UNSPECIFIED (1999) IMF conditionality as a screening device. In: Annual Conference of the Royal-Economic-Society, 1998, UNIV WARWICK, COVENTRY, ENGLAND.

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Abstract

A theoretical model is developed in which both buybacks and the adoption of an IMF programme can be used as screening devices which enable a creditor to discriminate between debtor countries which are willing to use debt relief in order to invest and repay and countries which are not. Asymmetric information is assumed. This problem can be solved if the country has sufficient resources to engage in a debt buyback and so gain the debt relief. When the country is credit constrained, an alternative screening mechanism is to undertake an IMF programme in return for debt reduction and possibly an IMF loan.

Item Type:	Conference Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Journal or Publication Title:	ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Publisher:	BLACKWELL PUBL LTD
ISSN:	0013-0133
Date:	March 1999
Volume:	109
Number:	454
Number of Pages:	15
Page Range:	C111-C125
Publication Status:	Published
Title of Event:	Annual Conference of the Royal-Economic-Society
Location of Event:	UNIV WARWICK, COVENTRY, ENGLAND
Date(s) of Event:	1998
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/14700

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