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Voting power and voting blocs

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Leech, Dennis and Leech, Robert, Dr. (2004) Voting power and voting blocs. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.716).

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Abstract

We investigate the applicability of voting power indices, in particular the Penrose index (aka absolute Banzhaf index), in the analysis of voting blocs by means of a hypothetical voting body. We use the power of individual bloc members to study the implications of the formation of blocs and how voting power varies as bloc size varies. This technique of analysis has many real world applications to legislatures and international bodies. It can be generalised in many ways: the analysis is a priori (assuming formal voting and ignoring actual voting behaviour) but can be made empirical with voting data; it examines the consequences of two blocs but can easily be extended to more.

Item Type:

Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)

Subjects:

H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory

Divisions:

Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics

Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):

Voting research, Social choice, Power (Social sciences), Group decision making

Series Name:

Warwick economic research papers

Publisher:

University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Place of Publication:

Coventry

Official Date:

July 2004

Dates:

Date	Event
July 2004	Published

Number:

No.716

Number of Pages:

Institution:

University of Warwick

Status:

Not Peer Reviewed

Access rights to Published version:

Open Access

References:

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