Cartwright, Edward and Wooders, Myrna Holtz (2004) On purification of equilibrium in Bayesian games and ex-post Nash equilibrium. Working Paper. University of Warwick, Department of Economics, Coventry.

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Abstract

We demonstrate that if any realization for a Bayesian game is, with high profitability, an approximate Nash equilibrium of the induced game of complete information, then there is a purification of that strategy that is an approximate equilibrium of the original Bayesian game. We also provide two examples demonstrating, amongst other things, that the bound we obtain on the distance of the purification from satisfying the requirements for an exact equilibrium is tight.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects:	Q Science > QA Mathematics
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Equilibrium (Economics), Bayesian statistical decision theory, Noncooperative games (Mathematics), Games of strategy (Mathematics), Game theory
Series Name:	Warwick economic research papers
Publisher:	University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Date:	19 February 2004
Number:	No.701
Number of Pages:	10
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
Description:	First version, December 1, 2003; this version February 19, 2004
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/1487

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