Lordan, Thomas (2018) Kant and the concept of cognitive finitude. PhD thesis, University of Warwick.

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Abstract

The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the concept of cognitive finitude, insofar as it is articulated in the opening chapters of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. The analysis of this concept involves an in-depth study of the limits of each element of human cognition, chraracterised by Kant as sensibility (the faculty of intuitions) and the understanding (the faculty of concepts). The limits which pertain to the former are formulated in the first part of the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements, the Transcendental Aesthetic. The limits which pertain to the latter are formulated in the major sections of the subsequent Transcendental Analytic, referred to as the Metaphysical Deduction and the Transcendental Deduction. Special care is paid to the Metaphysical Deduction, insofar as it is there that Kant argues for the necessity of conceiving of the pure concepts of the understanding as they are listed. Due to the extent Kant revised portions of his text in the B-Edition (published six years after the original), a substantial degree of comparative work is necessary, to properly explicate the nuances of Kant’s complex theory. Once the bulk of the exegetical labour is done and a concept of cognitive finitude is at hand, we will update our investigation with reference to a contemporary debate taking place amongst the Kantian community. This debate revolves around the terms ‘conceptualism’ and ‘nonconceptualism’. Though the ‘first-wave’ nonconceptualist argument concerning the status of a para-conceptual synthesis seems to have been disproved, a newer argument has been employed to insist upon the necessity for a nonconceptual, sensible unity. This argument trades in the currency of infinity, insofar as Kant seems to suggest that we are ‘given’ infinite spatio-temporal magnitudes. We reject this argument, and thereby re-affirm the relevance of cognitive finitude in Kant’s Critique.

Item Type:	Thesis or Dissertation (PhD)
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Cognition, Reason, Sensitivity (Personality trait), Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804
Official Date:	October 2018
Dates:	Date Event October 2018 Submitted
Institution:	University of Warwick
Theses Department:	Department of Philosophy
Thesis Type:	PhD
Publication Status:	Unpublished
Extent:	v, 79 leaves
Language:	eng

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