Nouweland, Anne van den and Wooders, Myrna Holtz (2005) Status equilibrium in local public good economies. Working Paper. University of Warwick, Department of Economics, Coventry.

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Abstract

We define a concept of status equilibrium for local public good economies. A status equilibrium specifies one status index for each agent in an economy. These indices determine agents' cost shares in any possible jurisdiction. We provide an axiomatic characterization of status equilibrium using consistency properties.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HM Sociology
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Public goods, Welfare economics, Equilibrium (Economics), Social status -- Mathematical models
Series Name:	Warwick economic research papers
Publisher:	University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Date:	19 September 2005
Number:	No.733
Number of Pages:	21
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
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URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/1462

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