On purification of equilibrium in Bayesian games and ex-post Nash equilibrium
Cartwright, Edward and Wooders, Myrna Holtz (2004) On purification of equilibrium in Bayesian games and ex-post Nash equilibrium. Working Paper. University of Warwick, Department of Economics, Coventry.
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We demonstrate that if any realization for a Bayesian game is, with high profitability, an approximate Nash equilibrium of the induced game of complete information, then there is a purification of that strategy that is an approximate equilibrium of the original Bayesian game. We also provide two examples demonstrating, amongst other things, that the bound we obtain on the distance of the purification from satisfying the requirements for an exact equilibrium is tight.
|Item Type:||Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)|
|Subjects:||Q Science > QA Mathematics|
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Equilibrium (Economics), Bayesian statistical decision theory, Noncooperative games (Mathematics), Games of strategy (Mathematics), Game theory|
|Series Name:||Warwick economic research papers|
|Publisher:||University of Warwick, Department of Economics|
|Place of Publication:||Coventry|
|Date:||19 February 2004|
|Number of Pages:||10|
|Status:||Not Peer Reviewed|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
|Description:||First version, December 1, 2003; this version February 19, 2004|
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