UNSPECIFIED (1999) Implementing tax coordination. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 72 (2). pp. 243-268. ISSN 0047-2727

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

This paper investigates whether tax competition can survive under tax coordination, when information is private or nonverifiable. We focus on a two-jurisdiction model where capital can move across borders, and where jurisdictions have different public good requirements, but are otherwise identical. In this setting, coordination may call for a second-best allocation supported by differentiated tax rates. If,however, coordination must be achieved via a set of common rules that condition tax rates on jurisdictions' choices, the second-best allocation may not be implementable. We show that incentive compatibility requirements will generally affect not only the choice of coordinated rates in states where jurisdictions are different, but also the choice of harmonized rates in states where jurisdictions have identical preferences for public consumption. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Journal or Publication Title:	JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
Publisher:	ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
ISSN:	0047-2727
Date:	May 1999
Volume:	72
Number:	2
Number of Pages:	26
Page Range:	pp. 243-268
Publication Status:	Published
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/14591

Data sourced from Thomson Reuters' Web of Knowledge

Request changes to a record

Actions (login required)

View Item