UNSPECIFIED (1999) Inter-regional insurance. In: Mini-Workshop on International Taxation, MAR 14-16, 1996, COPENHAGEN, DENMARK.Full text not available from this repository.
This paper considers the problem facing a central government which can insure regional governments (by use of intergovernmental grants) against region-specific and privately observed shocks either to income, or demand for, or cost of, the public good. Notable results are: (i) depending on the source of the shock, the grant may induce over- or undersupply of the public good relative to the Samuelson rule; (ii) with public good spillovers between regions, there is two-way distortion of public good supply - that is, qualitatively different distortions (relative to the Samuelson rule) for different values of the shock; (iii) the solution to the central government's problem may depend qualitatively on whether regional taxation is lump-sum or distortionary. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
|Item Type:||Conference Item (UNSPECIFIED)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions|
|Journal or Publication Title:||JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS|
|Publisher:||ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA|
|Number of Pages:||37|
|Page Range:||pp. 1-37|
|Title of Event:||Mini-Workshop on International Taxation|
|Location of Event:||COPENHAGEN, DENMARK|
|Date(s) of Event:||MAR 14-16, 1996|
Actions (login required)