The Library
Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes
Tools
Tools
Tools
Dutta, Bhaskar, Peters, Hans, Dr. and Sen, Arunava (2005) Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. (Warwick economic research papers.
![[img]](http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png)
|
PDF
WRAP_Dutta_twerp722.pdf - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader Download (260Kb) |
Official URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/resear...
| Item Type: | Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper) |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | Q Science > QA Mathematics |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics |
| Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | Decision making -- Mathematical models, Probabilities, Utility theory -- Mathematical models |
| Series Name: | Warwick economic research papers |
| Publisher: | University of Warwick, Department of Economics |
| Place of Publication: | Coventry |
| Date: | January 2005 |
| Number: | No.722 |
| Number of Pages: | 20 |
| Status: | Not Peer Reviewed |
| Access rights to Published version: | Open Access |
| Version or Related Resource: | Dutta, B., Peters, H. and Sen, A. (2008). Erratum : Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes. Social Choice and Welfare, 30(4), pp. 701-702. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/30352. ; Dutta B, Peters H, Sen A (2007) Stategy-proof cardinal decision schemes. Soc Choice Welfare 28: 163–197. DOI 10.1007/s00355-006-0152-9. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/32516. |
| Related URLs: | |
| References: | 1. S. Barbera, Nice decision schemes, in “Decision Theory and Social Ethics: Issues in Social Choice”, (H.W. Gottinger and W.Leinfellner, Eds.), D.Reidel. Dordrecht, 1978. 2. S. Barbera, Majority and positional voting in a probabilistic framework, Review of Economic Studies, 46 (1979), 379–389. 3. J. Duggan, A Geometric proof of Gibbard’s random dictatorship result, Economic Theory, 7(1996), 365–369. 4. B. Dutta, H.Peters, and A.Sen, Strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms in economies with pure public goods, Journal of Economic Theory, 106 (2002), 392–416. 5. L. Ehlers, H.Peters, and T.Storken, Probabilistic collective decision schemes, Journal of Economic Theory, 105, 408–434. 6. A. Gibbard, Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result, Econometrica 41 (1973), 587–601. 7. A. Gibbard, Manipulation of schemes that mix voting with chance, Econometrica 45 (1977), 665–681. 8. A. Gibbard, Straightforwardness of game forms with lotteries as outcomes, Econometrica 46 (1978), 595–614. 9. A. Hylland, Strategy-proofness of voting procedures with lotteries as outcomes and infinite sets of strategies, unpublished, 1980. 10. S. Nandeibam, An alternative proof of Gibbard’s random dictatorship result, Social Choice and Welfare (1998), 509–519. 11. S.Nandeibam, The structure of decision-schemes with von Neumann -Morgenstern preferences, unpublished, 2004. 12. Quirk, J.P., and R.Saposnik, Admissibility and Measurable Utility Functions, Review of Economic Studies, 29, (1962), 140–146. 13. M. Satterthwaite, Strategy-proofness and Arrow’s conditions: Existence and correspondence theorem for voting procedures and social choice functions, Journal of Economic Theory 10(1975), 187–217. |
| URI: | http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/1469 |
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
