Anonymous single-profile welfarism
Blackorby, Charles, 1937-, Bossert, Walter and Donaldson, David, 1938- (2004) Anonymous single-profile welfarism. Working Paper. Coventry: University of Warwick, Department of Economics. (Warwick economic research papers).
WRAP_Blackorby_twerp707.pdf - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader
Official URL: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/resear...
This note reexamines the single-profile approach to social-choice theory. If an alternative is interpreted as a social state of affairs or a history of the world, it can be argued that a multi-profile approach is inappropriate because the information profile is determined by the set of alternatives. However, single-profile approaches are criticized because of the limitations they impose on the possibility of formulating properties such as anonymity. We suggest an alternative de.nition of anonymity that applies in a single-profile setting and characterize anonymous single-profile welfarism under a richness assumption.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Welfare economics, Utility theory, Social choice, Social policy, Economic policy|
|Series Name:||Warwick economic research papers|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick, Department of Economics|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Number of Pages:||11|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
|Funder:||Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC)|
|References:||Arrow, K., 1951 (second ed. 1963), Social Choice and Individual Values, Wiley, New York. Blackorby, C., W. Bossert and D. Donaldson, 2002, Utilitarianism and the theory of justice, in Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 1, K. Arrow, A. Sen and K. Suzumura, eds., Elsevier, Amsterdam, 543–596. Blackorby, C., W. Bossert and D. Donaldson, 2004, Multi-profile welfarism: a generalization, Social Choice and Welfare, forthcoming. Blackorby, C., D. Donaldson and J. Weymark, 1990, A welfarist proof of Arrow’s theorem, Recherches Economiques de Louvain 56, 259–286. Bossert, W. and J. Weymark, 2004, Utility in social choice, in Handbook of Utility Theory, Vol. 2: Extensions, S. Barber`a, P. Hammond and C. Seidl, eds., Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1099–1177. d’Aspremont, C. and L. Gevers, 1977, Equity and the informational basis of collective choice, Review of Economic Studies 44, 199–209. Goodin, R., 1991, Utility and the good, in A Companion to Ethics, P. Singer, ed., Blackwell, Oxford, 241–248. Griffin, J., 1986, Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement, and Moral Importance, Clarendon, Oxford. Guha, A., 1972, Neutrality, monotonicity, and the right of veto, Econometrica 40, 821–826. Hammond, P., 1979, Equity in two person situations: some consequences, Econometrica 47, 1127–1135. Kelsey, D., 1987, The role of information in social welfare judgements, Oxford Economic Papers 39, 301–317. Mongin, P., 1994, Harsanyi’s aggregation theorem: multi-profile version and unsettled questions, Social Choice and Welfare 11, 331–354. Sen, A., 1977, On weights and measures: informational constraints in social welfare analysis, Econometrica 45, 1539–1572. Sen, A., 1979, Personal utilities and public judgements: or what’s wrong with welfare economics?, Economic Journal 89, 537–558. Weymark, J., 1998, Welfarism on economic domains, Mathematical Social Sciences 36, 251–268.|
Actions (login required)