Zissimos, Ben and Wooders, Myrna Holtz (2005) Relaxing tax competition through public good differentiation. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.737).

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Abstract

This paper argues that, because governments are able to relax tax competition through public good differentiation, traditionally high-tax countries have continued to set taxes at a relatively high rate even as markets have become more integrated. The key assumption is that firms vary in the extent to which public good provision reduces costs. We show that Leviathan governments are able to use this fact to relax the forces of tax competition, reducing efficiency. When firms can ‘vote with their feet’ tax competition leads firms to locate in ‘too many’ jurisdictions. A ‘minimum tax’ further relaxes tax competition, further reducing efficiency.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Noncooperative games (Mathematics), Taxation -- Econometric models, Equilibrium (Economics), Information asymmetry, Dependency
Series Name:	Warwick economic research papers
Publisher:	University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Official Date:	October 2005
Dates:	Date Event October 2005 Published
Number:	No.737
Number of Pages:	45
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access

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