Blackorby, Charles, 1937- and Bossert, Walter (2004) Interpersonal comparisons of well-being. Working Paper. University of Warwick, Department of Economics, Coventry.

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Abstract

This paper, which is to be published as a chapter in the Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, provides an introduction to social-choice theory with interpersonal comparisons of well-being. We argue that the most promising route of escape from the negative conclusion of Arrow's theorem is to use a richer informational environment than ordinal measurability and the absence of interpersonal comparability of well-being. We discuss welfarist social evaluation (which requires that the levels of individual well-being in two alternatives are the only determinants of their social ranking) and present characterizations of some important social-evaluation orderings.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Social choice, Utility theory, Welfare economics, Well-being, Social indicators
Series Name:	Warwick economic research papers
Publisher:	University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Date:	April 2004
Number:	No.711
Number of Pages:	18
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
Funder:	Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC)
Adapted As:	Blackorby, C. and Bossert, W. (2006). Interpersonal comparisons of well-being. In: Weingast, B.R. and Wittman, D.A. (eds). The Oxford handbook of political economy. Oxford : Oxford University Press, ch.22.
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URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/1478

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