. New Zealand aid programme continued well also after the end of the Cold War (Smith 2005).

From the mid-1970s New Zealand relations with Southeast Asia changed its focus from a merely security concerned to broader engagement. First, the Kirk-Rowling Labour Government (1972-75) supported a broader regional cooperation as a mean to contrast the historical dependence of New Zealand from the US policy both in security, as well as in trade issues (Lodge 1975a). Until then New Zealand approach to regional grouping was the one of a first world powers with development countries. Existing regional institutions, such as SEATO\textsuperscript{11} were created by first world powers concerned by the communist risk in the region and saw a limited involvement of the Southeast Asian countries. Thinks changed in 1967 with the creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The Southeast Asian countries were the main driver of the process of regionalization and New Zealand moved from being in a driving position to a be an equal partner (Rolfe 2005). Since the Kirk-Rowling Government new ways to engage with ASEAN were explored and the interest for previous regional grouping diminished as shown by the end of SEATO in 1977. Moreover, the shift in New Zealand relations with Southeast Asian countries also changed following the Britain access to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973. This event urged New Zealand to start looking for new trade partners and Southeast Asia was identified as one of the natural trade

\textsuperscript{11} The members of SEATO were Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan (including East Pakistan, now Bangladesh), the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States.
partners for New Zealand (Lodge 1975b). This process led to the creation in 1995, together with Australia, of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). This change reflected also in development assistance of New Zealand towards Southeast Asian countries. Since 1950 and for around ten years New Zealand’s development aid was channelled via contribution to the Colombo Plan. New Zealand contribution was characterized by the provision of technical assistance to the targeted countries and not much about direct capital provided to local governments with the aim of containing communism. Yet, the shift of focus started by New Zealand in the mid-70s was also reflected in the development aid that becomes part of New Zealand’s bilateral aid programme.

Following New Zealand’s shift towards its relations with the Southeast region and the new dialogue between New Zealand and ASEAN, a formal dialogue relationship was established in 1975. The key milestone of the signature of the ASEAN-New Zealand Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Partnership was reached in 2010 together with a Plan of Action covering a five-year period. In November 2015 ASEAN and New Zealand celebrated 40 years of cooperation and launched the new Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Statement for ASEAN-New Zealand Strategic Partnership (2016-2020).

**New Zealand-ASEAN cooperation in disaster management**

Disaster management is part of the New Zealand’s Development Assistance towards Southeast Asian countries. It gives country-specific support to countries such as Indonesia and Myanmar (New Zealand MFA 2017), and it also support regional ASEAN-led initiatives such as the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance (AHA) Centre. The support is both in the form of direct funding, as well as by
providing the technical expertise for enhance specific capacities and by supporting initiatives such as the AHA Centre Executive Programme. Yet, the New Zealand-ASEAN cooperation on disaster management is relatively recent and subsequent to the 2004 Tsunami. The Joint Declaration signed by New Zealand, Australia and ASEAN leaders in November 2004 –one month before the Tsunami- did not mentioned disaster management among the priority of the cooperation (ASEAN Secretariat 2004b). The need to strengthen the disaster management cooperation among the two partners was mentioned in 2010 in the Joint Declaration establishing the Comprehensive Partnership (ASEAN Secretariat 2010d, sec. 21). Even more, the need to deepen the ASEAN-New Zealand cooperation on disaster risk management and to support the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) also by assisting the ASEAN Secretariat in the operationalization of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for the Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre) was clearly stated in the 2010 Plan of Action (ASEAN Secretariat 2010c, 6).

New Zealand was the first AHA Centre partner (AHA Centre 2016b, 30). During the phase of the establishment of the AHA Centre, the Government of New Zealand provided two advisors for the development of the AHA Centre Strategic Work Plan and a short-term advisor for the drafting of job descriptions. Moreover, New Zealand Aid Programme allocated funding for NZD 600.000 for the period 2013-2015. The funding was used establish standard operation procedures, staff training, and for buying equipment for the AHA Centre. New Zealand engaged with the ACE Programme by providing various training such as
‘Leadership in crisis’ provided in cooperation with the University of Canterbury’s Centre for Risk, Resilience and Renewal (UCR3). Moreover, New Zealand supported technical and training support to the AHA Centre by hiring a private company: The Humanitarian Advisory Group (HAG).

In summary, New Zealand is less prone to disasters than Australia, yet it was the first dialogue partner signing an official partnership with the AHA centre. New Zealand support to the development of an ASEAN regional mechanism to respond to disasters is explained by the traditional support of New Zealand to the ASEAN regional institutionalization. A strong ASEAN is considered by New Zealand a key element for its peace and prosperity. Similar to Australia, disasters affecting the ASEAN region are recognized by New Zealand as a serious threat to a strong ASEAN. The 2004 tsunami reinforced this fear and pushed further the support of New Zealand to supporting ASEAN in developing its own regional mechanism.

3.3.4 Japan

Disaster Management in Japan
Japan is among the most affected countries by natural disasters. Catastrophic events such as typhoons, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and tsunamis recurred in the history of Japan. In September 1923 a devastating earthquake hit the cities of Tokyo and Yokohama. Around 100,000 people dead and the two cities were
devastated. Yet, Japan re-built the two cities and started a conscious path towards awareness, preparedness and response that makes Japan one of the world leader in disaster prevention and response (Rauhala 2011). The end of World War II in Japan was characterized by a series of major typhoons and earthquakes during which around 1.000 lost their lives. It was the Ise Bay Typhoon that in September 1959 killed over 5.000 people, which triggered the establishment of a planned and comprehensive disaster prevention administration system in Japan. The Japanese Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act was established in 1961 (MOFA 2017).

The Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act provided the institutional framework for disaster prevention and management in Japan. It established the central and local disaster prevention councils, including provisions for their organization, functioning and responsibilities. Since then Japan actively implemented a series of measures to prevent a respond to disasters. These actions cover all spectrum of disaster management. Starting with the investments in the technological research to reinforce the ability to prevent disasters. Going to the capacity building both in terms of expertise and facilities. Culminating with the improvement of information and communication systems (Government of Japan 1961).

In Japan disaster management is based on a three levels system: national, prefectural and municipal. At the centre of each level there is a disaster management council responsible for the overall coordination of its level. The Central Disaster Management Council coordinates the response at national level. It consists of the Prime Minister, the Minister of State for Disaster Management,
together with all concerned ministers and heads of major public institutions and experts (Nazarov 2011).

Since the second half of the 70s Japan started international emergency assistance activities. Since the Act on the Dispatch of the Japan Disaster Relief Team was signed in 1987 and revised in 1992, Japan started dispatching relief teams, medical teams, expert teams and Self-Defense Force units overseas to help disaster-stricken countries.

**ASEAN & Japan interregional cooperation: an overview**

The dialogue between ASEAN and Japan started informally in 1973 and was formalised in 1977 with the first ASEAN-Japan Forum.

Japan has always been the most important economic partner of ASEAN (Japanese Diplomat 2017a), therefore it is not surprising that it was also a pioneer in starting a more structured dialogue in 1973. The ASEAN-Japan relations have since then focused on three main elements: trade and investment, development assistance and political support (Severino 2013). ASEAN become the principal beneficiary of Japanese development assistance under the leading role of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), not coincidentally established in 1974. By implementing these initiatives Japan aimed at overcoming ASEAN bitter memories of the Japanese initiatives during World War II and at supporting the development of the countries that would then become its main trade partners in the following years. The new established bond was reinforced following the financial crisis that affected ASEAN countries in
1997-1998. Japan assisted ASEAN countries with the 30billion USD programme called the New Miyazawa Initiative (Government of Japan 2017).

In December 2003 the Leaders of ASEAN and Japan signed the Tokyo Declaration for the Dynamic and Enduring ASEAN-Japan Partnership in the New Millennium. The declaration together with its Plan of Action served as a road-map for the relations between the two. In November 2011 the Joint Declaration for Enhancing ASEAN-Japan Strategic Partnership for Prospering Together (called Bali Declaration) was issued in Bali together with a new Plan of Action covering the period from 2011 up to 2015.

In 2013 ASEAN and Japan celebrated 40 years of Dialogue Relations. The Commemorative Summit held in December 2013 in Tokyo, gave the opportunity to leaders to adopt the statement “Hand in hand, facing regional and global challenges”. It underlined ASEAN-Japan friendship and cooperation and it was accompanied by an implementation plan that provided a framework to straighten ASEAN-Japan relations and support ASEAN Community-building beyond 2015 (ASEAN Secretariat 2017b).

**Japan-ASEAN cooperation in disaster management**

The ASEAN-Japan dialogue on disaster management cooperation started after the magnitude 9.0 Great East Japan Earthquake that triggered the tsunami causing the nuclear accident in the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant in March 2011. A special ASEAN-Japan Ministerial Meeting was organised in April 2011 in Jakarta, Indonesia. The meeting represented the opportunity to discuss the
strengthening of the ASEAN-Japan cooperation in disaster management. The Japanese support was until then mainly devoted to ASEAN member states as part of the bilateral cooperation. Yet, the 2011 ministerial meeting agreed to a set of initiatives to support ASEAN in the establishment and reinforcement of disaster management capacities (ASEAN Secretariat 2011). The first initiative was the Japan-ASEAN Disaster Management Seminar held in Tokyo in December 2011. The seminar co-organised by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the AHA Centre that highlighted the potential area of cooperation between ASEAN and Japan (JICA 2011). Since then, disaster management is become one of the key priorities on the ASEAN-Japan dialogue agenda. Yet, although the aim of the partnership is to go beyond the typical development assistance logic, the set of collaborative activities that were so-far carried on under the ASEAN-Japan partnership saw ASEAN mainly acting as receiver of Japan financial and technical support.

Since 2011, Japan contributed with a total of USD 24 million. The Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund (JAIF) was already used to support the initial study on the establishment of the AHA Centre. In the following years the JAIF sponsored the implementation of the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) of the AHA Centre, as well as DELSA and the ACE programme.

The first phase (2011-2012) of the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) project was sponsored with a total of 1.6 million USD mainly used to set up the AHA Centre Emergency Operation Centre (EOC) by buying equipment, software and hardware, such as computers, laptops, screens, teleconference
facilities (See AHA Progress Report, August-December 2012, annex G.3). A second phase of the project started in 2012 and was sponsored with further 4.92 million USD. It focused on connecting the AHA Centre with National Disaster Management Offices (NDMOs) in ASEAN Member States and filed teams. In addition, JAIF also provided two experts on ICT and on Disaster Monitoring and Analysis (AHA Centre 2012).

In July 2012, the Government of Japan also approved the project on the Establishment of a Disaster Emergency Logistic System for ASEAN (DELSA) with a provision of 12.3 million USD. The project was divided in three components. Firstly, the establishment of an ASEAN Emergency Stockpile, an internal ASEAN asset to provide emergency relief items in case of medium and large-scale disasters to ASEAN member states. DELSA was inaugurated in December 2012 in Subang, Malaysia. Secondly, the implementation of a capacity development programme, aiming at building both the AHA Centre capacity, as well as the one of young officers in the ASEAN member states. The ACE Programme took place for the first time between January and June 2014 and was attended by 13 officials from 7 ASEAN countries. Thirdly, the project included the development of a communication and awareness strategy on AADMER and AHA Centre. In 2014 the Government of Japan funded with 137.391 USD the Mitsubishi Research Institute (MRI) as ICT advisory company to support the AHA Centre in the development of a five-years ICT blueprint and strategy. Finally, in July 2015 Japan also funded with 380.431 USD a Feasibility Study for the Establishment of Satellite Disaster Emergency Logistic in ASEAN
Member States. The main objective of the project is to identify the best approach to establish the satellite warehouses to complement DELSA.

In summary, although the Japan-ASEAN cooperation in disaster management started only in 2011 following the Japanese Earthquake and the consequent nuclear disaster of Fukushima, Japan is currently sponsoring the biggest projects so far implemented by the AHA Centre. The 2011 shift marked the change in the Japanese support towards ASEAN from a mainly bilateral cooperation to an inter-regional one. Yet, the Japan-ASEAN cooperation still sees ASEAN acting as a receiver of Japan aid, not (yet) in a position to reciprocate. Still, the ASEAN Secretariat and the AHA Centre –as we will see in detail in the next chapter(s)– are in a driving position, deciding the projects that Japan could support.

3.3.5 United States (US)

Disaster Management in the US

The US Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was created in 1979 by an executive order signed by President Carter. It coordinates the federal government in preparing and responding to domestic natural or man-made disasters. FEMA was created to solve the concerns raised by the National Governor’s Association about the excessive fragmentation of emergency and disaster activities among more than 100 different federal agencies (FEMA 2017). FEMA coordinates the US internal response. The first response comes from the local government. A federal response follows a major disaster or emergency declaration issued by the U.S. President and it unlock up to USD 5 million (Cara
The U.S. also provides support to foreign countries hit by disasters. The U.S. provides relief to over fifty countries per year (USAID 2017). In addition, the experience accumulated in responding internally to disaster is reflected also outside U.S. borders. The U.S. Department of Defense conducts assistance missions under the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) programs, which funds around 200 projects annually (Drifmeyer and Llewellyn 2003). The U.S. State Department assists disaster’s refugees. Moreover, USAID supports activities linked to disaster management outside U.S. soil and it coordinates the federal response to disasters (Perry, Travayiakis 2008). In addition to the actual relief provided by oversees, the U.S. also supports the knowledge transfer of good practices. These activities involve the deployment of experts and contractors that advice the local authorities (Cara Labrador 2018).

**ASEAN & US interregional cooperation: an overview**

The United States became ASEAN Dialogue Partner in 1977, two years after the end of the Vietnam war. It took quite sometimes to normalize the relations between U.S. and ASEAN and it was only in November 2005 that ASEAN-U.S. decided to enhance their partnership. Following the Joint Vision Statement produced during the meeting in New York, the 2006 Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN-U.S. Enhanced Partnership and the 2009 Revised Priorities for Cooperation under the ASEAN-U.S. Enhanced Partnership. Yet, it was after the election of Barack Obama as the 44th President of the United States in 2009, that the U.S. attention toward ASEAN –and the Asia Pacific in general-changed gear. In fact, since Obama’s election and its ‘re-balance’ policy the US commitment towards ASEAN increased (Huang 2016). The First ASEAN-U.S.
Leaders’ Meeting was organised in November 2009 and in June 2010, the US became the first non-ASEAN country to establish a dedicated Mission to ASEAN in Jakarta and one year after the first resident Ambassador to ASEAN was appointed (Ambassador Nina Hachigian). Indeed, the US-ASEAN relations were not a priority for the Bush Presidency. The dialogue was characterized by a series of postponement of summit, not attendance of ministerial conferences and cancellation of meeting (Limaye 2007). Yet, the cooperation continued at a lower level and it was instrumental in the subsequent enhancement of the partnership led by President Obama.

In 2015, the United States – ASEAN relationship was elevated to a Strategic Partnership. ASEAN-US partnership focuses on five areas, such as economic integration, maritime cooperation, ASEAN emerging leaders, promoting opportunity for ASEAN women, and addressing transnational challenges. Overall, the US attention towards ASEAN focused on the political and security dimension, on issues such as the maintenance of peace and stability in the region, in particular regarding the South China Sea dispute and the threat of terrorism. Moreover, the Economic relations saw the establishment of the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement. Finally, the U.S.-ASEAN development cooperation has also focused on capacity building efforts in technology, education, food security, human rights, as well as disaster management (U.S. Mission to ASEAN 2017).
US-ASEAN cooperation in disaster management

The U.S. has directly supported the development of the AHA Centre both in terms of decision-making process and capacity. The U.S. support has been mainly coordinated by the U.S. Government’s Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) programme. The 2006 Plan of Action to implement the Joint Vision Statement on the ASEAN-U.S. Enhanced Partnership identified disaster management among the potential area for ASEAN-U.S. cooperation in the social and development area. Yet, a more concrete support started during the Obama’s administration (Salazar 2016). Since 2011, the support of the U.S. Government mainly focused on the operationalization of the AHA Centre, as well as on capacity building for AHA Centre staff and the ACE Programme.

The US Forest Services (USFS) played a key role in the development of the first AHA Centre Strategic Plan (2011). Trough ASEAN-U.S. Technical Assistance and Training Facility (USTATF), the US Government provided also an advisor for supporting the development of the AHA Centre Strategic Work Plan, as well as the development of the first job description for the AHA Centre staff members. The USTATF Advisor also worked on the 2013-2015 Programme. In January 2015 USFS supported the AHA Centre in the improvement of the Emergency Response Organization Guidelines. In 2012, The ASEAN Disaster Monitoring and Response System was developed by the AHA Centre in close cooperation with the team of international experts provided by the US Government. Since 2013, the US provided a total of 3 capacity-building trainings (November 2013, February and March 2014) both for the AHA Centre staff and the ACE Programme officers.
In summary, U.S. support towards ASEAN is explained by the U.S. interest in maintaining a peaceful and stable region in the South-East Asia that could be a reliable economic partner. The increased cooperation in many areas including disaster management should be understood in a context of political shift with the Obama’s administration devoting much more attention to ASEAN then his predecessors. Moreover, the U.S. FEMA is the agency that coordinates one of the most advanced systems to prevent and respond to crisis. Although, different from a regional system, it clearly provides a model for ASEAN, if not at organizational level, at least as a provider of technical good practices.

Overall, this third section provided an overview of the ASEAN dialogue partners with whom ASEAN has implemented a cooperation in disaster management. Although some of the countries, such as Australia, New Zealand and the U.S., developed their crisis management systems after the end of the Second World War, and others like Japan and ASEAN member states in the 70s, they all have a national system to coordinate the response to crisis. These national systems are the results of the different experiences of these countries in facing disasters. The implemented mechanisms to respond to crises depend on the level and type of vulnerability face by these countries. Yet, they all recognize the importance for the ASEAN region to increase its response to disasters. Not only disasters can irreremediably hit the economic capacity of the region, but they can also create instability. What these four countries have in common is the goal of having a stable and peaceful South East Asia, as well as the support towards ASEAN regional organization to achieve this goal. Interestingly enough, all these
dialogue partners started by only supporting the development of local communities in coping with crisis, slowly incrementing their support towards ASEAN as a regional organization. The support towards ASEAN as a regional organization capable of coordinating the response to disaster was encouraged (as saw in the first section of this chapter) by the 1994 Yokohama Strategy, but it was also reinforced by a series of catastrophic events, such as the 2004 Tsunami or the Japanese Heart-quake, that similarly to the EU provided the necessary wake up call to mobilize the necessary means to reach the policy goal. Yet, as we will see in great detail in the next three chapters, the ways in which ASEAN dialogue partners supported the institutionalization of an ASEAN mechanism to respond to disasters follow different logics and modes of influence. For example, Australia provided direct funding to the AHA Centre to cover the current expanses, some other countries such as New Zealand provided direct technical assistance to ASEAN Secretariat first, and to the AHA Centre after. A way of supporting much more in line with their tradition. Other countries, such as Japan, generously sponsored specific projects proposed by the AHA Centre and finally a fourth way was the one proposed by the US that proposed the implementation of projects that they knew would fit the AHA Centre and its vision for the future. Overall, ASEAN dialogue partners intervened in the process by covering all actor types (leader, reference, sponsor and implementer), demonstrating the importance of these partnerships in the institutionalization of ASEAN disaster management both in terms of norms and instruments.
Chapter conclusion

This chapter aimed to show that the institutionalization of ASEAN disaster management did not happen in a vacuum. Since the 70s the increased frequency and intensity of disasters in the Southeast Asia region (EM-DAT 2016), as well as in the world, triggered national, global, and regional initiatives to better coordinate the preparedness and response to disasters. The chapter discussed how these national and global initiatives were reflected both at EU, as well as at ASEAN level. Understanding the evolution of the global norms regulating the issue of disaster management is essential to set the context in which the events that will be empirically analysed in the following chapters, took place. Similarly, a deep understanding of the EU instruments to manage crisis is key to picture the EU as an actor in this field. Moreover, an overview of the ASEAN relations with the other dialogue partners in disaster management is fundamental to support the argument that the EU was not the only actor influencing the institutionalization of ASEAN disaster management. Overall, the main aim of this chapter was to provide the context to the empirical analysis and to justify the decision to expand the analysis from the potential influence of the EU only, to the influence played by the other ASEAN dialogue partners active in disaster management.

The EU, as well as Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the US, started their cooperation with ASEAN on disaster management issues as part of their bilateral development assistance with ASEAN member states. The development assistance formally evolved into a full cooperation with ASEAN as a regional organization after a series of events that directly or indirectly involved the ASEAN regions, such as the 2004 Tsunami, the 2011 Fukushima disaster or the
new attention of Obama’s administration towards ASEAN. Also important to notice is that it has been the ASEAN Secretariat that promoted the enhancement of disaster management cooperation with ASEAN dialogue partners thus facilitating the cooperation from the bi-lateral to the regional level.

As for the EU, after the support provided to ASEAN member states via the DIPECHO programme, the cooperation with ASEAN on disaster management issues was triggered by the 2004 Tsunami, but it was formally established only in 2007. The cooperation suffered from the internal post-Lisbon dynamics of the EU that saw the EEAS Crisis Response Department and DG ECHO proposing two different and competing models. The ASEAN cooperation with the other dialogue partners was based on different assumptions. The cooperation with Australia and New Zealand did not move away from the development assistance model with the two countries providing a flexible financial and technical support to ASEAN. This support is not embedded in any specific project with ASEAN, but it is derived from what remains available from the bi-lateral cooperation with ASEAN member states. Therefore, although substantial this support is not guaranteed in the long period. Differently, Japan support towards ASEAN disaster management is embedded in a series of long-term projects aiming at supporting the regional dimension of disaster cooperation in the ASEAN region. Finally, the US could be described as ASEAN ad-hoc partners in crisis management. The US initiatives could be mainly linked back to technical assistance in implementing organizational was the result of initiatives were triggered by the internal political situation. Overall, this chapter showed why the cooperation implemented by Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the US contains
all the characteristics to present ASEAN’s partners as influential actors in the institutionalization process of ASEAN’s disaster management policy. The context presented, justifies the focus on these actors in terms of their involvement through various initiatives. It also allows for further nuanced analysis in the chapters that follow of their roles as leader, reference, sponsor or implementer in the different phases of this process.

To conclude, the EU is not the exclusive partner of ASEAN in disaster management. Other ASEAN’s dialogue partners established cooperation on this issue with their characteristics and peculiarity. In particular, disaster management is a priority area for other dialogue partners different from the EU. The reasons behind this and the ways in which ASEAN cooperation with other dialogue partners on disaster management is built are different. Yet, this chapter provided the necessary background to justify the need to look at the role played by other dialogue partners in the institutionalization of ASEAN disaster management. In the next three chapters the three phases of the institutionalization will be analysed, and the roles played by the different dialogue partners and ASEAN internal actors (member states and Secretariat) will be explored to assess the relative influence of the EU in the process.
CHAPTER 4

The emergence of a regional approach to disasters: the institutionalization of the ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster management (ARPDM)

This first empirical chapter focuses on the initial stages of the process that led to the institutionalization of ASEAN regional disaster management: the adoption in 2004 of the ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management (ARPDM). The ten ASEAN countries are located in the most disaster-prone part of the world (EM-DAT 2016). Therefore, and although it was not among the core elements that led to the founding of the Association in 1967, the need to collaborate more on disaster response at ASEAN level emerged early on and became an increasingly pressing issue.

The ASEAN Bangkok Declaration adopted in 1967 by the Foreign Ministers of the five founding countries did not mention the need to strengthen member state cooperation on responses to natural disaster. For historical and geo-political reasons, the focus was mainly on the need to strengthen the economic and social stability of the region, to ensure its peaceful and progressive development, as well as to maintain its stability and security against external interference. The need for the five ASEAN founding countries to cooperate in the area of disaster management was officially set for the first time in the article 4 of the Concord I Declaration, agreed during the first ASEAN Summit held in Bali in February 1976.
‘Natural disasters and other major calamities can retard the pace of development of member states. They [ASEAN member states] shall extend, within their capabilities, assistance for relief of member states in distress’.

With the aim of accelerating the implementation of the article 4 of the Concord Declaration, set in Bali four months earlier, the ASEAN Declaration for Mutual Assistance on Natural Disasters was signed in Manila on 26 June 1976 in the framework of the 9th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. The ASEAN Expert Group on Disaster Management (AEGDM) was officially tasked to explore different options to increase the ASEAN coordination of the response to disasters, but due to the scarcity of their meetings (one every two years) and the frequent turnover of its representatives, it was only in 1996 that the ASEAN Secretariat first proposed the adoption of a Regional Programme on Disaster Management (ARPDM). The ASEAN programme on disaster management was finally adopted in May 2004.

This development in the ASEAN disaster management domain is considered by some EU scholars and practitioners as the ASEAN replication of the EU Civil Protection Programme developed in 1997 (Pennis di Floristella 2015; Allison 2015; European Commission Official 2017d). Therefore this chapter responds to the research questions ‘Who are the main actors in the process that have influenced the institutionalization of the ASEAN disaster response mechanism? Does the EU directly or indirectly influence this process?’ by looking at the mechanism that triggered the institutionalization of the programme.
The chapter is divided in two main parts in line with the definition of process provided by Glennan (1996) as a complex system where the outcome is the result of the interaction of actors that produce actions. First, the chapter presents the ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management (ARPDM) as the outcome of the analysis to be explored and discusses its similarities and differences with the EU Civil Protection Action Programme. This comparative analysis of the two norms gives already a preliminary idea of the similarities between the EU and ASEAN programme. Second, the chapter discusses the mechanism, and by doing so the influence of the EU, by identifying the actors that played the role of leader, reference, sponsor and implementer. By doing so this first empirical chapter assesses the EU influence in the implementation of the first step towards the institutionalisation process analysed, in comparison with the other internal and external actors.

4.1 The Outcome: the ARPDM Programme

The ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management (ARPDM) was officially launched in May 2004 in Bali, Indonesia. It constituted the first ASEAN-wide strategy to develop regional cooperation on disaster management issues for the period of 2004-2010.

4.1.1 The main features

The six years programme (2004-2010) set the rationale, the objectives and the principles at the basis of the ASEAN cooperation on disaster management. The programme was structured around 29 activities categorised in five main
components. The first set component of the ARPDM was the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Disaster Management Framework. The aim of the framework was to promote the cooperation among ASEAN countries in all areas of disaster management, including joint projects, collaborative research and joint networking activities. The second component was the implementation of capacity building activities increasing the competencies of the officials working in the national disasters management agencies. The third ARPDM’s component was the promotion of the exchange of information, expertise, best practices and resources. The fourth component was the promotion of collaboration and the strengthening of partnerships among interested stakeholders, such as IOs and NGOs. Finally, the last component of the ARPDM programme was the promotion of advocacy, public education and awareness programmes on disaster management. Each component included a set of projects proposed by eight out of ten ASEAN member states (Annex 2).

4.1.2 Similarities and Differences with the EU Civil Protection Action Programme

The first EU Action Programme in the field of Civil Protection was established by the 1997 Council Decision one year after the 1996 AEGDM meeting started the discussion on the ARPDM (European Council 1997b). Differently from the ASEAN programme set for six years, the EU programme was initially set for two years (1 January 1998 – 31 December 1999), then prolonged for another five years (2000-2004) (European Council 1999b) and finally extended for an extra year until 20 December 2004. The EU programme set four priority areas (Article 3) for the cooperation in terms of prevention, preparedness, response and
awareness. First, in terms of prevention, the priority was to both decrease the risks and damages to persons, environments and properties. Second, in terms of preparedness, the aim was to professionalize the expertise on civil protection at member states level. Third, in terms of response, the programme promoted pilot projects to improve the techniques and methods of response. Finally, in terms of awareness, the programme encouraged the engagement with the public, helping citizens to learn how to best protect themselves. Overall, the EU programme was organised around the principles of prevention, preparedness, response and awareness. In contrast, the ASEAN programme’s main objectives were not organised around the different steps of the crisis cycle, but more on the ASEAN member states’ declared priorities.

Discussions about the need to elevate the level of ASEAN cooperation on disaster management and to implement a programme-oriented approach on the issue started eight years earlier, during the 9th AEGDM Meeting in 1996. As outlined in the next section, the discussion on the preparation of the regional programme was an intense process led by the AEGDM chaired by the Philippines and with the cooperation of the ASEAN Secretariat. The 1994 Yokohama Strategy was the main reference norm for the ASEAN programme, but other regional experiences also inspired the work of the AEGDM and the ASEAN Secretariat. The implementation of the ARPDM process was coordinated by the ADPC with funding from ECHO (see Table 3). Overall, the ARPDM was developed as a bottom-up process. The 10 ASEAN Member Countries took an active part in the process, clearly stating their needs (see
ASEAN Secretariat 2004, 93–97) and listing their proposals that resulted in the five Components of the ARPDM and in its Sub-components.
Table 3. The implementation of the ARPDM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date and Location</th>
<th>Meeting</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996, Manila (Philippines)</td>
<td>9th AEGDM Meeting</td>
<td>Secretariat proposes a Regional Programme on Disaster Management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998, Singapore (Singapore)</td>
<td>10th AEGDM Meeting</td>
<td>Philippines appointed Referent for the project, in coordination with ADPC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2000, Chiang Rai (Thailand)</td>
<td>11th AEGDM Meeting</td>
<td>AEGDM requested the ASEAN Secretariat to assist the Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2000</td>
<td>1st (RCC) Meeting ADPC Regional Consultive Committee on Regional Cooperation in Disaster Management</td>
<td>ADPC Agreed to provide technical support through its on-going programmes. Agreement on the process of for the development of a draft ARPDM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2001, Bangkok</td>
<td>1st PDR-SEA Working group. Partnerships for Disaster Reduction–South East Asia project.</td>
<td>Organised by ADPC, founded by ECHO. With representatives from Lao, Cambodia, Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam, ASEAN Secretariat and Mekong River Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2001</td>
<td>2nd (RCC) Meeting ADPC Regional Consultive Committee on Regional Cooperation in Disaster Management</td>
<td>Endorsed the approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2001 - March 2002</td>
<td>Compilation of Responses from ASEAN Member Countries to Questionnaire on national Needs and Regional Areas for Cooperation. 8 Countries out of 10 responded.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2002, Bangkok</td>
<td>Workshop for the development of the ARPDM</td>
<td>Jointly organised by ADPC and ASEAN Secretariat, founded by ECHO. Attended by Focal Points of 10 ASEAN countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Request for Project Proposal sent to ASEAN Countries</td>
<td>Request sent out by the ASEAN Secretariat 5 countries responded:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2002, Manila (Philippines)</td>
<td>Regional Workshop on the definition of Sub-components</td>
<td>Conducted by ASEAN Secretariat with the support of the UNHCR and the Government of the Philippines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date/Location</td>
<td>Event/Activity</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May-September 2002</td>
<td>Drafting of the framework document</td>
<td>The ADPC drafted this framework document.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2002, Hanoi (Vietnam)</td>
<td>12th AEGDM Meeting</td>
<td>Endorsed the ARPDM draft for approval of the ASEAN Standing Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) was established in 2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2003, Jakarta (Indonesia)</td>
<td>Regional Workshop on Partnership for Emergency Preparedness</td>
<td>Conducted by ACDM with the support of the UNHCR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2003, (Thailand)</td>
<td>Regional Workshop on ‘Operationalising ARPDM’</td>
<td>Conducted by ACDM with the support of the UNHCR and the Thai Government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2003</td>
<td>ARPDM Endorsed by the ASEAN Standing Committee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2003, Brunei D.</td>
<td>1st ACDM Meeting</td>
<td>ACDM discussed the implementation of ARPDM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2004, Luangprabang (Lao)</td>
<td>2nd ACDM Meeting</td>
<td>Discuss the operationalization ARPDM’s priority projects into a full-fledged proposal. Supported by UNHCR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2004, Bali (Indonesia)</td>
<td>ARPDM officially launched by ACDM</td>
<td>UNHCR supported event. presence of partners, counterparts and donors.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.2 The Mechanism

The second section of the chapter is dedicated to the mechanism that led to the implementation of the ARPDM Programme as the first step of the institutionalization of the ASEAN cooperation on disaster management. As explained in the analytical framework, the mechanism explaining the influence of internal and external actors in the institutionalization of disaster management as an ASEAN regional policy is composed by the interaction of four actors: the leader, the reference, the sponsor and the implementer.

4.2.1 The Leader

The leader of the mechanism proposed in this thesis is the actor that first took the initiative of proposing a new step (goal) towards the institutionalization of a regional policy. As we will see in the next paragraphs the development of the ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management (ARPDM) was primarily led by the ASEAN member states in cooperation with the ASEAN Secretariat: the leaders of this phase. Initially discussed under the ASEAN Expert Group on Disaster Management (AEGDM), it was finally the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) that launched the ARPDM programme in 2004. The ASEAN Secretariat supported the process and adjusted its own structure to better follow the ASEAN member states pro-activity.

The ASEAN Expert Group on Disaster Management (AEGDM) was created in 1971 as one of the seven subsidiary bodies under the ASEAN Committee on
Social Development (COSD). AEGDM expert group met overall 12 times between 1976 and 2002. Initially focused only on natural disasters such as volcanic eruptions, floods, earthquakes, fires, etc. since 1990 has been broadened to include both natural and man-made disasters (ARPDM 2004-10). Although the working group was active since 1971, its impact in terms of policy outputs was minimal. This was mainly due to the scarcity of the meetings (every two years), the consequent high rotation of its members, the lack of planning, and the non-high-level, but technical profile of its members, which made difficult any advance on the cooperation (AHA Centre Official 2017a).

A concrete discussion to elevate the cooperation and to have a dedicated committee started during the 9th AEGDM Meeting held in Manila in 1996 when the ASEAN Secretariat proposed the implementation of a Regional Programme on Disaster Management to the representatives of ASEAN member states as a way to prioritize the ASEAN regional cooperation on disaster management (AHA Centre Official 2017a). The Philippines, being the 9th AEGDM Chair, were tasked to work on a first draft of the ARPDM programme. Four years after no much advancement was registered. Therefore, the 11th AEGDM held in Chiang Rai (Thailand) in August 2000 tasked the Secretariat to support the Philippines in preparing the first draft of the regional programme to be submitted to AEGDM members and national experts for comments. The Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) assisted the ASEAN Secretariat during the drafting process.
Since the 2000s the drafting process accelerated. Cambodia, became the last member to join ASEAN in April 1999, following Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997, giving a new input to the ASEAN regional initiative. Moreover, the 1994 World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction produced the Yokohama Strategy that repeatedly called for a stronger regional response to natural disaster, providing additional legitimacy to those actors (the AEGDM working group and the ASEAN Secretariat) already in favour of increasing the regional cooperation in disaster management. Finally, the number of disasters hitting the region increased considerably so also those ASEAN member states not traditionally hit by catastrophic events felt the urge to move to the next phase (AHA Centre 2016g).

Starting from reflecting on its own efficiency, the AEGDM promoted a series of changes that ultimately led to the launch of the ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management (ARPDM) as the initial reflection of the institutionalization of the ASEAN disaster management at regional level. In a case of socialization, where certain expectations are set up in social situation, The AEGDM (and later the ACDM) acted as the socialization platform where ASEAN member states’ representatives exchanged ideas on how to boost the regional cooperation in disaster management further. The socialization effects of the platform were reflected in three main initiatives.

The first step towards the institutionalization of ASEAN disaster management was the creation of the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) as the Committee in charge of the implementation of the ARPDM regional
programme. In September 2002, the 12\textsuperscript{th} AEGDM Meeting recommended to the ASEAN Standing Committee (ASC) to replace the bi-annual AEGDM meeting to an annual meeting in charge of monitoring the on-going projects and to adopt a programme-oriented approach. The ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) was established in 2003. It consists of ten heads of national agencies or government bodies responsible for disaster management of ASEAN member countries, known as the National Disaster Management Offices (NDMOs). Therefore, the ACDM is an expert committee, but because of the high level of its members (Director-level) it has the leverage to propose policies. The ACDM reports directly to the ASEAN Standing Committee (ASC), made up by the ten ASEAN Foreign Ministers, and is the ultimate responsible for the coordination and implementation of the activities related to disaster response, carried at regional level.

Secondly, the increasing importance attributed to disaster management by ASEAN was not only reflected in the establishment of a dedicated committee (ACDM), but it was also reflected in the structural changes of the ASEAN Secretariat. The ASEAN Secretariat followed the emergence of a new need by changing its internal structure to better support ASEAN Member States (AHA Centre Official 2017a). The natural disaster management portfolio was always considered part of the ASEAN socio-cultural community. At the beginning, the management of natural disaster was part of the Health Unit portfolio. It was then moved under the responsibility of the Environment Unit, renamed because of this ‘Environment and Disasters’. One full time officer was assigned exclusively to the disaster management component (AHA Centre Official 2017a). Although one
person does not seem to be a lot, it is important to keep in mind that the ASEAN Secretariat counts overall around 60 officials. In the following years the changes in the structure of ASEAN Secretariat well reflect how disaster response was progressively prioritized.

Since the beginning of 2016, disaster response has a dedicated Unit (Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance) under the Sustainable Development Directorate.

Finally, the increasing importance of disaster management in ASEAN region was reflected in the establishment -or evolution- of the national agencies dealing with the topic at national level. Less affected ASEAN member states were socialised to the idea promoted during the meeting by both other more affected ASEAN member states (i.e. Philippines and Indonesia) and the ASEAN Secretariat representative(s) that a regional cooperation on the issue was fundamental (AHA Centre Official 2017a). This is demonstrated also by the fact that between the 90s and 2000 the majority of ASEAN countries created or transformed their departments dealing with disaster management into national agencies, de facto leveraging the attention given to the issue (See Table 4).

In Cambodia, the National Committee for Disaster Management was established in 1994 and restructured between 1999 and 2001 (Bildan 2003, 26). Indonesia established its Advisory Board for Natural Disaster in 1966. In 1979 the Advisory board was elevated to a fully national board with the establishment of the National Disaster Management Coordinating Board. Its scope was enlarged in 1990 to include man-made disasters and again in 2001 to include complex
emergencies and IDPs. The current National Disaster Management Authority (BNPB) was established in 2008 as result of the lessons learned after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami (BNPB 2017). Lao PDR created its National Disaster Management Office in 1999 (UNDP 2010). Vietnam established its Central Committee of Storm and Flood Control in 1990 as the inter-ministerial institutions composed of representatives of all key ministers. The Department of Dike Management and Flood Control of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development provided the secretarial support. Since 2015 the Department of Natural Disaster Prevention And Control (DNDPC) of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development is in charge of the management of disasters in Vietnam (Vietnam Today 2015). Since 2000 disasters in Malaysia were coordinated by the National Security Council (NSC) in accordance with the Directive No. 20 on the ‘Policy and Mechanism on National Disaster Relief and Management.’ The NSC facilitated activities that were implemented by the Disaster Management and Relief Committee, which comprised various agencies at federal, state and local levels (CFE-DM 2016b). In 2015 Malaysia launched the new National Disaster Management Agency (Nadma) to coordinate efforts to respond to disasters (Malaysia Insider 2015). Since 1992 Myanmar provides assistance to the victims of natural disaster and to implement actions to prevent people and economic losses via the Relief and Resettlement Department (RRD) as part of the Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement (CFE-DM 2017). Singapore’s disaster management is a competence of the Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF) Agency established as an independent organisation under the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) in 1986. Thailand established its Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation as an Agency under the
Ministry of Interior in 2002 (Thai Ministry of Interior 2018). It substituted the National Civil Defence Committee (NCDC), the strategic body that since 1979 coordinated the 17 different ministries responsible for disaster management (ADRC 2008b, 2008a). In the Philippines since 2010 the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) of the Office of Civil Defense is the national body in charge of coordinating disaster management. The NDRRMC replaced the National Disaster Coordinating Council NDCC created in 1972, the updated version of the National Disaster Control Center launched in 1970. The Brunei National Disaster Management Centre (NDMC) was established in August 2006, under the lead of the Ministry of Home Affairs and it ensures coordination in all aspects of disaster management. Before 2006 the Brunei focal point for the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) was the Fire Service Department of the Ministry of Home Affairs.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Creation</th>
<th>Current Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei Darussalam</td>
<td>Fire Service Department of the Ministry of Home Affairs.</td>
<td>National Disaster Management Centre (NDMC), Ministry of Home Affairs. Since 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>National Committee for Disaster Management (1994)</td>
<td>National Committee For Disaster Management (NCDM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>National Security Council (NSC), Prime Minister’s Department since 2000</td>
<td>National Disaster Management Agency Prime Minister’s Department since 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Relief and Resettlement Department, Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement. Since 1992</td>
<td>Relief and Resettlement Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC). Created between 1970 (NDCC) and 1972 (NDCC)</td>
<td>National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC), Office of Civil Defense since 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>National Civil Defence Committee (NCDC) since 1979</td>
<td>Department of Disaster Prevention And Mitigation Agency, Ministry of Interior. Since 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Central Committee of Flood and Storm Control (CCFSC) (1990)</td>
<td>Department of Natural Disaster Prevention And Control (DNDPC) since 2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Overall, the idea of advancing the ASEAN regional cooperation on disaster management was the result of the socialization and persuasion of the ASEAN member states representatives in the AEGDM working group first, and in the ACMV committee after. These committees presented a deeper cooperation in the field of disaster management as a more efficient and effective way to tackle the disasters affecting the region (rational-choice logic). The ARPDM was the regional reflection of a general effort of the ASEAN region to better manage disasters. Changes in the way disasters management was conducted were primary evident at country level with the establishment of national agencies dealing with disasters. The following step was the elevation of the discussion at the regional level and the launch of a process that led to the development of a regional programme in 2004 in line with the priorities set by the AEGDM expert group. In addition, the ASEAN Secretariat saw in this rational advancement the possibility to further advance ASEAN integration (sociological logic). Therefore, the ASEAN Secretariat distinguished itself for a proactive role in assisting the working groups and in reflecting on its own structure to better adhere the regional changes.

4.2.2 The Reference

The role of the reference is assigned to the actor(s) that act as a model for the norm first proposed by the leader in more general terms as objective. The ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management (ARPDM) was inspired by the Yokohama Strategy established in 1994 by the UN, as well as by the regional initiatives already existing in South Asia.
The 1994 Yokohama strategy was at that time the recognised global norm on natural disaster management (United Nations 1994). The ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management (ARPDM) was developed by ASEAN to implement the provisions established by the 1994 strategy. The five objectives (ARPDM, 10) reflect the principles stated in the Strategy (United Nations 1994, 8) in a case of normative emulation (mimicry). Firstly, the ARPDM calls for the establishment of an ASEAN Regional Disaster Management Framework reflecting the principle of implementing the instruments necessary to enhance the prevention and preparedness at all levels (United Nations 1994, para I.3). Secondly the ARPDM proposes the strengthening of capacities, exactly as done by the 1994 strategy (United Nations 1994, para I.4). Thirdly, the ARPDM aims at promoting the sharing of resources and information as proposed by principles 5 and 6 of the strategy (United Nations 1994, para I5-I6). Fourthly, the ARPDM calls for enhancing the collaboration and strengthening of partnerships, as the Yokohama strategy in its point 8 (United Nations 1994, para I.8). Fifthly, both documents recognised the importance of raising awareness and educate the wider public on disaster management as a tool to prevent vulnerability of the population (ARPDM, 5 and United Nations 1994, para I.7). Finally, the ARPDM (p.9), as well as the Yokohama strategy (United Nations 1994, para I:8) both underline as disaster management efforts should be carry on primarily by the national state according to the identified needs. Yet, here is probably the biggest difference: who decides which are the population needs? In the ARPDM is clearly up to the state to define the population needs, whereas the Yokohama strategy is more vague on clearly defining this point.
The ARDPM incorporated the norms provided by the 1994 Yokohama Strategy. Yet, the ASEAN Secretariat, the Philippines and the ADPC, inspired their work by looking at other examples of existing mechanisms of regional cooperation (AHA Centre Official 2017a). In fact, the ARPDM was not the first ASEAN’s attempt to improve the regional coordination on pressing issues related to disaster management. The ASEAN Secretariat developed its first proposal for a regional programme on disaster management to the AEGDM Meeting in 1996 by looking at the already existing experiences (AHA Centre Official 2017a) in a case of synthesis (Börzel and Risse 2012a) inspired by an historical Institutionalist logic.

Cooperation bodies addressing specific trans-border hazards were already in place both at regional (ASEAN Environment-Haze Technical Task Force) and sub-regional level (Mekong River Commission and ESCAP/WMO Typhoon Committee) (Wilderspin and Casals 2007). In 1995 ASEAN established the ASEAN Environment-Haze Technical Task Force (HTTF). Two years later the HTTF produced the 1997 Regional Haze Action Plan (RHAP). The plan aimed at guiding the process of strengthening the ASEAN capacity to address transboundary haze pollution issue. In 2002 ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution was signed by ASEAN member states and it entered into force five months later on 25 November 2003. Also established in 1995, replacing the Mekong Committee already established in 1957, was the Mekong River Commission (MRC). The MRC is an inter-governmental organisation directly working with the governments of Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand and Viet Nam to jointly manage the shared water resources and the
sustainable development of the Mekong River. Since its established in 1995, the MRC has implemented a series of procedures on data and information sharing and monitoring of the water use. Since 1968 the ESCAP/WMO Typhoon Committee coordinates the planning and implementation of measures required for minimizing the loss of life and material damage caused by typhoons. It is an intergovernmental body composed of fourteen members, out of which seven from South East Asia (Cambodia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam)\textsuperscript{12}. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Inter-Sessional Meeting on Disaster Relief (ISM on DR) represents another experience of disaster management and relief cooperation implemented in the Asia Pacific region since 1993. The inter-sessional meeting is one of the four meetings composing the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)\textsuperscript{13}. The ARF was established in 1994. It is a forum for security dialogue in Asia and it is composed of 27 members: the ten ASEAN member countries, the ten ASEAN Dialogue Partners (Australia, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Russia and the United States), as well as Papua New Guinea, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Mongolia, Pakistan, Timor-Leste, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. All these existing experiences means the discussion for a ASEAN regional programme on disaster management was not happening in a vacuum and that experiences at different levels already provided a good repository of lessons to be learned by the ASEAN Secretariat and the ASEAN member states’ working groups. The most important lesson here

\textsuperscript{12} Non ASEAN members are China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Hong Kong, Macao, Republic of Korea and the US.

\textsuperscript{13} The other three inter-sessional meetings focus on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime, Maritime Security, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.
was the need to prioritize a bottom-up approach to assure the support of the regional initiative at national level (AHA Centre Official 2017a). For this reason, the ARPDM regional programme was more of a compilation of projects proposed by ASEAN member states, rather than a programme organised around agreed principles (as was the case for the EU Civil Protection Action Programme).

In summary, discussions around the implementation of an ASEAN regional programme on disaster management cooperation started in ASEAN around mid-90s. The ASEAN ARPDM Programme was mainly influenced by the UN 1994 Yokohama strategy, as well as by other existing experiences in the regions, such as the Environment-Haze Technical Task Force or the Mekong River Commission. In the first case, the ASEAN Secretariat and the ACDM committee followed a more sociological institutional logic, emulating an example considered as legitimate by ASEAN member states because of its international support (AHA Centre Official 2017a). In the second case, the link with other lessons coming from other regional experiences was less direct and the result of a synthesis of various experiences inspired by a more historical logic demonstrated by the link of the ASEAN regional programme, with already existing sub-regional initiatives. After the establishment of an ad-hoc committee, the creation of a joint programme was the consequent step to further increase the cooperation on issues related to natural events also in other sub-regional initiative (see the case of the Regional Haze Action Plan), showing how this was a clear pattern within the region (AHA Centre Official 2017a). In addition to that, many of the projects proposed by ASEAN member states under the ARPDM Programme
were the results of existing cooperation on specific issues from reducing the
effects of haze pollution to the implementation of regional initiatives to reduce
typhoon’s effects (ARPDM, 2014), demonstrating how the ARPDM was a
regional initiative well linked with already existing sectorial initiative in the
region.

4.2.3 The Sponsor

The sponsor is the actor(s) that financially sustained the steps that led to the
further institutionalization. In the case of the discussion that led to the
establishment of the ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management
(ARPDM), ECHO played the role of the sponsor via the implementation of its
DIPECHO Programme in South East Asia.

In 1996 the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) launched
the Disaster Preparedness ECHO Program (DIPECHO) aiming at promoting
disaster preparedness as an approach to reduce vulnerability and exposure of
people to risk and disasters, as well as the economic costs of them. South East
Asia was identified as one of the targeted disaster-prone regions\(^\text{14}\). The
DIPECHO programme was launched to support the United Nations International
Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR). The programme also helped
fulfilling Article 2 of ECHO’s mandate (European Commission 1996), which
states that its activities in the field should: ‘ensure preparedness for risks of
natural disasters or comparable circumstances and use a suitable rapid early

\(^{14}\) The other identified areas were Central Asia, South Asia, the Andean Community, Latin America and the
Caribbean.
warning and intervention system’ (ECHO 2004). Although mainly focused on reinforcing community-based disaster management (CBDM), DIPECHO also promoted initiatives at national and regional level. In South East Asia DIPECHO sponsored short-term projects targeting Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Philippines, Vietnam and -from the second phase- Thailand (Wilderspin and Casals 2007).

Although discussion about implementing a ASEAN regional programme on disaster management were on-going since the 1970s, and although ECHO only got involved in the region in 1997, its DIPECHO programme sponsored the workshops that led to the creation of the ASEAN ARPDM Regional Programme. It first sponsored an exploratory study that pointed on the main actors in the South East Asia region, and identified ASEAN as the best regional organization to invest in to reinforce the Southeast Asia regional coordination. The exploratory study also suggested ADPC as the potential implementer of ECHO projects in the region. Overall, the EU involvement in supporting the regional capacity building on disaster management issues was mainly done via the PDR-SEA project coordinated by the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC).

The first exploratory diagnosis study was commissioned by ECHO and conducted by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) of the Université Catholique de Louvain (UCL), Belgium (Vrolijks 1997). The study focused on Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam, as well as Bangladesh as ‘it was felt by ECHO that given its high vulnerability, it should be included in the first phase of the DIPECHO regional
programme’ (Vrolijks 1997, pt. Preface). The study identified the hazards, the response structures and the specific policies already in place at community, national and regional levels and the external support that was already in place in the region.

Looking at the existing mechanisms for regional cooperation in the broad region, the CRED preliminary study analysed the existing regional programmes and exchanges mechanisms. The study explored possible cooperation with both ASEAN, as well as the South Asia Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC). Yet, the study recommended ASEAN as the preferred partner organization as ‘involvement of ASEAN could generate strong backing for the programme, and could further contribute to the co-operation between ASEAN and the EU’ (Vrolijks 1997, sec. 2.2).

The added value of cooperating with ASEAN was mainly due to the fact that three of the targeted countries were already ASEAN members (the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam) and that three more will have joined in the near future (Laos PDR and Myanmar in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999). On the other hand, Bangladesh was the only country member of South Asia Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) and not member of ASEAN.

The preliminary study provided by CRED was also instrumental in mapping the potential interlocutors in the region and suggesting some of them as potential partners for ECHO. The Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) which will become one of the main implementer of the DIPECHO Programme and in particular a key actor in the establishment of the ASEAN ARPDM Programme is suggested by the CRED report as ‘the main specialised regional disaster institute
in the region, [which] can provide an excellent resource for disaster management programmes under DIPECHO.’ (Vrolijks 1997, sec. 2.2). On the other hand, when presenting the Mekong Committee established in 1957, the CRED study clearly stated ‘its [technical] experiences may be valuable to the programme, but it is doubtful if the Mekong Committee as such would provide a feasible forum for the implementation of the DIPECHO programme.’ (Vrolijks 1997, sec. 2.2).

Overall, the CRED preliminary study pointed out ASEAN as a potential partner for ECHO programming on disaster management in the region and it also suggested the potential partner(s) as implementer of the DIPECHO programme. As a follow up to the CRED report, ECHO sponsored a regional consultation meeting in Bangkok, Thailand on March 1998 (ECHO 1998). The workshop organised by ADPC was attended by representatives of national administrations and regional organizations, NGOs and experts in the field of disaster preparedness and prevention. It provided a list of recommendations to the implementations of the DIPECHO Programme, but it also served as an important network event that facilitated discussions among EU representatives and the relevant stakeholders from the region. Different points were raised during the plenary discussion, including the need to interact with both the national and local levels, while supporting the efforts at regional level and the necessity to include Malaysia and Indonesia in the programme.

The DIPECHO Programme in Southeast Asia was officially launched in 1998. Since then DIPECHO supported small short-term biannual projects at community level, as well as nine regional actions for a total of 3.2 million Euros
(ECHO 2007). The first two DIPECHO Action Plans were implemented in 1998 and 2000 and covered countries such as Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, the Philippines and Vietnam. Since the third 2002 DIPECHO Action Plan Thailand was also included among the targeted countries (see Bildan 2003, 12). A regional dimension was present in all first three Action Plans (1998, 2000 and 2002).

ECHO interventions at regional level were implemented in the framework of the Partnerships for Disaster Reduction – South East Asia project (PDR-SEA) (Bildan 2003). The project was implemented by ADPC in collaboration with the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UN ESCAP). One of the main aims of the project was to reinforce the links between national disaster management offices (NDMOs) by sharing knowledge and experiences. During its three phases (2001-2002, 2003-2004, 2005-2006) the project created different opportunities for exchanging experiences and practices. Three practitioners’ workshops were organized in 1999, 2001 and 2004 to facilitate the knowledge sharing and regional newsletter and distribution lists created to facilitate the information sharing among the different stakeholders. Most importantly, under this project, the facilitation of ACDM’s ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management (ARPDM) was undertaken (Loy Rego and Le Huu Ti 2007).

Overall, ECHO supported the initial phase of the institutionalization of ASEAN disaster management policy. It provided the necessary financial support to the workshops that led to the creation of the ASEAN ARPDM Regional Programme. Following a sociological Institutionalist reading, the overall logic behind
ECHO’s involvement in the region can be linked back to its willingness to be perceived as a legitimate actor in the region, as demonstrated by the preliminary study commissioned by ECHO to identify the most suitable counter-part(s) in the region. Nevertheless, the facilitation of the ARPDM programme was an unintended consequence of ECHO’s support that was initially targeting the national level more than the regional one. ECHO’s initial aim in the region was to influence the attention of ASEAN member states towards preparedness initiatives, streamlining disaster preparedness and moving beyond their traditional focus on relief (European Commission Official 2017d). On that, the influence of ECHO was limited. Although ECHO’s officials repeatedly advocated during the preparatory meeting sponsored by ECHO for the inclusion of ‘disaster preparedness’ as one of the components of the programme, the discussion within the ASEAN expert groups (AEGDM first and ACDM after) were focused more on disaster relief (Wilderspin and Casals 2007).

4.2.4 The Implementer

The implementer is the actor in charge of the technical implementation of the norm that will advance the institutionalization process. In the first step of the process, the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre (ADPC) led the drafting of the ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management (ARPDM).

Already in 1996 the Manila AEGDM noted the interest advanced by the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) in collaborating to the drafting phase of
the ARPDM Plan. The support received from other actors during the drafting phase is also explicitly mentioned in the ARPDM (2004, 5).

The Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) is an independent non-governmental organization, established in 1986 as a technical capacity building center. Based in Thailand, it works in the Asia region, and in particular in countries such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, the Philippines, and Vietnam (ADPC 2018). In November 2000 ADPC launched the Regional Consultative Committee (RCC) on Disaster Management. The RCC is a regional dialogue platform to promote advocacy and exchange of experiences in disaster risk reduction (DRR) among its members. It was in its role of RCC’s Secretariat that the ADPC organised a meeting of disaster management officials from Lao PDR, Cambodia, Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam as a way to establish itself as a legitimate local actor in the domain of disaster management in the region. The meeting, founded by EU ECHO, was held in Bangkok on October 2001 with the participation of representatives from the ASEAN Secretariat and Mekong River Commission. The meeting defined the process for drafting the ARPDM. The process was divided in three main steps.

First, the ASEAN Secretariat conducted an assessment of regional needs and capacities, by sending a questionnaire to ASEAN member states. Eight countries responded by listing national identified needs and potential areas bilateral and multilateral areas of cooperation. The prioritised area of multilateral cooperation
included joint trainings and simulations, disaster information sharing and the implementation of an inventory of existing capacities in ASEAN region. Moreover, a bilateral cooperation proposal to strengthen the cooperation on flood mitigation and prevention was advanced Cambodia and Viet Nam. Second, an ASEAN workshop with representatives of all ten members states was organised in Bangkok on March 2002. The workshop was jointly organised by ASEAN Secretariat and the ADPC with funding support from ECHO. The workshop discussed the general principles, the objectives, the components and the priorities of the ARPDM. Third, between May and September 2002 the ASEAN Secretariat sent a call for projects to ASEAN member states. Five countries responded with project proposals that were integrated in the ARPDM.

Based on the results of the March 2002 workshop and the project proposals sent by ASEAN member states, the ADPC drafted the ARPDM framework document emulating a process already implemented in other experiences such as the adoption of the Haze Action Plan (AHA Centre Official 2017a). The 12th AEGDM Meeting held in September 2002 in Hanoi (Vietnam) endorsed ARPDM. A series of three regional workshops were organised with the support of the UNHCR to discuss the operationalization of the ARPDM programme. The first workshop on “Partnership for Emergency Preparedness” was held on February 2003 in Jakarta (Indonesia). As the momentum was right for increased regional cooperation on disaster management, the ACDM decided to meet quarterly to discuss the advancement of the regional programme. The second workshop organised in Manila in 2002 decided to prioritize the sub-components of the ARPDM and give the possibility to discuss the programme with relevant
stakeholders. The third workshop on “Operationalising ARPDM” was finally organised in October 2003 in Bangkok, Thailand. It set the priorities among the sub-components according to five criteria: the requirement of little or no funding assistance, the effectiveness of impact, a short-term duration, the regional scope and the no requirement of technical assistant for the implementation.

After receiving the necessary endorsements from the relevant committees, the ARPDM was officially launched in Bali (Indonesia) in May 2004. The event was funded by the UNHCR\(^\text{15}\) and saw the participation of Government officials from ASEAN member states responsible for disaster management, as well as donor representatives and UN agencies officials (OCHA 2004). The purpose was not only to officially launch the ARPDM programme, but also to engage donors and partners in mobilizing financial and technical support for the ARPDM.

Overall, the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) was the key implementer in the process the led to the drafting of the ARPDM Programme tanks to its knowledge of similar processes already implemented in the region. Active since the initial phase in 1996, the ADPC supported the ASEAN Secretariat in establishing and respecting the different phases of the drafting process proving itself a legitimate actor in the disaster management domain. ADPC provided an overview of the existing experiences within ASEAN, highlighting the positive and negative aspects of the different initiatives and suggesting a way of proceeding for drafting the ARPDM. By doing so it

\(^{15}\) The event was part of a to-day orientation workshop on UN Disaster Assessment Coordination (UNDAC) and International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) organized for the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM).
emulated similar processes already implemented in similar fields, such as the Haze Action Plan (AHA Centre Official 2017a). These consultation and drafting processes proved to be successful in finalising the regional programme in similar fields and where replicated also in the case of the ARPDM.

**Chapter conclusions**

The launch of the ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management (ARPDM) in May 2004 was the first step towards the institutionalization of a regional cooperation on disaster management.

The chapter analysed this outcome by analysing the mechanism that triggered this development. After briefly discussing the similarities and differences of the ARPDM Programme with the EU Civil protection Action Programme, the chapter identified four main actors which by performing certain action(s) produces the analysed outcome (Beach and Pedersen 2013). The ARPDM was produced thanks to the initiative and leadership of the ASEAN member states grouped in the Expert Group on Disaster Management (AEGDM) and in the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM), and thanks to the ASEAN Secretariat (the leader(s)). In a case of socialization, the AEGDM and the ACDM acted as socialization’s platforms where the need of increasing the level of cooperation among ASEAN member states became a national priority for all ASEAN member states. In addition, the ASEAN Secretariat saw in the further integration of disaster management, a potential advancement of the ASEAN regional integration and further supported this institutional advancement by implementing persuasive initiatives, such as the creation of a position.
exclusively dedicated to disaster management. The process launched in 1996 was based on the norms contained in the Yokohama strategy established in 1994 (United Nations 1994), as well as on the already existing experiences in the region (the reference(s)). The modes of indirect influence represent cases of normative emulation (mimicry) of a norm recognised as legitimate (the 1994 Yokohama Strategy), and of synthesis of already existing initiatives in the region. The Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) performed the entire process as well as the actual drafting of the document, which was key in connecting the different actor of the mechanism (the implementer). With the aim of being perceived as a credible and reliable actor in the ASEAN region, the ADPC influenced the institutionalization process by emulating the process followed in similar areas of cooperation, such as the 1997 Haze Action Plan. The ADPC was also instrumental in involving ECHO in founding the set of meetings and workshops that finally led to the adoption of the ARPDM programme (the sponsor). ECHO aim was to be perceived as a legitimate actor in the region. By sponsoring those workshops ECHO tried to influence the process by trying to impose a form of resource dependencies pressure.

By analysing the mechanism that triggered the implementation of an ASEAN programme on disaster management, the chapter argues that the EU cannot be considered an influential actor in disaster management policy for ASEAN member states. Even if often forgot in the existing analysis (Pennisi di Floristella, 2015) the initial discussion about a regional approach to disaster management originated within ASEAN and was not triggered by any inter-regional exchange. This outcome reinforces the idea advanced by scholars such
as Acharya (2004) that internal dynamics and local processes should be carefully analysed before advancing any claim of regional influence. Moreover, by analysing the actual programme, the chapter shows how the implemented norms were taken by the 1994 Yokohama strategy and not by the EU Action Programme in the field of Civil Protection launched in 1997, one year after the discussion has started within ASEAN member states.
Table 5. The ARPDM actors and mechanism overview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Objective of influence</th>
<th>Rationale behind influence</th>
<th>Modes of influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leader</td>
<td>Advance the ASEAN regional cooperation in the field of disaster management</td>
<td>For ASEAN MS as a more efficient, effective way to respond to disasters (RCI); For ASEAN Secretariat as a way to advance ASEAN regional integration (SI);</td>
<td>Socialization, Persuasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management (ARPDM)</td>
<td>The Yokohama Strategy is recognised as legitimate (SI); Existing initiative provide a known and trusted example to take inspiration (HI);</td>
<td>Indirect: Mimicry, Synthesis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sponsor</td>
<td>Financial support to norms (workshops and events)</td>
<td>ECHO aim was to be perceived as a legitimate actor in the region (SI); Failed resource dependences pressure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementer</td>
<td>Drafting the ARPDM Programme</td>
<td>Wanted to be perceived as a legitimate actor in the region on disaster management (SI); Interested in receiving the funding to implement the project (RCI);</td>
<td>Emulation of previous processes in similar fields</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 5

From a plan to a framework: the institutionalization of the AADMER Agreement

This chapter focuses on the second part of the process that led to the institutionalization of the ASEAN regional disaster management: the signature in 2005 of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER). The 2004 ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management (ARPDM), as discussed in the previous chapter, set the establishment of an ASEAN Regional Disaster Management Framework as its first objective to be reached within one year. Therefore, following the adoption of the ARPDM Programme, the ten ASEAN member states, together with the ASEAN Secretariat, started a discussion on the adoption of an ASEAN framework on disaster management. The December 2004 Tsunami accelerated this process quite consistently. The AADMER was signed by the ten ASEAN member states on July 2005, only seven months after the catastrophic disaster, but entered into force four years later in December 2009.

The chapter responds to the research question by looking at the mechanism that triggered the institutionalization of the agreement. The chapter starts by presenting the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) as the outcome to be explored. After introducing the main features of the AADMER Agreement, the chapter continues by providing a
comparative analysis between the 2005 AADMER (ASEAN 2005c) and the potential EU homologue: the 2001 EU Council Conclusion on the establishment of the Community Civil Protection Mechanism (European Council 2001b). The AADMER agreement is compared with the EU Community Mechanism implemented by the European Union in 2001 with the aim of identifying the similarities and differences between the two regional agreements. The two agreements, considered as the basis of the two regional cooperation agreements, are compared in terms of objectives, principles and general obligations. After comparing the core elements of the two legal texts, the analysis focuses on the practices that follow the introduction of the two regional agreements. In particular, the chapter presents and compares the EU and ASEAN response cycle, the regional funding system and the regional exercises. The overall aim of this comparative analysis is to see if similarities exist between the EU and the ASEAN agreements. Similar outcome would be the first element to prove that some forms of influence happened between the two regional organisations, confirming what the EU centric literature (Pennis di Floristella 2015; Börzel and Risse 2009, 2012a) and EU discourses suggest.

After assessing the potential effects of the EU influence on ASEAN by focusing on the outcome, the second part of the chapter is dedicated to unpacking the mechanism behind the adoption of the AADMER (the outcome). Following a process tracing analysis (Beach and Pedersen 2013) the mechanism is explained in terms of actor engaging in an activity. In line with the framework proposed by this thesis, the mechanism is unpacked by looking at the four intervening actors: the leader (which first advanced and lead the implementation of the norm), the
reference (an existing similar instrument that could have inspired the norm), the sponsor (which provided the means to implement the norm) and the implementer (which materially supported the writing process of the norm). The analysis looks at the institutional logics behind the interventions of the four actors, as well as at the modes implemented to influence the process.

5.1 The Outcome: the AADMER Agreement

The ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) is the single legally binding document that provides ASEAN with a framework for regional cooperation and coordination disaster management. The 10 ASEAN Foreign Affairs Ministers signed the AADMER on 26 July 2005 in Vientiane, Lao PDR. With Philippines ratification of the agreement in September 2009, the AADMER entered into force on 24 December 2009.

5.1.1 The main features

The AADMER Agreement is divided in eleven parts covering all phases of disaster management from before, during and after a disaster. The first part sets the general provisions of the agreement, including the objectives, principles, general obligations and use of terminology. The second part focuses on the Disaster Risk Identification, Assessment and Monitoring. The third part is dedicated to Disaster Prevention and Mitigation. The fourth part covers Disaster preparedness, and it includes an early warning component. This part contains also the provisions for the establishment of an ASEAN Standby Arrangements of assets and capacities. The fifth part is dedicated to the Emergency Response, the sixth one to Rehabilitation and the seventh one to the Technical Co-operation
and Scientific Research. The eighth part contains the provisions for the establishment of the ASEAN Co-ordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance. The ninth part clarifies the institutional arrangements, including the Conference of the Parties, the National Focal Points, the Secretariat and the Financial Arrangements. The tenth part covers the Agreement procedures and part eleventh the final clauses for the adoption.

The AADMER Agreement is operationalized via the implementation of the AADMER Work Programmes (2010-15 and 2016-20). The first AADMER work programme was launched seven months after the adoption of the AADMER Agreement during the 15th meeting of the ACM held in March 2010 in Singapore (ASEAN Secretariat 2010b). It was implemented in two phases (2010-2012) and (2013-2015) and focuses on four components namely Risk Assessment, Early Warning and Monitoring (RAEWM), Prevention and Mitigation (P&M), preparedness and Response (P&R) and Recovery.

The 2010-15 AADMER Work Programme is the action plan translating the provisions of the AADMER Agreement into concrete output. It substituted the ARPDM Programme adopted in 2004 (See Chapter 4 on ARPDM) but differently from it, the AADMER Work Plan is a top-down programme drafted by looking at the provisions established in the AADMER Agreement and not based on the project proposals coming from member states.
5.1.2 Similarities and differences with EU Community Mechanism

At EU level, the civil protection mechanism is ruled by a multitude of legal text. Starting with the Council Decision of 23 October 2001 on establishing a Community mechanism to facilitate reinforced cooperation in civil protection assistance intervention (European Council 2001b), recast by the 2006 proposal to the Council (European Commission 2006), and then by the 2007 Council Decision establishing the Civil Protection Financial Instrument (European Council 2007c). Yet, as the main scope of this chapter is to assess the potential influence of the EU towards ASEAN on disaster management, it seems logic to limit the analysis to EU decisions agreed before the signature of the AADMER Agreement (July 2005).

Similarities can be found in the general objectives of the cooperation. In particular in the type of losses that the two regional mechanisms aim at reducing, as well as in the broad understanding of the types of disaster that should be addressed and prevent. Yet, these elements can be linked back to the general understanding within the disaster community, as set already in the 1994 Yokohama guidelines for natural disaster prevention, preparedness and mitigation agreed by the first UN World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction, held in Japan in May 1994 (see Chapter ARDPM) and in the Concluding Forum of the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) held in Geneva in July 1999 (IDNDR 1999).

The ASEAN regional cooperation agreement in disaster management set as its main objective the reduction of disaster losses in terms of both lives and social,
economic and environmental assets (ASEAN 2005, art.2). The differentiation between people and property is also present within the objectives set by the EU in the 2001 Council Decision (European Council 2001, art.1.2). Yet, this can be linked back to the Yokohama guidelines in which the rising impact of natural disasters was already set in terms of both human and economic losses (United Nations 1994, art.1). In terms of type of disasters that can activate the regional mechanism both regional organizations have a broad understanding. The AADMER agreement defines disaster as ‘a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society causing widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses.’ (ASEAN 2005, art.1). Adding that hazards can be induced by natural events or human actions (ASEAN 2005, art.5). Similarly, the EU refers to ‘the protection in the event of natural, technological, radiological and environmental emergencies’ (European Council 2001, preamble 1). Although the 1994 Yokohama guidelines refers only to natural disasters, already at the end of the proclaimed UN decade on Natural Disaster Reduction in 1999, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan stated in his closing address ‘No doubt there will always be genuinely natural hazards [...] but today’s disasters are sometimes man-made, and nearly always exacerbated by human action or inaction’ (IDNDR 1999, 10).

The two organizations differ in the basic principles of the regional cooperation, as well as on the potential area of action, in the openness of the response mechanism and in the identification of the provider of assistance. In short, they differ in the main elements that characterised the regional dimension of the mechanisms.
The two organisations based their initiatives on two different sets of principles, which reflect two different ways of conceptualizing the objective of the regional cooperation. The AADMER agreement emphasises the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity (ASEAN 2005, art.3.1), affirming how the overall responsibility for the co-ordination should remain in the hands of the affected member states (ASEAN 2005, art.3.2). The principles of solidarity and partnerships should guide the cooperation, yet this should be calibrated to the situation and possibility of each member state (ASEAN 2005, art.3.3). The EU decision put the emphasis on the principle of subsidiarity, stating that ‘Community mechanism would provide added value in supporting and supplementing national policies [...] If the preparedness of the requesting Member State is not sufficient for an adequate response to a major emergency in terms of available resources’. The EU decision suggests a weakness of the requesting states that should therefore be helped, such language would sound simply unacceptable for ASEAN member states.

Regarding the area of intervention, on one side the AADMER mainly refers to assistance that should be provided within the territory of the ASEAN member states that ratified the agreement. Article 11.1 set the provision of assistance as follow: ‘if a Party needs assistance in the event of a disaster emergency within its territory, it may request such assistance from any other Party, directly or through the AHA Centre, or, where appropriate, from other entities’, where ‘party’ is defined in the agreement as the ASEAN member state that signed up the AADMER agreement (ASEAN 2005, art.1.11). Differently, the EU set the area of intervention both inside and outside the union (European Council 2001,
art.1.2). In practical terms, all 15 ASEAN interventions between 2011 and 2016 took place within ASEAN territory (see Annex 3). On the other hand, the EU mainly responded outside the union territory (European Commission Official 2017a).

The AADMER agreement involved ASEAN member states only, although listing among assisting entities ‘State, international organisation, and any other entity or person that offers and/or renders assistance to a Receiving Party or a Requesting Party in the event of a disaster emergency’ (ASEAN 2005, art.1.1). Differently, the EU mechanism for civil protection was since the beginning open to Central and Eastern Europe states that in 2001 have the status of candidate countries, as well as Cyprus, Malta and Turkey (European Council 2001, art.7). Yet, the mechanism is mainly directed in coordinating the assistance ‘provided by the Member States and the Community’ (European Council 2001, art.1.2). This difference is a clear example of how much previous experience influenced the AADMER agreement. ASEAN countries are often receivers of international assistance, therefore one of the main challenges for them is to coordinate the assistance coming from outside. On the other hand, EU member states did not experience big challenges in coordinating the assistance coming from outside Europe, as they are mainly provider of assistance.

Overall, the two frameworks also differ in their emphases. The AADMER agreement gives equal attention to all phases of the crisis, such as prevention, early warning, preparedness, response, whereas the 2001 EU Council Decision focused much more on the response phase of the mechanism.
| **Objectives** | **ASEAN** | Protect people & property from both natural and man-made disasters |
| **Principles** | **ASEAN** | Sovereignty, territorial integrity and solidarity |
| **General obligations:** | | |
| **Which area?** | **ASEAN** | Within ASEAN country |
| | **EU** | Inside and outside EU |
| **Which level of openness?** | **ASEAN** | ASEAN country only |
| | **EU** | All EU Member States participate in the Mechanism, as well as Iceland, Norway, Serbia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Turkey. |
| **Which assistance?** | **ASEAN** | Both coming from inside and outside ASEAN (State, IO, and any other entity or person) |
| | **EU** | Provided by the Member States and the Community |

**The response cycle**

The AADMER agreement set ASEAN emergency response cycle in its Part V. The ASEAN response is divided in four different steps visually presented as a big letter P. The so-called P Action Planning is composed of the first two phases –the leg of the P-which provide the situational awareness and establish the needs of the population. The second two steps are part of the operational phase –the circular O phase- of the operation that implies the execution of the plan and its
dissemination. The first phase focuses on understanding the situation on the ground. A rapid assessment is conducted by the AHA centre together with the ERAT team, as well as national representatives, as soon as the affected country request for help or authorizes the assessment. This first assessment provides information about the scale and impact of the disaster, the geographical spread and –most importantly- the populations’ needs and is used to priorities the objectives of the response. The second phase clarifies the objectives of the response and develops an Emergency Response Action Plan (ERAP). This plan is shared with the national focal points of ASEAN member states by the AHA centre with the aim of matching needs with offers. During the third and fourth phases the AHA centre coordinates the external assistance towards the national focal point of the affected country according to the ERAP Plan. The mobilisation to the disaster-affected areas is then directly done by the national NDMOs. The AHA Centre does not mobilise help directly to the affected areas of the receiving country.

Overall, the ASEAN emergency response mechanism works under three main principles. Firstly, support can be mobilised only if the affected country makes a request or approve the offer of assistance. Secondly, the ultimate responsible for the coordination of mobilised resources is the receiving country. The AHA centre can only help the affected country in coordinating the offered assistance. Thirdly, assistance should be provided on the bases of the needs and not on what member states –or other donors- can offer. Based on this, the AHA centre carries on three main activities. First, it provides operational support to the NDMO of the affected country by sending AHA centre’s staff on the ground and by
mobilising ASEAN-ERAT teams. Second, once the affected country’s needs are set, it matches requests from affected member states with offers. Third, it facilitates the logistics by coordinating the transportation of relief items from ASEAN member states, as well as from the ASEAN warehouse Delsa.

The EU 2003 Decision set the rules to implement the Community Mechanism and lay down the rules for interventions inside and outside the EU\(^\text{16}\) (European Commission 2003, art.28-34). Overall, the EU response whiting the territories of participating states is divided in five steps: alert, request for assistance, response, disengagement and lessons learnt. Firstly, during the Alert phase (European Council 2001, art.28) the affected participating state should inform the MIC about the potential transboundary effects of the emergency. Vice versa, if the MIC detects a potential emergency occurring in a participating state is required to take contact with local authorities. Differently from the AADMER provisions, which start the response phase with the request of assistance coming from the affected states, the EU includes the early warning component already as part of the response, whereas for ASEAN the early warning activities are part of the disaster preparedness phase (ASEAN 2005, art.7). Secondly, similarly to AADMER provisions, if assistance is required, the affected country should present a formal request to the ERCC. Yet, differently from the AADMER rules, this formal request to the ERCC should already include a needs assessment specifying the needs, the types of support requested, as well as the location. Thirdly, similarly to the AHA Centre, the ERCC has the role to match requests

\(^{16}\) In order to compare the two regional instruments the following analysis will focus only on the emergency plan activated by the EU in case of a crisis within its territory or within the territory of a participating state. Moreover, the 2003 Decision refers to the EU centre as MIC. As the MIC was renamed ERCC in 2012 I will use to the most recent name.
of assistance with offers of assistance. Fourthly, EU provisions, differently from AADMER agreement, include disengagement and reporting and lessons learnt as phases of the response (European Commission 2003, art.33-34).

Overall, the principles set in the AADMER agreement can be found back in the EU provisions (European Council 2001b; European Commission 2003a). As for the ASEAN case, the affected state should request the EU mechanism support and it remains the only responsible for the intervention (European Council 2001, art.5.3). The based-needs principle is also present in both regions (European Commission 2003, art.13.d). These principles are not exclusively coming from the two regions, but can be traced back to the principles set by the 1991 United Nations Resolution 46/182 on the strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations (United Nations 1991).

**Funding the regional coordination**

<table>
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<th>ASEAN</th>
<th>EU</th>
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<tr>
<td>• AHA Centre Fund (2011)</td>
<td>• Civil Protection Financial Instrument (2007)</td>
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<td>• Partners contributions</td>
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The costs of the ASEAN disaster response are covered through three funds. Firstly, the AADMER Agreement established the ASEAN Disaster Management and Emergency Relief Fund (ASEAN 2005, art.24). The fund is based on the
voluntary contribution of ASEAN member states and is administrated by the ASEAN Secretariat. Because of its voluntary basis, the AADMER Fund proved to rely too much on the benevolent contribution of the more threat countries without providing a solid background to implement long-term initiatives and to sustain the current costs. Therefore, in 2011 the ASEAN member states launched the AHA Centre Fund. This second mandatory fund is an annual contribution of 30,000 USD equally paid by all ten ASEAN member states. Thirdly, the AHA Centre receives financial support by its partners.

The financial costs of the EU civil protection actions are mainly covered by EU member states, but non-EU countries participating in the EU Civil Protection Mechanism can also contribute. Some specific actions can be supported by the activation of EU structural funds. In particular, following the severe floods that affected Central Europe in 2002, the EU set up the European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF) dedicated to supporting the response to major natural disasters within Europe (European Council 2002). Since November 2002 the EUSF has been used for supporting the response of 24 different European countries to 76 disasters for a total amount corresponding to over 5 billion Euros (European Commission 2017).

In 2007 the European Commission established a Civil Protection Financial Instrument (European Council 2007c). The budget dedicated to the EU Civil Protection Mechanism for the 2007-2013 period was 189.8 million Euros. The budget doubled for the subsequent 2014-2020 period. The total current budget is 368.4 million Euros (out of €1 billion per year assigned to DG ECHO). Out of
this budget 223.7 million Euros is to be spent on prevention, preparedness and response actions inside the EU, and 144.6 million Euros is for actions abroad (European Parliament 2015).

Before 2007 civil protection activities were financed under the Community action programmes in the field of civil protection. Starting with the first programme set up for the period January 1998 - December 1999, with a budget of €3 million (European Council 1997b). Following with the second programme set up for the period January 2000 to December 2004, with a budget of EUR 7.5 million (European Council 1999b). The second programme was then prolonged for other two year with additional 4 million budget to cover the period January 2005 to December 2006 (European Council 2004).

Overall, the founding systems of the two regional organizations differ on the main element that the ASEAN contributions are mainly voluntary, whereas the EU commission can count on a multi-annual budget. Yet, with the establishment of the AHA Centre Fund, as the mandatory fund directly administrated by the AHA Centre, ASEAN moved away from its traditional approach. The adopted system of funding resembles in its flexibility the EU Civil Protection Financial Instrument adopted in 2007. The adoption by ASEAN member states of a mandatory system of funding was what triggered the attention of many scholars and expert that looked at the adoption of the AADMER and its instrument as an innovation within ASEAN. Yet, the financial instruments are just one element out of many.
Exercises

Exercises are key components of the preparedness phase of disaster management activities. Simulate a disaster in order to test the phases of the response and the activation of the tools implemented by the organisation is a fundamental activity that often produces lessons-learned reports and resolve in a revision of the standard operating procedures. Both the AHA centre and the ERCC conduct regular exercises.

ASEAN regional response is tested during ARDEX. These comprehensive simulations are organised every two years by the AHA centre in cooperation with the host country. So far, a total of six ARDEX exercises have been organised and funded by the host country, together with ASEAN Dialogue Partners and other partners.

Scenarios are designed according to the regional priorities and the objective of testing specific emergency procedures. The AHA Centre developed the ARDEX Handbook, a manual to guide the simulation that was tested for the first time in Brunei Darussalam during ARDEX 2016 (ARDEX-16). Participants to ARDEX-16 included ASEAN NDMOs, as well as response teams from relevant UN agencies, international organisations and partners. ARDEX-16 was supported by
the German Agency for Development and Cooperation (GIZ) and the German Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK), together with the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) (AHA Centre 2016a). The technical support provided under the Global Initiative on Disaster Risk Management (GIDRM17) and it mainly focused on four activities. First, the development of a standardised referee system, including a manual and a training course to evaluate member states’ performance during the ARDEX exercise. Second, GIDRM provided Map Action team deployed during the exercise. Third, it provided a focus on Inclusive Disability Awareness. Fourth, GIDRM provided a training session on Crisis Communication for Senior Executives. On top of these activities, BBK presented the EU Civil Protection Mechanism to ARDEX participants (GIDRM 2016).

The AHA centre is also involved in two **extra-regional simulations**. Since 2009, the ASEAN Regional Forum exercise (ARF-Direx) engages ASEAN member states with countries outside the region. The ARF-Direx is organised every two years by one ASEAN member state and one non-ASEAN ARF participating country. It mainly focuses on inter-agency coordination and civil-military coordination. It is one of the most inclusive simulation exercises in the Asia Pacific region.

The East Asia Summit Direx involves ASEAN member states, as well as Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Russia and US. These

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17 The GIDRM is a German initiative aiming at improving disaster risk management worldwide. The GIDRM started in August 2013 with a budget of 15.750 million Euros, including co-financing from the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC). It focuses on 14 countries, including Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam (GIZ 2017).
exercises represent the opportunity for AHA centre to compare its response mechanisms with other relevant stakeholders involved in the management of disasters. As it is not a member of the EAS Summit, it is worth noticing that the EU is not part of these exercises.

At EU level ECHO funds both full-scale and modules exercises in the field of civil protection. These exercises are organised by civil protection national authorities and co-financed by the EU. Not all EU member states participate as these exercises are organised at sub-regional level. Between 2011 and 2016 ECHO supported a total of 23 civil protection exercises\(^1\). The EU does not organise full-scale exercises involving all EU member states. The EU capacity is mainly tested via table-top exercises organised by the European Commission (ECHO 2016).

ASEAN and EU do not have joint simulation exercises, yet they regularly meet during the ARF-Direx exercises (ARF Direx 2011, 2013, 2015).

### 5.2 The Mechanism

The second section of this chapter will unpack the mechanism that explains the process that led to the implementation of the AADMER Agreement. Similar to the previous chapter and in line with the analytical framework of this research,

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\(^1\) The full list of EU-supported civil protection exercises organised between 2011-2016 is available here: https://ec.europa.eu/echo/funding-evaluations/financing-civil-protection/civil-protection-exercises_en
the mechanism is based on the interaction of four actors: the leader, the reference, the sponsor and the implementer.

5.2.1 The Leader

The ACDM Committee in cooperation with the ASEAN Secretariat led the implementation of the ASEAN Disaster Management and Emergency Relief (AADMER) Agreement. As leaders, they influenced the binding character of the AADMER agreement as well as the exceptionally short-term conclusion of the negotiation.

The establishment of an ASEAN Regional Disaster Management Framework was the first objective of the 2004 ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management (ARPDM). During its first meeting held in Brunei Darussalam in December 2003, the ACDM agreed to focus on strengthening the cooperation by implementing a cross-border framework to assure a concerted, coordinated and comprehensive regional approach to disaster management (AHA Centre 2016g).

The work towards a regional framework on disaster management was presented by the ACDM as the next natural step in the institutionalization process of this issue (AHA Centre Official 2017a).

The ACDM tasked the ASEAN Secretariat to start exploring the different options and to conduct few feasibility studies. A team of three people were assigned to this task: the Head of the ASEAN Secretariat Environment & Disaster Unit at that time (Mr. Raman), the first full timer assigned since the beginning of 2004 to the disaster file at the Secretariat (Adelina Kamal) and an external consultant.
Results were presented in October 2004 at the second ACDM meeting held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

The ARPDM aim was to draft a framework on the ASEAN regional disaster management. Yet, The ARPDM was not clear on the form of this framework. By using the word “framework” the door was left open to two options: a more binding agreement or a less binding declaration. After the first exploratory phase conducted by the ASEAN Secretariat, and the sense of urgency for concrete actions provoked by some event as stated by one of the representative of the ASEAN Secretariat at that time: ‘There were some landslides in Philippines in that period, it was not a disaster, but we felt the urge to act’ (AHA Centre Official 2017a), the ACDM was convinced about the need to have a stronger cooperation on disaster management, not just a declaration. However, the actual form of this arrangement was not yet agreed (AHA Centre 2016g). In order to get more directions on the issue and to persuade also the representatives less convinced of the need to have a binding agreement, the ACDM suggested a meeting at ministerial level. The first ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Disaster Management (AMMDM) was convened on December 2004. ASEAN Ministers tasked the ACDM to start the negotiation process for implementing a regional instrument on Disaster Management and Emergency Response, later named as AADMER. The AMMDM ministerial meeting agreed on the need to have a more binding agreement and not a general declaration, and allowed a maximum of one-year period to negotiate and finalise what was later named ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER).
Less than three weeks later, on 26 December 2004, the Indian Ocean Tsunami struck six countries across Asia. Four ASEAN Member States were severely hit, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Myanmar, the others experienced the indirect consequences of the disaster in their homeland. Although the majority of ASEAN Member Countries were still dealing with the recovery phase and the effects of the Tsunami, the ACDM started the negotiation process by forming a Negotiating Committee, consisting of ACDM members assisted by legal representatives.

The Special ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting on Aftermath of Earthquake and Tsunami took place and produced the “Declaration on Action to Strengthen Emergency Relief, Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Prevention of the Aftermath of Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster of 26 December 2004” (ASEAN Secretariat 2005). This document represented the momentum. Although, the term to negotiate the AADMER Agreement was set in one year, it took only 4 months to get to an agreement. A process that started in February 1976, with the Concord I Declaration, and that lasted for 30 years, experienced an unprecedented acceleration. Overall, although at the beginning the ACDM and the ASEAN Secretariat led the discussion around a regional framework as the next step in a path set by the ARPDM Programme, the Tsunami reinvigorated the logics of efficiency and effectiveness and the meetings at all levels were used to persuade also non-affected member states to sustain the process.

As negotiations were driven by the personal and direct experiences of the negotiator in facing the effects of the Tsunami it was really hard for the
representatives of the less affected member states to hold back the advancement of the negotiation as they were pressured by the stories of their colleagues and the sense of urgency for the development of a binding regional response they were asking for (AHA Centre 2016g, 12).

5.2.2 The Reference

The ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) agreement references a global norm such as the UN Hyogo Framework for Action, as well as a local norm as the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution, presenting itself as a synthesis of global and local norms.

The AADMER agreement is presented as the ‘one and only legally-binding instrument in the world relating to the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA)’ (ASEAN Secretariat 2010a). Indeed, the introduction of the AADMER Agreement directly reference the Hyogo Framework of Action, as well as the previous UN General Assembly Resolution on disaster preparedness and response as the international norms that guided the adoption of the ASEAN regional agreement. Yet, the AADMER agreement is also presented as being ‘one of the first documents of its kind in the world’, a ‘truly ASEAN’ document built on the experiences of the practitioners working in the region (AHA Centre 2016g, 12). Indeed, on one hand, the AADMER Agreement follows the idea already advanced by the Yokohama Strategy, and reinforced by the Hyogo Framework that institutions, mechanisms and capacities should be developed and strengthen at all levels (HFA 2005, para. 12.b). Not only it proposes the creation
of the AHA Centre, but also the adoption of other elements such as the creation of Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements (SASOP), as well as the implementation of an ASEAN Regional Disaster Emergency Response and Simulation Exercises (ARDEX) or the provisions for an ASEAN Standby Arrangements for Disaster Relief and Emergency Response. On the other hand, the AADMER Agreement fails to fully implement the international norm in three main aspects. First, the elements introduced by the AADMER are mainly focused on improving the preparedness and response to disasters instead of really covering the broad spectrum of disaster management. Although part three of the AADMER Agreement is dedicated to disaster prevention and mitigation, there are no provisions dedicated to the improvement of these components of disaster management. Second, the HFA calls for the empowerment of communities and local authorities as a way to build more resilient communities (HFA 2005, para. 13f). Yet, the AADMER Agreement does not offer any concrete provision in this direction and leave the strengthening of local management capability to the initiative of each single member state (ASEAN 2005c, para. 2b). Finally, the HFA reiterates the provision already advanced by the Yokohama Strategy that the responsibility for disaster management lies primarily with states, while adding that states are required to acknowledge the role of the international stakeholders as potentially helpful is supporting the state in the response (HFA 2005, para. 13b). Yet, the AADMER Agreement limited the emphasis on the role of state as the primary responsible to coordinate the emergency response and to assure the protection of its population on its territory, without acknowledging the role of the international system in providing effective response (ASEAN 2005c, para. 3.1). These three
The Hyogo Framework was not the only reference inspiring the AADMER Agreement. The ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (HAZE Agreement) provided the local reference to the AADMER Agreement (AHA Centre Official 2017a). The Haze Agreement was adopted in June 2002 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and entered into force in November 2003. Even if, not all ASEAN countries ratified the HAZE agreement immediately, with countries such as Cambodia, Indonesia and the Philippines still discussing the ratification process and at the time of the discussions around the AADMER, elements of the HAZE agreement were incorporated in the AADMER (ASEAN Secretariat 2002, art.6). Interestingly enough, the HAZE Agreement established an ASEAN Co-ordinating Centre for Transboundary Haze Pollution Control (ACC) (ASEAN 2002, para. 5). Currently, the ACC is not yet operational and the ASEAN Secretariat serves as the Interim ACC. Also similarly to the AADMER Agreement the HAZE Agreement contains provisions for the establishment of national focal points (ASEAN 2002, art.6)

Overall the two ASEAN Agreements propose very similar regional structures to coordinate the response. Yet, the AADMER is much more detailed in establishing concrete provisions to improve the coordination and the response. This is explained by the fact that while discussing the AADMER Agreement the ASEAN national NDMOs were still responding to the 2004 disaster, meaning
they were testing their provision while negotiating them. Therefore, it is not surprising that the AADMER Agreement contains a much deeper level of detail in presenting the instruments that need to be implemented or the need to reinforce exercises as an element to increase the preparedness of the regional response (AHA Centre Official 2017a).

To conclude, the AADMER Agreement appears as a synthesis of a global norm, the Hyogo Framework of Action, as well as of a local norm, the ASEAN Agreement of Transboundary Haze Pollution. If the first one was chosen as the recognized legitimate global norm, the second one was the most known similar efforts done in the region.

5.2.3 The Sponsor

From a financial point of view, even if all ASEAN dialogue partners cooperating with ASEAN on issue related to disaster management declare the support to the AADMER agreement as the main objective of the cooperation, the 2004 adoption of the ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management (ARPDM) and the signature of the AADMER Agreement in 2005 were not sponsored by any external partner. The exploratory feasibility studies conducted by the ASEAN Secretariat following the ACDM’s directives were conducted as an internal process funded by the ASEAN Secretariat itself and mainly used to sponsor the external consultant hired by the ASEAN Secretariat following the inputs of the ACDM (AHA Centre Official 2017a). Even more, the Negotiating Committee that for 4 months discussed the main provisions of the AADMER Agreement following the 2004 Tsunami was also an ASEAN initiative, that did
not used any external found. ASEAN member states’ representatives were travelling to the meetings on the expenses of their own national budgets and this was never questioned, as there was a need to show ‘as much pro-activity as possible’ in the ASEAN response to the Tsunami (AHA Centre Official 2017a; Thai Diplomat 2017).

Overall, the financial support to this phase of the institutionalization process was provided by ASEAN member states and not financial donors, simply because the time was just too short to start looking for external funding (AHA Centre Official 2017a). The support from ASEAN member states to the process was a rational decision based on the need to quickly show initiatives after the devastating Tsunami (Ong 2005; Thai Diplomat 2017).

5.2.4 The Implementer

The Negotiating Committee, consisting of ACDM members assisted by legal representatives was the main driver behind the technical implementation process of the AADMER agreement. The Negotiating Committee took inspiration from ASEAN member states national experiences (Thai Diplomat 2017; AHA Centre Official 2017a) in what can be defined as a case of emulation. In addition to that a strong component of learning was also present, in fact ‘negotiations were driven by the personal and direct experiences of the negotiators in facing the effects of the Tsunami. They were discussing the regional agreement, while still dealing with the devastating effects of the crisis at home. They knew what was needed.’ (AHA Centre Official 2017a).
Overall, three elements of the AADMER negotiation show how the initial emulation of national practices was influenced by the experiential learning the followed the 2004 Tsunami.

Firstly, the Negotiating Committee started the discussion around the need to create an institution to translate in practice the regional instrument. The provisions for such a body were not present in the first draft of the AADMER, as this was not reflecting the traditional attention given by ASEAN member states to the principle of sovereignty, according to which the only coordinator during a disaster is the affected member states (AHA Centre Official 2017a). The idea of creating a regional instrument to assist the affected country was proposed by Indonesia and was based on the lessons learned that, even if during a disaster the affected country should own the leadership of the response and that this response should be driven by the needs of the affected country and not by the offer received, this might be hard to be done, as the state might be vulnerable and without the necessary manpower to deal not only with the emergency, but also with the incoming offers of assistance. The idea was to implement an institution able to assist the affected state in dealing with all the incoming offers: a body that can help the affected country in selecting the help according to its needs, as ‘it is easy to supply support than to receive support. Support is hard to manage during a disaster, a lot of supplies are not useful and are a burden for the recipient.’ (AHA Centre Official 2017a).

Overall, ASEAN member states representatives agreed on the need to implement an institution that could play the role of doorkeeper in supporting the affected
member state(s). The main elements imagined for this institution were the need to be permanent, fast moving and capable of transforming decision in action in a very short time as this was an important element missing in the response to the 2004 Tsunami (AHA Centre Official 2017a) Different options were discussed. Starting with the ACDM, that was considered inappropriate for this role as decision-making body with meetings held twice per year. The ASEAN Secretariat was also considered, but this was in contrast with the need of having a fast-moving team of expert. The decision of implementing an independent operational institution with operational procedures different from the ASEAN Secretariat was agreed (AHA Centre Official 2017a).

As indicated in the ASEAN Security Community Plan, the initial name imagined for this new institution was ‘ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Centre’, but the name was too focus on the humanitarian assistance, potentially leaving space to intervention in humanitarian crises created by conflicts. Therefore, some member states opposed the initial name obtaining to add the ‘disaster management’ element to the name, streamlining the focus of the centre towards humanitarian consequences of disaster and not conflicts. Finally, a consensus was reached around the current name ‘ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance’. Yet, the acronyms remained the same: AHA Centre (AHA Centre 2016g).

The second element of discussion among member states representatives was on how to fund the implementation of the agreement (see outcomes in the previous sections). Some member states were in favour of an equal annual mandatory
fund, some others wanted the fund to be voluntary. The ASEAN Disaster Management and Emergency Relief Fund (ADMER Fund) was finally designed to be annually, but voluntary in line with the so called ‘ASEAN way’ approach to regional cooperation. Nevertheless, as this fund relied too much on the benevolent contribution of some member states undermining long-term initiatives, the decision to provide the AHA Centre with a budget based on a mandatory fund equally paid by all ASEAN member states was agreed (AHA Centre Official 2017a).

Finally, the importance of exercises as tools to increase preparedness was recognised and implemented by the majority of ASEAN member states, but the response to the 2004 Tsunami showed the differences in the national approaches. From the use of different languages and technical terminologies, to the more practical way of organising the response, these differences contributed to the chaotic regional response. ‘ASEAN states all wanted to help by sending their specialised personnel on the ground, but they didn’t know how to do it, there was the need to have joint training as the only way to get to know each other’ (AHA Centre Official 2017a).

To conclude, the Negotiating Committee was initially set up to negotiate the AADMER Agreement as this was the same process already implemented in other similar situation, as part of the ASEAN approach to institutionalization processes (historical Institutionalist logics), but after the Tsunami discussions were driven by a rational-choice logic. The main rationale driving the negotiating committee was not only to negotiate an agreement that could reach the approval of all.
ASEAN member states, but also to develop an efficient and effective framework to improve the regional capacity to respond to similar disasters in the future.

Chapter conclusions

The signature of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) in July 2005 represents the second analysed step towards the institutionalization of the ASEAN regional cooperation on disaster management. It followed the adoption of the ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster management (ARPDM) analysed in Chapter 4 and it provided the legal basis for the operationalization of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre).

The chapter started by looking at the main features of the proposed outcome by comparing it with the EU Community Mechanism implemented by the 2001 Council Decision. The comparison of the two texts highlights similarities and differences of the two agreements. Although sharing the same objective, meaning the protection of people and property from both natural and man-made disasters, the two regional agreement differ in some substantial elements, such as the core principle (solidarity vs. subsidiarity), the area of response (within ASEAN only vs. inside and outside EU), the involvement of external partners (ASEAN only vs. open to non-EU participant states) and the provision of assistance (from inside and outside ASEAN vs. member states provisions). The comparative analysis continued by focusing on three aspects introduced by the two regional agreements and further developed in the following years. First, the
analysis of the two response cycles highlights how ASEAN and the EU share the principle that the regional mechanism should be activated by the affected member states, which remain the only responsible for the intervention. Moreover, both ASEAN and the EU share the principle according to which the response should be driven by the actual needs of the population. Yet, this principle can be linked back to the more general principles shared by the disaster management community and cannot be attributed to the diffusion of norms between the two organizations. Second, the two regions fund the response to disaster in two different ways. The explanation for these differences should be linked back to the different governance of the two organizations. Third, ASEAN and EU differ in the set-up of their respective regional exercises. Regional exercises are the main preparedness tool, yet the AHA Centre coordinates regional exercises that involve all ten ASEAN member states, whereas the EU sponsored sub-regional exercises coordinated by leading EU member states.

After comparing the two mechanisms implemented by ASEAN and the EU and concluding that the partial similarities can actually be linked back to globally recognised principles and are therefore not the result of a form of regional influence by the EU, in its second part, the chapter applied the thesis framework. By looking at the four main actors which by performing certain action(s) produces the analysed outcome (Beach and Pedersen 2013). The AADMER Agreement was produced thanks to the initiative and leadership of the ACDM supported by the ASEAN Secretariat (the leaders). They followed a path-dependency logic at the beginning, as well as a more rational-choice approach after the Tsunami. As already showed in the previous chapter, the main mode of
influence was persuasion between ASEAN member states’ representatives within the ACDM. The AADMER agreement was drafted by constantly referring to the 2005 Hyogo Framework as the recognised legitimate source, as well as by looking at already existing regional experiences, and in particular by looking at the 2002 ASEAN Haze Agreement as a known and trusted reference (the reference(s)), in a learning process characterized by the synthesis of these different norms. Overall, the discussion was conducted within the dedicated meetings and the negotiating committee (the sponsor) following a logic of efficiency and efficacy. Finally, the AADMER Agreement was drafted by the Negotiating Committee (the implementer), which worked on the text while coordinating the response to the 2004 Tsunami. The lessons learned while responding directly influenced some of the features present in the AADMER agreement. The Negotiating Committee responded at historical Institutionalist logics, but after the Tsunami discussions moved on a more rational-choice dimension.

By analysing the mechanism that triggered the signature of the AADMER agreement, it is argued in this chapter that the EU cannot be considered a point of reference in disaster management policy for ASEAN member states. The Hyogo framework and the Haze Agreement played a much prominent role in influencing the adoption of the AADMER Agreement, which was already planned by the ARPDM programme. Overall, the AADMER Agreement was an ASEAN product, inspired by the Hyogo Framework and influenced by the Tsunami experience. Overall this chapter shows how if EU’s actions are analysed in comparison with other actors’ actions or local initiatives, the limitation of EU
actorness, defined as the capacity to influence the regionalization process (p.33), comes across quite clearly.
Table 6. The AADMER actors and mechanism overview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Objective of influence</th>
<th>Rationale behind influence</th>
<th>Modes of influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leader</strong></td>
<td>ASEAN member states representatives via the ACDM Committee supported by ASEAN Secretariat A regional binding framework on disaster management negotiated in an exceptionally short period</td>
<td>In the first phase presented as the natural next step after the ARPDM programme (HI); After Tsunami presented as a more efficient, effective way to respond to disasters (RCI);</td>
<td>• Persuasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reference</strong></td>
<td>2005 UN Hyogo Framework of Action; ASEAN Transboundary haze Pollution Agreement ASEAN Disaster Management and Emergency Response Agreement (AADMER)</td>
<td>The Hyogo Framework is recognised as legitimate (SI); HAZE Agreement as a known and trusted example to take inspiration from (HI);</td>
<td><strong>Indirect:</strong> • Synthesis of global (Hyogo) and local (HAZE) norms (learning)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sponsor</strong></td>
<td>ASEAN member states Financial support to the Negotiating Committee</td>
<td>ASEAN member states aim was to show action to public opinion after Tsunami (RCI);</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implementer</strong></td>
<td>Negotiating Committee, including ACDM and legal representatives, and ASEAN Secretariat Drafting the AADMER Agreement</td>
<td>It was part of the path started by the ACDM (HI), but accelerated after the Tsunami (RCI);</td>
<td>• Emulation of local experiences with elements of learning from the Tsunami’s response;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 6

From a framework to an instrument:

the institutionalization of the AHA Centre

This chapter focuses on the last phase of the process that led to the institutionalization of the ASEAN regional disaster management: the operationalization of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (the AHA Centre).

After focusing on the processes that led to the ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management (Chapter 4) and the AADMER Agreement (Chapter 5), this chapter analysis the AHA Centre, as the actual instrument implemented by ASEAN to coordinate the response. The chapter directly responds to the research question by providing an analysis of the different components of the mechanism behind the setting up of the AHA Centre and its instruments. It explores the EU influence in comparison with the other internal and external actors’ involved. It starts from the assumption suggested both by the literature on EU-ASEAN relations and EU discourses that the instruments implemented by ASEAN to respond to disaster were inspired by the instruments already developed by the EU, thanks to a series of inter-regional cooperation projects (see Chapter 3). Building on the assumption that in a process-tracing analysis the investigated causal mechanisms is defined by Glennan as ‘a complex system, which produces an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts’ (Glennan 1996, 52), the chapter is divided in two main sections: the outcome and the mechanism.
The first section introduces the AHA Centre as the main outcome of the process. The AHA Centre is the final stage of the institutionalization process that lead to the regionalization of ASEAN disaster management. Initially outlined in the AADMER Agreement the evolution of the AHA Centre can be divided in three key moments. Firstly, between October 2007 and December 2009 the AADMER Agreement was approved, but it was still under ratification. During this period the AHA Centre started operating in interim mode. Secondly, between January 2009 and November 2011, after the entry into force of the AADMER Agreement, but before the signature of the agreement on the official establishment of the AHA Centre, the Centre acted in provisional mode. Finally, between December 2011 and December 2016 the AHA Centre had its first five years of operational phase. During the first five years of official establishment the AHA Centre developed a set of instruments to better respond to disaster within the ASEAN region.

The second section presents the mechanism that triggered the institutionalization of the instrument. This analysis starts by focusing on the actual set up of the AHA Centre, its premises and staff, as well as its technical and operational tools. Secondly, it focuses on the information tools implemented by the AHA Centre to monitor, coordinate and disseminate information. Finally, it analyses three of the operational instruments currently coordinated by the AHA Centre: The Emergency and Response Team (ERAT), the Disaster and Emergency Logistics System (DELSA) and the Executive Programme (ACE). Each analysis is divided in two steps. First, each instrument is introduced and compared to existing
similar EU tools. This first analysis explores in detail if the ASEAN instruments are in the end really similar to the one of the EU as both the literature on the EU-ASEAN relation (Pennisi di Floristella 2015; Börzel and Risse 2009, 2012a) and EU discourses suggest. The analysis of the outcomes already gives an idea of the potential influence of the EU. In the second part, the black box of the mechanism that led the creation of each instrument is then revealed, clarifying the role of the different actors in the process. As in a process tracing analysis the mechanism is always composed by an actor engaging in an activity (Beach and Pedersen 2013), the analysis of the mechanism looks at four actors for each instrument. First, the leader is the actor which first advanced the idea, and which lead its implementation. Second, the reference is an existing similar instrument that –at least initially- inspired the AHA Centre’s instrument. Third, the sponsor is the actor that funded the instrument or that provides the means to implement the analysed instrument. Fourth, the implementer is the actor, typically an agency, a private company or a seconded consultant that materially supported the AHA Centre in the building of the instrument. Overall, all these actors played a key role in the building of each analysed instrument. Without one of them the final instrument would not be implemented or would have been different.

6.1 The outcome

The ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) is the operational manifestation of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER). Although operational since October 2007, the AHA Centre was officially
established on 17 November 2011 during the 19th ASEAN Summit in Bali, Indonesia, through the signature of the Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management by ASEAN Foreign Ministers.

The objectives of the AHA Centre are outlined in the article 20 of the AADMER Agreement, signed by ASEAN Foreign Ministers on 26th July 2005 in Vientiane (Lao PDR) and entered into force on 24 December 2009. The objectives of the AHA Centre are to: (I) facilitate the cooperation among ASEAN member states by coordinating the network of National Focal Points (NFP) and by receiving, consolidating and disseminating data, analysis and recommendations sent by NFPs, while also facilitating technical cooperation and scientific research among ASEAN NFPs; (II) facilitate joint emergency preparedness and response by regularly reviewing regional standby arrangements, as well as by coordinating regional emergency response and by maintaining regional standby arrangements; (III) operationalize regional coordination mechanisms for emergency preparedness and response, such as the Disaster Emergency Logistics System (DELSA), the Emergency Response and Assessment Team (ERAT), the ASEAN Regional Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise (ARDEX) and the AHA Centre Executive Programme (ACE). The AHA Centre is an intergovernmental organisation, which receives its strategic directions by the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM), composed by the heads of the National Disaster Management Offices (NDMOs) of ten ASEAN Member States. Since its official establishment in November 2011, the AHA Centre has responded to 14 emergencies and provided preparedness and assessment
missions other 4 times. The AHA Centre response is focused on ASEAN member states only, and in its first five years of existence, seven ASEAN countries benefit from the AHA Centre support (See Annex 3).

6.1.1 The Interim AHA Centre

The 2005 AADMER Agreement established the creation of the AHA Centre (ASEAN 2005b, art.20). Yet, as the AADMER Agreement was still under ratification process, the ACDM together with the ASEAN Secretariat stared the creation of the interim AHA Centre. The request to start the operationalization of the AADMER Agreement was already advanced by Ministers during the 38th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) held in Vientiane, 26 July 2005 (ASEAN 2005a, para. 35). The following year, during the 39th AMM in Kuala Lumpur, Ministers noted the Indonesia’s offer to host the AHA Centre (ASEAN 2006). Following AMM Joint Communications, an initial exploratory study on the implementation of the AHA Centre’s concept of operation was conducted by the ASEAN Secretariat, and then discussed during two regional workshops (ADPC 2009). The two regional workshops produced the first AHA Centre’s Concept of Operation (Conops), as well as a road map and a nine priorities action plan. The 9th ACDM meeting endorsed the three documents. During the 40th AMM July 2007 Ministers officially endorsed the offer of Indonesia to host the AHA Centre. Three months later the interim AHA Centre started its activities. Between October 2007 and December 2009 the ‘interim’ AHA Centre mainly focused on providing disaster monitoring and analysis report to ASEAN Member States. Moreover, during its interim phase, the AHA Centre closely worked with the ASEAN Secretariat to start the implementation of the provisions established by
the AADMER Agreement, in particular by developing the ASEAN Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations (SASOP). The interim AHA Centre starts presenting itself as a new regional actor by actively participating in the Regional Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise (ARDEX) organised in Singapore. Firstly in 2007, with a marginal role on a communication exercise, testing the connectivity between the ten ASEAN member states’ operation centre. Then, in 2008 with a bigger role in filed simulation.

6.1.2 Cyclone Nargis and the international recognition of the AHA Centre

In May 2008 Myanmar experienced Cyclone Nargis, the worst disasters of the country’s history. According to Red Cross figures, 84,500 people died and 53,800 went missing. Overall, the UN estimates that 2.4 million people were affected (IFRC 2011). Myanmar military Junta was initially strongly criticized for limiting the access of humanitarian reliefs to the country arguing that ‘the country could get by without foreign handouts’ (The New York Times 2008). Overall, Cyclone Nargis represents an important moment in the history of the AHA Centre as it tested for the first time the initial provisions of the AADMER Agreement. Cyclone Nargis tested the AHA Centre Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations (SASOPS). Moreover, the ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment Team (ASEAN-ERAT) was deployed for the first time, providing useful feedback on how to better coordinate with the
national government. Cyclone Nargis represented an important moment in the life of the AHA Centre also because ASEAN AHA Centre played the role of regional coordinator in big scale disaster, gaining legitimacy in the eyes of international partners. In the words of John Holmes, the UN undersecretary general for humanitarian affairs and emergency relief coordinator at that time: ‘Nargis showed us a new model of humanitarian partnership, adding the special position and capabilities of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to those of the United Nations in working effectively with the government.’ (Collins 2013, 144)

The ruling junta of Myanmar initially refused international aid, putting under serious threat its own population. The initial refusal of international help, including the help offered by neighbours’ countries could be explained by the threat perception of Myanmar. On one hand the country experienced several invasions in its history, which explain its general mistrust in external countries (Collins 2013). On the other side, the military junta did not want to give a message of weaknesses by admitting it needs help in managing the situation. On 5th October, three days after the disaster, the ASEAN Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan, asked ASEAN countries to support Myanmar (ASEAN Secretariat 2009a). By that time Philippine and Singapore have already sent their experts to Bangkok to join the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team deployed by OCHA assembled there. The government of Myanmar agreed to open the door to the ERAT Team tanks to the good offices of Thailand. Thailand was strong supporter of the idea that Cyclone Nargis represented a good opportunity for ASEAN to show the added value of responding as one. Therefore, they
strongly lobbied with the Myanmar authorities to accept the deployment of the ASEAN Team (Thai Diplomat 2017). On 9th May the ASEAN-ERAT Team was deployed to Myanmar. The ERAT Team was composed of representatives from Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and the ASEAN Secretariat. The three members from Malaysia, Philippines and Singapore were initially deployed with the OCHA Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team (UNDAC), but with no possibility to enter the country. They finally managed to be the first responders accessing Myanmar as official members of the ASEAN ERAT team (ASEAN Secretariat 2008). The US government also supported the ASEAN deployment in Myanmar by providing the ICT equipment to the ASEAN team. These laptops, printers, scanners, satellites phones etc. were then donated to the AHA Centre (AHA Centre 2012, 31).

6.1.3 The Provisional AHA Centre

The AADMER Agreement entered into force in December 2009. Yet, an agreement establishing the working arrangements of the AHA Centre was still under discussion. The ACDM set up a Task Force in charge of negotiating the different elements of this agreement among ASEAN member states. The Task Force was composed of representatives of the Philippines, chair of the ACDM at that time, Singapore, vice-chair of the ACDM, Indonesia as host country, the Interim AHA Centre and the ASEAN Secretariat.

The discussion lead by the Task Force covers all elements necessary to operationalize the AHA Centre: organisational structure, immunities, funding
contributions and supervisory mechanism. Although ASEAN member states initially agreed as ‘annual but voluntary contribution’, it was agreed to set up a specific fund to cover the costs related to the AHA Centre. The initial amount proposed by the ASEAN Secretariat was about 100,000 USD. However, the AHA Centre Fund was set-up with an annual and equal contribution set at 30,000 USD per year. Indeed, it was already a good achievement as, apart from the ASEAN Secretariat, the AHA Centre was the only ASEAN body financed with annual and equal contribution. Indonesia played a key role in advancing the negotiations as the agreement was expected to be signed during the next ASEAN Summit hosts by Indonesia as incoming 2011 ASEAN Chair. Indonesian government set up a National Task Force to accelerate the negotiation on Establishment Agreement and to setting up the provisional AHA Centre.

In between the entry into force of the AADMER Agreement and the signature of the agreement officially establishing the AHA Centre, the centre continued working. The ‘provisional’ AHA Centre not only continued the awareness activities initiated by the interim AHA Centre among ASEAN member states and partners, but it also continued building the back bone of the centre by developing a strategic plan, the Emergency Operation Centre (EOC) and by continuing the work on the SASOP. The Provisional AHA Centre was set up to start undertaking disaster monitoring, developing partnerships, defining operational procedures and preparing for the official launch of the Centre. The Provisional AHA Centre developed a strategic plan, the first Standard Operating Procedures, and the Emergency Operation Centre (EOC). Overall, the Provisional AHA Centre continued the activities initiated by the Interim AHA Centre in building
awareness by participating in events, workshops and conferences. One of the main examples being the participation to the 2011 ASEAN Regional Forum on Disaster Relief Exercise (ARF-DiREx) in Manado, Indonesia.

6.1.4 The Fully Operational AHA Centre

On 17th November 2011 the Agreement on the Establishment of the AHA Centre was finally signed at the 19th ASEAN Summit in Bali, Indonesia. However, the AHA Centre was not yet ready to operate. A Special ACDM meeting was convened to discuss how to face the financial gap. Although member states agreed on an annual and equal contribution, the fund was not yet ready to be used. Australia intervened to fill the gap by providing 1 million AUD via the Australia-Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction (AIFDR), co-managed by Australia and BNPB of Indonesia. The ASEAN Secretariat was initially in charge of managing the fund and start hiring AHA Centre’s staff. The occasion of the Special ACDM represented also the opportunity to remove the ‘provisional’ label on the AHA Centre name and to appoint Said Faisal as Executive Director. The Special ACDM also discussed the number of staff. Although afraid of not being able to cover positions after the end of the Australia’s support (set for the end of 2012), the ACDM agreed on a team of 13 members. Finally, the Special ACDM endorsed the AHA Centre Strategic Work Plan.

The AHA Centre was not even celebrating its first anniversary when the 2012 Myanmar Earthquake hit the regions of Mandalay and Sagaing affecting more than 6,000 people. Although the disaster was not as devastating as previous ones, the Myanmar Earthquake represented the first opportunity for the AHA Centre to
act as a fully operational body. In its five years of existence the AHA Centre has implemented (or revised) several instruments with the aim of making the cooperation among ASEAN countries more effective. As already mentioned, the ASEAN Emergency Response and Assessment Team (ERAT) was firstly implemented during the interim phase of the AHA Centre in October 2007, soon becoming a key component of it. Yet, other instruments were implemented in the following years. On December 2012 the Disaster Emergency Logistics System for ASEAN (DELSA) was also implemented to swiftly provide relief items in a post-disaster emergency situation. In 2014 the AHA Centre Executive Programme (ACE) was launched as a six-month training course for ASEAN member states representatives. Finally, the AHA Centre implemented a range of disaster management communication tools to facilitate the communication among ASEAN member states, but also to increase the visibility of the centre.

6.2 The Mechanism

The second section of the chapter is dedicated to the mechanism explaining the institutionalization of the AHA Centre. The analysis focuses on five key elements that characterised the AHA Centre. First, it focuses on the backbone of the Centre, explaining the role played by the intervening actor in defining location, staff members, operational budget and ICT and logistic tools. Second, it analyses the collection, coordination and dissemination of information done by the AHA Centre, as an essential component of the daily activities of the Centre. Third, the analysis moved to the three main instruments at the AHA Centre’s disposal to respond to crises or to improve preparedness: the Emergency and
Response Team (ERAT), the Disaster and Emergency Logistics System (DELSA) and the Executive Programme (ACE).

For each of these components of the AHA Centre the analysis will first, briefly presents the instrument and its similarities with the existing EU instrument, and second it will present the mechanism resulting from the interaction of four key actors: the leader, the reference, the sponsor and the implementer.
### Table 7. AHA Centre actors overview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>AHA-Centre set up</strong></th>
<th><strong>Leader</strong></th>
<th><strong>Reference</strong></th>
<th><strong>Sponsor</strong></th>
<th><strong>Implementer</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indonesia</strong></td>
<td>Mix of influences: Indonesia BNPB, dialogue partners</td>
<td>ASEAN member states, Australia, Japan</td>
<td>Consultants from New Zealand and US</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Monitoring tool: ASEAN-DMRS</strong></th>
<th><strong>AHA Centre</strong></th>
<th><strong>US Pacific Disaster Center (PDC)</strong></th>
<th><strong>USAID</strong></th>
<th><strong>US Pacific Disaster Center (PDC)</strong></th>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Coordination tool: WEB-EOC</strong></th>
<th><strong>Singapore</strong></th>
<th><strong>WebEOC by Intermedix</strong></th>
<th><strong>ICT Project by Japan</strong></th>
<th><strong>Intermedix and Kyoto University</strong></th>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Dissemination tools</strong></th>
<th><strong>AHA Centre</strong></th>
<th><strong>Ushahidi Platform</strong></th>
<th><strong>Australia &amp; ICT Project by Japan</strong></th>
<th><strong>AHA Centre</strong></th>
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<tr>
<th><strong>ERAT</strong></th>
<th><strong>ACDM proposal of Malaysia and Singapore</strong></th>
<th><strong>UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) Teams</strong></th>
<th><strong>UNOCHA</strong></th>
<th><strong>Singapore</strong></th>
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<tr>
<th><strong>DELSA</strong></th>
<th><strong>Malaysia</strong></th>
<th><strong>UNHRD in Malaysia</strong></th>
<th><strong>Japan</strong></th>
<th><strong>Malaysia and WFP</strong></th>
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<tr>
<th><strong>ACE</strong></th>
<th><strong>AHA Centre</strong></th>
<th><strong>UN JPO Programme</strong></th>
<th><strong>JAIF as part of Japan-ASEAN cooperation</strong></th>
<th><strong>AHA Centre in cooperation with partners</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
6.2.1 The AHA Centre set up

6.2.1.1 The Instrument

The ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) is the hub coordinating the ASEAN regional response in case of disaster. Based in Jakarta with an initial staff of 12 people it is currently run by 24 staff members. The AHA Centre can currently count on a budget of almost 4 million dollars, out of which 500,000 USD provided by the equal contribution of ASEAN member States (AHA Centre 2012, 2016a). The setting up of the AHA Centre mainly took part in its first phase, between 2007 and 2013. During this period the location, the staff team, the initial budget and the ICT and logistic tools were set up. Moreover, all initial operational guidelines were agreed. The AHA Centre resembles the EU ERCC. Both centres operate 24/7, they both coordinate respective member states response to crisis (while ASEAN focusing only on internal disasters and the EU also responding outside EU borders), and both aim at ensuring better preparedness and coherent response based on needs. Yet, was the EU the main source of inspiration for the AHA Centre? The following analysis will show how, under Indonesia leadership, other ASEAN partners influenced the setting up of the centre much more than the EU by simply being directly involved in the implementation phases.
6.2.1.2 The Mechanism

The Leader

The Government of Indonesia was the main promoter behind the AHA Centre, providing the location, the first three staff members and their basic equipment. In a case of positive manipulation of utility calculation, the capacity-building support of Indonesia to the AHA Centre was instrumental in the creation of the AHA Centre as the operational tool of the AADMER Agreement. The positive incentives proposed by Indonesia to other ASEAN member states in forms of logistical and personnel assistance for the implementation of the AHA Centre, were instrumental in influencing other ASEAN member states about the feasibility of the project (Singaporean Diplomat 2017, Thai Diplomat 2017).

Firstly, Indonesia offered to host the interim AHA Centre in the Indonesian National Disaster Management Coordinating Board (BNPB), located in Jakarta, in a case of positive manipulation of utility calculation (see Chapter 2). The Indonesian offer was well received by other ASEAN member states, as it assured an easier coordination between the AHA Centre and the ASEAN Secretariat and the ten ambassadors of the ASEAN member states. The Indonesian government presented the offer to the other ASEAN member states as the most effective and economically convenient way (Rational-choice argument) to implement an instrument that was the next step in the process (Singaporean Diplomat 2017, Thai Diplomat 2017). Secondly, the government of Indonesia was the main manager of the Interim AHA Centre (October 2007- December 2009) and it directly appointed the BNPB senior official Pak Tabrani as Executive Director of Interim AHA Centre. The Provisional AHA Centre (January 2009 – November
2011) was resourced by Indonesian Government, which appointed Said Faisal as the Executive Director of the provisional AHA Centre in early 2011. Said Faisal was former Senior Advisor to the Special Envoy of Secretary-General of ASEAN for post-Nargis recovery in Myanmar. He was the only individual officially working at the Provisional AHA Centre. Thirdly, the other staff members of the Provisional AHA Centre were mainly composed by Indonesian secondments, or project staff hired by donors and partners. This was the case for Adi Bishry, Indonesian ICT expert in charge of the ICT system of the AHA Centre. Initially seconded from the Indonesian Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology (BPPT) to the Provisional AHA Centre between January and August 2011, joined the AHA Centre in September 2011. His position was later founded via Japanese Government funds. Similarly, Janggam Adityawarma, Risk Assessment, Early Warning and Monitoring Indonesian Expert, who become the second staff member to join the AHA Centre in October 2011 (Japanese Diplomat 2017b).

The Reference

The exploratory study conducted in 2006 on the implementation of the AHA Centre’s concept of operation represents the moment in which different options for the structure of the AHA Centre were discussed. The background experiences of the AHA Centre staff were the instrumental vehicle in influencing the vision of the AHA Centre. This was directly inspired by the Indonesian experiences, as well as by the experiences of Australia and New Zealand as the most pro-active ASEAN Dialogue Partners in this phase (AHA Centre Official 2017a). Firstly, the fact that AHA Centre shares the premises with the Indonesian BNPB
facilitated the exchange of practices between the Indonesian and the AHA Centre staff. In addition, the two Directors of respectively the Interim and Provisional AHA Centre have previous experiences within disaster management departments of the Indonesia government or related agencies, and these were replicated and reflected in the AHA Centre (AHA Centre Official 2017a). Moreover, the majority of the AHA Centre staff has previous experience within the UN or in other dialogue partners (mainly Australia and New Zealand) and these experiences were also influential in the elaboration of certain practices (AHA Centre Official 2017b). Overall, AHA Centre staff member follow an efficiency logic by conceptualizing the structure of the AHA Centre following what they considered the best practices of the different institutions they experienced (AHA Centre Official 2017a; 2017b). Finally, although representatives from the AHA Centre and the EU have the opportunity to meet (exercises or joint visits) this was not followed up by concrete capacity-building activities, such as the ones conducted by New Zealand, US or UN OCHA (See below).

**The Sponsor**

The daily activities of the AHA Centres would not be possible without the regular funds provide by the ASEAN Member States, as well as without the in-kind donations of Australia Government. Overall, Australia contributed to the AHA Centre operational budget for a total of 4.6 million USD between 2012 and 2016. This was still the result of the pressure coming from the Australian public opinion after the terrible Tsunami (Australian Diplomat 2017b). Japan was also instrumental in the development of the AHA Centre. The Government of Japan sponsored the ICT equipment necessary for the daily activities of the AHA
Centre, as well as the two staff positions dealing with ICT and disaster monitoring. In the case of Japan, the main reason for being involved in the process was the new push to be perceived as a credible and supportive actor in the region (Japanese Diplomat 2017a). Overall, the type of influence on the AHA Centre was based on resource dependencies, visible in the choice made in the adoption of some of the technical tools adopted by the AHA Centre, such as the WebEOC information management platform, the ICT projects development tools, as well as the ASEAN-ERAT, the DELSA and the ACE (see next paragraphs).

The Implementer

The AHA Centre Strategic Plan was drafted during the provisional phase of the AHA Centre. Consultants provided by the US Technical Assistance and Training Facility (USTATF) and New Zealand government supported Said Faisal and the two representatives of the ASEAN Secretariat (Dhannan Sunoto and Adelina Kamal) in the conceptualization of the plan. These consultants also provided suggestions on the type of job profiles necessary to the AHA Centre to be operational (AHA Centre 2012, 31). The Standard Operating Procedures of the AHA Centre were also developed with the support of the US Forest Service (USFS). The cooperation was part of the broader ASEAN-US and ASEAN-New Zealand cooperation and the dialogue partners’ offer should be read as a way to reinforce the cooperation with ASEAN (sociological institutionalism logic). It has proven very hard to rebuild the exact part influenced by the interconnection of the three actors: US and New Zealand representatives and AHA Centre’s staff. Overall, even if the US and New Zealand experiences inspired the AHA Centre
plan, they were not fully copied, but adapted to the local context and to already existing practices (AHA Centre Official 2017a, 2017b).
### Table 8. The AHA Centre set up actors and mechanism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Rationale behind influence</th>
<th>Modes of influence</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leader</td>
<td>The government of Indonesia</td>
<td>Jakarta presented as a convenient location to better cooperate with ASEAN Secretariat and ASEAS member states’ Ambassadors (RCI)</td>
<td>Positive manipulation of utility calculations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>Indonesian disaster Management Agency (BNPB), Australia and New Zealand</td>
<td>The references are recognised as legitimate (SI) and efficient (RCI);</td>
<td>Indirect: Synthesis based on lessons learned from previous experiences of the AHA Centre staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sponsor</td>
<td>ASEAN member states, Australia, Japan</td>
<td>ASEAN member states’ logic was the natural consequence of previous institutionalization actions (SI); For Australia it was still the result of public opinion pressure post-Tsunami (RCI); For Japan it was a way to be perceived as a credible actor in the region (RCI);</td>
<td>Resource dependencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementer</td>
<td>Consultants from US and New Zealand, in cooperation with AHA Centre Staff</td>
<td>The logic for both US and New Zealand was to reinforce the cooperation with ASEAN (SI)</td>
<td>Emulation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.2.2 The collection, coordination and dissemination of information

6.2.2.1 The Instrument(s)

The AHA Centre has two main tasks: the management of information and the resource mobilization. Since its ‘interim’ phase’ the AHA Centre has developed a set of communication tools to monitor, coordinate and disseminate disaster related information. These tools serve the AHA Centre both during emergency times as well as in ‘peace’ times (AHA Centre 2016f). Since early 2012 the AHA Centre uses the Disaster Monitoring and Response System (DMRS), which allow for real time information gathering about weather conditions and help the AHA Centre to detect potential disasters. The main aim of the DMRS is to inform the regional decision-making process about upcoming or potential disasters and to facilitate the preparedness phase. Between 2011 and 2013 the AHA Centre developed the ASEAN Disaster Information Network (ADInet), a dissemination system to store all information on potential or current disasters. ADInet is designed to inform the wide public and to raise awareness. Finally, between 2013 and 2015 the AHA Centre focused on enhancing the connectivity with the national NDMOs by developing the Web-based Emergency Operations Centre (WebEOC), an internal management instrument to coordinate the response between the AHA Centre, national NDMOs and ERAT teams. During non-emergency time information on disaster and on AHA centre’s activities are distributed to the wide audience (weekly updates and monthly newsletters). Although the main target of this information are the national focal points of ASEAN member states and the ASEAN-ERAT members, the AHA Centre distributes information also to partners, responder organisations, mass media,
and the wider public, in different format such as email, SMS, social media account and web publication. In the next sections the main characteristics of these instruments in comparison with the EU tools and their evolution will be analysed.

The ASEAN-DMRS is a monitoring system that combines hazard data from different regional and international sources to provide real-time information on disaster. This information is both used to inform disaster prevention actions (in case of typhoons for example), as well as to guide response activities in the aftermath of the event. The ASEAN-DMRS is a multi-hazard software developed in 2012. Although the ERCC (MIC at the time of DMRS implementation) also uses several tools to monitor disasters, the EU was not taken as a point of reference at the time of the building up of the DMRS. This is evident if we look at the different sets of internally developed instruments used by the EU. Starting with the European Flood Alert System (EFAS), operational since October 2012 and the European Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS), operational since 1998 developed by the Institute for Environment and Sustainability (IES), one of the scientific institutes of the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC). Following with the Global Disaster Alerts and Coordination System (GDACS) a 24/7 alert system gathering data about natural events, such as earthquakes, tsunamis, tropical storms, floods and volcanoes. GDACS has been developed in 2004 by the Commission’s Joint Research Centre and jointly used by the EU and UN. The Pacific Disaster Center is one of the partners of GDACS, which provides information on tropical cyclone monitoring since 2005 (GDACS
The development of the DMRS was led by the AHA Centre but inspired, founded and implemented by the US and its agencies.

Since April 2013 the internal coordination among ASEAN member states is done via the WebEOC. This information-sharing platform developed in 2013 connects emergency responders from the AHA Centre, national NDMOs and ERAT teams. It allows them to exchange information (text, pictures, etc.) during the emergency situation also by using mobile phones. The connection between the ERCC and the EU national focal points is also performed by an online platform. The EU **Common Emergency Communication and Information System (Cecis)** serves the purpose of connecting the Brussels based responders with the national focal points and the team deployed on the site of the disasters. Yet, differently from the WebEOC, Cecis is mainly used as a market place to match requests and offers of assistance then as information sharing tool. In fact, Cecis is less accessible then WebEOC. Updating information from the ground and via mobile phones is not possible, which makes it harder for the deployed team to upload information directly collected from the emergency cite (European Commission 2016b). Therefore, information is collected by the ERCC, which prepares a Deployment Plan in cooperation with the affected state. The deployment plan lists all the assets and expertise needed for the response and it is used a basis for the request posted by ERCC on cecis. Cecis is the instrument used by the EU Civil Protection to coordinate information between Brussels and member states. Cecis has been developed by an external Portuguese company selected in a call for tender (European Commission Official 2017c) ERCC upload the ‘Civil Protection messages (CP message)’ in cecis.
The AHA Centre also implemented tools to disseminate information to wider public both during emergencies, as well as during non-emergencies times. During emergency times and for disasters that affect at least 100 people, and involve more than one sub-district, the AHA centre activates the ASEAN Disaster Information Network (ADInet). This platform provides the single repository open to the public, where information on the on-going situation is collected. Reports about all types of natural emergencies (floods, storms, earthquakes, volcano’s activities, etc.) can be uploaded and are verified by the AHA Centre. Moreover, during times of emergency the AHA Centre produces Flesh Updates and Situation Updates. **Flesh Updates** are one-page reports contain basic information and statistics on the on-going emergency. The main targets of these dissemination tools are national NDMOs, as well as other relevant stakeholders. Flesh Updates are also available to the wide public, as they are published on the AHA centre’s social media accounts. **Situation Updates** are circulated to ASEAN stakeholders every two days during an emergency. They contain in-depth information and insights about the disaster, the affected countries and the response, including plans of actions undertaken, maps, images and graphics related to the emergency. Information comes from AHA Centre, the deployed ASEAN-ERAT, the NDMO of the affected country, as well as other sources, such as media outlets, and other UN and NGO reports from the ground.

The main EU open repository collecting information about the responses provided by the ERCC during crisis is the **ERCC Portal**. The ERCC Portal is
open to the public, but differently from the ASEAN ADInet, information can be posted only by the ERCC. Brief ECHO Crisis Reports are posted in the ERCC following the request of the affected member state(s) or for disaster classified as red emergency. During crisis the ERCC produces three types of information tool. The ECHO Civil Protection Messages (CP messages) target participant states and are produced once per day. CP messages are also shared with other responders via the Virtual OSOCC, the On-Site Operation Coordination Centre established during an emergency by UN OCHA. The ECHO Crisis Reports provide general information about an on-going humanitarian crisis and they can contain also a section dedicated to civil protection if relevant for the crisis. These reports are widely available via ECHO website and social media accounts. The Analytical brief are the reports dedicated to the ECHO management. These briefs are not distributed widely and their main purpose it is ECHO internal coordination. Since February 2017 ECHO implemented the Aristotle system (European Commission 2018) to provide multi-hazards assessment in crisis situation. Aristotle project connects 15 specialised institutes available 24/7 to provide a multi-hazards report within 3 hours since the request is issued. The multi-hazard report is used to better communicate with the affected country if the crisis is happening within the EU and it is distributed to other participant states only if the crisis is happening outside EU borders. Aristotle is still a work in progress, and it does not include forest fires and floods outside the EU.

The AHA centre also regularly produces other three types of communication products not linked to any particular ongoing emergency, with the main aim of disseminate information to a wider public. Every Monday the AHA centre
distributes **Weekly Disaster Updates** containing overview of disasters happened during the previous week with links to the relevant information available on ADInet. These updates are circulated to national NDMOs, Dialogue Partners, UN, Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, Civil Society Organisations and other stakeholders. The AHA centre also dedicates a monthly newsletter to disaster preparedness. The Disaster Risk Foresight (**Diasfore**) is a monthly newsletter focus on providing recommendations to prepare for possible disasters. The main target is the ASEAN community, but it is open to partners and interested stakeholders. Finally, since February 2015 the AHA centre distributes ‘**The Column**’, a monthly newsletter available both in electronic and print format. This dissemination tool aims at promoting the activities run by the AHA centre within and outside ASEAN region to a wider public. The column also includes an overview of disasters happened across ASEAN that month (Monthly Disaster Outlook).

DG ECHO also produces regular dissemination tools not linked with any specific emergency. **ECHO Daily Flash** is a daily overview of on-going emergencies within and outside the EU. The one-page reports offer summaries of current humanitarian crises as well as disasters. Moreover, since 2010 the EU Civil Protection department published **NexT**, a biannual newsletter aiming at informing the civil protection national experts on the training and exercises organised by the EU (European Commission Official 2017c).
Table 9. ASEAN and EU’s tools to collect, coordinate and disseminate informations

| Monitoring | Web-Based Emergency Operation Centre (WebEOC) - only information sharing- |
| ASEAN | ASEAN Disaster Monitoring and Response System (DMRS) |
| Coordination | Common Emergency Communication and Information System (Cecis) - meet requests and offers- |
| Information-sharing instruments during emergency times | • ADInet • Flesh updates • Situation updates |
| Dissemination instruments during non-emergency times | • Weekly disaster updates • Disaster Risk Foresight (Disfore) monthly Newsletter • The monthly Column |
| EU | • European Flood Alert System (EFAS) • European Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS) • Global Disaster Alerts and Coordination System (GDACS) • ERCC Portal • Civil Protection (CP) messages • ECHO Crisis Reports • Analytical brief • Aristotle multi-hazards report (Feb 17) • ECHO Daily Flash • Next the bi-annual newsletter (stopped in 2016) |
6.2.2.2 The Mechanism

*The Leader*

The implementation of DMRS started during the preliminary phase of the AHA Centre. The AHA Centre was in the lead of the process by coordinating the setting up of a prototype version of DMRS first, and by organizing a series of workshop to develop and learn how to use the DMRS tool. Similarly, also the development of ADInet, as well as the tools to share information collected by the AHA Centre during crisis (Flesh and Situation Updates) and the dissemination tools not linked to any emergencies (Diasfore and the Column) were coordinated directly by the AHA Centre as part of the initial capacity building phase. Overall, the main logic behind these implementations were inspired by the institutional rational-choice argument that this is the most efficient way to collect and share information on disasters at regional level (RCI) (AHA Centre Official 2017a). In addition, the sharing of information was also presented as a key moment in the institutionalization of ASEAN disaster management (HI) (Thai Diplomat 2017). Overall the member of the AHA Centre persuaded the ASEAN member states’ representatives on the need to implement these tools, as ‘these types of instruments for the collection and dissemination of information are the backbone of a centre dealing with risks and the response to disasters. Collecting, analysing and distributing real-time information is overall the mission that ASEAN member states gave them, but this cannot be accomplished unless they have the necessary instruments to do it’ (Singaporean Diplomat 2017).
Different from the first two cases, is the development of the ADInet. The implementation of the WebEOC was done as part of the initial capacity building phase of the AHA Centre, under phase II of the ICT project coordinated by Singapore. Following the previous phase of the project, the Government of Singapore proposed this second step (HI), de-facto influencing the process by positively manipulating the utility calculation of the AHA Centre (Singaporean Diplomat 2017).

The Reference
The tools developed by the AHA Centre to collect, coordinate and disseminate information mainly reference tools developed outside the Asian-Pacific region that are recognised as legitimate by the AHA Centre and ASEAN leadership, as well as by the ASEAN member states. The AHA Centre adopted the tools proposed by the respective reference(s) either because this was accompanied by the positive incentives of implementing a recognised legitimate instrument within the AHA Centre (DMRS), or because they were already socialized to the existing instrument and wanted to implement it within the AHA Centre (WebEOC), or – finally - because the instrument was perceived as already adherent to the AHA Centre’s needs (Ushahidi Platform).

The initial idea of supporting an ASEAN a multi-hazard early warning system was advanced by U.S. President Barack Obama in November 2009, during the First ASEAN-US Leaders’s Meeting (ASEAN Secretariat 2009c, para. 26). Following Obama’s offer, the US Department of State funded ASEAN-US technical assistance and Training Facility (USTATF) proposed the building of an
early warning system based on the one implemented by the Pacific Disaster Center (PDC). The offer was well received by ASEAN, as –in the words of ASEAN Secretary-General-: ‘I feel comforted that the AHA Centre is getting a state-of-the-art technology from the U.S.’ (US Mission to ASEAN 2012).

WebEOC is an information management tool developed by Intermedix and used in disaster management to collect and share information. Intermedix is a private company providing technological products and services to emergency management agencies (AHA Centre Official 2017b). WebEOC is largely used in the US, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Europe and Asia-Pacific demonstrating how it is overall recognised as a legitimate tool to share information in the region. Being a well-known tool within the disaster management community, it is not surprising that the implementation of a tool to connect the AHA Centre and NDMOs was inspired by this existing model (AHA Centre Official 2017a) in a typical case of socialization, also promoted by the same Intermedix as a way to reinforce even more their legitimacy in the Asian-Pacific region.

ADInet was initially based on the Ushahidi platform (AHA Centre 2012, 4) a crowdsourcing tool developed in 2008 to map reports of violence in Kenya after the post-election violence in 2008. Since then, Ushahidi has evolved considerably and was tasked by the US Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (CFE-DMHA) to create a platform aggregating and transparently mapping all the disaster management training events in the Asia-Pacific region. Overall, Ushahidi is a well know instrument in
the Asian-Pacific region (Ushahidi 2018), therefore is not surprising that the AHA Centre also use it as an initial tool to disseminate information about disasters to raise public awareness, but also to increase the visibility of the centre among responders (indirect SI). Overall, the ADInet is an example of emulation of the Ushahidi platform, an existing tool recognised as legitimate.

The Sponsor

The AHA Centre’s tools for the collection, coordination and dissemination of information were sponsored by Dialogue Partners often in line with a path-dependency logic (HI) as these tools were part of already existing projects (i.e. WebEOC or ADInet) or promised as part of the cooperation (USAID commitment after Obama’s speech).

The DMRS platform was founded by the U.S. Government through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in the framework of the technical assistance provided by the United States to ASEAN and following President Obama’s commitment in 2010, in line with a path-dependence logic (HI) the USAID project was lunched in 2013. The same logic can be considered when looking at the sponsorship of the WebEOC platform.

The WebEOC platform was developed in the framework of the ICT project sponsored by Japan ASEAN Integration funds (JAIF) with 1.627.634 USD. It was the natural development of the first phase of the ICT project. Overall, the project provided the software and hardware essentials for the operationalization of the AHA Centre. The first phase focused mainly on buying the basic
equipment for the AHA Centre, whereas the second phase was devoted to connecting the AHA Centre with national NDMOs (Japanese Diplomat 2017a, 2017b). As alternative tools were not even discussed, the AHA Centre accepted the adoption of WebEOC (AHA Centre Official 2017a, 2017b). The selection of the tool implemented by Intermedix was part of the ICT project. Finally, the development of ADInet was part of the Phase I of the capacity-building ICT Project founded by Japan. Differently, reports on crisis situations are part of the AHA Centre activities. These do not require any specific separate budget, but are covered via the AHA Centre annual budget.

Overall, the AHA Centre accepted the sponsorships of the main technical tools mainly because this was the only option available at that time. These instruments are the core of the work of a Centre of which the primary aim is to collect, coordinate and share information among its stakeholders. Alternatives were not even discussed as the proposed tools were already accompanied by an offer to cover the costs of implementation and maintenance (AHA Centre Official 2017a).

_The Implementer_

The implementation of the tools to collect, coordinate and disseminate information was done by the provider of the tools already proposed. Nothing new was created, but already existing tools were emulated or copied from tools already developed by the various implementer(s). Once again, alternatives were not even discussed as the institutions in charge of the implementation was part of the package that came together with choosing a certain reference, which was
overall, already accompanied by the means to be implemented (sponsorship), as well as the technical support for the implementation (implementer) (AHA Centre Official 2017a).

The DMRS multi-hazard software is a product developed by the Pacific Disaster Center (PDC) since November 2012. Created in 2006, PDC is located in the state of Hawaii (U.S.) and it has been managed by the University of Hawaii under a Cooperative Agreement with the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Policy) (Pacific Disaster Centre (PDC) 2017b). The DMRS is based on the DisasterAWARE platform developed by the Pacific Disaster Center (PDC) (Pacific Disaster Centre (PDC) 2017a). The DisasterAWARE system was already incorporated is some of the ASEAN NDMOs. Starting with Thailand, which in 2006 included DisasterAWARE as tool of the Thailand’s National Disaster Warning Center, followed in 2011 by the Vietnam’s Disaster Management Center in 2011 and Indonesia’s BNPB in 2014. Indeed, the DisasterAWARE system is the most used in the US and South East Asia. A series of workshop took place throughout 2012 to discuss the implementation of the platform. The first workshop was held in May 2012 in Jakarta and a second workshop was held in Singapore in July 2012.

Also the WebEOC was directly implemented by Intermedix, which coordinate the setting up phase within the AHA Centre and the training to AHA Centre staff and NDMOs representatives. A series of trainings to show the use of WebEOC to NDMOs representatives were organised by the AHA Centre with the cooperation of the Disaster Prevention Research Institute of the Kyoto University
and Intermedix (AHA Centre 2013). This was for Intermedix a deliverable of the project they were financed to implement (RCI) and they influenced the information sharing system implemented by the AHA Centre by literally copying the same tool already implemented in other countries of the region (Thai Diplomat 2017; AHA Centre Official 2017a).

A slightly different case is the one regarding the tools developed by the AHA Centre to inform about on-going crisis. These were mainly implemented directly by the AHA Centre staff, following logics of efficiency and effectiveness (RCI). Inspired by the individual experiences of the AHA Centre staff members and adjust according to ASEAN member states requests and needs (AHA Centre Official 2017b).
Table 10. The collection, coordination and dissemination of information tools: actors and mechanism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DMRS monitoring tool, actors and mechanism</th>
<th>Rationale behind influence</th>
<th>Modes of influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leader</strong></td>
<td>The AHA Centre</td>
<td>This is perceived as the most efficient way to collect information (RCI); Collecting information is an unavoidable step of the institutionalization of ASEAN disaster management (HI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reference</strong></td>
<td>US</td>
<td>The reference is recognised as legitimate (SI);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sponsor</strong></td>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Part of previous action promised by President Obama (HI).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implementer</strong></td>
<td>Pacific Disaster Center (PDC)</td>
<td>PDC was already the main partner of the US in providing the Disaster AWARE tool already implemented in some ASEAN member states (HI).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WebEOC coordination tool, actors and mechanism</th>
<th>Rationale behind influence</th>
<th>Modes of influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leader</strong></td>
<td>The government of Singapore</td>
<td>The natural follow up of the previous phase of the ICT project (HI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reference</strong></td>
<td>WebEOC by Intermedix</td>
<td>The references are recognised as legitimate (indirect SI) and the reference itself is willing to reinforce its legitimacy (SI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sponsor</strong></td>
<td>ICT Project by Japan</td>
<td>Part of previous action link to the ICT project (HI).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implementer</strong></td>
<td>Intermedix and Kyoto University</td>
<td>It was part of the implementation of the ICT project Copy phase II part that they were assigned to fulfil (RCI).</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Dissemination tools, actors and mechanism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Leader</strong></th>
<th>AHA Centre</th>
<th>This is perceived as the most efficient way to share Persuasion information (RCI); Sharing information is an unavoidable step of the institutionalization of ASEAN disaster management (HI).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reference</strong></td>
<td>Ushahidi Platform</td>
<td>The references are recognised as legitimate and is Emulation adopted to reinforce the legitimacy of the adopting actor (indirect SI).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sponsor</strong></td>
<td>ICT Project by Japan for ADI net, other tools thanks to Australia and ASEAN member states</td>
<td>Part of previous action link to the ICT project (HI). Resource dependencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implementer</strong></td>
<td>AHA Centre</td>
<td>It was part of the setting up of the AHA Centre, inspired by logics of efficiency and effectiveness (RCI).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.2.3 The ASEAN Emergency Response and Assessment Team (ERAT)

6.2.3.1 The Instrument

The ASEAN Emergency Response and Assessment Teams were originally inspired by the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC Teams), trained by Singapore and supported by Australia. This changed in 2012 and now ASEAT-ERAT is managed, trained and deployed by the AHA Centre. Initially called ASEAN Assessment Teams, the name was changed in ‘ASEAN Emergency Response and Assessment Team’, to underline that the ERAT team activity is not limited to providing assessments only, but that they are also active in coordinating the response to the crisis. As of today, ASEAN-ERAT counts more than 150 team members and has been deployed to 18 different emergencies.

The EU civil protection coordination and assessment (EUCP) teams aim at coordinating the work of the different states contributing to the EU civil protection mechanism and willing to respond to that specific crisis (European Commission 2016b). EUCP teams might also provide technical advice and facilitate the coordination with the affected state. They are usually deployed within 24 hours. The ERCC can already send a request to participating states before there is a formal request from the affected country, but of course the deployment cannot go ahead until the affected states send an official request, that should be approved by participating states. The EUCP team’s composition depends on participant states availability. After a formal request is sent via Cecis,
participant states nominate their candidates. The duration of this process might vary, but it is usually less than 24 hours.

Table 11. ASEAN and EU’s emergency teams

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ASEAN</th>
<th>EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Objectives</strong></td>
<td>• Support affected country NDMOs in the first assessment of the disaster;</td>
<td>• Coordinate the work of the different Participating States teams and modules on the ground;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Provide operational support to the NDMO</td>
<td>• Provide technical advice and facilitate coordination with the affected country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Coordinate the mobilisation of regional assets and disaster relief goods</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Show ASEAN solidarity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mobilisation</strong></td>
<td>Within 8 hours, for a maximum of 14 days</td>
<td>Less than 24 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Composition</strong></td>
<td>ERAT’s current roster contains 155 members and is updated quarterly.</td>
<td>(not available)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• (NDMOs) and other government authorities responsible for disaster management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• civil society,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• private sector</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• academia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Team structure</strong></td>
<td>• ERAT Team Leader</td>
<td>(not available)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ASEAN national specialists responsible for:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• assessment and information management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• emergency communications;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• logistics;</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• coordination;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• other specific expertise based on affected country’s needs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>At least one female member</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personal Preparedness</strong></td>
<td>Induction training and part of the ACE programme</td>
<td>Provided by participating states, based on the EU modular training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Costs coverage</strong></td>
<td>Coordinated by the AHA Centre Mission fund: USD 10.000 for ADMER Fund</td>
<td>Provided by states participating to the EU Civil protection mechanism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The ERAT Teams have two main declared **purposes**. The first one is to provide technical assistance to the affected ASEAN country. ERAT teams provide rapid assessments, information management, and coordination activities, as well as other services upon the request of the affected member state. In case of disaster, the ERAT teams are deployed within eight hours from the affected ASEAN country’s request for a maximum of 14 days. Following the disaster, the deployed ERAT team supports the national NDMO in drafting the first report assessment within 72 hours. The report gives a first estimation of the scale, severity and impact of the disaster, also providing a first needs assessment. If needed, the ERAT team also provides operational support to the NDMO, for example in setting up an emergency communication system. The ERAT team coordinates from the ground the mobilisation of regional assets and disaster relief goods coming from the AHA Centre to the affected country. The second purpose is to make the ASEAN more visible, in the words of Said Faisal: ‘When we deploy ERAT, we don’t just deploy a person or a group of individuals. We deploy the solidarity of ASEAN. It is about delivering results and adding value framed within ASEAN solidarity. Even the acronyms ERAT means ‘closely’ in the Bahasa Indonesian language.’ (AHA Centre 2016e, 21).

ERAT’s current roster contains 155 members, drawn from National Disaster Management Organisations (NDMOs) and other government authorities responsible for disaster management, ASEAN Secretariat and AHA Centre, as well as civil society, private sector, and academia (AHA Centre 2016e, 24).
The ERAT Team is composed by a group of ASEAN national specialists responsible for assessment and information management; emergency communications; logistics; coordination; and the other specific functions requested by the NDMO on the basis of the affected country’s needs. The ERAT Team Leader coordinates the team and reports directly to the country’s coordinator appointed by the national NDMO (AHA Centre 2016c, 35). Every ERAT team must include at least one female member. The ERAT roster is quarterly updated with the specialists identified by ASEAN member states. The national NDMOs already pre-approve the ERAT members, eliminating the need for further deployment approval processes.

The ERAT personnel should be ready to be deployed within few hours upon request from the NDMO of the affected country. Therefore, they are requested to attend a compulsory induction course and have all the documents ready for deployments (passport, visa, etc.). The course duration was extended to two full weeks, divided in one theoretical and one practical parts. During the theoretical part, ERAT future members receive an overview of the international humanitarian system, the AADMER, ASEAN mechanisms, functions of the AHA Centre, and more practical skills, such as using the emergency telecommunications equipment, doing rapid assessments, and coordinating with the national NDMOs. The last 2 days are used to test participants in a realistic simulation. Since 2015, at the end of the training ERAT members receive a kit, consisting of a backpack, containing all basic personal equipment needed for the mission (water purifier, raincoat, etc.).
The AHA Centre is responsible to arrange, support and cover the costs of the ERAT team before and during the deployment and use the ASEAN Disaster Management and Emergency Relief (ADMER) Fund to set up a mission fund of 10,000 USD.

At EU level the training of the experts deployed as member of EUCP teams is responsibility of the state participating to the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. They are usually asked to attend the modular training system provided by the ERCC.

6.2.3.2 The Mechanism

The Leader
The idea of developing an ASEAN team to assess the situation on the ground in the aftermath of the crisis was already advanced in 2002 during the discussions around the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze pollution. The AADMER Agreement reinforced the idea of having a joint assessment between the assisting and affected country, as a way to mutually agreed on the type of assistance required (ASEAN 2005b, art.11.3). The 10th ACDM Meeting held in Singapore on 26 October 2007 agreed on forming a regional assessment team. The proposal was already advanced by Malaysia during an ACDM sub-committee in May 2007 and then reinforced by the lessons-learned report of the 3rd ASEAN Regional Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise (ARDEX) held in Singapore on October 2007. The 11th ACDM Meeting held in
Malaysia on March 2008 adopted the SASOP, which includes the provision for the deployment of an ASEAN Rapid Assessment Team.

Winston Chang, member of the Singapore Civil Defence Force and UNDAC member, was part of the first ERAT Team deployed in response to Nargis\(^9\). He admittedly entered to Myanmar only thanks to the fact that he was part of the ASEAN Team. In his words ‘The global response community was held at the global staging point, Bangkok, which was the most accessible airport. Everybody was going to the embassy, trying to get visas. We were stuck there for a couple of days. Even Ow Yong [also Singapore nationality and UNDAC member] and myself, we were infamously turned back at the airport, even with our UN passports. Although we flew from Bangkok into Yangon, we had to turn back. […] But later, through the ASEAN channel, they said, ‘Okay, a team of ERAT can come in’ (AHA Centre 2016e, 14).

Although currently often presented as a flagship example of ASEAN integration in the response to disasters, the idea of having assessment teams under the ASEAN flag was mainly presented to other ASEAN representatives as the most efficient way to gather vital information from the ground and to coordinate the ASEAN response more effectively (RCI).

The Reference

\(^9\) The members of the first ERAT team deployed to Myanmar were Adelina Kamal from the ASEAN Secretariat, UNDAC members Jemilah Mahmood (Malaysia), Winston Chang (Singapore), Ow Yong Tuck Wah (Singapore), along with other members of the ERAT team from Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, and the Philippines, formed ERAT’s pioneer team. As the ERAT team was created ‘on the spot’ the team received t-shirts from the ASEAN gift shop as “we needed a sort of ASEAN logo so people would know who we were on the missions” (ERAT book, p. 20).
The idea to develop multi-country assessment team was inspired by the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) ‘which offered an appropriate model for the region’s culture and diverse political and economic context’ (AHA Centre 2016e, 5). UN OCHA participated in several exercises organised by ASEAN. The organization of regional exercises in which UNDAC teams took part, represented an opportunity for ASEAN member states representatives to learn how the OCHA system works. These exercises provided the opportunity to exchange ideas and, in a case of lessons drawing (Rose 1991) to encourage ASEAN representatives to develop an instrument similar to the one already in placed within the UN. The UNDAC system was already well known by ASEAN disaster management experts as some of them were already part of a UNDAC team. As of today, some of the members of the ASEAN ERAT team are also members of UNDAC team (CFE-DM 2015, 31). During the ARDEX 2007 the UN OCHA representatives directly suggested the implementation of UN-like team to run the ASEAN first assessment after a crisis. ‘It was also Dr. Rajan Gengaje from UNOCHA who served as one of our referees in ARDEX that reinforced the idea. He spelt out the basis for an ASEAN rapid assessment team, because, there will be times that UNDAC will not be available to respond to ASEAN, or not be able to respond to disasters in ASEAN.’ (AHA Centre 2016e, 12). The first ERAT Team was deployed following Cyclone Nargis in May 2008. As the creation of these teams was agreed only few months before Nargis, a real structure was not yet in place. Therefore, the members of the first ERAT Team were all citizens of ASEAN Member States hand-picked from the UNDAC roster (AHA Centre 2016e, 14).
The Sponsor

The reasons why UN OCHA supported the development of the ERAT Team are summarised in the word of Oliver Lacey Hall, head of UNOCHA Indonesia and former OCHA Regional Director for Asia-Pacific “The ASEAN 2025 vision on disaster management is broadly clear. Under the UN’s previous Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, he made it clear that he regarded relationships with regional organisations like ASEAN to be very important. The indications from our new Secretary General are that he shares this view and will want to ensure that regional organisations, like ASEAN, and the UN and now and every more synergistic way of working together” (AHA Centre 2016e, 44). Overall, OCHA follow this call coming from the UN Secretary General to reinforce ASEAN legitimacy in the region, and acted in his area of specialisation, to reinforce the disaster response capacity of the regional organisation, as a way to reinforce ASEAN legitimacy in front of ASEAN member states (SI). Once UNDAC teams were identified as the reference for a similar instrument in ASEAN, OCHA decided to sponsor the process.

The Implementer

Following the adoption of the AADMER Work Programme in 2010, the ERAT Team become the ASEAN flagship instrument to respond to disasters. The full operationalization of ERAT was coordinated by Singapore. In particular, Singapore took on a leading role in drafting the guidelines for the deployment of ERAT and in developing the first series of ASEAN-ERAT induction courses. Col. Kadir Maideen from the Singapore Civil Defence Force’s (SCDF) was instrumental in the development of ERAT and its guidelines. With a long
experience as second commander of the SCDF Disaster Assistance and Rescue Team (DART) and after receiving the Medal of Valour after working round the clock in response to the Nicoll highway collapsed in 2004, he was seconded to the ASEAN Secretariat. In 23-24 April 2010 Singapore hosted a training organised by UNDAC for ASEAN member States representatives to discuss the development of the ASEAN-ERAT team. In the words of Kadir Maideen: ‘I had good colleagues from the Bangkok office, Oliver Lacey Hall [UN OCHA], Dr. Rajan [UNOCHA], and others. They were very supportive of us having a response system. They gave everybody the whole architecture of the UN. Then, that’s where we came in, myself, Adelina [Kamal, ASEAN Secretariat], to share with them how the ASEAN architecture would fit in.’ (AHA Centre 2016e, 54).

In October 2010 the first week-long ERAT induction course was organised in Singapore. The ASEAN-ERAT Guidelines were presented as a sort of handbook on the ASEAN response. The Guidelines draw on the lessons learned from the Cyclone Nargis operation, adapting the UNDAC approaches to ASEAN context. An example of this adaptation was the inclusion of a list of terminology, such as local terms for village and village heads (AHA Centre 2016e, 54). Only few weeks after the training an earthquake on the Mentawai Islands (Indonesia) provided the opportunity to test the freshly trained ERAT teams as well as the ERAT Guidelines. This response provided once again useful lessons to be implemented in the following one. Among the others, the lack of a formal assessment methodology, the lack of communication equipment different from personal mobile phones, and the lack of available cash to be advanced.
The coordination of ERAT Teams was handed over to the newly created AHA Centre in April 2013 during the 3rd ERAT induction course organised in Singapore. In October 2013 the AHA Centre coordinated the ERAT Teams during the ARDEX 13 Exercise organised in Vietnam. On the side of the Exercise a refresher course was organised for the participants of the first two induction courses, in order to update them on the AHA Centre, as well as on the new structures created between 2010 and 2013. Two weeks after the ERAT Team under the AHA Centre coordination were tested once again in a big disaster.

On 8th November 2013 Typhoon Haiyan hit the Philippines. The AHA Centre deployed an ERAT team of four members which was expected not only to provide assessment of the situation, but also to coordinate the relief supplies provided by a huge number of humanitarian actors and organizations. In the words of Arnel Capili, current Head of Operation, and one of the members of the ERAT Team at that time: ‘For me, out of that experience came the feeling that ASEAN could have done more. My lesson from that was that we need to structure how we respond. We need to bring more to the affected country, not necessarily bring more in quantity but a more targeted response that would add value to the Member States’ response.’ (AHA Centre 2016e, 65). Overall, the ERAT Team deployed after Typhoon Haiyan was considered too small compared to the large proportion of the disaster, its mandate was bigger than just providing an assessment of the situation. The ERAT team was functional to also coordinate the relief sent by ASEAN Member States to assist the affected areas of the Philippines.
The recommendations generated by the Haiyan experience were collected in the report ‘Weathering the Perfect Storm: Lessons Learnt on the ASEAN’s Response to the Aftermath of Typhoon Haiyan’. The lessons learned produced the ERAT Transformation Plan, which was approved during the 9th Meeting of the ACDM Working Group on Preparedness and Response in Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia) in 2015.

During the 23rd ACDM Meeting in Da Nang, Viet Nam, the committee agreed to change ERAT’s name from the “Emergency Rapid Assessment Team” to “Emergency Response and Assessment Team” to more accurately capture the nature of its operations, which included rapid disaster assessments, and supporting emergency response operations of the affected country. Some scholars considered this change as an example of selective borrowing of EU-like instrument. In particular the name change of ERAT teams from ‘Rapid Assessment Team’, to ‘Response and Assessment Team’ is considered a clear reference to the EU Civil Protection Module system (Pennisi di Floristella 2015, 23). As we just saw, the process leading to the change of name was a reflection of the experiential learning of ASEAN on the ground, and it would be hard to link this experience with the reference to the EU instrument.

In June 2014, the 4th ASEAN-ERAT Induction Course was organised in Indonesia by the AHA Centre. The training still strongly relays on the Singapore SCDF and UNOCHA, but it is much more focus on the instrument available at ASEAN level (AADMER framework, the AHA CENTRE, DELSA), as well as
on understanding the international humanitarian system. The ASEAN-ERAT training receives funding from Australia and Japan.

As of today, ASEAN-ERAT counts more than 150 team members and have been deployed to 18 different emergencies. The aim expressed in the ERAT Transformation Plan is to reach by 2020 much bigger numbers. A total of 500 members with a full induction training, 50 members with a specialised training on issues ranging from emergency communication to civil-military coordination and a core group of 20 members with advanced training on leadership in crisis.
Table 12. ERAT Teams actors and mechanism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Rationale behind influence</th>
<th>Modes of influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leader</td>
<td>ACDM, Malaysia and Singapore</td>
<td>As the most efficient way to gather information and coordinate the response from the ground (RCI);</td>
<td>Persuasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>UNDAC Teams</td>
<td>Reinforce the efficacy and efficiency of the ASEAN system to respond (direct RCI); For AHA Centre as a way to gain more legitimacy (indirect SI);</td>
<td>Lessons Drawing (synthesis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sponsor</td>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>Reinforce ASEAN legitimacy in the region (SI)</td>
<td>Resource dependencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementer</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>It was part of the setting up of the AHA Centre, inspired by logics of efficiency and effectiveness (RCI).</td>
<td>Emulation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.2.4 The Disaster Emergency Logistics System for ASEAN (DELSA)

6.2.4.1 The Instrument

The Disaster Emergency Logistics System for ASEAN (DELSA) is a mechanism for the provision of relief items to ASEAN countries during the post-disaster emergency situations. Launched on 7 December 2012, DELSA main component, the emergency relief supply stockpile is housed in UN-WFP Humanitarian Response Depot in Subang (Malaysia). Managed by the AHA Centre, DELSA is directly funded by Japanese Government. Subang (Malaysia) is one of the six WFP strategically located depots that procures, stores, and transports emergency supplies on behalf of the humanitarian community. The DELSA relief stockpile aim is to increase the preparedness of the response by storing the assets and capacities and by making them available for a quick response. The standby arrangement system is based on the voluntary contribution of ASEAN Member states. Differently from the UN and ASEAN, the EU does not relay on a stockpile system. Relief items are directly mobilized by member states upon request (European Commission Official 2017d).

20 The other UNHRD depots are located in Italy (2000), United Arab Emirates (2008), Ghana (2014), Panama (2014), Spain (2014).
6.2.4.2 The Mechanism

The Leader

The provision for an ASEAN Standby Arrangements for Disaster Relief and Emergency Response was already present in the AADMER Agreement (ASEAN 2005b, art.8). Malaysia first proposed the creation of an ASEAN warehouse to be hosted in Subang. Already in November 2007 Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak, Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, suggested the use of the Subang Air Base in Kuala Lumpur as an ASEAN centre for disaster relief operations. The proposal on establishing an emergency stockpiles advanced during the 2007 ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting and was proposed again at the 16th ASEAN Summit held in April 2010 in Viet Nam. ASEAN Leaders ‘encouraged the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance [AHA Centre] to establish linkages and cooperation with other humanitarian centres in the region, including the United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot in Subang, Malaysia’ (Koh 2009, 1178). Indeed, Malaysia is strategically located in the middle of Southeast Asia and in particular Subang is in a relatively insulated position, protected by potential major disasters like earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. This explanation persuaded the ACDM to welcome the Malaysia offer. Overall, Malaysia’s aim was to demonstrate a strong support to ASEAN regional cooperation, in particular in the field of disasters management. In the word of a Malaysian Diplomat to ASEAN ‘we saw this as our contribution to the establishment of a regional warehouse, without that a regional response would be much more complicated considered the geography of our region’ (Malaysian Diplomat 2017).
The Reference

In May 2010 the 16th ACDM Meeting discussion on the establishment of an ASEAN emergency stockpile started. The different available options were discussed, not only stockpiling, but also others such as pre-arrangements with potential suppliers. Yet, ACDM agreed the creation of a regional stockpile at the UNHRD in Subang (Malaysia). ‘[DELSA] was the most feasible and cost-effective solution to the current situation. […] The alternative, i.e. establishing or supplementing national stockpiles in each Member State, was considered more difficult and costly to implement in view of different hazards, exposure, frequency, capacity, population, and geographical location of each Member State’ (AHA Centre 2016d, 36).

Considering the need to better understand the different national needs, the ACDM tasked Malaysia and Singapore, as the Co-Chairs of the working group dealing with ASEN preparedness, to organize a regional workshop to discuss the best option to set up a regional relief stockpile21. The workshop, organised in cooperation with the AHA Centre and ASEAN Secretariat, was held in Kuala Lumpur on 6-7 December 2011. Each ASEAN country sent two representatives, one disaster management expert and one logistics expert. Besides national experts, also representatives from the Japan Mission to ASEAN and JAIF Management Team also participated and ‘provided the workshop with insights’ (AHA Centre 2016d, 34). Furthermore, ‘WFP representatives were appointed as

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21 The initial proposal advanced by the ACDM was to appoint one logistic expert in charge of examining the different preferences of ASEAN Member States. The regional workshop solution was finally adopted as the most cost and time efficient one (AHA Centre 2016d, 28).
facilitators, in view of their vast experience in disaster management logistics and their agency’s lead role among the United Nations’ logistics cluster’ (AHA Centre 2016d, 34). Indeed, the role of WFP representatives was more than facilitators. They acted as solid benchmark to ASEAN member states requests. ‘During the workshop, each Member State was requested to identify the most-needed relief items in case of disaster emergencies. To avoid over-demand or under-supply of relief items to the affected countries, the WFP presented a proposed a priority list based on its experience in past disaster responses. The list was then verified with the Member States’ lists.’.

The 19th ACDM Meeting endorsed the final proposal in March 2012 and the Government of Japan gave its green light in July 2012. DELSA was officially launched on 7 December 2012 in Subang (Malaysia). Yet, the first deployment was already one month prior to the official launch in response to the Thabaittkyin earthquake in Myanmar in November 2012. Moreover, DELSA was immediately activated (one hour after the launching ceremony) following the Typhoon Bopha in the Philippines.

Between December 2012 and December 2016 DELSA was activated 14 times. The experiences learned after these activations triggered a series of changes. Among them the creation of a list of pre-approved vendors, meaning that during emergency operations, the AHA Centre could directly procure the relief items speeding up the delivery process that previously took up to 11 days. Another change that followed the direct experience of the AHA Centre was the use of “white stock”. The AHA Centre delivers to the affected NDMOs unlabelled
relief stocks provided by the local warehouse of the WFP. The same items are then replaced by the WFP by directly taken similar one from the ASEAN warehouse in Subang (AHA Centre Official 2017a).

The Sponsor

The DELSA stockpile is funded by Japan. During the 12th ASEAN-Japan Summit, Japan announced an additional contribution of 90 million USD to the Japan-ASEAN Integration Fund (JAIF) aiming at supporting ‘[ASEAN] Disaster Management and Emergency Response, Emergency Assistance Related to Financial Crisis and Japanese Language Training Courses for Nurses and Certified Care Workers’ (ASEAN Secretariat 2009b). Two months later, in October 2009 the 14th ACDM meeting agreed to use the JAIF funds to implement the ASEAN disaster relief stockpiles. Up to December 2016 the overall amount of JAIF funding dedicated to the DELSA project (including the ACE Programme) are more than 12 million USD. Japan funding follow the discussion within the region and the preferences of the member states. There was not element in the document analysis or in the interviews that suggested any form of influence from Japan on the DELSA project.

The Implementer

The depot was built in 2012 and is made available by the Government of Malaysia. In early 2010 the Government of Malaysia and WFP signed an agreement for the opening of the fifth response depot in Subang. Constructions were completed in March 2012. The government of Malaysia contributes USD 1 million annually (de Souza and Stumpf 2012, 37). Overall, the relationship
between Malaysian and WFP’ representatives was a long-standing cooperation. They simply expanded the issue covered from a national perspective to a more regional one. Their existing cooperation is at the bases of the DELSA project.
Table 13. DELSA actors and mechanism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Rationale behind influence</th>
<th>Modes of influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leader</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>For Malaysia as a way to advance regional cooperation on the disaster management (SI); For the ACDM as the most efficient way to facilitate the logistics of the response (RCI)</td>
<td>Persuasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>UNHRD in Malaysia</td>
<td>Recognised as the most efficient and cost-effective way for the region and indirect copying (indirect RCI); Considered that Malaysia was one of the co-chairs, their experience with UNHRD was also based on an already long-standing relation (HI)</td>
<td>Direct socialization and indirect copying (RCI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sponsor</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Reinforce ASAN legitimacy in the region (SI)</td>
<td>No influence region (SI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementer</td>
<td>Malaysia and WFP</td>
<td>The two already worked together in the general setting up of the UNHRD in Subang, so it was the continuation of an already existing relations (HI)</td>
<td>Copy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.2.5 The AHA Centre Executive Programme (ACE)

6.2.5.1 The Instrument

In 2013, the AHA Centre launched the ACE Programme, an intensive six-month training course on disaster management for ASEAN member states representatives. Each country identifies their participants. The programme is funded by the Japanese government and implemented with the collaboration of dialogue partners. Between 2014 and 2016 the ACE Programme trained 45 officers from eight ASEAN member states (see Annex 4).

The ACE Programme has three main objectives: training the ASEAN officers on technical and logistical aspects of the response to disasters, providing technical support to the AHA centre by spending around 150 hours of work within the AHA centre, and strengthening the connection between officers coming from different ASEAN countries to the declared aim of reinforcing their ‘sense of regionalism and cooperation’ (AHA Centre 2016c, 18). The objectives of the EU Civil Protection Programme are two folds. First, enhancing the technical preparation of its participants via the participation to intense-designed modules. Second, providing an opportunity to exchange and sharing knowledge on how the management of disaster is conducted in the different national systems of participating states, mainly done via the exchange programme. Differently from the ACE Programme, which implies 150 hours of practical work within the AHA Centre, the EU component does not foresee a training period within the EU Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC). The ACE programme duration is set for six months for a total of 1000 hours. The training is dedicated
to a preselected group of 16 officers (2 per countries since 2015) selected by the national focal points. The programme is divided in three cores: the Working at the AHA Centre core (500 hours), the Training on technical and non-technical skills core (350 hours) and the Study visit and development core (150 hours). In terms of specific knowledge, ACE programme focuses its first core (500 hours) on developing an in-depth knowledge of all the key components of the ASEAN regional mechanism (AADMER, SASOP, DELSA, AHA Centre, ERAT, etc.), as well as key skills for the day-to-day run of the AHA Centre, mainly in terms of monitoring an analysis, ICT, communication, data collection, preparedness and response, disaster monitoring. The second core (350 hours) is dedicated to technical skills, such as logistic, camp coordination, civil-military coordination, rapid assessment, post-disaster needs analysis and project management, as well as to soft skills, such as leadership in crisis, personality development, communication for disaster management professionals. Finally, the third core (150 hours) is dedicated to field visits and simulations. During the visits participants gain first-hand experience in real disaster settings, different from the one typical from their own country (i.e. participant from Thailand – not prone to earthquakes- can see areas affected by an earthquake).

The EU Programme also involves technical training courses, while adding a second major component to the training in promoting the exchange of experts between participating countries (see below). The EU technical trainings are divided in different modules. The participation to the different modules was not compulsory and structured as one single training, but having followed the courses according to the basic order of courses provided by EU Civil Protection.
was preferred (see the 2012 training course overview). In 2012\textsuperscript{22} the EU Civil Protection offered a different set of introductive, operational and management trainings (European Commission 2012). The Community Mechanism Introduction Course (CMI) was a four-day introductory course and it was a prerequisite to access the other modules. The module provided the basic knowledge about the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and actors in the international emergency environment inside and outside Europe. A similar six-days introductory course was offered to technical specialists, such as marine pollution and water management experts, environmental experts, geo-hazard or logistics experts, medical staff and infrastructure engineers. The Technical Experts Course (TEC) was designed to introduce technical experts to the EU Mechanism and the mission cycle of international missions. The Operational Management course (OPM) was an eight-day course specifically aimed at future deployments inside and outside Europe. A set of specialised four- or six-days training was dedicated to develop technical expertise in the field of security (SEC), information management (IMC), international coordination (ICC) and mission assessment (AMC). Two management trainings were also offered. The High Level Coordination (HLC) course was both the concluding training after previous modules, as well as standing alone module for specific candidates (like from other organisations or with extensive field-experience) that could have being admitted directly after permission of the EU commission. Differently from the ACE Programme, which is directed only to the 16 ASEAN officers selected by the national NDMOs, the targeted expertise of the EU training varies

\textsuperscript{22} 2012 is selected as it is the year before the launch of the ACE Programme. Although it is not proven that the ASEAN representatives run any explorative studies on existing trainings prior to setting their own, it is reasonable to imagine that this would be the setting they would have considered if looking at the EU.
depending on the modules proposed. The Community Mechanism Introduction Course (CMI) was open to all staff from national civil protection departments of the participating countries and other organisations that could serve as the core for the affected state in case their country might have to request and receive international assistance. The Operational Management course (OPM) targeted national experts and European Commission representatives aiming at joining a European Civil Protection team deployed to coordinate the response to emergencies.

In addition to the technical training, the EU also implemented the EU Exchange of Experts in Civil Protection Programme. The Programme, funded by the European Commission and coordinated by the German Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW), aims at promoting the exchange between different national expertise by allowing experts from one national systems to be temporarily seconded to another participating country, in order to gain direct experience and more in-depth knowledge of how the civil protection system works in a different participating country. Although this component of the EU training might sound as a way to reinforce the regional dimension of the EU Civil Protection by sharing knowledge and building trust, the short duration of the exchange (from a few days to two weeks) makes it more an exchange of technical expertise among experts coming from different countries (European Commission Official 2017b).

Although the ACE Programme is in principle not restricted to ASEAN citizens, the structure and the high costs of the training per individual make it de-facto
limited to representatives of the national NDMOs. On the other hand, for each cycle of training courses provided by the EU, the total number of course places is divided between the Participating States (EU members and non), on a quota based on both the reported training needs and the size of the country, as well as other European Commission services, the United Nations and the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement. Each state participating to the EU Civil Protection Mechanism has appointed a national training coordinator, who is in charge of the selection of national experts to attend the EU trainings. Even more, the Exchange of Experts programme is not only open to participating countries, but also to Albania, Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Kosovo, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia and Ukraine.

The management of the ACE Programme is centralized within the AHA Centre with one officer dedicated full time to the programme. This officer is in charge of the overall coordination of the training, as well as of the support of the participants both in terms of logistics and general needs. EU trainings are provided by external partners selected via a public Call for Tender. The call sets the general terms of the training (duration, general content, number of participants), but leave the curriculum design up to the implementer (European Commission Official 2017b).

The participants of the AHA programme are selected by the national NDMOs, but selection’s criteria are set at AHA centre level. The ACE programme requires (1) a bachelor degree in relevant subjects, but participants with a master degree
are preferred. In terms of previous experience, participants to the ACE programme are expected to have (3) at least three years of relevant work experience. In terms of specific skills, the ACE applicants should have (4) a good understanding of disaster emergency preparedness and response, as well as (5) a good understanding of the regional dimension of disaster management issues. In terms of more general skills, a (2) good knowledge of written and spoken English is required, as well as (3) good computer skills, (4) the ability to work under pressure, (5) the capacity to work with individuals of different cultural backgrounds, and (5) personal qualities such as ‘leadership, initiative, adaptability and sound judgment’. Applicants should be up to 40 years-old, and yet ‘it is expected that applicants should be no longer than 32 years-old’. This should be also considered in view of the young age of ASEAN population. The EU Programme does not set any specific criteria for the selection of participants. The selection is done at national level by the participating country. Therefore, it is up to participant states to set the criteria for participation to the training.

The costs of the ACE Programme are shared between ASEAN member states and external partners. Japan (via JAIF) directly found the programme, but other dialogue partners (mainly New Zealand and US) and private companies also engage with the Programme by providing free-of-charge services and/or items. The ASEAN Member States cover the salaries of their participants throughout the programme and ensure them with a position in their respective NDMO at the end of the programme. EU trainings are sponsored by ECHO budget.
Overall, the ACE Programme is quite different from the trainings and exchange of experts developed within the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (See Table below). And once again, this can be explained by looking at the mechanism that lead the creation of the AHA Centre, in which the EU did not played any relevant role.

**Table 14. ASEAN and EU’s training offers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ASEAN</th>
<th>EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Objectives</strong></td>
<td>• Technical and logistical trainings;</td>
<td>• Technical preparation;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Supporting to the day to day work of the AHA centre;</td>
<td>• Exchange-sharing, networking and learn about different national systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Reinforcing the ‘sense of regionalism and cooperation’;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Duration</strong></td>
<td>6 months intensive 1000 hours training (around 125 days)</td>
<td>Modular trainings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structure</strong></td>
<td>• Working at the AHA Centre core (500 hours);</td>
<td>• Community Mechanism Introduction Courses (CMI 4 days or TEC 6 days);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Technical and non technical skills core (350 hours)</td>
<td>• Operational Management course (OPM 8 days)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Study visit and development core (150 hours).</td>
<td>• Specialised four or six days trainings (SEC 4 days, IMC 4 days, ICC 4 days and AMC 6 days);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Accessibility</strong></td>
<td>De-facto restricted to ASEAN NDMOs officials</td>
<td>Map to EU participants, experts from other participating countries, and other organizations (Red Cross, UN, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Management</strong></td>
<td>Centralized by AHA Centre with training offered by different organizations.</td>
<td>Public call for tenders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Selection criteria</strong></td>
<td>Final decision by NDMOs, but AHA set criteria</td>
<td>Decision by national focal points, no common criteria for selection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• BA degree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• at least 3 years of relevant work experience</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• up to 40 years-old</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• good understanding of disaster emergency preparedness and response,</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• good understanding of the regional dimension of disaster management issues.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• General skills: English language, computer skills, work under</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.2.5.2 The Mechanism

The Leader

The ACE programme was developed in the shadow of the DELSA project. In fact, it was during the discussions surrounding the development of the ASEAN emergency logistic system that the need to develop ASEAN institutional capacity building was raised. The initial proposal advanced by the AHA Centre to create a specific training programme was a response to the critics advanced by some ASEAN member states’ representative during the implementation of the DELSA programme on the sustainability of the project across time and need to develop the internal expertise to manage the DELSA stockpile (Malaysian diplomat 2017). The overall idea was to form member states national experts on the regional system to respond to crisis, as well as to create an opportunity for them to connect. The actual form of this ‘training’ for national experts was discussed during formal and informal sessions. The consultation process focuses on the curriculum design, the programme name, duration and selection criteria for participants. The AHA Centre led the consultation, together with the ASEAN Secretariat. ASEAN member state’s positions were expressed both within the ACDM Preparedness and Response Working Group, as well as within the ACDM (AHA Centre Official 2017a). The consultation process also involved the Japan Mission to ASEAN, as well as the JAIF Management Team. Japan was
already very involved in supporting the DELSA project therefore the involvement of JAIF in the ACE Programme was ‘almost automatic’ (Japanese Diplomat 2017b), demonstrating how the involvement of Japan as partner was not based on any efficiency calculation (RCI), but the result of their involvement in previous projects (HI).

The Reference
The programme was initially proposed as a one year ‘Junior Attachment Programme’ (JAP). In the initial idea advanced by the AHA Centre, the JAP Programme was conceptualized as a one-year programme dedicated to two junior officers coming from the national agencies (NDMOs). The selected officers would have been seconded to the AHA Centre to learn more about the ASEAN mechanism to respond to disasters, as well as to support the daily work of the AHA Centre. Moreover, the pull of 20 junior officers would have learned more about the practices of the other ASEAN member states. This initial proposal was not far from the Junior Professional Officer (JPO) Programme offered by the UN. Similar to the UN JPO programme the ASEAN Programme was initially conceptualized as one-year period, sponsored by the respective governments. The final structure of the ACE Programme was finally approved on 29 July 2013 following the consultation phase and was quite different from the first proposal. First, the programme was not limited to junior staff, but also more senior personnel. Second, the duration was reduced to six months following the request advanced by member states. Releasing an officer for one full year would have had a too strong impact on the daily work of national NDMOs. Third, secondment to the AHA Centre period was integrated with actual trainings on
specific technical and soft skills. Leading entities different from the AHA Centre were identified as the most suited trainers for this part of the programme. The ACE Programme was officially launched in January 2014. A total of three rounds trainings have been carried on by the end of 2016 with a total of 39 officials trained. In 2015 a field visit component was added to the curriculum following participants’ requests. Officials participating to the ACE Programme have very different expertise. Not all ASEAN countries experience the same type of disasters, for example the knowledge of a Thai official about earthquakes is limited if compared to the one of an official coming from Myanmar. Field visits were considered a good way to provide participants with the same background knowledge about disasters sites and by meeting the official involved in that type of disasters. The 2015 group visited Aceh (Indonesia) to get a first sense of what was the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. In 2016 the visit was organised in Tacloban (Philippines), the most affected region after Typhoon Haiyan. Overall, although initially clearly inspired by the UN JPO Programme, the ACE Programme finally adopted its own structure based on NDMOs requests and shaped by feedbacks from participants.

*The Sponsor(s)*

The external support is a necessary element for the functioning of the ACE Programme. The ACE Programme is mainly funded by JAIF, as part of the Japan-ASEAN cooperation. Overall, the ACE Programme is part of the DELSA project. As explained in the leadership part, discussion about implementing a training system for the AHA Centre was advanced in the implementation phase of the DELSA project. Overall, more than 12 million dollars are allocated for the
DELSA project. ASEAN member states contribute by covering the salaries of their seconded officials and by providing specific trainings or field trips.

**The Implementer(s)**

The AHA Centre is centrally coordinating the ACE Programme. It provides specific trainings and it coordinates the entire curriculum. Yet, dialogue partners are essentials in supporting the implementation of its different components (see table below). Since 2014 several partners have contributed to the curriculum of the ACE Programme. The UN family contributed with trainings from UN OCHA on civil-military coordination, needs assessment conduction, International Humanitarian System and communication for disaster management professionals, as well as with trainings on logistics and supply chain management provided by the WFP. The US government also contributed offering trainings on exercise planning and incident command system. Countries such as Japan and New Zealand organise study trip to their disaster sites as well as to the departments dealing with disaster management in their respective countries. These study trip outside the ASEAN region, help participant in their understanding of how disaster management is conducted outside the ASEAN region (since 2015 they also have study visits inside the region). Some of the trainings have been added to the curriculum following the requests of participants. This is the case for the Project Management Training organised by RedR (AHA Centre 2016c, 20), or the English for Disaster Management Professionals organised by British Council (AHA Centre 2016c, 27). Some of the trainings organised by the AHA Centre or by a partner organisation saw interventions from other experts. This is the case of the Humanitarian Logistics
Training organised by the WFP, which saw the intervention of facilitators from Save the Children, Red Cross and The Kuehne Foundations. The EU never took part in the trainings, nor as a coordinator of one of the specific trainings, nor as one of the invited facilitators.

The ACE Programme is the last instrument developed within the ASEAN disaster management framework. Overall, for ASEAN AHA Centre it represents the move from being a capacity-building receiver to be a capacity-building provider. Although still relaying on external funding the ACE Programme was the ‘less externally influenced’ instrument. The framework is built by the AHA Centre in cooperation with national NDMOs, the external partners see the added value of cooperating. In the words of Antonio Massella, UNOCHA Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific: ‘The ACE Programme was a unique opportunity for OCHA to continue its ongoing relationship with the AHA Centre and also to get to know the future generation of ASEAN’s disaster management leaders here in the Southeast Asia region. The ACE Programme also helps OCHA’s Regional Office achieved two of its core strategic objectives, specifically strengthening relationship of the regional organisations, specifically ASEAN and secondly strengthening relationship and support to national disaster management agencies of Member States in the region.’ (AHA Centre 2016c, 34).
### Table 15. ACE: Overview of partnerships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partners</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government of Japan</td>
<td>4 days Study Trip to Japan</td>
<td>6 days Study Trip to Japan</td>
<td>6 days Study Trip to Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of New Zealand</td>
<td>5 days Study Trip to New Zealand</td>
<td>10 days Study Trip to Canterbury and Wellington, NZ</td>
<td>10 days Study Trip to Dunedin, Canterbury, Wellington and Auckland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hazard and Area Business Continuity management workshop</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Pacific Command</td>
<td></td>
<td>Exercise Planning Training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK Ministry of Defence via experts from the British Council Peacekeeping English Project</td>
<td></td>
<td>English for Disaster Management Professional</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Canterbury, NZ</td>
<td>Leadership in crisis and exercise management trainings</td>
<td></td>
<td>Leadership in crisis training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>Communication training for disaster management professionals</td>
<td>Coordinated Needs Assessment training</td>
<td>Coordinated Needs Assessment training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil-military coordination framework in disaster management</td>
<td>International Humanitarian System Communications and Disaster professional training</td>
<td>Humanitarian Civil-military coordination training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>International Humanitarian System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Training Courses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN World Food Programme (WFP)</td>
<td>Humanitarian Logistics and supply chain management training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Organisation for Migration (IOM)</td>
<td>Camp coordination and camp management and shelter workshop</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Forest Service of the US Department of Agriculture</td>
<td>Incident command system training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)</td>
<td>Humanitarian Induction Course during study trip in Semerang and Yogyakarta</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RedR</td>
<td>Project Management for Development Professional Training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London School Academy Indonesia</td>
<td>Communication training for disaster management professionals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cohn and Wolfe PR</td>
<td>Personality Development Workshop</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communication and Public Speaking</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Leader</strong></td>
<td><strong>Reference</strong></td>
<td><strong>Rationale behind influence</strong></td>
<td><strong>Modes of influence</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
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<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHA Centre</td>
<td>UN JPO Programme</td>
<td>The necessary following step after the creation of DELSA stockpile (HI)</td>
<td>Persuasion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference</td>
<td>UN JPO Programme</td>
<td>The reference is a well-known junior training system (HI) and is recognised as legitimate (SI)</td>
<td>Synthesis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sponsor</td>
<td>JAIF as part of Japan-ASEAN Cooperation</td>
<td>Follow up to DELSA project (HI)</td>
<td>No influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementer</td>
<td>AHA Centre in cooperation with partners</td>
<td>For the AHA Centre this is a way to present itself as a legitimate actor in the eyes of ASEAN member states (SI); For other partners this is a way to support AHA Centre legitimization in the region</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter conclusions

The final phase of the institutionalization of ASEAN disaster management, namely the setting up of the AHA Centre and its instruments, can be seen as a synthesis of lesson drawing and emulation, often emerging from socialization and persuasion practices mixed with the experiential learning of the AHA Centre staff. Often led by one of the ASEAN member states (being Indonesia, Malaysia or Singapore) or directly by AHA Centre staff, the different instruments were implemented thanks to the collaboration of strategic partners. Strategic partners played a fundamental role in the development of the AHA Centre, some directly funding the instrument, some others providing the expertise to implement it, some others inspiring at least the first set up of the instrument (see Annex 5). Different logics can explain the adoption of the different instruments, from a more institutional rational choice logics (RCI) evident in all the references made by the actor involved to reach more efficiency in the response, to a path-dependency logic in line with a more historical Institutionalist approach (as in the case of DELSA and ACE). Gaining more legitimacy is also a clear explanation in the adoption of several instruments.

Overall, summarizing the role played by ASEAN strategic partners, we can see that Japan was supporting the AHA Centre already in the early stages by providing the funding for the study on the establishment and operationalization of the AHA Centre and by sponsoring two positions within the interim AHA Centre (ICT and Senior Disaster Monitoring and Analysis). The Government of Japan was also instrumental in providing the funding to establish the ASEAN
Emergency Stockpile (DELSA), in supporting the ACE Programme and in the building up of the ICT technology to monitor disaster and share information among ASEAN Countries. Australia provided the first 1 million AUD used to fill the 2012-2013 financial gap to operationalize the AHA Centre. In the subsequent years the contribution in support of the operationalization of the AHA Centre was revised up to 4.6 million USD. In 2013 Australia also allocated 500,000 USD to support the ASEAN-ERAT teams deployed in the Philippines following the Typhoon Haiyan. Finally, from 2013 Australia funded the organization of several ASEAN-ERAT Induction and Refresher Course, as well as the development of the ERAT Guidelines. The U.S. Government funded and supported the establishment of the ASEAN Disaster Monitoring and Response System (DMRS), it provided the ICT equipment that the AHA Centre used in response to Cyclone Nargis and it seconded an advisor to work on the AHA Centre Work plan, as well as on the job description of AHA staff members. In the following years the US strongly supported the AHA Centre via capacity building activities. New Zealand provided two advisors to the AHA Centre mainly working on the development of the Strategic Plan and on the job profiles. Between 2013 and 2015 New Zealand funded the recruitment of a consortium of consultants to advise the AHA Centre on risk monitoring, maintenance of standard operating procedures and database management. Moreover, New Zealand also supported the ACE Programme by providing trainings on leadership and Advanced Crisis Management.

The European Union did not play a functional role in the establishment and operationalization of the AHA Centre. Differently from what is suggested by
some EU-ASEAN cooperation literature (Pennisi di Floristella 2015; Börzel and Risse 2009, 2012a) and by EU representatives, the activity promoted or sponsored by the EU never qualified the EU for one of the key roles identified in the analysis. In July 2012 representatives from the ACDM, the ASEAN Secretariat and the AHA Centre visited the EU facilities dealing with crisis management, in particular the ERCC and the EEAS Situation Room. The visit was the opportunity to discuss future projects, mainly (I) a visit of the EU representatives to the AHA Centre; (II) A technical workshop to be organised by Belgium in Jakarta to draft a plan of cooperation; (III) a set of potential capacity building activities such as in-house training to AHA Centre staff and NDMOs representatives, a senior executive programme to give the opportunity to head of ASEAN NDMOs to meet and discuss with head of EU national focal points, a comparative study to identify area for capacity building activities, and technical assistance in the areas indicated by the AHA Centre Work Plan. In May 2013 an EU delegation participated in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Disaster Relief Exercises (DiREx) held in Cha-Am (Thailand). In the words of Jean-Louis de Brouwer, ECHO Director of Operations: ‘Training in rapid deployment and good co-ordination between ASEAN member states and regional partners such as the EU is vital in creating effective disaster response which saves lives. These exercises provide an important platform for an exchange of technical knowledge and experiences’ (European Commission 2013). The EU delegation included members of the EEAS, as well as representatives of ECHO. The day before DiREx, Alicia Dela Rosa Bala, Deputy Secretary-General for ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) attended the inauguration of ECHO Emergency Response Center (EERC) in Brussels. In July 2013 the EU Instrument for
Stability launched the ASEAN-EU Emergency Management Programme. The 2.776,288 Euros project was coordinated by Eunida and started with a capacity-building workshop organised by Belgium. The aim of the project was to strengthen the ASEAN crisis response architecture, in particular the early warning and situation awareness capabilities of both the AHA Centre as well as a number of individual National Crisis Response Centres in the ASEAN region. Moreover, it aimed at facilitating links between the EU situation room, the Emergency Response Centre (MIC/EERC), the AHA Centre, the ASEAN Secretariat and other Emergency Operation Centres in ASEAN in order to strengthen capacities to foresee and rapidly react to emergency response situations. Finally, the project included a High-Level Conference on Managing Complex International Crisis held in Brussels in order to strengthen cooperation and networking between the EU and international early-warning actors. Despite these series of events and joint visits organised between the EU and the AHA Centre and ACDM representatives, this research shows how the EU was not a leader, nor a reference, a sponsor, or an implementer of any tools implemented by the AHA Centres.

The Eurocentric literature, as well as EU discourses, often considers the EU the main point of reference for ASEAN (See Chapter 1). Yet, this chapter demonstrates how the EU was not influential in providing not only a valid reference to the AHA Centre and its tools and how other actors played a much more relevant role, but also even the possibility to sponsor some initiative was missed. It first demonstrated how the instruments, once analysed in their details are different from the one implemented by the EU. In cases such as the DELSA
or the ACE Programme, the EU even implemented a completely opposite instrument. The chapter shows how ‘the reference’ was often chosen because it was familiar to the leader, the funder and/or the implementer. Strategic partners such as Japan, Australia, New Zealand and the US influenced the instruments by being involved in the institutionalization process of the AHA Centre, both as funder and/or implementer. This is the case of the DMRS monitoring system funded by the U.S. and based on DisasterAWARE a tool developed and used by the U.S. Pacific Disaster Centre in cooperation with the U.S. Undersecretary of Defence. In other cases, such as the establishment of the ERAT Teams or the ACE Programme, it was the leader that draws lessons from the UN because it is familiar with its tools. In the case of the ERAT Teams they were inspired by the UN Disaster and Coordination teams (UNDAC), in the case of the ACE Programme, it was initially conceptualized thinking about the UN JPO Programme. Indeed, the UN was not only an active partner since the beginning of the AHA Centre and an instrumental implementer for some of the Centre’ capacities such as DELSA warehouse, the ERAT trainings and the ACE Programme. The UN often provided the inspirational reference for the first conceptualization of the AHA Centre instrument, chosen by the leaders because it is more familiar with it. The familiarity is due to the previous experience of the actual individuals leading the process, either because of their previous experiences within the UN system or because they closely worked with some of the tools they then used as inspiration. This is the case of the first ERAT Team deployed in response to Cyclone Nargis for example, in which the ASEAN deployed members were almost exclusively also part of the UNDAC roster.
The chapter analysis mainly focused on the lessons drawing elements of the evolution of the AHA Centre and its tools. Yet, the evolution should not ignore the experiences faced by the AHA Centre and its staff that triggered the evolution of each instrument. The experiential learning of the AHA Centre and its components is linked to the catastrophic events that provided lessons to be learned. Disaster such as Cyclone Nargis (2008) or Typhoon Haiyan (2013) tested the AHA Centre’s first provisions and shaped them.

Overall, the evolution of the AHA Centre should not only be attributed to the partnerships. In particular, the leadership carried on by ASEAN member states or directly from the AHA Centre was often driven by direct experiences of its staff. Overall, the experiential learning, as the lessons learned followed up a direct experience in testing the implemented tools, played an equal role in the institutionalization of these instruments.
CONCLUSIONS

The exploration of the institutionalization of the ASEAN regional response to disasters and the relative role of the EU in influencing this process are the main aims of this doctoral research. The central research questions of this project “Who are the main actors in the process that have influenced the institutionalization of the ASEAN disaster response mechanism? Does the EU directly or indirectly influence this process?” have been answered in the three empirical chapters focused on the three phases of the institutionalization process of the ASEAN disaster management policy, by applying an original framework based on four analytical categories: the leader, the reference, the sponsor and the implementer. By opening the black box of the processes that led to the institutionalization of the ASEAN disaster management policy, this study explored the role of internal and external actors in directly and indirectly influencing a regional organization such as ASEAN, also analysing the role of the EU influencing this outcome. By doing so, this analysis contributes to enhance the empirical knowledge on EU–ASEAN cooperation in the field of disaster management, and it also contributes to the EU actorness debate and, in particular, to its inter-regional dimension.

The two main theoretical contributions: an analytical framework for the post-revisionist approach to inter-regionalism linking the EU actorness and influence debates.
This research showed not only that initiatives taken by the European Union (EU) can be compared to the ones of other actors, but also that this comparative analysis is useful as it gives new perspectives on the analysis of EU’s actions towards regional organisations. This research is an empirical demonstration that going beyond the understanding of the EU as an actor *sui generis* is not only possible, but it is necessary as it puts the EU’s action into perspective.

First, linked to the ongoing debate in the research community focused on inter-regional relations, this research is a contribution to the post-revisionist turn in inter-regional studies (Telò, Fawcett, and Ponjaert 2015). The recognition that Interregionalism is not a monopoly of the EU and the consequent need to analyse the actions of other actors and their influence in the institutionalization process, resulted in an original framework that emphasizes where the EU is failing in influencing the process. Even when, as suggested by post-revisionist scholars, the EU has the potential to be a point of reference, as in the disaster management policy, the analysis should focus on the different elements of the process and should not be limited to the outcome. The framework proposed by this thesis allows for a more clear understanding of what it means to be a point of reference and how this can be analysed in practice. The decision of focusing on the intervention of multiple actors in the institutionalization process has implied some methodological decisions, including the empirical focus on one single policy (disaster management in this case). The focus on the analysis of the actions advanced by multiple actors, made it necessary to focus on one single policy as this allowed for the necessary depth in the analysis of the process. Although the possibility of comparing EU’s actions to other actors’ actions in
different policies would offer more generalizable results, this proved to be very complex in one single piece of research. The results presented in this research would definitely benefit from similar analysis in other policy fields.

Second, this doctoral research links the debate on EU actorness with the one on influence. It defines actorness as the effective capacity of an actor of influencing regionalisation processes and, by doing so, it offers a definition that can be applied to several other empirical cases. It offers a potential solution to reconcile the two debates, the one on actorness and the one on influence, that so far have often taken parallel a path. After establishing the institutionalization of a new policy at the regional level as the main outcome to be explored, the thesis argued that actors are fundamental drivers of the institutionalization of regional policies and that their role in influencing these processes should be explored in a systematic way. In order to do so, the analysis is built around four analytical categories (the leaders, the reference, the sponsor, the implementer). The thesis provides a definition of each of this analytical category, and clarifies the objective of the influence, the institutional logics that explains the actor’s involvement and the different modes of influence applied by each category. The argument of this research is that different actors can perform these roles in different situations and this allows for a systematic analysis of the process that goes beyond the main characteristic of the actors. Being a nation state, a regional organisation, an ASEAN member state country, or a private institution does not prevent the actor to perform certain actions contributing to the institutionalization process. The contribution given by the different actors can be explored and explained and, most importantly, the EU becomes only one of the
potential actors’ influencing the process. Even if the focus of the thesis was on the actors’ influence on the institutionalization process, an analysis of the outcomes’ similarities and differences was also included. A clear overview of similarities and differences between norms and instruments proved to be a useful first step to argue the need to further explore the influence mechanisms on the process. This thesis used what are sometimes perceived as competing approaches (analysis of outcomes vs. processes) as two complementary aspects of the analysis.

Overall, the proposed framework is designed to be applied to other actors different from regional organizations, and does not need to include the EU among the potential actors. The discussion on influence and actorness can and should go beyond the EU and should be tested in other institutionalization processes, advancing not only the EU studies literature and IR, but also the Public Policy literature. The aim of the thesis was to find an analytical framework that allows for a systematic analysis of the processes, not limited to the comparison of the outcomes. The suggestion that beyond each process of influence there are four actors’ categories with different aims and instruments to pursue forms of influence makes the analysis of those processes more systematic and applicable to all sort of actors and processes.

Although the focus of this thesis is on the actors involved, crises, defined as a ‘perceived threat that must be urgently averted or addressed in order to avoid dire consequences’ (Boin, Ekengren, and Rhinard 2013), also proved to have an important impact on the institutionalization process. Indeed, the literature
considers crises as important drivers in these processes. Also in this thesis, considered that disaster management was the analysed policy, natural disasters played an important role. Yet, more than critical juncture that triggered institutional change (Pierson, 2004, 135) the empirical analysis showed how crises acted more as accelerator of already existing processes.

Finally, from a methodological point of view, process-tracing proved to be a valuable method, but with its own challenges. On one hand, the conceptualization that an outcome (institutionalization process) is the result of the interaction of a number of different actors that influence the process really inspired the conceptualization of a replicable analytical framework. On the other hand, by conducting the empirical analysis a lot of uncertainty was created by the idea of avoiding the ‘the story-telling trap’. Overall, the empirical analysis of a mechanism cannot avoid telling a story. The story of how different actors interact in certain moments, the instruments they used and the rational behind their involvement need a certain narrative. Therefore, even if evidence is a fundamental element of this analysis, they were necessarily presented as part of a story.

**The findings: the relative role of the EU in the institutionalization of the ASEAN disaster management policy**

The thesis’ research question is answered in the three empirical chapters. Each of them is dedicated to one of the steps of the institutionalization process: the launch of the first ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management (ARPDM), the signature of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and
Emergency Response (AADMER) and the operationalization of the AHA Centre as the main hub to coordinate the management of disaster in the ASEAN region.

The thesis showed the limitations of the EU’s action in influencing the ASEAN institutionalization process of disaster management, and it also offers a more specific description of this limitation, showing how the EU played sometimes the role of sponsor or implementer, but with limited influence on the overall process. This thesis shows that, differently from what some scholars present, the EU is far from being a model or reference for ASEAN in the field of disaster management.

First, even if both scholars and practitioners often identify the ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management (ARPDM) as the ASEAN version of the EU Civil Protection Action Programme adopted in 1997, directly inspired by the EU, the EU played a marginal role in the launch of the ARPDM in May 2004 by sponsoring the set of meetings and workshops that finally led to the adoption of the ARPDM programme. During the first phase of the institutionalization process, the EU de facto acted as the sponsor, but did not really exercise any direct or indirect influence in the process, nor provided an inspiration to the norm finally adopted by ASEAN. The analysis of the institutionalization process showed how the other three main actors were the ASEAN member states representatives grouped in the Expert Group on Disaster Management (AEGDM) and in the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) and supported by the ASEAN Secretariat (the leader(s)); the Yokohama strategy established in 1994 (United Nations 1994), as well as on the already existing experiences in the region, which inspired the content of the norm (the reference(s)); and the Asian
Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) which was key in connecting the different actor of the mechanism and in drafting the document (*the implementer*). The rationale behind the influence of these actors can be linked back to both sociological and historical rationales and the modes of influence were direct (socialization and persuasions) in the case of the leaders, whereas more indirect modes of influence were applied by the other three identified actors, showing how overall this phase of the process was more led by ASEAN member states and ASEAN Secretariat representatives, than by external actors.

Second, by analysing the mechanism that triggered the signature of the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) this research argues that the EU cannot be considered a point of reference for ASEAN in the adoption of this norm. Although the AADMER is often presented as the ASEAN version of the EU Community Mechanism implemented from 2001, the empirical analysis shows how the outcomes’ partial similarities can actually be linked back to globally recognised principles and are therefore not the result of a form of regional influence by the EU. Even more, the analysis demonstrated that the main actors performing the fundamental roles in the institutionalization process were different from the EU. The Hyogo framework and the Haze Agreement played a much prominent role in influencing the adoption of the AADMER Agreement, which was already planned by the ARPDM programme (*the references*). Overall, the AADMER Agreement was an ASEAN product, inspired by the Hyogo Framework and influenced by the lessons learned by ASEAN national officers in the aftermath of the Tsunami experience.
Third, beyond the missing influence of the key norms adopted by ASEAN in the field of disaster management, the EU did not play a functional role in the establishment and operationalization of the AHA Centre. The sixth chapter analysed the set-up of the AHA Centre, as well as how the collection, coordination and dissemination of information is conducted, it also analysed the ASEAN Emergency and Assessment Team (ERAT), the Disaster Emergency Logistic System (DELSA) and the AHA Centre Executive Programme (ACE), both in terms of final outcome, as well as in terms of adoption process, concluding that despite the existence of projects to strengthen the cooperation between the EU and ASEAN in the field of disaster management, these activities promoted or sponsored by the EU never qualified the EU for one of the key roles (leader, reference, sponsor or implementer) and this is because other external actors were much more effective in their cooperation, *de-facto* influencing the instruments implemented by the AHA Centre. The rationale behind their influence could be mainly linked back to their historical relation with the ASEAN region, a relation that the EU is still in the process of building, and in the social relation often existing between representatives of ASEAN and the analysed partners’ countries, meaning Japan, Australia, New Zealand and the US.

Overall, the thesis showed that as soon as the analysis moves beyond the EU and includes the actions of other local and external actors the influence of the EU on the process is very limited. The analysis of the regionalisation process that goes beyond the assessment of its outcome, and that analyses the role played by the
different actors’ types provided a benchmark for the (limited) EU actions. The potential direct and indirect influence of the actors involved proved to be an effective way to analyse actoriness in terms of actor types.

Even if the empirical findings and implications of the analysis might sound disappointing for certain EU officials, the thesis aims to stress that the disaster management policy remains an important area for potential further cooperation for the EU and ASEAN. With the ASEAN Declaration on ‘One ASEAN One Response’ published in September 2016 and the ASEAN vision of becoming ‘a global leader on disaster management by 2025’, it is key for the EU to find new ways to approach the cooperation with ASEAN in the field of disaster management. Beyond its contribution to the literature, this thesis speaks also to the policy-makers working on the EU-ASEAN cooperation, by opening the process beyond these ASEAN initiatives the thesis aims to be a real encouragement for EU policy-makers to start treating ASEAN as a more equal partner in the field of disaster management and beyond. It suggests a conceptual turn in the way the EU-ASEAN cooperation is conceptualised and conducted. If the EU aim is to be perceived as an influential actor in the ASEAN region, a preliminary reflection should be done in terms of ‘which type of actor does the EU aim to be in ASEAN?’. As this research suggests, this can be defined by clarifying the main rationale driving this desire, and by assessing the modes of influence that the EU can implement in the region. For example, does the EU have access to the forum where ASEAN leaders can be persuaded about the need of implementing certain norms or instruments? Or, do EU officers have enough contacts with the ASEAN officers to implement forms of socialization to EU
practices? Answering these questions is a necessary step to clearly assess if the EU has the means to effectively implement its aims in the region. In addition, beyond the self-reflection on what the EU aims to do-and can do-in the region, this thesis also suggests that any further initiative in the field of disaster management (and beyond) should also carefully take into consideration what are the ASEAN priorities in the analysed field, as well as what are other actors doing in the field. Overcoming the conceptualization of the EU as a sui generis actor also has very practical consequences, it means going beyond the vision of the EU as the unique actor in the region and have a more clear understanding of what are the on-going dynamics in the region before implementing any actions. Who are the other actors involved? What are their aims and means? How can the EU intervene in this scenario avoiding overlaps and repetition? These are all questions that EU practitioners should ask themselves before implementing any further action in the region.

**Avenues for further research**

This research generates a number of other questions to be explored. Although the framework proposed in this research aims for a certain degree of generalizability, the four analytical categories and their characteristics can be definitely applied to other institutionalization processes.

First, in 2016, the so-called regional order remains one of the core elements of the new EU Global Strategy. “[the EU] will promote and support cooperative regional orders worldwide, including in the most divided areas. Regional orders do not take a single form. Where possible and when in line with our interests, the
EU will support regional organisations. We will not strive to export our model, but rather seek reciprocal inspiration from different regional experiences.” (EUGS 2016, 32). Beyond the ASEAN case, similar regional processes are happening across the globe where the EU is involved, therefore it would be interesting to explore if the role of the EU changes according to the region interested. For example, does the role of the EU in influencing institutionalizations processes changes in regions where the cooperation with the EU is based on a much longer relationship (see in the African continent) or where the role is historically different from the one of ASEAN (see with Mercosur)? And if yes, in which capacity does the EU influence these processes, as leader, reference, sponsor or implementer? Furthermore, beyond the potential involvement in different regions, does the involvement of the EU change according to the policy explored? For example, other policies, such as economic cooperation, environment, agriculture, etc., might experience a different involvement of the EU compared disaster management policy, which is a relatively new policy for the EU. Both these questions would test the proposed framework further and would add other cases to the discussion.

Second, the question of the role of crises as trigger (Pierson 2004) or accelerator of processes still need further exploration, and it is another interesting aspect resulted from the empirical analysis that would be worth exploring further. Even if in this thesis crises acted more as accelerator of existing institutionalization processes, further analysis is required to assess the generalizability of this claim and to clarify if this result of the research is a case-specific conclusion or a more general claim that can be extended beyond this analysis.
Third, process-tracing proved to be a valuable research method as it allowed to explore the process beyond the outcome. Yet, it leaves the researcher with the feeling of always missing something: ‘is there something I have missed or some information I have overlooked?’, ‘are there other actors I could have potentially interviewed?’, or ‘did I properly understand the context of the event, in particular the one that happened long time ago?’. More discussions need to take place among researchers using this method to see what can be done to better define when facts become evidence, in particular when the focus is one narrow policy and the number of actors involved is relatively limited.

To conclude, although a growing literature explores regional initiatives to manage disasters from an internal point of view (Coppola 2006; Kirton 2013; Morsut 2014; Rum 2016), the exploration of the differences and similarities between these regional institutions, as well as the role that actors have in influencing the institutionalization process of regional disaster management initiatives was still missing. For example, looking at the EU, in the past fifteen years a quite advanced system to respond to both natural and man-made disasters has been developed. This has encouraged some scholars (Pennisi di Floristella 2015), as well as some practitioners to suggest that the EU could potentially be considered a role model for other regions interested in implementing a regional system to coordinate the management of crisis. Yet, a systematic analysis of the influence of the EU, as well as of the other relevant actors, on regions such as ASEAN, in the field of disaster management was still missing. This thesis
provides an empirical contribution to this knowledge, but it also provides an analytical framework that would be possibly applied to other similar cases.

The EU remains an important global actor and has the potentials to play a major role in the regional integration processes that are happening at the global level. Yet, the capacities of the EU to influence these processes and have a role in the growing inter-regional dimension of international relations will depend on the EU capacity to challenge its own strengths. EU scholars should focus more on the other actors that, similarly to the EU, play important roles in the analysed processes. The conceptualization of the EU as an actor that cannot be compared should not be used as a justification, and comparative analyses should be favoured as concrete ways to contribute to the advancement of the EU (inter-regional) actorness.
### Table 17. Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Sponsor</th>
<th>Implementer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN member states representatives via the ACDM Committee supported by ASEAN Secretariat</td>
<td>2005 UN Hyogo Framework of Action; ASEAN Transboundary haze Pollution Agreement</td>
<td>ASEAN member states</td>
<td>Negotiating Committee, including ACDM and legal representatives, and ASEAN Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective of influence</td>
<td>Regional framework on disaster management</td>
<td>Financial support to the Negotiating Committee</td>
<td>Drafting the AADMER Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rationale behind influence</td>
<td>In the first phase presented as the natural next step after the ARPDM programme (HI); After Tsunami presented as a more efficient, effective way to respond to disasters (RCI);</td>
<td>ASEAN member states aim was to show action to public opinion after Tsunami (RCI);</td>
<td>It was part of the path started by the ACDM (HI), but accelerated after the Tsunami (RCI);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modes of influence</td>
<td>• Persuasion</td>
<td>• Indirect: The Hyogo Framework is recognised as legitimate (OI); HAZE Agreement as a known and trusted example to take inspiration from (HI);</td>
<td>• Emulation of local experiences with elements of learning from the Tsunami’s response;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annexes

1. List of interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Date and Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AHA Centre Official 2017a</td>
<td>Jakarta, 10 February 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHA Centre Official 2017b</td>
<td>Skype, 12 October</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN Official 2017a</td>
<td>Jakarta, 13 February 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN Official 2017b</td>
<td>Jakarta, 14 February 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Diplomat 2017a</td>
<td>Jakarta, 16 February 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Diplomat 2017b</td>
<td>Jakarta, 16 February 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodian Diplomat 2017</td>
<td>Jakarta, 9 February 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEAS Official 2015</td>
<td>Brussels, 15 October 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEAS Official 2017a</td>
<td>Jakarta, 6 February 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEAS Official 2017b</td>
<td>Jakarta, 7 February 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Commission Official 2017a</td>
<td>Brussels, 10 July 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Commission Official 2017d</td>
<td>Brussels, 7 December 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Commission Official 2017e</td>
<td>Brussels, 14 December 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Commission Official 2015</td>
<td>Brussels, 30 September 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian Academic 2017a</td>
<td>Jakarta, 9 February 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian Academic 2017b</td>
<td>Jakarta, 9 February 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Diplomat 2017a</td>
<td>Jakarta, 15 February 2017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This research project considered the ethical implications for the involved participants, the wider community, and for the researcher. A continued assessment of the ethical consequences has been done during the research period, using the PAIS Research Ethics Guidelines, as well as the guiding principles of the University’s Research Code of Practice, the UK Economic and Social Research Council’s Research Ethics Framework and the Department’s guidelines for the ethical conduct of research. Although the investigated subject does not foresee any risk for the interviewees, does not include children or incompetent adults and does not collect personal data, the research has been conducted in an ethical way. First, researcher has always introduced herself as an independent researcher part of a programme sponsored by the EU Commission. Second, a summary of the research project has been distributed to the interviewees prior to the interview. Third, before starting the interview researcher has always briefly summarized the key elements of the research, and has given the details of Warwick and ULB institutions and supervisors.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diplomat</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Diplomat 2017b</td>
<td>Jakarta, 15 February 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singaporean Diplomat 2017</td>
<td>Jakarta, 13 February 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thai Diplomat 2017</td>
<td>Jakarta, 14 February 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysian Diplomat 2017</td>
<td>Jakarta, 14 February 2017</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management (ARPDM) (2004-2010)

Objectives

Component 1: Establishing the ASEAN Regional Disaster Management Framework

Promote cooperation and collaboration among Member Countries in all areas of disaster management including joint projects, collaborative research and networking.

Sub-components

- Establishing the ASEAN Response Action Plan (RAP)
- Enhancing Quick Response Capacities of Member Countries
- ASEAN Joint Simulation Exercises for Disaster Relief
- Technical Cooperation Projects
  - Earthquake Vulnerability Reduction
  - Flash Flood, Landslide, Sea/River Erosion Preparedness and Mitigation
  - Dissemination of Flood Early Warning
  - Safety of Children in Flood-Prone Areas
  - Typhoon and Cyclone Preparedness and Mitigation
  - Early Warning System for Land and Forest Fire Management and Haze Preparedness

Component 2: Capacity Building
Strengthen capacity building in areas of priority concern of Member Countries, and promote human resources development in disaster management in accordance with the needs of Member Countries.

Component 3: Sharing information and resources

Promote sharing of information, expertise, best practices, and resources.

Component 4: Promoting collaboration and strengthening partnerships

ASEAN Disaster Management Training Institutes Network
- Specialised Disaster Management Training
- Specialised Training in Risk, Damage and Needs Assessment
- Specialised Training in Collapsed Structure Search and Rescue
- Specialised Training in Forest Fire Fighting
- Refresher Courses/ Expertise Development
- Training on the Management of Disaster Stress and Behavior

ASEAN Disaster Information Sharing and Communication Network (ASEAN DISCNet)
- Development of ACDM Website and NDMO Websites
- Establishing Effective Communication Systems
- Publication of ADMIN Newsletter
- ASEAN Inventory of Disaster Management Experts (Brain Bank) and Resources
- ASEAN Hazard and Vulnerability Mapping Project

Research and Development and Dissemination of Good Practices

Improved Use of Climate and Weather Forecasting
Promote partnerships among various stakeholders (GOs, NGOs, and community based international organizations)

Supporting Community-Based Management Programmes
Partnerships with Relevant Organizations and NGOs
Mobilising Financial Support and Resources

**Component 5: Public Education, Awareness and Advocacy**

Promote advocacy, public education and awareness programme related to disaster management

ASEAN Day for Disaster Management
Integration of Disaster Management in School Curricula
Enhancing Disaster Management Public Education and Awareness Programmes
Mainstreaming Disaster Management into Development Plans of ASEAN Member Countries

Source: Asia-Pacific Disaster Report 2010
### 3. AHA Centre Emergency Responses 2011-2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>When?</th>
<th>What?</th>
<th>Where?</th>
<th>How? (level of…)</th>
<th>ASEAN Response</th>
<th>ASEAN Provided</th>
<th>Member States Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 2012</td>
<td>Thabaitkkyin Earthquake</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Deployed coordination support team</td>
<td>250 Multi Purpose Tents</td>
<td>70 Rolls of Trapaulins</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2012</td>
<td>Typhoon Bopha</td>
<td>Mindanao, Philippines see if index of disaster</td>
<td>Deployed emergency response and ERAT team</td>
<td>250 Multi Purpose Tents 600 Family Kit 5000 Rolls of Trapaulins USD 1000 worth of rice Meal for 200 volunteers 3 Mobile storage Unit 45 KVA generators 10 wheeler trucks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Aid Provided</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
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<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2013</td>
<td>Jakarta Flood</td>
<td>Jakarta, Indonesia</td>
<td>Portable toilets, Drinking water, Trash bags, Sanitary wipes for 3000 evacuees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2013</td>
<td>Bener Meriah &amp; Aceh Earthquake</td>
<td>Aceh, Indonesia</td>
<td>Deployed Response team 250 Family Tents 500 Shelter Toolkits Malaysia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2013</td>
<td>Tropical Storm Maring</td>
<td>Manila, Philippines</td>
<td>Deployed Response team 9 Rescue Boat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2013</td>
<td>Flood in Central &amp; Northern Lao</td>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>Deployed Response team 200 Family Kit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2013</td>
<td>Bohol Earthquake</td>
<td>Bohol, Philippines</td>
<td>Deployed Response team 250 Family Tents 250 Family Kit Malaysia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2013</td>
<td>Typhoon Haiyan</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Deployed response team and ERAT All 10 ASEAN member states</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2014</td>
<td>Typhoon Rammamasun</td>
<td>Bohol, Philippines</td>
<td>Deployed Response team 500 Rolls of Tarpaulines 2 Generators</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2014</td>
<td>Typhoon Rammamasun</td>
<td>Northern Region, Viet Nam</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Month</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Deployment Details</td>
<td>Supplies Provided</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2014</td>
<td>Typhoon Hagupit</td>
<td>Bohol, Philippines</td>
<td>Deployed emergency response and ERAT team</td>
<td>650 Rolls of Tarpaulines 5000 Shelter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December-January 2014</td>
<td>Malaysia Floods</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Deployed 3 ASEAN-ERAT members</td>
<td>538 Family Tents 538 Family Kits 498 Shelter Toolkits 1000 Rolls of Tarpaulins 1500 Kitchen sets Singapore &amp; Thailand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July-August 2015</td>
<td>Myanmar Floods</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Deployed in-country coordination Team (ICCT): 2 AHA Centre + 7 ASEAN ERAT members</td>
<td>2000 Tarpaulins 2000 Collapsible jerry cans 2000 mosquito nets 4 Aluminium Boats with engine 3 Mobile storage unit 2000 Family Kits 2000 Kitchen kits Cambodia &amp; Thailand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2015</td>
<td>Typhoon Koppu</td>
<td>Casiguran, Philippines</td>
<td>Deployed 3 AHA Centre + In-country ASEAN ERAT members</td>
<td>1000 Rolls of Tarpaulins</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2016</td>
<td>Typhoon</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Deployed in-country coordination Team (ICCT): 2 AHA Centre + 2 ASEAN ERAT members from the Philippines</td>
<td>8 Units of generator set 20-25 KVA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AHA Centre Progress Reports 2012-2016
### 4. ACE Alumni (2014-2015-2016)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2014</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maes Rasmey (m)</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hari Susanto (m)</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayu Setiadvie (f)</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vilaykam Lathsath (f)</td>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ka Saysana (m)</td>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shalihin Annuar (m)</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurul Fatien Rusly (f)</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Win Ohnmar (f)</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aye Kyi Mann (f)</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wariga Reiwlaung (f)</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kedsirin Panichayacheewa (f)</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Ngoc Diep (m)</td>
<td>Viet Nam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nguyen Van Hoang (m)</td>
<td>Viet Nam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2015</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mao Saohorn (m)</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ly Chandra (m)</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theophilus Yanuarto (m)</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merina Sofiati (f)</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sombath Douangsavanh (m)</td>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bouasavanh Vongbounieua (m)</td>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amir Shah Noor Ahmad (m)</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad Fauzie Ismail (m)</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khan Lynn (m)</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min Soe Han (m)</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marc Remembrant Victore (m)</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riezel Joy Chatto (f)</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wirinda Sirisuwan (f)</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Pisuth Wannachatrasiri (m) Thailand
Vu Hoang (m) Viet Nam
Duong Duc My (m) Viet Nam

2016
Chun Buntha (m) Cambodia
Lorn Trob (m) Cambodia
Wahyu Indriyadi (m) Indonesia
Luqmanul Hakim (m) Indonesia
Sacksy Vilayhak (m) Lao PDR
Vimala Khountalangsy (f) Lao PDR
Fazlisyah Bin Muslim (m) Malaysia
Rohaizat Bin Hadli (m) Malaysia
Thein Zaw Htike (m) Myanmar
Zaw Myo Khine (m) Myanmar
Mary Grace Somido (f) Philippines
Mark July Yap (m) Philippines
Phatsita Rern gnirunsathit (f) Thailand
Suttapak Suksabal (f) Thailand
Nguyen Duc Thang (m) Viet Nam
Nguyen Vinh Long (m) Viet Nam

Source: AHA Centre ACE Reports 2014-2016
5. AHA Centre overview of partners support 2011-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Up to 2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Establishment of an Integrated Information and Communication Technology System to strengthen the Operation of the AHA Centre (ICT Project Phase I) USD 1.627.634</td>
<td>Second Phase on the Establishment of an Integrated Information and Communication Technology System to strengthen the Operation of the AHA Centre (ICT Project Phase II) USD 4.92 million</td>
<td>Launch of the 5 years ICT Blueprint strategy for the hiring of an ICT advisory firm to develop a sustainable ICT system. USD 137.392</td>
<td>Feasibility Study for the Establishment of Satellite Disaster Emergency Logistic in ASEAN member States USD 380.431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establishment of a Disaster Emergency Logistic System for ASEAN (DELSA) USD 12.265.967</td>
<td>Via the support for the ASEAN Logistic System (DELSA), Japan also supported the ACE Programme</td>
<td>Continuation of the support of DELSA.</td>
<td>Continuation of previous projects: DELSAICT Phase II and 5 years ICT Blue Print.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Conclusion of the first ACE Programme (January-June 2014)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Series of training on WebEOC established under the ICT Project Phase II.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>In-kind support to AHA Centre’s initial financial and operational needs for the period 2012-2013 AUD 1million</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Additional contribution to cover the AHA Centre’s financial and operational needs up to 2014 AUD 400,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support to the emergency operations in the Philippines after Typhoon Haiyan USD 50,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Funding support for the ASEAN-ERAT Induction Course and Refresher Course</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In-kind support to operationalization of the AHA Centre for the period January-June 2015 USD 419,584</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Funding support for the development of the lessons learned from Typhoon Haiyan and the provision of the advisory service of Ernst and Young Consulting on financial functions.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support of the 4th ASEAN-ERAT Induction course and the development of ERAT Guidelines.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Signature of the Amendment 6 of the Cooperation Agreement for the provision of additional 714,841 USD for the period July 2015-Deceber 2016</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Definition</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Two Advisor to support the drafting of the Strategic Workplan and AHA Centre job descriptions</td>
<td>Two years funding to recruit a consortium of consultants (Humanitarian Advisory Group) to advise the AHA Centre on risk monitoring, maintenance of standard operating procedures and database management (2013-15) 600,000 NZD</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Support for an intensive leadership in crisis training for ACE Programme and AHA Centre staff provided by Canterbury’s Centre for Risk, Resilience and Renewal (UCR3)</td>
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<td>Continuation of previously launched projects.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Donation of basic ICT equipment previously used by ERAT in response to Cyclone Nargis;</td>
<td>Capacity building programme provided by the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civil Aid (OHDACA) based on the proposal written by Harvard University.</td>
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<td>One advisor through USTATF and technical assistance from the US Forest Service.</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>Visit to Brussels based EU facilities dealing with crisis management (ERCC and EEAS Situation Room) in July 2012 organised for representatives from the ACDM, the ASEAN Secretariat and the AHA Centre.</td>
<td>Launch of the ASEAN-EU Emergency management Programme (July 2013-December 2015) by the Instrument for Stability EUR 2.776.288 Capacity-building workshop organised by Belgium.</td>
<td>ASEAN-EU Emergency management Programme in the 2015 report copy and past of previous year.</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>World Food Programme: Signature of the Memorandum of Understanding to manage the UNHRD warehouse in Subang (Malaysia)</td>
<td>UNOCHA: Joint workshop to develop mutual understanding in March 2013</td>
<td>Set of training provided by UN family (OCHA, SPIDERWFP) in the framework of ACE Programme and ERAT Trainings.</td>
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<td>China</td>
<td></td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding and commitment for 8 million US in grant assistance.</td>
<td>Support in the establishment of a second disaster relief warehouse in Cambodia.</td>
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</table>

Source: AHA Centre Progress Reports 2012-2015


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