Free-riding, carbon treaties, and trade wars: the role of domestic environmental policies
UNSPECIFIED. (1999) Free-riding, carbon treaties, and trade wars: the role of domestic environmental policies. JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, 58 (2). pp. 463-483. ISSN 0304-3878Full text not available from this repository.
This paper uses a calibrated general-equilibrium model of North-South trade with carbon emissions to explore the strategic, open-economy implications of price- and quantity-based instruments for CO2 emission reduction. We compute non-cooperative environmental and trade policy equilibria and Nash bargaining outcomes in environmental policies with side payments of cash. Results show that quotas can lead to higher internalization levels in a non-cooperative zero-tariff equilibrium in comparison with emission fees. If tariffs are also chosen non-cooperatively, the form of policy instrument used affects equilibrium tariffs, with quotas leading to lower trade barriers, particularly under a regional carbon treaty. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: Q3; Q4; F1.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions|
|Journal or Publication Title:||JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS|
|Publisher:||ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV|
|Official Date:||April 1999|
|Number of Pages:||21|
|Page Range:||pp. 463-483|
Actions (login required)