Anonymous single-profile welfarism
Blackorby, Charles, Bossert, Walter and Donaldson, David (2004) Anonymous single-profile welfarism. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. Warwick economic research papers (No.707).
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This note reexamines the single-profile approach to social-choice theory. If an alternative is interpreted as a social state of affairs or a history of the world, it can be argued that a multi-profile approach is inappropriate because the information profile is determined by the set of alternatives. However, single-profile approaches are criticized because of the limitations they impose on the possibility of formulating properties such as anonymity. We suggest an alternative de.nition of anonymity that applies in a single-profile setting and characterize anonymous single-profile welfarism under a richness assumption.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Welfare economics, Utility theory, Social choice, Social policy, Economic policy|
|Series Name:||Warwick economic research papers|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick, Department of Economics|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Official Date:||March 2004|
|Number of Pages:||11|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
|Funder:||Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC)|
Arrow, K., 1951 (second ed. 1963), Social Choice and Individual Values, Wiley, New York.
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